[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 239 (Tuesday, December 16, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58352-58355]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-22855]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-104359; File No. SR-OCC-2025-018]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation;
Notice of Filing of Partial Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Partial
Amendment No. 1, by The Options Clearing Corporation Concerning
Methodology To Allocate Clearing Fund Deposit Requirements Among Its
Clearing Members To Better Align the Allocation With the Sizing of the
Clearing Fund so Stress Based Risk Is Fairly Allotted to Market
Participants That Expose OCC to Such Stress Risk
December 11, 2025.
I. Introduction
On September 26, 2025, the Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC'')
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the
proposed rule change SR-OCC-2025-018, pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act'') \1\ and Rule
19b-4 \2\ thereunder, to amend its allocation methodology for the
Clearing Fund deposit requirements of its Clearing Members by
realigning the allocation to correspond to the sizing of the Clearing
Fund so that certain stress-based risk is proportionally allotted to
market participants that expose OCC to such risk.\3\ The proposed rule
change was published for public comment in the Federal Register on
October 1, 2025.\4\ On October 7, 2025, OCC amended SR-OCC-2025-018 to
append an Exhibit 2 to documents filed as part of File No. SR-OCC-2025-
018 on September 26, 2025 (hereinafter, together, defined as ``Proposed
Rule Change'').\5\ On November 3, 2025, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of
the Exchange Act,\6\ the Commission designated a longer period within
which to approve, disapprove, or institute proceedings to determine
whether to approve or disapprove the Proposed Rule Change, until
December 30, 2025.\7\ The Commission has received no comments regarding
the Proposed Rule Change. The Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on Partial Amendment No. 1 from interested persons,
and, for the reasons discussed below, is approving the Proposed Rule
Change, as modified by Partial Amendment No. 1.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
\3\ See Notice of Filing infra note 4, at 90 FR 47383.
\4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 104111 (Sept. 26,
2025), 90 FR 47383 (Oct. 1, 2025) (File No. SR-OCC-2025-018)
(``Notice of Filing'').
\5\ Exhibit 2 consists of communication from OCC to its Clearing
Members discussing, amongst other things, the proposed rule change
in File No. SR-OCC-2025-018. This amendment does not change the
purpose of or basis for SR-OCC-2025-018.
\6\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
\7\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 104173 (Nov. 3,
2025), 90 FR 51424 (Nov. 17, 2025) (File No. SR-OCC-2025-018).
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II. Background
OCC is a central counterparty (``CCP''), which means that, as part
of its function as a clearing agency, it interposes itself as the buyer
to every seller and the seller to every buyer for certain financial
transactions. As the CCP for the listed options markets in the United
States,\8\ as well as for certain futures and stock loans, OCC is
exposed to various risks arising from providing clearance and
settlement services to its Clearing Members. Because OCC is obligated
to perform on the contracts it clears, one such risk that OCC is
exposed to is credit risk, including the risk that OCC would not
maintain sufficient financial resources to cover exposures if one of
its Clearing Members defaults.
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\8\ OCC describes itself as ``the sole clearing agency for
standardized equity options listed on a national securities exchange
registered with the Commission (`listed options').'' See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 96533 (Dec. 19, 2022), 87 FR 79015 (Dec.
23, 2022) (File No. SR-OCC-2022-012).
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Among the ways that OCC manages credit risk during a Clearing
Member failure is by periodically collecting margin collateral from
Clearing Members on an individual basis and, to the extent this margin
collateral is insufficient to cover OCC's credit exposure in the event
of a Clearing Member default, maintaining a Clearing Fund, which is a
mutualized pool of financial resources to which each Clearing Member is
required to contribute. OCC establishes the size of its Clearing Fund
on a monthly basis, in part, at an amount determined by OCC to be
sufficient to protect it against losses stemming from the default of
the two Clearing Member Groups that would potentially cause the largest
aggregate credit exposure for OCC under stress test scenarios that
represent extreme but plausible market conditions.\9\ Each Clearing
Member's proportionate contribution to the Clearing Fund is a function
of that member's proportionate share of total risk,\10\ open interest,
and volume.\11\ OCC currently uses a one-month lookback when
calculating a member's proportionate share of the Clearing Fund.\12\
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\9\ OCC Rule 1001(a). OCC determines the size of its Clearing
Fund based on the daily output of stress tests conducted using a
range of foreseeable scenarios that utilize standard pre-determined
parameters and assumptions, including: (1) relevant peak historic
price volatilities; (2) shifts in other market factors including, as
appropriate, priced determinants and yield curves; (3) the default
of one or multiple members; (4) forward-looking stress scenarios.
