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This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains documents other than rules or proposed rules that are applicable to the public. Notices of hearings and investigations, committee meetings, agency decisions and rulings, delegations of authority, filing of petitions and applications and agency statements of organization and functions are examples of documents appearing in this section.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

Order Renewing Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

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Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2025) (''EAR'' or ''the Regulations''), I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export Enforcement (''OEE'') to renew the temporary denial order issued in this matter on October 29, 2024. I find that renewal of this order, as modified, is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations and that renewal for an extended period is appropriate because Mahan Airways has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR.[1]

I. Procedural History

On March 17, 2008, Darryl W. Jackson, the then-Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement (''Assistant Secretary''), signed an order denying Mahan Airways' export privileges for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order also named as denied persons Blue Airways, of Yerevan, Armenia (''Blue Airways of Armenia''), as well as the ''Balli Group Respondents,'' namely, Balli Group PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, two of its officers, Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six Ltd., all of the United Kingdom. The order was issued *ex parte* pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations, and went into effect on March 21, 2008, the date it was published in the **Federal Register**.

This temporary denial order (''TDO'') was renewed in accordance with Section 766.24(d) of the Regulations.[2] Subsequent renewals also have issued pursuant to Section 766.24(d), including most recently on October 29, 2024.[3]

[1] The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730–774 (2025), originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 4601–4623 (Supp. III 2015)) (''EAA''), which lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, *et seq.* (2012)) (''IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (''NDAA''), which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (''ECRA''). While Section 1766 of the NDAA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of the NDAA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section 4820(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.

[2] Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods, if it believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation. In cases demonstrating a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may request the renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional period not exceeding one year. Renewal requests are to be made in writing no later than 20 days before the scheduled expiration date of a temporary denial order. Renewal requests may include discussion of any additional or changed circumstances, and may seek appropriate modifications to the order, including the addition of parties as respondents or related persons, or the removal of parties previously added as respondents or related persons. BIS is not required to seek renewal as to all parties, and a removal of a party can be effected if, without more, BIS does not seek renewal as to that party. Any party included or added to a temporary denial order as a respondent may oppose a renewal request as set forth in Section 766.24(d). Parties included or added as related persons can at any time appeal their inclusion as a related person, but cannot challenge the underlying temporary denial order, either as initially issued or subsequently renewed, and cannot oppose a renewal request. *See also* note 4, *infra.*

[3] The October 29, 2024 renewal order was effective upon issuance and published in the **Federal Register** on November 1, 2024 (89 FR 87329). Prior renewal orders issued on September 17, 2008, March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009, March 9, 2010, September 3, 2010, February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011, February 15, 2012, August 9, 2012, February 4, 2013, July 31, 2013, January 24,

Some of the renewal orders and the modification orders that have issued between renewals have added certain parties as respondents or as related persons, or effected the removal of certain parties.[4]

The September 11, 2009 renewal order continued the denial order as to Mahan Airways, but not as to the Balli Group Respondents or Blue Airways of Armenia.[5] As part of the February 25, 2011 renewal order, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard (a/k/a Kosarian Fard), Mahmoud Amini, and Gatewick LLC (a/k/a Gatewick Freight and Cargo Services, a/k/a Gatewick Aviation Services) were added as related persons to prevent evasion of the TDO.[6] A modification order issued on July 1, 2011, adding Zarand Aviation as a respondent in order to prevent an imminent violation.[7]

As part of the August 24, 2011 renewal, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, and Ali Eslamian were added as related persons. Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. were added as related persons by a modification order issued on April 9, 2012. Mehdi Bahrami was added as a related person as part of the February 4, 2013 renewal order.

On May 21, 2015, a modification order was issued adding Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as respondents. As detailed in that order and discussed further *infra,* these respondents were added to the TDO based upon evidence that they were acting together to, *inter alia,* obtain aircraft subject to the Regulations for export or reexport to Mahan in violation of the Regulations and the TDO.

Sky Blue Bird Group and its chief executive officer, Issam Shammout, were added as related persons as part of the July 13, 2015 renewal order.[8] On November 16, 2017, a modification order issued to remove Ali Eslamian, Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. as related persons following a request by OEE for their removal.[9]

The December 11, 2018 renewal order continued the denial of the export privileges of Mahan Airways, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, Bahar Safwa General Trading, Sky Blue Bird Group, and Issam Shammout.

On September 22, 2025, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for renewal of the TDO that issued on October 29, 2024. The written request was made more than 20 days before the TDO's scheduled expiration. Notice of the renewal request was provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading in accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received. Furthermore, no appeal of the related person determinations made as part of the September 3, 2010, February 25, 2011, August 24, 2011, April 9, 2012, February 4, 2013, and July 13, 2015 renewal or modification orders has been made by Kosarian Fard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue Bird Group, or Issam Shammout.[10]

II. Renewal of the TDO

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue or renew an order temporarily denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ''imminent violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ''A violation may be 'imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.'' 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ''either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' *Id.* As to the likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge ''is significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent [.]'' *Id.* A ''lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a violation.'' *Id.*

If BIS believes that renewal of a denial order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation, it may file a written request for renewal, with any modifications if appropriate. 15 CFR 766.24(d)(1). The written request, which must be filed no later than 20 days prior to the TDO's expiration, should set forth the basis for BIS's belief that renewal is necessary, including any

2014, July 22, 2014, January 16, 2015, July 13, 2015, January 7, 2016, July 7, 2016, December 30, 2016, June 27, 2017, December 20, 2017, June 14, 2018, December 11, 2018, June 5, 2019, May 29, 2020, November 24, 2020, May 21, 2021, November 17, 2021, May 13, 2022, November 8, 2022, May 5, 2023, October 31, 2024, and October 29, 2024, respectively. The August 24, 2011 renewal followed the issuance of a modification order that issued on July 1, 2011, to add Zarand Aviation as a respondent. The July 13, 2015 renewal followed a modification order that issued May 21, 2015, and added Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading as respondents. Each of the renewal orders and each of the modification orders referenced in this footnote or elsewhere in this order has been published in the **Federal Register**.

[4] Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and 766.24(c) of the Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to a denied person by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct of trade or related services may be added as a ''related person'' to a temporary denial order to prevent evasion of the order.

[5] Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation settled proposed BIS administrative charges as part of a settlement agreement that was approved by a settlement order issued on February 5, 2010. The sanctions imposed pursuant to that settlement and order included, *inter alia,* a $15 million civil penalty and a requirement to conduct five external audits and submit related audit reports. The Balli Group Respondents also settled related charges with the Department of Justice and the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

[6] *See* note 4, *supra,* concerning the addition of related persons to a temporary denial order. Kosarian Fard and Mahmoud Amini remain parties to the TDO. On August 13, 2014, BIS and Gatewick resolved administrative charges against Gatewick, including a charge for acting contrary to the terms of a BIS denial order (15 CFR 764.2(k)). In addition to the payment of a civil penalty, the settlement includes a seven-year denial order. The first two years of the denial period were active, with the remaining five years suspended conditioned upon Gatewick's full and timely payment of the civil penalty and its compliance with the Regulations during the seven-year denial order period. This denial order, in effect, superseded the TDO as to Gatewick, which was not included as part of the January 16, 2015 renewal order. The Gatewick LLC Final Order was published in the **Federal Register** on August 20, 2014. *See* 79 FR 49283 (Aug. 20, 2014).

