[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 134 (Wednesday, July 16, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 31945-31951]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-13308]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Part 2
[ET Docket No. 24-136; FR ID 302403]
Promoting the Integrity and Security of Telecommunications
Certification Bodies, Measurement Facilities, and the Equipment
Authorization Program
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission or FCC) proposes and seeks comment on further measures to
safeguard the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization program.
The Commission seeks comment on whether to extend recently adopted
prohibitions to include entities subject to the jurisdiction of a
foreign adversary or
[[Page 31946]]
alternatively apply a presumption-of-prohibition to a larger class of
entities. Additionally, the Commission seeks comment on expanding the
group of prohibited entities to include several additional lists from
federal agencies or statutes and ways it can facilitate and encourage
more equipment authorization testing to occur at test labs within the
United States or allied countries. Lastly, the Commission encourages
further comment on post-market surveillance procedures to ensure
compliance to prohibitions on authorization of covered equipment.
DATES: Comments are due on or before August 15, 2025 and reply comments
are due on or before September 15, 2025.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by ET Docket No. 24-136,
by any of the following methods:
Federal Communications Commission's Website: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/. Follow the instructions for submitting comments. See Electronic
Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1988).
Mail: Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery,
by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S.
Postal Service mail (although the Commission continues to experience
delays in receiving U.S. Postal Service mail). All filings must be
addressed to the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission.
People with Disabilities: Contact the Commission to
request reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign
language interpreters, CART, etc.) by email: [email protected] or phone:
202-418-0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
For detailed instructions for submitting comments and additional
information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jamie Coleman of the Office of
Engineering and Technology, at [email protected] or 202-418-2705.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ET Docket No. 24-136; FCC 25-27,
adopted on May 22, 2025, and released on May 27, 2025. The full text of
this document is available for public inspection and can be downloaded
at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-27A1.pdf. Alternative
formats are available for people with disabilities (Braille, large
print, electronic files, audio format) by sending an email to
[email protected] or calling the Commission's Consumer and Governmental
Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-0432 (TTY).
Comment Period and Filing Procedures. Pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.415
and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested
parties may file comments and reply comments on or before the dates
provided in the DATES section of this document. Comments must be filed
in ET Docket No. 24-136. Comments may be filed using the Commission's
Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of
Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998).
All filings must be addressed to the Commission's
Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/.
[ssquf] Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must file
an original and one copy of each filing. If more than one docket or
rulemaking number appears in the caption of the proceeding, filers must
submit two additional copies for each additional docket or rulemaking
number.
[cir] Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive,
Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.
[cir] U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority mail
must be addressed to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
Ex Parte Presentations. The proceedings shall be treated as
``permit-but-disclose'' proceedings in accordance with the Commission's
ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte presentations must file a copy
of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral
presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a
different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda
summarizing the presentation must (1) list all persons attending or
otherwise participating in the meeting at which the ex parte
presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and
arguments made during the presentation. If the presentation consisted
in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already
reflected in the presenter's written comments, memoranda or other
filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such
data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other
filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where
such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the
memorandum. Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex
parte meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must
be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by
rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of
electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto,
must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available
for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g.,
.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in the proceeding
should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
Procedural Matters
Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980,
as amended (RFA), requires that an agency prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis for notice and comment rulemakings, unless the
agency certifies that ``the rule will not, if promulgated, have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' 5 U.S.C. 603, 605(b). The RFA, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, was
amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
1996 (SBREFA), Public Law 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
Accordingly, the Commission has prepared an Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning the possible/potential impact of
the rule and policy changes contained in the FCC document. The IRFA is
found in Appendix D of the FCC document, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-27A1.pdf. The Commission invites the general public,
in particular small businesses, to comment on the IRFA. Comments must
have a separate and distinct heading designating them as responses to
the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments on the Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking indicated in the DATES section of this
document.
Paperwork Reduction Act. This document may contain proposed or
modified information collection requirements. Therefore, the Commission
seeks comment on potential new or revised information collections
subject to the Paperwork
[[Page 31947]]
Reduction Act of 1995. If the Commission adopts any new or revised
information collection requirements, the Commission will publish a
notice in the Federal Register inviting the general public and the
Office of Management and Budget to comment on the information
collection requirements, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, Public Law 104-13. In addition, pursuant to the Small Business
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(4), the Commission seeks specific comments on how it might
further reduce the information collection burden for small business
concerns with fewer than 25 employees.
