[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 106 (Wednesday, June 4, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 23768-23811]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-09279]
[[Page 23767]]
Vol. 90
Wednesday,
No. 106
June 4, 2025
Part II
Federal Communications Commission
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
47 CFR Parts 0 and 9
Facilitating Implementation of Next Generation 911 Services (NG911);
Improving 911 Reliability; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 90 , No. 106 / Wednesday, June 4, 2025 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 23768]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 0 and 9
[PS Docket Nos. 21-479 and 13-75, FCC 25-21; FR ID 295635]
Facilitating Implementation of Next Generation 911 Services
(NG911); Improving 911 Reliability
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (the
FCC or Commission) proposes rules that would help ensure that emerging
Next Generation 911 (NG911) networks are reliable and interoperable.
NG911 is replacing legacy 911 technology across the country with
Internet Protocol (IP)-based infrastructure that will support new 911
capabilities, including text, video, and data. However, for NG911 to be
fully effective, NG911 networks must safeguard the reliability of
critical components and support the interoperability needed to
seamlessly transfer 911 calls and data from one network to another.
When the Commission first adopted 911 reliability rules in 2013, the
transition to NG911 was in its very early stages. Since then, many
state and local 911 Authorities have made significant progress in
deploying NG911 capabilities in their jurisdictions. This Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) is the next step in fulfilling
the Commission's commitment to facilitate the NG911 transition and to
ensure that the transition does not inadvertently create
vulnerabilities in the nation's critical public safety networks. The
FNPRM proposes to update the definition of ``covered 911 service
provider'' in the Commission's existing 911 reliability rules to ensure
that the rules apply to service providers that control or operate
critical pathways and components in NG911 networks. It also proposes to
update the reliability standards for providers of critical NG911
functions to ensure the reliable delivery of 911 traffic to NG911
delivery points, and proposes to establish NG911 interoperability
requirements for interstate transfer of 911 traffic between Emergency
Services IP Networks (ESInets). In addition, the FNPRM proposes to
modify the certification and oversight mechanisms in the current 911
reliability rules to improve reliability and interoperability in NG911
systems while minimizing burdens on service providers, and proposes to
empower state and local 911 Authorities to obtain reliability and
interoperability certifications directly from covered 911 service
providers.
DATES: Comments are due on or before July 21, 2025, and reply comments
are due on or before August 18, 2025.
ADDRESSES: Pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's
rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and
reply comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of
this document. Comments may be filed using the Commission's Electronic
Comment Filing System (ECFS). See Electronic Filing of Documents in
Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (1998), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1998-05-01/pdf/98-10310.pdf. You may submit comments,
identified by PS Docket Nos. 21-479 and 13-75, by any of the following
methods:
Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs.
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by
commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be
addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for
the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of
before entering the building.
Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the
U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class
Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L
Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.
People With Disabilities: To request materials in
accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print,
electronic files, audio format), send an email to [email protected] or
call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chris Fedeli,
[email protected] or 202-418-1514, or Daniel Spurlock,
[email protected] or 202-418-0212, Attorney-Advisors, of the
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, Policy and Licensing
Division.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM), in PS Docket Nos. 21-479
and 13-75, FCC 25-21, adopted on March 27, 2025, and released on March
28, 2025. The full text of this document is available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-21A1.pdf.
Ex Parte Presentations--Permit-But-Disclose. The Commission will
treat this proceeding as a ``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in
accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex
parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a
memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days
after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the
Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations
are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list
all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at
which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data
presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the
presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data
or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments,
memoranda, or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may
provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior
comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page
and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in
lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to
Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex
parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b).
In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has
made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte
presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations,
and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic
comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed
in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf).
Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the
Commission's ex parte rules.
Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act. Consistent with
the Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act, Public Law 118-
9, a summary of this FNPRM will be available on https://www.fcc.gov/proposed-rulemakings.
[[Page 23769]]
Synopsis
Introduction
In this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM), we propose
to update existing Commission rules to ensure the resiliency,
reliability, interoperability, and accessibility of Next Generation 911
(NG911) networks. With the transition to NG911, dedicated 911 networks
are evolving from Time Division Multiplexing (TDM)-based architectures
to Internet Protocol (IP)-based architectures, which will provide state
and local 911 authorities with significant new capabilities to respond
to those in need of emergency assistance and to improve system
resilience in comparison to legacy 911. These new capabilities include
multimedia NG911 calls that allow the transmission of texts, photos,
videos, and data, which persons with disabilities depend on for full
and equal access to emergency services. However, for NG911 to be fully
effective and accessible, it is essential that NG911 networks are
designed to ensure the reliability of critical components and
applications and interoperability to enable seamless transfer of 911
calls and data.
Today, we propose certain reliability and interoperability
requirements that would apply to ``covered 911 service providers''
(CSPs), the providers that support essential functions within 911
networks such as call routing and automatic caller location, with
particular emphasis on entities that provide these capabilities in the
NG911 environment.\1\ Our proposals build on the 911 reliability rules
that the Commission adopted in 2013, which require CSPs to take
measures to provide reliable 911 service to Public Safety Answering
Points (PSAPs) with respect to circuit diversity, central-office backup
power, and diverse network monitoring.\2\ We propose to modify and
update these rules to keep pace with the ongoing transition to NG911,
improve NG911 network reliability and resilience, reduce the risk of
outages, and ensure accessibility to the life-saving improvements that
NG911 is uniquely capable of delivering. We also propose to adopt rules
that would require Emergency Services IP Network (ESInet) providers to
support interoperability in the interstate transfer of 911 calls and
data, which will strengthen the ability of state and local 911
Authorities to ensure continued access to NG911 services during major
emergencies by deploying resources in support of one another.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See 47 CFR 9.19(a)(4) (defining a CSP as any entity that (A)
``[p]rovides 911, E911, or NG911 capabilities such as call routing,
automatic location information (ALI), automatic number
identification (ANI), or the functional equivalent of those
capabilities, directly to a [PSAP] . . . ; and/or (B) [o]perates one
or more central offices that directly serve a PSAP'').
\2\ See 47 CFR 9.19; Improving 911 Reliability; Reliability and
Continuity of Communications Networks, Including Broadband
Technologies, PS Docket Nos. 13-75 and 11-60, Report and Order, 28
FCC Rcd 17476, 17477-78, paras. 2-5 (2013), 79 FR 3123 (Jan. 17.
2014) (911 Reliability Order); FCC Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau, Impact of the June 2012 Derecho On Communications
Networks and Services: Report and Recommendations at 1-2 (2013)
(Derecho Report), http://www.fcc.gov/document/derecho-report-and-recommendations. PSAP refers to ``[a]n answering point that has been
designated to receive 911 calls and route them to emergency services
personnel.'' 47 CFR 9.3.
\3\ An ESInet is ``[a]n internet Protocol (IP)-based network
that is managed or operated by a 911 Authority or its agents or
vendors and that is used for emergency services communications,
including Next Generation 911.'' 47 CFR 9.28. A ``911 Authority'' is
a ``State, territorial, regional, Tribal, or local governmental
entity that operates or has administrative authority over all or any
aspect of a communications network for the receipt of 911 traffic at
NG911 Delivery Points and for the transmission of such traffic from
that point to PSAPs.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is particularly important that we take action on these issues
now. When the Commission adopted the current 911 reliability rules in
2013, the transition to NG911 was in its very early stages. However, as
the Commission observed in its July 2024 NG911 Transition Order, the
NG911 transition has now progressed to the point that most states have
invested in NG911 technology, and many states and local jurisdictions
have operating ESInets.\4\ Moreover, many public safety commenters in
the NG911 Transition proceeding expressed strong support for the
Commission taking further action to strengthen NG911 reliability,
interoperability, and accessibility. Finally, while NG911 has inherent
reliability and accessibility advantages over legacy 911, our
experience with recent outages affecting 911 suggests that some
critical elements of NG911 networks may not be adequately covered by
our existing 911 reliability rules. To address these issues, we propose
and seek comment on the following measures:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Facilitating Implementation of Next Generation 911 Services
(NG911); Location-Based Routing for Wireless 911 Calls, PS Docket
Nos. 21-479 and 18-64, Report and Order, FCC 24-78, 2024 WL 3507091
at *12, para. 29 (Jul. 19, 2024), 89 FR 78066 (Oct. 17, 2024) (NG911
Transition Order).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Covered 911 Service Providers. First, we propose to update
the definition of ``covered service provider'' in the Commission's
existing 911 reliability rules to specify how the rules apply to
service providers that control or operate critical pathways and
components of NG911 networks.
[cir] The current CSP definition focuses on providers of certain
network facilities and capabilities that are specific to legacy 911
systems and states that the rules also apply to their ``functional
equivalents'' in the NG911 environment. We propose to specify that
certain critical NG911 facilities and capabilities (e.g., Location
Validation Functions (LVFs), Geographic Information Systems (GISs),
Emergency Call Routing Functions (ECRFs), Emergency Services Routing
Proxies (ESRPs), and Policy Routing Functions (PRFs)) are among the
functional equivalents referred to in the current rule and that
providers of these capabilities therefore fall within the definition of
CSPs.
[cir] We also propose to expand the CSP definition to encompass the
following types of providers of critical connectivity in the NG911
environment: (1) operators of Location Information Servers (LISs) or
equivalent IP 911 location databases; (2) operators of Legacy Network
Gateways (LNGs); (3) operators of interstate Major Transport Facilities
that meet or exceed Optical Carrier 3 (OC3) capacity and carry 911
traffic from multiple OSPs for ultimate delivery to NG911 Delivery
Points or ESInets; (4) operators of IP Traffic Aggregation Facilities
that carry segregated 911 traffic from multiple OSPs towards ultimate
transmission to an NG911 Delivery Point or ESInet; and (5) operators of
interstate interconnecting facilities between ESInets.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ OSPs are ``[p]roviders that originate 911 traffic,
specifically wireline providers; commercial mobile radio service
(CMRS) providers, excluding mobile satellite service (MSS) operators
to the same extent as set forth in Sec. 9.10(a); covered text
providers, as defined in Sec. 9.10(q)(1); interconnected Voice over
internet Protocol (VoIP) providers, including all entities subject
to subpart D of this part; and internet-based Telecommunications
Relay Service (TRS) providers that are directly involved with
routing 911 traffic, pursuant to subpart E of this part.'' 47 CFR
9.28. The term ``911 traffic'' means ``[t]ransmissions consisting of
all 911 calls (as defined in Sec. Sec. 9.3, 9.11(b)(2)(ii)(A),
9.14(d)(2)(iii)(A), and 9.14(e)(2)(ii)(A)) and/or 911 text messages
(as defined in Sec. 9.10(q)(9)), as well as information about
calling parties' locations and originating telephone numbers and
routing information transmitted with the calls and/or text
messages.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reliability Standards. Second, we propose to update the
reasonable reliability standards that providers of critical NG911
functions must employ to ensure the reliable delivery of 911 traffic to
NG911 delivery points. We believe such action is needed to ensure the
reliability of critical transport, aggregation, and data facilities in
the NG911 ecosystem at the interstate and national level and the
accessibility of NG911 services.
[[Page 23770]]
Interoperability. Third, we propose to establish NG911
interoperability requirements for interstate transfer of 911 traffic
between ESInets to optimize PSAP call transfer capabilities during
service disruptions. We seek to ensure that PSAPs can transfer calls to
nearby PSAPs located across state borders with minimal need for the
traffic to be retranslated or reformatted in order for such transfers
to occur. We further propose to harmonize this action with our current
911 reliability certification rules by adding an interoperability
certification to the rules. We also seek updated information on
interstate interoperability by type of service, with particular
emphasis on services used by consumers, including those with
accessibility needs.
Oversight. Finally, we propose to modify the certification
and oversight mechanisms in our 911 reliability rules to improve
implementation of reliability and interoperability in NG911 systems.
Additionally, we propose to enable state and local 911 Authorities to
obtain reliability and interoperability certifications directly from
CSPs, so that 911 Authorities can more easily exercise their existing
authority to address reliability, interoperability, and accessibility
needs within their jurisdictions.
Together, these proposals are intended to improve transparency and
accountability during the NG911 transition and help ensure that the
nation's 911 system functions effectively and reliably. We believe that
these proposals will make the nation's 911 service more accessible,
reliable and interoperable, while striking an appropriate balance
between costs and benefits of such regulation. We seek comment on the
tentative conclusions, proposals, and analyses set forth in this FNPRM,
as well as on any alternative approaches.
Background
A. 911 Reliability Framework
The Commission adopted certain, specific 911 reliability rules for
``covered 911 service providers'' or CSPs in 2013 following the
devastating impact on 911 services of the June 2012 mid-Atlantic
derecho storm.\6\ In the 2013 911 Reliability Order, the Commission
determined that the reliability, resiliency, and availability of 911
service could be improved through implementation of network reliability
practices and other sound engineering principles, and it accordingly
adopted 911 reliability certification rules for CSPs.\7\ CSPs are
entities that provide 911, E911, or NG911 capabilities such as call
routing, automatic location information (ALI), automatic number
identification (ANI), or the functional equivalent of those
capabilities, directly to a PSAP, statewide default answering point, or
appropriate local emergency authority.\8\ The rules mandate that all
CSPs ``shall take reasonable measures to provide reliable 911 service
with respect to circuit diversity, central-office backup power, and
diverse network monitoring.'' \9\ To demonstrate that they are taking
such reasonable measures, the rules require CSPs to annually certify
that they have ``perform[ed] all the specific certification elements
outlined in our rules regarding 911 circuit auditing, backup power at
central offices that directly service PSAPs, and diverse network
monitoring links.'' \10\ CSPs may also meet these certification
requirements by showing that they have implemented ``alternative
measures . . . that are reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of
failure, or that one or more certification elements are not applicable
to its network.'' \11\ In addition, CSPs must notify PSAPs of network
outages that may affect the PSAPs' ability to receive 911 calls.\12\
The Commission delegated authority to the Bureau ``to order appropriate
remedial action on a case-by-case basis where 911 reliability
certifications indicate such actions are necessary to protect public
safety.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17477, para. 2.
\7\ Id. at 17477-78, paras 2-5; Derecho Report at 1-2.
\8\ 47 CFR 9.19(a)(4)(i)(A)-(B). For ease of reference, we
sometimes refer herein to PSAPs, statewide default answering points,
and appropriate local emergency authorities collectively as
``PSAPs.'' The term ``covered 911 service provider'' does not
include PSAPs or governmental authorities to the extent they provide
911 capabilities or entities that offer the capability to originate
911 calls where another service provider delivers those calls and
associated number or location information to the appropriate PSAP.
47 CFR 9.19(a)(4)(ii)(A)-(B).
\9\ 47 CFR 9.19(b).
\10\ 47 CFR 9.19(c).
\11\ 47 CFR 9.19(b); see Improving 911 Reliability; Reliability
and Continuity of Communications Networks, Including Broadband
Technologies, PS Docket Nos. 13-75 and 11-60, Order on
Reconsideration, 30 FCC Rcd 8650, 8655, para. 12 (2015), 80 FR 60548
(Oct. 7, 2015) (2015 Reliability Recon. Order). The designated
corporate officer may fulfill the certification requirement by
explaining how the communications service provider has undertaken
alternative measures that mitigate the risk of 911 network failure.
47 CFR 9.19(c)(1)(ii)(A), 9.19(c)(2)(ii)(A), and 9.19(c)(3)(ii)(A).
See also 2015 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8656-58,
paras. 14-20 (confirming that, under Sec. 12.4 (now Sec. 9.19) of
the Commission's rules, CSPs may implement and certify an
alternative measure for any of the specific 911 certification
elements, as long as the certification includes an explanation of
how such alternative measures are reasonably sufficient to mitigate
the risk of failure).
\12\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17526, para. 140; 47
CFR 4.9(h).
\13\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17534, para. 163.
These rules improved upon the pre-existing requirement of
telecommunications carriers, commercial mobile radio service
providers, and interconnected voice over internet protocol providers
to transmit all 911 calls to PSAPs. See 47 CFR 9.4, 9.10(b),
9.11(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the adoption of the 911 reliability rules in 2013, the
Commission has revisited the rules on several occasions, but has not
updated them to account for the transition to NG911. In 2014, the
Commission issued a Policy Statement and NPRM on improving 911
governance and reliability, which reaffirmed the importance of 911
reliability and posited that changes in 911 technologies and a recent
series of ``sunny day'' 911 outages indicated a potential need for
further action.\14\ Among the proposals advanced in the NPRM, the
Commission sought comment on whether to broaden the definition of CSPs
in former Sec. 12.4 (now Sec. 9.19).\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ 911 Governance and Accountability, Improving 911
Reliability, Policy Statement and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, PS
Dockets 14-193 and 13-75, 29 FCC Rcd 14208, 14222, para. 32 (2014),
80 FR 3191 (Jan. 22, 2015) (2014 Reliability NPRM).
\15\ Id. at 14225, para. 42. The 2014 Reliability NPRM also
sought comment on ensuring transparency in connection with major
changes in 911 service; ensuring reliability of IP-based 911
capabilities and services; and situational awareness and
coordination of responsibility during outages. Id. at 14228, para.
48. Although the Commission did not act on the proposals from the
2014 Reliability NPRM, we incorporate comments filed in response to
the NPRM into today's item.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2015, the Commission issued a Reconsideration Order finding that
the network reliability certification framework adopted in the 2013 911
Reliability Order was intended to allow flexibility for all CSPs to
rely on reasonable alternative measures in lieu of any of the
enumerated reliability practices set forth in former Sec. 12.4(c) (now
Sec. 9.19(c)) of the rules, and that such flexibility was specifically
intended to apply to the transition to NG911.\16\ The Commission stated
that ``flexibility is essential to support and encourage the transition
to NG911'' and pointed out that, in the 911 Reliability Order, the
Commission stated that ``we intend today's rules to apply to current
[[Page 23771]]
911 networks, as well as NG911 networks to the extent they provide
functionally equivalent capabilities to PSAPs.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ 2015 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8654, para.
10. The Commission stated that the ``overarching purpose of the
certification, including the attestation of a responsible corporate
officer, is to `hold service providers accountable for decisions
affecting 911 reliability.' '' Id. (citing 911 Reliability Order, 28
FCC Rcd at 17495-96 paras. 54, 59; 47 CFR 12.4(a)(3) (2015) (now 47
CFR 9.19(a)(3)). The Commission emphasized that ``[i]nflexible
insistence on specified actions as part of each certification
despite technical considerations that show those actions may not be
appropriate in all cases would undermine this principle of
flexibility without advancing the Commission's goal of improving 911
reliability.'' Id.
\17\ Id.; 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17479, para. 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2018, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau)
issued a public notice seeking comment on the effectiveness of the 911
reliability rules, fulfilling a commitment made by the Commission in
2013 to reexamine the rules after five years to consider whether the
rules were still ``technologically appropriate and both adequate and
necessary.'' \18\ In response to the 2018 Reliability Public Notice,
the Bureau received ten comments and six reply comments from entities
representing industry, local government, and the public safety
community.\19\ The Commission did not take further action following the
public notice, leaving the 2013 rules in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Seeks Comment on
911 Network Reliability Rules, PS Docket No. 13-75, Public Notice,
33 FCC Rcd 5987, 5988 (2018) (2018 Reliability Public Notice); 911
Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17533, para. 159.
\19\ The commenters to the 2018 Reliability Public Notice were
the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials-
International, Inc. (APCO); NENA: The 9-1-1 Association (NENA); West
Safety Service; Alaska Communications; Texas 911 Alliance; Verizon;
INdigital; USTelecom-The Broadband Association (USTelecom); Alliance
for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS); Motorola; the
Colorado Public Utilities Commission (Colorado PUC); AT&T; T-Mobile;
CenturyLink; and the National Association of State 911
Administrators (NASNA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. 911 Reliability Practices and CSRIC Recommendations
In 2018, the Bureau disseminated lessons learned from major network
outages and reminded and encouraged communications service providers to
review industry best practices to ensure network reliability.\20\ The
Bureau created a new network reliability page (http://www.fcc.gov/network-reliability-resources) to help ensure that network providers,
public safety entities, and the general public can readily access the
Bureau's work in promoting industry best practices.\21\ Based on the
Bureau's analysis of several major network outages that affected
subscribers, including those calling 911 for emergency assistance, the
Bureau staff determined that providers could have likely prevented or
mitigated the outages by employing certain network reliability best
practices.\22\ The Bureau encouraged communications service providers
to implement certain industry best practices, as previously recommended
by the Commission's Communications Security, Reliability and
Interoperability Council (CSRIC),\23\ including practices that could
prevent or mitigate similar outages in the future.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Encourages
Communications Service Providers to Follow Best Practices to Help
Ensure Network Reliability, Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd 3776, 3776
(PSHSB 2018) (2018 Best Practices PN).
\21\ Id.
\22\ Id.
\23\ For a general overview of CSRIC see FCC, Communications
Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/advisory-committees/communications-security-reliability-and-interoperability-council-0 (last visited Feb 14,
2025).
\24\ 2018 Best Practices PN at 3776-77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2019, in anticipation of additional entities transitioning to
NG911, CSRIC VI issued a report and recommendations for 911 system
reliability and resiliency.\25\ The recommendations included measures
to improve both legacy 911 and NG911, including ways in which the
Commission could further the NG911 transition and enhance the
reliability and effectiveness of NG911 through routing redundancy,
maintenance, and mitigation of the threat of outages in both legacy 911
and NG911 systems.\26\ The CSRIC recommendations address the need for
service providers to (1) monitor for events resulting in loss of
service; \27\ (2) understand points of failure risks to (a) call
delivery, (b) location delivery, and (c) callback information; \28\ and
(3) consider incorporating network detection tools and working with
stakeholders to share information.\29\ CSRIC VI also developed and
recommended action for modifying or adding best practices regarding
overall monitoring, reliability, notifications, and accountability in
preventing 911 outages in transitional NG911 environments \30\ as well
as addressing cybersecurity considerations.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ CSRIC VI Working Group 1, Final Report--Recommendations for
9-1-1 System Reliability 5 and Resiliency during the NG9-1-1
Transition 6 Version 2.0--March 8, 2019 (Addition of Best Practices)
(2019), https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/csric6wg1_finalreport_030819.pdf (CSRIC VI, WG 1 Report).
\26\ Id. at 69.
\27\ Id. (``There is a need for Service Providers across all
industry segments (cable, wireline, wireless, Interconnected VoIP)
to be able to identify within their networks service-impacting
events that impair or cause a total loss of service.'').
\28\ Id. at 70.
\29\ Id. (recommending (1) ``Service Providers consider
incorporating network detection tools, as appropriate, to assist
network operations in detecting or deterring threats to 9-1-1 before
they reach the ESInet perimeter'' and (2) ``Service Providers and
other stakeholders work together to ensure that the system
monitoring information that is needed to mitigate risks, monitor
elements of the NG9-1-1 infrastructure and identify 9-1-1 outages is
shared between providers and that the information is available to
stakeholders when needed''). Working Group 1 also assessed the use
of tools for Network Monitoring/Reporting to address the FCC's
question: ``Are there tools commercially available that can detect
or deter to mitigate an outage?'' The CSRIC VI, WG 1 Report included
a matrix summarizing the responses and providing information ``on
tools used to detect, deter and mitigate network anomalies within
the 9-1-1 networks infrastructure.'' Id. at 70, Appendix A.
\30\ Id. at Appendix B. In addition, CSRIC VI offers
recommendations on how small and rural carriers can transition to
NG911 while minimizing risks of the transition, such as preventative
measures to avoid service outages. See CSRIC VI, Working Group 1,
Transition Path to NG9-1-1, Final Report--Small Carrier NG9-1-1
Transition Considerations (2018), https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/csric6wg1sept18ng911report.docx.
\31\ CSRIC VI, WG 1 Report at 71 (recommending that (1)
``stakeholders take deliberate steps to consider the cybersecurity
implications introduced by the transition to NG9-1-1'' and (2) ``a
future CSRIC focus on NG9-1-1 related cybersecurity challenges and
develop Best Practices as appropriate'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2020, the Bureau updated the CSRIC Best Practices database.\32\
The Bureau noted that CSRIC VII \33\ unanimously approved an update to
the database to include best practices from CSRIC VI (addressing
communications network security, emergency preparedness, and disaster
recovery) as well as the deletion of best practices that had become
obsolete. The Bureau reminded and encouraged communications service
providers to follow industry best practices to ensure network
reliability, consistent with the CSRIC's recommendations, including
ensuring (1) sufficient circuit diversity and alternative routing of
911 calls; (2) validating network changes in test environment, (3)
using virtual interfaces and network management controls, and (4)
making spare equipment available.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See Public Safety And Homeland Security Bureau Announces
Updates To The Communications Security, Reliability, And
Interoperability Council Best Practices Database, Public Notice, 35
FCC Rcd 577 (PSHSB 2020). The CSRIC Best Practices database can be
accessed on the FCC website at https://opendata.fcc.gov/Public-Safety/CSRIC-Best-Practices/qb45-rw2t/data (last visited Feb. 14,
2025).
\33\ FCC, Communications Security, Reliability, and
Interoperability Council VII, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/advisory-committees/communications-security-reliability-and-interoperability-council-vii (last visited Feb. 14, 2025).
\34\ See Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Encourages
Communications Service Providers to Implement Important Network
Reliability Practices, Public Notice, PS Docket Nos. 11-60 and 20-
183, 35 FCC Rcd 13179, 13179-80 (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. 911 Interoperability
While the Commission has not to date adopted rules relating to 911
interoperability, in 2019, it directed CSRIC VII to survey the state of
interoperability for the nation's 911 systems, including for legacy
911,
[[Page 23772]]
transitional 911, and NG911 networks.\35\ In 2020, CSRIC VII Working
Group 4 issued its report and recommendation on 911 interoperability,
which were adopted by CSRIC VII. The report observed that 911 systems
are highly interconnected, and interoperability between call-taking and
call processing components is critical.\36\ In addition, the report
noted that ``[l]egacy, transitioning, and fully NG911-capable systems
capture and exchange potentially large amounts of data and transferring
such data between 9-1-1 systems potentially requires external data
connections.'' \37\ The report concluded that the state of national
NG911 interoperability was highly dependent on the degree of progress
made by state and local 911 authorities in transitioning their
respective systems to mature or end-state NG911 capability.\38\ The
report identified interoperability challenges and indicators of
successful interoperability, and recommended that the U.S. ``continue
to move forward with the deployment of NG9-1-1, with a strong focus on
achieving interoperability, as defined in this report, which includes
industry standards-based solutions.'' \39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ CSRIC VII, Report on the Current State of Interoperability
in the Nation's 911 Systems (2020) (CSRIC VII WG 4 Report), https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/advisory-committees/communications-security-reliability-and-interoperability-council-vii.
\36\ CSRIC VII WG 4 Report at 5-6.
\37\ CSRIC VII WG 4 Report at 5-6.
\38\ CSRIC VII looked to the ``maturity states'' adopted by the
FCC's earlier Task Force on Optimal Public Safety Answering Point
Architecture (TFOPA) to guide its report formulation. See TFOPA,
Working Group 2, Phase II Supplemental Report: NG9-1-1 Readiness
Scorecard at 13 (2016), https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/911/TFOPA/TFOPA_WG2_Supplemental_Report-120216.pdf. The TFOPA defined states
of transition ranging from today's legacy state through
foundational, transitional, and intermediate states, culminating in
the jurisdictional and nation-wide ``end states'' of NG911 service.
Per TFOPA, ``End State'' refers to the state in which PSAPs have
evolved to become emergency communications centers (ECCs); are
served by standards-based NG911 systems and/or elements; OSPs are
providing SIP interfaces with location information during call
setup; and ESInets are interconnected providing interoperability on
a national basis, supported by established agreements, policies and
procedures. Id.
\39\ CSRIC VII WG 4 Report at 21-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Next Generation 911 Transition Order
In July 2024, the Commission adopted the NG911 Transition Order,
which established rules to create a consistent NG911 transition
framework at the national level while also affording flexibility to 911
Authorities to modify the transition framework at the state, regional,
local, territorial, or Tribal level.\40\ The new transition rules
specify a two-phased approach to guide the transition to NG911, in
which 911 Authorities initiate each phase by submitting a valid request
to OSPs within the relevant jurisdiction and OSPs must comply with
NG911 requirements for that phase within a defined period. As part of
the order, the Commission adopted a definition of ``Next Generation
911'' that includes interoperability, security, use of commonly
accepted standards, and other criteria as core elements of the
definition.\41\ The Commission also noted the potential for NG911 to
support improved reliability and interoperability and that some
commenters had urged us to consider specific reliability and
interoperability requirements.\42\ While the Commission deferred
consideration of these issues in the Order, it recognized that they
warranted further scrutiny.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ NG911 Transition Order at *2, para. 2.
\41\ 47 CFR 9.28.
\42\ NG911 Transition Order at **62-68, paras. 182-197.
\43\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The definition of Next Generation 911 adopted in the NG911
Transition Order also requires that emergency communications centers--
e.g., PSAPs--be able to receive, process, and analyze ``all types'' of
911 requests for emergency assistance.\44\ The Commission explained
that this language incorporates an accessibility component into the
NG911 definition, and agreed with Communications Equality Advocates
(CEA) that NG911 must support accessible technologies.\45\ Several
commenters urged the Commission to consider additional measures to
enhance NG911 accessibility. While the Commission declined to address
those proposals because they were outside the scope of that proceeding,
it resolved to ``continue to monitor the development of NG911 systems
and technologies'' and ``to take steps as necessary to ensure that
NG911 is fully accessible to all.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ 47 CFR 9.28.
\45\ NG911 Transition Order at *17, para. 43.
\46\ Id. at *61, para. 179.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussion
A. The Need for Rules To Promote the Reliability and Interoperability
of NG911 Networks
NG911 architecture offers distinct advantages over legacy 911
technologies, including the possibility of greater reliability,
redundancy, interoperability, and accessibility.\47\ In order to
realize these advantages, however, NG911 networks must be designed to
ensure resiliency and avoid potential single points of failure. Unlike
legacy 911 networks, in which 911 call routing and delivery by a CSP
typically occurs within the same service area as the destination PSAP,
NG911 networks frequently aggregate traffic from various OSPs and
widespread regions and transport it to geographically distant network
components for processing and eventual delivery to ESInets for routing
to the appropriate PSAP. In addition, NG911 network providers often
contract with third parties to operate servers and other critical
facilities that support 911 call routing and other key functions in
multiple states and jurisdictions.\48\ Without measures to ensure the
resiliency of these critical components, failure of NG911 networks can
lead to large, multistate outages. The introduction of NG911 and IP-
based technologies therefore requires collaboration between industry,
public safety participants including 911 Authorities, and the
Commission to ensure that technology-enabled optimization does not
introduce unacceptable risks that imperil 911 reliability, resiliency,
and accessibility.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Id. at *62-64, paras. 182-183, 185-186; id. at *63, para.
