[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 138 (Tuesday, July 22, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 34394-34405]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-13765]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
28 CFR Parts 25 and 107
[Docket No. OAG191; AG Order No. 6336-2025]
RIN 1105-AB78
Application for Relief From Disabilities Imposed by Federal Laws
With Respect to the Acquisition, Receipt, Transfer, Shipment,
Transportation, or Possession of Firearms
AGENCY: Department of Justice.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Justice (``the Department'') proposes to
implement criteria to guide determinations for granting relief from
disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition,
receipt, transfer, shipment, transportation, or possession of firearms.
In accordance with certain firearms laws and the Second Amendment of
the Constitution, the criteria are designed to ensure the fundamental
right of the people to keep and bear arms is not unduly infringed, that
those granted relief are not likely to act in a manner dangerous to
public safety, and that granting such relief would not be contrary to
the public interest.
DATES: Written comments must be postmarked and electronic comments must
be submitted on or before October 20, 2025.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number
(OAG191), by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments. Commenters should be
aware that the electronic Federal Docket Management System will not
accept comments after 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the last day of the
comment period.
Mailed Comments: Paper comments that duplicate an
electronic submission are discouraged. Should you wish to mail a paper
comment in lieu of submitting comments electronically, it should be
sent via regular or express mail to: Kira Gillespie, Deputy Pardon
Attorney, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20530. Hand-delivered
comments will not be accepted. Comments submitted in a manner other
than the ones listed above, including emails or letters sent to
Department officials, will not be considered comments on the proposed
rule and will not receive a response from the Department.
As required by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(4), a summary of this rule may be
found in the docket for this rulemaking at www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kira Gillespie, Deputy Pardon
Attorney, Office of the Pardon Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20530; telephone: (202) 514-
9251.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Public Participation
Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written data, views, or arguments on all aspects of this
rule. The Department specifically requests comments regarding the
felony offenses that should be presumptively disqualifying; the felony
offenses that should be presumptively disqualifying until a specific
length of time; and the appropriate length of time after which the
former offenses should not be presumptively disqualifying. The
Department also invites comments that relate to the economic or
federalism effects that might result from this rule. Comments that will
provide the most assistance to the Department in developing these
procedures will reference a specific portion of the rule, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include data, information, or
authority that supports such recommended change. Comments must be
submitted in English.
Each submitted comment should include the agency name and reference
Docket No. OAG 191. All properly received comments are considered part
of the public record and generally may be made available for public
inspection at www.regulations.gov. Such information includes personally
identifying information (such as name, address, etc.) voluntarily
submitted by the commenter. The Department may, in its discretion,
withhold from public viewing information provided in comments that it
determines may impact the privacy of an individual or is offensive. But
all submissions may be posted, without change, to the Federal
eRulemaking Portal at https://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, you may
wish to limit the amount of personal information you include in your
submission.
For additional information, please read the Privacy Act notice that
is available via the link in the footer of http://www.regulations.gov.
If you want to submit personally identifying information (such as
your name, address, etc.) as part of your comment, but do not want it
to be posted online, you must include the phrase ``PERSONALLY
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph of your comment and
identify what information you want redacted. The redacted personally
identifying information will be placed in the agency's public docket
file but not posted online.
If you want to submit confidential business information as part of
your comment but do not want it to be posted online, you must include
the phrase ``CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION'' in the first paragraph
of your comment. You also must prominently identify confidential
business information to be redacted within the comment. If a comment
has so much confidential business information that it cannot be
effectively redacted, all or part of that comment may not be posted on
www.regulations.gov. The redacted confidential business information
will not be placed in the public docket file.
To inspect the agency's public docket file in person, you must make
an appointment with the agency. Please see the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT paragraph above for agency contact information.
II. Background
The federal Gun Control Act seeks ``broadly to keep firearms away
from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and
[[Page 34395]]
dangerous.'' \1\ Accordingly, the Gun Control Act prohibits firearm
possession by categories of persons who, as a general matter, pose a
danger to others if armed. For example, the prohibition in 18 U.S.C.
922(g)(1) on firearm possession by felons (i.e., persons convicted of
crimes punishable for a term exceeding one year) is based on Congress's
conclusion that individuals ``convicted of serious crimes'' can
generally ``be expected to misuse'' firearms.\2\
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\1\ Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976); see
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 67 (1980) (observing that
``[t]he federal gun laws'' are designed ``to keep firearms away from
potentially dangerous persons'').
\2\ Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119
(1983).
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At the same time, the Gun Control Act includes a mechanism where a
``person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or
receiving firearms or ammunition may make application to the Attorney
General for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws with
respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment,
transportation, or possession of firearms[.]'' 18 U.S.C. 925(c).
Congress, in enacting section 925(c), recognized that a subset of
persons subject to the Gun Control Act may be able to make an
individualized showing both that they ``will not be likely to act in a
manner dangerous to public safety'' if allowed to possess firearms and
that granting relief from federal firearm disabilities ``would not be
contrary to the public interest.'' Id. Granting such relief in
appropriate cases would, among other things, protect the Second
Amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms in a manner that is
consistent with public safety. Section 925(c) thus provides a mechanism
for the Attorney General to relieve otherwise-prohibited persons from
federal firearm disabilities if they can show that they are likely to
possess firearms safely, while simultaneously ensuring that violent or
dangerous persons remain subject to the prohibitions in the Gun Control
Act.
Before 2025, the process for determining who qualified for relief
pursuant to section 925(c) was delegated to the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (``ATF'') by an Assistant Secretary
within the Department of the Treasury, see 27 CFR 178.144, and, most
recently, after ATF was transferred to the Department of Justice by the
Homeland Security Act, by the Attorney General. See 27 CFR 478.144
(withdrawn). Problems arose, however, in the administration of section
925(c). ATF had few clear criteria to guide its assessment of whether
applicants would pose a danger to public safety.\3\ ATF's ad hoc
determinations led to significant public-safety concerns. Between 1985
and 1990, ATF granted relief to approximately half of applicants who
did not drop out of the process.\4\ One 1992 study found that, out of
100 randomly selected felons to whom ATF granted relief, five had been
convicted for felony sexual assault, 11 for burglary, 13 for
distribution of narcotics, and 4 for homicide.\5\ Another analysis
revealed that ATF granted relief, for example, to an applicant who had
fatally shot his cousin while intoxicated and to an applicant who
untruthfully failed to disclose his nine-year-old convictions for
burglary and brandishing a firearm.\6\ Unsurprisingly, given that
applicants received relief even after committing violent and serious
felonies, ``too many. . . felons whose gun ownership rights were
restored went on to commit crimes with firearms.'' \7\
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\3\ See S. Rep. No. 353, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1992)
(explaining that this was a ``subjective task'').
\4\ Josh Sugarmann, Felons Granted Relief From Disability Under
Federal Firearms Laws--Ten Case Studies, 138 Cong. Rec. 4186 (March
3, 1992).
\5\ Violence Policy Center, Putting Guns Back Into Criminals'
Hands Section Three: 100 Case Studies of Felons Granted Relief From
Disability, at 26 (May 1992), https://perma.cc/PN7A-685V.
\6\ Sugarmann, supra, 138 Cong. Rec. 4187.
\7\ H.R. Rep. No. 183, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1996).
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ATF's administration of section 925(c) was also time consuming and
resource intensive. Under the prior regulatory regime, ATF made
determinations under section 925(c) after a background check that
included interviewing references. See 27 CFR 478.144 (withdrawn). A
congressional committee report indicates that ``$3.75 million'' and
``40 man-years'' were being spent each year ``investigating and acting
upon these applications for relief.'' \8\ The committee concluded that
such resources ``would be better utilized by ATF in fighting violent
crime.'' \9\
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\8\ H.R. Rep. No. 618, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1992).
