President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14172, titled “Restoring Names That Honor American Greatness” (90 FR 8629) on January 20, 2025. E.O. 14172 directed that the area formerly known as the Gulf of Mexico be renamed as the Gulf of America.

The purpose of this rule is to update the NMFS and NOS regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) to reflect the renaming. Specifically, this rule changes all “Gulf of Mexico” references to “Gulf of America” and makes other consistency edits in existing regulations promulgated under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) (15 CFR parts 921, 923), National Marine Sanctuaries Act (15 CFR part 922), Marine Mammal Protection Act (50 CFR parts 217, 218, 229), Endangered Species Act (50 CFR parts 222-224, 226), Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) (50 CFR parts 300, 600, 622, 635), and Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act (50 CFR part 697). The text of some statutes, such as the MSA and CZMA, contains explicit references to the “Gulf of Mexico.” In those cases, “Gulf of America” references in agency regulations mean the same geographic area as the “Gulf of Mexico,” as that term is used in the relevant statute. Note that the agency can make nomenclature changes in its regulations consistent with law, but cannot modify the text of statutes enacted by Congress.

This rule replaces the term “Gulf of Mexico” with “Gulf of America” where it appears in the above-referenced regulations. This change is consistent with E.O. 14172, and the name used by the Geographic Names Information System, which maintains standardized geographic names for Federal use. Under this rule, the name change in NMFS and NOS regulations does not result in any changes to, and has no effect on, the applicability or enforceability of the regulations. This rule will have no cost or substantive impact on the public, but will make consistent regulatory references to reflect the renamed Gulf of America.

In addition, for streamlining purposes, this rule removes 15 CFR part 922, subpart L, Appendix B, “Flower Garden Banks National Marine Sanctuary-Terms of Designation.” The terms of designation for a national marine sanctuary are not required to be in the CFR, and removal of the appendix does not change the terms of designation for Flower Garden Banks National Marine Sanctuary.

NOAA is issuing this rule pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 1855(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA), 16 U.S.C. 1382(a) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. 1540(f) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 5103(b) of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act (ACA), 16 U.S.C. 1439 of the National Marine Sanctuaries Act (NMSA), and 16 U.S.C. 1463 of the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). The reason for using these general rulemaking authorities is that the rule makes nomenclature changes and related edits and does not substantively change regulations previously issued under the MSA, MMPA, ESA, ACA, NMSA, and CZMA. The Chief of Staff, exercising the Delegated Authority of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and NOAA Administrator, has determined that this final rule is consistent with the MSA, MMPA, ESA, ACA, NMSA, and CZMA, regulations issued pursuant to those statutes, and other applicable law.

This final rule has been determined to be not significant for purposes of Executive Order 12866.

This final rule is not an Executive Order 14192 regulatory action because this action is not significant under Executive Order 12866.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), there is good cause to waive prior notice and an opportunity for public comment on this action, as notice and comment are unnecessary.

Consistent with E.O. 14172, this final rule updates the name of Gulf of America in NMFS and NOS regulations and makes other related edits. This rule does not substantively change existing regulations and has no effect on the applicability or enforceability of the regulations. In addition, for streamlining purposes, this rule removes an appendix containing terms of designation for a national marine sanctuary. The terms of designation are not changed and are not required to be in the CFR. For the same reasons described above, there is good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3) to waive the 30-day delay in effective date. It is unnecessary to provide time for the regulated community to adjust to this rule, as the rule makes no substantive changes to regulations with which they must already comply.

Because prior notice and opportunity for public comment are not required for this rule by 5 U.S.C. 553, or any other law, the analytical requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., are inapplicable.

NOAA has determined that this action would not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes; therefore, consultation with Tribal officials under E.O. 13175 is not required, and the requirements of sections (5)(b) and (5)(c) of E.O. 13175 also do not apply. A tribal summary impact statement under section (5)(b)(2)(B) and section (5)(c)(2)(B) of E.O. 13175 is not required and has not been prepared.

For the reasons set out in the preamble, NMFS amends 15 CFR parts 921, 922 and 923, and 50 CFR parts 217, 218, 222, 223, 224, 226, 229, 300, 600, 622, 635, and 697 as follows:

Throughout this document “we,” “us,” and “our” means the EPA.

The EPA is approving Wyoming's 2022 SIP revision addressing regional haze long term strategy for the first implementation period at Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2. As required by section 169A of the CAA, the regional haze rule (RHR) calls for state and federal agencies to work together to improve visibility in 156 national parks and wilderness areas, known as mandatory Class I Federal areas. 1 The rule requires the states, in coordination with the EPA, the National Park Service (NPS), the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Forest Service, and other interested parties, to develop and implement air quality protection plans to reduce the pollution that causes visibility impairment in mandatory Class I Federal areas. Visibility impairing pollutants include fine and coarse particulate matter (PM) ( e.g., sulfates, nitrates, organic carbon, elemental carbon, and soil dust) and their precursors ( e.g., SO 2 , NO X , and, in some cases, volatile organic compounds (VOC) and ammonia (NH 3 )). As discussed in further detail in our proposed rule, this document, and the accompanying Response to Comments (RTC) document, the EPA finds that Wyoming submitted a regional haze SIP revision addressing long term strategy at Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 that meets the regional haze requirements for the first implementation period. The State's submission, the proposed rule, and the RTC document can be found in the docket for this action.

On December 30, 2022, Wyoming submitted a revision to its SIP to address regional haze for the first implementation period for Jim Bridger, Units 1 through 4 in accordance with the requirements of the CAA's regional haze program established by CAA sections 169A and 169B and 40 CFR 51.308. 2

On April 10, 2024, the EPA proposed to approve Wyoming's 2022 SIP revision which will replace the previously approved NO X emission limit of 0.07 pounds per million British Thermal Units (lb/MMBtu) (30-day rolling average) at Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 for Wyoming's regional haze long-term strategy. 3 Specifically, the Wyoming 2022 SIP revision amends the State's previously approved long-term strategy for the first regional haze implementation period and requires Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 to meet NO X emission limits of 0.12 lb/MMBtu (30-day rolling average) and annual NO X limits of 1,314 tons/year for each unit, and a heat input limit of 21,900,000 MMBtu/year per unit by January 1, 2024. Ultimately, the Wyoming 2022 SIP revision finds the modified NO X emission and heat input limits to be sufficient for reasonable progress as part of the long-term strategy during the first implementation period in lieu of the existing emission limits associated with the installation of SCR controls approved and codified by EPA at 40 CFR 52.2636(c)(1). 4 Wyoming also included in Wyoming's 2022 SIP revision NO X and SO 2 monthly and annual emission limits for Jim Bridger Units 1-4. The Wyoming 2022 SIP revision reflects changes to Chapters 7 and 8 of Wyoming's regional haze SIP narrative  5 and incorporates certain conditions of Wyoming air quality permits #P0025809 and #P0036941.

Our April 10, 2024, proposed rule provided background on the requirements of the CAA and RHR, a summary of Wyoming's regional haze submittals and related EPA actions, and the EPA's rationale for its proposed action. 6 That background and rationale will not be restated in full here; see the proposed rule preamble for details. 7

The public comment period on the proposal closed on May 10, 2024. During the public comment period, we received three comments on our proposal; two in support and one in opposition. The commenters were:  8 Idaho Power Company, 9 NPS, 10 and PacifiCorp. 11 The full text of comments received is included in the publicly posted docket associated with this action at https://www.regulations.gov. Our RTC document, which is also included in the docket associated with this action, provides detailed responses to all significant comments received.

For the reasons stated in the proposed rule, we find that the Wyoming 2022 SIP revision requiring NO X emission and heat input limits, are sufficient for reasonable progress during the first planning period and that the NO X emission limits associated with the installation of SCR controls are no longer required. Therefore, we are approving Wyoming's 2022 SIP revision for the NO X reasonable progress analysis and determination for Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2, including the associated emission and operational limitations, compliance dates, and monitoring, recordkeeping and reporting requirements as well as the separate monthly and annual NO X and SO 2 emission limits. Specifically, the EPA is approving the following as federally enforceable elements of the Wyoming 2022 SIP revision for Jim Bridger Units 1-4:

• The NO X emission limits found in Wyoming air quality permit #P0036941 (Condition 9 for NO X lb/MMBtu and tons/year emission limits) for Units 1 and 2.

• The NO X and SO 2 emission limits found in Wyoming air quality permit #P0025809 (Condition 7 for pounds per hour (lb/hr) and Condition 9 for tons/year) for Units 1-4.

• The operational limit on annual heat input (based on a 12-month rolling average of hourly heat input values) found in Wyoming air quality permit #P0036941 (Condition 19).

• The compliance dates found in Wyoming air quality permit #P0036941 (Conditions 11 and 16) requiring that Units 1 and 2 comply with NO X emission rates in lb/MMBtu (30-day rolling average) and tons/year as well as an annual heat input in MMBtu/year; and permit #P0025809 (Conditions 7 and 9) requiring that Units 1-4 comply with the NO X and SO 2 emission limits in lb/hr and tons/year, respectively.

• The monitoring, recordkeeping and reporting requirements found in Wyoming air quality permit #P0036941 (Conditions 4, 5, 6, 10.i.1, 10.i.4, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21) and permit #P0025809 (Condition 8.i and 9).

The approval of the above elements into the SIP will remove the 0.07 lb/MMBtu NO X (30-day rolling average) long-term emission limits for Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 from the SIP and add the 0.12 lb/MMBtu NO X (30-day rolling average) reasonable progress emission limit and associated NO X emission and heat input limits. The 0.07 lb/MMBtu (30-day rolling average) NO X long-term strategy emission limits will remain for Units 3 and 4.

We are also approving the following non-enforceable narrative elements of the Wyoming 2022 SIP revision for:

• Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2, Chapters 7.3.6 PacifiCorp Jim Bridger Electric Generating Station of Wyoming's regional haze narrative, Addressing Regional Haze Visibility Protection For The Mandatory Federal Class I Areas Required Under 40 CFR 51.309, which contain a source-specific NO X reasonable progress analysis.

• Jim Bridger Units 1-4, Chapter 8.3.3 Long-Term Control Strategies for BART Facilities (Jim Bridger Power Plant (Units 1 and 2) only) of Wyoming's regional haze narrative, Addressing Regional Haze Visibility Protection For The Mandatory Federal Class I Areas Required Under 40 CFR 51.309, which contains (1) monthly NO X and SO 2 emission limits and an annual emissions cap for NO X plus SO 2 ;  12 and (2) a compliance date for Units 1 and 2 to meet a NO X 30-day rolling average (lb/MMBtu), NO X annual emission cap (tons/year), and annual heat input (MMBtu/year).

In this document, the EPA is finalizing regulatory text that includes incorporation by reference. In accordance with requirements of 1 CFR 51.5, the EPA is finalizing the incorporation by reference of the operating permits for Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 and Jim Bridger Units 1-4 described in sections II. and IV. of this preamble and set forth below in the amendments to 40 CFR part 52. The EPA has made, and will continue to make, these materials generally available through https://www.regulations.gov and at the EPA Region 8 Office (please contact the person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this preamble for more information). Therefore, these materials have been approved by the EPA for inclusion in the State Implementation Plan, have been incorporated by reference by the EPA into that plan, are fully federally enforceable under sections 110 and 113 of the CAA as of the effective date of the final rulemaking of the EPA's approval, and will be incorporated by reference in the next update to the SIP compilation. 13

Under the CAA, the Administrator is required to approve a SIP submission that complies with the provisions of the Act and applicable Federal regulations. 42 U.S.C. 7410(k); 40 CFR 52.02(a). Thus, in reviewing SIP submissions, the EPA's role is to approve state choices, provided that they meet the criteria of the CAA. Accordingly, this action merely approves state law as meeting Federal requirements and does not impose additional requirements beyond those imposed by state law. For that reason, this action:

• Is not a significant regulatory action subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993);

• Is not subject to Executive Order 14192 (90 FR 9065, February 6, 2025) because SIP actions are exempt from review under Executive Order 12866;

• Does not impose an information collection burden under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. );

• Is certified as not having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. );

• Does not contain any unfunded mandate or significantly or uniquely affect small governments, described in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4);

• Does not have federalism implications as specified in Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999);

• Is not subject to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997) because it approves a state program;

• Is not a significant regulatory action subject to Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001); and

• Is not subject to requirements of section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. 272 note) because application of those requirements would be inconsistent with the CAA.

