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Federal Communications Commission.
Proposed rule.
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (
Comments are due November 26, 2025; reply comments are due December 26, 2025.
Pursuant to §§ 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). You may submit comments, identified by OI Docket No. 24-523 or MD Docket No. 24-524, by any of the following methods:
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• Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
• Hand-delivered or messenger delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building.
• Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
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Desiree Hanssen, Office of International Affairs, Telecommunications and Analysis Division, at
This is a summary of the Commission's Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (
1. In this item, we modernize and streamline the Commission's submarine cable rules to facilitate faster and more efficient deployment of submarine cables, while at the same time ensuring the security and resilience of this critical infrastructure. We recognize that investment in such infrastructure is vital to American prosperity and economic dynamism. The rules that we adopt today will ensure that the United States remains ready and able to deploy submarine cable infrastructure with increasing amounts of capacity to meet current and future internet and data demands so that the United States remains “the unrivaled world leader in critical and emerging technologies—such as artificial intelligence.” With global competition for submarine cables increasing, connections to the United States should continue to be at the forefront of the submarine cable marketplace. Nonetheless, “[i]nvestment at all costs is not always in the national interest,” because of the potential for foreign adversary exploitation. We also recognize that “[e]conomic security is national security,” and thus protecting our communications networks against foreign threats is crucial. With these principles in mind today, we undertake the first major comprehensive update of our submarine cable rules since 2001. Since that time, technology, consumer expectations, international submarine cable traffic patterns, submarine cable infrastructure, and the foreign threat landscape have changed greatly.
2. To advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a more secure and resilient communications supply chain, we adopt rules that place a strong emphasis on preventing and mitigating national security risks from foreign adversaries, while welcoming investment from United States allies and partners. We also lighten the regulatory burden on industry by modernizing and simplifying the submarine cable license approval process.
3. In the
4. While the
5. In short, we “maintain[ ] the strong, open investment environment that benefits our economy and our people, while enhancing our ability to protect the United States from new and evolving threats” in the submarine cable ecosystem.
6. In November 2024, the Commission adopted the
7.
8. Earlier this year, shortly after President Trump announced in February 2025 the America First Investment Policy, which states that “[e]conomic security is national security” and discusses the need to limit certain investments in strategic sectors by six identified foreign adversaries, the Commission initiated a series of actions. In March 2025, the Commission responded to threats posed by the People's Republic of China and to the evolving threat environment more generally, by establishing a Council for National Security to bring together the Commission's regulatory, investigatory, and enforcement authorities to counter foreign adversaries. The Council was established with a three-part goal: “(1) Reduce the American technology and telecommunications sectors' trade and supply chain dependencies on foreign adversaries; (2) Mitigate America's vulnerabilities to cyberattacks, espionage, and surveillance by foreign adversaries; and (3) Ensure the U.S. wins the strategic competition with China over critical technologies, such as 5G and 6G, AI, satellites and space, quantum computing, robotics and autonomous systems, and the Internet of Things.” In the same month, the Commission opened a separate proceeding, the
9. On May 22, 2025, the Commission took action in two distinct proceedings to protect our nation's communications infrastructure from foreign adversary threats. First, in the
10. Second, in the
11.
12. Earlier this year, the Commission received 18 comments, nine reply comments, and several ex partes pertaining to a wide range of topics discussed in the
13. In this
14. In the
15. Although we decline in the
16. We propose to adopt a rule that would require any entity that owns or operates SLTE to become a licensee (SLTE owner and operator) and also be subject to certain routine conditions. We propose to amend § 1.70003 of our newly adopted rules to include as licensees “all entities that own or operate submarine line terminal equipment.” To reduce the burden of requiring existing SLTE owners and operators to file an application to become a licensee, we propose to adopt a blanket license for existing owners and operators of SLTE subject to the conditions below. We use the term “existing owners and operators of SLTE” to refer to any entity that owns and/or operates SLTE on a Commissioned-licensed submarine cable system prior to the effective date of any new applicable rules subsequently adopted in this proceeding. We seek comment on this proposal or whether there are alternatives to this approach. We seek comment on whether our approach is properly tailored to reduce burdens on existing SLTE owners and operators and to limit any impacts of such proposal on existing licensees. We also seek comment on whether this proposal will disproportionately impact small entities that own or operate SLTE.
17. We tentatively conclude the Cable Landing License Act authorizes the Commission to regulate SLTE owners and operators. INCOMPAS and Microsoft state that there is no basis in the Cable Landing License Act for requiring these entities to become licensees because such entities do not “land or operate” a cable system, as required by the Act. We disagree with these commenters' assertions. Under the Cable Landing License Act, a license is required to land or operate a submarine cable connecting to the United States. An entity that owns or operates SLTE operates a significant component of the submarine cable system. In the
18. The ability to convert the telecommunications traffic optical signals to electrical signals and vice versa is simply not possible without equipment that performs that function. That is, the submarine cable system cannot be operated
19. The Committee explains that entities with dark fiber IRUs that deploy their own SLTE could be foreign
20. Based on the ownership of SLTE and ability to operate a significant component of the submarine cable system, we believe SLTE owners and operators fit within the Cable Landing License Act as operators of a submarine cable system. Therefore, we propose to require SLTE owners and operators to become licensees so that we can effectively carry out our duty to protect national security. Moreover, “[t]he Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with [the Communications] Act, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” Given that submarine cable systems are only functional with SLTE, regulating SLTE owners and operators seems necessary to execute the Commission's duties under the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530 to regulate submarine cable landing or operation, including withholding or revoking a cable landing license where such action would “promote the security of the United States.” We seek comment on our analysis.
21. To reduce burdens and ensure that the Commission tailors this requirement so that it does not interfere with the existing licensing process under our rules, we propose to adopt a blanket license for SLTE owners and operators. We understand that SLTE owners and operators may be different entities from the cable owners and operators that are required to be applicants/licensees under our rules, as amended in § 1.70003. We expect to have a better understanding of SLTEs after the completion of the one-time collection adopted today.
22. We believe that this blanket license approach for SLTE owners and operators is important to ensure the Commission is aware of all the entities that install their own SLTE to use fiber, capacity, or spectrum on the submarine cable system, while also not impacting those entities that are required to apply for a cable landing license pursuant to § 1.70003 of our newly adopted rules. Commenters voice concern that if the Commission requires SLTE owners and operators to become licensees, then it will take a very long time for such entities to obtain a license, resulting in backlog and harm to investment in the submarine cable industry. In addition, commenters are concerned that each time a new SLTE owner and operator is added to the submarine cable system, a modification application would be required in advance, which would exacerbate aforementioned harms. By proposing a blanket license for SLTE owners and operators, we believe that this approach will obviate the need for an initial application for a cable landing license or a modification application as contended by AWS and Coalition, and thus streamline the licensing process for this category of licensees.
23. To protect national security and law enforcement interests, we propose to exclude certain entities from the grant of this blanket license to the extent such entities seek to own or operate new SLTE on any current or future submarine cables landing in the United States. Specifically, we propose to exclude from the grant of this blanket license, any entity that would be subject to the foreign adversary and/or character presumptive disqualifying conditions that we adopt in the
24. We seek comment on whether this proposal is sufficient to ensure the protection and security of the submarine cable infrastructure. Should we instead exclude a larger or smaller category of entities from grant of the blanket license? We seek comment on how this proposal could affect existing licensees as well as the users of submarine cable systems. Are there any alternative approaches that may better achieve our objectives in a less burdensome way? For example, should we adopt regular reporting requirements instead?
25. We seek comment on whether we should allow entities that are excluded from the grant of a blanket license to file an application in accordance with our application rules, as amended in the
26. We seek comment on whether to apply distinct routine conditions to SLTE owners and operators as a separate category of licensees. Although SLTE owners and operators operate a significant portion of the submarine cable system as it pertains to an entity's control over a fiber, capacity, or spectrum, we understand that SLTE owners and operators may have distinct responsibilities from other submarine cable owners and operators, such as those licensees that own and maintain common infrastructure for the submarine cable system. Therefore, to satisfactorily tailor any regulatory obligations of SLTE owners and operators, we seek comment on appropriate routine conditions to apply to SLTE owners and operators, as set forth below.
27. With the understanding that certain existing routine conditions may not neatly apply to this category of cable landing licensees, we seek comment to examine whether we should specifically tailor routine conditions to apply to SLTE owners and operators, including for small providers. Are there national security or law enforcement reasons
28. Specifically, we propose that the Commission should require the following as routine conditions on the grant of a blanket license: (1) compliance with all rules and regulations of the Commission; (2) compliance with any treaties or conventions relating to communications to which the United States is or may hereafter become a party; (3) compliance with any action by the Commission or the Congress of the United States rescinding, changing, modifying or amending any rights accruing to any person by grant of the license; (4) the licensee, or any person or company controlling it, controlled by it, or under direct or indirect common control with it, does not enjoy and shall not acquire any right to handle traffic to or from the United States, its territories or its possessions unless such service is authorized by the Commission pursuant to section 214 of the Communications Act, as amended; (5) the licensee shall file a notification for prior approval to become affiliated with a foreign carrier; (6) the licensee shall file annual circuit capacity reports as required by § 43.82 of this chapter; (7) the cable landing license is revocable by the Commission after due notice and opportunity for hearing pursuant to section 2 of the Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. 35, or for failure to comply with the terms of the license or with the Commission's rules; and (8) the licensee must comply with proposed rule, § 1.70017, by filing the SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report, if one or more of the criteria under the proposed rule are met. We believe that the routine conditions will promote the statutory purposes under the Cable Landing License Act and better enable the Commission to carry out its licensing duties in furtherance of those purposes. We seek comment on this view.
29. Licensees under § 1.70003 of our newly adopted rules that seek to consummate a transaction, such as a transfer of control or assignment of the cable landing license, must seek prior approval from the Commission or provide a post-consummation notification consistent with §§ 1.70012 and 1.70013. We seek comment on whether, and if so, how, to apply the Commission's new rules at §§ 1.70012 and 1.70013 to transactions by SLTE owners and operators. If SLTE is sold or transferred to another entity that resumes operation of the SLTE connected to the licensed submarine cable system, the Commission cannot maintain oversight of the SLTE without this information. We seek comment on whether the Commission should be made aware if the SLTE and/or SLTE owner and operator is transferred or assigned to another entity. We seek comment on the impact of such a reporting requirement on small SLTE owners and operators. For transactions involving transfers of control or assignments of the SLTE itself or the SLTE owner and operator, how should the Commission frame its rules? For both scenarios, should the existing SLTE owner and operator be obligated to file an application seeking prior approval of the transaction? Or should the existing SLTE owner and operator file a notification including basic information about the transaction? We seek comment on how the Commission should handle
30. In the
31. In the
32. Lastly, we seek comment on whether to adopt any other new rules applicable to SLTE owners and operators, or apply any other existing rules to such entities. Should SLTE owners and operators be subject to certain certification requirements such as cybersecurity certifications? Should we attach additional routine conditions to the blanket license for SLTE owners and operators that would require certain notifications to the Commission? Should the Commission be aware if there is a change in the third-party entity that operates the SLTE to the extent the SLTE owner itself does not operate the SLTE? We seek comment on whether there are national security and law enforcement concerns that we should consider in adopting rules that may be applicable and warranted in the case of SLTE owners and operators. Additionally, we seek comment on whether SLTE and/or SLTE owners and operators are more vulnerable to physical exploitation or attack by foreign adversaries, given their presence on land. Are there are additional measures we should require of SLTE owners and operators to ensure physical security of SLTE and the submarine cable system?
33. Similar to the Foreign Adversary Annual Report that we adopt in the
34. We propose that SLTE owners and operators that meet one or more of the following criteria must submit an SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report to the Commission on an annual basis:
(1) That is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g);
(2) That is identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act;
(3) That has purchased, rented, leased, or otherwise obtained equipment or services on the Commission's Covered List and is using in the submarine cable infrastructure;
(4) Whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval, whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity; and/or
(5) The submarine cable system for which the SLTE owner and operator is licensed to operate in the United States lands in a foreign adversary country or the SLTE is located or operated from a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f).
35. The Commission currently does not know the identity of every single owner and operator of SLTE. In the
36.
37. We seek comment on whether an entity that meets one or more of the criteria to file a Foreign Adversary Annual Report and an SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report (as both a licensee under § 1.70003(a) or (b) and an SLTE owner and operator) should file both reports every year. If both reports should be required, what timing or reporting deadlines should we consider? Should such entity be permitted to seek a waiver of a requirement to file the SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report if it incorporates necessary information about its SLTE ownership and location in the Foreign Adversary Annual Report? Should the Commission instead use a single form for both the SLTE Foreign Adversary Annual Report and the Foreign Adversary Annual Report and require the filer to indicate which annual report it is submitting? We seek comment on our proposed approach and whether there are any other approaches that would reduce burdens on licensees.
38. Below, we propose to further amend our newly adopted rules by adopting new certification requirements for submarine cable applications and new routine conditions. Generally, we propose to require applicants for a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license, to certify in their application that they will comply with all of the routine conditions set out in our rules, as amended. We seek comment on these proposals and any burdens on applicants and licensees.
39. We seek comment on whether to require an applicant for a cable landing license to certify, as a condition of the potential grant of an application, that it will not use any equipment in the operation of the submarine cable system that is produced by any entity owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g). We propose that notifications of
40. We also seek comment on whether we should apply this certification requirement solely to (1) all equipment; (2) only logic-bearing hardware or software; or (3) only “communications equipment” as defined in § 1.50001(d) of the Commission's rules, which includes most equipment with Bluetooth or Wi-Fi connectivity, as reflected in the 2022
41. We propose to adopt a routine condition prohibiting the use of certain third-party service providers to ensure the security, integrity, and resilience of submarine cable systems. The operation of a submarine cable system involves many vendors and contractors, and supply chain integrity is an important priority. We propose to prohibit cable landing licensees from using any third-party service provider in the operation of the submarine cable that is (1) an entity owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules, as suggested by the Committee; (2) an entity identified on the Covered List; and/or (3) an entity that can access the submarine cable system from a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f) of our newly adopted rules. We do not apply a strict liability standard, but we expect licensees to conduct substantial due diligence to ensure compliance with FCC requirements. To the extent a licensee conducts substantial due diligence to verify all relevant information and reasonably believes the entity is not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined herein, such licensee would not be subject to enforcement sanctions. We would consider all of the facts and circumstances raised in an individual case and take into consideration the steps a licensee took in conducting substantial due diligence to ensure compliance with the rule. We believe these measures will further protect critical submarine cable infrastructure from vulnerabilities presented by national security threats. We also propose to require applicants for a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing
42. We seek comment on these proposals. What would be the potential impact on licensees that currently use the aforementioned third-party service providers? Will this increase costs for licensees significantly? What is the length of time that licensees would need to choose alternative third-party service providers? Should the Commission provide additional guidance on how licensees can verify whether third-party service providers are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary? For example, should the Commission merely require that licensees exercise their reasonable due diligence in detecting whether third-party service providers meet the definition? If so, what actions by licensees would be necessary and sufficient to support their verification? How would the Commission monitor to ensure that licensees will not use prohibited third-party service providers? Should the Commission adopt specific monitoring, auditing, or verification procedures? What should these look like? For example, should the Commission require third-party auditing of licensees? Should the Commission require annual reporting on all of licensees' contracts with third-party service providers? How can the Commission best ensure compliance while minimizing burdens. Does mitigating the risks presented by untrustworthy third-party service providers outweigh any burdens involved in complying with this prohibition? Should we solely prohibit licensees from entering into new or an extension of existing contracts with the aforementioned third-party service providers, or should we also apply this prohibition to existing contracts that licensees currently may have with such third-party service providers? We seek comment on the costs and benefits of implementing this proposal.
43. In the alternative, should we only prohibit licensees from using a narrower category of third-party service providers, and require licensees to report whether or not they use other third-party service providers, including any of the entities discussed above, in the operation of the submarine cable system? Would this approach strike a balance between our objective to mitigate foreign adversary control and interference in critical submarine cable infrastructure and the burdens on licensees? We seek detailed comments on which third-party service providers we should prohibit or which third-party service providers we should allow licensees to simply disclose to the Commission, as well as justification for any proposed approaches. To the extent we incorporate a reporting requirement under this approach, how frequently should we require licensees to disclose their third-party service providers and what additional information should we require licensees to provide so that we have the necessary visibility into potential threats to submarine cable systems? We seek comment on the costs and benefits of any approaches.
44.
45.
46. Submarine cable repair and maintenance services, when conducted by entities subject to the exploitation of foreign adversaries, also present potential opportunities for foreign adversary sabotage, interference, or surveillance of U.S. submarine cables. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted, “the overreliance on Chinese repair ships due to limited alternatives in the marketplace is another vulnerability if, during a time of military conflict, the Chinese government prohibits access to its repair ships and subsea cables are left damaged without timely repair.” Cable repair ships are in limited supply, and as a result, this is a growing stressor to the submarine cable industry. Approximately 22 such ships in the
47. We also seek comment on how the Commission may support or promote the expansion of additional U.S./non-foreign adversary repair ships. Should the Commission also use its submarine cable licensing authority to promote the restoration of U.S. shipbuilding capacity, thus helping to facilitate the recently-announced “policy of the United States to revitalize and rebuild domestic maritime industries and workforce to promote national security and economic prosperity”? Should the Commission, for example, impose similar requirements for ships that engage in cable repair and maintenance as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, better known as the Jones Act, imposes on ships that transport cargo between American ports? Should the Commission also give priority to allied-built or owned ships? If so, how should the Commission define “allied”? Should the Commission rely on the State Department's list of U.S. treaty allies? Should the Commission rely on some combination of ownership, location of the ship was built in, and citizenship of the crew members? Should the Commission instead simply distinguish between those ships owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary as defined in § 1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules, and those ships that are not? To what extent should the Commission consider broader industrial policy goals, alongside its traditional role in protecting the security of submarine cable infrastructure?
48. To further protect U.S. communications networks from national security and law enforcement threats, and consistent with our actions today, we seek comment on adopting a routine condition that would prohibit cable landing licensees from entering into new or an extension of existing arrangements for IRUs or leases for capacity on submarine cable systems landing in the United States, with any entity identified on the Covered List. In the
49. This approach is consistent with the actions taken today to prohibit the use of covered equipment and services in new submarine cable systems, to apply a disqualifying condition that will presumptively preclude the grant of a cable landing license filed by any applicant that is identified on the Covered List, and to require existing licensees to certify they will not
50. We also propose to require licensees to notify the Commission of any change of address or geographic coordinates concerning information provided under § 1.70005(e)(7) and (f), within thirty (30) days of the change. In the
51. The Commission currently does not have a formal process, other than outreach to individual licensees, to confirm whether a licensee intends to renew a cable landing license that is nearing the date of expiration. We propose to adopt a routine condition requiring a licensee to notify the Commission within sixty (60) days prior to the date of license expiration if the licensee does not intend to renew or extend the license. If a licensee has already submitted an application to renew or extend the license or requested an STA to continue operating a
52. We propose to adopt a routine condition requiring a cable landing licensee to notify the Commission within sixty (60) days prior to any retirement of its submarine cable system. Our rules require a licensee to notify the Commission within 30 days of the date the cable is placed into service, whereupon the license will expire 25 years from the in-service date. However, the Commission's rules do not require a licensee to notify the Commission if the submarine cable will be retired and taken out of service. It is important that the Commission maintain up-to-date records of the operational status of licensed submarine cable systems for national security and emergency preparedness and response purposes (for example, in the event of a natural disaster or conflict) and to verify that a licensee is in compliance with Commission rules and the terms of its license. We seek comment on this proposal and whether we should require a licensee to provide any additional information in such notification.
53. We seek comment on whether we should adopt a routine condition requiring cable landing licensees to submit a certification within thirty (30) days of any changes in the licensee's status (
54. We seek comment on whether we should adopt a routine condition requiring cable landing licensees to submit a foreign adversary certification within thirty (30) days of any new additions to the list of foreign adversaries identified in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4, or the removal of any countries from this list. Specifically, we seek comment on whether to require licensees to submit a certification that they are or are not owned by controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the foreign adversary newly identified in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4. Alternatively, should we only require licensees to submit a certification acknowledging the new addition to the list of foreign adversaries identified in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4?
55. We propose to adopt a routine condition that requires licensees, irrespective of when the license was granted, to certify, within sixty (60) days of a
56. This is a continuation of the
57. We seek comment on adopting a rule which would allow the Commission to share with relevant federal government agencies, including the Committee, information submitted in an application for a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a license on a confidential basis without the pre-notification requirements of § 0.442(d) of the Commission's rules. We seek comment, for example, on sharing such information required in § 1.70005 and other rules that reference § 1.70005. Under this approach, the Commission would be able to share the confidential information with federal agencies that have a legitimate need for the information consistent with their functions without the delay attendant to providing parties an opportunity to object to the sharing. The sharing of confidential information would, however, continue to be subject to the requirement that each of the other federal agencies comply with the confidentiality protections applicable both to the Commission and the other agencies relating to the unlawful disclosure of information, and we
58. We tentatively find that Executive Order 13913 provides a basis to share such information with the Committee by establishing that the members and advisors of the Committee have a legitimate need for such information. The policy of Executive Order 13913 is to ensure the “[t]he security, integrity, and availability of the United States telecommunications networks [that] are vital to United States national security and law enforcement interests.” Further, in this regard, Executive Order 13913 authorizes the Committee to review not only license applications but also existing licenses. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion.
59. We propose adopting a national security standard that would exclude a submarine cable application from Commission referral to the Executive Branch agencies, if
60. Currently, § 1.40001 of the rules states that “[t]he Commission will generally refer to the [Executive Branch] applications filed for . . . submarine cable landing license[s] as well as an application[s] to assign, transfer control of, or modify those authorizations and licenses where the applicant has reportable foreign ownership . . . .” Subject to certain exceptions, including the presumptive disqualifications that we adopt today, we currently refer submarine cable applications where an applicant has a foreign owner that directly or indirectly owns 10% or more of the equity interests and/or voting interests, or a controlling interest, of the applicant. The Commission received several comments raising concerns about the lengthy duration of the submarine cable licensing process and encouraging the Commission to use the existing streamlining process and to exercise its discretion in determining which applications to refer to the Committee.
61. The Commission tentatively concludes that extensive delays to submarine cable applications that do not threaten national security or law enforcement interests are not in the public interest. Such delays impose economic costs without national security benefits. Furthermore, not only do such delays not benefit national security; in fact, they may undermine national security by deterring investment in submarine cables and thus reducing the resilience of America's submarine cable network. This is not consistent with the America First Investment Policy or the goals of the Commission. We seek comment on whether this analysis is correct.
62. Specifically, we propose to adopt a national security standard that is a list of qualifications for a submarine cable application—including an application for a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of such license—to qualify the applicant for exemption from Commission referral to the Committee. We seek comment on the list of qualifications and whether there are other standards that we should adopt to ensure the applicant has met qualifications to ensure the national security of the United States if its application is granted. We propose to require applicants to certify to all of the qualifications below to enable the Commission to verify whether or not the application qualifies for exclusion from Commission referral to the Committee. We propose that our determination of whether an applicant meets each qualification would be considered on a case-by-case basis and in light of the relevant facts and circumstances. We are particularly interested in comments from both the affected industry and the Committee on what qualifications would serve the public interest and protect national security. Additionally, we seek comment on the impact of the Committee's application and license review prioritization based on section 3(a) of Executive Order 14117 on our proposed rules and interaction with the Committee.
63. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant must be a licensee of a submarine cable licensed by the Commission and has operated its licensed submarine cable(s) without any incident. An applicant in good standing would be, for example, one that has complied with the terms of the license(s) and has no pending or adjudicated enforcement action by the Commission and/or national security, law enforcement, or other concerns brought to the Commission's attention in the course of operating the submarine cable(s) and has no history of false statements or certifications in its dealings before the Commission related to its cable landing license(s). For instance, should we consider that an application meets this qualification if there was no referral of any issue to the Commission's Enforcement Bureau and/or no issuance of a Letter of Inquiry or subpoena at any point in the history of the cable landing license(s) or within a certain timeframe? What would be an appropriate standard or timeframe to ensure that the applicant has demonstrated good standing with the Commission with respect to its licensing obligations in the past? We seek comment on an appropriate timeframe in assessing any history of incidents involving a licensee's operation of its submarine cable.
64. We also seek comment on other incidents, or lack thereof, that we should consider for purposes of assessing an applicant's qualification for exclusion from referral. We note that several commenters support expediting review for applicants whose prior applications were approved, and propose relying on certifications in conjunction with a streamlined process for a “frequent filer.” In considering the record, we seek further comment on whether an application should qualify for exclusion from referral if a prior submarine cable application filed by the applicant was recently cleared by the Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee, and granted by the Commission. For instance, should we consider whether a prior application that was filed by the same applicant was cleared by the Executive Branch agencies, with or without mitigation, within the past 18 months from the filing of a new application? Does the timeframe of 18 months following any clearance by the Executive Branch
65. We seek comment on how we should apply this qualification for recurring applicants in good standing where an applicant is or has previously been a part of a consortium. For example, if multiple joint licensees on a cable landing license hold equal ownership and controlling interests in the submarine cable and operated it without any incident, and one of the licensees files an application for a new cable landing license, should we consider that the applicant has met this standard? Should we require that a licensee must hold a specific threshold of ownership and/or controlling interests in its licensed submarine cable to meet this standard for any submarine cable application it subsequently files? How should we apply this standard if an applicant(s) is a joint licensee of another submarine cable where one of the joint licensees holding less than a majority of the ownership and controlling interests violated the Commission's rules or a condition of the license in the course of operating the submarine cable? We seek comment generally on how we should apply a “in good standing” standard where an application is filed by multiple parties, such as an application for a new cable landing license filed by joint applicants or an application filed by any or all of the joint licensees of a submarine cable. To the extent multiple parties file an application, if one applicant meets the qualification but others do not, how should we apply the “in good standing” standard with respect to those other applicants? Are there other combinations of scenarios that we should consider?
66. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant must have consistently demonstrated the requisite character qualifications. Specifically, should we consider an applicant qualifies for the exclusion if in the last 20 years it has not (1) materially violated the Cable Landing License Act where the violation (a) was not remediated with an adjudication involving a consent decree and/or compliance plan, (b) resulted in a loss of Commission license or authorization, or (c) was found by the Commission to be intentional; (2) committed national security-related violations of the Communications Act or Commission rules as identified in Commission orders, including but not limited to violations of rules concerning the Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act; (3) made materially false statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct concerning national security or the Cable Landing License Act; (4) been subject to an adjudicated finding of making false statements or engaging in fraudulent conduct concerning national security before another U.S. government agency; or (5) materially failed to comply with the terms of a cable landing license, including but not limited to a condition requiring compliance with a mitigation agreement with the Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee, where the violation (a) was not remediated with an adjudication involving a consent decree and/or compliance plan, (b) resulted in a loss of Commission license or authorization, or (c) was found by the Commission to be intentional? We seek comment on this approach.
67. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant must submit a cybersecurity certification consistent with §§ 1.70005(m) and 1.70006(c) of our newly adopted rules, which sets out the requirements of an initial applications for a cable landing license, if such applicant is to qualify for exclusion from Commission referral to the Committee. Should we require a more stringent standard in order to meet this presumptive qualification? Should a requirement of this qualification involve the structuring of a licensee's cybersecurity and physical risk management plans in accordance with higher cybersecurity standards such as the NIST CSF, and a set of established cybersecurity best practices, such as the standards and controls set forth in the CISA CPGs or the CIS Controls? We seek comment on what other cybersecurity standards would be reasonable to require that a licensee implement, if any submarine cable application that it subsequently files is to qualify for exclusion from referral.
68. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant must certify that it will meet appropriate physical security standards, such as taking all practicable measures to physically secure the submarine cable system (including the cable landing stations, beach manholes and related sites, and SLTEs), if such applicant is to qualify for exclusion from Commission referral to the Committee. We also propose that, in order to qualify for exclusion from referral, applicants must certify they will ensure that individuals who have access to the submarine cable system (including cable landing stations, beach manholes and related sites, and SLTEs) will be screened in accordance with the applicant's security policies. In addition, we propose that, in order to qualify for exclusion from referral, the applicant must certify that it will exclude any company personnel, including contractors, that is a citizen of a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f) of our newly adopted rules, from physical or logical access to the submarine cable system. Finally, we seek comment on the physical security requirements and best practices (
69. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant must certify that it will not include any logic-bearing hardware (
70. In the
71. In the
72. To what extent should we consider whether the capacity sold or leased out by an applicant to another entity is, in turn, sold to, leased out, or swapped with an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g)? Instead of relying solely on contract terms, should we assess whether applicants have taken measures to enforce any such contractual provisions? Should we also require applicants to file with the Commission copies of any arrangements for IRUs or leases of capacity, and if so, should we treat this information as presumptively confidential?
73. We propose that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant must certify that the submarine cable system will not connect directly or via a branching unit with a submarine cable owned or operated by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules, or that lands in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f). We seek comment on whether this qualification should include other types of connections to submarine cable systems that could present national security risks.
74. We propose to require that, in order to qualify for exclusion from Commission referral to the Committee, an applicant must certify that it will not use a ship for submarine cable installation or repair and maintenance of the submarine cable system that is owned or operated by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules, or that is flagged in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f). We seek comment on whether it is reasonable to require that applicants must meet this qualification in order to qualify for exclusion from referral, or whether restricting the use of such cable installation or repair and maintenance ships would have any adverse impact on owners and operators of submarine cable systems as well as the submarine cable system itself. Alternatively, rather than a prohibition, should we merely require that, an applicant certify that it will implement adequate security measures if it uses any such cable installation or repair and maintenance ships, regardless of whether the ship is operated by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g)? We seek comment on how applicants will know if a given ship is restricted. Should we rely on applicants' due diligence, require the Commission publish a white list of permissible ships, or use some other method? We seek comment on ways to ensure that this qualification would not curtail or otherwise adversely impact the ability of submarine cable owners and operators to quickly deploy or repair submarine cable systems connecting to the United States.
75. We propose to require that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant must certify that no senior official of the applicant or the applicant's parent company(ies) is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g) of our newly adopted rules. For purposes of such requirement, we propose to define a senior official as a board member or executive-level management, such as a Chief Executive Officer or Chief Operating Officer. We seek comment on this proposal. Should we adopt a different definition of “senior official” for purposes of the proposed requirement? Should we only apply this proposed requirement with respect to the board members or executives of the applicant or the applicant's parent company(ies)?
76. We seek comment on whether we should also require that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant must certify to other measures that are common features of national security agreements with the Committee that concern submarine cables. For example, national security agreements often require that licensees provide the Committee with notice for certain third party access to the submarine cable infrastructure. Should we require that, to presumptively qualify for exemption, an applicant must certify that it will not provide any individual or entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g), or that is identified on the Covered List
77. We seek comment generally on whether there are any other standards that the Commission should consider to qualify an application for exemption from Commission referral to the Executive Branch agencies. In the alternative, we seek comment on whether we should not refer any applications to the Executive Branch in light of the strong national security measures we adopt in the
78. To further protect U.S. submarine cable networks from national security and law enforcement threats, we seek comment on whether to require existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system any and all covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. In the
79. We seek comment on whether to require a gradual transition away from the use of covered equipment and services in current submarine cable infrastructure, and if so, we seek comment on the appropriate timeframe for the transition. For example, should a requirement to implement a gradual transition away from using covered equipment or services track the remaining term of a cable landing license held by an existing licensee? To the extent an existing licensee seeks to renew or extend a cable landing license upon expiration, we seek comment on whether to require that the licensee must certify that it has removed from the submarine cable system any and all covered equipment or services. In the alternative, should we require such existing licensee to certify that it has a credible plan to remove covered equipment and services within a certain timeframe (
80. As an alternative to requiring a transition based on the remaining term of a cable landing license, should we require existing licensees to remove any and all covered equipment or services within a set number of years as of the effective date of any new rule? Is 5 years an appropriate timeframe? Should we adopt a longer or shorter timeframe? What considerations should we review in making a determination about how long to provide for the transition?
81.
82. We seek comment on how the Commission can use its authority pursuant to the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United States and its allies, such that “American AI technologies, standards, and governance models are adopted worldwide . . .” How can the Commission leverage the submarine cable licensing regime to “make [the U.S.] the global partner of choice and the standards setter” by “enabl[ing] and encourag[ing] American companies to distribute the American tech stack around the world”? Are there ways we can encourage foreign countries and companies to adopt and use technologies produced and provided by the United States and its allies, as opposed to adopting and using the technologies and produced and provided by foreign adversaries? For example, should the Commission prioritize grants of licenses for submarine cables that land in countries aligned with U.S.-trusted technology standards? Should the Commission prioritize grants of licenses for submarine cables that interconnect to data centers, or other facilities with the necessary infrastructure to support internet traffic exchange, that use trusted technologies, as opposed to technologies produced and provided by foreign adversaries? How should the Commission develop definitions and standards for such a policy?
83. We seek comment on the use of artificial intelligence in SLTEs in particular, as well as the use of artificial intelligence generally in the submarine cable system as a whole. According to market forecasts, submarine cable operators will likely incorporate artificial intelligence into SLTEs and submarine cables for various reasons. Artificial intelligence, for example, may play a role in improving the function of the submarine cable, such as improving network planning, intelligent traffic routing, and capacity optimization. Artificial intelligence can also safeguard the submarine cable system through predictive maintenance, physical threat detection, and cybersecurity threat detection. While artificial intelligence brings positive attributes to submarine cable operations, we believe that there are significant national security concerns when artificial intelligence technologies involve foreign adversaries. We seek comment on any national security concerns regarding use of artificial intelligence in submarine cable systems. What are the national security impacts and potential threats posed by incorporating artificial intelligence owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction or jurisdiction of foreign adversaries? Given that submarine cables are critical infrastructure, should we refer assessment of any national security concerns regarding the use of artificial intelligence in submarine cable systems to the Commission's Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) for consideration and recommendations?
84. We seek comment on whether under certain circumstances to streamline approval of domestic cables (
85. A domestic cable application can present national security concerns even if a domestic cable would only connect points within the United States and would not have foreign landing points. For example, a domestic cable application may involve applicants with foreign ownership or propose to use foreign equipment in the cable system. Indeed, several existing domestic cable systems are subject to mitigation agreements with the Committee. We seek comment on whether the certifications we adopt in the
86. Domestic cable applications are often reviewed by the Committee. We seek comment on reasons why domestic cable applications should undergo review by the Committee and whether the reasons are different than for review of applications involving international cables. If there are national security and law enforcement reasons warranting review by the Committee, are there any mechanisms the Commission and Committee could employ to reduce the time for review of a domestic cable application? Are there any other methods we should consider to streamline review of domestic cable applications in light of the policies adopted in the
87. We seek comment on how the Commission can and should modify and streamline any existing cable license conditions that were based on previous mitigation agreements once our rules are in effect. We have made significant regulatory changes to address national security concerns and prior mitigation agreements may not have consistent requirements to ensure the safety and security of submarine cables. Should we, for example, modify and streamline any existing license terms that were based on mitigation agreements, which include Letters of Agreements (LOAs) and National Security Agreements (NSAs), to ensure they are in line with the principles behind our new rules adopted in the
88. We recognize that the Commission is not the only agency in the Federal Government that interfaces with submarine cable systems. There are other agencies and regulatory processes that rely on submarine cables for many uses, including government contracts, use of submarine cables for commercial service, and/or reliance on submarine cables for critical missions. Some agencies outside of the Commission include those agency members of the Committee, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS), among others. We seek comment on what impacts, if any, the Commission's adopted rules in the
89. Subsequent to the issuance of the
90. We seek comment on the potential benefits and costs of the proposals discussed throughout this
91. Among the proposals in the
92. The benefits of the proposed rules are difficult to quantify, as they extend to our national security and public interest responsibilities. We expect that the rules we propose will allow us to build upon the
93. Our estimate of costs should include all of the expected costs that would be incurred as a result of the rules proposed in the
94. We seek comment on the costs that applicants will incur from the new requirements detailed above. We expect that our proposal to expedite applications that meet national security conditions will result in significant cost savings for licensees by reducing the time and resources required to prepare these applications. We seek comment on the estimated cost savings that would accrue if these rules are adopted. We also seek comment on any additional costs on licensees, including on small entities.
95. The Commission has also prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning the potential impact of rule and policy change proposals on small entities in the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the policies and rules proposed in the
104. In this
105. We propose new certifications and routine conditions related to foreign adversaries to further protect submarine cables from national security risks as explained in detail in the
106. We propose an approach to expedite deployment of submarine cables that connect to the United States by presumptively excluding submarine cable applications from referral to the Executive Branch agencies if they meet certain standards. To further protect U.S. submarine cable networks from national security and law enforcement threats, we seek comment on whether to require existing licensees to remove from their submarine cable system any and all covered equipment or services, within a specified timeframe prior to the expiration of the license. We also seek comment on how the Commission can use its authority pursuant to the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, to incentivize and encourage the adoption and the use of trusted technologies produced and provided by the United States and its foreign allies. We seek comment on whether under certain circumstances to streamline approval of domestic cables. Finally, we seek comment on the costs and benefits of the proposed rules and any alternatives, including the impact of the proposed rules on small entities and alternative approaches.
107. The proposed action is authorized pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 201-255, 303(r), 403, and 413 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 201-255, 303(r), 403, and 413, and the Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. 34-39, and Executive Order No. 10530, section 5(a), (May 12, 1954) reprinted as amended in 3 U.S.C. 301.
108. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. The RFA generally defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as the terms “small business,” “small organization,” and “small governmental jurisdiction.” In addition, the term “small business” has the same meaning as the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act.” A “small business concern” is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117. Additionally, according to Commission data on internet access services as of June 30, 2024, nationwide there were approximately 2,204 providers of connections over 200 kbps in at least one direction using various wireline technologies. The Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for providers of these services, therefore, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of providers that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard. However, in light of the general data on fixed technology service providers in the Commission's
118.