Accessing Materials
Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act. Consistent with
the Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act, Public Law 1189-
9, a summary of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking will be available at
https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings.
OPEN Government Data Act. The OPEN Government Data Act, requires
agencies to make ``public data assets'' available under an open license
and as ``open Government data assets,'' i.e., in machine-readable, open
format, unencumbered by use restrictions other than intellectual
property rights, and based on an open standard that is maintained by a
standards organization. 44 U.S.C. 3502(20), (22), 3506(b)(6)(B). This
requirement is to be implemented ``in accordance with guidance by the
Director'' of the OMB. (OMB has not yet issued final guidance. The term
``public data asset'' means ``a data asset, or part thereof, maintained
by the Federal Government that has been, or may be, released to the
public, including any data asset, or part thereof, subject to
disclosure under [the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)].'' 44 U.S.C.
3502(22). A ``data asset'' is ``a collection of data elements or data
sets that may be grouped together,'' and ``data'' is ``recorded
information, regardless of form or the media on which the data is
recorded.'' 44 U.S.C. 3502(17), (16).
Synopsis
In the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM), the
Commission seeks to expand upon its efforts to ensure the integrity of
the FCC's equipment authorization program, particularly through
prohibitions on ownership, direction, or control by untrustworthy
actors that pose a risk to national security. Specifically, the
Commission looks at additional sources of entities that pose a risk to
national security and seeks comment on whether and how it should expand
the FCC's list of prohibited entities. To balance these efforts, the
Commission also solicits feedback on ways to increase equipment testing
and certification within the United States or allied countries. The
Commission also explores other opportunities to build upon these
efforts by proposing tighter controls over post-market surveillance
procedures, avoiding conflicts between test labs and the
telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs) that review their test
reports, and requiring equipment authorized under the Supplier's
Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) procedure to be tested at an
accredited and FCC-recognized laboratory.
A. Expanding Equipment Authorization Program Prohibitions
Other Entities Potentially Controlled by a Foreign Adversary. In
the Report & Order portion of the proceeding, the Commission imposed
restrictions on TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies
owned by certain entities on one or more federal agency or statutory
lists. In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) (89 FR 55530), the
Commission also sought comment ``on whether there are other types of
direct or indirect ownership or control, or other types of influences
beyond the Covered List determinations that potentially could adversely
affect a TCB's or test lab's trustworthiness, or otherwise undermine
the public's confidence.'' The Commission seeks further comment on
various additions to the list of prohibited entities.
The Commission is concerned, based on the record before us, that
limiting the FCC's restriction to TCBs, test labs, and laboratory
accreditation bodies that are owned by, or under the direction or
control of, prohibited entities, may not be sufficient to address the
threats to the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization processes
posed by malign foreign actors. Now that the Commission has included
foreign adversaries, as defined by the Department of Commerce, as
prohibited entities, should the Commission prohibit recognition of any
TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that conducts
operations related to the Commission's equipment authorization program
within foreign adversary countries? In other words, should the
Commission extend the prohibitions in this rule beyond TCBs, test labs,
and laboratory accreditation bodies that are owned by, controlled by,
or subject to the direction of a foreign adversary or other prohibited
entity to also include those TCBs, test labs, and laboratory
accreditation bodies that are subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign
adversary country? Should the Commission fully extend the prohibitions
adopted in the Report and Order portion of the proceeding to any TCB,
test lab, or laboratory accreditation body that meets the Commerce
Department's definition of ``owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
jurisdiction of or direction of a foreign adversary''? If so, how
should the Commission implement such a prohibition? For example, would
the Commission base the prohibition on any activity that physically
occurs within the relevant foreign adversary country or any activity
performed by an entity that is subject to the jurisdiction of such,
regardless of physical location? Should the Commission require
disclosure of the location of employees or activity conducted by the
TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body within the jurisdiction
of a foreign adversary or other prohibited entity? What other methods
of implementation should the Commission consider to protect the
integrity of its equipment authorization program against foreign
adversary countries?
