The Department of Energy's (“DOE”) Loan Programs Office (“LPO”) administers Title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“Title XVII”). 1 Since its initial enactment, Congress has made substantial amendments to Title XVII, including through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (“IIJA”)  2 and the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (“IRA”). 3 For example, section 50144 of the IRA amended Title XVII to introduce a loan guarantee program (“section 1706”) for projects that (1) retool, repower, repurpose, or replace energy infrastructure that has ceased operations, or (2) enable operating energy infrastructure to avoid, reduce, utilize, or sequester air pollutants, including anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. 4 More recently, Congress passed and the President signed into law the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (“OBBBA”) on July 4, 2025, which includes substantial amendments to section 1706, and Title XVII. 5

The Energy Dominance Financing provisions of OBBBA amended section 1706 to now authorize the Secretary of Energy (“Secretary”) to guarantee loans of up to a total principal amount of $250 billion through September 30, 2028. Additionally, the Energy Dominance Financing provisions amended the definitions and criteria used to determine section 1706 eligible projects and eliminated certain section 1706 application and project requirements.

The cumulative effect of the Energy Dominance Financing amendments to Title XVII is a material expansion of the types of projects eligible for loan guarantees from DOE. DOE is therefore revising 10 CFR part 609 (“part 609”) through this interim final rule (“IFR”) and requesting comments to implement the Title XVII Loan Guarantee Program, as modified, and fully and timely meet the ambitious timeline of guaranteeing loans under section 1706 prior to expiration. DOE is also modifying the colloquial name of section 1706 projects from Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment (“EIR”) to Energy Dominance Financing (“EDF”) projects. Section 1706 is still entitled: “Energy infrastructure reinvestment financing;” however, this rebranding is meant to reflect the material changes to the loan program established by OBBBA, as well as the type and volume of projects DOE anticipates.

Title XVII, as amended, provides the Secretary the authority to issue loan guarantees for certain eligible projects, including innovative energy projects and energy infrastructure reinvestment projects. 6 DOE has administered the Title XVII Loan Guarantee Program pursuant to its regulations set forth at part 609, as required by the authorizing statute. 7 Part 609 sets forth the policies and procedures that DOE uses for the application process, which includes receiving, evaluating, and approving applications for loan guarantees to support eligible projects under Title XVII. 8 Part 609 applies to all applications, conditional commitments, and loan guarantee agreements under the Title XVII Loan Guarantee Program and provides specific guidance to program applicants regarding eligibility for the program, the loan guarantee application process and requirements, criteria for DOE's evaluation of applications, and the process for negotiation and execution of a loan guarantee agreement term sheet, conditional commitment, and loan guarantee agreement. Part 609 also describes the terms applicable to the loan guarantee.

Following DOE's issuance of initial guidelines and an initial solicitation for pre-applications for the program in 2006, DOE promulgated the original part 609 to implement and issue loan guarantees under the program in 2007. 9 In 2009, DOE amended part 609 to accommodate additional flexibility regarding liens and other collateral utilized for securing guaranteed loans. 10 DOE subsequently amended part 609 in 2011 to address the submission and treatment of trade secrets and other privileged commercial or financial information  11 and in 2012 to incorporate certain statutory changes to section 1702 of Title XVII  12 related to payment of credit subsidy costs. 13

In 2016, DOE promulgated additional amendments to part 609 to provide increased clarity and transparency, reduce paperwork, and provide a more workable interpretation of certain statutory provisions in light of DOE's experience with operation of the Title XVII program. 14 These amendments included removing a pre-application process and adopting a Part I and Part II application process, clarifying certain application limitations on technologies and locations, implementing the Risk-Based Charge, and a number of additional changes.

In 2021, DOE amended part 609 to incorporate directives from Executive Order 13953 to clarify the eligibility of projects related to “Critical Minerals,” “Critical Minerals Production,” and related activities. 15 And in 2023, DOE substantially amended part 609 to implement provisions of the IRA that expanded or modified the authorities applicable to the Title XVII Loan Guarantee Program. 16 Specifically, DOE established regulations necessary to implement the Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment (“EIR”) projects (and other categories of projects) authorized by the IRA for Title XVII loan guarantees; amended provisions to conform with the broader changes to the Title XVII Loan Guarantee Program; and revised certain sections for clarity and organization. 17

This IFR amends the DOE loan guarantee regulations, set forth in part 609, to implement the Energy Dominance Financing provisions of the OBBBA. This IFR expands the definition and criteria of eligible projects under section 1706; and revises certain sections for clarity, organization, and conformance with the recent enactment. DOE has determined that it is imperative to put these IFR provisions in place for potential EDF-eligible projects, concurrent with the solicitation of public comment, to meet the ambitious timeline of guaranteeing loans under section 1706 prior to expiration of DOE's commitment authority. Those provisions not impacted or otherwise amended by the OBBBA remain in full force and effect.

Through publication of this IFR, DOE is also providing a comment period until December 29, 2025. Comments submitted during this period will be reviewed and considered. A final rule, or additional notice, may be issued at a later date, with a response to comments, reflecting any experience DOE may gain in implementing this IFR.

The amendments in this IFR essentially revise three sections of part 609 to conform the Title XVII Loan Guarantee Program with the OBBBA and otherwise implement its Energy Dominance Financing provisions. Provided below is a section-by-section analysis of the changes made by this IFR.