In addition, the SIP is not approved to apply on any Indian reservation land or in any other area where EPA or an Indian Tribe has demonstrated that a Tribe has jurisdiction. In those areas of Indian country, the rule does not have Tribal implications and will not impose substantial direct costs on Tribal governments or preempt Tribal law as specified by Executive Order 13175 (65 FR 67249, November 9, 2000).

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. Section 804, however, exempts from section 801 the following types of rules: Rules of particular applicability; rules relating to agency management or personnel; and rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice that do not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties. 5 U.S.C. 804(3). Because this is a rule of particular applicability, the EPA is not required to submit a rule report regarding this action under section 801.

Under section 307(b)(1) of the CAA, petitions for judicial review of this action must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit by October 6, 2025. Filing a petition for reconsideration by the Administrator of this final rule does not affect the finality of this action for the purposes of judicial review nor does it extend the time within which a petition for judicial review may be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or action. This action may not be challenged later in proceedings to enforce its requirements (see section 307(b)(2)).

For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Environmental Protection Agency is amending title 40 CFR part 52 as follows:

Each State has a SIP containing the control measures and strategies used to attain and maintain the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). The SIP is extensive, containing such elements as air pollution regulations, emissions inventories, monitoring networks, attainment demonstrations, and enforcement mechanisms, among other elements. In developing the SIP, the State formally adopts the control measures and strategies used to attain and maintain the NAAQS and submits them to the EPA for review and approval. 1 The EPA approves the State's submitted regulatory provisions and codifies them in part 52, “Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans,” of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR part 52). In codifying the State regulatory provisions, the full text is not reproduced in its entirety in 40 CFR part 52 but is “incorporated by reference” as of a specific effective date. The public is referred to the location of the full text version for the specifics of each State regulatory provision incorporated by reference into the SIP. The information provided allows the EPA and the public to monitor the extent to which a State implements and enforces the SIP.

The SIP is a living document that is revised by the State as necessary to address the unique air pollution problems in the State. A SIP revision may include changes to one or more regulations in their entirety, or portions of regulations. The State indicates the changes in the submitted SIP revision (such as by using redline/strikethrough text) and the EPA takes action on the requested changes. The EPA establishes a docket for each action using a unique Docket Identification Number, listed in each Federal Register document. The docket and complete submission are available for viewing on www.regulations.gov.

On May 22, 1997 (62 FR 27968), the EPA began implementing revised procedures for incorporating regulatory provisions by reference into the Code of Federal Regulations for each SIP. The revised procedures updated the format for the identification of each SIP in 40 CFR part 52, streamlined the mechanism for announcing EPA approval of SIP revisions, and streamlined the mechanism for updating the “IBR material” (the full text of the regulatory provisions and source-specific permits, etc.) incorporated by reference into each SIP in 40 CFR part 52. The revised procedures also called for the EPA to maintain a “SIP Compilation” of the IBR material for each State.

The EPA must update each SIP Compilation and periodically publish an informational document in the rules section of the Federal Register notifying the public that updates have been made to a SIP Compilation for a particular State. The EPA began applying the 1997 revised procedures to the Oregon SIP on December 10, 2013 (78 FR 74012). The EPA subsequently published updates to the Oregon SIP IBR materials on April 10, 2019 (84 FR 14272) and December 20, 2022 (87 FR 77720).

Since the last published update to the Oregon SIP IBR materials, the EPA took two actions, on July 23, 2024 (89 FR 59610) and October 8, 2024 (89 FR 81361), to approve and incorporated by reference a number of regulatory provisions into the Oregon SIP at 40 CFR 52.1970(c) and (d). The approval actions and associated regulatory provisions are described in the following paragraphs of this preamble.

a. Action on July 23, 2024 (89 FR 59610):

• OAR 340-200-0020 General Air Quality Definitions (defining terms used in the Oregon air quality regulations), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-200-0025 Abbreviations and Acronyms (defining abbreviations and acronyms used in the Oregon air quality regulations), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-200-0035 Reference Materials (specifying the title and version of each reference material used in the Oregon air quality regulations), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-204-0300 Designation of Sustainment Areas (identifying the areas in Oregon designated as sustaining the relevant air quality standard), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-204-0310 Designation of Reattainment Areas (identifying the areas in Oregon designated as reattaining the relevant air quality standard), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-206-0010 Introduction (establishing significant harm levels for pollutants in areas based on priority level), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-208-0110 Visible Air Contaminant Limitations (establishing limits and test methods for visible emissions), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-209-0080 Issuance or Denial of a Permit (specifying procedures for issuing and denying permits, including how to request a hearing to contest a permit decision), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-210-0100 Registration in General (identifying categories of sources that are required to register with the Oregon DEQ), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-210-0205 Notice of Construction and Approval of Plans: Applicability and Requirements, except paragraph (3) (listing source types and activities that require notice to the Oregon DEQ prior to construction), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-210-0225 Notice of Construction and Approval of Plans: Types of Construction/Modification Changes (establishing the activities that qualify for each type of notice of construction), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-210-0230 Notice of Construction and Approval of Plans: Notice to Construct Application (requiring the specific information to be submitted in an application), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-210-0240 Notice of Construction and Approval of Plans: Construction Approval (specifying what level of approval from Oregon DEQ is needed before a source may begin construction), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-210-0250 Notice of Construction and Approval of Plans: Approval to Operate (specifying what is required of a source to obtain approval to operate), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-214-0110 Reporting: Request for Information (requiring sources to respond to Oregon DEQ requests for information), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-214-0114, Reporting: Records; Maintaining and Reporting (detailing when and how to record and report data), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-214-0130 Reporting: Information Exempt from Disclosure (establishing that trade secrets and other eligible data may be exempt from disclosure), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0020 Applicability and Jurisdiction (identifying source categories subject to Division 216 regarding air contaminant discharge permits), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0025 Types and Permits (identifying the types of air contaminant discharge permits), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0040 Application Requirements (spelling out the information required to be included in permit applications), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0054 Short Term Activity ACDPs (listing the pilot and other time-limited activities that may be eligible for a short term activity ACDP), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0056 Basic ACDPs (identifying the contents of a basic ACDP), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0060 General Air Contaminant Discharge Permits (identifying the contents of a general ACDP), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0064 Simple ACDPs (identifying the contents of a simple ACDP), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0066 Standard ACDPs (identifying the contents of a standard ACDP), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0068 Simple and Standard ACDP Attachments (allowing Oregon DEQ to add requirements to existing simple and standard ACDP permits), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0082 Expiration, Termination, Reinstatement or Revocation of an ACDP (regulating when and how ACDPs expire, are terminated, reinstated or revoked), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-0084 Department Initiated Modification (establishing a means by which Oregon DEQ may modify an ACDP when needed), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-8010 Table 1—Activities and Sources (listing which source categories and associated activities must obtain an ACDP), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-216-8020 Table 2—Air Contaminant Discharge Permits, except paragraph (2) and Table 2 (requiring sources to pay ACDP fees to the Oregon DEQ), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-222-0020 Applicability and Jurisdiction (requiring that plant site emission limits are included in most ACDPs and title V operating permits), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-222-0035 General Requirements for Establishing All PSELs (describing how plant site emission limits are established and how they are revised), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-222-0041 Annual PSELs (prescribing how annual plant site emission limits are established on a source-specific basis), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-222-0042 Short Term PSEL (establishing short term limits for sources located in areas with an established short term significant emission rate), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-222-0046 Netting Basis (establishing netting basis requirements), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-224-0030 New Source Review Procedural Requirements (establishing application and processing procedures for new source review permits), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-224-0520 Net Air Quality Benefit Emission Offsets: Requirements for Demonstrating Net Air Quality Benefit for Ozone Areas (requiring certain sources to offset emissions in areas with ozone problems), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-224-0530 Net Air Quality Benefit Emission Offsets: Requirements for Demonstrating Net Air Quality Benefit for Non-Ozone Areas (requiring sources to offset emissions in areas with particulate matter problems), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-225-0030 Procedural Requirements (prescribing the procedures for air quality analysis), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-225-0050 Requirements for Analysis in PSD Class II and Class III Areas (establishing the modeling requirements for sources in PSD class II and III areas), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-225-0070 Requirements for Demonstrating Compliance with Air Quality Related Values Protection (describing how to comply with limits established for national parks, wilderness, and other areas), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-226-0100 Highest and Best Practicable Treatment and Control: Policy and Application (requiring appropriate conditions in permits to control and treat emissions to the highest extent), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-226-0130 Highest and Best Practicable Treatment and Control: Typically Achievable Control Technology (TACT) (laying out when and how the Oregon DEQ will make typically achievable control technology determinations), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-226-0140 Highest and Best Practicable Treatment and Control: Additional Control Requirements for Stationary Sources of Air Contaminants (providing that the Oregon DEQ will establish additional control requirements to protect the NAAQS, visibility, and other public health and environmental goals), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-226-0210 Grain Loading Standards: Particulate Emission Limitations for Sources Other Than Fuel Burning Equipment, Refuse Burning Equipment and Fugitive Emissions (establishing particulate emission standards for non-fuel burning equipment), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-228-0210 General Emission Standards for Fuel Burning Equipment: Grain Loading Standards (setting grain loading standards for fuel-burning equipment), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-232-0030 Definitions (defining terms used in the rules establishing emission standards for VOC point sources), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-232-0040 General Non-Categorical Requirements (spelling out general case-by-case RACT requirements for VOC point sources), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-232-0090 Bulk Gasoline Terminals Including Truck and Trailer Loading (VOC emission limits for bulk gasoline terminals), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-232-0160 Surface Coating in Manufacturing (VOC emission limits for surface coating operations), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-232-0170 Aerospace Component Coating Operations (VOC emission limits for component coating in the aerospace industry), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-234-0010 Definitions except (8) and (10) (defining terms used in the rules establishing emission standards for the wood products industry), State effective March 1, 2023;

• OAR 340-234-0210 Kraft Pulp Mills: Emission Limitations, except references to total reduced sulfur (setting emission limits for kraft pulp mills), State effective March 1, 2023; and

• OAR 340-236-8010 Hot Mix Asphalt Plants: Table—Process Weight Table (requiring hot mix asphalt plants to comply with specific process weight discharge rates), State effective March 1, 2023.

b. Action on October 8, 2024 (89 FR 81361):

• OAR 340-223-0010 Purpose (for maintaining reasonable progress and other requirements associated with Oregon's implementation of the Federal Regional Haze Rule), State effective July 26, 2021;

• OAR 340-223-0020 Definitions (updating this section to account for revised program requirements between the first regional haze implementation period and the second implementation period), State effective July 26, 2021;

• OAR 340-223-0100 Screening Methodology for Sources for Round II of Regional Haze (establishing the criteria for selecting sources for review under the regional haze program), State effective July 26, 2021;

• OAR 340-223-0110 Options for Compliance with Round II of Regional Haze (establishing requirements for sources and compliance options under the regional haze program), State effective July 26, 2021;

• OAR 340-223-0120 Four Factor Analysis (establishing the requirements for assessing potential controls for reasonable progress under the regional haze program), State effective July 26, 2021; and

• OAR 340-223-0130 Final Orders Ordering Compliance with Round II of Regional Haze (establishing unilateral order authority and procedures for contested case hearings under the regional haze program), State effective July 26, 2021.

a. Action on October 8, 2024 (89 FR 81361):

• Ash Grove Cement Company, Permit No. 01-0029-TV-01, permit conditions (3), (9) through (11), (14), (16) through (28), (42), (45) through (76), (84) through (97), (99), (100), and (102) only, State effective October 16, 2020;

• Biomass One, L.P., Order No. 15-0159, State effective August 9, 2021;

• Boise Cascade Wood Products, LLC—Elgin Complex, Order No. 31-0006, State effective August 12, 2021;

• Boise Cascade Wood Products, LLC—Elgin Complex, Permit No. 31-0006-TV-01, permit conditions (56), (59) through (75), (77), and (78) only, State effective December 5, 2016;

• Boise Cascade Wood Products, LLC—Medford, Order No. 15-0004, State effective August 9, 2021;

• Boise Cascade Wood Products, LLC—Medford, Permit No. 15-0004-TV-01, permit conditions (71), (72), and (74) through (88) only, State effective February 20, 2020;

• Cascade Pacific Pulp, LLC—Halsey Pulp Mill, Order No. 22-3501-A2, State effective August 25, 2023;

• Cascades Tissue Group: A Division of Cascades Holding US Inc., Order No. 05-1849, State effective August 18, 2021;

• Cascades Tissue Group: A Division of Cascades Holding US Inc., Permit No. 05-1849-TV-01, permit conditions (24), (25), (27), and (29) through (43) only, State effective April 6, 2018;

