[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 137 (Monday, July 21, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 34190-34197]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-13606]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 137 / Monday, July 21, 2025 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 34190]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
[Docket No. PRM-50-123; NRC-2020-0155]
Public Protective Actions During a General Emergency
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; consideration in the rulemaking
process.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will consider in
its rulemaking process issues raised in a petition for rulemaking
(PRM), PRM-50-123, submitted by Thomas McKenna. The petitioner
requested that the NRC amend its regulations to ensure protective
actions in the event of a general emergency will likely do more good
than harm.
DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-123, is
closed on July 21, 2025.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2020-0155 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may
obtain publicly available information related to this action by any of
the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2020-0155. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Helen Chang; telephone: 301-415-3228;
email: [email protected].
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. For the convenience of the reader,
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are
provided in the ``Availability of Documents'' section.
NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time, Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Philip Benavides, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3246, email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents:
I. The Petition
A. Background
B. Issues Raised in the Petition
II. Public Comments on the Petition
A. Overview of Public Comments
B. NRC Response to Public Comments
III. Reasons for Consideration
IV. Availability of Documents
V. Conclusion
I. The Petition
The NRC received and docketed a petition for rulemaking dated June
1, 2020, filed by Thomas McKenna. On August 31, 2020, the NRC published
a notice of docketing and request for public comment on the petition
(85 FR 53690). The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its
regulations in part 50 to title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(10 CFR), ``Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization
Facilities,'' and that the NRC work with the U.S. Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) to revise associated implementation guidance,
supporting analysis, and materials and activities to ensure that
protective actions in the event of a general emergency will likely do
more good than harm considering the health hazards of both radiation
exposure and protective actions.
A. Background
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, authorizes the
Commission to establish, by rule, minimum criteria for the issuance of
licenses for utilization facilities in a manner that protects the
health and safety of the public. The Commission's emergency planning
regulations are an important part of the regulatory framework for
protecting public health and safety. Before it can issue an operating
license or combined license for a nuclear power plant, the NRC is
required by paragraph (a) of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' to make
a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective
measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological
emergency. The NRC bases its finding on its review of a license
applicant's emergency plan. A licensee's emergency plan is considered
adequate if it complies with the NRC's regulations, specifically, the
16 planning standards of Sec. 50.47(b) and the content of emergency
plan requirements in appendix E, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness
for Production and Utilization Facilities,'' to part 50. The objective
of the Commission's emergency planning regulations is to provide dose
savings for a spectrum of radiological incidents that have the
potential to produce offsite doses in excess of Federal protective
action guides.
A general emergency is an emergency classification level indicating
that events at a nuclear power plant are in progress or have occurred
that involve either actual or imminent substantial core degradation or
melting with potential for loss of containment integrity, or hostile
action that results in an actual loss of physical control of the
facility. During a general emergency, offsite releases can be
reasonably expected to exceed exposure levels in the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides (PAG) Manual EPA-400/
R-17/001, ``PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance
for Radiological Incidents'' (PAG Manual). Onsite and offsite emergency
plans provide for public protective actions in response to a general
emergency under Sec. 50.47(b)(10). This regulation requires, in part,
a range of protective actions for the plume exposure pathway emergency
planning zone \1\ for emergency workers
[[Page 34191]]
and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration must
be given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the
prophylactic use of potassium iodide, as appropriate. Guidelines for
the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with
Federal guidance, must be developed and in place.
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\1\ A ``plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone'' is a
geographic area, approximately 10 miles in radius, including and
surrounding a commercial nuclear power plant, within which the
health and safety of the general public could be adversely affected
by radiological exposure from an emergency at the plant. This
emergency planning zone defines the area where predetermined, prompt
protective measures may be necessary during an emergency at the
plant that results in an offsite release.
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In an emergency, a nuclear power reactor licensee would recommend
protective actions to the offsite decision-maker (e.g., the Governor,
Incident Commander), who would make any protective action decisions.
The current NRC guidance for developing protective action strategies is
contained in Supplement 3, ``Guidance for Protective Action
Strategies,'' to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, ``Criteria for
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and
Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.'' This guidance
provides an NRC-accepted method for implementing a range of protective
actions for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone and is
intended for use by nuclear power reactor licensees to develop site-
specific protective action recommendation (PAR) procedures. Offsite
response organizations also should use Supplement 3 to develop
protective action strategy guidance for decision-makers.
The recommended dose criteria and their associated bases for
protective actions for radiological incidents are in the PAG Manual.
PAGs are the projected dose to an individual at which a specific
protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is recommended. The PAG
Manual provides PAGs to help decision-makers select appropriate
protective actions under emergency conditions. As the EPA states in the
PAG Manual, the decision to advise members of the public to take a
protective action during a radiological emergency must be weighed
against the action's inherent risks. The EPA established the PAGs by
balancing the acceptable level of risk of health effects from radiation
exposure in an emergency situation against the costs and risks
associated with the protective action. The EPA considered the following
principles in establishing exposure levels for the PAGs: (1) prevent
acute effects, (2) reduce risk of chronic effects, and (3) balance
protection with other important factors and ensure that actions result
in more benefit than harm.