Prior to passage of the OBBBA, energy infrastructure meant “a facility, and associated equipment, used for: (1) The generation or transmission of electric energy; or (2) The production, processing, and delivery of fossil fuels, fuels derived from petroleum, or petrochemical feedstocks.”  18

As prescribed by statute, DOE is now revising part 609 to define Energy Infrastructure to mean “a facility, and associated equipment, used for enabling the identification, leasing, development, production, processing, transportation, transmission, refining, and generation needed for energy and critical minerals.”  19

Prior to passage of the OBBBA, an eligible energy infrastructure reinvestment project was a project located in the United States that either “enables operating Energy Infrastructure to avoid, reduce, utilize, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases;” or “[r]etools, repowers, repurposes, or replaces Energy Infrastructure that has ceased operations; provided that if such project involves electricity generation through the use of fossil fuels, such project shall be required to have controls or technologies to avoid, reduce, utilize, or sequester air pollutants and anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.”  20 Additionally, an eligible energy infrastructure reinvestment project could “include the remediation of environmental damage associated with Energy Infrastructure.”  21

DOE is now revising part 609 such that an eligible Energy Dominance Financing Project is a project located in the United States that, as prescribed by statute, either: “(1) retools, repowers, repurposes, or replaces Energy Infrastructure that has ceased operations; (2) enables operating Energy Infrastructure to increase capacity or output; or (3) supports or enables the provision of known or forecastable electric supply at time intervals necessary to maintain or enhance grid reliability or other system adequacy needs.”  22 As also prescribed by statute, an eligible EDF Project may continue to “include the remediation of environmental damage associated with Energy Infrastructure.”

This interim final rule expands the definition and criteria of eligible projects under the Title XVII Loan Guarantee Program to conform with the recent enactment of OBBBA. Specifically, the removal of the requirement that an eligible energy infrastructure reinvestment project “avoid, reduce, utilize, or sequester air pollutants or anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases,” has been directed by law. Congress has also expressly directed the removal of the requirement that an eligible energy infrastructure reinvestment project “have controls or technologies to avoid, reduce, utilize, or sequester air pollutants and anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.” Similarly, Congress has expanded the eligibility of a project, under section 1706, to include one that “supports or enables the provision of known or forecastable electric supply at time intervals necessary to maintain or enhance grid reliability or other system adequacy needs.”

Prior to passage of the OBBBA, an energy infrastructure reinvestment project application would have been denied if it failed to “include an analysis of how the proposed project will engage with and affect associated communities.”  23

DOE is now revising part 609 to reflect OBBBA's elimination of this application requirement. However, as directed by statute, DOE will continue to require a detailed plan describing the proposed project, as well as an assurance that an electric utility Applicant will pass on any financial benefit from the Guarantee to the customers of, or associated communities served by, the electric utility (with respect to applications for EDF Projects, where the Applicant is an electric utility).

In summary, this IFR amends DOE's loan guarantee regulations, set forth in part 609, to implement the Energy Dominance Financing provisions of the OBBBA. This IFR expands the definition and criteria of eligible projects under the Title XVII Loan Guarantee Program, and makes revisions for clarity, organization, and conformance with the recent enactment. This IFR also incorporates OBBBA's elimination of the statutory provision that required an applicant to submit an analysis of how the proposed project would engage with, and affect, associated communities. This was a statutory requirement that DOE incorporated into its loan guarantee regulations to implement section 1706 projects, and its elimination has been directed by law. Given the material changes to the loan program, and the type of projects anticipated under section 1706, DOE is also modifying its references to section 1706 projects from Energy Infrastructure Reinvestment (“EIR”) projects to Energy Dominance Financing (“EDF”) projects. Those provisions not impacted or otherwise amended by the OBBBA remain in full force and effect.

DOE will accept comments, data, and information regarding this IFR on or before the date provided in the DATES section at the beginning of this IFR. Interested parties may submit comments, data, and other information using any of the methods described in the ADDRESSES section at the beginning of this document.

Submitting comments via www.regulations.gov. The www.regulations.gov web page will require you to provide your name and contact information. Your contact information will not be publicly viewable except for your first and last name(s), organization name (if any), and submitter representative name (if any). If your comment is not processed properly because of technical difficulties, DOE will use this information to contact you. If DOE cannot read your comment due to technical difficulties and cannot contact you for clarification, DOE may not be able to consider your comment.

However, your contact information will be publicly viewable if you include it in the comment itself or in any documents attached to your comment. Any information that you do not want to be publicly viewable should not be included in your comment, nor in any document attached to your comment. Otherwise, persons viewing comments will see only first and last names, organization names, correspondence containing comments, and any documents submitted with the comments.

Do not submit to www.regulations.gov information the disclosure of which is restricted by statute, such as trade secrets and commercial or financial information (hereinafter referred to as Confidential Business Information (“CBI”)). Comments submitted through www.regulations.gov cannot be claimed as CBI. Comments received through the website will waive any CBI claims for the information submitted. For information on submitting CBI, see the Confidential Business Information section.

DOE processes submissions made through www.regulations.gov before posting. Normally, comments will be posted within a few days of being submitted. However, if large volumes of comments are being processed simultaneously, your comment may not be viewable for up to several weeks. Please keep the comment tracking number that www.regulations.gov provides after you have successfully uploaded your comment.

Submitting comments via email, hand delivery/courier, or postal mail. Comments and documents submitted via email, hand delivery/courier, or postal mail also will be posted to www.regulations.gov. If you do not want your personal contact information to be publicly viewable, do not include it in your comments or any accompanying documents. Instead, provide your contact information in a cover letter. Include your first and last names, email address, telephone number, and optional mailing address. The cover letter will not be publicly viewable as long as it does not include any comments.

