[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 123 (Monday, June 30, 2025)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 27764-27770]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-11991]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
31 CFR Part 1010
Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of
Funds Involving Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V.
AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing notice of an order prohibiting certain
transmittals of funds involving Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V., a
financial institution operating outside of the United States determined
to be of primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit
opioid trafficking.
DATES: This action is effective [21 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN THE
FEDERAL REGISTER].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FinCEN Resource Center at
www.fincen.gov/contact.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Summary of Order
This order sets forth FinCEN's finding that Vector Casa de Bolsa,
S.A. de C.V. (Vector), a Mexico-based brokerage firm, is a financial
institution operating outside of the United States that is of primary
money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid
trafficking--specifically, through its provision of financial services
that facilitate illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs), including (1) the Sinaloa Cartel and
(2) the Gulf Cartel--and imposes a prohibition on certain transmittals
of funds involving Vector by any covered financial institution.\1\
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\1\ The application of FinCEN's authorities in this order is
specific to authorities provided by the Fentanyl Sanctions Act and
codified at 21 U.S.C. 2313a. It is not intended to otherwise reflect
the applicability of, or obligations under, any provision of the
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) or its implementing regulations.
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II. Background
A. Statutory Provisions
In 2024, Congress enacted the FEND Off Fentanyl Act,\2\ which among
other things, added 21 U.S.C. 2313a \3\ (section 2313a). Section 2313a
grants the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) the authority to make
a finding that ``reasonable grounds exist for concluding'' that any of
the following is of primary money laundering concern in connection with
illicit opioid trafficking:
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\2\ The FEND Off Fentanyl Act is Division E of Public Law 118-50
(Apr. 24, 2024).
\3\ Section 2313a codifies section 7213A of the Fentanyl
Sanctions Act, as amended by section 3201(a) of the FEND Off
Fentanyl Act. The Fentanyl Sanctions Act is Title LXXII of Public
Law 116-92 (Dec. 20, 2019).
(1) One or more financial institutions operating outside of the
United States;
(2) One or more classes of transactions within, or involving, a
jurisdiction outside of the United States; or
(3) One or more types of accounts within, or involving, a
jurisdiction outside of the United States.\4\
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\4\ 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a).
Upon making such a finding, the Secretary is authorized to require
domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take
certain ``special measures,'' which are safeguards that may be employed
to defend the United States financial system from money laundering
risks connected to illicit opioid trafficking.\5\ The authority of the
Secretary to administer section 2313a has been delegated to FinCEN.\6\
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\5\ See 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a).
\6\ In accordance with Treasury Order 101-05 and 31 U.S.C.
321(b), the authority vested in the Secretary under section 2313a
has been delegated to the Director of FinCEN.
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Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose one or more of
six special measures.\7\ First, the Secretary may impose any of the
five special measures provided for in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b), commonly
known as section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act.\8\ Special measures one
through four, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4), describe
additional recordkeeping, information collection, and reporting
requirements. Through these special measures, the Secretary may impose
such information collection and reporting requirements on covered
domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies--
collectively, ``covered financial institutions.'' \9\ Special measure
five, codified at 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5), authorizes the Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to
prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in the
United States of correspondent or payable-through accounts by any
domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency for, or on
behalf of, a foreign banking institution, if such correspondent account
or payable-through account involves one or more financial institutions
operating outside of the United States that the Secretary has found to
be of primary money laundering concern.\10\ Special measure six,
codified at 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(2), allows the Secretary to ``prohibit,
or impose conditions upon, certain transmittals of funds (to be defined
by the Secretary) by any domestic financial institution or domestic
financial agency, if such transmittal of funds involves any such
institution, class of transaction, or type of accounts.'' \11\
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\7\ 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a).
\8\ See 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(1). 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(1) explicitly
references ``the special measures provided for in section 9714(a)(1)
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Pub.
L. 116-283; 31 U.S.C. 5318A note)'' (section 9714). Section 9714, in
turn, references the five special measures set out in 31 U.S.C.
5318A(b)(1)-(5).
\9\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4).
\10\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5).
\11\ 21 U.S.C. 2313a(a)(2).
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Importantly, in connection with finding that a financial
institution is of primary money laundering concern and imposing any
special measure, section 2313a requires a finding that the relevant
financial institution is ``of primary money laundering concern in
connection with illicit opioid trafficking'' (emphasis added). 21
U.S.C. 2302 provides the operative definition of ``opioid trafficking''
for purposes of section 2313a, as any illicit activity:
(1) to produce, manufacture, distribute, sell, or knowingly
finance or transport--(a) synthetic opioids, including controlled
substances that are synthetic opioids and listed chemicals that are
synthetic opioids; or (b) active pharmaceutical ingredients or
chemicals that are used in the production of
[[Page 27765]]
controlled substances that are synthetic opioids;
(2) to attempt to carry out an activity described above; or
(3) to assist, abet, conspire, or collude with other persons to
carry out such an activity.\12\
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\12\ 21 U.S.C. 2302(8).