B. Issues Raised in the Petition
The NRC identified four issues in the petition as follows:
Issue 1: NRC requirements and guidance on protective action
strategies are outdated and do not reflect the results of the latest
studies of nuclear power plant emergencies.
The petitioner requested that the NRC promptly conduct studies to
better quantify the current understanding of health risks of protective
actions and associated dislocations, which refers to people moving to
and residing in a different location as a result of protective actions.
In addition, the petitioner stated that the revisions to regulations
and guidance need to be based on a probabilistic risk assessment of
protective action strategies considering (1) updated estimates of
important early and late radiation-induced health effects, (2) the
detrimental health effects of protective actions and resulting
dislocations, and (3) possible public response. The petitioner also
requested that the revisions consider the application of the EPA PAGs,
which the petitioner stated are an integral part of the NRC's
protective action guidance. The petitioner requested that analyses
should not be based on conservative assumptions that could distort the
results.
Issue 2: The NRC does not provide tools to allow decision-makers
and the public to balance the radiation health hazards versus the
health hazards of the protective actions. Additionally, the petitioner
requested that the NRC and stakeholders develop guidance for the public
and public officials that would facilitate them making risk-informed
decisions during planning and response, by balancing the hazards of
radiation exposure, protective actions, and resulting dislocations.
Issue 3: NRC regulations and guidance do not state that protective
actions should do more good than harm. The petitioner claimed that
rulemaking may be the only effective approach to ensure that the term
``adequate protective measures'' in Sec. 50.47 is interpreted to mean
taking protective measures that will likely do more good than harm
considering the health hazards of both radiation exposure and
protective actions.
Issue 4: Dislocations resulting from taking protective actions
consistent with NRC guidance upon declaration of a general emergency
may cause more deaths among the public and elderly than deaths caused
by radiation exposure due to the general emergency.
II. Public Comments on the Petition
A. Overview of Public Comments
On August 31, 2020, the NRC requested comments from interested
persons on the petition. The comment period ended on November 16, 2020.
The NRC received 14 public comments from 5 different entities. Two
entities (Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and a private citizen)
generally supported the petition, and two entities (Nuclear Energy
Oversight Project (NEOP) and Beyond Nuclear) generally opposed the
petition. One entity provided one comment that was outside the scope of
the petition and did not express support or opposition.
B. NRC Response to Public Comments
The NRC binned the comments related to the petition into three
categories. The following discussion provides a summary of each comment
and the NRC's response to the comment.
1. Comments Supporting the Petition
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that current guidance
directs power reactor licensees to transmit protective action
recommendations to offsite response organizations within 15 minutes of
a general emergency declaration. The offsite response organizations
then have 15 minutes to determine protective actions for the public.
Protective action strategies should be revised to meet these time-based
goals or the goals should be changed if additional decision-making time
would aid in making better risk-informed decisions for protection of
the public.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees, in part, with this comment. The NRC's
regulations require prompt notification to the public and for licensees
to have the capability to notify responsible State and local
governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency.
Under current guidance, licensees should issue protective action
recommendations with the notification of a general emergency. The
capability to decide upon appropriate protective action recommendations
is typically included in these 15 minutes but is not a regulatory
requirement. The 15-minute notification requirement is based on
postulated accident scenarios in Appendices V and VI to NUREG-75/014,
``Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S.
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants'' (WASH-1400), from 1975, and assumes
that the time from initiation of the event to the start of atmospheric
release could be as short as 30 minutes. However, more recent State-of-
the-Art Reactor
[[Page 34192]]
Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) studies and advanced reactor designs
likely would not support continued use of the assumption of a release
within 30 minutes, but instead indicate that more than 30 minutes would
be available before the start of a release. The PAR process could be
enhanced by considering the timing of the PAR decision and the
timeliness of emergency declarations and notifications in relation to
accident characteristics, specifically the accident timing, specific to
the facility type. The NRC will consider this issue in its rulemaking
process.
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that the development of
new protective action strategies and decision-making aids requires
extensive stakeholder input and reviews that should include licensees,
offsite response organizations, the Conference of Radiation Control
Program Directors, and FEMA.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with this comment. The NRC would
provide opportunities for stakeholder input on new protective action
strategies, whether as a revision to current guidance or as part of
rulemaking. These opportunities would include public meetings and
requests for public comment noticed in the Federal Register. In
addition, the NRC regularly participates in radiological emergency
preparedness (EP) conferences and meetings to keep key stakeholders,
such as the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, aware of
current EP activities. The NRC routinely consults with FEMA on
radiological EP under the July 1, 2024, memorandum of understanding
between the two agencies.
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that requirements for
implementation of new protective action strategies should allow time
for budgeting, completion of procedure and dose projection software
changes, and training by both licensees and offsite response
organizations.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with this comment. Whether through the
rulemaking or guidance development process, the NRC will seek
stakeholder input regarding the cumulative effects of regulation,
including the timing and expected resource needs related to the
implementation of new protective action strategies.