In what ways would foreign adversary countries have the capability
to effectively control any and all entities organized under or doing
business within their jurisdiction? Would such action be under- or
over-inclusive? What would the economic effects of such action be? In
particular, could TCBs and test labs conducting equipment authorization
functions in China, or any other foreign adversary, be rapidly replaced
by TCBs and test labs conducting such functions outside of a foreign
adversary country? What are the estimated costs associated with such a
prohibition? How much of the costs are estimated to be passed on to
U.S. consumers? Commenters have also raised concerns that the
withdrawal of recognition of a significant number of testing facilities
would slow down the equipment approval process for manufacturers and
require ample time for U.S. companies to identify alternative testing
facilities and make new arrangements for certifications, and may even
require breaking commercial agreements. How, if at all, should the
Commission weigh these economic concerns against potential national
security threats? What could the Commission do to assist this
transition and mitigate economic harms? As an alternative to wholesale
prohibitions, should the Commission consider other limitations on TCBs
and test labs operating in foreign adversary countries to mitigate the
potential risks to national security and the integrity of the
[[Page 31948]]
equipment authorization program? If so, what sort of mitigation
measures would suffice to ensure the integrity of the equipment
authorization program against national security risks?
The Commission also seeks comment on the extent to which the
existence of test labs in foreign adversary countries, particularly
China, encourage trade and supply chain dependencies for radio
frequency (RF)-emitting equipment. Does the prominence of FCC-
recognized test labs in China encourage greater manufacturing and
production of finished equipment and components in China? If so, how
much? Do test labs in China offer favorable treatment for equipment
produced in China or by Chinese companies? Should the Commission
prohibit test labs in China from participation in the equipment
authorization program in part as a means of reducing these trade and
supply chain dependencies on foreign adversaries, given the potential
risks to national security threats such dependencies pose? How, if at
all, do these considerations relate to the goals of the proceeding?
As the Commission weighs the national security threat posed by test
labs and test lab accreditation bodies located in foreign adversary
nations, to what extent should the Commission consider the President's
determination that nominally private companies in China in particular
are not really ``private,'' but functionally controlled by, and
answerable to, the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party,
which is a foreign adversary? For example, Executive Order 13959 states
President Donald J. Trump's finding that, ``key to the development of
the PRC's military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses is the
country's large, ostensibly private economy. Through the national
strategy of Military-Civil Fusion, China increases the size of the
country's military-industrial complex by compelling civilian Chinese
companies to support its military and intelligence activities. Those
companies, though remaining ostensibly private and civilian, directly
support China's military, intelligence, and security apparatuses and
aid in their development and modernization.'' Indeed, in February of
this year, President Trump wrote to several of his Cabinet secretaries
recognizing that ``[t]hrough its national Military-Civil Fusion
strategy, [China] increases the size of its military-industrial complex
by compelling civilian Chinese companies and research institutions to
support its military and intelligence activities.'' Even the Supreme
Court has accepted that a private company in China ``is subject to
Chinese laws that require it to assist or cooperate with the Chinese
Government's intelligence work and to ensure that the Chinese
Government has the power to access and control private data the company
holds.'' As the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau has
previously recognized, ``the Chinese government is highly centralized
and exercises strong control over commercial entities in its sphere of
influence, permitting the government, including state intelligence
agencies, to demand that private communications sector entities
cooperate with governmental requests, including revealing customer
information and network traffic information. Demands for such
information could come in the form of legal pressure, as in the case of
the Chinese National Intelligence Law, or in the form of extralegal
political pressure taken through control of subsidy funding, employee
unions, or threats and/or coercion. Several commenters also made this
point.
The Commission seeks comment as well on whether and to what extent
the Commission should factor in the military situation in the Indo-
Pacific in recognizing test labs and laboratory accreditation bodies.
To what extent should the Commission consider the threat China poses to
U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with regard to
a possible invasion of Taiwan, potentially as soon as 2027? If such a
conflict erupts, there would no doubt be a substantial, if not total,
rupture in trade and economic relations between the U.S. and China,
raising significant concerns if the Commission's authorization program
is partially reliant on test labs in China. Should the Commission treat
test labs in China differently from those in other foreign adversary
countries given this consideration of potential military conflicts? The
Commission seeks comment on whether it should consider this possibility
in determining whether to prohibit recognition of a broader array of
test labs in China. How, if at all, do these considerations relate to
the goals of the proceeding?