185 (agreeing with Intrado's assertion that ``establishing direct
OSP connectivity via SIP to ESInets `will materially reduce the
number of 911 outages through improved network reliability and
availability.' ''). See also, e.g., StateScoop, North Carolina
officials say next-generation 911 network withstood Hurricane Helene
(October 21, 2024), https://statescoop.com/north-carolina-next-generation-911-hurricane-helene/ (quoting the Executive Director of
North Carolina's state 911 board as crediting NG911 infrastructure
for ensuring the continuity of 911 service through the Hurricane
Helene disaster: ``Had the old technology and analog network still
been in place, the infrastructure would have been destroyed and we
would not have had the capability to route calls to other PSAPs and
connect people to critical emergency services . . . .'' ``Thanks to
the resiliency and redundancy of this network, we had no reports of
911 calls not being delivered.'').
\48\ FCC Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, April 2014
Multistate 911 Outage: Cause and Impact, PS Docket No. 14-72 at 1-2
(2014) (2014 Multistate 911 Outage Report), https://www.fcc.gov/document/april-2014-multistate-911-outage-report.
\49\ See, e.g., NG911 Transition Order at **1, 12, 25, 60, 64,
paras. 1, 29, 69, 176, 188.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the Commission adopted the 911 reliability rules for CSPs in
2013, the nation has continued to experience periodic ``sunny day''
outages that have impaired the ability of millions of Americans to
access 911. While many of these outages have been local, some have been
large, multistate outages associated with IP-based networks.
In 2014, an outage in a service provider's 911 call-
routing facility in Colorado caused 11 million people to lose 911
service for up to six hours, prevented emergency calls from reaching 81
PSAPs across seven states,
[[Page 23773]]
and resulted in more than 6,600 calls to 911 never reaching a PSAP.
In 2018, a service provider experienced a nationwide
outage on its fiber network that lasted for one and a half days,
affecting 22 million customers across 39 states, including
approximately 17 million customers across 29 states who lacked reliable
access to 911.
In December 2022, an outage affected 911 calling for a
service provider's VoIP customers in much of the South, and another
service provider experienced two outages in 2022 disrupting 911 service
to thousands in North Dakota and South Dakota for several hours.
In February 2024, a provider experienced a nationwide
wireless service outage that lasted at least twelve hours and rendered
all voice and 5G data services unavailable for all users. More than 92
million voice calls were blocked, including more than 25,000 calls to
PSAPs.
In April 2024, a service provider experienced an outage
caused by a cut fiber optic cable adjacent to its central office in
Kansas City, Missouri. The outage disabled a portion of the provider's
high-capacity transport network for 911 and non-911 traffic originated
by various OSPs in different states, including 911 traffic that had
first been collected by a 911 aggregator--a service provider that
segregates and consolidates 911 calls from OSPs and routes them to the
appropriate PSAP or ESInet.
Some of these recent 911 outages have exposed possible gaps in the
coverage of the existing 911 reliability rules applicable to CSPs. The
current rules relating to ``critical 911 circuits'' require CSPs to
certify whether they have eliminated all single points of failure
between the selective router, ALI/ANI databases, or equivalent NG911
components, and the central office serving each PSAP. However, in some
of the multistate outages noted above, the vulnerabilities contributing
to the outage were found to exist at points in the 911 call flow
downstream from the OSP (which is already required under Sec. 9.4,
9.10, or 9.11 to transmit all 911 calls to PSAPs) but upstream from
either the selective router in legacy 911 environments or the ESInet in
transitional or NG911 environments. In many cases, those points are
operated by third parties that transport 911 traffic over high-capacity
fiber from OSP networks to the ESInets that directly serve PSAPs. In
other cases, OSPs segregate their 911 traffic and hand it off to 911
aggregation services, which deliver 911 traffic consolidated from
multiple OSPs to PSAPs and ESInets. When these transport and
aggregation components fail, they can interrupt 911 call flow to many
PSAPs. Yet, because these components do not deliver calls directly to
PSAPs at the local level, providers can argue that the components fall
outside of the scope of the current reliability rules, particularly in
the NG911 environment. We therefore believe Commission action is needed
to address the reliability of these critical facilities in NG911
ecosystems. We seek comment on this analysis.
Another indicator of the need to revisit the 911 reliability rules
for CSPs is that many of the multistate 911 outages reported to the
Commission are ``sympathetic'' outages, i.e., outages reported by one
entity that are caused by a failure in the network of another
entity.\50\ Based on the data available in NORS, there have been at
least 92 reported ``sympathetic,'' multistate outages in 2024
alone.\51\ The Commission has noted that these ``sympathy reports
contain information regarding service outages that, while caused by a
failure in the network of another provider, nonetheless have an effect
on the reporting service provider that may have public safety
implications.'' \52\ The high frequency and widespread scope of these
sympathetic outages highlights the degree to which carriers
increasingly rely upon large third-party service providers to aggregate
and transport their traffic. These sympathetic outages usually are
outside the scope of the existing 911 reliability rules, because CSPs
can claim such outages occur in network elements that do not directly
serve PSAPs and because the 911 reliability rules do not apply to OSPs.
As a result, sympathetic outages expose a potential gap between our
outage reporting and reliability certification rules, and the
Commission currently has a limited ability to correlate reliability
certifications with multistate outages reported in NORS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission's Rules
Concerning Disruptions to Communications, PS Docket No. 15-80,
Second Report and Order, 36 FCC Rcd 6136, 6160, para. 77 & n.156
(2021), 86 FR 22796 (Apr. 29, 2021) (NORS Information Sharing
Order).
\51\ This is based on reports identifying multiple states
impacted by a reported outage, and does not include outages due to
transport or SS7.
\52\ NORS Information Sharing Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 6160, para.
78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the Commission adopted the 911 reliability rules for CSPs, it
committed itself to review the rules in the future ``to determine
whether they are still technologically appropriate and both adequate
and necessary to ensure reliability and resiliency of 911 networks.''
\53\ The Commission stated that it would consider ``how NG911 networks
may differ from legacy 911 service as well as outage reporting trends,
adoption of NG911 capabilities on a nationwide basis, and whether the
certification approach has yielded the necessary level of compliance.''
\54\ Given the recurrence of major, multistate 911 outages, we believe
the 2013 rules are not sufficient to safeguard 911 service in an NG911
environment, and that there are several ways that the current rules
could be improved. We seek comment on this analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17533, para. 159.
\54\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, the rules could more clearly specify which types of
providers of NG911 capabilities qualify as CSPs that must comply with
the reliability best practices in Sec. 9.19 and file annual
reliability certifications. The current rule refers to NG911
capabilities and/or ``functional equivalents'' of specified legacy
capabilities. Although we believe that the Commission made clear its
intent that NG911 capabilities be considered equivalent if they
contribute to the routing of 911 traffic or to the storage or retrieval
of associated location information, the generalized nature of this
definition may explain why NG911 service providers are underrepresented
among providers filing annual reliability certifications; of the 290
CSPs that filed 911 reliability certifications in 2024, only a small
minority were NG911 providers. To the extent providers of NG911
capabilities are uncertain about whether they fall within the
definition of CSPs, they also may not be implementing the Commission's
reliability best practices.
The need for updating our rules regarding covered NG911 facilities
is heightened by the fact that the entities operating the legacy 911
facilities that are highlighted in the rules--i.e., selective routers
and ALI/ANI databases--are retiring these facilities as they are
superseded by NG911 networks.\55\ As a consequence, continuing to rely
solely on the 2013 rules to cover the transition from legacy 911 to
NG911 could lead to reduced transparency and a weakening of reliability
safeguards. Updating the rules to ensure that the functional equivalent
standard clearly encompasses NG911 technology therefore should provide
additional certainty that NG911 service providers are covered by our
rules and improve the reliability practices of NG911 networks and the
accessibility of NG911
[[Page 23774]]
service. We seek comment on our view that updating the rules is needed
to address these issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ NG911 Transition Order at *64, para. 186.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The reliability rules also do not address interoperability between
ESInets--understandably so given that few ESInets existed when the
rules were adopted in 2013. It has become clear, however, that one of
the greatest potential benefits of NG911 technology is its ability to
empower PSAPs to use ESInets to seamlessly transfer 911 calls and
associated call data to other PSAPs that are better positioned to
respond and deploy resources for emergencies. This life-saving benefit
is an emerging one, but its potential will be substantially diminished
if PSAPs cannot transfer calls to nearby PSAPs located across a state
border, or if someone must retranslate or reformat the traffic to allow
transfers to occur. In order to ensure that this capability exists
nationwide, we believe we should consider adopting interoperability
standards to facilitate the interstate flow of information between
ESInets. We seek comment on our view that interoperability requirements
are needed.
B. 911 Reliability
1. Expanding the Scope and Applicability of the 911 Reliability Rules
To account for the transition from legacy 911 to NG911, we propose
to modify our definition of ``covered 911 service provider'' as
follows. First, we would specify certain NG911 capabilities that
satisfy the ``functional equivalent'' capability language of the
current rule. Second, we propose to modify the current rule regarding
what ``direct service'' to a PSAP or other answering point means,
codifying language from prior Commission orders. Third, we propose to
add five new NG911 CSP categories to cover both the expanding network
gap between OSPs and state and local governments and the increasingly
interstate and interlinked nature of NG911 ecosystem facilities. We
seek comment on these proposals.
When the Commission adopted the reliability rules in 2013, it
focused their application on service providers that, collectively,
carry out the primary function of the 911 network: routing emergency
calls to the geographically appropriate PSAP based on the caller's
location.\56\ The Commission recognized ``that overbroad rules could
inadvertently impose obligations on entities that provide peripheral
support for NG911 but may not play a central role in ensuring 911
reliability[.]'' \57\ It therefore stated that it would only consider
OSPs, internet service providers (ISPs), backhaul providers,
aggregators, commercial data centers, and ESInets as CSPs to the extent
they provide covered 911 capabilities directly to PSAPs.\58\ The
Commission further interpreted ``direct'' service to a PSAP to require
a contractual arrangement or tariff agreement with the PSAP.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17478, para. 7 (citing
the Derecho Report at 25).
\57\ Id. at 17489, para. 37.
\58\ 47 CFR 9.19(4)(i)(B); 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at
17490, para. 39. Backhaul providers offer the infrastructure
necessary to transmit data from one network point to another, often
over long distances. For example, a mobile carrier may rely on a
third-party backhaul provider to carry data from rural cell towers
to its main network.
\59\ 2015 911 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8657,
para. 17 (noting that CSPs are ``the entities with direct
contractual relationships with PSAPs'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 911 facilities enumerated in the current definition of CSPs
correspond to the rule's definition of ``critical 911 circuits,'' which
comprise 911 facilities that originate at a selective router or its
functional equivalent and terminate in the central office that serves
the PSAP(s) to which the selective router or its functional equivalent
delivers 911 calls, including all equipment in the serving central
office necessary for the delivery of 911 calls to the PSAP(s).\60\
Critical 911 circuits also include ALI and ANI facilities that
originate at the ALI or ANI database and terminate in the central
office that serves the PSAP(s) to which the ALI or ANI databases
deliver 911 caller information, including all equipment in the serving
central office necessary for the delivery of such information to the
PSAP(s).\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ 47 CFR 9.19(5).
\61\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the Commission adopted the reliability rules in 2013, it
declined to enumerate specific NG911 capabilities in the rules, because
NG911 was still early in its development at that time, and the
Commission expected that NG911 functionalities would evolve
significantly in the future.\62\ Instead, the Commission stated that it
would consider NG911 service providers to be CSPs if they provided
capabilities ``functional[ly] equivalent'' to the legacy routing
capabilities enumerated in the rules or if they were the last service-
provider facility connecting to a PSAP.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17489, para. 36 &
n.85.
\63\ 47 CFR 9.19(4)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bureau issued a Public Notice in 2018 that revisited the
definition of ``covered 911 service providers.'' \64\ Public safety and
governmental commenters broadly agreed that the current definition of
CSPs is too narrow, noting that it excludes the growing class of
critical NG911 services that are provided by subcontractors and other
parties that have no contractual relationship with PSAPs and therefore
do not ``directly'' serve a PSAP under the current rules.\65\ APCO, for
example, asked the Commission ``to include any entity that provides 9-
1-1, E9-1-1, or NG9-1-1 capabilities, directly or indirectly'' and
reported that ``entities without a direct relationship to a PSAP have
found methods to impact the ALI, routing, or supplemental data relevant
to a 9-1-1 call.'' \66\ The Colorado Public Utility Commission (COPUC)
stated that the definition of CSPs ``should encompass any service or
network component that could potentially impact 9-1-1 call delivery to
the PSAPs, even if that service or network component is not directly
contracted to deliver 9-1-1 calls and location information to the
[PSAP].'' Comments from service providers mostly opposed broadening the
definition of CSP. For example, the Alliance for Telecommunications
Industry Solutions (ATIS) stated its belief that the current rules
``adequately encompass transitional and NG9-1-1 networks,'' and
Motorola Solutions, Inc. (Motorola) requested that the definition be
clarified by adding an express requirement that CSPs must have a direct
contractual relationship with a PSAP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ 2018 Reliability Public Notice, 33 FCC Rcd at 5989.
\65\ APCO Comments, PS Docket No. 13-75, at 1-2 (filed July 16,
2018); Daryl Branson, Colorado Public Utilities Commission Reply
Comments, PS Docket No. 13-75, at 2 (filed Aug. 8, 2018); NENA
Comments, PS Docket No. 13-75, at 1-2 (filed July 17, 2018); NASNA
Reply Comments, PS Docket No. 13-75, at 2 (filed Aug. 13, 2018). See
also 47 CFR 9.19(4)(i).
\66\ APCO Comments, PS Docket No. 13-75, at 2 (filed July 16,
2018) (emphasis in original); see also NENA Comments, PS Docket No.
13-75, at 1-2 (filed July 17, 2018) (suggesting that the databases
and software underpinning the infrastructure of the NG911 network
should be included).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NG911 Transition Order requires OSPs to provide SIP-based 911
traffic to 911 Authorities (typically via ESInets) to enable those
authorities to establish NG911 networks in their states. While
establishing NG911 service brings inherent potential advantages to
reliability and interoperability, the Commission did not seek to amend
the 911 reliability or outage notification rules in that proceeding.
Nevertheless, certain commenters suggested that the Commission update
its rules to better address network reliability in an NG911
environment, including to encompass emerging classes of NG911 service
providers.\67\ We agree, and we
[[Page 23775]]
accordingly propose the measures described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ See, e.g., Windstream Reply Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at
2-3 (filed Sept. 8, 2023) (NG911 traffic aggregators should be
subject to the Commission's rules relating to disruption
notification requirements, which currently apply to OSPs); Home
Telephone Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at iii, 13 & n.6 (filed Aug.
9, 2023); see also NTCA Reply Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 7-8
(filed Sept. 8, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specification of Certain NG911 ``Functional Equivalents.'' We
propose to amend the definition of ``covered 911 service provider'' to
specify that NGCS Routing Facilities and NGCS Location Facilities are
examples of NG911 capabilities that are functionally equivalent to the
legacy facilities enumerated in the rule (i.e., selective routers and
ALI/ANI databases).\68\ We further propose to define these NG911
capabilities consistently with the definitions adopted in the NG911
Transition Order. Together, these amendments would provide greater
specificity for providers of these equivalent NG911 capabilities that
they qualify as CSPs and are subject to the reliability standards in
Sec. 9.19 and the reporting requirements in Sec. 4.9. We seek comment
on this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ See proposed rules at Sec. Sec. 9.19(a)(4)(i)(A), (B) and
9.19(a)(15)-(16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe that these proposed amendments are consistent with the
Commission's intent in adopting the current rule and would provide
additional guidance as to the types of NG911 network functions and
their associated network elements that are the ``functional
equivalents'' of covered legacy routing facilities. The Commission
explained in the 911 Reliability Order that the routing of a legacy 911
call is accomplished via an aggregation point called a selective
router, which identifies the PSAP that should receive the call based on
the caller's phone number and address.\69\ The selective router then
determines the correct routing path for the call and transmits the
call, together with the caller's location and telephone number, to the
central office serving the PSAP. Finally, the central office transmits
the 911 call and associated caller information to the PSAP, typically
along dedicated trunk lines. The PSAP validates the caller's location
and callback number by querying ALI and ANI databases before
dispatching emergency services. Wireless 911 calls are routed
similarly, but the caller's location must be determined using other
technologies and third-party providers.\70\ We set forth a simplified
graphic representation of a legacy network below. Service providers
operating the legacy facilities that perform essential routing and
transmission capabilities--i.e., selective routers and ALI and ANI
databases--are clearly defined as CSPs in the current rule.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17478-79, paras. 7-8
(describing the typical legacy 911 call flow); NG911 Transition
Order at *4, para. 10.
\70\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17478-79, paras. 7-8.
\71\ 47 CFR 9.19(4)(i). See also NG911 Transition Order at *4,
para. 10 (legacy network diagram). The acronym MSAG refers to the
Master Street Address Guide, which is replaced by the LVF in NG911
networks, while ANI/ALI databases are replaced by LISs. NG911
Transition Order at *31, para. 86.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP04JN25.000
[[Page 23776]]
In the NG911 Transition Order, the Commission recognized that
``[t]he transition to NG911 involves fundamental changes in the
technology . . . use[d] to receive and process 911 traffic, and it
requires equally fundamental changes in the way OSPs deliver 911
traffic to PSAPs.'' \72\ The default NG911 rules adopted in the NG911
Transition Order require OSPs to deliver 911 traffic to an NG911
Delivery Point that each 911 Authority may designate within its state
or territory.\73\ From that demarcation hand-off point, 911 Authorities
are responsible for transmitting 911 traffic to the PSAP(s), which may
be accomplished through a combination of interconnected NGCS provided
via the 911 Authority's ESInet(s).\74\ These services may include
Location Validation Functions (LVFs), Geographic Information Systems
(GISs), Emergency Services Routing Proxies (ESRPs), Emergency Call
Routing Functions (ECRFs), and Policy Routing Functions (PRFs).\75\ The
LVF is a server that validates civic location information against a GIS
database to deliver more dynamic and actionable information about a
caller's location than legacy ALI/ANI databases can.\76\ GIS is a
mapping system that collects, stores, and analyzes spatial data,
ensuring that emergency services can pinpoint where to send help.\77\
Next, an ESRP, which is a routing engine that determines the next hop
for the 911 call, queries an ECRF, which is a database function that
determines the appropriate destination PSAP by mapping the caller's
validated location to maps with the boundaries of emergency response
zones.\78\ The call then is routed to the geographically appropriate
PSAP in accordance with the PRF, which is a ruleset that decides how
the call should be routed based on predetermined policies (e.g.,
priority levels, time of day, and load balancing).\79\ We set forth a
simplified graphic representation of a Phase 2 NG911 network below.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ NG911 Transition Order at *12, para. 28.
\73\ See id. at *26, para. 71.
\74\ See id. at *3, para. 6.
\75\ See id. at **28-29, para. 79 (NG911 network diagram).
\76\ Id. at **28, 31, paras. 78, 86; 47 CFR 9.28 (``An LVF is
functional element in NG911 Core Services (NGCS) consisting of a
server where civic location information is validated against the
authoritative Geographic Information System (GIS) database
information. A civic address is considered valid if it can be
located within the database uniquely, is suitable to provide an
accurate route for an emergency call, and is adequate and specific
enough to direct responders to the right location.'').
\77\ NG911 Transition Order at *65, para. 191; see generally
NENA, NENA i3 Standard for Next Generation 9-1-1 at Sec. 4 (Oct. 7,
2021), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/standards/NENA-STA-010.3e-2021_i3_Stan.pdf (NENA i3 Standard) (describing
standard NGCS functions).
\78\ NG911 Transition Order at *7, para. 17 & n.57; NENA i3
Standard, Sec. 4.
\79\ NG911 Transition Order at *65, para. 189, n.560; NENA i3
Standard, Sec. 4.
\80\ NG911 Transition Order at *28, para. 79 (NG911 network
diagram). The acronym BCF in the diagram refers to the Border
Control Function, which acts as a firewall between the ESInet and
external networks.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP04JN25.001
We believe the LVF and GIS core services are NG911 capabilities
that are functionally equivalent to the ALI/ANI databases used in
legacy networks. While they are not identical in a technical or
engineering sense, we believe that these NGCS Location Facilities are
equivalent in a functional sense because they similarly validate the
911 caller's location by reference to databases of geographical and
civic data using information about the caller that
[[Page 23777]]
has been provided by their OSP.\81\ In turn, we believe that the ESRP,
ECRF, and PRF core services are NG911 capabilities that are
functionally equivalent to legacy selective routers, because they
similarly determine the path along which to route 911 traffic so that
it reaches the appropriate PSAP.\82\ We refer to them collectively as
NGCS Routing Facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ See, e.g., NG911 Transition Order at *64, para. 186 (``ALI/
ANI databases will be replaced with IP-based systems with more
precise location information[.]'').
\82\ See, e.g., id. at *64, para. 186 (``Selective routers will
be replaced with NGCS IP routing at the ESInet[.]'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As has always been the case with Sec. 9.19, this proposal, as well
as those described below, are service provider agnostic. In other
words, rather than designate certain entities as CSPs by virtue of
regulatory status or industry category, we propose to continue to focus
on the services provided and the facilities operated. We seek to
preserve flexibility in a rapidly evolving technology market so that
only entities that ultimately provide critical 911 functions in an
NG911 environment are the ones subject to our rules. The goal is to
ensure reliability, interoperability, and accessibility of critical
NG911 facilities, not to predetermine market outcomes or to usurp or
constrain state and local government decision-making.
We seek comment on these proposals and our analysis. Does the
current definition of CSPs sufficiently encapsulate NG911 service
providers, or should the definition specify which NG911 capabilities
are the ``functional equivalent'' of the covered legacy routing and
transmission services? Are LVFs, GISs, ESRPs, ECRFs, and PRFs examples
of such functionally equivalent capabilities? Are these capabilities
usually performed by non-governmental entities (e.g., via contracts or
agreements) or are there instances where they are performed directly by
governmental entities? Are there other NG911 facilities or services
that constitute functional equivalents? If so, what functions do they
perform, and which legacy elements do they replace? Because CSPs may
not uniformly fit the definition of ``telecommunications carriers,''
should we clarify that, similar to the requirement in Sec. 9.4 of the
Commission's rules, CSPs are required to transmit all 911 calls they
receive to PSAPs? If not, on what basis should we treat CSPs
differently from telecommunications carriers? We also request estimates
of any new costs that would be caused by expanding the CSP definition
in this manner.
As we propose to expand the classes of entities covered by our
NG911 reliability rules to ensure that the rules capture entities that
perform critical NG911 functions, we seek comment on whether we should
conform Sec. 4.5(e) in our outage reporting rules to similarly reflect
this change. While Sec. 4.5(e) already applies to NG911 outages, it
does not specifically reference outages within the NG911 ecosystem
facilities that we propose to define as critical (e.g., Major Transport
Providers, ESInet interconnection facilities, NGCS facilities,
etc.).\83\ Should these facilities be identified explicitly in the
rule, and, if so, how? We also seek comment on whether we should amend
the outage-reporting thresholds in Sec. 4.5(e) to reflect additional
outage impacts that are specific to the types of NG911 ecosystem
facilities that we address in our proposed 911 reliability rules. If
so, what should those NG911-specific outage effects be? The current
rule includes a threshold of 900,000 user-minutes of lost communication
with PSAPs. Are user-minutes (as defined in Sec. 4.7(e)) the
appropriate metric for outages that are specific to NG911 facilities?
\84\ If not, what metric would be appropriate?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ We note that an outage that exhibits any of the effects of
an outage described in Sec. 4.5(e) would qualify as an ``outage
that potentially affects a 911 special facility,'' regardless of
whether the underlying 911 service is legacy 911 or NG911. See 47
CFR 4.5(e).
\84\ ATIS argued in a prior proceeding that the outage threshold
calculations set forth in Sec. Sec. 4.5(e) and 4.7(e) are
unsuitable for NG911 networks and that NG911 outage thresholds
should be determined based on census or population data. See ATIS
Comments, PS Docket Nos. 15-80, 13-75, at 15-16 (filed Jul. 30,
2021) (``Unlike legacy 911 systems, NG911 systems using the i3
architecture do not have access to telephone number counts. Legacy
systems match a caller's phone number with information in the [MSAG]
to determine a caller's location. With NG911 systems, calls are
validated and routed using [GIS] data rather than the MSAG. Without
telephone number counts, [CSPs] cannot calculate the number of user
minutes potentially affected by an outage under Section 4.7(e) and
thus cannot determine whether an outage potentially affects a 911
special facility under Section 4.5(e).'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct vs. Indirect Relationships with PSAPs. We propose to modify
the requirement in the rules that providers of NG911 equivalent
functionalities must ``directly'' serve a PSAP or other answering point
in order to qualify as a CSP. The Commission included the ``direct
service'' limitation in the original reliability rules to avoid
imposing obligations on providers that ``may not play a central role in
ensuring 911 reliability.'' \85\ The Commission also recognized,
however, that the scope of the CSP definition might need to ``be
revised or expanded to cover . . . additional entities that provide
NG911 capabilities, or in light of our understanding about how NG911
networks may differ from legacy 911 service.'' \86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17489, para. 37.
\86\ Id. at 17533, para. 159.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modern NG911 networks have evolved to route 911 calls to PSAPs very
differently from legacy architectures. In legacy networks, PSAPs
typically contract with a single entity (such as an ILEC) to receive
routing and location information services via a selective router and
access to ALI and ANI databases, and they typically contract with the
same entity to receive call delivery via trunk lines from the entity's
nearest central office.\87\ In contrast, NG911 routing is performed by
many dispersed functional elements that may be operated by a variety of
service providers, including OSPs, ESInet providers, their contractors,
and other parties.\88\ A PSAP or 911 Authority may not have contractual
relationships with any or all of these entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ 2014 Multistate 911 Outage Report at 1-2, 14.
\88\ NG911 Transition Order at *64, para. 186; 2014 Multistate
911 Outage Report at 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe it is important that indirect providers of essential
NG911 services comply with reliability best practices. As noted above,
there was strong support for doing so among public safety and
government commenters that responded to the 2018 Reliability Public
Notice. We are concerned, however, that including all indirect service
providers within the definition of CSPs could unnecessarily increase
the number of service providers that must file reliability
certifications each year well beyond the increase we anticipate as a
result of specifying certain NG911 capabilities that are ``functionally
equivalent'' to covered legacy capabilities. That increase could drive
up the operating costs of service providers--and, consequently, the
costs for individual subscribers and 911 Authorities--and could
interfere with the Commission's ability to closely review reliability
certifications to identify and address problems.
We think the solution that best accomplishes our objective--while
avoiding unnecessarily-burdensome certification and outage notification
requirements--is to retain the direct service requirement but amend
Sec. 9.19 to state that CSPs directly serving PSAPs are responsible
for ensuring the reliability of all of the NG911 capabilities they
provide to the PSAP, whether through contractors of any tier, vendors,
or via leased facilities. This proposal largely would be a codification
of the longstanding principle that CSPs
[[Page 23778]]
must comply with Sec. 9.19 reliability practices for facilities they
lease from other parties, while the lessors themselves do not become
subject to Sec. 9.19 reporting requirements by making their facilities
available to a CSP.\89\ We believe this codification would ensure that
reliability measures apply to essential NG911 functions while avoiding
unnecessary burdens on providers and unnecessary distractions to PSAPs
and 911 Authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ 2015 911 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8657,
para. 17 (`` `[I]n cases where a party provides 911 services
directly to a PSAP (pursuant to contract or tariff) over leased
facilities, the auditing obligation would apply to that party, and
not to the facilities lessor.' The Commission also suggested that
[CSPs] could contract with facilities lessors, if necessary, to
audit and tag leased circuits, but that the entity providing 911
service under a direct contractual relationship with each PSAP would
remain responsible for certifying compliance with those
requirements. We reaffirm those principles here, but clarify that
[CSPs] (i.e., the entities with direct contractual relationships
with PSAPs) that rely on such contracts may implement and certify
reasonable alternative measures as set forth above. We emphasize,
however, that the contracting out of certain functions, or the
determination of a PSAP to contract with more than one entity for
various aspects of 911 service, does not absolve individual entities
of their respective obligations for reliable 911 service.'') (citing
911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17506, para. 90); see also,
e.g., Eure Family Limited Partnership, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
17 FCC Rcd 21861, 21863-64, para. 7 (2002) (``[T]he Commission has
long held that licensees and other Commission regulatees are
responsible for the acts and omissions of their employees and
independent contractors.''); FCC, Frequently Asked Questions: FCC
911 Reliability Certification, https://www.fcc.gov/frequently-asked-questions-fcc-911-reliability-certification#whocertify (last visited
Feb. 14, 2025) (``Where a Covered 911 Service Provider provides 911
services directly to a PSAP (pursuant to contract or tariff) over
leased facilities, the circuit auditing obligation applies to the
Covered 911 Service Provider, and not to the facilities lessor.
Companies that directly serve PSAPs over leased facilities may
contract with the lessor to audit those circuits or to provide some
other assurance that they are physically diverse, but only the
company with a direct relationship to the PSAP is responsible for
certification.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We seek comment on this proposal. Should providers of NG911 routing
and transmission services be explicitly included in the definition of
CSPs if they do not serve PSAPs directly? As the transition to NG911
has advanced, how typical is it for these types of services to be
provided indirectly by entities with no contractual relationships with
PSAPs? How are the relationships with these entities structured or
memorialized? Would retaining the ``direct service'' requirement
provide adequate oversight to the Commission and 911 Authorities? What
advantages and disadvantages would this approach bring in contrast with
simply requiring third-party, indirect providers to submit their own
certifications? What would the cost impact be?
We also invite feedback on whether the proposed rules could hamper
the flexibility of 911 Authorities to manage the implementation of
NG911 in their jurisdictions. Would the rules interfere with 911
Authorities' procurement processes or unduly impact the cost of NG911
services? Would any of our proposals, if adopted, result in any
existing contracts or agreements needing to be terminated or
renegotiated, and, if yes, would that impact 911 service or costs or
delay the transition to NG911? Would governmental entities prefer to
have more or sole discretion over minimum reliability requirements or
practices in their jurisdictions? How would eliminating the direct
service limitation impact NG911 transition costs, and could it
inadvertently slow NG911 deployments or discourage new market entrants?