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that the NRC should
consider improvements to both the regulations and guidance that govern
the consequence-based EP frameworks for the various types of facilities
licensed by the NRC.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees with this comment. The NRC applies a
graded approach to emergency preparedness in which the emergency
planning requirements and criteria for a facility are commensurate with
the relative radiological risk and potential hazards of the facility,
among other considerations. This approach is risk-informed and
consequence-oriented. Examples of how the NRC applies this regulatory
framework can be found in the exemptions granted to the licensees of
the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,
and Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station to reduce or eliminate EP
requirements that were no longer necessary due to the decommissioning
status of those facilities. The NRC also proposed this regulatory
framework in the ``Regulatory Improvements for Production and
Utilization Facilities Transitioning to Decommissioning'' proposed rule
published in the Federal Register on March 3, 2022 (87 FR 12254).
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that the Commission
should consider the insights identified in the petition. For example,
the petitioner noted that, in incident response dose assessment,
protective actions should never be recommended based on worst case
conservative dose assessments. The comment stated that the petitioner
showed the harm that can occur from basing PARs on worst case dose
assessments. Also, the EPA PAGs are set at levels well below those that
would cause harm from radiological exposure. As a result, basing PARs
on more realistic dose projections could also result in the harm
described by the petitioner.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees, in part, with the comment. The NRC
will consider the insights identified in the petition in the
rulemaking. The NRC disagrees that more realistic dose projections
could result in the harm described by the petitioner. Section 1.4.5 of
the EPA PAG Manual discusses the level of conservatism built into the
PAGs. The EPA encourages radiological assessors to use realistic inputs
and to avoid overly conservative dose estimates that may lead to
unnecessary protective actions. As such, realistic dose projections are
more likely to reduce unnecessary protective actions and the risk of
harm from those actions.
2. Comments Opposing the Petition
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that evacuation
planning and preparedness should be expanded, not diminished. The
outcome of the petitioner's request would be to significantly diminish
the nuclear industry's liability for the precipitating accident and
what can be extremely prolonged, complicated dislocation and recovery
costs. Nuclear disasters should require that industry liability bear
more, not less, responsibility to its victims.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. The NRC examined
the EP planning basis in response to a petition for rulemaking
requesting the NRC to expand emergency planning zones in light of the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station and Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power
Plant accidents (79 FR 19501; April 9, 2014). The NRC denied the
petition and concluded that the basis for the current size of emergency
planning zones is valid for existing reactors and that reasonable
assurance exists that protective measures can and will be taken in the
event of a radiological emergency at an existing nuclear power plant.
Similar petitions for rulemaking to expand emergency planning were also
denied on the grounds that an insufficient basis existed to amend the
EP regulations (55 FR 5603; February 16, 1990).
A rulemaking to address this petition would not change the
industry's liability in the event of an accident at a nuclear power
plant. The Price-Anderson Act (PAA) is a Federal statute enacted in
1957 to cover liability claims of members of the public for personal
injury and property damage caused by a commercial nuclear power plant
accident. The PAA limits the total amount of liability each nuclear
power plant licensee faces in the event of an incident. If damages from
the incident exceed this limit, then under the PAA, Congress will
``thoroughly review the particular incident and will take whatever
action is determined necessary and appropriate to protect the public
from the consequences of a disaster of such magnitude.'' Furthermore,
there are other Federal authorities and funding mechanisms that could
be used to respond to a nuclear/radiological incident depending on the
circumstances. These include the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act and the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that the NRC's SOARCA
program needs serious adjustment before using it to assess deaths from
nuclear emergencies. The comment stated that, at the time SOARCA was
released, there were concerns about the assumptions used for design
failures of Mark I reactors, severe accident probabilities,
availability of resources to mitigate
[[Page 34193]]
accidents, and the use of risk coefficients based on older studies.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC conducted
the SOARCA project to develop best estimates of the offsite
radiological health consequences for potential severe reactor
accidents. While SOARCA had limitations (for example, not including
spent fuel pool accidents and releases), it represents some of the most
detailed reactor analyses ever completed at that time. Those analyses
still serve as reasonable representations for how a severe reactor
accident could progress and the magnitude of radiological consequences
as a result of a release if operators and mitigation equipment are
unable to prevent a release.
The initial SOARCA deterministic analyses of postulated accidents
at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and Surry Power Station
indicated that all modeled accident scenarios progress more slowly and
release smaller amounts of radioactive material than calculated in
earlier studies, even if operators are unsuccessful in stopping the
accident. The NRC followed the initial SOARCA studies with more
detailed uncertainty analyses for a boiling water reactor with a Mark I
containment (NUREG/CR-7155, ``State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence
Analyses Project: Uncertainty Analysis of the Unmitigated Long-Term
Station Blackout of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station''), a
pressurized water reactor with a large dry containment (``State-of-the-
Art Reactor Consequence Analyses Project: Uncertainty Analysis of the
Unmitigated Short-Term Station Blackout of the Surry Power Station,
Draft Report''), and a pressurized water reactor with an ice condenser
containment (NUREG/CR-7245, ``State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence
Analyses (SOARCA) Project: Sequoyah Integrated Deterministic and
Uncertainty Analysis''). The three uncertainty analyses were summarized
in ``State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses Project: Uncertainty
Analyses for Station Blackout Scenarios.'' The uncertainty analyses
corroborated the conclusions from the earlier SOARCA studies. The
SOARCA studies were extensively peer-reviewed, and the NRC addressed
public comments on the modeling approach and assumptions as described
in Appendices B and C of NUREG-1935, ``State-of-the-Art Reactor
Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report.''