[7] Zarand Aviation's export privileges remained denied until July 22, 2014, when it was not included as part of the renewal order issued on that date.

[8] The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (''OFAC'') designated Sky Blue Bird and Issam Shammout as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (''SDGTs'') on May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for ''providing support to Iran's Mahan Air.'' *See* 80 FR 30762 (May 29, 2015).

[9] The November 16, 2017 modification was published in the **Federal Register** on December 4, 2017. *See* 82 FR 57203 (Dec. 4, 2017). On September 28, 2017, BIS and Ali Eslamian resolved an administrative charge for acting contrary to the terms of the denial order (15 CFR 764.2(k)) that was based upon Eslamian's violation of the TDO after his addition to the TDO on August 24, 2011. Equipco (UK) Ltd. and Skyco (UK) Ltd., two companies owned and operated by Eslamian, also were parties to the settlement agreement and were added to the settlement order as related persons. In addition to other sanctions, the settlement provides that Eslamian, Equipco, and Skyco shall be subject to a conditionally suspended denial order for a period of four years from the date of the settlement order.

[10] A party named or added as a related person may not oppose the issuance or renewal of the underlying temporary denial order, but may file an appeal of the related person determination in accordance with Section 766.23(c). *See* also note 2, *supra.*

additional or changed circumstances. *Id.* ''In cases demonstrating a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may request the renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional period not exceeding one year.'' [11] *Id.*

B. The TDO and BIS's Requests for Renewal

OEE's request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the issuance of the initial TDO, and the renewal and modification orders subsequently issued in this matter, including the May 21, 2015 modification order and the renewal order issued on October 29, 2024, and the evidence developed over the course of this investigation, which indicate a blatant disregard of U.S. export controls and the TDO. The initial TDO was issued as a result of evidence that showed that Mahan Airways and other parties engaged in conduct prohibited by the EAR by knowingly re-exporting to Iran three U.S.-origin aircraft, specifically Boeing 747s (''Aircraft 1–3''), items subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control Classification Number (''ECCN'') 9A991.b, without the required U.S. Government authorization. Further evidence submitted by BIS indicated that Mahan Airways was involved in the attempted re-export of three additional U.S.-origin Boeing 747s (''Aircraft 4–6'') to Iran.

As discussed in the September 17, 2008 renewal order, evidence presented by BIS indicated that Aircraft 1–3 continued to be flown on Mahan Airways' routes after issuance of the TDO, in violation of the Regulations and the TDO itself.[12] It also showed that Aircraft 1–3 had been flown in further violation of the Regulations and the TDO on the routes of Iran Air, an Iranian Government airline. Moreover, as discussed in the March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009 and March 9, 2010 renewal orders, Mahan Airways registered Aircraft 1–3 in Iran, obtained Iranian tail numbers for them (EP–MNA, EP–MNB, and EP–MNE, respectively), and continued to operate at least two of them in violation of the Regulations and the TDO,[13] while also committing an additional knowing and willful violation when it negotiated for and acquired an additional U.S.-origin aircraft. The additional acquired aircraft was an MD–82 aircraft, which subsequently was painted in Mahan Airways' livery and flown on multiple Mahan Airways' routes under tail number TC–TUA.

The March 9, 2010 renewal order also noted that a court in the United Kingdom (''U.K.'') had found Mahan Airways in contempt of court on February 1, 2010, for failing to comply with that court's December 21, 2009 and January 12, 2010 orders compelling Mahan Airways to remove the Boeing 747s from Iran and ground them in the Netherlands. Mahan Airways and the Balli Group Respondents had been litigating before the U.K. court concerning ownership and control of Aircraft 1–3. In a letter to the U.K. court dated January 12, 2010, Mahan Airways' Chairman indicated, *inter alia,* that Mahan Airways opposes U.S. Government actions against Iran, that it continued to operate the aircraft on its routes in and out of Tehran (and had 158,000 ''forward bookings'' for these aircraft), and that it wished to continue to do so and would pay damages if required by that court, rather than ground the aircraft.

The September 3, 2010 renewal order discussed the fact that Mahan Airways' violations of the TDO extended beyond operating U.S.-origin aircraft and attempting to acquire additional U.S.-origin aircraft. In February 2009, while subject to the TDO, Mahan Airways participated in the export of computer motherboards, items subject to the Regulations and designated as EAR99, from the United States to Iran, via the United Arab Emirates (''UAE''), in violation of both the TDO and the Regulations, by transporting and/or forwarding the computer motherboards from the UAE to Iran. Mahan Airways' violations were facilitated by Gatewick LLC, which not only participated in the transaction, but also has stated to BIS that it acted as Mahan Airways' sole booking agent for cargo and freight forwarding services in the UAE.

Moreover, in a January 24, 2011 filing in the U.K. court, Mahan Airways asserted that Aircraft 1–3 were not being used, but stated in pertinent part that the aircraft were being maintained in Iran ''in an airworthy condition'' and that, depending on the outcome of its U.K. court appeal, the aircraft ''could immediately go back into service . . . on international routes into and out of Iran.'' Mahan Airways' January 24, 2011 submission to U.K. Court of Appeal, at p. 25, ¶¶ 108, 110. This clearly stated intent, both on its own and in conjunction with Mahan Airways' prior misconduct and statements, demonstrated the need to renew the TDO in order to prevent imminent future violations. Two of these three 747s subsequently were removed from Iran and are no longer in Mahan Airways' possession. The third of these 747s remained in Iran under Mahan's control. Pursuant to Executive Order 13224, this 747 was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (''SDGT'') by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (''OFAC'') on September 19, 2012.[14] Furthermore, as discussed in the February 4, 2013 Order, open source information indicated that this 747, painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways, had been flown between Iran and Syria, and was suspected of ferrying weapons and/or other equipment to the Syrian Government from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

In addition, as first detailed in the July 1, 2011 and August 24, 2011 orders, and discussed in subsequent renewal orders in this matter, Mahan Airways also continued to evade U.S. export control laws by operating two Airbus A310 aircraft, bearing Mahan Airways' livery and logo, on flights into and out of Iran.[15] At the time of the July 1, 2011 and August 24, 2011 orders, these Airbus A310s were registered in France, with tail numbers F–OJHH and F–OJHI, respectively.[16] The August 2012 renewal order also found that Mahan Airways had acquired another Airbus A310 aircraft subject to the Regulations, with MSN 499 and Iranian tail number EP–VIP, in violation of the Regulations.[17] On September 19, 2012, all three Airbus A310 aircraft (tail numbers F–OJHH, F–OJHI, and EP–VIP) were designated as SDGTs.[18]

[11] 88 FR 59791 (Aug. 30, 2023).

[12] Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k).

[13] The third Boeing 747 appeared to have undergone significant service maintenance and may not have been operational at the time of the March 9, 2010 renewal order.