119. The SBA small business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 4,590 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of fixed local services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,146 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered small entities.
120. The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact of proposed rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance requirements, including an estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirements and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record.
121. The
122. The
123. We also seek comment on a requirement to provide submarine cable installation, maintenance, and repair plans to the Commission upon request, which we do not anticipate to be costly as the licensee will likely already produce such plans in the ordinary course of business.
124. We seek comment on new routine conditions for all licensees, including requiring licensees to notify the Commission for changes to the coordinates or addresses for each beach manhole, cable landing station, or network operations center (NOC); notification of a licensee's license expiration and intent of non-renewal or non-extension of the license; notification of a system retirement; certification for changes to foreign adversary ownership of a licensee; and certification for changes to the foreign adversary country list. We propose to require a certification of changes to the Covered List. The cost of compliance for a licensee would vary depending on how often the licensee undergoes any of the experiences that would trigger a notification or certification to the Commission. We anticipate that the information the Commission seeks would be information licensees would already possess in the ordinary course of business.
125. The
126. Our estimate of costs should include all of the expected costs that would be incurred as a result of the rules proposed in the
127. We are especially interested in estimates that address alternative means to provide the same benefits, in terms of protecting submarine cable infrastructure from national security risks, at lower costs. The Commission expects the information we receive in comments including, where requested, cost and benefit analyses, will help to identify and evaluate relevant compliance matters for small entities, including compliance costs and other burdens that may result if the proposals and associated requirements discussed in the
128. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of any significant alternatives to the proposed rules that would accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes, and minimize any significant economic impact on small entities. The discussion is required to include alternatives such as: “(1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small entities.”
129. As described in the
130. We considered the burdens on SLTE owners in our proposal to extend licensing requirements to SLTE owners, by proposing blanket licensing that would prevent SLTE owners from having to apply for a license or for a modification to an existing license. We do not know how many SLTE owners are small businesses, but our proposal to minimize the burden on SLTE owners of proposed licensing would also lighten the burden on small business SLTE owners.
131. We seek comment on the burdens of applicants submitting cable installation and maintenance and repair plans with their application, and on licensees if a routine condition were imposed requiring their cable installation and repair plans. The major alternative to these proposals is opting not to impose them if the burdens are too onerous and outweigh the benefits.
132. We propose additional requirements on licensees' cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans. We seek comment which standards and best practices to use, proposing alternatives such as National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency Cybersecurity Cross sector Performance Goals and Objectives, or the Center for Internet Security's Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls).
133. We seek comment on whether to impose routine conditions tailored to SLTE owners and operators who may become licensees, and in doing so seek comment on which routine conditions are warranted; the contemplated alternatives include refraining from imposing any or all of them.
134. We seek comment on a broad range of timelines for transitioning licensees away from use of equipment and services on the Covered List, and seek comment on alternatives such as having licensees submit their own plan for removal of covered equipment and services within a specified timeframe.
135. We also contemplate a number of proposals to expedite or streamline submarine cable applications, including expediting review of domestic U.S. cables and excluding from referral to the Executive Branch applicants which meet certain requirements, which could benefit any submarine cable licensees who are small businesses.
136. None.
137.
138.
139.
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Department of Commerce.
Notice.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is implementing the Streamlined Claim Set Pilot Program to evaluate how having a limited number of claims under examination impacts pendency and examination quality. Under the pilot program, certain pending utility patent applications that have no more than one independent claim and no more than ten total claims may be eligible for expedited examination, if the requirements specified in this notice are met. An applicant may comply with the claim requirements of the pilot program by filing a preliminary amendment before or with a petition to make special under the pilot program. Applications accepted into the pilot program will be advanced out of turn (
Nicholas Hill, Legal Advisor, Office of Patent Legal Administration, Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Patents, at
New patent applications ordinarily are taken up for examination in the order of their U.S. filing date or national stage entry date.
To qualify for the Streamlined Claim Set Pilot Program, an applicant must file a timely petition to make special under the pilot program in an original (non-reissue),
To be eligible for the pilot program, an application must have no more than one independent claim, no more than ten total claims, no multiple dependent claims, and all claims other than the independent claim must comply with the dependency format specified in this notice. An applicant may comply with the claim requirements of the pilot program by filing a preliminary amendment before or with the petition to make special. The entry of such a preliminary amendment will not, however, be contingent upon the grant of the petition to make special. An applicant must also certify that no inventor or joint inventor has been named as the inventor or a joint inventor on more than three other nonprovisional applications in which a petition to make special under this program has been filed. Applications accepted into the program will be advanced out of turn (
Any application that claims the benefit of the filing date of a prior-filed application that is a nonprovisional U.S. application and/or international application designating the United States is not eligible for participation in the pilot program. Claiming the benefit under 35 U.S.C. 119(e) of one or more prior provisional applications or claiming a right of priority under 35 U.S.C. 119(a)-(d) or (f) to one or more foreign applications will not affect eligibility for the program.
The petition to make special must be properly signed and accompanied by the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(h), as required by 37 CFR 1.102(d). The patent application and the petition must meet the following requirements.
The pilot program is available for original, noncontinuing, utility applications filed under 35 U.S.C. 111(a). The application must have an actual filing date that is before October 27, 2025. The petition to make special under the pilot program must be filed before the issuance of a first Office action, including a written restriction requirement. Because preparing a first Office action may begin soon after an application is docketed to an examiner, the USPTO will, as stated above, generally dismiss a petition under the pilot program if the application has already been docketed to a particular examiner in a Technology Center at the time the petition is taken up for decision.
Form PTO/SB/472, titled “CERTIFICATION AND PETITION TO MAKE SPECIAL UNDER THE STREAMLINED CLAIM SET PILOT PROGRAM,” must be used to submit the petition under the pilot program (available at
When the petition to make special is filed, the application must contain no more than one independent claim, no more than ten total claims, and no multiple dependent claims. All claims other than the single independent claim must comply with the dependency format specified below.
For applications accepted into the pilot program, the examiner may refuse entry of any amendment that, if entered, would result in a set of pending claims with more than one independent claim, more than ten total claims, or a multiple dependent claim. The examiner may also refuse entry of any amendment that would result in a claim other than the independent claim being noncompliant with the dependency format specified in this notice. An applicant may meet the claim requirements of the pilot program by filing a preliminary amendment in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121 before or with the petition to make special.
To comply with the dependency format for this pilot program, a claim must be in proper dependent form under 35 U.S.C. 112(d). That is, the claim must refer to a previous claim, include every limitation of the previous claim referred to, and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter of the previous claim.
For example, consider a claim set having independent claim 1, which recites “A widget comprising A and B,” and claim 2.
• If claim 2 recites “The widget of claim 1 further comprising C,” the claim would comply with the dependency format for the pilot program.
• If claim 2 recites “A fastener for use in securing the widget of claim 1,” the claim would not comply with the dependency format for the pilot program because it does not include all of the limitations of the previous claim.
• If claim 2 recites “A device comprising the widget of claim 1 fastened to a gadget,” the claim would not comply with the dependency format for the pilot program because the reference to the previous claim does not appear in the preamble.
• If claim 2 recites “A method of producing the widget of claim 1,” the claim would not comply with the dependency format for the pilot program because claim 2 is not directed to the same statutory class of invention as the independent claim.
If the application is granted special status under the program, the applicant must agree to comply with the claim requirements of the pilot program during the remainder of pendency.
If there is a nonpublication request in the application, the applicant must file a rescission of the nonpublication request no later than the time the petition to make special is filed. The applicant may use form PTO/SB/36 to rescind the nonpublication request.
The petition to make special may be made only by filing form PTO/SB/472, which must be filed electronically using the USPTO's Patent Center (at
DOCX format delivers a number of benefits, including increased efficiencies and higher data quality, that enhance the USPTO's ability to expedite examination. Thus, for an application to be eligible for the pilot program, the specification, claim(s), and abstract must be in compliance with the USPTO requirements for submission in DOCX format at the time the application was filed.
An applicant may file a petition to participate in the pilot program if no inventor or joint inventor has been named as the inventor or a joint inventor on more than three other nonprovisional patent applications in
If applicant files a petition to make special under the pilot program, the USPTO will decide the petition once pre-examination processing of the application is completed. If the petition is granted, the application will be accorded special status under the pilot program. The application will be placed on an examiner's special docket until issuance of a first Office action. After the first Office action, the application will no longer be treated as special during examination. For example, if an amendment is filed after the first Office action, it will be placed on the examiner's regular amended docket.
Meeting the requirements in Part I of this notice will not ensure acceptance into the pilot program. The USPTO will generally dismiss a petition under the pilot program if the application has already been docketed to an examiner in a Technology Center at the time the petition is being reviewed for decision. The USPTO will not refund the 37 CFR 1.17(h) petition fee if an application is not accepted into the pilot program. This includes occurrences where the petition is dismissed because the application has been docketed to an examiner when the petition is taken up for decision despite being filed before the application was docketed to the examiner.
The purpose of the pilot program is to assess the effect of having a limited number of claims under examination on pendency and examination quality. As such, the USPTO intends to continue accepting applications into the pilot program until each Technology Center that examines utility applications has been docketed at least approximately 200 pilot applications. This is to make certain that the data collected during the pilot program is a balanced representation of examination across all technology areas. The USPTO will indicate on its website the total number of petitions filed and the number of applications accepted into the pilot program for each Technology Center.
If the petition to make special under the pilot program does not comply with the requirements set forth in this notice, the USPTO will dismiss the petition. In view of the limited duration of the pilot program and the limited number of applications being accepted into the pilot program, an applicant will not have an opportunity to correct deficiencies in the petition after a petition is dismissed. An applicant may file only a single petition under the pilot program for an application.
The USPTO anticipates fewer restriction requirements than in non-pilot program applications due to the claim set requirements of the pilot program. If the examiner believes that a requirement for restriction is appropriate, including an election of species requirement, the examiner should try to contact the applicant in accordance with the procedure for telephone restriction practice set forth in section 812.01 of the MPEP. If the applicant does not make an election (for example, does not reply to a request for a telephonic interview within five business days of the examiner's request), the examiner will mail a written restriction requirement, and the application will no longer be treated as special. In such cases, the written restriction requirement would be considered the “first Office action” in terms of this pilot program.
Applications that are accorded special status under the pilot program will be placed on an examiner's special docket until a first Office action is issued. After the first Office action, the application will be entered into the examiner's regular docket.
The time periods set for reply in Office actions for an application granted special status under the pilot program will be the same as those set forth in section 710.02(b) of the MPEP. A reply to an Office action must be fully responsive to the rejections, objections, and requirements made by the examiner. Any amendment filed in reply to an Office action may be treated as not fully responsive if it attempts to (1) add claims that would result in more than one independent claim and/or more than ten total claims pending in the application; (2) add any multiple dependent claim(s); or (3) present a claim, other than the independent claim, that does not comply with the dependency format set forth in Part I, section 3, of this notice. If a reply to a nonfinal Office action is not fully responsive for failing to comply with the pilot program's claim requirements but is a
Any amendment, affidavit, or other evidence after a final Office action and prior to an appeal must comply with 37 CFR 1.116. During the appeal process, the application will be treated in accordance with the normal appeal procedure.
If an application becomes involved in proceedings outside of the normal examination process (for example, a secrecy order, derivation proceeding, or petition under 37 CFR 1.181 through 1.183), the application will not be under special status during those proceedings. For example, while under a secrecy order, the application will be treated in accordance with the normal secrecy order procedures and will not be in special status under the pilot program. Once the proceeding outside of the normal examination process is completed, the application will continue in special status, as described above in this notice.
There is no provision for withdrawal from the pilot program. An applicant may abandon an application that has been granted special status under the pilot program in favor of a continuing application. However, a continuing application will not be granted special status based on the petition filed in the parent application. Only noncontinuing applications are eligible for this pilot program.
The pilot program is designed to allow the USPTO to evaluate how having a limited number of claims under examination affects pendency and examination quality. Accordingly, the USPTO intends to collect data on the progression of applications accepted into the pilot program throughout the examination process. During or after the pilot program, the USPTO will provide avenues for participants to provide feedback on their experience with the pilot program. As applicable, the USPTO will follow the United States Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) leading practices for effective pilot design, including (1) establishing clear objectives; (2) collecting relevant data; (3) evaluating outcomes; (4) considering scalability; and (5) ensuring stakeholder communication.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Notice.
The Agency has postponed the 3-day virtual public meeting of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Scientific Advisory Panel (FIFRA SAP) for peer review on “Determining the Absence of Novel Proteins in the Saliva of Genetically Engineered Mosquitoes for Mosquito Control” scheduled for November 3 to 5, 2025. The meeting was announced in the
Alie Muneer, Designated Federal Official, Mission Support Division, Office of Program Support, Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention, Environmental Protection Agency; telephone number: (202) 564-6369 or the main office number: (202) 564-8450; email address:
The meeting was announced in the
Office of the Secretary, Department of Homeland Security.
Notice of determination.
The Secretary of Homeland Security has determined, pursuant to law, that it is necessary to waive certain laws, regulations, and other legal requirements in order to ensure the expeditious construction of barriers and roads in the vicinity of the international land border in the state of Texas.
This determination takes effect on October 27, 2025.
Important mission requirements of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) include border security and the detection and prevention of illegal entry into the United States. Border security is critical to the nation's national security. Recognizing the critical importance of border security, Congress has mandated DHS to achieve and maintain operational control of the international land border. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public Law 109-367, section 2, 120 Stat. 2638 (Oct. 26, 2006) (8 U.S.C. 1701 note). Congress defined “operational control” as the prevention of all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries by terrorists, other unlawful aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband.
Congress has provided to the Secretary of Homeland Security a number of authorities necessary to carry out DHS's border security mission. One of those authorities is found at section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, as amended (“IIRIRA”). Public Law 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-554 (Sept. 30, 1996) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note), as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Public Law 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302, 306 (May 11, 2005) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note), as amended by the Secure Fence Act of 2006, Public Law 109-367, section 3, 120 Stat. 2638 (Oct. 26, 2006) (8 U.S.C. 1103 note), as amended by the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, Public Law 110-161, Div. E, Title V, section 564, 121 Stat. 2090 (Dec. 26, 2007). In section 102(a) of IIRIRA, Congress provided that the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take such actions as may be necessary to install additional physical barriers and roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection of illegal entrants) in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States. In section 102(b) of IIRIRA, Congress mandated that in carrying out the authority of section 102(a), I provide for the installation of additional fencing, barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors to achieve and maintain operational control of the border. Finally, in section 102(c) of IIRIRA, Congress granted to the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to waive all legal requirements that I, in my sole discretion, determine necessary to ensure the expeditious construction of barriers and roads authorized by section 102 of IIRIRA.
The United States Border Patrol Del Rio Sector is an area of high illegal entry. Between fiscal year 2021 and July 2025, Border Patrol apprehended over 1,408,600 illegal aliens attempting to enter the United States between border crossings in the Del Rio Sector. In that same time period Border Patrol seized over 275 pounds of marijuana, over 131 pounds of cocaine, over 18 pounds of
Since the President took office, DHS has delivered the most secure border in history. More can and must be done, however. As the statistics cited above demonstrate, the Del Rio Sector is an area of high illegal entry where illegal aliens regularly attempt to enter the United States and smuggle illicit drugs, and given my mandate to achieve and maintain operational control of the border, I must use my authority under section 102 of IIRIRA to install additional barriers and roads in the Del Rio Sector. Therefore, DHS will take immediate action to construct additional barriers and roads in a segment of the border in the Del Rio Sector. The segment where such construction will occur is referred to herein as the “project area,” which is more specifically described in Section 2 below.
I determine that the following area in the vicinity of the United States border, located in the State of Texas within the U. S. Border Patrol Del Rio Sector, is an area of high illegal entry (the “project area”): Within the Del Rio Sector, starting at approximately GPS point 29.09, −100.67 and extending south and east to approximately GPS point 28.47, −100.36.
There is presently an acute and immediate need to construct additional physical barriers and roads in the vicinity of the border of the United States in order to prevent unlawful entries into the United States in the project area pursuant to section 102(a) and 102(b) of IIRIRA. In order to ensure the expeditious construction of additional physical barriers and roads in the project area, I have determined that it is necessary that I exercise the authority that is vested in me by section 102(c) of IIRIRA.
Accordingly, pursuant to section 102(c) of IIRIRA, I hereby waive in their entirety, with respect to the construction of physical barriers and roads (including, but not limited to, accessing the project areas, creating and using staging areas, the conduct of earthwork, excavation, fill, and site preparation, and installation and upkeep of physical barriers, roads, supporting elements, drainage, erosion controls, safety features, lighting, cameras, and sensors) in the project area, all of the following statutes, including all federal, state, or other laws, regulations, and legal requirements of, deriving from, or related to the subject of, the following statutes, as amended: The National Environmental Policy Act (Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (Jan. 1, 1970) (42 U.S.C. 4321
This waiver does not revoke or supersede any other waiver determination made pursuant to section 102(c) of IIRIRA. Such waivers shall remain in full force and effect in accordance with their terms. I reserve the authority to execute further waivers from time to time as I may determine to be necessary under section 102 of IIRIRA.
Judicial Conference of the United States.
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules; revised notice of open meeting.
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules will hold a meeting virtually on November 5, 2025, rather than in New Orleans, LA, as previously announced. The meeting is open to the public only for remote observation with no participation. Please see the
November 5, 2025.
An agenda and supporting materials will be posted at least 7 days in advance of the meeting at:
Carolyn A. Dubay, Chief Counsel, Rules Committee Staff, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building, One Columbus Circle NE, Suite 7-300, Washington, DC 20544, Phone (202) 502-1820,
Remote registration is available until the meeting date, provided it is completed before the projected end time. The announcement for this meeting was previously published in the
Judicial Conference of the United States.
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules; revised notice of open meeting.
The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules will hold a meeting virtually on November 6, 2025, rather than in New Orleans, LA, as previously announced. The meeting is open to the public only for remote observation with no participation. Please see the
November 6, 2025.
An agenda and supporting materials will be posted at least 7 days in advance of the meeting at:
Carolyn A. Dubay, Chief Counsel, Rules Committee Staff, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building, One Columbus Circle NE, Suite 7-300, Washington, DC 20544, Phone (202) 502-1820,
Remote registration is available until the meeting date, provided it is completed before the projected end time. The announcement for this meeting was previously published in the
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).
Notice.
The NCUA's staff draft “detailed business-type budget” for 2026 and 2027 was made available for public review in the
The hearing date included in the notice published on October 21, 2025 (90 FR 48439) is changed to November 5, 2025, at 1 p.m. Eastern.
Melissa L. Lowden, Acting Chief Financial Officer, National Credit Union Administration, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314-3428, or telephone: (703) 518-1182.
As noted in documents published on September 29, 2025 (90 FR 4664) and October 21, 2025 (90 FR 48439), the NCUA will hold a public hearing on its staff draft budget for 2026-2027. Interested parties are referred to those notices for further background and deadlines for providing input. This notice is being issued to reschedule the in-person public hearing from November 6, 2025 at 1 p.m. Eastern to November 5, 2025 at 1 p.m. Eastern. All other details and deadlines associated with the staff draft budget are unchanged.
Postal Regulatory Commission.
Notice.
The Commission is noticing a recent Postal Service filing for the Commission's consideration concerning a negotiated service agreement. This notice informs the public of the filing, invites public comment, and takes other administrative steps.
Submit comments electronically via the Commission's Filing Online system at
David A. Trissell, General Counsel, at 202-789-6820.
Pursuant to 39 CFR 3041.405, the Commission gives notice that the Postal Service filed request(s) for the Commission to consider matters related to Competitive negotiated service agreement(s). The request(s) may propose the addition of a negotiated service agreement from the Competitive product list or the modification of an existing product currently appearing on the Competitive product list.
The public portions of the Postal Service's request(s) can be accessed via the Commission's website (
Section II identifies the docket number(s) associated with each Postal Service request, if any, that will be reviewed in a public proceeding as defined by 39 CFR 3010.101(p), the title of each such request, the request's acceptance date, and the authority cited by the Postal Service for each request. For each such request, the Commission appoints an officer of the Commission to represent the interests of the general public in the proceeding, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 505 and 39 CFR 3000.114 (Public Representative). The Public Representative does not represent any individual person, entity or particular point of view, and, when Commission attorneys are appointed, no attorney-
The Commission invites comments on whether the Postal Service's request(s) identified in Section II, if any, are consistent with the policies of title 39. Applicable statutory and regulatory requirements include 39 U.S.C. 3632, 39 U.S.C. 3633, 39 U.S.C. 3642, 39 CFR part 3035, and 39 CFR part 3041. Comment deadline(s) for each such request, if any, appear in Section II.
Section III identifies the docket number(s) associated with each Postal Service request, if any, to add a standardized distinct product to the Competitive product list or to amend a standardized distinct product, the title of each such request, the request's acceptance date, and the authority cited by the Postal Service for each request. Standardized distinct products are negotiated service agreements that are variations of one or more Competitive products, and for which financial models, minimum rates, and classification criteria have undergone advance Commission review.
1.
1.
This Notice will be published in the
State Justice Institute.
Grant Guideline for Fiscal Year (FY) 2026.
This guideline sets forth the administrative, programmatic, and financial requirements attendant to FY 2026 State Justice Institute grants.
October 7, 2025.
State Justice Institute, 12700 Fair Lakes Circle, Suite 340, Fairfax, VA 22033.
Jonathan Mattiello, Executive Director, State Justice Institute, 703-660-4979,
Pursuant to the State Justice Institute Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10701
The following Grant Guideline is adopted by the State Justice Institute for FY 2026.
Pursuant to the State Justice Institute Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10701
SJI is authorized by Congress to award grants, cooperative agreements, and contracts to the following entities and types of organizations:
• State and local courts and their agencies (42 U.S.C. 10705(b)(1)(A)).
• National nonprofit organizations controlled by, operating in conjunction with, and serving the judicial branches of state governments (42 U.S.C. 10705(b)(1)(B)).
• National nonprofit organizations for the education and training of judges and support personnel of the judicial branch of state governments (42 U.S.C. 10705(b)(1)(C)). An applicant is considered a national education and training applicant under section 10705(b)(1)(C) if:
the principal purpose or activity of the applicant is to provide education and training to state and local judges and court personnel; and
the applicant demonstrates a record of substantial experience in the field of judicial education and training.
• Other eligible grant recipients (42 U.S.C. 10705(b)(2)(A) through (D)).
Provided that the objectives of the project can be served better, SJI is also authorized to make awards to:
○ Nonprofit organizations with expertise in judicial administration
○ Institutions of higher education
○ Individuals, partnerships, firms, corporations (for-profit organizations must waive their fees)
○ Private agencies with expertise in judicial administration
SJI may also make awards to state or local agencies and institutions other than courts for services that cannot be adequately provided through nongovernmental arrangements (42 U.S.C. 10705(b)(3)).
SJI is prohibited from awarding grants to federal, tribal, and international courts.
The SJI Board of Directors makes awards on a federal fiscal year quarterly basis. Applications may be submitted at any time but will be considered for award based only on the timetable below.
To be considered timely, an application must be submitted by the application deadline noted above. Applicants must use the SJI Grants Management System (GMS) to submit all applications and post-award
Questions related to the SJI Grant Program or the SJI GMS should be directed to
The State Justice Institute Authorization Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10701
• direct a national program of financial assistance designed to ensure that each citizen of the United States is provided ready access to a fair and effective system of justice;
• foster coordination and cooperation with the federal judiciary;
• promote recognition of the importance of the separation of powers doctrine to an independent judiciary; and
• encourage education for judges and support personnel of state court systems through national and state organizations.
To accomplish these broad objectives, SJI is authorized to provide funding to state courts, national organizations that support and are supported by state courts, national judicial education organizations, and other organizations that can assist in improving the quality of justice in the state courts.
Through the award of grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements, SJI is authorized to perform the following activities:
• support technical assistance, demonstrations, special projects, research, and training to improve the administration of justice in the state courts;
• provide for the preparation, publication, and dissemination of information regarding State judicial systems;
• participate in joint projects with Federal agencies and other private grantors;
• evaluate or provide for the evaluation of programs and projects to determine their impact upon the quality of criminal, civil, and juvenile justice and the extent to which they have contributed to improving the quality of justice in the state courts;
• encourage and assist in furthering judicial education; and
• encourage, assist, and serve in a consulting capacity state and local courts in the development, maintenance, and coordination of criminal, civil, and juvenile justice programs and services.
SJI is supervised by a board of directors appointed by the U.S. President, with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The SJI Board of Directors is statutorily composed of six judges; a State court administrator; and four members of the public, no more than two of the same political party. Additional information about SJI, including a list of members of the SJI Board of Directors, is available at
The SJI Board of Directors has established Priority Investment Areas for grant funding. SJI will allocate significant financial resources through grant-making for these Priority Investment Areas. The Priority Investment Areas are applicable to all grant types. SJI strongly encourages potential grant applicants to consider projects addressing one or more of these Priority Investment Areas and to integrate the following factors into each proposed project:
• evidence-based, data-driven decision-making;
• cross-sector collaboration;
• systemic approaches (as opposed to standalone programs);
• institutionalization of new court processes and procedures;
• ease of replication; and
• sustainability.
For FY 2026, the Priority Investment Areas are listed below in no specific order.
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SJI supports five types of grants: Project, Technical Assistance (TA), Curriculum Adaptation and Training (CAT), Strategic Initiatives Grants (SIG) Program, and the Education Support Program (ESP). A brief description of each type of grant is below.
Project grants are intended to support innovative education and training, research and evaluation, demonstration, and TA projects that can improve the administration of justice in state courts locally or nationwide. State court and national nonprofit applicants may request up to $300,000 for 36 months. Local court applicants may request up to $200,000 for 24 months. Examples of expenses not covered by project grants include the salaries or benefits of full- or part-time court employees. Funding may not be used for the ordinary, routine operations of court systems.
All applicants for project grants must contribute a cash match greater than or equal to the SJI award amount. This means that grant awards by SJI must be matched at least dollar for dollar by grant applicants. For example, an applicant seeking a $300,000 Project Grant must provide a cash match of at least $300,000. Applicants may contribute the required cash match directly or in cooperation with third parties. Funding from other federal departments or agencies may not be used for a cash match.
TA grants are intended to provide state or local courts—or regional court associations—with sufficient support to obtain expert assistance to diagnose a problem, develop a response to that problem, and implement any needed changes. TA grants may not exceed $75,000 or 12 months in duration. In calculating project duration, applicants are cautioned to fully consider the time required to issue a request for proposals, negotiate a contract with the selected provider, and execute the project. Funds may not be used for salaries or benefits of full- or part-time court employees.
Applicants for TA grants are required to contribute a total match (cash and in-kind) of no less than 50 percent of the SJI award amount, of which 20 percent must be cash. For example, an applicant seeking a $75,000 TA Grant must provide a $37,500 match, of which up to $30,000 can be in-kind and not less than $7,500 must be cash. Funding from other federal departments and agencies may not be used for a cash match.
CAT grants are intended to: (1) enable courts or national court associations to modify and adapt model curricula, course modules, or conference programs to meet states' or local jurisdictions' educational needs; train instructors to present portions or all of the curricula; and pilot-test them to determine their appropriateness, quality, and effectiveness; or (2) conduct judicial branch education and training programs, led by either expert or in-house personnel, designed to prepare judges and court personnel for innovations, reforms, and/or new technologies recently adopted by grantee courts. CAT grants may not exceed $40,000 or 12 months in duration. Examples of expenses not covered by CAT grants include the
Applicants for CAT grants are required to contribute a total match (cash and in-kind) of not less than 50 percent of the SJI award amount, of which 20 percent must be cash. For example, an applicant seeking a $40,000 CAT grant must provide a $20,000 match, of which up to $16,000 can be in-kind and not less than $4,000 must be cash. Funding from other federal departments and agencies may not be used for a cash match.
The SIG Program provides SJI with the flexibility to address national court issues as they occur and develop solutions to those problems. This is an innovative approach where SJI uses its expertise and the expertise and knowledge of its grantees to address key issues facing state courts across the United States.
The funding is used for grants or contractual services and is handled at the discretion of the SJI Board of Directors and staff. SJI requires the submission of a concept paper prior to the full application process.
The ESP is intended to enhance the skills, knowledge, and abilities of state court judges and court managers by enabling them to attend out-of-state or enroll in online educational and training programs sponsored by national and state providers they could not otherwise attend or take online because of limited state, local, and personal budgets. The program covers only the cost of tuition up to a maximum of $1,000 per course.
The ESP is administered by the National Judicial College (NJC) and the National Center for State Courts (NCSC)/Institute for Court Management (ICM), in partnership with SJI. For NJC courses, register online at
This section describes in detail what an application must include. An applicant should anticipate that if he or she fails to submit an application that contains all the specified project components, it may negatively affect the review of the application. Applicants must use the SJI GMS to submit all applications and post-award documents. The SJI GMS is accessible at
Applicants for SJI grants must submit the following forms and/or documents via the SJI GMS:
The application form requests basic information regarding the proposed project, the applicant, and the total amount of funding requested from SJI. It also requires the signature of an individual authorized to certify on behalf of the applicant that the information contained in the application is true and complete; submission of the application has been authorized by the applicant; and, if funding for the proposed project is approved, the applicant will comply with the requirements and conditions of the award, including the assurances set forth in section V.A.4,
An application from a state or local court must include a copy of the
Applicants must provide a detailed budget and a budget narrative providing an explanation of the basis for the amounts in each budget category. If funds from other sources are required to conduct the project, either as a match or to support other aspects of the project, the source, current status of the request, and anticipated decision date must be provided.
The
Applicants other than units of state or local government are required to disclose whether they, or another entity that is part of the same organization as the applicant, have advocated a position before Congress on any issue, and to identify the specific subjects of their lobbying efforts.
The abstract must highlight the purposes, goals, methods, and anticipated benefits of the proposed project. It must not exceed one single-spaced page and must be uploaded on the “Attachments” tab in the SJI GMS.
The program narrative for an application may not exceed 25 double-spaced pages on 8
Applicants must provide a verified source for the data (
If the project is not site-specific, the applicants must discuss the problems that the proposed project would address and why existing programs, procedures, services, or other resources cannot adequately resolve those problems. In addition, applicants must describe how, if applicable, the project will be sustained in the future through existing resources.
The applicants must include a clear, concise statement of what the proposed project is intended to accomplish and how those objectives will be met. Applicants must delineate the tasks to be performed in achieving the project objectives and the methods to be used for accomplishing each task.
Applicants must describe how the proposed project addresses one or more Priority Investment Areas. If the project does not address one or more Priority Investment Areas, the applicants must provide an explanation as to the reason.
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If a consultant has not yet been identified, the applicants must describe the procedures and criteria that will be used to select the consultant (applicants are expected to follow their jurisdictions' normal procedures for procuring consultant services).
If the consultant has been identified, the applicants must provide a letter from that individual or organization documenting interest in and availability for the project, as well as the consultant's ability to complete the assignment within the proposed timeframe and for the proposed cost. The consultant must agree to submit a detailed written report to the court and SJI upon completion of the TA. Applicants must then describe the steps that have been or will be taken to facilitate implementation of the consultant's recommendations upon completion of the technical assistance.
The applicants must then address the following questions:
• What specific tasks will the consultant and court staff undertake?
• What is the schedule for completion of each required task and the entire project?
• How will the applicant oversee the project and provide guidance to the consultant, and who at the court or regional court association would be responsible for coordinating all project tasks and submitting Quarterly Progress and Financial Status Reports?
• Why is this education program needed at the present time?
• What are the project's goals?
• What are the learning objectives of the adapted curriculum?
• What program components would be implemented, and what types of modifications, if any, are anticipated in length, format, learning objectives, teaching methods, or content?
• Who would be responsible for adapting the model curriculum?
• Who would the participants be, how many would there be, how would they be recruited, and from where would they come (
The applicants must also provide the proposed timeline, including the project start and end dates, the date(s) the judicial branch education program will be presented, and the process that will be used to modify and present the program. Applicants must also identify who will serve as faculty, and how they will be selected, in addition to the measures taken to facilitate subsequent presentations of the program.
If a trainer has not yet been identified, the applicants must describe the procedures and criteria that will be used to select the trainer.
If the trainer has been identified, the applicants must provide a letter from that individual or organization documenting interest in and availability for the project, as well as the trainer's ability to complete the assignment within the proposed timeframe and for the proposed cost.
In addition, the applicants must address the following questions:
• What specific tasks would the trainer and court staff or regional court association members undertake?
• What presentation methods will be used?
• What is the schedule for completion of each required task and the entire project?
• How will the applicant oversee the project and provide guidance to the trainer, and who at the court or affiliated with the regional court association would be responsible for coordinating all project tasks and submitting Quarterly Progress and Financial Status Reports?
• The applicant must explain what steps have been or will be taken to coordinate the implementation of the training. For example, if the support or cooperation of specific court, regional court association officials, committees, other agencies, funding bodies, organizations, or a court other than the applicant will be needed to adopt the reform and initiate the proposed training, how will the applicant secure their involvement in the development and implementation of the training?
The application must: (1) explain how and to whom the products would be disseminated; describe how they would benefit the state courts, including how they could be used by judges and court personnel; (2) identify development, production, and dissemination costs covered by the project budget; and (3) present the basis on which products and services developed or provided under the grant would be offered to the court community and the public at large (
The type of product to be prepared depends on the nature of the project. For example, in most instances, the products of a research, evaluation, or demonstration project must include: (1) an article summarizing the project findings that is publishable in a journal serving the courts community nationally, (2) an executive summary that would be disseminated to the project's primary audience, or (3) both an article and executive summary. Applicants proposing to conduct empirical research or evaluation projects with national import must describe how they would make their data available for secondary analysis after the grant period.
The curricula and other products developed through education and training projects must be designed for use by others and again by the original participants in the course of their duties. Applicants proposing to develop web-based products must provide, for sending, a notice and description of the document (
Applicants must submit a final draft of all written grant products to SJI for review and approval at least 30 days before the products are submitted for publication or reproduction. Applicants must provide multimedia products for SJI review at the treatment, script, rough-cut, and final stages of development, or their equivalents. No grant funds may be obligated for publication or reproduction of a final grant product without the written approval of SJI. Project products should be submitted to SJI electronically in HTML or PDF format.
Applicants must also include in all project products a prominent acknowledgment that SJI provided support and a disclaimer paragraph such as, “This [document, film, videotape, etc.] was developed under [grant/cooperative agreement] number SJI-[insert number] from the State Justice Institute. The points of view expressed are those of the [author(s), filmmaker(s), etc.] and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the State Justice Institute.” The “SJI” logo must appear on the front cover of a written product or in the opening frames of a website or other multimedia products, unless SJI approves another placement. The SJI logo can be downloaded from SJI's website (
An applicant that is not a state or local court and has not received a grant from SJI within the past 3 years must indicate whether it is either: (1) a national nonprofit organization controlled by, operating in conjunction with, and serving the judicial branches of state governments; or (2) a national nonprofit organization for the education and training of state court judges and support personnel. If the applicant is a nonjudicial unit of Federal, State, or local government, it must explain whether the proposed services could be adequately provided by nongovernmental entities.
Applicants that have not received a grant from SJI within the past 3 years must include a statement describing their capacity to administer grant funds, including the financial systems used to monitor project expenditures (and income, if any), a summary of their past experience in administering grants, and any resources or capabilities they have that would particularly assist in the successful completion of the project.
Unless requested otherwise, an applicant that has received a grant from SJI within the past 3 years must describe only the changes in its organizational capacity, tax status, or financial capability that may affect its capacity to administer a grant. If the applicant is a nonprofit organization (other than a university), it must also provide documentation of its 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status as determined by the
The applicant must include a summary of key staff members' and consultants' training and experience that qualify them to conduct and manage the proposed project. Resumes of identified staff should be attached to the application. If one or more key staff members and consultants are not known at the time of the application, a description of the criteria that would be used to select persons for these positions should be included. The applicant must also identify the person who would be responsible for managing and reporting on the financial aspects of the proposed project.
Projects must include an evaluation plan to determine whether the project has met its objectives. The evaluation must be designed to provide an objective and independent assessment of the effectiveness or usefulness of the training or services provided; the impact of the procedures, technology, or services tested; or the validity and applicability of the research conducted. The evaluation plan must be appropriate to the type of project proposed, considering the nature, scope, and magnitude of the project.
Describe how the project will be sustained after SJI assistance ends. The sustainability plan must describe how current collaborations and evaluations will be used to leverage ongoing resources. SJI encourages applicants to ensure sustainability by coordinating with local, state, and other federal resources.
Applicants must complete a budget in the SJI GMS and upload a budget narrative. The budget narrative must provide the basis for all project-related costs and the sources of any match, as required. The budget narrative must thoroughly and clearly describe every category of expense listed. SJI expects proposed budgets to be complete, cost effective, and allowable (
• To supplant state or local funds supporting a program or activity (
• To construct court facilities or structures.
• Solely to purchase equipment.
Examples of
• Hiring of personnel;
• Purchase and/or maintenance of equipment;
• Purchase of software and/or licenses;
• Purchase of internet access or service;
• Supplies to support the day-to-day operations of courts.
The final determination of what constitutes basic court services is made by SJI and is not negotiable.
Meals and refreshments are not allowable costs.
Trinkets (
The grantee is responsible for ensuring that the total amount of the match proposed is contributed. If a proposed contribution is not fully met, SJI may reduce the award amount accordingly, to maintain the ratio originally provided for in the award agreement. The match should be expended at the same rate as SJI funding.
• Soundness of the methodology.
• Demonstration of need for the project.
• Appropriateness of the proposed evaluation design.
• If applicable, the key findings and recommendations of the most recent evaluation and the proposed responses to those findings and recommendations.
• Applicant's management plan and organizational capabilities.
• Qualifications of the project's staff.
