Under section 409(b)(5) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 348(b)(5)), we are giving notice that we have filed a food additive petition (FAP 2323), submitted by Green Innovation GmbH, Grabenweg 68-A6020, Innsbruck, Austria. The petition proposes that we amend our food additive regulations in 21 CFR part 573—Food Additives Permitted in Feed and Drinking Water of Animals, to provide for the safe use of hydrolyzed lignin as a source of neutral detergent soluble fiber in food for broiler chickens, laying hens, turkeys, growing swine, sows, lactating dairy cows, beef cattle, sheep, goats, salmonids, and adult dogs at no more than 1% of the food on a weight basis or 10 kilograms per metric ton of food.

The petitioner has claimed that this action is categorically excluded under 21 CFR 25.32(r) because it is of a type that does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. In addition, the petitioner has stated that, to their knowledge, no extraordinary circumstances exist that may significantly affect the quality of the human environment. If FDA determines a categorical exclusion applies, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required. If FDA determines a categorical exclusion does not apply, we will request an environmental assessment and make it available for public inspection.

WSDOT owns and operates the Wishkah Street Bridge crossing the Wishkah River at mile 0.4. WSDOT is asking to change the current bridge operating regulation, 33 CFR 117.1065(c), to allow for maintenance and restoration work. The bridge must remain in the closed-to-navigation position from 7 a.m. on September 1, 2026, through 6 p.m. on August 31, 2027, for WSDOT to replace major mechanical components. Records show that the drawbridge has only opened once per year on average over the last four years.

The proposed rule will allow the Wishkah Street Bridge to remain closed from 7 a.m. on September 1, 2026, until 6 p.m. on August 31, 2027. Vessels that can pass under the bridge without needing it to open may do so whenever it is safe to transit. When closed, the bridge provides a vertical clearance of 10 feet and 6 inches above high tide and more than 19 feet at low tide. Maritime activity on the Wishkah River has been declining for years, so closing the draw is unlikely to affect mariners who need it opened. There are no alternate routes on this section of the Wishkah River.

This proposed temporary rule is based on the need to keep the bridge in the closed to navigation position during maintenance and restoration. Pending public comments to this NPRM the Coast Guard has preliminarily determined that the proposed rule change will meet the reasonable navigation needs of mariners while allowing for necessary repairs and replacement of structurally deficient parts.

We developed this proposed rule after considering numerous statutes and Executive Orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses based on these statutes and Executive Orders.

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits. This proposed rule has not been designated a “significant regulatory action,” under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, the NPRM has not been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

This regulatory action determination is based on the documented low utilization rates of bridge openings and the ability of vessels to transit under the bridge.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601-612, as amended, requires Federal agencies to consider the potential impact of regulations on small entities during rulemaking. The term “small entities” comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000. The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

While some owners or operators of vessels intending to transit the bridge may be small entities, for the reasons stated in section IV.A above this proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on any vessel owner or operator.

If you think that your business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction qualifies as a small entity and that this rule would have a significant economic impact on it, please submit a comment (see ADDRESSES ) explaining why you think it qualifies and how and to what degree this rule would economically affect it.

Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), we want to assist small entities in understanding this proposed rule. If the proposed rule affects your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this proposed rule or any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

This proposed rule would call for no new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520.).

A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132 (Federalism), if it has a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. We have analyzed this proposed rule under that Order and have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles and preemption requirements described in Executive Order 13132.

Also, this proposed rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175 (Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments) because it would not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes. If you believe this proposed rule has implications for federalism or Indian tribes, please contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. In particular, the Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100,000,000 (adjusted for inflation) or more in any one year. Though this proposed rule will not result in such expenditure, we do discuss the effects of this proposed rule elsewhere in this preamble.

We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security Management Directive 023-01, Rev.1, associated implementing instructions, and Environmental Planning Policy COMDTINST 5090.1 (series), which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f). The Coast Guard has determined that this action is one of a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. This proposed rule promulgates the operating regulations or procedures for drawbridges. Normally such actions are categorically excluded from further review, under paragraph L49, of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 1.

Neither a Record of Environmental Consideration nor a Memorandum for the Record are required for this rule. We seek any comments or information that may lead to the discovery of a significant environmental impact from this proposed rule.

We view public participation as essential to effective rulemaking and will consider all comments and material received during the comment period. Your comment can help shape the outcome of this rulemaking. If you submit a comment, please include the docket number for this rulemaking, indicate the specific section of this document to which each comment applies, and provide a reason for each suggestion or recommendation.

Submitting comments. We encourage you to submit comments through the Federal Decision Making Portal at https://www.regulations.gov. To do so, go to https://www.regulations.gov, type USCG-2025-0714 in the search box and click “Search.” Next, look for this document in the Search Results column, and click on it. Then click on the Comment option. If your material cannot be submitted using https://www.regulations.gov, contact the person in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document for alternate instructions.

Viewing material in docket. To view documents mentioned in this proposed rule as being available in the docket, find the docket as described in the previous paragraph, and then select “Supporting & Related Material” in the Document Type column. Public comments will also be placed in our online docket and can be viewed by following instructions on the https://www.regulations.gov Frequently Asked Questions web page. Also, if you go to the online docket and sign up for email alerts through the “Subscribe” option, you will be notified when comments/updates are posted, or a final rule is published.

We review all comments received, but we will only post comments that address the topic of the proposed rule. We may choose not to post off-topic, inappropriate, or duplicate comments that we receive.

Personal information. We accept anonymous comments. Comments we post will include any personal information you have provided. For more information about privacy and submissions in response to this document, see DHS's eRulemaking System of Records notice (85 FR 14226, March 11, 2020).

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard proposes to amend 33 CFR part 117 as follows:

All submitted comments and attachments are part of the public record and subject to disclosure. Do not enclose any material in your comments that you consider to be confidential or inappropriate for public disclosure.

On August 21, 2025, ( Postal Bulletin 22683) the Postal Service revised DMM 609.1.4 to reduce the insured mail “No Sooner Than” filing date to 6 days, effective November 3, 2025.

After further evaluation of this revision, the Postal Service is proposing to re-establish the “No Sooner Than” filing date of 15 days for filing insured mail claims to re-align the filing thresholds with other mail service and bulk claims.

The Postal Service is proposing to implement this change effective January 18, 2026.

Although exempt from the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553(b), (c)) regarding proposed rulemaking by 39 U.S.C. 410(a), the Postal Service invites public comment on the proposed revisions to Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), incorporated by reference in the Code of Federal Regulations.

We will publish an appropriate amendment to 39 CFR part 111 to reflect these changes.

Accordingly, the Postal Service proposes the following changes to Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), incorporated by reference in the Code of Federal Regulations (see 39 CFR 111.1):

In the Final Rules section of this Federal Register , EPA is approving the State's SIP submittal as a direct final rule without prior proposal because the Agency views this as a noncontroversial submittal and anticipates no adverse comments. A detailed rationale for the approval is set forth in the direct final rule. If no relevant adverse comments are received in response to this rule, no further activity is contemplated. If EPA receives such comments, the direct final rule will be withdrawn and all public comments received will be addressed in a subsequent final rule based on this proposed rule. EPA will not institute a second comment period. Any parties interested in commenting on this action should do so at this time. Please note that if EPA receives adverse comment on an amendment, paragraph, or section of this rule and if that provision may be severed from the remainder of the rule, EPA may adopt as final those provisions of the rule that are not the subject of an adverse comment. For additional information, see the direct final rule which is located in the Rules section of this Federal Register .

This is a summary of the Commission's Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( Third FNPRM ) in GN Docket No. 13-111; FCC 25-65, adopted and released on September 30, 2025. The full text of this document is available for public inspection online at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-65A1.pdf.

Paperwork Reduction Act. This document may contain potential new or revised information collection requirements. If the Commission adopts any new or modified information collection requirements, they will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, the general public, and other federal agencies are invited to comment on the new or modified information collection requirements contained in this proceeding. In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, the Commission seeks specific comment on how it might “further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.”

Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act: The Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act, Public Law 118-9, requires each agency, in providing notice of a rulemaking, to post online a brief plain language summary of the proposed rule. The required summary of this Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is available at https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings.

Ex Parte Status: The proceeding this Third FNPRM initiates shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with § 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by § 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format ( e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.

1. In this Third FNPRM, the Commission proposes to deauthorize, for purposes of FCC licensing, subscriber operation of contraband wireless devices and leverage its existing leasing process as a preferred approach to licensing jamming solutions, thereby providing correctional officials with additional methods to address a demonstrable public safety threat. The Commission also proposes and seeks comment on restrictions that might prove necessary to ensure that jamming solutions are limited to this targeted use, and to mitigate the risk that these solutions are deployed in contexts other than a correctional facility environment.

2. The Commission proposes to define the term “jamming solution” as “the deployment of RF transmitter(s) within a correctional facility to prevent contraband wireless devices from establishing or maintaining a connection with a network.” This definition is solely applicable in the context of combatting contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities and incorporates the concept that such a solution disrupts a network connection on affected spectrum bands in a specific geographic area. We seek comment on this proposed definition and any alternatives that commenters believe will further this proceeding's goals. To provide clarity for stakeholders regarding both proposed licensing frameworks, i.e. leasing and overlay licensing, we propose to incorporate a definition of a “jamming solution”: (1) as another type of contraband interdiction system (CIS) where appropriate to facilitate leasing arrangements, with certain special provisions solely applicable to jamming solutions where warranted; and (2) to authorize overlay licensees to provide such a solution where certain eligibility criteria are met.

3. The Commission proposes to address the prohibition in section 333 of the Communications Act by deauthorizing subscriber operation of contraband wireless devices located within a correctional facility. Specifically, the Commission proposes to amend its rules and the rights granted under licenses issued, such that operations in this specific context would not be authorized by the Commission within the meaning of section 333. This approach would allow departments of correction (DOCs) to employ jamming solutions, or other similar technologies, without violating section 333, and would provide an additional tool to prevent criminal activity stemming from unauthorized communications within and to those outside a correctional facility.

4. Under current Commission rules, wireless providers may legally transmit RF signals within the boundaries of their geographic area license, including areas within those boundaries where a correctional facility may be located. Subscribers operating devices in connection with those licensed services are authorized under that same wireless provider license pursuant to the Commission's rules. We propose a key change to the authorization status, as it relates to Commission licensing, of subscribers operating contraband wireless devices on commercial wireless networks in correctional facilities, which will enable the Commission to authorize jamming solutions in a narrow context in compliance with section 333 of the Act.

5. As a threshold matter, the Commission proposes to amend § 1.903(c) of its rules to create an exception regarding subscriber operation of a “contraband wireless device.” Specifically, the proposal is to amend the rule to make clear that subscriber contraband wireless device operation of any fixed or mobile station in the Wireless Radio Services (WRS) is not authorized by the Commission. As such operation would not be considered to be licensed or authorized by or under the Act, there is no statutory protection against willful or malicious interference by other technologies, such as jamming solutions, that would be licensed under our proposed process. This proposal is referred to as the “deauthorization rule” or “deauthorization approach.” We tentatively conclude that we have the authority to propose this approach pursuant to section 303 of the Act, which provides the Commission with expansive powers and duties to make rules governing wireless operations that are required by the public convenience, interest, or necessity. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion, and on our deauthorization approach more generally.

6. The Commission proposes to apply the deauthorization rule to subscriber operation of a contraband wireless device that is used within a correctional facility in violation of federal, state, or local law, or a correctional facility rule, regulation, or policy, and seeks comment on this approach. This expansive approach is consistent with the Commission's definition of “contraband wireless device” as applied in our current CIS leasing context. We note, however, that when adopting the framework permitting DOC officials with an approved CIS to request that wireless providers disable contraband wireless devices, we took a narrower view of “contraband wireless devices” and limited disabling of such devices to those “used in violation of state or federal criminal statutes.” We seek comment on whether to apply to our deauthorization rule the more restrictive approach taken in the CIS disabling context.

7. We propose to apply the deauthorization rule to subscriber operations of contraband wireless devices used in “correctional facilities,” as defined in its existing CIS leasing context. Section 1.9003 defines correctional facility as “any facility operated or overseen by federal, state, or local authorities that houses or holds criminally charged or convicted inmates for any period of time, including privately owned and operated correctional facilities that operate through contracts with federal, state or local jurisdictions.” We recognize, however, that the proposed deauthorization rule would apply broadly to contraband wireless devices located in correctional facilities that include local facilities, e.g., city or county jails, often located next to, or relatively near, other government facilities ( e.g., a city hall, courthouse, etc.) or residential areas. This proximity presents an increased risk of interference to authorized devices if a jamming solution is not properly engineered, deployed, and maintained. We seek comment on whether it is necessary to restrict the application of our deauthorization rule and subsequent authorization of jamming solutions to a particular type(s) of correctional facility. In this regard, we also seek comment on the extent to which contraband devices are used in local facilities, and whether local municipalities are seeking these particular RF solutions that require extensive technical expertise to engineer and require associated costs to install and maintain. Where are states more likely to invest in carefully deployed, properly engineered and maintained jamming solutions? Should the Commission consider the security level of the correctional facility ( e.g., minimum, medium, maximum), or the average length of time of inmate incarceration, in this analysis? Commenters advocating for a restriction should consider our goal of reaching those facilities where contraband wireless device use is a serious public safety threat, and should also address the argument that a properly engineered and maintained jamming solution is substantially less likely to cause harmful interference to authorized users, notwithstanding the proximity issue.

8. Section 316 of the Act states that “any station license or construction permit may be modified by the Commission . . . if in the judgment of the Commission such action will promote the public interest, convenience and necessity.” We propose a rule change to deauthorize certain operations that would be promulgated pursuant to the Commission's rulemaking authority consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act. As additional legal support for this approach, we also propose, pursuant to section 316 of the Act, to modify any and all licenses affected by the proposed rule change, if adopted and made effective, that would eliminate authority for WRS subscribers to operate contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities. We believe that this proposed modification is within our authority under the Act, is in the public interest and, given that its scope is limited to deauthorizing subscriber operation of contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities, does not result in a fundamental change to any underlying wireless provider license. We seek comment on this proposal.

9. The proposed deauthorization rule would make subscriber operation of any contraband wireless device in a correctional facility a violation of section 301 of the Act and proposed revised § 1.903(c) of the Commission's rules. Recognizing that wireless providers might also be liable for continuing to authenticate and provide service to such devices following deauthorization, we propose to create a safe harbor, to the extent necessary, for wireless providers that engage in good faith negotiations with DOCs that are actively seeking an RF solution to this issue, including a jamming solution.

10. Specifically, we propose a “safe harbor” wherein the Commission would not take enforcement action against a wireless provider arguably in violation of section 301 of the Act for unauthorized operation on its network of contraband wireless devices in a correctional facility under the following circumstances. First, the safe harbor would apply to a wireless provider licensed in a geographic area where no DOC is actively seeking to implement an RF solution, including jamming, to combat contraband wireless device use. Second, the proposed safe harbor would apply to a wireless provider where it actively participates in good faith negotiations (or has successfully completed such negotiations) with the DOC/solutions provider that is seeking to lease spectrum to authorize operation of a CIS, including a jamming solution.

11. We clarify that, under our proposal, where a party actively seeks authority as lessee for a jamming solution to combat contraband wireless devices and negotiates in good faith, but a wireless provider fails to negotiate in good faith, the wireless provider would not be eligible for the proposed safe harbor. We also clarify that a wireless provider would not qualify for a safe harbor if it responds to a DOC/solutions provider request for a jamming solution by indicating that it is only willing to lease spectrum for a managed access system (MAS) or detection system deployment. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal, including whether a wireless provider should be eligible for the proposed safe harbor in the absence of a good faith lease arrangement, but where it can demonstrate that a DOC's jamming solution poses an unreasonable risk of interference to authorized subscribers or otherwise is not technically feasible as sought to be deployed. We also seek comment on whether to extend the proposed safe harbor to future instances where a wireless provider actively facilitates the implementation, at a DOC/solutions provider's request, of an alternative technological solution, such as geolocation or beacon technology in the applicable correctional facility.

12. We believe our proposal to establish a safe harbor will address any potential wireless industry concerns about liability for deauthorized operations, while also encouraging wireless providers to work with correctional facilities to combat the problem of contraband wireless device use. We seek comment on this proposal and on whether there are additional liability concerns regarding potential unauthorized transmissions in violation of section 301 and proposed revised § 1.903(c) of the Commission's rules. Commenters should specifically describe instances where they believe a wireless provider should be further shielded from enforcement action, including the costs and benefits of such an approach. Also, we are not aware of any instance where a wireless provider directly owned and installed base stations within a correctional facility to effectively block signals from its macro-network pursuant to a contract with a DOC. We seek comment on the prospect of wireless providers engaging directly with DOCs to install transmitters for the purpose of effectuating a jamming solution. Should the Commission expand the scope of a prospective safe harbor to include instances where a wireless provider elects to directly employ a jamming solution in a correctional facility through a contract with a DOC?

13. The Commission proposes to authorize jamming solutions in correctional facilities by substantially leveraging its existing leasing regime used for CIS deployment in correctional facilities. We seek comment on a proposed definition of “jamming solution” to distinguish it, where relevant, from other CISs. Importantly, however, we also propose to amend our current definition of CIS by: (1) incorporating jamming solutions as a type of CIS for purposes of administrative efficiency and to achieve regulatory harmony across technologies where feasible and appropriate; and (2) refining the CIS definition to better describe current CISs that have the capability of preventing contraband wireless devices from ultimately connecting to a wireless provider network, while also distinguishing between contraband and non-contraband wireless devices in the area of CIS operation ( e.g., MAS).

14. Leasing Arrangement Framework and Types of Leases. Our goal is to leverage our existing leasing rules used for CIS deployment as much as possible to reduce regulatory burdens. We therefore seek comment on the extent to which the part 1 rules require amendment to effectuate authorization through lease arrangements of transmitters operating on wireless provider licensed spectrum to deploy jamming solutions in correctional facilities. Is it necessary to revise any other existing leasing rules or add new rules to effectuate the authorization of jamming solutions in correctional facilities?

15. Included Services. We seek comment on the applicability of the bands currently set forth in our part 1 leasing rules as “included services,” and therefore eligible for leasing, to the deployment of jamming solutions through lease arrangements. We seek to ensure that our approach to authorizing leasing arrangements for jamming solutions in correctional facilities does not inadvertently fail to include a relevant band deployed in commercial networks, thus creating a technical loophole for inmates to potentially exploit. Accordingly, we seek comment on whether additional bands beyond the recognized included services should be part of our proposed framework. We also seek comment on whether a particular band or service currently specified as an included service should be excluded from a jamming solutions leasing framework and, if so, through what rationale.

16. Although our focus is removing barriers to jamming solutions that would necessarily be deployed on WRS bands commonly used in commercial networks, we also seek comment on whether there are bands not typically included in current CIS leasing arrangements that commenters believe should nonetheless be considered in authorizing jamming solutions. For example, should the Commission include any Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) or Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) satellite bands that are authorized under part 25? Is there evidence that those bands, or any other bands not listed in our part 1 leasing rules as “included services,” are currently used in serving contraband wireless devices and therefore present an issue for DOCs? We ask that commenters supporting inclusion of other bands for jamming solutions through leasing arrangements indicate which bands the Commission should consider as included services, and whether there is a regulatory bar that must be overcome, address any associated costs, and describe in detail the need for the operation of jamming technology in these bands in correctional facilities. We also ask commenters to consider the international treaty implications of permitting jamming solutions in satellite bands, specifically the potential for harmful interference to any foreign spacecraft that may cover the United States.