[14] *See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/20120919.aspx.*

[15] The Airbus A310s are powered with U.S.-origin engines. The engines are subject to the Regulations and classified under Export Control Classification (''ECCN'') 9A991.d. The Airbus A310s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the Regulations. They are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.

[16] OEE subsequently presented evidence that after the August 24, 2011 renewal, Mahan Airways worked along with Kerman Aviation and others to de-register the two Airbus A310 aircraft in France and to register both aircraft in Iran (with, respectively, Iranian tail numbers EP–MHH and EP–MHI). It was determined subsequent to the February 15, 2012 renewal order that the registration switch for these A310s was cancelled, and that Mahan Airways then continued to fly the aircraft under the original French tail numbers (F–OJHH and F–OJHI, respectively). Both aircraft apparently remain in Mahan Airways' possession.

[17] *See* note 14, *supra.*

[18] *See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/*

The February 4, 2013 renewal order laid out further evidence of continued and additional efforts by Mahan Airways and other persons acting in concert with Mahan, including Kral Aviation and another Turkish company, to procure U.S.-origin engines—two GE CF6–50C2 engines, with MSNs 517621 and 517738, respectively—and other aircraft parts in violation of the TDO and the Regulations.[19] The February 4, 2013 order also added Mehdi Bahrami as a related person in accordance with Section 766.23 of the Regulations. Bahrami, a Mahan Vice-President and the head of Mahan's Istanbul Office, also was involved in Mahan's acquisition of the original three Boeing 747s (Aircraft 1–3) that resulted in the original TDO, and has had a business relationship with Mahan dating back to 1997.

The July 31, 2013 renewal order detailed additional evidence obtained by OEE showing efforts by Mahan Airways to obtain another GE CF6–50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 528350) from the United States via Turkey. Multiple Mahan employees, including Mehdi Bahrami, were involved in or aware of matters related to the engine's arrival in Turkey from the United States, plans to visually inspect the engine, and prepare it for shipment from Turkey.

Mahan Airways sought to obtain this U.S.-origin engine through Pioneer Logistics Havacilik Turizm Yonetim Danismanlik (''Pioneer Logistics''), an aircraft parts supplier located in Turkey, and its director/operator, Gulnihal Yegane, a Turkish national who previously had conducted Mahan related business with Mehdi Bahrami and Ali Eslamian. Moreover, as referenced in the July 31, 2013 renewal order, a sworn affidavit by Kosol Surinanda, also known as Kosol Surinandha, Managing Director of Mahan's General Sales Agent in Thailand, stated that the shares of Pioneer Logistics for which he was the listed owner were ''actually the property of and owned by Mahan.'' He further stated that he held ''legal title to the shares until otherwise required by Mahan'' but would ''exercise the rights granted to [him] exactly and only as instructed by Mahan and [his] vote and/or decisions [would] only and exclusively reflect the wills and demands of Mahan[.]'' [20]

The January 24, 2014 renewal order outlined OEE's continued investigation of Mahan Airways' activities and detailed an attempt by Mahan, which OEE thwarted, to obtain, via an Indonesian aircraft parts supplier, two U.S.-origin Honeywell ALF–502R–5 aircraft engines (MSNs LF5660 and LF5325), items subject to the Regulations, from a U.S. company located in Texas. An invoice of the Indonesian aircraft parts supplier dated March 27, 2013, listed Mahan Airways as the purchaser of the engines and included a Mahan ship-to address. OEE also obtained a Mahan air waybill dated March 12, 2013, listing numerous U.S.-origin aircraft parts subject to the Regulations—including, among other items, a vertical navigation gyroscope, a transmitter, and a power control unit—being transported by Mahan from Turkey to Iran in violation of the TDO.

The July 22, 2014 renewal order discussed open source evidence from the March–June 2014 time period regarding two BAE regional jets, items subject to the Regulations, that were painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers EP–MOI and EP–MOK, respectively.[21] In addition, aviation industry resources indicated that these aircraft were obtained by Mahan Airways in late November 2013 and June 2014, from Ukrainian Mediterranean Airline, a Ukrainian airline that was added to BIS's Entity List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations) on August 15, 2011, for acting contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.[22] Open source information indicated that at least EP–MOI remained active in Mahan's fleet, and that the aircraft was being operated on multiple flights in July 2014.

The January 16, 2015 renewal order detailed evidence of additional attempts by Mahan Airways to acquire items subject to the Regulations in further violation of the TDO. Specifically, in March 2014, OEE became aware of an inertial reference unit bearing serial number 1231 (''the IRU'') that had been sent to the United States for repair. The IRU is a U.S.-origin item, subject to the Regulations, classified under ECCN 7A103, and controlled for missile technology reasons. Upon closer inspection, it was determined that IRU came from or had been installed on an Airbus A340 aircraft bearing MSN 056. Further investigation revealed that as of approximately February 2014, this aircraft was registered under Iranian tail number EP–MMB and had been painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways.

The January 16, 2015 renewal order also described related efforts by the Departments of Justice and Treasury to further thwart Mahan's illicit procurement efforts. Specifically, on August 14, 2014, the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland filed a civil forfeiture complaint for the IRU pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(b) that resulted in the court issuing an Order of Forfeiture on December 2, 2014. EP–MMB remains listed as active in Mahan Airways' fleet and has been used on flights into and out of Iran as recently as December 19, 2017.

Additionally, on August 29, 2014, OFAC blocked the property and interests in property of Asian Aviation Logistics of Thailand, a Mahan Airways affiliate or front company, pursuant to Executive Order 13224. In doing so, OFAC described Mahan Airways' use of Asian Aviation Logistics to evade sanctions by making payments on behalf

20120919.aspx. Mahan Airways was previously designated by OFAC as a SDGT on October 18, 2011. 77 FR 64427 (October 18, 2011).

[19] Kral Aviation was referenced in the February 4, 2013 renewal order as ''Turkish Company No. 1.'' Kral Aviation purchased a GE CF6–50C2 aircraft engine (MSN 517621) from the United States in July 2012, on behalf of Mahan Airways. OEE was able to prevent this engine from reaching Mahan by issuing a redelivery order to the freight forwarder in accordance with Section 758.8 of the Regulations. OEE also issued Kral Aviation a redelivery order for the second CF6–50C2 engine (MSN 517738) on July 30, 2012. The owner of the second engine subsequently cancelled the item's sale to Kral Aviation. In September 2012, OEE was alerted by a U.S. exporter that another Turkish company (''Turkish Company No. 2'') was attempting to purchase aircraft spare parts intended for re-export by Turkish Company No. 2 to Mahan Airways. *See* February 4, 2013 renewal order.

On December 31, 2013, Kral Aviation was added to BIS's Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Regulations. *See* 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12, 2013). Companies and individuals are added to the Entity List for engaging in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. *See* 15 CFR 744.11.

[20] Pioneer Logistics, Gulnihal Yegane, and Kosol Surinanda also were added to the Entity List on December 12, 2013. *See* 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12, 2013).

[21] The BAE regional jets are powered with U.S.-origin engines. The engines are subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. These aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR. They are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.