Include contact information each time you submit comments, data, documents, and other information to DOE. If you submit via postal mail or hand delivery/courier, please provide all items on a CD, if feasible, in which case it is not necessary to submit printed copies. No telefacsimiles (faxes) will be accepted.

Comments, data, and other information submitted to DOE electronically should be provided in PDF (preferred), Microsoft Word or Excel, WordPerfect, or text (ASCII) file format. Provide documents that are written in English, and that are free of any defects or viruses. Documents should not contain special characters or any form of encryption. If possible, documents should carry the electronic signature of the author.

Confidential Business Information. Pursuant to 10 CFR 1004.11, any person submitting information that they believe to be confidential and exempt by law from public disclosure should submit via email, postal mail, or hand delivery/courier two well-marked copies: One copy of the document marked “confidential” including all the information believed to be confidential, and one copy of the document marked “non-confidential” that deletes the information believed to be confidential. Submit these documents via email or on a CD, if feasible. DOE will make its own determination about the confidential status of the information and will treat it according to its determination. It is DOE's policy that all comments, including any personal information provided in the comments, may be included in the public docket, without change and as received, except for information deemed to be exempt from public disclosure.

Section 6(a) of E.O. 12866 “Regulatory Planning and Review” requires agencies to submit “significant regulatory actions” to OIRA for review. OIRA has determined that this regulatory action does constitute a “significant regulatory action” under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866. Accordingly, this action was subject to review under that Executive Order by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) of the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”). The action is economically significant under E.O. 12866. The rule implements a material change in the types of projects eligible for loan guarantees from DOE under Title XVII, affecting loan guarantees up to a total principal amount of $250 billion through September 30, 2028. As a result, both the mix of projects funded under the program and the set of borrowers securing loans under the program may change. While there is no assurance that a loan guarantee for any particular project will be realized, stakeholders within industry may change behavior given the material change of the type of projects eligible. Industry may be willing to undertake different projects than they did prior to the rule. That said, DOE has determined that the default rate is not changing. The class of potentially eligible projects has expanded, but the criteria, rules, etc. used to determine whether a project has a “reasonable prospect of repayment” (as determined by DOE in consultation with Treasury) has not changed.

This IFR has also been determined to be an “E.O. 14192 deregulatory action” under E.O. 14192, “Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation,” 90 FR 9065 (February 6, 2025) because it eliminates the loan application requirement to submit “an analysis of how the proposed project will engage with and affect associated communities.” As previously stated, this application requirement was introduced by the IRA and incorporated into part 609. 88 FR 34419 (May 30, 2023). Therefore, prior to passage of the OBBBA, an energy infrastructure reinvestment project application would have been denied if it failed to include an analysis of how the proposed project will engage with and affect associated communities. DOE previously estimated “14 hours per response” for the inclusion of information regarding an applicant's community benefits plan; and “89 respondents” to the information collection request annually. Id. at 88 FR 34426. This IFR eliminates the application requirement, and associated burdens, from part 609, making it a E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

Section 553(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) exempts rulemakings that involve matters relating to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts from the APA's notice and comment procedures. As a rulemaking relating to the issuance of loans, DOE has determined that a notice of proposed rulemaking (and comment thereon) or delay in effective date is not required for this IFR's amendments to part 609. Though DOE has determined that a notice of proposed rulemaking (and comment thereon) is not required for this IFR's amendments to part 609, DOE has nevertheless voluntarily elected to solicit comment. DOE will accept comments, data, and information regarding this IFR on or before the date provided in the DATES section at the beginning of this IFR. Interested parties may submit comments, data, and other information using any of the methods described in the ADDRESSES section at the beginning of this document. Comments submitted during this period will be reviewed and considered. A final rule, or additional notice, may be issued at a later date, with a response to comments, reflecting any experience DOE may gain in implementing this IFR.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ) requires that an agency prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis whenever an agency is required by section 553 of this title, or any other law, to publish general notice of proposed rulemaking for any proposed rule. However, as noted above, and in prior part 609 rulemakings, DOE is not required to publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking for this matter, relating to public loans, under the Administrative Procedure Act. DOE has therefore determined that the regulatory flexibility analysis is inapplicable.

The information collection requirements for the DOE regulations at 10 CFR part 609 pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ) and the procedure implementing that Act (5 CFR 1320.1 et seq. ) are under OMB Control Number 1910-5134. As previously stated, this IFR eliminates the loan application requirement to submit “an analysis of how the proposed project will engage with and affect associated communities.” Therefore, DOE will be submitting a revision to its information collection request.

DOE has considered this IFR in accordance with NEPA, as amended, DOE's NEPA implementing regulations, set forth in 10 CFR part 1021, and DOE's NEPA implementing procedures published outside the Code of Federal Regulations on June 30, 2025. DOE has determined that NEPA does not apply to this action as this IFR is an administrative and routine action excepted from NEPA review, and is necessary to bring DOE's loan guarantee regulations into conformance with the recent enactment of OBBBA. DOE has determined that this rulemaking is a Federal action, but it is not “major” and therefore not subject to NEPA. This action is one to which NEPA does not apply because it does not fall within the definition of “major Federal action” in section 110(10) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4336e(10). For more information, please see appendix A of 10 CFR part 1021 (“A5, Interpretive rulemakings with no change in environmental effect”) and appendix A of DOE's NEPA implementing procedures, A5, Interpretive rulemakings with no change in environmental effect (June 30, 2025).