17. Eligibility Criteria. We find it in the public interest to propose eligibility criteria for those seeking authorization to deploy jamming solutions as a lessee under part 1 of our rules. We believe that proposing strict eligibility restrictions is vital to ensure that use of jamming solutions is on a limited scale for a very specific public safety purpose. We also seek comment on whether, in the interest of maintaining technological neutrality and harmonizing procedures across CISs, we should require the eligibility criteria set forth below for all CIS leases.

18. We propose that an entity will be eligible for authorization to engage in jamming solutions through a leasing arrangement if it is: (1) a DOC with authority over the correctional facility for which the lease is sought; or (2) a solutions provider that has entered into a contract with a DOC with authority over the correctional facility for which the lease is sought. We also propose that the applicant is required to provide a certification as an attachment to the FCC Form 608 stating that the applicant: (1) is eligible for authorization to engage in jamming solutions; and (2) seeks to deploy equipment that has a valid part 2 equipment authorization, as discussed below. Should we require, as a condition of the lease, that the lessee must deploy the specific equipment in its jamming solution that it certified in its attachment has a valid part 2 equipment authorization, without substitution or modification? Should we require that entities seeking authority to operate transmitters as part of a jamming solution provide proof of the contractual arrangement with the correctional facility by, for example, including a copy of the contract with any lease filing? Would it be in the public interest to require disclosure of any particular lease terms to the Commission in the application process, subject to any appropriate protections sought for proprietary information under current rules?

19. We seek comment on whether to expressly include wireless provider licensees as entities eligible to provide jamming solutions through lease arrangements, which in certain circumstances might include the need to lease spectrum from another wireless provider in the limited geographic area of a correctional facility to achieve a comprehensive spectrum solution. Are wireless providers interested in, independent of leasing to DOCs/solutions providers, directly participating in resolving this public safety issue by entering into a contract with a DOC for the purpose of operating a jamming system within a correctional facility? To the extent wireless provider licensees seek to operate transmitters that provide jamming solutions, we seek comment on whether such licensees should be subject to the same or similar requirements proposed herein for DOCs and solutions providers that provide jamming solutions.

20. We also seek comment on whether we should consider, as an eligibility criterion, a geographical component regarding the location of a correctional facility. For example, should we first take a measured approach, perhaps limiting eligibility for authorization of jamming solutions to DOCs/solutions providers seeking jamming solutions in correctional facilities located in rural areas? Would excluding from a lease authorization structure arrangements with DOCs/solutions providers seeking solutions for more densely-populated areas reduce the potential for harmful interference to authorized devices, given the challenges presented in managing RF technologies in certain environments? Are DOCs primarily interested in jamming solutions for rural facilities, or do they seek to deploy in urban/suburban areas as well? Should DOCs/solutions providers first be required to demonstrate that a proposed solution can be sufficiently targeted so as to not impact authorized users, particularly in a less rural environment? What are the costs and benefits of taking an incremental approach? If we were to initially limit eligibility for authorization of jamming technology to rural correctional facilities, how should it define “rural,” given that the Commission has defined this term in different ways depending on context. If we were to limit eligibility to deploy jamming solutions based on geographic considerations, how should we treat suburban areas? To what extent would authorizing jamming solutions in non-rural areas be problematic, or are DOCs/solutions providers committed to properly engineering, maintaining, and updating the network as necessary to avoid causing harmful interference to non-contraband devices located either within or outside the correctional facility located in such areas?

21. Good Faith Negotiations. We propose to adopt a good faith negotiation rule—akin to current § 20.23(a) of the Commission's rules—that would require wireless providers to engage in good faith lease negotiations with eligible entities seeking to deploy a jamming solution in a correctional facility. To ensure wireless provider cooperation, we proposes to require a wireless provider to engage in good faith negotiations with a DOC, or with a solutions provider that has executed a contract with a DOC, that seeks Commission authorization to deploy a jamming solution in a correctional facility via a leasing arrangement. If, after a 45-day period, there is no good faith agreement, the DOC/solutions provider may apply for a non-exclusive overlay license, as discussed below. Because wireless providers that fail to negotiate in good faith toward a leasing arrangement would not be eligible for our proposed safe harbor, the Commission potentially could take enforcement action for possible unauthorized operation of contraband wireless devices in a correctional facility in violation of section 301 of the Act and our proposed amended rule § 1.903(c). Although below we propose to provide an overlay license fallback approach to leasing arrangements, we recognize that there may be instances where stakeholders fail to reach a lease agreement due to the bad faith of either party. To provide proper incentives for stakeholders on either side of a transaction, we propose that DOCs and their contracted solutions providers also are subject to a good faith negotiation requirement to discourage sham negotiations undertaken to avoid the Commission-preferred leasing process in favor of directly seeking what we clearly intend as a fallback overlay authorization.

22. We seek comment on this proposal and whether we should revise our approach. Are there additional distinguishing factors in play with respect to negotiating leases for the deployment of jamming solutions, thus necessitating a negotiation period lengthier than 45 days? We seek comment on whether and how we should specifically define “good faith negotiations” or elaborate on relevant factors to be considered in making the determination. Are the same factors relevant for lease negotiations to operate base station transmitters as part of a jamming solution? If not, we ask commenters to propose factors for possible incorporation into a Commission rule. Stakeholders should specifically address the questions above, as well as provide comments on the costs and benefits of the proposed approach and any alternatives.

23. Technical Rules. To provide flexibility for stakeholders and maintain consistency with current CIS leasing approach, we propose to apply to jamming solutions in correctional facilities our current secondary markets approach to compliance with technical rules. Accordingly, an entity seeking to deploy a jamming solution in a correctional facility would enter into a part 1 leasing arrangement(s) with a wireless provider to operate on the provider's licensed frequencies. Under existing leasing rules, a lessee would be subject to the same technical limits as the lessor, as set forth in band-specific radio service rules ( e.g., complying with power limits and out-of-band emission limits to protect adjacent band licensees). A DOC or solutions provider seeking to use a jamming solution would therefore be required to comply with a variety of, and possibly differing, technical rules that are set forth under various parts of the Commission's rules governing spectrum typically used in commercial wireless networks, including, for example, parts 22, 24, 27, 30, and 96.

24. As in the current CIS leasing context, we generally believe that parties to a lease arrangement are best positioned to agree on technical details that not only comply with the technical limits of various applicable radio service rule parts, but that address the potential for harmful interference to a lessor's licensed operations from the lessee's operations limited to a particular correctional facility. We seek comment on whether the introduction of jamming solutions, even when authorized through leasing arrangements negotiated at arms-length, requires a stricter regulatory framework from a technical perspective than its current maximum levels set forth across various service rules to best ensure that authorized wireless devices are not subjected to harmful interference. We request that commenters provide detailed analysis in support of any proposed alternative technical parameters. If such rules are needed, what are appropriate technical parameters to govern jamming deployments through leasing in a correctional facility environment? Should we establish more restrictive technical limits for jamming solutions than those established for wireless provider commercial operations in flexible use bands? Should we require a DOC or solutions provider lessee to use narrowly tailored means to achieve the goal of combatting contraband wireless device use, which will vary from a technical perspective, depending on the particular correctional facility? For example, should we prohibit use of a jamming solution across an entire 5G band(s), some with bandwidths as large as 100 megahertz, where a jamming solution could be targeted on the control channel portion of a band? We seek comment on how to implement a narrowly tailored jamming solution, while balancing the cost tradeoffs associated with deploying an effective solution that does not cause harmful interference to authorized users.

25. Further, we seek comment on how DOCs, as the primary advocates for additional tools to combat contraband wireless device use, intend to deploy jamming solutions to avoid harmful interference to wireless provider networks in a manner that accounts for differences in how commercial wireless networks are deployed, for example, the use of time division duplexing (TDD) versus frequency division duplexing (FDD). Should we require those seeking to deploy jamming solutions to adjust their technical parameters based on the specific technology the wireless providers use to provide a signal that covers a correctional facility? To what extent should we adopt technical rules applicable to jamming solutions that distinguish between the potential for harmful interference in bands using FDD versus those using TDD? Or, in a leasing scenario, should any such distinctions be addressed solely through leasing arrangements and the underlying contractual agreements between wireless providers and solutions providers? Are specific measures needed to prevent harmful interference to a wireless provider's base stations in a TDD context, for example taking into consideration the desired v. undesired signal levels in a TDD pattern? Should we require, in a TDD context, synchronization between a solutions provider deploying a jamming solution and the wireless provider offering service to an area that includes a correctional facility to avoid unwanted transmissions during the wireless provider's base station transmit timeslot? Are different considerations raised where a jamming solution is deployed in bands using FDD and seeks to cause interference to the contraband wireless device's ability to receive a base station's downlink transmissions?

26. To minimize the risk of harmful interference to authorized users, should we set specific limits on: radiated power ( e.g., limiting transmitter output power to 1-watt or 5-watt maximum) or power spectral density per band, out-of-band emission (OOBE) limits, field strength limit at a correctional facility boundary, power flux density (PFD) limit measured at a certain point from a transmitter, and/or Signal to Interference Noise Ratio (SINR) at the boundary of proposed jamming operations? Are more stringent restrictions required, in particular PFD or OOBE limits, in order to protect authorized operations outside of the boundary of the leased service area and users of immediately adjacent or nearby frequency bands? If so, what are the appropriate limits? If we impose more restrictive limits, would the efficacy of the jamming solution be compromised? Would providers of jamming solutions find it necessary to internalize a guard band to comply with our technical rules? Would adopting stricter limitations on transmitter power levels in an effort to help prevent harmful interference to authorized users, potentially resulting in a substantial increase in the number of transmitters required to be deployed, drive up the cost of deploying and maintaining a jamming solution? Conversely, if DOCs/solutions providers seek to deploy a jamming solution that operates band-wide with multiple licensees within a band, are there any current technical rules or policies in any of the included services that might hinder operation of a jamming solution across the band that might require revision? Should any of our technical rules be more permissive to foster an effective jamming solution in the limited context of correctional facilities?

27. We seek comment on whether technical parameters should vary depending on various factors including, but not limited to: whether the deployment is in a rural, suburban, or urban location; the size of the correctional facility and the topography of the surrounding area; the materials used in constructing the facility; and the proximity of wireless provider networks in the area, including the proximity of wireless provider service to residential/office locations, highways, and the corresponding strength of those RF signals entering the correctional facility. We also seek comment on how to adequately protect public safety communications from harmful interference potentially caused by jamming solutions. Are there appropriate technical measures, including filters, that could protect first responder communications near correctional facilities that deploy a jamming solution? What agreements should be in place to prevent interference to public safety communications? In addition, we seek comment on whether additional measures would need to be in place to protect first responder and priority communications using commercial wireless spectrum, such as FirstNet, Verizon's Frontline, and T-Mobile's T-Priority. Are there other spectrum bands that support public safety communications that might require specific protection against potential harmful interference from jamming solutions?

28. We also seek comment on the potential effect of jamming solutions on the public's ability to receive Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA), which federal, state, Tribal, territorial, and local officials rely on to send critical notifications concerning emergencies. Could the use of jamming solutions by correctional officials prevent the wireless providers that participate in WEA (Participating CMS Providers) from delivering WEAs in or near facilities employing jamming solutions? Would this result in Participating CMS Providers being unable to comply with the Commission's WEA rules, including its geographic accuracy requirements? Do emergency managers have concerns that the use of jamming solutions would put the public at risk? If the use of jamming solutions did prevent the delivery of WEAs, what effect could this have on the safety of correctional officials, prisoners, and other individuals during emergencies?

29. Solutions Providers with Existing Lease Arrangements for CIS Operation. We seek comment on whether we should permit solutions providers with existing CIS leases that seek authority for jamming operations to file a lease modification application, rather than file a new FCC Form 608 for a spectrum manager or de facto transfer leasing arrangement. If so, what information or certification should we require to be filed with the modification application to support the lessee's eligibility to engage in jamming operations? We ask commenters to discuss the pros and cons of this approach, and to provide any other proposals on ways in which an existing leasing arrangement could be modified to reflect authorization of a newly proposed jamming solution.

30. Immediate Approval Procedures. We also seek comment on whether leases for the operation of jamming systems, consistent with our approach to CISs, should be subject to the Commission's immediate approval procedures. We seek to seek to harmonize its CIS leasing rules to accommodate jamming solutions within the framework where feasible. As its proposed revised definition of CIS in the leasing rules would include jamming solutions, qualifying leases for jamming solutions in correctional facilities would be subject to immediate processing and approval. We seek comment on whether this is the appropriate approach for these types of lease applications. We also seek comment on whether there is a compelling reason to exclude leasing arrangements for jamming solutions from immediate processing procedures. Commenters supporting such an exclusion are requested to provide details regarding why an application for lease of spectrum for deployment of a jamming solution, if otherwise complete and meeting the Commission's requirements, would necessitate lengthier Commission review than that of current CIS lease arrangements subject to expedited processing.

31. Regulatory Status. We believe that a Private Mobile Radio Service (PMRS) presumption is most applicable to eligible DOCs/solutions provider entities seeking to deploy jamming solutions, which we understand are not intended to provide a service that meets the Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) definition. We therefore seek comment on applying the PMRS presumption to all spectrum leasing arrangements entered into for the provision of jamming solutions, unless the lessee includes an exhibit to its lease application indicating that it is CMRS for regulatory status purposes, thereby aligning the treatment of regulatory status for jamming solutions with other CIS operations, e.g., MAS and detection systems.

32. 911-Related Leasing Rules. We seek comment on the possible effects on wireless emergency/911 calls and public safety communications of the deployment of jamming solutions in correctional facilities. Our understanding is that jamming solutions block calls on all affected frequencies and, unlike MAS, are unable to allow 911 calls to be transmitted to a PSAP. We seek comment on whether it is in fact technically infeasible for the operator of any type of jamming solution to satisfy, under any circumstances, the 911-related requirements in part 1 and § 9.10 of the Commission's rules. Commenters citing a technical inability to comply with these rules should describe which particular requirements are not feasible and why. We ask that commenters provide details regarding any scenario where a jamming system, including any type of system under development, could be deployed in a correctional facility in a way that permits the transmission of 911 calls to a PSAP.

33. We seek comment from stakeholders on how emergency calls from wireless devices are addressed today in a correctional facility environment. We are aware that some state DOC officials have indicated that correctional facilities typically do not allow any calls from within, including emergency calls. In contrast, we seek comment as to how 911 calls are routed today if made from an authorized phone that might be used, for example, by counsel during visitation or by a vendor serving the premises that requires emergency services. Are such calls routed to a local PSAP or to internal DOC personnel, including perhaps internal DOC firefighting and/or medical personnel? Are such calls handled differently if made from an inmate using a contraband wireless device? To what extent have PSAPs opted to not receive calls from correctional facilities regardless of whether the source of the call is authorized by the correctional facility?

34. Based on the record in this proceeding, including our assumption that current jamming solutions are not capable of permitting impacted calls to reach a PSAP, we seek comment on the prospect of not applying the Commission's 911 and E911 rules to entities that have entered into leasing arrangements for the provision of jamming solutions in correctional facilities, if ultimately regulated as PMRS, whether it be a DOC directly or through its contracted solutions provider. To the extent jamming solutions are included in the proposed revised definition of CIS, we seek comment on whether it is necessary to modify existing leasing rules related to the provision of 911 service in the context of CIS leasing. Finally, we seek comment on how to treat a CMRS wireless provider, for 911 regulatory purposes, that opts to deploy base stations as part of a jamming solution, if the developing record indicates wireless provider interest in participating at that direct level to address this public safety issue. If so, what rule revisions are necessary to reflect the apparent technical limitations of jamming solutions, if deployed directly by wireless providers, with respect to passage of 911 calls to PSAP?

35. Interference-Related Leasing Rules. We seek comment on leasing rules and the issue of potential interference to non-contraband, authorized devices within a correctional facility and/or interference to authorized devices outside of the correctional facility perimeter. We seek comment on whether to retain the existing hierarchy of responsibility in the context of a proposed framework that would authorize jamming solutions in correctional facilities. Does our proposal to permit jamming solutions in such a limited context warrant revisions to Commission rules relating to interference resolution? In the case of a spectrum manager lease under the proposed jamming authorization framework, is it practical and appropriate for direct responsibility and accountability to apply to the licensee/lessor, where unwanted harmful interference would likely be to the licensee/lessor's authorized subscribers? Commenters seeking a rule revision are requested to address how this risk differs from that currently existing with deployment of transmitters for MAS and detection systems. Should we specify in the jamming solutions context that the lessee is primarily responsible for interference resolution caused by its jamming operations?

36. Community Notification. We seek comment on whether we should apply the current CIS community notification requirement to deployments of jamming solutions, to the extent that jamming solutions are proposed to be included within a revised definition of CIS for purposes of part 1 leasing arrangements. We also seek comment on whether the existing notification requirement has been effective in contributing to corrective action by DOCs in cases, if any, where users outside of the correctional facility were negatively impacted. Conversely, are there relevant DOC security reasons for not mandating such a notification requirement, or perhaps eliminating the current notification requirement applicable to CIS? Is it in the public interest to continue to require inherently sensitive information regarding the status of CIS deployments, specifically focused on preventing contraband wireless device use, to be made publicly available, where inmates potentially are able to obtain real-time updated deployment information on a per-facility basis nationwide?

37. Notification to Solutions Providers of Wireless Provider Technical Changes. We seek comment on applying to wireless providers the advance notification rule applicable to wireless providers and MAS lessees to assist jamming system operators in maintaining the effectiveness of jamming solutions deployed in a correctional facility. What are the costs and benefits of applying our current notification structure to jamming solutions? Are there differences in the operation of MAS compared to jamming solutions that would necessitate amendments to our current advance notification criteria?

38. Length of Lease. We seek comment on whether to apply the current part 1 lease term requirements to leasing arrangements for jamming solutions. Although we seek to provide regulatory flexibility where feasible, we seek comment on whether a revised approach is warranted here, given the contractual collaboration between solutions providers implementing jamming solutions and DOCs. For example, should we amend our rules to specify that the length of the lease for the provision of jamming services may only be as long as the length of the contractual arrangement with the applicable DOC, with possible extensions? What are the costs and benefits of such a restriction? Should we strengthen our approach to CISs generally and revise current rules to take this approach for MAS and detection systems?

39. Subleasing. In the proposed framework, an eligible entity—whether a lessee DOC or lessee solutions provider under contract—would be implementing jamming solutions to combat contraband device use in a specific correctional facility. Under this framework, we believe that the ability to sublease to a third party would raise practical and technical issues, particularly with respect to system security, oversight of operations, and increased risk of harmful interference. Accordingly, we propose to not allow subleasing under the proposed jamming framework and seek comment on this proposal and on whether we should clarify in our rules that subleasing is not permitted for any CIS in the interest of harmonizing our leasing rules across technologies.