See Notice of Filing, 90 FR at 47384.
\10\ Total risk in this context refers to a member's
proportionate share of margin posted to OCC. See OCC Rule
1003(b)(i).
\11\ OCC Rule 1003(a). The proportionate requirements are
determined over and above the contribution of $500,000 per Clearing
Member. See id.
\12\ See Notice of Filing, 90 FR at 47386.
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Although the current Clearing Fund allocation methodology
contemplates risk as a function of margin, it does not include a
component that takes into account the same stressed losses used to size
the Clearing Fund when determining each Clearing Member's required
Clearing Fund deposit. OCC states that the lack of such a stress loss
component creates an inconsistency between the sizing and allocation
across the membership.\13\ To address this inconsistency, OCC proposes
to include such a component in the allocation methodology, allowing OCC
to distribute individual Clearing Fund requirements based on the
directional stressed risk that Clearing Members present to OCC.
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\13\ Notice of Filing, at 47384.
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Specifically, OCC proposes to modify OCC's allocation weighting
formula for allocating Clearing Fund Contribution requirements by (a)
introducing a 70 percent Clearing Fund risk-based shortfall allocation
based on stress loss in excess of margin (the ``shortfall'');
[[Page 58353]]
and (b) changing the weighting percentages by reducing the margin
allocation from 70 percent to 15 percent and open interest to zero
percent. These changes would result in a new weighting scheme of 70
percent shortfall, 15 percent margin, and 15 percent cleared volume. As
part of the change to allocation weighting, OCC also proposes to extend
the lookback period from one month to three months of data to align
with parameters OCC uses when sizing the Clearing Fund. Secondly, OCC
proposes to adopt rules that would authorize OCC to hold allocation
weights constant month-over-month in light of volatile market
conditions. Finally, OCC proposes to make clarifying and conforming
changes to the Clearing Fund Methodology Policy (``Policy''), and
Comprehensive Stress Testing & Clearing Fund Methodology, and Liquidity
Risk Management Description (``Methodology Description'').
A. Modifications to the Allocation Weighting Formula
As noted above, OCC proposes to replace the current allocation
weighting (70 percent total risk, 15 percent open interest, and 15
percent volume) with a new weighting that aligns more closely with
OCC's Clearing Fund sizing methodology (70 percent shortfall,\14\ 15
percent margin,\15\ and 15 percent volume). Given the proposed
weighting scheme, the proposed methodology would be driven primarily by
a Clearing Member's proportionate share of shortfalls (i.e., the
estimated stress loss exposure in excess of margin requirements) and
would use the same Clearing Fund sizing scenarios to calculate these
shortfalls.\16\ OCC believes, based on its analysis of different
allocation weightings, that this specific allocation scheme generates a
balance between the various risks captured by each component and would
align the Clearing Fund allocation with the exposure driving the size
of the Clearing Fund.\17\ OCC also proposes to align the lookback
period for all allocation-related measures with the parameters used to
size the Clearing Fund by moving from a one-month lookback to a three-
month lookback.
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\14\ As proposed, OCC would define ``shortfall'' to mean ``an
estimated stress loss exposure in excess of margin amounts
aggregated across all accounts of a Clearing Member determined using
the Corporation's margin methodology and such add-on charges as may
be determined pursuant to the Corporation's policies and
procedures.'' See Notice of Filing, 90 FR at 47385.
\15\ ``Margin'' under the proposed rule would have the same
meaning as ``total risk'' under the current rule. OCC states that
using the term ``margin'' rather than ``total risk'' provides better
clarity as to the metric upon which the factor is based. See id. at
47385 n. 12.
\16\ The shortfall component used in the allocation is based on
the highest shortfall across all sizing scenarios for that Clearing
Member on a given business date and will be treated as zero in the
event there are no shortfalls.
\17\ See Notice of Filing, 90 FR at 47385. OCC provided the
results of its analysis in confidential Exhibit 3 to File No. SR-
OCC-2025-018. See id. at 47385 n. 14.
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OCC provided data describing how the proposed methodology could
affect contributions by its Clearing Members.\18\ OCC observed that,
overall, the proposed approach allocates the Clearing Fund in a more
distributed fashion within the top 10 Clearing Members (as measured by
highest Clearing Fund contribution amounts), with some members
experiencing larger changes relative to other Clearing Members.\19\
Under the proposed methodology, while the top 10 Clearing Members would
have experienced, on average, a 1.28 percent increase in their Clearing
Fund contributions, the top five Clearing Members within that group
would have experienced, on average, a 2.67 percent decrease in such
contributions.\20\ Outside of the top 10 group, the remaining Clearing
Members would have experienced a 1.28 percent decrease in average
contributions.\21\
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\18\ See Notice of Filing, 90 FR at 47386.