For purposes of this order, FinCEN interprets the term ``synthetic
opioid'' to include fentanyl and fentanyl analogs, as well as
precursors to fentanyl and precursors to fentanyl analogs.\13\
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\13\ See, e.g., Drug Enforcement Agency, Synthetic Opioids Fact
Sheet (Dec. 2024), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/Synthetic-Opioids-Drug-Fact-Sheet.pdf; World Health Organization,
Opioid Overdose (Aug. 29, 2023), https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/opioid-overdose; See also Drug Enforcement Agency,
Docket No. DEA-1086, Special Surveillance List of Chemicals,
Products, Materials and Equipment Used in the Manufacture of
Controlled Substances and Listed Chemicals (Oct. 24, 2023) available
at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-10-24/pdf/2023-23478.pdf.
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B. Illicit Opioid Trafficking
The sustained influx of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids into
the United States has profound consequences, resulting in drug overdose
becoming the leading cause of death for people aged 18 to 44 in the
United States.\14\ To address the synthetic opioid crisis, it is
necessary to target the money laundering efforts of the Mexico-based
DTOs that are the primary source of fentanyl and other synthetic
opioids trafficked into the United States. These DTOs manufacture
synthetic opioids in clandestine laboratories in Mexico using precursor
chemicals sourced largely from the People's Republic of China (China),
traffic these synthetic opioids into and throughout the United States,
and launder the illicit profits back to Mexico.\15\
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\14\ See Centers for Disease Control, CDC Reports Nearly 24%
Decline in U.S. Drug Overdose Deaths (Feb. 25, 2025), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2025/2025-cdc-reports-decline-in-us-drug-overdose-deaths.html; E.O. 14159, Imposing Duties To Address the
Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China, 90
FR 9121 (Feb. 7, 2025), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/07/2025-02408/imposing-duties-to-address-the-synthetic-opioid-supply-chain-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china.
\15\ See Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
2024 National Drug Threat Assessment (May 2024), pp. 46-50, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf; FinCEN, FIN-2024-A002, Supplemental Advisory on the
Procurement of Precursor Chemicals and Manufacturing Equipment Used
for the Synthesis of Illicit Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids
(June 20, 2024), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2024-06-20/FinCEN-Supplemental-Advisory-on-Fentanyl-508C.pdf; Congressional Research Service, Illicit Fentanyl and
Mexico's Role (Dec. 19, 2024), pp. 1-2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400.
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These DTOs could not profit on trafficking fentanyl and other
synthetic opioids if not for their ability to launder and remit the
monetary proceeds back to Mexico. DTOs and third-party money launderers
use a diverse array of methods to launder money, including using
financial institutions, remittance payments, bulk cash smuggling,
trade-based money laundering, mirror trades, and cryptocurrencies.\16\
It is therefore critical to address the role that financial
institutions operating outside the United States play in facilitating
the money laundering that enables and facilitates the DTOs and their
illicit opioid trafficking and related money laundering.
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\16\ See Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
2024 National Drug Threat Assessment (May 2024), pp. 46-50, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf.
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III. Finding That Vector Is a Financial Institution Operating Outside
the United States That Is of Primary Money Laundering Concern in
Connection With Illicit Opioid Trafficking
Based on public and non-public information available to FinCEN,
FinCEN finds that reasonable grounds exist to conclude that Vector, a
financial institution operating outside the United States, is of
primary money laundering concern in connection with illicit opioid
trafficking through its provision of financial services that facilitate
illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs, including the Sinaloa
Cartel and the Gulf Cartel. In making this finding, FinCEN has
considered the relevant evidence in light of factors identified in 31
U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B), taking into account the specific circumstances
of money laundering activities in connection with illicit opioid
trafficking and the protection of U.S. national security and the U.S.
financial system. While FinCEN is under no obligation pursuant to
section 2313a to consider any particular factor or set of factors when
making a finding that a financial institution operating outside of the
United States is of primary money laundering concern in connection with
illicit opioid trafficking, it nonetheless finds these factors
instructive in guiding the analysis set forth below.\17\
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\17\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B) provides, as relevant here, that
in making a finding that reasonable grounds exist for concluding
that a financial institution outside the United States is of primary
money laundering concern and to apply one or more of special
measures one through four to such a financial institution, the
Secretary shall consider such information as the Secretary
determines to be relevant, including the following potentially
relevant factors:
(1) the extent to which such financial institutions,
transactions, or types of accounts are used to facilitate or promote
money laundering in or through the jurisdiction, including any money
laundering activity by organized criminal groups, international
terrorists, or entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction or missiles;
(2) the extent to which such institutions, transactions, or
types of accounts are used for legitimate business purposes in the
jurisdiction; and
(3) the extent to which such action is sufficient to ensure,
with respect to transactions involving the jurisdiction and
institutions operating in the jurisdiction, that the purposes of
this subchapter continue to be fulfilled, and to guard against
international money laundering and other financial crimes.