40. Construction Attribution. Due to the nature of jamming solutions deployed to prevent “service” in a limited public safety-related circumstance, we propose to not allow a licensee/lessor(s) to rely on its lessee(s) deployment of a jamming solution for purposes of satisfying the performance requirements of the underlying license. We seek comment on this proposal, and whether we should clarify in our rules that such construction attribution is not permitted for any CIS.

41. ECIP Holding Period Exception. In July 2022, the Commission established the Enhanced Competition Incentive Program (ECIP), which among other things, modified the Commission's leasing rules to provide incentives for stakeholders to engage in qualifying transactions that make spectrum available in rural areas for advanced wireless services. In this regard, the Commission adopted several measures to protect the integrity of ECIP, including a five-year holding period during which licensees cannot further partition, disaggregate, assign, or lease licenses assigned through ECIP. The Commission, however, adopted an exception to the holding period for lease arrangements involving CIS providers, deeming CIS deployment in correctional facilities as vital to public safety. Because leasing arrangements entered into for the provision of jamming solutions would likewise promote public safety, we propose to apply the exception to the ECIP holding period for lease arrangements involving providers of jamming solutions in correctional facilities. We seek comment on this proposal.

42. We propose, as a method of last resort, an authorization path for jamming solutions in correctional facilities available only when parties fail to reach a leasing arrangement negotiated in good faith. In such cases, we propose to permit eligible entities to directly apply for an overlay license, provided certain conditions are met, to increase flexibility for jamming solutions in correctional facilities and to incentivize market-based solutions in the first instance. We believe that an overlay construct is an appropriate mechanism for authorizing jamming solutions where DOCs/solutions providers seek lease arrangements in good faith, but the wireless provider is unwilling to enter into the leasing arrangement on a good faith basis.

43. Statutory Authority and Mutual Exclusivity. Consistent with the proposed deauthorization rule, we believe that a non-exclusive overlay licensing approach complies with section 333 of the Act, as the overlay licensee would be licensed to transmit under section 301 of the Act and would be permitted to cause interference to the operations of subscribers using contraband wireless devices that are no longer authorized under the wireless provider's license. We also believe that a non-exclusive, eligibility-based licensing approach is consistent with its statutory authority under section 309(j) of the Act. We seek comment on an overlay licensing approach that would not result in receipt of mutually exclusive applications requiring resolution through competitive bidding. Under the proposal, absent a good faith leasing arrangement, DOCs/solutions providers would be eligible to receive an overlay license to operate on the identical spectrum used in that geographic area by the relevant wireless provider, effectively resulting in spectrum sharing. We therefore propose, pursuant to section 316 of the Act, to modify any and all licenses affected by overlay licensing for jamming solutions, if adopted and made effective, which would eliminate the wireless providers' exclusive use rights to their licensed spectrum in certain limited geographic areas. We seek comment on this proposed modification as applied in the overlay licensing construct.

44. In addition, we seek comment on an approach that would permit more than one applicant to serve a given correctional facility, at a DOC's option, which also results in spectrum sharing in the defined geographic area and the absence of mutual exclusivity. We seek comment on implementing an approach whereby applications for new overlay licenses would be placed in a processing “queue” and would be reviewed and processed in the order in which they are filed.

45. Overlay Licensing Through Part 90. Currently, wireless providers that provide service across several spectrum bands to contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities are regulated through service and technical rules set forth in a number of rule parts, for example, parts 22, 24, 27, 30, 90, and 96. Providers of jamming solutions must necessarily transmit on bands used to provide commercial wireless service to counteract contraband wireless device use in correctional facilities. For administrative ease, we propose to adopt a new, standalone subpart within part 90 of the Commission's rules to address the use of overlay licenses for jamming solutions in correctional facilities, and we seek comment on this proposal. We propose to define “jamming solution” in a new part 90 subpart in the same way as proposed in the leasing rules, and we seek comment on whether there is any reason not to mirror, for overlay licensing purposes, the language ultimately adopted in the leasing construct.

46. Eligibility Restrictions. To effectuate an overlay licensing framework, we propose to limit eligibility to apply for an overlay license to DOCs with authority over the correctional facility for which authority to operate a jamming solution is sought and solutions providers that have entered into a contract with a DOC with authority over the correctional facility for which authority to operate a jamming solution is sought. We also propose that, to be eligible to seek an overlay license for a jamming solution: (1) the entity must have attempted to negotiate a lease arrangement with the relevant wireless provider in good faith; and (2) the wireless provider must have acted in bad faith during the negotiation process resulting in no lease arrangement.

47. Further, we recognize that there may be a fact-specific circumstance where a mix of Commission authorization vehicles for jamming solutions may be necessary. For example, a solutions provider may be able to negotiate lease arrangements with two wireless providers for a given correctional facility, but unable to reach a good faith agreement with a third wireless provider serving that same geographic area. In such a case, we believe it is in the public interest to permit the solutions provider to apply for an overlay authorization for bands/specific frequencies at a given correctional facility for which it has not reached a good faith leasing arrangement, so as to prevent an incomplete spectrum solution in that correctional facility. We seek comment generally on these proposed eligibility restrictions, and on whether we should consider any other eligibility restrictions and/or entry criteria in an overlay licensing model.

48. Overlay Licensing Bands. We seek comment on whether, in an overlay licensing framework, we should limit the authorization of jamming solutions to those bands typically used by wireless providers to provide commercial service to subscribers, identified as “included services” in the leasing context. We seek comment on the inclusion of each band (or block within a band), currently set forth as an included service in its leasing rules, in the proposed overlay license framework. We seek comment on whether the authorization of jamming operations by issuing non-exclusive overlay licenses in bands currently licensed to wireless providers would require an amendment to § 2.106 of the U.S. Table of Allocations, including potentially the addition of a table footnote applicable to relevant bands.

49. License Area. We seek comment on a licensing model in which the overlay license area would be confined to the geographic area affected by the proposed subscriber operation deauthorization rule, so as to comply with section 333 of the Act. We seek comment on permitting an applicant, most likely a solutions provider, to seek authority to transmit in a geographic area that is based upon its agreement with a DOC, which could involve the entire area within the perimeter of a correctional facility or a defined smaller area within the correctional facility. We seek comment on the necessary information and level of detail that should be provided to the Commission in describing the requested license area, for example, the name and address of the facility, the exact coordinates of the leased spectrum boundaries, or a shapefile reflecting the requested area. We also seek comment on the appropriate mechanism by which this information should be provided to the Commission.

50. License Term/Renewal. We seek comment on the appropriate license term if we implement our overlay license proposal. Commercial wireless provider licensees seek certainty and flexibility in implementing their networks and clearly benefit from a 10-year (or in some bands a 15-year) term, for administrative certainty and planning purposes. We seek comment on whether we should issue an overlay license for a shorter period, noting that the Commission has granted shorter license terms in other bands as a means to manage and ensure periodic reevaluation of possible interference issues. Should the initial license term mirror the contractual terms with a DOC for each individual facility to ensure the license authorization does not exceed the jamming solutions provider's contract with the correctional facility? Similarly, we seek comment on the appropriate term to apply for any subsequent license renewal.

51. We also seek comment on how to address compliance with the Commission's renewal standard at the end of any license term. We seek comment on whether to require overlay licensees for jamming operations to make a “renewal showing” consistent with the WRS rules, for instance, certifying that it is operating consistent with its authorization to operate at specific correctional facilities with which the licensee continues to have a contract to perform jamming operations. We seek comment on the costs and benefits of imposing a renewal requirement for these licensees and invite commenters to submit alternate proposals for the appropriate license terms and renewal showings.

52. Regulatory Status. We seek comment on applying the PMRS presumption—similar to the regulatory status that we seek comment on for leasing arrangements—to any overlay licenses issued for the provision of jamming operations as discussed herein. Would applying this presumption to eligible entities in the overlay license model help align with the services to be provided, which are not intended to provide CMRS service as defined in the statute and our rules?

53. Secondary Market Transactions. We seek comment on allowing overlay licensees for jamming solutions to engage in secondary market transactions only where the licensee is engaging in a transfer of control of the licensee, and not permitting assignment, partitioning, or disaggregation to another party. We likewise seek comment on not permitting overlay licensees to lease the non-exclusively licensed spectrum, which is not permitted under current secondary markets rules. Are such limitations necessary in the jamming solutions overlay context, where different considerations may be relevant, including that the request for authority would be limited a relatively small service area of a correctional facility, and that such authority would be available only to entities that meet strict eligibility requirements as a DOC or solutions provider following the failure of good faith leasing negotiations? Or should we permit alienability conditioned upon the assignee, for example, making a showing that it too meets all underlying requirements to be an overlay licensee in this specific, limited context? Commenters should address the costs and benefits of these potential limitations and any alternatives that we should consider.

54. 911 Call Transmission Requirements. We seek comment on whether to refrain from applying the Commission's 911 and E911 rules to PMRS overlay licensees authorized to provide jamming solutions in correctional facilities. We seek comment on whether there are considerations in the overlay license context that are different from considerations in the leasing context with regard to the treatment of 911 for jamming operations. We ask stakeholders to discuss whether it is technically feasible for a licensee that deploys any type of jamming solution to satisfy the requirements in § 9.10 of the Commission's rules, and if not, which particular requirements are not feasible and why.

55. Performance Requirements. Due to the nature of jamming operations, we believe it unnecessary to impose performance requirements on the overlay licensee, and seek comment on this proposal. Although we believe that operation through an overlay license in satisfaction of a contract with a correctional facility for public safety purposes meets our goal of ensuring spectrum usage, we seek comment on whether an overlay licensee should be required to meet some form of construction obligation.

56. We seek detailed comment on the specific technical requirements that we should apply to an overlay license for jamming solutions in correctional facilities. Commenters are requested to provide technical details and analysis in support of any recommended action, including an evaluation of the impact of their proposals on other radio services. Among other issues, these studies and analyses should address how entities seeking to deploy jamming solutions plan to protect co- and adjacent channel, geographically proximate licensees, and also protect out-of-band spectral neighbors from harmful interference. Additionally, commenters should compare their recommendations to the technical requirements applicable to existing licensees as authorized under the pertinent service rules. We seek comment on the challenges and issues that stakeholders have experienced when testing or deploying jamming technology and welcomes the results of technical studies and analyses.

57. We also seek comment on how our proposal to authorize jamming solutions through an overlay license might impact non-contraband devices located within a correctional facility. These include so-called “white-listed devices” approved for use by select correctional facility personnel ( i.e., administrators, corrections staff, on-premises vendors, contractors, medical personnel). We seek detailed comment as to how correctional facilities and solutions providers with which they contract intend to deploy jamming solutions, while limiting the impact to only contraband devices within a correctional facility. Commenters that propose particular techniques to address this issue should also indicate whether their proposal should be incorporated into our technical rules and, if so, provide specific requirements.

58. Power Limits. We seek comment on the appropriate power limits that should be applied to jamming operations in correctional facilities under an overlay license. We seek comment on whether we should apply the power limits applicable to each band in the respective service rules or, in the alternative, implement a uniform power limit for overlay jamming operations. Is there a way to regulate power limits that does not unnecessarily constrain jamming technological advancements, while also allowing for successful operations in a manner that does not create harmful interference to authorized users in widely deployed commercial bands? Should we adopt varying power levels for overlay licenses based on bands in operation, as is done for CMRS licenses today? Should we permit higher power levels in certain geographic areas, such as rural areas, with significantly less power available for jamming solutions operating in non-rural areas? Should we establish power limits for overlay licensee operation based on the size of the correctional facility at issue? Should we apply the power spectral density (PSD) model to transmitters deployed as part of a jamming solution? What are the costs and benefits of taking this approach, which has been implemented to achieve parity amongst varying technologies in the commercial services? Commenters advocating for higher power should also address how much more power they believe is necessary to effectively serve correctional facilities in rural areas, and provide comment on how we should define rural areas in this specific context.

59. Further, should we also generally require overlay licensees to use narrowly tailored means in implementing a jamming solution, which will vary from a technical perspective depending on the particular correctional facility? For example, should we prohibit use of jamming technology across an entire 5G band(s) where a jamming solution could be targeted on the control channel portion of a band, which would require less overall radiated power and potentially reduce the risk of harmful interference to authorized devices? Should we require licensees to adjust their technical parameters contingent on what technology the wireless provider is using in the particular correctional facility, for example, deployments in FDD or TDD bands?

60. Field Strength Limit and Market Boundaries. We seek comment on whether we should adopt a new, uniform field strength or power flux density limit that will apply to jamming overlay licensees, if commenters believe that existing field strength limits set forth in the Commission's rule parts governing commercial wireless services are not sufficient to protect co-channel adjacent market users. We seek comment on whether modified or additional technical protections are required, as well as the costs and benefits of any alternative approach.

61. Intermodulation Interference. We seek comment on the likelihood of jamming operations causing intermodulation interference and what technical solutions, if any, are available to mitigate such interference during the design of a jamming solution. We also seek comment on what methods could mitigate such interference, should it occur after a jamming solution is installed and operating.

62. Interference Resolution Procedures. We seek comment on whether to implement strict responsibility for eliminating harmful interference to authorized devices. Should operators utilizing jamming technologies be required to respond to every complaint of interference to an authorized in-band or adjacent band licensee with full cooperation and utmost diligence to abate objectionable interference in the shortest practicable time? In addition, we seek comment on the appropriate obligations of an operator using jamming solutions following receipt of a complaint of harmful interference to a non-contraband wireless device. Should such an operator be required to immediately shut down all operations until it can ensure that the interference issue has been resolved? Would such an obligation unintentionally allow inmates or other stakeholders to circumvent a jamming solution?

63. We seek comment on whether we should adopt standardized procedures for reporting any such harmful interference and implementing a solution. For example, should we require overlay licensees to establish some type of common electronic means of receiving initial notification of harmful interference complaints from in-band and adjacent band licensees? If so, what information should we require in a complaint? Should we also impose a response time on the overlay licensee? We seek comment on whether we should require overlay licensees receiving an initial notification of harmful interference to perform a timely analysis and identification of the harmful interference, including, whenever necessary, an immediate on-site visit. We ask stakeholders to discuss whether we should consider alternatives or additions to the interference resolution mechanisms discussed.

64. RF Exposure. We propose to require jamming solutions to comply with the RF exposure rules set forth in §§ 1.1307, 2.1091, and 2.1093 of the Commission's rules that outline exposure limits, equipment authorization requirements, and other regulatory requirements that are based on the type of device, how it is deployed or used, the power of its transmissions, and the proximity of its antenna and radiating structures to a person's body. Are there additional provisions we should implement for transmitters utilizing jamming technology? We also seek comment on whether to prohibit any transmitters implementing a jamming solution that are designed to be deployed where the radiating structure(s) is/are within 20 centimeters of the user or other persons, as defined for portable devices in § 2.1093(b) of the Commission's rules.

65. Canadian and Mexican Border Coordination. We seek comment on whether compliance with existing bilateral agreements is sufficient in the context of overlay licensing for jamming solutions, or whether additional limits on transmissions are required to prevent harmful interference to operations across international borders. If commenters believe that additional protections ( e.g., stricter limits, larger coordination distances, or other technical criteria) are required in this regard, we ask for specific technical comments.

66. Other Technical Requirements and Limitations. We seek comment on how other current technical limits for operations in bands commonly used to provide commercial wireless service should be applied to jamming operations in correctional facilities in an overlay licensing framework. For example, should we apply the existing frequency stability, duty cycle, synchronization requirements, and other limits that apply to CMRS base stations and devices, as set forth in the service rules for the respective band of operation, to jamming solutions? If existing technical limits are insufficient to protect against harmful interference, commenters should offer specific limits, with a justification of why those limits are needed and an analysis of how they might impact in-band and adjacent band authorized operations in the bands under consideration. We also seek comment on the applicability to jamming operations of various coordination, notification, and other rules currently applicable to 800 MHz cellular terrestrial base stations to protect public safety operations.

67. Other Licensing and Operational Rules. We seek comment on whether there are any other relevant service rules that we should consider including in an overlay licensing framework for jamming solutions. We invite comment on the costs and benefits associated with authorizing jamming solutions and ask that commenters provide detailed technical and economic data to support their suggestions. We seek comment on whether there are other studies, standards, efforts, or analyses that we should consider in this proceeding. We also invite comment on other possible approaches to authorizing jamming solutions in correctional facilities.

68. We propose and seek comment on a multi-step application process that includes: (1) submission of an application with supporting information demonstrating that the licensee is prepared to deploy an effective jamming solution without causing harmful interference to authorized devices; (2) Commission review of the application and, where in the public interest, an initial grant of a conditional overlay license; (3) satisfaction of the condition of the license grant through on-site testing; and (4) provision of final Commission authority to operate at the facility following successful testing.

69. As an initial step, we propose that an eligible entity seeking an overlay license would be required to submit an FCC Form 601 in ULS that provides: administrative information, a certification regarding its eligibility, a certification that it seeks to deploy equipment as part of a jamming solution with a valid part 2 equipment authorization, a brief description of its jamming solution, the requested technical parameters, the proposed service area and geographic boundaries of the requested license area, and a showing as to how the proposed system will not cause harmful interference to authorized devices. We seek comment regarding what specific additional information should be required to be filed along with the application. Should we require an applicant to file an attachment to its FCC Form 601 sufficiently demonstrating that it attempted to negotiate in good faith, that the wireless provider acted in bad faith during the negotiation process, and that as a result, the parties were unable to enter into a lease agreement? We seek comment on what would constitute a sufficient demonstration of bad faith in the exhibit. Regarding service area, should we require that the applicant submit the name and address of the facility, the specific services to be provided and frequency bands requested, and the service area requested for the overlay license, including specific coordinates and/or map? Should the application include, as an attachment, a copy of the applicant's contract with the DOC to provide jamming services at the particular correctional facility? Alternatively, would it be sufficient for the applicant to provide a certification that a contract with a DOC exists to provide jamming services at the facility? We propose to require an applicant to include a declaration consistent with § 1.16 of the Commission's rules that its application contains truthful and accurate information. Finally, the application would be required to be accompanied by the requisite filing fee, and we propose to treat an overlay license application for jamming solutions as site-based for application fee purposes, given that the area of operation is limited to a specific correctional facility ( e.g., the perimeter of the facility). We seek comment on each of these proposals, including related costs and benefits.

70. Following the initial grant of an overlay license for a jamming solution, as a condition of the grant, we propose that a DOC/solutions provider perform on-site testing at the correctional facility to demonstrate that the system will function as expected and within the boundaries of the overlay license service area, protecting authorized users both within and outside the boundaries from harmful interference. We seek comment on the nature of wireless provider participation in the testing and what details the conditional licensee will be required to provide the Commission following the testing.

71. We seek comment on what information conditional licensees must provide to the Commission to show successful testing and how such information should be provided. Following the filing and Commission approval of the on-site test results, we propose that a jamming solutions provider would be authorized to begin jamming operations. We seek comment on whether, and how often, we should require an overlay licensee to re-test the effectiveness of its system, particularly where technical or operational details of the deployment change in response to wireless provider network adjustments. We seek comment on the costs, benefits, and burdens to potential stakeholders of requiring a jamming solutions provider to obtain conditional authorization, test, and provide test results to the Commission for approval before commencing jamming operations, and of potentially requiring the relevant wireless providers to be part of the solution through mandatory involvement in the on-site testing process, and if so, to what extent.