• Products and benefits resulting from the project, including the extent to which the project will have long-term benefits for state courts across the nation.
• Degree to which the findings, procedures, training, technology, or other results of the project can be transferred to other jurisdictions.
• Reasonableness of the proposed budget.
• Demonstration of cooperation and support of other agencies that may be affected by the project.
• Whether the assistance would address a critical need of the applicant.
• Soundness of the technical assistance approach to the problem.
• Qualifications of the consultant(s) to be hired or the specific criteria that will be used to select the consultant(s).
• Commitment of the court or association to act on the consultant's recommendations.
• Reasonableness of the proposed budget.
• Goals and objectives of the proposed project.
• How the training would address a critical need of the court or association.
• Need for outside funding to support the program.
• Soundness of the approach in achieving the project's educational or training objectives.
• Integration of distance learning and technology in project design and delivery.
• Qualifications of the trainer(s) to be hired or the specific criteria that will be used to select the trainer(s) (training project only).
• Likelihood of effective implementation and integration of the modified curriculum into the state or local jurisdiction's ongoing educational programming (curriculum adaptation project only).
• Commitment of the court or association to the training program (training project only).
• Expressions of interest by judges and/or court personnel, as demonstrated by letters of support.
• Goals and objectives of the proposed project.
• Demonstration of need for the project.
• Degree to which the project addresses a current national court issue.
• Level of innovation in addressing the identified need.
• Potential impact on the court community.
• Qualifications of the consultant(s) engaged to manage the project.
• Must be submitted by an eligible type of applicant.
• Must request funding within funding constraints of each grant type (if applicable).
• Must be within statutorily allowable expenditures.
• Must include all required forms and documents.
• The SJI Board of Directors reviews all applications and makes final funding decisions. The decision to fund a project is solely that of the SJI Board of Directors.
Applicants must use the SJI GMS to submit all applications and post-award documents. SJI urges applicants to submit applications at least 72 hours prior to the application due date in order to allow time for the applicant to receive an application acceptance message and to correct, in a timely fashion, any problems that may arise, such as missing or incomplete forms. Files must be in .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .pdf, .jpg, or .png format. Individual file size cannot exceed 5 MB.
Applicants (except for ESP) must register with the SJI GMS to submit applications for funding consideration. Below are the basic steps for submission:
1. Access the SJI GMS and complete the information required to create an account.
2. If you already have an account, log in and create a new application.
3. Complete all required forms and upload all required documents:
• Application Form.
• Certificate of State Approval.
• Budget and Budget Narrative.
• Assurances.
• Disclosure of Lobbying Activities.
• Project Abstract.
• Program Narrative.
• Attachments.
Letters of Support.
Project Timeline.
Resumes.
Indirect-Cost Approval.
Other Attachments.
4. Certify and submit the application to SJI for review.
All required reports and documents must be submitted via the SJI GMS.
Recipients of SJI funds must submit Quarterly Progress and Financial Status Reports within 30 days after the close of each calendar quarter (
Awardees will receive funds on a reimbursable basis via electronic funds transfer (EFT) basis. All requests for reimbursement must include a Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) as generated by the System for Reward Management (SAM) with an active registration. Upon receipt, review, and approval of a request for reimbursement by SJI, payment will be issued directly to the grantee or its designated fiscal agent. Requests for reimbursements, along with the instructions for their preparation are available in the SJI GMS.
• Properly accounts for receipt of funds under each grant awarded and the expenditure of funds for each grant by category of expenditure (including matching contributions and project income).
• Assures that expended funds are applied to the appropriate budget category included within the approved grant.
• Presents and classifies historical costs of the grant as required for budgetary and evaluation purposes.
• Provides cost and property controls to assure optimal use of grant funds.
• Is integrated with a system of internal controls adequate to safeguard the funds and assets covered, check the accuracy and reliability of the accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and assure conformance with any general or special conditions of the grant.
• Meets the prescribed requirements for periodic financial reporting of operations.
• Provides financial data for planning, control, measurement, and evaluation of direct and indirect costs.
The Final Progress Report must describe the project activities during the final calendar quarter of the project and the close-out period, including to whom project products have been disseminated; provide a summary of activities during the entire project; specify whether all the objectives set forth in the approved application or an approved adjustment have been met and, if any of the objectives have not been met, explain why not; and discuss what, if anything, could have been done differently that might have enhanced the impact of the project or improved its operation. In addition, grantees are required to submit electronic copies of the final products related to the project (
No funds made available by SJI may be used to support or conduct training programs for the purpose of advocating particular nonjudicial public policies or encouraging nonjudicial political activities (42 U.S.C. 10706(b)).
If the qualifications of an employee or consultant assigned to a key project staff position are not adequately described in the application or if there is a change of a person assigned to such a position, the recipient must submit a description of the qualifications of the newly assigned person to SJI. Prior written approval of the qualifications of the new person assigned to a key staff position must be received from SJI before the salary or consulting fee of that person and associated costs may be paid or reimbursed from grant funds.
Recipients of SJI grants must provide for an annual fiscal audit, which includes an opinion on whether the financial statements of the grantee fairly present its financial position and its financial operations in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. If requested, a copy of the audit report must be made available electronically to SJI.
Prior SJI approval is required for budget revisions among direct-cost categories that: (1) transfer grant funds to an unbudgeted cost category; or (2) individually or cumulatively exceed 5 percent of the approved original budget or the most recently approved revised budget. Refer to section X,
Personnel and other officials connected with SJI-funded programs must adhere to the following requirements:
• Officials or employees of a recipient court or organization must not participate personally through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation, or otherwise, in any proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, claim, controversy, or other particular matter in which SJI funds are used, where, to their knowledge, they or their immediate family; partners; organization other than a public agency in which they are serving as officer, director, trustee, partner, or employee; or any person or organization with whom they are negotiating or have any arrangement concerning prospective employment have a financial interest.
• In the use of SJI project funds, an official or employee of a recipient court or organization must avoid any action that might result in or create the appearance of:
using an official position for private gain; or
adversely affecting the confidence of the public in the integrity of the SJI program.
• Requests for proposals (RFPs) or invitations for bids issued by a recipient of SJI funds or a subgrantee or subcontractor will provide notice to prospective bidders that the contractors who develop or draft specifications, requirements, statements of work, and/or RFPs for a proposed procurement will be excluded from bidding on or submitting a proposal to compete for the award of such procurement.
If any patentable items, patent rights, processes, or inventions are produced during the course of SJI-sponsored work, such fact must be promptly and fully reported to SJI. Unless there is a prior agreement between the grantee and SJI on the disposition of such items, SJI will determine whether protection of the invention or discovery may be sought should the grantee choose to pursue such protection.
Funds awarded to recipients by SJI must not be used—directly or indirectly—to influence Executive Orders or similar promulgations by federal, state, or local agencies; or to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation by federal, state, or local legislative bodies (42 U.S.C. 10706(a)).
It is the policy of the SJI Board of Directors to award funds only to support applications submitted by organizations that would carry out the objectives of their applications in an unbiased manner. Consistent with this policy and the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 10706, SJI will not knowingly award a grant to an applicant that has, directly or through an entity that is part of the same organization as the applicant, advocated a position before Congress on the specific subject matter of the application.
All grant recipients are required to provide a match. A match is the portion of project costs not borne by SJI. A match includes both cash and in-kind contributions. A cash match is the direct outlay of funds by the grantee or a third party to support the project. An in-kind match for state and local courts or other units of government consists of contributions of time and/or services of current staff members, new employees, space, supplies, etc., made to the project by the grantee or others (
Under normal circumstances, an allowable match may be incurred only during the project period. The amount and nature of the required match depends on the type of grant. Refer to section V.C.12,
The grantee is responsible for ensuring that the total amount of the match proposed is contributed. If a proposed contribution is not fully met, SJI may reduce the award amount accordingly to maintain the ratio originally provided for in the award agreement. The match should be expended at the same rate as SJI funding.
The SJI Board of Directors looks favorably upon any unrequired match contributed by applicants when making grant decisions. The match requirement may be waived in exceptionally rare circumstances upon the request of the chief justice of the highest court in the state or the highest-ranking official in the requesting organization, and approval by the SJI Board of Directors (42 U.S.C. 10705(d)). The SJI Board of Directors encourages all applicants to provide the maximum amount of cash and in-kind match possible, even if a waiver is approved. The amount and nature of the match are criteria in the grant selection process.
Other federal department and agency funding may not be used for a cash match.
No person may, on the basis of race, sex, national origin, disability, color, or creed, be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program or activity supported by SJI funds. Recipients of SJI funds must take any measures necessary to effectuate this provision immediately.
No recipient may contribute or make available SJI funds, program personnel, or equipment to any political party or association or the campaign of any candidate for public or party office. Recipients are also prohibited from using funds in advocating or opposing any ballot measure, initiative, or referendum. Officers and employees of recipients must not intentionally identify SJI or recipients with any partisan or nonpartisan political activity associated with a political party or association or the campaign of any candidate for public or party office (42 U.S.C. 10706(a)).
Recipients also must display the following disclaimer on all grant products: “This [document, film, videotape, etc.] was developed under [grant/cooperative agreement] number SJI-[insert number] from the State Justice Institute. The points of view expressed are those of the [author(s), filmmaker(s), etc.] and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the State Justice Institute.”
Applicants must disclose their intent to sell grant-related products in the application. Grantees must obtain SJI's prior written approval of their plans to recover project costs through the sale of grant products. Written requests to recover costs ordinarily should be received during the grant period and should specify the nature and extent of the costs to be recouped, the reason that such costs were not budgeted (if the rationale was not disclosed in the approved application), the number of copies to be sold, the intended audience for the products to be sold, and the proposed sale price. If the product is to be sold for more than $25, the written request should also include a detailed itemization of costs that will be recovered and a certification that the costs were not supported by either SJI grant funds or grantee matching contributions.
In the event that the sale of grant products results in revenues that exceed the costs to develop, produce, and disseminate the product, the revenue must continue to be used for the authorized purposes of the SJI-funded project or other purposes consistent with the State Justice Institute Act that have been approved by SJI.
Except as otherwise provided in the terms and conditions of an SJI award, a
All products and, for TA and CAT grants, consultant and/or trainer reports are to be completed and distributed not later than the end of the award period, not the 90-day closeout period. The 90-day closeout period is intended only for grantee final reporting and to liquidate obligations.
In addition to the distribution specified in the grant application, grantees must send an electronic version of all products in HTML or PDF format to SJI.
All products prepared as the result of SJI-supported projects must be originally developed material unless otherwise specified in the award documents. Material not originally developed that is included in such products must be properly identified, whether the material is in a verbatim or extensive paraphrase format.
No funds made available by SJI may be used directly or indirectly to support legal assistance for parties in litigation, including cases involving capital punishment.
All reports must be submitted via the SJI GMS as detailed below:
• To supplant state or local funds supporting a program or activity (
• To construct court facilities or structures.
• Solely to purchase equipment.
Examples of
The final determination of what constitutes basic court services is made by SJI and is not negotiable.
Meals and refreshments are not allowable.
Trinkets (
The purpose of this section is to establish accounting system
• Complying with the statutory requirements for the award, disbursement, and accounting of funds.
• Complying with regulatory requirements of SJI for the financial management and disposition of funds.
• Generating financial data to be used in planning, managing, and controlling projects.
• Facilitating an effective audit of funded programs and projects.
All grantees receiving awards from SJI are responsible for the management and fiscal control of all funds. Responsibilities include accounting for receipts and expenditures, maintaining adequate financial records, and refunding expenditures disallowed by audits. If the project includes subawards, the grantees' responsibilities also include:
The grantee is responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate system of accounting and internal controls and for ensuring that an adequate system exists for each of its subgrantees and contractors. An acceptable and adequate accounting system:
• Properly accounts for receipt of funds under each grant awarded and the expenditure of funds for each grant by category of expenditure, including matching contributions and project income.
• Assures that expended funds are applied to the appropriate budget category included within the approved grant.
• Presents and classifies historical costs of the grant as required for budgetary and evaluation purposes.
• Provides cost and property controls to assure optimal use of grant funds.
• Is integrated with a system of internal controls adequate to safeguard the funds and assets covered, check the accuracy and reliability of the accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and assure conformance with any general or special conditions of the grant.
• Meets the prescribed requirements for periodic financial reporting of operations.
• Provides financial data for planning, control, measurement, and evaluation of direct and indirect costs.
Accounting for all funds awarded by SJI must be structured and executed on a total-project-cost basis. That is, total project costs, including SJI funds, state and local matching shares, and any other fund sources included in the approved project budget, serve as the foundation for fiscal administration and accounting. Grant applications and financial reports require budget and cost estimates based on total costs.
The procedures and regulations set forth below are applicable to all SJI grant funds and grantees.
• A copy of an indirect-cost-rate agreement or allocation plan approved for a grantee during the preceding 2 years by any federal granting agency on the basis of allocation methods substantially in accord with those set forth in the applicable cost circulars must be submitted to SJI.
• Where flat rates are accepted in lieu of actual, indirect costs, grantees may not also charge expenses normally included in overhead pools (
• Following up.
• Maintaining a record of the actions taken on recommendations and time schedules.
• Responding to and acting on audit recommendations.
• Submitting periodic reports to SJI on recommendations and actions taken.
All requests for programmatic or budgetary adjustments requiring SJI approval must be submitted by the project director in a timely manner (ordinarily 30 days prior to the implementation of the adjustment being requested). All requests for changes from the approved application will be carefully reviewed for both consistency with this guideline and the enhancement of grant goals and objectives. Failure to submit adjustments in a timely manner may result in the termination of a grantee's award.
The following Grant Adjustments require the prior written approval of SJI:
• Budget revisions among direct-cost categories that: (1) transfer grant funds to an unbudgeted cost category; or (2) individually or cumulatively exceed 5 percent of the approved original budget or the most recently approved revised budget.
• A change in the scope of work to be performed or the objectives of the project.
• A change in the project site.
• A change in the project period, such as an extension of the grant period or extension of the Final Financial Report or Final Progress Report deadline.
• Satisfaction of special conditions, if required.
• A change in or temporary absence of the project director.
• The assignment of an employee or consultant to a key staff position whose qualifications were not described in the application, or a change in a person assigned to a key project staff position.
• A change in or temporary absence of the person responsible for managing and reporting on the grant's finances.
• A change in the name of the grantee organization.
• A transfer or contracting out of grant-supported activities.
• A transfer of the grant to another recipient.
• Pre-agreement costs.
• The purchase of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) equipment and software.
• Consultant rates.
• A change in the nature or number of the products to be prepared or the way a product would be distributed.
All grantees must promptly notify SJI, in writing, of events or proposed changes that may require adjustments to the approved project design. In requesting an adjustment, the grantee must set forth the reasons and basis for the proposed adjustment and any other information the program manager determines would help SJI's review. All requests for Grant Adjustments must be submitted via the SJI GMS.
If the request is approved, the grantee will be sent a Grant Adjustment signed by the SJI Executive Director. If the request is denied, the grantee will be sent a written explanation of the reasons for the denial.
Major changes in scope, duration, training methodology, or other significant areas must be approved in advance by SJI. A grantee may make minor changes to methodology, approach, or other aspects of the grant to expedite achievement of the grant's objectives with subsequent notification to SJI.
A request to change or extend the grant period must be made at least 30 days in advance of the end date of the grant. A revised task plan must accompany a request for an extension of the grant period, along with a revised budget if shifts among budget categories will be needed. A request to change or extend the deadline for the Final Financial Report or Final Progress Report must be made at least 14 days in advance of the report deadline.
Whenever an absence of the project director is expected to exceed a continuous period of 1 month, the plans for the conduct of the project director's duties during such absence must be approved in advance by SJI. This information must be provided in a letter signed by an authorized representative of the grantee or subgrantee at least 30 days before the departure of the project director or as soon as it is known that the project director will be absent. The grant may be terminated if arrangements are not approved in advance by SJI.
If the project director relinquishes or expects to relinquish active direction of the project, SJI must be notified immediately. In such cases, if the grantee or subgrantee wishes to terminate the project, SJI will forward procedural instructions upon notification of such intent. If the grantee wishes to continue the project under the direction of another individual, a statement of the candidate's qualifications should be sent to SJI for review and approval. The grant may be terminated if the qualifications of the proposed individual are not approved in advance by SJI.
No principal activity of a grant-supported project may be transferred or contracted out to another organization without specific prior approval by SJI. All such arrangements must be formalized in a contract or other written agreement between the parties involved. Copies of the proposed contract or agreement must be submitted for prior approval to SJI at the earliest possible time. The contract or agreement must state, at a minimum, the activities to be performed, the time schedule, the policies and procedures to be followed, the dollar limitation of the agreement, and the cost principles to be followed in determining what costs, both direct and indirect, will be allowed. The contract or other written agreement must not affect the grantee's overall responsibility for the direction of the project and accountability to SJI.
Office of the Secretary (OST), U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).
Notice and request for comments.
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regulations, the Department of Transportation (DOT) invites public comments on currently approved Transportation Acquisition Regulation (TAR) part 1239 information collection requests (ICRs) and our intention to request OMB approval to renew the ICRs on an interim basis as abstracted below while DOT undertakes further review to streamline its regulations. The public will be afforded another opportunity to review revised streamlined TAR content when published as a part of a proposed rule. DOT is required to publish this notice in the
Interested persons are invited to submit comments on or before December 26, 2025.
DOT invites interested persons to submit comments identified by Docket No. DOT-OST-2025-1921 through one of the following methods:
•
•
•
Comments received generally will be posted without change to
LaWanda Morton-Chunn, Procurement Analyst, Office of the Secretary, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone: (202) 366-2267 or
DOT invites comments on: (1) whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of DOT acquisitions, including whether the information will have practical utility; (2) the accuracy of the estimate of the burden of the proposed information collection; (3) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology. OMB has approved this information collection for use through December 31, 2025. DOT proposes that OMB extend its approval for use for three additional years beyond the current expiration date.
As a result of the Revolutionary Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (RFO) Initiative, the Transportation Acquisition Regulation (TAR) is also under review. The TAR must align with on-going interim class deviations to the FAR issued by DOT, as well as a later planned FAR proposed rule to be published in the
DOT requires an extension of the current information collection requirements currently in the TAR at 48 CFR chapter 12 until this analysis is completed, and a proposed TAR rule is developed and published in the
The summary below describes the ICRs that DOT will submit for OMB clearance as the PRA requires:
October 30, 2025, 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., EDT.
The meeting will be accessible via conference call and via Zoom Meeting and Screenshare. Any interested person may call (i) 1-929-205-6099 (US Toll) or 1-669-900-6833 (US Toll), Meeting ID: 994 7596 5095, to listen and participate in this meeting. The website to participate via Zoom Meeting and Screenshare is
This meeting will be open to the public.
The Unified Carrier Registration Plan Board of Directors (the “Board”) will continue its work in developing and implementing the Unified Carrier Registration Plan and Agreement. The subject matter of this meeting will include:
The UCR Board Chair will welcome attendees, call the meeting to order, call roll for the Board, confirm the presence of a quorum, and facilitate self-introductions.
The UCR Executive Director will verify publication of the meeting notice on the UCR website and distribution to the UCR contact list via email, followed by subsequent publication of the notice in the
The proposed Agenda will be reviewed. The Board will consider action to adopt.
➢ Board actions taken only in designated areas on the agenda.
Draft Minutes from the August 7, 2025, UCR Board meeting will be reviewed. The Board will consider action to approve.
Draft Minutes from the September 4, 2025, UCR Board meeting will be reviewed. The Board will consider action to approve.
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) will provide a report on any relevant agency activity.
The UCR Board Chair and Executive Director will present a proposed 1-year renewal of the contract between the UCR Plan and DSL Transportation Services, Inc. No action is asked from the UCR Board at this meeting.
No report.
No report.
The UCR Education and Training Subcommittee Chair will provide an update on key projects and initiatives, including the ongoing development of the learning management program and training modules, awareness and engagement efforts for various stakeholders, and the optimization of the website and newsletter.
The UCR Enforcement Subcommittee Chair will provide an update on current and planned initiatives, including efforts to enhance UCR enforcement efficiency, and recognition of states and inspectors.
The UCR Finance Subcommittee Chair and Executive Director will provide an update on the 2027 registration fee recommendation.
The UCR Depository Manager will review the revenues received from the 2024, 2025, and 2026, UCR Plan years' registration fees.
The UCR Finance Subcommittee Chair and UCR Depository Manager will provide an update on the UCR Plan's 2024 External Financial Audit.
The UCR Finance Subcommittee Chair and UCR Depository Manager will discuss the proposed 2026 administrative fund budget as approved by the UCR Plan Finance Subcommittee. The UCR Board may take action to approve a 2026 administrative fund budget.
The UCR Finance Subcommittee Chair and UCR Depository Manager will provide an update on UCR finances and related topics.
No report.
The UCR Executive Director will provide a report covering his recent activity for the UCR Plan.
The UCR Chief of Staff will provide a management update covering any additional activity for the Depository, Operations, and Communications.
DSL Transportation Services, Inc. will report on the latest data from the FARs program, Tier 5 and 6 unregistered motor carriers, and other matters.
Seikosoft will provide an update on its recent/new activity related to the UCR's National Registration System.
The UCR Chief Legal Officer will provide a report covering the status of several legal issues involving the UCR Plan.
The UCR Board Chair will call for any other business, old or new, from the floor.
The UCR Board Chair will adjourn the meeting.
The agenda will be available no later than 5:00 p.m. Eastern daylight time, October 22, 2025, at:
Elizabeth Leaman, Chair, Unified Carrier Registration Plan Board of Directors, (617) 305-3783,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DHS.
Final rule with request for comments.
This final rule amends Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regulations to provide that DHS may require all aliens to be photographed when entering or exiting the United States, and may require non-exempt aliens to provide other biometrics. The final rule also amends the regulations to remove the references to pilot programs and the port limitation to permit collection of biometrics from aliens departing from airports, land ports, seaports, or any other authorized point of departure. In addition, DHS is requesting comments on the specific collection process as well as costs and benefits for new transportation modalities.
You may submit comments regarding the specific collection process as well as costs and benefits for the newly implemented transportation modalities (the Simplified Arrival process at air entry, sea entry processes, and the process for entry for pedestrians at land) to the Federal eRulemaking Portal:
Larry Panetta, Director, Biometrics Program Office, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, by phone at (202) 344-1253 or via email at
Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written data, views, or arguments on the specific collection process, as well as costs and benefits regarding the newly implemented transportation modalities for facial biometric collection, namely, the Simplified Arrival process at air entry, the sea entry processes, and the process for entry for pedestrians at land ports. Comments that will provide the most assistance will reference a specific portion of the final rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include data, information, or authority that supports such recommended change. All submissions received must include the agency name and docket number for this rulemaking. All comments received will be posted without change to
Comments submitted regarding any topic other than the specific collection process and costs and benefits on these newly implemented transportation modalities are out of scope for this final rule and will not be considered.
On November 18, 2020, the Department of Homeland Security
DHS received a total of 320 comments in response to the NPRM. The submissions included comments supporting the rule, requesting clarification, providing suggestions for changes, and voicing concerns. After review of the comments, through this final rule, DHS is finalizing the proposed changes in the NPRM without substantive modification.
DHS is mandated by statute to develop and implement an integrated, automated entry and exit data system to match records, including biographic data and biometrics,
Implementing an integrated biometric entry-exit system that compares biometric data of aliens collected upon arrival with biometric data collected upon departure helps address the national security concerns arising from the threat of terrorism, the fraudulent use of legitimate travel documentation, aliens who remain in the United States beyond their period of authorized stay (overstays) or are present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, as well as incorrect or incomplete biographic data for travelers. As recognized by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission), combatting terrorism requires a screening system that examines individuals at multiple points within the travel continuum.
Such a system will also allow DHS to confirm more concretely the identity of aliens seeking entry or admission to the United States and to verify their departure from the United States. By having more accurate border crossing records of aliens, DHS can more effectively identify overstays and aliens who are, or were, present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and prevent their potential unlawful reentry into the United States. It will also make it more difficult for imposters to utilize other travelers' credentials. In addition, performing biometric identity verification can help DHS reconcile any errors or incomplete data in a traveler's biographic data.
DHS has faced a number of logistical and operational challenges in developing and deploying a biometric exit capability. This is, in part, because U.S. ports generally do not have designated and secure exit areas for conducting outbound inspections, recording travelers' departures, or comparing biometric information against arrival data.
As stated in the NPRM, CBP has been testing various options to collect biometrics at entry and departure.
CBP has fully implemented its facial comparison system in the commercial air environment at entry through a process known as Simplified Arrival. CBP has implemented exit in the air environment primarily through partnerships with airlines at select locations. CBP has also fully implemented facial comparison biometrics at entry in the sea environment through processes known as Facial Biometric Debarkation (FBD), Mobile Primary Face, and Simplified Arrival Sea, and at entry in the pedestrian land environment through a process known as Pedestrian Entry. CBP plans to eventually establish a biometric entry-exit system at all air, sea, and land ports of entry.
As noted above, in this final rule, CBP is seeking comments regarding the specific collection process as well as costs and benefits for these newly implemented transportation modalities (the Simplified Arrival process at air entry, sea entry processes, and the process for entry for pedestrians at land).
CBP estimates that a biometric entry-exit system can be fully implemented at all commercial airports and sea ports for both entry and exit within the next three to five years. CBP plans to continue to work to determine the best option for implementing a comprehensive biometric entry-exit system nationwide, which may include pilot programs to test various options for travelers at exit in the sea and pedestrian land environment as well as for travelers entering and exiting in vehicles at land ports and on private aircraft.
This final rule advances the legal framework for DHS collection and use of biometrics from aliens through a comprehensive biometric entry-exit system by removing the references to pilot programs and the port limitations and requiring facial comparison biometrics from all aliens on entry and exit.
This final rule provides that all aliens may be required to be photographed upon entry and/or departure. Facial comparison technology upon entry and departure makes the process for verifying aliens' identities more efficient and accurate. It enables CBP to match the travelers' biometric photographs with their biographic information. The ability to biometrically verify the identity to confirm the departure of aliens will improve security, comply with federal statutory requirements, and help DHS detect overstays and aliens who are or were present in the United States without being admitted or paroled and prevent their illegal reentry. Having accurate entry and exit records is a fundamental piece of the U.S. immigration system and detecting overstays supports that system. Remaining in the United States beyond the period of authorized stay is unlawful and carries consequences for future visits to the United States.
CBP will comply with all legal requirements (
CBP anticipates that during the time period of analysis (2017-2029) this final rule will result in costs, cost savings, and benefits to CBP, approved partners, and travelers. CBP estimates total costs to CBP, outbound air travelers, inbound pedestrian travelers, and approved partners will range between $1.3 billion (in discounted 2024 U.S. dollars) using a three percent discount rate and $993 million (in discounted 2024 U.S. dollars) using a seven percent discount rate. Annualized costs are estimated to be between $122 million using a three percent discount rate and $119 million using a seven percent discount rate. Meanwhile, total cost savings to inbound air and sea travelers, and CBP, will be between $578 million (in discounted 2024 U.S. dollars) using a three percent discount rate and $406 million (in discounted 2024 U.S. dollars) using a seven percent discount rate. Annualized total cost savings are estimated to range between $54 million using a three percent discount rate, to $49 million using a seven percent discount rate. Total net costs from the
Additionally, some travelers may perceive having their photographs taken for facial comparison as a loss of privacy; however, CBP could not quantify these costs. Other cost savings that CBP was unable to monetize were an estimated time savings to vessel carriers from a swifter debarkation process when using Facial Biometric Debarkation, approximately 1.25 hours per vessel arrival. Improving national and homeland security efforts through the application of facial comparison technology during biometric identification of individuals entering and leaving the United States is the primary benefit of this final rule. CBP was unable to quantify these enhanced security benefits. Table 1 below shows CBP's estimates for future annualized costs, costs savings, benefits, and net costs from this final rule using three and seven percent discount rates over the period of analysis (2017-2029).
As discussed above, CBP is responsible for implementing an integrated, automated entry-exit system that matches the biographic data and biometrics of aliens entering and departing the United States. Furthermore, to carry out its mission responsibilities to control the border and to regulate the arrival and departure of both U.S. citizens and aliens, CBP has the authority to confirm the identity of all travelers and verify that they are the authorized bearers of their travel documents.
The primary benefit of a biometric entry-exit system is the enhanced security provided by having biometric confirmation of the identification of alien travelers entering and leaving the United States. CBP has a comprehensive automated biographic information-based system that vets and checks aliens entering and departing the United States. Although this information is extremely valuable to CBP in completing its mission, no biographic information-based system, by itself, can definitively verify the identity of persons presenting travel and identity documents. Modern e-passports can make passport fraud more difficult. However, the best tool to combat passport fraud is to utilize the digital photos contained in e-passports to biometrically verify that a person who presents a travel document is the true bearer of that document. CBP's biometric tests using facial comparison technology support this conclusion.
In addition to the benefits this technology can provide on entry, an integrated system, including biometric exit, is also essential for maintaining the integrity of the U.S. immigration system. Under current statutes and regulations, entering or staying in the United States without official permission from the U.S. government can cause a person to be legally barred from reentry to the United States for a number of years following that person's departure or
Finally, a comprehensive and integrated biometric entry-exit system serves as an important tool in the fight against global terrorism. Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States remains vulnerable to the threat of global terrorism. Recognizing terrorism as one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and the need to take immediate action to address the evolving threat environment, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on December 21, 2017, calling on member nations to increase aviation security and to develop and implement systems to collect biometric data to properly identify terrorists.
CBP has conducted extensive tests of the biometric comparison technology prior to implementation of this final rule. All of those tests support CBP's statements above regarding the efficacy of the congressionally mandated biometric entry-exit process.
In this final rule, DHS is amending the regulations to provide that all aliens may be required to be photographed upon entry and departure from the United States.
Facial comparison technology will provide DHS a successful foundation for a biometric exit solution, as well as an improved and more streamlined biometric entry process. The following sections discuss CBP's facial comparison-based entry-exit process pursuant to this final rule. This process has been implemented for entry and exit at commercial airports and for entry at sea ports and pedestrian land ports. In this final rule, CBP seeks comments on these newly implemented transportation modalities. CBP will proceed with full implementation of an entry-exit process at all land modalities and for private aircraft, as well as on exit at sea ports, after refining its biometric exit strategies in those environments. Additionally, when CBP moves forward with a large-scale implementation for entry-exit at land ports or for private aircraft or for exit at sea ports, CBP will publish a notice in the
Some of the facial comparison-based entry and exit processes described below may already be implemented in limited form at entry or under biometric exit pilot programs. For such existing processes, CBP adheres to all applicable laws and regulations that govern its collection of biometrics. Pursuant to this final rule, CBP may collect and compare facial images under the processes described here from all aliens arriving in and departing from the United States.
CBP has developed a model for implementing a biometric entry-exit solution using facial comparison technology, currently implemented at commercial air entry and exit, pedestrian entry, and sea entry. As fingerprint scans have proven to be an effective law enforcement tool, CBP will continue to capture fingerprints as one of the initial identification biometrics at entry to the United States.
The key benefit of using facial comparison for biometric identity verification (as opposed to fingerprints) is its efficiency. The facial comparison process leverages information that all travelers provide to the U.S. government as a condition for international travel. In general, photographs of travelers are readily available to DHS through sources such as previous encounter photos and visa databases, eliminating the need to collect new information and add another layer to the travel process. In addition, a system that matches a traveler's facial biometrics against a limited number of stored photographs, rather than an entire government database of photographs, significantly reduces the amount of time necessary to verify a traveler's identity. As a result,
Biometric verification using facial comparison is highly accurate. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Demographic Effects Report (NIST FRVT Demographic Effects Report) shows that facial comparison technology is able to match travelers at a rate of greater than 98 percent.
As an added benefit, a biometric entry-exit system based on facial comparison is relatively unobtrusive. It relies on current traveler behaviors and expectations; most travelers are familiar with cameras and do not need to learn how to have a photograph taken. Finally, the biometric capture device can be installed at an airline departure gate without any necessary changes to existing airport infrastructure.
By collecting photographs from all aliens departing the United States, DHS can more effectively verify their identity and confirm their departure. It also helps DHS identify known or suspected terrorists or criminals traveling using someone else's documents before they depart the country. This collection also helps identify visa overstays and aliens who are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, and prevent their illegal reentry into the United States, as well as prevent visa fraud and the use of fraudulent travel documents. After confirmation that the traveler is not the true bearer of a presented travel document, the traveler would then be subject to further inspection, first by the airline and also in some circumstances by CBP officers, which may include fingerprinting and/or an interview. Through this additional inspection, CBP will be better able to identify known criminals and other threats to border security.
The collection of photographs from all aliens avoids the need to have different processes at the point of departure for different alien travelers depending on whether they are exempt or not (such as the exemption based on age provided by the regulations prior to the effective date of this final rule). Collecting photographs from all alien travelers aligns with international passport standards, which require a photograph of the traveler on the document regardless of age or visa classification.
DHS has also determined that the collection of photographs from all aliens at entry is necessary, without regard to age, visa classification, or immigration status. Establishing a requirement that all aliens may be photographed without exemption enables DHS to biometrically verify the identity of all alien travelers traveling to and from the United States, thereby helping prevent visa fraud and the fraudulent use of legitimate travel documentation.
Collecting photographs from all aliens at entry also enables CBP to implement a streamlined entry process using facial comparison for all such aliens. For example, under the Simplified Arrival process, CBP primarily uses photographs rather than fingerprints to verify the traveler's identity and retrieve the traveler's biographic information for inspection.
Pursuant to this rule, DHS may collect photographs from all aliens seeking to enter or exit the United States regardless of their age for the purposes of identity verification. This enables DHS to associate the immigration records created for children to their adult records later, which will help combat the trafficking of children, and screen for criminal history or associations with terrorist or other organizations seeking to violate applicable law throughout a person's lifetime. The exemptions in the current regulations for biometric collection based on the age of the individual (
Certain privacy advocates have expressed concern over the accuracy of facial matching technology especially as it relates to demographics such as age, race and sex. CBP has conducted extensive testing of facial matching technology and CBP's internal analysis shows that facial comparison technology as used in international traveler screening operations is able to match travelers at a rate of greater than 98 percent. By expanding the scope of individuals subject to facial image collection, more travelers can be successfully matched. This will improve the experience for all segments of the population, including children and the
In this final rule, CBP has not analyzed the costs and benefits for implementing a facial comparison-based biometric entry-exit program for vehicles at land ports and private aircraft, or for exit at sea ports and pedestrians at land ports because CBP is still in the process of determining the best way to implement biometric entry-exit within each of these unique environments.
CBP has developed a matching service for all biometric entry and exit operations that use facial comparison, regardless of the method of entry or exit (
Due to the complexities in logistics and variety of air, land, and sea port designs across the entry and exit environments, CBP will collect photographs of the arriving or departing traveler via several different methods depending on the local port of entry and mode of travel. Generally, when travelers present themselves for entry or exit, they will encounter a camera connected to CBP's cloud-based TVS facial matching service via a secure, encrypted connection. This camera matches live images with existing photo templates from previously submitted passenger travel documents or other photos that CBP possesses (
Historically, prior to admission of a person to the United States, CBP used a manual process to inspect travel documents, such as passports or visas, to initiate system checks and verify a traveler's identity, travel history, and any law or border enforcement concerns that may require attention. The new primary entry solutions, including Simplified Arrival, FBD, Mobile Primary Face, and Pedestrian Entry, use biometrics to initiate the transaction and system checks, using facial comparison as the primary biometric verification modality. This shift from a biographic, document-based system to a biometric-initiated transaction requires travelers to provide facial photos for identity verification purposes. This enables CBP to more accurately verify identity and citizenship by matching the traveler's photograph with vetted and validated biographic information that is associated with a validated photo. Studies show that humans can benefit in face comparison tasks when assisted by a machine, and vice versa.
At entry, CBP uses CBP-owned cameras, CBP's primary arrival subsystem of TECS (not an acronym), and the TVS facial matching service to capture facial biometric data from travelers seeking to enter the United States. TVS automatically creates a template from the image and uses the template to query against a gallery of known identities, based on the manifests for entering flights and vessels that day. At this time, CBP is not actively using galleries of known travelers in the land vehicle environment. CBP uses gallery matching in some instances at land borders, such as bus manifest processing. The process works the same as in the air and sea environments, but APIS submission is currently voluntary for commercial bus and rail operators. CBP does not receive a manifest for pedestrians crossing the land border on foot or for persons traveling in private vehicles. CBP is conducting technical demonstrations to determine the feasibility of gallery matching in the personal vehicle environment at entry. CBP uses one-to-one matching in environments where no manifest exists, such as pedestrian entry. In those cases, CBP will use facial comparison technology to compare the live image captured at the time of application for entry with the traveler's travel document (
CBP is using biometric technologies in voluntary partnerships with other federal agencies and commercial stakeholders. These partnerships enable CBP to more effectively verify the identities of individuals entering and exiting the United States, identify aliens who are violating the terms of their admission, and expedite immediate action when such violations are identified. In some partnership
During the boarding process, CBP's facial comparison matching service allows CBP to biometrically verify the identity of travelers departing the United States with the assistance of airline or airport partnerships. Once the traveler's photo is captured via a camera at the departure gate, TVS generates a template from the departure photo and uses that template to search the gallery of historical photo templates in the cloud-based gallery. Some airlines now accept CBP's biometric identity verification in lieu of boarding passes as part of a new paperless, self-boarding process. Carriers, pursuant to the APIS regulations, are responsible for comparing the travel document to validate the information provided and ensure that the person presenting the document “is the person to whom the travel document was issued.” 19 CFR 122.49a, 122.49b, 122.75a, and 122.75b. The use of TVS provides a more efficient and accurate way to meet this requirement.