• Collins Products, L.L.C., Permit No. 18-0013-TV-01, permit conditions (3), (14) through (16), (19) through (24), (34 through (42), (63) through (75), and (77) only, State effective January 26, 2015;

• Columbia Forest Products, Inc., Permit No. 18-0014-TV-01, permit conditions (3), (8) through (20), (22), (23), (34) through (52), (58) through (66), (67—introductory paragraph), (67.a), (67.b.iii) through (67.b.v), and (68) through (70) only, State effective September 26, 2017;

• EVRAZ Inc, Order No. 26-1865, State effective August 9, 2021;

• Gas Transmission Northwest LLC—Compressor Station 12, Order No. 09-0084, State effective August 9, 2021;

• Gas Transmission Northwest LLC—Compressor Station 12, Permit No. 09-0084-TV-01, permit conditions (32) through (34) and (37) through (50) only, State effective August 10, 2017;

• Gas Transmission Northwest LLC—Compressor Station 13, Order No. OAH CASE NO. 2021-ABC-04835/DEQ CASE NO. AQ/RH-HQ-2021-140, State effective June 1, 2022;

• Gas Transmission Northwest LLC—Compressor Station 13, Permit No. 18-0096-TV-01, permit conditions (24) through (26), (32) through (35), and (37) through (44) only, State effective July 11, 2018;

• Georgia-Pacific—Toledo LLC, Order No. 21-0005, Amendment No. 21-005-A1, State effective December 5, 2022;

• Georgia Pacific—Wauna Mill, Order No. 04-0004, Amendment No. 04-004-A1, State effective December 5, 2022;

• Gilchrist Forest Products, Permit No. 18-0005-TV-01, permit conditions (4), (5), (9), (10), (12) though (19), (41) through (43), (45) through (59), and (61) only, State effective July 25, 2023;

• International Paper—Springfield, Order No. 208850, State August 9, 2021;

• International Paper—Springfield, Permit No. 208850, permit conditions (186) through (189), (192), and (198) only, State effective October 4, 2016;

• JELD-WEN, Permit No. 18-0006-TV-01, permit conditions (55) through (77) and (80) through (87) only, State effective December 01, 2021;

• JELD-WEN, Permit No. 18-0006-TV-01, Addendum No, 1, permit conditions 53 and 53b only, State effective August 11, 2022;

• Kingsford Manufacturing Company, Permit No. 204402, addendum No. 2, permit conditions (71) through (73) and (75) through (91) only, State effective November 15, 2021;

• Klamath Energy LLC—Klamath Cogeneration, Permit No. 18-0003-TV-01, permit conditions (10) through (16), (18), (24) through (28), (32) through (37), (39) through (49), (51), (52), and (54), and (56) only, State effective June 12, 2017;

• Klamath Energy LLC—Klamath Cogeneration, Permit No. 18-0003-TV-01, Addendum No. 1, permit conditions (3.a), (3.b), (61.l), and (66.b.xii), State effective December 8, 2020;

• Northwest Pipeline LLC—Baker Compressor Station, Order No. 01-0038, amendment 01-0038-A1, State effective February 1, 2022;

• Northwest Pipeline LLC—Baker Compressor Station, Permit No. 01-0038-TV-01, permit conditions (27) through (30) and (32) through (43) only, State effective January 12, 2017;

• Northwest Pipeline LLC—Oregon City Compressor Station, Order No. 03-2729, amendment 03-2729-A1, State effective February 1, 2022;

• Northwest Pipeline LLC—Oregon City Compressor Station, Permit No. 03-2729-TV-01, permit conditions (7), (19), (25) through (27), (38), (41), (45), and (50) through (65) only, State effective February 19, 2013;

• Ochoco Lumber Company, Permit No. 12-0032-ST-01, permit conditions (1.1) through (1.3), (1.6), (2.1) through (2.5), (4.1) though (4.4), and (5.1) through (6.2) only, State effective June 25, 2019;

• Owens-Brockway Glass Container Inc., Order No. 26-1876, State effective August 9, 2021;

• Owens-Brockway Glass Container Inc., Permit No. 26-1876-TV-01, permit conditions (33) through (48) only, State effective December 10, 2019,

• Pacific Wood Laminates, Inc., Permit No. 08-0003-TV-01, permit conditions (3), (9), (10), (12) through (19), (26) through (41), (56) through (71), and (73) only, State effective December 30, 2019;

• PGE Beaver Plant/Port Westward I Plant, Order No. 05-2606, State effective August 10, 2021;

• PGE Beaver Plant/Port Westward I Plant, Permit No. 05-2520, permit conditions (62) through (66), (68) through (78), (79.a), (80) through (83), (85), (87), (88.a), (89.d), (89.f), and (89.i) only, State effective January 21, 2009;

• Roseburg Forest Products—Dillard, Order No. 10-0025, State effective August 9, 2021;

• Roseburg Forest Products—Medford MDF, Permit No. 15-0073-TV-01, permit conditions (44) through (46), (48) through (61), (63), and (64) only, State effective August 18, 2022;

• Roseburg Forest Products—Riddle Plywood, Permit No. 10-0078-TV-01, permit conditions (65), (66), (68) through (81) only, State effective July 31, 2019;

• Swanson Group Mfg. LLC, Permit No. 10-0045-TV-01, permit conditions (4), (10) through (24), (25—introductory paragraph), (25.a) through (25.c), (27) through (40), (50) through (64), and (66) only, State effective June 12, 2017;

• Timber Products Co. Limited Partnership, Permit No. 15-0025-TV-01, permit conditions (70) through (72) and (74) through (90) only, State effective June 23, 2022;

• Willamette Falls Paper Company, Order No. 03-2145, State effective August 9, 2021;

• Willamette Falls Paper Company, Permit No. 03-2145-TV-01, permit conditions (40) through (55) only, State effective February 24, 2016; and

• Woodgrain Millwork LLC—Particleboard, Permit No. 31-0002-TV-01, permit conditions (3), (12) through (21), (22—introductory paragraph), (22.a), (22.e), (22.f), (23), (25) though (28), (30) through (35), (37), (39) through (41), (43), (44), (46), (48), (49), (51) through (72), (80) through (94), and (96) only, State effective May 24, 2021.

Since the last published update to the Oregon SIP IBR materials, the EPA also removed regulatory materials from the Oregon SIP at 40 CFR 52.1970(c). The actions and associated regulatory provisions removed from incorporation by reference are described in the following paragraphs of this preamble. No IBR material was removed from paragraph (d).

a. Action on July 23, 2024 (89 FR 59610):

• OAR 340-210-0215, Notice of Construction and Approval of Plans: Requirement (requirements to notify the Oregon DEQ prior to constructing or modifying a subject source), State effective April 16, 2015;

• OAR 340-222-0040, Generic Annual PSEL (establishing generic plant site emission limits for subject sources that emit less than the significant emission rate), State effective April 16, 2015;

• OAR 340-021-200 Purpose (describing the purpose of contingency control requirements for existing industrial sources in coarse particulate matter nonattainment areas), State effective May 1, 1995;

• OAR 340-021-205 Relation to Other Rules (describing the relation of contingency control requirements to other regulations), State effective March 10, 1993;

• OAR 340-021-210 Applicability (stating that contingency control requirements shall apply if the EPA determines an area has failed to attain the PM 10 standard by the applicable attainment date), State effective March 10, 1993;

• OAR 340-021-215 Definitions (establishing definitions used in the contingency control requirements), State effective March 10, 1993;

• OAR 340-021-220 Compliance Schedule for Existing Sources (setting the compliance schedule for sources to install emissions control systems as a contingency control requirement), State effective March 10, 1993;

• OAR 340-021-225 Wood-Waste Boilers (limiting emissions from wood-waste boilers to a specific rate as a contingency control requirement), State effective March 10, 1993;

• OAR 340-021-230 Wood Particle Dryers at Particleboard Plants (limiting emissions from wood particle dryers to a specific rate as a contingency control requirement), State effective March 10, 1993;

• OAR 340-021-235 Hardboard Manufacturing Plants (limiting emissions from hardboard manufacturing plants to a specific rate as a contingency control requirement), State effective March 10, 1993;

• OAR 340-021-240, Air Conveying Systems (limiting emissions from air conveying systems to a specific rate as a contingency control requirement), State effective March 10, 1993; and

• OAR 340-021-245, Fugitive Emissions (requiring wood products manufacturing plants to limit fugitive emissions as a contingency control requirement), State effective March 10, 1993.

2. Action on October 8, 2024 (89 FR 81361):

• OAR 340-223-0030 BART and Additional Regional Haze Requirements for the Foster-Wheeler Boiler at the Boardman Coal-Fired Power Plant (Federal Acid Rain Program Facility ORISPL Code 6106 (establishing nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emission limits, retrofit control technology and fuel requirements for the Foster-Wheeler Boiler), State effective December 10, 2010;

• OAR 340-223-0040 Federally Enforceable Permit Limits (requirements for sources that accept a federally enforceable limit to avoid specific best available retrofit technology requirements), State effective December 10, 2010;

• OAR 340-223-0050 Alternative Regional Haze Requirements for the Foster-Wheeler Boiler at the Boardman Coal-Fired Power Plant (Federal Acid Rain Program Facility ORISPL Code 6106 (regional haze compliance options and dates for the Foster-Wheeler Boiler), State effective December 10, 2010; and

• OAR 340-223-0080 Alternative Requirements for the Foster-Wheeler Boiler at the Boardman Coal-Fired Power Plant (Federal Acid Rain Program Facility ORISPL Code 6106) Based Upon Permanently Ceasing the Burning of Coal Within Five Years of EPA Approval of the Revision to the Oregon Clean Air Act State Implementation Plan Incorporating OAR Chapter 340, Division 223 (regional haze compliance options and dates for the Foster-Wheeler Boiler if it ceases to burn coal), State effective December 10, 2010.

In this action, the EPA is providing notification of an update to the materials incorporated by reference into the Oregon SIP as of June 1, 2025, and identified in 40 CFR 52.1970(c) and (d). This update includes SIP materials submitted by Oregon and approved by the EPA since the last IBR update. See 87 FR 77720 (December 20, 2022).

In addition, the EPA is providing notification of the following corrections:

40 CFR 52.1970(c): correcting entry “629-048-0110” to reflect that a revision to this regulation was approved in the EPA action on May 25, 2021 (86 FR 27976); and

40 CFR 52.1970(e): correcting the entry for “ODEQ Continuous Emissions Monitoring Manual” in Table 5 to include the statewide applicable geographic area, which was inadvertently left blank in the action on October 11, 2017 (82 FR 47122).

The EPA has determined that this action falls under the “good cause” exemption in section 553(b)(3)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) which, upon finding “good cause,” authorizes agencies to dispense with public participation and section 553(d)(3) which allows an agency to make an action effective immediately (thereby avoiding the 30-day delayed effective date otherwise provided for in the APA). This administrative action simply codifies provisions which are already in effect as a matter of law in Federal and approved State programs, makes corrections and clarifying changes to the tables in the CFR, and makes ministerial changes to the prefatory heading to the tables in the CFR. Under section 553 of the APA, an agency may find good cause where procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” Public comment for this administrative action is “unnecessary” and “contrary to the public interest” since the codification (and corrections) only reflect existing law. Immediate notice of this action in the Federal Register benefits the public by providing the public notification of the updated Oregon SIP Compilation and notification of corrections to the Oregon “Identification of Plan” portion of the CFR. Further, pursuant to section 553(d)(3), making this action immediately effective benefits the public by immediately updating both the SIP Compilation and the CFR “Identification of plan” section (which includes table entry corrections).

In this document, The EPA is finalizing regulatory text that includes incorporation by reference. In accordance with requirements of 1 CFR 51.5, The EPA is finalizing the incorporation by reference of regulations promulgated by Oregon, previously approved by the EPA and federally effective before June 1, 2025, contained in Volume I, 40 CFR 52.1970(c), EPA approved regulations and statutes, and Volume II, 40 CFR 52.1970(d) EPA approved state source-specific requirements, described in section II. of this preamble. The EPA has made, and will continue to make, these materials generally available through www.regulations.gov and at the EPA Region 10 Office (please contact the person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this preamble for more information).