With respect to the review of existing regulations and the promulgation of new regulations, section 3(a) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform,” 61 FR 4729 (February 7, 1996), imposes on executive agencies the general duty to adhere to the following requirements: (1) eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity; (2) write regulations to minimize litigation; and (3) provide a clear legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general standard and promote simplification and burden reduction.

With regard to the review required by section 3(a), section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988 specifically requires, in pertinent part, that executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect, if any; (2) clearly specifies any effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

Section 3(c) of Executive Order 12988 requires Executive agencies to review regulations in light of applicable standards in section 3(a) and section 3(b) to determine whether they are met or it is unreasonable to meet one or more of them.

DOE has completed the required review and determined that, to the extent permitted by law, this rule meets the relevant standards of Executive Order 12988.

Executive Order 13132, “Federalism,”  24 imposes certain requirements on agencies formulating and implementing policies or regulations that preempt State law or that have federalism implications. Agencies are required to examine the constitutional and statutory authority supporting any action that would limit the policymaking discretion of the States and to carefully assess the necessity for such actions. The executive order also requires agencies to have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by State and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism implications. On March 14, 2000, DOE published a statement of policy describing the intergovernmental consultation process it will follow in the development of such regulations. 25

DOE has examined this IFR and has determined that it will not preempt State law and will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Accordingly, no further action is required by Executive Order 13132.

Under Executive Order 13175, “Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,”  26 DOE may not issue a discretionary rule that has Tribal implications and imposes substantial direct compliance costs on Indian Tribal governments without prior Tribal consultation. DOE has determined that this IFR will not have such effects and has concluded that Executive Order 13175 does not apply to this IFR.

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (“UMRA”)  27 requires each Federal agency to provide a written statement assessing the effects of Federal regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal governments and the private sector that may cause the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100 million or more in any one year (adjusted annually for inflation), before promulgating any general notice of proposed rulemaking, and before promulgating any final rule for which a general notice of proposed rulemaking was published. As noted above, and in prior part 609 rulemakings, DOE is not required to publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking for this matter, relating to public loans, under the Administrative Procedure Act. DOE notes, however, that this IFR contains neither an intergovernmental mandate nor a mandate that may result in the expenditure of $100 million or more in any year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector. This IFR establishes only requirements that are a condition of Federal assistance or a duty arising from participation in a voluntary program. Accordingly, no further assessment or analysis is required under UMRA.

Section 654 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999  28 requires Federal agencies to issue a Family Policymaking Assessment for any proposed rule that may affect family well-being. This IFR will not have any impact on the autonomy or integrity of the family as an institution. Accordingly, DOE has concluded that it is not necessary to prepare a Family Policymaking Assessment.

Section 515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001  29 provides for Federal agencies to review most disseminations of information to the public under guidelines established by each agency pursuant to general guidelines issued by OMB. OMB's guidelines were published at 67 FR 8452 (February 22, 2002), and DOE's guidelines were published at 67 FR 62446 (October 7, 2002). Pursuant to OMB Memorandum M-19-15, “Improving Implementation of the Information Quality Act” (April 24, 2019), DOE published updated guidelines which are available at: www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/12/f70/DOE%20Final%20Updated%20IQA%20Guidelines%20Dec%202019.pdf.

DOE has reviewed this IFR under the OMB and DOE guidelines and has concluded that it is consistent with applicable policies in those guidelines.

Executive Order 13211, “Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use,”  30 requires Federal agencies to prepare and submit to the OMB, a Statement of Energy Effects for any proposed significant energy action. A “significant energy action” is defined as any action by an agency that promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, and that: (1)(i) is a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866, or any successor order; and (ii) is likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy, or (2) is designated by the Administrator of OIRA as a significant energy action. For any proposed significant energy action, the agency must give a detailed statement of any adverse effects on energy supply, distribution, or use should the proposal be implemented, and of reasonable alternatives to the action and their expected benefits on energy supply, distribution, and use. This regulatory action will not have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy and is therefore not a significant energy action. Accordingly, DOE has not prepared a Statement of Energy Effects.

As required by 5 U.S.C. 801, DOE will report to Congress on the promulgation of this rule. The report will state that it has been determined that the rule is a “major rule” as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2). As this IFR amends regulations concerning loan guarantees, it is exempt from the notice-and-comment and effective date delay requirements in the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2). As such, and in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 808(2), this IFR will be effective upon publication.

The Secretary of Energy has approved publication of this interim final rule; request for comments.

This document of the Department of Energy was signed on October 16, 2025, by Chris Wright, Secretary of Energy. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the Federal Register .

For the reasons stated in the preamble, DOE amends part 609 of chapter II of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations as set forth below:

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)—which was enacted in 1970 and has been amended several times since—sets forth certain requirements “concerning the creation and use of consumer reports.”  1 The FCRA has always preempted State law, but the scope of that preemption has changed over time. Since its inception, the FCRA has preempted State laws “to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of” the FCRA. 2 But in 1996, Congress emphasized that FCRA standards were national by adding a provision that further preempted any State regulation related to specifically enumerated subjects already regulated by the FCRA. 3 This was “a strong preemption provision” that was meant to “to avoid a patchwork system of conflicting regulations.”  4 This newly added subject matter preemption provision was originally designed to expire in 2004. But in 2003, Congress made it permanent, 5 looking to preserve the FCRA's “national standards” in order to promote economic growth.

