

by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or

C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.

Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of UTair any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by UTair of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby UTair acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from UTair of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

D. Obtain from UTair in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or

E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by UTair, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by UTair if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.

Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to UTair by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

In accordance with the provisions of Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, UTair may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–4022.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be opposed by UTair as provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days before the expiration date of the Order.

A copy of this Order shall be provided to UTair, and shall be published in the **Federal Register**.

This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for one year.

John Sonderman,

Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export Privileges; Azur Air, Krasnoyarsk, Russia

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730–774 (“EAR” or “the Regulations”),¹ I hereby grant the

¹ On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (“ECRA”). While Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2401 *et seq.* (“EAA”), (except for three sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.* (“IEEPA”), and were in effect as of ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue

request of the Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”) to renew the temporary denial order (“TDO”) issued in this matter on September 20, 2024. I find that renewal of this order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations and that renewal for an extended period is appropriate because Azur Air (“Azur”) has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR.

I. Procedural History

On April 7, 2022, the then-Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement (“Assistant Secretary”) signed an order denying Azur’s export privileges for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order was issued *ex parte* pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations and was effective upon issuance.² The TDO was subsequently renewed on October 3, 2022,³ March 29, 2023,⁴ September 23, 2023,⁵ and September 20, 2024⁶ in accordance with Section 766.24(d) of the Regulations.⁷ The September 20, 2024 renewal order was modified on January 31, 2025⁸ to update the address for Azur based on additional investigation. No other changes or modifications were made to the September 20, 2024 renewal order. This renewal order reflects the corrected address.

On August 26, 2025, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for a

in effect according to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5).

² The TDO was published in the **Federal Register** on April 12, 2022 (87 FR 21614).

³ The October 3, 2022 renewal order was published in the **Federal Register** on October 7, 2022 (87 FR 60983).

⁴ The March 29, 2023 renewal order was published in the **Federal Register** on April 4, 2023 (88 FR 19908).

⁵ The September 23, 2023 renewal order was published in the **Federal Register** on September 28, 2023 (88 FR 66805).

⁶ The September 20, 2024 renewal order was published in the **Federal Register** on September 25, 2024 (89 FR 78280).

⁷ Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods if it believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation. In cases demonstrating a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may request the renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional period not exceeding one year.

⁸ The January 30, 2025 modification order was published in the **Federal Register** on February 5, 2025 (90 FR 9017).

fifth renewal of the TDO. The written request was made more than 20 days before the TDO's scheduled expiration and, given the temporary suspension of international mail service to Russia, OEE has attempted to deliver a copy of the renewal request to Azur by alternative means in accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received.

II. Renewal of the TDO

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an "imminent violation" of the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). "A violation may be 'imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood." 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show "either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations." *Id.* As to the likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge "is significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]" *Id.* A "lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a violation." *Id.*

If BIS believes that renewal of a denial order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation, it may file a written request for renewal, with any modifications if appropriate. 15 CFR 766.24(d)(1). The written request, which must be filed no later than 20 days prior to the TDO's expiration, should set forth the basis for BIS's belief that renewal is necessary, including any additional or changed circumstances. *Id.* "In cases demonstrating a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations, BIS may request the renewal of a temporary denial order for an additional period not exceeding one year." ⁹ *Id.*

B. The TDO and BIS's Request for Renewal

The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian Federation's ("Russia's") further

invasion of Ukraine by implementing a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs, atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage. Effective February 24, 2022, BIS imposed expansive controls on aviation-related (e.g., Commerce Control List Categories 7 and 9) items to Russia, including a license requirement for the export, reexport or transfer (in-country) to Russia of any aircraft or aircraft parts specified in Export Control Classification Number ("ECCN") 9A991 (Section 746.8(a)(1) of the EAR).¹⁰ BIS will review any export or reexport license applications for such items under a policy of denial. *See* Section 746.8(b). Effective March 2, 2022, BIS excluded any aircraft registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia from being eligible for license exception Aircraft, Vessels, and Spacecraft ("AVS") (Section 740.15 of the EAR).¹¹ Accordingly, any U.S.-origin aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin content, and that is registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia, is subject to a license requirement before it can travel to Russia.