Although these studies model protective actions and demonstrate
that protective actions are effective for avoiding or reducing dose,
the SOARCA studies were not used to assess the relative efficacy of
various protective action strategies. Additionally, the health risk
models and risk coefficients from exposure to ionizing radiation,
including mortality, are established through epidemiological studies
and recommendations by scientific bodies such as the International
Commission on Radiological Protection, the United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements, and the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR).
Specifically, the technical basis for the health risk parameters used
in the SOARCA studies were based on the BEIR V risk models; see the NAS
report titled, ``Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing
Radiation: BEIR V,'' 1990. An NRC rulemaking to address this petition
may benefit from SOARCA insights but would be supported by additional
technical analyses specific to the issues raised in this petition for
rulemaking.
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that a serious meltdown
with release of radiation and widespread contamination has occurred
every 7 years on average, in contrast to the petitioner's assumption
that severe consequences are improbable.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Following the
Fukushima Dai-ichi reactor accident, the NRC developed NUREG-2201,
``Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Regulatory Decisionmaking: Some
Frequently Asked Questions,'' to address complaints that probabilistic
risk assessment-based estimates of the likelihood of major accidents
were significantly smaller than simple statistical estimates based on
international events (notably the accidents at Three Mile Island,
Chernobyl, and Fukushima). Plant risk is heavily dependent on plant-
specific details, and major safety improvements have been made to
nuclear power plants in the United States over time in response to
hypothetical and actual accidents. As such, statistical estimates of
accident rates based solely on past accident data are not a valid
indicator of future events. Nuclear power plant accidents are rare
events, and the NRC has applied lessons learned following these
accidents aimed at preventing future such occurrences. Even so,
emergency preparedness is based on a spectrum of accidents, including
those with a very low likelihood of occurring. The EP planning basis
ensures regulatory requirements for emergency plans are effective
regardless of the accident probability.
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that thyroid cancer is
the most recognized health impact from nuclear meltdowns, and thyroid
cancer and other thyroid diseases need to be assessed in the context of
this petition. Consideration of shelter-in-place replacing evacuation
should focus on the protection of and disproportionate impacts of
radiation on women, children, and fetuses. There are too many
limitations and uncertainties to recommend risky shelter-in-place,
instead of evacuation, in the event of a general emergency at nuclear
facilities.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees, in part, with the comment. Although
thyroid cancer is a risk associated with radiation exposure and some
populations are more radiosensitive than others, any given accident
will have its own set of circumstances to be considered in making
decisions for public protective actions. The experience of actual
reactor accidents has highlighted the need to consider a holistic view
of public health and emphasized the importance of a risk-informed
approach to protective action decision-making based on a balanced
assessment of the risks. A focus on the stochastic risks (i.e., the
risk of cancer and genetic effects from exposure to ionizing radiation)
at the expense of ignoring the cost and health risk of the protective
action itself is contrary to the principles for the PAGs established by
the EPA. A rulemaking would provide an opportunity to examine ways to
reduce the uncertainties on implementation strategies for protective
actions by making use of the known benefits and limitations of
evacuation and shelter-in-place.
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that the petitioner's
argument aims to reduce public protection from the harmful effects of
radiation exposure and diminish ``defense-in-depth,'' the longstanding
philosophical foundation of nuclear power oversight.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. Emergency
preparedness exists as an independent layer of defense-in-depth.
Emergency planning provides reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency. Enhancing protective action strategies would
not alter the role emergency planning plays in defense-in-depth. These
enhanced strategies would support the goal of defense in depth, which
is to ensure that the public is protected from harm, as stated in
NUREG/KM-0009, ``Historical Review and Observations of Defense-in-
Depth.''
[[Page 34194]]
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that any proposed rule
related to a general emergency declaration at a commercial nuclear
power plant should be considered in light of a ``worst case'' scenario.
A worst-case scenario involves a loss of coolant accident in which the
nuclear reactor core melts down through the bottom of the nuclear
reactor vessel and containment building. The comment refers to the
Fukushima Dai-ichi and Chernobyl nuclear power plant events as support
for the use of a worst-case scenario.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees, in part, with the comment. The NRC's
EP planning basis considers the need for emergency planning in light of
severe accidents, including the comment-provided scenario of a core
melt-through and subsequent atmospheric release of radioactive
materials. However, as described in NUREG-0396, ``Planning Basis for
the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency
Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,'' a
combined NRC and EPA task force determined that radiological emergency
planning should be based on a full spectrum of accidents and
corresponding consequences tempered by probability considerations. This
standard for developing emergency plans, which uses the consequences of
various events and the likelihood of those consequences occurring, is
known as a risk-informed, consequence-oriented approach. The risk-
informed planning basis for EP established in NUREG-0396 was endorsed
for use in the Commission's policy statement, ``Planning Basis for
Emergency Responses to Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents,'' dated October
23, 1979 (44 FR 61123). A rulemaking to address this petition should
follow a risk-informed, consequence-oriented approach. This approach
would allow an applicant or licensee to develop protective action
strategies appropriate for its facility type.