Are there other considerations appropriate for the Commission to
consider related to the goals of the proceeding, for example, should
the Commission consider the extent to which there is a lack of
reciprocity with another country with regard to equipment testing and
certification? For example, should the Commission take into account
whether China requires domestic testing for all equipment sold in
China? If so, to what extent does that unfairly encourage entities that
want to sell equipment both in the U.S. and China to test their
equipment in China-based test labs?
Alternative Approaches. Congress recently twice codified a
definition of ``controlled by a foreign adversary'' in statutes
involving data privacy. In this context, Congress defines a ``company
or other entity'' as ``controlled by a foreign adversary'' if it
satisfies one of three conditions:
(A) a foreign person that is domiciled in, is headquartered in, has
its principal place of business in, or is organized under the laws of a
foreign adversary country;
(B) an entity with respect to which a foreign person or combination
of foreign persons described in subparagraph (A) directly or indirectly
own at least a 20 percent stake; or
(C) a person subject to the direction or control of a foreign
person or entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
The Commission seeks comment on whether to revise the definitions
adopted in the Report & Order portion of the proceeding to include
entities that meet one of these three conditions to be considered
``controlled by a foreign adversary.'' Should the Commission consider
``historical patterns of behavior by affiliated organizations,'' as
suggested by the Foreign Investment Review Section, National Security
Division, U.S. Department of Justice? Can any entity that Congress has,
in the context of data privacy considerations, twice found to be
``controlled by a foreign adversary'' be trusted not to undermine the
integrity and security of the equipment authorization program? Would
such a definition be under- or over-inclusive? What would be the
economic harms or implementation burden of such a prohibition? What
steps, if any, could the Commission undertake to mitigate those
concerns? As an alternative to outright prohibition of participation by
such entities, should the Commission impose mitigation requirements on
entities ``controlled by foreign adversaries''?
Should the Commission adopt the definition used in the CHIPS Act
for a ``foreign entity of concern''? This definition lists various ways
for an entity to be a ``foreign entity of concern,'' including being
``owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction
of'' China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea, which is similar to the
statutory definition of ``controlled by a foreign adversary.'' However,
the CHIPS Act also includes numerous other ways for an entity to be a
``foreign entity of concern,'' including being designated as a foreign
terrorist
[[Page 31949]]
organization and being alleged to have been involved in various
activities for which a conviction was obtained. Is one of these
definitions preferable? Should the Commission adopt some amalgamation
of this definition along with the other statutory definition?
Alternatively, should the Commission adopt a different definition?
If so, what should that definition be and why? The Commission welcomes
comment on which category of entities are ``controlled by a foreign
adversary.'' Should the Commission adopt a more limited or expansive
definition? Does the definition need to be clearly defined? To what
extent should the definition be aligned with other Commission rules on
foreign ownership?
As an alternative to an outright prohibition on TCBs, test labs,
and laboratory accreditation bodies located in or subject to the
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary, should the Commission adopt a
presumption-of-prohibition policy? Under this policy, any entity
subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign adversary would need to
provide clear-and-convincing evidence that there was no national
security risk from its participation in the equipment authorization
program. What are some potential benefits and drawbacks of such an
approach? If the Commission adopts such an approach, should the
Commission use a different standard than clear-and-convincing? Should
the Commission consult the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign
Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector
and require its approval before recognizing for participation in the
equipment authorization program TCBs, test labs, or laboratory
accreditation bodies ``controlled by a foreign adversary''? Should the
Commission adopt any alternative mechanism to screen such entities for
participation?
Other Federal Agency Lists. In the NPRM, the Commission sought
comment on ``whether the Commission should consider any other Executive
Branch agency lists to rely upon as a source to identify entities that
raise national security concerns and to restrict participation of those
entities in the FCC's equipment authorization program. The Report &
Order portion of the proceeding incorporated several of these lists in
the FCC's determination regarding prohibited entities. What other
federal agency lists, or entities identified by federal agencies, or
lists created by statute, should the Commission consider including in
its definition of ``prohibited entity''? The Commission welcomes
comment on which ``lists'' are particularly appropriate and which are
not.