The main preemption provision of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1), uses carefully crafted language to preempt several areas of State law that it intended to be governed solely by Federal law. The lead paragraph states that “[n]o requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under” each of the eleven subparagraphs. Each subparagraph then includes a provision of the FCRA followed by the phrase “relating to” and then a description of the subject matter of that provision.

In full, section 1681t(b)(1) says that “[n]o requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State with respect to any subject matter regulated under” certain sections or subsections of the FCRA:

(a) Subsection (c) or (e) of section 1681b, relating to the prescreening of consumer reports;

(b) Section 1681i, relating to the time by which a consumer reporting agency must take any action, including the provision of notification to a consumer or other person, in any procedure related to the disputed accuracy of information in a consumer's file, [with an exception for laws in effect on September 30, 1996];

(c) Subsections (a) and (b) of section 1681m, relating to the duties of a person who takes any adverse action with respect to a consumer;

(d) Section 1681m(d), relating to the duties of persons who use a consumer report of a consumer in connection with any credit or insurance transaction that is not initiated by the consumer and that consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance;

(e) Section 1681c, relating to information contained in consumer reports, [with an exception for laws in effect on September 30, 1996];

(f) Section 1681s-2, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies [with exceptions for certain enumerated State laws];

(g) Section 1681g(e), relating to information available to victims under section 1681g(e);

(h) Section 1681s-3, relating to the exchange and use of information to make a solicitation for marketing purposes;

(i) Section 1681m(h), relating to the duties of users of consumer reports to provide notice with respect to terms in certain credit transactions;

(j) Subsections (i) and (j) of section 1681c-1 relating to security freezes; or

(k) Subsection (k) of section 1681c-1, relating to credit monitoring for active duty military consumers, as defined in that subsection.

On July 11, 2022, the Bureau published an interpretive rule purporting to analyze section 1681t(b)(1), finding that it has “a narrow sweep,” which allows for substantial State regulation of consumer reports and consumer reporting agencies. 6 The 2022 interpretive rule declared that “section 1681t(b)(1) does not preempt all State laws relating to the content or information contained in consumer reports.”  7 According to the interpretive rule, “[t]he `with respect to' phrase necessarily reaches a subset of laws narrower than those that merely relate to information contained in consumer reports.”  8 The interpretive rule thus concluded that unless a State law specifically concerned a requirement or obligation addressed in the enumerated FCRA provision, it was not preempted.

For example, section 1681t(b)(1)(E) preempts State laws “with respect to any subject matter regulated under” section 1681c “relating to information contained in consumer reports.” Section 1681c states requirements on four topics relating to information contained in consumer reports: obsolescence, certain information about medical information furnishers, certain information about veterans' medical debt, and certain information that must be included in a consumer report. The interpretive rule reasoned that section 1681t(b)(1)(E) does not preempt State laws about subject matter regarding the content of or information on consumer reports beyond these topics. Applying this logic, the interpretive rule specifically identified a number of areas in which States could regulate consistent with the interpretive rule's view of the FCRA, including medical debt, rental information, and arrest records. 9

The 2022 rule also examined 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(5), another preemption clause in the FCRA, and concluded that it too has a narrow scope.

On May 12, 2025, the Bureau withdrew a substantial number of guidance documents, including the 2022 interpretive rule. 10 Consistent with the May notice, the Bureau is now confirming the withdrawal of the 2022 interpretive rule. The Bureau is also clarifying that the FCRA generally preempts State laws that touch on broad areas of credit reporting, consistent with Congress's intent to create national standards for the credit reporting system.

When the Bureau withdrew its guidance documents in May 2025, the Bureau explained that it is “committed to issuing guidance only where that guidance is necessary and would reduce compliance burdens rather than increase them.”  11 The Bureau has reviewed the 2022 interpretive rule that interprets sections 1681t(b)(1) and 1681t(b)(5) of the FCRA, and the Bureau now confirms the withdrawal of that rule.

The 2022 rule is neither necessary nor does it reduce compliance burdens. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that courts are the ultimate arbiters of statutory meaning, 12 and in particular “agencies have no special authority to pronounce on pre-emption absent delegation by Congress.”  13 It was unnecessary for the Bureau in 2022 to opine on the scope of preemption under the FCRA. The FCRA does not compel—or even authorize—the Bureau to provide its legally binding views on preemption. That stands in contrast to other statutes administered by the Bureau, which do delegate such authority to the Bureau. 14 Nor did the 2022 rule ease compliance burdens. To the contrary (and as explained below), the 2022 rule sowed confusion into the credit reporting system by creating a patchwork quilt of federal and state laws competing to govern the marketplace.

Therefore, having completed its review, the Bureau has determined that the 2022 rule does not meet its current standards for the issuance of guidance. Additionally, consistent with its May 2025 guidance withdrawal notice, the Bureau does not believe that reliance interests compel the retention or reissuance of the 2022 rule. Parties understand that guidance, including the 2022 rule, is non-binding. Parties interested in the application of FCRA preemption to particular State laws can litigate such questions in court. The 2022 rule was not binding on the public or courts, and the withdrawal of the 2022 rule will have no effect on the legal status of any State law.

For these reasons, the Bureau is exercising its discretion to confirm the withdrawal of the 2022 interpretive rule on preemption under the FCRA.