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A. Vector Is a Financial Institution Operating Outside the United
States
Vector is a Mexico-based brokerage firm. By its own account, Vector
offers a variety of financial services including, but not limited to,
mutual fund management, money market, foreign exchange, investment
banking, and fiduciary services.\18\ According to commercially
available banking information, Vector is headquartered in San Pedro
Garza Garcia, Mexico, and provides U.S. dollar (USD) correspondent
banking services through at least one U.S. financial institution.\19\
Considering the services it provides, Vector is a financial institution
within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. 5312(a)(2), and based on the foregoing,
FinCEN has determined that Vector is a financial institution operating
outside of the United States, as described in section 2313a.
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\18\ Detailed descriptions of Vector's financial services can be
found under the Services dropdown menu, available at Vector.com.mx/
en/ and e-vector.com.mx/guia-de-servicios/ (last accessed Apr. 14,
2025).
\19\ BankCheck, Profile for Vector Casa de Bolsa available at
https://bankcheck.app (last accessed Apr. 14, 2025).
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B. Vector Is a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering
Concern in Connection With Illicit Opioid Trafficking
FinCEN has considered the extent to which Vector is used to promote
money laundering including in connection with organized criminal groups
associated with illicit opioid trafficking.\20\ Based on information
available to FinCEN, FinCEN has determined that Vector has a history of
suspected ties to international DTOs and facilitation of transactions
on their behalf. Vector's exposure to, and facilitation of,
transactions associated with suspected illicit opioid trafficking-
related activities is consistent with its long-standing pattern of
associations with, and conduct of transactions for multiple actors
operating on behalf of or in tandem with, DTOs, including both the
Sinaloa Cartel and the Gulf Cartel, each of which have been designated
by
[[Page 27766]]
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and, as of February
20, 2025, have also been designated as foreign terrorist organizations
(FTOs) pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), as amended.\21\
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\20\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B)(i).
\21\ Department of State, Designation of International Cartels
Fact Sheet, https://www.state.gov/designation-of-international-cartels/ (last accessed Feb.27, 2025); see also Department of State,
Foreign Terrorist Organization Designation of Tren de Aragua, Mara
Salvatrucha, Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jalisco Nueva
Generaci[oacute]n, Carteles Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del
Golfo, and La Nueva Generacion, Carteles Unidos, Cartel del Noreste,
Cartel del Golfo, and La Nueva Familia Michoacana, 90 FR 10030-31
(Feb. 20, 2025), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-02-20/pdf/2025-02873.pdf; 8 U.S.C. 1189 (codifying section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act).
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1. Vector Processed Funds Transfers on Behalf of Exporters and
Importers of Synthetic Opioid-Related Precursor Chemicals
Based on non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN has
determined that Vector has a history of processing USD-denominated
funds transfers that finance the importation of precursor chemicals
used for the production of illicit synthetic opioids on behalf of DTOs.
In the United States, precursor chemicals are substances regulated
by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in order to prevent the
illicit manufacture of controlled substances. As of December 2024, most
U.S.-destined illicit fentanyl was produced in clandestine labs in
Mexico, using precursor chemicals imported from China.\22\ Although the
Mexican and Chinese governments have established controls on multiple
precursor chemicals, China-based suppliers remain the main source for
precursor chemicals used by DTOs in Mexico to produce illicit
opioids.\23\
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\22\ Congressional Research Service, Illicit Fentanyl and
Mexico's Role (Dec. 19, 2024), p. 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400/13.
\23\ Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2024 (May 2024), p. 7, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/508_5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf; FinCEN, FIN-2024-A002, Supplemental Advisory on the
Procurement of Precursor Chemicals and Manufacturing Equipment Used
for the Synthesis of Illicit Fentanyl and Other Synthetic Opioids
(Jun. 20, 2024), pp. 2-6, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2024-06-20/FinCEN-Supplemental-Advisory-on-Fentanyl-508C.pdf.
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DTOs are known to employ transnational funds transfer services via
various financial institutions and agencies, including, but not limited
to, banks, money services businesses, and online payment processors to
drive illicit opioid-related financial flows.\24\ A common method
employed by DTOs to obfuscate illicit opioid trafficking-related
payments includes using shell and front companies in an effort to
disguise the origin and destination of illicit funds.\25\ Specifically,
DTOs operate through shell companies--businesses that exist only as an
entity through which money may be transferred--to hide beneficial
ownership. Similarly, DTOs commingle drug proceeds with legitimate
revenue from front companies--which operate partially as normal
businesses--in an effort to disguise the illicit proceeds.\26\ For
example, according to public and non-public information available to
FinCEN, Vector remitted over USD 17 million in suspicious wire
transfers to multiple China-based companies in early 2021 on behalf of
a company that was reportedly tied to an international drug trafficking
organization. FinCEN assesses that these same methods are being used by
DTOs to import precursor chemicals from China into Mexico under the
guise of legitimate business transactions, which are facilitated by
Vector through the clearance of payments between Mexico-based companies
and China-based companies known to have engaged in the trade of
precursor chemicals for the furtherance of illicit opioid trafficking
as described below.