Under the Clean Air Act, the Administrator is required to approve a SIP submission that complies with the provisions of the Clean Air Act and applicable Federal regulations. 42 U.S.C. 7410(k); 40 CFR 52.02(a). Thus, in reviewing SIP submissions, EPA's role is to approve State choices, provided that they meet the criteria of the Clean Air Act. Accordingly, this action merely approves State law as meeting Federal requirements and does not impose additional requirements beyond those imposed by State law. For that reason, this action:

• Is not a significant regulatory action subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget under Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993);

• Is not subject to Executive Order 14192 (90 FR 9065, February 6, 2025) because SIP actions are exempt from review under Executive Order 12866:

• Does not impose an information collection burden under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. );

• Is certified as not having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. );

• Does not contain any unfunded mandate or significantly or uniquely affect small governments, as described in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4);

• Does not have federalism implications as specified in Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999);

• Is not subject to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997) because it approves a State program;

• Is not a significant regulatory action subject to Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001); and

• Is not subject to requirements of section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. 272 note) because application of those requirements would be inconsistent with the Clean Air Act.

In addition, the SIP is not approved to apply on any Indian reservation land or in any other area where EPA or an Indian Tribe has demonstrated that a Tribe has jurisdiction. In those areas of Indian country, the rule does not have Tribal implications and will not impose substantial direct costs on Tribal governments or preempt Tribal law as specified by Executive Order 13175 (65 FR 67249, November 9, 2000).

This action is subject to the Congressional Review Act, and EPA will submit a rule report to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. This action is not a “major rule” as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

Under section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, petitions for judicial review of this action must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit by October 6, 2025. Filing a petition for reconsideration by the Administrator of this final rule does not affect the finality of this action for the purposes of judicial review nor does it extend the time within which a petition for judicial review may be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or action. This action may not be challenged later in proceedings to enforce its requirements. (See section 307(b)(2).)

For the reasons set forth in the preamble, EPA is amending 40 CFR part 52 as follows:

This is a summary of the Commission's Report and Order ( Report and Order ), in ET Docket No. 24-136, FCC 25-27, adopted on May 22, 2025, and released on May 27, 2025. The full text of this document is available for public inspection and can be downloaded at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-27A1.pdf. Alternative formats are available for people with disabilities (Braille, large print, electronic files, audio format) by sending an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or calling the Commission's Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-0432 (TTY).

Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), requires that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice-and-comment rulemaking, unless the agency certifies that “the rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.” Accordingly, the Commission has prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the possible impact of the rule and policy changes contained in the Report and Order on small entities. The FRFA is set forth in Appendix C of the Report and Order.

Paperwork Reduction Act. This document contains proposed new or modified information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment on any information collection requirements contained in this document. In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment on how we might “further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.”

Congressional Review Act. The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, concurs, that this rule is “non-major” under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of this Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

The Commission adopts new rules to help ensure that the telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), measurement facilities (test labs), and laboratory accreditation bodies that participate in the FCC's equipment authorization program are not subject to ownership, direction, or control by untrustworthy actors that pose a risk to national security. The Commission previously established new equipment authorization program rules that prohibit authorization of specified equipment determined to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons. It is incumbent on TCBs and test labs, to which certain functions of the certification process—including the receipt and maintenance of sensitive and proprietary information regarding communications equipment—have been entrusted, to be vigilant and to promote the integrity of the FCC's authorization procedures to help protect our nation's supply chain against such unacceptable risk. In light of these responsibilities and ongoing security risks, the Commission strengthens its oversight of TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies by adopting new rules that will help ensure the integrity of these entities for purposes of the FCC's equipment authorization program, promote national security, and advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a more secure and resilient communications supply chain. The Commission finds that it is critical for national security and the integrity of the supply chain that it prohibit from recognition or participation in the equipment authorization program TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity.

In defining the scope of the term “prohibited entity,” the Commission relies on federal government agency determinations identifying entities that pose national security threats. For purposes of the Order, the term “prohibited entity” means any of the following:

The Commission will deem a TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body as “owned by” a prohibited entity when any such prohibited entity, has, possesses, or otherwise controls an equity or voting interest of 10% or more in the relevant TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body. The Commission also provides further clarity on what it means for a TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body to be controlled by or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity.

To help ensure that the Commission has the necessary information to enforce this prohibition, the FCC expands its current reporting and certification requirements. The Commission adopts a requirement for all recognized TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to certify to the FCC, within 30 days after the effective date of the rules, and thereafter with the request for recognition, that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity. The Commission also adopts a requirement for all recognized TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to report, within 90 days after the effective date of the rules, and thereafter with the request for recognition, all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The Commission also amends its rules to state that it will not recognize—and will revoke any existing recognition of—any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate, certification; or that fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater.

In keeping with the new reporting requirements, the Commission also clarifies the requirement that every entity specifically named on the Covered List must provide to the Commission, pursuant to § 2.903(b), information regarding all of its subsidiaries and affiliates, not merely those that produce “covered” equipment. Each relevant entity must provide this information no later than 30 days after the effective date of this rule and thereafter in accordance with the provisions of § 2.903(b). The Commission makes a minor rule change clarifying its process for withdrawing recognition from test labs and laboratory accreditation bodies. The Commission also adopts several additional rules to strengthen the integrity of TCBs and test labs associated with its equipment authorization program.

In the EA Integrity NPRM, the Commission sought to strengthen its requirements for and oversight of FCC-recognized TCBs and test labs by proposing new rules that would help ensure the integrity of these entities for purposes of the equipment authorization program, better protect national security, and advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a more secure and resilient supply chain. As the Commission stated, it is vital to ensure that these TCBs and test labs are not subject to control by foreign adversaries or other untrustworthy actors that pose a risk to national security.

The Commission's equipment authorization program, codified in its part 2 rules, plays a critical role in enabling the Commission to carry out its responsibilities under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act). Under section 302 of the Act, the Commission is authorized to make reasonable regulations governing the interference potential of equipment that emits radiofrequency (RF) energy and that can cause harmful interference to radio communications; such regulations are implemented through the equipment authorization program. In addition, the equipment authorization program helps ensure that communications equipment complies with certain other policy objectives—which include protecting the communications networks and supply chain from equipment that poses an unacceptable risk to national security.

Under section 302a(e) of the Act, certain important responsibilities have been delegated to TCBs and test labs with regard to implementing its equipment authorization program. Specifically, TCBs and test labs each play a role in ensuring that RF equipment complies with Commission rules, which is required for such equipment to be marketed in or imported to the United States. Test labs gather radiofrequency measurement data and develop technical reports to demonstrate subject equipment compliance with the Commission's applicable technical rules to minimize the risk of harmful interference, promote efficient use of spectrum, and advance other technical policy goals, such as ensuring hearing aid compatibility and controlling the environmental effects of RF radiation.

TCBs perform evaluation and review of application data, including test reports, and make decisional determinations for certifications. For all granted certification applications, the TCBs must send to the Commission any test lab data and other information relied upon by the TCB. This information is made publicly available on the FCC's website upon grant of the equipment authorization. Commission rules also impose certain obligations on each TCB to perform post-market surveillance, based on “type testing a certain number of samples of the total number of product types” that the TCB has certified. Accreditation bodies conduct assessments to ensure that TCBs and test labs are competent and capable of providing accurate and reliable certification and testing services.

To be recognized for participation in the FCC's equipment certification process, TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies must meet certain criteria specified in its rules. TCBs must be designated to issue grants of certification and must be located in the United States or in countries that have entered into applicable mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) with the United States. Currently, there are 39 FCC-recognized TCBs, 23 of which are located in the United States while the remaining 16 are located in seven MRA-partnered countries. The Commission will withdraw recognition of a TCB if the TCB's designation or accreditation is withdrawn, if the Commission determines that there is “just cause,” or if the TCB requests that it no longer hold its designation or recognition. The Commission's rules also set forth specific procedures, including notification requirements, that the Commission will follow if the Commission intends to withdraw its recognition of a TCB.

Test lab recognition occurs based on current Commission rules stating that if a test lab has been accredited for the appropriate scope for the types of equipment that it will test, then it “shall be deemed competent to test and submit test data for equipment subject to certification.” Based on such accreditation, the Commission—namely, the Chief Engineer, to whom recognition authority has been delegated—makes determinations regarding the continued acceptability of individual test labs. Test labs must be reassessed for accreditation and recognition at least every two years. Approximately 75% of certified devices are tested in recognized labs located in China.

The Commission recognizes four laboratory accreditation bodies in the U.S. that can accredit test labs in the United States. For test labs in countries with which the U.S. has entered into an MRA, the Commission will consider for recognition an accredited laboratory that has been designated by a foreign designating authority. Currently there are 24 such FCC-recognized laboratory accreditation bodies outside the United States, located in 23 different MRA-partnered countries. All other test labs must be accredited by an organization recognized by the Commission to perform test lab accreditations in non-MRA countries. Currently, the Commission recognizes three such accrediting bodies. Current rules do not preclude a laboratory accreditation body that is not in an MRA-partnered country from submitting a request to be recognized, but, to date, the FCC has not recognized any laboratory accreditation body outside of an MRA-partnered country.

The EA Security R&O and FNPRM. On November 11, 2022, the Commission adopted the EA Security Report and Order, Order, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (88 FR 7592; February 6, 2023). Specifically, the Commission established several new rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Commission's Covered List (covered equipment) maintained pursuant to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 (Secure Networks Act). The Covered List identifies certain types of communications equipment produced by particular entities as well as information security products and certain services provided by various entities. This list is derived from specific determinations made by sources enumerated in the Secure Networks Act, including certain federal agencies and Congress, that certain equipment or services pose an unacceptable risk to national security. The EA Security R&O adopted several revisions to part 2 of the Commission's rules concerning equipment authorization requirements and processes. These revisions include requirements that, to help implement the prohibition on authorization of any covered equipment, applicants seeking equipment certification must make certain attestations about the relevant equipment. These include attesting that the equipment is not prohibited from receiving authorization and whether the applicant is an entity identified on the Covered List as an entity producing covered communications equipment. TCBs, pursuant to their responsibilities as part of the Commission's equipment authorization program, review the applications and must ensure that only applications that meet all of the Commission's applicable technical and non-technical requirements are ultimately granted, and that none of these grants are for covered equipment.

In the EA Security R&O, the Commission, in affirming its authority to prohibit authorization of communications equipment that had been placed on the Covered List, noted that it has broad statutory authority, under sections 302 and 303(e) of the Communications Act and other statutory provisions, to take into account national security concerns when promoting the public interest, including in its equipment authorization program.

Evolving Risks Order and NPRM (88 FR 50486; August 1, 2023). Since adopting the EA Security R&O, the Commission has taken several additional steps to address evolving national security concerns to protect the security of America's critical communications networks and supply chains. In April 2023, in the Evolving Risks Order and NPRM, the Commission required all international section 214 authorization holders to respond to a one-time information collection to update the Commission's records regarding their foreign ownership, noting that “the information will assist the Commission in developing a timely and effective process for prioritizing the review of international section 214 authorizations that are most likely to raise national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy concerns.” The Commission also sought comment on further actions it could take to protect the nation's telecommunications infrastructure from threats in an evolving national security and law enforcement landscape by proposing comprehensive changes to the Commission's rules that allow carriers to provide international telecommunications service. The Commission proposed, among other things, to adopt a renewal framework or, in the alternative, a formalized periodic review process for all international section 214 authorization holders. The Commission stated that, due to the evolving national security and law enforcement concerns identified in its recent proceedings to revoke the section 214 authorizations of certain providers controlled by the Chinese government, a formalized system of periodically reassessing international section 214 authorizations would better ensure that international section 214 authorizations, once granted, continue to serve the public interest.

In addition, in the Evolving Risks NPRM, the Commission proposed, among other things, to prioritize the renewal applications or any periodic review filings and deadlines based on, for example, “reportable foreign ownership, including any reportable foreign interest holder that is a citizen of a foreign adversary country,” as defined in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4. The Commission also sought comment on whether to revise its ownership reporting threshold, currently set at 10% or greater direct and indirect equity and/or voting interests, to 5%, noting that the current 10% threshold may not capture all of the foreign interests that may present national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy concerns in today's national security and law enforcement environment. The Commission also proposed, among other things, to require applicants to certify in their application whether they use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List.