\9\ Id.
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For these reasons, beginning in 1992, Congress prohibited ATF from
using funds to process applications under section 925(c), observing
that a mistaken determination under section 925(c) can have
``devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision
is made.'' \10\ Since 1992 and continuing thereafter, ``the
appropriations bar has prevented ATF . . . from using `funds
appropriated herein . . . to investigate or act upon applications for
relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 925(c).' ''
\11\ And before 2025, the Attorney General had delegated section
925(c)'s statutory authority to ATF. As a result, until recently, the
relief from disabilities program was not a viable option for
individuals federally prohibited from possessing firearms.
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\10\ See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1993, Public Law 102-393, 106 Stat. 1732; S.
Rep. No. 353, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1992).
\11\ United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74-75 (2002).
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Recognizing that the appropriations bar applies only to ATF, the
Attorney General recently issued an interim final rule withdrawing the
delegation of authority to ATF to administer section 925(c). See
Withdrawing the Attorney General's Delegation of Authority, 90 FR 13080
(Mar. 20, 2025). That interim final rule stated that ``the Department
anticipates future actions, including rulemaking consistent with
applicable law, to give full effect to 18 U.S.C. 925(c) while
simultaneously ensuring that violent or dangerous individuals remain
disabled from lawfully acquiring firearms.'' Id. at 13083. The rule
proposed herein is intended to fulfill these objectives.
The appropriations restriction pre-dates the Supreme Court's 2008
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), which
held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep
and bear arms. Under the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in N.Y. State
Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), courts must
assess whether firearms laws such as section 922(g) are consistent with
the Second Amendment's text and the principles evident from the
Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. And under the
Supreme Court's 2024 decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680
(2024), whether an individual is dangerous or poses a threat of
physical violence is an important consideration in determining whether
he may be disarmed.
Since the Bruen decision, there have been many challenges to
section 922(g)'s constitutionality under the Second Amendment, with a
particularly large volume focusing on section 922(g)(1)'s prohibition
on firearm possession by felons. Some of those challenges are
declaratory judgment actions brought by felons who have not themselves
violated section 922(g)(1) and who maintain that their prior
convictions for non-violent offenses do not indicate that they pose an
ongoing danger to others. Some of these plaintiffs have had success in
challenging section 922(g)(1), as courts have found that the statute is
[[Page 34396]]
unconstitutional as applied to them.\12\ At the same time, some courts
have expressly recognized that section 925(c) would alleviate any such
constitutional concerns, absent the proviso prohibiting ATF from
carrying it out.\13\
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\12\ See, e.g., Range v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir.
2024) (en banc).
\13\ See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637, 661
(6th Cir. 2024) (The ``rearmament criteria in Sec. 925(c) map
neatly onto the dangerousness principle underlying traditional
firearm regulation.''); see also Range, 124 F.4th at 230, 232
(objecting to ``permanent'' disarmament and concluding that the
civil plaintiff was entitled to an opportunity to seek
``protection'' for ``future possession of a firearm''); id. at 275-
76 (Krause, J., concurring in the judgment) (``The necessity of such
individualized review was evidently not lost on Congress when it
enacted Sec. 922(g)(1).'').
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As recognized by courts, a functional section 925(c) process would
render much of this litigation unnecessary and ensure that individuals
meeting the relevant criteria may possess firearms under federal law in
a manner consistent with the Second Amendment, while still protecting
public safety.
Even more broadly, the Supreme Court has been clear that the rights
of ordinary, law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms is
foundational. This rulemaking reflects the Department's commitment to
the Second Amendment as an indispensable safeguard of security and
liberty and a policy decision that the Department must find a way to
both advance public safety and ensure that the rights of the people
enshrined in the Constitution are not infringed.
The proposed rule seeks to implement section 925(c) by providing
detailed criteria to structure and guide the Attorney General's
discretionary determinations under that statute. The criteria are
designed to ensure that those granted relief are, in fact, ``not likely
to act in a manner dangerous to public safety'' and that granting such
relief would ``not be contrary to the public interest.'' Unlike ATF's
approach prior to 1992, which provided relief from disability to many
people convicted of violent crimes or crimes often linked with
violence, the proposed rule considers the risk of recidivism posed by
those who commit certain offenses and makes certain categories of
offenders presumptively ineligible for relief. By making clear that
certain characteristics will presumptively result in a denial of
relief, the proposed rule ensures that government resources are focused
primarily on persons who could plausibly make these necessary showings
for relief.
III. Proposed Rule
Under the proposed rule, certain applicants would be presumptively
ineligible for relief and therefore denied relief absent extraordinary
circumstances. For example, persons currently subject to the
prohibitions in section 922(g)(2) (fugitives from justice), (g)(3)
(unlawful users of controlled substances), and (g)(8) (those subject to
domestic violence restraining orders) would presumptively be denied
relief because, having an adjudicated status that indicates a lack of
respect for the law and potential dangerousness, they are unlikely to
meet the statutory criteria. Moreover, such persons can ordinarily take
themselves out of the prohibited category by discontinuing their
unlawful conduct or, in the case of section 922(g)(8), seeking a
modification or early termination of the protective order.\14\
Individuals subject to the prohibition in 922(g)(5) (unlawfully present
aliens or certain aliens admitted on nonimmigrant visas) would also be
presumptively disqualified because ``unlawful aliens are not part of
`the people' to whom the protections of the Second Amendment extend,''
United States v. Sitladeen, 64 F.4th 978, 987 (8th Cir. 2023).
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\14\ See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 699 (finding that the burden of
section 922(g)(8) ``fits within our regulatory tradition,'' in part,
because ``like surety bonds of limited duration'' its restriction
``was temporary.''); Range, 124 F.4th at 252 (Krause, J.,
concurring) (The ``Second Amendment demands that the disability it
imposes has at least the potential to be `of limited duration' '');
United States v. Perez-Garcia, 96 F.4th 1166, 1181 (9th Cir. 2024)
(finding the Bail Reform Act's prohibition on possessing firearms
while pending trial as a condition of pretrial release does not
violate the Second Amendment because even though it ``imposes a
heavy burden on Appellants' rights to bear arms because it prohibits
them from possessing or attempting to possess any firearm,'' the
condition ``is a temporary one''); Fried v. Garland, 640 F. Supp. 3d
1252, 1262 (N.D. Fla. 2022) (Section 922(g)(3) ``does not
categorically ban marijuana users from exercising their Second
Amendment rights; the burden exists only as long as marijuana users
fit the regulations' definition of a `current user.' This is enough
to find the regulations `relevantly similar' and foreclose
Plaintiffs' Second Amendment claim.''); United States v. Posey, 655
F. Supp. 3d 762, 775-76 (N.D. Ind. 2023) (``The burden imposed by
Sec. 922(g)(3) only endures for as long as the individual is an
unlawful user or addict, leaving them free to regain their full
Second Amendment rights at any time.'').
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A. Presumptively Disqualifying Crimes
Congress created section 925(c) to enable individuals to seek
relief from federal firearm disabilities where they ``will not be
likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety'' and it ``would
not be contrary to the public interest.'' The rule identifies certain
characteristics that are presumptively disqualifying. An applicant with
one of these characteristics may seek to rebut that presumption, but
the Department anticipates that the statutory criteria required for the
Department to grant relief could only be satisfied if such an applicant
could make a showing of extraordinary circumstances.