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\24\ Congressional Research Service, Illicit Fentanyl and
Mexico's Role (Dec. 19, 2024), p. 1-2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10400/13.
\25\ Shell companies are businesses that exist only as an entity
through which money may be transferred to hide beneficial ownership.
Front companies operate partially as normal businesses; however,
DTOs commingle drug proceeds with legitimate revenue from the front
companies in an effort to disguise them. Drug Enforcement
Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21, 2020 National Drug Threat
Assessment (Mar. 2021), p. 88, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf.
\26\ Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-21, 2020
National Drug Threat Assessment (Mar. 2021), p. 88, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf.
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Based on non-public information, FinCEN also assesses that Vector
has been instrumental in processing funds transfers to China-based
companies known to have shipped precursor chemicals to Mexico for
illicit purposes. Since at least 2019, over 20 China-based companies,
including the three with activity highlighted below, were known to have
shipped precursor chemicals to Mexico for illicit purposes--for
instance:
From 2018 through 2023, one China-based company received
over 12 international funds transfers totaling over USD 300,000 from
over four Mexico-based companies through Vector.
From 2022 through 2023, a second China-based company
received over 18 international funds transfers totaling over USD
700,000 from over five Mexico-based companies through Vector.
From 2020 through 2023, a third China-based company
received over 10 international funds transfers totaling over USD 70,000
from at least two Mexico-based companies through Vector.
Based on non-public information, as well as the volume and dollar
amount of funds transfers that Vector processed over several years with
these companies, FinCEN assesses that such transactions likely
facilitated illicit opioid trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs.
2. Vector Provided Financial Services That Benefited the Sinaloa Cartel
In 2024, the DEA described the Sinaloa Cartel as being ``at the
heart'' of the synthetic drug crisis, including opioids--using its
global supply chain network to gain access to the pill presses and
precursor chemicals needed to manufacture opioids in Mexico, distribute
them in the United States, and then return laundered profits back to
Mexico.\27\ In 2009, the Sinaloa Cartel was found to be a significant
foreign narcotics trafficker pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Act (Kingpin Act).\28\
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\27\ See supra note 16, pp. 4-11.
\28\ The White House, Fact Sheet: Overview of the Foreign
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Apr. 15, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-overview-foreign-narcotics-kingpin-designation-act; OFAC, Press Release,
Treasury Designates Sinaloa Cartel Members Under the Kingpin Act
(Dec. 15, 2009), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg444.
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Based on non-public information, FinCEN has identified several
transactions involving Vector and affiliates of the Sinaloa Cartel. For
example, information available to FinCEN demonstrates that, between
2013 and 2016, a suspected Sinaloa Cartel money mule \29\ transferred
over USD 1.5 million to Vector. Further, from 2019 through 2021, the
same money mule transferred over USD 500,000 to
[[Page 27767]]
Vector through a U.S.-based company. As another example, Vector engaged
in several transactions over several years that FinCEN assesses
involved proceeds of bribes paid by the Sinaloa Cartel to Mexico's
``top law enforcement official,'' Genaro Garcia Luna. Garcia Luna,
Mexico's former Secretary of Public Security and head of Mexico's
Federal Investigative Agency, was convicted at trial in 2023 for
abusing his positions between 2001 and 2012 to permit the Sinaloa
Cartel to evade law enforcement in exchange for millions of dollars in
bribes.\30\ FinCEN has further determined that between 2013 and 2019, a
business controlled by Garcia Luna conducted transactions with Vector
totaling more than USD 40 million. FinCEN assesses that these
transactions involved the proceeds of bribes to Garcia Luna, and along
with the transactions conducted by the money mule described above,
likely facilitated illicit opioid trafficking by the Sinaloa Cartel.
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\29\ A ``money mule'' is an individual who transfers or moves
illegally acquired money on behalf of someone else. Money mules help
launder proceeds derived from multiple illicit activities, including
drug trafficking. As part of the layering process, money mules make
it harder for law enforcement to accurately trace money trails. For
further information on money mules, see the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Money Mules, https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/scams-and-safety/common-frauds-and-scams/money-mules.
\30\ U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New
York, Press Release, Ex-Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro
Garcia Luna Sentenced to Over 38 Years' Imprisonment. U.S.
Attorney's Office (Oct. 16, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/ex-mexican-secretary-public-security-genaro-garcia-luna-sentenced-over-38-years.
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3. Vector Provided Financial Services That Specifically Benefited the
Gulf Cartel
In 2021, the DEA stated that it considered the Cartel del Golfo
(Gulf Cartel) to be one of the Mexican DTOs with the greatest drug
trafficking impact on the United States.\31\ When designating the Gulf
Cartel in 2021, under E.O. 14059, OFAC similarly described the
organization as one of Mexico's oldest and most powerful DTOs.\32\
Moreover, in December 2024, the Department of Justice described the
Gulf Cartel as ``one of Mexico's oldest criminal syndicates, engaging
in drug trafficking, violence, human smuggling, and more.'' \33\
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\31\ Drug Enforcement Administration, 2020 National Drug Threat
Assessment (Mar. 2021), p. 71, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2021-02/DIR-008-21%202020%20National%20Drug%20Threat%20Assessment_WEB.pdf.