Cybersecurity IoT Labeling R&O (89 FR 61242; July 30, 2024). On March 14, 2024, the Commission adopted the Cybersecurity IoT Labeling R&O to strengthen the nation's cybersecurity protections by adopting a voluntary cybersecurity labeling program for wireless Internet of Things (IoT) products. In that R&O, the Commission determined that entities that are owned by, controlled by, or affiliated with “foreign adversaries,” as defined by the Department of Commerce, should be ineligible for purposes of the Commission's voluntary IoT Labeling Program. The Commission also generally prohibited entities that produce equipment on the Covered List, as well as entities named on the DOD's list of Chinese military companies or the Department of Commerce's Entity List, and entities suspended or debarred from receiving federal procurements or financial awards, including all entities and individuals published as ineligible for award on the General Service Administration's System for Award Management, from any participation in the IoT Labeling Program. Also, the Commission specifically prohibited any of these entities from serving as a Cybersecurity Label Administrator or serving as a CyberLAB for testing products for compliance with forthcoming cybersecurity technical standards. The Commission concluded that these lists represent the determination of relevant federal agencies that entities on these lists may pose a national security threat within their respective areas, and that it is not in the public interest to permit these entities to provide assurance to the public that their IoT products meet the new cybersecurity standards for obtaining the U.S. Cyber Trust Mark.

In the Submarine Cable Landing License NPRM (90 FR 12036; March 13, 2025), the Commission opened a proceeding to improve and streamline the submarine landing license rules, seeking comment on how to facilitate efficient deployment of submarine cables while ensuring the security, resilience, and protection of this critical infrastructure. It noted that, of the 84 licensed cables that currently are operating or planned to enter service, three land in a “foreign adversary” country as defined by the U.S. Department of Commerce rules and, according to the Commission's records, nine licensees of submarine cables have direct or indirect interest holders that include the Chinese government or an entity with a place of organization in China.

The Commission, among other things, sought comment on whether to preclude the grant of a cable landing license application filed by any applicant that: (1) is directly and/or indirectly owned or controlled by, or subject to the influence of a government organization of a foreign adversary country, as defined under 15 CFR 791.4; (2) is directly and/or indirectly owned or controlled by, or subject to the influence of an individual or entity that has a citizenship(s) or place(s) of organization in a foreign adversary country; (3) is directly and/or indirectly owned or controlled by, or subject to the influence of an individual or entity on the Commission's Covered List; and/or (4) is using or will use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List in the proposed submarine cable infrastructure.

The Commission also proposed, among other things, to prioritize the filing and review of periodic ownership reports and related submarine cable system information for submarine cable systems that: (1) have a licensee that is directly or indirectly wholly or partially owned by a government of, or other entities with a place of organization in, a “foreign adversary” country, as defined in the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4; (2) have a licensee with a place of organization in a “foreign adversary” country; or (3) land in a “foreign adversary” country.

The Commission also sought comment on whether it should prohibit cable landing licensees from entering into arrangements for Indefeasible Rights of Use or leases for capacity on submarine cables landing in the United States, with any entity that has a citizenship(s) or place(s) of organization in a “foreign adversary” country, as defined under 15 CFR 791.4. It sought comment on whether it should prohibit cable landing licensees from entering into such arrangements with any entity that is directly and/or indirectly owned or controlled by, or subject to the influence of, (1) a government organization of a foreign adversary country, and/or (2) any individual or entity that has a citizenship(s) or place(s) of organization in a “foreign adversary” country, as defined under 15 CFR 791.4. Additionally, it sought comment on whether to adopt rules that prohibit cable landing licensees from landing a cable licensed by the Commission in certain locations, such as landing points in a “foreign adversary” country, as defined under 15 CFR 791.4.

On May 23, 2024, the Commission adopted the EA Integrity NPRM (89 FR 55530; July 5, 2024), in which it proposed measures to strengthen the requirements for and oversight of TCBs and test labs to help ensure the integrity of these entities for purposes of the equipment authorization program, better protect national security, and help build a more secure and resilient communications supply chain. The Commission explained that, in light of the new national security-related responsibilities on TCBs and test labs, and their ongoing responsibilities to receive and maintain sensitive and proprietary information regarding communications equipment, among other reasons, it is vital to ensure that TCBs and test labs are not subject to influence or control by untrustworthy actors that pose a risk to national security.

First, the Commission proposed to prohibit any TCB or test lab in which an entity identified on the Covered List has, possesses, or otherwise controls an equity or voting interest of 10% or more from being recognized by the FCC or participating in the FCC's equipment authorization program. Second, the Commission proposed prohibiting the use of, or reliance on, any TCB or test lab for equipment authorization if any entity listed on the Covered List holds, possesses, or otherwise controls an equity or voting interest of 10% or more. Third, the Commission sought comment on prohibiting recognition of any TCB or test lab owned or controlled by a foreign adversary or any other entity that has been found to pose a risk to national security. To that end, the Commission sought comment on whether and how the FCC should consider national security determinations made in other federal agency lists in establishing eligibility qualifications for Commission recognition of a TCB or a test lab in the equipment authorization program. Fourth, to help ensure that the Commission has the information required to enforce any requirements adopted in the proceeding, the FCC proposed new certification, recordkeeping, and reporting obligations for TCBs and test labs, including requiring TCBs and test labs to certify that no entity identified on the Covered List has, possesses, or otherwise controls an equity or voting interest of 10% or more in the TCB or test lab, and to produce documentation identifying any entity that has, possesses, or otherwise controls an equity or voting interest of 5% or more in the TCB or test lab. The Commission also sought comment on other revisions or clarifications to its rules to implement this requirement. Finally, the Commission sought comment on various related matters regarding implementation of the proposed prohibition and the equipment authorization program generally. Namely, the Commission sought comment regarding whether to revise its rules, policies, or guidance regarding post-market surveillance, accreditation and reassessment of TCBs, recognition and withdrawal of recognition of TCBs, transparency for test labs, accreditation of test labs, recognition and withdrawal of recognition of test labs, and whether to require the use of accredited, FCC-recognized test labs in the SDoC process. In particular, in light of the goals of the proceeding, the Commission sought comment on potential revisions to the rules governing TCB and laboratory accrediting bodies.

In response to the NPRM, the Commission received 10 comments and two reply comments. Some commenters generally supported the goal of the Commission to ensure the integrity of entities that participate in its equipment authorization program and found the Commission's proposals to be reasonable and important to promoting national security, while others generally supported the Commission's goals but expressed concerns with certain aspects of its proposals or contended that no changes to the equipment authorization program are needed. Some advised that any action the Commission takes should be designed so as not to cause disruption or delay in the equipment authorization process and to the FCC's supply chains, and suggest alternative actions the Commission could take that those commenters believe would be less disruptive.

In the Report and Order, the Commission adopts revisions to its rules designed to promote the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization program and ensure that it serves the Commission's goal of protecting its communications equipment supply chain from entities posing unacceptable risks to national security. The Commission recognizes that the benefits of protecting U.S. national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy interests are difficult to quantify in monetary terms. The difficulty in quantifying these benefits does not, however, diminish their importance. The Commission previously has found that “a foreign adversary's access to American communications networks could result in hostile actions to disrupt and surveil its communications networks, impacting the nation's economy generally and online commerce specifically, and result in the breach of confidential data.” Given that the national gross domestic product was over $29 trillion in 2024, the digital economy accounted for approximately 16% of its economy, and the volume of international trade for the United States (exports and imports) was $7.3 trillion in 2024, even a temporary disruption in communications could cause millions of dollars in economic losses. The harms by foreign adversaries or other untrustworthy actors thus could be significant, causing disruption to the U.S. economy, residential and government communications, and critical infrastructure.

Through the Commission's equipment authorization process, third party entities are tasked with various responsibilities to ensure that RF devices comply with FCC rules. Specifically, equipment for which an authorization is sought is provided to a test lab to gather radiofrequency measurement data and develop technical reports to demonstrate device compliance with the Commission's applicable rules. For devices for which equipment certification is sought (as opposed to SDoC), TCBs perform evaluation and review of those test reports along with other application data, and make decisional determinations for certifications. The Commission has a process, known as “recognition,” for ensuring that accredited TCBs and test labs, and the laboratory accreditation bodies, meet the necessary qualifications for participation in the FCC's equipment authorization program.

The Commission finds that excluding from participation in its equipment authorization program entities that threaten to undermine national security is necessary to effectively promote the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization program and to protect national security interests. To implement this finding, the Commission takes several actions to ensure the integrity of those entities the FCC recognizes for participation in its equipment authorization program or upon which entities seeking authorization may rely. First, the Commission identifies, pursuant to federal agency or congressional determinations, a class of “prohibited entities” that pose national security threats and therefore could adversely affect the trustworthiness of, or otherwise undermine the public's confidence in, a TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity. Second, the Commission prohibits from participation in its equipment authorization process, any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity. This includes a prohibition on the reliance on or use of, for purposes of equipment authorization, any such TCB or test lab, for both certification and supplier's declaration of conformity (SDoC). Third, the Commission explains that it will consider a TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body as “owned by” a prohibited entity when a prohibited entity has, possesses, or otherwise controls an equity or voting interest of 10% or more in the TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body. The Commission also provides clarification on what it means for a TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body to be controlled by, or subject to the direction of, a prohibited entity. Fourth, the Commission adopts expanded reporting requirements to require that all TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies seeking Commission recognition certifies to the Commission that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity and report all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The Commission will not recognize, and will revoke recognition of, any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide or provides false or inaccurate information or certification. Finally, the Commission adopts a minor rule change clarifying its process for withdrawing recognition from test labs and laboratory accreditation bodies, and the Commission adopts other revisions to its rules including related recordkeeping and reporting obligations associated with the FCC's equipment authorization program and non-substantive changes to remove repetition of requirements.

In the EA Integrity NPRM, the Commission proposed to not recognize or permit reliance on TCBs, test labs, or their accrediting bodies, or permit them to have any role in the FCC's equipment authorization program, if they have sufficiently close ties with Covered List entities. The Commission also sought comment on whether, and to what extent, the Commission should apply its measures to other entities identified by federal agencies or Congress that reflect expert determinations about entities that pose national security concerns. Specifically, the Commission sought comment on extending the proposed prohibition to the entities identified pursuant to the following:

• Department of Commerce list of “foreign adversary” countries that identifies any foreign government or foreign non-government person that the Secretary of Commerce has determined to have engaged in a “long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security interest of the United States or security and safety of United States persons;”

• DOD 1260H list of Chinese Military Companies;

• Department of Commerce Entity List;

• Department of Commerce Military End-User List;

• Non-Specially Designated Nationals Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List;

• FY2023 NDAA section 5949 list of semiconductor companies;

• Foreign entities of concern as defined by the CHIPS Act; and

• Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List.

The Commission concludes that the integrity of its equipment authorization program is more effectively ensured not only through the exclusion of participation by entities identified on the Covered List, but also the other entities as described herein that federal government agencies or Congress have determined pose national security risks. Collectively, the Commission will refer to these as “prohibited entities” with regard to participation in the Commission's equipment authorization program.

The Covered List is derived from specific determinations made by certain sources (particular federal agencies with national security expertise and Congress) designated by the Secure Networks Act that certain equipment or services produced or provided by a specified entity poses an unacceptable risk to national security. In light of these determinations from expert federal agencies and Congress about the serious national security risks posed by equipment or services produced or provided by entities identified on the Covered List, the Commission concludes that it should not permit TCBs, test labs, or laboratory accreditation bodies to have any role in its equipment authorization program, if they have sufficiently close ties with entities identified on the Covered List. This exclusion will help to promote the integrity of the equipment authorization program and protect the equipment supply chain from pre-authorization exposure to entities that present national security concerns.

The Covered List is only one source that identifies entities presenting national security concerns that have potential to compromise the integrity of the equipment authorization program. Several federal agencies with particular national security responsibilities—including two agencies that also serve as sources of determinations for the Covered List—develop or maintain lists that identify entities, companies, persons, and other parties that they have determined raise national security concerns. Congress has done similarly in legislation. The Commission finds that to help ensure the integrity of entities that play a role in its equipment authorization program, to promote national security, and to advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a more secure and resilient communications supply chain, the Commission should not limit its definition of “prohibited entities” to entities identified on the Covered List, but also address entities that federal agencies have determined raise similar national security concerns.