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that during a general
emergency declaration involving a worst-case loss of coolant accident,
in which the nuclear reactor core melts down through the bottom of the
reactor vessel and containment building, there currently does not exist
any NRC rule or regulation that would protect the health and safety of
the public or protect the environment. To the extent that government
officials would recommend shelter-in-place or evacuation, that advice
would result in tens of thousands of deaths.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. NRC regulations
exist to protect the health and safety of the public and protect the
environment. For example, in the event of a loss of coolant accident,
emergency core cooling systems, which are required by Sec. 50.46,
``Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-
water nuclear power reactors,'' would provide core cooling and prevent
a significant core melt accident and large release of radioactive
materials. In addition, as part of this regulatory framework, the EP
regulations in Sec. 50.47 provide reasonable assurance that adequate
protective measures can and will be taken in the unlikely event that a
significant radiological release were to occur.
Specific to radiological emergencies, the EPA provides guidance to
decision-makers to recommend evacuation or shelter-in-place for the
general public when whole body doses are projected to exceed
established PAGs. In addition, protective actions such as evacuation
and shelter-in-place are not unique to radiological events and are
commonplace actions in response to a variety of hazards such as
chemical spills, fires, and natural disasters. FEMA's Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101 is the foundation for State, territorial,
Tribal, and local emergency planning in the United States. The CPG 101
states that while the causes of emergencies can vary greatly, many of
their effects do not. As such, planners can address common operational
functions, including conducting evacuations and shelter operations,
which are effective even though each emergency's characteristics are
different. Specific guidance for the use of evacuation and shelter-in-
place is part of comprehensive emergency planning as described in the
FEMA guidance on ``Planning Considerations: Evacuation and Shelter-in-
Place.''
The NRC has performed extensive studies, described in NUREG/CR-
6864, Volume 1, ``Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting
Emergency Evacuations,'' and NUREG/CR-6981, ``Assessment of Emergency
Response Planning and Implementation for Large Scale Evacuations,'' and
found that evacuations, whether pre-planned or ad hoc, safely removed
people from the affected area, saved lives, and reduced the potential
number of injuries from the hazard. However, these studies did not
examine the physical health impacts of prolonged displacements of
populations as a result of evacuation or relocation to ensure that
protective actions are properly balanced against the radiological risk.
The NRC study in NUREG/CR-7285, ``Nonradiological Health Consequences
from Evacuation and Relocation,'' published in September 2021, examines
the relative risk of experiencing negative health effects among
populations displaced as a result of various emergency events. The
results of this analysis are available to decision-makers to help
assess the risk of evacuation as compared to the risk of sheltering-in-
place and could be used as part of a technical basis for rulemaking.
3. Other Public Comments
Comment: The NRC received a comment stating that consideration
should be given to potential revisions aimed at providing better
alignment of the Design Basis Accident (DBA) dose criteria specified in
regulation with the EPA PAGs. Currently this differential is
substantial. The PAGs are set below the dose levels that would cause
harm from radiation exposure, and protective actions based on these
PAGs could result in harm from unnecessary evacuations. The design
basis accident dose criteria should be better aligned with the PAGs.
Consideration should be given to using 10 rem for the PAGs and for
design basis accident dose criteria.
NRC Response: This comment is outside the scope of the petition
because design basis accident dose criteria are not part of EP
regulations. In addition, the EPA, not the NRC, has the authority to
develop and revise the PAGs.
III. Reasons for Consideration
The NRC will consider all four issues raised in the PRM within its
rulemaking process. The NRC will evaluate within its rulemaking process
the current requirements and guidance for protective actions
implemented during a general emergency at nuclear power plants to
assess whether and how to incorporate risk insights considering the
health hazards of both radiation exposure and protective actions. The
remaining paragraphs of Section III summarize the NRC's evaluation of
the four assertions identified in the petition.
Evaluation of Petition Issues (Petitioner Assertions)
Issue 1: NRC requirements and guidance on protective action
strategies are outdated and do not reflect the latest studies of
nuclear power plant emergencies.
The petitioner stated that the fundamental problem with NRC
requirements and guidance on protective action strategies is that they
are based on analysis that is, in some cases, more than 40 years old
and did not consider either (1) the health impact
[[Page 34195]]
of protective actions and resulting dislocations or (2) the latest
analysis of nuclear power plant emergencies, which project much smaller
releases and thus smaller radiation-induced health consequences. The
petitioner asserted that the NRC requirements and guidance were not
established on a truly risk-informed basis. Additionally, the
petitioner observed that the latest NRC analysis of radiation-induced
health consequences of general emergencies did not include (1) the
consideration of all important early radiation-induced health effects
(e.g., to the embryo/fetus), (2) probabilistic risk assessment of
radiation-induced health effects for various protective action
strategies as done in earlier studies, and (3) consideration of the
health impact of protective actions.