[22] *See* 76 FR 50407 (Aug. 15, 2011). The July 22, 2014 renewal order also referenced two Airbus A320 aircraft painted in the livery and logo of Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail numbers EP–MMK and EP–MML, respectively. OEE's investigation also showed that Mahan obtained these aircraft in November 2013, from Khors Air Company, another Ukrainian airline that, like Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines, was added to BIS's Entity List on August 15, 2011. Open source evidence indicates the two Airbus A320 aircraft may have been transferred by Mahan Airways to another Iranian airline in October 2014, and issued Iranian tail numbers EP–APE and EP–APF, respectively.

of Mahan for the purchase of engines and other equipment.[23]

The May 21, 2015 modification order detailed the acquisition of two aircraft, specifically an Airbus A340 bearing MSN 164 and an Airbus A321 bearing MSN 550, that were purchased by Al Naser Airlines in late 2014/early 2015 and were under the possession, control, and/or ownership of Mahan Airways.[24] The sales agreements for these two aircraft were signed by Ali Abdullah Alhay for Al Naser Airlines.[25] Payment information reveals that multiple electronic funds transfers (''EFT'') were made by Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General Trading in order to acquire MSNs 164 and 550.

The May 21, 2015 modification order also laid out evidence showing the respondents' attempts to obtain other controlled aircraft, including aircraft physically located in the United States in similarly-patterned transactions during the same recent time period. Transactional documents involving two Airbus A320s bearing MSNs 82 and 99, respectively, again showed Ali Abdullah Alhay signing sales agreements for Al Naser Airlines.[26] A review of the payment information for these aircraft similarly revealed EFTs from Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar Safwa General Trading that follow the pattern described for MSNs 164 and 550, *supra.* MSNs 82 and 99 were detained by OEE Special Agents prior to their planned export from the United States.

The July 13, 2015 renewal order outlined evidence showing that Al Naser Airlines' attempts to acquire aircraft on behalf of Mahan Airways extended beyond MSNs 164 and 550 to include a total of nine aircraft.[27] Four of the aircraft, all of which are subject to the Regulations and were obtained by Mahan from Al Naser Airlines, had been issued the following Iranian tail numbers: EP–MMD (MSN 164), EP–MMG (MSN 383), EP–MMH (MSN 391) and EP–MMR (MSN 416), respectively.[28] Publicly available flight tracking information provided evidence that at the time of the July 13, 2015 renewal, both EP–MMH and EP–MMR were being actively flown on routes into and out of Iran in violation of the Regulations.[29]

The January 7, 2016 renewal order discussed evidence that Mahan Airways had begun actively flying EP–MMD on international routes into and out of Iran. Additionally, the January 7, 2016 order described publicly available aviation database and flight tracking information indicating that Mahan Airways continued efforts to acquire Iranian tail numbers and press into active service under Mahan's livery and logo at least two more of the Airbus A340 aircraft it had obtained from or through Al Naser Airlines: EP–MME (MSN 371) and EP–MMF (MSN 376), respectively.

The July 7, 2016 renewal order described Mahan Airways' acquisition of a BAE Avro RJ–85 aircraft (MSN 2392) in violation of the Regulations and its subsequent registration under Iranian tail number EP–MOR.[30] This information was corroborated by publicly available information on the website of Iran's civil aviation authority. The July 7, 2016 order also outlined Mahan's continued operation of EP–MMF in violation of the Regulations on routes from Tehran, Iran to Beijing, China and Shanghai, China, respectively.

The December 30, 2016 renewal order outlined Mahan's continued operation of multiple Airbus aircraft, including EP–MMD (MSN 164), EP–MMF (MSN 376), and EP–MMH (MSN 391), which were acquired from or through Al Naser Airlines, as previously detailed in pertinent part in the July 13, 2015 and January 7, 2016 renewal orders. Publicly available flight tracking information showed that the aircraft were operated on flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Beijing, China, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and Istanbul, Turkey.[31]

The June 27, 2017 renewal order included similar evidence regarding Mahan Airways' operation of multiple Airbus aircraft subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to, aircraft procured from or through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Moscow, Russia, Shanghai, China and Kabul, Afghanistan. The June 27, 2017 order also detailed evidence concerning a suspected planned or attempted diversion to Mahan of an Airbus A340 subject to the Regulations that had first been mentioned in OEE's December 13, 2016 renewal request.

The December 20, 2017 renewal order presented evidence that a Mahan employee attempted to initiate negotiations with a U.S. company for the purchase of an aircraft subject to the

[23] *See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20140829.aspx. See* 79 FR 55073 (Sep. 15, 2014). OFAC also blocked the property and property interests of Pioneer Logistics of Turkey on August 29, 2014. *Id.* Mahan Airways' use of Pioneer Logistics in an effort to evade the TDO and the Regulations was discussed in a prior renewal order, as summarized, *supra,* at 14. BIS added both Asian Aviation Logistics and Pioneer Logistics to the Entity List on December 12, 2013. *See* 78 FR 75458 (Dec. 12, 2013).

[24] Both of these aircraft are powered by U.S.-origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. Both aircraft contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.

[25] The evidence obtained by OEE showed Ali Abdullah Alhay as a 25% owner of Al Naser Airlines.

[26] Both aircraft were physically located in the United States and therefore are subject to the Regulations pursuant to Section 734.3(a)(1). Moreover, these Airbus A320s are powered by U.S.-origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under Export Control Classification Number ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A320s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.

[27] This evidence included a press release dated May 9, 2015, that appeared on Mahan Airways' website and stated that Mahan ''added 9 modern aircraft to its air fleet [,]'' and that the newly acquired aircraft included eight Airbus A340s and one Airbus A321. *See http://www.mahan.aero/en/mahan-air/press-room/44.* The press release was subsequently removed from Mahan Airways' website. Publicly available aviation databases similarly showed that Mahan had obtained nine additional aircraft from Al Naser Airlines in May 2015, including MSNs 164 and 550. As also discussed in the July 13, 2015 renewal order, Sky Blue Bird Group, via Issam Shammout, was actively involved in Al Naser Airlines' acquisition of MSNs 164 and 550, and the attempted acquisition of MSNs 82 and 99 (which were detained by OEE).

[28] The Airbus A340s are powered by U.S.-origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A340s contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of their location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.

[29] There is some publicly available information indicating that the aircraft Mahan Airways is flying under Iranian tail number EP–MMR is now MSN 615, rather than MSN 416. Both aircraft are Airbus A340 aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser Airlines in violation of the Regulations. Moreover, both aircraft were designated as SDGTs by OFAC on May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13224. *See* 80 FR 30762 (May 29, 2015).

[30] The BAE Avro RJ–85 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The BAE Avro RJ–85 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result is subject to the EAR regardless of its location. The aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or re-export to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.

[31] Specifically, on December 22, 2016, EP–MMD (MSN 164) flew from Dubai, UAE to Tehran, Iran. Between December 20 and December 22, 2016, EP–MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran to Beijing, China and Istanbul, Turkey, respectively. Between December 26 and December 28, 2016, EP–MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A610. Moreover, the order highlighted Al Naser Airlines' acquisition, via lease, of at least possession and/or control of a Boeing 737 (MSN 25361), bearing tail number YR–SEB, and an Airbus A320 (MSN 357), bearing tail number YR–SEA, from a Romanian company in violation of the TDO and the Regulations.[32] Open source information indicates that after the December 20, 2017 renewal order publicly exposed Al Naser's acquisition of these two aircraft (MSNs 25361 and 357), the leases were subsequently cancelled and the aircraft returned to their owner.