Research has shown that violent offenders recidivate at a higher
rate than non-violent offenders.\15\ And individuals convicted of
violent offenses are more likely to recidivate by committing another
violent offense than those convicted of any other type of crime.\16\
Indeed, state assault and robbery offenders were more likely than any
kind of offender to recidivate with a violent offense.\17\ These
findings support a strong presumption that felons convicted of crimes
that are particularly linked with dangerous or violent conduct are
unlikely to be able to demonstrate that relief from disabilities is in
the public interest.
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\15\ U.S. Sentencing Commission, Recidivism of Federal Violent
Offenders Released in 2010, at 5 (``over an eight-year follow-up
period, nearly two-thirds (63.8 percent) of violent offenders
released in 2010 were rearrested, compared to more than one-third
(38.4 percent) of non-violent offenders'').
\16\ Id.; see also, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of
Prisoners Released in 24 States in 2008: A 10-Year Follow-Up Period
(2008-2018), at 10, https://perma.cc/WHE3-KQ6W (``10-Year Recidivism
Report'').
\17\ Id. (noting that, within ten years, 52.8 percent of assault
offenders were arrested for a new violent offense and 47.5 percent
of robbery offenders were arrested for a new violent offense).
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The list of presumptively disqualifying violent crimes is drawn in
large part from the definitions of ``crime of violence'' in the Federal
Firearms Act, ch. 850, sec. 1(6), 52 Stat. 1250, and the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(2). The list also includes
other crimes closely associated with dangerousness, such as threatening
or stalking offenses and certain firearm-related offenses that are most
often associated with violence or dangerousness.
Similarly, the proposed rule presumptively disqualifies those who
have been convicted of any felony sex offense. Sex offenders ``released
after serving time for rape or sexual assault'' are ``more than three
times as likely as other released prisoners . . . to be arrested for
rape or sexual assault during the 9 years following release.'' \18\
[[Page 34397]]
The proposed rule also would presumptively disqualify other applicants
who cannot show that relief from federal firearm disabilities is
consistent with public safety and the public interest, such as those
currently serving any part of their sentence.
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\18\ Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders
Released from State Prison: A 9-Year Follow-Up (2005-14), Table 2 at
4, https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorsp9yfu0514.pdf
(individuals released after conviction for rape or sexual assault
were three times as likely to be rearrested within 9 years for a
rape or sexual assault (7.7 percent) versus someone convicted for a
property offense (2.5 percent)); R. Przybylski, Office of Sex
Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and
Tracking, Recidivism of Adult Sexual Offenders (2015), https://smart.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh231/files/media/document/recidivismofadultsexualoffenders.pdf (citing a 2003 finding that sex
crime rearrest rate was four times higher for sex offenders than for
non-sex offenders (5.3 percent compared to 1.3 percent)).
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B. Registration Related Disqualification
The proposed rule also presumptively disqualifies all persons who
are currently required to register under the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (``SORNA''), 34 U.S.C. 20911-20932, or a state
equivalent. Sex offender registration and notification reflect an
assessment of ongoing dangerousness. Restoration of firearms rights to
someone who is currently required to register as a sex offender due to
a felony conviction is unlikely to be in the public interest.
C. Time Limitations
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 925(c), the Attorney General must establish
to her ``satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disability,
and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant
will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and
that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public
interest.'' In order to make a considered decision regarding the
applicant's record and reputation, the Attorney General has determined
that certain offenses that are less serious or indicative of violence
than those discussed above should be deemed presumptively disqualifying
only for a specific period of time. Applicants convicted of such
offenses must demonstrate good behavior for a period of time after
completion of the sentence for the relevant offense.
Under Sec. 107.1(7) and (8) of the proposed rule, those convicted
of certain serious offenses that are not the violent or sexual offenses
discussed above, may be considered for relief 10 years after the
completion of their sentences based on their individualized
circumstances without triggering the presumptive disqualification set
forth in this rule. For all other offenses, as specified in Sec.
107.1(a)(9), the Department has selected a presumptively disqualifying
time-period of 5 years based on a review of the research and a need to
balance public safety with individual rights.
As a preliminary matter, recidivism research shows that most
offenders who recidivate do so in the first few years following reentry
into the community. But a not insignificant subset continue to
recidivate over time. And some offenders will not have a first instance
of recidivation until more than nine years after reentry.\19\ At the
same time, there is a strong relationship between age and recidivism--
as offenders age, they are less likely to commit new crimes or to pose
a risk to public safety.\20\ For specified offenses that bear a more
direct relationship to violence, the Department selected 10 years
following the successful conclusion of any term of probation, parole,
supervised release, or other supervision as the period of time during
which the offender must not recidivate before an application generally
will be considered. For other offenses, the Department selected 5
years. Those selections reflect the Department's expectation that most
offenders who pose a risk to public safety will have recidivated before
the expiration of those time periods and that the likelihood of new
offenses will continue to decrease.
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\19\ A 10-year study of state offenders found that 66 percent
were arrested the within 3 years following release. Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 24 States in
2008: A 10-Year Follow-Up Period (2008-2018), at 1 (2021) https://perma.cc/ZT4S-38GF. But some offenders had an initial post-release
arrest in subsequent years--13 percent of the released offenders who
were not re-arrested in the first 4 years had their first arrest in
year 5, and 4 percent of the released prisoners not re-arrested
after 9 years had their first arrest in year 10. Id at 17.
\20\ See U.S. Sentencing Commission, The Effects of Aging on
Recidivism Among Federal Offenders, at 3 (2017) (``Older offenders
were substantially less likely than younger offenders to recidivate
following release'').
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While persons are not precluded from filing applications prior to
the completion of the applicable 5- or 10-year periods, relief from
disabilities will not be granted absent a showing of extraordinary
circumstances. Additionally, relief from disability following the
expiration of the relevant time period is not automatic; the passage of
the applicable time period merely enables an individual to attempt to
demonstrate that restoration of firearms rights would not be contrary
to public safety and the public interest.
The first category of offenders who would be subject to a time-
limited presumptive disqualification is those convicted of drug-
distribution crimes. It is well established that ``offenses relating to
drug trafficking . . . are closely related to violent crime.'' \21\ For
example, drug traffickers are apt to use firearms ``to protect drug
stockpiles, to preempt encroachment into a dealer's `territory' by
rival dealers, and for retaliation.'' \22\ Recidivism is common for
drug traffickers, with more than 80 percent re-arrested within 10 years
following release.\23\ Presumptively disqualifying drug traffickers
from possessing a firearm following the conclusion of a previous
sentence for drug offending is designed to ensure that the offender is
no longer engaged in or likely to engage in criminal behavior. Studies
show that the risk of recidivism decreases significantly over time.\24\
In addition, state laws punishing drug distribution vary widely,
covering everything from large-scale narcotics trafficking to
possessing small amounts of marijuana for distribution.\25\ And those
convicted only of such minor offenses do not necessarily present a
danger to public safety long after their release from prison.
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\21\ United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2011).
\22\ United States v. Luciano, 329 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003).
\23\ 10-Year Recidivism Report at 10 (Table 11).
\24\ See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Recidivism of Federal Drug
Trafficking Offenders Released in 2010, at 44 (2022), https://perma.cc/PY28-RXMD (``Rearrest rates decreased over time across all
drug types.''); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of
Prisoners Released in 24 States in 2008: A 10-Year Follow-Up Period
(2008-2018), at 1 (2021) https://perma.cc/ZT4S-38GF (``The annual
arrest percentage declined over time, with 43 percent of prisoners
arrested at least once in Year 1 of their release, 29 percent
arrested in Year 5, and 22 percent arrested in Year 10.'').