The Commission's conclusion to include entities identified by federal agencies as posing unacceptable risks to national security in addition to those on the Covered List is supported by the Heritage Foundation and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) (two Washington, DC think tanks with national security expertise). Heritage stated that “it would be prudent for the Commission to consult other agencies that maintain lists of known entities that present national security risks to the U.S.” In fact, Heritage encouraged the Commission to go even further and consider extending the prohibition to any foreign adversary-linked entity. FDD similarly encouraged the Commission to extend its prohibition to “entities not only listed on the FCC's Covered List, but also those subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or control of a foreign adversary, consistent with federal definitions under the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.” According to FDD, “[g]iven the PRC's current regulatory environment, including national security laws that coerce corporate cooperation with state intelligence objectives, firms operating under PRC jurisdiction cannot credibly demonstrate operational independence from the Chinese government. This presents a material compliance and reputational risk to U.S. markets. Therefore, all PRC-based or PRC-controlled entities must be assumed to be under state influence.” Additionally, DOJ strongly supports “the FCC considering eligibility restrictions based on determinations made by Executive Branch agencies regarding entities that pose national security risks. This whole-of-government approach leverages specialized expertise across the federal enterprise to identify and mitigate evolving threats. For example, it is essential that the FCC utilizes other lists developed by Executive Branch agencies that reflect expert determinations about entities that pose national security concerns, rather than relying solely on the FCC's Covered List.” The Commission seeks comment on a similar proposal in the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) portion of the proceeding, relying instead on the Department of Commerce's definition of foreign adversary.

Conversely, the China-based Telecommunication Terminal Industry Forum Association (TAF) argued that the Commission's current regulations in this area are “sufficiently strict,” and that the Commission should not rely on lists from other U.S. government agencies, and instead, use these lists “as background references for the FCC when considering the covered list.” The Commission disagrees and finds unpersuasive TAF's argument that these other federal agency lists “are established for different regulatory purposes.” The Commission also rejects TAF's argument that referencing other lists and determinations would “contravene the spirit of the [World Trade Organization Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade]” and “increase the costs for telecommunications equipment manufacturers, ultimately driving up the final prices of electronic consumer products in the U.S.” The Commission finds that prohibiting entities that have been determined to pose risks to U.S. national security is not an unnecessary or arbitrary barrier to trade, but instead serves to promote public confidence in the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization process and helps protect U.S. communications networks by addressing these national security concerns. The Commission also finds that any potential increased costs are outweighed by the substantial benefit to enhancing national security.

Each of the entities on the lists that the Commission discusses in the Order has been determined by either Congress or a federal agency to raise national security concerns and has been blocked from accessing certain aspects of the U.S. supply chain, thereby addressing concerns similar to those that the FCC seeks to address today to protect the integrity of its equipment authorization program. Moreover, many of the same agencies that Congress directed to serve as sources of determinations for inclusion on the Covered List are the sources of determination for entities on these other lists. The Commission finds that permitting such entities to participate in its equipment authorization program as TCBs, test labs, or laboratory accreditation bodies would adversely affect the trustworthiness of, or otherwise undermine the public's confidence in, the equipment authorization program, and would be inconsistent with U.S. national security interests.

For these and the other reasons discussed in the Order, the Commission finds that, in addition to the entities identified on the Covered List, it is incumbent upon us to also address, with regard to the equipment authorization program, other entities deemed by federal agencies to pose risks to national security as follows:

Department of Commerce BIS Entity List. “The [BIS] Entity List . . . identifies persons or addresses of persons reasonably believed to be involved, or to pose a significant risk of being or becoming involved, in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States” as determined by an End-User Review Committee consisting of various federal national security agencies. The BIS Entity List in part seeks to ensure that sensitive technologies do not fall into the hands of known threats. The Commission concludes that these entities, which federal agencies found to, at the very least, “pose a significant risk” of activities threatening American national security or foreign policy interests, present the same concerns with regard to the integrity of the equipment authorization program. Seeing as U.S. persons are generally prohibited from providing unlicensed exports, re-exports, or transfers (in-country) of certain commodities, software, and technology subject to BIS jurisdiction to entities on the BIS Entity List, the Commission finds it particularly risky for such entities to be closely associated with the review and approval of communications devices (with all the components therein) for the U.S. market—if these entities should not be allowed access to sensitive technologies after they are on the market, they similarly should not be allowed access before they are on the market through the equipment authorization program. This conclusion is consistent with the Commission's action in the Cybersecurity IoT Labeling R&O (89 FR 61242; July, 30, 2024), which prohibited entities named on the BIS Entity List from having their products receive a U.S. Cyber Trust Mark label or from serving as Cybersecurity Label Administrator or other lab participating in the labelling program.

Commerce Department BIS Military End-User List. The Military End-User List consists of entities subject to heightened export controls because the End-User Review Committee determined that “exports, reexports, or transfers . . . to that entity represent an unacceptable risk of use in or diversion to a `military end use' in Belarus, Burma, Cambodia, China, Nicaragua, the Russian Federation, or Venezuela, or for a Belarusian, Burmese, Cambodian, Chinese, Nicaraguan, Russian, or Venezuelan `military end user,' wherever located.” The Commission finds that the national security risks presented by these foreign military-associated entities in terms of export activities are applicable to the FCC's obligation to ensure the integrity of its equipment authorization program, which is an integral step in the importation and marketing of devices in the U.S.

DHS Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List. Section 2 of the UFLPA requires reporting a list of entities found to be involved in forced labor in the Xinjiang region of China, which the Department of Homeland Security posts on its website. The Commission received no comments on this specific list, but Heritage did urge the Commission to consider forced labor practices in China and noted that broadening the sources used to make determinations about recognition of test labs might remove from recognition consideration labs using forced labor or committing other human rights abuses. Federal agencies have found the entities listed on the UFLPA Entity List to be involved in forced labor, and goods that are manufactured wholly or in part by such entities are prohibited from U.S. importation. Because goods manufactured by these entities are prohibited from U.S. importation, the Commission finds that it would not be in the public interest or consistent with the integrity and security of the equipment authorization testing program for these entities to play a role in the equipment authorization program, particularly in such a way that contributes to ensuring compliance to the FCC's rules of equipment that must be authorized to be imported.

Section 5949 List of Semiconductor Companies. Section 5949 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 prohibits Executive Branch agencies from procuring, obtaining, or contracting with entities to obtain any electronic parts, products, or services that include a semiconductor, a semiconductor product, or a product that incorporates semiconductor products designed or produced by Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, ChangXin Memory Technologies, Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp, or any subsidiary, affiliate, or successor of such entities; or any such product produced by an entity determined by designated sources. The FCC finds that Congress's determination that these entities were not to be trusted to provide semiconductor products and services to “Federal systems” and were a threat in the “supply chains of Federal contractors and subcontractors” is strong evidence that the Commission should address the threat such entities present to ensuring the integrity and security of the equipment authorization program.

DOD 1260H List of Chinese Military Companies. Under section 1260H of the FY 2021 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense is required to publicly list entities that the Secretary has determined to be a “Chinese military company” that is “operating directly or indirectly in the United States” and is “engaged in providing commercial services, manufacturing, producing, or exporting.” Effective June 30, 2026, DOD is prohibited from entering into, renewing, or extending contracts for goods, services, or technology with entities on the 1260H List or their affiliates. Contracts with companies controlled by these listed entities are also prohibited. Further, in 2027, DOD is prohibited from entering into, renewing, or extending a contract for the procurement of goods or services that include goods or services produced or developed by an entity, or controlled by an entity, on the Section 1260H List. The prohibitions do not extend to existing contracts or to contracts for goods, services, or technology that provide a service that connects to the facilities of a third party, including backhaul, roaming, or interconnection arrangements. The Secretary of Defense may waive the prohibition under certain circumstances.

The FCC concludes that, for the same reasons that these entities are identified on the 1260 List, such companies present an unacceptable risk to ensuring the integrity and security of the equipment authorization testing program. This is consistent with the Commission's action in the Cybersecurity IoT Labeling R&O, which prohibited entities named on the DOD 1260H List from having their products receive a U.S. Cyber Trust Mark label or from serving as Cybersecurity Label Administrator or other lab participating in the labelling program.

Department of Treasury NS-CMIC List of Chinese Military Companies. The NS-CMIC List, maintained by the Department of Treasury, consists of persons found to “operate or have operated in the defense and related materiel sector or the surveillance technology sector of the economy of the PRC” and was created as part of an Executive Order to address “the threat posed by the military-industrial complex of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and its involvement in military, intelligence, and security research and development programs, and weapons and related equipment production under the PRC's Military-Civil Fusion strategy.” This list is almost identical to the 1260H List. The FCC concludes that the threat presented by such entities as determined by federal agencies would apply in terms of its efforts to ensuring the integrity and security of the equipment authorization program.

Foreign Adversary Governments and Persons. The Department of Commerce has developed a list of “foreign adversary” governments and persons, which includes “any foreign government or foreign non-government person determined by the Secretary [of Commerce] to have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or security and safety of United States persons.” Currently, the list of foreign adversaries consists of the People's Republic of China (including the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region), Republic of Cuba, Islamic Republic of Iran, Democratic People's Republic of North Korea, Russian Federation, and the Venezuelan politician Nicolas Maduro.

The rules establishing the process for these determinations were made pursuant to Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain.” President Trump issued Executive Order 13873 in response to the national emergency caused by the threat of foreign adversaries exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications technology and services (ICTS). The same concerns that the Department of Commerce's ICTS rules seek to address are also a key component of the Commission's equipment authorization program; namely, the equipment authorization program seeks to ensure the Commission protects the U.S. communications networks and the supply chain from equipment that poses an unacceptable risk to national security.

Moreover, the Secure Networks Act's definition of “foreign adversary” is identical to the definition of “foreign adversary” as used by the Department of Commerce in producing its list of foreign adversaries. National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), in a notice and request for public comment implementing these provisions of the Secure Networks Act, treated the Department of Commerce's list of foreign adversaries as “foreign adversaries” for purposes of determining who is a “trusted . . . provider of advanced communications service or a supplier of communications equipment or service” under the Secure Networks Act. If Congress and NTIA determined that entities subject to foreign adversaries' ownership or control are not to be trusted to provide or supply communications equipment or services, the Commission does not believe they should be trusted to participate in the equipment authorization program, which tests and reviews communications equipment.

The FCC's proposal to address participation by foreign adversaries in the equipment authorization program is generally supported by Heritage and FDD. And the Commission does not agree that application of the foreign adversary list is “discriminatory,” as TAF contends, given that the list reflects determinations by an expert agency that the entities listed have engaged in a “long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security interest of the United States or security and safety of United States persons.”

The Commission finds that its efforts to ensure the integrity and security of the equipment authorization program could be hindered by the participation of entities determined to have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or security and safety of United States persons. These findings are consistent with the Commission's actions in other proceedings. For example, in the Cybersecurity IoT Labeling R&O, the Commission relied on the foreign adversary list as a disqualifier from receiving a U.S. Cyber Trust Mark label or from serving as Cybersecurity Label Administrator or other lab participating in the labelling program. Additionally, in the Evolving Risks Order and NPRM, the Commission proposed to rely on the Department of Commerce's definition of foreign adversary in its proposal to prioritize the renewal applications or any periodic review filings and deadlines based on, for example, “reportable foreign ownership, including any reportable foreign interest holder that is a citizen of a foreign adversary country.”

CHIPS Act. At this time, the FCC declines to extend the definition of prohibited entity to any “foreign entity of concern” as defined by the CHIPS Act, because this definition extends to entities subject to the “jurisdiction” of specified countries. The FCC interprets this definition as potentially applicable to a broader range of entities than those owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of certain entities, and thereby more broadly applicable than anticipated in the EA Integrity NPRM. So, the FCC seeks further comment on adopting this definition, as discussed in the FNPRM portion of the proceeding. The FCC also declines at this time to extend the prohibition in this R&O to several other federal agency-developed and statutory “lists” of entities of concern both because the record on these lists is not developed and because the alignment between the policy goals underlying those lists and the integrity and security of the equipment authorization testing program is not as obvious, and seeks further comment in the FNPRM.

Recognizing the importance of ensuring that the TCBs and test labs that review equipment for importation and marketing in the U.S., and the entities that accredit test labs, are themselves trustworthy actors, and to complement the FCC's efforts to ensure the security of the supply chain, the Commission takes steps to remove from participation in its equipment authorization program entities that have been determined to pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States based on a number of sources ( i.e., prohibited entities). The Commission adopts its proposals in the EA Integrity NPRM to: (1) prohibit from recognition by the Commission and participation in the FCC's equipment authorization program any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity; and (2) prohibit reliance on or use of, for purposes of equipment authorization, any TCB or test lab owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity. By adopting these prohibitions, the FCC takes a significant step in addressing the risks posed by these actors to U.S. national security in the communications equipment supply chain.