72. We seek comment on whether there are alternatives to the proposed overlay licensing mechanism that would authorize jamming solutions where good faith leasing agreements cannot be reached. Commenters should include detailed descriptions of their proposals and should discuss the costs and benefits of the approach.

73. We seek comment on whether contraband devices operating in other radio services, such as part 25, or on unlicensed spectrum are a substantial issue in correctional facilities and, if so, on the appropriate means to authorize jamming solutions to address this issue.

74. Part 15 Equipment. We seek comment on whether inmate use of Wi-Fi in a contraband wireless device is a current or anticipated problem in correctional facilities and ask stakeholders to specifically describe the nature of the problem, if any. Commenters should also discuss in detail the types of current or future technologies that are available to block, interfere with, or de-authenticate Wi-Fi transmissions; how the Commission should facilitate the authorization of those technologies; and whether any of these technologies include functions that might enable certain Wi-Fi devices to communicate, while blocking others located in the same limited geographic area. We also seek comment on whether correctional facilities are relying on any unlicensed devices essential for facility operation, such as wireless security cameras, and how these devices can be protected while jamming contraband Wi-Fi devices.

75. Framework for Deauthorization of Contraband Part 15 Devices and Authorizing Part 15 Jamming Solutions. If we determine that jamming solutions should be authorized to cause interference to contraband wireless devices operating on unlicensed spectrum, such as those that communicate using Wi-Fi, we seek comment on the appropriate deauthorization approach to permit such action consistent with section 333 of the Act. We seek comment on whether the definition of a contraband wireless device in § 1.9003 of our leasing rules is broad enough to cover unlicensed devices, such that a cross-reference to the § 1.9003 definition in part 15 is sufficient, or whether we would need to replicate this definition within part 15 to ensure that it is applicable to unlicensed devices. With respect to deauthorization of contraband wireless devices operating on part 15 spectrum, is it necessary to adopt a part 15 provision expressly prohibiting the operation of such devices under part 15? Alternatively, is a rule change unnecessary to comply with section 333 of the Act because part 15 devices already operate without any protection from interference that may be caused by the operation of an authorized radio station? We seek comment on these issues.

76. We seek comment on the appropriate authorization framework for jamming solutions using part 15 spectrum. In lieu of leasing, should we require an operator of a jamming solution intended to prevent unlicensed contraband device use to obtain a part 90 overlay license for authorization to operate such equipment? Should such a license be a separate part 90 authorization for part 15 spectrum use or should it be combined with a more expansive part 90 overlay license that covers a mix of licensed bands, as well as the bands most commonly used by unlicensed devices? Are there other alternatives available to license transmissions for which current operations are authorized on an unlicensed basis? Further, should we take an approach analogous to the procedures proposed herein for licensed operations, where an entity (if acting on behalf of a DOC) seeking such a license would certify that it: (1) has entered into a contractual agreement with a DOC that requires the solutions provider to block or otherwise deny access to unlicensed ( e.g., Wi-Fi transmissions); and (2) is proposing to use equipment that has part 2 equipment authorization? We seek comment on the appropriate licensing requirements for jamming solutions intended to prevent unlicensed devices from communicating and to what extent amendments are needed to parts 15 and 90.

77. Some stakeholders have expressed a belief that transmitting devices that are fully intended to cause harmful interference could arguably operate on commercial bands within the current part 15 rules if their power levels are sufficiently low. We propose that the Commission will not certify transmitter(s) intended for use as part of a jamming solution under part 15 of the rules. Are there other safeguards we should put in place to achieve the same result? We seek comment on these proposals.

78. Technical Requirements. Unlicensed operation is permitted under part 15 rules in multiple frequency bands. We seek comment on the specific bands for which it should authorize jamming solutions for unlicensed devices. Should the rules be flexible to permit jamming solutions for any band where unlicensed devices can operate, which would also include the same bands on which services allocated in the frequency allocation table operate, or only the most commonly used unlicensed bands? How can the Commission ensure that jamming solutions adequately protect unauthorized incumbent users operating on spectrum shared with unlicensed operations?

79. We seek comment on what technical rules should apply to jamming solutions that are intended to prevent unlicensed devices from communicating. We also seek comment on whether a jamming solution operator should comply either fully or in-part with the existing part 15 rules for each band in which it operates. Or should the technical rules for jamming solutions be specific to jamming solutions? We seek comment on the specific rules that either should or should not apply in each band of interest, as well as relevant interference analyses to demonstrate how authorized incumbent users can be protected if a jamming solution is operating nearby and on the same or adjacent spectrum bands.

80. We also seek comment on what interference protection obligations jamming solutions should have with respect to unlicensed device operations that are permitted either within or near a correctional facility. We seek comment on whether the general rule requiring unlicensed devices to accept interference from authorized devices should be amended when such interference is caused by a jamming solution and whether, in such instances, the jamming solution operator should be obligated to adjust its system to ensure that interference to such unlicensed, yet authorized, operations is remedied. We request that commenters provide relevant interference analyses supporting the co-existence between jamming solutions and non-contraband unlicensed devices or justifications for requiring non-contraband unlicensed devices to have to accept interference from a jamming solution.

81. We seek comment on whether contraband devices that operate using part 25 (satellite communications) spectrum is a current or anticipated problem in correctional facilities. We ask stakeholders to specifically describe the nature of the problem and to discuss in detail the types of technologies, whether current or potentially under development, that can block or interfere with part 25 authorized transmissions. How should the Commission facilitate the authorization of those technologies, and do any of these technologies include functions that enable network connections for authorized devices that might be located in a correctional facility? How can these technologies protect other satellite services, including international satellite systems, from harmful interference? Finally, if we determine that we should deauthorize contraband wireless device satellite communications currently authorized under part 25, we seek comment on the appropriate approach to authorizing jamming solutions in the relevant bands.

82. We propose to apply our current procedures to eligible entities for equipment certification regarding equipment to be used as part of a jamming solution in correctional facilities. Specifically, we propose to require entities to comply with existing part 2, subpart J, equipment authorization procedures for certification of equipment used as part of a jamming solution that would be authorized for operation pursuant to our part 1 leasing rules, a part 90 overlay license, or a combination thereof. This would require that RF equipment associated with jamming solutions must be shown to comply with a variety of, and possibly differing, technical rules under various parts of the Commission's rules governing spectrum typically used in commercial wireless networks, including, for example, parts 22, 24, 27, 30, and 96. Because the equipment could also potentially be used under a part 90 overlay license, it would necessarily require a part 90 equipment certification. Importantly, we propose that the Commission will not certify such transmitters under part 15 of the rules to ensure the authorization of jamming solutions does not result in the production, marketing, and sale of unlicensed low-power, hand-held jamming solution devices. We seek comment on this proposal.

83. We seek comment on whether the application requirements of current Commission rule §§ 2.911 and 2.1033 are appropriate in this case or whether specific requirements should be added, modified, or considered inapplicable. We believe that a transmitter used for jamming solutions would fall within § 2.1033(e), which applies to a “composite system that incorporates devices subject to certification under multiple rule parts.” Commenters should target any proposals regarding this rule to the specific issues associated with approving jamming solutions and not generally comment on equipment authorization procedures that could apply to any device. Further, should the testing of equipment used to provide jamming solutions include a method to ensure that it does not operate in any unauthorized bands (not just the bands adjacent to those for which it seeks authorization)? Finally, we propose to include jamming solutions equipment on the “Pre-approval Guidance List,” thus requiring a TCB to process the application in coordination with the Commission in accordance with the Commission's rules.

84. Are any additional procedures necessary to ensure the equipment's ability to comply with the Commission's technical rules? We seek comment on the costs and benefits of applying existing procedures to certifying equipment to transmitters that can be deployed as part of a jamming solution in a correctional facility. We also seek comment on ways the Commission can facilitate, encourage, or require the production of these devices within the United States or United States allied countries. Are there specific actions we should take to mitigate any national security risks posed by jamming solutions that use equipment produced by foreign adversaries or other entities that have been determined to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons?

85. Operation of Equipment Used for Jamming Solutions Prior to Equipment Authorization. We seek comment on whether we should amend § 2.805 to specify that jamming solutions may not be operated for testing purposes, unless and until equipment authorization is obtained. Alternatively, should we adopt more flexible rules to permit testing of jamming solutions prior to equipment authorization, but only through one of two methods: (1) special temporary authority granted by the Bureau; or (2) experimental license granted by OET pursuant to part 5 of the Commission's rules? What are the costs and benefits of either of these approaches or any suggested alternatives?

86. We seek comment on whether we should limit the marketing of transmitters intended for use in jamming solutions directly to DOCs and solutions providers that contract to provide jamming solutions within a correctional facility. If so, what rule changes would be required to limit the marketing of transmitters in this way? What are stakeholders' concerns, challenges, or cost considerations associated with limiting the marketing of transmitters to these entities? Further, should we adopt a specific rule in its marketing rules? Such a rule could set forth the compliance requirements that apply to the responsible party associated with the part 2 equipment certification. If we adopt such a rule, should applicants be required to address compliance with the rule requirements by including a compliance plan in any certification application submitted to a TCB? Should all marketing include clear disclosures that such equipment can only be sold to DOC or solutions provider lessees or overlay licensees for the provision of jamming solutions in correctional facilities? Should specific language be required for the disclosure? Should the marketer be required to verify and retain documentation that any sale is only to a DOC or solutions provider lessee or licensee?

87. To ensure compliance with any marketing restriction that we might adopt, we seek comment on the need for a number of potential requirements the Commission could put on manufacturers dealing with tracking jamming equipment, reporting, and rule enforcement. We also seek comment on whether labeling requirements are necessary, including e-labeling.

88. In addition, we ask whether we should exclude equipment used to provide jamming solutions from exceptions for importing and marketing RF devices prior to equipment authorization, or apply significantly more restrictive limits, while permitting such pre-equipment authorization importation. Alternatively, rather than restricting importation, should we require that equipment intended for use in a jamming solution be manufactured or assembled in the United States to simplify efforts by our federal partners to interdict equipment imported into the United States intended for use outside of the correctional facility context? Should we restrict distribution of equipment intended for use in a jamming solution, such that the equipment may only be shipped directly from the manufacturer to a DOC or solutions provider lessee or licensee?

89. We seek comment on whether it is in the public interest to require manufacturers to employ some type of locking mechanism, if technically feasible, that would prevent any non-eligible entities from using such a transmitter outside of the correctional facilities context. If so, we seek detailed comment on how to accomplish this goal. We seek comment on whether there are other conditions that might be appropriate to prevent transmitters authorized for correctional facility use from being diverted to uses outside of the intended locations and purposes.

90. Phased Implementation. We seek comment on a phased implementation of jamming solutions, such as a pilot program in controlled environments, or an initial restriction to, for example, facilities located in rural areas that might pose an even lower risk of harmful interference. We seek comment on the costs and benefits of phased implementation and on whether this would ultimately help reduce the risk of harmful interference, or whether it would inhibit manufacturers from developing equipment at scale. We also seek comment on appropriate parameters for phased implementation. For example, what is the optimal duration of any such program to draw accurate and valuable conclusions? How should eligible facilities be chosen? Should we prioritize facilities with a greater volume of contraband devices? Can such a program be limited in a way that allows us to proceed cautiously while providing the benefits of representative sampling?

91. Consumer Complaints. We recognize that the public might benefit from specific processes for communicating complaints of harmful interference from jamming solutions. Do wireless providers have effective contacts at correctional facilities or jamming solutions providers that they can work with to resolve issues if they receive complaints from the public? Should the Commission require that correctional facilities and solutions providers establish and publicize a phone number or dedicated email address for complaints from the public or that providers can use when an issue arises? Would the Commission's existing complaints mechanism adequately enable affected persons to file complaints about signal jamming in and around correctional facilities? We also seek comment on our authority to serve complaints on DOCs and/or jamming solutions providers noting that, under our lead proposal, such entities would be operating as lessees on spectrum licensed to common carrier wireless providers. How might the Commission use complaint data to track challenges, resolution, and any consumer issues that might arise from jamming? Is such tracking needed?

92. We seek comment on whether there are other device-based solutions that should be considered for inclusion in the proposed deauthorization framework in addition to jamming solutions. In the context of the proposed deauthorization framework, we invite commenters to refresh the record specifically on the feasibility of geofencing, or geolocation-based denial (and if feasible, whether the Commission should consider mandating that wireless providers eliminate unauthorized devices within correctional facility perimeters), and beacon technology, including whether there have been technological, economic, or policy developments affecting the deployment of these technologies, and whether the Commission can play a role in promoting these tools. We seek comment on specific rules that we should amend or adopt, if any, to promote the use of these technologies as tools available to combat contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities.

93. We seek comment to refresh the record on potential steps the Commission could take to ensure that MAS maintains effectiveness as technology evolve and facilitate MAS deployments. We invite stakeholders to refresh the record on the question of whether it should make any changes to rules in parts 1 and 20 to further streamline the current CIS leasing process. We also seek comment on whether we should amend any procedures in § 20.23, in particular, to further streamline the CIS Phase 1 and Phase 2 processes or make changes to the disabling process.

94. We seek comment generally on whether there are other technologies currently available or under development that could be used in correctional facilities to combat contraband devices. If so, what steps could the Commission take to facilitate deployment of those technologies? We also seek comment on whether there are other studies, standards, efforts, or analyses regarding the effectiveness of CISs or other related solutions that we should consider in this proceeding.

95. The benefits of the proposed rule amendments include reduced criminal activity resulting from inmates' use of contraband wireless devices, which can impact the safety of prison officials and employees, the prison population, and members of the general public. The costs of the proposed rule amendments include the need for considerable stakeholder cooperation and a commitment, particularly from DOCs, to make the expenditures necessary to ensure that jamming solutions are installed, deployed, and maintained in such a manner as to avoid harmful interference to non-contraband devices located outside a correctional facility, as well as non-contraband devices that might be permitted within a particular correctional facility, depending on state or local law or policies ( e.g., devices used by vendors, attorneys, or medical personnel). We seek comment on all costs and benefits associated with adopting the proposals, accompanied by specific data and analysis supporting claimed costs and benefits.

96. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), requires that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings, unless the agency certifies that “the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” Accordingly, the Commission has prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning potential rule and policy changes contained in this Third FNPRM. The IRFA is set forth in Appendix B of the Third FNPRM. The Commission invites the general public, in particular small businesses, to comment on the IRFA.

97. In the Third FNPRM, the Commission aims to strengthen public safety through the removal of regulatory barriers to the deployment and viability of existing and developing technologies that can assist the ability of correctional facilities to stem the use of contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities, which can be used to engage in criminal activity. The proposals contained in the Third FNPRM build upon prior Commission actions and seek to meet our objectives of expanding the scope of technical options available to corrections officials, while simultaneously fostering a collaborative environment among key stakeholders, including DOCs, solutions providers, and wireless providers. To achieve these goals, the Commission seeks comment on a broad range of potential actions intended to help eliminate a continuing public safety threat, reduce regulatory burdens, and also continue the growth of currently deployed technologies, commonly known as CISs, while ensuring that the Commission's rules evolve to afford consistent regulatory treatment across technologies, some of which are operated by small entities.

98. As a first step, the Third FNPRM proposes to deauthorize subscriber operation of contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities. The proposed deauthorization rule is intended to facilitate the use of jamming solutions consistent with section 333 of the Act and is a key step towards permitting corrections officials to engage with wireless providers to use jamming solutions or other technologies in the limited context of combatting contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities. The Commission's lead licensing proposal would involve the participation of wireless providers, so as to help prevent harmful interference to legitimate users, a long-standing wireless industry concern.

99. In addition, the proposed approach ensures that a contraband wireless device located in a correctional facility would not be considered, for purposes of section 301 of the Act, a “station licensed or authorized by or under [the] Act” and, therefore, would not be afforded protection against willful or malicious interference by other technologies, such as jamming solutions, that have been approved under our proposed process. The Third FNPRM proposes to apply the deauthorization rule to subscriber operation of a contraband wireless device that is used in a correctional facility in violation of federal, state, or local law, or a correctional facility rule, regulation, or policy, consistent with the approach that the Commission took in prior decisions to facilitate CISs. The Third FNPRM also seeks comment on only applying a jamming solutions approach to a narrower group of correctional facilities ( e.g., only those located in jurisdictions that impose criminal penalties for possessing or using contraband wireless devices, or for delivering or attempting to deliver those devices to prison inmates).

100. Recognizing that the proposed deauthorization rule would make operation of any contraband wireless device a violation of section 301 of the Act and revised § 1.903(a) of the Commission's rules, the Third FNPRM also proposes to create a “safe harbor” wherein the Commission would take no enforcement action against a wireless provider, to the extent it might be liable, for unauthorized operation of contraband wireless devices in a correctional facility if certain conditions exist. Specifically, the proposed safe harbor would apply to (1) wireless providers licensed in a geographic area where no DOC is actively seeking to implement a technology solution, including jamming, to combat contraband devices; and (2) any wireless provider that is actively participating in good faith negotiations (or has successfully completed such negotiations) with the DOC/solutions provider that is seeking to lease spectrum to authorize operation of a CIS solution, including jamming.

101. The Third FNPRM also seeks to establish the framework whereby correctional facilities or solution providers that contract with them can become authorized to deploy an expanded range of technological solutions to combat contraband wireless devices. The Commission's lead proposal in the Third FNPRM is to authorize jamming solutions in correctional facilities by applying its existing secondary markets framework. The Commission's goal and expectation is that wireless providers will reach agreement with DOCs and solutions providers on lease terms for authorized jamming solutions, in the same way that parties have, to date, successfully negotiated in good faith for CIS deployments. The Third FNPRM seeks comment on, among other things, the types of leases parties may wish to utilize, eligibility criteria, including whether wireless providers should be required to provide jamming technology directly to correctional facilities, and a requirement for good faith negotiations.

102. As a method of last resort, in cases where parties fail to reach a good faith leasing arrangement, the Commission proposes to permit eligible entities to directly apply for a non-exclusive overlay license to deploy a jamming solution in a correctional facility provided certain conditions are met. The Third FNPRM seeks comment on a variety of issues related to the framework for issuing a last resort overlay license, including licensing and operating rules, license term and renewal, application procedures, and technical parameters of the overlay licenses. The Third FNPRM also seeks comment on other issues related to the deployment of jamming solutions. For example, the Commission seeks comment on authorizing jamming solutions on Wi-Fi spectrum and part 25 satellite spectrum, in order to ensure that that the proposed authorization framework is broad enough to include all spectrum that may be used to communicate with contraband wireless devices.