OEE's request for renewal for a period of one year is based upon the facts underlying the issuance of the TDO and the renewal orders subsequently issued in this matter, as well as other evidence developed during this investigation. This evidence demonstrates that Azur has continued, and continues, to act in blatant disregard for U.S. export controls and the terms of previously issued TDOs. Specifically, the initial TDO, issued on April 7, 2022, was based on evidence that Azur engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations by operating multiple aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights into Russia after

March 2, 2022 from destinations including, but not limited to, Nha Trang, Vietnam; Dubai, United Arab Emirates ("UAE"); and Antalya, Turkey, without the required BIS authorization.¹² Further evidence indicated that Azur also operated aircraft subject to the EAR on domestic flights within Russia, potentially in violation of Section 736.2(b)(10) of the Regulations.

As discussed in the prior renewal orders, BIS presented evidence indicating that, after the initial TDO issued, Azur continued to operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights both into and out of Russia, in violation of the Regulations and the TDO itself.¹³ The October 3, 2022 renewal order detailed flights into and out of Russia from/to Antalya, Turkey; Dalaman, Turkey; and Bodrum, Turkey.¹⁴ The March 29, 2023 renewal order detailed flights into and out of Russia from/to Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt; Goa, India; Male, Maldives; Rayong, Thailand; and Adana, Turkey.¹⁵ Similarly, the September 23, 2023 renewal order detailed flights into and out of Russia from/to Hurghada, Egypt; Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt; Phuket, Thailand; Antalya, Turkey; and Dalaman, Turkey.¹⁶ Further, the September 20, 2024 renewal order detailed flights into and out of Russia from/to Antalya,

¹² Publicly available flight tracking information shows that on March 6, 2022, serial number (SN) 27612 flew from Nha Trang, Vietnam to Moscow, Russia and on March 10, 2022, SN 27909 flew from Dubai, UAE to Vladivostok, Russia. In addition, on March 17, 2022, SN 21614 flew from Antalya, Turkey to Kazan, Russia.

¹³ Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial order violates the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and (k).

¹⁴ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that SN 29377 flew from Antalya, Turkey to Moscow, Russia on September 21, 2022. In addition, on September 20, 2022, SN 26271 flew from Bodrum, Turkey to Moscow, Russia and SN 30045 flew from Dalaman, Turkey to Yekaterinburg, Russia.

¹⁵ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that SN 29377 flew from Adana, Turkey to Moscow, Russia on March 13, 2023 and from Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to Moscow, Russia on March 14, 2023. In addition, SN 30045 flew from Goa, India to Perm, Russia on March 3, 2023 and from Rayong, Thailand to Kemerovo, Russia on March 6, 2023. On February 18, 2023, SN 24947 flew from Male, Maldives to Moscow, Russia.

¹⁶ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that SN 29377 flew from Antalya, Turkey to Moscow, Russia on September 19, 2023 and from Phuket, Thailand to Vladivostok, Russia on August 15, 2023. In addition, SN 26271 flew from Hurghada, Egypt to Moscow, Russia on August 31, 2023 and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to Perm, Russia on September 20, 2023. On September 12, 2023, SN 24947 flew from Dalaman, Turkey to Yekaterinburg, Russia.

¹⁰ 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). Additionally, BIS published a final rule effective April 8, 2022 which imposed licensing requirements on items controlled on the Commerce Control List ("CCL") under Categories 0–2 that are destined for Russia or Belarus. Accordingly, now all CCL items require export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) licenses if destined for or within Russia or Belarus. 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022).

¹¹ 87 FR 13048 (Mar. 8, 2022).

⁹ 88 FR 59791 (Aug. 30, 2023).