The Commission is particularly interested in and seeks comment on
the usefulness of relying on the following sources:
The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled
Applications Act (``PFACA'') imposed restrictions on the domestic
operations of certain foreign adversary-controlled social media
applications. In particular, the PFACA imposed restrictions on
applications directly or indirectly operated by ByteDance, Ltd.,
TikTok, their subsidiaries, entities they controlled, or any other
entity that the President determines ``is controlled by a foreign
adversary'' and ``present[s] a significant threat to the national
security of the United States.'' Should the Commission rely on this
list to impose restrictions with regard to participation in the
equipment authorization program given that either Congress or the
President has expressly determined such entities to be national
security threats? The Commission welcomes comment on the usefulness and
applicability of this list in terms of the equipment authorization
program.
Pursuant to various statutory authorities and Executive
Orders, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (``OFAC'') in the U.S.
Department of Treasury publishes a Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List (``SDN List'') of entities subject to certain
prohibitions. ``Collectively, such individuals and companies are called
`Specially Designated Nationals' or `SDNs.' Their assets are blocked,
and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.'' The
justifications for these sanctions are wide ranging, but entities on
the SDN List are generally subject to the most extreme form of
sanctions, suggesting that such entities should have no role in the
Commission's TCB and test lab program. Additionally, although the SDN
List is long, it is published, and businesses have well-established
compliance mechanisms. Should the Commission include entities on the
SDN List in its definition of prohibited entities?
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2024 prohibits the DOD from procuring batteries produced by several
Chinese entities, starting in 2027. This list included leading battery
manufacturers and their successors. Should the Commission consider this
list of battery manufacturers as part of its definition of prohibited
entities? Would this list be relevant or useful in determining the
integrity and security of TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation
bodies?
Are there any other federal agency or statutory ``lists'' that the
Commission should consider including within its prohibition?
B. Increasing Equipment Authorization Testing and Certification Within
the United States
The actions the Commission takes in the Report and Order portion of
the proceeding are the first steps in ensuring the integrity of the
FCC's equipment authorization program against ownership, direction, or
control by untrustworthy actors that pose a risk to national security.
To further the FCC's goals in this area, the Commission seeks comment
on ways in which it can facilitate and encourage more equipment
authorization testing and certification within the United States and
allied countries, such as those with which the Commission has a mutual
recognition agreement (MRA). In addition to financial, what other
hinderances or advantages (i.e., costs and benefits) would entities
seeking equipment authorization encounter in relying primarily on TCBs,
test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies located in the U.S.?
What conflicts or other concerns might arise? What rules or processes
could the Commission implement or modify to encourage equipment
authorization processes that rely primarily upon domestic TCBs, test
labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies? How can the Commission
encourage the establishment of new, or expansion of existing, TCBs and
test labs in the U.S.? What are the primary barriers limiting the
presence of TCBs and test labs in the U.S.? Are there actions the
Commission can take to reduce regulatory barriers to TCBs and test
labs? Should the Commission offer incentives for utilization of
domestic TCBs and test labs, and, if so, what sort of incentives?
Should any of these incentives or efforts to increase testing be
similarly directed toward utilization of TCBs and test labs in allied
countries, such as those with which the U.S. has an MRA? If so, which
ones and why?
To what extent would having more equipment authorization testing
and certification in the United States reduce risks and threats to
national security in terms of the equipment supply chain or in other
ways? Given the importance of a strong industrial base for national
security, should the Commission consider such reindustrialization goals
in crafting a program of incentives? The Commission seeks comment on
the overall benefits and costs, with quantifiable data, associated with
any
[[Page 31950]]
proposed measures to encourage more equipment authorization testing and
certification within the United States or allied countries.