103. In addition, the Commission seeks comment on possible measures to ensure that jamming solutions are limited solely to correctional facilities. For example, the Third FNPRM proposes an express prohibition against certifying any transmitter utilizing jamming solutions pursuant to part 15 of the Commission's rules and against the operation of such equipment under part 15 to ensure that the proposed deauthorization framework does not result in low-power, hand-held jamming devices being produced, marketed, and sold in the United States for use on a part 15 unlicensed basis. The Commission also seeks comment on the appropriate procedures for the certification of equipment used to provide jamming solutions in correctional facilities, and on the extent to which it is necessary to specifically limit the marketing and sale of such transmitters directly to DOCs and solutions providers that contract with them to provide jamming solutions.

104. Given the novelty of the proposed framework, the Commission also seeks comment on a phased implementation of jamming solutions, such as a pilot program in controlled environments, or an initial restriction to, for example, facilities located in rural areas that might pose an even lower risk of harmful interference. The Commission requests specific comment on the costs and benefits of a phased implementation, as well as appropriate parameters for a phased approach. In addition, the Commission seeks comment on whether the public would benefit from specific processes for communicating complaints of harmful interference from jamming solutions, beyond processes currently in place.

105. Finally, the Commission seeks comment on whether there are other device-based solutions that should be considered for inclusion in the proposed deauthorization framework in addition to jamming solutions. In the context of the proposed deauthorization framework, the Third FNPRM invites commenters to refresh the record specifically on the feasibility of geofencing, or geolocation-based denial (and if feasible, whether the Commission should consider mandating that wireless providers eliminate unauthorized devices within correctional facility perimeters), and beacon technology, whether there have been technological, economic, or policy developments affecting the deployment of these technologies, and whether the Commission can play a role in promoting these tools.

106. The proposed action is authorized pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4(i), 4(j), 301, 302, 303, 307-310, 319, 324, and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i), 154(j), 301, 302a, 303, 307-310, 319, 324, and 332, and § 1.411 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.411.

107. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as under the Small Business Act. In addition, the term “small business” has the same meaning as the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act.” A “small business concern” is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.

108. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that are not easily categorized at present. We therefore describe three broad groups of small entities that could be directly affected by our actions. In general, a small business is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees. These types of small businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 34.75 million businesses. Next, “small organizations” are not-for-profit enterprises that are independently owned and operated and not dominant their field. While we do not have data regarding the number of non-profits that meet that criteria, over 99 percent of nonprofits have fewer than 500 employees. Finally, “small governmental jurisdictions” are defined as cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special districts with populations of less than fifty thousand. Based on the 2022 U.S. Census of Governments data, we estimate that at least 48,724 out of 90,835 local government jurisdictions have a population of less than 50,000.

109. The actions taken in the Third FNPRM will apply to small entities in the industries identified in the chart below by their six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes and corresponding SBA size standard.

110. Based on currently available U.S. Census data regarding the estimated number of small firms in each identified industry, we conclude that the adopted rules will impact a substantial number of small entities. Where available, we provide additional information regarding the number of potentially affected entities in the above identified industries, and information for other affected entities, as follows.

111. Experimental Radio Service (Other Than Broadcast). Neither the SBA nor the Commission have developed a size standard for this industry. Experimental Radio Service is a service in which radio waves are employed for purposes of experimentation in the radio art or for purposes of providing essential communications for research projects that could not be conducted without the benefit of such communications. The majority of experimental licenses are issued to companies such as Motorola and Department of Defense contractors such as Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin. Large businesses such as these are the primary applicants for such licenses and may have as many as 200 licenses at one time. For the purposes of this regulatory flexibility analysis, using the SBA's Office of Advocacy's general definition that a small business is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees, the Commission estimates that 30 percent of applications, will be awarded to small entities. The Commission processes approximately 1,000 applications a year for experimental radio operations. About half, or 500 of these are renewals and the other half are for new licenses. We do not have adequate information to predict precisely how many of these are from small entities. However, based on the above figures we estimate that as many as 300 of these applications could be from small entities and could potentially be impacted.

112. The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact of proposed rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance requirements, including an estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirements and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record.

113. In the Third FNPRM, the Commission seeks public comment on a potential framework that would increase the RF options that DOCs could utilize to combat contraband wireless device use in correctional facilities. There are three classes of small entities that might be impacted: correctional facilities, solutions providers, and providers of wireless services. For all of these entities, the Commission first proposes to leverage its existing leasing rules applicable to CISs as much as possible to reduce regulatory burdens and continue expedited processing for these important solutions. With this intent in mind, the Third FNPRM seeks comment on the extent to which the Commission's rules require amendment to effectuate authorization through lease arrangements of transmitters operating on wireless provider licensed commercial spectrum to deploy jamming solutions in correctional facilities. Small and other entities are encouraged to comment on any potential regulatory burdens or costs incurred in connection with these proposals, if adopted. We also encourage suggestions from small and other entities on ways in which the Commission may minimize any required information collections, while ensuring that all parties meet the desired goals of providing an additional tool toward combating contraband wireless device use, and that only non-authorized devices are impacted.

114. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of any significant alternatives to the proposed rules that would accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes, and minimize any significant economic impact on small entities. The discussion is required to include alternatives such as: “(1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small entities.”

115. As discussed above, in the Third FNPRM, the Commission seeks public comment on a proposed framework that seeks to increase the RF options that DOCs could utilize to better combat contraband wireless device use. Additionally, the Commission seeks comment on several regulatory alternatives that might reduce impacts on small entities. For example, the Commission seeks to leverage its current licensing process and existing leasing rules applicable to CISs, which small and other correctional facilities and/or solution providers that contract with correctional facilities have successfully used for more than a decade, rather than creating a completely new paradigm. Many entities that may be interested in participating in the framework proposed in the Third FNPRM may already be engaged in the process of combatting contraband wireless devices by the processes currently available, specifically for CISs. By leveraging the Commission's current spectrum leasing rules, small entities—be they solutions providers, or even the DOCs, as well as wireless providers—will already be familiar with the processes, thereby decreasing any new regulatory burdens and, by extension, minimizing significant economic impact to such entities. The Commission also seeks comment on the alternative of a phased implementation of jamming solutions, such as a pilot program in controlled environments, or an initial restriction to, for example, facilities located in rural areas that might pose an even lower risk of harmful interference. The Commission requests specific comment on the costs and benefits of a phased implementation, as well as appropriate parameters for a phased approach.

116. The Third FNPRM also proposes a safe harbor for wireless providers to avoid potential liability for unauthorized operation of subscriber devices that fall within the proposed deauthorization rule, as well as direct jamming solution authorization mechanisms. The safe harbor will provide wireless providers with assurance that they will not be subject to enforcement action, provided they either: have not received a specific request to lease their spectrum to support the authorization of a jamming solution or, if they have received such a request, they negotiated a good faith leasing arrangement with a DOC or its contracted solutions provider.

117. The Commission invites comment on its proposed deauthorization rule and framework for facilitating the authorization of jamming solutions. Through these comments, the Commission seeks to develop final rules that combat the exigent public safety concerns of contraband wireless device use in correctional facilities, while also minimizing economic and other compliance burdens on small and other entities to the greatest extent possible.

118. To clarify and simplify compliance and reporting requirements for impacted small and other entities, the Third FNPRM also invites comment regarding the prospective needs of the entities and the various approaches that can be taken to accommodate those needs in both a leasing arrangement and in a direct overlay licensing approach. In so doing, the Commission invites small and other entities to help inform on any necessary clarifications and/or simplification of compliance and reporting requirements that should be incorporated in the final rules. Receiving input from small entities will allow the Commission, to the extent feasible, to better consider options that could minimize the impact for these entities.

119. Finally, the Commission finds an overriding public interest in preventing the illicit use of contraband wireless devices by incarcerated people to perpetuate criminal enterprises and therefore does not propose any exemptions for small entities from the potential solutions discussed in the Third FNPRM. If small entities were to be exempted from the selected approach, it is likely that the overall effectiveness of the solution would be reduced which is not consistent with, and is contrary to, the Commission's overarching goal of eliminating the use of contraband wireless devices in correctional facilities. Small and other entities have the opportunity to provide comments on technological, economic, policy, and/or legal developments sufficient to overcome the potential challenges presented by widespread deployment of the various options discussed in the Third FNPRM to combat wireless contraband use in correctional facilities. Importantly, the Third FNPRM gives small entities the ability to submit cost-benefit analyses, comments on economic and other challenges they may face with the potential solutions that have been discussed, and the opportunity to suggest other alternatives for the Commission to consider in any final rules that it may adopt.

120. None.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR parts 1, 15, and 90 as follows:

This is a summary of the Commission's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ) in WC Docket Nos. 25-304, 25-208, 17-97; FCC 25-73, adopted on October 28, 2025, and released on October 29, 2025. The full text of this document is available for public inspection at the following internet address: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-73A1.pdf.

Paperwork Reduction Act: This document may contain proposed new or revised information collection requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on the information collection requirements contained in this document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.

Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act: Consistent with the Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act, a summary of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is available at https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings. To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities ( e.g. Braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530.

Ex Parte Rules: The proceeding this document initiates shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format ( e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.

Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), requires that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings, unless the agency certifies that “the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” Accordingly, the Commission has prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning potential rule and policy changes contained in this NPRM. The IRFA is set forth below. The Commission invites the general public, in particular small businesses, to comment on the IRFA. Comments must be filed by the deadlines for comments on the NPRM indicated on the first page of this document and must have a separate and distinct heading designating them as responses to the IRFA.

We seek comment on the (time-division multiplexing) TDM-based interconnection arrangements that remain in place today for all types of providers. What types of carriers continue to require or employ TDM-based interconnection—for example, large incumbent LECs, small or rural incumbent LECs, competitive LECs, or access tandem operators—and for what services? To what extent are IP-based providers today required to interconnect with incumbent LECs in TDM, even when traffic originates and/or terminates in IP? Are calls still aggregated at TDM access tandems or central offices for routing and transit? Are tandems necessary for routing, or are they an artifact of existing routing arrangements that rely on databases such as the Local Exchange Routing Guide (LERG)? How do carriers exchange TDM traffic today, and do any alternate (non-tandem) interconnection arrangements exist? We ask commenters to describe the typical TDM network topology in use ( e.g., local switches, tandems, SS7 signaling points, 911 selective routers), including any legacy functions that depend on TDM interconnection and the classes of providers and categories of service recipients that rely on those arrangements.

1. How do interconnection arrangements between LECs for local traffic differ from arrangements between incumbent LECs and interexchange carriers for long-distance traffic? How do interconnection agreements between other types of providers work, and how do they differ from those governed by section 251(c)? For example, how do competitive LECs interconnect with other competitive LECs? How do competitive LECs interconnect with mobile carriers? How do competitive LECs interconnect with rural telephone companies? How do mobile carriers interconnect with each other or with rural telephone companies? How do interexchange carriers interconnect with mobile carriers or rural telephone companies? Are there subgroups of carriers that should be examined differently? For example, are there some competitive LECs that function as interconnection points, similar to the tandems of incumbent LECs, and are their interconnection arrangements different from competitive LECs that serve a local market? Recognizing that incumbent LEC switched access lines encompass only 3.1% of the voice telephony market, we seek further comment how often interconnection arrangements are actually facilitating the origination or termination of traffic on the legacy public switched telephone network and how often section 251(c)(2) interconnection arrangements are leveraged for the transit of calls to other networks.

We also seek comment on where TDM interconnection actually occurs. Currently, under section 251(c)(2)(B), an incumbent LEC must allow a requesting telecommunications carrier to interconnect at any technically feasible point. The Commission has interpreted this provision to mean that competitive LECs have the discretion to interconnect at multiple points or just at a single point of interconnection (POI) in a given local access and transport area (LATA). We seek comment on where these TDM POIs are located within the network, and how are they geographically distributed. How many TDM POIs are still in use, and how concentrated are these POIs among networks? Do different categories of providers tend to use different types of POIs? For instance, do large incumbent LECs primarily interconnect at their tandems, while smaller competitive and rural LECs rely on third-party tandem hubs or other arrangements? We invite commenters to detail how many POIs exist in a given region and how they are used. For example, how many TDM tandems are active, how many end offices interconnect directly, and to what extent are carrier hotels and other centralized POIs used? Finally, are most, if not all, TDM POIs resident in facilities that do not have SIP POIs? And if so, does this place a burden for providers in transitioning to an all-IP SIP interconnection point with one or more providers?

What are the operational or financial impacts of TDM interconnection arrangements on competitive carriers, particularly rural and small LECs, and those that have already transitioned to all-IP networks? We note concerns that ending incumbent LECs' section 251(c)(2) interconnection obligations could shift new cost among carriers. We therefore seek comment regarding current TDM interconnection practices of small and rural carriers. Do rural telephone companies currently avail themselves of section 251(c)(2)? What interconnection costs do these providers face under existing rules? Are there potential system-wide efficiencies and cost savings from an all-IP network? Are any small and rural carriers now required to interconnect at an IP POI, and if so, under what cost arrangements? What interconnection arrangements do carriers subject to the rural exemption under section 251(f)(1) or (f)(2) have for TDM or IP voice services? Given that such carriers, despite being incumbent LECs, are largely exempt from section 251(c)(2), how do those arrangements with competitive LECs differ from other such interconnection arrangements?

We also seek comment on the architecture of hybrid connections between IP networks and legacy TDM networks, and on the effect of such network arrangements on interconnection agreements. In a typical scenario, an IP-originated call is handed off to a TDM network, or vice versa, requiring media and signaling gateways at the IP-TDM boundary to handle protocol conversions. How often are calls that originate or terminate on the PSTN converted to VoIP for transport and interconnection, and vice versa? Where in the network is the IP-to-TDM or TDM-to-IP conversion occurring? Which providers deploy VoIP-to-TDM and TDM-to-VoIP gateways when calls are exchanged between networks, which providers are responsible for the protocol conversions, and where are these gateways located? What carriers own and operate those gateways, including emergency services gateways that connect to selective routers, and signaling links? How is traffic routed through the TDM portion ( e.g., via which tandem switches or trunks), and who bears the costs of these conversions and transport? Do certain incumbent LECs offer interconnection in both TDM and IP, and if so, at what frequency?

We seek comment on the volume of voice traffic still transiting legacy TDM networks. We ask commenters to quantify the remaining TDM usage that providers carry or expect to carry in the near term. For example, what percentage of calls or trunks in providers' networks remain on TDM switches? What service categories ( e.g., legacy telephone lines, business T-1/PRI, alarm and elevator lines, 911 services) are still provisioned via TDM, and why have they not yet transitioned to modern alternatives? (“T-1” refers to a physical transmission line standard in North America for digital voice and data services. “PRI,” or “Primary Rate Interface,” refers to a high capacity digital voice and data service delivered over a T-1 line.) To what extent do carriers still offer stand-alone local exchange and/or long-distance service? How relevant is the distinction between local exchange and long-distance service to today's consumers? How often do voice service customers choose a long-distance carrier that is unaffiliated with their local exchange carrier? We ask that commenters provide any data or studies on TDM traffic volumes by category, if possible.

We seek comment on the technical, financial, and regulatory factors that account for the persistence of TDM architectures in our nation's networks. Are there statutory or public safety-related mandates that have effectively required maintaining circuit-switched networks? To what extent do state-level regulatory requirements compel certain carriers to maintain legacy TDM infrastructure or continue offering TDM-based service? To what extent do the costs associated with upgrading networks to IP account for providers' continued reliance on TDM interconnection arrangements? To what extent do certain providers operate IP networks for their own services but rely on TDM solely for interconnection? We seek comment on the contexts and services for which carriers, utilities, and government agencies assert TDM must be maintained alongside IP to prevent disruption to critical services. Despite significant industry progress in transitioning to all-IP networks, some observers have previously noted that certain critical services still depended on existing TDM infrastructure to function, and that complex issues related to these services must be addressed before the IP transition can be completed. For example, the Department of Transportation has emphasized that the Federal Aviation Administration's Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) network “is heavily dependent on obsolete 1960s TDM technology across over 30,000 services at 4,600 sites.” To what extent do infrastructure or emergency services currently continue to rely on TDM circuits for critical applications like aviation communications, railway operations, industrial process control, infrastructure monitoring, rural call completion, public safety radio backhaul, or selective routing for legacy 911 networks? Are there other known over-the-top services, such as medical monitors, security alarms, or point of sale terminals, that still use and/or require TDM facilities? Are there commercially available alternatives that could be used, should TDM interconnection become unavailable? We ask that commenters provide detailed examples of such TDM-reliant services, as well as traffic volume estimates, to the extent possible. Are there technical, financial, security, or other practical reasons to maintain certain technologies, in an all-IP world? What specific portion(s) of the network must be TDM to accommodate TDM-reliant services?

We seek comment on current carrier practices and arrangements for IP-to-IP interconnection for voice services. Today's IP-based voice networks often use managed IP cores and session border controllers (SBCs) to carry VoIP calls end-to-end. When an IP-initiated call must transit a TDM network, the VoIP call is handed off via a media gateway to TDM at the network edge. We seek comment on the current network architecture underlying IP interconnection for interconnected VoIP services—how has it evolved since the Commission first took action to promote IP-to-IP interconnection for voice services? In referring to “interconnected VoIP service,” we include those services elsewhere deemed “IP-enabled voice service.” For example, do carriers exchange traffic via Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) trunks, public internet gateways, or private IP networks? How often do carriers use IP-to-IP peering to interconnect directly in IP versus indirectly via IP “tandems” or intermediate providers? How are commercial arrangements for direct IP voice interconnection structured? Do carriers need to individually negotiate each direct connection agreement? What are the costs associated with interconnecting directly over IP compared to exchanging voice traffic over existing internet connections? What protocols and quality-of-service (QoS) mechanisms ensure voice quality?

Some stakeholders have previously noted that voice traffic can be routed and exchanged over the public internet—is the “best efforts” QoS model sufficient to preserve existing voice quality? What mechanisms, protocols, or redundancies are available or in place to prevent voice service disruption when there are network outages or unusual strain on a network's capacity, such as during a natural disaster? How does call routing work when voice traffic is exchanged over the public internet? How are IP addresses and routing handled at IP POIs? Is the Domain Name Service (DNS) used within or between providers in support of SIP? Or, are IP addresses manually set for static routes between points set by a provider? Are there concerns about hijacking of IP address prefixes used for border gateway protocol (BGP) routing? We seek comment on any QoS, latency, or interoperability issues that have arisen in current IP voice interconnection. Are there technical barriers to IP interconnection that the Commission should address and what types of providers are impacted? Commenters should describe in detail the network layers and equipment used in VoIP interconnection today.

We also seek comment on how interconnection practices vary by size, type of provider, and network technology. For example, are small or rural incumbent LECs offering direct IP interconnection at the same frequency as larger incumbent LECs? What percentage of rural carriers have deployed IP facilities and services in their networks, and are they currently providing, or capable of providing, VoIP services? Have competitive LECs and cable operators generally adopted IP-to-IP interconnection, and if so, what models do they use? How do wireless carriers interconnect for Voice over LTE (VoLTE) traffic, and do they require special gateways? Do VoIP providers interconnect directly, or do they rely on their carrier partners? Do large incumbent LECs and rural incumbent LECs also currently offer IP interconnection? What types of providers currently have direct IP interconnection agreements, and how do these agreements account for different network architectures and regulatory status? For cases involving intermediaries, such as third-party IP tandems or transit providers, what role do these intermediaries play, and how widely are such services used?