\32\ OFAC, Press Release, Treasury Uses New Sanctions Authority
to Combat Global Illicit Drug Trade (Dec. 15, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0535. The cartel was also
identified as a significant foreign narcotics trafficker pursuant to
the Kingpin Act, in 2007. The White House, Letter to Congressional
Leaders Transmitting Designations Under the Kingpin Act (June 1,
2007), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PPP-2007-book1/pdf/PPP-2007-book1-doc-pg679-2.pdf. And, on February 20, 2025, the
Department of State identified the Gulf Cartel as a foreign
terrorist organization. See supra note 21.
\33\ U.S. Attorney's Office Southern District of Texas, Press
Release, Gulf Cartel Drug Trafficker Sent to Prison Following Major
Cocaine and Cash Seizures (Dec. 18, 2024), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/gulf-cartel-drug-trafficker-sent-prison-following-major-cocaine-and-cash-seizures.
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The Gulf Cartel receives fentanyl produced by partner cartels and
moves it into the United States.\34\ In connection with those
activities, numerous illicit opioid traffickers affiliated with the
Gulf Cartel have been convicted in the United States. For example, in
2023, an individual operating on behalf of the Gulf Cartel pleaded
guilty to international drug trafficking and money laundering
conspiracy charges stemming from a large-scale operation involving at
least sixteen other participants trafficking six kilograms of fentanyl
and other illicit narcotics.\35\
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\34\ S. Dudley and P. Asmann, ``Gulf Cartel Still `Public Enemy
No. 1' on US-Mexico Border: Homeland Security,'' InSight Crime (May
18, 2023), https://insightcrime.org/news/interview/gulf-cartel-public-enemy-us-mexico-border-homeland-security/ security/.
\35\ Drug Enforcement Administration, Press Release, Money
Launderer for Cartel Sent to Prison (Dec. 13, 2023), https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2023/12/13/money-launderer-cartel-sent-prison; IRS, Press Release, Money launderer for cartel sent to
prison (Dec. 12, 2023), https://www.irs.gov/compliance/criminal-investigation/money-launderer-for-cartel-sent-to-prison.
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Based on non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN has
identified several transactions involving Vector and affiliates of the
Gulf Cartel. For example, in the first half of 2023, a Gulf Cartel-
affiliated money launderer purportedly used Vector as a guaranteed
secured and reliable mechanism through which to transfer illicit funds.
FinCEN assesses that these transactions likely facilitated illicit
opioid trafficking by the Gulf Cartel.
C. The Extent to Which Vector Is Used for Legitimate Business Activity
In reaching its finding, FinCEN has considered the extent to which
Vector is used for legitimate business purposes.\36\ Vector is the
ninth largest brokerage firm in Mexico, worth Mexican Pesos (MXN)
215.841 billion (USD 10.67 billion) in custodial assets, as of December
2024, and maintains one U.S. correspondent.\37\ According to Mexico's
National Banking Securities Commission (CNBV), as of February 2025,
Vector was one of 37 registered brokerage houses in Mexico.\38\ As of
2024, Vector's custodial assets represented 2.1 percent of brokerage
firm custodial assets in Mexico.\39\
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\36\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B)(ii).
\37\ Ranking determined by comparing Vector's custodial assets
reported by CNBV in December 2024 with the total custodial assets
reported for brokerage firms in Mexico by CNBV in December 2024. See
Government of Mexico, CNBV, Casas de Bolsa, (Dec. 2024), available
for export at https://portafolioinfo.cnbv.gob.mx/PUBLICACIONES/Boletines/Paginas/CB.aspx (last accessed Feb. 27, 2025); see supra
note 19 for BankCheck Profile for Vector Casa de Bolsa, at Payments
Information, https://bankcheck.app.
\38\ CNBV, Information Portfolio on Casas de Bolsas, https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiYjA5ZWFjNTctYzZlMC00M2Y2LWEwNzAtMWM3YTkzNTRmYTk2IiwidCI6IjVlMmM0OTc3LTEwN2QtNDBhMy04YWY3LTcwMDc0ODFhNjBkNCIsImMiOjR9.
\39\ See supra note 37; percentage determined by comparing
Vector's custodial assets reported by CNBV in December 2024 with
total custodial assets reported for brokerage firms by CNBV in
December 2024.
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According to Vector's 2023 Report on Sustainability and other
public materials, Vector maintains an anti-money laundering and
countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) compliance program.