The December 20, 2017 renewal order also included evidence indicating that Mahan Airways was continuing to operate a number of aircraft subject to the Regulations, including aircraft originally procured from or through Al Naser Airlines, on flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Lahore, Pakistan, Shanghai, China, Ankara, Turkey, Kabul, Afghanistan, and Baghdad, Iraq.

The June 14, 2018 renewal order outlined evidence that Mahan began actively operating EP–MMT, an Airbus A340 aircraft (MSN 292) acquired in 2017 and previously registered in Kazakhstan under tail number UP–A4003, on international flights into and out of Iran.[33] It also discussed evidence that Mahan continued to operate a number of aircraft subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to, EP–MME, EP–MMF, and EP–MMH, on international flights into and out of Iran, including from/to Beijing, China.

The June 14, 2018 renewal order also noted OFAC's May 24, 2018 designation of Otik Aviation, a/k/a Otik Havacilik Sanayi Ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi, of Turkey, as an SDGT pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for providing material support to Mahan, as well as OFAC's designation as SDGTs of an additional twelve aircraft in which Mahan has an interest.[34] The June 14, 2018 order also cited the April 2018 arrest and arraignment of a U.S. citizen on a three-count criminal information filed in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey involving the unlicensed exports of U.S.-origin aircraft parts valued at over $2 million to Iran, including to Mahan Airways.

The December 11, 2018 renewal order detailed publicly available information showing that Mahan Airways had continued operating a number of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, EP–MMB, EP–MME, EP–MMF, and EP–MMQ, on international flights into and out of Iran from/to Istanbul, Turkey, Guangzhou, China, Bangkok, Thailand, and Dubai, UAE.[35] It also discussed that OEE's continued investigation of Mahan Airways and its affiliates and agents had resulted in an October 2018 guilty plea by Arzu Sagsoz, a Turkish national, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, stemming from her involvement in a conspiracy to export a U.S.-origin aircraft engine, valued at approximately $810,000, to Mahan.

The December 11, 2018 order also noted OFAC's September 14, 2018 designation of Mahan-related entities as SDGTs pursuant to Executive Order 13224, namely, My Aviation Company Limited, of Thailand, and Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD, a/k/a Mahan Travel a/k/a Mihan Travel & Tourism SDN BHD, of Malaysia.[36] As general sales agents for Mahan Airways, these companies sold cargo space aboard Mahan Airways' flights, including on flights to Iran, and provided other services to or for the benefit of Mahan Airways and its operations.[37]

The June 5, 2019 renewal order highlighted Mahan's continued violation of the TDO and the Regulations. An end-use check conducted by BIS in Malaysia in March 2019 uncovered evidence that, on approximately ten occasions, Mahan had caused, aided and/or abetted the unlicensed export of U.S.-origin items subject to the Regulations from the United States to Iran via Malaysia. The items included helicopter shafts, transmitters, and other aircraft parts, some of which are listed on the Commerce Control List and controlled on anti-terrorism grounds. The June 5, 2019 order also detailed publicly available flight tracking information showing that Mahan continued to unlawfully operate a number of aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into and out of Iran, including on routes to and from Damascus, Syria.[38]

The June 5, 2019 order also described actions taken by both BIS and OFAC to thwart efforts by entities connected to or acting on behalf of Mahan Airways to violate U.S. export controls and sanctions related to Iran. On May 14, 2019, BIS added Manohar Nair, Basha Asmath Shaikh, and two co-located companies that they operate, Emirates Hermes General Trading and Presto Freight International, LLC, to the Entity List pursuant to Section 744.11 of the Regulations, including for engaging in activities to procure U.S.-origin items on Mahan's behalf.[39] On January 24, 2019, OFAC designated as SDGTs Flight Travel LLC, which is Mahan's general service agent in Yerevan, Armenia, and Qeshm Fars Air, an Iranian airline which operates two U.S.-origin Boeing

[32] The Airbus A320 is powered with U.S.-origin engines, which are subject to the EAR and classified under Export Control Classification (''ECCN'') 9A991.d. The engines are valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft, which consequently is subject to the EAR. The aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or reexport to Iran would require U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations.

[33] The Airbus A340 is powered by U.S.-origin engines that are subject to the Regulations and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A340 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a result is subject to the Regulations regardless of its location. The aircraft is classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of this aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. On June 4, 2018, EP–MMT (MSN 292) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran.

[34] *See* 83 FR 27828 (June 14, 2018). OFAC's related press release stated in part that ''[o]ver the last several years, Otik Aviation has procured and delivered millions of dollars in aviation-related spare and replacement parts for Mahan Air, some of which are procured from the United States and the European Union. As recently as 2017, Otik Aviation continued to provide Mahan Air with replacement parts worth well over $100,000 per shipment, such as aircraft brakes.'' The twelve additional Mahan-related aircraft that were designated are: EP–MMA (MSN 20), EP–MMB (MSN 56), EP–MMC (MSN 282), EP–MMJ (MSN 526), EP–MMV (MSN 2079), EP–MNF (MSN 547), EP–MOD (MSN 3162), EP–MOM (MSN 3165), EP–MOP (MSN 2257), EP–MOQ (MSN 2261), EP–MOR (MSN 2392), and EP–MOS (MSN 2347). *See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0395. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20180524.aspx.*

[35] Flight tracking information showed that on December 10, 2018, EP–MMB (MSN 56) flew from Istanbul, Turkey to Tehran, Iran, and EP–MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran, Iran. Additionally, on December 6, 2018, EP–MMF (MSN 376) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran, and on December 9, 2018, EP–MMQ (MSN 449) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran, Iran.

[36] *See* 83 FR 34301 (July 19, 2018) (designation of Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on July 9, 2018), and 83 FR 53359 (Oct. 22, 2018) (designation of My Aviation Company Limited and updating of entry for Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on September 14, 2018).

[37] OFAC's press release concerning its designation of My Aviation Company Limited on September 14, 2018, states in part that ''[t]his Thailand-based company has disregarded numerous U.S. warnings, issued publicly and delivered bilaterally to the Thai government, to sever ties with Mahan Air.'' My Aviation provides cargo services to Mahan Airways, including freight booking, and works with local freight forwarding entities to ship cargo on regularly scheduled Mahan Airways' flights to Tehran, Iran. My Aviation has also provided Mahan Airways with passenger booking services. *See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm484.*

[38] Specifically, on May 26, 2019, EP–MMJ (MSN 526) flew from Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran. In addition, on May 24, 2019, EP–MNF (MSN 547) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, and on May 23, 2019, EP–MMF (MSN 376) flew from Dubai, UAE to Tehran.

[39] *See* 84 FR 21233 (May 14, 2019).