\25\ See, e.g., Ala. Code 13A-12-213 (possession of any amount
of marijuana for other than personal use); Ark. Stat 5-64-
419(b)(5)(C), 5-64-215(a)(1) (possession of more than four ounces of
marijuana).
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Presumptively disqualifying drug-distribution offenders from relief
for a period of 10 years has multiple benefits. It ensures that large-
scale drug traffickers who serve substantial sentences will be unlikely
to ever legally obtain firearms given the length of their sentences. By
requiring drug traffickers who served shorter sentences to avoid
violating the law for 10 years after their release if they wish to
apply for relief without being subject to a presumption against
granting relief, the proposed rule reduces the likelihood that those
whose firearms rights are restored will subsequently recidivate. At the
same time, the proposed rule provides a vehicle for relief for those
convicted of low-level drug distribution offenses who have developed a
track record of responsibility after the completion of their sentences.
The rule similarly would presumptively disqualify from eligibility,
absent extraordinary circumstances, any person who has either: (a)
served any part of a sentence
[[Page 34398]]
for a ``misdemeanor crime of domestic violence'' (as defined in 18
U.S.C. 921(a)(33) and 27 CFR 478.11) within the last 10 years; or (b)
engaged in behavior demonstrating continued propensity for violence at
any time within the last 10 years following a conviction for a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
By imposing this requirement, the proposed rule recognizes that 18
U.S.C. 922(g)(9) was enacted in part because existing laws ``were not
keeping firearms out of the hands of domestic abusers [and] because
`many people who engage in serious spousal or child abuse ultimately
are not charged with or convicted of felonies.' '' \26\ However, not
all misdemeanor domestic violence offenses indicate a long-term
propensity to engage in violent force. Accordingly, there are instances
in which an applicant could show that the underlying circumstances of
the prior misdemeanor offense did not involve a firearm or potentially
lethal violence and that the applicant's good behavior over time (as
indicated by no subsequent arrests, no reports to law enforcement for
violent or threatening behavior, and no additional protective orders)
make relief under section 925(c) appropriate.
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\26\ United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 426 (2009) (internal
citations omitted).
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Finally, the Department has determined that it will presumptively
disqualify from eligibility for relief any person who, within the last
5 years, has been convicted of or served any part of a sentence
(including probation, parole, supervised release, or other supervision)
for any other offense under state or federal law punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year (as defined in 18 U.S.C.
921(a)(20)). The more limited presumptive disqualification period
applicable to general offenses reflects the Department's view that
while these offenses may be less serious than the offenses subject to
the 10-year presumptive disqualification period, an applicant still
needs to demonstrate good behavior while not subject to criminal
justice supervision. The Department believes that for these offenses, 5
years of good behavior by an applicant is a reasonable period after
which the Department will generally consider whether relief under
section 925(c) may be appropriate.
D. No Categorical Approach
In determining whether an applicant's prior offense is
presumptively disqualifying under this rule, the Attorney General is
not limited to a ``categorical approach'' that looks only at the
elements of the applicant's underlying offenses and compares them to a
``generic'' version of the listed offenses.\27\ Under the categorical
approach that courts have applied in other contexts, such as the Armed
Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the actual conduct that led to a
person's conviction does not matter; what matters is whether the
statute establishing the predicate offense categorically meets the
relevant federal definition. As Justice Alito has explained, ``[t]he
whole point of the categorical approach . . . is that the real world
must be scrupulously disregarded.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588-89 (1990)
(establishing the categorical approach).
\28\ United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015, 2026 (2022)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In applying this rule, the Attorney General would not be bound by
the artificial limits of the categorical approach. The Attorney General
may consider the elements of the statute of conviction and conclude
that those elements, standing alone, necessarily match the offenses
listed in the proposed rule and thereby presumptively render relief to
be not in the interest of public safety. But the Attorney General may
also go beyond the elements and consider all the facts underlying the
applicant's prior offense to determine whether that offense involved
conduct that, as a practical matter, qualifies as one of the listed
offenses.
The rule also would clarify that the Attorney General's decision
whether to grant relief will be based on all the relevant
circumstances, rather than a blindered approach that looks only at the
facts that led to the applicant's federal firearm disability. For
example, an applicant whose only disqualification under section 922(g)
is a decades-old, comparatively minor nonviolent felony may still
present a danger to others if, for example, he has a recent history of
drug use, threatening behavior, or mental health issues. Repeat arrests
may also indicate a higher likelihood of recidivism, even if the
applicant is not ultimately convicted of additional crimes. And
convictions that are not disqualifying under section 922(g) may still
indicate that the applicant is a danger to others or is at a higher
risk of recidivism.\29\ To guide the Attorney General's holistic
review, the rule would set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that
the Attorney General may consider in determining whether the applicant
has ``established to the [Attorney General's] satisfaction'' that
relief would be consistent with public safety and the public interest.
The rule would also require the applicant to attest that the applicant
has not been a member of, or associated with, a group of three or more
persons who acted together in the United States or elsewhere with the
aim of committing any crime within the last 10 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Commission, Recidivism among
Federal Offenders, A Comprehensive Overview 19, Figure 7A (2016),
https://perma.cc/DS8P-LTER (showing correlation between criminal
history and recidivism).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To ensure the Attorney General's holistic review is as broad as
possible, the Department is requiring notification of the fact of
application to the chief law enforcement officer in the locality where
the individual lives. The chief law enforcement officer is an
individual who is well placed to have specific information regarding
relevant or potentially violent conduct that falls short of arrest or
conviction, the drug or alcohol abuse of an applicant, or other
pertinent facts not available from other readily accessible sources.
The chief law enforcement officer may also serve as a conduit for other
individuals to submit relevant information about the applicant. In
order to facilitate chief law enforcement officer comments on
applications, the Department is establishing a routine and simple
mechanism that will be published on its website.
E. Limits of Relief
Importantly, relief under section 925(c) only relieves the
applicant of specific federal firearm disabilities. It does not restore
the right to possess a firearm under state law if the applicant is
independently subject to any such state-law prohibition. Additionally,
the proposed rule makes clear that relief under section 925(c) does not
extend to a person who incurs a new disability after the granting of
relief, such as by being convicted of an additional offense punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
F. Application Fees
The proposed rule contains a fee provision to offset the costs to
the government of processing applications requesting relief from the
disability imposed under section 922(g). See 31 U.S.C. 9701. Further,
in keeping with the mandates of OMB Circular A-25, Transmittal
Memorandum (User charges), the collection of fees will ensure that the
valuable services provided to those seeking relief from this
disability--the restoration of a vital, constitutional right to
individuals not likely to act in a manner dangerous to
[[Page 34399]]
public safety--can be self-sustaining. This proposed rule establishes a
new and untested application process and similar processes do not exist
elsewhere in the federal government. Moreover, considering the vital
nature of the constitutional right the individual seeks to restore, the
Department is unable to delay the proposed rule for sufficient time to
allow the performance of a full-scale cost analysis. The Department is
proposing an interim fee in the meantime to help offset the costs to
the government.
In the meantime, the Department estimates that approximately 1
million people will apply for relief within the first year of the
program. In order to fully adjudicate those 1 million applications
within a year of receipt, the Department estimates the following
personnel and operating costs:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2026 cost
Cost allocation (million)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 FTE personnel at average yearly cost of salary and $11.25
benefits of $225,000.................................