C. Other Matters
Post-market surveillance procedures. Commission rules impose
certain obligations on each TCB to perform post-market surveillance,
based on ``type testing a certain number of samples of the total number
of product types'' that the TCB has certified. In light of issues
discussed in the Report and Order portion of the proceeding to ensure
the integrity of the FCC's equipment authorization program, the
Commission invites further comment on whether the Commission should
revise the post-market surveillance rules, policies, or guidance to
address such concerns. The Commission seeks comment on reasonable
practices TCBs could implement to better identify equipment that may be
noncompliant with Commission rules, despite authorization. In
particular, should the Commission change the post-market surveillance
requirements to require that TCBs review certification grants by other
TCBs? How would such a requirement work? Should the Commission require,
instead, that TCBs engage independent reviewers/auditors to conduct
their required post market surveillance? If so, what would be the
criteria for such third-party reviewers? The Commission invites comment
on this and any other measures the Commission might take to strengthen
the integrity of the post-market surveillance process.
TCB and test lab relationships. The FCC's rules incorporate ISO/IEC
17025 and ISO/IEC 17065 standards, against which accreditation bodies
assess test labs and TCBs, respectively to ensure, in part, that these
entities operate in a competent, consistent, and impartial manner. TCBs
also are required under the FCC's rules to have the technical expertise
and capability to test the equipment it will certify and be accredited
to ISO/IEC 17025. The Commission recognizes that this results in most,
or all, TCBs in a position to not only verify the test reports received
with an application for authorization but also to produce such test
reports. The Commission seeks comment on any potential for this current
structure to raise questions as to the integrity of the FCC's equipment
authorization program or the impartiality of TCBs or test labs. What
types of procedures have TCBs and test labs put into place to ensure
impartiality, particularly when a TCB reviews an authorization
application for which a test lab under the same ownership as the TCB
conducted the required testing? What additional information should the
Commission require regarding the relationship between the individuals
who each performed a defined role in the review and approval process?
The Commission seeks comment on additional safeguards that it should
consider to further ensure the impartiality of our TCBs and test labs.
Specifically, the Commission seeks comment on whether it should
restrict the relationships between TCBs and test labs to prevent TCBs
from reviewing authorization applications for which the equipment was
tested by a test lab owned by, or under the direction or control of the
same entities that own, direct, or control the TCB.
Supplier's Declaration of Conformity Procedures. By the Report and
Order portion of this proceeding, the Commission prohibits reliance
upon test labs owned by, or under the direction or control of, a
prohibited entity for SDoC authorization measurement requirements. The
ownership information required to be collected pursuant to these new
rules will be retained by the responsible party and made available to
the Commission upon request. To further the FCC's efforts to ensure the
integrity of the equipment authorization program, the Commission is
considering additional measures to strengthen the integrity of
laboratories upon which entities rely for the SDoC procedure.
Specifically, the Commission proposes to require that all equipment
authorized under the SDoC procedure be tested at an accredited and FCC-
recognized laboratory. The Commission seeks comment on some of the
impacts such an action could have on the supply chain and to the
testing process, particularly with regard to the confidence in the
integrity of the test labs and thereby the security of the U.S.
equipment supply chain.
Ordering Clauses
Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to the authority found in
sections 1, 4(i), 229, 301, 302, 303, 309, 312, 403, and 503 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 229,
301, 302a, 303, 309, 312, 403, and 503, section 105 of the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. 1004; the
Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, 47 U.S.C. 1601-
1609; and the Secure Equipment Act of 2021, Public Law 117-55, 135
Stat. 423, 47 U.S.C. 1601 note, that the Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking is hereby adopted.
It is further ordered that the Office of the Secretary, shall send
a copy of the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 2
Administrative practice and procedures, Communications,
Communications equipment, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Telecommunications, and Wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
Proposed Rules
For the reasons discussed in the document, the Federal
Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR part 2 as follows:
Part 2--FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AND RADIO TREATY MATTERS; GENERAL
RULES AND REGULATIONS
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1. The authority citation for part 2 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 302a, 303, and 336 unless otherwise
noted.
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2. Amend Sec. 2.902 by revising the entry for ``Prohibited entities''
to add paragraphs (2)(vii) through (ix) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.902 Terms and definitions.
* * * * *
Prohibited entities.
* * * * *
(2) * * *
(vii) The Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled
Applications Act (15 U.S.C. 9901 note);
(viii) Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Person List; and
(ix) Section 154(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2024 (Pub. L. 118-31).