\19\ Id.
\20\ Id.
\21\ Id.
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B. Authority To Hold Constant
As noted above, OCC proposes to adopt rules that would authorize it
to hold allocation weights constant month-over-month in light of
volatile market conditions. As OCC states in its proposal, when markets
are highly volatile during periods of market stress, elevated margin
coverage becomes more commonplace and consequently may reduce or even
eliminate Clearing Fund shortfalls because of elevated margin
requirements.\22\ This is because the shortfall component represents a
stress loss in excess of margin. Thus, an increase in margin, all else
being equal, results in a decreased shortfall.
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\22\ See Notice of Filing, 90 FR at 47387.
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As OCC further states in its proposal, reductions in shortfalls
could cause the resulting Clearing Fund allocation to change
dramatically month-over month.\23\ This is because the proposed changes
to the allocation methodology described above reduce the weight of
margin and give significant weight to shortfall. As a result, an
increase in a Clearing Member's proportionate share of margin would not
offset an equal reduction in that member's proportionate share of
shortfall under the proposed allocation methodology. OCC states that
the proposed implementation of a three-month lookback would help to
smooth month-over-month changes; \24\ however, OCC believes it is
possible the extended lookback alone may not be sufficient in the
unlikely event that high volatility and reduced shortfalls persisted
even though OCC did not observe such persistence in its analysis.\25\
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\23\ Id.
\24\ Id.
\25\ Id.
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To address the potential impact of persistent high volatility on
the allocation of Clearing Fund requirements, OCC proposes to adopt
rules that would allow it to hold allocations constant month-over-
month. As proposed, Rule 1003(c) would grant OCC the authority to make
the hold-constant decision at its sole discretion. The rule would
provide that any hold-constant decision would (i) be based upon then-
existing facts and circumstances, (ii) be in furtherance of the
integrity of OCC and the stability of the financial system, and (iii)
take into consideration the legitimate interests of Clearing Members
and market participants. Under the proposed Policy, OCC would exercise
its hold-constant authority by conducting daily analyses of the output
of OCC's sizing stress tests \26\ and, if warranted, by escalating to
the Chair of the Stress Testing Working Group (``STWG'') \27\ or the
Chief Financial Risk Officer that an STWG meeting be convened to
review, and approve or reject, a hold-constant
[[Page 58354]]
recommendation.\28\ Such a recommendation would be supported by an
analysis that may include and is not limited to the percentage of firms
generating shortfalls, the size of peak shortfalls relative to the
Clearing Fund size, a comparison of the Clearing Fund allocation
projections to current requirements, and a breakdown of the allocation
projections by component.\29\ OCC would be required to notify Clearing
Members and the Risk Committee of any hold-constant decision or
reversion to the proportionate approach. Further, OCC would be required
to notify the Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(``CFTC'') promptly of any decision to hold allocations constant and to
provide the reasons for such decision.
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\26\ In particular, these tests would be the Cover 2 Sizing
Stress Tests, where ``Cover 2'' means ``sufficient Pre-Funded
Financial Resources, at a minimum, to enable OCC to cover a wide
range of foreseeable stress scenarios that include, but are not
limited to, the default of the two Clearing Member Groups that would
potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure in extreme
but plausible market conditions.'' See Notice of Filing, 90 FR at
47384 n.23 and accompanying text. See also Notice of Filing, 90 FR
at 47384 (``As described in the Methodology Description, OCC
leverages a suite of sizing stress tests broadly categorized into
two types: `Systemic Scenarios' and `Idiosyncratic Scenarios.'
Systemic Scenarios are created to capture risk to OCC in an extreme
event impacting all positions mainly driven by risk drivers, while
Idiosyncratic Scenarios are used to assess the impact of extreme
moves of specific equities in a Clearing Member portfolio. [. . .]
OCC selects the largest aggregate stress test exposures as the
primary basis for sizing the Clearing Fund.'').
\27\ See Notice of Filing, 90 FR at 47387 (``OCC believes the
STWG is the appropriate OCC internal governing body to approve or
reject such recommendation given the authority the Management
Committee has delegated to it as the subject matter expert on OCC's
financial risk and liquidity risk stress-testing scenarios, models,
underlying parameters and assumptions, and stress test results.'').
\28\ See Notice of Filing, 90 FR at 47387 n. 24. Likewise, OCC
would have the authority to revert to the proposed allocation
calculation formula, subject to the STWG's prior approval. See
Notice of Filing, 90 FR at 47387.