Technology and Case Management Startup costs.......... 6.5
Technology Maintenance and Support.................... .75
Operational Costs including rent and operational 1.5
support..............................................
Contracting and short-term support.................... 1
-----------------
Total............................................. 20
------------------------------------------------------------------------
At a total cost of $20 Million and with anticipated yield of 1
million applications, the Department would estimate a $20 per
application cost to fully self-sustain the first year of the program's
operation if the personnel and programmatic levels were accomplished at
the above projections.
Accordingly, to cover the costs of processing each application,
each applicant would be charged a fee. Indigent applicants, however,
could request a waiver or modification of the application fee. Under
the proposed rule, the Attorney General will continue to evaluate costs
and the interim fee charges periodically, but not less than every two
years, to determine the current cost of processing applications; would
adjust the fee amount as necessary; and would publish any fee amounts
as notices in the Federal Register. This fee would be adjusted using a
method of analysis consistent with widely accepted accounting
principles and practices and calculated in accordance with the
provisions of 31 U.S.C. 9701 and other federal law as applicable.
G. Revocation of Relief Granted
An informed decision by the Attorney General to grant relief from
disability requires the applicant to provide all the requested
information. If the Attorney General determines the applicant willfully
subscribed as true any material matter that the applicant did not
believe to be true or if the applicant willfully omitted requested
information, the Attorney General retains the discretion to revoke any
previously granted relief from disability upon appropriate notice.
H. Other Proposed Regulatory Changes
As relevant here, 28 CFR 25.6(j)(2) currently allows ATF to access
the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (``NICS'') Index
as part of ATF's criminal and civil enforcement functions under Title
18, Chapter 44. See 28 CFR 25.6(j)(2). Title 18, Chapter 44 includes 18
U.S.C. 925(c). This rule proposes amendments to 28 CFR 25.6(j) to
reflect that the Attorney General has rescinded the prior delegation to
ATF of the relief of disabilities function under 18 U.S.C. 925(c) and
to allow access to the NICS Index by the Attorney General or her
designee when making determinations on whether to grant a relief from
disabilities.
IV. Statutory and Executive Order Review
A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563--Regulatory Review
This proposed regulation has been drafted and reviewed in
accordance with Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and
Review,'' sec. 1(b), The Principles of Regulation, and in accordance
with Executive Order 13563, ``Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review.''
The Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') has determined that
this proposed rule is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under
Executive Order 12866, section 3(f). This rule will not have an annual
effect on the economy of $100 million or more, nor will it adversely
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health, or
safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities.
This proposed rule would implement 18 U.S.C. 925(c) by providing
detailed criteria to guide determinations under section 925(c) in order
to ensure that those granted relief are, in fact, ``not likely to act
in a manner dangerous to public safety'' and that granting such relief
would be ``not be contrary to the public interest.'' 18 U.S.C. 925(c).
The Department estimates that this rule will have an impact on
approximately 1 million applicants per year, and that the application
will take approximately 60 minutes to complete. The Department's cost
estimates for this rule are as follows:
Labor Costs: One hour of labor ($47.92/hour x 1 hour) \30\ for
completing and submitting or mailing the application x 1 million
potential applicants = $47,920,000. The annual labor cost of this rule
would be $47,920,000. In addition, the Department is proposing a $20
per application cost to fully self-sustain the first year of the
program's operation. Indigent applicants would be allowed to request a
waiver or modification of the application fee. However, assuming this
fee is imposed, and all 1 million potential applicants pay the full
fee, this payment would result in total additional cost of $20,000,000
in the first year. Therefore, the total annual cost in the first year
would be $67,920,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ The Department bases these economic cost estimates on
employee compensation data for March 2025 as determined by the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and announced in
its news release dated June 13, 2025, which can be found at https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics determined the average hourly employer costs for employee
compensation for civilian workers to be $47.92.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The benefits to this rule are that it would provide detailed
criteria to guide determinations under section 925(c), and it would
make clear that certain characteristics will presumptively result in a
denial of relief, ensuring that government resources are focused
primarily on persons who could plausibly make the dangerousness and
public interest showings necessary for relief under the statute.
[[Page 34400]]
B. Executive Order 13132--Federalism
This proposed rule will not have substantial direct effects on the
States, on the relationship between the Federal Government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with section 6
of Executive Order 13132, the Attorney General has determined that this
proposed rule does not have federalism implications warranting the
preparation of a federalism summary impact statement.
C. Executive Order 12988--Civil Justice Reform
This proposed rule meets the applicable standards set forth in
sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, ``Civil Justice
Reform.''
D. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, the
Attorney General has considered whether this proposed rule would have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The term ``small entities'' comprises small businesses, not-for-profit
organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not
dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with
populations of less than 50,000.
By approving this proposed rule, the Attorney General certifies
that it will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The Department estimates that this rule will
have an impact on at least 20 million adults in the United States and
that approximately 1 million individuals will apply in the first year.
However, only a small minority of those applications are likely to be
from individuals holding federal firearms licenses and small businesses
who are seeking to avoid revocation of their licenses, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 925(c). Based on recent data regarding the number of firearms
licenses that were revoked in a given year, the Department estimates
that fewer than 195 federal firearms licensees will apply per year.
Although the Department acknowledges that slightly higher numbers of
licensees may apply in the first few years due to a preexisting pool of
revocations, the Department does not anticipate that this will have a
substantial impact on the yearly estimate given that individuals who
had their licenses revoked many years ago are more likely to have
transitioned to other businesses. The application is estimated to take
60 minutes to complete. The cost estimates for this rule are as
follows:
Labor Costs: One hour of labor ($47.92/hour x 195 federal firearm
licensees) \31\ for completing the application = $9,344.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ DOJ bases these economic cost estimates on employee
compensation data for March 2025 as determined by the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and announced in
its news release dated June 13, 2025, which is found at https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics determined the average hourly employer costs for employee
compensation for civilian workers to be $47.92.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, the cost associated with the application to small
business is no more than $9,344 per year.
E. Congressional Review Act
This proposed rule is not a major rule as defined by the
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804.
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
This proposed rule will not result in the aggregate expenditure by
State, local, and tribal governments, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more in any one year (adjusted for inflation), and it will
not significantly or uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no
actions are necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1531-1538.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
This proposed rule would call for a new collection of information
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501-3521. As
defined in 5 CFR 1320.3(c), ``collection of information'' comprises
reporting, recordkeeping, monitoring, posting, labeling, and other
similar actions. The title and description of the information
collection, a description of those who must collect the information,
and an estimate of the total annual burden follow. The estimate covers
the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing sources of
data, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and
reviewing the collection for submission to the Department.
Title: Application for Restoration of Federal Firearms Rights.
OMB Control Number: TBD.
Summary of the Collection of Information: Under 18 U.S.C. 925(c),
the Attorney General may grant relief to individuals who are prohibited
under federal law from possessing and engaging in certain activities
with respect to firearms and ammunition. Granting such relief in
appropriate cases would, among other things, protect the Second
Amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms in a manner that is
consistent with public safety. Section 925(c) thus provides a mechanism
for the Attorney General to relieve otherwise-prohibited persons from
federal firearm disabilities if they can show that they are likely to
possess firearms safely, while ensuring that violent and dangerous
persons remain subject to the prohibitions in the Gun Control Act.