We also seek comment on the types and number of IP interconnection agreements for interconnected VoIP service that exist today, and how parties to those agreements treat technical and financial issues. For example, in past proceedings, some parties have noted that carriers historically have relied primarily on the LERG and local number portability database (Number Portability Administration Center—NPAC) to route calls, but these databases cannot identify SIP endpoints. Additionally, other parties have previously noted that the preference to route calls to the VoIP provider's competitive LEC partner via PSTN trunks, rather than to the VoIP provider directly, has hampered the implementation of VoIP interconnection. Are these issues still relevant in the context of current IP interconnection arrangements, and if so, how have parties responded to these challenges? How do providers allocate the cost burdens of exchanging IP traffic? How do interconnection arrangements accommodate features like number portability, caller ID authentication, and emergency calling (911)? Are there regulatory burdens or other transaction costs that have stymied the growth of such arrangements in the voice market? We recognize that IP interconnection implicates certain regulatory issues stemming directly from the legacy TDM framework, including intercarrier compensation, access charges, and universal service. While this item is focused on the technological and regulatory frameworks for interconnection the Commission will address other issues as appropriate in separate items. Are carriers negotiating new IP interconnection contracts, or modifying existing TDM agreements? How do state requirements regarding TDM interconnection affect the negotiation and implementation of IP interconnection agreements? Are there other factors affecting negotiations that the Commission has not considered? What lessons can be drawn from providers or states that have made substantial progress toward IP-only infrastructure?

In a legacy TDM world, carriers tend to interconnect at many local central offices and tandems. By contrast, IP networks can span larger regions and aggregate traffic at fewer POIs, such as carrier hotels and internet exchanges. We seek comment on where interconnection for interconnected VoIP traffic is happening today and between which types of carriers. One industry report notes that national carriers have negotiated traffic exchange at a small number of POIs, such as carrier hotels, rather than on a per-LATA basis. Is this the current trend, and if so, why? How do parties negotiate the POIs? Do the location and use of POIs vary with the size and type of provider or modality ( e.g., wireline or wireless)? At how many physical POIs do VoIP providers currently exchange traffic with other voice providers and where are these POIs located? Are IP voice POIs co-located with TDM POIs, or are they separate? Are there regional interconnection hubs or multiple local interconnects per area? To what extent are carriers exchanging traffic over the public internet, and where are the POIs located in such arrangements? We ask that comments provide data or estimates on the number and location of current IP POIs.

We also seek comment, specifically, on the effect of recent Commission efforts to facilitate the NG911 transition on current IP interconnection arrangements and the role of TDM architecture during the NG911 transition. In the 2024 NG911 Order, the Commission adopted rules requiring originating service providers (OSPs) to take steps to transition from legacy analog 911 technology to the IP-based NG911 system. Pursuant thereto, OSPs, upon a “valid request” for delivery of 911 traffic in IP-based format by a 911 Authority, must follow a two-phase process for transitioning to NG911. In jurisdictions that have submitted valid requests under the Commission's NG911 transition framework, would NG911 Delivery Points for the delivery of 911 traffic in an IP format to ESInet or other NG911 network facilities play a role in facilitating the IP transition? Has the ongoing transition to NG911 impacted providers' existing interconnection arrangements, and if so, how? How do IP interconnection agreements for interconnected VoIP account for providers' obligations to implement NG911? To what extent does deployment of NG911 promote IP interconnection arrangements? Do any providers rely on existing TDM interconnection to prevent disruption to emergency communications pending completion of the NG911 transition, and what alternative arrangements can be used in these situations? Commenters should address the interplay between any continuing TDM needs for jurisdictions that have not begun or completed the transition to NG911 and interconnection agreements. In what other ways has the NG911 transition affected IP interconnection arrangements for voice service? Commenters should explain in detail the interplay between the NG911 transition and the current state of IP interconnection for interconnected VoIP.

We invite comment on the costs to incumbent LECs of complying with sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6) of the Act and our rules implementing those provisions, sections 51.305, 51.321, and 51.323, and their impact on the IP transition. We observe that the additional interconnection obligations imposed under section 251(c) of the Act can create heavy burdens for incumbent LECs. These costs can in turn divert resources away from investments in high-speed communications infrastructure, slowing the transition to all-IP networks. Consequently, we seek comment on these observations and on whether forbearance from these additional requirements will speed the move away from TDM-based technologies.

What kinds of expenses—capital, operating, or otherwise—do the additional interconnection mandates found in section 251(c) of the Act impose? On whom, and to what extent? Does the asymmetry in regulatory duties between competing carriers and incumbent LECs encourage investments in outmoded TDM technologies? For example, Digital Progress Institute contends that section 251(c)'s requirements necessitate that incumbent LECs design and maintain outdated TDM facilities, facilities in which they claim competing carriers invest further to gain a regulatory advantage. At the same time, CCA argues that smaller carriers' dependency on incumbent LECs to route their calls stymies IP network investments because smaller carriers must “subtend[] [incumbent LECs'] non-IP tandem facilities.” We seek comment on what burdens carriers, particularly small and rural carriers, face as a result of section 251(c)'s requirements. For example, what costs must carriers bear in converting IP voice traffic to TDM? From TDM to IP? What costs must competing carriers bear in having to interconnect in TDM? How should the Commission evaluate competing costs among different categories of providers? Do these costs for carriers impede the IP transition? How would carriers otherwise allocate resources associated with section 251(c)'s additional interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs? To the extent that resources would be otherwise allocated towards speeding up a carrier's IP transition, how much more quickly could a move to all-IP networks occur? Do these requirements inhibit certain types of commercial agreements that could benefit consumers? Would a determination that interconnection for the exchange of VoIP traffic is not subject to the requirements of section 251(c) facilitate the negotiation of VoIP interconnection agreements? Finally, what kinds of state and local laws and regulations exist for interconnection, and what kinds of costs do they impose?

We propose to forbear, as of the adopted sunset date, from section 251(c)(2) of the Act, forbear from section 251(c)(6) of the Act to the extent it requires incumbent LECs to provide for physical collocation of interconnection equipment, and eliminate our rules implementing those statutory provisions (47 CFR 51.305 (interconnection); 47 CFR 51.321 (methods for obtaining interconnection and access to unbundled elements); 47 CFR 51.323 (standards for physical collocation and virtual collocation)). Below, we seek comment on whether the forbearance criteria outlined in section 10 of the Act have been met. Additionally, we seek comment on the extent to which we should forbear from section 251(c) of the Act, how the Commission should potentially modify its rules, and what steps could be taken to mitigate any potential harm to critical infrastructure services and consumers that may result from forbearance.

Section 10 of the Act requires the Commission to forbear from applying any requirement of the Act or of our regulations to a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications carriers or telecommunications services, if the Commission determines that: (1) enforcement of the requirement “is not necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or regulations by, for, or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory”; (2) enforcement of that requirement “is not necessary for the protection of consumers”; and (3) “forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent with the public interest.” Satisfaction of all three criteria mandates forbearance. With respect to the third prong, the Commission must consider “whether forbearance from enforcing the provision or regulation will promote competitive market conditions.”

Ensuring practices are just and reasonable (section 10(a)(1)). Were we to forbear from section 251(c)(2) and section 251(c)(6) (to the extent it requires incumbent LECs to provide for physical collocation of interconnection equipment) and eliminate the Commission's implementing rules, incumbent LECs would no longer be subject to additional interconnection requirements not imposed on other kinds of carriers. We believe that these requirements are no longer necessary to ensure that interconnection practices for voice services are just and reasonable and not unreasonably discriminatory. We believe changes in the marketplace since the passage of the 1996 Act's monopoly-ending provisions have reduced competing providers' reliance on incumbent LECs in provisioning service to their customers. In the span of a little over 20 years, reliance on legacy networks has dropped precipitously: the number of reported end-user switched access lines declined from 181 million to just 18 million, far fewer than the 64.5 million interconnected VoIP subscriptions or 288.3 million mobile subscriptions reported in June 2024. Consequently, we seek comment on whether incumbent LECs continue to have the ability or the incentive to engage in the kinds of harmful practices typically associated with a monopoly power with respect to retail voice service, and whether it is still necessary to differentiate incumbent LECs from other carriers with regard to interconnection. We also seek comment on whether interconnection needs could be met pursuant to sections 201 and 251(a).

To what extent, if any, are these additional requirements for incumbent LECs still necessary to ensure providers' practices remain just and reasonable? Assuming carriers cannot avoid interconnecting with incumbent LECs, would incumbent LECs have incentive to take advantage of that? Do incumbent LECs still exert sufficient control over the marketplace to do so? How does the balance of negotiating power differ among the providers today and would that negotiating power change depending on whether the proposals herein are adopted? Absent Commission regulations, would disputes arise between incumbent LECs and competing carriers that could lead to access issues, such as for terminating access or selective router access for 911? Do the Commission's 911 service rules affect LECs' pricing power over facilities used to route 911 calls? How does the Act's collocation requirement ensure just and reasonable practices, if at all? How does the transition of providers' networks to IP affect the necessity of the Act's collocation mandate? Are there any cost savings for incumbent LEC from not having to collocate equipment?

Ensuring protection of consumers (section 10(a)(2)). We seek comment on whether enforcement of these statutes and regulations is necessary for the continued protection of consumers. We believe that the Act's additional interconnection requirements for incumbent LECs are no longer necessary for consumers' protection given the explosive growth in competition from competitive carriers and interconnected VoIP service providers. We believe that such competition renders the kinds of consumer protections afforded by sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6) unnecessary. We seek comment on this belief. With incumbent LECs' need to compete on more even grounds as a result of their eroded market dominance, we do not anticipate rate increases by incumbent LECs or that other costs would otherwise be absorbed by consumers. Do commenters agree? Does forbearance risk stranding consumers, as alleged by NCTA? Would forbearance expose consumers to disruptions, discontinuation of voice service, or otherwise affect carriers' ability to provide service? Are there concerns specific to customers of small and rural carriers? What role does our collocation requirement play, if any, in continuing to protect consumers?

Consistent with the public interest (section 10(a)(3)). We believe that forbearance from the Act's additional interconnection requirements for incumbent LECs would be consistent with the public interest, in part by improving market competition and ultimately encouraging the transition to modernized networks and services. As outlined above, we seek comment whether burdening incumbent LECs alone with direct interconnection obligations for retail voice service continues to make sense given their lack of dominance in the market. Rather, we seek comment on whether incumbent LECs no longer possess especial leverage in negotiating with competitive LECs or in competing for customers, and whether competitive carriers' stronger market position today enables them to negotiate agreements to interconnect and collocate their equipment in the absence of rules requiring as much. We also seek comment on whether the Act's current requirements distort the market unnecessarily by shifting costs almost entirely to incumbent LECs rather than allowing the parties to negotiate their distribution. By forbearing, we would seek to remedy this distortion and in turn improve market competition. Do commenters agree with our assessment? Is this analysis of the market correct? Do competitive carriers today face challenges in interconnecting with incumbent LECs, particularly in IP? Should we consider whether large incumbents can leverage other services to exact market concessions from smaller providers? Do incumbent LECs ever refuse outright to interconnect in IP or otherwise resist interconnecting outside of TDM? If so, to what extent is this the result of incumbent LECs' additional interconnection obligations under 251(c)? Would forbearance encourage interconnection in IP? What incentives exist for incumbent LECs to interconnect with competitive LECs and other competing providers in TDM versus IP?

We also believe that forbearing from the Act's additional interconnection requirements for incumbent LECs would free up resources for use in development and deployment of next-generation networks, promoting the public interest and counseling in favor of forbearance. Do commenters agree? Do we need to forbear from any section to support the transition to IP? Would forbearance assist in ending the digital divide, whether through hastening the IP transition or otherwise? What other benefits might inure to the public as a result of forbearance? Would forbearance need to be tailored in any way to accommodate the particular needs of small or rural carriers, and if so, how? What harms to the public interest do commenters anticipate, if any, and are they outweighed by the benefits resulting from increased competition, more efficient networks, and availability of additional resources for next-generation high-speed networks?

Extent of forbearance. We further seek comment on whether the Commission should forbear from section 251(c)(2) entirely or whether we should only partially forbear to the extent that section 251(c)(2) imposes obligations on incumbent LECs interconnecting in TDM, specifically. That is, to the extent that section 251(c)(2) could be read to authorize the FCC to newly impose additional requirements on incumbent LECs when they interconnect with other carriers for the exchange of IP voice traffic, we seek comment on whether the Commission should preserve that possibility by tailoring the scope of its forbearance. As outlined above, we seek comment whether incumbent LECs hold a specially advantaged position in the market relative to their competitors in the exchange of IP-based traffic. Is our analysis of the competitiveness of the market correct? How do we account for the continued existence of bottlenecks in voice markets? How does any of the foregoing forbearance analysis differ if we were to only partially forbear from section 251(c)(2)? Are there other reasons the Commission should maintain the possibility of additional obligations for incumbent LECs in the IP context? Do carriers rely on our rules implementing section 251(c)(2) when they interconnect for the exchange of VoIP traffic? Absent section 251(c)(2), what would happen to interconnection arrangements reliant thereon? If the Commission were to only partially forbear, how should the Commission approach making any changes to our implementing rules?

Commission rules. We seek comment on how the Commission should address its implementing rules in light of the proposed forbearance. Could the Commission delete §§ 51.305, 51.321, and 51.323 outright? Are there reasons to maintain those rules, whether in whole or in part? If the Commission partially forbore from sections 251(c)(2) and (6) of the Act, and did not eliminate its rules implementing those sections, would any changes need to be made? Would other sections of the Commission's rules require reevaluation or amendment in light of their deletion or modification?

Interruptions to 911 service. We also seek comment whether forbearing from the interconnection and collocation requirements in section 251(c)(2) and (6) create any risk of interruptions to 911 service. As we noted recently, there are areas where 911 authorities and OSPs have either not begun or have not yet completed the transition to NG911 and continue to rely on legacy selective routers and other TDM-based infrastructure for delivery of 911 calls to public safety answering points (PSAPs). Some commenters have suggested that delivery of 911 calls could be disrupted if carriers of 911 traffic lose access to critical TDM circuits in the 911 call path and are not provided sufficient opportunity to establish alternate IP connections to those facilities. To what extent do carriers rely on the interconnection and collocation rights in sections 251(c)(2) and (6) to obtain access to selective routers and other critical 911 circuits? Is there a risk that incumbent LECs may refuse access or charge unfair prices if we exercise forbearance? If we sunset incumbent LEC interconnection and collocation obligations under sections 251(c)(2) and (6) on December 31, 2028—as we propose below—will that provide carriers sufficient time to secure long-term access to alternative facilities that support routing and delivery of 911 calls? We seek comment on whether any additional safeguards are needed to ensure the continuity of 911 service. For example, should we carve out an exception to our forbearance for interconnections and collocations at a selective router? Should the Commission, on a case-by-case basis, direct incumbent LECs to interconnect or allow collocation when necessary to preserve 911 service? On what basis would the Commission have the authority to do so?

Mitigating harm to critical infrastructure services. We seek comment on how the Commission can avoid any harm to critical infrastructure services in forbearing from interconnection and collocation obligations specific to incumbent LECs. Would forbearance affect the ability of critical infrastructure industries, government agencies, or public safety entities to maintain operations and services? If so, how and to what extent? Can the Commission take steps to mitigate any potential harms? For example, should forbearance from these obligations be conditional, or include a carveout for interconnection and collocation arrangements that are used to provide services to public safety entities or critical infrastructure purposes?

Full implementation of section 251(c) of the Act (section 10(d)). Section 10(d) of the Act requires the Commission to determine whether the requirements in section 251(c) of the Act “have been fully implemented” before forbearing from its provisions. We believe that section 251(c) of the Act has been fully implemented, and seek comment on this view. The Commission has previously concluded that full implementation occurred when its implementing rules went into effect. The D.C. Circuit upheld this conclusion in Qwest Corp. v. FCC. We seek comment on any current and relevant aspects of the fully implemented requirement. We further seek comment on whether the Commission's determination in the Qwest Forbearance Order that section 251(c) has been fully implemented constitutes the best reading of the statute, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Loper Bright.

We propose to forbear from the interconnection obligations specific to incumbent LECs under sections 251(c)(2) and (6) of the Act, as well as our rules implementing those provisions, as of December 31, 2028. We seek comment on our proposal. We believe that this date provides sufficient time for affected parties to make any necessary alternative arrangements. Importantly, we note that sunsetting incumbent LEC-specific interconnection obligations is not tantamount to a prohibition on TDM interconnection. Incumbent LECs, like other providers, could continue interconnecting in TDM, and all telecommunications carriers would still bear the duty to interconnect pursuant to sections 201 and 251(a) of the Act.

Do commenters agree with our proposal? We seek comment on the costs and benefits of establishing December 31, 2028 as the sunset date. If commenters believe that a different date would be more appropriate, what criteria should the Commission use in evaluating the feasibility of a given date? Should there be a single date by which all incumbent LECs' additional interconnection obligations under section 251(c)(2) and (6) are sunset, or should the Commission stagger its sunsetting of these requirements? Do the particular challenges of small and rural carriers necessitate a different or tailored approach? What other dates do commenters propose, and what are the costs and benefits associated with those dates? What other factors or issues should the Commission take into account when determining a sunset date's feasibility? Is this timeframe feasible for seamless accessibility-related transitions?

We seek comment on what changes carriers will need to make to their networks prior to our proposed date of December 31, 2028, for forbearance. What steps must be taken, both by incumbent LECs and the providers with which they interconnect? What steps do small and rural carriers, specifically, need to take, and what are the associated costs? What steps would other relevant parties, such as those that provide critical infrastructure services, need to take? Should the Commission establish intermediate deadlines by which certain benchmarks must be met, e.g., if we imposed requirements on establishing new or modified agreements? Are there any kinds of benchmarks we should establish after the sunset date?

We also seek comment on how existing agreements might be affected. For example, change-in-law provisions of a contract might allow for renegotiation of terms or establish the means by which to resolve disputes. Do providers anticipate modifying existing interconnection agreements or entering into new agreements? What opportunities or challenges might arise? How does the balance of negotiating power differ among the providers today and would that negotiating power change depending on whether the proposals herein are adopted? Would forbearance from certain requirements be likely to necessitate renegotiation of existing agreements, or are those agreements likely to remain unaffected by forbearance? Do small and rural carriers anticipate particular challenges with making arrangements following the elimination of our additional interconnection requirements for incumbent LECs, such as by needing to lease third-party networks or services or purchase equipment and other technology for network upgrades? Are there any steps the Commission should take to prevent unnecessary disruption and costs to providers while they make preparations to transition their networks and agreements?

Other Commission timelines. Additionally, we seek comment on whether and how setting December 31, 2028 as the date certain for ending incumbent LEC-specific interconnection obligations will affect other related and adjacent timeframes adopted or being considered by the Commission. As discussed below, the Commission has previously established or proposed timelines for matters that may affect providers' transitions of their networks to IP. Simultaneously, we recognize that the additional interconnection obligations imposed on incumbent LECs under sections 251(c)(2) and (6) may affect the parties' willingness or ability to interconnect in IP. How should the timeframe for forbearance account for our other timeframes? We specifically seek comment in the context of NG911, caller ID authentication, and technology transitions.