We note that, during investigations of 911 outages, it is common
for service providers to claim that they are contractually prohibited
from sharing their contractors' confidential business information.\90\
In response to one such claim, BRETSA argued that ``[i]f providers are
contractually restricted from cooperating to provide information as to
callers unable to reach 9-1-1 during an outage, then the Commission and
the states must adopt rules permitting and requiring all providers to
cooperate in supplying such information to PSAPs.'' How should the
Commission address confidentiality concerns of indirect service
providers? What is the appropriate balance for protecting and
safeguarding non-public information (e.g., proprietary business
information) and creating and maintaining a reliable and resilient 911
system? Should 911 Authorities be allowed access to reliability
certifications, and associated information, relating to indirect
providers in addition to the certifications, and associated
information, of CSPs?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ See, e.g., 2014 Multistate 911 Outage Report at 21-22
(``Intrado suggests that it is contractually precluded from
providing the Commission or PSAPs with a clear understanding of what
happened, adding that its business units are under contract to
varying service providers and government agencies, and that `those
contracts are strictly honored.' '' Intrado further asserted that
``it would be improper for [it] to `cross the lines' established by
its customers relative to information considered by them to be
confidential in order for Intrado to `glue together' a more complete
picture of an outage for other parties, including, as the case may
be, PSAPs or the Commission[.]'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Encompassing Other Essential NG911 Services. In order to improve
the reliability of essential NG911 ecosystem facilities, we propose to
add to the definition of ``covered 911 service provider'' the following
classes of service providers that have emerged as critical to NG911
services: (1) operators of ``a Location Information Server (LIS) . . .
or equivalent IP 911 location database;'' (2) operators of ``a Legacy
Network Gateway (LNG) used for conversion of Time Division Multiplexing
(TDM) 911 traffic to Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) . . .;'' (3)
operators of Major Transport Facilities, which are ``[d]edicated SIP
transport facilities meeting or exceeding Optical Carrier 3 (OC3) in
capacity that collect and/or transmit IP 911 traffic, either segregated
or mixed with non-911 traffic, originated from multiple OSPs and
transported over interstate routes, for ultimate transport and delivery
to an NG911 Delivery Point or ESInet''; (4) operators of IP Traffic
Aggregation Facilities, which are ``[f]acilities that collect and
segregate IP 911 traffic from non-911 traffic for multiple OSPs, or
transport such traffic for ultimate delivery to an NG911 Delivery Point
or ESInet;'' and (5) operators of ``interstate interconnecting
facilities between ESInets.'' \91\ We seek comment on this proposal, as
discussed in further detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ See proposed rules at Sec. Sec. 9.19(a)(4)(i)(C) through
(G), 9.19(a)(12) and (13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Operators of LISs and LNGs
The framework adopted in the NG911 Transition Order addresses
technology changes that are occurring in NG911 networks over the entire
course of the 911 call flow, from origination to delivery to PSAPs. The
in-state or in-territory NG911 Delivery Point serves as the demarcation
point that presumptively divides responsibility for processing and
transmitting NG911 traffic between OSPs on the one hand and 911
Authorities on the other.\92\ The NGCS Location Facilities and NGCS
Routing Facilities we discuss above address NG911 core services that
are being provided on the 911 Authority side of the demarcation point.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ NG911 Transition Order at *3, 26, paras. 6, 71. The NG911
Transition Order does not place any affirmative requirements on 911
Authorities. Instead, it invites 911 Authorities to adopt the
Commission's NG911 framework, and, if they do, OSPs providing NG911
service to the 911 Authorities are assigned a series of performance
and cost obligations from origination to the demarcation point in
the absence of an alternate agreement with the 911 Authority. See
id. at *2-3, paras. 2-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the OSP side of the demarcation point, the NG911 Transition
Order requires OSPs that receive a valid request for NG911 service to
incorporate certain NG911 functional elements into their networks,
because those elements are necessary in order for ESInets to be able to
route and deliver NG911 traffic
[[Page 23779]]
and to provide their full array of core services. First, the NG911
Transition Order requires OSPs to put into operation a LIS or its
functional equivalent (or to acquire equivalent services from a third
party) in order to verify their customers' location information.\93\
That location information is then embedded with the 911 call and
delivered to an NG911 Delivery Point or ESInet and is used by the
ESInet's NGCS Location Facilities and NGCS Routing Facilities to route
and deliver 911 calls. Second, in some cases, OSPs may be using an LNG
(or acquiring equivalent services), in order to translate TDM-
originated 911 traffic into SIP format before the 911 traffic is handed
off to the ESInet.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ Id. at *2, para. 3. See also 47 CFR 9.28 (formally defining
a LIS as a ``functional element that provides locations of
endpoints. A LIS can provide Location-by-Reference or Location-by-
Value, and, if the latter, in geodetic or civic forms. A LIS can be
queried by an endpoint for its own location, or by another entity
for the location of an endpoint.''). ``A LIS [may] be a database, or
[may] be a protocol interworking function to an access network-
specific protocol. In NG9-1-1, the LIS supplies location (by value
or reference) to the endpoint, or to a proxy operating on behalf of
the endpoint.'' NENA i3 Standard, Sec. 4.10 (emphasis removed).
\94\ NG911 Transition Order at *26, para. 71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because all 911 traffic must access LISs and all TDM-based 911
traffic must be converted to SIP format via LNGs, we believe it is
critical that operators of these facilities employ reasonable
reliability practices. The need for reliability is especially
significant given that national carriers appear to be relying on a
relatively small number of these facilities to service large portions
of their networks and to deliver 911 traffic to ESInets across many
states. We seek comment on our proposal to designate operators of LISs
(or equivalent IP 911 location databases) and LNGs as CSPs.
b. Operators of Major Transport Facilities and IP Traffic Aggregation
Facilities
When the Commission adopted the reliability rules in 2013, it
excluded third-party transport providers and 911 aggregation services
from the definition of CSPs because, at that time, they did not play a
central role in the provision of 911 service.\95\ We tentatively
conclude that, in the decade that has since passed, these providers
have become crucial to the provision of NG911 service at the interstate
and national level, and, therefore, they should be subject to the same
reliability and transparency requirements as other providers of covered
services. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17490, para. 39; id.,
at n.90 (noting a commenter's argument that the reliability rules
``should apply to backhaul providers and aggregators of 911 call
traffic'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our understanding is that many OSPs now rely on high-capacity, IP-
based fiber networks provided by third parties--which we refer to as
Major Transport Facilities--to carry their 911 traffic to ESInets and
PSAPs. These transport networks aggregate traffic (both 911 traffic and
non-911 traffic) from multiple OSPs located in various states and carry
it over long distances. The degree to which the 911 ecosystem has
become dependent on these intermediate transport services is reflected
in the outage investigations conducted by the Commission and by the
outage reports submitted by OSPs through NORS. As we describe above, a
number of multistate ``sunny day'' 911 outages have been caused by
failures arising in or otherwise compromising Major Transport
Facilities. Despite their outsized impact on 911 service, these
networks currently fall within a gap in the Commission's rules; as
providers of third-party transport service, they are neither CSPs nor
OSPs, meaning they are not covered by the 911 reliability rules that
are focused on routing and transmission services near the end of the
911 call flow nor by the Part 4 outage reporting rules relating to call
originators and CSPs.
We wish to be cautious in how we define Major Transport Facilities
so that Sec. 9.19 continues to be focused on only the most critical
911 and NG911 elements and does not encompass smaller transport
providers whose facilities do not pose a risk of widespread 911
outages. Accordingly, we propose to limit the definition Major
Transport Facilities to providers that operate dedicated SIP transport
facilities meeting or exceeding OC3 capacity; that also collect or
transmit 911 traffic originated by multiple OSPs; and that also carry
911 traffic over interstate routes for ultimate delivery to an NG911
Delivery Point or ESInet.\96\ We derive the proposed OC3 capacity from
the outage reporting requirements in Sec. 4.9. That rule requires
``outage reporting for communication disruptions impacting major
transport facilities, specifically those with significant traffic-
carrying capacity[.]'' \97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ See proposed rules at Sec. Sec. 9.19(a)(4)(i)(E),
9.19(a)(12).
\97\ In the Matter of Amends. to Part 4 of the Commission's
Rules Concerning Disruptions to Commc'ns; New Part 4 of the
Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications; The
Proposed Extension of Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Regarding
Outage Reporting to Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol
Service Providers and Broadband internet Service Providers, PS
Docket Nos. 15-80, 11-82, 31 FCC Rcd 5817, 5822, para. 11 (2016), 81
FR 45055 (July 12, 2016), 81 FR 45095 (July 12, 2016); see also In
the Matter of Amends. to Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Concerning
Disruptions to Commc'ns; New Part 4 of the Commission's Rules
Concerning Disruptions to Communications, PS Docket No. 15-80, 30
FCC Rcd 3206, 3212-13, para. 19 (2015), 80 FR 34321 (June 16, 2015),
80 FR 34350 (June 16, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operators of IP Traffic Aggregation Facilities provide a niche
service to OSPs: they segregate or collect segregated 911 traffic from
OSPs and process and transmit the traffic towards the appropriate NG911
Delivery Points or ESInets.\98\ We allowed the use of such services in
the NG911 Transition Order because they ``enable multiple small
carriers to bundle their data streams and share the cost of
transporting the pooled data stream to a common destination, resulting
in lower overall costs than if each OSP paid for separate transport.''
\99\ As with Major Transport Facilities, a large percentage of 911
traffic now passes through IP Traffic Aggregation Facilities. For
example, one of these providers claims that it has ``deployments of
NG911 call aggregation service in states and counties across the
country'' \100\ and that its 911 aggregation network serves 40% of the
U.S. population. The provider claims to process more than 1.8 million
911 calls per month and to deliver the calls to more than 5,000 PSAPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ See proposed rules at Sec. Sec. 9.19(a)(4)(i)(F),
9.19(a)(13).
\99\ NG911 Transition Order at *47, para. 138.
\100\ Sinch, NG911 call aggregator, Inteliquent, leads U.S.
public safety, https://sinch.com/news/ng911-call-aggregator-inteliquent-leads-us-public-safety/?UTM-Inteliquent (last visited
Feb. 14, 2025). Sinch acquired Inteliquent in 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We expect the roles of Major Transport Facilities and IP Traffic
Aggregation Facilities to only increase as a result of the NG911
Transition Order, because it requires OSPs to deliver the 911 traffic
they originate to NG911 Delivery Points that 911 Authorities may
designate at any location within their state or territorial
borders.\101\ If these newly-designated traffic hand-off points are
located outside of an OSPs' certificated service areas, OSPs may choose
to procure the services of Major Transport Facilities and/or IP Traffic
Aggregation Facilities rather than incur the high cost of building out
their own networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ NG911 Transition Order at *55, para. 163.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We tentatively conclude that Major Transport Facilities and IP
Traffic Aggregation Facilities have become critical to the overall
reliability of the 911 ecosystem and that their operators therefore
should comply with reasonable reliability standards. We
[[Page 23780]]
seek comment on this tentative conclusion. Commenters in the NG911
Transition proceeding observed the important roles that these third-
party entities have come to have.\102\ We also believe that federal-
level oversight of Major Transport Facilities and IP Traffic
Aggregation Facilities is appropriate because they typically have
multi-state or national footprints that exceed the scope of regulation
or contractual terms imposed by any individual state or local
government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ See, e.g., USTelecom Comments, PS Docket No. 21-479, at 5
(filed Aug. 9, 2023) (noting that NG911 systems will make it more
challenging for wireline providers to comply with the Commission's
911 reliability rules, because 911 call traffic will be traveling
over third-party networks); Windstream Reply Comments, PS Docket No.
21-479, at 2-3 (filed Sep. 8, 2023) (arguing that NG911 traffic
aggregators should be subject to the Commission's rules relating to
disruption notification requirements, which currently apply to
OSPs); Home Telephone Comments, PS Docket No. 21-479, at 8, 14-17
(filed Aug. 9, 2023) (asserting that the use of NG911 call
aggregators needs to be addressed to ensure reliability); NTCA
Comments, PS Docket No. 21-479, at 4-5, 6-7 (filed Aug. 9, 2023)
(predicting that NG911 will expand OSPs' use of third-party
networks).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We seek comment on the inclusion of these providers in the
definition of CSPs. Have Major Transport Facilities and IP Traffic
Aggregation Facilities become critical to the reliable and
interoperable transmission of 911 traffic to PSAPs? How frequently have
outages impacting 911 originated within these facilities, and what were
the causes and consequences of the outages? Would one or both of these
definitions capture instances where ESInet operators accept 911 traffic
at an NG911 Delivery Point, send the traffic out of state for
processing, and then back in-state to the ESInet for ultimate delivery
to a PSAP? Do our proposed definitions appropriately describe these
providers, or should they be defined more narrowly or broadly? For
example, should we update the ``OC3 and equivalent'' standard for Major
Transport Facilities to ``1 Gbps (or 10 Gbps) Ethernet and
equivalent,'' to better reflect modern IP transport facilities in use
today? \103\ Should we further limit the definition of Major Transport
Facilities so that it refers only to facilities that carry a minimum
volume of 911 traffic? If so, what is an appropriate minimum threshold?
Should it be based on the number of 911 calls handled by the facility,
on the number of OC3 minutes of 911 traffic, or some other metric?
\104\ Also, what specific costs would these providers incur if they
were included as CSPs, and what would be the benefits to the
reliability of the NG911 network? Are there other classes of providers
that should be included as well, and why? \105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ Is OC3 Bandwidth Still a Good Choice?, GigaPackets,
https://www.gigapackets.com/articles/oc3bandwidth.php (``The SONET
family of line rates spans OC-1 at 52 Mbps on up to OC-768 at 40
Gbps. But in practice, only a few optical carrier levels are
standard and readily available. These are OC-3 at 155 Mbps, OC-12 at
622 Mbps, OC-48 at 2.5 Gbps, OC-192 at 10 Gbps and OC-768 at 40 Gbps
. . . Standard Ethernet WAN services mirror the standard Ethernet
LAN speeds of 10 Mbps, 100 Mbps, 1 Gbps and 10 Gbps.'') (last
visited Feb. 18, 2025).
\104\ Note that we also are proposing to modify the 911
reliability certification form to ask NG911 CSPs to report the
volume of 911 traffic handled by their facilities that do not
conform to the Commission's reliability best practices.
\105\ Bandwidth, Inc. argues that ``local exchange carriers'
discontinuance of TDM services'' and a lack of ``alternative
interconnection facilities, such as Ethernet'' is negatively
impacting 911 reliability and the NG911 transition. See Bandwidth,
Inc. Ex Parte, PS Docket 21-479, at 1-2 (filed Mar. 20, 2025). The
broader TDM to IP technology transition is outside of the scope of
today's Further Notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Operators of ESInet Interconnection Facilities
Finally, we propose to designate interstate interconnecting
facilities between ESInets as critical 911 facilities. As we explain in
greater detail below, while ESInets are providing greater PSAP-to-PSAP
interoperability within their areas of deployment compared to legacy
networks, there is a concerning lack of interoperability between
different ESInet providers. Interstate interoperability is especially
low for the types of data associated with the advanced features that
NG911 is meant to deliver, such as GIS-based location information, SMS
text, and Multimedia Emergency Services (MMES), that enhance the
accessibility of emergency services to persons with disabilities.
We do not propose requiring ESInets to adopt any particular
technological solution to the interoperability problem, only that they
take reasonable measures to provide reliable and interoperable 911
service and confirm their interoperability with other ESInets by
conducting conformance testing. We expect, however, that whatever
solutions ESInets adopt to become interoperable will require the
exchange of potentially large amounts of data and may also require
external data connections and therefore will be critical to the
resiliency of NG911 service.\106\ We therefore propose that these
interconnection facilities should be treated as critical facilities
that are subject to Sec. 9.19 reliability standards and certification
requirements. We seek comment on this proposal and on our analysis
above. We also seek comment on how designating providers of
interconnecting facilities between ESInets as CSPs would affect the
accessibility of advanced, multimedia NG911 services for persons with
disabilities, as well as estimates of cost impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ CSRIC VII WG 4 Report at 5-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Reliability Requirements
a. Reasonableness Standard
We propose that any entity providing the foregoing critical NG911
capabilities or facilities be subject to the current requirement in
Sec. 9.19 to take ``reasonable measures'' to ensure reliability.\107\
We believe moving to IP-based architecture in NG911 inherently improves
reliability by enabling greater redundancy and geodiversity.\108\ We
further believe that it is reasonable for NG911 CSPs to ensure network
reliability by adhering to prevailing industry standards.\109\ We
therefore tentatively conclude that these prevailing industry standards
are achievable for CSPs at acceptable additional cost.\110\ We further
propose that CSPs may presumptively meet this
[[Page 23781]]
reasonableness requirement by adopting reliability practices in three
broad areas: physical diversity, network monitoring, and operational
integrity (which as proposed will subsume and replace backup
power).\111\ We seek comment on these proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ 47 CFR 9.19(a)(4)(i)(A) and 9.19(a)(4)(i)(B) (applying
rules to ``functional equivalent'' facilities and ``equivalent NG911
capabilities''); 47 CFR 9.19(b) (``All covered 911 service providers
shall take reasonable measures to provide reliable 911 service with
respect to circuit diversity, central-office backup power, and
diverse network monitoring.'').
\108\ NG911 Transition Order at *64, para. 185, n.546 (``NG911
materially reduces the number of 911 outages by improving network
availability and reliability as IP allows for greater redundancy. It
provides greater geodiversity for PSAPs--no longer will there be a
single point of failure at a selective router.'') (internal citation
omitted); See also Sophia Fox-Sowell, North Carolina officials say
next-generation 911 network withstood Hurricane Helene, State Scoop
(Oct. 21, 2024) (`` `Had the old technology and analog network still
been in place, the infrastructure would have been destroyed . . . .
Thanks to the resiliency and redundancy of this network, we had no
reports of 911 calls not being delivered.' ''), at https://statescoop.com/north-carolina-next-generation-911-hurricane-helene/.
\109\ CSRIC VI, WG 1 Report at 115 (``Network Operators . . .
should implement a continuous engineering process to identify and
record single points of failure and any components that are critical
to the continuity of the infrastructure . . . [and] pursue
architectural solutions to mitigate the identified risks . . . .''),
p. 124 (providers should ``design networks with redundant
interconnectivity to'' ESInets), p. 122 (``Network Operators . . .
should identify and manage critical network elements and
architecture that are essential for network connectivity and
subscriber services considering . . . functional redundancy and
geographical diversity.'').
\110\ See e.g. Interstate Nat. Gas Ass'n of Am. v. Pipeline &
Hazardous Materials Safety Admin., 2024 U.S. App. Lexis 20710, *22
(D.C. Cir. 2024) (``[T]he final rule invokes certain consensus
industry standards that most operators already successfully utilize,
so the incremental cost . . . would be negligible.'') (cleaned up);
see also Public Serv. Co. v. FCC, 328 F.3d 675, 680 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(``In its analysis, the FCC approved of the Bureau's assessment of
the prevailing industry standards'' to determine a reasonable pole
attachment rate.).
\111\ 47 CFR 9.19(b) (``Performance of the elements of the
certification set forth in [paragraph c] of this section shall be
deemed to satisfy the requirements of this paragraph.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Importantly, our proposed approach would retain the current
structure of the 911 reliability regulations, which imposes a
reliability ``reasonableness'' standard on all CSPs, subject to
equitable remediation orders by the Bureau for failure to demonstrate
reasonableness of network practices.\112\ We propose to continue to
allow CSPs to achieve presumptive reasonableness for specified CSP
facilities by affirmatively implementing network practices described in
the regulations.\113\ This structure is designed to enable the Bureau
to investigate \114\ and validate network reliability based on filed
certifications which show how well and how much of a CSP's network
meets the Commission's standards. This process in turn enables the
Commission to take preemptive actions to prevent outages before they
occur. Bureau investigations can proceed by asking CSPs to provide
information about the costs they would incur to upgrade their network
reliability measures and assessing, from a cost-benefit standpoint,
whether incurring such cost would be reasonable in light of the
increased risk of critical 911 facility failure created by the CSPs'
existing measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17492, para. 44 (``As
discussed below, we adopt rules to require that Covered 911 Service
Providers (1) take reasonable measures to ensure reliable 911
service and (2) certify annually that they do so by adhering either
to specified, essential practices based on established industry
consensus or to appropriate alternative measures demonstrated to be
reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of failure.''). See also
47 CFR 0.392(j), 9.19(b).
\113\ 47 CFR 9.19(b).
\114\ 47 CFR 0392(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While we propose to keep the reasonableness standard that the
Commission adopted in 2013, we propose to identify new ``best
practice'' benchmarks for NG911 providers to allow them to
presumptively satisfy the reasonableness requirement. We also propose
to modify the process by which CSPs report alternative reliability
measures to enable the Bureau to better assess reasonableness of
network practices. We seek comment on this proposed framework, in
tandem with the proposed reliability benchmarks below.
b. Benchmarks for CSP Demonstration of Presumptive Reasonableness
We propose to expand the range of required network reliability
practices to ensure they better capture all relevant factors in the
reliability of NG911 networks.\115\ The Commission based its original
2013 rules ``on the Derecho Report and other prior experiences with
natural disasters'' and therefore required reliability certifications
only for circuit diversity, central-office backup power, and diverse
network monitoring.\116\ However, the Commission observed that as
technologies evolve, ``categories based on legacy 911 networks may not
adequately reflect reasonable measures to provide reliable service,
particularly in an NG911 environment.'' \117\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ 2014 Reliability NPRM, 29 FCC Rcd at 14223-24, para. 37
([``W]e seek to ensure that the Commission remains equipped,
consistent with its statutory mandates and existing legal authority,
with the proper regulatory tools to enforce continued and clear
lines of accountability for reliable 911 call completion, including
as the nation transitions to an IP-based NG911 architecture.''). The
Commission noted, for example, the April 2014 multistate 911 outage
resulted from a software coding error that disrupted routing of 911
calls and inadequate alarm management, which resulted in
``significant delays in determining the software fault and restoring
911 service to full functionality.'' 2014 Reliability NPRM, 29 FCC
Rcd at 14226, para. 43, citing 2014 Multistate Outage Report at 3.
\116\ 2014 Reliability NPRM, 29 FCC Rcd at 14226, para. 43
(internal quotations omitted).
\117\ Id. at 14226, para. 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We intend for today's proposed benchmarks for presumptive
reasonability to capture the IP network engineering principles of
reliability, resiliency, redundancy, physical diversity, and geographic
diversity, which we believe most responsible NG911 network operators
should be implementing. We wish to preserve the flexibility of PSAPs,
911 Authorities, and state governments regarding how best to allocate
resources to meet their reliability needs,\118\ while still adequately
capturing the increasingly interstate and interlinked nature of NG911
where national standards may aid 911 Authorities.\119\ Finally, our
intent is that these NG911 reliability benchmarks would not apply to
the origination of 911 traffic by OSPs, but would apply to service
providers who aggregate 911 traffic or perform other critical NG911
functions and services for multiple OSPs.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ See, e.g., Texas 9-1-1 Entities Reply Comments, PS Docket
No. 14-193, at 2, n.6 (filed April 21, 2015) (FCC reliability
regulation of state contractors could increase the costs for PSAPs
and state governments to hire contractors and delay NG911
transitions and deployments); NASNA Comments, PS Docket No. 14-193,
at 2 (filed March 17, 2015) (PSAPs and 911 Authorities should be
responsible for ensuring the reliability of 911 network services
provided by their contractors); Washington Utilities and
Transportation Commission Comments, PS Docket No. 14-193, at 3-4
(filed March 17, 2015) (911 oversight in Washington state is already
shared by the Utilities and Transportation Commission, the
Washington Military Department, and the E91l County
Coordinators.'').
\119\ Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission Reply Comments,
PS Docket No. 14-193, at 9 (filed April 21, 2015) (``The Pa PUC does
support the development of a federal regulatory `backstop' to
eliminate gaps between federal and State authority. Where multi-
state aspects of interlinked 911 network architectures exist, or
where technology trends make vulnerabilities more likely or cause
confusion to PSAPs and end-users, the Commission is best positioned
to forge resolutions and develop national standards.''); Washington
Utilities and Transportation Commission Comments, PS Docket No. 14-
193, at 4 (filed March 17, 2015) (``Although it is true that
technological and marketplace changes are altering the manner in
which some components of 911 service are handled, including
increasing reliance on network components and technology that are
multi-state in nature, the vast majority of 911 calls originate and
terminate within or to nearby PSAPs within each state and county and
are jurisdictionally intrastate in nature. Accordingly, federal
efforts should be dedicated to measures that assist, or complement,
state and local governance efforts, rather than act to supersede
them.'').
\120\ NG911 Transition Order at *69, para. 202 (``. . . OSPs
could significantly lower the overall costs of transmitting 911
calls to ESInets by taking advantage of third-party aggregators'
services.''); NG911 Transition Order at *71, para. 206 (``CSRIC
explains that LIS as a service is contemplated as an NG911 solution
at `minimal expense' to small OSPs, as it relieves OSPs of most
costs beyond monthly services, and an LNG and can be provided either
by a commercial vendor or the 911 authority.''); Home Telephone
NG911 Notice Comments at iii (``[T]he Commission should focus on the
back-end for-profit entities that aggregate front-end 911
transmissions from multiple jurisdictions, process, and then deliver
via back-end connections IP-based information to the appropriate
local [PSAPs]. The Commission should establish standards and
reporting requirements for these `Aggregators' to ensure the NG911
network is safe and reliable for IP emergency transmissions destined
to local PSAPs.''); Bandwidth NG911 Notice Comments at 2-3
(``Bandwidth predominately acts as a VoIP Positioning Center (`VPC')
where it provides stand-alone emergency location and 911 call
routing capabilities for its VoIP service provider customers . . . .
Bandwidth has a robust network that reaches across the United States
and Canada and delivers around 3 million calls a year from 26.7
million end points . . . . To date, Bandwidth established network
aggregation capabilities to route its customers' 911 traffic through
16 ESInets.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The purpose of these benchmark and certification proposals is to
give the Commission reasonable oversight of CSP reliability practices
while avoiding micromanagement of the network construction and design
decisions of private entities. Accordingly, we do not propose to
specify the details of reliable network practices down to the level of
daily operational decisions and practices. Rather, we seek to
articulate the kinds of measures that would demonstrate presumptive
reliability when requesting certification. We seek comment on how best
to improve 911 reliability and gather information that is reasonably
actionable for efficient and
[[Page 23782]]
effective Commission and 911 Authority oversight, while also ensuring
robust notice of ``reasonable'' reliability compliance expectations for
CSPs. We also seek comment on whether adopting a reasonable reliability
standard of ``five nines'' availability would be another valuable
measure for determining compliance, or whether annual CSP facility
availability time should be reported in addition to these
benchmarks.\121\ How should ``five nines'' availability be calculated?
\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ See In the Matter of the Nebraska Public Service
Commission, on its own motion, conducting an investigation into the
911 service outage that began on August 31, 2023 in areas of
Nebraska served by Lumen, Application Nos. 911-075/PI-248 and 911-
077/C-5581/PI-252, Order Issuing Findings and Closing Investigation,
p. 24 (Jan. 15, 2025), https://www.nebraska.gov/psc/orders/state911/2025-01-14%20911-075%20PI-248%20911-077%20C-5581%20PI-252%20Order%20Issuing%20Findings%20and%20Closing%20Investigation.pdf
(``Mr. Rosen then explained that five nines is a term used in 911
systems to determine reliability of a 911 system, and the term
refers to a 911 system being available 99.999% of the time. Mr.
Rosen said there are two ways to determine availability. One way is
to determine the actual availability of the system based on the
period of time the system has been operational. In the alternative,
availability can be determined by calculating two quantities: the
mean time between failures and the mean time to repair for each
component in the network.'') (Nebraska PSC Order).
\122\ FCC, Task Force on Optimal PSAP Architecture (TFOPA),
Adopted Final Report, p. 103, (2016), https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/911/TFOPA/TFOPA_FINALReport_012916.pdf (``While `five nines' is
the generally accepted minimum availability service level, it should
be noted that this equates to 5.26 minutes of unscheduled downtime
or service unavailability per year. Another important factor when
comparing network availability to consider is specifically how
different network service providers define availability and how it
is calculated. For example, scheduled maintenance events are
typically not included/classified as downtime. The ESInet by design
incorporates multiple paths for voice and data transmission. The
failure of a single element within the network or congestion along a
path will not necessarily limit the ability to deliver traffic.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Physical Diversity
We propose specifying that the critical IP paths subject to the
rules be subject to physical diversity requirements appropriate to
NG911 and transitional networks.\123\ For legacy 911 circuits, the best
practice benchmark of audits and tagging will remain the same. For
NG911 facilities, we propose that ``physical diversity'' would mean
that critical paths established by CSPs must be geographically
diverse,\124\ load-balanced,\125\ and capable of automatic failover to
the backup element (e.g., redundant routers or node connections and
links) and automatic reroutes to redundant paths in the transport layer
in the event of path failure.\126\ Redundant routers or node paths and
links should be located in different geographic locations (i.e., in
different physical facilities). We seek comment on this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ CSRIC VI, WG 1 Report at 51 (``It is assumed in this
Report that all network elements and transport facilities are
deployed with redundancy'').
\124\ 2014 Reliability NPRM, 29 FCC Rcd at 14227, para. 45,
n.106 (``For example, network architectures utilizing . . .
databases in different geographic locations . . . will be more
reliable and resilient than those that route all calls through a
single active database . . . .'').
\125\ Id. at 14227, para. 45, n.107 (``A 911 network is `load
balanced' if call volume is dynamically distributed among all
available databases or call processing facilities rather than
concentrated in one location. Calls assigned to each database should
be automatically rerouted to the other in the event of a fault with
the primary route. Furthermore, if two or more PSAPs share the same
911 service provider and rely on each other as a backup PSAP for
rerouting of 911 calls, the 911 service provider should consider
assigning each PSAP to a different primary routing database.'').
\126\ Id. at 14227, para. 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In general, ``physical diversity'' means that data between two
points in a network can be transmitted over diverse routes that do not
share any common physical segments, such as fiber-optic cables,
conduits, or structures, so that a single failure at any point on one
of those data paths, such as a power outage, equipment failure, or
cable cut, would not cause both paths to fail and disrupt the
transmission of data between those points. Importantly, we propose to
add geographic diversity as a necessary part of this updated definition
for IP paths, to ensure service providers can automatically re-route
911 traffic to travel over a different path that is both physically
diverse and geographically separated. We seek comment on the
appropriateness of geographical diversity as part of the physical
diversity requirement for IP-based networks.