747s[40] and is owned or controlled by Mahan, and also linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC–QF).[41]

The December 2, 2019 renewal order noted that OEE's on-going investigation revealed that U.S.-origin passenger flight and database management software subject to the Regulations was provided to a company in Turkey and subsequently used to facilitate and service Mahan's operations into and out of Turkey in further violation of the Regulations.

Additionally, open source information, including flight tracking data and news articles published in October 2019, showed that Mahan Airways was now operating a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 on routes between Iranian airports in Tehran, Kish Island, and Mashhad. This aircraft, bearing Iranian tail number EP–MNB, appears to be one of the three aircraft that Mahan illegally acquired via Blue Airways of Armenia and U.K.-based Balli Group that resulted in the issuance of the original TDO.[42] *See supra* at 10–12.

Evidence was also described in the December 2, 2019 renewal order showing that on or about November 11, 2019, Mahan caused, aided and/or abetted the unlicensed export of a U.S.-origin atomic absorption spectrometer, an item subject to the Regulations, from the United States to Iran via the UAE. Finally, publicly available flight tracking information showed that Mahan continued to unlawfully operate a number of aircraft subject to the EAR on flights into and out of Iran, including on routes to and from Guangzhou, China, Istanbul, Turkey, and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.[43]

The May 29, 2020 renewal order cited Mahan's operation of EP–MMD, EP–MMF, and EP–MMI, aircraft originally acquired from Al Naser Airlines, on international flights into and out of Iran from/to Bangkok, Thailand, Dubai, UAE, and Shanghai, China in violation of the TDO and EAR.[44] The May 29, 2020 renewal order also detailed the indictment of Ali Abdullah Alhay and Issam Shammout, parties added to the TDO in May and July 2015, respectively, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Alhay and Shammout were charged with, among other violations, conspiring to export aircraft and parts to Mahan in violation of export control laws and the embargo on Iran beginning around August 2012 through May 2015.

In addition to detailing the operation of multiple aircraft in violation of the Regulations,[45] the November 24, 2020 renewal order discussed a related TDO issued on August 19, 2020, denying for 180 days the export privileges of Indonesia-based PT MS Aero Support (''PTMS Aero''), PT Antasena Kreasi (''PTAK''), PT Kandiyasa Energi Utama (''PTKEU''), Sunarko Kuntjoro, Triadi Senna Kuntjoro, and Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito based on their involvement in the unlicensed export of aircraft parts to Mahan Airways—often in coordination with Mustafa Ovieci, a Mahan executive.[46] These parties also facilitated the shipment of damaged Mahan parts to the United States for repair and subsequent export back to Iran in further violation of U.S. laws. In both instances, the fact that the items were destined to Iran/Mahan was concealed from U.S. companies, shippers, and freight forwarders.[47]

The November 24, 2020 renewal order also includes actions taken by other U.S. government agencies such as OFAC's August 19, 2020 designation of UAE-based Parthia Cargo, its CEO Amin Mahdavi, and Delta Parts Supply FZC as SDGTs pursuant to Executive Order 13224 for providing ''key parts and logistics services for Mahan Air. . . .'' The OFAC press release further states, in part, that Mahdavi ''has directly coordinated the shipment of parts on behalf of Mahan Air.''[48] In addition, Mahdavi and Parthia Cargo were indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for violating sanctions on Iran.[49]

Moreover, in October 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced Joyce Eliasbachus to 18 months of confinement based on her role in a conspiracy to export $2 million dollars' worth of aircraft parts from the United States to Iran, including to Mahan Airways.[50]

The May 21, 2021 renewal order outlined Mahan's continued operation of a number of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, EP–MMH, EP–MMI, and EP–MMQ, on international flights into and out of Iran from/to Shanghai, China, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Guangzhou, China, respectively.[51]

Open source news reporting also indicated that after five years of maintenance, Mahan Air is now operating EP–MNE, a Boeing 747 on domestic flights within Iran.[52] In addition to this aircraft being one of the original three Boeing aircraft Mahan obtained in violation of the Regulations, any service or maintenance involving parts subject to the EAR would further violate the TDO.

The November 17, 2021 order details Mahan's continued operation of a number of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to EP–MME, EP–MMJ, EP–MMQ, on flights into and out of Iran from/to Istanbul, Turkey, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Shenzhen, China, respectively.[53]

[40] These 747s are registered in Iran with tail numbers EP–FAA and EP–FAB, respectively.

[41] OFAC's press release concerning these designations states that Qeshm Fars Air was being designated for ''being owned or controlled by Mahan Air, as well as for assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, the IRGC–QF,'' and that Flight Travel LLC was being designated for ''acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air.'' It further states, *inter alia,* that ''Mahan Air employees fill Qeshm Fars Air management positions, and Mahan Air provides technical and operational support for Qeshm Fars Air, facilitating the airline's illicit operations.'' *See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/* sm590. *See also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/* 20190124.aspx.

[42] The same open sources indicated this aircraft continued to operate on flights within Iran to include a May 11, 2020 flight from Tehran, Iran to Kerman, Iran.

[43] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on November 23, 2019, EP–MME (MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran, Iran, and on November 21, 2019, EP–MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes between Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran. Additionally, on November 20, 2019, EP–MMQ (MSN 449) flew from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to Tehran, Iran.

[44] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on May 8, 2020, EP–MMD (MSN 164) flew on routes between Bangkok, Thailand and Tehran, Iran, and on May 10, 2020, EP–MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes between Dubai, UAE and Tehran. In addition, on May 9, 2020, EP–MMI (MSN 416) flew on routes between Shanghai, China and Tehran.

[45] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on November 13, 2020, EP–MMQ (MSN 449) flew on routes between Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran, and on November 15, 2020, EP–MMI (MSN 416) flew on routes between Shenzhen, China and Tehran.

[46] *See* 85 FR 52321 (Aug. 25, 2020).

[47] PTMS Aero, PTAK, PTKEU, and Sunarko Kuntjoro were each indicted in December 2019 on multiple counts related to this conspiracy in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

[48] *https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1098.*

[49] *https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iranian-national-and-uae-business-organization-charged-criminal-conspiracy-violate-iranian.*

[50] Eliasbachus' arrest and arraignment were detailed in the June 14, 2018 renewal order, as described *supra* at 21.

[51] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on May 14, 2021, EP–MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes between Shanghai, China and Tehran, Iran, and on May 13, 2021, EP–MMI (MSN 416) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran. In addition, on May 20, 2021, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Guangzhou, China and Tehran.

[52] *https://simpleflying.com/mahan-air-747-300-flies-again/.*

[53] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on November 7, 2021, EP–MME (MSN 376) flew on routes between Istanbul, Turkey and Tehran, Iran, and on November 9, 2021, EP–MMJ (MSN 526) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran, Iran. In addition, on November 8, 2021, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Shenzhen, China and Tehran, Iran.

Additionally, publicly available industry sources showed that EP–MMG (MSN 383), an aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser Air in violation of both the TDO and Regulations, was in a maintenance, repair, overhaul (''MRO'') status at Iran's Imam Khomeini International Airport in Tehran, Iran.