Vector's AML/CFT program includes a risk-based approach to onboarding
and is comprised of the following five pillars: (1) ``Know Your
Customer'' (KYC); (2) analysis and monitoring; (3) training; (4)
systems; and (5) auditing.\40\ The AML/CFT compliance program is
administered by a Compliance Officer who reports to the Communication
and Oversight Committee--which in turn supports the Board of
Directors--and whose duties include, but are not limited to,
coordinating transaction monitoring and investigations, designing
annual training for staff, serving as a resource on applicable
regulations, verifying implementation of new or updated compliance
guidance, and reporting violations of the Vector compliance manual to
the Communication and Oversight Committee.\41\
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\40\ Vector, Informe de Sostenibilidad 2023, pp. 24-27, https://www.vector.com.mx/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/InformedeSostenibilidadVector2023.pdf023 (last accessed Apr. 14,
2025).
\41\ Id.
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Notwithstanding Vector's AML/CFT compliance program, in light of
public and non-public information available to FinCEN, FinCEN assesses
that Vector's legitimate business activities do not outweigh the risk
posed by its provision of services to facilitate illicit opioid
trafficking activities by DTOs who seek to circumvent AML/CFT
obligations and obfuscate the source of funds or their intended use. In
particular, FinCEN analyzed references to regulated Mexican banks and
brokerage houses in 2022-2024, from non-public information made
available to FinCEN, and produced an asset-weighted ranking based on
asset data published by Mexico's CNBV. Vector ranked second in the
asset-weighted analysis of potentially illicit activity, and FinCEN
assesses that a higher relative concentration of such activity amongst
smaller market share financial institutions such as Vector in Mexico is
likely indicative of weak AML/CFT
[[Page 27768]]
controls within these institutions. Accordingly, given the extensive
flows of illegitimate funds through Vector, FinCEN assesses that the
need to protect U.S. financial institutions from the money laundering
risks presented by Vector outweighs any potential legitimate utility
its services may provide.
D. The Extent to Which This Action Would Guard Against International
Money Laundering and Other Financial Crimes Associated With Illicit
Opioid Trafficking
A finding that Vector is of primary money laundering concern in
connection with illicit opioid trafficking establishes--and
emphasizes--the significant illicit finance risks posed by Vector's
provision of financial services that facilitate illicit opioid
trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs. This finding will place U.S. and
foreign financial institutions and regulators on notice to guard
against those risks.\42\ Moreover, such a finding--in combination with
a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving Vector by
covered financial institutions--will safeguard the U.S. financial
system, by severing Vector's access.
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\42\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B)(iii).
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IV. Imposition of a Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of
Funds Involving Vector
Having found that Vector is a financial institution operating
outside of the United States that is of primary money laundering
concern in connection with illicit opioid trafficking, FinCEN has
determined that the imposition of a special measure prohibiting certain
transmittals of funds involving Vector is warranted.\43\ In making this
determination and assessing which special measures may be appropriate,
FinCEN has considered the relevant evidence in light of factors
identified in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B). While FinCEN is under no
obligation pursuant to section 2313a to consider any particular factor
or set of factors in selecting one or more special measures, it
nonetheless finds these factors instructive in guiding the analysis set
forth below.\44\
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\43\ In connection with this action, and consistent with 31
U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(A), FinCEN consulted with staff at the following
Departments and agencies with regard to the proposed order and
prohibition: the Department of Justice; the Department of State; the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency; and the National Credit Union
Administration. None of the Departments or agencies objected to the
issuance of this order based on the information provided to staff at
the time of this consultation.
\44\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B) provides, as relevant here, that
in selecting which special measure(s) to take, the Secretary shall
consider:
(1) whether similar action has been or is being taken by other
nations or multilateral groups;
(2) whether the imposition of any particular special measure
would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any
undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial
institutions organized or licensed in the United States;
(3) the extent to which the action or the timing of the action
would have a significant adverse systemic impact on the
international payment, clearance, and settlement system, or on
legitimate business activities involving the particular
jurisdiction, institution, class of transactions, or type of
account; and
(4) the effect of the action on United States national security
and foreign policy.
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A. Whether the Prohibition on Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving
Vector Will Address the Money Laundering Concern in a Manner Consistent
With U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy Interests
FinCEN has considered the effect this action will have on U.S.
national security and foreign policy, as well as the extent to which
multilateral groups or other nations have taken similar actions.\45\
Given Vector's association with DTOs and other actors engaged in
illicit opioid trafficking, FinCEN assesses that imposing a prohibition
on certain transmittals of funds involving Vector is necessary to
safeguard U.S. national security and the U.S. financial system, as well
as to serve key U.S. national security objectives.\46\ In particular,
prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Vector will further
ongoing U.S. efforts to curtail illicit opioid trafficking--including
the manufacture of synthetic opioids--and related financial
transactions that facilitate the laundering of the proceeds of their
distribution. Targeting the illicit proceeds of drug traffickers and
DTOs, especially those with a nexus to illicit opioids--like the
Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels--is a high priority for the United States.