In 2013, the Commission included ``circuit auditing and tagging''
as an element of the 911 reliability rules, which requires CSPs to
certify annually whether they have (1) audited the physical diversity
of critical 911 circuits \127\ or equivalent data paths to any PSAP
served, (2) tagged such circuits to reduce the probability of
inadvertent loss of diversity between audits,\128\ and (3) eliminated
all single points of failure in critical 911 circuits or equivalent
data paths serving each PSAP.\129\ If a CSP has not implemented the
third element (i.e., the elimination of all single points of failure),
it must certify ``[w]hether it has taken alternative measures to
mitigate the risk of critical 911 circuits that are not physically
diverse or is taking steps to remediate any issues that it has
identified with respect to 911 service to the PSAP.'' \130\ Respondents
also may certify that the circuit auditing requirement is not
applicable because they do not operate any critical 911 circuits.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ Critical 911 circuits are defined as ``911 facilities that
originate at a selective router or its functional equivalent and
terminate in the central office that serves the PSAP(s) to which the
selective router or its functional equivalent delivers 911 calls,
including all equipment in the serving central office necessary for
the delivery of 911 calls to the PSAP(s).'' They also include
automatic location information (ALI) and automatic number
information (ANI) connecting circuits that originate at the ALI or
ANI database and terminate in the central office that serves the
PSAP. See 47 CFR 9.19(a)(5).
\128\ The rules define tagging as ``[a]n inventory management
process whereby critical 911 circuits are labeled in circuit
inventory databases to make it less likely that circuit
rearrangements will compromise diversity.'' Covered 911 Service
Providers may use any system they wish to tag circuits so long as it
tracks whether those circuits are physically diverse and identifies
changes that would compromise such diversity. See 47 CFR
9.19(a)(11).
\129\ See 47 CFR 9.19(c)(1)(i).
\130\ 47 CFR 9.19(c)(1)(ii)(A).
\131\ For example, small or rural local exchange carriers (LECs)
may provide administrative lines to PSAPs but do not typically
operate selective routers or control the facilities that connect
selective routers to the central offices serving each PSAP. In such
cases, they could respond that the circuit auditing element of the
certification is not applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2013, the Commission required CSPs to certify to circuit
diversity measures for paths between a selective router or its
functional equivalent and the central office serving a PSAP. The
Commission further identified routing and 911 traffic aggregation as
distinct functions performed by the selective router.\132\ While this
standard always applies to aggregated circuits when service is directly
provided to a PSAP, under today's proposals if 911 traffic aggregation
and routing are occurring at different points, both functions would
trigger the requirement under our rules specify the examples that
``functional equivalence'' includes IP traffic paths from NGCS facility
capabilities (when provided directly to PSAPs), or from an aggregation
point located in a different central office from the selective
router.\133\ In 2014, the Commission introduced concepts such as
dynamic routing, load balancing, automatic re-routing, and geographic
facility diversity as reliability best practices for IP network paths
and facilities.\134\ In
[[Page 23783]]
2015, the Commission observed that NG911 networks achieve reliability
and resiliency with geographic diversity and dynamic routing instead of
traditional TDM circuit auditing and tagging.\135\ Today we propose to
add critical paths of major transport facilities and 911 aggregation
network facilities as subject to our physical diversity rules
regardless of whether the provider has direct service contracts with a
PSAP or other answering point.\136\ Furthermore, we propose to codify
additional physical diversity technical standards to encompass both
legacy and NG911 facilities, to ensure that NG911 entities will no
longer have to explain each year that they are using the IP
``alternative'' to legacy TDM 911 reliability. We seek comment on our
assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 Rcd at 17478, para. 7 (``The
local switch then sends the call to an aggregation point called a
selective router . . .'') (italics added).
\133\ See proposed rules at Sec. 9.19(a)(4)(i)(A)-(B), Sec.
919(a)5(i).
\134\ 2014 Reliability NPRM, 29 FCC Rcd at 14227, para. 45,
nn.106, 107 (proposing to expand reliability certifications for
NG911 to ensure IP-based 911 architecture is geographically
distributed, load-balanced, and capable of automatic reroutes.'');
Id., 29 FCC Rcd at 14243-44, Appx. A, Proposed Rules 12.4(a)(12) to
(14), 12.4 (c)(4).
\135\ 2015 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8656, para.
15.
\136\ See e.g. Nebraska PSC Order, p. 40 (``While the Commission
recognizes the failures were all between the aggregation point and
the LNG, and not the ESInet nor core services, Lumen designed,
installed and implemented this system and continues to be
responsible for its failing infrastructure.''); see also CenturyLink
Communications, LLC d/b/a Lumen Technologies Group's Responses to
Commission Staff's First Set of Data Requests, at 4 (Dec. 1, 2023)
(``Because of this outage, impacted calls never reached the NG911
network. The outage also impacted the SS7 links that connected to
the [] aggregation point, preventing some OSPs' 911 calls from
completing from that aggregation point.''), https://psc.nebraska.gov/sites/psc.nebraska.gov/files/doc/Exhibit%20List%20%26%20Exhibit%201-30.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, we seek comment on whether our proposed reliability
measure for IP physical diversity is sufficiently inclusive, and on the
likely compliance costs and lives-saved benefits from adopting this
rule. We note that today's proposed rules are not meant to capture
every single transit provider of general internet traffic, but rather
dedicated transport providers that carry substantial 911 traffic.\137\
Does the explicit inclusion of major transport paths and 911 aggregator
networks capture enough of the critical 911 bottleneck infrastructure
to reasonably improve 911 reliability? Or does this proposal sweep too
many OSP operators of IP traffic-aggregated paths into the CSP
category, and if so, what metric could be used to better distinguish
the most critical 911 transport and aggregation points and paths which
should be covered in an NG911 environment? Should we also designate
additional paths to and from the LIS as covered critical paths, or
would that expand the CSP category too far to include the majority of
OSPs? In the alternative, should LIS and LNG operators be at least
required to ensure physically diverse ingress and egress points from
their facilities? What would the additional costs be of such an
expansion of this benchmark?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ NG911 Transition Order at *47, para. 140 (commenters argue
``the Commission should establish rules requiring the transport of
911 traffic over dedicated SIP lines, and highlight that there are
several options available to OSPs to comply with IP delivery rules
with varying reliability . . . . We decline to establish the
requested rules . . . . At this time, we provide flexibility to 911
Authorities, in concert with their NG911 vendors, to determine the
IP-based SIP format to request from OSPs.''); NG911 Transition Order
at *47, para. 140, n.414 (commenters ask the Commission to consider
the costs of routing 911 traffic over a ``dedicated connection'' as
opposed to ``best efforts public internet connections'') (internal
citations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Network Monitoring
In the 911 reliability rules adopted in 2013, the Commission
required CSPs to certify whether they have taken the following steps to
ensure reliable monitoring of critical components of their networks:
(a) conducting audits of aggregation points for gathering network
monitoring data, (b) conducting audits of monitoring links, and (c)
implementing physically diverse aggregation points and links.\138\ We
propose to expand this existing requirement--which requires physical
diversity between monitoring points and physically diverse links to
network operations center (NOC) control points--by also including
appropriate NG911 monitoring technologies identified in prior
Commission orders as methods of compliance.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ See 47 CFR 9.19(c)(3)(i).
\139\ CSRIC VI, WG 1 Report at 52 (``The NG9-1-1 SSP will be
responsible for monitoring IP connections for transport alarms.
Where appropriate, heartbeats may be used to verify the availability
of network facilities. NG9-1-1SSPs should provide the means for
capturing network traffic, generating alarms, and producing other
metrics for monitoring and troubleshooting outages within NG
Emergency Services Networks, as well as those impacting the ability
of an NG Emergency Services Network to deliver calls to the target
PSAP.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe this revised rule should apply equally to both legacy
and NG911 architectures. NG911-appropriate standards for network
monitoring rely on automatic disruption detection and alarms.\140\ The
legacy 911 best practice of network monitoring via link and aggregation
point audits \141\ would continue to be a means of compliance for
legacy facilities. In either case, network monitoring should ensure the
performance of the critical NG911 ecosystem facilities of routers,
LISs, and LNGs in real time by detecting failures, disruptions, or
degradations in 911 service. We also propose that this new monitoring
benchmark for IP networks should specify IP-appropriate monitoring of
critical NG911 ecosystem facilities we identify today, including LNGs,
LISs, and the IP routers responsible for path diversity. Should the IP
monitoring benchmark be expanded further to interoperability
capabilities, where applicable? We seek comment on our assessments and
on this proposed benchmark.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ 2014 Reliability NPRM, 29 FCC Rcd at 14243, Appendix A,
Proposed Rule 12.4(c)(3)(i)(D); Id., 29 FCC Rcd at 14244-45,
Appendix A, Proposed Rule 12.4(c)(5)(i)(A).
\141\ 47 CFR 9.19(c)(3)(i)(1)-(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) Operational Integrity
The current ``backup power'' portion of the 911 reliability
certification requires CSPs to indicate whether they provide at least
24 hours of backup power at any central office that directly serves a
PSAP or at least 72 hours at any central office that hosts a selective
router, and whether they have implemented certain design and testing
procedures for backup power equipment.\142\ We propose to retain this
requirement for legacy central office facilities. However, we believe a
modified requirement should be applied to NG911 networks to ensure
continued operation in the event of a power outage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\ See 47 CFR 9.19(c)(2)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IP-based NG911 facilities, especially when cloud-based, can
reasonably be expected to have redundant and geographically distributed
backups located in different facilities sufficient to ensure that a
failure of any localized facility will not interrupt 911 traffic,\143\
and should have appropriate continuous power, such as an
uninterruptible power supply (UPS) device.\144\ In 2014 the Commission
observed that network architectures using ``two active databases in
different geographic locations, each of which is capable of handling
all 911 call traffic in the event of a fault in the other database,
will be more reliable and resilient than those that route all calls
through a single active database with backup equipment on passive
``standby'' mode.'' \145\ We seek comment on whether to codify this
geographic diversity standard as a best practice benchmark to improve
reliability. We also seek comment on whether requiring geographic
diversity
[[Page 23784]]
at different physical facilities is robust enough to ensure reasonable
reliability. Should we go further and require geographic diversity to
mean redundant functionality housed in different cities or states, not
just in different physical locations? Given the increasing size of
natural disasters, what would be an appropriate distance requirement?
Should we further expand the same IP operational integrity benchmark to
monitoring interoperability facilities, diverse IP paths, and redundant
routers, as well as to LIS and LNG facilities?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ CSRIC VI, WG 1 Report at 51 (``When the primary path is
unavailable, the alternate path can be instantly deployed to ensure
continuity of network services. As such the switching to a backup
configuration, in general, does not cause service degradation.'');
see also 2014 Reliability NPRM, 29 FCC Rcd at 14227, para. 45.
\144\ See e.g. FCC Urges Companies Using UPS Devices to Take
Action Against Threats, Public Notice (Apr. 7, 2022), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-382138A1.pdf.
\145\ 2014 Reliability NPRM, 29 FCC Rcd at 14227, para. 45,
n.106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Interoperability
As noted above, the lack of interoperability is a known concern in
NG911, which impairs and increases the cost of call and data transfer.
CSRIC VII observed that the ``transition from legacy to IP-based
networks, may result in hybrid system settings that commingle legacy
and IP network elements. While in this hybrid state, the 911 systems
operate at higher risk. For example, these systems may encounter
challenges in ensuring interoperability with respect to 911 calls and
related data.'' \146\ CSRIC VII also observed that data collected by
NASNA from showed low levels of interstate interoperability,
particularly for data associated with NG911 such as location or SMS
text as well as for features that enhance accessibility, (e.g.,
Multimedia Emergency Services (MMES).\147\ CSRIC VII found that ``[t]he
more advanced technologies used day to day by the general public such
as multi-media services had a very low level of respondents indicating
interoperability.'' \148\ As the NG911 transition progresses, these
interoperability issues are likely to manifest into incompatibilities
detrimental to the processing and receipt of 911 traffic and related
information by 911 Authorities across state lines.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\146\ CSRIC VII, WG 4 Report at 5.
\147\ Id. at Appendix B.
\148\ Id. at 25.
\149\ See Jackie Mines, How is NG911 progressing? (Feb. 11.
2025), https://urgentcomm.com/911/how-is-ng911-progressing- (``While
the [NG911 i3] standards were written with interoperability in mind,
if Vendor A interprets them differently than Vendor B, interfacing
the systems doesn't go well and sometimes is nearly impossible.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address these concerns, we propose to adopt interstate
interoperability requirements to support the reliable exchange of
interstate 911 traffic between ESInets. Specifically, we propose to
require that CSPs certify whether their interstate interconnecting
ESInet facilities achieve interoperability for exchanged 911 traffic
sufficiently to enable complete interstate transfers between
ESInets.\150\ In that connection, CSPs would annually certify whether
their interstate interconnecting ESInet facilities use conformance-
tested equipment and whether they have tested their interstate
interoperability capabilities. If a CSP cannot certify to these
elements, we propose to require the CSP to certify with respect to
those facilities: (1) whether it (or its ESInet facility operator) has
taken alternative measures to ensure interoperability between ESInets
in multiple states and between providers; (2) whether it believes that
one or more of the requirements of this paragraph are not applicable to
its facilities; and (3) to additional questions about the non-
conforming facilities as directed by the Bureau. We also propose to
apply the definition of ``NG911'' adopted in the NG911 Transition Order
to CSPs. Finally, we seek comment on the scope of our proposed
interoperability requirements relative to other NG911 elements and
whether to define interoperability to cover those elements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ Under our proposal, ESInet interconnecting facilities
operator refers to an entity that provides communication
capabilities between ESInets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Interstate Interoperability, Conformance and Interoperability
Testing, and Interoperability Certification
Conformance and Interoperability Testing. We propose to adopt an
interoperability best practice benchmark of testing and verification to
support interstate interoperability. We recognize that there have been
voluntary efforts to promote interoperability across NG911 vendors
through best practices, standards development and conformance testing,
but no national rules are in place for providers of NG911 capabilities.
Conformance testing, a process generally planned and developed by
industry organizations and conducted by certified labs, is a mechanism
that could be used to ensure that devices and network equipment that
are deployed are compliant with commonly accepted standards.
Consistent with our existing framework for reliability
certifications, we propose that CSPs submit an annual certification of
whether the equipment in their networks has undergone conformance
testing and if not, whether they are using alternative measures to
ensure interstate interoperability. Under our proposed approach, CSPs
would be required to certify that they are able to process and share
interstate 911 requests for emergency assistance and all associated
information consistent with commonly accepted standards. We seek
comment on this proposal. Is a certification approach sufficient to
ensure that interoperability between ESInets across multiple states can
be achieved without the need for proprietary interfaces, and regardless
of jurisdiction, equipment, device, software, service provider, or
other relevant factors? Should we require CSPs to certify that they are
capable of maintaining interstate interoperability during a ``sunny
day'' outage or disaster scenario?
We also seek comment on whether to adopt additional
interoperability benchmarks, such as requirement to conduct
interoperability testing between ESInets in addition to conformance
testing of technology used by ESInets. Interoperability testing is an
important mechanism for ensuring that CSPs are technically capable of
supporting interoperability between states and different service
providers. Unlike conformance testing, which can be used by a service
provider to demonstrate its NG911 solution conforms to a standard and
increases the likelihood of interoperability, interoperability testing
involves two or more service providers to demonstrate the exchange of
information. We therefore seek comment on adopting a benchmark that CSP
perform interoperability testing with two or more ESInets in different
states. To this end, we seek comment on requiring that CSPs annually
test and certify that they have performed interoperability testing with
at least two different providers in two different states, or if they
are using alternative measures to satisfy interstate interoperability.
Interoperability Certification and Alternative Measures. We propose
that CSPs submit an annual certification attesting to both conformance
testing and interoperability testing starting one year after OMB
approval of any associated information collection requirements. We seek
comment on whether CSPs will be reasonably able to conduct the required
testing within this time period. What processes or standards for test
labs need to be in place before conformance testing can begin? Are
there any other barriers to either conformance testing or
interoperability testing that would impact being able to submit this
certification?
Our proposed annual certification approach is consistent with our
existing requirement under Sec. 9.19(c).\151\ We also propose to
require CSPs to update their certifications annually to reflect any
[[Page 23785]]
changes in their interoperability solutions that render prior
certifications outdated. In addition, we seek comment on whether there
are other methods, in addition to conformance testing and
interoperability testing, for verifying that CSPs comply with
``commonly accepted standards'' and allow them to demonstrate that they
are technically capable of providing interoperability. For example, is
it necessary to specify end-to-end testing (typically required by the
customer) and/or performance testing (testing that simulates a real
world scenario)? \152\ Are any such methods more reliable than
conformance and interoperability testing for verifying interstate
interoperability? What are the potential costs of, and challenges with,
implementing any such methods?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\ 47 CFR 9.19(c).
\152\ See, e.g., iCERT Interoperability Testing Report at 10;
Brian Rosen Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 4 (filed Jul. 28, 2023)
(``Call transfer across ESInets is now standardized in NENA STA-
010.3, which is the standard that all current NGCS implementations
are currently at or are expected to be upgraded to soon. Vendor
testing at NENA ICE events and bilateral testing between vendors are
proving interoperability today.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, we propose to adopt an alternative ``reasonable''
interoperability requirement for providers of interstate ESInet
interconnecting facilities, following the same framework of Sec. 9.19
for reliability. As with the current Sec. 9.19 reliability
certifications, CSPs would be allowed to either certify to meeting the
interoperability benchmarks specified in the rules or to certify that
they have achieved reasonable interoperability using alternative
measures. We seek comment on this proposal. What alternative measures
in lieu of our benchmarks would likely be used to certify and
demonstrate ``reasonable'' interoperability? Should we require that
CSPs successfully test the transfer of interstate calls between ESInets
in order to demonstrate ``reasonable'' interoperability? What other
alternative measures would demonstrate reasonable interoperability?
NG911 and Commonly Accepted Standards. We propose to amend Sec.
9.19 of the rules to define providers of ``NG911'' capabilities by
cross-referencing the definition of NG911 in Sec. 9.28 of the rules.
The definition adopted in the NG911 Transition Order helps define
common sets of features and parameters at various points in the 911
call flow to allow any 911 call or text to be able to reach 911 call
takers. We believe our proposal, consistent with the NG911 Transition
Order, will help lay foundational elements to realizing
interoperability between OSPs to 911 Authorities in multiple states.
Under this proposal, CSPs would ``ensure interoperability'' and comply
with ``commonly accepted standards'' similar to OSPs. Our proposed rule
amendment would therefore ensure CSPs operate from the same baseline
requirements to facilitate interstate interoperability and promote
cooperation with OSPs. We seek comment on our proposal, including
potential costs.
In addition, we seek comment on alternative approaches to ensure
interstate interoperability. In response to the NG911 NPRM, some
commenters urged us to clarify the roles of OSPs and providers of NG911
services.\153\ APCO proposed that in addition to focusing on the
delivery of 911 traffic by OSPs, the Commission should take the ``next
step toward achieving public safety's vision for NG9-1-1'' by
initiating a further notice of proposed rulemaking to address
``interoperability requirements for 9-1-1 service providers and other
elements of the emergency communications chain.'' \154\ In that
connection, we seek comment from 911 Authorities and others as to
whether we should expand the scope of our proposed interoperability
requirement, and, if so, to what other elements of the emergency
communications chain? Similarly, we seek comment on whether to amend
Sec. 9.19(a) of the rules to add a definition for ``interoperability''
for purposes of clarifying the obligations of NG911 service providers,
including the definition of interoperability from the Spectrum Auction
Reauthorization Act of 2023 (H.R. 3565), or some variation, for
purposes of defining the scope of our interoperability requirements;
and the potential benefits and costs of adopting such a definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ See, e.g., APCO Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 4-5 (filed
Aug. 9, 2023) (``The greatest impact the Commission can have on
facilitating the transition to NG9-1-1 would be to require
interoperability between OSPs and 9-1-1 service providers, and among
9-1-1 service providers.''); Jack Varnado, Livingston Parish Sheriff
Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 1 (filed Aug. 9, 2023) (urging the
Commission to require all OSPs and 9-1-1 service providers achieve
interoperability); Michael Coonfield, Oklahoma 911 Management
Authority Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 2 (filed Aug. 8, 2023)
(stating that interoperability between ESInet and core services must
be required and included in the forest guide); Texas 9-1-1 Entities
Reply Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 17 (filed Sept. 8, 2023)
(``[T]he Commission should consider a notice of inquiry regarding
interoperability between NG911 service providers, with emphasis on
911 call transfers between ESInets and within ESInets.'').
\154\ APCO Ex Parte, PS Docket 21-479, at 2 (filed Apr. 18,
2024) (emphasis added). APCO previously urged the Commission to
require interoperability between OSPs and NG911 service providers as
part of the current proceeding. APCO Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at
2-4 (filed Aug. 9, 2023). However, in its ex parte, APCO expressed
support for moving forward with the OSP requirements that the
Commission proposed in the NG911 Notice. APCO Ex Parte, PS Docket
21-479, at 1 (filed Apr. 18, 2024). In a more recent ex parte, APCO
urges the Commission to ``seek comment on a rule that would require
9-1-1 service providers to enable the ECCs they serve to exchange
all forms of 9-1-1 traffic with ECCs in different states and/or
served by different 9-1-1 service providers. Each 9-1-1 service
provider could demonstrate compliance with this interoperability
requirement by certifying that the ECCs it serves are able to
exchange 9-1-1 traffic with at least three ECCs located in different
states and/or served by other 9-1-1 service providers. Such a
certification should include an attestation that the 9-1-1 service
provider has confirmed interoperability through real-world testing
at its sole cost.'' APCO Ex Parte, PS Docket 21-479, at 3 (filed
Nov. 1, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intrastate Interoperability. Today's proposals cover interstate
interoperability between ESInets. With respect to intrastate
interoperability, we believe that 911 Authorities can address NG911
interoperability within their jurisdictions pursuant to contracts and
tariffs with providers of NG911 services and have the ability to order
necessary testing and resolve interoperability disputes, including with
sub-contractors, pursuant to such instruments. In addition, 911
Authorities are in the best position to address intrastate
interoperability from the border control function at the in-state or
in-territory NG911 Delivery Point through ingress to ESInet connected
PSAPs and between PSAPs. We seek comment on our view.
2. Interstate Interoperability for Text and Video Accessibility
We seek comment on whether interoperability certifications relating
to ESInet interconnection facilities should include specific
certifications regarding interoperability of 911 text messaging and
video accessibility consistent with the benchmarks discussed above. We
believe that ensuring interoperability for non-voice NG911
communications is equal in importance to ensuring interoperability for
voice NG911 calls. In the NG911 Transition Order, the Commission
extended NG911 requirements to OSPs providing non-voice 911 services,
including covered text providers and internet-based Telecommunications
Relay Service (TRS) providers. NG911 is specifically intended to
provide improved support for the full range of 911 voice, text, data,
and video communications, including promoting and enabling 911 access
for individuals with disabilities.\155\ In its end state, NG911 will
facilitate interoperability and system resilience, improve connections
between 911 call centers, and support the transmission of text, photos,
videos, and data to PSAPs
[[Page 23786]]
by individuals seeking emergency assistance.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ NG911 Transition Order at *74, para. 215.
\156\ NG911 Transition Order at *6, para. 14; NG911 Notice, 38
FCC Rcd at 6209, para. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We seek comment on how best to ensure that NG911 systems support
interoperability for non-voice 911 services, with specific emphasis on
text, video, and multimedia capabilities that support 911 access for
people with disabilities. As noted above, NASNA's 2020 Interoperability
Matrix reflected higher levels of interstate interoperability for 911
voice calls but no or low levels of interstate interoperability for all
other services, including text-to-911 and MMES. We ask commenters to
provide updated information on interstate 911 interoperability by type
of service, with particular emphasis on services used by those with
accessibility needs. For example, what are the current levels of
interstate interoperability for the following types of service: (1) 911
voice calls; (2) location data; (3) text-to-911, including real-time
text (RTT); and (4) MMES?
Text Messaging. Regarding text messaging, in response to the NG911
NPRM, Google and NENA proposed that we consider the implementation of
new interoperable messaging protocols, such as Rich Communications
Service (RCS).\157\ We seek comment on Google's view that, ``[b]y
addressing interoperable text messaging as part of its NG911 efforts,
the Commission can further enable members of the public to connect to
lifesaving resources, family members, and friends in a more effective
and secure manner.'' Do commenters agree with NENA and Google's
concerns about text interoperability and comments about RCS, and if so,
would RCS fall under our definition of ``commonly accepted standards''?
We seek comment more generally as to whether the public interest is
better served by the Commission making such determinations in the short
term or allowing the marketplace to make such determinations over a
longer period of time. We also seek comment on whether there are
interoperability problems in the commercial wireless market that are
impeding end state end-to-end NG911? We invite commenters to comment on
the specific connectivity, data transmission, and security issues
Google describes as inherent in SMS/MMS. What options are currently
available to address the aforementioned concerns as part of our
certification requirements for CSPs, including intrastate
interoperability requirements, and issues and what options do
commenters foresee becoming available in the near-term and long-term?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\ Google Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 9-11 (filed Aug. 10,
2023); NENA Reply Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 9-10 (filed Sept.
6, 2023). RTT is available in some locations as a text-based
communications technology for 911 purposes. See FCC, Real-Time Text,
www.fcc.gov/rtt (Nov. 5, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Video. Point-to-point video calls can be instrumental to
demonstrate the emergency at hand in order to expedite the provision of
appropriate emergency assistance. Additionally, people with
disabilities may benefit from video calling in order to communicate
more clearly in conjunction with other modalities such as text
communications. We seek comment concerning accessibility with
particular focus on measures we can take to promote interstate
interoperability between ESInets.\158\ In response to the NG911 NPRM,
commenter Brian Rosen suggested that the Commission could adopt
requirements to ensure ESInets support three-way video for Video Relay
Service (VRS) within a reasonable period of time, such as 12 months.
Further, three-way video has the potential to support individuals with
speech disabilities relying on speech-to-speech relay services.\159\
Rosen claims that many vendors of NGCS systems plan to support video in
upcoming releases and suggests imposing a regulatory deadline to do so.
In addition, Communication Service for the Deaf, Inc. states that video
sign-language communications in NG911 systems could occur in different
ways, including through standard VRS, three-way video relay
services,\160\ or direct video calling (DVC). DVC would allow a caller
who uses sign language to place a call to a call taker who is both
fluent in sign language and trained in handling emergency calls,
potentially eliminating the need for a third-party intermediary.\161\
Should we amend our rules to require that NGCS systems support three-
way video for relay services, and support DVC? If so, within what time
frame should such support be required for either service? What
conditions or qualifications, if any, should be included in
requirements associated with these video calls? We seek updated data on
interstate interoperability needed to meet the needs of the
accessibility community, including the feasibility of providing DVC or
three-way video 911 calls that include VRS, and challenges with
implementation during the transition to NG911 and relevant
timelines.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ NG911 Transition Order at *17, para. 43. In the NG911
Transition Order, the Commission adopted an NG911 definition that
includes accessibility as an essential requirement, consistent with
the definition in the Spectrum Auction Reauthorization Act of 2023
(H.R. 3565), which requires that NG911 ``be capable of processing
`all types' of requests.'' The Commission agreed that this
requirement mandates that NG911 standards support accessible
technologies. NG911 Transition Order at **14, 61, paras. 34, 179.
The Commission declined, however, to expand the scope of the
proceeding to consider accessibility issues raised in comments, but
consistent with its authority under the CVAA, committed to monitor
the development of NG911 systems and technologies and be prepared to
take necessary steps to ensure that NG911 is fully accessible to
all.
\159\ See, e.g., FCC, Speech-to-Speech Relay Service (STS),
www.fcc.gov/sts (Jan. 28, 2025).
\160\ Communication Service for the Deaf, Inc., et al. Ex Parte,
PS Docket 21-479, at 2-3 (filed Mar. 12, 2025) (stating that
traditional VRS uses a communications assistant fluent in sign
language to enable a 911 caller to communicate through an
intermediary, so that the VRS interpreter voices what the caller
signs and signs back the call taker's response, while three-way
video would allow the VRS caller, the 911 call taker, and the video
interpreter to all be visible to each other on the same video call).
\161\ Id. at 3. See also Structure and Practices of the Video
Relay Service Program, CG Docket 10-51, Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd 2436, 2484, para. 125 (2017), 82 FR 17613
(Apr. 12, 2017), 82 FR 17754 (Apr. 13, 2017) (``A direct video
calling (DVC) customer support service . . . permits individuals who
are deaf, hard of hearing, deaf-blind, or have a speech disability .
. . to engage in real-time video communication in ASL without using
VRS. The purpose of DVC is to provide direct telephone service to
such individuals that is functionally equivalent to voice
communications service provided to hearing individuals who do not
have speech disabilities.'').
\162\ Brian Rosen Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 5 (filed July
28, 2023) (stating that from the very first version (NENA 08-003),
three-way video was a firm requirement and that the requirement was
there expressly for VRS: a VRS user should be able to dial 9-1-1 and
be placed in a 3-way video call with the caller, the 911 call taker,
and a sign language interpreter).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We further seek comment on any potential efficiencies that three-
way video and DVC, respectively, would achieve for PSAPs in NG911
systems. Could three-way video improve accuracy and efficiency for 911
call handlers to take an emergency call and dispatch the right
assistance? Could DVC improve accuracy and efficiency in the handling
of emergency calls? Could emergency calling-trained DVC call handlers
located at regional or nationwide PSAPs send electronic dispatchable
reports directly to the local PSAP, eliminating the need for
intermediary interpretation? To what extent would three-way video and
DVC services need to rely on each other's facilities and capabilities?
\163\ What role
[[Page 23787]]
should Emergency Call Relay Centers play in processing DVC calls? Would
it be possible to route these calls to a call taker at an Emergency
Call Relay Center (ECRC), who would then transmit the caller's
information to a dispatcher at the appropriate PSAP? Should the
Commission require all VRS providers to direct all incoming 911 calls
to an ECRC upon receipt, to facilitate such direct communication? What
are the costs and benefits associated with each of these services? What
modifications to the NG911 architecture would be needed to enable DVC
calls? What modifications would be needed to enable three-way video?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ Communication Service for the Deaf, Inc., et al. Ex Parte,
PS Docket 21-479, at 4 (filed Mar. 20, 2025) (``. . . ASL users use
either a VRS app or a video communications device provided by their
VRS provider to access 911 services. Each VRS company in turn
contracts with an `Emergency Call Relay Center' provider to
facilitate the routing and processing of their 911 calls to the
caller's appropriate PSAP . . . If the ability to use DVC is
integrated into the NG911 infrastructure, could 911 calls placed by
ASL-fluent callers be placed directly to an ASL-fluent 911 call
taker without being routed through a VRS provider?'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also seek comment regarding current IP-based relay \164\
provider capabilities and how to expand them. Do commenters agree that
IP-based relay services providers currently supply a VoIP audio
connection through a VPC, and that, to support video 911 calls, these
providers would have to provide a video and audio connection, which
current VPCs cannot handle? To enable IP-based relay services providers
to support such calls, should we amend our rules to require ESInets to
support internet connections, including video, via VPNs, to the
ESInets, and if so, within what time frame, and subject to what
conditions or qualifications? In that connection, do commenters agree
with Brian Rosen that, to support three-way 911 video calls, IP-based
relay providers would need to use the NGCS bridge, because bridges are
used extensively in NG911 system to support attended transfer (so the
call taker(s) can hear/see the call while they are completing the
transfer--911 calls are not placed on hold)? If so, would this
represent a change to their current process, which uses a Provider
bridge, at least when supporting Voice carryover/hearing carryover?