The restriction on entities that present national security concerns is rooted in longstanding legislative and regulatory efforts aimed at safeguarding U.S. national security, economic interests, and technological leadership, which have consistently recognized the risks posed by foreign adversaries. These efforts have consistently targeted the same foreign adversaries (or a subset thereof) designated as such by the Department of Commerce and treated as “prohibited entities” in the rules the FCC adopts today. These efforts include actions to safeguard military operations, protect U.S. supply chains against foreign adversaries exploiting vulnerabilities in key industries, and federal restrictions on adversarial access to sensitive data and emerging technologies that have been implemented to address cybersecurity, research security, and otherwise protect national security. In February of this year, President Trump issued a memorandum announcing the America First Investment Policy which, among other things, states that “[e]conomic security is national security,” discusses the need to limit certain investments in strategic sectors by the same six foreign adversaries as identified in the Department of Commerce's rules, and singles out China in particular for its nefarious exploitation of U.S. open capital markets to gain access to U.S. strategic technology and critical infrastructure. Taken together, these measures reflect an ongoing, bipartisan effort to mitigate foreign adversary involvement in U.S. economic and technological supply chains across multiple fronts over multiple Congresses and multiple Presidential Administrations.

Contrary to TAF's assertion that accreditation according to relevant ISO standards alone is sufficient to allow test lab participation in the Commission's equipment authorization program, the FCC believes that compliance with ISO standards should be a floor, not a ceiling, for all equipment authorization participants. And, while such compliance with generally universally-applied standards may be necessary to ensure technical competency, it may not be sufficient. Furthermore, the Commission believes that implementation of Congress's instruction that the Commission “may . . . establish such qualifications and standards as it deems appropriate for such private organizations, testing, and certification” requires us to address other concerns, such as protecting the supply chain from entities that present national security concerns. In light of ongoing security risks, the Commission must take measures to ensure that entities entrusted with access to equipment, and related data, prior to authorization for importing and marketing, as well as entities that assess the competence of such, are not acting on behalf of foreign adversaries but instead are operating consistent with their responsibilities to help ensure that equipment that poses an unacceptable risk to national security is kept out of our nation's supply chain, in addition to being technically competent. In fact, the Secure Networks Act demonstrates Congress's view that participants in the communications equipment supply chain that are “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the influence of a foreign adversary” are not to be “trusted.”

Additionally, one of the agencies upon which the FCC regularly relies for national security expertise—the Department of Justice, National Security Division (FIRS)—has noted several other national security concerns arising from reliance on TCBs and test labs “that could be exploited by adversarial entities.” Specifically, FIRS points out that TCBs and test labs perform certain activities that create technical vulnerabilities. The privileged access by TCBs and test labs to highly sensitive intellectual property and emerging technologies could lead to systematic collection of information that represents a significant counterintelligence concern and the aggregation of such data has the potential to aid foreign adversaries in developing counterstrategies or identifying asymmetric advantages. Also, compromised entities could deliberately overlook or inadequately test devices, or manipulate test results, which could result in compromised devices in the U.S. market that have the potential to facilitate access by foreign intelligence services or that do not meet compliance requirements and pose interference risks.

The FCC finds that allowing entities that have been repeatedly identified as foreign adversaries of the U.S. government, specifically those identified in the Order as prohibited entities, to participate in the equipment authorization program as TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies could adversely affect a TCB's, test lab's, or laboratory accreditation body's “trustworthiness, or otherwise undermine the public's confidence,” especially their “access to proprietary, sometimes sensitive information about suppliers and their devices.” By enforcing stricter regulations on ownership and control of TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies, the FCC upholds core national security priorities, reinforcing the broader strategy to protect U.S. interests from adversarial exploitation.

In the EA Integrity NPRM, the Commission proposed to prohibit from recognition by the Commission and participation in the FCC's equipment authorization program any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body in which an entity identified on the Covered List has, possesses, or otherwise controls an equity or voting interest of 10% or more, either directly or indirectly, and sought comment on this proposal. The Commission also proposed and sought comment on whether it should decline to recognize laboratory accreditation bodies associated with any foreign adversary, including as to how such association should be determined.

The Commission adopts a modified version of these proposals to include a prohibition on recognition of, or participation by, TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of prohibited entities, as defined in the Order. Several commenters were broadly supportive of the proposal, stating, for example, that it is necessary to ensure equipment is properly vetted against the Commission's rules intended to address national security threats. The Covered List represents expert determinations made by Congress and relevant federal agencies that the specified equipment and services produced by certain named entities represent an unacceptable threat to national security, and the risk of their importation into the United States necessitates that the FCC take measures to prevent such equipment from improperly obtaining FCC equipment authorization. Congress believed so strongly that the importation or marketing of certain equipment and services produced or provided by specific entities posed a threat to the national security and public safety that it passed the Secure Equipment Act to ensure that such equipment and services would be unable to obtain equipment authorizations from the Commission. The Commission takes seriously the Congressional mandate to ensure that its equipment authorization system excludes entities that have been determined to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons. As such, the FCC finds it necessary to expand its proposal beyond the Covered List to include all prohibited entities as defined in the Order. The Commission finds it imperative that it not allow prohibited entities to circumvent supply chain protections or otherwise undermine the integrity of its supply chain. Prohibiting recognition of TCBs, test labs, or laboratory accreditation bodies that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of prohibited entities will help to ensure that participants in the FCC's equipment certification procedure, the most rigorous equipment authorization process, are not subject to undue influence and support the integrity and security of the program.

The Commission rejects TAF's arguments that there is no need to make changes to the existing authorization system because it has operated effectively to date without national security incidents, and that restricting lab authorization based on national security lacks a technical basis because labs do not modify products and so cannot introduce national security issues, nor do they possess any information that could threaten national security. A2LA also observed that as part of ISO/IEC 17011, accreditation bodies must maintain impartiality and, by that criteria, no accreditation body should have an “affiliation” with a foreign government, adversarial or not. The Commission emphasizes that the measures it adopts today are both an important corollary to the rules the FCC adopted in the EA Security R&O and proactive measures against evolving risks reflected in the record before us. As FDD noted, this action is just the latest Commission effort in recognition of “a growing vector of systemic risk: adversarial control over the authorization process that safeguards the U.S. communications technology ecosystem.” Further, the Commission agrees with FDD that “TCBs and test labs handle highly sensitive, proprietary manufacturing and development data, conduct testing protocols, and produce compliance certifications upon which the FCC relies,” meaning “their actions directly affect what devices are legally imported into and offered for sale within the United States.” The Commission further agrees with FDD that if U.S. adversaries are participants in this layer of the supply chain, they can introduce vulnerabilities at scale, long before devices reach consumers or critical systems.”

Absent rules intended to ensure the impartiality of TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies, prohibited entities could pressure TCBs, test labs, or laboratory accreditation bodies to take actions that are contrary to the FCC's efforts to protect the communications equipment supply chain. For example, entities that own, control, or direct TCBs, test labs, or laboratory accreditation bodies could pressure the TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body to overlook requirements that could ultimately result in the authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List. Furthermore, TCBs and test labs have access to sensitive, proprietary information related to equipment submitted for testing and certification and laboratory accreditation bodies are tasked with assessing the competence of test labs. Access to such information by entities who have been determined to pose unacceptable risks to national security would provide further opportunity for actions that would compromise the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization program.

Given the importance of ensuring the security of the FCC's supply chain and limiting vulnerabilities from entities that present national security concerns, the Commission declines to implement certain alternatives proposed by commenters. For example, the Commission finds inadequate TIC's suggestion that it would be sufficient to simply adopt disclosure requirements, because such disclosure requirements would not necessarily prevent entities presenting national security concerns from, participating in the FCC's equipment authorization program. Moreover, such a disclosure regime would potentially require the Commission to engage in extensive, individualized reviews of test lab and TCB ownership to determine whether national security interests are implicated. Such a regime also would result in uncertainty within the regulated community as to what the Commission might do to address such instances. By adopting the rules in the Order, the Commission is creating a transparent method of addressing the threat of entities that present national security risks within its equipment authorization program. The Commission is also not persuaded that its proposed rules would meaningfully adversely impact global supply chains, slow equipment approvals, or increase costs for manufacturers. The transparency of these new requirements will not only provide the Commission with the necessary information to ensure the integrity of its equipment authorization program, it will also increase awareness within industry as to the entities with whom they choose to do business and lessen concern that prohibited entities could interfere with their equipment authorizations or the process of obtaining such, potentially speeding up equipment approvals and reducing costs. Additionally, the Commission doesn't find it necessary to provide an extended transition period for implementation of the rules in order to allow sufficient time to identify and engage adequate replacement facilities, as suggested. Considering the time needed for the rules adopted here to take effect, in addition to the procedural timeframes included in the rules for withdrawal of recognition, the Commission believes that any concerns are speculative and outweighed by its goal of ensuring the integrity of the equipment authorization program.

The role of laboratory accreditation bodies in the FCC's equipment authorization program—namely, to provide impartial assessment of the competence of the test labs that they accredit—requires that they be free of and safeguarded from influence by actors that may pose a risk to national security. The Commission also recognizes that the activities and practices of laboratory accreditation bodies extend internationally and include relationships with various foreign actors, and so clarity is needed regarding how to determine which laboratory accreditation bodies will be recognized by the Commission. In addition, if the Commission were to adopt a prohibition on TCBs and test labs owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of prohibited entities without adopting a corresponding prohibition on laboratory accreditation bodies, the Commission would leave open the possibility that prohibited entities would simply move upstream to exercise ownership, control, or direction within the equipment authorization program. Acknowledging commenters' desire for clarity, the Commission adopts a rule that it will not recognize a laboratory accreditation body, and will revoke the recognition of any previously-recognized laboratory accreditation body, that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity.

The Commission finds that this rule, along with the explanation provided in the proceeding of what the FCC means by “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of” will provide clear requirements for participation in the equipment authorization program. With regard to A2LA's observation that laboratory accreditation bodies are required to maintain impartiality pursuant ISO/IEC 17011, the Commission finds it incumbent upon us to take proactive measures to ensure the integrity and guarantee against equipment authorization program participation by entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of prohibited entities.

In the EA Integrity NPRM, the Commission also proposed to prohibit from recognition by the Commission and participation in its equipment authorization program, any TCB or test lab in which an entity identified on the Covered List has direct or indirect ownership or control. The Commission tentatively concluded that, in light of the determinations made from expert federal agencies and Congress about the national security risks posed by entities with equipment identified on the Covered List, the Commission should not permit such TCBs and test labs to have any role in its equipment authorization program.

The Commission adopts the proposed rule to prohibit reliance on or use of any TCB or test lab owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of an entity (or its subsidiaries or affiliates) identified on the Covered List, for purposes of equipment authorization. The Commission expands this prohibition, however, to include all “prohibited entities.” This means that parties seeking equipment authorization pursuant to the SDoC process may not rely on testing performed at a test lab that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity.

By prohibiting, for purposes of SDoC authorization, the use of test labs that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity, the Commission seeks to ensure that entities posing national security risks cannot use the SDoC process as a loophole to circumvent the FCC's restrictions. The Commission rejects the arguments of commenters that extending the prohibition to the SDoC process will not enhance national security, and that any security concerns are mitigated by the existing prohibition on entities identified on the Covered List from using SDoC. The Commission also disagrees with TIA that we must provide specific evidence of abuse of the SDoC process to warrant changes. In enacting the Secure Networks Act and Secure Equipment Act, Congress recognized that it was imperative that those entities determined to pose unacceptable risks to U.S. national security be foreclosed from accessing U.S. communications networks and supply chains, and nothing in the record would support excluding test labs used as part of the SDoC process from this prohibition.

Information on equipment authorized via the SDoC process is less readily transparent to the Commission than information on equipment authorized via certification, meaning that equipment authorization through the SDoC process may be at greater risk of potential exploitation by prohibited entities, raising national security concerns regarding the possible introduction of equipment that poses an unacceptable risk to national security into the U.S. market. In prohibiting entities identified on the Covered List from using SDoC to obtain equipment authorization, the Commission sought to ensure consistent application of the prohibition on further authorization of covered equipment, while also providing for more active oversight. The same rationale applies here—namely that, absent the clarification the Commission adopts today, prohibited entities might use their influence over labs, and take advantage of the more limited oversight the Commission has over the SDoC process, to allow for the introduction of equipment that poses an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security and otherwise undermine the integrity of its equipment authorization process. The value of the SDoC process to many parties seeking equipment authorization, and the importance of prohibiting equipment that poses an unacceptable risk to national security, necessitates that the Commission takes measures to prevent abuse of the SDoC process.