(3) * * *
* * * * *
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2. Amend Sec. 2.948 by revising paragraphs (a) and (b) to read as
follows:
Sec. 2.948 Measurement facilities.
(a) Equipment authorized under the procedures set forth in this
subpart must be tested at a laboratory that is:
* * * * *
(b) A laboratory that makes measurements of equipment subject to an
equipment authorization must compile a description of the measurement
facilities employed.
* * * * *
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3. Amend Sec. 2.949 by revising paragraphs (b)(5), (c), and (e), and
[[Page 31951]]
adding paragraphs (c)(4) and (e)(4) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.949 Recognition of laboratory accreditation bodies.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) Certification to the Commission that the laboratory
accreditation body is not:
(i) Owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a
prohibited entity pursuant to Sec. 2.902; or
(ii) Physically or legally located within the geographical
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary country.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(3) Fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information
regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater as required in
this section; or
(4) Is physically or legally located within the geographical
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary country.
* * * * *
(e) The Commission will withdraw recognition of any laboratory
accreditation body that:
(2) Fails to provide, or provides a false or inaccurate,
certification, as required by this section;
(3) Fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information
regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater, as required by
this section; or
(4) Is physically or legally located within the geographical
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary country.
* * * * *
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4. Amend Sec. 2.951 by revising paragraphs (a)(10), (b)(2) and (3),
adding paragraph (b)(4), revising paragraphs (d)(2) and (3), and adding
paragraph (d)(4) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.951 Recognition of measurement facilities.
(a) * * *
(10) Certification to the Commission that the laboratory is not:
(i) Owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a
prohibited entity pursuant to Sec. 2.902; or
(ii) Physically or legally located within the geographical
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary country.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
* * * * *
(2) That fails to provide, or that provides a false or inaccurate,
certification as required in this section;
(3) That fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate,
information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater as
required in this section; or
(4) That is physically or legally located within the geographical
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary country.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Fails to provide, or provides a false or inaccurate,
certification, as required in this section;
(3) Fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information
regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater, as required in
this section; or
(4) Is physically or legally located within the geographical
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary country.
* * * * *
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5. Amend Sec. 2.960 by revising paragraphs (a)(2), (b)(2) and (3),
adding paragraph (a)(4), revising paragraphs (h)(2) and (3), and adding
paragraph (h)(4) to read as follows:
Sec. 2.960 Recognition of Telecommunication Certification Bodies
(TCBs).
(a) * * *
* * * * *
(2) Certified to the Commission that:
(i)The TCB is not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
direction of a prohibited entity pursuant to Sec. 2.902; or
(ii) Physically or legally located within the geographical
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary country.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
* * * * *
(2) That fails to provide, or provides a false or inaccurate,
certification as required in paragraph (a) of this section;
(3) That fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate,
information regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater; or
(4) That is physically or legally located within the geographical
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary country.
(h) * * *
(2) Fails to provide, or provides a false or inaccurate,
certification, as required in this section;
(3) Fails to provide, or provides false or inaccurate, information
regarding equity or voting interests of 5% or greater, as required in
this section; or
(4) Is physically or legally located within the geographical
jurisdiction of a foreign adversary country.
* * * * *
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6. Amend Sec. 2.962 by adding (a)(3) and revising paragraphs (d)(2)
and (i) introductory text to read as follows:
Sec. 2.962 Requirements for Telecommunication Certification Bodies.
(a) * * *
(3) A TCB is prohibited from reviewing an application that includes
test data, as required under this part, that was prepared by a
measurement facility that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the
direction of any entity that also owns, controls, or directs the TCB.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
* * * * *
(2) Accept test data from any Commission-recognized accredited test
laboratory, except as provided in paragraph (a)(3), subject to the
requirements in ISO/IEC 17065, and must not unnecessarily repeat tests.
* * * * *
(i) In accordance with ISO/IEC 17065 a TCB must perform appropriate
post-market surveillance activities. These activities must be based on
type testing a certain number of samples of the total number of product
types that a different TCB has certified.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2025-13308 Filed 7-15-25; 8:45 am]
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