This authority was originally assigned to ATF. Since 1992, however,
Congress has prohibited ATF from using appropriated funds to process
applications for individuals seeking to restore their federal firearms
rights; Congress did not, however, prohibit ATF from using such funds
to grant relief to corporations under this provision. The
appropriations restriction pre-dates the Supreme Court's 2008 decision
in Heller,\32\ which held that the Second Amendment guarantees an
individual right to keep and bear arms. Under the Supreme Court's 2022
decision in Bruen,\33\ courts must assess whether firearms laws such as
18 U.S.C. 922(g) are consistent with the principles evident from the
Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. And under the
Supreme Court's 2024 decision in Rahimi,\34\ whether an individual is
dangerous or poses a threat of physical violence is an important
consideration in determining whether he may be disarmed. Since the
Bruen decision, there have been many challenges to section 922(g)(1)'s
constitutionality under the Second Amendment. Some of those challenges
are declaratory judgment actions brought by non-violent convicted
felons who do not pose any apparent danger to others, and who have not
themselves violated section 922(g)(1). Some of these plaintiffs have
had success in challenging section 922(g)(1), as courts have found that
the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.\35\ At the same
time, some courts have expressly recognized that section 925(c), absent
the proviso prohibiting ATF from carrying it out, might have provided
non-violent convicted felons with a viable route to restore their
Second Amendment rights.\36\ A functional 925(c) process would render
much of this litigation unnecessary and ensure that individuals meeting
the relevant criteria may possess firearms in a manner consistent with
the Second
[[Page 34401]]
Amendment, while still protecting public safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
\33\ Bruen, 597 U.S. 1.
\34\ Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680.
\35\ See, e.g., Range, 124 F.4th 218.
\36\ E.g., Williams, 113 F.4th at 661.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposed rule adds a new 28 CFR part 107 to allow individuals
prohibited under federal law from possessing, shipping, transporting,
or receiving firearms or ammunition to regain the ability to make
application to the Attorney General for relief from the disabilities
imposed under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). It provides detailed criteria to guide
determinations under section 925(c). By making clear that certain
characteristics will presumptively result in a denial of relief, these
criteria will ensure that government resources are focused on persons
who could plausibly make these necessary showings for relief.
Importantly, relief under section 925(c) only relieves the applicant of
specific federal firearm disabilities. It does not restore the right to
possess a firearm under state law if the applicant is independently
subject to any such state-law prohibition. Additionally, the proposed
rule makes clear that relief under section 925(c) does not extend to a
person who incurs a new disability after the granting of relief, such
as by being convicted of an additional, subsequent offense punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
Currently, any individual who wishes to seek relief from these
disabilities has limited options available, such as seeking a full and
unconditional pardon if the disability applies due to a felony
conviction. This proposed rule would allow submission of applications
to the Attorney General for processing.
Need for Information: The restoration of firearms rights is
statutorily codified in 18 U.S.C. 925(c) and protects the Second
Amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms. There is, however,
currently no regulatory process in place addressing the Attorney
General's process for granting restoration to all individuals who meet
the statutory standard. To determine if such relief should be granted
to an individual, the Attorney General, by statute, must determine if
``the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant's
record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely
to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of
the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.'' The
information requested in the application is necessary for the Attorney
General to make such a determination.
Proposed Use of Information: To allow the Attorney General to
determine whether to grant restoration of firearms rights to applicants
while ensuring safety of the public and that such a decision is not
contrary to the public interest.
Description of the Respondents: Persons who are subject to
disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and who choose to make an
application for relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 925(c).
Estimated Number of Respondents: 1 million per year.
Frequency of Response: Once every five years until relief is
granted.
Burden of Response: 60 minutes.
We ask for public comment on the proposed collection of information
to help us determine how useful the information is, whether it can help
the various levels of government perform their functions better,
whether it is readily available elsewhere, how accurate our estimate of
the burden of collection is, how valid our methods for determining that
burden are, how we can improve the quality, usefulness, and clarity of
the information, and how we can minimize the burden of collection.
If you submit comments on the collection of information, submit
them both to OMB and to the Docket Management Facility where indicated
under ADDRESSES, by the date set forth under DATES.
You need not respond to a collection of information unless it
displays a currently valid control number from OMB. Before the
requirements for this collection of information become effective, we
will publish a notice in the Federal Register of OMB's decision to
approve, modify, or disapprove the proposed collection.
H. Executive Order 14192--Regulatory Costs
Executive Order 14192, ``Unleashing Prosperity Through
Deregulation,'' was issued on January 31, 2025. Section 3(a) of
Executive Order 14192 requires an agency, unless prohibited by law, to
identify at least ten existing regulations to be repealed when the
Agency publicly proposes for notice and comment or otherwise
promulgates a new regulation. In furtherance of this requirement,
section 3(c) of Executive Order 14192 requires that the new incremental
costs associated with new regulations shall, to the extent permitted by
law, be offset by the elimination of existing costs associated with at
least ten prior regulations. This proposed rule is intended to be a
deregulatory action under Executive Order 14192 because it provides a
means by which the Attorney General may adjudicate applications for
relief from the disabilities imposed by 18 U.S.C. 922 pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 925(c).
List of Subjects
28 CFR Part 25
Administrative practice and procedure, Computer technology, Courts,
Firearms, Law enforcement officers, Penalties, Privacy, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures, Telecommunications.
28 CFR Part 107
Administrative practice and procedure, Arms and munitions, Customs
duties and inspection, Exports, Imports, Intergovernmental relations,
Law enforcement officers, Military personnel, Penalties, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Research, Seizures and forfeitures,
Transportation.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, the
Department of Justice is proposing to amend 28 CFR part 25, subpart A
and add a new 28 CFR part 107 as follows:
28 CFR Part 25, Subpart A--the National Instant Criminal Background
Check System
0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Public Law 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536, 49 U.S.C. 30501-
30505; Public Law 101-410, 104 Stat. 890, as amended by Public Law
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
0
2. Amend Sec. 25.6 by revising paragraph (j)(2) to read as follows:
Sec. 25.6 Accessing records in the system.
* * * * *
(j) * * *
* * * * *
(2) Responding to an inquiry from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives, or the Attorney General, Attorney General's
designee, or Attorney General's designated component in connection with
a civil or criminal law enforcement activity relating to the Gun
Control Act (18 U.S.C. Chapter 44) or the National Firearms Act (26
U.S.C. Chapter 53); or,
* * * * *
0
3. Add a new Part 107 to read as follows:
28 CFR Part 107--Relief From Disabilities Under the Gun Control Act
Sec.
107.1 Relief from disabilities under the Gun Control Act.
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552(a); 18 U.S.C. 921-931.
Sec. 107.1 Relief from disabilities under the Gun Control Act.
(a) Any person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping,
transporting, or
[[Page 34402]]
receiving firearms or ammunition may make application to the Attorney
General for relief from the disabilities imposed under section 922(g)
of the Act. See 18 U.S.C. 925(c). The Attorney General has determined,
however, that certain characteristics render an applicant presumptively
unable to establish to the Attorney General's satisfaction that the
applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public
safety and that the granting of relief would not be contrary to the
public interest. Applications will therefore be denied, absent
extraordinary circumstances, if the applicant:
(1) Has been convicted under state or federal law of any offense
punishable by a term exceeding one year (as defined in 18 U.S.C.