The May 13, 2022 renewal order outlines Mahan's continuing violation of the TDO and/or Regulations including, but not limited to the operation of EP–MME, EP–MNO, and EP–MMB on flights into and out of Iran from/to Moscow, Russia, Damascus, Syria, and Guangzhou, China, respectively.[54] Open source press reports also indicates that as of April 2022, Mahan Air increased its service into Moscow, Russia by adding two weekly flights to Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport (''SVO'') to its current service into Moscow's Vnukovo Airport (''VKO'').[55] Mahan flights into Russia after February 24, 2022 violated the stringent export controls imposed on aviation-related (*e.g.,* Commerce Control List Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia in response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine. These controls include a license requirement for the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts specified in Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 9A991 (Section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).[56]

The May 13, 2022 renewal order also cited OFAC's recent administrative enforcement action with an Australian freight forwarder resulting in a $6,131,855 civil penalty, which resolved, in part, allegations of receiving 327 payments from Mahan that were processed through U.S. financial institutions or foreign branches of U.S. financial institutions in apparent violation of OFAC sanctions.[57]

The November 8, 2022 order detailed Mahan Air's continued violation of the TDO and Regulations, including the Russia-related export controls set out in Section 746.8 of the Regulations. On September 19, 2022, BIS publicly identified Mahan's EP–MEE aircraft for its unlicensed reexport to Russia in apparent violation of Section 746.8 of the Regulations.[58] Additionally, open source evidence showed that Mahan continues to operate EP–MME, EP–MMJ, and EP–MMQ on flights into and out of Iran from/to Moscow, Russia, and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, respectively, without the requisite authorization.[59]

Further, on August 2, 2022, BIS took a related enforcement action against Venezuela-based cargo airline Empresa de Transporte Aéreocargo del Sur, S.A., a/k/a Aerocargo del Sur Transportation Company, a/k/a EMTRASUR (''EMTRASUR''), for acquiring custody and/or control from Mahan Air of a U.S.-origin Boeing 747 aircraft bearing manufacturer's serial number 23413 (''MSN 23413'') in violation of the TDO.[60] In or around October 2021, Mahan Air transferred custody and control of MSN 23413 to EMTRASUR's parent company, CONVIASA,[61] through an intermediary.

The May 5, 2023 renewal order outlined open source evidence showing Mahan continuing to operate EP–MNF, EP–MMQ, and EP–MME on flights into and out of Iran from/to Guangzhou, China, Kabul, Afghanistan, and Moscow, Russia, respectively, without the requisite authorization.[62] The renewal order also noted the national security and foreign policy concerns raised by Mahan's intention to start direct flights from Iran to Minsk, Belarus.[63] Lastly, the May 3, 2023 renewal order cited publicly available information showing that Russian airline Aeroflot, which is currently subject to its own TDO,[64] has begun sending its aircraft to Mahan for repairs and/or maintenance.[65]

OEE's October 31, 2023 renewal outlined Mahan's continued violation of the TDO by operating aircraft including EP–MME, EP–MMQ, and EP–MMB on flights into and out of Iran from/to Erbil, Iraq, Shanghai, China, Lahore, Pakistan, and Moscow, Russia.[66] The October 31, 2023 order also highlighted OEE's continued investigation into Mahan's recent acquisition of an Airbus A340 (MSN 75) bearing Iranian tail number EP–MJA, and its flights to/from Tehran, Iran and Moscow, Russia.

The October 31, 2023 renewal order also detailed the on-going national security and foreign policy threats and concerns raised by Mahan's destabilizing activities. Specifically, open source reporting details October 12, 2023 airstrikes at Syria's Damascus and Aleppo airports made in an effort to divert a Mahan A340 (MSN 282 and bearing tail number EP–MMC)[67] which was in route at the time from Tehran, Iran to Syria and suspected of carrying weapons.[68]

The October 31, 2024 renewal order outlined Mahan's on-going violations of the TDO by operating aircraft including EP–MME, EP–MMQ, EP–MMR on flights into and out Iran from/to Guangzhou, China, Moscow, Russia, and Erbil, Iraq.[69] Additionally, a May 2024 BIS post-shipment verification indicated that Taiwanese Company No. 1 diverted several shipments of electronic components to Russia via Iran aboard Mahan aircraft.[70]

[54] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on May 2, 2022, EP–MME (MSN 376) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran, and on May 5, 2022, EP–MNO (MSN 595) flew on routes between Damascus, Syria and Tehran, Iran. In addition, on May 6, 2022, EP–MMB (MSN 56) flew on routes between Guangzhou, China and Tehran, Iran.

[55] *https://centreforaviation.com/news/mahan-air-launches-moscow-sheremetyevo-service-1131185.*

[56] The TDO prohibits Mahan from being eligible to use license exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft (AVS) (Section 740.15 of the EAR).

[57] *https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20220425_toll.pdf.*

[58] *https://bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3138-bis-press-release-gp10-iranian-craft-additions/file.*

[59] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on October 9, 2022, EP–MME (MSN 376) flew on routes between Tehran, Iran and Moscow, Russia's VTO airport, and on October 26, 2022, EP–MMJ (MSN 526) flew on routes between Tehran, Iran and Moscow, Russia's SVO airport. On October 28, 2022, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab Emirates and Tehran, Iran.

[60] BIS issued a separate TDO denying the export privileges of EMTRASUR for a period of 180 days. *See* 87 FR 47964 (Aug. 5, 2022).

[61] On or about February 7, 2020, U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (''OFAC'') added CONVIASA, a Venezuelan state-owned airline, to the list of Specially Designated Nationals (''SDN'') pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13884. *See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm903.*

[62] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on April 24, 2023, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Guangzhou, China, and Tehran, Iran, and on April 27, 2023, EP–MNF (MSN 547) flew on routes between Kabul, Afghanistan and Tehran, Iran. On April 28, 2023, EP–MME (MSN 371) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran.

[63] *https://iranpress.com/content/76332/mahan-air-launches-direct-flight-from-tehran-minsk.*

[64] *See* 88 FR 66807 (Sep. 28, 2023).

[65] *https://simpleflying.com/aeroflot-airbus-a330-maintenance-iran-mahan-air/.*

[66] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on October 24, 2023, EP–MME (MSN 371) flew on routes between Erbil, Iraq and Tehran, Iran, and on October 23, 2023, EP–MMB (MSN 56) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran. On October 21–22, 2023, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Lahore, Pakistan and Tehran, Iran.

[67] *See supra* at footnote 34.

[68] *https://www.jns.org/syria-airport-strikes-said-to-stop-iranian-missile-shipment/; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-state-tv-says-israeli-attack-targets-aleppo-damascus-airports-2023-10-12/; https://www.israelhayom.com/2023/10/17/revealed-this-could-be-why-israel-allegedly-bombed-2-airports-simultaneously/.*

[69] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on October 13–14, 2024, EP–MME (MSN 371) flew on routes between Guangzhou, China and Tehran, Iran, and on October 10, 2024, EP–MMQ (MSN 346) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran. On October 15, 2024, EP–MMR (MSN 416) flew on routes between Erbil, Iraq and Tehran, Iran.