What are the costs associated with requiring three-way video support at
the ESInet, and would such a requirement ensure equivalence for callers
who are deaf or hard of hearing or have a speech disability?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ This would include VRS, IP Relay Services, and certain
forms of IP Captioned Telephone Services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Implementation and Oversight
In order to assist in monitoring compliance with our proposed rules
for NG911 reliability and interoperability, we propose to update our
911 reliability data collections and oversight mechanisms. In the 911
Reliability Order, the Commission stated that ``if a Covered 911
Service Provider certifies that it has taken alternative measures to
mitigate the risk of failure, or that a certification element is not
applicable to its network, its certification is subject to a more
detailed Bureau review.'' \165\ If the Bureau's review indicates that a
provider's alternative measures are not reasonably sufficient to ensure
reliable 911 service, the Commission stated that the Bureau should
first engage with the provider and other interested stakeholders (e.g.,
affected PSAPs) to address any shortcomings. To the extent that such a
collaborative process does not yield satisfactory results, the
Commission stated that the Bureau may order remedial action consistent
with its delegated authority.\166\ The Commission intended this process
to allow flexibility to employ alternative--but reliable--network
designs and technologies, not to create an exception that would swallow
the rule.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ See 47 CFR 0.392(j); 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at
17497 para. 62 (``The Bureau will consider a number of factors in
determining whether the particular alternative measures are
reasonably sufficient to ensure reliable 911 service. Such factors
may include the technical characteristics of those measures, the
location and geography of the service area, the level of service
ordered by the PSAP, and state and local laws (such as zoning and
noise ordinances).'').
\166\ See 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17497 para. 63.
\167\ 2015 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8654-55,
paras. 2, 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed below, we believe that revised reporting requirements
would be helpful to Commission staff and 911 Authorities in identifying
risks to the reliability and interoperability of 911 traffic, including
single points of failure, and ask commenters to identify specific
information that providers should include in their certifications. We
also seek comment on measures the Commission could take to limit the
burden of reporting on NG911 reliability and interoperability. We also
seek comment on how to better identify single points of failure that
could have cascading effects on 911 traffic in multiple states. To what
extent could the Commission limit the burden of any reporting
requirements by providing increased flexibility for providers or
businesses identified as small by the Small Business Administration?
\168\ We also propose to require disclosure of reliability and
interoperability certifications to 911 Authorities. In that connection,
we seek comment on establishing procedures for 911 Authorities to
report concerns to the Bureau to conserve limited resources and focus
attention on critical elements that could result in multistate outages
or hamper interstate interoperability. We tentatively conclude that
improving 911 Authorities' access to information about the 911
reliability measures in place within their states would amplify the
Commission's ability to address potential risks to NG911 service and
enable 911 Authorities to assess taking their own measures to prevent
and mitigate disruptions to 911 service in their jurisdictions. We seek
comment on this tentative conclusion and on the specific proposals
below. In addition to enhancing reporting requirements for providers
and improving information sharing with 911 Authorities, we seek comment
on whether we should establish a dedicated consumer portal for 911-
related outage complaints. Such a portal could provide the public with
a clear and accessible means to report concerns about 911 service
disruptions directly to the FCC. This approach may improve the
Commission's ability to identify and address potential risks to NG911
reliability while empowering consumers to play a more active role in
ensuring public safety. We invite input on the potential benefits of
this proposal, including how it could complement existing reporting
mechanisms and enhance transparency in addressing 911 service
reliability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\ For example, the Commission's requirements for live call
data reporting provide a reduced reporting schedule for non-
nationwide CMRS providers. 47 CFR 9.10(i)(3)(ii)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Reform of Reliability Certification Process
Traditionally, NG911 CSPs select ``alternative measures'' to report
reliability practices that differ from the legacy 911-specific best
practice benchmarks articulated in our existing regulations, but which
the Commission deemed reliable in the 2015 Reliability Recon.
Order.\169\ We seek comment on whether one potential improvement from
today's proposed changes of both defining NG911 equivalents and
functional equivalents and codifying the best practice measures
applicable to IP-based networks would be allowing NG911 CSPs to
directly certify that they meet the benchmarks specified in our
regulations, instead of having to use the alternative measures option
to report IP-based network reliability practices. We seek comment on
the impact of this change, and on related proposed minor changes
described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ 2015 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8656-57,
paras. 12, 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2015, the Commission observed that NG911 networks achieve
reliability and resiliency with geographic diversity and dynamic
routing instead of traditional TDM circuit auditing and tagging, so the
existing 911 reliability certification rules did not apply well to
[[Page 23788]]
NG911 networks.\170\ The Commission similarly observed that the
existing monitoring benchmark was appropriate for legacy 911 facilities
but not IP facilities, as IP-based service providers do not ``audit''
monitoring circuits the way TDM providers do, but rather use the
automated network monitoring capabilities for their resilient IP-
enabled networks.'' \171\ At the time, the Commission did not undertake
revision of the certification form, but rather instructed NG911 CSPs to
report that they are using ``alternative measures'' for reliable IP
best practices, since the CSPs could not realistically certify to using
TDM-specific best practices on IP networks.\172\ Accordingly, NG911
providers currently answer the legacy 911 certification questions in
the negative, but then provide narrative descriptions of how IP network
reliability differs from legacy 911 reliability.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ 2015 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8656, para.
15 (``The circuit auditing requirement adopted in the 911
Reliability Order was based upon a CSRIC best practice urging
network operators to `periodically audit the physical and logical
diversity . . . of their network segment(s) . . . .' [H]owever,
appropriate measures to preserve physical and logical diversity may
differ between circuit-switched time division multiplexing (TDM) and
IP-based networks because IP-based routing and . . . re-routing can
occur dynamically over many possible paths.'').
\171\ 2015 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8659, para.
20.
\172\ 2015 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8656, para.
12 (``[W]e clarify that the certification framework adopted in the
911 Reliability Order allows flexibility for all Covered 911 Service
Providers--legacy and IP-based--to certify reasonable alternative
measures to mitigate the risk of failure in lieu of specified
certification elements.''); 2015 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC
Rcd at 8657, para. 16 (``Technology transitions have already
resulted in a variety of hybrid 911 network architectures in which
some functions are provided over legacy TDM circuits and others are
provided over IP-based infrastructure. In such cases, our rules as
revised will permit the provider to certify reasonable alternative
measures with respect to either portion of the network.'').
\173\ 2015 Reliability Recon. Order, 30 FCC Rcd at 8657, para.
16 (``[E]xplanations of alternative measures with respect to circuit
audits and tagging should . . . describe affirmative steps in lieu
of audits and tagging to mitigate the risk of a service disruption.
. . .'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We seek comment on whether specifying NG911 and IP-based network
benchmarks directly in the rules will allow NG911 CSPs to more easily
certify to meeting reasonable reliability best practices without having
to describe alternative measures for the compliant IP-based network
facilities they operate, reserving alternative measures for deviations
from the best practice benchmarks. If so, will this proposed change
improve Commission collection and analysis of certification reliability
data? What are the pros and cons of this approach in terms of data
reported and collected? What drawbacks are there to this approach?
Should the certification form be revised to require drop-down
selections for the kind of legacy or NG911 facilities being certified
to (e.g., selective router central office, path from selective router
to central office serving PSAP, major transport path to ESInet, LIS
facility, etc.) to ensure clarity of which best practice standard
(legacy or NG911) is being certified to? \174\ We propose to direct
PSHSB to consider revisions the certification form so that CSPs can
specify which type(s) of 911 facilities they are operating--legacy and/
or NG911--in a way that constrains which best practice standard they
are certifying to. We further direct PSHSB to consider revisions to the
certification form in ways that will ensure NG911 CSPs do not have to
submit narrative explanations of alternative measures for IP-based
facilities if those facilities meet the regulatory best practice
benchmarks for IP-based networks. Will this change help the Commission
identify which filers are proving NG911 services, which are providing
legacy 911 services, and which are providing both? Would these changes
also reduce the number of times CSPs have to answer portions of the
certification form with ``not applicable,'' if the kind of facilities
they operate and select from the drop-down menu automatically constrain
which reliability and interoperability benchmarks they may certify to?
We seek comment on these assessment and proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ See Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Seeks
Comment on Modifications to Network Outage Reporting system and 911
Reliability Certification System, PS Docket Nos. 15-80, 13-75,
Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 4409, 4413 (seeking comment on adding
``drop-down fields to 911 reliability certifications that will
require covered 911 service providers to indicate whether they
provide'' specified 911, E911, or NG911 services) (PSHSB 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, we propose to direct PSHSB to revise the reliability
and interoperability certification form to replace the current free-
form text reporting option for alternative measures or ``not
applicable'' answers with specified drop-down selection answers as
determined by the Bureau, and to seek comment on a revised
certification form. We tentatively conclude that this approach will
best illuminate network practices for Commission staff and potentially
reduce burdens on CSP filers. Similarly, if the updated form asks CSPs
to select alternative measures and then list all facilities that employ
them instead of vice-versa as it is now, we believe this will also
improve reporting. We seek comment on this proposal.
We further propose modifying the certification form to ask NG911
CSPs to report on the volume of 911 call traffic that their non-
conforming facilities handle. In response to a previous request for
comment,\175\ state government parties suggested improvements to the
certification system to enable the Commission to determine the size of
potentially impacted populations from critical 911 facility
failures.\176\ We believe most CSPs handling NG911 traffic from
multiple OSPs have this data readily available,\177\ and so such
reporting would constitute a minimal burden to providers while
providing valuable data to the Commission and to 911 Authorities.\178\
We therefore believe such a change would improve 911 reliability and
oversight with minimal additional burden on regulated entities. We seek
comment on this proposal, on the best metric and reporting format to
use for 911 traffic volume data, and on any additional suggestions for
improving the certification form. Should the proposal be expanded to
require 911
[[Page 23789]]
traffic volume reporting for conforming facilities as well?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\175\ See Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Seeks
Comment on Modifications to Network Outage Reporting system and 911
Reliability Certification System, PS Docket Nos. 15-80, 13-75,
Public Notice, 35 FCC Rcd 4409, 4414-5 (PSHSB 2020).
\176\ NASNA Comments, PS Docket 13-75, at 3 (filed July 17,
2020) (recommending changes to the reliability certification form to
``allow the FCC to analyze filed Reliability Certification Systems
to know what populations are being made vulnerable to outages due to
lack of redundancy or diversity in 911 networks.''); Colorado Public
Utility Commission Comments, PS Docket 13-75, at 2 (filed July 8,
2020) (same).
\177\ See e.g., Bandwidth Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 2-3
(filed Aug. 9, 2023) (``Bandwidth predominately acts as a VoIP
Positioning Center (`VPC') where it provides stand-alone emergency
location and 911 call routing capabilities for its VoIP service
provider customers. . . . Bandwidth has a robust network that
reaches across the United States and Canada and delivers around 3
million calls a year from 26.7 million end points. . . . To date,
Bandwidth established network aggregation capabilities to route its
customers' 911 traffic through 16 ESInets.''); Inteliquent Reply
Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 1 (filed Sept. 8, 2023) (``Sinch
provides a Voice over Internet Protocol (`VoIP') Positioning Center
(`VPC') service to VoIP providers. Sinch's VoIP customers contract
with Sinch to facilitate VoIP 911 call delivery to the appropriate
Public Safety Answering Points (`PSAP').'')
\178\ Inteliquent Ex Parte, PS Docket 21-479, at 1 (filed Oct.
10, 2023) (''. . . Sinch explained that a subset of Next Generation
Core Services Providers (`NGCS Providers') rely on Sinch to assist
with steering Automatic Location Information (``ALI'') queries
between PSAPs and Sinch's Voice over Internet Protocol Positioning
Center (`VPC') platform via the ALI Database or Location Database
(`ALI/LDB'). These NGCS Providers are considered Covered 911 Service
Providers under the FCC's rules.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We further propose to direct the Bureau to consider additional ways
to improve the certification forms pursuant to its delegated
authority.\179\ The 911 reliability and interoperability certification
submission form and data should simultaneously: (1) ensure the Bureau
can reasonably perform its investigation \180\ and Remediation Order
\181\ delegated responsibilities to facilitate 911 reliability and
interoperability; (2) provide similar reasonable oversight for 911
Authorities; and (3) impose no greater reporting burdens on CSPs than
is necessary for these purposes. We direct the Bureau to prepare to
appropriately implement such improvements bearing these factors in
mind, consistent with today's rule proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\ 47 CFR 0.392(j) (``The Chief of the Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau is delegated authority to . . . develop and
revise forms and procedures as may be required for the
administration of part 9, subpart H, of this chapter. . . .'').
\180\ 47 CFR 0.392(h) (``The Chief, Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau or her/his designee is authorized to issue non-
hearing related subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of books, papers, correspondence,
memoranda, schedules of charges, contracts, agreements, and any
other records deemed relevant to the investigation of matters within
the jurisdiction of the Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau.'').
\181\ 47 CFR 0.392(j) (``The Chief of the Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau is delegated authority to . . . order
remedial action on a case-by-case basis to ensure the reliability of
911 service in accordance with such rules and policies.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In connection with the above, we propose minor amendments to
consolidate rule 9.19 in some instances, to minimize the burden on
regulated entities subject to these rules by making it easier for them
to identify and comply with all 911 reliability and interoperability
requirements. For example, propose to consolidate the alternative
measures reporting paragraphs at Sec. 9.19(c)(1) to (3) to similarly
capture both legacy and NG911 providers, and to better ensure the
Bureau can revise the annual certification form to best respond to 911
Authorities' needs and obtain necessary data to make a reasonableness
determination under its delegated authority.\182\ We also propose to
consolidate and streamline the record retention paragraphs under Sec.
9.19(d)(3) to better apply across all legacy and NG911 CSPs. We seek
comment on these modifications, and any other advisable non-substantive
or conforming edits to rule 9.19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\ 47 CFR 0.392(j).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, we seek comment on whether there are measures in addition
to annual certification that would promote 911 reliability and
interoperability. For example, could the Commission implement an
outcome-based standard that establishes how many annual user minutes of
911 traffic could be interrupted by network or facility outages and
still be considered reasonable, beneath which a CSP is subject to
remediation orders? Could the Commission adopt a similar
interoperability standard based on percentage of interstate 911 call
transfers which fail completely, or fail to include caller location or
other data?
2. Access to Reliability Certifications
We propose amending the rules to provide that any 911 Authorities
are entitled to receive, upon request to the CSP, the annual
reliability and interoperability certifications filed with the
Commission directly from CSPs operating in their jurisdictions.
Furthermore, we propose to adopt the same process for NORS access that
state and local governments may follow for access to the 911
reliability and interoperability certificate system. Accordingly, 911
Authorities will have options for accessing 911 reliability and
interoperability certification data, and may use the option that best
suits their local needs and relationships with CSPs. We seek comment on
these proposals.
Under existing rules, 911 reliability certifications are
presumptively confidential.\183\ The Commission adopted the rule in
2013 after balancing the interests of CSPs to protect proprietary and
sensitive information and the public's access to 911 reliability
information.\184\ The Commission recognized that ``PSAPs and state 911
authorities have a strong interest in obtaining relevant information
about the reliability and resiliency of their 911 service.'' \185\ The
Commission noted that PSAPs identified a limited set of information
they believed to be important in assessing reliability of their service
(e.g., circuit audits), and accordingly, the Commission found no reason
to address the need for disclosure of additional information to PSAPs
and/or state 911 authorities.\186\ Nonetheless, the Commission expected
that CSPs ``will, at the request of the PSAP (or state 911 authority,
as relevant), enter into discussions concerning the content of the
provider's 911 circuit auditing certification with respect to the
PSAP.'' \187\ In light of the wide variety of circumstances involved in
how PSAPs nationwide purchase 911 service, the Commission declined ``to
require specific disclosure by rule, preferring to allow parties to
negotiate reasonable and appropriate terms for assuring protection of
proprietary information.'' \188\ The Commission made clear, however,
that CSPs ``should respond promptly to a PSAP request in this area''
and reiterated its belief ``that PSAPs should have access to the
details of circuit-auditing certifications, as long as the sensitive
and proprietary nature of the information can be maintained.'' \189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ Specifically, Rule 0.457(d)(1)(viii) states: ``Information
submitted with a 911 reliability certification pursuant to 47 CFR
12.4 [now 47 CFR 9.19] that consists of descriptions and
documentation of alternative measures to mitigate the risks of
nonconformance with certification elements, information detailing
specific corrective actions taken with respect to certification
elements, or supplemental information requested by the Commission
with respect to such certification.'' 47 CFR 0.457(d)(1)(viii). See
47 CFR 9.19(d)(2)(i) and (ii).
\184\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17533, paras. 157-
158.
\185\ For example, NENA stated that ``PSAPs may be in the best
position to use this information to prompt 911 service providers to
make specific reliability improvements in their networks, but they
may not otherwise be able to negotiate reliable access to this
information through their contracts or tariffs.'' 911 Reliability
Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17533, para. 157.
\186\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17533, para. 158.
\187\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17533, para. 158.
\188\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17533, para. 158.
\189\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17533, para. 158.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We seek comment on whether there is an increased need for state and
local government access to 911 reliability and interoperability
certification data today, particularly in light of the advancing NG911
transition and the new roles being adopted by 911 Authorities and
private network operators. Do other changes in network architecture
evolution also change the need for state and local access to Commission
data concerning 911 reliability and interoperability? For example in
2021, the Commission concluded that directly sharing NORS data with
state and federal agencies, subject to appropriate and sufficient
safeguards, is in the public interest, and the Commission extended this
finding to include the sharing of DIRS data.\190\ The
[[Page 23790]]
Commission limited eligibility for direct access to our NORS and DIRS
databases to ``need to know'' agencies acting on behalf of the federal
government, the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Tribal Nations,
and the U.S. territories.\191\ In discussing sharing of complete NORS
and DIRS reports and filings, the Commission noted ``that sympathy
reports and reports containing information about TSPs contain
actionable information on outages that could be of use to public safety
officials for emergency response or service restoration and declined to
exclude these reports from NORS filings. For example, sympathy reports
contain information regarding service outages that, while caused by a
failure in the network of another provider, nonetheless have an effect
on the reporting service provider that may have public safety
implications.'' \192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\190\ See NORS Information Sharing Order, 36 FCC Rcd 6136. By
way of background, the Commission collects network outage
information in the Network Outage Reporting System (NORS) and
infrastructure status information in the Disaster Information
Reporting System (DIRS). This information is sensitive for reasons
concerning national security and commercial competitiveness, and the
Commission thus treats it as presumptively confidential. The
Commission makes this information available to the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center but does not share the information more broadly
with other federal, state, or local partners. New Part 4 of the
Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications, ET
Docket No. 04-35, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 16830, 16856, para. 47 (2004), 69 FR 68859
(Nov. 26, 2004), 69 FR 70316 (Dec. 3, 2004) (making NORS reports
available to DHS ``in encrypted form and immediately upon
receipt'').
\191\ NORS Information Sharing Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 6141, para.
16.
\192\ NORS Information Sharing Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 6160, para.
78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under our proposal, we would retain the existing requirements under
Sec. 9.19(d)(2)(i) and (ii), but would add that 911 Authorities will
be eligible to accessing the 911 reliability and interoperability
certification database under the same conditions as NORS access, and
also require CSPs to provide their annual certifications to 911
Authorities in their CSP service areas upon the request of a 911
Authority.\193\ For example, if a 911 Authority issues a request to
contacts a CSP, including a CSP that delivers 911 traffic to the in-
state NG911 Delivery Point, the CSP would be required to provide the
information applicable to that 911 Authority and within that 911
Authority's jurisdiction. We believe that 911 Authorities have a strong
interest in accessing certification filings to ensure the reliability
of 911 traffic in their jurisdictions during the NG911 transition.\194\
In addition, we believe 911 Authorities would benefit from having 911
reliability and interoperability certifications to assist with
developing emergency response plans in advance of an outage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\ In that connection, we would also retain the existing
record retention requirements under 47 CFR 9.19(d)(3) with updates
to cover interoperability certifications and streamlining as noted
above.
\194\ See, e.g., Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission Comments, PS Docket No. 14-193, p. 8 (filed March 17,
2015) (``Additionally, as part of the cooperative framework with
state and local partners the Commission seeks to maintain, the UTC
suggests the proposed expanded certification requirements of Rule
12.4 be modified to require that all covered entities that submit
annual certification, compliance, or audit reports, should also be
required to simultaneously submit such information to designated
state governance officials, such as the UTC and the Washington State
E911 Coordinator's Office, that are actively involved or have some
oversight responsibilities with respect to reliable 911 service
delivery at the state level. Access to such information by state
officials would greatly assist in understanding and tracking
marketplace developments affecting 911 service delivery within the
scope of their jurisdictions. State access could also greatly assist
officials during times of emergency, like the April 2014 multi-state
outage, in understanding and interacting with such entities as
events unfold. The UTC urges the Commission to modify the
certification and reporting requirements of Rule 12.4 by requiring
covered 911 service providers to submit certification and compliance
information and reports to the Commission's state partners.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We acknowledge that certifications are presumptively confidential
under our existing rules, and CSPs and 911 Authorities must agree to
confidentiality for sharing certifications. Under today's proposed
approach, CSPs must share relevant portions of certifications, but may
omit or redact information relating to portions of their networks that
are not located within and not providing any service directly to the
requesting 911 Authority's jurisdiction. CSPs may condition providing
their certifications on the 911 Authority executing a confidentiality
agreement.
We also propose extending our NORS/DIRS information sharing
framework to 911 reliability and interoperability certifications to 911
Authorities only. 911 Authorities who prefer not to request
confidential certifications directly from CSPs may request access to
certifications from the Bureau under the same terms currently provided
under rule 4.2.\195\ CSPs receiving a request to provide a
certification to a 911 Authority must provide it within 14 days under
confidentiality terms no more restrictive than the same rule.\196\ We
seek comment on whether this proposal would best help ensure 911
Authorities' access to valuable information. Would this proposal
incentivize cooperation between states and CSPs? Do 911 Authorities
prefer having the option to seek this information either directly from
CSPs or from PSHSB? We seek comment on this proposal and any
alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ 47 CFR 4.2.
\196\ To protect sensitive communications status data,
Participating Agencies and Downstream Agencies must preserve the
confidentiality of certification filings. The Commission will grant
access to certification filings only after 911 Authorities certify
that they will comply with requirements for maintaining the
confidentiality of the data and the security of the databases. 911
Authorities will also be responsible for ensuring downstream
agencies certify that they, too, will maintain the confidentiality
of the data they receive. See 47 CFR 4.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, we propose to amend Sec. 9.19(d) of the rules to require
CSPs to notify their 911 Authority of cessation of service at the same
time they notify the Commission. Under our current rules, CSPs that
cease covered operations under this section must notify the FCC by
filing a notification under penalty of perjury no later than 60 days
after the cessation of service.\197\ For the reasons discussed above,
we believe that 911 Authorities would benefit from having situational
awareness of when CSPs cease providing services to their jurisdictions,
and seek comment on this proposal, including alternatives, and
potential costs to CSPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\197\ 47 CFR 9.19(d)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Remedial Action and Petition Process
To promote accountability and transparency in ensuring 911
reliability and interoperability, we propose to amend Sec. 9.19 of the
rules to add a new paragraph to provide guidance regarding the Bureau's
process for responding to reliability and interoperability concerns. In
addition, we seek comment on adopting a procedure for 911 Authorities
to submit petitions alleging violations of the Commission's 911
reliability and interoperability rules to the Bureau, which then would
have the option to exercise its authority under Sec. 0.392(j) to
launch investigations or direct remedial action against CSPs.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ 47 CFR 0.392(j) (``The Chief of the Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau is delegated authority to administer the
communications reliability and redundancy rules and policies
contained in part 9, subpart H, of this chapter, develop and revise
forms and procedures as may be required for the administration of
part 9, subpart H, of this chapter, review certifications filed in
connection therewith, and order remedial action on a case-by-case
basis to ensure the reliability of 911 service in accordance with
such rules and policies.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently, Sec. 0.392(j) references the Bureau's delegated
authority to administer the 911 reliability rule and order remedial
action for deficiencies, but Sec. 9.19 does not explicitly reference
the Bureau's delegated authority under 0.392(j).
To formalize the remediation order process, we propose to codify
into the rules that when certification filings or other information
available to the Commission indicate that a CSPs actions appear to be
deficient or inadequate to address any of the risks to the reliability
or resiliency of 911
[[Page 23791]]
networks, the Bureau Chief or other Bureau official acting on the
Chief's delegated authority will first issue and serve upon the CSP a
notice that describes the apparent deficiencies and proposes different
or additional actions that CSP must take to mitigate the apparent
deficiencies. A CSP would have 30 days to submit a written response
disputing the allegations and/or providing alternatives for remediation
to such a notice. Any time after the 30th day a CSP receives notice
from the Bureau, the Bureau may issue and serve upon the CSP an order
setting forth its findings as to such deficiencies and specifying the
actions that the CSP is required to take to mitigate the deficiencies.
The order may specify deadlines by which the CSP must complete the
required actions and may identify information that the CSP must submit
to demonstrate its compliance with the order. We seek comment on this
proposal.
Second, we propose to establish a process under which a 911
Authority may file a petition with the Bureau against a CSP in the 911
Authority's jurisdiction using alternative measures or claiming
inapplicability in the certification, or for inaccurate certifications,
alleging a lack of reasonable network practices in conformity with our
rules. The petition process would be subject to the procedural
requirements set forth in Sec. 1.41 (informal requests for Commission
action), 1.45 (pleadings and filing periods), and 1.47 (service of
documents) of the rules.\199\ Prior to filing a petition with the
Bureau, a 911 Authority must provide the CSP with 30 days written
notice to provide the CSP an opportunity to address the issue directly
with the 911 Authority. If the issue has not been addressed to the 911
Authority's satisfaction within 30 days, the 911 Authority may file a
petition with the Bureau Chief for relief no later than an additional
30 days later, and the 911 Authority's filing should include the
relevant correspondence with the CSP and all documentation applicable
to base a finding of lack of reasonableness. Petition proceedings will
be treated as non-public restricted adjudicatory matters. CSP will have
the proof burden to demonstrate their network practices and facilities
are reasonable under rule 9.19(b), unless they have certified to
meeting all benchmarks for their facilities, in which case the burden
to show unreasonableness shifts to the petitioning 911 Authority. The
petition must be in the form of an affidavit signed by the 911
Authority, and contain all relevant facts and references to this rule
section alleging a violation. This proposal is similar to the petition
process the Commission recently adopted for OSPs to challenge the
validity of 911 Authorities' NG911 Phase 1 and Phase 2 requests.\200\
We also propose to specify that 911 Authorities may continue to
informally refer alleged 911 reliability and interoperability
deficiencies to the Bureau without a formal petition.\201\ We seek
comment on these proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ 47 CFR 1.41, 1.45, and 1.47.
\200\ 47 CFR 9.31(c).
\201\ See Public Safety Support Center at https://www.fcc.gov/general/public-safety-support-center (last visited Feb. 14, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We invite comment on whether our proposals will promote
transparency and accountability to 911 Authorities and assist 911
Authorities with local oversight. Will these proposals incentivize
greater collaboration between 911 Authorities and CSPs, and serve as a
backstop should 911 Authorities and CSPs reach an impasse? We invite
comment on our proposals, including potential alternatives and costs on
CSPs and 911 Authorities. Do commenters perceive risks in establishing
that 911 Authorities contact CSPs to address reliability and
interoperability concerns before filing a report with the Bureau, and
encouraging 911 Authorities and providers to resolve such issues before
contacting the Bureau? We seek comment on establishing such a step in
our process.
Regarding providing CSPs with notice of potential Bureau
remediation inquiries or orders under Sec. 0.392(j) of our rules, do
commenters agree with adopting formal procedures for Bureau actions
specifying the process and time for CSPs to respond to an inquiry? We
seek comments on what procedures CSPs should follow in such a process.
Thus, we seek comment on whether our proposed rule would add another
layer of transparency and oversight regarding the Bureau's processes to
ensure CSPs are accountable for reliability and interoperability
measures. We invite comment on the potential costs and risks associated
with our proposal.
E. Legal Authority
We tentatively conclude that the rules we are proposing in this
FNPRM are well-grounded in our broad authority to ``promot[e] safety of
life and property through the use of wire and radio communications,''
\202\ including through use of the nation's 911 system.\203\ Congress
has enacted numerous provisions in the Communications Act and other
911-related statutes ``that, taken together, establish an overarching
federal interest in ensuring the effectiveness of the 911 system.''
\204\ Beyond this general mandate, section 251(e)(3) of the
Communications Act confirms the Commission's authority and
responsibility for designating 911 as the universal emergency telephone
number for both wireline and wireless telephone service,\205\
demonstrating Congress's intent to grant the Commission broad authority
for ``ensuring that 911 service is available throughout the country.''
\206\ In a subsequent statute, Congress found that ``for the sake of
our Nation's homeland security and public safety, a universal emergency
telephone number (911) that is enhanced with the most modern and state-
of-the-art telecommunications
[[Page 23792]]
capabilities possible should be available to all citizens in all
regions of the Nation.'' \207\ The D.C. Circuit consistently has
affirmed the Commission's duty to consider public safety under the
Communications Act and to impose obligations to protect public safety
in the public interest.\208\ The Commission's public safety interest is
among its most important responsibilities, and it informs the
Commission's exercise of its other statutory authority pursuant to
Congress's other directives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\202\ 47 U.S.C. 151. The Communications Act of 1934, as amended
(the Communications Act) authorizes the Commission to make rules and
regulations, issue orders, and prescribe restrictions and conditions
that are consistent with the provisions of the Act. See, e.g., 47
U.S.C. 154(i), 303(r).