Turkey; Hurghada, Egypt; Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt; and Dalaman, Turkey.¹⁷

Since that time, Azur has continued to engage in conduct prohibited by the applicable TDO and Regulations. In its August 26, 2025 request for renewal of the TDO, BIS submitted evidence that Azur continues to operate aircraft

subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b, both on flights into and within Russia, in violation of the September 20, 2024 renewal order and/or the Regulations. Specifically, BIS's evidence and related investigation demonstrates that Azur continues to operate aircraft subject to the EAR,

including, but not limited to, on flights into and out of Russia from/to Antalya, Turkey; Dalaman, Turkey; Nha Trang, Vietnam; and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, as well as domestically within Russia. Information about those flights includes, but is not limited to, the following:

Tail No.	Serial No.	Aircraft type	Departure/arrival cities	Dates
RA-73071	29377	757-2Q8 (B752)	Ufa, RU/Antalya, TR	September 4, 2025.
RA-73071	29377	757-2Q8 (B752)	Antalya, TR/Mineralnye Vody, RU	August 19, 2025.
RA-73071	29377	757-2Q8 (B752)	Antalya, TR/Samara, RU	August 18, 2025.
RA-73071	29377	757-2Q8 (B752)	Nha Trang, Vietnam/Novosibirsk, RU	July 10, 2025.
RA-73071	29377	757-2Q8 (B752)	Irkutsk, RU/Tomsk, RU	May 15, 2025.
RA-73075	26271	757-2Q8 (B752)	Antalya, TR/Moscow, RU	August 17, 2025.
RA-73075	26271	757-2Q8 (B752)	Kazan, RU/Antalya, TR	August 16, 2025.
RA-73075	26271	757-2Q8 (B752)	Nizhny Novgorod, RU/Antalya, TR	August 14, 2025.
RA-73075	26271	757-2Q8 (B752)	Sochi, RU/Antalya, TR	August 2, 2025.
RA-73075	26271	757-2Q8 (B752)	Moscow, RU/Kazan, RU	June 25, 2025.
RA-73076	30043	757-2Q8 (B752)	Sochi, RU/Antalya, TR	September 4, 2025.
RA-73076	30043	757-2Q8 (B752)	Kazan, RU/Antalya, TR	August 19, 2025.
RA-73076	30043	757-2Q8 (B752)	Antalya, TR/Sochi, RU	August 19, 2025.
RA-73076	30043	757-2Q8 (B752)	Dalaman, RU/Kazan, RU	August 17, 2025.
RA-73076	30043	757-2Q8 (B752)	Moscow, RU/Kazan, RU	June 15, 2025.
RA-73079	24947	767-3Y0 (ER) (B763)	Yekaterinburg, RU/Antalya, TR	September 4, 2025.
RA-73079	24947	767-3Y0 (ER) (B763)	Antalya, TR/Moscow, RU	August 18, 2025.
RA-73079	24947	767-3Y0 (ER) (B763)	Moscow, RU/Antalya, TR	August 18, 2025.
RA-73079	24947	767-3Y0 (ER) (B763)	Sharm el-Sheikh, EG/Moscow, RU	August 15, 2025.
RA-73079	24947	767-3Y0 (ER) (B763)	Irkutsk, RU/Moscow, RU	April 28, 2025.

III. Findings

Under the applicable standard set forth in Section 766.24 of the Regulations and my review of the entire record, I find that the evidence presented by BIS convincingly demonstrates that Azur has acted in violation of the Regulations and the TDO; that such violations have been significant and deliberate; and that given the foregoing and the nature of the matters under investigation, there is a likelihood of imminent violations. Moreover, I find that renewal for an extended period is appropriate because Azur has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR. Therefore, renewal of the TDO for one year is necessary in the public interest to prevent imminent violation of the Regulations and to give notice to companies and individuals in the United States and abroad that they should avoid dealing with Azur, in connection with export and reexport transactions involving items subject to the Regulations and in connection with any other activity subject to the Regulations.