[70] The items at issue were subject to the Regulations and included items classified under

Continued

OEE's September 22, 2025 TDO renewal request along with its on-going investigation, illustrates that Mahan continues operating aircraft including EP–MMR, EP–MMT, and EP–MMG on flights into and out of Iran from/to Moscow, Russia, Lahore, Pakistan, and Shanghai, China.[71] Recent open source evidence also indicates Mahan's further efforts to violate the TDO and U.S. sanctions by obtaining five additional U.S.-origin aircraft. Multiple news sources and industry databases describe the evasive steps by Mahan and third parties to divert five Boeing 777–212ER aircraft to Iran via multiple intermediary countries. Mahan and its proxies were able to coordinate a complex series of re-positioning and re-registrations of the aircraft, which at one point were registered in the United States, utilizing multiple front companies in a number of countries. Evidence indicates the five aircraft were reportedly placed in long-term storage until late 2023, and were then relocated and placed in storage at Lanzhou Airport in China. The aircraft, which bore U.S. registered tail numbers, appeared to have been stored in Lanzhou Airport in China until early July 2025, when they were relocated to Cambodia via Indonesia's Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, and re-registered under temporary Madagascar aircraft registration.[72] On or about July 15, 2025, all five aircraft departed Cambodia and reportedly turned their transponders off over Afghanistan rendering their flight paths untraceable until they landed at Iranian airports, to include Mashhad International Airport and Zahedan International Airport.[73]

Aircraft	MSN	U.S. registry	Madagascar temporary registry
Boeing 777–212ER	33369	N99001	5R–RIJ.
Boeing 777–212ER	32334	N99002	5R–RIS.
Boeing 777–212ER	30866	N99003	5R–ISA.
Boeing 777–212ER	28527	N99004	5R–IJA.
Boeing 777–212ER	28522	N99005	5R–HER.

C. Findings

Under the applicable standard set forth in Section 766.24 of the Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that the denied persons have acted in violation of the Regulations and the TDO; that such violations have been significant, deliberate and covert; and that given the foregoing and the nature of the matters under investigation, there is a likelihood of imminent violations. Moreover, I find that renewal for an extended period is appropriate given the pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR. Therefore, renewal of the TDO is necessary in the public interest to prevent imminent violation of the Regulations and to give notice to companies and individuals in the United States and abroad that they should continue to avoid dealing with Mahan Airways and Al Naser Airlines and the other denied persons, in connection with export and reexport transactions involving items subject to the Regulations and in connection with any other activity subject to the Regulations.

III. Order

It is therefore ordered:

First, that MAHAN AIRWAYS, Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way, Tehran, Iran; PEJMAN MAHMOOD KOSARAYANIFARD A/K/A KOSARIAN FARD, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; MAHMOUD AMINI, G#22 Dubai Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al Rigga, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; KERMAN AVIATION A/K/A GIE KERMAN AVIATION, 42 Avenue Montaigne 75008, Paris, France; SIRJANCO TRADING LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; MAHAN AIR GENERAL TRADING LLC, 19th Floor Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road, Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates; MEHDI BAHRAMI, Mahan Airways-Istanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey; AL NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL-NASER AIRLINES A/K/A AL NASER WINGS AIRLINE A/K/A ALNASER AIRLINES AND AIR FREIGHT LTD., Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, St. 3/H.20, Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq, and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 11191, Jordan; ALI ABDULLAH ALHAY A/K/A ALI ALHAY A/K/A ALI ABDULLAH AHMED ALHAY, Home 46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif, Saudi Arabia 61177; BAHAR SAFWA GENERAL TRADING, P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor-5, Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates; SKY BLUE BIRD GROUP A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD AVIATION A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD LTD A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Trade Zone, United Arab Emirates; and ISSAM SHAMMOUT A/K/A MUHAMMAD ISAM MUHAMMAD ANWAR NUR SHAMMOUT A/K/A ISSAM ANWAR, Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous Street, Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17–18 Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 8RP, United Kingdom, and Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey, and when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees (each a ''Denied Person'' and collectively the ''Denied Persons'') may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as ''item'')

ECCN 3A991.a.2 and others listed in Tier 1 of BIS's Common High Prior List. Since February 24, 2022, BIS has implemented a series of stringent export controls that restrict Russia's access to the technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its brutal attack on Ukraine. Tier 1 items are of the highest concern due to their critical role in the production of advanced Russian precision-guided weapons systems, Russia's lack of domestic production, and limited global manufacturers.

[71] Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on May 25, 2025, EP–MMR (MSN 615) flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and Tehran, Iran, and on September 7, 2025, EP–MMT (MSN 292) flew on routes between Lahore, Pakistan and Tehran, Iran. On September 9, 2025, EP–MMG (MSN 383) flew on routes between Shanghai, China and Tehran, Iran.

[72] *https://aviationa2z.com/index.php/2025/07/25/irans-mahan-air-smuggle-ex-singapore-airlines-777s/.*

[73] *https://onemileatatime.com/news/iranian-aircraft-smuggling-disappearing-planes/.*

exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license exception, or export control document;

B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR; or

C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR.

Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item subject to the EAR;

B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;

C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States;

D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or

E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.

Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to a Denied Person by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

Fourth, that this Order does not prohibit any export, reexport, or other transaction subject to the EAR where the only items involved that are subject to the EAR are the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.-origin technology.

In accordance with the provisions of Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa General Trading may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–4022. In accordance with the provisions of Sections 766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR, Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue Bird Group, and/or Issam Shammout may, at any time, appeal their inclusion as a related person by filing a full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–4022.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be opposed by Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa General Trading as provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days before the expiration date of the Order.

A copy of this Order shall be provided to Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa General Trading and each related person, and shall be published in the **Federal Register**.

This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for one year.

David Peters,

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.

[FR Doc. 2025–19727 Filed 10–30–25; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

[EPA–HQ–OAR–2004–0489; FRL–13052–01–OMS]

Agency Information Collection Activities; Submission to the Office of Management and Budget for Review and Approval; Comment Request; Air Emissions Reporting Requirements (Renewal)

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has submitted an information collection request (ICR), Air Emissions Reporting Requirements (EPA ICR Number 2170.09, OMB Control Number 2060–0580) to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review and approval in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act. This is a proposed extension of the ICR, which is currently approved through October 31, 2025. Public comments were previously requested via the **Federal Register** on June 5, 2025, during a 60-day comment period (90 FR 23932). This notice allows for an additional 30 days for public comments.

DATES: Comments may be submitted on or before December 1, 2025.

ADDRESSES: Submit your comments, referencing Docket ID Number EPA–HQ–OAR–2004–0489, to EPA online using *www.regulations.gov* (our preferred method), by email to *houyoux.marc@epa.gov,* or by mail to: EPA Docket Center, Environmental Protection Agency, Mail Code 28221T, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20460.

EPA's policy is that all comments received will be included in the public docket without change including any personal information provided, unless the comment includes profanity, threats, information claimed to be Confidential Business Information (CBI) or other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute.

Submit written comments and recommendations to OMB for the proposed information collection within 30 days of publication of this notice to *www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain.* Find this particular information collection by selecting ''Currently under 30-day Review—Open for Public Comments'' or by using the search function.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Marc Houyoux, Air Quality Assessment Division, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, C339–02, Environmental