Typically, on air exit, CBP is not permanently stationed at the gate. Therefore, CBP currently relies on the review of biographic data (provided via APIS) to determine whether further inspection on departure is warranted and whether an outbound enforcement team should be sent to the gate. With the use of facial comparison technology, outbound enforcement teams are informed immediately when a no match occurs (via notification on a mobile device) and may, in some cases, determine that additional inspection is warranted. The carrier may also notify CBP if additional CBP inspection is needed.
Outbound processing for travelers on commercial sea vessels (
All U.S. citizens and nationals are subject to inspection upon arrival into and departure from the United States to confirm their identity and citizenship.
CBP strives to be transparent and provide notice to individuals regarding its collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of PII, as set forth in this rulemaking, the CBP biometrics website regarding CBP's Biometric Privacy Policy,
Upon request, CBP officers provide individuals with a handout (
CBP has designed the entry and exit inspection process such that, in the event of a mismatch, false match, or no match, CBP or the carrier may use alternative means to verify the traveler's identity and ensure that the traveler is not unduly delayed. If the system fails to match a traveler, then a manual review of the traveler's document should be performed. On entry, the CBP officer may continue to conduct additional screening or request fingerprints (if appropriate) to verify identity. Each inspection booth at entry is equipped with a fingerprint reader. At departure, after the manual review of the travel document (
Under the INA, a U.S. national is either a citizen of the United States, or a person who, though not a U.S. citizen, owes permanent allegiance to the United States.
For purposes of this rule, a U.S. national or dual national who presents as a citizen of another country will be processed as a foreign national and the individual's photo will be retained accordingly, unless the individual is able to present evidence of U.S. citizenship or nationality.
The business requirements implemented by CBP with its partners govern the retention and use of the facial images collected using CBP's facial comparison technology. The Business Requirements Documents are available on CBP's biometrics website at
To advance the legal framework for the full implementation of a biometric exit capability as described above, DHS is amending the regulations in parts 215 and 235 of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (8 CFR parts 215 and 235) that set forth the requirements for providing biometrics upon entry and departure as described below.
Prior to the effective date of this final rule, the regulations at 8 CFR 215.8(a)(1) authorize DHS to collect biometric exit information from certain aliens on departure from the United States pursuant to pilot programs at air, land, or sea ports of entry and places a limit of 15 air or sea ports of entry at which
To implement a biometric entry-exit system based on facial comparison, DHS is amending the regulations to provide that all aliens may be required to be photographed upon departure from the United States. Specifically, DHS is amending 8 CFR 215.8 to add a new paragraph (a)(1), which provides that an alien may be required to be photographed when departing the United States to determine identity or for other lawful purposes. The collection of photographs from an alien upon departure will assist DHS in determining the alien's identity and whether immigration status in the United States has been properly maintained. The exemptions of certain aliens from the collection of biometrics provided in 8 CFR 215.8(a)(1) and (2), redesignated as 8 CFR 215.8(a)(2) and (3) and revised by this final rule, will no longer pertain to the collection of photographs from aliens upon departure and will only apply to the collection of other biometrics.
In addition, DHS is amending 8 CFR 235.1(f) to add new paragraph (f)(1)(ii), which provides that an alien seeking admission may be required to be photographed to determine the alien's identity, admissibility, and whether immigration status in the United States has been properly maintained. Like the collection of photographs upon departure, the exemptions provided in 8 CFR 235.1(f)(1)(ii), redesignated as 8 CFR 235.1(f)(1)(iii) and revised by this final rule, will no longer pertain to the collection of photographs from aliens seeking admission and will only apply to the collection of other biometrics.
As noted above, DHS is retaining the exemptions in 8 CFR 215.8 and 235.1(f)
DHS is amending 8 CFR 215.8(a) to expand where the collection of biometrics may be required. Prior to the effective date of this final rule, 8 CFR 215.8(a)(1) provided that biometrics may be collected from aliens only when departing “the United States from a designated port of entry.” As described above, this final rule adds new paragraph 8 CFR 215.8(a)(1) and redesignates 8 CFR 215.8(a)(1) as 8 CFR 215.8(a)(2). Both new paragraph 8 CFR 215.8(a)(1) and redesignated paragraph 8 CFR 215.8(a)(2) now provide that biometrics may be collected from aliens “when departing the United States” from any location. This amendment is necessary to allow for the collection of biometrics from individuals upon departure at locations other than from a designated port of entry.
In addition, DHS is making certain minor conforming and editorial changes in 8 CFR 215.8 and 235.1(f). In 8 CFR 215.8, DHS is redesignating paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) as paragraphs (a)(2) and (3), and revising cross-references and adding paragraph headings as necessary. In § 235.1(f), DHS is redesignating paragraphs (f)(1)(ii), (iii), and (iv) as paragraphs (f)(1)(iii), (v), and (vi), respectively; adding new paragraphs (f)(1)(ii) and (iv); and revising cross-references and adding paragraph headings as necessary. In both §§ 215.8 and 235.1(f), DHS is removing the phrase “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security or his or her designee” and adding in its place “DHS”, and removing the phrase “biometric identifiers” and adding in its place “biometrics.”
Finally, DHS is amending 8 CFR 215.8(a) and 235.1(f) to remove the specific references to fingerprints and photographs. Prior to the effective date of this final rule, 8 CFR 215.8(a)(1) and 235.1(f)(1)(ii) provided that any alien may be required “to provide fingerprints, photograph(s) or other specified biometric identifiers” upon arrival into or departure from the United States. Because this final rule adds new paragraphs relating to the provision of photographs, the word “photograph(s)” in these provisions is no longer appropriate. Furthermore, to allow the flexibility for DHS to employ different methods of biometric collection in the future as biometric technology advances, DHS is amending 8 CFR 215.8(a) and 235.1(f) to provide instead that any alien, other than those exempt by regulation, may be required “to provide other biometrics” upon arrival into and departure from the United States.
In response to the NPRM, DHS received 320 comments during the two
Nevertheless, to carry out its responsibilities effectively under the INA, for both arrivals and departures from the United States, CBP must be able to determine conclusively whether a traveler is a U.S. citizen or national or an alien by verifying that the traveler is the true bearer of the presented travel documentation. CBP is authorized to take and consider evidence concerning the privilege of any person to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United States, or concerning any matter material or relevant to the enforcement or administration of the INA.
CBP also participates regularly in events sponsored by travel industry partners to provide updates which highlight the benefits of biometric facial comparison technology. Some of these partners have included but are not limited to the U.S. Travel Association (USTA), Global Business Travel Association (GBTA), Cruise Line Industry Association (CLIA), American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), and Airlines for America (A4A), to name just a few. Moreover, to maximize messaging efforts, CBP has often participated in these events in collaboration with its government partners, like TSA or the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) of DHS.
CBP concurred with the 2020 GAO audit recommendations and has addressed each recommendation, as indicated in the Recommendations for Executive Action Table on the applicable GAO website.
CBP may use mobile devices with the relevant CBP-built mobile applications to support its multilayered enforcement approach. These CBP applications include the Biometric Exit Mobile application. Additional information about the Biometric Exit Mobile application can be found in the Biometric Exit Mobile Program PIA.
CBP's biometric entry-exit program does not contradict existing accessibility regulations and processes. In many cases, biometric collection equipment accommodates disabilities; furthermore, it is CBP's policy to afford persons with disabilities an equal opportunity to participate in, or benefit from, CBP-conducted services, programs, and activities and to provide reasonable modifications to its services, programs, and activities to qualified individuals with a disability when necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.
Through this rulemaking, DHS is removing the age restrictions for photograph collection under 8 CFR 235.1 for aliens seeking admission to the United States, as well as under 8 CFR 215.8 for aliens departing the United States. See Section V.B.4.l,
This final rule improves DHS's ability to meaningfully implement a comprehensive biometric entry-exit system and make the process for verifying the identity of aliens more efficient, accurate, and secure by using facial comparison technology. Implementing an integrated biometric entry-exit system that verifies the identity of aliens at arrival and on exit and then uses that information to confirm that the alien has exited as required is essential for addressing the national security concerns arising from the threat of terrorism, combatting the fraudulent use of legitimate travel documentation, and identifying aliens who overstay their authorized period of admission or are present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. An integrated biometric entry-exit system can also fill the gaps left by incorrect or incomplete biographic data for travelers.
CBP has issued PIAs for many pilots that were testing/developing facial comparison technology. These PIAs include information about how the algorithms are tested to assure accuracy of the facial comparison technology.
For more information on how CBP ensures high accuracy rates across all demographics see Section V.B.4.k.,
When DHS personnel discover a suspected or confirmed privacy incident, there are a series of actions and activities that must occur to appropriately report, investigate, respond, and mitigate the privacy incident. DHS's policy for responding to privacy incidents is established in the DHS Privacy Office, DHS Instruction Guide 047-01-008, Privacy Incident Handling Guidance (2017).
For more information on how CBP safeguards sensitive information, see Section V.B.4.g.,
CBP's investment in technology is designed to empower officers to execute the agency's critical law enforcement mission and alleviate the administrative burden on officers so they are able to focus on enforcement. The use of facial comparison technology saves frontline officers' time in matching travelers to
The privacy compliance documentation process is an iterative process that not only provides transparency into the details of DHS activities, but also shapes those activities by identifying privacy risks as well as mitigations and privacy-enhancing solutions. Privacy is a DHS-wide responsibility, and the DHS Privacy Office works with DHS components, including CBP, to ensure privacy protections are incorporated in the entire lifecycle of DHS projects, programs, and activities. DHS is committed to the fair and equal treatment of all individuals in its screening and vetting activities, ensuring the rights of all people are protected, while taking lawful actions necessary to secure the homeland. In addition to adhering to all relevant statutory and regulatory privacy protections, DHS complies with existing DHS policies, which include the DHS Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPS)
DHS acknowledges that the Privacy Act requires that “each agency that maintains a system of records shall . . . collect information to the
Privacy information on the program such as SORNs and PIAs, including the TVS PIA and information on CBP's previous pilots during the development and testing of facial comparison technology, are published on the DHS Privacy website,
In response to the 2020 GAO audit recommendations,
Additionally, CBP has briefed the staff of the CBP Information Center to ensure the staff has the latest information to answer questions. CBP will continue to ensure that content is up to date on the CBP biometrics website, as required, and when substantive updates are made, CBP will provide new details to the CBP Information Center.
Furthermore, CBP regularly conducts periodic signage audits that include local CBP personnel to ensure signs are accurate and placed appropriately.
CBP agrees that it is important to advise the traveling public of appropriate redress mechanisms if a traveler believes that CBP actions are the result of the TVS maintaining incorrect or inaccurate information. Nevertheless, CBP must be mindful of the limited space on the sign itself. Current signage language directs travelers to the CBP biometrics website for more information. The CBP biometrics website includes several additional links to additional resources such as information on the FOIA, the CBP Information Center and a link to the DHS website,
CBP will continue to keep the public informed regarding the use of facial comparison technology as it expands to additional locations.
The alternative procedures implemented pursuant to this rule are intended to be similar to the existing process at entry today, in which a CBP officer physically examines the traveler's documentation to ensure the bearer is the true owner and scans the document to pull up the traveler's data for inspection. On exit, airline partners would then conduct manual identity verification using the travel document, as is done today with minimal impact to the boarding and exit process. If there is some question as to the authenticity of the passport or whether the person presenting the passport is the person to whom the passport was lawfully issued, the airline will contact CBP for additional inspection, and a CBP officer may perform a manual review of the passport. A CBP officer may ask the traveler questions to validate identity and citizenship. As mentioned above, every effort will be made to not delay or hinder travel; however, as the alternative procedures include a more manual process it may be slower than the automated process using facial comparison technology.
Prior to deploying facial comparison technology to ports of entry, CBP conducts extensive and ongoing officer training, including emphasis on U.S. citizens being able to request to opt-out of having their photo taken and instead proceed through the traditional inspection process consistent with existing requirements for entry into the United States. Additionally, CBP sends reminder memos to the field offices to ensure compliance.
CBP requires the full face to be viewable. As such, CBP may request that the individual adjust or remove religious headwear to the degree necessary for identification verification. Should religious headwear need to be removed, CBP endeavors to provide as much privacy as possible. During processing, if a traveler requires special consideration due to religion, cultural, or privacy concerns, CBP officers and managers should endeavor to reasonably accommodate the traveler's request.
CBP has long recognized the importance of effective and accurate communication between CBP personnel and the public they serve. Language and communication barriers can negatively affect interactions with the public, provision of services, and law enforcement activities. Ensuring effective communication with all persons facilitates the CBP mission. CBP has a protocol for the use of interpreters and translation services, which is triggered by a request for interpreters or language services.
As such, once at the primary inspection booth, CBP requires that all travelers momentarily lower their masks either to conduct the facial comparison match or to visually confirm that the traveler is the true bearer of the travel document. Requiring travelers to briefly remove their masks does not violate any laws. Upon departure, CBP defers to stakeholders, but does request that travelers pull their masks down as much as possible and ensure that no other facial obstructions (
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CBP experienced a cybersecurity incident during a biometric pilot in 2019.
In addition to the assessment of biometric exit stakeholders, discussed in more detail below, CBP is working with DHS S&T, Office of Test and Evaluation, to develop and execute a cybersecurity test plan that will ensure all required security controls are in place on existing hardware and software. Additionally, CBP has contracted with a third-party vendor to perform an adversarial assessment to identify and mitigate any cyber vulnerabilities.
These business requirements implemented by CBP with its partners govern the retention and use of the facial images collected using CBP's facial comparison technology. CBP prohibits all approved partners such as airlines, airport authorities, or cruise lines and participating organizations (
CBP comprehensively assesses compliance with DHS's security and privacy requirements on the part of CBP and CBP's partners. This includes security interviews with partner IT departments, security scans of biometric processing systems, and penetration tests of those systems. CBP has conducted 14 assessments thus far.
CBP's cybersecurity resilience efforts, including the assessment of biometric exit stakeholders and adversarial assessment, align with Executive Order 14028, “Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity,” 86 FR 26633 (May 17, 2021), which highlights the need to strengthen collaboration between the private sector and the Federal Government.
Furthermore, CBP is taking steps to promote data minimization and privacy protections by using an airline-generated alphanumeric unique ID (UID) to disassociate the biographic information associated with the new facial images. As CBP verifies the identity of the traveler, either through the automated TVS facial comparison process or manual officer processing, the backend matching service returns the “match” or “no-match” result, along with the associated unique identifier. There is no additional PII shared with industry partners, which minimizes harm to individuals should cybersecurity incidents occur. A UID is generated by either the travel agent, travel website hosting service, or the airline at the time of the reservation. The UID is comprised of a sequential number (which is only valid for the particular airline and the specific flight), plus the Record Locator, a six-digit code used to access additional information about the traveler.
Additionally, in accordance with DHS policy, CBP uses the DHS FIPPs
DHS prioritizes data protection and security as part of its mission to protect the homeland and is cognizant of the serious impact that unauthorized disclosure of information could create for vulnerable populations. DHS acknowledges that the risk of a data breach is always technically possible, but DHS works tirelessly to minimize those risks and continues to safeguard its information from any unauthorized use. DHS's IDENT already contains controls so that only those individuals whose jobs require knowledge of information retained in IDENT (including facial images as discussed in the response in this section above at the bullet on
Further, external connections must be documented and approved with both parties' signatures in an Interconnection Security Agreement (ISA), which outlines controls in place to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being shared or processed. DHS OBIM is responsible for all PII associated with IDENT, and the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology System (HART), the successor system to IDENT currently in development, whether the data is held in data centers or in a cloud infrastructure, and therefore imposes strict requirements for safeguarding PII.
Additionally, DHS OBIM requires contracted cloud service providers to segregate IDENT and HART data from all other third-party data.
CBP participated in two congressional hearings, one in 2019
Additionally, CBP has published several reports that provide the public with information on how CBP is implementing the Biometrics Entry-Exit Program. For example, in August 2019, DHS provided the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security a comprehensive report on the program that included material on the operational and security benefits of the biometric entry-exit system. CBP and TSA's efforts to address privacy concerns and potential performance differential errors, and a comprehensive description of audits performed.
CBP has addressed the recommendations from two audits, both in 2020, one by GAO and one by DHS OIG. See Sections V.B.2.c and V.B.4.b and d, above. CBP is aware of the DHS OIG report on its September 2023 audit, entitled “DHS Needs to Update Its Strategy to Better Manage Its Biometric Capability Needs.”
Furthermore, CBP complies with the requirements of the Privacy Act, as well as all DHS and Government-wide policies. In accordance with DHS policy, CBP uses the FIPPs to assess the privacy risks and ensure appropriate measures are taken to mitigate risks from data collection through the use of biometrics. CBP's partnering stakeholders are also held to the same standards. For additional information on how CBP complies with the FIPPS, please see page 15 of the CPE TVS Report.
Also, the business requirements implemented by CBP with its partners govern the retention and use of the facial images collected using CBP's facial comparison technology. The Business Requirements Documents are available on CBP's biometrics website at
Several DHS Offices and Programs also have oversight of CBP activities. For example, CBP collaborates regularly with the DHS Privacy Office to ensure
Additionally, in June 2019, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) started an ongoing oversight project to review the use of facial comparison technology in aviation security, with the goal of informing policymakers and the public about these technologies, their uses, and their implications for security, privacy, and civil liberties.
Furthermore, CBP works closely with DHS S&T, OBIM and NIST on technical standards and system performance. Additionally, CBP is a member of the DHS Biometric Capabilities Executive Steering Committee (BC-ESC), which continues to meet quarterly.
Although CBP's Biometric Entry-Exit Program does have sufficient oversight and accountability mechanisms, CBP is committed to transparency in its use of facial comparison technology and welcomes the opportunity to engage with Congress on legislative enhancements and to provide technical assistance, as necessary. CBP will ensure compliance with any new applicable legislation or regulations passed.
Alleged violations by CBP or ICE officers or agents are outside the scope of this rulemaking.
To ensure higher accuracy rates, as well as efficient traveler processing, CBP uses high performing cameras, proper lighting, and image quality controls. CBP then compares traveler photos to a very small gallery of high-quality images that those travelers already provided to the U.S. Government to obtain a passport or visa using a high-quality facial comparison algorithm. CBP builds the galleries of photographs based on where and when a traveler will enter or exit. If CBP has access to advance information, CBP will build galleries of photographs based on upcoming flight or vessel arrivals or departures. CBP uses a commercial face comparison algorithm from a developer that participates in the NIST Face Recognition Technology Evaluation (FRTE) 1:N.
The NIST performance metrics described in the NIST FRVT Demographic Effects Report are consistent with CBP operational performance metrics for entry-exit. CBP's operational data continues to show there is no measurable differential performance in matching based on demographic factors. As mentioned in the CBP: Evaluating Possible Bias document included in the docket for this rulemaking, docket number [USCBP-2020-0062], CBP has conducted extensive statistical analysis (chi squared independence tests) to determine whether traveler demographics (age, sex, and nationality) affect facial comparison match rates.
Additionally, CBP continually monitors algorithm performance and technology enhancements. As mentioned in CBP: Evaluating Possible Bias, the performance of CBP's TVS continues to improve over time due to technical, operational, and procedural advancements including threshold adjustments and testing multiple vendors.
CBP is also aware of several other tests, studies, and articles on the use of facial comparison technology. While informative, these studies do not evaluate the specific algorithm that CBP is using and as such cannot be used to draw conclusions about CBP's biometric entry-exit program.
Additionally, biographic systems are not 100% accurate either. As mentioned in the preamble, often there are errors or incomplete data. For example, the U.S. government may have the name and date of birth but not the passport number. The use of biographic data alone leads to a very high rate of mismatches, as dozens of people often have the exact same name and date of birth. The use of biometrics solves this problem by effectively and efficiently confirming a traveler's identity. Nevertheless, biometric algorithms
Additionally, CBP mitigates spoof and imposter risk by ensuring that those utilizing the technology are appropriately trained to detect these attacks. CBP officers using the technology upon entry have several tools at their disposal, to include facial comparison technology, to identify imposters. Additionally, CBP officers undergo extensive training prior to starting the job, including specific tactics, techniques, and procedures for identifying imposters. For example, CBP has used Eye-dentify, which is an imposter detection training technology.
Additionally, while one commenter calculated the false non-match or false negative rate “by subtracting the true acceptance rate from 1,” NIST's report indicates that “that definition is naïve in that it assumes every traveler was photographed. It ignores instances of failure-to-capture, and also cases where travelers are photographed, not matched, and then make further attempts.” NIST, NISTIR 8381, FRVT Part 7: Identification for Paperless Travel and Immigration 8 (2021) (NIST 2021 FRVT Report), available at
There are several factors that could contribute to travelers not matching to the gallery. For example, whether a traveler has a photo in the gallery and how many photos of the traveler are in the gallery are two main factors. Some of the reasons why a traveler may not have a photo staged in the gallery include: first-time travelers to the United States entering the country under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), travelers on military orders, and travelers whose flight manifest data was incorrect. As noted in the NIST 2021 FRVT Report press release, “performance improves dramatically if the database contains multiple images of a passenger. The database gallery can contain more than one image of a single passenger. When an average of six prior images of a passenger are in the gallery, then all algorithms realize large gains.”
Prior to deploying facial comparison technology to ports of entry, CBP conducts extensive officer training, including mismatch, false match, or no match procedures. As discussed in the rule, in the event of a mismatch, false match, or no match CBP may use alternative means to verify the traveler's identity and ensure that the traveler is not unduly delayed. If the system fails to match a traveler, then a manual review of the traveler's document is performed. On entry, the CBP officer may continue to conduct additional screening or request fingerprints (if appropriate) to verify identity. Each inspection booth at entry is equipped with a fingerprint reader. At departure, the airline partner may conduct a manual review of the travel document (
In accordance with its statutory authority, CBP uses the totality of information available, to include the results of a facial comparison match, to make admissibility decisions and take any law enforcement actions. Facial comparison alone does not determine admissibility. Nevertheless, if a traveler believes that CBP actions are the result of the TVS maintaining incorrect or inaccurate information, (
Individuals seeking notification of and access to biometric information contained in the TVS, or seeking to contest the results of the biometric matching process may gain access to certain information in the TVS by filing a Privacy Act access request by emailing
DHS disagrees with commenters that removing age restrictions violates the INA. DHS interprets section 287(f)(1) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1357(f)(1)) to require photographs and fingerprints from aliens 14-years or older in removal proceedings, but that authority does not prohibit the collection from those younger than 14 as authorized by other laws. The language of the statute is silent regarding collecting biometrics from those under the age of 14 outside of enforcement proceedings, as it explicitly states, “the Commissioner shall provide for the fingerprinting and photographing of each alien 14 years of age or older against whom a proceeding is commenced” under section 240 of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1229a). INA 287(f)(1) (8 U.S.C. 1357(f)(1)). In addition, DHS is authorized to take and consider evidence (including biometrics) concerning the privilege of any person to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United States, or concerning any matter which is material or relevant to the enforcement of the INA and the administration of DHS.
DHS abides by all relevant privacy laws, regulations, and policies in collection of biometric information for individuals, including children. DHS disagrees that adding a biometrics requirement constitutes subjecting children to additional scrutiny or is inappropriate due to their inability to consent. CBP's responsibilities, regardless of age, gender, race and nationality, include ensuring the interdiction of persons illegally entering or exiting the United States, facilitating, and expediting the flow of legitimate travelers, and detecting, responding to, and interdicting terrorists, drug smugglers and traffickers, human smugglers and traffickers, and other persons who may undermine the security of the United States.
Not only will the facial comparison technology be used to determine and verify identity, but it will also support CBP efforts to ensure the safety of everyone crossing the border, including children. Typically, fraud schemes that DHS encounters involve adults and unrelated children posing as family units to DHS authorities.
To take the photos of travelers, including children, CBP will not physically touch them. CBP may provide verbal instructions to the travelers to stand at a certain distance from the camera. Additionally, many cameras at CBP's primary inspection booths can be adjusted by the CBP officer to allow the CBP officer to place the camera in the optimal position to capture a high-quality image without touching the traveler. If CBP is unable to position the traveler to take a photo or in the event of a mismatch, false match, or no match, CBP may use alternative means to verify the traveler's identity and ensure that the traveler is not unduly delayed. If the system fails to match a traveler, then a manual review of the traveler's document is performed. This rule does not authorize the collection of other biometrics such as fingerprints on individuals younger than 14.
Consistent with regulatory requirements, photos of aliens who are required to provide a biometric are securely transferred to DHS's IDENT.
DHS OBIM is the lead designated provider of biometric identity services for DHS and manages IDENT.
Misuse of the data in IDENT is mitigated by requiring that IDENT users conform to appropriate security and privacy policies, follow established rules of behavior, and be adequately trained regarding the security of their systems.
DHS has policies in place to prevent improper sharing or unauthorized use of any data and nothing in this rule changes those policies.
DHS laid out both the general and specific statutory authority for biometric collection, including photographs, in the NPRM, and restates much of that explanation of authority in this final rule, and disagrees with commenters that it does not have authority to promulgate this rulemaking.
Although CBP does use 1:1 verification, using strictly 1:1 verification would add a substantial amount of processing time to each inspection, which would negatively affect CBP's mission of facilitating travel. On entry, CBP utilizes 1:1 comparison in the pedestrian environment for travelers that possess an e-chip photo consistent with Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) requirements. For other travelers, CBP is able to create galleries based on the manifest information received from carriers for air, sea, and bus travelers. The galleries allow for a 1:n comparison, which is faster and less intrusive to the travelers.
On exit, a 1:1 verification would require private sector partners to procure additional equipment that can open and read e-chips, when available, and collect and submit more information to CBP. This is both costly and time-consuming as well as an increase in the privacy implications on the public. As with entry, CBP is able to create galleries based on manifest information received from carriers for air, sea, and bus travelers. The galleries allow for 1:n comparison which is faster and less intrusive to the travelers.
Additionally, as part of the inspection process, DHS is authorized to take and consider evidence (including biometrics) concerning the privilege of any person to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United States, or concerning any matter which is material or relevant to the enforcement of the INA and the administration of DHS.
This rule improves DHS's ability to meaningfully implement a comprehensive biometric entry-exit system and make the process for verifying the identity of aliens more efficient, accurate, and secure by using facial comparison technology. Implementing an integrated biometric entry-exit system that compares biometric data of aliens collected upon arrival with biometric data collected upon departure is essential for addressing the national security concerns arising from the threat of terrorism, the fraudulent use of legitimate travel documentation, aliens who overstay their authorized period of admission (overstays) or are present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, and incorrect or incomplete biographic data for travelers.
In this final rule, DHS thoroughly discusses how facial comparison mitigates the above-mentioned national security concerns. Nevertheless, the
CBP's responsibilities, regardless of age, gender, race and nationality, include ensuring the interdiction of persons illegally entering or exiting the United States, facilitating and expediting the flow of legitimate travelers, and detecting, responding to, and interdicting terrorists, drug smugglers and traffickers, human smugglers and traffickers, and other persons who may undermine the security of the United States.
Biometric entry-exit is an identity verification tool. As previously explained, the biometric entry-exit program uses facial comparison technology to ensure a person is whom the person says the person is—the bearer of the passport the person presents. Biometric entry-exit is complementary to CBP's multilayered enforcement approach and border security mission.
DHS has no data or evidence, and the commenters provide only assertions and not any empirical evidence, studies, or reports, to support the statement that photograph submission reduces circular migration, deters vulnerable populations from fleeing persecution or causes a decline in U.S. tourism or the U.S. economy. DHS's intent for this rule is explained in detail herein.
Nothing in this rule prevents refugees from receiving protections since, other than requiring biometrics for certain new populations, this rulemaking does not change eligibility requirements for asylum seekers or refugees and does not alter existing regulations at 8 CFR 208.6 protecting the confidentiality of information contained in or pertaining to asylum applications and certain other records, and which are also applied to information contained in refugee applications as a matter of departmental policy.
Furthermore, each CBP employee has a responsibility to the United States Government and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws, and ethical principles above private gain. To ensure that every citizen can have complete confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, each employee shall respect and adhere to the principles of ethical conduct set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 5 CFR part 2635. Additionally, Section 7.11.2 of the CBP Standards of Conduct specifically states, “Employees will not make abusive, derisive, profane, or harassing statements or gestures, or engage in any other conduct evidencing hatred or invidious prejudice to or about another person or group on account of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability.” CBP Directive 51735-013B, Standards of Conduct at 11 (2020), available at
As stated in 8 CFR 215.8(b) prior to the effective date of this final rule, “an alien who is required to provide biometric identifiers at departure . . . who fails to comply with the departure requirements may be found in violation of the terms of his or her admission, parole or admission status.” DHS is simply expanding the scope of aliens that are subject to that requirement.
Further, DHS is statutorily mandated to develop and implement an integrated, automated entry and exit data system to match records, including biographic data and biometrics, of aliens entering and departing the United States. Additionally, DHS believes that the purposes of this rule, namely to deploy a comprehensive biometric entry-exit system and enable CBP to make the process for verifying the identity of aliens more efficient, accurate, and secure by using facial comparison technology, as well as the national security and immigration benefits—such as helping detect and deter visa overstays and visa fraud; helping identify persons attempting to fraudulently use travel documents; and alerting authorities to criminals or known or suspected terrorists prior to boarding—are all appropriate uses of DHS and the administration's time and resources. DHS disagrees strongly that this rule is a waste of taxpayer funds.
The analysis for the NPRM was done using the standards required under Executive Order 12866 and 13563 and is in compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Specific guidance on how agencies should conduct cost benefit analyses for regulations can be found in OMB Circular A-4. Regulatory analysis should monetize any effects that can be monetized. Those that cannot be monetized should be analyzed quantitatively, if possible. Those that cannot be monetized or quantified should be analyzed qualitatively. The analysis for the NPRM was done based on the best information available at the time. When the NPRM had been written, biometrics had not yet been deployed in all environments, so it was impossible to conduct a quantitative analysis for those environments. For this final rule, CBP has updated the estimates in the NPRM and has expanded it to include several new use-cases. There are still environments where CBP has not implemented a biometric process. For these environments lack of information and details make it impossible to monetize or quantify the effects, so CBP provides qualitative discussion based on limited details that were available at the time of the final rule on future biometric process implementation provides qualitative so we analyze them qualitatively.
DHS acknowledges that there will be costs associated with this final rule. DHS has updated the regulatory impact analysis for this final rule to reflect more recent data and information to improve DHS's best estimate of this rule's costs and benefits, including the expansion of facial comparison biometric collection to additional environments beyond the air environment. According to the regulatory impact analysis for this rule, DHS determined a net cost of $572 million (in undiscounted 2024 U.S. dollars) during the pilot period (2017-2024) and estimates a net cost of $287 million (in undiscounted 2024 U.S. dollars) in the 5-year regulatory period 2025-2029.
Because CBP has not determined the best approach to implement biometric collection at entry-exit for private aircraft, at exit at land ports, at entry for travelers in vehicles or for exit at sea ports, CBP is unable to provide any estimates for these costs to implement a biometric entry-exit system nationwide to these environments. This rule provides CBP authority to establish biometric entry-exit on a nationwide basis but CBP acknowledges that due to lack of information at this time, when CBP moves forward with a large-scale implementation for entry-exit biometric collection for private aircraft, at exit at land ports, at entry at land ports for travelers in vehicles or for exit at sea ports, CBP will publish a notice in the
To determine the opt-out rate for U.S. citizens during facial comparison at Simplified Arrival for biometric collection at entry, CBP used data from internal databases to calculate the actual number of opt-outs compared to the total number of U.S. citizen inbound air travelers processed through Simplified Arrival. CBP calculated the opt-out rate for U.S. citizens at entry during biometric collection through Simplified Arrival was approximately 0.13%. CBP used this estimate to calculate the number of U.S. citizens who will opt-out of facial comparison at entry during Simplified Arrival during the regulatory period of the regulatory impact analysis for the final rule. CBP also used this opt-out rate of approximately 0.13% to estimate the number of U.S. citizens who will elect to opt out of facial comparison biometric collection during entry processing at Simplified Arrival in the sea environment and at Mobile Face Primary in the sea environment.
To account for U.S. citizens opting out of facial comparison biometric collection at entry in the sea environment during Facial Biometric Debarkation, CBP used the same opt-out rate that was determined from the CBP Time and Motion Study for travel industry-led facial comparison biometric collection in the air environment of approximately 0.28% discussed above. Additionally for pedestrians entering the United States in the land environment and who are processed through Pedestrian Entry, CBP used internal data to determine that approximately 0.21% of U.S. citizens elected to opt out of facial comparison biometric collection. CBP used this rate to estimate the number of U.S. citizen pedestrians that would elect to opt out of facial comparison biometric collection when processed through Pedestrian Entry, in the regulatory impact analysis for this final rule.
As discussed above, DHS is issuing a final rule to finalize the changes proposed in the NPRM. However, DHS is requesting comments regarding the specific method of collection for newly implemented transportation modalities as well as costs and benefits for the newly implemented transportation modalities, namely, the Simplified Arrival process at air entry, the sea entry processes, and the process for entry for pedestrians at land ports. Comments submitted regarding any other topic on these newly implemented transportation modalities are out of scope for this final rule and will not be considered DHS will also provide notice and seek comments for future implementations of facial biometric collection in line with the authorities discussed in this rule.
Executive Orders 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review) direct agencies to assess the costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits. Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility. Executive Order 14192 (Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation) directs agencies to significantly reduce the private expenditures required to comply with Federal regulations and provides that “any new incremental costs associated
This rule has been designated a “significant regulatory action” that is economically significant, under section 3(f)(1) of Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, the rule has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget.
Pursuant to section 5(a) of Executive Order 14192, the requirements of that Executive Order do not apply to regulations issued with respect to a national security or homeland security function. As discussed in this preamble, the primary, direct benefit of this rule is improvement in national and homeland security. Accordingly, this rule is exempt from the requirements of Executive Order 14192.
In summary, during the period of analysis, FY 2017-2029, CBP expects there to be costs, and benefits from this final rule, resulting in annualized net costs ranging from $67.9 million in 2024 U.S. dollars (using a three percent discount rate) to $70.3 million in 2024 U.S. dollars (using a seven percent discount rate) to the Federal Government, the air travel industry, the sea travel industry and alien and U.S citizen air travelers, sea travelers and land pedestrian travelers. The final rule will result in the non-monetized benefit of improving national security by validating the identity of individuals entering and exiting the United States. CBP expects this final rule will improve CBP's ability to detect and deter visa overstays and visa fraud, identify persons using fraudulent travel documents and the detection of criminals or known or suspected terrorists at entry or exit. The following is an abbreviated analysis of the costs, cost savings and benefits of this final rule. The full regulatory impact analysis of this final rule is in a separate document included in the docket for this rulemaking, docket number [USCBP-2020-0062].
DHS is statutorily mandated to develop and implement an integrated, automated entry and exit data system to match records, including biographic data and biometrics, of aliens entering and departing the United States. Since 2004, DHS, through CBP, has been collecting biometric data from aliens arriving in the United States, but currently there is no comprehensive biometric system in place to track when the aliens depart the country. Since taking over management of biometric entry and exit operations in 2013, CBP has been testing various options to collect biometrics at arrival and departure. The results of these tests and the recent advancement of facial comparison technology have provided CBP with a model for moving forward with implementing a comprehensive biometric exit solution in the air environment as well as improving the collection of biometrics at entry in the air, sea, and land environments.
CBP has developed a process for using facial comparison technology to collect biometrics in the commercial air environment, at entry in the sea environment and at entry for pedestrians in the land environment; however, CBP is still determining the best approach to expand the collection of biometrics using facial comparison technology for processing travelers in vehicles entering the United States in the land environment or a comprehensive solution for travelers at exit in the sea and land environments. CBP continues its work to determine the best option for biometric collection in these environments. At this time CBP has implemented comprehensive facial comparison biometrics at entry in the air, sea, and land (pedestrians only) environments and at exit only in the air environment.
During the initial stage of implementation for biometric collection at exit in the commercial air environment, starting in 2016, CBP introduced facial comparison technology to a limited number of airports in a voluntary pilot program. These deployments allowed CBP to fine-tune the process of using facial comparison technology for biometric collection at exit, while also partnering with airline carriers and airports (the air travel industry) toward a nationwide implementation. CBP's biometric exit program in the air environment was initially limited to 15 locations during the pilot period. CBP has since partnered with air travel industry members voluntarily expanding the program to additional locations. CBP has been able to find willing partners from the air travel industry as the industry has recognized the benefits of streamlining the boarding process and creating a seamless touchless experience for air travelers using facial comparison technology throughout the entire airport, from verifying identity, to obtaining boarding passes, checking bags, passing security and boarding. Additionally, the touchless passage through an airport may mitigate the risk of pathogen transmission.
The facial comparison system engineered and developed for biometric exit in the air environment, known as the Traveler Verification Service (TVS) has also been implemented in other environments. CBP used the TVS when developing a program to use facial comparison technology to collect biometrics at entry in the commercial air environment, known as the Simplified Arrival process (Simplified Arrival), expediting the entry process for inbound air travelers, and improving security measures. Prior to Simplified Arrival, most inbound alien air travelers were already photographed during the entry process into the United States. Simplified Arrival compares the photographs collected at arrival to the passport, which expedites the arrival process. Because the infrastructure was already in place to take photographs of aliens, CBP was able to complete the entire nationwide deployment of Simplified Arrival in the air environment by the end of 2022. The entry processes in the air and sea environments are similar and in certain locations CBP was able to introduce Simplified Arrival in the sea environment starting in 2021 to use facial comparison technology for biometric collection of some inbound sea travelers.
Where the entry process differs between the air and sea environments and Simplified Arrival was not a viable option, TVS allowed CBP to implement additional processes for biometric collection using facial comparison technology at entry. Starting in 2018, CBP began working with the sea travel industry to introduce facial comparison biometric collection at entry in the sea environment for certain sea travelers. Sea travel industry members voluntarily participated in conducting FBD, which uses facial comparison technology hardware procured by the sea travel industry in coordination with CBP's TVS to confirm passenger identity at entry.