First, we seek comment on the effect of our NG911 requirements on any proposed date certain for ending incumbent LEC-specific interconnection obligations. We note that although the Commission declined to “reference any specific standard or set of standards as part of the codified definition of NG911,” at least one of the commonly accepted standards envisions an end-state NG911 as contingent on ubiquitous IP networks. Would forbearing from sections 251(c)(2) and (6) to the extent described above impact changes being made to upgrade networks to IP and deploy NG911 systems? How else might deployment of NG911 affect the feasibility of our proposed sunset date for additional interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs, or vice versa?

Second, we seek comment on extending the two-year timeframe proposed in the Non-IP Caller ID Authentication NPRM, which would give providers two years to either upgrade their networks to IP or to implement a non-IP caller ID authentication solution, to December 31, 2028, or whatever sunset date we ultimately adopt. We believe that aligning the dates of our proposals in this manner best facilitates the goals of each item and avoids any inconsistencies or redundancies that might otherwise arise. Do commenters agree? What other considerations should we take into account in light of the Non-IP Caller ID Authentication NPRM' s proposals?

Third, we seek comment on the effect our proposals in the Technology Transitions NPRM would have on sunsetting additional interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs. Do these proposals bear on our proposed date of December 31, 2028? Or vice versa? Specifically, how does the timing of our streamlining or forbearance proposals in the Technology Transitions NPRM affect setting a date for ending incumbent LECs' additional interconnection obligations? What are the implications of forbearing from section 251(c)(5) before, concurrently, or after forbearing from sections 251(c)(2) and (6)? Are there other considerations about which the Commission should be mindful?

We seek comment on whether forbearing from section 251(c)(2) and from section 251(c)(6) (to the extent it requires incumbent LECs to provide for physical collocation of interconnection equipment) and eliminating the Commission rules implementing those provisions would require updating other Commission rules or bear on other statutory frameworks. For example, our numbering rules require an interconnected VoIP provider that has obtained an authorization for direct access to numbering resources from the Commission to demonstrate that the applicant is or will be capable of providing service to the area within sixty (60) days of the numbering resources activation date—often referred to as “facilities readiness”—before obtaining North American Numbering Plan (NANP) numbers. The Commission has explained that an interconnected VoIP provider can satisfy that requirement by providing (1) a combination of an agreement between the interconnected VoIP provider and its carrier partner and an interconnection agreement between that carrier and the relevant LEC, or (2) proof that the interconnected VoIP provider obtains interconnection with the PSTN pursuant to a tariffed offering or a commercial arrangement (such as a TDM-to-IP or VoIP interconnection agreement) providing access to the PSTN. We seek comment on whether an IP-to-IP interconnection agreement for local call exchange should be sufficient under section 52.15(g)(2), if the Commission were to adopt its proposal to forbear from interconnection and related obligations under sections 251(c)(2) and (6) of the Act. We note that in 2023 the Commission declined to revise section 52.15(g)(2) to specify additional documentation, instead retaining flexibility to consider each application. Is that approach still appropriate now, or should our rules explicitly recognize IP-based interconnection as fulfilling the requirement? Would interconnection to the PSTN still be necessary? Are there other numbering administration matters that providers would need to address before and after a transition to IP interconnection, such as call routing, number assignments, and toll-free routing? In the event that we grant relief from incumbent LEC-specific interconnection obligations, are there any changes necessary to the definition of interconnected VoIP?

Do LECs leasing remaining UNEs pursuant to section 251(c)(3) require interconnection pursuant to section 251(c)(2) and § 51.323 of our rules? To what extent would ending such interconnection obligations have the practical effect of eliminating remaining incumbent LEC UNE obligations? If they do, is this a desirable result? We invite comment on whether our rules governing UNE loops, subloops, network interface devices, or other legacy elements would need to be revised or forborne from.

While the NPRM we adopt today focuses on interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs and immediately related issues, we note that the Commission's rules related to tariffing and access charge requirements stem directly from the legacy TDM framework; we intend to address any such related issues as needed in separate future items. In this item, however, we welcome commenters' views on any other rules or sections of the Act that might be rendered obsolete or redundant by the elimination of incumbent LEC-specific interconnection obligations. We also ask commenters to identify any provisions (for example, in sections 251(b)(1)-(4) or 252 of the Act, Parts 51 or 52 of our rules, or elsewhere) that should be updated or clarified, or from which we should forbear. For example, should we eliminate any requirement that local exchange carriers offer presubscribed interexchange providers and the information-sharing requirements associated with that requirement? Does the strict distinction between local and long-distance service, and associated concepts like presubscribed interexchange carriers and LATAs continue to make sense in an all-IP world?

We seek comment on whether and how the Commission should modify its regulatory framework for interconnection to account for IP voice services. As the Commission has previously stated, “[i]t is important that any IP-to-IP interconnection policy framework adopted by the Commission be narrowly tailored to avoid intervention in areas where the marketplace will operate.” Today, carriers can freely negotiate how IP-to-IP interconnection occurs absent heavy-handed Commission regulation. We seek comment on whether there has been any demonstrated need for Commission intervention. Have market incentives proved sufficient to meet the needs contemplated by Congress and the Act? Do any carriers possess sufficient market power to pressure other carriers into accepting unfavorable interconnection terms?

Does the regulatory framework established for traffic exchange under section 251(a) continue to make sense for IP-to-IP interconnection for voice services, or should it more closely resemble the light-touch regulatory approach taken in other areas, including internet traffic exchange? How does the network architecture for interconnected VoIP differ from that of best-efforts internet? Do any particular technical characteristics counsel toward or away from the need for Commission oversight of interconnection for VoIP service? To what extent might the current dynamics of the IP-to-IP voice interconnection marketplace change if we forbore from the TDM interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs under sections 251(c)(2) and (6)? Are there aspects of section 251(c)(2)'s framework that are needed in an IP interconnection environment, and if so, who should those aspects apply to? For example, is the incumbent LECs' responsibility to exchange TDM traffic within existing LATA boundaries appropriate for VoIP traffic today? If so, given that incumbent LECs serve approximately one fourth of all wireline subscriptions, should that burden fall exclusively on one part of the market (such as today's incumbent LECs or comparable carriers) or on all VoIP operators? What protections are needed to ensure secure and efficient delivery of VoIP calls? How should any IP interconnection framework for general voice traffic account for the existing NG911 framework and its requirement for carriers to hand off 911 traffic in IP at designated points of connection within each state? To what extent would a transition to an all-IP infrastructure affect accessibility for people with disabilities? Are there still devices or services, such as TTY or speech-to-speech, that require TDM technology? We invite detailed comment on how the Commission should account for these issues and those raised below.

Scope of traffic and services. We seek comment on the scope of traffic and services that a framework specific to IP-to-IP interconnection for voice traffic should encompass. Should the Commission distinguish between managed or facilities-based VoIP and over-the-top VoIP? Should the Commission's framework encompass all U.S. domestic voice providers that use NANP resources? Are there any definitional or other challenges that exist in attempting to categorize the different types of VoIP traffic? How can we avoid any regulatory asymmetries that could distort the market or otherwise harm consumers? Would adopting an IP interconnection framework for interconnected VoIP traffic compel providers to exchange VoIP traffic under different technological or legal arrangements from those that providers use to exchange other IP traffic? Could the interconnection framework be structured to provide certain interconnection rights with respect to the exchange of VoIP traffic, or certain types of VoIP traffic, while giving providers the freedom to exchange other IP traffic as they are doing now? What impact, if any, would such an approach have on any preexisting arrangements for the exchange of voice or non-voice IP traffic?

We also seek comment on whether any such regulatory framework should distinguish between different types of carriers. For example, should our rules differentiate between incumbent LECs, rural LECs, competitive LECs, or interconnected VoIP providers, particularly if providers interconnect through the internet and not through individual incumbent LEC switches in multiple LATAs? Do other classes of providers, such as originating versus terminating, require specific rule subsets? Does the type of VoIP service provided— e.g., facilities-based versus over-the-top—warrant or necessitate different regulatory schemes?

Duty to interconnect. We seek comment on whether the Commission should adopt rules to require carriers to interconnect in IP, specifically, for voice traffic. Should the Commission mandate that carriers provide direct IP-to-IP interconnection? Alternatively, should the Commission require IP-to-IP interconnection but permit carriers to do so indirectly? Should the Commission require carriers to make an IP address available on public internet at which it will receive voice traffic, and should such a requirement be instead of or in addition to a direct interconnection requirement? Should the Commission prohibit incumbent LECs from requesting that other carriers or VoIP providers exchange traffic in TDM, or alternatively, require the provider requesting TDM interconnection to bear the costs of conversion of IP traffic? Should the Commission prohibit carriers from distinguishing between different types of traffic or providers in its receipt of voice traffic? What requirements would the Commission need to specify if it undertook any such approach? What are the benefits and drawbacks of these various alternatives?

We seek comment whether the Commission should impose certain baseline requirements, such as particular terms and conditions, on IP-to-IP interconnection agreements. Does the application of terms like “just and reasonable” under section 201 and “not unjust or unreasonably discriminatory” under section 202 of the Act differ in an all-IP context? If so, how? How otherwise might any VoIP interconnection obligation differ from that currently imposed on incumbent LECs and other telecommunications carriers in the TDM context? Would incumbent LECs and interconnecting carriers need to specify a date by which there could no longer be changes to existing TDM interconnection arrangements, or to certain terms in those agreements, in preparation of a proposed sunset date? Would a numbering directory similar to that required for telecommunications relay services (TRS) under § 64.613 of our rules allow IP-to-IP traffic to be easily routed in the absence of direct interconnection agreements? What would the costs and benefits of any of the approaches outlined above be? For small and rural carriers, specifically?

Duty to negotiate in good faith. We also seek comment on whether the Commission should impose additional or specific requirements for IP-to-IP interconnection for voice service related to a carrier's duty to negotiate in good faith. The Commission has previously recognized that the “duty to negotiate in good faith has been a longstanding element of interconnection requirements under the Communications Act,” irrespective of the “network technology underlying the interconnection, whether TDM, IP, or otherwise.” The Commission in 2011 espoused its expectation that all carriers negotiate in good faith in response to requests for IP-to-IP interconnection for the exchange of voice traffic and that such good faith negotiations will result in interconnection arrangements between IP networks. We seek comment on whether the Commission's expectation has been realized in the past decade and a half. Was the Commission's stated expectation sufficient to ensure that IP interconnection arrangements for the exchange of voice traffic came to fruition in a timely manner? If not, how can the Commission ensure that all providers of voice services negotiate in good faith in response to requests for IP-to-IP interconnection for the exchange of voice traffic?

IP voice traffic POIs. We seek comment on whether the Commission should determine POIs for VoIP in an all-IP world. If so, how would the Commission do so? Could or should the Commission require POIs in each state, region, or tandem, or at certain “technically feasible” points? How does the concept of technical feasibility apply in end-to-end IP networks? Does the concept of LATAs continue to make sense in an all-IP world? By comparison, how many interconnection points do providers use to interconnect with the internet? Should the Commission limit the number of required POIs? We seek comment on what role, if any, the Commission should play in developing a POI framework for IP interconnection for voice services, and on approaches that do not impose overly prescriptive regimes that detract from the efficiencies of IP networks. Could or should the Commission require interconnection at existing NG911 Delivery Points where they exist? Would doing so interfere with a state's ability to determine the configuration of their emergency services networks? What call routing requirements are needed, if any, to ensure continued functionality of services such as E911 or 988? Should the Commission require certain categories of voice traffic be managed? What should be the role of technical standards-setting bodies in developing a framework for IP interconnection?

Exchanging VoIP traffic over the public internet. We seek comment on whether the Commission can and should encourage the exchange of IP voice traffic over the public internet. What efficiencies could be derived through exchanging IP-based voice traffic over the internet? Would individually-negotiated contracts be needed? Are there voice carriers today that do not have existing connections to the internet for the provision of consumer internet connectivity to their customers? We seek comment on what tools would need to be developed to efficiently implement such a solution. For example, how would call routing work? Would a database connecting phone numbers to a carrier gateway's IP address need to be developed? Would such a database require technical standards work, and are there any efforts on this front already underway?

Role of states. Finally, we seek comment on what role states should play, if any, in VoIP interconnection and on the landscape of state regulation of IP-to-IP interconnection today. Has any state role been necessary for the establishment of IP interconnection agreements for voice traffic to date? What equities do the states have in ensuring efficient interconnection of intrastate and interstate voice traffic? What role should the Commission play in overseeing any state regulation of VoIP interconnection? Have state actions with respect to VoIP interconnection been consistent with federal policy? Have they been helpful, or a hindrance, to promoting the IP transition? We seek comment whether the Commission should exercise preemption authority over matters related to interconnected VoIP interconnection. If the Commission adopts rules for a framework for IP-to-IP interconnection, should those rules limit the states' role in IP-to-IP interconnection, or prohibit states from attaching certain conditions to IP interconnection negotiations and agreements?

To the extent that a regulatory framework governing interconnection for IP voice services is necessary, we seek comment on the best authority under which the Commission could or should adopt rules or requirements to govern IP interconnection for voice services. We also seek comment on which authority is most consistent with our statute as a whole. Specifically, we seek comment on the particular statutory authority that would provide the strongest basis for any interconnected VoIP interconnection framework we might adopt. We also seek comment on how to carefully circumscribe the scope of traffic or services subject to any such framework to leave issues to the marketplace that appropriately can be resolved there.

However, the Commission has not broadly determined whether Voice over internet Protocol (VoIP) providers are “telecommunications carriers,” whether VoIP services, including interconnected VoIP, are “telecommunications services” or “information services,” or whether VoIP services constitute “telephone exchange service” or “exchange access” for the purposes of interconnection rights under sections 201 and 251. Under Commission rules and precedent, providers of interconnected VoIP service may in certain circumstances be treated as telecommunications carriers. For example, the Commission and states have recognized that interconnected VoIP providers may seek designation as Eligible Telecommunications Carriers (ETCs) to participate in universal service programs, so long as they voluntarily hold themselves out as common carriers and meet the applicable requirements. Commission precedent suggests that the statutory terms defining section 251's scope are not confined to legacy TDM-based offerings, but rather turn on the functional nature of the service regardless of protocol. The Commission's technology-neutral reading of these definitions is also consistent with how the Commission has approached interconnection rights under section 251 in the context of IP-based voice services. In the USF/ICC Transformation Order, the Commission observed that “interconnection requirements [under section 251] are technology neutral—they do not vary based on whether one or both of the interconnecting providers is using TDM, IP, or another technology in their underlying networks.” Although the Commission refrained from explicitly ruling that IP-to-IP interconnection is mandated under section 251, it found that the statutory language was neutral on its face as to the underlying network technology, and encouraged parties to negotiate such arrangements in good faith.

Section 251(a)(1). Section 251(a)(1) requires all telecommunications carriers to interconnect either directly or indirectly. The requirements of this provision extend broadly to all telecommunications carriers, and are technology neutral on their face with respect to the transmission protocol used for purposes of interconnection. Can the Commission require providers of voice service to interconnect in IP under section 251(a)? Could the Commission rely on section 251(a)(1) to require IP interconnection between facilities-based interconnected VoIP providers that have not been classified as either a telecommunications service or an information service under the Act?

We seek comment whether section 251(a) provides the Commission authority to adopt rules, if necessary, requiring providers of voice service to make interconnection arrangements for the exchange of voice traffic in IP, and to negotiate good faith arrangements for the same.

To that end, we seek comment on whether providers of interconnected VoIP service are or could be telecommunications carriers (or common carriers). As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained in NARUC II, “the primary sine qua non of common carrier status is a quasi-public character, which arises out of the undertaking `to carry for all people indifferently.' ” The court went on to explain that the second prerequisite to common carrier status, “formulated by the FCC with peculiar applicability to the communications field,” is that the system be such that customers transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing. We seek comment on whether providers of interconnected VoIP service are common carriers under this test.

While the Commission has not affirmatively classified all VoIP offerings as either a telecommunications service or information service, it has nonetheless recognized that providers may elect to offer interconnected VoIP as a telecommunications service. We thus seek comment on whether the Commission must classify all interconnected VoIP as a telecommunications service in order to regulate interconnected VoIP providers as telecommunications carriers, given that the Act states that a “telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.” Can providers of interconnected VoIP service avail themselves of section 251(a) by offering interconnected VoIP service on a common carrier basis? If so, do both sides of IP-to-IP interconnection need to be offering VoIP on a common carrier basis for the section 251(a) interconnection obligations to apply? Do both sides need to agree that the VoIP service is being offered as a common carrier service? To ensure that any carrier seeking the benefits of such a classification also accepts the accompanying burdens (such as the section 251(a) duty to accept interconnections from others), should we require a carrier seeking to offer VoIP on a common carrier basis to do so throughout their territory or throughout an entire state? We also seek comment whether, if a carrier elects to offer such VoIP services as telecommunications services, and does so without changing the rates, terms, or conditions of service for the customer, it should be viewed “as a transition of underlying network technology, analogous to a provider undertaking a switch migration.”

Section 201. The Commission has historically imposed interconnection obligations pursuant to section 201 of the Act. We seek comment on whether section 201 provides the Commission authority to mandate IP interconnection obligations for voice traffic, including for intrastate traffic—either alone, or in conjunction with, other provisions of the Act—under the interconnection frameworks we explore today. Section 201(a) imposes a duty on “common carrier[s]” engaged in “interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio” to “establish physical connections with other carriers” in cases where the Commission finds it necessary or desirable in the public interest. (We observe that the Commission found interconnected VoIP to a be a jurisdictionally mixed use service in the Vonage Order, and determined that it was not possible to separate out the purely intrastate uses from the interstate uses.) Section 201(b) further requires that all “charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for or in connection with common carrier service” be just and reasonable and not unjust or unreasonable. Section 201(b) also permits the Commission to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of” the Communications Act. We seek comment whether these provisions provide the Commission authority to adopt rules, if necessary, requiring providers of voice service to make interconnection arrangements for the exchange of voice traffic in IP, and to negotiate good faith arrangements for the same. Is this approach most consistent with the best reading of the statute? Does the fact that section 251 specifically governs interconnection bear on whether section 201 can authorize regulations governing IP interconnection? We observe that section 251 includes a savings provision specifying that nothing in section 251 “shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect the Commission's authority under section 201.” What is the import of this provision in evaluating our authority of section 201(a) with respect to IP interconnection? Could regulations addressing VoIP interconnection be grounded in our authority that “[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for or in connection with [common carrier] service shall be just and reasonable”? Would a section 201 approach be limited only to interstate and foreign communications?