\203\ See, e.g., Revision of the Commission's Rules to Ensure
Compatibility With Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems; Amendment
of Parts 2 and 25 to Implement the Global Mobile Personal
Communications by Satellite (GMPCS) Memorandum of Understanding and
Arrangements; Petition of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration to Amend Part 25 of the Commission's
Rules to Establish Emissions Limits for Mobile and Portable Earth
Stations Operating in the 1610-1660.5 MHz Band, CC Docket No. 94-
102, IB Docket No. 99-67, Report and Order and Second Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 25340, 25345, para. 13 (2003), 69
FR 6578 (Feb. 11, 2004), 69 FR 6595 (Feb. 11, 2004) (``We find that
Congress has given the Commission broad authority to deal with
public safety concerns in wire and radio communications.'');
Revision of the Commission's rules to ensure compatibility with
enhanced 911 emergency calling systems, CC Docket No. 94-102, Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, 9 FCC Rcd 6170, 6171, para. 7 (1994), 59 FR
54878 (Nov. 2, 1994) (``It is difficult to identify a nationwide
wire or radio communication service more immediately associated with
promoting safety of life and property than 911.''); Nuvio Corp. v.
FCC, 473 F.3d 302, 312 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Nuvio Corp., 473 F.3d at
312 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (stating that Congress has granted
the Commission ``broad public safety and 911 authority''). Moreover,
in the Net 911 Act's legislative history, Congress recognized that
``[s]hould changes in the marketplace or in technology merit, the
Committee expects that the Commission will reexamine its regulations
as necessary, consistent with the Commission's general authority
under section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934 to promote the
`safety of life and property' through the use of wire and radio
communications.'' H.R. Rep. No.110-442, at 13 (Nov. 13, 2007),
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CRPT-110hrpt442.
\204\ See, e.g., 911 Fee Diversion; New and Emerging
Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008, PS Docket Nos. 20-291 and
09-14, Report and Order, 36 FCC Rcd 10804, 10810-11, para. 16 & n.41
(2021), 86 FR 45892 (Aug. 17, 2021) (911 Fee Diversion Order); NG911
Transition Order at *52, para. 154.
\205\ 47 U.S.C. 251(e)(3).
\206\ Nuvio Corp., 473 F.3d at 311 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
\207\ ENHANCE 911 Act of 2004, Public Law 108-494, Sec. 102,
118 Stat. 3986, 3986 (2004) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 942 note).
\208\ See, e.g., Nuvio Corp., 473 F.3d at 307-08 (upholding new
E911 requirements on the basis of, in part, the Commission's
statutory duty to `` `promot[e] safety of life and property through
the use of wire and radio communications' '' (quoting 47 U.S.C. 151;
emphasis omitted)); U.S. Cellular Corp. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 85
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding the Commission's E911 default cost
allocation rule based in part on the fact that ``the Commission . .
. imposed upon wireless carriers an obligation to implement a
service in the public interest'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, to the extent that 911 service providers are common
carriers, section 201(b) of the Communications Act requires the
providers to adopt ``practices'' that are ``just and reasonable'' and
authorizes the Commission to ``prescribe such rules and regulations as
may be necessary in the public interest'' to enforce that
requirement.\209\ The Commission also may require carriers ``to provide
[themselves] with adequate facilities for the expeditious and efficient
performance of [their] service[s]'' when ``reasonably required in the
interest of public convenience and necessity.'' \210\ The Commission
consistently has relied on these authorities before to regulate the
provision of 911 service, including when it adopted the reliability
rules we propose to modify today.\211\ Similar provisions empower the
Commission to regulate the adequacy of the services provided by
wireless and interconnected VoIP providers.\212\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ 47 U.S.C. 201(b).
\210\ 47 U.S.C. 214(d).
\211\ See, e.g., 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17529,
para. 149.
\212\ 47 U.S.C. 303 (``[T]he Commission . . . , as public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall . . . (b)
[p]rescribe the nature of the service to be rendered by each class
of licensed stations and each station within any class'' [and] ``(r)
[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions
and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this chapter'') (wireless carriers); 47
U.S.C. 615a-1 (``(a) It shall be the duty of each IP-enabled voice
service provider to provide 9-1-1 service and enhanced 9-1-1 service
to its subscribers in accordance with the requirements of the
[FCC];'' ``(c) The Commission . . . (3) may modify such regulations
from time to time, as necessitated by changes in the market or
technology, to ensure the ability of an IP-enabled voice service
provider to comply with its obligations under subsection (a)[.]'')
(VoIP providers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe that the Commission also has broad authority under the
Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act (CVAA)
to regulate the provision of NG911 services specifically.\213\ Congress
enacted the CVAA to ensure that people with disabilities have ``equal
access to emergency services . . . as a part of the migration to a
national [IP]-enabled emergency network[.]'' \214\ To further that
goal, Congress required the FCC to establish an Emergency Access
Advisory Committee (EAAC) to recommend ``the most effective and
efficient technologies and methods'' by which to achieve the CVAA's
purpose, and Congress provided the Commission ``the authority to
promulgate regulations to implement the recommendations proposed by the
[EAAC].'' \215\ Importantly, Congress also authorized the Commission to
promulgate ``any other regulations, technical standards, protocols, and
procedures as are necessary to achieve reliable, interoperable
communication that ensures access by individuals with disabilities to
an [IP]-enabled emergency network, where achievable and technically
feasible.'' \216\ Ensuring the reliability and interoperability of the
nation's NG911 network therefore is one of the Commission's key
mandates under the CVAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\ Twenty-First Century Communications and Video
Accessibility Act of 2010, Public Law 111-260, 124 Stat. 2751
(2010).
\214\ 47 U.S.C. 615c(a).
\215\ 47 U.S.C. 615c(c), (g).
\216\ 47 U.S.C. 615c(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe the rules we propose today comport with the CVAA's
mandate because they would enhance the reliability and interoperability
of the nation's NG911 network--the IP-enabled emergency network
addressed in the CVAA. The proposed rules would: (1) clarify and expand
the definition of ``covered 911 service providers'' so that the
facilities that are most critical to modern NG911 networks are subject
to reliability standards; (2) require basic interoperability between
ESInets; and (3) improve the process for covered 911 service providers
and ESInets to certify their reliability and interoperability. These
amendments are intended to reduce NG911 service outages, thereby
increasing access to IP-based 911 services for people with
disabilities, including through the use of internet-based TRS, which is
used primarily by persons who are deaf, hard of hearing, deafblind, or
have a speech disability, as well as through the use of wireline, CMRS,
covered text, and interconnected VoIP services with multimedia
capabilities that cannot be supported on legacy TDM-based
networks.\217\ Indeed, one of EAAC's recommendations to the Commission
was to ensure an ``[a]ccessible NG9-1-1 Network'' that could ``support
features, functions and capabilities . . . to enable individuals with
disabilities to make multimedia NG9-1-1 emergency calls.'' These
advanced 911 features currently are the least likely to be supported by
existing interoperability measures, and users of these services
therefore stand to benefit most from the interoperability rules we have
proposed. The EAAC also recommended that the FCC promote
interoperability by allowing NG911 providers ``to identify the formats
for their environment[s]'' and to ``convert these formats where their
environments interface with other environments[.]'' That is the
approach we are proposing to take.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\217\ See Emergency Access Advisory Committee (EAAC), Report and
Recommendations, at 21-25 (Dec. 7, 2011), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-312161A1.doc (describing NG911
functions that can benefit persons with disabilities) (EAAC Report).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the Commission has recognized consistently in prior rulemakings,
the Commission's regulatory authority under the CVAA is not limited to
services that are used exclusively by people with disabilities.\218\
Nor does the CVAA ``requir[e] the FCC to ensure that any rules we adopt
confer zero benefits on consumers outside the disability community[.]''
\219\ Rather, we believe the rules we propose today would adhere to and
advance the CVAA's mandate precisely because they would promote NG911
reliability equally between people with and without disabilities on a
platform-neutral basis. Moreover, the EAAC concluded that, in emergency
situations, people with disabilities may
[[Page 23793]]
depend on the same wireline, CMRS, covered text, and interconnected
VoIP services as those without disabilities,\220\ or they may rely on a
caretaker or other persons using such services.\221\ We believe the
Commission's NG911 rules therefore should broadly cover different types
of service providers in order to ensure that persons with disabilities
will have full and equal access to emergency services when they are
needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\ NG911 Transition Order at *53, para. 157; see also, e.g.,
Facilitating the Deployment of Text-to-911 and Other Next Generation
911 Applications; Framework for Next Generation 911 Deployment, PS
Docket Nos. 11-153, 10-255, Report and Order, 28 FCC Rcd 7556, 7598,
para. 119 (2013), 78 FR 32169 (May 29, 2013) (``[T]he FCC has
authority under the CVAA to require action that is not limited to
the disability community.'') (Bounce-Back Order); Facilitating the
Deployment of Text-to-911 and Other Next Generation 911
Applications; Framework for Next Generation 911 Deployment, PS
Docket Nos. 11-153, 10-255, Second Report and Order and Third
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd 9846, 9878, para.
71 (2014), 79 FR 55367 (Sept. 16, 2014), 79 FR 55413 (Sept. 16,
2014) (affirming that ``the CVAA vests the Commission with direct
authority to impose 911 bounce-back requirements on both CMRS
providers and other providers of interconnected text messaging
applications, including [over-the-top] providers'') (T911 Second
Report and Order).
\219\ T911 Second Report and Order, 29 FCC Rcd at 9878, para.
71.
\220\ EAAC Report at 19 (Recommendation P1.2); see id. at 14
(finding that 14.7% of persons with disabilities have a ``mobility
disability that does not affect [their] ability to use
communications devices''). The EAAC found that respondents to its
survey ``overwhelmingly want to be able to call PSAPs using the same
technologies they use daily and know how to use reliably (just as
all other citizens can).'' Id. at 19 (``Users need to use familiar
technologies and methods, such as text/audio/video communication,
when calling in an emergency and therefore both want and need to be
able to access NG9-1-1 from the same devices they will use every
day.'').
\221\ See also Bounce-Back Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 7598, para. 120
(``In emergency situations, persons with disabilities may need to
access emergency services quickly and this may require them to use
mobile devices owned by others.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the CVAA, we believe that the other 911-related
statutes discussed above confirm the Commission's authority and
responsibility to establish and maintain a comprehensive and effective
911 system.\222\ Together, the statutes give the Commission broad
authority to ensure that the 911 system is available and accessible and
functions effectively to process and deliver 911 calls and texts from
all people in need of aid using any type of service; authorize the
Commission to adopt the rules proposed herein; and represent the
repeated endorsement by Congress of the Commission's ability to act in
this context.\223\ The Commission previously concluded that ``[i]n
light of these express statutory responsibilities, regulation of
additional capabilities related to reliable 911 service, both today and
in an NG911 environment, would be well within Commission's . . .
statutory authority.'' \224\ The Commission also has stated that
``[t]he Commission already has sufficient authority to regulate the 911
and NG911 activity of, inter alia, wireline and wireless carriers,
interconnected VoIP providers, and other IP-based service providers''
and that its jurisdiction to regulate 911 extends to the regulation of
NG911 across different technologies.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\ 911 Fee Diversion Order, 36 FCC Rcd at 10810-11, para. 16
(stating that federal 911-related statutes and the Communication
Act's provisions ``establish an overarching federal interest in
ensuring the effectiveness of the 911 system'').
\223\ Id. at 10810-11, para. 16.
\224\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17529, para. 150.
\225\ FCC, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Next Generation
911 Services, Report to Congress and Recommendations, section
4.1.2.2 (Feb. 22, 2013), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-319165A1.pdf; 2014 Reliability NPRM, 29 FCC Rcd at 14223, para.
34 (``[T]he Commission has the public safety imperative to oversee
each of the increasingly complex component pieces of the nation's
911 infrastructure.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to our proposals to amend the reliability
certification process and to allow 911 Authorities to request relevant
certifications, we note that section 218 of the Communications Act
authorizes the Commission to ``inquire into the management of the
business of all carriers'' and to obtain from them ``full and complete
information necessary to enable the Commission to perform the duties
and carry out the objects for which it was created.'' \226\
Furthermore, section 4(n) of the Communications Act states that ``[f]or
the purpose of obtaining maximum effectiveness from the use of radio
and wire communications in connection with safety of life and
property,'' the Commission ``shall investigate and study all phases of
the problem and the best methods of obtaining the cooperation and
coordination of these systems.'' \227\ The Commission has previously
relied on section 4(n) in similar contexts, for example, as providing
authority to require interconnected VoIP providers to report outages
and to require emergency alerting plans to allow the Commission and
other stakeholders to review and identify gaps in emergency alerting
architecture and to take measures to address these shortcomings.\228\
The Commission also has authority under the NET 911 Act to ``compile .
. . information concerning 9-1-1 and enhanced 9-1-1 elements, for the
purpose of assisting IP-enabled voice service providers in complying
with this section.'' \229\ Thus, as part of a cooperative governance
structure for 911, ``the Commission is authorized to gather and
disseminate information from carriers and other regulatees for the
purpose of ensuring effective public safety communications.'' \230\ We
seek comment on the foregoing legal analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ 47 U.S.C. 218. See also 47 U.S.C. 303(j) (authorizing the
Commission to issue rules and regulations requiring wireless
licensees to keep records of ``programs, transmissions of energy,
communications, or signals'').
\227\ 47 U.S.C. 154(n).
\228\ Ensuring the Reliability and Resiliency of the 988 Suicide
& Crisis Lifeline; Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission's Rules
Concerning Disruptions to Communications; Implementation of the
National Suicide Hotline Improvement Act of 2018, PS Docket Nos. 23-
5, 15-80, Report and Order, 38 FCC Rcd 6917, 6945, para. 50 & n.190
(2023), 89 FR 2503 (Jan. 16, 2024) (citing The Proposed Extension of
Part 4 of the Commission's Rules Regarding Outage Reporting to
Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol Service Providers and
Broadband Internet Service Providers, PS Docket No. 11-82, Report
and Order, 27 FCC Rcd 2650, 2676, para. 61 (2012), 77 FR 25088 (Apr.
27, 2012)).
\229\ 47 U.S.C. 615a-1(g).
\230\ 2014 Reliability NPRM, 29 FCC Rcd at 14235, para. 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also note that our proposals do not seek to alter state
jurisdiction over 911 or directly affect intrastate facilities. Rather,
we propose to empower 911 Authorities by ensuring them access to the
reliability certifications of service providers in their states and
creating an optional process by which 911 Authorities can choose to
address rules violations to the FCC. We also specifically propose to
exempt PSAPs and other governmental entities from the reliability
obligations we propose today while focusing on the interstate paths
within multistate 911 networks that no individual state can regulate
effectively. Similarly, the ESInet interoperability requirement we
would adopt also applies only to interstate communications. Consistent
with past practice, we intend to implement our proposals in partnership
with state, territorial, Tribal, and local authorities while respecting
their unique interest in the delivery of 911 service to their
communities. We seek comment on additional considerations for striking
the most effective balance between state and federal authority to
ensure the reliability and interoperability of the nation's NG911
network.
F. Benefits and Costs
Benefits. To estimate benefits of today's proposals, we rely on our
calculation of the benefit of improved 911 reliability in the NG911
Transition Order.\231\ The Commission has previously relied on a study
examining 73,706 emergency incidents in the Salt Lake City area that
found that, on average, a one-minute decrease in ambulance response
times would reduce the total number of post-incident deaths from 4,386
deaths to 3,640 deaths within 90 days after the incident (746 lives
saved), representing a 17% reduction in mortality.\232\ According to
[[Page 23794]]
the National Association of State Emergency Medical Services Officials
(NASEMSO), local Emergency Medical Services (EMS) agencies respond to
nearly 28.5 million 911 dispatches each year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\231\ NG911 Transition Order at **63-64, **66-67, paras. 185-86,
194-96.
\232\ See Elizabeth Ty Wilde, Do Emergency Medical System
Response Times Matter for Health Outcomes?, 22(7) Health Econ. 790-
806 (2013), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22700368 (Salt Lake
City Study). The study examined 73,706 emergency incidents during
2001 in the Salt Lake City area. Id. at 794. The study found that
the one-minute increase in response time caused mortality to
increase 17% at 90 days past the initial incidence, i.e., an
increase of 746 deaths, from a mean of 4,386 deaths to 5,132 deaths.
Id. at 795. Because the regression is linear, this result implies
that a one-minute reduction in response time also saves 746 lives,
i.e., a 17% reduction from a mean of 4,386 deaths to 3,640 deaths.
NG911 Transition Order at *66, para. 193, n.569 (``The Salt Lake
City Study shows a one-minute decrease in ambulance response times
reduced the likelihood of 90-day mortality from approximately 6% to
5%, representing a 17% reduction in the total number of deaths.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We assess that improvements to 911 reliability from the proposed
rules will reduce 911 call failures and outages. We estimate that, from
2019 through 2023, an average of 4.1 billion user-hours of
telecommunication voice service outages per year were reported to the
Commission.\233\ If these 4.1 billion user-hours of outages were
distributed evenly across the total U.S. population (approximately 335
million people),\234\ this is equivalent to each person in the country
experiencing an average of 12 hours of voice telecommunications service
outages per year.\235\ Hence, we estimate that on average, consumers
experience telecommunications outages 0.14% of the time per year.\236\
As noted above, available evidence shows that 911 calls resulted in
28.5 million EMS dispatches per year during the most recent year when
data was available. If service outages prevent 0.14% of these 911 calls
from going through, that means 39,900 potentially life-saving emergency
911 calls would be dropped per year as a result of legacy 911 system
failures.\237\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\ We estimate the average time consumers were affected by
outages was approximately 4.1 billion user-hours per year based on
data from the Commission's Network Outage Reporting System (NORS)
between 2019 and 2023. Staff calculation. FCC, Network Outage
Reporting System (NORS) (Nov. 30, 2023), https://www.fcc.gov/network-outage-reporting-system-nors.
\234\ See U.S. Census Bureau, National Population Totals and
Components of Change: 2020-2023 (Dec. 18, 2023), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2020s-national-total.html (Census Population Estimates) (referring to Annual
Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions,
States, District of Columbia and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2020 to July
1, 2023 (NST-EST2023-POP) on the page, which estimates U.S.
population around 334,914,895 as of July 1, 2023).
\235\ We calculate the average outages a U.S. resident
experience as follows: 4.1 billion user-hours/335 million residents
= 12.24 hours per resident, which we round to 12 hours.
\236\ We estimate the average percentage of time U.S. consumers
experience telecommunication network outages as follows: average
12.24 hours of outages/(24 hours per day x 365 days per year) =
0.14% outage per year.
\237\ We estimate the life-threatening emergency 911 calls that
would be dropped due to call failures or system outages as: 28.5
million EMS dispatches x 0.14% outages = 39,900 potentially life-
saving emergency 911 calls dropped per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If we conservatively estimate that our proposed rules improving 911
reliability reduce the number of 911 outages and call failures by just
1%, this will translate to a reduction in mortality risks associated
with emergency medical situations for which ambulances were dispatched
in response to 911 calls roughly equivalent to 23 lives saved per
year.\238\ While we do not attempt to place a value on human life, we
note that the amount consumers are willing to pay to reduce mortality
risk is approximately $13.2 million, using a methodology developed by
the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) that the Commission has
relied on in past orders.\239\ We seek comment on this benefits
estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\ A 1% reduction in call failures results in 23 lives saved
(39,900 dropped calls per year x 1% reduction in call failures x
5.95% (90 day mortality in Salt Lake City Study) = 23.74, rounded
down to 23). Note that this calculation conservatively equates a
dropped call with an approximately 3.5-second savings in response
time based in the Salt Lake City Study. The study finds that the
one-minute increase in response time caused mortality to increase
17% at 90 days past the initial incidence, meaning that a 3.5-second
increase in response time would cause a 1% (roughly 3.5/60 x 17%)
mortality increase.
\239\ See NG911 Transition Order at *66, para. 194, n.574; U.S.
Department of Transportation, Departmental Guidance on Valuation of
a Statistical Life in Economic Analysis (May 7, 2024), https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis). Twenty-three estimated lives saved per year
times the 2023 value of $13.2 million is approximately $304 million
per year. See NG911 Transition Order at *67, para. 195, n.580
(calculating 23 lives saved per year from increased 911 system
reliability).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs--Initial Considerations. As the Commission observed in the
NG911 Transition Order and as remains similarly true here, many of the
proposed reliability rules describe network changes which providers are
already implementing due to factors independent of any rules the
Commission ultimately might adopt as a result of this FNPRM.\240\ The
transition to IP networks broadly and to NG911 networks in particular
naturally has the capacity to increase 911 reliability, partly due to
the fact that IP reliability measures are a standard industry best
practice from a quality-of-service standpoint.\241\ Provider concerns
about various liabilities or risks to their business as a consequence
of 911 outages preventing people from reaching 911 will also cause
network operators to independently implement the measures we propose
today.\242\ Finally, the Commission has already assessed the costs of
transitioning to IP-based 911 facilities with their greater inherent
reliability in the NG911 Transition Order.\243\ Accordingly, we assess
that any additional cost impact of today's proposed rules will be
limited in light of the independent factors of technological
advancement, ordinary market forces, and prior Commission actions, all
of which will accomplish a substantial portion of the reliability and
interoperability improvements we seek today for certain networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\ See e.g. NG911 Transition Order at *72, para. 209
(``Although we agree that converting TDM networks to IP networks can
be costly, we reject the contention that such system upgrade costs
should be attributed to the requirements in these rules. The
transition from TDM to IP technology has been ongoing for over a
decade as the subscriptions to voice-only local exchange telephone
service (switched access lines) has fallen from nearly 141 million
lines in December 2008 to 27 million in June 2022. A linear model
predicts that switched access lines will be fully phased out in the
near future. Therefore, since we can reasonably expect that these
system upgrades will occur organically as part of the natural
technological evolution, regardless of whether OSPs are required to
comply with Phase 2 requests, the cost of the upgrades cannot be
attributed to these requirements. Instead, they should be considered
baseline costs of operating telecommunications business.'').
\241\ NG911 Transition Order at *64, para. 186 (``[T]he more
extensive use of IP routing in the Phase 2 architecture is
inherently more reliable than legacy TDM selective routing because
of the greater capability of IP traffic to be dynamically rerouted
among various available paths.'').
\242\ NG911 Transition Order at *59, paras. 172, 174 (``RLEC
commenters express concern that they will face increased liability
costs for 911 call failures occurring within the networks of the
third-party transport services they will retain to deliver 911 calls
beyond their service areas . . . .'' However, ``the implementation
of NG911 is far more likely to reduce the risk of dropped 911 calls
than to increase it. OSPs that make the necessary changes to fully
implement NG911 will be able to leverage improvements to 911
security and reliability, including the ability to reroute 911 calls
in response to network congestion or outages. Indeed, OSPs may face
greater exposure to liability due to the risk of dropped 911 calls
if they fail to implement NG911 in a timely and prudent manner as
the NG911 rules require.'').
\243\ NG911 Transition Order at *61-62, paras. 180-81 (estimated
benefits from 911 improvement to reduction in mortality of
approximately $617 billion over ten years, and costs of
approximately $321 million over ten years). See also NG911
Transition Order at *26, *28, paras. 71, 78 (describing OSP's NG911
Phase 1 and Phase 2 technology deployment obligations triggered by a
911 Authority's transition readiness request); 47 CFR 9.29 (same).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, in calculating these costs, we emphasize that the only
affirmative operational requirement we propose today is for network
reliability practices to be reasonable. The specific benchmarks we
propose for path physical diversity, network monitoring, and
operational integrity are merely measures we have identified which--if
network operators meet them for critical facilities--presumptively
demonstrate
[[Page 23795]]
reasonableness. Networks can continue to use alternative measures that
they certify are reasonable to ensure reliability. Accordingly, no
network will be required to meet our benchmarks for their critical
facilities even if we adopt today's rule proposals. We are not
proposing to change the fundamental structure of the 911 reliability
regulation, which requires a separate and subsequent Bureau inquiry and
finding of an unreasonable network practice in a Remediation Order
prior to imposing costs. Such a Remediation Order would require its own
separate weighing of the costs and benefits for any targeted directive
to improve the reliability of specific network facilities, and that
analysis must stand on its own. Today we propose to preserve a
regulatory structure that was already adopted in 2013 and was found at
that time to have substantial benefits which greatly outweighed the
limited costs.\244\ In sum, the only potential costs of today's item
would be to those covered network operators that are failing to take
measures widely deemed ``reasonable'' by industry standards, including
reasonable interoperability. Accordingly, we estimate that the costs of
these proposed regulations on their own is not substantial. We further
assess that, to the extent commenting parties estimate that the costs
are substantial, this would indicate a higher level of unreasonableness
or negligence on the part of private entities operating the nation's
critical 911 call traffic bottleneck facilities than we currently
estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd 17500-01, paras. 73, 75
(conservatively underestimating a life-saving mortality reduction
benefit from the 911 improvements of at least one life per year, for
a minimum statistical economic impact of $9.1 million annually,
which easily outweighed the estimated maximum one-time costs of
approximately $9 million total).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, today's proposals leave the 2013 best-practice benchmarks
for legacy 911 circuits, monitoring, and backup power in place,
imposing no new obligations on entities operating legacy 911
facilities. Moreover, the reasonableness obligation has always applied
to NG911 facilities in certain central offices or with direct
contractual relationships with 911 Authorities or PSAPs through the
``functional equivalent'' and ``equivalent NG911 facilities'' language
in the current rules.\245\ Accordingly, we view the impact of today's
changes even on NG911 network facilities to be minimal. Further, we
observe that most of any potential new cost impact would apply to NG911
networks and facilities, many of which are in the process of being
designed and constructed, and which--given NG911's inherent increased
reliability \246\--would mostly be constructed with the specified
benchmarks we articulate today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\245\ 47 CFR 9.19(a)(4)(i)(A) and 9.19(a)(4)(i)(B).
\246\ NG911 Transition Order at *63, para. 185 (``. . . NG911
will reduce the likelihood of 911 service outages because it will
facilitate deployment of new facilities to replace the aging and
failure-prone infrastructure used to operate the legacy 911
system.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nevertheless, despite the fact that these rules reflect steps that
providers will undertake as an ordinary baseline cost of doing
business, the fact the rules require only reasonableness and do not
dictate substantial investment in specific technologies, and the likely
minimal impact to both legacy TDM and NG911 IP critical facilities, we
will err on the side of conservatism and estimate the following network
cost elements as a potential impact of today's proposals.
Anticipated Affected Entities. 290 entities filed 911 Reliability
Certifications in 2024. The large majority of these entities filed to
certify legacy 911 facilities only, with a smaller group certifying for
NG911 equivalent facilities. We anticipate that, over the estimated
five years of the NG911 transition,\247\ the overall number of CSPs
will shrink as smaller RLEC CSPs exit direct contractual 911 services
to state and local government and retire their legacy 911 facilities of
selective routers, TDM CAMA trunks, and ALI/ANI databases,\248\ leaving
other entities as the critical bottleneck facilities providers in the
NG911 ecosystem.\249\ Indeed, as of today, multiple previously-covered
RLECs have already notified the Bureau that they have ceased providing
the services of a CSP.\250\ We estimate that this new smaller group of
mostly larger national or regional providers will provide most of the
specialized critical bottleneck facilities in the NG911 environment,
including ``LIS as a service'' provided to OSPs,\251\ major transport
facilities,\252\ VoIP Positioning Centers and traffic aggregation
facilities,\253\ and LNG facilities at the NG911 Delivery Point.\254\
We anticipate
[[Page 23796]]
these larger entities will provide critical 911 facilities and services
on a contract and for-hire basis to the larger group of approximately
2,200 OSPs offering 911 call origination service to the public.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\ NG911 Transition Order at *61, para. 180, n.533 (``We
estimate that, nationwide, both NG911 transition phases will be
complete within five years, due in significant part to the
provisions of this Order that remove obstacles to completion of the
transition, but this estimate is quite conservative because the full
transition will likely be completed sooner in many states and
regions.'').
\248\ NG911 Transition Order at *64, para. 186 (``Today's rules
will accelerate the full retirement of the legacy TDM-based 911
system and facilitate use of an NG911 architecture that uses newer
and less failure-prone facilities. Selective routers will be
replaced with NGCS IP routing at the ESInet, ALI/ANI databases will
be replaced with IP-based systems with more precise location
information, TDM trunks will be replaced with IP transmission to
provide faster connections, and traffic will be routed to more
reliable and efficient IP-based NG911 Delivery Points'').
\249\ NG911 Transition Order at *59, para. 174 (``[C]ertain
commenters suggest that we should apply 911 network reliability and
PSAP outage notification requirements to additional categories of
service providers in an NG911 environment.''); NG911 Transition
Order at *69 para 202 (``. . . OSPs could significantly lower the
overall costs of transmitting 911 calls to ESInets by taking
advantage of third-party aggregators' services.''); See also Home
Telephone Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 4-7 (filed Aug. 9, 2023)
(new NG911 Service Providers will assume most responsibility for
NG911 critical architecture but are currently unregulated by the
Commission, as they are not required to comply with the Commission's
911 reliability reporting rules); NTCA Reply Comments, PS Docket 21-
479, at 7-8 (filed Sept. 8, 2023).
\250\ 47 CFR 9.19(d)(4); See also PSHSB Announces Compliance
Date and Instructions for Information Collection Requirement
Associated with Improving 911 Reliability, Public Notice, DA 24-524,
PS Docket Nos. 15-80 and 13-75, p. 1 (PSHSB June 4, 2024)
(``Beginning July 4, 2024 . . . notifications of cessation of
operations should be filed with the Bureau staff via email to
[email protected].''), at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-524A1.pdf.
\251\ NG911 Transition Order at *71, para. 206 (``CSRIC explains
that LIS as a service is contemplated as an NG911 solution at
`minimal expense' to small OSPs, as it relieves OSPs of most costs
beyond monthly services, and an LNG and can be provided either by a
commercial vendor or the 911 authority.''); NG911 Transition Order
at * 72, para. 208 (``AT&T, in its role as the lead NGCS and ESInet
contractor in Virginia, has already provided a solution that allows
legacy OSP wireline ALI and MSAG location data to be used for NG911-
compliant LIS as a service, which eliminates TDM OSPs' needs to
upgrade their networks to IP.'').
\252\ NG911 Transition Order at *59, para. 174. See also Home
Telephone Comments,, PS Docket 21-479, at 5 (filed Aug. 9, 2023)
(``[S]everal large Aggregators will be consolidating massive
portions of the country's critical emerging NG911 services on their
systems with little Commission oversight.''); Id. at iii (``[T]he
Commission should focus on the back-end for-profit entities that
aggregate front-end 911 transmissions from multiple jurisdictions,
process, and then deliver via back-end connections IP-based
information to the appropriate local [PSAPs]. The Commission should
establish standards and reporting requirements for these
`Aggregators' to ensure the NG911 network is safe and reliable for
IP emergency transmissions destined to local PSAPs.''); USTelecom
Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 5 (filed Aug. 9, 2023); Windstream
Reply Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 2-3 (filed Sept. 8, 2023).