IV. Order

It is therefore ordered:

First, Azur Air, Office 29, Vzletnaya St. 57, Krasnoyarsk, Russia 660020, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as "item") exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;

B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or

C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.

Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of Azur any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by Azur of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby Azur acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from Azur of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except

¹⁷ Publicly available flight tracking information shows that SN 29377 flew from Antalya, Turkey to Sochi Russia on September 13, 2024 and from

Hurghada, Egypt to Samara, Russia on September 5, 2024. In addition, SN 30045 flew from Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt to Ufa, Russia on September 7, 2024.

On September 3, 2024, SN 24947 flew from Dalaman, Turkey to Yekaterinburg, Russia.

directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;

D. Obtain from Azur in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or

E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by Azur, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Azur if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.

Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Azur by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

In accordance with the provisions of Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Azur may, at any time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in support of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202–4022.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not later than 20 days before the expiration date. A renewal request may be opposed by Azur as provided in Section 766.24(d), by filing a written submission with the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than seven days before the expiration date of the Order.

A copy of this Order shall be provided to Azur, and shall be published in the **Federal Register**.

This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for one year.

John Sonderman,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement.

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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security

Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export Privileges; PJSC Aeroflot, 1 Arbat St., 119019, Moscow, Russia

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730–774 (“EAR” or “the Regulations”),¹ I hereby grant the request of the Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”) to renew the temporary denial order (“TDO”) issued in this matter on April 7, 2022. I find that renewal of this order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations and that renewal for an extended period is appropriate because PJSC Aeroflot (“Aeroflot”) has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR.

I. Procedural History

On April 7, 2022, the then-Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement (“Assistant Secretary”) signed an order denying Aeroflot export privileges for a period of 180 days on the grounds that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order was issued *ex parte* pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations and was effective upon issuance.² This temporary denial order was subsequently renewed in accordance with Section 766.24(d) of

the Regulations.³ The renewal order was issued on October 3, 2022,⁴ and was effective upon issuance. Subsequent renewal orders were issued on March 29, 2023, September 23, 2023, and September 20, 2024, respectively, and were also effective upon issuance.⁵

On August 26, 2025, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for renewal of the TDO that was issued on September 20, 2024. The written request was made more than 20 days before the TDO’s scheduled expiration and, given the temporary suspension of international mail service to Russia, OEE has attempted to deliver a copy of the renewal request to Aeroflot by alternative means in accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received.

II. Renewal of the TDO

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily denying a respondent’s export privileges upon a showing that the order is necessary in the public interest to prevent an “imminent violation” of the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization issued thereunder. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). “A violation may be ‘imminent’ either in time or degree of likelihood.” 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show “either that a violation is about to occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.” *Id.* As to the likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under investigation or charge “is significant, deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]” *Id.* A “lack of information establishing the precise time a violation may occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long as there is sufficient

¹ On August 13, 2018, the President signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (“ECRA”). While Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 *et seq.* (“EAA”), (except for three sections which are inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, including as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.* (“IEEPA”), and were in effect as of ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section 1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders. 50 U.S.C. 4820(a)(5).

² The TDO was published in the **Federal Register** on April 12, 2022 (87 FR 21611).

³ At the time of the renewal, Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek renewal of a temporary denial order for additional 180-day renewal periods, if it believes that renewal is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation. Renewal requests are to be made in writing no later than 20 days before the scheduled expiration date of a temporary denial order.

⁴ The October 3, 2022 renewal order, which was effective upon issuance, was published in the **Federal Register** on October 7, 2022 (87 FR 60985).

⁵ The March 29, 2023 renewal order was published in the **Federal Register** on April 3, 2023 (88 FR 19609). The September 23, 2023 renewal order was published in the **Federal Register** on September 28, 2023 (88 FR 66807). The September 20, 2024 renewal order was published in the **Federal Register** on September 25, 2024 (89 FR 78283).