CBP was also able to use TVS and the Simplified Arrival process to develop a biometric collection process using facial comparison technology during the entry process for pedestrians in the land environment, known as Pedestrian Entry. The entry process for pedestrians in the land environment is similar to other environments such that travelers go through a CBP inspection where they provide their travel documents (
This final rule will allow for the collection of facial biometrics of all aliens at entry and exit. Prior to the effective date of this final rule, most aliens were already subject to photograph at entry; however, some aliens, such as aliens who are under the age of 14 or over the age of 79, were exempt and not required to be photographed at entry or exit. This final rule provides that all aliens, including those previously exempt, may be photographed at entry and exit. U.S. citizens may be photographed at entry and exit under this final rule if they voluntarily participate in biometric collection but retain their ability to opt out of being photographed for the purpose of identity verification using biometric facial comparison. Removing the exemptions for aliens for photographs at entry and exit will allow CBP to further expand the facial comparison technology used for the collection of biometrics and provide for a more complete evaluation as CBP moves toward nationwide expansion. Additionally, this final rule will remove the reference in regulations to pilot programs, eliminate the 15-location pilot program air and sea port limit for conducting biometric collection at exit in the air and sea environments, and include authority for CBP to continue the expansion of biometric collection at exit in the sea and land environments and at entry in the land environment.
Because CBP is still determining the best option for implementing biometric collection at exit in the sea, land, and private aircraft environments or at entry in the land environment for travelers entering in vehicles or private aircraft, the analysis for this final rule will only discuss the costs and benefits of biometric programs that have been established in the air, sea, and land environments. Capturing images using facial comparison technology during biometric collection at entry and exit as a result of this final rule will affect CBP, air travelers, sea travelers, pedestrian land travelers, the air travel industry, and the sea travel industry. The implementation of the facial comparison technology will also improve CBP's security efforts; provide CBP with greater accuracy in determining whether aliens are departing the country when they are required to depart; reduce visa or travel document fraud; and improve CBP's ability to identify criminals and known or suspected terrorists before they enter or depart the United States.
In the analysis for the final rule, CBP considers the effects from the implementation of facial comparison technology used for biometric collection at exit and entry in the commercial air environment and at entry in the sea environment and at entry for pedestrians in the land environment during the 8-year pilot period spanning fiscal years 2017-2024 and the 5-year regulatory period spanning fiscal years 2025-2029. In addition, CBP provides the total costs, cost savings and net costs during both the pilot and regulatory periods to reflect the total cost of these biometric programs as a whole from 2017-2029. CBP has revised the cost and benefit estimates provided in the analysis for the NPRM in response to public comments to include recently available information and data, including costs and benefits attributable to the implementation of Simplified Arrival, FBD, Mobile Primary Face, Pedestrian Entry, and to include the results from the CBP Biometric Air Exit Time and Motion Study (CBP Time and Motion Study).
In this analysis, CBP analyzes the effect of the biometrics program over two time periods: the pilot period and the regulatory period. In the analysis of the pilot period for the NPRM, CBP only identified costs to CBP and outbound air travelers. CBP had expected that during the pilot period, CBP would be solely responsible for the implementation of biometric exit pilot programs, bearing the costs for installing hardware, and staffing biometric exit collection operations. However, the pilot period has lasted long enough that the air travel industry has voluntarily installed facial comparison technology hardware for biometric collection at exit sooner than CBP had anticipated, allowing CBP to provide estimated costs to the air travel industry during the pilot period in the analysis for the final rule. CBP has also added an analysis of the estimated costs and benefits from implementing facial comparison technology in Simplified Arrival in both the air and sea environments, FBD and Mobile Primary Face at entry in the sea environment, and Pedestrian Entry in the land environment during the pilot period in the analysis for the final rule.
CBP, air travelers, pedestrian land travelers, the air travel industry, and the sea travel industry all experienced costs during the pilot period. Costs during the pilot period to CBP included costs to engineer and develop TVS, procure hardware, provide management, operation, support, training, and staffing for the implementation of facial comparison technology at entry and exit in the air environment and at entry in
Cost savings from the implementation of facial comparison technology for biometric collection during the pilot period were experienced by CBP, inbound air travelers processed through Simplified Arrival, inbound sea travelers when processed through Simplified Arrival, FBD or Mobile Primary Face, and sea travel industry members from a swifter debarkation process during FBD. CBP estimates that the cost savings to CBP, inbound air travelers, sea travelers, and the sea travel industry were due to reduced time burdens per traveler as a result of shorter processing times from the use of facial comparison technology at entry. CBP also estimates that the sea travel industry experienced time savings of approximately 1.25 hours per vessel arrival that conducts FBD operations. CBP does not have information available to monetize these time savings but expects the value of these time savings to be significant to sea travel industry members that operate in a very time sensitive business, specifically, when a cruise vessel arrives at a sea port and has to debark passengers, and quickly clean and prepare the vessel for new onboarding passengers and a swift departure. CBP estimated that the total cost savings during the pilot period were approximately $260 million in undiscounted 2024 U.S. dollars, or on average around $15.5 million annually. As shown in Table 2, total net costs from this final rule during the pilot period are estimated to be approximately $572 million in undiscounted 2024 U.S. dollars, or on average $83.8 million annually.
CBP also estimated the effects of implementing facial comparison technology for biometric collection at exit and entry in the commercial air environment and at entry in the sea and land (pedestrians only) environments during the regulatory period. CBP's analysis for the NPRM did not include costs and benefits from the implementation of the Simplified Arrival process, FBD, Mobile Primary Face, or Pedestrian Entry due to lack of data and information available. In this analysis for the final rule, CBP was able to include these costs and benefits from implementing these biometric collection operations using facial comparison technology and the availability of additional data led CBP to revise its estimated costs and benefits for this final rule during the regulatory period.
CBP, outbound air travelers, inbound pedestrians, the air travel industry, and the sea travel industry will experience costs due to this final rule during the regulatory period. During the regulatory period, CBP expects additional costs to CBP will largely consist of the ongoing maintenance and support activities associated with operating TVS. CBP also anticipates that outbound air travelers will incur a minor time burden per traveler when boarding flights conducting facial comparison for biometric collection at exit.
During the regulatory period CBP expects that CBP, inbound air travelers, and sea travelers will experience cost savings during the entry process from the use of facial comparison technology at Simplified Arrival, FBD, Mobile Primary Face, and Pedestrian Entry. CBP estimates that cost savings to CBP, inbound air, and sea travelers will be approximately $505 million in undiscounted 2024 U.S. dollars or on average $101 million annually during the regulatory period. CBP also anticipates that the sea travel industry will experience time savings during the debarkation process when conducting FBD operations resulting in around 1.25 hours of time savings per vessel arrival. CBP presents net costs for each year of the regulatory period in Table 3, and CBP estimates that total net costs during the regulatory period will be approximately $287 million in undiscounted 2024 U.S. dollars, or on average $57 million annually.
The primary benefit of this final rule is the enhanced security from having biometric confirmation using facial comparison technology of the identification of alien travelers entering and leaving the country to prevent imposters attempting to fraudulently enter the United States, identifying individuals who have overstayed their visas, and individuals who have entered the United States without inspection at entry. CBP is unable to monetize these security benefits in the analysis for the final rule. Comparing biometrics at entry and departure enables CBP to know with greater certainty the identity of those entering and leaving the United States, which will help detect and deter visa overstays and visa fraud; helps identify persons attempting to fraudulently use travel documents; and alerts authorities to criminals or known or suspected terrorists prior to entry or exit. For FY 2023, DHS estimates that about 565,155 aliens who entered by air or sea and were expected to depart that year overstayed their lawful period of admission, or 1.45 percent of aliens arriving by air and sea.
Table 4 presents monetized present value and annualized net costs for the final rule during the regulatory period.
CBP also displays the total effect of this final rule as a whole from 2017-2029. Table 5 below shows the total costs, cost savings, and net costs from the biometric collection programs using facial comparison technology, from 2017-2029 in undiscounted 2024 U.S. dollars. In total CBP estimates that this final rule will result in total costs of around $1,625 million during the entire period of analysis (2017-2029). Average annual costs are estimated to be around $125 million. Total cost savings from this final rule are expected to be around $765 million or on average $59 million annually. CBP anticipates that the total net costs from 2017-2029 will be around $860 million or on average $66 million annually.
CBP also provides the monetized present value and annualized net costs for the final rule during the entire period of analysis (2017-2029) in discounted 2024 U.S. dollars. CBP estimates total net costs from this final rule will range between around $722 million using a three percent discount rate and $587 million using a seven percent discount rate. On an annualized basis, total net costs from this final rule will range from $67 million using a three percent discount rate and $70 million using a seven percent discount rate. In addition to the costs, cost savings and net costs, this final rule provides added national security benefits as discussed above. Table 6, below, displays CBP's estimates for the present value and annualized net costs from this final rule from 2017-2029.
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601
The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to consider the impacts of their rules on small entities. This final rule would only directly regulate individual travelers, who are not considered small entities. CBP received a public comment suggesting that individual travelers could be small businesses, sole proprietors, self-employed individuals, and freelancers, therefore a significant number of small entities would be affected as a result of this rule and that warrants a complete RFA for this rule. CBP does not have data on how many international travelers would fall in these categories. However, the effects on individual travelers are not significant. CBP estimates that the time burden to air travelers is less than 4-6 seconds (0.00167 hours) per boarding, or less than $0.12 per individual traveler during the boarding process.
This rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more in any one year (adjusted for inflation), and it will not significantly or uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no actions are necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Public Law 104-4, 109 Stat. 48.
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507), an agency may not conduct, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid control number assigned by OMB. The collections of information related to this final rule, including biometric exit, Simplified Arrival, FBD, Mobile Primary Face, and Pedestrian Entry are approved by OMB under OMB Control Number 1651-0138. CBP anticipates that this final rule would reduce the overall time burdens incurred by respondents during the information collection for biometric identity verification. The implementation of facial comparison technology for biometric collection is significantly quicker and more efficient than previous processes (
However, this final rule would also introduce new time burdens to travelers departing the United States and CBP expects that the total number of travelers affected by biometric identity information collection will increase as a result of this final rule. Additionally, as CBP partners with air travel industry members and sea travel industry members, they will also incur some time burdens as a result of this final rule while they facilitate the collection of the biometric identity information. CBP assumes that the new time burden to conduct biometric identity using facial comparison technology is approximately 0.00095 hours (3.42 seconds) based on the CBP Time and Motion Study conducted on facial comparison technology implementation for biometric collection at exit in the air environment. CBP uses this estimate of 3.42 seconds for the average time burden to capture an image by facial comparison technology and conduct the biometric identity verification in all environments.
CBP estimates that the overall total time burden to the public from this information collection will decrease from around 705,336 hours to around 536,583 hours annually. Additionally, CBP anticipates that under this collection the total number of responses and respondents will increase from 115,200,000 to around 414,044,049. This information collection is being revised to reflect a reduction in burden hours and an increased number of travelers affected by facial comparison biometric collection as a result of this final rule. The new information collection requirements for this final rule will result in the following estimated time burdens to the public for information collection under OMB Control Number 1651-0138 from expanding facial comparison technology for biometric identity for each environment below:
CBP will ensure that all legal requirements (
CBP retains biographic records for 15 years for U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents and 75 years for non-immigrant aliens, as provided in the DHS/CBP-007 Border Crossing Information (BCI) SORN.
Under CBP's facial comparison-based entry-exit program, CBP's biographic data retention policies remain the same. CBP temporarily retains facial images of non-immigrant aliens and lawful permanent residents for no more than 14 days within Automated Targeting System (ATS)-Unified Passenger Module (UPAX) for confirmation of travelers' identities, evaluation of the technology, assurance of accuracy of the algorithms, and system audits.
CBP is implementing the biometric entry-exit system through the TVS. CBP has issued a number of PIAs for the TVS and earlier traveler verification tests,
DHS and its components analyze final actions to determine whether the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. 4321
NEPA allows Federal agencies to establish categories of actions (“categorical exclusions”) that experience has shown do not, individually or cumulatively, have a significant effect on the human environment and, therefore, do not require an environmental assessment (“EA”) or environmental impact statement (“EIS”). An agency is not required to prepare an EA or EIS for a proposed action “if the proposed agency action is excluded pursuant to one of the agency's categorical exclusions.” 42 U.S.C. 4336(a)(2). The Instruction Manual, Appendix A, lists the DHS Categorical Exclusions. For an action to be categorically excluded, the DHS Instruction Manual requires the action to satisfy each of the following three conditions: (1) the entire action clearly fits within one or more of the Categorical Exclusions; (2) the action is not a piece of a larger action; and (3) no extraordinary circumstances exist that would have or could create the potential for a significant environmental effect. DHS Instruction Manual, Section V.B.(1)-(3).
DHS analyzed this final rule and has concluded that the changes to 8 CFR parts 215 and 235 concerning the collection of biometric data from aliens upon entry and departure falls within DHS's categorical exclusion A3.
Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Travel restrictions.
Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Immigration, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, DHS is amending 8 CFR parts 215 and 235 as set forth below:
6 U.S.C. 202(4), 236; 8 U.S.C. 1101, 1103, 1104, 1184, 1185 (pursuant to Executive Order 13323, 69 FR 241, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 278), 1357, 1365a and note, 1365b, 1379, 1731-32; and 8 CFR part 2.
The revisions and additions read as follows:
(a)
(2)
(3)
(i) Aliens younger than 14 or older than 79 on date of departure;
(ii) Aliens admitted on A-1, A-2, C-3 (except for attendants, servants, or personal employees of accredited officials), G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO-2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6 visas, and certain Taiwan officials who hold E-1 visas and members of their immediate families who hold E-1 visas who are maintaining such status at time of departure, unless the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly determine that a class of such aliens should be subject to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2) of this section;
(iii) Classes of aliens to whom the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State jointly determine it shall not apply; or
(iv) An individual alien to whom the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central Intelligence determines it shall not apply.
(b)
(c)
6 U.S.C. 218 and note; 8 U.S.C. 1101 and note, 1103, 11f58, 1182, 1183, 1185 (pursuant to Executive Order 13323, 69 FR 241, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 278), 1185 note, 1201, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1228, 1357, 1365a and note, 1365b, 1379, 1731-32; 48 U.S.C. 1806 and note, 1807, and 1808 and 48 U.S.C. 1806 notes (title VII, Pub. L. 110-229, 122 Stat. 754); 8 U.S.C. 1185 note (sec. 7209, Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638, and Pub. L. 112-54, 125 Stat. 550).
(f)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(A) Aliens younger than 14 or older than 79 on the date of admission;
(B) Aliens admitted on A-1, A-2, C-3 (except for attendants, servants, or personal employees of accredited officials), G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO-2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6 visas, and certain Taiwan officials who hold E-1 visas and members of their immediate families who hold E-1 visas unless the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly determine that a class of such aliens should be subject to the requirements of paragraph (f)(1)(iii);
(C) Classes of aliens to whom the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of State jointly determine it shall not apply; or
(D) An individual alien to whom the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of State, or the Director of Central Intelligence determines it shall not apply.
Federal Communications Commission.
Final rule.
In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a
These rules are effective November 26, 2025, except for amendatory instructions 6 (§ 1.767), 7 (§ 1.768), 10 (§ 1.70002), 11 (§ 1.70003), 12 (§§ 1.70005 and 1.70006), 13 (§ 1.70007), 14 (§§ 1.70008 and 1.70009), 15 (§§ 1.70011 through 1.70013), 16 (§ 1.70016), 17 (§ 1.70017), 18 (§ 1.70020), 19 (§§ 1.70023 and 1.70024), and 22 (§ 43.82), which are indefinitely delayed. The One-Time Information Collection will also be indefinitely delayed. The Commission will publish a document in the
Desiree Hanssen, Office of International Affairs, Telecommunications and Analysis Division, at
This is a summary of the Commission's
1. In this item, we modernize and streamline the Commission's submarine cable rules to facilitate faster and more efficient deployment of submarine cables, while at the same time ensuring the security and resilience of this critical infrastructure. We recognize that investment in such infrastructure is vital to American prosperity and economic dynamism. The rules that we adopt today will ensure that the United States remains ready and able to deploy submarine cable infrastructure with increasing amounts of capacity to meet current and future internet and data demands so that the United States remains “the unrivaled world leader in critical and emerging technologies—such as artificial intelligence.” With global competition for submarine cables increasing, connections to the United States should continue to be at the forefront of the submarine cable marketplace. Nonetheless, “[i]nvestment at all costs is not always in the national interest,” because of the potential for foreign adversary exploitation. We also recognize that “[e]conomic security is national security,” and thus protecting our communications networks against foreign threats is crucial. With these principles in mind today, we undertake the first major comprehensive update of our submarine cable rules since 2001. Since that time, technology, consumer expectations, international submarine cable traffic patterns, submarine cable infrastructure, and the foreign threat landscape have changed greatly.
2. To advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a more secure and resilient communications supply chain, we adopt rules that place a strong emphasis on preventing and mitigating national security risks from foreign adversaries, while welcoming investment from United States allies and partners. We also lighten the regulatory burden on industry by modernizing and simplifying the submarine cable license approval process.
3. In this
4. We update the Commission's submarine cable licensing process to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats. Specifically, we adopt a presumption that will preclude the grant of applications filed by any entity owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary; any entity identified on the Commission's “Covered List”;
5. We modernize our submarine cable rules by adopting a definition of the term, “submarine cable system,” that acknowledges the range of technological advancement in existing submarine cable systems. This definition incorporates the future technological evolution of submarine cable systems, all of which include SLTE as a significant component of the system itself. While at this time we decline to require SLTE owners and operators to become licensees, we take steps to identify, through a one-time information collection, how many entities currently own or operate SLTEs on existing licensed cable systems. The one-time information collection we adopt will further inform the Commission about the identities of SLTE owners and operators and their role in operating a portion of the submarine cable system, including information about system capacity, spectrum, or the lighting of a fiber. The one-time collection will also assess for insolvent cables or licensees, and require licensees to disclose whether or not their submarine cable systems use covered equipment or services. Importantly, this one-time information collection will inform our proposed regulatory approach to SLTEs as discussed in the
6. We also codify the Commission's longstanding practice of requiring a cable landing license for submarine cables that lie partially outside of U.S. territorial waters. Moreover, while we do retain a number of our current rules, we eliminate the requirement that entities that solely own, and do not control, a U.S. cable landing station must be applicants for, and licensees on, a cable landing license. We update our application rules to require a statement that grant of the application is in the public interest, and require applicants to provide detailed information about the submarine cable system and to report whether or not they use and/or will use third-party foreign adversary service providers in the operation of the submarine cable. We also require applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their systems and services from cybersecurity and physical security risks that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system. Additionally, applicants for a cable landing license are required to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. These rules will ensure that licensees will protect their networks from cybersecurity and physical security threats and threats from foreign adversaries. Finally, to make it easier for applicants and licensees to navigate our rules, we clarify and update the rules for applications to modify, assign, transfer control of, or renew or extend a cable landing license or request special temporary authority. We adopt rules to obligate licensees to keep the Commission abreast of changes to important information such as the contact information of the licensee and other information that will enable the Commission to maintain accurate records regarding licensees.
7. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, we streamline our rules and eliminate the requirement for licensees to file a Cable Operator Report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis. Instead, we require licensees and common carriers to report their capacity on domestic and international cables in a single report, the Capacity Holder Reports—a report filed by each Filing Entity on an individual basis—that will enable the Commission to continue collecting accurate and important data for national security and public safety purposes. Importantly, consistent with other actions, we require cable landing licensees and common carriers to provide certain information about their SLTEs in the Capacity Holder Report.
8. In short, we “maintain[ ] the strong, open investment environment that benefits our economy and our people, while enhancing our ability to protect the United States from new and evolving threats” in the submarine cable ecosystem.
9. In November 2024, the Commission adopted the
10.
11. Earlier this year, shortly after President Trump announced in February 2025 the America First Investment Policy, which states that “[e]conomic security is national security” and discusses the need to limit certain investments in strategic sectors by six identified foreign adversaries, the Commission initiated a series of actions. In March 2025, the Commission responded to threats posed by the People's Republic of China and to the evolving threat environment more generally, by establishing a Council for National Security to bring together the Commission's regulatory, investigatory, and enforcement authorities to counter foreign adversaries. The Council was established with a three-part goal: “(1) Reduce the American technology and telecommunications sectors' trade and supply chain dependencies on foreign adversaries; (2) Mitigate America's vulnerabilities to cyberattacks, espionage, and surveillance by foreign adversaries; and (3) Ensure the U.S. wins the strategic competition with China over critical technologies, such as 5G and 6G, AI, satellites and space, quantum computing, robotics and autonomous systems, and the Internet of Things.” In the same month, the Commission opened a separate proceeding, the
12. On May 22, 2025, the Commission took action in two distinct proceedings to protect our nation's communications infrastructure from foreign adversary threats. First, in the
13. Second, in the
14.
15. Earlier this year, the Commission received 18 comments, nine reply comments, and several ex partes pertaining to a wide range of topics discussed in the
16. We adopt rules that streamline, modernize, and enhance investment in submarine cable infrastructure, while protecting this critical infrastructure against foreign adversaries in an evolving threat environment. In recent actions, the Commission has taken concrete steps to identify and halt foreign adversaries from participating in U.S. communications markets and supply chains. Our rules take similar steps for submarine cables while reducing regulatory burdens.
17. We take action to protect the security, integrity, and resilience of the nation's critical infrastructure by adopting proposals to implement certain information requirements, certification requirements, conditions, and prohibitions that will enable the Commission to identify and mitigate foreign adversary threats, as discussed below. We adopt a modified and tailored version of the Commission's proposals by simplifying and providing a clear and consistent standard that incorporates the Department of Commerce's definitions for identifying a “foreign adversary,” “foreign adversary country,” and “[p]erson owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.” Our approach is aligned with long-standing interagency rules and regulations, pursuant to Executive Order 13873, to identify and mitigate foreign adversary threats to U.S. critical infrastructure, including exploitation through individuals and entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. This approach is further supported by the record. For example, FDD states that the Commission should prohibit entities subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or control of a foreign adversary from owning submarine cables connected to the United States. The Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector (Committee) also supports the Commission relying on the Department of Commerce's determinations and definitions in its efforts to mitigate threats to submarine cable infrastructure presented, such as prohibiting the use of such vendors for equipment or services.
18.
19. In identifying foreign adversaries for the purposes of implementing the rules we adopt today, we follow the Department of Commerce's determinations. Currently, the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4(a), identifies the following “foreign governments or foreign non-government persons” as “foreign adversaries”: (1) The People's Republic of China, including the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region (China); (2) Republic of Cuba (Cuba); (3) Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran); (4) Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea); (5) Russian Federation (Russia); and (6) Venezuelan politician Nicolás Maduro (Maduro Regime). For purposes of the submarine cable rules, we define “foreign adversary” to include the foreign governments and foreign non-government persons identified in 15 CFR 791.4(a), including the Maduro Regime.
20.
21.
(1) Any individual or entity, wherever located, who acts as an agent, representative, or employee, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign adversary or of an individual or entity whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in majority part by a foreign adversary;
(2) Any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen of a foreign adversary or a country controlled by a foreign adversary, and is not a United States citizen or permanent resident of the United States;
(3) Any entity, including a corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, that has a principal place of business in, or is headquartered in, incorporated in, or otherwise organized under the laws of a foreign adversary or a country controlled by a foreign adversary; or
(4) Any entity, including a corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by a foreign adversary, to include circumstances in which any person identified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this section possesses the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a dominant minority (10% or greater) of the total outstanding voting interest and/or equity interest, or through a controlling interest, in an entity, board representation, proxy voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity.
22. In the
23. Our approach is also recommended by the Committee, whose expertise the Commission frequently
24. Importantly, our rule will also assess private entities that are operating in foreign adversary countries. Some entities that are “ `ostensibly private and civilian' ” may “ `directly support China's military, intelligence, and security apparatuses and aid in their development and modernization.' ” Horizon Advisory stresses that “no Chinese company is private in any traditional sense,” adding that “[a]s the Chinese government refines its use and messaging around authorities like the National Security Law, the Anti-Espionage Law, and the Personal Information Protection Law, any firm operating in China is at risk of official influence that belies traditional conceptions of a private company.” Recently, the Supreme Court unanimously accepted findings that a privately held company that has operations in China “is subject to Chinese laws that require it to `assist or cooperate' with the Chinese Government's `intelligence work' and to ensure that the Chinese Government has the power to access and control private data the company holds.”
25. We note that the Commission's rules recognize that “[b]ecause the issue of control inherently involves issues of fact, it must be determined on a case-by-case basis and may vary with the circumstances presented by each case.” While we include factors indicative of control in our definition of “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,” a determination of control is not limited to these factors. The Commission will consider the totality of the circumstances reflected in the record.
26. We make certain modifications from the Department of Commerce's definition to appropriately tailor the Commission's definition and clearly define terms for purposes of the submarine cable rules, including the disclosure requirements and conditions adopted herein.
27.
28. To protect the security, integrity, and resilience of this critical U.S. communications infrastructure against national security, law enforcement, and other threats, we adopt a presumption that a foreign adversary applicant, as further described below, is not qualified to hold a cable landing license unless the applicant overcomes the adverse presumption. No commenter opposes the Commission's proposals. We find that adopting this presumptive disqualifying condition is consistent with the Commission's authority to withhold cable landing licenses and condition the grant of licenses to “promote the security of the United States” under the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, and will protect this critical submarine cable infrastructure and help ensure that it is secure from foreign adversaries and entities identified on the Commission's Covered List.
29. Specifically, the disqualifying condition will presumptively preclude the grant of a submarine cable application filed by any applicant:
(1) That is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g);
(2) That is identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act; and/or
(3) Whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval, whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity.
30. We will apply this presumptive disqualifying condition to: (1) any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the
31. To the extent an application for modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license is filed after the effective date of the
32. Importantly, we will presume that denial of an application as specified herein is warranted where it is filed by any applicant that is subject to any of the aforementioned criteria.
33. For example, the presumptive disqualifying condition will apply to any initial application for a cable landing license filed by China Mobile International (USA) Inc. (China Mobile USA), China Telecom (Americas) Corporation (CTA), China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited (CUA), Pacific Networks Corp. (Pacific Networks), and ComNet (USA) LLC (ComNet) and their current and future affiliates and subsidiaries. In the
34. Today, we adopt a standard by which the Commission will consider whether an applicant seeking a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license has the requisite character qualifications. To ensure that applicants have the requisite character qualifications, we adopt a presumption that an applicant is not qualified to hold a cable landing license if it meets any of the criteria listed below, unless the applicant overcomes the adverse presumption. This presumption will supplement the foreign adversary presumptive disqualifying condition and codifies a narrower application of the longstanding Commission practice of considering the character qualifications of applicants for submarine cable applications.
35. We presume an applicant does not possess the requisite character qualifications to become a cable landing licensee if the applicant has within the last 20 years:
(1) Materially violated the Cable Landing License Act where the violation (a) was not remediated with an adjudication involving a consent decree and/or compliance plan, (b) resulted in a loss of Commission license or authorization, or (c) was found by the Commission to be intentional;
(2) Committed national security-related violations of the Communications Act or Commission rules as identified in Commission orders, including but not limited to violations of rules concerning the Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act;
(3) Made materially false statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct concerning national security or the Cable Landing License Act;
(4) Been subject to an adjudicated finding of making false statements or engaging in fraudulent conduct concerning national security before another U.S. government agency; or
(5) Materially failed to comply with the terms of a cable landing license, including but not limited to a condition requiring compliance with a mitigation agreement with the Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee, where the violation (a) was not remediated with an adjudication involving a consent decree and/or compliance plan, (b) resulted in a loss of Commission license or authorization, or (c) was found by the Commission to be intentional.
36. We will apply this presumptive disqualifying condition to (1) any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the
37. The criteria set out in this presumptive disqualifying condition are not the only grounds on which the Commission may deny an application
38. An applicant subject to any of the aforementioned criteria can overcome this adverse presumption only by establishing that the applicant has the requisite character, despite its past conduct. We will not require applicants to disclose pending investigations, but rather only disclose violations as preliminarily or finally determined by the Commission, and as adjudicated by another U.S. government agency or a court in the United States.
39. We disagree with Microsoft's and NASCA's comments that the Commission's proposal regarding character qualifications was “overbroad.” Nevertheless, we choose to narrow the scope of the character qualifications to initially prioritize considerations related to national security in our assessment of an applicant's truthfulness and reliability and to better allocate administrative resources. Microsoft and NASCA disagree, for example, with any requirement to disclose any felony absent a material or specific threshold. The Commission considers all felonies as relevant to its evaluation of character qualifications in the broadcast licensing context, as such is indicative of an applicant's or licensee's “propensity to obey the law.” Further, the Commission retains the authority to take enforcement action or to revoke a licensee's cable landing license when warranted, including but not limited to reasons involving these or other character qualifications or misconduct of a licensee. Finally, while we agree with Microsoft's and NASCA's recommendation to limit the scope of the character qualifications to conduct related to ownership and operation of a submarine cable, we consider that fraudulent conduct and false statements before the Commission or other U.S. government agencies are relevant to determining the qualification of an applicant to become a cable landing licensee because such conduct bears directly on the licensee's truthfulness and propensity to obey the law and thus our ability to rely on the licensee to comply with our rules and the Cable Landing License Act. We find that the character qualifications discussed above are relevant to the determination of whether denial of a submarine cable application is warranted.
40. To further protect U.S. communications networks from national security and law enforcement threats, we adopt a presumption that denial of an application, as specified below, is warranted where an applicant seeks to land a submarine cable in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f) of our newly adopted rules, unless the applicant overcomes the adverse presumption. The Committee supports a presumption of denial on building new cable landings connecting foreign adversary countries to the United States, given the intent and capabilities of such countries to harm U.S. interests and the vulnerabilities inherent in submarine cable infrastructure. No other commenter addressed this issue. We find that adopting this presumptive disqualifying condition is consistent with the Commission's authority to withhold cable landing licenses and condition the grant of licenses to “promote the security of the United States” under the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, and will protect this critical submarine cable infrastructure and ensure that it is secure from foreign adversaries and entities identified on the Commission's Covered List.
41. Specifically, we adopt a disqualifying condition that will presumptively preclude the grant of a submarine cable application filed by any applicant:
(1) That seeks to land a new submarine cable in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f).
(2) That seeks to modify, renew, or extend its cable landing license to add a new landing located in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f).
42. We will apply this presumptive disqualifying condition to: (1) any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the
43. We agree with the Committee that there are substantial and serious national security and law enforcements risks associated with landing submarine cables in foreign adversary countries. Since 2017, there have been two submarine cable applications filed in part by entities with ties to foreign adversary countries and with the proposed cable landings in foreign adversary countries. The Executive Branch agencies recommended that the Commission partially deny the PLCN cable system application due to national security and law enforcement risks, stating that the proposed connection to Hong Kong, “combined with other pending applications seeking to directly connect the United States to Hong Kong, furthers the PRC's ambitions to have access to an information hub that is directly linked to U.S. ICT infrastructure” and “potentially could place voluminous amounts of sensitive U.S. person data in these companies' possession at risk.” The Committee recommended that the Commission deny the ARCOS-1 modification application due to national security and law enforcement risks, stating that “[i]f the application is granted as proposed, U.S. persons' internet traffic, data, and communications transiting the proposed ARCOS-1 cable expansion (Segment 26) to Cuba are very likely to be compromised,” given the “Cuban government maintains tight control of the Cuban telecommunications networks through [Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A. (ETECSA)].”
44. To further protect U.S. communications networks from national security, law enforcement, and other threats, we adopt a condition that cable landing licensees are prohibited from entering into arrangements for Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRUs) or leases for capacity on submarine cable systems landing in the United States,
45. The Commission sought comment on whether it should prohibit cable landing licensees from entering into arrangements for IRUs or leases for capacity on submarine cables landing in the United States with entities associated with foreign adversaries. Specifically, the Commission sought comment on applying this prohibition to any entity that is directly and/or indirectly owned or controlled by, or subject to the influence of, (1) a government organization of a foreign adversary country, and/or (2) any individual or entity that has a citizenship(s) or place(s) of organization in a “foreign adversary” country, as defined under 15 CFR 791.4. For the reasons discussed above, we instead adopt the narrower, more precise, and previously-used formulation “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.”
46. We are persuaded by the record support for our action today. NASCA argues that the proposal “to ban certain commercial transactions is not supported by specific findings that the transactions pose a national security or law enforcement risk, given that the customers in such transactions typically do not have the ability to exert influence or control over the cable.” Other commenters, however, address national security risks associated with submarine cables in the current threat environment. FDD states that “Beijing has also repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use security gaps within U.S. critical infrastructure” and “[t]hese risks are heightened by private firms' use of remote network management systems, particularly those connected directly to the [I]nternet, to control submarine cable systems.” The Committee states that “the United States and its networks are under constant threat from various foreign adversaries, particularly China” and recent compromise of U.S. telecommunications infrastructure “reflects the increasing capability of China to target critical American infrastructure and systems.” The Committee states that prohibiting cable landing licensees from entering into dark fiber IRU agreements with foreign adversary-affiliated entities would reduce risks posed by such entities owning or operating SLTE on submarine cables landing in the United States “pursuant to an IRU or similar or similar legal instrument,” and also provide “a bright line rule” requested by commenters. The Committee emphasizes the national security risks presented by foreign adversary entities with this type of access, including serious counterintelligence risks where an adversary could intercept or misroute U.S. persons' communications and sensitive data transiting the submarine cable.
47. We find there are serious national security and law enforcement risks associated with access, ownership, and control of communications fiber and principal equipment on this critical U.S. infrastructure by entities that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. Capacity may be held on submarine cables through ownership, leasing, purchasing, selling, buying, or swapping of capacity, spectrum, or fiber (partial fiber pair or a full fiber pair) for transmission of voice, data, and internet over the submarine cable system to interconnect with a U.S. terrestrial network. Significant national security and law enforcement risks are raised where an untrustworthy actor has access to U.S.-based infrastructure and sensitive information that traverses such infrastructure. In the
48. We adopt the Commission's proposal to apply an informal written process in cases involving withholding or revocation and/or termination of a cable landing license. Below, we describe the procedures we will use for revocations and denials, respectively. We find that these procedures are consistent with due process and procedural requirements under the Cable Landing License Act, the Communications Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
49. The Cable Landing License Act states that the President may “withhold or revoke such [cable landing] license . . . after due notice and hearing,” but does not identify particular procedures that must be followed. Where a statute does not expressly require an “on the record” hearing and instead calls simply for a “hearing,” a “full hearing,” or uses similar terminology, the statute does not trigger the APA's formal adjudication procedures absent clear evidence of congressional intent to do so. Agencies must adhere to the formal hearing procedures in sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA only in cases of “adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” In addition to the Cable Landing License
50.
51. While we believe that oral hearing procedures are not warranted in all cases involving revocation of cable landing licenses, we delegate authority to OIA to determine appropriate procedures on a case by case basis, including addressing requests for oral hearing procedures, providing an opportunity for oral hearing procedures where warranted by the facts and circumstance, and designating an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) as the presiding officer if the hearing includes oral procedures, if OIA determines that doing so would be appropriate based on the ALJ's expertise or for other reasons. Courts have held that the question of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is “within [the agency's] discretion, and it may `properly deny an evidentiary hearing if the issues, even disputed issues, may be adequately resolved on the written record, at least where there is no issue of motive, intent or credibility.'” As stated in the
52. While no commenter opposed an informal written hearing process, a few commenters state that revocation procedures should provide licensees with notice and an opportunity to resolve or cure concerns. A few commenters state generally that revocation will have an impact on investments, or that the Commission should “provide licensees with a clearly established process to revoke a license,” but they do not claim that the informal written process itself would provide insufficient process or fail to provide adequate opportunities for affected licensees to address the Commission's concerns. However, a few commenters propose mitigation as an additional procedural safeguard to resolve concerns or as a substitute for any revocation action. For example, INCOMPAS states that, “[b]efore the Commission resorts to revocation, it first should engage with licensees” to provide an opportunity to work with the Commission and Executive Branch agencies to identify national security concerns and develop mitigation measures. U.S. Chamber of Commerce states that licensees should be provided “a meaningful opportunity” to respond to allegations of misconduct and to cure or to mitigate concerns. As discussed below, we delegate authority to OIA to implement procedures on a case by case basis in accordance with section 558(c) of the APA, including providing notice and opportunity, where appropriate, to achieve compliance unless the facts and circumstances indicate willfulness or that the public interest or safety requires otherwise (including harm to national security). The Commission may determine, for example, in light of the relevant facts and circumstances that national security and law enforcement risks presented in a particular case cannot be addressed through mitigation with the Executive Branch agencies. Moreover, Executive Order 10530 requires the Commission to obtain the approval of the State Department, and, “as the Commission may deem necessary,” to seek advice from other Executive Branch agencies, before granting or revoking or terminating a cable landing license. The Commission has sought the expertise of the relevant Executive Branch agencies in identifying and evaluating issues of concern that may arise from an applicant's or licensee's foreign ownership, while also emphasizing that it will make an independent decision and will evaluate concerns raised by the Executive Branch agencies in light of all the issues raised. Further, revocation cases may involve other issues that do not involve the Executive Branch agencies, such as character concerns, or other Commission rule violations. To
53. We disagree with proposals to curtail the Commission's authority to revoke and/or terminate a cable landing license under the Cable Landing License Act, Executive Order 10530, and the Commission's rules. Commenters suggest, for example, that the Commission should only revoke the license of a cable landing licensee on national security and economic security grounds or solely based on a history of noncompliance, or otherwise provide a clear standard such as specific national security threats posed by changed circumstances or noncompliance with the terms of a license or Commission rules. We cannot effectively discharge our duty to protect national security by limiting our revocation and termination process to a prescribed list of circumstances, as we cannot predict with certainty what circumstances might threaten national security in the future. However, in general, we will consider the possibility of initiating revocation proceedings, for example, where a licensee's actions or failure to act, or other circumstances, raise concerns about our ability to trust the licensee to comply with the Cable Landing License Act, our submarine cable rules, and/or national security commitments, or to otherwise protect national security interests. Further, a licensee's violation of other statutory or regulatory requirements, as well as serious non-FCC misconduct, may call into question our ability to trust a licensee in this regard. We will consider the possibility of initiating termination proceedings where a licensee fails to comply with any condition of its license. Separate and apart from revocation, the Commission uses the term “termination” where a license or authorization is terminated based on the licensee's or authorization holder's failure to comply with a condition of the license or authorization, and has determined that the informal written procedures applicable to termination need not mirror the procedures used for revocation of licenses or authorizations. To the extent any revocation and/or termination proceeding is commenced, we find that our informal written hearing process will ensure the Commission obtains the approval of the State Department, and will seek advice from other Executive Branch agencies, “as the Commission may deem necessary,” before revoking or terminating a cable landing license. As discussed below, we delegate authority to OIA to determine appropriate procedures on a case by case basis for revocation and/or termination of a cable landing license, as required by due process and applicable law and in light of the relevant facts and circumstances.