\29\ See Notice of Filing, 90 FR at 47387 n. 25.
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C. Clarifying and Conforming Changes
Finally, OCC proposes clarifying and conforming changes to the
Rules, Policy, and Methodology Description to align with the proposed
changes to the Clearing Fund methodology. Such clarifying changes
include the removal of Interpretation and Policy .03 of Rule 1003,
which provides for implementation of the current allocation methodology
and is no longer necessary. The conforming changes also include the
introduction of ``shortfall'' into the provisions describing OCC's
Clearing Fund allocation methodology across the Rules, Policy, and
Methodology Description. Similarly, OCC would remove references to
``open interest'' and other terms that are not relevant to the proposed
allocation methodology.
III. Discussion and Commission Findings
Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Exchange Act directs the Commission to
approve a proposed rule change of a self-regulatory organization if it
finds that such proposed rule change is consistent with the
requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to such organization.\30\ Under the Commission's
Rules of Practice, the ``burden to demonstrate that a proposed rule
change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the rules and
regulations issued thereunder . . . is on the self-regulatory
organization [`SRO'] that proposed the rule change.'' \31\
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\30\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C).
\31\ Rule 700(b)(3), Commission Rules of Practice, 17 CFR
201.700(b)(3).
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The description of a proposed rule change, its purpose and
operation, its effect, and a legal analysis of its consistency with
applicable requirements must all be sufficiently detailed and specific
to support an affirmative Commission finding,\32\ and any failure of an
SRO to provide this information may result in the Commission not having
a sufficient basis to make an affirmative finding that a proposed rule
change is consistent with the Exchange Act and the applicable rules and
regulations.\33\ Moreover, ``unquestioning reliance'' on an SRO's
representations in a proposed rule change is not sufficient to justify
Commission approval of a proposed rule change.\34\
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\32\ Id.
\33\ Id.
\34\ Susquehanna Int'l Group, LLP v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 866 F.3d 442, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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After carefully considering the Proposed Rule Change, the
Commission finds that the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with the
requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to OCC. More specifically, the Commission finds
that the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with Section 17A(b)(3)(F)
of the Exchange Act,\35\ and with Exchange Act Rules 17ad-22(e)(18)
\36\ and 17ad-22(e)(2),\37\ as described in detail below.
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\35\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\36\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(18).
\37\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(2).
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A. Consistency With Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act requires, among other
things, that a clearing agency's rules are not designed to permit
unfair discrimination among participants in the use of the clearing
agency.\38\ Based on Commission's review of the record, and for the
reasons described below, the changes described above are consistent
Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act \39\ because the changes would
continue to align participants' obligations with their use of the
clearing agency.
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\38\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\39\ Id.
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OCC's current methodology for allocating Clearing Fund requirements
to its members is based in part on OCC's exposure to such participants
(as measured by margin) as well as metrics related to the transactions
a participant submits for clearing (as measured by open interest and
volume). While these measures link a participant's obligation to post
collateral to the participant's use of the clearing agency, they do not
align with such obligations with the methodology for determining how
much collateral is required. As described above, OCC proposed to change
its allocation methodology to align, in large part, with OCC's
methodology for determining the collateral requirement to be allocated
(i.e., the size of the Clearing Fund). Such an allocation would
continue to tie a participant's obligation to post collateral with its
use of OCC because it would tie such obligations to the exposures
generated by the risk the participant poses to OCC in its cleared
positions. Further, the proposed authority to hold allocations constant
would provide OCC the ability to avoid potential distortions in
allocation caused by persistently high market volatility.
Accordingly, the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with the
requirements of Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act.\40\
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\40\ Id.
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B. Consistency With Rule 17ad-22(e)(18) Under the Exchange Act
Rule 17ad-22(e)(18) under the Exchange Act requires, in part, that
a covered clearing agency establish, implement, maintain, and enforce
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to establish
objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for
participation, which permit fair and open access by direct, and where
relevant, indirect participants and other financial market utilities,
require participants to have sufficient financial resources and robust
operational capacity to meet obligations arising from participation in
the clearing agency, and monitor compliance with such participation on
an ongoing basis.\41\
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\41\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(18).