921(a)(20)) that involves the following conduct, excluding
jurisdictional requirements:
(i) The death of another of person; sexual abuse or sexual assault
(as defined by 18 U.S.C. Chapter 109A); human trafficking; kidnapping
(as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1201);
(ii) Intimate partner and domestic violence; animal abuse;
burglary; robbery; extortion; carjacking; arson; racketeering (if at
least one of the predicate racketeering acts is violent) or gang-
related offenses;
(iii) Assault or battery;
(iv) Threats of violence;
(v) Stalking;
(vi) Escape or rescue of a fugitive;
(vii) Terrorism; or
(viii) Witness tampering;
(2) Has been convicted under state or federal law of any felony
offense involving conduct prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), (i), (j),
(k), (l), (n), (o), (q), or (u), or 18 U.S.C. 932 and 933, except an
individual convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) based on an
underlying conviction that itself would not be subject to a presumptive
denial under this part;
(3) Has been convicted under state or federal law of any felony
offense involving the manufacture, possession, transfer, or use of
explosives;
(4) Has been convicted under state or federal law of any other
felony offense where the defendant committed or threatened acts of
violence, or used, brandished, or discharged a firearm or explosive in
the course of committing that offense;
(5) Has been convicted under state or federal law of attempting,
soliciting, or conspiring to commit, or aiding or abetting the
commission of, any of the offenses listed in paragraphs (a)(1) through
(a)(4) of this section;
(6) Is currently required to register under the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. 20911-20932, or
comparable sex offender registration statute, based on an offense that
disqualified that person from possessing a firearm under the Gun
Control Act;
(7) Has, within the last 10 years, been convicted of or served any
part of a sentence (including probation, parole, supervised release, or
other supervision) for an offense under state or federal law,
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year (as defined in
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20)), that prohibits the manufacture, import, export,
distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance or the possession
of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, import, export,
distribute, or dispense; or has, within the last 10 years, been
convicted of or served any part of a sentence (including probation,
parole, supervised release, or other supervision) for attempting,
soliciting, or conspiring to commit, or aiding or abetting the
commission of, an offense listed in this paragraph (a)(7);
(8)
(i) Has within the last 10 years been convicted of or served any
part of a sentence (including probation, parole, supervised release, or
other supervision) for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (as
defined in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33) and 27 CFR 478.11); or
(ii) At any time within the 10 years following a conviction for a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence (as defined in 18 U.S.C.
921(a)(33) and 27 CFR 478.11) has been:
(A) Subject to any of the disabilities set forth in 18 U.S.C.
922(g) or
(B) Arrested for an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, or any
offense where the defendant was alleged to have committed or threatened
to commit acts of violence or used, brandished, or discharged a firearm
or explosive in the course of committing that offense, or attempts
thereof, barring evidence from the applicant of a judicial
determination that no misconduct occurred;
(9) Has, within the last 5 years, been convicted of or served any
part of a sentence (including probation, parole, supervised release, or
other supervision) for any other offense under state or federal law
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year (as defined in
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20));
(10) Is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment;
(11) Is currently on any form of supervision as part of a criminal
sentence (such as probation, parole, or other supervision);
(12) Is currently subject to any of the disabilities set forth in
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(2), (g)(3), (g)(5), or (g)(8); or
(13) Has, at any time, had an application for relief under this
section denied based on a disqualification under paragraphs (a)(1)
through (a)(5) of this section or has, within the previous 5 years, had
an application for relief under this section denied for any other
reason.
(b) For purposes of this subsection, the phrase ``state or federal
law'' shall include state laws, federal laws, the laws of United States
territories, laws of the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and
Tribal laws. In determining whether the applicant's prior offense is
presumptively disqualifying under subsection (a)(1) through (a)(5) of
this section and (a)(7) through (a)(9) of this section, the Attorney
General may consider all the facts underlying the prior offense to
determine whether that offense involved the same or similar conduct
targeted by the listed offense. The Attorney General is not confined to
a ``categorical approach'' that looks only at the elements of the
underlying offense or that requires an exact correspondence with a
``generic'' offense.
(c) An application for such relief shall be submitted online or by
mail using the form and procedures established by the Attorney General
and shall include the information required by this section and any
additional data the Attorney General deems appropriate.
(d) Any record or document of a court or other government entity or
official required by this paragraph to be furnished by an applicant in
support of an application for relief shall be certified by the court or
other government entity or official as a true copy. An application
shall include:
(1) A statement of all applicable prohibitions on the applicant's
possession, transfer, shipment, or receipt of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
922(g);
(2) Written consent from the applicant to obtain and examine copies
of records and to receive statements and information regarding the
applicant's background, including records, statements and other
information concerning employment, medical history, military service,
and criminal record;
(3) In the case of an applicant having been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year (as defined in
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20)), a copy of the indictment or information on which
the applicant was convicted; any plea agreement; any factual basis for
a plea; any presentence report or other
[[Page 34403]]
document prepared to aid in sentencing or response thereto; the
judgment of conviction or record of any plea of nolo contendere or plea
of guilty or finding of guilt by the court; and a certificate from the
relevant authority (such as a department of corrections, probation
office, or parole board) stating the date of completion of the
applicant's sentence, including any term of supervision;
(4) In the case of an applicant who has been adjudicated a mental
defective or committed to a mental institution, a copy of the order of
a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that made the
adjudication or ordered the commitment; any petition that sought to
have the applicant so adjudicated or committed; any medical records
reflecting the reasons for commitment and diagnoses of the applicant;
any court order or finding of a court, board, commission, or other
lawful authority showing the applicant's discharge from commitment,
restoration of mental competency, or the restoration of rights; and a
current certification from a licensed mental health professional that
the applicant does not pose a danger to the community if permitted to
possess a firearm;
(5) In the case of an applicant who has been discharged from the
Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions, a copy of the applicant's
summary of service record (Department of Defense Form 214), charge
sheet (Department of Defense Form 458), and final court martial order;
(6) In the case of an applicant who, having been a citizen of the
United States, has renounced his or her citizenship, a copy of the
formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular
officer of the United States in a foreign state or before an officer
designated by the Attorney General when the United States was in a
state of war (see 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5) and (6)); and
(7) In the case of an applicant who has been convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence; a copy of the charging
instrument on which the applicant was convicted; a copy of the
underlying investigative reports, a statement of the relationship of
the victim to the applicant; the judgment of conviction or record of
any plea of nolo contendere or plea of guilty or finding of guilt by
the court; a certificate from the relevant authority (such as a
department of corrections, probation office, or parole board) stating
the date of completion of the applicant's sentence, including any term
of supervision; and any record purporting to show that the conviction
was rendered nugatory or that civil rights were restored;
(8) A copy of any application, and any decision on that
application, made to a state or other political subdivision to expunge
or set aside a prior conviction, to restore the right to possess a
firearm, or to restore any other civil rights that the applicant has
forfeited;
(9) Two properly completed FBI Forms FD-258 (Fingerprint Card) or
an equivalent electronic fingerprint scan;
(10) A copy of the individual's criminal record check for:
(i) Each state, or locality if a state-wide report unavailable, in
which the applicant has resided since turning 18 or for the last 25
years, whichever is shorter; and
(ii) Each state, or locality if a state-wide report unavailable, in
which the individual has been arrested since turning 18.
(11) In the case of an applicant who is an individual, an affidavit
from three references, attesting under penalty of perjury that:
(i) The affiant is not related to the applicant by blood or
marriage and has known the applicant for at least three years;
(ii) The affiant is not currently prohibited from possessing a
firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g);
(iii) To the affiant's knowledge, the applicant:
(A) Has not committed any crime, other than routine traffic or
parking infractions, or similarly minor offenses, within the past five
years;
(B) Is not an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled
substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 802), including marijuana, regardless of whether the
controlled substance has been legalized or decriminalized for medicinal
or recreational purposes in the state where the applicant resides;
(C) Does not regularly abuse alcohol or other intoxicants,
including prescription drugs;
(D) Is not currently suffering from a mental health condition that
would impair the applicant's judgment or behavior;
(E) Is a person of good character and has a good reputation in the
community;
(F) Has not threatened to use violence, or attempted to do so,
toward any person regardless of whether the authorities were notified;
and
(H) Would not pose a danger to public safety, to family members, or
to intimate partners if permitted to possess a firearm.