NRC Evaluation: The petitioner's assertion that the latest NRC
analysis of radiation-induced health consequences of general
emergencies does not reflect the latest studies was made in reference
to the insights available in the NRC's SOARCA studies. The SOARCA
studies showed that mitigation efforts can effectively stop or slow an
accident; some accidents take much longer to happen and release much
less radioactive material than earlier analyses suggested; and the
analyzed accidents would cause essentially zero immediate deaths and
only a very small increase in the risk of long-term cancer deaths.
Although the SOARCA studies did not assess all potential early
radiation-induced health effects or assess the benefit of various
protective action strategies, SOARCA did include a sensitivity analysis
on the timing of protective actions and the health risks for various
population cohorts including the general public, schools, and special
facilities such as hospitals and nursing homes.
While SOARCA provides many useful insights, the SOARCA studies were
performed after the EP rulemaking that established the current
regulations and guidance (``Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness
Regulations'' (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011)) and, thus, did not form
the basis for current NRC regulations and guidance for protective
action strategies. The current guidelines for the choice of protective
actions are consistent with the PAG Manual, and early radiation-induced
health effects were considered in establishing the PAGs. The guidance
for protective action strategies is also risk-informed. In the mid-
2000s, the NRC used the latest technical information available at the
time to examine various protective action strategies as documented in
Volumes 1-3 of NUREG/CR-6953, ``Review of NUREG-0654, Supplement 3,
`Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents.'
'' This study served as the basis for revisions to NUREG-0654, Revision
1, Supplement 3, published in 2011. The 2011 NRC guidance on protective
action strategies places more emphasis on staged evacuation and
sheltering-in-place as an alternative to radial evacuation when staged
evacuation and sheltering-in-place are more protective. This guidance
also provided ways to risk-inform implementing protective actions under
various conditions including rapidly progressing events; impediments to
evacuation such as adverse weather, earthquake impacts, or hostile
action against the nuclear facility; and changes in wind direction or
plant conditions.
The NRC partially agrees with the petitioner's assertions that the
NRC's requirements and guidance on protective action strategies could
be updated to reflect the latest studies of nuclear power plant
emergencies and will evaluate this issue in its rulemaking process. The
NRC does not agree that NRC guidance would result in excess evacuations
or relocations, leading to excess deaths among the public, especially
in the elderly. NRC guidance on protective action strategies is
consistent with the principles established in the PAG Manual for early
phase PAGs and is intended to reduce or avoid dose in the event of a
general emergency. Licensees are responsible for terminating the
general emergency declaration, but offsite response organizations are
responsible for terminating protective actions for the public, the
duration of which will vary depending on the severity of the event.
Considering the risk of the protective actions alone, the effectiveness
of evacuations was examined by the NRC as documented in NUREG/CR-6864,
Volume 1, and the planning efforts important to implementing effective
large-scale evacuations were assessed in the study published in NUREG/
CR-6981, ``Assessment of Emergency Response Planning and Implementation
for Large Scale Emergencies.'' However, the NRC agrees that there are
physical health effects of prolonged evacuation and relocation that
should be considered in protective action decision-making and that
these physical health effects are not explicitly considered in current
guidance. Therefore, the NRC is considering the issues raised by the
petitioner in a rulemaking process that will assess the physical health
effects of prolonged evacuation and relocation.
Issue 2: The NRC does not provide tools to allow decision-makers
and the public to balance the radiation health hazards versus the
health hazards of the protective actions.
The petitioner asserted that to allow for risk-informed decisions,
guidance is needed on balancing the health hazards of radiation
exposure versus the health hazards of protective actions during
planning and response.
NRC Evaluation: The NRC agrees, in part, with the assertion. The
NRC guidance for protective action strategies in Supplement 3 to NUREG-
0654, Revision 1, provides a development tool and is intended for use
by nuclear power reactor licensees to develop site-specific protective
action recommendation procedures. Offsite response organizations should
use the tool to develop protective action strategy guidance for
decision-makers. The development tool is risk-informed and based on a
study of the efficacy of alternative protective action strategies in
reducing consequences to the public from a spectrum of nuclear power
plant core melt accidents, as described in Volumes 1-3 of NUREG/CR-
6953. However, the tool is not optimized to balance radiation health
hazards against the health hazards of the protective actions. The NRC
will evaluate changes to guidance during either the rulemaking process
or as part of a separate prior action, as appropriate.
Issue 3: NRC regulations and guidance do not state that protective
actions should do more good than harm.
The petitioner observed that NRC regulations and guidance state
that the overall objective of radiological emergency planning is to
provide dose savings for a spectrum of accidents that could produce
offsite doses in excess of the current Federal PAGs. However, no
mention is made that protective actions should do more good than harm.
NRC Evaluation: The NRC agrees, in part, with the assertion. NRC EP
regulations do not state that protective actions should do more good
than harm, and NRC EP guidance documents do state dose savings as a
primary objective of EP. However, EP regulations in Sec. 50.47(b)(10)
state that guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an
emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, must be developed and in
place. The PAG Manual does include the principle to balance protection
with other important factors and ensure that actions result in more
benefit than harm. However, as part of the rulemaking process, the NRC
will consider potential amendments to its regulations to explicitly
state that
[[Page 34196]]
protective actions should do more good than harm.