And, for that reason, recent actions by OFAC and the Department of
State have focused on DTOs affiliated with opioid-related illicit
finance threats, including the February 20, 2025, designation of
certain DTOs--including the Sinaloa and Gulf Cartels--as FTOs.\47\
Publicly countering a financing mechanism used by these illicit
entities by prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving Vector
will serve the national security and financial system of the United
States by further deterring and curtailing illicit opioid trafficking,
along with the activities of DTOs and FTOs. Similarly, such a
prohibition would sever a pathway that may facilitate circumvention of
U.S. economic sanctions, increasing the efficacy of those sanctions and
complementing previous actions taken by the U.S. government.
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\45\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B)(i), (iv).
\46\ See generally National Security Memorandum/NSM-24, National
Security Memorandum on Prioritizing the Strategic Disruption of the
Supply Chain for Illicit Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioids Through a
Coordinated, Whole-of-Government, Information-Driven Effort (July
31, 2024), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202400663/pdf/DCPD-202400663.pdf; Treasury, 2024 National Strategy for Combating
Terrorist and Other Illicit Financing (May 2024), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/2024-Illicit-Finance-Strategy.pdf; Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA-DCT-DIR-010-24,
2024 National Drug Threat Assessment (May 2024), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/5.23.2024%20NDTA-updated.pdf.
\47\ See supra note 21.
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Moreover, this action reinforces the expectations of AML/CFT
compliance in the financial system, highlighting the importance of
identifying and reporting suspicious activity by financial institutions
around the world. With respect to the illicit finance risks posed by
Vector, that is of particular importance, as no multilateral groups and
no other nations have yet acted to address those risks.
B. Whether the Prohibition on Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving
Vector Would Create a Significant Competitive Disadvantage, Including
Through Imposing Undue Burdens on Legitimate Activity of Vector or
Third Parties
FinCEN has considered whether prohibiting certain transmittals of
funds would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including
any undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial
institutions organized or licensed in the United States, as well as the
extent to which the action could have a significant adverse systemic
impact on legitimate business activities involving Vector.\48\ FinCEN
assesses that prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving
Vector may impose a burden on legitimate activities currently
transacted through Vector or the legitimate activities of third parties
impacted by this order; however any burden and disruption should be
relatively minimal, as similar services are offered by other financial
institutions in Mexico, and third parties will have sufficient time and
capability to ensure compliance.
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\48\ See 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B)(ii), (iii).
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As noted above, Vector is the ninth largest brokerage firm in
Mexico, worth Mexican Pesos (MXN) 215.841 billion (USD 10.67 billion)
in custodial assets, as of December 2024, and maintains one
[[Page 27769]]
U.S. correspondent.\49\ As of 2024, Vector's custodial assets
represented 2.1 percent of brokerage firm custodial assets in
Mexico.\50\ By comparison, the assets of the two largest Mexico-based
brokerage firms in 2024 represented 26.6 percent with MXN 2.706
trillion (USD 133.72 billion) and 22.9 percent with MXN 2.329 trillion
(USD 115.11 billion), respectively, of brokerage firm custodial assets
in Mexico.\51\ FinCEN assesses that given Vector's size compared to the
largest financial institutions in Mexico and the array of correspondent
relationships between U.S. and Mexican financial institutions, the
macroeconomic impact of prohibiting certain transmittals of funds
involving Vector would be negligible. Vector has one recorded
location--its head office located in Monterrey--and no identified
offices outside of Mexico.\52\ Indeed, although Vector offers services
used by licit actors, the legitimate business services that it offers
would be readily available through other regulated institutions, and
those financial institutions would do so with the appropriate
transparency necessary to support international efforts to protect the
integrity of the international financial system.
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\49\ See supra note 19.
\50\ See supra note 37; percentage determined by comparing
Vector's custodial assets reported by CNBV in December 2024 with
total custodial assets reported for brokerage firms by CNBV in
December 2024.
\51\ See supra note 37.
\52\ See supra note 19.
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Although this order represents one of the first issuances of an
order under section 2313a, FinCEN has afforded financial institutions
an additional 21 days to prepare for the prohibition and, regardless,
assesses that this action would not impose any undue cost or burden for
financial institutions, as covered financial institutions would be
positioned to readily incorporate the requirements of this order into
their compliance programs. FinCEN does anticipate that, although any
Vector affiliates outside of Mexico from this order would not be
subject to the restrictions set out in this order, there may yet be
challenges associated with transactions involving such entities.
However, the burden associated with any such challenges remains
outweighed by the benefits to national security from this action, and,
again, FinCEN assesses that covered financial institutions' existing
compliance programs and process will be sufficient to navigate those
challenges and mitigate associated burden. FinCEN further assesses that
the implementation period of this order will appropriately ensure
compliance while mitigating burden and unintended consequences on licit
businesses and customers.
C. Whether Any Other Reasonable Alternatives or Special Measures Would
Adequately Address the Money Laundering Concern
In imposing a prohibition on certain transmittals of funds, FinCEN
considered other available special measures \53\ and, after due
consideration, has determined that special measure six--prohibiting
certain transmittals of funds involving Vector--is the appropriate
means to adequately address the illicit finance risks that Vector
poses.