\253\ See Inteliquent Reply Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 1
(filed Sept. 8, 2023) (``Sinch provides a Voice over internet
Protocol (`VoIP') Positioning Center (`VPC') service to VoIP
providers. Sinch's VoIP customers contract with Sinch to facilitate
VoIP 911 call delivery to the appropriate Public Safety Answering
Points (`PSAP').''); see also Bandwidth Comments, PS Docket 21-479,
at 2-3 (filed Aug. 9, 2023) (``Bandwidth predominately acts as a
VoIP Positioning Center (`VPC') where it provides stand-alone
emergency location and 911 call routing capabilities for its VoIP
service provider customers . . . . Bandwidth has a robust network
that reaches across the United States and Canada and delivers around
3 million calls a year from 26.7 million end points . . . . To date,
Bandwidth established network aggregation capabilities to route its
customers' 911 traffic through 16 ESInets.'').
\254\ 47 CFR 9.33(a)(2) (OSPs are responsible for the bearing
the costs of ``IP Conversion using a Legacy Network Gateway or the
functional equivalent, if necessary''); NG911 Transition Order at
*49, para. 145, n.425 (``. . . OSPs also are responsible for the
cost of the hardware and software components needed to transform TDM
transmissions into the appropriate IP-based format (if necessary) .
. . . At Phase 1, these components will typically include LNG
facilities . . . .''); NG911 Transition Order at *51, para. 151
(``At Phase 1, our rules require OSPs to deliver 911 traffic in the
IP-based SIP format requested by the 911 Authority, using either IP
origination or IP translation through an LNG or other solution.'');
NG911 Transition Order at *45, para. 132 (``. . . OSPs must transmit
and deliver 911 traffic to NG911 Delivery Points designated by 911
Authorities and must bear the financial responsibility for such
transmission, including costs associated with completing any needed
TDM-to-IP translation . . . .'').
\255\ NG911 Transition Order at *68, para. 198, n.588 (``Based
on FCC Form 477 data as of June 2023, there are a total of 2,287
OSPs . . . .'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the foregoing, we tentatively estimate that the 911
reliability rule amendments we propose today will apply to
approximately 100 larger entities, most of which are currently subject
to the existing reliability rules for providing NG911 equivalent
services. We further estimate that, of those entities currently
providing only legacy 911 critical facilities, most will phase out in
approximately 5 years and revert to providing 911 call origination
services only, surrendering CSP status but otherwise remaining subject
to the ``911 call transmission'' obligations and liability standard for
originators.\256\ We seek comment on this estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\256\ See 47 CFR 9.4, 9.10(b), and 9.11(a)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, we estimate that most of the benchmarks articulated here
would already apply to covered entities providing NG911 equivalent
services, because the majority of those providers are already subject
to the reasonableness requirement which must be met with either
alternative measures or the current articulated best practices.
Furthermore, we assess that the new benchmark practices described today
are standard IP network reliability measures that are generally being
implemented as baseline costs for communications networks to meet
expected quality of service standards, and so will only result in new
costs to a few CSPs. In addition, because these rules impose a
reasonableness requirement only, with safe harbor benchmarks that are
mandatory obligations, we anticipate the cost impact will be even more
narrow. Accordingly, we estimate that the changes to the rule would
impact the network decisions of no more than one-quarter of these 100
entities, or 25 entities total. We seek comment on this estimate as
well.
Critical IP Path Diversity for Major Transport Providers and IP 911
Aggregators. The primary cost for ensuring IP path diversity is
redundancy of routers capable of load-balancing and automatic re-
routing. We conservatively estimate the cost of such network routers at
approximately $40,000 each.\257\ Assuming 25 CSPs acquire new redundant
routers to meet the proposed IP path diversity benchmark, the total
cost would be approximately $1 million. We seek comment on this
estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\ See ``NetMode,'' network router cost quotes of $18,295
(https://netmode.com/product/new-cisco-ncs-5001-ncs-5001-series-router-ncs-5001-bun, of $72,995 (https://netmode.com/product/juniper-ptx10003-80c-ac-80x100ge-16x400ge-port-ac-or-dc-router-new),
and of $30,995 (https://netmode.com/product/new-cisco-systems-asr1002-x-5g-vpn-bundle-asr1002x-5g-vpnk9/) (last visited Feb. 14,
2025); See also FCC Announces Final Supply Chain Reimbursement
Program Procedures, Public Notice, DA 21-947, WC Docket No. 18-89,
36 FCC Rcd 12190, 12255 (WCB 2021), 86 FR 48521 (Aug. 31, 2021)
(identifying Multiprotocol Label Switching L3 router cost at
$4,500).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To the extent CSPs must acquire additional IP transport to ensure
diverse paths in and out of their facilities, we rely in part on our
estimates of IP transport in the NG911 Transition Order.\258\ We assess
that most CSPs affected by today's proposals will be larger providers
that are already aggregating or transporting aggregated NG911 IP
traffic over SIP trunks with diverse and redundant paths.\259\ We
conservatively estimate that additional IP transport to connect to
third-party networks will not exceed $3,000 per month relying on record
evidence from the NG911 proceeding.\260\ Furthermore, to the extent any
CSP must acquire dedicated long-haul transport or SIP trunking, we rely
on record evidence that such costs would be approximately $7,000 per
month.\261\ Conservatively estimating that 25 entities will acquire
both additional last-mile transport and long-distance transport in
response to our proposed rules, the estimated cost would be $3 million
annually.\262\ We seek comment on this estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\ NG911 Transition Order at *69, paras. 200-202.
\259\ Based on FCC Form 477 data as of June 2023, there are a
total of 2,287 OSPs. Of the 291 large OSPs that serve more than
10,000 subscribers each, there are only 2 wireline OSPs that do not
offer any form of IP services (e.g., broadband or VoIP services), 20
wireline OSPs that also provide broadband services, 232 VoIP OSPs,
and 37 wireless OSPs which provide IP services. Staff Calculation.
FCC Form 477 Data as of June 2023. See also Jessica Dine and Joe
Kane, The State of US Broadband in 2022 (Dec. 5, 2022) (``4G covers
almost 100 percent of the population.''), https://itif.org/publications/2022/12/05/state-of-us-broadband-in-2022-reassessing-the-whole-picture/; TechTarget, What is 4G (fourth-generation
wireless)? (``4G is also an all-IP (internet protocol)-based
standard for both voice and data . . .''), https://www.techtarget.com/searchmobilecomputing/definition/4G (last visited
Feb. 14, 2025).
\260\ See NG911 Transition Order at *69, para. 201 (staff
estimated the transport cost would be $3,000 per month for OSPs that
currently only offer TDM-based voice services, which should be
treated as an upper bound for in-state transport cost).
\261\ South Carolina Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Office Comments,
PS Docket 21-479, at 4-5 (filed Aug. 8, 2023) (stating that the
network transport costs to deliver SIP traffic from South Carolina
to two delivery points in Dallas, Texas and Raleigh, North Carolina
are $172,000 per year). This amounts to $86,000 per path, or
approximately $7,000 per month.
\262\ Total IP transport costs = ($3,000 + $7,000) per month x
12 months x 25 entities = $3 million per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, while the aggregated 911 traffic circuits of CSPs
providing direct service to PSAPs have always been covered critical
facilities under our rules, out of an abundance of caution, we include
an estimate here, relying on the calculation in the 2013 Reliability
Order.\263\ There, the Commission estimated that the total incremental
cost of the critical circuit auditing and tagging best practice for all
critical 911 circuits was $6.4 million annually.\264\ We estimate less
than a quarter of these critical legacy 911 circuits are impacted given
that the previous record indicates ``only a segment of critical 911
circuits are not already subject to regular audits,'' \265\ so any
incremental cost would not exceed $2.4 million annually after adjusting
for inflation.\266\ We seek comment on this estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\263\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17510-14, paras. 100-
105.
\264\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17513, para. 103.
\265\ 911 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17512, para. 102. See
also 2013 Reliability Order, 28 FCC Rcd at 17511, para. 101 (most
CSPs ``already perform regular diversity audits for many . . .
critical 911 circuits'').
\266\ We estimate a 146% inflation adjustment between December
2013 and September 2024. See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
Average Hourly Earnings of All Employees, Total Private
(CES0500000003), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CES0500000003
(last visited Feb. 14, 2025) (Inflation Adjustment) (showing that
the average hourly private wage increased from to $35.36 in
September 2024, approximately 146% of the average hourly wage of
$24.18 in December 2013). Therefore, we estimate the total cost as
$6.4 million x (1/4) x 146% = $2,336,000, rounded to $2.4 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational Integrity for LIS and LNG. We estimate the costs of
meeting this benchmark would include servers, UPS devices, and
collocation space. Based on data in the NG911 proceeding, we
conservatively estimate the cost of diverse LNG or LIS servers at
approximately $5,000 each.\267\ We
[[Page 23797]]
further estimate the cost of uninterruptible power supply or UPS
devices on the high-end of approximately $3,000 per unit.\268\ Finally,
we conservatively estimate the cost of any needed diverse secondary
server collocation ``full rack'' space at approximately $700 per
month.\269\ Collectively, assuming the same 25 entities would acquire
this reasonable reliability--and would not have done so absent today's
proposals--this amounts to $200,000 in one-time costs and recurring
cost of $210,000 annually.\270\ We seek comment on this estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\267\ Brian Rosen Reply Comments, PS Docket 21-479, at 2 (filed
Sept. 8, 2023) (``The RLECS commenting on this proceeding wildly
overestimate the cost of the gateway required to convert TDM to SIP.
An Audiocodes Mediant 500 gateway, for example, costs approximately
$1000, and a Mediant 1000, which has much more capability than a
smaller carrier requires is approximately $5000.'').
\268\ See ``Industrial Networking Solutions,'' UPS cost quote of
$3,075 at 75 https://www.industrialnetworking.com/Manufacturers/APC-Tower-Uninterruptible-Power-Supplies-UPS/APC-Smart-UPS-X-Uninterruptible-power-supply-SMX3000RMLV2UNC (last visited Feb. 14,
2025).
\269\ See ``QuoteColo,'' server collocation quote at https://www.quotecolo.com/rack-space-rental/ ($700 per month for ``Full rack
space--appropriate for medium and large web based companies seeking
a primary and/or disaster recovery rack space data center.'') (last
visited Feb. 14, 2025).
\270\ We calculate total one-time costs as follows: ($5,000
server cost + $3,000 UPS device) x 25 entities = $200,000. The
collocation cost is calculated as: $700/month x 12 months x 25
entities = $210,000 per year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IP Network Monitoring. We estimate the costs of IP network
monitoring capability as similar in facilities as those of operational
integrity for LIS and LNG. Accordingly, we start with the same $200,000
in one-time costs and $210,000 annually as an impact of this proposal.
However we add an additional estimated $2,000 per year in monitoring
software licensing costs,\271\ which we multiply by 25 estimated
entities to $50,000, for a total to $260,000 annually. We seek comment
on this estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\ See ``Enterprise Networking Planet,'' IP network
monitoring pricing of approximately $2,000 per year at https://www.enterprisenetworkingplanet.com/guides/network-monitoring-tools/
(last visited Feb. 14, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interoperability. We tentatively estimate the costs of acquiring
interoperability capability as substantially similar to those of IP
network monitoring. Accordingly, we tentatively estimate $200,000 in
one-time costs and $260,000 annually as an impact of this proposal. We
seek comment on this estimate.
Labor Costs--Software, Engineering, and Installation. We estimate
additional labor costs for programming, engineering, and installation
for integrating and/or testing each of the above reliable and
interoperable facilities. Assuming the average wage of a software
developer is $63.75/hour,\272\ with a 45% markup for benefits,\273\ we
arrive at $92.44/hour as the compensation rate for software developers.
Assuming the average wage of computer network engineers is $54.95/
hour,\274\ with a 45% markup for benefits, we arrive at $79.68/hour as
the compensation rate for network engineers. We also assume the average
benefits-adjusted wage for telecommunications equipment installers and
repairers is $46.78 per hour.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\ The mean hourly wage for software developers in the
telecommunications industry in May 2023 is $63.75. See Bureau of
Labor Statistics, May 2023 National Industry-Specific Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates NAICS 517000--Telecommunications,
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_517000.htm (BLS
Telecommunications Wages) (see Occupation Code 15-1252 ``Software
Developers'').
\273\ We markup wages for software developers by 45% to account
for benefits. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of
June 2024, civilian wages and salaries across all sectors averaged
$31.80/hour and benefits averaged $14.41/hour. Total compensation
therefore averaged $31.80 + $14.41, rounded to $46.21. See Press
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for Employee
Compensation--June 2024 (Sept. 10, 2024), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf. Using these figures, benefits constitute
a markup of $14.41/$31.80 ~ 45% (Compensation Benefit Mark-up).
\274\ The mean hourly wage for computer network architects in
the telecommunications industry in May 2023 is $54.95. BLS
Telecommunications Wages (see Occupation Code 15-1241 ``Computer
Network Architects''). The Bureau of Labor Statistics considers the
title ``computer network architect'' to be synonymous with ``network
engineer.'' Bureau of Labor Statistics, Computer Network Architects:
What Computer Network Architects Do, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/computer-network-architects.htm#tab-2 (visited Feb. 15, 2025).
\275\ The mean hourly wage for telecommunications equipment
installers and repairers in the telecommunications industry in May
2023 is $32.26. BLS Telecommunications Wages (see Occupation Code
49-2022 ``Telecommunications Equipment Installers and Repairers,
Except Line Installers''). We mark up wages for telecommunications
equipment installers and repairers by 45% to account for benefits.
$32.26 x 1.45 = $46.78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We tentatively estimate additional labor costs of meeting
benchmarks not already implemented would be approximately 160 labor-
hours total in each of those three categories. Accordingly, the
estimated labor costs would be approximately $14,790 in software labor,
$12,748 in engineering labor, and $7,484 in installation labor, for a
total of $35,023 per CSP. Estimating the same figure of 25 CSPs that
will newly decide to begin meeting the reasonableness benchmarks as a
result of today's proposed rules, the total estimated one-time labor
cost is $875,568. We seek comment on this estimate.
Labor Costs--Annual 911 Reliability and Interoperability
Certification. The Commission recently estimated that the existing 911
Reliability Certification filing requirement imposes a total cost for
all CSPs of $14,446,785 annually.\276\ This figure estimates 168,651
total burden hours across all CSPs at appropriate labor costs,\277\ for
an average compliance cost of $48,156 for each of 300 estimated annual
filers. We anticipate these costs will be reduced consistent with the
reduction in total filing entities to approximately 100 as the NG911
transition progresses. Using the average cost of $48,156 and
multiplying by 100, that would result in a total annual estimated cost
for all CSPs of $4,815,600. However, those figures represent the costs
of an existing requirement adopted in 2013. We therefore further
estimate that the incremental costs from today's proposals further
specifying the NG911 equivalent facilities, functional equivalents, and
best practice benchmarks of CSPs will be minimal, which we
conservatively estimate at a 10% increase, or $481,560 per year. We
seek comment on this estimate. We also seek comment on whether our
proposals to move to drop-down reporting, and to allow certification to
NG911 IP-specific benchmarks instead of requesting alternative measures
reports for those practices, will further reduce reporting burdens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\276\ See Improving 911 Reliability, OMB Control No. 3060-1202,
Supporting Statement at 10 (Oct. 10, 2023), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewDocument?ref_nbr=202309-3060-007 (October 2023 OMB
Submission).
\277\ For certification labor cost estimates used in the October
2023 OMB Submission, we used the job categories of ``Miscellaneous
Media and Communication Worker,'' ``Chief Executive,'' and
``Electronic Engineer, Except Computer'' and their respective mean
hourly wages. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release,
National employment and wage data from the Occupational Employment
Statistics survey by occupation, May 2022 (May 2022) https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ocwage.t01.htm. For miscellaneous
communications worker, we began with the mean hourly wage $36.94 and
multiplied by 1.5 to account for benefits to $55.41, then rounded
down to $55. For chief executive, we used the mean hourly wage of
$118.48, multiplied by 1.5 to account for benefits, and rounded up.
$118.48 x 1.5 = $177.72, rounded to $178/hour. For electronic
engineer, we used the mean hourly wage of $56.95, multiplied by 1.5
to account for benefits, and rounded down. $56.95 x 1.5 = $85.425,
rounded to $85/hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Comparison of Costs and Benefits. Based on the foregoing, we
conservatively estimate the benefits of today's proposals at
approximately $304 million annually,\278\ and the maximum
[[Page 23798]]
worst-case costs at approximately $2.5 million in one-time expenses
\279\ and $6.7 million in annual recurring costs.\280\ The benefits
therefore outweigh the costs. We seek comment on this conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\ The mortality reduction benefit per fatality in 2023 is
estimated at $13.2 million by the U.S. Department of Transportation,
Departmental Guidance on Valuation of a Statistical Life in Economic
Analysis (May 7, 2024), https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis). 23 estimated
lives saved per year times $13.2 million is approximately $304
million per year.
\279\ Total one-time costs include $1 million in router costs,
$200,000 in server and UPS costs, $200,000 in IP network monitoring
one-time cost, $200,000 in interoperability one-time cost and
$875,568 in software, engineering, and installation labor costs =
$2,475,568, rounded up to $2.5 million.
\280\ Annual costs of $6.7 million include $3 million in
transport path diversity costs, $2.4 million in incremental cost of
the critical circuit auditing and tagging per year, $210,000 in
annual collocation costs, $260,000 in annual IP network monitoring
cost, $260,000 in annual interoperability cost, and $481,560 in
incremental annual reporting costs, summed to $6,611,560 and rounded
up to $6.7 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Pursuing a Deregulatory Agenda
As discussed above, today we propose to eliminate, consolidate, or
streamline existing regulations contained in Part 9, Subpart H of our
regulations.\281\ Specifically, today we propose the following
regulatory reductions. Current reliability rules 9.19(c)(1) to (3)
contain 25 subparts and 876 words. Today's proposed amendments reduce
rules 9.19(c)(1) to (3) to 9 subparts and 574 words. In addition, we
propose that the recordkeeping requirements at rule 9.19(d)(3), which
currently contain three subparts and total 251 words, be reduced to a
single section containing 102 words. We also propose to substantially
reduce the complexity and time-burdens of filing annual reliability
certifications by streamlining and simplifying our CSP reporting
obligations. These regulatory reductions are described further above in
this FNPRM, the anticipated cost savings of these reductions are
described above, and the rules reductions are shown below in the
proposed rules. We tentatively conclude that these regulatory
reductions will make our rules easier ``for the average person or
business to understand,'' reduce compliance costs, and ``reduce the
risk of costs of non-compliance.'' \282\ We seek comment on any
additional 911 reliability rules at Part 9, Subpart H and related
certification filing compliance burdens that should be eliminated,
consolidated, or streamlined consistent with the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\281\ See Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, Executive
Order (Jan. 31, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/unleashing-prosperity-through-deregulation/.
\282\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Procedural Matters
Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980,
as amended (RFA),\283\ requires that an agency prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis for notice and comment rulemakings, unless the
agency certifies that ``the rule will not, if promulgated, have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' \284\ Accordingly, the Commission has prepared an Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) concerning potential rule and
policy changes contained in this FNPRM. The IRFA is set forth in
Appendix B. The Commission invites the general public, in particular
small businesses, to comment on the IRFA. Comments must be filed by the
deadlines for comments indicated on the first page of this document and
must have a separate and distinct heading designating them as responses
to the IRFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\283\ 5 U.S.C. 603. The RFA, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, was amended by
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA), Public Law 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
\284\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paperwork Reduction Act. This FNPRM may contain proposed new or
modified information collection requirements. The Commission, as part
of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the
general public and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to comment
on any information collection requirements contained in this document,
as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13.
In addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of
2002, Public Law 107-198, we seek specific comment on how we might
``further reduce the information collection burden for small business
concerns with fewer than 25 employees.'' \285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\ 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
(RFA), the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) has prepared
this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities
by the policies and rules proposed in the Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (FNPRM). Written public comments are requested on this IRFA.
Comments must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed
by the deadlines in the FNPRM. The Commission will send a copy of the
FNPRM, including this IRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration (SBA). In addition, the FNPRM and IRFA
(or summaries thereof) will be published in the Federal Register.
A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
In the FNPRM, the Commission takes steps to improve the reliability
and interoperability of Next Generation 911 (NG911) networks nationwide
to ensure the American public can continue to reach emergency services
without undue delay or disruption. Following the devastating impact of
the June 2012 ``derecho'' storm to 911 services, the Commission
determined that reliability, resiliency, and availability of 911
services could be improved through implementation of network-
reliability best practices and other sound engineering principles, and
accordingly adopted 911 reliability certification rules in 2013
applicable to certain entities providing 911 services to Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs). These entities were designated as ``covered
911 service providers'' (CSPs). Since 2013, the Commission has taken
steps to facilitate the transition from legacy 911 to NG911. Most
recently, the Commission adopted a Report and Order to facilitate an
orderly and coordinated transition from legacy 911 systems to NG911
systems for 911 Authorities and originating service providers (OSPs).
The proposals in the FNPRM aim to ensure that NG911 is fully accessible
to all Americans which requires that among other things NG911 networks
have the capacity to handle multimedia NG911 calls from users including
those with disabilities that include the transmission of texts, photos,
videos, and data, and that NG911 networks have the requisite
reliability and interoperability to seamlessly transfer 911 calls and
data.
The NG911 transition represents a significant change in the 911
network architecture which will substantially alter the class of
entities that are providing critical 911 services, requiring an update
to which entities are CSPs under the Commission's 911 reliability
rules. In legacy 911 systems, a single entity such as the local
Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC) or Rural Local Exchange Carrier
(RLEC) handles most critical 911 functions for the PSAPs in its service
areas, including routing to PSAPs, maintaining caller location
information databases, and providing call delivery via trunk lines. In
contrast, NG911 systems perform these critical functions by a variety
of service providers, including Emergency
[[Page 23799]]
Services IP Network (ESInet) operators, Next Generation Core Services
(NGCS) providers, and various third-party platforms providing services
to OSPs. As the NG911 transition progresses, many smaller RLECs who are
currently CSPs will stop providing these critical 911 functions to
state and local government and retire their legacy 911 facilities, as
larger NG911 service providers start performing the functions
previously performed by these smaller entities.
The Commission estimates that this new group of NG911 CSPs will be
mostly larger national or regional providers, and they will provide
most of the specialized critical bottleneck facilities in the NG911
environment, including ``Location Information Servers (LIS) as a
service'' provided to OSPs, major transport facilities, VoIP
Positioning Centers or traffic aggregation facilities, and LNG
facilities at the NG911 Delivery Point. We anticipate these larger
entities will provide critical 911 facilities and services on a
contract and for-hire basis to the larger group of approximately 2,200
OSPs offering 911 call origination service to the public. We further
anticipate that, over the estimated five years of the NG911 transition,
the overall number of CSPs will shrink, leaving mostly a different
group of entities as the critical bottleneck facilities providers in
the NG911 ecosystem. Multiple RLECs that were CSPs have already
notified the Commission's public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau
(Bureau) that they have ceased providing the services of a CSP.
The FNPRM proposes rules intended to account for these developments
in the NG911 transition, and to ensure the reliability and
interoperability of NG911 as the technological and regulatory landscape
evolves. In particular, the FNPRM proposes to revise the Commission's
911 reliability rules to ensure their continued effectiveness for NG911
systems. The rules adopted in 2013 codified in Sec. 9.19 require CSPs
to certify annually that they have ``take[n] reasonable measures to
provide reliable 911 service with respect to circuit diversity,
central-office backup power, and diverse network monitoring.'' The
FNPRM proposes to update the Commission's reliability rules in Sec.
9.19 as described below.
The Commission proposes to update the definition of ``covered 911
service provider'' or CSP in Sec. 9.19(a) of the Commission's existing
911 reliability rules to specify how the rules apply to service
providers that control or operate critical pathways and components of
NG911 ecosystem networks. The current CSP definition focuses on
providers of certain network facilities and capabilities directly
serving PSAPs using descriptions specific to legacy 911 systems, but
also states that the rules apply to the ``functional equivalents'' or
``equivalent facilities'' in the NG911 environment. We propose to
specify which critical NG911 ecosystem facilities and capabilities are
among the functional equivalents referred to in the current rule, and
that providers of these capabilities therefore fall within the
definition of CSPs.
We also propose to expand the CSP definition to apply to additional
providers of critical connectivity in the NG911 environment, whether
they directly serve PSAPs or not. These new proposed CSP entities are:
(1) operators of LISs or equivalent IP 911 location databases; (2)
operators of Legacy Network Gateways (LNGs); (3) operators of Major
Transport Facilities that exceed Optical Carrier 3 (OC3) capacity and
carry 911 traffic from multiple OSPs for ultimate delivery to NG911
Delivery Points or Emergency Services IP Networks (ESInets); (4)
operators of IP Traffic Aggregation Facilities that carry 911 traffic
from multiple OSPs towards ultimate transmission to an NG911 Delivery
Point or ESInet; and (5) operators of interstate interconnecting
facilities between ESInets. We also update Sec. 9.19(a) to include
defined terms consistent with the proposed rules we discuss in the
FNPRM.
In Sec. 9.19(c) the Commission proposes to update the reasonable
reliability standards that providers of critical NG911 ecosystem
functions must employ to ensure the reliable delivery of 911 traffic to
NG911 delivery points. We believe such action is needed to ensure the
reliability of critical transport, aggregation, and data facilities in
NG911 networks at the interstate and national level and the
accessibility of NG911 services.
In Sec. 9.19(c)(4) the Commission proposes updates to establish
NG911 interoperability requirements for interstate transfer of 911
traffic between ESInets to optimize PSAP call transfer capabilities
during service disruptions. We seek to ensure that PSAPs can transfer
calls to nearby PSAPs located across state borders with minimal need
for the traffic to be retranslated or reformatted in order for such
transfers to occur. We further propose to harmonize this action with
our current 911 reliability certification rules in Sec. 9.19(c) by
adding an interoperability certification to the rules. We also seek
updated information on interstate interoperability by type of service,
with particular emphasis on services used by consumers, including those
with accessibility needs.
In Sec. 9.19(d) the Commission proposes updates to modify the
certification and oversight mechanisms in our 911 reliability rules to
improve implementation of reliability and interoperability in NG911
systems. We propose expansion of the ``Confidential Treatment''
provisions to enable state and local 911 Authorities to obtain
reliability and interoperability certifications directly from CSPs, so
that 911 Authorities can more easily exercise their existing authority
to address reliability, interoperability, and accessibility needs
within their jurisdictions. We also propose to modify Sec. 9.19(d) to
include the compliance schedule for the NG911 reliability and
interoperability phase-in in the FNPRM.
The Commission also proposes to add a new Sec. 9.19(e) to provide
guidance on the Bureau's procedures for remediation investigations and
handling reports from 911 Authorities regarding reliability and
interoperability concerns. In addition, we seek comment on adding a new
Sec. 9.19(f) to create a petition process for 911 Authorities to
submit allegations of violations of our 911 reliability and
interoperability rules to the Bureau.
Finally, the Commission believes that the proposals we discuss in
the FNPRM and summarize above will facilitate a more effective and
reliable 911 system resulting in a national 911 service that is more
accessible, reliable and interoperable increasing the lifesaving
benefits for the public.
B. Legal Basis
The proposed action is authorized pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4(i),
201, 214, 222, 225, 251(e), 301, 303, 316, and 332 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i),
201, 214, 222, 225, 251(e), 301, 303, 316, 332; the Wireless
Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, Public Law 106-81, 47
U.S.C. 615 note, 615, 615a, 615a-1, 615b; and section 106 of the
Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of
2010, Public Law 111-260, 47 U.S.C. 615c.
C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which
the Proposed Rules Will Apply
The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be
affected by the proposed rules, if adopted. The RFA generally defines
the term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms
``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.''
[[Page 23800]]
In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same meaning as the
term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business Act. A small
business concern is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated;
(2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any
additional criteria established by the SBA.
Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental
Jurisdictions. Our actions, over time, may affect small entities that
are not easily categorized at present. We therefore describe, at the
outset, three broad groups of small entities that could be directly
affected herein. First, while there are industry specific size
standards for small businesses that are used in the regulatory
flexibility analysis, according to data from the Small Business
Administration's (SBA) Office of Advocacy, in general a small business
is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees. These types
of small businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United
States, which translates to 34.75 million businesses.
Next, the type of small entity described as a ``small
organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.''
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a revenue benchmark of $50,000
or less to delineate its annual electronic filing requirements for
small exempt organizations. Nationwide, for tax year 2022, there were
approximately 530,109 small exempt organizations in the U.S. reporting
revenues of $50,000 or less according to the registration and tax data
for exempt organizations available from the IRS.
Finally, the small entity described as a ``small governmental
jurisdiction'' is defined generally as ``governments of cities,
counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' U.S. Census
Bureau data from the 2022 Census of Governments indicate there were
90,837 local governmental jurisdictions consisting of general purpose
governments and special purpose governments in the United States. Of
this number, there were 36,845 general purpose governments (county,
municipal, and town or township) with populations of less than 50,000
and 11,879 special purpose governments (independent school districts)
with enrollment populations of less than 50,000. Accordingly, based on
the 2022 U.S. Census of Governments data, we estimate that at least
48,724 entities fall into the category of ``small governmental
jurisdictions.''
Advanced Wireless Services (AWS)--(1,710-1,755 MHz and 2,110-2,155
MHz bands (AWS-1); 1,915-1,920 MHz, 1,995-2,000 MHz, 2,020-2,025 MHz
and 2,175-2,180 MHz bands (AWS-2); 2,155-2,175 MHz band (AWS-3); 2,000-
2,020 MHz and 2,180-2,200 MHz (AWS-4)). Spectrum is made available and
licensed in these bands for the provision of various wireless
communications services. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except
Satellite) is the closest industry with a SBA small business size
standard applicable to these services. The SBA small business size
standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has
1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that
there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire
year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees.
Thus, under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a
majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.
According to Commission data as of December 2021, there were
approximately 4,472 active AWS licenses. The Commission's small
business size standards with respect to AWS involve eligibility for
bidding credits and installment payments in the auction of licenses for
these services. For the auction of AWS licenses, the Commission defined
a ``small business'' as an entity with average annual gross revenues
for the preceding three years not exceeding $40 million, and a ``very
small business'' as an entity with average annual gross revenues for
the preceding three years not exceeding $15 million. Pursuant to these
definitions, 57 winning bidders claiming status as small or very small
businesses won 215 of 1,087 licenses. In the most recent auction of AWS
licenses 15 of 37 bidders qualifying for status as small or very small
businesses won licenses.
In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the
Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning
bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction
does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently
in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent
business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers,
unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the
Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for
licensees providing these services, at this time we are not able to
estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would
qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.