Section 251(c)(2). Were the Commission to forbear from 251(c)(2) with respect to TDM services, we seek comment whether section 251(c)(2) could provide the Commission the authority to address IP-to-IP interconnection. First, we observe that section 251(c)(2)'s direct interconnection obligations only extend to some incumbent LECs (not rural telephone companies nor mobile carriers nor competitive LECs) and requesting telecommunications carriers (other than interexchange carriers) seeking interconnection with them. Given this framework, would it be appropriate to ground any IP-to-IP interconnection obligations for voice services in the Commission's authority under section 251(c)(2)? If so, would the Commission need to classify VoIP services as telecommunications services for section 251(c)(2) to govern interconnection for IP voice services under this provision? Or would it be sufficient that a VoIP provider held itself out as providing its service on a common carrier basis? Relatedly, we also seek comment whether interconnection for the exchange of VoIP traffic would be “for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access.” Or to put it differently, if the Commission did classify VoIP as a telecommunications service, would section 251(c)(2) apply, if so, to whom and in what respect? And assuming it did apply, should the Commission nonetheless forbear from applying section 251(c)(2) to VoIP?

Section 256. We also seek comment on whether section 256 of the Act provides the Commission authority to regulate IP interconnection for voice service. Section 256(a) states that the purpose of the section is “to ensure the ability of users and information providers to seamlessly and transparently transmit and receive information between and across telecommunications networks.” The Commission “shall establish procedures for Commission oversight of coordinated network planning by telecommunications carriers and other providers of telecommunications service for the effective and efficient interconnection of public telecommunications networks used to provide telecommunications service.” To what extent does this section provide a source of authority for regulation of IP interconnection given the statement in section 256(c) that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed as expanding or limiting any authority that the Commission may have under law in effect before February 8, 1996”?

Section 227b. We seek comment on whether section 227b provides authority for rules governing IP interconnection for voice services. Pursuant to section 227b(b)(1), all voice service providers are required to implement the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication framework in their IP networks, and the Commission has extended that obligation to intermediate providers. Providers must also take reasonable measures to implement an effective caller ID authentication framework in their non-IP networks, but are not required to do so until a non-IP caller ID authentication framework has been developed and is reasonably available. In applying these provisions, the Commission requires voice service providers to either upgrade their entire networks to IP and fully implement STIR/SHAKEN or participate in efforts to develop a non-IP caller ID authentication framework. Section 227b(b)(5)(D) requires the Commission to “take reasonable measures to address any” burdens or barriers to the implementation of STIR/SHAKEN or a non-IP caller ID authentication framework, and to “enable as promptly as reasonable full participation of all classes of providers of voice service and types of voice calls” in these frameworks. We seek comment on whether regulating IP interconnection would be a reasonable measure to address the burdens and barriers of STIR/SHAKEN implementation as necessary to enable full participation in the framework as promptly as reasonable.

Ancillary Authority. We seek comment whether the Commission can rely upon ancillary authority as a basis for an IP interconnection regulatory framework. The Commission may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission's general jurisdictional grant under Title I of the Act covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities. Regarding the first prong, because interconnected VoIP services are “communications by wire or radio,” the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction over IP traffic such as packetized voice traffic. With regard to the second prong, the D.C. Circuit in Comcast held that the Commission's use of ancillary authority must be linked to express delegations of regulatory authority. The Commission has previously relied in part—though not exclusively—on ancillary authority to apply certain of Title II's obligations to interconnected VoIP service—including obligations pertaining to section 222 customer proprietary network information (CPNI), local number portability, USF contribution, Form 499 regulatory fees, section 255 disability access and TRS, section 214 discontinuance, outage reporting, truth-in-billing, and Form 477 reporting.

We seek comment whether any requirements the Commission might adopt to regulate interconnected VoIP interconnection would be reasonably ancillary to the Commission's exercise of its authority under a statutory provision, such as sections 201, 251(a), (e), 254, 615a-1(b), 617(d), or other authority. For example, would the failure to make arrangements to interconnect, directly or indirectly, for the exchange of voice traffic in IP be reasonably ancillary to the Commission's authority to ensure that all practices in connection with common carrier services be just and reasonable under section 201? Would adopting an IP interconnection regulatory framework be ancillary to the Commission's obligation to enforce telecommunications carriers' duty to “interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers?” Is maintaining Commission oversight over interconnection for exchange of voice traffic ancillary to the Commission's authority over 911 emergency access? Similarly, under the New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008 (NET911 Act), IP-enabled voice service providers are required to provide 911 service and enhanced 911 (E911) service in accordance with Commission requirements, and have a right to interconnect with entities that provide such capabilities on the same rates, terms, and conditions as that provided to CMRS providers. Further, the Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (CVAA) authorizes the Commission to implement regulations necessary to achieve reliable and interoperable communication that ensures access to an IP-enabled emergency network by individuals with disabilities, where achievable and technically feasible. We seek comment on whether oversight over IP interconnection arrangements for voice service would be ancillary to the Commission's authorities for 911, including its obligation under the CVAA and its obligations to modify regulations implementing the NET911 Act “from time to time, as necessitated by changes in the market or technology, to ensure the ability of an IP-enabled voice service provider to comply with its obligations” under the statute, observing that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to permit the Commission to issue regulations that require or impose a specific technology or technological standard.”

Alternatively, or in addition, we seek comment on whether the Commission should adopt regulations pertaining to interconnection for VoIP services by relying on ancillary authority in conjunction with its authority under section 254. Section 254 provides that “[a]ccess to advanced telecommunications and information services should be provided in all regions of the Nation,” and that the Commission's universal service programs “shall” be based on this and other enumerated principles. Section 254(c)(1) states that “[u]niversal service is an evolving level of telecommunications services that the Commission shall establish periodically under this section.” Section 254(b) requires the Commission to base policies for the preservation and advancement of universal service on access to “advanced telecommunications and information services.” We seek comment whether rules to ensure interconnection of networks for the exchange of IP voice traffic would be ancillary to the Commission's obligation to enable advanced telecommunications services to be provided in all regions of the nation. Are there other sources of statutory authority to which interconnected VoIP interconnection obligations are ancillary? Finally, if the Commission were to rely on ancillary authority to impose requirements, would it also need to adopt associated complaint procedures, or could the existing informal and formal complaint processes, which derive from section 208, be interpreted to extend more broadly than alleged violations of Title II duties?

Classification of Interconnected VoIP Service. For any proposed IP interconnection framework, we also seek comment on whether it is necessary, or appropriate, to address classification issues associated with facilities-based or over-the-top interconnected VoIP service. In particular, to the extent that an entity that historically was classified as an incumbent LEC or other telecommunications carrier ceased offering circuit-switched voice telephone service, and instead offered only interconnected VoIP service, we seek comment on whether that entity would remain a “local exchange carrier” or “telecommunications carrier.” The Act defines a “local exchange carrier” as “any person that is engaged in the provision of telephone exchange service or exchange access.” The Act defines the term “telephone exchange service” as “(A) service within a telephone exchange, or within a connected system of telephone exchanges within the same exchange area operated to furnish to subscribers intercommunicating service of the character ordinarily furnished by a single exchange, and which is covered by the exchange service charge, or (B) comparable service provided through a system of switches, transmission equipment, or other facilities (or combination thereof) by which a subscriber can originate and terminate a telecommunications service.” The term “exchange access” means the offering of access to telephone exchange services or facilities for the purpose of the origination or termination of telephone toll services. In the universal service context, the Commission has found that, insofar as a carrier elected to offer VoIP on a common carrier basis, it “did not see a reason why such service would not also be classified as telephone exchange service and exchange access to the same extent as traditional voice telephone service.” Would this same reasoning apply in the context of interconnection for VoIP services?

As mentioned above, the Commission has not determined whether interconnected VoIP services are “telecommunications services” or “information services.” To what extent would the Commission need to classify interconnected VoIP service as a “telecommunications service” under the Act to require voice providers to negotiate IP interconnection agreements for interconnected VoIP services or set other rules or requirements for IP-to-IP interconnection for VoIP services? The Act defines “telecommunications service” as the “offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used,” and defines “telecommunications” as “the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without any change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.” We seek comment whether interconnected VoIP service is most appropriately classified as a “telecommunications service” under the best reading of the Act. Should all VoIP services be subject to Title II classification, or should we limit our actions to interconnected VoIP services? If so, why? Alternatively, are some offerings of VoIP (or interconnected VoIP) provided on a common carrier basis and others provided on a private carriage basis? If so, how should we distinguish them, both as a matter of law and as to what legal obligations should be imposed on each?

Were the Commission to classify interconnected VoIP service as a telecommunications service, from what provisions of Title II should the Commission forbear with respect to interconnected VoIP service? Should the Commission forbear from provisions of Title II that it has thus far not found necessary to impose on interconnected VoIP service? We seek comment on whether there is any evidence of market failure in the provision of such VoIP services, or whether broader Title II regulation of VoIP services is otherwise necessary to protect consumers or ensure that rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable. If there is no evidence of market failure, we seek comment whether it would be in the public interest to forbear from all Title II requirements other than those the Commission currently applies to VoIP service. Alternatively, we seek comment on whether the Commission should align any forbearance for VoIP services with the forbearance granted to commercial mobile radio services.

Other Sources of Authority. Finally, we seek comment on any other sources of Commission authority for adopting a policy framework for IP interconnection for interconnected voice services. What would be the scope and substance of the Commission's authority to address IP interconnection under that authority?

Benefits. We seek comment on the benefits of forbearing from our specific interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs and on any potential regulatory framework for IP interconnection. As outlined above, the Commission believes that its current regulatory scheme imposes various costs on providers, whether on incumbent LECs or otherwise. We also anticipate that elimination of these burdens will, among other things, speed deployment of next-generation networks and services. We seek comment on the likely benefits of eliminating these costs, as well as any other benefits resulting from sunsetting our additional interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs.

What regulatory costs will incumbent LECs avoid as a result of such deregulation? Carriers in general? What effect would the absence of Commission intervention have on market competition? What impact could the other proposals herein have on competition? Does our current interconnection regime promote anticompetitive conduct, and would its elimination promote affordability of voice services or improved service offerings? How might small and rural carriers and their customers, in particular, benefit? What other benefits will inure to the public as a consequence? Do commenters believe, as the Commission anticipates, that eliminating incumbent LECs' additional interconnection obligations will hasten the IP transition? How should the Commission account for increased investment in next-generation networks in evaluating the benefits of forbearance? How will providers and the public benefit from ending carriers' reliance on expensive (and frequently stolen) copper, as well as TDM equipment that may be difficult to source? How does the cost of maintaining copper, TDM, and legacy facilities generally compare with the cost of maintaining a modern all-IP network, and does that analysis have implications for high-cost universal service programs? Are there national security implications from ongoing sourcing of second-hand TDM equipment from potentially unsecure supply chains, and how should the Commission evaluate the benefits of transitioning toward an all-IP world? Are there other security benefits to an all-IP world, or ending legacy protocols such as SS7, that would benefit consumers? Specifically, how should the Commission account for the potential benefits of faster adoption of IP-based NG911 and improved implementation of STIR/SHAKEN for the reduction robocalls? Would any state and local laws and regulations undermine these benefits? What kinds of new technologies or services might emerge, and how should the Commission measure the resulting benefits? In addition to enhanced services, do commenters expect carriers to pass along cost savings to customers in the form of reduced prices? What other parties may benefit from our forbearance from incumbent LEC's additional interconnection obligations, and in what ways? We seek quantifications of any expected benefits.

Costs. We recognize that there may be potential costs resulting from forbearance from incumbent LECs' specific section 251(c) interconnection obligations, including the potential to strand customers where service may no longer be practicable for carriers. Additionally, we acknowledge that forbearance from our collocation requirements for incumbent LECs may impose costs on competitive LECs that previously were borne by the former. These costs may include incurring both capital and operating expenditures. We seek comment on the extent of these costs and any others that may result from the elimination of our additional interconnection rules for incumbent LECs, including for competitive and rural providers and their customers. Could forbearance have a negative impact on competition? We also seek comment on whether there any technical or policy issues the Commission should be aware of that could arise as carriers transition from TDM to IP as a result of our proposals. For example, for carriers that have not fully converted to IP calling, would there be a need to convert their existing TDM traffic to IP? What would the burdens of such conversion be? What are the costs and burdens imposed on other carriers by those that have not converted their traffic to IP? What costs would be associated with any potential regulatory framework for IP interconnection? What costs might this order place on emergency services that currently continue to rely on TDM circuits for critical applications? In particular, we seek comment on the potential costs to small and rural carriers and their customers. We also seek analysis that includes quantification of these risks.

As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA) the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the policies and rules proposed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ( NPRM ) assessing the possible significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Commission requests written public comments on this IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments specified on the first page of the NPRM. The Commission will send a copy of the NPRM, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA). In addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register .

The NPRM seeks to accelerate the transition of our Nation's communications networks to all‐internet Protocol (IP) technology by examining our incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC)-specific interconnection requirements. Changes in the communications marketplace have altered how providers deliver services to consumers. To reduce regulatory burdens that hinder providers from investing in and deploying next-generation networks, the NPRM seeks comment on the current state of time division multiplexing (TDM) and IP interconnection for voice services, and on the costs to telecommunications carriers of complying with sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6) of the of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules implementing those provisions, and their impact on the IP transition. The NPRM proposes to forbear from incumbent LEC-specific interconnection and related obligations in sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6), and to eliminate the Commission's rules implementing those provisions, by December 31, 2028. The NPRM also seeks comment on whether forbearing from sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6) would require updating other Commission rules or statutory frameworks. The NPRM seeks comment on whether and how the Commission should modify its regulatory framework for interconnection to account for IP voice services, and on the scope of the Commission's authority to regulate IP interconnection under any such framework. The NPRM further seeks comment on the benefits of forbearing from the Commission's specific interconnection obligations for incumbent LECs and on any potential regulatory framework for IP interconnection. Finally, the NPRM seeks comment on the potential costs that may result from the elimination of the Commission's additional interconnection rules for incumbent LECs, including the costs to small and rural carriers and their customers.

The proposed action is authorized pursuant to sections 1-4, 201, 251(a), 251(c)(2), 251(c)(6) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151-54, 201, 251(a), 251(c)(2), 251(c)(6).

The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. The RFA generally defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” “small organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.” In addition, the term “small business” has the same meaning as the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act.” A “small business concern” is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA. The SBA establishes small business size standards that agencies are required to use when promulgating regulations relating to small businesses; agencies may establish alternative size standards for use in such programs, but must consult and obtain approval from SBA before doing so.

Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that are not easily categorized at present. We therefore describe three broad groups of small entities that could be directly affected by our actions. In general, a small business is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees. These types of small businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, which translates to 34.75 million businesses. Next, “small organizations” are not-for-profit enterprises that are independently owned and operated and not dominant their field. While we do not have data regarding the number of non-profits that meet that criteria, over 99 percent of nonprofits have fewer than 500 employees. Finally, “small governmental jurisdictions” are defined as cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special districts with populations of less than fifty thousand. Based on the 2022 U.S. Census of Governments data, we estimate that at least 48,724 out of 90,835 local government jurisdictions have a population of less than 50,000.

The rules proposed in the NPRM will apply to small entities in the industries identified in the chart below by their six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes and corresponding SBA size standard.

Based on currently available U.S. Census data regarding the estimated number of small firms in each identified industry, we conclude that the proposed rules will impact a substantial number of small entities. Where available, we also provide additional information regarding the number of potentially affected entities in the above identified industries.

The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact of proposed rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance requirements, including an estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirements and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record.

The NPRM seeks comment on proposals that, if adopted, we expect will reduce reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements, as small and other carriers would then be subject to fewer regulatory burdens. In the NPRM, we first propose to end incumbent LECs' interconnection obligations under section 251(c)(2) and (c)(6) of the Act, as well as our rules implementing those provisions on December 31, 2028. We propose to forbear, as of the sunset date, from section 251(c)(2) of the Act, partially forbear from section 251(c)(6) of the Act, and eliminate our rules implementing those statutory provisions, by which incumbent LECs would no longer be required to meet additional interconnection obligations or provide collocation of interconnection equipment. The NPRM seeks comment on the costs and benefits of these proposals, or of commercial or other arrangements, needed for providers that may require additional time to transition to IP technology, and whether small carriers face specific challenges resulting from eliminating interconnection requirements, such as needing to lease third-party networks or services to interconnect in IP. For example, through comments received in response to the NPRM, we seek to ascertain the potential cost of forbearance to small and rural competitive LECs from our collocation requirements previously borne by incumbent LECs. We then seek comment on whether forbearing from sections 251(c)(2) and (c)(6) would require updating other Commission rules that might be rendered obsolete or redundant by the elimination of incumbent LECs' interconnection obligations. The NPRM also seeks comment on whether the Commission should establish a regulatory framework for IP-to-IP interconnection for voice traffic and what such a framework would look like, and any related costs and benefits for small carriers.

We expect that the proposals in the NPRM will decrease regulatory burdens on small and other carriers, and also free up resources for use in development and deployment of next-generation networks. This would reduce costs and technical complexity associated with maintaining parallel TDM and IP-based networks, and reduce reporting and recordkeeping requirements associated with legacy networks, such as the requirement to file notices of network change. While we do not anticipate that these carriers will need to hire professionals to comply with the proposals herein, we request comments specific to any potential burdens or costs small entities may incur in connection with these requirements.

The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of any significant alternatives to the proposed rules that would accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes, and minimize any significant economic impact on small entities. The discussion is required to include alternatives such as: “(1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small entities.”

The NPRM seeks comment on proposals and alternatives that we expect will positively impact small entities. We propose to eliminate the obligation under section 251(c)(2) of the Act that incumbent LECs provide direct interconnection upon request on December 31, 2028. This proposal reflects the ongoing transition to IP-based network architecture and the declining relevance of legacy TDM interconnection in an environment increasingly dominated by packet-switched technologies. In addition, the NPRM seeks comment on other factors that may determine the feasibility of the December 31, 2028 sunset date and any alternative benchmarks that should be met by small and other carriers in the interim. We seek comment on whether removing this requirement would eliminate unnecessary operational burdens and allow carriers, including small entities, to redirect resources away from maintaining outdated switching and signaling infrastructure and toward investment in modern, efficient, all-IP networks. Small entities may benefit if the Commission adopts proposed rules or other alternatives that facilitate the retirement of legacy equipment and the streamlining of interconnection arrangements through modern, IP-based alternatives. We seek comment on whether any of the burdens associated with alternatives that alter current filing, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements described in the NPRM can be further minimized to lessen economic impact on small entities.

The Commission will fully consider the economic impact on small entities as it evaluates the comments filed in response to the NPRM, including comments related to costs and benefits. Alternative proposals and approaches from commenters will further develop the record and could help the Commission further minimize the economic impact on small entities. The Commission's evaluation of the comments filed in this proceeding will shape the final conclusions it reaches, the final alternatives it considers, and the actions it ultimately takes to minimize any significant economic impact that may occur on small entities from the final rules.

None.

Accordingly, it is ordered that pursuant to sections 1-4, 201, 251(a), 251(c)(2), 251(c)(6) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151-54, 201, 251(a), 251(c)(2), 251(c)(6) the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking hereby is adopted.

It is further ordered that, pursuant to applicable procedures set forth in §§ 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments on this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on or before 30 days after publication in the Federal Register , and reply comments on or before 60 days after publication in the Federal Register .

It is further ordered that, the Commission's Office of the Secretary, shall send a copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR part 51 as follows: