[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 131 (Friday, July 11, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30896-30901]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-12925]
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DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Clarification of Federal Public Benefits Under the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, Department of Education.
ACTION: Interpretive rule.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Education (Department) issues this
interpretation to revise and clarify its position on the classification
of certain Department programs providing ``Federal public benefits,''
as defined in Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Public Law 104-193.
The Department concludes that the postsecondary education programs and
``other similar benefit'' programs described within this interpretive
rule, including adult education programs authorized under Title II of
the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014, postsecondary
career and technical education programs under the Carl D. Perkins
Career and Technical Education Act of 2006, and other programs when
used to fund postsecondary learning opportunities, provide federally
funded forms of assistance that constitute ``Federal public benefits''
subject to PRWORA's citizenship verification requirements. The
interpretation also revokes and supersedes certain aspects of the
Department's previously issued Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) of November
19, 1997, which mischaracterized these programs as not affected by
PRWORA, for the reasons described further within this notice.
DATES: July 11, 2025.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Office of Career, Technical, and Adult
Education, U.S. Department of Education, 400 Maryland Avenue SW,
Washington, DC 20202. Adam Flynn-Tabloff. Email: [email protected].
If you use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) or a text
telephone (TTY), call the Federal Relay Service (FRS), toll free, at 1-
800-877-8339.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Full Text of Announcement
On February 19, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14218
(Ending Taxpayer Subsidization of Open Borders), directing agencies,
among other actions, to ensure that federally funded programs are
operating in compliance with PRWORA. For the reasons described herein,
the Department has concluded that Federal programs administered by the
Department that provide postsecondary education and other similar
benefits, including adult education and career and technical education
programs, are ``Federal public benefits'' subject to the citizenship
and immigration verification requirements of PRWORA, so long as such
benefits are not protected under Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
Plyler as part of a basic public education.
I. Background
Title IV of PRWORA, as enacted into law as Public Law 104-193 on
August 22, 1996, and amended by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (Pub.
L. 105-33), generally limits eligibility for ``Federal public
benefits'' to U.S. citizens, U.S. non-citizen nationals, and certain
categories of ``qualified aliens.'' For programs that provide ``Federal
public benefit[s],'' providers are required to verify eligibility in
order to comply with PRWORA. PRWORA defines ``qualified alien'' to mean
``an alien who, at the time the alien applies for, receives, or
attempts to receive a Federal public benefit, is--
(1) an alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence under
the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.];
(2) an alien who is granted asylum under section 208 of such Act [8
U.S.C. 1158];
(3) a refugee who is admitted to the United States under section
207 of such Act [8 U.S.C. 1157];
(4) an alien who is paroled into the United States under section
212(d)(5) of such Act [8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)] for a period of at least 1
year;
(5) an alien whose deportation is being withheld under section
243(h) of such Act [8 U.S.C. 1253];
(6) an alien who is granted conditional entry pursuant to section
203(a)(7) of such Act [8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(7)] as in effect prior to April
1, 1980;
(7) an alien who is a Cuban and Haitian entrant (as defined in
section 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980); or
(8) an individual who lawfully resides in the United States in
accordance with a Compact of Free Association.'' 8 U.S.C. 1641(b).
In other words, ``qualified alien'' status generally refers to
those non-citizens that have a lawful immigration status allowing them
to reside in the U.S. indefinitely, as well as immigrants holding
specific humanitarian statuses identified by Congress. Under PRWORA, an
alien who is not a ``qualified alien'' is ineligible for payment or
assistance of any ``Federal public benefit.'' 8 U.S.C. 1611. Federal
public benefits, as defined in 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1)(A), include ``any
grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license
provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds of
the United States.'' PRWORA further defines Federal public benefits to
include ``any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or
assisted housing,
[[Page 30897]]
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any
other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to
an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of
the United States or by appropriated funds of the United States''
(emphasis added). 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1)(B).
II. Applicability of PRWORA to Department Programs That Provide
``Postsecondary Education'' and ``Other Similar Benefit[s]''
The Department's programs are funded by appropriated funds of the
United States and are subject to the restrictions of PRWORA, where such
program provides ``Federal public benefits'' based on the applicable
criteria of PRWORA. Specifically, PRWORA applies to ``postsecondary
education'' benefits or ``any other similar benefit'' under Department
programs ``for which payments or assistance are provided to an
individual, household, or family eligibility unit.'' Such benefits are
``Federal public benefits'' within the meaning of PRWORA, unless an
exception applies.
On November 19, 1997, the Department issued a DCL interpreting
PRWORA to, among other things, not cover benefits under Departmental
programs provided at the preschool, elementary, and secondary education
level. U.S. Dept. of Edu., PRWORA DCL, (Nov. 19, 1997). In general, the
Department's interpretation in the DCL enabled all aliens, regardless
of immigration status and including adults, to be eligible to receive
educational benefits and assistance provided by the Department so long
as such benefits were not provided at the ``postsecondary education''
level. The Department's 1997 DCL also reasoned that educational
programs provided at the preschool, elementary, and secondary level are
not ``similar'' to the programs that Congress enumerated in PRWORA,
including ``any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or
assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance,
unemployment benefit[.]'' (emphasis added). The Department specifically
claimed that these programs are dissimilar from ``postsecondary
education'' because those programs ``are at a completely different
level of education.'' The Department also asserted that these programs
provide ``a different form of assistance'' than postsecondary
education.
The Department finds that the reasoning in the 1997 DCL is flawed
because it failed to fully analyze the context and full statutory text
of PRWORA, and therefore ultimately misconstrued its meaning. In
crafting PRWORA, Congress created an operative definition for ``Federal
public benefit'' under 8 U.S.C. 1611(c), five substantive exceptions
under 8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(1)(A)-(E), three rules of non-applicability
under 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(2)(A)-(C), and three rules of statutory
construction under 8 U.S.C. 1643 (a)-(c). Each part of this statutory
enactment contains interrelated parts, which may provide context when
construing one of its parts that may otherwise appear to be ambiguous.
See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law, 167 (2012)(``Context is the
primary determinant of meaning. A legal instrument typically contains
interrelated parts that make up the whole. The entirety of the document
thus provides the context for each of its parts.''); see also United
Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988) (a statutory ``provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is
often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme--because the
same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning
clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.'')
In the first instance, the Department looks at the operative
definition for ``Federal public benefit'' under 8 U.S.C. 1611(c). In
defining the phrase, Congress included enumerated categories of
benefits, including ``any retirement, welfare, health, disability,
public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance,
[or] unemployment benefit,'' (emphasis added) followed by a broader
unenumerated category of benefits that encompasses any ``similar
benefit[s] for which payments or assistance are provided to an
individual, household, or family eligibility unit.'' To ascertain the
meaning of the phrase: ``similar benefit for which payments or
assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family
eligibility unit,'' and whether an unenumerated benefit would fall
under that definition, we must analyze the similarity of other benefits
to the enumerated list of benefits already included within the
definition of a ``Federal public benefit.''
Here, Congress included a broad and disparate group of benefits
within the enumerated list of ``Federal public benefits.'' For example,
``food assistance'' is a near-term benefit for human subsistence, while
retirement benefits are quite different in that they provide for long-
term financial stability in old age. The disparate nature of these
benefits suggest that Congress intended to capture an expansive array
of Federal benefits, within the statutory limit that such benefits be
provided through Federal funds, and to ``an individual, household, or
family eligibility unit.''
In contrast, the Department's analysis in the 1997 DCL did not
mention any of the enumerated examples in the statute, except
``postsecondary education'' when construing whether the benefits
discussed in that DCL were ``similar.'' In doing so, the Department
ignored important statutory clues regarding the proper reading of the
statute. Instead, the Department's previous analysis inappropriately
manipulated the level of generality of the inquiry to focus on the
narrow question of whether ``postsecondary education'' is similar to
education at the ``preschool, elementary, and secondary level.'' This
flawed framing led to a flawed result. The conclusion of the 1997 DCL
that preschool, elementary, and secondary education are dissimilar from
postsecondary education because those programs ``are at a completely
different level of education'' ignores the context of the statute that
makes it clear that Congress intended to cover a broader array of other
Federal benefits. Indeed, preschool, elementary, and secondary
education are similar to postsecondary education in that these benefits
provide educational assistance to individuals.
The 1997 DCL also discusses the form in which the benefits are
distributed. Specifically, the DCL states that ``elementary and
secondary `benefits' are typically made available to public educational
agencies through grants that help them supplement their educational
programs . . . [while] [p]ostsecondary benefits typically involve
financial assistance to individual students.'' Even if assumed to be
true, it would be irrelevant.
The statute discusses the method of delivery required in order to
be a ``Federal public benefit'' and provides that only those benefits
``for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual,
household, or family eligibility unit'' may be construed as a ``Federal
public benefit.'' The statute provides for distinct methods of delivery
of benefits to include a ``payment'' or ``assistance.'' The word
``payment'' is derivative of the word ``pay,'' which means ``the act of
paying or state of being paid.'' See Payment, Webster's II: New
Riverside University Dictionary (1994); Pay, Webster's II: New
Riverside University Dictionary (1994). In other words, for something
to be a ``payment,'' money must be exchanged.
[[Page 30898]]
The term ``assistance'' is defined as ``the act of assisting'',
which is derivative of the word ``assist'' which means ``to aid'' or
``to give aid or support'' to someone or something. See Assistance,
Webster's II: New Riverside University Dictionary (1994) and Assist,
Webster's II: New Riverside University Dictionary (1994). The word
``assistance'' is indeed broader than ``payment'' and includes at least
some actions that do not involve the direct exchange of money.
To further understand the meaning of the word ``assistance'' within
the context of the statute, it is appropriate to consult other parts of
the statutory framework. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,
291 (1988) (``In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the
court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well
as the language and design of the statute as a whole.''). In the list
of five substantive exceptions under 8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(1)(A)-(E), we
find clues in deciphering any ambiguities in the term ``assistance'' as
applied in this context. In 8 U.S.C. 1611(b)(1)(B) & (D), Congress
provided that the prohibition against providing non-qualified aliens
with any federal public benefit ``shall not apply with respect to the
following Federal public benefits:''
``(B)Short-term, non-cash, in-kind emergency disaster relief [.
. .]
``(D) Programs, services, or assistance (such as soup kitchens,
crisis counseling and intervention, and short-term shelter)
specified by the Attorney General, in the Attorney General's sole
and unreviewable discretion after consultation with appropriate
Federal agencies and departments, which (i) deliver in-kind services
at the community level, including through public or private
nonprofit agencies; (ii) do not condition the provision of
assistance, the amount of assistance provided, or the cost of
assistance provided on the individual recipient's income or
resources; and (iii) are necessary for the protection of life or
safety.''
As the excepted benefits that are enumerated within sub-clause (A)
though (E) are specified as otherwise being ``Federal public
benefits'', it is clear that Congress believed these benefits all would
have otherwise met that definition. Therefore, in interpreting whether
a program provides ``other similar benefit(s)'', it is instructive to
look not just to the enumerated benefits within 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1),
but also to the exempted Federal public benefits under 8 U.S.C.
1611(b)(1). Here, Congress specified under sub-clause (B) and (D) that
there are exemptions from the general alien restrictions of 8 U.S.C.
1611 on certain types of non-cash or in-kind benefits.\1\ The exception
under sub-clause (D) applies more specifically to in-kind benefits that
are delivered ``at the community level, including through public or
private nonprofit agencies.'' It would not make sense for Congress to
exclude these limited non-cash or in-kind benefits explicitly in 8
U.S.C. 1611(b)(1)(B) & (D) if at least some of those benefits were not
already captured under the operative definition of ``Federal public
benefit'' under 8 U.S.C. 1611(c). Congress would have no need to carve
something out that would not otherwise be covered in the first instance
under the ``Federal public benefit'' definition. As such, the general
definition of ``Federal public benefit'' is best understood to include
``assistance'' similar to the ``deliver[y] [of] in-kind services at the
community level, including through public or private nonprofit
agencies'' where such benefits have not been specifically excluded by 8
U.S.C. 1611(b)(1).
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\1\ In-kind is defined as ``in the same manner or with something
equivalent'' Webster's II: New Riverside University Dictionary
(1994). In the context of the statute, ``in-kind'' means some sort
of non-cash benefit that provides goods or services directly, rather
than providing cash to procure those goods or services.
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The DCL essentially ignored Congress's decision to include Federal
public benefits delivered through ``assistance,'' narrowing its
analysis not only to Federal public benefits as ``payment,'' but even
further still to whether that assistance was similar to ``postsecondary
[. . .] financial assistance to individual students.'' The rule against
surplusage requires us ``to avoid rendering superfluous any statutory
language.'' Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004). Here, the DCL did
not give independent meaning to the word ``assistance,'' improperly
rendering it superfluous. Instead, as demonstrated above, Congress
clearly contemplated that Federal public benefits could cover
assistance provided from entities to ``individual[s], household, or
family eligibility unit,'' even when that assistance is provided
through an ``in-kind'' non-money benefit ``at the community level,
including through public or private nonprofit agencies.''
Next, we consider one of the three rules of statutory construction
that Congress included under 8 U.S.C. 1643(a)(2) which provides that
nothing within [Title IV of the Act] may be construed as ``addressing
alien eligibility for a basic public education as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States under Plyler v. Doe (457 U.S. 202)
(1982).'' In effect, this provision codifies the holding of that case
into the statute. Therefore, when construing PRWORA, the Department's
interpretation may not otherwise contravene Plyler.
Plyler's holding was expressly grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment, as applied to States, and the ability of States to impose
unique restrictions on alien eligibility absent ``some articulable
federal policy[.]'' There is nothing in Plyler's holding that addresses
the ability of the Federal government to deny benefits (be they
educational or other) based on alienage, and expressly noted that
``[i]n light of our disposition of the Fourteenth Amendment issue, we
have no occasion to reach this claim [of pre-emption by federal law and
policy].'' The inclusion of 8 U.S.C. 1643(a)(2)'s limitation that
PRWORA was not intended to ``addres[s] alien eligibility for a basic
public education'' is thus best understood as instructive toward the
other provisions of PRWORA that speak to ``State authority to make
determinations concerning the eligibility of qualified aliens for
public benefits'', 8 U.S.C. 1601(7), and the provision of ``State or
local public benefits'' 8 U.S.C. 1621-1625.
A harmonious reading of Plyler, 8 U.S.C. 1643(a)(2), and the
ability of Congress to regulate the provision of ``Federal public
benefits'' is thus readily apparent. Scalia & Garner, supra, at 180
(``The imperative of harmony among provisions is more categorical than
most other canons of construction because it is invariably true that
intelligent drafters do not contradict themselves.'') Indeed, such a
harmonious reading is necessary as the text itself of Plyler,
incorporating its antecedents, specifically noted that ``it is the
business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather
than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate
the conditions of entry and residence of aliens.'' Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 84 (1976).
Furthermore, Plyler focused on the unique position of children who
have ``little control'' over their immigration status. In Plyler, the
Court noted that ``it is thus difficult to conceive of a rational
justification for penalizing these children for their presence within
the United States.'' The Court's rationale for protecting the ability
of minors to attend school stands in contrast to adults who do have the
ability to control their actions and movement. Indeed, the Court noted
that the ``undocumented status'' of adults is not ``an absolutely
immutable characteristic since it is the product of conscious, indeed
unlawful, action.'' As such, the Department does
[[Page 30899]]
not interpret the holding in Plyler as conferring any rights to adults.
Nor does the holding in Plyler reach the question as to whether a minor
has the right to postsecondary education (such as a 17-year-old
individual who may wish to enroll in postsecondary programs, like dual
enrollment) or adult training programs that are not included within a
``basic public education''.
Therefore, the Department interprets and finds that ``Federal
public benefits'' under 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1) includes all educational
benefits that are provided to individuals, households, or family
eligibility units, regardless of age, and including when benefits are
provided as in-kind services at the community level, such as through
public or private nonprofit agencies, except those benefits that are
basic public education benefits under Plyler. In codifying the
exceptions under Plyler, Congress made clear the term ``Federal public
benefits'' does not cover basic public education benefits that are
received by children. At the same time, ``Federal education benefits''
does include postsecondary education benefits provided regardless of
age, as Plyler did not address postsecondary benefits and PRWORA
explicitly calls for such benefits to be included. 8 U.S.C.
1611(c)(1)(B).
In other words, non-qualified alien adults are not permitted to
receive education benefits (postsecondary education benefits or
otherwise) and non-qualified alien children are not eligible to receive
postsecondary education benefits and certain other education benefits,
so long as such benefits are not basic public education benefits.
Postsecondary education benefits include dual enrollment and other
similar early college programs that provide opportunities to earn
college level credits while participating in a secondary education
program, because those programs provide individualized payments or
assistance beyond that of a basic public education. This interpretation
does not apply to specific later in time statutory exceptions,
including under 20 U.S.C. 1070e. In sum, this reading of the statute
respects the statutory command to adhere to the holding in Plyler,
while appropriately capturing the statutory directive to include
``other similar benefits'' within the meaning of a ``Federal public
benefit'' under PRWORA.
Of note, the 1997 DCL cited the Congressional conference report to
PRWORA. The DCL claimed that with respect to section 401 of PRWORA, the
conference report said that ``the intent of the conferees is that Title
I, part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act would not be
affected by section 401 because the benefit is not provided to an
individual household or family eligibility unit.'' \2\ Use of
legislative committee reports like this is disfavored because these
reports do not go undergo the ordinary legislative process of
bicameralism and presentment. In other words, Congress did not vote on
the conference report, nor should we assume Members of Congress
actually read the report. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (``As anyone familiar with
modern-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware,
the references to the cases [in the committee report] were inserted, at
best by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at
worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-
lobbyist . . . What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to
know that his or her citation of obscure district court cases can
transform them into the law of the land . . .''). As such, the
Department declines to consider the non-authoritative conference report
from PRWORA when interpreting the statute, as it is unreliable in
ascertaining the meaning of the text.
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\2\ The Department does not have specific concerns about how the
Congressional conference report is referencing Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as such programs generally
provide support for states in delivering a basic public education,
as protected under Plyler. Rather, the Department declines to
consider the conference report because it is unreliable in general,
and specifically here in how it interprets PRWORA as it relates to
the phrase ``payments or assistance'' under 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1)(B).
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III. Applicability of PRWORA to Specific Department Programs
As it relates to additional programs under the Department's
administration, we interpret PRWORA to apply to benefits provided to
individuals under programs authorized under Title II of the Workforce
Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014 (WIOA) and career and technical
education (CTE) programs authorized under the Carl D. Perkins Career
and Technical Education Act of 2006, as amended (Perkins V), as well as
benefits provided through postsecondary education programs.
First, it is clear that these programs are all provided through
``appropriated funds of the United States'' because the Department
receives these funds under appropriations laws passed by Congress. See
e.g., FY 2025 Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act,
Public Law 119-4, Sec. 1101(a)(8) 139 Stat. 9, 11. Second, whether as
an enumerated benefit or ``other similar benefit,'' these programs
provide ``payments or assistance'' to ``an individual, household, or
family eligibility unit[.]''
Under WIOA, the Department administers Title II Adult Education and
Literacy Activities, which provides grants to States to support adult
education and literacy activities. 29 U.S.C. 3291, 3303. State
agencies, in turn, may award grants or enter into contracts with
eligible providers who provide adult education and literacy services to
eligible individuals. An ``eligible individual'' is an individual who
(A) who has attained 16 years of age;
(B) who is not enrolled or required to be enrolled in secondary
school under State law; and
(C) who--
(i) is basic skills deficient;
(ii) does not have a secondary school diploma or its recognized
equivalent, and has not achieved an equivalent level of education; or
(iii) is an English language learner.
The Department interprets Title II WIOA programs to provide
``Federal public benefits'' because these educational programs: (1) are
``similar benefits,'' within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1)(B),
because the programs provide educational services to adults and
children who lack certain skills or abilities (as discussed in further
detail above); (2) are provided on a non-cash and in-kind basis to
individuals, and therefore are a form of ``assistance [. . .] to an
individual'' eligibility unit as defined under 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1)(B);
and (3) are not specifically exempted under PRWORA. As discussed above,
the Department interprets PRWORA to apply to adults receiving any form
of educational benefits and children receiving educational benefits
other than a ``basic public education.''
The Department interprets Title II WIOA benefits to be distinct
from the provision of a ``basic public education'' by State and local
governments under Plyler because, among other distinctions, these
benefits are provided to individuals in addition to the basic public
education already provided by States to minors of compulsory attendance
age. Under Title II of WIOA, any minor who had aged out of compulsory
secondary school attendance would further have to drop out of the basic
public education offered by their State in order to be eligible for
Title II WIOA benefits. Plyler, in addition to highlighting the
compulsory nature of basic public education, did not confer illegal
immigrant children aging out of basic public education with the right
to drop out of secondary school in favor of alternative educational
programs, such as those designed for
[[Page 30900]]
adults under WIOA. As such, the Title II WIOA programs provide
``Federal public benefits'' that are distinct from and are not included
within a basic public education under Plyler.
Under Perkins V, the Department administers the Basic Grants to
States program which is a formula grant for career and technical
education to States to support the development and implementation of
programs for individuals who are in need of such career and technical
education. Congress provided that the purpose of Perkins V, among other
things, is to ``to develop more fully the academic knowledge and
technical and employability skills of secondary education students and
postsecondary education students who elect to enroll in career and
technical education programs and programs of study.'' 20 U.S.C. 2301.
Although Perkins V does not explicitly create a test for eligibility,
it is clear the educational benefits that flow from these programs are
designed to benefit students who are individuals. Indeed, the very
definition of ``career and technical education'' under Perkins V
highlights that CTE is always an individual good as it is provided
through ``a sequence of courses,'' ``competency-based, work-based, or
other applied learning'' or ``career exploration'' that can only be
received or experienced by an individual for their personal
development. 20 U.S.C. 2302(5). Perkins V benefits flow from the
Federal government to states, and then to local recipients, who provide
educational assistance to individual students in a non-cash in-kind
manner.
Perkins V funds programs for individuals both at the secondary and
postsecondary levels. 20 U.S.C. 2301. Students may receive Perkins V
benefits while enrolled in secondary school. In contrast to Title II
WIOA benefits, Perkins V benefits do not require students to drop out
or have aged out of secondary school compulsory attendance in order to
receive such benefits and are thus provided as part of a ``basic public
education'' in those limited circumstances. As such, these benefits,
when provided to minors in the secondary school setting, are basic
public education benefits that are protected under Plyler.
Therefore, the Department interprets Perkins V programs to provide
``Federal public benefits'' because these educational programs: (1) are
``similar benefits,'' within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1)(B),
because the programs provide career and technical educational services
to adults and children who lack certain skills or abilities; (2) are
provided on a non-cash and in-kind basis to individuals, and therefore
are a form of ``assistance'' as defined under 8 U.S.C. 1611(c)(1)(B);
and (3) are not specifically exempted under PRWORA, except that Perkins
V programs that support minors in the secondary school setting are
basic public education benefits and are not ``Federal public
benefits.'' 8 U.S.C. 1643.\3\
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\3\ In this interpretive rule, the Department announces how it
interprets PRWORA with respect to certain Department programs;
however, just because a program is not specifically mentioned herein
does not mean the program does not have obligations under PRWORA.
The Department may, but is not required to, exercise its enforcement
discretion to refrain from taking actions against grantees in
certain circumstances, such as for programs not mentioned in this
interpretive rule.
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IV. Verification
Grantees that may have existing legal obligations under PRWORA may
seek to verify eligibility using, among other things: (1) the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements (SAVE) program; \4\ (2) review of U.S. birth certificates;
(3) review of REAL ID compliant identification cards (ineligible aliens
are not able to obtain such IDs); (4) DHS issued documentation
verifying immigration status; or (5) other methods to verify
eligibility.
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\4\ Effective April 1, 2025, the Department of Homeland Security
has eliminated the transaction charge for using SAVE for all state,
local, tribal, and territorial government agencies. See U.S. Dep't
of Homeland Sec., Save Transaction Charges (last accessed June 25,
2025), https://www.uscis.gov/save/about-save/transaction-charges.
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In addition, the Department notes that there are existing legal
exemptions from verification requirements for nonprofit charitable
organizations administering ``Federal public benefits''. Nonprofit
charitable organizations that administer ``Federal public benefits''
are not required to conduct eligibility verification under 8 U.S.C.
1642(d). The exemption in 8 U.S.C. 1642(d) is narrowly crafted and does
not include other entities administering ``Federal public benefits''.
Accordingly, the Department does not interpret 8 U.S.C. 1642(d) to
relieve states or other governmental entities involved in the
administration of ``Federal public benefits'' from the requirements to
ensure that all relevant programs are in compliance with PRWORA (even
when some or all educational services are ultimately provided by a
nonprofit charitable organization). Grantees may, consistent with 2 CFR
200.413(b)-(c) and 2 CFR 200.405(d), charge direct administrative costs
associated with verification as an allocable benefit that can be
reasonably documented toward each grant award.
Unless required by Departmental regulations, grantees have no
affirmative obligation to report on verification to the Department.
Because this interpretative rule is not legislative, the Department
lacks the ability to require affirmative reporting.
Interpretive rules cannot have effective dates. Rather, this
interpretive rule informs the public of the Department's interpretation
of the law. See Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that an
interpretive rule cannot have an effective date and is instead an
interpretation of how the law should be interpreted, past and present).
The Department may, but is not required to, exercise its enforcement
discretion to refrain from taking actions against grantees in certain
circumstances.
V. Conclusion
This interpretive rule finds that Federal programs administered by
the Department that provide postsecondary education and other similar
benefits, including adult education and CTE programs, are ``Federal
public benefits'' subject to the citizenship and immigration
verification requirements of PRWORA, so long as such benefits are not
protected under Plyler as part of a basic public education. This
interpretation of adult education and covered CTE programs as providing
``Federal public benefits'' also includes programs that provide dual
enrollment and other similar early college programs that go beyond
providing a basic public education to prepare students for credit
accumulation, degree attainment, or to enter the workforce. Therefore,
entities administrating these programs may consider this interpretation
when taking action to comply with PRWORA. This interpretation
represents the Department's current position on the issue and may be
referenced when enforcing or monitoring grantee and subgrantee
compliance with PRWORA.
Accessible Format: On request to the program contact listed under
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT, individuals with disabilities can
obtain this document in an accessible format. The Department will
provide the requestor with an accessible format that may include Rich
Text Format (RTF) or text format (txt), a thumb drive, an MP3 file,
braille, large print, audiotape, or compact disc, or other accessible
format.
Electronic Access to This Document: The official version of this
document is the document published in the Federal Register. You may
access the official
[[Page 30901]]
edition of the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations at
www.govinfo.gov. At this site you can view this document, as well as
all other documents of this Department published in the Federal
Register, in text or Portable Document Format (PDF). To use PDF, you
must have Adobe Acrobat Reader, which is available free at the site.
You may also access documents of the Department published in the
Federal Register by using the article search feature at
www.federalregister.gov. Specifically, through the advanced search
feature at this site, you can limit your search to documents published
by the Department.
Signing Authority
This document of the U.S. Department of Education was signed on
July 8, 2025, by Linda E. McMahon, Secretary of Education. That
document with the original signature and date is maintained by the U.S.
Department of Education. For administrative purposes only, and in
compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the
undersigned has been authorized to sign the document in electronic
format for publication, as an official document of the U.S. Department
of Education. This administrative process in no way alters the legal
effect of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Sharon Cooke,
Associate Director, Office of the Executive Secretariat, Office of the
Secretary, U.S. Department of Education.
[FR Doc. 2025-12925 Filed 7-10-25; 8:45 am]
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