Issue 4: Dislocations resulting from taking protective actions
consistent with NRC guidance upon declaration of a general emergency
may cause more deaths among the public, especially in the elderly, than
caused by radiation exposure due to the general emergency.
The petitioner estimated that dislocations resulting from
protective actions triggered by declaration of a general emergency,
under NRC guidance, may cause 12 times more deaths among the public and
specifically 15 times more deaths among elderly residents of care
facilities than caused by radiation exposure during a representative
general emergency. The petitioner also estimated that dislocations
resulting from protective actions triggered by dose projections during
a general emergency where the EPA PAGs are projected to be exceeded, as
called for by NRC guidance, may cause 24 to 600 times more deaths among
the public and 30 to 750 times more deaths among the elderly residents
of care facilities than the radiation-induced deaths prevented by the
relocation. The petitioner also asserted that--
[S]ome States may be using dose criteria lower than EPA PAGs
(NRC 2013a) making them potentially more hazardous. These
disparities could be even greater when protective actions are taken
based on imprecise or conservative dose projections thus resulting
in less dose saving than the PAG (footnotes omitted).
NRC Evaluation: The NRC agrees, in part, with the assertion. As
documented in NUREG/CR-6864, Volume 1, the NRC studied the efficiency
and effectiveness of public evacuations in response to emergency events
and found that evacuations saved lives and reduced the potential number
of injuries from the hazard. In addition, NRC regulations in Sec.
50.47(b)(13) require general plans for recovery and reentry to be
developed, including the framework for relaxing protective actions and
allowing for return as described in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 2,
``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency
Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,''
published December 2019. Although the magnitude of deaths caused by
dislocations resulting from protective actions triggered by declaration
of a general emergency is difficult to precisely estimate, the NRC
studied the nonradiological health impacts of evacuations and
relocations, and as reported in NUREG/CR-7285, the study supports the
general assertion that prolonged dislocation results in (1) excess
mortality among susceptible population groups and (2) other physical
health consequences in the general population. The study also supports
the petitioner's assertion in that prolonged dislocations may cause
more deaths among the public, especially in the elderly, than caused by
radiation exposure.
IV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as
indicated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adams accession No./web
Document link/ Federal Register
citation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-50-123), ML20176A313.
``Public Protective Actions During a
General Emergency,'' June 1, 2020.
PRM-50-123, Petition for Rulemaking, Notice 85 FR 53690.
of Docketing and Request for Comment,
``Public Protective Actions During a
General Emergency,'' August 31, 2020.
Comment (001) of David Young on Behalf of ML20289A632.
the Nuclear Energy Institute, October 15,
2020.
Comment (002) of Thomas Saporito on Behalf ML20301A614.
of Nuclear Energy Oversight Project, Inc.,
October 25, 2020.
Comment (003) of Cindy Folkers on Behalf of ML20321A255.
Beyond Nuclear, November 16, 2020.
Comment (004) of Anonymous, November 14, ML21056A497.
2020.
Comment (005) of John Parillo, November 16, ML21056A495.
2020.
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, ML113010596.
Supplement 3, ``Criteria for Preparation
and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency
Response Plans and Preparedness in Support
of Nuclear Power Plants: Guidance for
Protective Action Strategies,'' November
2011.
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 2, https://www.fema.gov/sites/
``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation default/files/2020-08/
of Radiological Emergency Response Plans fema_NUREG-0654-REP1-
and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear rev2_12-2019.pdf.
Power Plants,'' December 2019.
EPA-400/R-17/001, ``PAG Manual: Protective https://www.epa.gov/sites/
Action Guides and Planning Guidance for default/files/2017-01/
Radiological Incidents,'' January 2017. documents/
epa_pag_manual_final_revis
ions_01-11-
2017_cover_disclaimer_8.pd
f.
NUREG-75/014, ``Reactor Safety Study: An ML070530533 (App. V)
Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. ML070600389 (App. VI).
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants,'' (WASH-
1400), Appendices V and VI, October 1975.
Memorandum of Understanding Between the ML24184A043.
Department of Homeland Security/Federal
Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission Regarding
Radiological Emergency Response Planning
and Preparedness, July 1, 2024.
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 ML20244A292.
and 2--Exemptions from Certain Emergency
Planning Requirements and Related Safety
Evaluation (EPID L-2019-LLE-0016),
December 1, 2020.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station--Exemptions ML19142A043.
from Certain Emergency Planning
Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation
(EPID L-2018-LLE-0011), December 18, 2019.
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station-- ML18220A980.
Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning
Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation
(CAC NO. MG0153; EPID L-2017-LLE-0020),
October 16, 2018.
Proposed Rule, ``Regulatory Improvements 87 FR 12254.
for Production and Utilization Facilities
Transitioning to Decommissioning,'' March
3, 2022.
Denial of Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-50- 79 FR 19501.
104), ``Emergency Planning Zones,'' April
9, 2014.
Denial of Petitions for Rulemaking (PRM-50- 55 FR 5603.