The FCC prohibitions in section III.B. of this document rely on specific definitions of “ownership” and “direction or control.” As the Commission discusses below, it has repeatedly used ownership limits or attribution rules to identify entities presumed to be able to exert effective direction or control even in the absence of a majority voting interest. Here the Commission defines and adopts such a limit. The Commission also recognizes that an entity may exert direction or control when it has minority interests below the limits the Commission sets or no ownership interests, so the Commission adopts and clarifies qualitative indicia that entities, and the Commission, may use in determining and attesting to the existence of direction or control.

The Commission adopts its proposals in the EA Integrity NPRM to prohibit from recognition by the Commission and participation in its equipment authorization program, any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body in which a prohibited entity directly or indirectly owns or controls 10% or more of the equity or voting rights. Consistent with Commission precedent and the rules and precedent of other federal regulatory agencies, the Commission finds that the 10% ownership threshold provides a reasonable proxy or indication that a TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body is controlled by or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity.

Some commenters oppose the proposed prohibition and recommended alternative approaches. For instance, TIA proposed that the Commission first “target” only TCBs and test labs that are wholly owned by entities on the Covered List. TIA presented no evidence, however, to support its implicit contention that a threat is only present when a TCB or a test lab is wholly owned by a prohibited entity, nor does it explain why a prohibited entity cannot exert direction or control even though it may hold only a minority ownership interest or no ownership interest in the TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body. Indeed, under TIA's proposal, a TCB 99.99% owned by an entity identified on the Covered List would not be prohibited, but it would be prohibited if such ownership rose to 100%. Based on the FCC's record, such a limited prohibition would not adequately protect the integrity of the equipment authorization program against participation by prohibited entities. Therefore, the Commission rejects TIA's proposal and concludes that prohibiting only those TCBs and test labs that are wholly owned by prohibited entities would not sufficiently advance the national security interests in the proceeding.

Some commenters question whether laboratory accreditation bodies have the capability to ascertain ownership interests. In their view, because laboratory accreditation is primarily a technical assessment conducted by technical experts—and not a review of ownership interests by financial analysts, accountants, or auditors—reliance on laboratory accreditation bodies to prevent accreditation of test labs based on ownership interests is not feasible. A preferable approach, according to A2LA, would be for the Commission to assess all test labs, offer accreditation if warranted, and then restrict the ability of labs to conduct testing or participate in the equipment authorization if accredited entities are found to be a national security risk. Another proposed alternative was to create a “self-reporting component” for ownership interests of TCBs and test labs that the Department of Commerce might oversee. A2LA further stated that it was unclear how ownership impacts national security risk.

In response to concerns of commenters that laboratory accreditation bodies are not equipped to determine ownership interests, the Commission clarifies that the rules it adopts today do not require laboratory accreditation bodies to independently investigate and establish ownership. Rather, the rules will require TCBs and test labs themselves to certify that no prohibited entity has an equity or voting interest of 10% or more in the TCB or test lab. And while the FCC's rules do require that the laboratory accreditation body submit a test lab's certification directly to the Commission in order for the test lab to be included on the list of accredited test labs that the FCC has recognized, this does not require the laboratory accreditation body to undertake its own investigation of a test lab's ownership. Nor do the Commission see that this requirement imposes an undue burden on laboratory accreditation bodies, which must already submit to the Commission various information regarding the test lab. That said, the Commission do, however, expect a laboratory accreditation body to take reasonable steps to not knowingly or negligently facilitate the obfuscation of the ownership of a test lab. In other words, a laboratory accreditation body could be held responsible for what it knew or should reasonably have known concerning the ownership interests in the TCB or test lab. Indeed, this is the same standard that TCBs should already be applying in the equipment authorization context in assessing whether an applicant's attestations regarding the equipment for which authorization is sought—namely that the equipment is not “covered,” and providing a valid U.S. agent for service of process—is accurate and true.

A2LA asked how “affiliation” would be defined, as used in the NPRM, and asked whether participation by accreditation bodies in countries with which the U.S. has MRA and accreditation of test labs in foreign countries might be considered “affiliation.” A2LA said U.S. accreditation bodies have accredited test labs in foreign countries that “may be” on the adversary list and questioned whether those accreditation bodies would be precluded for that reason. ANAB similarly said that the FCC should clarify that “affiliation” does not include participation in widely recognized international accreditation cooperations through which ANAB accepts and promotes the results of conformity assessment bodies accredited by other signatories, some of which are government organizations in countries identified on the foreign adversaries list. In the proposals the Commission provided in the NPRM, we used the term “affiliation” very broadly throughout the discussion and once in the proposed rules to convey a connection between entities. The Commission did not specifically propose to tie that term to its definition of “affiliate” nor did the Commission propose a new definition. In finalizing the rules that the Commission adopts today, we are adopting a defined relationship of ownership, direction, or control in lieu of affiliation, for the reasons discussed herein. As such, the Commission finds no reason to further expand upon the discussion of “affiliation” as raised by A2LA and ANAB. The Commission also clarifies here that its rules apply equally to all TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies regardless of the existence of MRAs or physical location of the relevant facility.

The Commission concludes that it is appropriate to prohibit any TCB, test lab, laboratory accreditation body from participating in the equipment authorization process if a prohibited entity directly or indirectly owns 10% or more of the equity or voting stock. Consistent with Commission precedent and that of other federal agencies, the Commission finds that a third party could exert direction or control over another entity even without holding a majority of the equity or voting rights. Establishing the direct and indirect ownership rule at 10% aligns with Commission precedent and reflects a reasonable standard for identifying potential direction or control. For example, applicants for an international section 214 authorization are required to identify any individual or entity that directly or indirectly owns 10% or more of the equity interests and/or voting interests, or a controlling interest, of the applicant. Also, applicants or licensees subject to the ownership reporting requirements of § 1.2112 of the FCC's rules must identify any party holding 10% or more of stock, partnership interest, or indirect ownership interest in the reporting entity.

This 10% threshold is also consistent with definitions of ownership applied by other federal agencies with expertise in examining corporate ownership and structure. For example, the Internal Revenue Code defines the term “United States shareholder” with respect to any foreign corporation, as “a United States person . . . who owns . . . 10 percent or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote of such foreign corporation, or 10 percent or more of the total value of such shares of all classes of stock of such foreign corporation.” Under the Change in Bank Control Act, anyone, including those “acting in concert,” must provide a written notice before acquiring control of a bank or bank holding company, if they acquire 10% or more of its voting shares. Similarly, a foreign entity acquiring at least 10% of the voting interest (directly or indirectly through a U.S. entity) in a U.S. business enterprise, either through acquisition or establishment of a new entity, is required to file a BE-13 Report with the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The Commission concludes that adopting the 10% ownership threshold appropriately identifies entities with sufficient direction or control as to pose a risk.

Heritage asked the Commission to explain “why entities with less than 10% [ownership or control] pose a risk, but entities below 5% do not.” The Commission recognizes that a third party may exercise direction or control over another entity even where it holds less than a 10% ownership stake in that entity or holds no ownership stake. Consistent with precedents discussed above of this document, the Commission expands its current reporting requirement and adopts a requirement that all TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies report all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. This 5% reporting threshold balances the need to protect national security while minimizing undue reporting burden by providing the Commission with the necessary information to confirm compliance with the ownership prohibitions and to more easily identify closely associated entities. The Commission notes that the reporting requirement is parallel to and not a substitute for its requirement that all TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies, regardless of ownership interests, certifies that they are not under the ownership, or otherwise direction or control of prohibited entities based on the indices of direction or control that the Commission discusses next.

In addition to prohibiting any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body in which a prohibited entity has direct or indirect ownership or control of 10% or more equity or voting interest from recognition or participation in the FCC's equipment authorization process, the Commission also adopts that prohibition for any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that is subject to the direction or control of a prohibited entity. The concept of direction and control includes the control that is inherent when an entity is a part of the governmental structure or hierarchy of a foreign adversary, including subnational governments thereof. Recognizing that a prohibited entity may exert direction or control over another entity even where it does not own 10% or more of the equity or voting stock of that entity, the Commission therefore requires TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to assess whether a prohibited entity directly or indirectly possesses or has the power (whether or not exercised) to determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity. Factors indicating direction or control could include the power to decide matters pertaining to the entity's reorganization, merger, or dissolution; the opening or closing of facilities or major expenditures or to exercise authority over its operating budget; selection of new lines of business; entering into, terminating, or otherwise affecting the fulfillment of significant contracts; adopting policies relating to treatment of non-public or proprietary information; appointing officers or senior leadership; appointing or dismissing employees with access to critical or sensitive technology; or amending the entity's organizational documents. Such indicators would be relevant regardless of whether the power was exercised, and could take the form of, for example, ownership of securities or partnership or other ownership interests, board representation, holding a special share, contractual arrangements, or other formal or informal arrangements to act in concert or to decide important matters affecting an entity. Additionally, the Commission considers any applicant, wherever located, to be under the direction or control of a prohibited entity if that applicant acts as an agent or representative of a prohibited entity or acts in any other capacity at the order or request of a prohibited entity or whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in majority part.

To help ensure that the Commission have the necessary information to implement the measures it adopts to prohibit from participation in the equipment authorization program entities that have been determined to pose unacceptable risks to national security, the Commission expands its current reporting and certification requirement for TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies that seeks Commission recognition. The Commission finds that requiring certification and reporting of ownership is necessary to minimize vulnerabilities in the telecommunications infrastructure and strengthen national security through the equipment authorization process by ensuring that TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies will not be owned by or under the direction or control by prohibited entities. The Commission finds that these adopted rules will yield significant benefits, including improved consistency in the Commission's consideration of evolving national security risks, completeness of the Commission's information regarding equipment authorization, and timely Commission attention to issues that warrant heightened scrutiny. The Commission also finds that the adoption of the rules will better protect U.S. telecommunications infrastructure from national security risks posed by prohibited entities. These benefits cannot be achieved with ad hoc reviews alone. Thus, adopting a systemized review of the ownership certification and report by TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies is necessary to help ensure that the Commission and the Executive Branch agencies have the necessary information to address evolving national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy risks on a continuing basis. While it is difficult to quantify these economic benefits, the Commission believes the benefits are far greater than the costs of the requirements.

The Commission adopts a requirement for all recognized TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies to certify to the Commission, within 30 days after the effective date of the relevant rules, and thereafter with each request for recognition, that they are not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity. The Commission also adopts a requirement that all recognized TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies report, within 90 days after the effective date of the relevant rules and thereafter with each request for recognition, all equity or voting interests of 5% or greater by any entity. The Commission will not recognize—and will revoke any existing recognition of—any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate certification; or that fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater. If there is any change to any of the lists that make up the prohibited entities resulting in the addition of an entity after the effective date of these rules, the Commission will require compliance with the relevant reporting, certification, and recordkeeping requirements no later than 90 days after the effective date of such change. In keeping with these reporting requirements, the FCC also clarifies the requirement that every entity specifically named on the Covered List must provide to the Commission, pursuant to § 2.903(b), information regarding all of its subsidiaries and affiliates, not merely those that produce “covered” equipment. The Commission orders each relevant entity to provide this information no later than 30 days after the effective date of this rule and thereafter in accordance with the provisions in § 2.903(b).

In order to more effectively protect the FCC's equipment authorization program from the direction or control of untrustworthy entities and ensure the integrity of the program, the Commission proposed and sought comment in the EA Integrity NPRM on new recordkeeping, reporting, and certification obligations for TCBs and test labs to enable the Commission to determine ownership or control, as well as comment on any changes to its rules governing laboratory accreditation bodies.

First, the Commission proposed that any entity seeking to become an FCC-recognized TCB or test lab report to the Commission equity or voting interests in the TCB or test lab of 5% or more. Second, the Commission proposed to require that recognized TCBs and test labs: (1) no later than 30 days after the effective date of any final rules adopted in this proceeding, certify that no entity identified on the Covered List (or otherwise specified in our final rules) has, possesses, or otherwise controls an equity or voting interest of 10% or more in the TCB or test lab, and (2) no later than 90 days after the effective date of any final rules adopted in this proceeding identify any entity (including the ultimate parent of such entities) that holds such ownership or control interest as our final rules require, proposed as 5% or more ownership, as discussed above. Third, the Commission proposed that any test lab that takes measurements of equipment subject to an equipment authorization, whether pursuant to certification or SDoC, maintain in its records a certification that no entity identified on the Covered List has, possesses, or otherwise controls an equity or voting interest of 10% or more in the test lab and documentation identifying any entity that has, possesses, or otherwise controls an equity or voting interest of 5% or more in the test lab. Finally, the Commission sought comment on precluding laboratory accreditation bodies associated with foreign adversaries, including how such association should be determined.