54.
55. Consistent with Executive Order 10530, we also adopt the proposal to amend § 1.767(b) of the rules so that it does not state that denial of an application requires approval by the Secretary of State. No commenter addressed this proposal. Executive Order 10530 does not require the State Department's approval of a denial action and expressly states that “no such license shall be
56.
57. We adopt a process to revoke the cable landing licenses of licensees that are insolvent or no longer exist. Section 1.767(m)(2) of the rules requires that “[a]ny licensee that seeks to relinquish its interest in a cable landing license shall file an application to modify the license.” The Commission's records in the International Communications Filing System (ICFS) and other records, indicate that some submarine cables licensed by the Commission may not have commenced service and/or some cable landing licensees of record may be insolvent or no longer in operation. Furthermore, some licensees that may be insolvent or no longer exist did not file a modification application to
58. If a licensee fails to timely respond to the information collection required in the
59. In situations where a licensee has gone out of business and is no longer able to make the filing on its own behalf, other licensees that jointly hold the license, if any, may appoint one licensee to make a filing that demonstrates and certifies that the licensee has ceased to exist and that the remaining licensee(s) will retain collectively
60. Any licensee whose cable landing license is revoked for failure to respond following the institution of a proceeding may file a petition for reinstatement
61. In the
62. Accordingly, we agree with the suggestion of NTIA and the State Department that we refrain from using the term “international waters” because the term is not used in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and to instead use “areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” or similar phrasing. Although the United States has neither signed nor ratified UNCLOS, the United States considers provisions of UNCLOS concerning traditional uses of the ocean as generally reflective of customary international law binding on all States. One provision of UNCLOS that the United States abides by is that:
63. We therefore adopt the proposed rule with clarification as follows:
A cable landing license must be obtained prior to landing a submarine cable that connects:
(1) The continental United States with any foreign country;
(2) Alaska, Hawaii, or the U.S. territories or possessions with:
(i) a foreign country,
(ii) the continental United States, or
(iii) with each other; or
(3) Points within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or a territory or possession in which the cable is laid in areas beyond U.S. territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles seaward from the coastline.
64.
65.
66. First, we disagree that the licensing requirement in the Cable Landing License Act is not intended to apply to cables connecting Alaska to other parts of the United States. Congress limited the application of the Cable Landing License Act by adding the following language that is now codified at section 34 of title 47 of the U.S. Code: “The conditions of sections 34 to 39 of this title shall not apply to cables, all of which, including both terminals, lie wholly within the continental United States.” Even if Alaska was a part of the continental United States as ATA would argue is a proper interpretation, a cable landing license would nonetheless be required for a submarine cable connecting Alaska to the United States because the submarine cable would in no way meet the statutory exception that the “cable[ ], all of which, including both terminals, lie[s] wholly within the continental United States.” The plain language of the statute does not state that
67. ATA makes two additional claims. First, ATA claims that “submarine cables connecting solely domestic points—even those laid in international or foreign waters—do not implicate any of the evolving national security risks that the NPRM seeks to address.” ATA's argument is based on the mistaken premise that domestic cables are only owned or operated by domestic entities, such as U.S. carriers. This is an inaccurate assessment of the submarine cable industry in the United States as foreign entities are often cable landing licensees subject to Commission rules or there may be other foreign components of submarine cables, domestic or international. Further, domestic cables connect the United States to faraway U.S. territories such as Guam, where U.S. military bases are strategically located. It is inaccurate to indicate that there are no such concerns regarding national security or law enforcement with regard to domestic submarine cables. The Commission has long stated that foreign participation in submarine cables licensed by the Commission may pose risks to national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy for which Executive Branch agencies' expertise is needed to assist the Commission with its public interest determination. Therefore, we reject ATA's claim that cables connecting solely domestic points do not implicate national security risks. Second, ATA states that “[i]f the Commission finds that any category of purely domestic submarine cables is subject to the Cable Act's licensing mandate, it should streamline that requirement by granting blanket license authority by rule to land such fully domestic cables, whether or not they traverse international waters.” We address this request in the
68. We adopt a submarine cable system definition that will provide regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators and ensure administrative efficiency for the Commission. The
69. We adopt a definition that is consistent with the Committee's proposed definition as well as the Commission's definition in its outage reporting rules. Importantly, our definition ensures that a submarine cable system extends to and includes the SLTE, whether it is located in a cable landing station near the initial beach landing or further in-land within data centers. We believe this definition captures what a submarine cable system is under the Cable Landing License Act and clearly identifies the demarcation point of where the submarine cable system ends and the terrestrial system begins. Based on the record, we adopt the following definition:
70. Where the submarine cable system ends and the terrestrial system begins has changed over time and our definition establishes that the cable extends to and includes the SLTE, whether it is located in a cable landing station near the initial beach landing or further in-land within data centers. In older architectural deployments prior to the advent of open cable systems, the SLTE was placed at the cable landing stations. Some subsequent architectural deployments place an Optical Add-Drop Multiplexer (OADM), or a Reconfigurable Optical Add/Drop Multiplexer (ROADM) in the cable landing station, with the SLTEs distributed further inland. ROADMs facilitate adding and dropping optical signals used in a fiber cable, and ROADMs add additional flexibility by allowing the operator to reconfigure the device. Both of these components add efficiency and flexibility to the optical network by inserting or removing channels. Remote management of the SLTE and all other submarine cable system equipment is also a necessity of modern systems. Remote management includes configuration, performance and fault management and testing, which emphasizes the need to have trusted management systems and personnel who can access the cable system and all associated components and facilities, including the SLTE.
71. The Committee stated that it has historically viewed a submarine cable system as including SLTE, adding that the Committee shares the Commission's view on the importance of the SLTE and the access and control it offers its owners and users. NASCA, a trade association whose members include over 25 submarine cable owners and submarine cable maintenance authorities for cable systems operating in North America, supports codification of a submarine cable definition, stating that such is “clear and consistent with licensees' current reporting requirements to the Team Telecom agencies.” Microsoft also maintains that the proposed definition—cable system SLTE to cable system SLTE—is consistent with the Committee's current mitigation instrument conditions imposed on many licensees.
72. Some commenters disagreed with the proposed definition, and argued that the Commission should define a submarine cable system in terms of its components that would not include SLTE. NASCA does not specifically address or take a position on inclusion of SLTE in the Commission's proposed definition, but does propose that the Commission could define a submarine cable to include only the components up to and including the optical distribution frame (ODF),” contending that the ODF is the “demarcation point at which the submarine cable terminates and interconnects to terrestrial fiber.” NASCA maintains that because the “SLTE also converts terrestrial signals to submarine signal,” the SLTE is “just as much a terrestrial network element as a submarine network element.” Microsoft also takes the position that the SLTE is a terrestrial component used to “convert terrestrial signals to submarine signals,” and states that the “Commission equally could modify the NPRM's proposed definition to delimit the end points of a submarine cable at the ODF,” claiming this is the demarcation point at which a submarine cable terminates and interconnects to SLTE. ICC disagrees with inclusion of SLTE as the end point of the submarine cable system, arguing that the definition is somewhat outdated and that modern submarine cable systems typically terminate at an ODF, Open Cable Interface (OCI), ROAD-M, or similar device—which serves as a given system's interface with a particular user's optical network.
73. While we adopt ICC's recommendation to clarify in our definition that the components relate to the “operation of” the submarine cable system, we decline to accept commenters recommendations concerning SLTEs or comments that would limit the definition. For example, ICC recommends that we limit the definition to cover only transponders that are solely located within the SLTEs. We find that doing so would incorrectly limit the definition because transponders that support the operation of submarine cable systems can be located elsewhere. We also decline to accept NCTA's recommendation to exclude fully domestic SLTE operators and lessees as some SLTE operators and lessees do not have foreign ownership and may not pose a meaningful risk to U.S. national security. Contrary to NCTA's argument, the definition is meant to encapsulate the scope of what constitutes a submarine cable system, not whether particular components of the system pose risks.
74. Finally, we do not accept commenters' suggestion that ODF, OCI, ROADM, and similar devices should be considered as the end point of a submarine cable system. We recognize that the Commission's proposed definition of a submarine cable reflects traditional/legacy architecture when the terminal cable landing station was located near the shore and cable operators were not, as is the case today, purchasing SLTE(s) from independent equipment vendors that can be remotely managed. We also understand that cable operators today require multiplexing and other equipment to manage their fiber in cable landing stations, and that SLTE equipment allows for routing of fiber from one cable landing station to another cable landing station, or a data center located further inland and beyond the initial cable landing station. We find it necessary to include SLTE as a component in our definition because it is the SLTE that converts between submarine cable signals and terrestrial signals. While the reverse is also true, as was raised by commenters, only the SLTE converts cable signals to terrestrial signals. Therefore, whether this conversion occurs at the first, or initial, cable landing station, or occurs inland at a cable landing station or data center, we include the SLTE as the end point component of the submarine cable in our definition of a submarine cable under the Cable Landing License Act. Several commenters, noting that the Commission's proposed definition of a submarine cable system aligns with that used by the Committee in its mitigation agreements (SLTE to SLTE), support continued engagement by the Commission with other governmental entities to address risks to submarine cable infrastructure and to limit regulatory compliance burdens by avoiding unnecessary duplication on licensees' parallel Committee obligations.
75. Based on the comments in the record, we retain the 25-year term for cable landing licenses. In the
76. In this
77. We retain the requirement that an entity owning or controlling a 5% or greater interest in the cable system and using the U.S. points of the cable system must submit an application to become a licensee. We decline to adopt other proposals at this time. In the
78. Commenters generally support the Commission's retention of the current requirement with its 5% interest threshold and use of the U.S. points of the cable system, and oppose other options. Commenters argue that the rule continues to serve a good purpose. The Coalition, for example, asserts that there is no need to change the 5% threshold because it is still an efficient method to remove regulatory burden for small carriers or investors that do not have any ability to control the submarine cable system. NASCA and INCOMPAS echo this point and state that “imposing licensing burdens on [cable] owners [with no interest in the U.S. territory portion of a submarine cable system] would harm the market by making it less attractive for systems with multiple non-U.S. landing points to partner with investors who have no interest in the U.S. endpoint.” Many commenters, including Microsoft, ICC, INCOMPAS, AP&T, ITI, CTIA, USTelecom, and the Coalition disagree that capacity holders should be licensees because they assert that there is no basis under the Cable Landing License Act to require such entities to become licensees, as capacity holders do not land or operate the cable system.
79. We agree with commenters that there is not a sufficient reason to disturb the requirement that any entity owning or controlling a 5% or greater interest in the cable system and using the U.S. points of the cable system must become an applicant/licensee. Additionally, requiring entities that merely own capacity on the cable system, without meeting the requisite licensing requirements of ownership of 5% or greater interest and using the U.S. points of the cable system, to become applicants/licensees would greatly increase the number of entities that must comply with our regulatory framework. At this time, pure capacity holdings, without ownership of infrastructure or deployment of certain equipment, have a negligible impact or harm on national security and do not rise to the level of requiring a license. Instead, we tailor the licensing requirements to identify those entities that can exercise ownership or control over the submarine cable system, as discussed below and in the
80. In this
81. We agree with commenters that licensing requirements should not apply to entities that may own the cable landing station but are not directly involved in cable operations and do not control the operations of the cable system. Commenters were generally supportive of the proposal to reduce the licensing requirement. INCOMPAS does not support licensing for data center owners, claiming it would be a shift beyond the Commission's legal authorities and would not yield useful information for advancing the Commission's national security goals because “data center owners often lack visibility into or control over cable operations” unlike licensed cable operators. The Commission's standard practice has been to grant requests for waiver of the licensing requirements filed by entities that own the real property or facility in which the cable landing station is located but that do not have the ability to significantly affect the cable system's operation. Instead of continuing to process waivers on a case-by-case basis, we now revise our licensing requirement to require a license for “[a]ny entity that controls a cable landing station in the United States” and to require the applicant to
82. While we include SLTE within the definition of a submarine cable system, we decline to adopt a licensing requirement for owners and operators of SLTE at this time. A SLTE owner would need to be a licensee if it otherwise meets the Commission's requirements to be a licensee (
83. Today, we adopt new application requirements that will ensure the Commission has targeted and granular information about the submarine cable system and third-party foreign adversary service providers, which is critical to improve the Commission's assessment of national security risks. We also adopt new certification requirements that will require applicants and licensees to certify whether or not they meet any of the Commission's presumptive disqualifying conditions; that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan; and that they comply with Covered List requirements. For purposes of the information requirements, unless otherwise indicated, we use the terms “applicant” or “applicants” to refer to an applicant or licensee that currently files the following applications or notifications: (1) applicants that file an initial application for a cable landing license or an application for modification, substantial assignment, substantial transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license; (2) cable landing licensees that file a notification of pro forma assignment or transfer of control of a cable landing license; and/or (3) applicants that file a request for special temporary authority (STA) related to the operation of a submarine cable.
84. Consistent with longstanding practice, we adopt the proposed requirement that “an applicant seeking a submarine cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a submarine cable landing license shall include in the application a statement demonstrating how the grant of the application will serve the public interest.” The Commission has long found that national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy concerns are important to its public interest analysis of submarine cable applications, and these concerns warrant continued consideration in view of evolving and heightened threats to the nation's communications infrastructure.
85. We agree with NASCA that the requirements of the public interest standard should be clarified so they are “targeted, objective, and express.” Accordingly, our final rule clarifies the scope of this obligation. Specifically, and consistent with the express statutory objectives, the public interest statement must explain how the application will “assist in securing rights for the landing or operation of cables in foreign countries, or in maintaining the rights or interests of the United States or of its citizens in foreign countries, or will promote the security of the United States,” provide “just and reasonable rates and service,” and prohibit “exclusive rights of landing or of operation in the United States.”
86. NASCA acknowledges that a reasonably tailored public interest standard “would not be overly burdensome,” observing that “applicants already routinely include information relevant to the public interest in their applications.” However, NASCA argues that “the Commission must have an identifiable legal basis” for imposing such requirements, which it claims the
87. We retain our current requirement for applicants to identify the 10% or greater direct and indirect equity and/or voting interests held in the submarine cable applicants. In the
88. Below, we adopt rules to provide the Commission with important and relevant information concerning the submarine cable system. As discussed, we find that collection of this information is critical to our review of submarine cable applications and cable landing licensees for national security purposes and will advance our efforts to protect the security, integrity, and resilience of this critical U.S. infrastructure.
89. We adopt the Commission's proposal to require applicants seeking a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a license, and licensees submitting a Foreign Adversary Annual Report, to provide additional detailed information concerning the submarine cable system. Specifically, we adopt the proposal to require applicants and licensees to submit with these applications and/or Foreign Adversary Annual Reports the following detailed information regarding the submarine cable system:
(1) the states, territories, or possessions in the United States and the foreign countries where the submarine cable system will land;
(2) the number of segments in the submarine cable system and the designation of each (
(3) the length of the submarine cable system by segment and in total;
(4) the location, by segment, of any branching units;
(5) the number of optical fiber pairs, by segment, of the submarine cable system;
(6) the design capacity, by segment, of the submarine cable system;
(7) specific geographic location information (geographic coordinates, street address, county or county equivalent, as applicable), or if not available, a general geographic description and specific geographic location information to be filed no later than ninety (90) days prior to construction regarding:
(i) each U.S. and non-U.S. cable landing station and beach manhole;
(ii) each network operations center (NOC) and backup NOC and, if distinct from the NOC, each security operations center (SOC) and backup SOC, or else a statement that the SOC and backup SOC are not distinct from the NOC and/or backup NOC;
(iii) where each Power Feed Equipment (PFE) and each Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) is connected with the terrestrial land based system(s) and from where each is operated; and
(iv) the route position list including the wet segment of the submarine cable system; and
(8) Anticipated time frame when the applicant(s) intends to place the submarine cable system into service.
90. In addition, we adopt the proposal to modify the rules by requiring applicants to provide a specific description of the submarine cable system, including a map and geographic data in generally accepted GIS formats or other formats. We adopt the proposal to delegate authority to OIA, in coordination with the Office of Economics and Analytics (OEA), to determine the file formats and specific data fields in which data will ultimately be collected. We will allow applicants for a cable landing license to initially file a general geographic description of the geographic location information described in our newly adopted rule at § 1.70005(e)(7) concerning the submarine cable, but grant of the application will be conditioned on the Commission's final approval of specific geographic location information, consistent with the new requirements, to be filed by the applicant no later than ninety (90) days prior to construction.
91. With respect to route position lists, cable landing licensees with a license granted prior to the effective date of the new rules must submit a route position list consistent with the requirement under § 1.70005(e)(7)(iv) under the relevant license file number in the Commission's International Communications Filing System (ICFS), or any successor system, no later than sixty (60) days after the effective date of the new rules. Existing licensees may petition the Commission for waiver of the requirement, which may be granted only to the extent the licensee demonstrates that the required information is unavailable by the submission deadline.
92. We disagree with commenters' suggestions that requiring applicants and licensees to provide this information does not serve a regulatory purpose. We find that requiring specific information about the submarine cable system, including a map and route list data, is essential for ensuring the Commission can properly evaluate applications for cable landing licenses for their national security implications, determining if the application is in the public interest, and ensuring the Commission has fundamental and accurate knowledge about the security and resilience of submarine cable systems. The Coalition, for example, is generally supportive of requiring the specific location of each beach manhole, cable landing station (including locations of each PFE and each SLTE), NOC, and route position lists, provided the Commission ensures it does not involve disclosure of material non-public technical information and does not delay the review of the Commission or the Committee. We find the concerns about application delay are addressed by our adopted rules, permitting a general description at the application stage supplemented by landing points notifications. We find that concerns regarding confidentiality are addressed
93. NASCA requests that the Commission allow applicants to file this information at a time closer to the in-service date. While we decline to adopt the in-service date, we recognize that the final specific geographic location information may not be available at the time an application for a cable landing license is filed. In those cases, the Commission will accept a general geographic description, provided the Commission is notified of the specific geographic location no later than ninety (90) days prior to commencing construction as a condition of any grant of such application. NASCA also requests that the Commission accept a route position list that is limited to the geocoordinate data in a full route position list. We believe our clarification to § 1.70005(e)(7) of our adopted rules shows that the Commission will require geographic location information and not other potentially competitively-sensitive information about system design as raised by NASCA. NASCA asserts that the Committee does not currently require NOC information and recommends that the Commission instead require a certification that a NOC is not located in a “high-risk jurisdiction.” We find that the location information of NOCs is critical for the Commission's knowledge and assessment of from where a submarine cable is or will be accessed and controlled, including by third parties, through network management, monitoring, maintenance, performance measurement, or other operational functions, and any risks presented by such access and control.
94.
95.
96. We adopt a modified, narrower version of the Commission's proposals to require applicants to report whether or not they use and/or will use third-party foreign adversary service providers in the operation of the submarine cable. Specifically, we will require applicants to report whether or not they use and/or will use the following third-party service providers in the operation of the submarine cable system:
(1) any entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g);
(2) any entity identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609; and/or
(3) any entity that can access the submarine cable from a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f), and to identify any such foreign adversary country.
97. This targeted approach sufficiently addresses the national security and law enforcement risks from foreign adversaries. In the
98. We find that obtaining information about the third-party service providers is important and relevant to the Commission's consideration of national security, law enforcement, and other risks associated with a submarine cable application. We therefore disagree with INCOMPAS' suggestion that information about providers of “supporting services” exceeds the scope of the Cable Landing License Act. While NASCA and Microsoft argue that the most effective way to address risks of third-party access involves implementing “rigorous” or “robust” access controls, we find that requiring disclosure as to whether untrustworthy third-party
99. A few commenters recommend requiring such information only to the extent it is available at the time an application is filed given third-party service arrangements may not be known until a later time. Based on this, if an applicant is unable to confirm this information at the time of filing, we will require such applicants to file a request for waiver with status updates every thirty (30) days until they provide the information. We also find that our tailored approach addresses concerns that the information requirements we adopt relating to third-party service providers would duplicate information that is currently submitted to the Committee. Finally, as discussed below, as an initial step, we adopt a one-time collection that requires licensees to disclose whether they use certain third-party service providers.
100. Below, we adopt rules requiring applicants to certify whether or not they exhibit any of the criteria set out in the presumptive disqualifying conditions adopted herein; that they have created and will implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan; and that they comply with Covered List requirements. We will require licensees to inform the Commission of any Covered List equipment/services in a one-time collection. We also hold applicants and licensees responsible for the acts, omissions, or failures of third-parties with whom the applicant or licensee has a contractual relationship that impact the cybersecurity of the applicant's or licensee's systems and services.
101. We adopt new certification requirements consistent with the presumptive disqualifying conditions adopted herein. Specifically, we will require an applicant seeking a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license to certify whether or not it exhibits any of the criteria set out in the foreign adversary and character presumptive disqualifying conditions. We will require an applicant seeking a cable landing license or modification, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license to certify whether or not it exhibits any of the criteria set out in the foreign adversary cable landing presumptive disqualifying condition. We delegate authority to OIA to develop the questions and certifications for the applications.
102. As discussed above, we will apply the foreign adversary and character presumptive disqualifying conditions to: (1) any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the
103. To protect submarine cable infrastructure from cybersecurity and physical security threats, we require all applicants for an initial cable landing license to certify that they have created and will implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their systems and services from these threats that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system, as supported by the record. We require all licensees seeking a modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license to certify in the application that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their systems and services from cybersecurity and physical security risks that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system. We also require existing licensees to implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan within one year of the effective date of the new rules to also protect against these threats that could affect the provision of communications services through the submarine cable system. As discussed below, we do not require that these plans use any particular framework, in line with commenters who supported a flexible approach. Cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan certification is also supported by the Committee, as it will “bring all licensees up to the minimum standards . . . needed to protect our critical infrastructure from foreign adversary threats.”
104. All applicants and licensees must certify that the cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan meets the following three requirements:
• The plan describes how the applicant or licensee takes or will take reasonable measures to employ its organizational resources and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its systems and services that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system;
• The plan identifies the cyber risks they face, the controls they use or plan to use to mitigate those risks, and how they ensure that these controls are applied or will be applied effectively to their operations; and
• The plan addresses both logical and physical access risks, as well as supply chain risks.
105. Although the
106. Beyond those baseline requirements, applicants and licensees will retain flexibility to tailor their cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans to the risks they face that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system and their organizational needs. Applicants and licensees will have flexibility to determine, for example, how to best mitigate the risks of compromised access controls by, at a minimum, using multifactor authentication or other suitable measures to protect their systems and services. Although we do not require applicants and licensees to follow any particular frameworks in creating their plans, we further find a plan will presumptively satisfy our requirements if it is structured according to an established risk management framework, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), and incorporates best practices, such as the standards and controls set forth in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Cybersecurity Cross-Sector Performance Goals and Objectives (CISA CPGs), or the Center for internet Security's Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls). The plan should address both cybersecurity and physical security risks.
107. This approach is consistent with views of commenters that support a flexible approach to cybersecurity grounded in the NIST CSF. Given our approach and to reflect the evolving nature of cybersecurity risks, we decline to require that all plans include the six additional security controls identified in the
108. The rules promote the harmonization of cybersecurity certification requirements for licensees and applicants, as many commenters requested. CTIA and USTelecom suggest that the Commission should align its rules for submarine cable licensees with its rules for 5G Fund recipients. Submarine cable applicants and licensees that satisfy the requirements adopted in the
109. We agree with commenters on the importance of harmonizing cybersecurity certification requirements with requirements imposed by the Committee and other Executive Branch agencies. We find that licensees that have an existing mitigation agreement or are required to enter into a new mitigation agreement with the Committee, and who implement those agreements in full, will be presumed to satisfy the cybersecurity certification requirements. We expect that the logical security measures or other measures to prevent unauthorized or unlawful access, use, or disclosure of information being carried on a licensee's cable imposed by the Committee in such agreements will be comparable to, or more demanding than, the baseline measures we require here.
110. We stress that, while this is our expectation, a mitigation agreement would not satisfy the requirements of the rules if it does not comprehensively identify the cybersecurity risks that the licensee faces (including physical and supply chain risks), the controls it uses to mitigate those risks, and how it ensures that these controls are applied effectively to its operations. This approach is consistent with the Committee's request in its reply comments that the Commission work with the Committee to harmonize cybersecurity requirements to the extent possible, while supporting the Commission's proposed certification requirement and acknowledging that “there may be instances where the Commission needs . . . information independent of the Committee's actions.” NCTA suggests that the rules are unnecessary in view of the Committee's imposition of logical access requirements as part of its review. We disagree as the Committee does not review all cable landing license applications, therefore, not all cable landing licenses are subject to mitigation agreements. Instead, we agree with Microsoft that “adoption of uniform rules for cybersecurity” is important “to avoid unnecessary duplication or complexity,” and we establish a baseline certification requirement here that applies to all applicants and licensees, with the conditions in a mitigation agreement presumed to satisfy these requirements, which will contribute to a more streamlined approach across the U.S. government.
111. We also reject ICC's argument that the physical resiliency of submarine cable infrastructure should be the sole focus of the Commission's security requirements, and that adopting cybersecurity requirements that also address logical access and supply chain risks would “significantly increase regulatory burden and privacy concerns without meaningfully increasing the security of the underlying data.” While the most common threat to submarine cables remains physical damage from fishing, shipping, or undersea weather events, intentional damage from state or non-state actors using more subtle means of infiltration is “of greater concern.” These threats require holistic planning, including both cybersecurity and physical security. Physical resiliency protections (
112. Submarine cable infrastructure also faces a threat of malicious cyber activities that target the broader networks of which submarine cables represent only one link. Malicious actors may take advantage of vulnerabilities in these larger networks at locations with remote access to the submarine cable infrastructure to disrupt data flows, divert traffic, or delete data transmitted through the submarine cables, with serious consequences for the operational security of this critical infrastructure and the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the information. Accordingly, we adopt cybersecurity and physical security risk management requirements to ensure that appropriate cybersecurity protections are in place against the physical, logical, and supply chain threats to applicants' and licensees' communications systems and services that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system.
113. We adopt commenters' suggestion to limit the scope of the cybersecurity certification requirement to the submarine cable system operator and the submarine cable network management systems only. In the interests of tailoring our requirements to the specific problem of submarine cable security and to limit regulatory burdens, the risk management plans only need to explain how the applicant or licensee takes or will take reasonable measures to employ its organizational resources and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its systems and services that could affect its provision of communications services through the submarine cable system.
114.
115. Commenters raise a variety of concerns regarding this requirement. CTIA recommends harmonizing the signatory requirement with the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122. However, we find that reliance upon a third party to manage, route, or otherwise contribute to critical system operations does not relieve licensees of their cybersecurity responsibilities. The Commission has long held that “licensees and other regulatees are responsible for the acts and omissions of their employees and independent contractors,” and has recognized that “under long established principles of common law, statutory duties are nondelegable.” The risk of systemic harm to critical infrastructure warrants a regulatory approach that ensures licensees remain ultimately accountable for the security of their systems, including those operated or maintained by third parties.
123. We adopt the proposal in the
124.
125. Many commenters are generally supportive of the use of the Commission's Covered List as a tool to promote national security. Equipment or services are placed on the Covered List based on a determination made by, among others, an appropriate national security agency that the equipment and/or services pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons pursuant to the Secure Networks Act. NASCA explicitly supports adopting the Commission's proposal to require applicants to certify that any proposed submarine cable systems will not use covered equipment or services. NASCA supports the Commission's proposal to “require applicants . . . to certify whether or not
126. We also require, as a condition of a potential grant of an application to modify a cable landing license to add a new segment, that applicants must certify that the new submarine cable segment and landing point will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. For example, if a licensee files a modification application to add a new landing point, the certification would apply to the segment connecting the submarine cable to the new landing point to ensure the protection of the new segment and landing point from any national security threats.
127. We are not persuaded by CTIA's argument that we should decline to prohibit the use of covered equipment or services in submarine cable systems because it would expand the Covered List “in ways that were not originally contemplated by pertinent statutory authorities” and “without Congressional direction.” The Commission's responsibility to place equipment and services on the Covered List is set out in section 2 of the Secure Networks Act, and both that Act and the Secure Equipment Act of 2021 impose certain related duties on the Commission. However, the Commission can adopt, and has adopted, certain requirements that are not specifically required by statute but that take into consideration the fact that the Covered List represents a list of equipment and services that have been determined to pose risks to national security and public safety. In fact, the Secure Equipment Act recognizes the Commission's legal authority to take actions concerning the Covered List to fulfill the Commission's national security mission. We act here pursuant to our authority under the Cable Landing License Act and on the basis of this record to prevent new or additional insecure equipment and services from being integrated into this critical U.S. infrastructure by a cable landing licensee.
128. Finally, we received a variety of viewpoints on using other federal government lists. For example, SentinelOne supports expanding the sources used for identifying untrusted equipment, encouraging the Commission “to align its Covered List with other federal authorities, including the Department of Defense's 1260H list, the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List, and related U.S. Government assessments.” TIA argues that while it makes sense to rely on the Covered List to limit the participation by untrusted vendors, the Commission should also collaborate with its national security counterparts in the federal government to investigate the need for additional restrictions. We are not prepared at this time, however, to draw from the lists of those other federal agencies or apply the certification requirement to all vendors “from” foreign adversaries, given the uncertain nature of this latter category. Rather, in the
129.
130. We provide an exception to this certification requirement for existing licensees that are entities identified on the Commission's Covered List. Such entities identified on the Covered List can continue to add covered equipment or services on their submarine cable system. Based on the determinations that equipment or services produced or provided by entities on the Covered List have been found to present national security risks, the Commission believes there is little national security benefit to prohibiting their use of covered equipment or services on their submarine cable system. Rather, the risks these entities pose are best mitigated through the presumptive disqualifying conditions and the Foreign Adversary Annual Report that we adopt in this
131. We find that it is premature to establish a “rip and replace”-like framework for current submarine cable infrastructure. We recognize that for existing licensees with covered equipment or services, there are costs associated with replacing these equipment or services, as well as other challenges, as suggested by commenters. Unlike the context of section 4 of the Secure Networks Act, where funds have been allocated to reimburse entities that are required by the federal government to remove equipment determined to present a national security risk, no such funds have been appropriated for submarine cable systems. Under these circumstances, we find that requiring licensees to replace existing covered equipment or services in their submarine cable systems would be overly burdensome and could have adverse effects, such as fewer deployment of submarine cables or related facilities.
132. In addition, given the national security risks and threats posed by covered equipment or services, and the Commission's responsibilities as a licensing agency for submarine cables, we believe that the Commission should have a greater understanding of the covered equipment or services involved with licensed submarine cables. While the Committee may have individual mitigation agreements with certain cable landing licensees, the Commission is in the position as the licensing agency for submarine cables to understand the collective U.S. submarine cable ecosystem. Therefore, we modify the proposed scope of the certification and require licensees to certify that they will not add to their submarine cable systems, covered equipment or services that are currently identified or newly identified in the future. Licensees will be required to provide this certification
133.
134. We adopt new routine conditions and modify the Commission's existing routine conditions that are attached to cable landing licenses under § 1.767(g) of the current rules. The routine conditions we adopt: (1) eliminate a distinction that applies the routine conditions only to licensees of a cable landing license granted on or after March 15, 2002, (2) ensure the protection of this critical submarine cable infrastructure through prohibitions, (3) require commencement of service within three years following the grant of a cable landing license, and (4) require important updated information regarding the submarine cable system, including contact information. These measures are necessary to ensure that licensees remain vigilant against foreign adversary threats and that the Commission has updated and accurate information about licensees and the operation of licensed submarine cable systems. The routine conditions will promote the security, integrity, and resilience of critical submarine cable infrastructure.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140. We did not receive comment on this proposal, and we adopt it as a routine condition on all grants of a cable landing license granted after the effective date of the new rules. We find this requirement would provide the Commission with more accurate information as to which license grants were not utilized to construct and operate submarine cables and improve the administration of the Commission's rules. Failure to notify the Commission of commencement of service within three years following the grant of the license shall result in automatic termination of the license after seeking approval of the State Department, unless
141.
142.
143. In noting existing licensing delays, commenters indicate that applications that qualify for streamlining under the Commission's rules often are removed from streamlined processing. Commenters encourage the Commission to use the existing streamlining process. While the
144. We adopt a rule specifying the requirements for an application to renew or extend a cable landing license upon expiration of the 25-year license term. Specifically, we adopt the proposals set out in the
145.
146.
147. We will place a renewal or extension application on streamlined Accepted for Filing public notice and take action on such application within forty-five (45) days after release of the public notice if: (1) the Commission does not refer the application to the Executive Branch agencies because (a) the applicant does not have reportable foreign ownership, as defined in § 1.40001(d), or (b) the only reportable foreign ownership is not ownership or control by a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g), and has been previously reviewed by the Commission and the Committee and (c) the application does not raise other national security or law enforcement concerns, or other considerations warranting Executive Branch review; (2) the application does not raise other public interest considerations, including regulatory compliance; (3) the Executive Branch agencies do not separately request during the comment period that the Commission defer action and remove the application from streamlined processing; (4) no objections to the application are timely raised by an opposing party; and (5) any proposed grant of a renewal or extension application is approved by the State Department.
148. We adopt the proposal in the
149. As was discussed in the
150. We find that removal of a previously approved landing point, licensee, or condition to comply with a national security mitigation condition does not raise concerns that would normally require a full application. Based on the record in the proceeding, we agree with ICC and NASCA that certain types of changes to a submarine cable system, such as the removal of a licensee or a cable landing point or a minor change in the location of an existing landing point can be handled through a notification to the Commission. Consequently, we will not adopt the proposal in the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155. We adopt a pre-action notification requirement when two Commission-licensed cables propose to interconnect. In the
156. Although such a change may not raise concerns, there may be instances where an interconnection—whether it be in U.S. territorial waters or outside of U.S. territorial waters—may raise national security concerns and the Commission should be notified about such a change in advance. Accordingly, we adopt procedures for such changes similar to the process used for landing point notifications. Licensees will be required to file a notification about a proposed interconnection at least 90 days prior to the construction of the proposed interconnection. The Commission will give public notice of the notification of modification. The modification will be considered granted, without further Commission action, unless the Commission notifies the licensees otherwise in writing no later than 60 days after the submission of the notification. If, upon review of the notification, the Commission finds that such an interconnection presents a risk to national security, law enforcement, foreign policy and/or trade policy or raises other concerns, it may require the licensee(s) to file a complete modification application to seek Commission approval for the interconnection. We find that this notification process will be less burdensome on licensees than the full modification process proposed in the
157. The notification about a proposed interconnection must be filed 90 days prior to construction of the proposed connection. The filing must include information on: (1) the cable systems being interconnected, including the names and file numbers for the cables and (2) a general description of where the interconnection will take place and the terms of the interconnection agreement.
158. We agree with the Coalition and NASCA that if a new segment and landing point only connects two (or more) foreign points and the connection cannot be used to connect directly with the United States, the segment does not need to be licensed by the Commission. In the
159. The filing must include: (1) the name and file number of the U.S.
160. We adopt the proposal to require that an applicant seeking to assign or transfer control of a cable landing license must include the percentage of voting and ownership interests being assigned or transferred, including in the U.S. portion of the cable system, which includes all U.S. cable landing station(s). The applicant must also demonstrate that grant of the transaction will serve the public interest. In addition, the rule regarding assignments and transfer of control applications is amended to incorporate the changes adopted herein for all applications, including the required certifications. No commenter addressed these proposals.
161. We adopt the proposal to have a separate rule section regarding notification of
162. Under the rules we adopt, a licensee will continue to be required to file a
163. Additionally, to ensure the Commission has up-to-date information on national security or compliance matters affecting a cable landing license, we will require that notifications of
164. We adopt the proposal to create a rule specific to requests for an STA for submarine cables rather than continuing to rely on the STA rule in Part 63 for temporary or emergency service by international carriers. Generally, the Commission will consider requests for an STA: (1) seeking to commence construction of or commercial service on a cable system while the cable landing license or modification application is pending Commission approval; (2) seeking to continue operating a cable system following the expiration of a license and pending the filing of an application to renew or extend the cable landing license when the renewal or extension application is not filed in a timely or complete manner; (3) where the cable system is being operated without first obtaining a license; (4) where a transaction was consummated without prior Commission consent; or (5) seeking to provide emergency service arising from a need occasioned by conditions unforeseen by, and beyond the control of, the licensee(s), among other examples. ICC is generally supportive of the proposals related to STAs.