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OCC manages its credit exposures, in part, through the resources
held in its Clearing Fund. Such resources are sized to address stress
losses in excess of margin; however, the current allocation methodology
does not consider the extent to which a member poses risk to OCC that
exceeds its potential margin contributions. As a requirement of
participation, each Clearing Member is required to contribute financial
resources to fund the Clearing Fund. The methodology for allocating
such contributions is not currently aligned with the methodology for
setting the size of the Clearing Fund itself. As described above, OCC
proposed to revise its allocation methodology to
[[Page 58355]]
align the weighting of variables and lookback period more closely with
OCC's methodology for sizing the Clearing Fund. As a result, the
proposed changes would more closely align a member's financial
obligations to OCC with the credit risk the member poses without
entirely removing consideration of other factors. To address the
possibility that the proposed weighting methodology could cause an
inappropriate allocation of requirements due to persistent, high
volatility, the Proposed Rule Change would authorize OCC to hold
allocation requirements constant month-over-month where doing so would
be in furtherance of the integrity of OCC and the stability of the
financial system, and take into consideration the legitimate interests
of Clearing Members and market participants. Taken together, these
changes are consistent with Rule 17ad-22(e)(18) \42\ because they would
further align Clearing Members' obligations with the exposures such
members pose to OCC while also providing flexibility to respond to
extreme market volatility.
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\42\ Id.
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Accordingly, the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with Rule 17ad-
22(e)(18) under the Exchange Act.\43\
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\43\ Id.
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C. Consistency With Rule 17ad-22(e)(2) Under the Exchange Act
Rule 17ad-22(e)(2) under the Exchange Act requires, in part, that a
covered clearing agency establish, implement, maintain, and enforce
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to provide for
governance arrangements that specify clear and direct lines of
responsibility.\44\
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\44\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(e)(2).
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OCC's proposed decision to hold allocations constant to address the
potential impact of persistent high volatility is subject to a review
process initiated by OCC staff and implemented by the STWG, a panel
delegated by OCC management as the relevant subject matter expert. As
proposed, OCC staff would be required to base the hold-constant
recommendation on daily analyses of stress test results and in
consideration of a non-exhaustive list of factors before escalating it
to the STWG or the Chief Financial Risk Officer. The STWG or the Chief
Financial Risk Officer would have the authority to accept or reject the
hold-constant recommendation. This same review process would be
implemented if OCC staff recommends a reversion to the proportionate
approach. Additionally, OCC staff would be required to provide
notification of (1) a hold-constant decision or reversion to Clearing
Members and the Risk Committee; and (2) a hold-constant decision to the
Commission and CFTC, with reasons for such a decision provided to the
regulators. This recommendation review process provided for in OCC's
rules and policies would help facilitate governance arrangements that
specify clear and direct lines of responsibility.
Accordingly, the Proposed Rule Change is consistent with Rule 17ad-
22(e)(2) under the Exchange Act.\45\
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\45\ Id.
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IV. Solicitation of Comments on Partial Amendment No. 1 to the Proposed
Rule Change
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change, as modified by Partial Amendment No. 1, is consistent with the
Exchange Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following
methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
file number SR-OCC-2025-018 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to: Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to file number SR-OCC-2025-018. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method of submission. The Commission will post all
comments on the Commission's website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Do not include personal identifiable information in
submissions; you should submit only information that you wish to make
available publicly. We may redact in part or withhold entirely from
publication submitted material that is obscene or subject to copyright
protection. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-OCC-2025-018
and should be submitted on or before January 6, 2026.
V. Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Partial
Amendment No. 1
The Commission finds good cause, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of
the Exchange Act,\46\ to approve the proposed rule change prior to the
30th day after the date of publication of notice of the filing of
Partial Amendment No. 1 in the Federal Register. As discussed above,
Partial Amendment No. 1 modified the original proposed rule change to
append an Exhibit 2 to documents filed as part of File No. SR-OCC-2025-
018 on September 26, 2025. Partial Amendment No. 1 does not change the
purpose of or basis for the proposed changes.
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\46\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
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For similar reasons as discussed above, the Commission finds that
Partial Amendment No. 1 is consistent with the requirement that OCC's
rules not be designed to permit unfair discrimination among
participants in the use of the clearing agency, under Section
17A(b)(3)(F) of the Exchange Act.\47\ Accordingly, the Commission finds
good cause, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, to
approve the proposed rule change, as modified by Partial Amendment No.
1, on an accelerated basis, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Exchange Act.\48\
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\47\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
\48\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
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VI. Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission finds that the
proposed rule change, as modified by Partial Amendment No. 1, is
consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act, and in
particular, the requirements of Section 17A of the Exchange Act \49\
and the rules and regulations thereunder.
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\49\ In approving the Proposed Rule Change, the Commission has
considered the proposed rules' impact on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
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It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Exchange Act,\50\ that the proposed rule change (SR-OCC-2025-018), as
modified by Partial Amendment No. 1, be, and hereby is, approved.
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\50\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\51\
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\51\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Sherry R. Haywood,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2025-22855 Filed 12-15-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P