As noted above, agencies do not have special expertise in interpreting preemption clauses, and the 2022 rule should not have done so with respect to the scope of preemption under the FCRA. In addition to withdrawing the 2022 rule, the Bureau now clarifies that its prior interpretation was manifestly wrong. The 2022 interpretive rule contradicted the plain text of section 1681t(b)(1), ignored the legislative history of the preemption clause, and reflected a misguided policy choice that would undermine the credit reporting system and credit markets.

The plain text of a preemption clause will “necessarily contain[ ] the best evidence of Congress' preemptive intent.”  15 The 2022 interpretive rule failed to properly interpret the plain text of section 1681t(b)(1) and erroneously concluded that it had a narrow sweep. The plain text leads to the opposite conclusion: Congress's use of broad and categorical language shows that it intended the clause to apply expansively.

As noted above, the relevant statutory text says that “[n]o requirement or prohibition” may be imposed by a State “with respect to any subject matter regulated under” a specified provision of the FCRA, which provision is then followed by the phrase “relating to” and then a description of the subject matter of that provision. For example, section 1681t(b)(1)(E) says that States can impose “[n]o requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681c, relating to information contained in consumer reports.”

In crafting section 1681t(b)(1), Congress chose a series of broad and expansive phrases. To begin with, the phrase “[n]o requirement or prohibition” in the context of preemption “sweeps broadly” and applies to all State laws, whether enacted by a legislature or decreed by a common-law court. 16 Next, a phrase like “with respect to” also “has a broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its subject but also matters relating to that subject.”  17 The word “any,” when “[r]ead naturally,” also has “an expansive meaning, that is, one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.”  18 A “subject matter” is generally defined as an “issue presented for consideration” or “the thing in dispute.”  19 Finally, “the phrase `relate to' in a preemption clause express[es] a broad pre-emptive purpose,” and is typically used by Congress “to reach any subject that has a connection with, or reference to, the topics the statute enumerates.”  20

Read together, these “deliberately expansive”  21 terms can mean only one thing: Congress meant to occupy the field of consumer reporting and displace State laws within that field. By preempting laws respecting the “subject matter” of some of FCRA's broadest provisions—and then defining that subject matter in broad terms through the “relating to” clause—Congress plainly meant to sweep away most State regulation in the area.

For example, section 1681t(b)(1)(E) says that States can impose “[n]o requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . 1681c,” that is “relating to information contained in consumer reports.” So section 1681t(b)(1)(E) first identifies that laws touching on the subject matter of 1681c are preempted. It proceeds to say that these are laws “relating to information contained in consumer reports,” and the fact that this phrase is the verbatim title of 1681c is a clear indication that Congress is clarifying the subject matter of 1681c. And that subject matter is broad—it covers the inclusion of information in consumer reports. All State laws on that subject are preempted.

As another example, section 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts any State law “with respect to any subject matter regulated under section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.” This provision identifies that laws touching on the subject matter of 1681s-2 are preempted. It proceeds to say that these are laws “relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies,” and again that phrase is the verbatim title of 1681s-2. Thus, any State law that concerns the responsibilities of furnishers is preempted.

Notably, Congress knew how to craft narrower preemption clauses in the FCRA. For example, in a separate clause, the FCRA preempts any State law “with respect to the frequency of any disclosure under section 1681j(a) [the free annual credit report].”  22 Had Congress meant for section 1681t(b)(1) to have a similarly narrow sweep, Congress would have chosen that kind of narrow, targeted language. But it purposefully chose a broader approach with section 1681t(b)(1), and the scope of preemption under section 1681t(b)(1) must accordingly be interpreted expansively.

The 2022 interpretive rule musters no justification for reading section 1681t(b)(1) in a limited manner. It claimed that if Congress had meant to occupy the field so broadly, it would have used more categorical language. However, as explained above, it would be hard to imagine language more categorical than section 1681t(b)(1).

Instead of giving proper effect to the broad language of section 1681t(b)(1), the 2022 interpretive rule wrongly concluded that the “with respect to” phrase has a limited effect. According to that rule, “the phrase `with respect to any subject matter regulated under' is an important limiting factor” on the scope of preemption” and “reaches a subset of laws narrower than those that merely relate to information contained in consumer reports. It narrows the universe of preemption only to those laws that concern the subject matter regulated under the enumerated FCRA sections.”  23 Thus, according to the 2022 rule, “if a State law does not `concern' the subject matters regulated under the FCRA sections specified in section 1681t(b)(1), it is not preempted by that clause.”  24

The case on which the interpretive rule principally relied, Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 25 does not support the rule's conclusion that the “with respect to” clause must be construed narrowly. In Dan's City, the Supreme Court considered the preemption clause in the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), which prohibits enforcement of State laws “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.”  26 The Court compared the FAAAA's preemption clause with that of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), which displaces any State law “related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.”  27 In comparing the FAAAA's preemption clause to the ADA's, the Court noted that the “with respect to” phrase “massively limits the scope of preemption ordered by the FAAAA.” It was “not sufficient that a state law relates to the `price, route, or service' of a motor carrier in any capacity; the law must also concern a motor carrier's `transportation of property.' ”  28

Contrary to the interpretive rule, Dan's City merely “offered the straightforward observation that the addition of the second requirement in the FAAAA preemption provision `massively limits the scope of preemption' of that provision in comparison to the ADA's preemption provision —not because `with respect to' carries some inherent limiting meaning but because the FAAAA reduced the scope of preemption vis-à-vis the ADA by doubling the boxes a law must check before it is preempted.”  29 Nothing in Dan's City requires that the “with respect to” phrase be given an artificially narrow meaning.