31, PRM-50-45, and PRM-50-46), ``Emergency
Preparedness at Nuclear Power Plants,''
February 16, 1990.
Price-Anderson Act, 1957................... 42 U.S.C. 2210, Public Law
85-256.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, 42 U.S.C. 9601.
Compensation, and Liability Act, 1980.
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.,
Emergency Assistance Act, 1988. Public Law 93-288.
Disaster Relief Act, 1974 (as amended)..... 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.,
Public Law 100-707.
[[Page 34197]]
NUREG/CR-7155, ``State-of-the-Art Reactor ML16133A461.
Consequence Analyses Project: Uncertainty
Analysis of the Unmitigated Long-Term
Station Blackout of the Peach Bottom
Atomic Power Station,'' May 2016.
``State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence ML15224A001.
Analyses Project: Uncertainty Analysis of
the Unmitigated Short-Term Station
Blackout of the Surry Power Station,''
Draft Report for Comment, August 2015.
NUREG/CR-7245, ``State-of-the-Art Reactor ML19296B786.
Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Project:
Sequoyah Integrated Deterministic and
Uncertainty Analysis,'' October 2019.
Conference Paper, 9th European Review https://www.tandfonline.com/
Meeting on Severe Accident Research doi/full/10.1080/
(ERMSAR 2019), ``State-of-the-Art Reactor 00295450.2021.1875737.
Consequence Analyses Project: Uncertainty
Analyses for Station Blackout Scenarios,''
March 2019.
NUREG-1935, ``State-of-the-Art Reactor ML12332A053 (Package).
Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Report,''
November 2012.
National Academy of Sciences, ``Health https://www.nap.edu/catalog/
Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of 1224/health-effects-of-
Ionizing Radiation: BEIR V,'' 1990. exposure-to-low-levels-of-
ionizing-radiation.
NUREG-2201, ``Probabilistic Risk Assessment ML16245A032.
and Regulatory Decisionmaking: Some
Frequently Asked Questions,'' September
2016.
NUREG/KM-0009, ``Historical Review and ML16104A071.
Observations of Defense-in-Depth,'' April
2016.
NUREG-0396, ``Planning Basis for the ML051390356.
Development of State and Local Government
Radiological Emergency Response Plans in
Support of Light Water Nuclear Power
Plants,'' December 1978.
NRC Policy Statement, ``Planning Basis for 44 FR 61123.
Emergency Responses to Nuclear Power
Reactor Accidents,'' October 23, 1979.
FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guides https://www.fema.gov/
(CPG) 101, Version 3.0, ``Developing and emergency-managers/
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' national-preparedness/
September 2021. plan.
FEMA Guidance, ``Planning Considerations: https://www.fema.gov/sites/
Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place Guidance: default/files/2020-07/
State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial planning-considerations-
Partners,'' July 2019. evacuation-and-shelter-in-
place.pdf.
NUREG/CR-6864, Vol. 1, ``Identification and ML050250245.
Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency
Evacuations: Main Report,'' January 2005.
NUREG/CR-6981, ``Assessment of Emergency ML082960499.
Response Planning and Implementation for
Large Scale Evacuations,'' October 2008.
NUREG/CR-7285, ``Nonradiological Health ML21252A104.
Consequences from Evacuation and
Relocation,'' September 2021.
Final Rule, ``Enhancements to Emergency 76 FR 72560.
Preparedness Regulations,'' November 23,
2011.
NUREG/CR-6953, Vol. 1, ``Review of NUREG- ML080360602.
0654, Supplement 3, `Criteria for
Protective Action Recommendations for
Severe Accidents,''' December 2007.
NUREG/CR-6953, Vol. 2, ``Review of NUREG- ML083110406.
0654, Supplement 3, `Criteria for
Protective Action Recommendations for
Severe Accidents': Focus Groups and
Telephone Survey,'' October 2008.
NUREG/CR-6953, Vol. 3, ``Review of NUREG- ML102380087.
0654, Supplement 3, `Criteria for
Protective Action Recommendations for
Severe Accidents': Technical Basis for
Protective Action Strategies,'' August
2010.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
V. Conclusion
For the reasons cited in this document, the NRC will consider the
four issues raised in the petition in its rulemaking process and as
part of the development of related guidance. The NRC will evaluate the
current requirements and guidance for protective actions implemented
during a general emergency at nuclear power plants, assess whether
changes are needed to consider risk insights into the health hazards of
both radiation exposure and protective actions, and if changes are
needed, determine the proper regulatory action.
The NRC tracks the status of all rules and PRMs on its website at
https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/rules-petitions.html. The public may monitor the docket for the rulemaking on
the Federal rulemaking website, https://www.regulations.gov, by
searching on NRC-2025-0412. In addition, the Federal rulemaking website
allows members of the public to receive alerts when changes or
additions occur in a docket folder. To subscribe: (1) navigate to the
docket folder (NRC-2020-0155); (2) click the ``Subscribe'' link; and
(3) enter an email address and click on the ``Subscribe'' link.
Publication of this document in the Federal Register closes Docket ID
NRC-2020-0155 for PRM-50-123.
Dated: July 17, 2025.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carrie Safford,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2025-13606 Filed 7-18-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P