165. An application for an STA must include the following information: (1) the name(s), contact(s), and citizenship(s) or place(s) of organization of each applicant requesting an STA with respect to the submarine cable, including the licensees that jointly hold a cable landing license; (2) the name of the cable system for which applicant(s) request an STA; (3) a description of the request for an STA: (a) the reason why the applicants seek an STA, (b) whether it is a new request for an STA, a request to extend or renew an STA, or other type, and (c) the justification for such request, including why grant is warranted; (4) the date by which applicants seek grant of the STA; and (5) the duration for which applicants seek an STA (up to 180 days). Applicants must acknowledge that any grant of an STA (1) does not prejudice action by the Commission on any underlying application(s); (2) is subject to revocation/cancellation or modification by the Commission on its own motion without a hearing; (3) will expire automatically upon the termination date unless the applicant has made a timely and complete application for extension of the STA; and (4) does not preclude enforcement action for non-compliance with the Cable Landing License Act, the Communications Act, or the Commission's rules for action or failure
166. If the STA application relates to a licensed cable or a cable whose license expired, the applicant(s) must provide the license file number(s) of the cable landing license. If the request for an STA is associated with an application(s) pending with the Commission (
167. All STA applications require a certification that none of the applicant(s) are subject to a denial of Federal benefits pursuant to of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. If the STA application is for operation of the cable system, the applicant(s) must include the certifications required in an application for a new cable landing license, with the exception of § 1.70006(d).
168. We will continue to follow our current practice related to STA applications. Once an STA application is found to be Acceptable For Filing, we will place it on public notice for comment. While we will not formally refer the STA application to the Executive Branch agencies, we will send a courtesy copy of the public notice to the Executive Branch agencies if any of the applicants have reportable foreign ownership. The Commission may consult with the Committee on a particular request for an STA, where appropriate, prior to releasing the public notice. Any grant of an STA does not prejudice action by the Commission on any underlying application, including enforcement action.
169. We adopt the Commission's proposal to amend § 1.768(e)(4) of the rules to require that licensees must include voting interests in a notification of a foreign carrier affiliation, in addition to the equity interests, and a diagram of individuals or entities with a 10% or greater direct or indirect ownership in the licensee. Currently, a licensee is required to include, among other things, in a foreign carrier affiliation notification “[t]he name, address, citizenship, and principal business of any person or entity that directly or indirectly owns at least ten percent (10%) of the equity of the licensee, and the percentage of equity owned by each of those entities (to the nearest one percent (1%)).” In the
170. NASCA also contends that the Commission should “reassess the rule's purpose” and “the rule should be narrowed to apply only to foreign carriers in the countries where the relevant cable lands,” but offers no justification for this proposal nor explains with particularity how this would be implemented. In any event, we find that our regulatory framework ensures that the Commission considers whether foreign participation in U.S. markets would raise national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy concerns due to an applicant's foreign ownership, as well as potential anti-competitive behavior by a carrier with market power at the foreign end of a U.S. cable.
171.
172.
173. In the
174. Similarly, in the
175.
176.
177. We adopt an annual report requirement for existing licensees that meet certain conditions below. We adopt this Foreign Adversary Annual Report to ensure that the Commission has the information it needs to timely monitor and continually assess national security or other risks that may arise over the course of a licensee's 25-year license term, which may inform decisions to revoke or impose additional conditions upon a license in response to changed circumstances. In the
178. In an effort to ease burdens on licensees that do not meet the applicable criteria, we adopt a routine condition as proposed in the
179. We require existing licensees that meet one or more of the criteria below to provide an annual report. We find that although the frequency of filing for the annual report is more than would be required for the three-year periodic report, the burden is outweighed by the benefit because the licensees subject to this requirement present a potentially heightened national security risk. This annual reporting requirement applies to an existing licensee:
(1) That is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g);
(2) That is identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act;
(3) Whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval, whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity; and/or
(4) Whose submarine cable system is licensed to land or operate in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f).
180.
181.
182. We adopt the requirement that licensees that meet the criteria under our newly adopted rule, § 1.70017, shall submit their initial Foreign Adversary Annual Report within six months of the effective date of the new rules, and each year. We delegate authority to OIA to establish and modify, as appropriate, deadlines for the report.
183.
184.
185. Section 8(a) of the Communications Act mandates that the Commission assess and collect application fees based on the Commission's costs to process applications. Section 8(c) also requires the Commission to amend the application fee schedule if the Commission determines that the schedule requires amendment to ensure that: (1) such fees reflect increases or decreases in the costs of processing applications at the Commission or (2) such schedule reflects the consolidation or addition of new categories of applications.
186. The Commission processes a wide range of applications that are subject to a filing fee. Based on the comments, we determine that the filing fee for Foreign Adversary Annual Reports should be lower than the fee for the three-year periodic reports proposed in the
187. We modify the circuit capacity reporting requirements to enhance the quality and usefulness of the data for national security and other purposes, provide greater clarity on the reporting requirements to Filing Entities, and eliminate duplicative burdens. The Commission has found that the data from the circuit capacity reports are necessary for the Commission to fulfill its statutory obligations and serve a vital role by sharing this information with other federal agencies. The Committee regularly requests these data for its work on national security and law enforcement issues, as has DHS for its national security and homeland security functions. We find that the data provided through the Capacity Holder Reports provides the information necessary for these purposes and thus eliminate the Cable Operator Report. We direct OIA to revise the Filing Manual to conform with the changes we adopt here.
188. Based on our review of the record, we eliminate the requirement for licensees to file a Cable Operator Report. Microsoft and NASCA propose eliminating the Cable Operator Report, as it requires joint licensees for a system to share competitively sensitive information with each other and the information provided is redundant of the Capacity Holder Reports. The Coalition supports “allowing for each licensee on a cable to report its `available capacity' on the cable on an individual basis,” and suggests the Commission could aggregate the data provided by each licensee to determine the total capacity for each system, which “would necessarily require each licensee to report its own capacity in order for the Commission to have accurate data.” We agree with commenters that certain data collected in the Cable Operator Report and Capacity Holder Report are redundant. We find that we can streamline the reporting requirements by eliminating the Cable Operator Report and collecting the information currently obtained through the Cable Operator Report in the Capacity Holders Reports which will eliminate the concerns about sharing confidential information with other licensees on the cable.
189. While we will no longer collect the total “available capacity” on a per system basis through the Cable Operator Report, we provide definitional clarifications, as discussed in section III.H.3., to ensure we can reliably assess the “owned capacity” data individually and in the aggregate to ascertain the total available capacity of each submarine cable.
190. In addition, we will retain important information from the Cable Operator Report by integrating planned capacity data and design capacity data into the Capacity Holder Report. As explained below, we modify the approach raised in the
191. We modify the rules to require Capacity Holder Reports for domestic cables licensed by the Commission. We find that the lack of information on domestic cables creates a critical gap in the Commission's insight into the ownership and use of capacity on submarine cables regulated by the Commission. We find that extending the capacity reporting requirements to domestic submarine cables will strengthen our ability and that of the Committee to identify and assess national security, law enforcement, and other risks to this critical U.S. communications infrastructure.
192. We disagree with commenters' arguments that the Commission should not extend the annual capacity reporting requirements to domestic submarine cables because it would “impose burdens disproportionate to their benefit” and domestic submarine cables “do not implicate the national security risks that the [
193. We therefore modify § 43.82 to require cable landing licensees and common carriers to file Capacity Holder Reports for their capacity holdings on domestic submarine cables. We find it is appropriate to require Filing Entities to report the same capacity information that we collect for U.S.-international submarine cables, especially in light of other changes we adopt for the circuit capacity reporting requirements. Accordingly, Filing Entities shall report their capacity holdings on domestic submarine cables in accordance with § 43.82, as amended in this proceeding.
194. We find that eliminating the Cable Operator Report and consolidating the capacity data into the Capacity Holder Reports—a report filed by each Filing Entity on an individual basis—will enable the Commission to continue collecting accurate and important data for national security and public safety purposes while addressing the concerns of commenters about sharing competitively sensitive information with other joint licensees and duplicative reporting requirements. We will therefore amend the Capacity Holder Report to integrate information about available, planned and design capacity that was previously reported in the Cable Operator Report. We also clarify the definitions to provide clarity to Filing Entities and improve the consistency and reliability of the data. We believe that clarifying the definitions will better ensure that Filing Entities report their data accurately and consistently, and consequently, will enable the Commission to rely on aggregation of owned capacity data from the Capacity Holder Reports to assess the total available capacity of a submarine cable in absence of the Cable Operator Report.
195.
196. Accordingly, we will apply this definition of “available capacity” to the existing categories of capacity holdings in the Capacity Holder Report. These categories include (1) owned capacity (“Cable Ownership”), (2) the net amount of IRUs, (3) net amount of ICLs, (4) net capacity, (5) activated (
197.
198. In light of the national security and other risks raised in the record, and the important role of capacity data for advancing national security purposes, we adopt additional categories for reporting capacity holdings to include data for fiber and spectrum holdings. The current circuit capacity data collection does not provide visibility into how and to what extent capacity holders, including any entity that is owned and/or controlled by foreign
199. While industry commenters did not address these issues specifically, a few commenters generally oppose expanding the capacity reporting requirements and argue the Commission should focus on clarifying and simplifying existing requirements. We agree with the Committee, however, that it would be useful to identify in the Capacity Holder Reports how the capacity is held “on a fiber or spectrum basis.” The Committee explains that an entity with a dark fiber interest in a submarine cable “typically is responsible for `lighting' its own dark fiber or spectrum” and may “attach its own SLTE, or equivalent equipment, to the fiber, in its own facility to route its own U.S. communications traffic, all operated, monitored, and secured by its own network operations center (NOC) and its own employees and service providers.” Significantly, as noted by the Committee, “[a] foreign adversary-controlled non-licensee entity that owns, controls, or operates its own SLTE, or equivalent equipment, on a submarine cable landing in the United States may have connectivity comparable to operating their own communications cable to the United States without a license, or any regulatory review, mitigation, or monitoring for national security or law enforcement risk.”
200. Accordingly, licensees and common carriers will be required to identify, with respect to each sale, lease, or purchase of a fiber pair and/or spectrum, the submarine cable, the U.S. and foreign landing points of the fiber pair and/or spectrum, and the entity that manages the fiber pair and/or spectrum, if different from the entity that owns it. We thus will apply consistent reporting requirements where, for example, a Filing Entity sold, leased, or purchased whole fiber pairs or spectrum partitioned on a fiber. We will tailor these requirements by not requiring licensees and common carriers to separately report the amount of capacity that is sold, leased, and/or purchased by fiber pair or spectrum. We expect this capacity information will be represented in the data that Filing Entities must report under existing categories of owned capacity, net IRUs, and net ICLs.
201. Consistent with other actions in this
202. The Coalition opposes incorporating “a new reporting category regarding SLTE ownership and operation on a cable system,” arguing that it is unnecessary and, “[w]ithout a demonstrable gain to national security, increases in the reporting and compliance burdens on the industry should be avoided.” We disagree with the Coalition's views that there is no “demonstrable gain to national security” in collecting this information. Indeed, we find that addressing this critical information gap is essential for our national security objectives. Moreover, as discussed above, the Committee emphasizes the importance of obtaining information about entities with access to, or ownership or control of, SLTE and equivalent equipment in light of “the risk of foreign adversary-controlled non-licensee entities owning, controlling, and operating SLTE, or equivalent equipment, on submarine cables landing in the United States.”
203. We therefore modify § 43.82 to require cable landing licensees and common carriers to identify in the Capacity Holder Report whether they
204. We find that any subsidiary, parent entity, or affiliate should be allowed to file the Capacity Holder Report on behalf of a licensee or common carrier, so long as the legal name of the licensee or common carrier is identified in the report and an officer of the licensee or common carrier certifies that the information in the report is accurate and complete. To the extent a subsidiary, parent entity, or affiliate of a Filing Entity submits the circuit capacity reports on the Filing Entity's behalf, the Filing Entity shall be held accountable for any defects in the certification as to the accuracy and completeness of information filed in the circuit capacity reports. While no commenter addressed these issues, based on Commission staff review of the annual capacity data, we find that allowing any subsidiary, parent entity, or affiliate to file the Capacity Holder Report on behalf of a licensee or common carrier, subject to identification and certification requirements, would be consistent with a common filing practice. Further, we find that our approach will improve the administrative efficiency of our current practice, which involves informal inquiries by Commission staff, to confirm whether the licensee or common carrier has complied with its reporting obligations.
205. To the extent a subsidiary, parent entity, or affiliate files the Capacity Holder Report on behalf of a licensee or common carrier, we will require that the report must identify the legal name of the licensee or common carrier that is subject to the § 43.82 reporting requirements. To the extent a consolidated Capacity Holder Report is filed on behalf of multiple affiliated entities, we will require that the report must identify the legal name of each entity and, where applicable, indicate whether certain information (
206. We adopt the Commission's proposal to codify a compliance provision in § 43.82 of the rules. In the
207. As was proposed in the
208. Since 2019, the Commission has annually issued a Public Notice to announce its intent to share the annual capacity data with DHS and subsequently the Committee pursuant to the procedures set out in § 0.442 of the Commission's rules, and no party has opposed such disclosure of the capacity data for which confidential treatment was requested. The Commission has found that the data provided in the Circuit Capacity Reports “are essential for our national security and public safety responsibilities in regulating communications submarine cables” and that “circuit capacity data are important for the Commission's contributions to the national security and defense of the United States. The data are also useful for federal agencies in fulfilling their other duties and responsibilities.
209. The Committee supports adoption of a rule to allow the Commission to share with other federal government agencies the capacity data filed on a confidential basis without the pre-notification requirements of § 0.442(d) and states that streamlining the sharing of information would “help the Committee efficiently fill some information gaps on older cable systems and reduce delays, administrative burden, and duplicative filings on behalf of industry.” The Committee “recommends that the Commission include at least all the Committee members,” and states that it “intends to treat any information, received from the Commission in accordance with Commission confidentially rules . . . and the confidentiality provisions contained in Section 8 of E.O. 13913.” The Committee states that it also “intends to treat such information as eligible for exemption under the Freedom of Information Act, to the extent applicable.” Industry commenters do not object to the sharing of the data with federal agencies provided that “licensees' requests for confidential treatment are honored” and “such information remains confidential.
210. Pursuant to the new rule we adopt today, the Commission will be able to share the confidential data with federal agencies that have a legitimate need for the data consistent with their functions without the delay attendant to providing parties an opportunity to object to the sharing. Further, the rule we adopt will make clear that sharing of the confidential circuit capacity data with other federal government agencies is subject to the requirements of the confidentiality protections contained in the Commission's regulations and 44 U.S.C. 3510, and, in the case of the Committee, section 8 of Executive Order 13913 that require the Committee to keep the information confidential. Therefore, sharing of confidential capacity data will continue to be subject to the requirement that each of the other federal agencies comply with the confidentiality protections applicable both to the Commission and the other agency relating to the unlawful disclosure of information. We will also provide notice to the parties whose information is being shared.
211. We find that the Committee states that it has a legitimate need for reviewing the capacity data to fulfill its mandate under Executive Order 13913, as the data are relevant to its national security and law enforcement reviews and “[h]aving this information provides a clearer picture of how such cables are being used and by whom and better enables the Committee to evaluate international data flows on various cables.” We also find that DHS has a legitimate need for the capacity data. In the
212. We adopt a mandatory one-time information collection applicable to cable landing licensees. As noted above, the one-time information collection is necessary to obtain information to assist the Commission in fulfilling the purposes of the Cable Landing License Act.
213.
214.
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219.
220.
221. We estimate that the rules that we adopt today will facilitate faster and more efficient deployment of submarine cables, while at the same time ensuring the security and resilience of this critical infrastructure. Applying conservative assumptions, we estimate that licensees will incur total costs of no more than approximately $2.5 million per year to implement the rules. Our estimate includes all the expected ongoing costs that would be incurred as a result of the rules adopted in the
222. We implement the following proposals from the
223. To protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, we will presumptively preclude the grant of applications filed by: any entity owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or control of a foreign adversary; any entity on the Commission's “Covered List;” and/or any entity whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval, whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity. To ensure that applicants have the requisite character qualifications, we adopt a presumption that an applicant is not qualified to hold a cable landing license if it meets certain criteria. We adopt a presumption that denial of an application is warranted where an applicant seeks to land a new submarine cable in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f), or that seeks to modify, renew, or extend its cable landing license to add a new landing located in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f). To ensure that applicants have the requisite character qualifications, we adopt a presumption that an applicant is not qualified to hold a cable landing license if it meets any of the criteria listed below, unless the applicant overcomes the adverse presumption. Additionally, we adopt a condition prohibiting cable landing licensees from entering into new or an extension of existing arrangements for IRU or leases for capacity on submarine cable systems landing in the United States, where such arrangement for IRUs or lease for capacity would give the entity owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, the ability to install, own, or manage SLTE on a submarine cable landing in the United States. For current licensees that meet the above definition or whose cable lands in a foreign adversary country, we adopt increased oversight tools as they must file an annual Foreign Adversary Annual Report containing information about the submarine cable system operations and the licensee and submarine cable system ownership. We also adopt a written hearing process for denial or revocation and/or termination of cable landing licenses.
224. We modernize our submarine cable rules by adopting a definition of the term, “submarine cable system,” that acknowledges the range of technological advancement in existing submarine cable systems. This definition incorporates the future technological evolution of submarine cable systems, all of which include SLTE as a significant component of the system itself. While at this time we decline to require SLTE owners and operators to become licensees, we take steps to identify, through a one-time information collection, how many entities currently own or operate SLTEs on existing licensed cable systems. The one-time information collection we adopt will further inform the Commission about the identities of SLTE owners and operators and their respective role in operating a portion of the submarine cable system, including information about system capacity, spectrum, or the lighting of a fiber. The one-time collection will also assess for insolvent cables or licensees, and require licensees to disclose whether they use covered equipment or services.
225. We also codify the Commission's longstanding practice of requiring a cable landing license for submarine cables that lie partially outside of U.S. territorial waters. Moreover, while we do retain a number of our current rules, we eliminate the requirement that entities that solely own, and do not control, a U.S. cable landing station must be applicants for, and licensees on, a cable landing license. We also update our application rules to ensure applicants provide sufficient information about the submarine cable infrastructure for which they are seeking a license and to require compliance with ongoing certifications regarding cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans and use of equipment and services identified on the Covered List. These rules will ensure that licensees protect their networks from cybersecurity threats and threats from individuals and entities subject to foreign adversary ownership, control, jurisdiction, or direction. We clarify when a modification of an existing license is required and whether the change requires prior approval or a post-action notification. We formalize rules for applications to renew a cable landing license upon expiration of the license term and for special temporary authority. To make it easier for applicants and licensees to navigate our rules, we update the organization of rules for applications to modify, assign, transfer control of, or renew or extend a cable landing license or request special temporary authority. We adopt rules to obligate licensees to keep the Commission abreast of changes to important information such as the contact information of the licensee and other information that will enable the Commission to maintain accurate records regarding licensees. We eliminate the requirement for licensees to file a Cable Operator Report about the capacity on a cable. We will require licensees and common carriers to report their capacity on domestic as well as international cables and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported
226. The rules we adopt today should benefit national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy, as well as fulfill our public interest responsibilities under the Cable Landing License Act. The rules overall will increase our ability to monitor international data flows over the international submarine cable network, to identify those entities that are using the cables, and to detect attacks on the U.S. government, private sector, and critical infrastructure. Updating the circuit capacity data collection to include more granular information on submarine cable equipment and more precise measures of circuit capacity should enable the Commission to identify new risks to submarine cables. Including SLTE in the formal definition of a submarine cable system should strengthen our oversight of potentially vulnerable SLTE end points which should increase the security of the entire submarine cable network. Adopting an information collection on cable landing licensees to learn about SLTE owners and operators and whether the licensee currently uses any equipment or services identified on the “Covered List,” uses a third-party foreign adversary service provider, or uses a third-party service provider that can access the submarine cable system from a foreign adversary country should inform our efforts in coordination with the Committee to respond to potential vulnerabilities of the submarine cable system.
227. We couple our rules improving risk identification and monitoring with rules that allow us to mitigate potential risks. Strengthening our rules on presumptive denials of certain applications filed by applicants with previous adverse actions on national security grounds should reduce the surveillance of sensitive data and disruption to online commerce and international financial transactions. By prohibiting IRUs and leasing capacity agreements owned by foreign adversaries, we are reducing their access to capacity on submarine cables that access the United States, thereby mitigating the risk of hostile actions.
228. Our actions today balance the need to strengthen national security with efforts to expedite and streamline our processes, thereby reducing the burden of compliance. By narrowing the Commission's proposals to require applicants to report whether or not they use and/or will use third-party foreign adversary service providers in the operation of a submarine cable, we balance our goals of strengthening national security while minimizing the burden on our trading partners and allies. Similarly, streamlining the information sharing procedures with the Committee should reduce the burden on industry of preparing reports and filings while expediting coordinated efforts across the federal government to protect U.S. cable systems from foreign adversary attacks.
229. Submarine cables are estimated to carry 99% of intercontinental internet traffic and serve as the backbone to global communications. In updating our submarine cable rules for the first time since 2001, the Commission is responding to recent geopolitical developments and addressing potential hostile actions by foreign adversaries against our submarine cable network, including potentially severing submarine cables or damaging equipment located at cable landing stations, disrupting communications, and negatively impacting international financial transactions and online commerce. In recent years the threat of malicious cyberattacks by foreign adversaries, most notably China, on U.S. telecommunications companies and critical infrastructure has become more significant. Cyber threats to the U.S. government, private sector, and infrastructure include espionage, surveillance, and the suppression of communications. There has been an increase in reports of physical cutting of submarine cable infrastructure, and these incidents appear to be deliberately targeting the key linkages between the United States and its trading partners. Cybercrime and malicious cyber activities have become more costly over the past decade. The hacking group Salt Typhoon compromised the networks of several major U.S. Internet companies in 2024. A third party entity reports that the volume of attacks by China to the U. S. government, technology and communications sectors increased by 50% between 2023 and 2024.
230. The U.S. gross domestic product was over $29 trillion in 2024. The digital economy added approximately $2.6 trillion in value to the overall U.S. economy in 2022, representing approximately 10% of gross domestic product, and represents a rapidly growing segment of the overall economy. Globally, the volume of financial transactions flowing over submarine cables has been estimated to be greater than ten trillion dollars per day. Thus, even a temporary, localized disruption to data passing through submarine cables would likely result in very substantial economic losses. The harms would encompass business imports and exports, the operations of multinational corporations, international financial flows, online commerce, residential and government communications, and online access to information including emergency services. Although such losses are very difficult to measure, on an annual basis, we find that they are likely well in excess of the annual costs that we estimate would be associated with our rules.
231. Our revised estimate of costs is $2.5 million per year, including all additional expected costs that would be incurred as a result of the rules adopted in this
232. We base our cost estimate on the Commission's records that indicate, as of July 31, 2025, there are currently 91 submarine cable systems licensed by the Commission that are owned by approximately 147 unique licensees. Furthermore, we estimate that there are approximately ten (10) applications for new cables landing licenses filed every year. We also estimate that there are approximately 24 applications filed every year for modification, assignment, or transfer of control of a cable landing license. Based on these estimated numbers of applications, and our estimate that there will be four renewal applications filed annually, we estimate that 38 submarine cable applications are submitted annually.
233. Our cost estimate assumes that approximately 114 licensees will undergo the application process each year for the estimated 38 cable systems that are submitting applications for that year. We base this on the conservative assumption that each cable landing license application will have an average of three licensees. In addition, we estimate that applicants will incur an additional cost associated with the rules we adopt to certify compliance with baseline cybersecurity standards, including implementing the cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans. We expect that the amount of work associated with preparing a new license application likely will be similar to the work associated with preparing a renewal application.
234. In the
235. The rules adopted in this
236.
237.
238.
239. Additionally, this
240.
241.
242.
243. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) incorporated an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) in the
244. In this
245. Specifically, we adopt a standard for identifying a “foreign adversary,” “foreign adversary country,” and an individual or entity “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,” and use these to adopt rules that will better protect U.S. national security and critical U.S. communications infrastructure from foreign adversaries. We presumptively preclude the grant of applications filed by any entity owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary; any entity identified on the Commission's “Covered List”; and/or any entity whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval, whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity. We adopt a presumption that an applicant is not qualified to hold a cable landing license if it meets any of the criteria identified in the
246. We define the term, “submarine cable system,” that acknowledges the range of technological advancement in existing submarine cable systems, including SLTEs. We adopt a one-time information collection to collect the number of entities that currently own or operate SLTEs on existing licensed cable systems, and the respective SLTE owners and operators' identities and their role in operating a portion of the submarine cable system, among other information. The one-time collection will also assess for insolvent cables or licensees, and require licensees to disclose whether they use covered equipment or services.
247. We also codify the Commission's longstanding practice of requiring a cable landing license for submarine cables that lie partially outside of U.S. territorial waters. We eliminate the requirement that entities that solely own, and do not control, a U.S. cable landing station must be applicants for, and licensees on, a cable landing license. We require a statement that grant of the application is in the public interest, to ensure applicants provide sufficient information about the submarine cable system for which they are seeking a license, to report whether or not they use and/or will use third-party foreign adversary service providers in the operation of the submarine cable, and to require compliance with ongoing certifications regarding cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans and use of equipment and services identified on the Covered List. We clarify when a modification of an existing license is required and whether the change requires prior approval or a post-action notification. We formalize rules for applications to renew or extend a cable landing license upon expiration of the license term and for special temporary authority. We update the organization of rules for applications to modify, assign, transfer control of, or renew or extend a cable landing license or request special temporary authority. We adopt rules for licensees to keep the Commission abreast of changes to important information such as the contact information of the licensee and other information that will enable the Commission to maintain accurate records regarding licensees. We eliminate the requirement for licensees to file a Cable Operator Report about the capacity on a cable. We require licensees and common carriers to report their capacity on domestic as well as international cables and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported.
248. No comments were made on the record on the IRFA specifically. However, several commenters addressed the impact of the Commission's proposed rules in the
249. Commenters raised small business impacts in the context of the Commission's seeking comment on whether to retain the requirement that an entity that owns or controls a 5% or greater interest in the cable and uses the U.S. points of the cable system be an applicant for and licensee on a cable landing license. As an example, the Submarine Cable Coalition argues in favor of keeping the 5% or greater threshold for licensing and claimed “[a]ny proposed changes to modify the 5% ownership threshold . . . will specifically and disproportionately impact small carriers and investors.” Microsoft similarly argues the Commission should not “impos[e] unnecessary burdens on small investors” who do not have the ability to materially influence the operation of the cable.
250. The Commission's proposal in the
251. Commenters noted the burdens of the
252. USTelecom generally expressed support for the Commission's proposed cybersecurity requirements and noted that its small and medium enterprise members “have a mature cybersecurity culture,” agreed with the Commission on letting companies demonstrate compliance with proposed cybersecurity requirements by following an established risk management framework like the NIST CSF and using government resources. USTelecom advocated allowing organizations to combine their cybersecurity risk management and supply chain risk management plans, citing “unnecessary administrative burdens, particularly on small and medium-sized enterprises.”
253. USTelecom also notes that a “rip and replace” mandate would be especially difficult for “smaller and rural operators” to implement overall.
254. The Committee notes that “[s]maller businesses are more likely to acquire lit capacity, fiber, or spectrum leaseholds from dark fiber owners or IRU holders” rather than own, control, or operate their own SLTE, and therefore claims the new SLTE reporting requirements suggested in the
255. Finally, AP&T notes the general burden of regulation on small businesses, “the administrative burden is same for large and small carriers alike . . . small carriers have fewer customers, the fixed costs of managing the carrier's regulatory requirements are significantly more burdensome on a per-customer basis.”
256. The Commission responds to the concerns of commenters by not adopting some of the proposals from the
257. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended the RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA), and provide a detailed statement of any change made to the proposed rules as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not file any comments in response to the proposed rules in this proceeding.
258. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the term “small entity” as having the same meaning as under the Small Business Act. In addition, the term “small business” has the same meaning as the term “small business concern” under the Small Business Act.” A “small business concern” is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267. Additionally, according to Commission data on internet access services as of June 30, 2019, nationwide there were approximately 2,747 providers of connections over 200 kbps in at least one direction using various wireline technologies. The Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for providers of these services, therefore, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of providers that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard. However, in light of the general data on fixed technology service providers in the Commission's
268.
269. The SBA small business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 4,590 providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of fixed local services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,146 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
270. The RFA directs agencies to describe the economic impact of proposed rules on small entities, as well as projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance requirements, including an estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record.
271. It is not possible to separately estimate the costs of compliance for large and small entities. The cost estimate for compliance with the new rules is no more than approximately $2.5 million per year for licensees, including all additional expected costs that would be incurred as a result of the rules adopted in this
272. We based our cost estimate on the Commission's records that indicate, as of July 31, 2025, there are currently 91 submarine cable systems licensed by the Commission that are owned by approximately 147 unique licensees. Furthermore, we estimate that there are approximately ten (10) applications for new cable landing licenses filed every year. We also estimate that there are approximately 24 applications filed every year for modification, assignment, or transfer of control of a cable landing license. Based on these estimated numbers of applications, and our estimate that four (4) renewal applications are filed annually, we estimate that 38 submarine cable applications are submitted annually.
273. Our cost estimate assumes that approximately 114 licensees will undergo the application process each year for the estimated 38 cable systems that are submitting applications for that year. We base this on the conservative assumption that each cable landing license application will have an average of three licensees. In addition, we estimate that applicants will incur an additional cost associated with the rules we adopt to certify compliance to baseline cybersecurity and physical security standards, including implementing the cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans. We expect that the amount of work associated with preparing a new license application likely will be similar to the work associated with preparing a renewal or extension application.
274. In the
275. We do not believe these rules would disproportionately impact small entities; all applicants are required to submit the additional information required for applications. We also deliberately chose a cybersecurity and physical security compliance requirement that is flexible and can be customized for different types of entities. We also clarified that the requirement pertains to the reasonable measures to protect the system and services that could affect the provision of communications services through the submarine cable system. The Foreign Adversary Annual Report would impact large and small entities alike.
276. The one-time information collection requirement will only apply to current cable landing licensees, and so will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.
277. The RFA requires an agency to provide, “a description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact on small entities . . . including a statement of the factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final rule and why each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which affect the impact on small entities was rejected.”
278. Commenters expressed concern about impact on small businesses or smaller carriers of removing the 5% threshold for licensing. We retain the existing requirement that an entity owning or controlling a 5% or greater interest in the cable system and using the U.S. points of the cable system must submit an application to become a licensee, and decline to adopt any other proposals at this time. We agree with the commenters that there is not a sufficient reason to disturb the existing requirement. Lowering or removing the 5% threshold would increase the number of entities that must comply
279. Commenters raised implications for smaller entities in the context of the proposal to license data center owners. We adopt rules to limit licensing to entities that control the cable landing station, which would exclude entities that may own the cable landing station but are not directly involved in cable operations and do not control the cable system's operations. We believe this strikes the right balance between our need to license those who control the submarine cable system while not burdening data center owners who do not control the system.
280. Commenters expressed concern about the burden of the three-year periodic reports. We do not adopt the proposed three-year periodic reports, rather adopt only a Foreign Adversary Annual Report, which will impact only those licensees that meet specific criteria. We do not believe any small businesses will fall into the category required to file the Foreign Adversary Annual Report, but if any do, we deem the national security benefits of the Foreign Adversary Annual Report significant enough to justify the burden.
281. With regard to commenters advocating for allowing organizations to combine their cybersecurity risk management and supply chain risk management plans to avoid administrative burdens on small or medium-sized enterprises, the rules we adopt today regarding cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans permit a great deal of flexibility for structuring such plans. We do not require any particular framework, rather find that applicants and licensees will presumptively satisfy the Commission's cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan requirement if their plan is structured according to an established risk management framework such as the NIST CSF, and follows an established set of best practices, such as the standards and controls set forth in the CISA CPGs or the CIS Controls.
282. Commenters noted that a proposed “rip and replace” mandate would be especially difficult for smaller operators to implement. We do not adopt a requirement that licensees remove “Covered List” equipment from their systems currently, and so this burden will not impact smaller operators.
283. We decline to adopt rules for SLTE owners and operators in the
284. Regarding the general burden placed on smaller entities by regulation, throughout this item we considered options and adopt rules that focus reporting or other requirements on the narrow set of entities that we describe may involve foreign adversary threats, keeping regulatory burdens to a minimum for other entities.
285. The Commission will send a copy of the
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
Communications, Communications common carriers, Communications equipment, Cuba, Internet, Security measures, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Telecommunications.
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications Commission amends 47 CFR parts 0, 1, and 43 as follows:
47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 155, 225, 409, and 1754, unless otherwise noted.
(a) * * *
(9) To act upon applications for cable landing licenses or revoke or terminate cable landing licenses under the Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. 34 through 39, and Executive Order 10530, dated May 10, 1954.
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(iv) The exact specific geographic location information of submarine cables as specified in § 1.70005(e)(7) and (f) of this chapter.
47 U.S.C. chs. 2, 5, 9, 13; 28 U.S.C. 2461 note; 47 U.S.C. 1754, unless otherwise noted.
The provisions contained in this subpart implement the Cable Landing License Act of 1921, codified at 47 U.S.C. 34 through 39, as amended, and section 5(a) of Executive Order 10530, dated May 10, 1954, and provide requirements for initial applications for a cable landing license; certifications; routine conditions; requests for special temporary authority; foreign carrier affiliation notifications; amendment of applications; modification applications; substantial assignment and transfer of control of a cable landing license;
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(1) The term “foreign adversary country” includes Venezuela to the extent Venezuelan politician Nicolás Maduro (Maduro Regime) is identified as a foreign adversary in 15 CFR 791.4.
(2) [Reserved]
(g)
(1) Any individual or entity, wherever located, who acts as an agent, representative, or employee, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign adversary or of an individual or entity whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in majority part by a foreign adversary;
(2) Any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen of a foreign adversary or a country controlled by a foreign adversary, and is not a United States citizen or permanent resident of the United States;
(3) Any entity, including a corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, that has a principal place of business in, or is headquartered in, incorporated in, or otherwise organized under the laws of a foreign adversary or a country controlled by a foreign adversary; or
(4) Any entity, including a corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by a foreign adversary, to include circumstances in which any person identified in paragraphs (g)(1) through (3) of this section possesses the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a dominant minority (10% or greater) of the total outstanding voting interest and/or equity interest, or through a controlling interest, in an entity, board representation, proxy voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity.
(h)
(a)
(1) The continental United States with any foreign country;
(2) Alaska, Hawaii, or the U.S. territories or possessions with—
(i) A foreign country;
(ii) The continental United States; or
(iii) Each other; or
(3) Points within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or a territory or possession in which the cable is laid in areas beyond the U.S. territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles seaward from the coastline.
(b) [Reserved]
(c)
(i) Materially violated the Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. 34 through 39, where the violation—
(A) Was not remediated with an adjudication involving a consent decree and/or compliance plan;
(B) Resulted in a loss of Commission license or authorization; or
(C) Was found by the Commission to be intentional;
(ii) Committed national security-related violations of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 151
(iii) Made materially false statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct concerning national security or the Cable Landing License Act;
(iv) Been subject to an adjudicated finding of making false statements or engaging in fraudulent conduct concerning national security before another U.S. Government agency; or
(v) Materially failed to comply with the terms of a cable landing license, including but not limited to a condition requiring compliance with a mitigation agreement with the Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (Committee), where the violation—
(A) Was not remediated with an adjudication involving a consent decree and/or compliance plan;
(B) Resulted in a loss of Commission license or authorization; or
(C) Was found by the Commission to be intentional.
(2)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(3)
(d)
(a)
(i) That is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g);
(ii) That is identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains on its website pursuant to the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. 1601 through 1609; and/or
(iii) Whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval, whether or not related to the operation of a submarine cable, was denied or revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as the current and future affiliates and subsidiaries of any such entity as defined in § 2.903(c) of this chapter.
(2)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(3)
(b)
(i) That seeks to land a new submarine cable in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f).
(ii) That seeks to modify, renew, or extend its cable landing license to add a new landing located in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f).
(2)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(3)
Except as otherwise ordered by the Commission, this section applies to each licensee of a cable landing license.
(a) Grant of the cable landing license is subject to:
(1) All rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission in this chapter;
(2) Any treaties or conventions relating to communications to which the United States is or may hereafter become a party; and
(3) Any action by the Commission or the Congress of the United States rescinding, changing, modifying or amending any rights accruing to any person by grant of the license.
(b) The location of the cable system within the territorial waters of the United States of America, its territories and possessions, and upon its shores shall be in conformity with plans approved by the Secretary of the Army. The cable shall be moved or shifted by the licensee at its expense upon request of the Secretary of the Army, whenever he or she considers such course necessary in the public interest, for reasons of national defense, or for the maintenance and improvement of harbors for navigational purposes.
(c) The licensee shall at all times comply with any requirements of United States government authorities regarding the location and concealment of the cable facilities, buildings, and apparatus for the purpose of protecting and safeguarding the cables from injury or destruction by enemies of the United States of America.
(d) The licensee, or any person or company controlling it, controlled by it, or under direct or indirect common control with it, does not enjoy and shall not acquire any right to handle telecommunications services to or from the United States, its territories or its possessions unless such service is authorized by the Commission pursuant to section 214 of the Communications Act, as amended.
(e) The following prohibition on special concessions applies:
(1) The licensee shall be prohibited from agreeing to accept special concessions directly or indirectly from any foreign carrier, including any entity that owns or controls a foreign cable landing station, where the foreign carrier possesses sufficient market power on the foreign end of the route to affect competition adversely in the U.S. market, and from agreeing to accept special concessions in the future.