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\53\ As noted in section II.A, pursuant to section 2313a, these
measures include: (1) the special measures described in 31 U.S.C.
5318A(b), including the imposition of additional recordkeeping,
information collection, and reporting requirements on covered U.S.
financial institutions and/or the imposition of conditions upon the
opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts
for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution; and (2) the
prohibition, or imposition of conditions on, the transmittal of
funds.
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None of the special measures set out in 31 U.S.C. 5318A--special
measures one through five--would effectively address the illicit
finance threat posed by Vector. Any additional recordkeeping,
information collection, or reporting requirements, as described in 31
U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4), would be insufficient to guard against the
risks posed by covered financial institutions processing transmittals
of funds involving Vector. Those special measures would allow such
transfers to continue to the benefit of illicit actors connected to
illicit opioid trafficking. Further, merely prohibiting and/or placing
conditions upon the opening or maintaining in the United States of
correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for or on behalf of
Vector, as described in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5), would be similarly
inadequate. Neither prohibiting nor imposing conditions on such
accounts would safeguard the U.S. financial system to the same degree
as prohibiting transmittals of funds, as such a special measure would
not address the movement of funds outside of a strict correspondent or
payable-through relationship, for example, through the movement of
funds outside the traditional banking relationship, which may permit
Vector to access USD through indirect correspondent relationships via
other foreign financial institutions.
Given Vector's longstanding facilitation of illicit opioid
trafficking by Mexico-based DTOs and because transmittals of funds
involving Vector do not necessarily have to go through a correspondent
account, FinCEN assesses that it is appropriate to more broadly
prohibit any transmittals of funds. Because such a prohibition would
cut off any transmittal of funds, and not just those conducted through
a correspondent or payable-through account, the prohibition on any
transmittal of funds involving Vector would more effectively prevent
Vector from accessing the U.S. financial system. FinCEN therefore
assesses that such a prohibition is the most appropriate special
measure to protect the U.S. financial system.
D. Whether the Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of
Funds Should Be Imposed by Order or Regulation
Pursuant to section 2313a, the Secretary may impose specified
special measures, including a prohibition on certain transmittals of
funds, ``by order, regulation or otherwise as permitted by law.'' In
determining the appropriate approach in this instance, FinCEN
considered imposing special measures by order or regulation, taking
into account the nature of the underlying threat, and determined that
proceeding by an order is the most appropriate course of action given
the imminent threats posed by the illicit actors whose transactions and
access to funds Vector facilitates, as well as the ongoing transactions
associated with suspected activity related to illicit opioid
trafficking that continue to be processed through Vector. Further,
FinCEN has assessed that this order will not be unduly burdensome or
impose new or unique compliance costs on financial institutions.
A copy of this order will be published in the Federal Register. To
the extent Vector or other parties have information relevant to this
order, they may submit it to FinCEN at [email protected].
V. Order
A. Definitions
1. Vector
The order defines Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. (Vector) as
Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. and its branches, subsidiaries, and
offices located in Mexico. Any branches, subsidiaries, and offices of
Vector Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V. operating outside of Mexico,
including any such branches, subsidiaries, and offices located in the
United States, are expressly excluded from the definition of ``Vector''
for purposes of this order.
[[Page 27770]]
2. Covered Financial Institution
The order defines covered financial institution as having the same
meaning as ``financial institution'' in 31 CFR 1010.100(t).
3. Transmittals of Funds
The order defines transmittals of funds as the sending and
receiving of funds, including convertible virtual currency.
4. Meaning of Other Terms
All terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the
meaning set forth in 31 CFR Chapter X, 31 U.S.C. 5312, and 21 U.S.C.
2302.
B. Prohibition on Transmittals of Funds Involving Vector
A covered financial institution is prohibited from engaging in any
transmittal of funds from or to Vector.
C. Order Period
The terms of this order are effective [21 DAYS AFTER PUBLICATION IN
THE FEDERAL REGISTER], with no cessation date.
D. Reservation of Authority
FinCEN reserves authority to impose conditions on certain
transmittals of funds from or to Vector and to grant appropriate
exemptions from the requirements of this order.
E. Other Obligations
Nothing in this order shall be construed to modify, impair, or
otherwise affect any requirements or obligations to which a covered
financial institution is subject pursuant to the BSA, including, but
not limited to, the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), or
other applicable laws or regulations, such as the sanctions
administered and enforced by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's
Office of Foreign Assets Control.
F. Penalties for Noncompliance
The covered financial institution, and any of its officers,
directors, employees, and agents, may be liable for civil or criminal
penalties under 31 U.S.C. 5321 and 5322 for violating any of the terms
of this order.
G. Validity of Order
Any judicial determination that any provision of this order is
invalid shall not affect the validity of any other provision of this
order, and each other provision shall thereafter remain in full force
and effect.
Andrea M. Gacki,
Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2025-11991 Filed 6-27-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P