(12) An affirmation from the applicant under penalty of perjury
that the applicant:
(i) Has not committed any crime, other than routine traffic or
parking infractions, or similarly minor offenses, within the past five
years;
(ii) Is not an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled
substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act
(21 U.S.C. 802), including marijuana, regardless of whether the
controlled substance has been legalized or decriminalized for medicinal
or recreational purposes in the state where the applicant resides;
(iii) Does not regularly abuse alcohol or other intoxicants,
including prescription drugs;
(iv) Is not currently suffering from a mental health condition that
would impair the applicant's judgment or behavior;
(v) Is a person of good character and has a good reputation in the
community;
(vi) Has not threatened to use violence, or attempted to do so
toward any person regardless of whether the authorities were notified;
and
(vii) Would not pose a danger to public safety, to family members,
or to intimate partners if permitted to possess a firearm.
(viii) Has notified, through an appropriate form, the chief law
enforcement officer of the locality in which the applicant is located
that the applicant is seeking relief through this section, and that
within 14 days of that notification, the chief law enforcement officer
may submit comments through the mechanism described on the Restoration
of Federal Firearms Rights application or website to the Department
either supporting or opposing the application. The chief law
enforcement officer is the local chief of police, county sheriff, head
of the state police, or state or local district attorney or prosecutor.
(ix) Has not been a member of, or associated with, a group of three
or more persons who acted together in the United States or elsewhere
with the aim of committing any crime within the last 10 years.
(x) Provided all information relevant to the applicant's
eligibility under paragraph (a) of this section and that all
information provided in the application is true and correct.
(d) The Attorney General may grant relief to an applicant if the
applicant has established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General
that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant's
record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely
to act in a manner dangerous to public safety, and that the granting of
the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. In making this
determination,
[[Page 34404]]
the Attorney General may consider all information submitted as part of
the application and all other relevant information, including the
following:
(1) All of the applicant's prior convictions for any offense;
(2) The seriousness of the conduct involved in all of the
applicant's prior convictions for any offense;
(3) The conduct underlying any charges against the applicant that
were dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea;
(4) The applicant's conduct while serving any criminal sentence,
including compliance with conditions of supervision and satisfaction of
any financial penalties;
(5) The time elapsed since the applicant's completion of any
criminal sentence and their conduct during that time;
(5) The applicant's past or present use of controlled substances;
(6) Any arrests, regardless of whether they resulted in criminal
charges, including a review of the police report, where available;
(7) Any restraining orders, regardless of whether that behavior
related to an arrest;
(8) Any threats or threatening behavior, regardless of whether that
behavior resulted in criminal charges;
(9) The applicant's mental health, including any abnormal behaviors
or mental health treatment;
(10) Any information provided by the chief law enforcement officer
of the locality in which the applicant is located, including victim
impact statements; and,
(11) Whether, in the view of the Attorney General, the applicant's
individual circumstances demonstrate that a failure to grant relief
would infringe the applicant's rights under the Second Amendment.
(e) In addition to meeting the requirements of paragraph (d) of
this section, an applicant who has been adjudicated a mental defective
or committed to a mental institution will not be granted relief unless
the applicant was subsequently determined by a court, board,
commission, or other lawful authority to have been restored to mental
competency, to be no longer suffering from a mental disorder, and to
have had all rights restored. Where an applicant was adjudicated a
mental defective or committed to a mental institution in a state that
has adopted a relief-from-disability program implemented in accordance
with 34 U.S.C. 40915, the state program shall be the exclusive means of
relief, and the applicant may not obtain relief under this section.
(f) Where an application fails to identify a disability for which
relief may be granted, is improperly executed, or is otherwise
incomplete, the applicant will be notified of the defect and given an
opportunity to amend and resubmit the application within 30 days.
Failure to amend and resubmit the application, with supporting
documents or records, within 30 days will result in the application
being considered abandoned. An abandoned application will not be
considered for purposes of determining whether the person's application
should be presumptively denied based on paragraph (a)(13).
(g) Whenever relief is granted to any person pursuant to this
section, a notice of such action shall be promptly published in the
Federal Register, together with the reasons therefor.
(h) A person who has been granted relief under this section shall
be relieved of the disability or disabilities imposed by the Act for
which relief is sought with respect to the acquisition, receipt,
transfer, shipment, transportation, or possession of firearms or
ammunition and incurred by reason of such disability. Such relief will
not extend to disabilities imposed by state law if the applicant is
independently subject to any such state-law prohibition. A person who
is subject to a different disability or incurs a new disability after
the granting of relief, such as being convicted in any court of an
additional crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, will not be relieved of such disability and must reapply for
relief.
(i)(1) A federal firearms licensee who incurs disabilities under
the Act (see 27 CFR 478.32(a)) during the term of a current license or
while the licensee has pending a license renewal application with the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and who,
within 30 days following the date of incurring the disability for which
relief may be granted, files an application for removal of such
disabilities, shall not be barred from licensed operations for 30 days
following the date on which the applicant was first subject to such
disabilities (or 30 days after the date upon which the conviction for a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year becomes
final), and if the licensee files the application for relief as
provided by this section within such 30-day period, the licensee may
further continue licensed operations during the pendency of the
application. A licensee who does not file such application within such
30-day period shall not continue licensed operations beyond 30 days
following the date on which the licensee was first subject to such
disabilities (or 30 days from the date the conviction for a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year becomes final).
(2) In the event the term of a license of a person expires during
the 30-day period specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this section, or
during the pendency of the application for relief, a timely application
for renewal of the license must be filed in order to continue licensed
operations. Such license application shall show that the applicant (or
responsible person of the applicant) is subject to federal firearm
disabilities, shall describe the event giving rise to such
disabilities, and shall state when the disabilities were incurred.
(3) A licensee shall not continue licensed operations beyond 30
days following the date on which the notification that the licensee's
application for removal of disabilities has been denied is issued.
(4) When as provided in this paragraph (i) a licensee may no longer
continue licensed operations, any application for renewal of license
filed by the licensee during the pendency of the application for
removal of disabilities shall be denied by the Attorney General.
(j)(1) The Attorney General will charge a fee for processing
applications requesting relief from the disabilities imposed under
section 922(g) of the Act.
(i) The Attorney General shall review the amount of the fee
periodically, but not less than every two years, to determine the
current cost of processing applications.
(ii) Fee amounts and any revisions thereto shall be determined by
current costs, using a method of analysis consistent with widely
accepted accounting principles and practices, and calculated in
accordance with the provisions of 31 U.S.C. 9701 and other federal law
as applicable.
(iii) Fee amounts and any revisions thereto shall be published as a
notice in the Federal Register.
(2) Applicants may request a waiver or modification of the
application fees. Each applicant shall set forth the reasons why a
waiver or modification should be granted. Fees may be waived or reduced
because of indigency.
(k) The Attorney General retains the discretion to revoke relief
granted to a person pursuant to this section and upon notice if the
Attorney General determines the person willfully subscribed as true any
material matter which he does not believe to be true or willfully
omitted requested information.
[[Page 34405]]
Dated: July 16, 2025.
Pamela Bondi,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 2025-13765 Filed 7-21-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-29-P