The 2022 interpretive rule's reading of section 1681t(b)(1) also contradicts the canon against surplusage, which provides that “every word and every provision is to be given effect [and that n]one should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.”  30 Rather than giving full effect to every part of section 1681t(b)(1), the 2022 rule effectively reads “the relating to” clause out of the statute. If—as the 2022 rule says—the scope of preemption under section 1681t(b)(1) is bounded by the requirements or obligations in the specific section enumerated in the “with respect to” clause, then the “relating to” cause has no work to do. It is entirely descriptive and redundant. By contrast, under a proper reading of the provision, the “with respect to” and “relating to” clauses complement each other: the “with respect to” clause identifies the FCRA provision whose subject matter is preempted and the “relating to” clause defines the scope of that subject matter.

Many courts evaluating the scope of FCRA preemption have not read section 1681t(b)(1) as narrowly as the 2022 interpretive rule. Instead, they have properly interpreted FCRA's preemption clause to broadly preempt the general subject matter that is identified by the clause. For instance, in Premium Mortgage Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 31 the plaintiff mortgage lender brought State-law claims against several consumer reporting companies for selling pre-screened reports containing trigger leads to other mortgage lenders. The claims included misappropriation of trade secrets, fraud, unfair competition, tortious interference with contract, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The court concluded that these claims were preempted because they “relate[ ] to the prescreening of consumer reports.”  32 The court did not ask whether the claims addressed requirements or obligations in section 1681b(c) or (e). Likewise, in Ross v. FDIC, 33 the Tenth Circuit determined that the plaintiff's State law claims against a bank for furnishing inaccurate information to a credit bureau were preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(F) because they “concern[ the] reporting of inaccurate credit information to CRAs.” Again, the court did not perform a granular review of section 1681s-2. 34

In these cases, the fact that a State law touched upon the same subject matter as the one addressed by the FCRA preemption clause was enough for the court to make a preemption determination; there was no need to specifically interrogate which actions or ideas were discussed in the FCRA provision itself. These holdings cannot be squared with the logic of the 2022 rule. 35

Legislative history “need not be consulted when, as here, the statutory text is unambiguous.”  36 But even the legislative history of section 1681t(b) confirms that Congress intended to broadly displace State laws on consumer reporting.

As noted above, when the FCRA was enacted in 1970, it preempted only conflicting State laws. Congress expanded FCRA preemption when it first enacted section 1681t(b) in 1996, reaching a wide swath of State laws that were more protective than the FCRA. However, in those 1996 amendments, Congress clarified that this broader provision would not apply to any State law that “(A) is enacted after January 1, 2004; (B) states explicitly that the provision is intended to supplement [the FCRA]; and (C) gives greater protection to consumers than is provided under [the FCRA].”  37 In 2003, however, Congress made permanent section 1681t(b), deleted the sunset-provision applying to laws giving “greater protection to consumers,” and added a new preemption clause. 38 In short, since 1970 Congress has continually expanded FCRA preemption.

The congressional debates that led to the 1996 and 2003 laws also reflect this pattern of expanding FCRA preemption. When section 1681t(b) was first added to the FCRA in 1996, Members of Congress made clear that the preemption clause was intended to usher in a national credit reporting system. As noted by Senator Richard Bryan (one of the sponsors of the Senate version of the 1996 amendments), “When representatives of the business community approached us about the need for uniformity in this area, they stressed the need to preempt multiple States' laws while a new Federal law demonstrated its effectiveness.”  39 As Representative Castle explained, to meet that need the 1996 amendments to the FCRA “recognize[d] that the credit industry is now a complex, nationwide business” and established “a uniform, national standard for credit reporting.”  40 The broad preemption under section 1681t(b) would “allow businesses to comply with one law on credit reports rather than a myriad of State laws,” thereby “benefit[ting] consumers and businesses.”  41 In other words, the preemption clause was specifically intended to avoid “a patchwork of State laws.”  42

But Congress also implemented a sunset-provision for the preemption clause in case a national credit reporting system did not ultimately result in the expected benefits. The probationary period “should provide adequate time to demonstrate whether these Federal standards are sufficient”  43 and “test the viability of a uniform national standard.”  44 But “[if] after 8 years the Federal law is not adequately protecting consumers,” Congress “expect[ed] States to step in once again and do the job.”  45

In 2003, Congress decided to make permanent section 1681t(b) in order to “enhance the national credit reporting system.”  46 As Representative Kanjorski noted, the 1996 amendments had “created a nationwide consumer credit system that works increasingly well,” by “expand[ing] access to credit, lower[ing] the price of credit, and accelerat[ing] decisions to grant credit.”  47 The key to this nationwide credit system was “the establishment of the uniform system that preempts States from enacting miscellaneous and potentially conflicting requirements regarding credit reporting.”  48 The “`miracle of instant credit' created by our national credit reporting system has given American consumers a level of access to financial services and products that is unrivaled anywhere in the world,” said Representative Oxley, adding that “[t]he protection and growth of these services, as provided for in this legislation, are critical to the success of our economy.”  49 Senator Shelby, one of the sponsors of the 2003 bill, argued that the legislation was “creating permanent national standards” for the “national credit reporting system,” which he also noted was important to “our financial markets and economy as a whole.”  50

Thus, as the conference report for the 2003 law noted, the amendments would “ensure the operational efficiency of our national credit system by creating a number of preemptive national standards.”  51 Congress recognized the “significant concern . . . that [these national standards] preclude states from adopting more robust consumer protections” but nonetheless concluded that “[n]ational credit markets are necessary to meet business and consumer demands and are very important to the efficient operation of the United States economy.”  52

In summary, the legislative history of both the 1996 and 2003 amendments corroborates the plain text of section 1681t(b)(1). Congress clearly intended for that preemption clause to have a broad sweep.