(2) For purposes of this section, a special concession is defined as an
(3) Licensees may rely on the Commission's list of foreign carriers that do not qualify for the presumption that they lack market power in particular foreign points for purposes of determining which foreign carriers are the subject of the requirements of this section. The Commission's list of foreign carriers that do not qualify for the presumption that they lack market power is available from the Office of International Affairs' website at:
(f)-(h) [Reserved]
(i) The Commission reserves the right to require the licensee to file an environmental assessment should it determine that the landing of the cable at the specific locations and construction of necessary cable landing stations may significantly affect the environment within the meaning of § 1.1307 implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. See § 1.1307(a) and (b). The cable landing license is subject to modification by the Commission under its review of any environmental assessment or environmental impact statement that it may require pursuant to its rules. See also note 1 to § 1.1306 and § 1.1307(c) and (d).
(j) The Commission reserves the right, pursuant to section 2 of the Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. 35, Executive Order 10530 as amended, and section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 214, to impose common carrier regulation or other regulation consistent with the Cable Landing License Act on the operations of the cable system if it finds that the public interest so requires.
(k) The licensee, or in the case of multiple licensees, the licensees collectively, shall maintain
(l)-(m) [Reserved]
(n) The cable landing license is revocable or subject to termination by the Commission after due notice and opportunity for hearing pursuant to section 2 of the Cable Landing License Act, 47 U.S.C. 35, or for failure to comply with the terms of the license or with the Commission's rules in this chapter.
(o) The cable landing license shall expire twenty-five (25) years from the in-service date, unless renewed or extended upon proper application. Upon expiration, all rights granted under the license shall be terminated.
(p) The licensee(s) must commence service provided under its license within three years following the grant of its license.
(1) The licensee must notify the Commission within thirty (30) days of the date the cable is placed into service.
(2) Failure to notify the Commission of commencement of service within three years following the grant of the license shall result in automatic termination of the license after the Commission receives approval from the State Department, unless the licensee submits a request for waiver showing good cause why it is unable to commence commercial service on the cable, why the license should not be terminated, and the expected commencement of service date. The requirement to commence service may be extended upon a showing of good cause.
(q) [Reserved]
(r) Licensees shall file submarine cable outage reports as required in part 4 of this chapter.
(s)-(t) [Reserved]
(u) A licensee whose application for a cable landing license is filed and granted after November 26, 2025, shall not use equipment or services identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains on its website pursuant to the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. 1601 through 1609, on its submarine cable system under the license.
(1) A licensee whose modification application to add a new segment is filed and granted after November 26, 2025, shall not use equipment or services identified on the Covered List on the new segment and the new landing point. No licensee shall add to its submarine cable system(s) under its respective license(s) equipment or services identified on the Covered List; except, this paragraph (u)(1) shall not apply to a licensee that is identified on the Covered List whose cable landing license was or is granted prior to November 26, 2025.
(2) [Reserved]
(v) [Reserved]
(w) The licensee shall not enter into a new or extension of an existing arrangement for Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRUs) or leases for capacity on submarine cable systems landing in the United States, where such arrangement for IRUs or lease for capacity would give an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g), the ability to install, own, or manage SLTE on a submarine cable landing in the United States, unless so authorized by the Commission.
(1) A licensee may petition the Commission for waiver of the condition; however, any waiver of the condition would be granted only to the extent the licensee demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that a new or extension of an existing arrangement for IRUs or lease for capacity subject to this subpart would serve the public interest and would present no risks to national security or that the national security benefits of granting the waiver would substantially outweigh any risks.
(2) [Reserved]
(x) [Reserved]
Any application may be amended as a matter of right prior to the date of any final action taken by the Commission or designation for hearing. Amendments to applications shall be signed and submitted in the same manner as was the original application. If a petition to deny or other formal objection has been filed in response to the application, the amendment shall be served on the parties.
(a)
(b)
Any licensee that is, or is affiliated with, a carrier with market power in any of the cable's destination countries must comply with the following requirements:
(a) File quarterly reports summarizing the provisioning and maintenance of all network facilities and services procured from the licensee's affiliate in that destination market, within ninety (90) days from the end of each calendar quarter. These reports shall contain the following:
(1) The types of facilities and services provided (for example, a lease of wet link capacity in the cable, collocation of licensee's equipment in the cable station with the ability to provide backhaul, or cable station and backhaul services provided to the licensee);
(2) For provisioned facilities and services, the volume or quantity provisioned, and the time interval between order and delivery; and
(3) The number of outages and intervals between fault report and facility or service restoration; and
(b) File quarterly, within 90 days from the end of each calendar quarter, a report of its active and idle 64 kbps or equivalent circuits by facility (terrestrial, satellite and submarine cable).
(a)
(1) Certifying that it is not a foreign carrier and it is not affiliated with a foreign carrier in any of the cable's destination markets;
(2) Demonstrating pursuant to § 63.12(c)(1)(i) through (iii) of this chapter that any such foreign carrier or affiliated foreign carrier lacks market power; or
(3) Certifying that the destination market where the applicant is, or has an affiliation with, a foreign carrier is a World Trade Organization (WTO) Member and the applicant agrees to accept and abide by the reporting requirements set out in § 1.70015. An application that includes an applicant that is, or is affiliated with, a carrier with market power in a cable's non-WTO Member destination country is not eligible for streamlining.
(4) Certifying that all individuals or entities that hold a ten percent or greater direct or indirect equity and/or voting interests, or a controlling interest, in the applicant are U.S. citizens or entities organized in the United States.
(5)(i) For a license to construct and operate a submarine cable system or to modify the construction of a previously approved submarine cable system, the applicant must certify that it is not required to submit a consistency certification to any state pursuant to section 1456(c)(3)(A) of the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. 1456.
(ii) Streamlining of cable landing license applications will be limited to those applications where all potentially affected states, having constructive notice that the application was filed with the Commission, have waived, or are deemed to have waived, any section 1456(c)(3)(A) right to review the application within the thirty-day period prescribed by 15 CFR 930.54.
(b)
(1) Including the information and certifications required in paragraph (a) of this section.
(2) [Reserved]
(a) With the exception of submarine cable outage reports, and subject to the availability of electronic forms, all applications and notifications described in this subpart must be filed electronically through the International Communications Filing System (ICFS). A list of forms that are available for electronic filing can be found on the ICFS homepage. For information on electronic filing requirements, see subpart Y of this part, and the ICFS homepage at
(b) Submarine cable outage reports must be filed as set forth in part 4 of this chapter.
The Office of International Affairs shall determine appropriate procedures on a case by case basis for grant or denial of an application or revocation and/or termination of a cable landing license, and grant or deny an application, initiate and conduct application, revocation, and/or termination proceedings, and revoke and/or terminate a cable landing license, as required by due process and applicable law and in light of the relevant facts and circumstances, including providing the applicant or licensee with notice and opportunity to cure noncompliance to the extent such an opportunity is required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 558(c), and to respond to allegations and evidence in the record.
(b)
Except as otherwise required by the Commission, the following entities, at a
(a) Any entity that controls a cable landing station in the United States; and
(b) All other entities owning or controlling a five percent (5%) or greater interest in the cable system and using the U.S. points of the cable system.
An applicant must demonstrate in the initial application for a cable landing license that it meets the requirements under § 1.70002(b) and (c), and the initial application must contain:
(a) The name, address, email address(es), and telephone number(s) of each applicant.
(b) The Government, State, or Territory under the laws of which each corporate or partnership applicant is organized.
(c) The name, title, address, email address(es), and telephone number of the officer and any other contact point, such as legal counsel, of each applicant to whom correspondence concerning the application is to be addressed.
(d) The name of the submarine cable system.
(e) A description of the submarine cable system, including:
(1) The States, Territories, or possessions in the United States and the foreign countries where the submarine cable system will land;
(2) The number of segments in the submarine cable system and the designation of each (
(3) The length of the submarine cable system by segment and in total;
(4) The location, by segment, of any branching units;
(5) The number of optical fiber pairs, by segment, of the submarine cable system;
(6) The design capacity, by segment, of the submarine cable system;
(7) Specific geographic location information (geographic coordinates, street address, county or county equivalent, as applicable), or if not available, a general geographic description and specific geographic location information to be filed no later than ninety (90) days prior to construction regarding:
(i) Each U.S. and non-U.S. cable landing station and beach manhole;
(ii) Each network operations center (NOC) and backup NOC and, if distinct from the NOC, each security operations center (SOC) and backup SOC, or else a statement that the SOC and backup SOC are not distinct from the NOC and/or backup NOC;
(iii) Where each Power Feed Equipment (PFE) and each Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) is connected with the terrestrial land based system(s) and from where each is operated; and
(iv) The route position list including the wet segment of the submarine cable system;
(8) Anticipated time frame when the applicant(s) intends to place the submarine cable system into service; and
(9) For each U.S. cable landing station that is not owned by the applicant(s), provide—
(i) The name of the entity(ies) that owns the cable landing station;
(ii) A statement that the owner(s) of the cable landing station will have no ability to significantly affect the operation of the submarine cable system;
(iii) A statement that the applicant(s) will meet the requirements under § 1.70007(k); and
(iv) A statement that the applicant(s) will ensure the landing station lease agreement(s) have initial terms, with extension options at the sole discretion of the applicant(s), for a total of 25 years, coextensive with the term of the cable landing license.
(f) A specific description of the submarine cable system consistent with paragraph (e)(7) of this section, including a map and geographic data in generally accepted GIS formats or other formats. The Office of International Affairs, in coordination with the Office of Economics and Analytics, shall determine the file formats and specific data fields in which data will ultimately be collected.
(1) The applicant initially may file a general geographic description of the information required in paragraph (e)(7) of this section; however, grant of the application will be conditioned on the Commission's final approval of specific location information, consistent with paragraph (e)(7), to be filed by the applicant no later than ninety (90) days prior to construction. The Commission will give public notice of the filing of each description, and grant of the license will be considered final with respect to that specific geographic location unless the Commission issues a notice to the contrary no later than sixty (60) days after receipt of the specific description, unless the Commission designates a different time period.
(2) Information under paragraph (e)(7) of this section and the exact location information of the wet segment as it approaches the shore, the submarine cable as it reaches the beach manhole, and the dry segment including the cable landing station(s), such as where the SLTE is located and/or from where it is operated, will be withheld from public inspection.
(3) The Commission may disclose to relevant Federal Government agencies information submitted by an applicant, petitioner, licensee, or authorization holder about the submarine cable system, including the location information of cable landing stations, beach manholes, PFE, SLTE, NOCs and backup NOCs, SOCs and backup SOCs, and route position lists. Where such information has been submitted in confidence pursuant to § 0.457 or § 0.459 of this chapter, such information may be shared subject to the provisions of § 0.442 of this chapter and, notwithstanding the provisions of § 0.442(d)(1) of this chapter, notice will be provided at the time of disclosure.
(g) A statement disclosing whether or not the applicant uses and/or will use the following third-party service providers, as defined in § 1.70001(d), in the operation of the submarine cable system:
(1) Any entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g);
(2) Any entity identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains on its website pursuant to the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. 1601 through 1609; and/or
(3) Any entity that can access the submarine cable from a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f), and to identify any such foreign adversary country.
(h) A statement as to whether the cable will be operated on a common carrier or non-common carrier basis. Applicants for common carrier cable landing licenses shall also separately file an application for an international section 214 authorization for overseas cable construction under § 63.18 of this chapter.
(i) A list of all of the proposed owners of the submarine cable system including those owners that are not applicants, their respective equity and/or voting interests in the submarine cable system as a whole, their respective equity and/or voting interests in each U.S. cable landing station including SLTE, and their respective equity and/or voting interests by segment of the cable.
(j) For each applicant:
(1) The information and certifications required in § 63.18(h), (o), (p), and (q) of this chapter;
(2) A certification as to whether or not the applicant is, or is affiliated with, a
(3) A certification as to whether or not the applicant seeks to land and operate a submarine cable connecting the United States to any country for which any of the following is true. The certification shall state with specificity the foreign carriers and each country:
(i) The applicant is a foreign carrier in that country; or
(ii) The applicant controls a foreign carrier in that country; or
(iii) There exists any entity that owns more than 25 percent of the applicant, or controls the applicant, or controls a foreign carrier in that country; or
(iv) Two or more foreign carriers (or parties that control foreign carriers) own, in the aggregate, more than 25 percent of the applicant and are parties to, or the beneficiaries of, a contractual relation (
(4) For any country that the applicant has listed in response to paragraph (j)(3) of this section that is not a member of the World Trade Organization, a demonstration as to whether the foreign carrier lacks market power with reference to the criteria in § 63.10(a) of this chapter.
(5) Under § 63.10(a) of this chapter, the Commission presumes, subject to rebuttal, that a foreign carrier lacks market power in a particular foreign country if the applicant demonstrates that the foreign carrier lacks 50 percent market share in international transport facilities or services, including cable landing station access and backhaul facilities, intercity facilities or services, and local access facilities or services on the foreign end of a particular route.
(k) The certifications in § 1.70006, including a certification that the applicant accepts and will abide by the routine conditions specified in § 1.70007, and information pursuant to §§ 1.70002(c) and 1.70004(a) and (b);
(l) [Reserved]
(m) Each applicant shall certify that it has created and will implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan consistent with § 1.70006(c). Applicants shall submit cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans to the Commission upon request. The Office of International Affairs, in coordination with the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, may request, at its discretion, submission of such cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans and evaluate them for compliance with the Commission's rules in this subpart. The cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans provided under this paragraph (m) shall be treated as presumptively confidential.
(n) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the application.
(o) Applicants for cable landing licenses may be subject to the consistency certification requirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. 1456, if they propose to conduct activities, in or outside of a coastal zone of a state with a federally-approved management plan, affecting any land or water use or natural resource of that state's coastal zone.
(1) Before filing their applications for a license to construct and operate a submarine cable system or to modify the construction of a previously approved submarine cable system, applicants must determine whether they are required to certify that their proposed activities will comply with the enforceable policies of a coastal state's approved management program. In order to make this determination, applicants should consult National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regulations, 15 CFR part 930, subpart D, and review the approved management programs of coastal states in the vicinity of the proposed landing station to verify that this type of application is not a listed federal license activity requiring review.
(2) After the application is filed, applicants should follow the procedures specified in 15 CFR 930.54 to determine whether any potentially affected state has sought or received NOAA approval to review the application as an unlisted activity. If it is determined that any certification is required, applicants shall consult the affected coastal state(s) (or designated state agency(ies)) in determining the contents of any required consistency certification(s). Applicants may also consult the Office for Coastal Management (OCM) within NOAA for guidance.
(3) The cable landing license application filed with the Commission shall include any consistency certification required by 16 U.S.C. 1456(c)(3)(A) for any affected coastal state(s) that lists this type of application in its NOAA-approved coastal management program and shall be updated pursuant to § 1.65 to include any subsequently required consistency certification with respect to any state that has received NOAA approval to review the application as an unlisted federal license activity. Upon documentation from the applicant—or notification from each coastal state entitled to review the license application for consistency with a federally approved coastal management program—that the state has either concurred, or by its inaction, is conclusively presumed to have concurred with the applicant's consistency certification, the Commission may take action on the application.
An applicant must certify to the following in the initial application for a cable landing license:
(a) That the applicant accepts and will abide by the routine conditions specified in § 1.70007.
(b) Whether or not it exhibits any of the criteria set out in the presumptive disqualifying conditions per §§ 1.70002(c) and 1.70004(a) and (b):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(c) That the applicant has created and will implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan, and:
(1) That the plan describes how the applicant will take reasonable measures to employ its organizational resources and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its systems and services that could affect its provision of
(2) That the plan identifies the cybersecurity risks the applicant faces, the controls it uses or plans to use to mitigate those risks, and how the applicant will ensure that these controls are applied effectively to its operations;
(3) That the plan addresses both logical and physical access risks, as well as supply chain risks;
(4) That the plan has been signed by the entity's Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Technology Officer, Chief Information Security Officer, or similarly situated senior officer responsible for governance of the organization's security practices;
(5) That the applicant will submit cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans to the Commission upon request; and
(6) That the applicant will preserve data and records related to its cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans, including documentation necessary to demonstrate how those plans are implemented, for a period of two years from the date the related risk management plan certification is submitted to the Commission.
(d) That the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains on its website pursuant to the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. 1601 through 1609.
(f) The cable landing license and rights granted in the license shall not be transferred, assigned, or disposed of, or disposed of indirectly by transfer of control of the licensee, except in compliance with the requirements set out in §§ 1.70012 and 1.70013.
(g) Entities that are parties to a
(h) Unless the licensee has notified the Commission in the application of the specific geographic location information required by § 1.70005(e)(7) and (f), the licensee shall notify the Commission no later than ninety (90) days prior to commencing construction. The Commission will give public notice of the filing of each description, and grant of the cable landing license will be considered final with respect to that specific geographic location unless the Commission issues a notice to the contrary no later than sixty (60) days after receipt of the specific description, unless the Commission designates a different time period.
(l) The licensee shall comply with the requirements of § 1.70009.
(m) The licensee shall file annual circuit capacity reports as required by § 43.82 of this chapter.
(q) The licensee must implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan consistent with the requirements in § 1.70006(c) as of the date the submarine cable is placed into service.
(1) The licensee must certify to the Commission, within thirty (30) days of the date the submarine cable is placed into service, that it has created and implemented the cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan as of the in-service date.
(2) The licensee must continue to implement and update, as required based on material changes to the cybersecurity and physical security risks and vulnerabilities that the licensee faces, the cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan.
(3) The licensee shall submit cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans to the Commission upon request. The Office of International Affairs, in coordination with the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, may request, at its discretion, submission of such cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans and evaluate them for compliance with the Commission's rules in this subpart. The cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans provided under this paragraph (q)(3) shall be treated as presumptively confidential.
(4) The licensee shall preserve data and records related to its cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans, including documentation necessary to demonstrate how those plans are implemented, for a period of two years from the date the related risk management plan certification is submitted to the Commission.
(s) The licensee shall notify the Commission of any changes to the following within thirty (30) days:
(1) The contact information of the licensee provided under § 1.70005(a) and (c); and
(2) The name of the licensee (including the name under which the licensee is doing business).
(t) The licensee(s) shall notify the Commission of any changes to the name of the licensed submarine cable system within thirty (30) days of such change. If there are multiple licensees of the submarine cable system, the lead licensee shall file the notification.
(v) The licensee(s) that meet the applicant/licensee requirements of § 1.70003 and criteria under § 1.70017(b) shall submit a Foreign Adversary Annual Report every year consistent with the requirements under § 1.70017.
(x) Cable landing licensees with a license granted prior to [effective date of amendatory instruction 13], must submit a route position list consistent with the requirement under § 1.70005(e)(7)(iv) under the relevant license file number in the Commission's International Communications Filing System (ICFS), or any successor system, no later than sixty (60) days after [effective date of amendatory instruction 13]. Licensees may petition the Commission for waiver of the requirement, which may be granted only to the extent the licensee demonstrates that the required information is unavailable by the submission deadline.
(a) Special temporary authority may be used for construction, testing, or operation of a submarine cable system for a term up to and including 180 days.
(b) Applicants seeking special temporary authority must file the requisite application(s) related to the request for special temporary authority. Applicants must identify the file number(s) of any pending application(s) associated with the request for special temporary authority.
(c) An application for special temporary authority must include:
(1) A narrative describing the request for a special temporary authority including the type of request (
(2) Information required by § 1.70005(a) through (d);
(3) Whether or not the request for special temporary authority is
(4) The date by which applicants seek grant of the request for special temporary authority and the duration for which applicants seek special temporary authority;
(5) An acknowledgement that any grant of special temporary authority:
(i) Does not prejudice action by the Commission on any underlying application(s);
(ii) Is subject to revocation/cancellation or modification by the Commission on its own motion without a hearing;
(iii) Will expire automatically upon the termination date unless the applicant has made a timely and complete application for extension of the special temporary authority; and
(iv) Does not preclude enforcement action for non-compliance with the Cable Landing License Act, the Communications Act, or the Commission's rules in this chapter for action or failure to act at any time before or after grant of the special temporary authority; and
(6) The certification required in § 63.18(o) of this chapter.
(7) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the application.
Any entity that is licensed by the Commission (“licensee”) to land or operate a submarine cable landing in a particular foreign destination market that becomes, or seeks to become, affiliated with a foreign carrier that is authorized to operate in that market, including an entity that owns or controls a cable landing station in that market, shall notify the Commission of that affiliation.
(a)
(1) Acquisition by the licensee, or by any entity that controls the licensee, or by any entity that directly or indirectly owns more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the capital stock of the licensee, of a controlling interest in a foreign carrier that is authorized to operate in a market where the cable lands; or
(2) Acquisition of a direct or indirect interest greater than twenty-five percent (25%), or of a controlling interest, in the capital stock of the licensee by a foreign carrier that is authorized to operate in a market where the cable lands, or by an entity that controls such a foreign carrier.
(b)
(i) The Commission has previously determined in an adjudication that the foreign carrier lacks market power in that destination market (for example, in an international section 214 application or a declaratory ruling proceeding); or
(ii) The foreign carrier owns no facilities in that destination market. For this purpose, a carrier is said to own facilities if it holds an ownership, indefeasible-right-of-user, or leasehold interest in a cable landing station or in bare capacity in international or domestic telecommunications facilities (excluding switches).
(2) In the event paragraph (b)(1) of this section cannot be satisfied, notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this section, the notification required by this section need not be filed before consummation, and may instead be filed pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section, if the licensee certifies that the destination market where the cable lands is a WTO Member and provides certification to satisfy either of the following:
(i) The licensee demonstrates that its foreign carrier affiliate lacks market power in the cable's destination market pursuant to § 63.10(a)(3) of this chapter; or
(ii) The licensee agrees to comply with the reporting requirements contained in § 1.70015 effective upon the acquisition of the affiliation.
(c)
(d)
(e)
(1) The name of the newly affiliated foreign carrier and the country or countries at the foreign end of the cable in which it is authorized to provide telecommunications services to the public or where it owns or controls a cable landing station.
(2) Which, if any, of those countries is a Member of the World Trade Organization.
(3) The name of the cable system that is the subject of the notification, and the FCC file number(s) under which the license was granted.
(4) The name, address, citizenship, and principal business of any person or entity that directly or indirectly owns ten percent or more of the equity interests and/or voting interests, or a controlling interest, of the licensee, and the percentage of equity and/or voting interest owned by each of those entities (to the nearest one percent). Where no individual or entity directly or indirectly owns ten percent or more of the equity interests and/or voting interests, or a controlling interest, of the licensee, a statement to that effect.
(i)
(ii)
(5) An ownership diagram that illustrates the licensee's vertical ownership structure, including the direct and indirect ownership (equity and voting) interests held by the individuals and entities named in response to paragraph (e)(4) of this section. Every individual or entity with ownership shall be depicted and all controlling interests must be identified.
(6) The name of any interlocking directorates, as defined in § 63.09(g) of this chapter, with each foreign carrier named in the notification.
(7) With respect to each foreign carrier named in the notification, a statement as to whether the notification is subject to paragraph (a) or (c) of this section. In the case of a notification subject to paragraph (a) of this section, the licensee shall include the projected date of closing. In the case of a notification subject to paragraph (c) of this section, the licensee shall include the actual date of closing.
(8) If a licensee relies on an exception in paragraph (b) of this section, then a certification as to which exception the foreign carrier satisfies and a citation to any adjudication upon which the licensee is relying. Licensees relying upon the exceptions in paragraph (b)(2) of this section must make the required certified demonstration in paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section or the certified commitment to comply with the reporting requirements in paragraph (b)(2)(ii) of this section in the notification required by paragraph (c) of this section.
(f)
(g)
(1) If the Commission deems it necessary at any time before or after the deadline for submission of public comments, the Commission may impose reporting requirements on the licensee based on the provisions of § 1.70015.
(2) In the case of a prior notification filed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, the authorized U.S. licensee must demonstrate that it continues to serve the public interest for it to retain its interest in the cable landing license for that segment of the cable that lands in the non-WTO destination market. Such a showing shall include a demonstration as to whether the foreign carrier lacks market power in the non-WTO destination market with reference to the criteria in § 63.10(a) of this chapter. In addition, upon request of the Commission, the licensee shall provide the information specified in § 1.70005(j). If the licensee is unable to make the required showing or is notified by the Commission that the affiliation may otherwise harm the public interest pursuant to the Commission's policies and rules in this chapter under 47 U.S.C. 34 through 39 and Executive Order 10530, dated May 10, 1954, then the Commission may impose conditions necessary to address any public interest harms or may proceed to an immediate authorization revocation hearing.
(3) Under § 63.10(a) of this chapter, the Commission presumes, subject to rebuttal, that a foreign carrier lacks market power in a particular foreign country if the applicant demonstrates that the foreign carrier lacks 50 percent market share in international transport facilities or services, including cable landing station access and backhaul facilities, intercity facilities or services, and local access facilities or services on the foreign end of a particular route.
(h)
(i)
(j)
A separate application shall be filed with respect to each individual submarine cable system for which a licensee(s) seeks to modify the cable landing license. Each modification application shall include a narrative
(a) An application to add a landing point(s), segment(s), or other like material changes to a submarine cable system must also include the following:
(1) Information as required by § 1.70005(a) through (i), (k), (m), and (o), except as specified in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, as it relates to the modified portion of the cable system and a description of how any new landing point(s) or segment(s) will be connected to the cable system;
(2) Certifications set forth under § 1.70006, except for § 1.70006(d). A licensee seeking a modification of a cable landing license must certify in the application that it has created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan, consistent with §§ 1.70006(c) and 1.70007(q);
(3) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the application; and
(4) Signature(s) by each licensee. Joint licensees may appoint one party to act as proxy for purposes of complying with this paragraph (a)(4).
(b) An application to add an applicant as a licensee for an existing cable landing license must also include the following:
(1) Information required by § 1.70005(a) through (c), (g), (j), (k), and (m), except as specified in paragraph (b)(4) of this section, for the proposed new licensee;
(2) Information required by § 1.70005(d) through (f);
(3) Information required by § 1.70005(i) for the proposed new licensee and current owners of the submarine cable system;
(4) Certifications set forth under § 1.70006 for the proposed new licensee, except for § 1.70006(d);
(5) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the application; and
(6) Signature(s) by the proposed licensee and each current licensee. Joint licensees may appoint one party to act as proxy for purposes of complying with this paragraph (b)(6).
(c) A notification of the removal of a landing point(s), segment(s), or other like changes to a submarine cable system must be filed no later than 30 days after the removal. The notification must also include the following:
(1) Information as required by § 1.70005(a) through (d);
(2) A description of which element(s) were removed from the submarine cable system and the date on which the element(s) was removed from the submarine cable system;
(3) An updated description of the submarine cable system after the removal of the elements of the submarine cable system;
(4) An explanation of what happened with the physical facilities upon removal from the submarine cable system;
(5) An explanation of how the removal affected the ownership of the remaining portions of the submarine cable;
(6) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the notification; and
(7) Signature(s) by each licensee. Joint licensees may appoint one party to act as proxy for purposes of complying with this paragraph (c)(7).
(d) A notification that a licensee(s) has relinquished an interest in a cable landing license must be filed no later than 30 days after the relinquishment. The notification must also include:
(1) Information required by § 1.70005(a) through (d) for the licensee(s) that relinquished an interest in the submarine cable system;
(2) The ownership interests that were held by that licensee(s) prior to the relinquishment;
(3) Whether the licensee(s) relinquished all of its interests in the submarine cable system or what interests it has retained;
(4) An explanation of what happened to the interests that were relinquished (whether the interests were re-distributed pro rata amongst the remaining licensees or otherwise re-distributed);
(5) A demonstration that the entity is not required to be a licensee under § 1.70003 and that the remaining licensee(s) retain collectively
(6) A signature(s) from the licensee(s) that relinquished its interest;
(7) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the notification; and
(8) A certification that the notification was served on each of the other licensees of the submarine cable system.
(e) If any joint licensee(s) of a submarine cable no longer exists and did not file a notification to modify the license to relinquish its interest in the license, the remaining joint licensee(s) of the cable may collectively file a modification notification to remove the licensee from the license. Joint licensees may appoint one party to act as proxy for purposes of complying with this paragraph (e). The notification must also include:
(1) Information required by § 1.70005(a) through (d) for the licensee(s) that seeks to remove a licensee(s) from a cable landing license;
(2) An explanation of why the licensee(s) request removal of a licensee(s) from the license;
(3) A description of the efforts to contact the licensee to be removed;
(4) The ownership interests in the submarine cable held by the licensee(s) to be removed;
(5) An explanation of what will happen to the interests of the licensee(s) that will be removed (whether the interests were re-distributed pro rata amongst the remaining licensees or otherwise re-distributed);
(6) A demonstration that the remaining licensee(s) retain collectively
(7) A signature(s) from all of the licensee(s) of the submarine cable that seeks to remove the licensee(s);
(8) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the notification; and
(9) A certification that the notification was served on each of the other licensees of the submarine cable system.
(f) A notification to add, remove, or otherwise change a condition on the cable landing license regarding compliance with a national security mitigation agreement (
(1) Information required by § 1.70005(a) through (c) of the licensee(s) that seeks to add, remove, or change a condition;
(2) Information required by § 1.70005(d);
(3) An explanation of the change in the national security condition;
(4) A copy of the new national security mitigation agreement, if applicable;
(5) A certification that the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector (Committee) agrees with the change;
(6) A certification that the notification has been served on the Chair of the Committee;
(7) A signature(s) from the licensee(s) that seeks to add, remove, or change a condition; and
(8) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the notification.
(g) If a landing point is being moved within the same town/city/county as approved in the cable landing license, the licensee(s) must file a notification no later than 30 days after the landing point is moved. The notification must include:
(1) Information as required by § 1.70005(a) through (f), as it relates to the modified portion of the cable system;
(2) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the notification; and
(3) Signature(s) by each licensee. Joint licensees may appoint one party to act as proxy for purposes of complying with this paragraph (g)(3).
(h) A notification to add an interconnection between two or more licensed cable systems must be filed no later than ninety (90) days prior to construction. The Commission will give public notice of the filing of this description, and grant of the modification will be considered final if the Commission does not notify the applicant otherwise in writing no later than sixty (60) days after receipt of the notification, unless the Commission designates a different time period. If, upon review of the notification, the Commission finds that the proposed interconnection presents a risk to national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy or raises other concerns, it may require the licensee(s) to file a complete modification application to seek Commission approval for the interconnection. The notification must include:
(1) Information as required by § 1.70005(a) through (c) for each licensee of the submarine cables to be interconnected;
(2) Information as required by § 1.70005(d) and the license file number of each of the cable systems to be interconnected;
(3) A general description of where the interconnection will take place and the terms of the interconnection agreement;
(4) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the notification; and
(5) Signature(s) by each licensee of each cable to be interconnected. Joint licensees may appoint one party to act as proxy for purposes of complying with this paragraph (h)(5).
(i) A notification to add a new connection between a branching unit of a licensed submarine cable and a foreign landing point must be filed no later than ninety (90) days prior to construction. The Commission will give public notice of the filing of this description, and grant of the modification will be considered final if the Commission does not notify the applicant otherwise in writing no later than sixty (60) days after receipt of the notification, unless the Commission designates a different time period. If, upon review of the notification, the Commission finds that the proposed connection presents a risk to national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy or raises other concerns, it may require the licensee(s) to file a complete modification application to seek Commission approval for the connection. The notification must include:
(1) Information as required by § 1.70005(a) through (c) for each licensee of the Commission-licensed cable whose branching unit will be used to make the connection between two (or more) foreign points;
(2) Information as required by § 1.70005(d) and the license file number of the Commission-licensed cable whose branching unit will be used to make the connection between two (or more) foreign points;
(3) A description of the proposed connection, including which foreign points would be connected;
(4) The relationship between the owner of the proposed connection and the licensees of the Commission-licensed cable whose branching unit will be used to make the connection between two (or more) foreign points;
(5) An explanation of how the proposed connection would not allow for direct connection from the new foreign point(s) to the United States
(6) Any other information that may be necessary to enable the Commission to act on the notification; and
(7) Signature(s) by each licensee of the cable. Joint licensees may appoint one party to act as proxy for purposes of complying with this paragraph (i)(7).
(a) Each application for authority to assign or transfer control of an interest in a cable system shall contain information pursuant to §§ 1.70002(b) and (c) and 1.70004(a). The application shall contain a certification as to whether or not the licensee, assignor/transferor, or assignee/transferee exhibit any of the criteria set out in the presumptive disqualifying conditions under §§ 1.70002(c)(1) and 1.70004(a)(1).
(b) An application for authority to assign or transfer control of an interest in a cable system shall contain a narrative description of the proposed transaction, including relevant facts and circumstances. The application shall also include the following information:
(1) The information requested in § 1.70005(a) through (c) for both the assignor/transferor and the assignee/transferee.
(2) The information required in § 1.70005(d) through (f).
(3) A narrative describing the means by which the assignment or transfer of control will take place.
(4) The information and certifications required in § 1.70005(j) for the assignee or the transferee and the licensee that is the subject of the transfer of control.
(5) The application shall also specify, on a segment specific basis, the percentage of voting and ownership interests being assigned or transferred in the cable system, including in the U.S. portion of the cable system (which includes all U.S. cable landing station(s)).
(6) The information and certifications required in § 1.70005(g) and (m), except as specified in paragraph (b)(7) of this section, for each assignee or licensee that is the subject of a transfer of control.
(7) The certifications set forth in § 1.70006, except for § 1.70006(d). A licensee seeking an assignment or transfer of control of a cable landing license must certify in the application that it has created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan, consistent with §§ 1.70006(c) and 1.70007(q). The application must also include a certification that the assignee or the transferee and the licensee that is the subject of the transfer of control accepts and will abide by the routine conditions specified in § 1.70007.
(8) In the event the transaction requiring an assignment or transfer of control application also requires the filing of a foreign carrier affiliation notification pursuant to § 1.70009, the application shall reference the foreign carrier affiliation notification and the date of its filing.
(9) The Commission reserves the right to request additional information concerning the transaction to aid it in making its public interest determination.
(10) An assignee or transferee must notify the Commission no later than thirty (30) days after either
(a) A
(b) Assignments or transfers of control that do not result in a change in the actual controlling party are considered non-substantial or
(1) The information requested in § 1.70005(a) through (c) for both the assignor/transferor and the assignee/transferee.
(2) The information required in § 1.70005(d).
(3) A narrative describing the means by which the
(4) The information and certifications required in § 63.18(h), (o), and (q) of this chapter for the assignee or the transferee and the licensee that is the subject of the transfer of control.
(5) The notification shall also specify, on a segment specific basis, the percentage of voting and ownership interests being assigned or transferred in the cable system, including in the U.S. portion of the cable system (which includes all U.S. cable landing station(s)).
(6) The notification must certify that the assignment or transfer of control was
(7) The information and certifications required in § 1.70005(j)(2) through (5).
(8) A certification that the assignee or the transferee and the licensee that is the subject of the transfer of control accepts and will abide by the routine conditions specified in § 1.70007.
(9) A certification as to whether or not the licensee, assignor/transferor, or assignee/transferee exhibit any of the criteria set out in the presumptive disqualifying conditions under §§ 1.70002(c)(1) and 1.70004(a)(1).
(10) The licensee may file a single notification for an assignment or transfer of control of multiple licenses issued in the name of the licensee if each license is identified by the file number under which it was granted.
(11) The Commission reserves the right to request additional information concerning the transaction to aid it in making its public interest determination.
The addition reads as follows:
(b) * * *
(2) Certifying that individuals or entities that hold a ten percent or greater direct or indirect equity and/or voting interests, or a controlling interest, in the applicant are:
(i) U.S. citizens or entities organized in the United States; and/or
(ii) Individuals or entities that have citizenship(s) or place of organization in a foreign country and:
(A) Do not have a citizenship(s) or place of organization in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f); and
(B) Whose ownership interest in the applicant has been previously reviewed by the Commission and the Committee.
(a)
(b)
(1) That is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g);
(2) That is identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains on its website pursuant to the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. 1601 through 1609;
(3) Whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval, whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity; and/or
(4) Whose submarine cable system is licensed to land or operate in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f).
(c)
(1) The information as required in § 1.70005(a) through (g), (i), and (m).
(2) Certifications as set forth under § 1.70006, except for § 1.70006(b) and (d).
(d)
(e)
(a) Licensees seeking to renew or extend a cable landing license shall file an application six months prior to the expiration of the license.
(b) The application must include the information and certifications required in §§ 1.70002(b) and (c), 1.70004, 1.70005, and 1.70006 (except for § 1.70006(d)). A licensee seeking a renewal or extension of a cable landing license must certify in the application that it has created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan, consistent with §§ 1.70006(c) and 1.70007(q).
(c) Upon the filing of a timely and complete application to renew or extend a cable landing license in accordance with the Commission's rules in this
Each cable landing licensee shall submit a certification, within sixty (60) days of [effective date of amendatory instruction 19], that it will not add to its submarine cable system(s) under its respective license(s) equipment or services identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains on its website pursuant to the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. 1601 through 1609; except, this condition shall not apply to a licensee that is identified on the Covered List whose cable landing license was or is granted prior to [effective date of amendatory instruction 19].
(a)
(1) Implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan consistent with the requirements in § 1.70006(c) within one year of [effective date of amendatory instruction 19]. To the extent the licensee does not commence service on the submarine cable by this timeframe, the licensee must implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan as of the date the submarine cable is placed into service.
(2) Submit a certification to the Commission within thirty (30) days of [effective date of amendatory instruction 19], that it will implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan consistent with the requirements in § 1.70006(c).
(3) The licensee shall submit cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans to the Commission upon request. The Office of International Affairs, in coordination with the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, may request, at its discretion, submission of such cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans and evaluate them for compliance with the Commission's rules in this subpart. The cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans provided under this subsection shall be treated as presumptively confidential.
(4) The licensee shall preserve data and records related to its cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans, including documentation necessary to demonstrate how those plans are implemented, for a period of two years from the date the related risk management plan certification is submitted to the Commission.
(b)
47 U.S.C. 35-39, 154, 211, 219, 220; sec. 402(b)(2)(B), (c), Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 129.
The revisions and additions read as follows:
(a)
(1)
(2)
(d)
(e)