Although it is clear that Congress' intention in enacting section 1681t(b) was to “enhance” the national credit reporting system through national standards, the 2022 interpretive rule risked fracturing that system by allowing each State to create its own standards.

In enacting the FCRA, Congress recognized that “[t]he banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting” and that “[c]onsumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and other information on consumers.”  53 The FCRA's purpose was thus “to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.”  54

Between the passage of the FCRA and the preemption amendments, the American economy became more nationalized, supported in large part by the development of a lending and credit-reporting system that crossed State borders. As the conference report to the 2003 amendments noted, “we live in a mobile society in which 40 million Americans move annually. The FCRA permits consumers to transport their credit with them wherever they go.”  55 Congress wanted to promote “national credit markets,” and a national credit-reporting system was of “seminal importance . . . for economic development.”  56 As Congress recognized, “these uniform national standards . . . operate in a very fundamental way to expand the opportunity for consumers to get access to credit and a broad range of financial services. What they really do is allow you to take your reputation with you as you travel around the country.”  57

This purpose—and its accompanying benefits to the economy—risked being sacrificed by the 2022 interpretive rule's reading of the FCRA's preemption clause, with harmful consequences to consumers. Under the interpretive rule's view of the FCRA, there can be 50-plus State regulatory regimes governing credit reporting in addition to the national standards established by Federal law. Having to comply with those disparate regimes would impose substantial compliance costs on consumer reporting agencies, users of credit reports, and furnishers of credit report information, turning what is currently a cohesive national market into dozens of regional markets. It would lead to “a patchwork system of conflicting regulations,” which the preemption clause was meant to “avoid.”  58 The content of a consumer's credit report could vary depending on the State in which they resided. Thus, instead of the unified national credit market that we have today, lending and underwriting decisions would have to be based in part on where a borrower lives, since the information available to a creditor making a lending decision could be better or worse depending on the borrower's State. The utility of credit reports would be undermined because lenders would no longer be able to accurately compare consumers across the country. Thus, instead of being able to “transport their credit with them wherever they go,” consumers could be stuck with the credit options where they live. As a result, the cost of credit would be likely to increase under the 2022 rule's interpretation. For instance, if some State laws were to limit the types of adverse information that could be included in a credit report, lenders may not be able to accurately identify the riskiest borrowers, which in turn could lead to a cross-subsidy by good credit risk borrowers for worse credit risk borrowers. Or for example, if regulation of credit reports is fragmented by State, lenders may charge more for credit in the States where regulation diverges from the national standard in order to account for the reduced accuracy of credit reports in those States.

Even if the 2022 interpretive rule were correct that the phrase “with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681c” in section 1681t(b)(1)(E) means the granular topics addressed by section 1681c (and not the general subject matter of “information contained in consumer reports”), the interpretive rule was still wrong to conclude that States can validly regulate the presence of certain categories of information—such as medical debt or arrest records—on a consumer report.

Section 1681c provides guidelines for how long information can remain on a credit report, including a general seven-year limitation for any “adverse item of information.”  59 The interpretive rule reasoned that “although how long the specific types of information listed in section 1681c may continue to appear on a consumer report is a subject matter regulated under section 1681c, what or when items generally may be initially included on a consumer report is not a subject matter regulated under section 1681c.”  60 Thus, under the interpretive rule, “State laws relating to what or when items generally may be initially included on a consumer report—or what or when certain types of information may initially be included on a consumer report—would generally not be preempted by section 1681t(b)(1)(E).”  61 According to the rule, States could thus forbid consumer reporting agencies from reporting entire categories of information, such as medical debt, arrest records, rental arrears, or convictions. 62

That reasoning is flawed, even on the 2022's interpretive rule's own terms. The presence of information on a credit report is clearly a subject matter regulated under section 1681c. To be sure, section 1681c mainly addresses this subject matter through obsolescence periods, and the 2022 rule recognizes that section 1681t(b)(1)(E) prohibits States from changing the seven-year obsolescence period for negative information on a credit report. But how long information can remain on a credit report and whether the information can be included in the credit report in the first place are two points on the same continuum, and the 2022's artificial distinction between them is arbitrary. To take an extreme example, if a State established a one-day obsolescence period for medical debt information ( i.e., such information can remain on a report only for a day), such a law would be preempted under the 2022 rule. But if a State were to prohibit medical debt from appearing on a report in the first place, such a law would not be preempted under the prior rule. It would make no sense to forbid the former but allow the latter.

This is an interpretive rule issued under the Bureau's authority to interpret the FCRA, including under section 1022(b)(1) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, which authorizes guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to enable the Bureau to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of Federal consumer financial laws, such as the FCRA. 63

As guidance, this interpretive rule does not have the force or effect of law. It has no legally binding effect, including on persons or entities outside the Federal government.

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has determined that this action is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended.

Pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, 64 the Bureau will submit a report containing this interpretive rule and other required information to the United States Senate, the United States House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to the interpretive rule taking effect. OMB has designated this interpretive rule as not a “major rule” as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

The Bureau has determined that this interpretive rule does not contain any new or substantively revised information collection requirements that would require approval by OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act. 65