All Other Telecommunications. This industry is comprised of
establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized
telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications
telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes
establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal
stations and associated facilities connected with one or more
terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to,
and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems. Providers of
internet services (e.g., dial-up ISPs) or Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP) services, via client-supplied telecommunications connections are
also included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard
for this industry classifies firms with annual receipts of $40 million
or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were
1,079 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of
those firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than $25 million. Based on this
data, the Commission estimates that the majority of ``All Other
Telecommunications'' firms can be considered small.
Broadband Personal Communications Service. The broadband personal
communications services (PCS) spectrum encompasses services in the
1,850-1,910 and 1,930-1,990 MHz bands. The closest industry with a SBA
small business size standard applicable to these services is Wireless
Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). The SBA small business
size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it
has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show
that there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the
entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250
employees. Thus under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates
that a majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.
Based on Commission data as of November 2021, there were
approximately 5,060 active licenses in the Broadband PCS service. The
Commission's small business size standards with respect to Broadband
PCS involve eligibility for bidding credits and installment payments in
the auction of licenses for these services. In auctions for these
licenses, the Commission defined ``small business'' as an entity that,
together with its affiliates and controlling interests, has average
gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three
[[Page 23801]]
years, and a ``very small business'' as an entity that, together with
its affiliates and controlling interests, has had average annual gross
revenues not exceeding $15 million for the preceding three years.
Winning bidders claiming small business credits won Broadband PCS
licenses in C, D, E, and F Blocks.
In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the
Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning
bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction
does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently
in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent
business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers,
unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the
Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for
licensees providing these, at this time we are not able to estimate the
number of licensees with active licenses that would qualify as small
under the SBA's small business size standard.
Cable System Operators (Telecom Act Standard). The Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, contains a size standard for a ``small cable
operator,'' which is ``a cable operator that, directly or through an
affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than one percent of all
subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with any entity
or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate exceed
$250,000,000.'' For purposes of the Telecom Act Standard, the
Commission determined that a cable system operator that serves fewer
than 498,000 subscribers, either directly or through affiliates, will
meet the definition of a small cable operator. Based on industry data,
only six cable system operators have more than 498,000 subscribers.
Accordingly, the Commission estimates that the majority of cable system
operators are small under this size standard. We note however, that the
Commission neither requests nor collects information on whether cable
system operators are affiliated with entities whose gross annual
revenues exceed $250 million. Therefore, we are unable at this time to
estimate with greater precision the number of cable system operators
that would qualify as small cable operators under the definition in the
Communications Act.
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs). Neither the Commission
nor the SBA has developed a size standard for small businesses
specifically applicable to local exchange services. Providers of these
services include several types of competitive local exchange service
providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry
with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small business size
standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having
1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017
show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the
entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250
employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 3,378
providers that reported they were competitive local service providers.
Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 3,230 providers have
1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business
size standard, most of these providers can be considered small
entities.
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the
Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard
specifically for incumbent local exchange carriers. Wired
Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry with an SBA small
business size standard. The SBA small business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there
were 3,054 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees.
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 1,212 providers
that reported they were incumbent local exchange service providers. Of
these providers, the Commission estimates that 916 providers have 1,500
or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size
standard, the Commission estimates that the majority of incumbent local
exchange carriers can be considered small entities.
Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). Neither the Commission nor the SBA
have developed a small business size standard specifically for
Interexchange Carriers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the
closest industry with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this
industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with
fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the
2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021,
there were 127 providers that reported they were engaged in the
provision of interexchange services. Of these providers, the Commission
estimates that 109 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, the
Commission estimates that the majority of providers in this industry
can be considered small entities.
Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the Commission nor the SBA
has developed a size standard for small businesses specifically
applicable to local exchange services. Providers of these services
include both incumbent and competitive local exchange service
providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry
with an SBA small business size standard. Wired Telecommunications
Carriers are also referred to as wireline carriers or fixed local
service providers. The SBA small business size standard for Wired
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees.
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 4,590 providers
that reported they were fixed local exchange service providers. Of
these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,146 providers have
1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business
size standard, most of these providers can be considered small
entities.
Lower 700 MHz Band Licenses. The lower 700 MHz band encompasses
spectrum in the 698-746 MHz frequency bands. Permissible operations in
these bands include flexible fixed, mobile, and broadcast uses,
including mobile and other digital new broadcast operation; fixed and
mobile wireless commercial services (including FDD and TDD-based
services); as well as fixed and mobile wireless uses for private,
internal radio needs, two-way interactive, cellular, and mobile
television broadcasting services. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers
(except Satellite) is the closest industry with a SBA small business
size standard applicable to licenses providing services in these bands.
The SBA small business
[[Page 23802]]
size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it
has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show
that there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the
entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250
employees. Thus under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates
that a majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.
According to Commission data as of December 2021, there were
approximately 2,824 active Lower 700 MHz Band licenses. The
Commission's small business size standards with respect to Lower 700
MHz Band licensees involve eligibility for bidding credits and
installment payments in the auction of licenses. For auctions of Lower
700 MHz Band licenses the Commission adopted criteria for three groups
of small businesses. A very small business was defined as an entity
that, together with its affiliates and controlling interests, has
average annual gross revenues not exceeding $15 million for the
preceding three years, a small business was defined as an entity that,
together with its affiliates and controlling interests, has average
gross revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years,
and an entrepreneur was defined as an entity that, together with its
affiliates and controlling interests, has average gross revenues not
exceeding $3 million for the preceding three years. In auctions for
Lower 700 MHz Band licenses seventy-two winning bidders claiming a
small business classification won 329 licenses, twenty-six winning
bidders claiming a small business classification won 214 licenses, and
three winning bidders claiming a small business classification won all
five auctioned licenses.
In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the
Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning
bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction
does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently
in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent
business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers,
unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the
Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for
licensees providing these services, at this time we are not able to
estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would
qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.
Offshore Radiotelephone Service. This service operates on several
UHF television broadcast channels that are not used for television
broadcasting in the coastal areas of states bordering the Gulf of
America,\286\ and is governed by subpart I of Part 22 of the
Commission's Rules. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except
Satellite) is the closest industry with a SBA small business size
standard applicable to this service. The SBA small business size
standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has
1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that
there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire
year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees.
Thus, under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a
majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.
Additionally, based on Commission data, as of December 2021, there was
one licensee with an active license in this service. However, since the
Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for this
service, at this time we are not able to estimate the number of
licensees that would qualify as small under the SBA's small business
size standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\286\ Exec. Order No. 14172, 90 FR 8630, 2025 WL 343885 (Jan.
20, 2025). The Gulf of America, formerly known as the Gulf of
Mexico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications
Equipment Manufacturing. This industry comprises establishments
primarily engaged in manufacturing radio and television broadcast and
wireless communications equipment. Examples of products made by these
establishments are: transmitting and receiving antennas, cable
television equipment, GPS equipment, pagers, cellular phones, mobile
communications equipment, and radio and television studio and
broadcasting equipment. The SBA small business size standard for this
industry classifies businesses having 1,250 employees or less as small.
U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 656 firms in this
industry that operated for the entire year. Of this number, 624 firms
had fewer than 250 employees. Thus, under the SBA size standard, the
majority of firms in this industry can be considered small.
Rural Radiotelephone Service. Neither the Commission nor the SBA
have developed a small business size standard specifically for small
businesses providing Rural Radiotelephone Service. Rural Radiotelephone
Service is radio service in which licensees are authorized to offer and
provide radio telecommunication services for hire to subscribers in
areas where it is not feasible to provide communication services by
wire or other means. A significant subset of the Rural Radiotelephone
Service is the Basic Exchange Telephone Radio System (BETRS). Wireless
Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite), is the closest
applicable industry with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA
small business size standard for Wireless Telecommunications Carriers
(except Satellite) classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as
small. For this industry, U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that
there were 2,893 firms that operated for the entire year. Of this
total, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus under the
SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that the majority of Rural
Radiotelephone Services firm are small entities. Based on Commission
data as of December 27, 2021, there were approximately 119 active
licenses in the Rural Radiotelephone Service. The Commission does not
collect employment data from these entities holding these licenses and
therefore we cannot estimate how many of these entities meet the SBA
small business size standard.
Satellite Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' Satellite
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth
station operators. The SBA small business size standard for this
industry classifies a business with $44 million or less in annual
receipts as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 firms
in this industry operated for the entire year. Of this number, 242
firms had revenue of less than $25 million. Consequently, using the
SBA's small business size standard most satellite telecommunications
service providers can be considered small entities. The Commission
notes however, that the SBA's revenue small business size standard is
applicable to a broad scope of satellite telecommunications providers
included in the U.S. Census Bureau's Satellite Telecommunications
industry definition. Additionally, the Commission neither requests nor
collects annual revenue information from satellite telecommunications
providers, and is therefore unable to more accurately estimate the
number of
[[Page 23803]]
satellite telecommunications providers that would be classified as a
small business under the SBA size standard.
Semiconductor and Related Device Manufacturing. This industry
comprises establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing
semiconductors and related solid state devices. Examples of products
made by these establishments are integrated circuits, memory chips,
microprocessors, diodes, transistors, solar cells and other
optoelectronic devices. The SBA small business size standard for this
industry classifies entities having 1,250 or fewer employees as small.
U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 729 firms in this
industry that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 673 firms
operated with fewer than 250 employees. Thus under the SBA size
standard, the majority of firms in this industry can be considered
small.
Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS) Providers.
Telecommunications relay services enable individuals who are deaf, hard
of hearing, deafblind, or who have a speech disability to communicate
by telephone in a manner that is functionally equivalent to using voice
communication services. Internet-based TRS connects an individual with
a hearing or a speech disability to a TRS communications assistant
using an internet Protocol-enabled device via the internet, rather than
the public switched telephone network. Video Relay Service (VRS) one
form of internet-based TRS, enables people with hearing or speech
disabilities who use sign language to communicate with voice telephone
users over a broadband connection using a video communication device.
Internet Protocol Captioned Telephone Service (IP CTS) another form of
internet-based TRS, permits a person with hearing loss to have a
telephone conversation while reading captions of what the other party
is saying on an internet-connected device. A third form of internet-
based TRS, internet Protocol Relay Service (IP Relay), permits an
individual with a hearing or a speech disability to communicate in text
using an internet Protocol-enabled device via the internet, rather than
using a text telephone (TTY) and the public switched telephone network.
Providers must be certified by the Commission to provide VRS and IP CTS
and to receive compensation from the TRS Fund for TRS provided in
accordance with applicable rules. Analog forms of TRS, text telephone
(TTY), Speech-to-Speech Relay Service, and Captioned Telephone Service,
are provided through state TRS programs, which also must be certified
by the Commission.
Neither the Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business
size standard specifically for TRS Providers. All Other
Telecommunications is the closest industry with a SBA small business
size standard. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Voice over
internet Protocol (VoIP) services, via client-supplied
telecommunications connections are included in this industry. The SBA
small business size standard for this industry classifies firms with
annual receipts of $35 million or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau
data for 2017 show that there were 1,079 firms in this industry that
operated for the entire year. Of those firms, 1,039 had revenue of less
than $25 million. Based on Commission data there are 14 certified
internet-based TRS providers and two analog forms of TRS providers. The
Commission however does not compile financial information for these
providers. Nevertheless, based on available information, the Commission
estimates that most providers in this industry are small entities.
Upper 700 MHz Band Licenses. The upper 700 MHz band encompasses
spectrum in the 746-806 MHz bands. Upper 700 MHz D Block licenses are
nationwide licenses associated with the 758-763 MHz and 788-793 MHz
bands. Permissible operations in these bands include flexible fixed,
mobile, and broadcast uses, including mobile and other digital new
broadcast operation; fixed and mobile wireless commercial services
(including FDD- and TDD-based services); as well as fixed and mobile
wireless uses for private, internal radio needs, two-way interactive,
cellular, and mobile television broadcasting services. Wireless
Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) is the closest industry
with a SBA small business size standard applicable to licenses
providing services in these bands. The SBA small business size standard
for this industry classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or
fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were
2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of that
number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees. Thus, under the
SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a majority of
licensees in this industry can be considered small.
According to Commission data as of December 2021, there were
approximately 152 active Upper 700 MHz Band licenses. The Commission's
small business size standards with respect to Upper 700 MHz Band
licensees involve eligibility for bidding credits and installment
payments in the auction of licenses. For the auction of these licenses,
the Commission defined a ``small business'' as an entity that, together
with its affiliates and controlling principals, has average gross
revenues not exceeding $40 million for the preceding three years, and a
``very small business'' an entity that, together with its affiliates
and controlling principals, has average gross revenues that are not
more than $15 million for the preceding three years. Pursuant to these
definitions, three winning bidders claiming very small business status
won five of the twelve available licenses.
In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the
Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning
bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction
does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently
in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent
business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers,
unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the
Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for
licensees providing these services, at this time we are not able to
estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would
qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.
Wired Telecommunications Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau defines
this industry as establishments primarily engaged in operating and/or
providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure that
they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, sound,
and video using wired communications networks. Transmission facilities
may be based on a single technology or a combination of technologies.
Establishments in this industry use the wired telecommunications
network facilities that they operate to provide a variety of services,
such as wired telephony services, including VoIP services, wired
(cable) audio and video programming distribution, and wired broadband
internet services. By exception, establishments providing satellite
television distribution services using facilities and infrastructure
that they operate are included in this industry. Wired
Telecommunications Carriers are also referred to as wireline carriers
or fixed local service providers.
The SBA small business size standard for Wired Telecommunications
Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small.
U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that
operated in this industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964
[[Page 23804]]
firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on
Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of
December 31, 2021, there were 4,590 providers that reported they were
engaged in the provision of fixed local services. Of these providers,
the Commission estimates that 4,146 providers have 1,500 or fewer
employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard,
most of these providers can be considered small entities.
Wireless Communications Services. Wireless Communications Services
(WCS) can be used for a variety of fixed, mobile, radiolocation, and
digital audio broadcasting satellite services. Wireless spectrum is
made available and licensed for the provision of wireless
communications services in several frequency bands subject to Part 27
of the Commission's rules. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except
Satellite) is the closest industry with an SBA small business size
standard applicable to these services. The SBA small business size
standard for this industry classifies a business as small if it has
1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that
there were 2,893 firms that operated in this industry for the entire
year. Of this number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 employees.
Thus under the SBA size standard, the Commission estimates that a
majority of licensees in this industry can be considered small.
The Commission's small business size standards with respect to WCS
involve eligibility for bidding credits and installment payments in the
auction of licenses for the various frequency bands included in WCS.
When bidding credits are adopted for the auction of licenses in WCS
frequency bands, such credits may be available to several types of
small businesses based average gross revenues (small, very small and
entrepreneur) pursuant to the competitive bidding rules adopted in
conjunction with the requirements for the auction and/or as identified
in the designated entities section in Part 27 of the Commission's rules
for the specific WCS frequency bands.
In frequency bands where licenses were subject to auction, the
Commission notes that as a general matter, the number of winning
bidders that qualify as small businesses at the close of an auction
does not necessarily represent the number of small businesses currently
in service. Further, the Commission does not generally track subsequent
business size unless, in the context of assignments or transfers,
unjust enrichment issues are implicated. Additionally, since the
Commission does not collect data on the number of employees for
licensees providing these services, at this time we are not able to
estimate the number of licensees with active licenses that would
qualify as small under the SBA's small business size standard.
Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). This
industry comprises establishments engaged in operating and maintaining
switching and transmission facilities to provide communications via the
airwaves. Establishments in this industry have spectrum licenses and
provide services using that spectrum, such as cellular services, paging
services, wireless internet access, and wireless video services. The
SBA size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if
it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show
that there were 2,893 firms in this industry that operated for the
entire year. Of that number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250
employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 594
providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of wireless
services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 511
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered
small entities.
Wireless Telephony. Wireless telephony includes cellular, personal
communications services, and specialized mobile radio telephony
carriers. The closest applicable industry with an SBA small business
size standard is Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except
Satellite). The size standard for this industry under SBA rules is that
a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. For this
industry, U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 2,893
firms that operated for the entire year. Of this number, 2,837 firms
employed fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission
data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December
31, 2021, there were 331 providers that reported they were engaged in
the provision of cellular, personal communications services, and
specialized mobile radio services. Of these providers, the Commission
estimates that 255 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees.
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of
these providers can be considered small entities.
D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
The FNPRM proposes and seeks comment on revisions to requirements
that may affect the reporting, recordkeeping, and/or other compliance
requirements for small and other entities that provide 911 services. As
explained previously in this IRFA, the Commission anticipates the NG911
transition, and the conforming proposals in today's FNPRM will
eliminate the burdens on most small entities currently subject to the
911 reliability rules since most small entities currently designated as
CSPs will likely cease providing the services of a CSP. Therefore, the
Commission also anticipates the proposals in the FNPRM will not
continue to subject these small entities to the CSP regulations, and
will not impose compliance obligations that require small entities to
hire professionals. We expect the new requirements proposed in the
FNPRM will generally apply to larger entities. Nevertheless, we
summarize these requirements here.
In the FNPRM, the Commission proposes to maintain the current
structure of the existing reliability regulations, which require all
911 CSPs (including those providing NG911 services) to take reasonable
measures to ensure reliability, and allows the presumptive
demonstration of ``reasonableness'' by meeting certain ``best
practice'' benchmarks codified in the rules and reported in an annual
certification filing. The new compliance measures we proposed in the
FNPRM update best practice benchmarks applicable to NG911 facilities,
add a ``reasonable interoperability'' requirement and best practice
benchmarks for certain CSPs, and modify the certification reporting
process for CSPs.
The Commission tentatively estimates that the proposed reasonable
reliability and interoperability requirements would affect
approximately twenty-five NG911 providers imposing costs they are not
already incurring. We further estimate the new certification reporting
requirements will result in incremental compliance costs for
approximately one-hundred NG911 providers. In the FNPRM, we seek
comment on these estimates, and provide a breakdown of the estimated
costs below for the relevant groups of NG911 providers.
NG911 Reliability Best Practices. The Commission anticipates that
some entities will choose to satisfy the ``reasonable reliability''
requirement by meeting the three best practice
[[Page 23805]]
benchmarks to demonstrate presumptive reasonability. The first
benchmark is physical diversity of network paths and circuits, to
eliminate single points of failure in the call chain. For NG911
facilities, we propose that ``physical diversity'' would mean that
critical paths established by CSPs must be geographically diverse,
load-balanced, and capable of automatic failover to the backup element
(e.g., redundant routers or node connections and links) and automatic
reroutes to redundant paths in the transport layer in the event of path
failure. Redundant routers or node paths and links should be located in
different geographic locations (i.e., in different physical
facilities). We propose that this benchmark would apply to Major
Transport Providers and IP Aggregation Facilities. The Commission
estimates that all entities choosing to meet the physical diversity
benchmark will incur approximately $1 million in redundant router
costs, and $3 million annually in short and long distance transport
costs for the 25 estimated affected CSPs.
The second benchmark is operational integrity. For NG911
facilities, the operational integrity benchmark means maintaining
redundant and geographically distributed backups located in different
facilities sufficient to ensure that a failure of any localized
facility will not interrupt 911 traffic, and having appropriate
continuous power, such as an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) device.
In 2014, the Commission observed that network architectures using ``two
active databases in different geographic locations, each of which is
capable of handling all 911 call traffic in the event of a fault in the
other database, will be more reliable and resilient than those that
route all calls through a single active database with backup equipment
on passive `standby' mode.'' We propose this benchmark would apply to
LIS and LNG facilities used in NG911 ecosystems.
Relying on data in the NG911 proceeding, the Commission
conservatively estimates the cost of diverse LNG or LIS servers at
approximately $5,000 each. We further estimate the cost of
uninterruptible power supply or UPS devices on the high-end of
approximately $3,000 per unit. Finally, we conservatively estimate the
cost of any needed diverse secondary server collocation ``full rack''
space at approximately $700 per month. This amounts to $200,000 in one-
time costs, and recurring cost of $210,000 annually for the estimated
25 CSPs that will be affected.
The third benchmark is network monitoring. The Commission proposes
to specify NG911 monitoring technologies identified in prior Commission
orders as methods of compliance. Specifically, we propose NG911-
appropriate standards for network monitoring relying on automatic
disruption detection and alarms. We propose this monitoring benchmark
would apply to path diversity facilities of Major Transport Providers
and IP Aggregation Facilities such as routers, nodes, and node links,
as well as to LNG and LIS facilities used in NG911 ecosystems. The
Commission estimates the costs of IP network monitoring capability as
similar in facilities as those of operational integrity for LIS and
LNG. Thus, our cost estimate starts with $200,000 in one-time costs,
and $210,000 annually similar to LIS and LNG, and we add an additional
estimated $50,000, for $2,000 per year in monitoring software licensing
costs, which we multiply by the 25 estimated affected CSPs for a total
cost of $260,000 annually.
NG911 Reasonable Interoperability and Best Practices. The
Commission proposes to adopt interstate interoperability reasonableness
requirement for entities operating ESInet interstate interconnecting
facilities. We also propose to apply the existing annual certification
requirement for interoperability to these new CSPs. In the annual
certification our proposed requirement would require CSPs operating
interstate ESInet interconnecting facilities to certify whether their
facilities achieve interoperability for exchanged 911 traffic
sufficiently to enable complete interstate transfers between ESInets.
To demonstrate presumptive reasonableness, we propose that CSPs
annually certify that their interstate interconnecting ESInet
facilities have deployed conformance-tested equipment as well as
annually certify that it has tested its interstate interoperability
capabilities. If a CSP does not conform to the benchmark elements, the
CSP would be required to certify to its alternative measures used, as
the current rules require all CSPs to do for reliability. The
Commission tentatively estimates the costs of acquiring
interoperability capability as substantially similar to those of IP
network monitoring. Accordingly, we tentatively estimate $200,000 in
one-time costs and $260,000 annually as the cost of compliance of this
proposal.
Technical Labor Costs for Compliance. The Commission estimates that
there will be additional labor costs for programming, engineering, and
installation for integrating and/or testing each of the above reliable
and interoperable facilities. First, we assume the average wage of a
software developer is $63.75/hour, with a 45% markup for benefits, to
arrive at $92.44/hour as the compensation rate for software developers.
Next, we assume the average wage of computer network engineers is
$54.95/hour, with a 45% markup for benefits, to arrive at $79.68/hour
as the compensation rate for network engineers. We also assume the
average benefits-adjusted wage for telecommunications equipment
installers and repairers is $46.78 per hour. For additional labor costs
of meeting benchmarks not already implemented we tentatively estimate
approximately 160 labor-hours total in each of those three categories.
We therefore calculate an estimated labor cost of approximately $14,790
for software labor, $12,748 for engineering labor, and $7,484 for
installation labor, for a total cost of $35,023 per CSP. Applying this
cost estimate to the 25 CSPs that will begin meeting the reasonableness
benchmarks for the first time as a result of today's proposed rules,
the total estimated one-time labor cost is $875,568.
911 Reliability and Interoperability Annual Certification. In the
FNPRM, the Commission proposes that all NG911 CSPs must file an annual
911 reliability and interoperability certification indicating whether
they meet the best practice benchmarks or are using alternative
measures to achieve reasonable reliability or interoperability. This is
an expansion of the existing annual 911 reliability requirement. In the
next section of this IRFA we discuss the measures and revisions we
propose in the FNPRM to streamline the certification form and reporting
process to minimize burdens for affected entities.
The Commission recently estimated that the existing 911 Reliability
Certification filing requirement imposes a total cost for all CSPs of
$14,446,785 annually. This cost estimates 168,651 total burden hours
across all CSPs at appropriate labor costs, for an average compliance
cost of $48,156 for each of 300 estimated annual filers. As the NG911
transition progresses, the Commission anticipates these costs will
decrease consistent with the reduction in the total number of filing
entities. We estimate the filing entities will decrease from 300 to
approximately 100 filing entities. Using the average cost of $48,156
per CSP and multiplying by 100, would result in a total annual
estimated cost for all CSPs of $4,815,600. These costs however
[[Page 23806]]
represent the costs of compliance with the existing requirements the
Commission adopted in 2013. To account for the incremental costs for
the proposals in the FNPRM further specifying the NG911 equivalent
facilities, functional equivalents, and best practice benchmarks of
CSPs which will be minimal, we conservatively estimate a 10% increase.
The incremental cost of a 10% increase results in $481,560 per year.
Record Retention and Compliance Timeframe. The proposed rules in
the FNPRM include revision of the existing record retention requirement
in Sec. 9.19(d)(3) to include a requirement for CSPs to retain
internal reports concerning reliability and interoperability
compliance, records of action to achieve reliability and
interoperability compliance, and testing and maintenance of
reliability, and interoperability measures and technology, to support
the Annual 911 reliability and interoperability certification. The
FNPRM also proposes codification of the compliance timeframe for the
NG911 reliability and interoperability phase-in which grants CSPs that
would be subject to the proposed requirements if adopted, one year
after all of the information and recordkeeping requirements subject to
approval by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have been
approved to comply.
The Commission estimates that the maximum costs of the compliance
and reporting obligations imposed on CSPs subject to the proposals in
the FNPRM would be approximately $2.5 million in one-time expenses and
$6.7 million in annual recurring costs. At the same time the Commission
estimates that there will be a benefit of approximately $304 million
annually for the estimated lives saved as a result of the proposals in
the FNPRM.
E. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant,
specifically small business, alternatives that it has considered in
reaching its proposed approach, which may include the following four
alternatives (among others): ``(1) the establishment of differing
compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into
account the resources available to small entities; (2) the
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance or
reporting requirements under the rule for such small entities; (3) the
use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an exemption
from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small
entities.''
Some Alternatives Considered. To reduce the burdens for small
entities, the Commission specifically considers and seeks comment on
whether providing increased flexibility to providers or businesses
classified by SBA's small business size standards as small could
alleviate the burden of any reporting requirements. Further, the
Commission considers, but declines to include all indirect service
providers--which could include small entities, within the definition of
CSPs to avoid imposing burdens of outage reporting and certification
requirements on indirect providers of essential NG911 services. Instead
we retain the direct service requirement amending Sec. 9.19 to specify
that CSPs directly serving PSAPs are responsible for ensuring the
reliability of all of the NG911 capabilities they provide to the PSAP
regardless of how the NG911 capabilities are provisioned. Coincident
with the Commission's proposed expansion of the classes of entities
covered by our NG911 reliability rules to include entities that perform
critical NG911 functions, we also consider whether to amend the outage
reporting requirements in Sec. 4.5(e) to include the NG911 entities
subject to our 911 reliability rules. Additionally, we explore whether
there are measures in addition to the annual certification that can be
taken to further promote 911 reliability and interoperability, such as
implementing an outcome-based standard that establishes how many annual
user minutes of 911 traffic could be interrupted by network or facility
outages and still be considered reasonable, beneath which a CSP is
subject to remediation orders, or adopting a similar interoperability
standard based on the percentage of interstate 911 call transfers which
fail completely, or fail to include caller location or other data.
Eliminating Compliance Burdens on Small Businesses. Today's FNPRM
declines to extend the current reliability regulatory regime to
continue to cover small entities--OSPs and RLECs who will be retiring
from the provision of certain legacy 911 facilities during the NG911
transition. While all entities in the 911 call chain including small
OSPs play critical roles in ensuring 911 traffic gets delivered to
PSAPs, the Commission recognizes as some small entities indicate that
the rules we propose in the FNPRM should only apply to ``bottleneck''
network facilities upon which multiple OSPs and PSAPs depend.
Accordingly, we propose that smaller OSPs such as RLECs will no longer
be subject to the reliability regulations or the annual certification
filing requirement once they retire their legacy 911 routing, location,
and trunking facilities and no longer provide direct services to PSAPs.
This proposal should eliminate the economic burdens for the significant
number of OSP and RLEC small entities that are currently subject to the
reliability rules and to the annual certification filing requirement.
Cost Flexibility for Smaller Government Entities. As discussed
above, the Commission tentatively proposes to keep the existing
``direct service to PSAPs'' condition for qualifying as a CSP for most
entities that provide 911 routing, location services, and critical
delivery paths to PSAPs. This preserves flexibility under our rules for
portions of the NG911 networks on the state government and 911
Authority side of the NG911 cost allocation demarcation point. By
keeping this condition, we ensure that 911 Authorities and state
governments will have maximum flexibility in their service contracts
with NG911 vendors, and the ability to make locally-appropriate
decisions as to whether their vendors provide services directly to
PSAPs or to another branch of government. This proposal ensures that
state and local governments will not be constrained by federal
regulations that would automatically impose costs on any private entity
that does business with state and local government, which could impose
undue burdens on the smallest local government entities such as PSAPs.
By preserving flexibility in state and local government NG911
deployments, the Commission ensures that related cost decisions
involving small government entities will be made at the state and local
level, not by the Commission.
Compliance Timelines. The compliance timeframe the Commission
proposes in today's FNPRM provides CSPs subject to the requirements one
year to comply after approval of all information and recordkeeping
requirements subject to approval by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). The one-year post OMB approval period would include the time
needed for OMB to review and approve of a revised 911 reliability and
interoperability certification form which we direct the PSHSB to
implement. The Commission expects the burdens of compliance to be
minimal since most of the benchmarks in the proposed rules already
apply to covered entities providing NG911 equivalent services, which
includes the reasonableness requirement which requires compliance
[[Page 23807]]
with either the alternative measures, or the current best practices.
Thus, many CSPs that will be required to comply with the proposed rules
are likely already in compliance. Further, the new benchmark practices
we adopt are also standard IP network reliability measures that are
generally being implemented for communications networks to meet
expected quality of service standards. Therefore, the Commission
believes this proposed compliance timeframe will give CSPs adequate
notice and advance opportunity to prepare in accordance with ordinary
business cycles, and at minimal cost.
Consolidations, Streamlining, and Simplifications of Compliance and
Reporting Requirements. Today's FNPRM takes steps to ensure that all
CSPs subject to the proposed reliability and interoperability rules can
comply with the minimum necessary burden, reducing the compliance costs
for regulated entities. For example, by specifying the NG911 best
practice benchmarks in the regulations along with the legacy 911
benchmarks, CSPs will have greater certainty of what constitutes
reasonable reliability and interoperability in the NG911 environment.
Including these NG911 benchmarks in the regulations will further ease
certification reporting burdens by allowing NG911 providers to certify
they meet the benchmarks, rather than having to certify that they do
not meet the legacy 911 benchmarks and then describe their alternative
NG911 measures in narrative format for dozens or hundreds of
facilities. Providing a description of alternative measures would be
reserved for instances when there were deviations from the best
practice benchmarks.
We also consider and propose to streamline the certification form
by allowing CPSs to select alternative measures from a drop-down menu
and then identify all facilities that use them, rather than the current
process where CSPs list each facility and describe its alternative
measure separately and narratively. We further propose to revise the
certification form so that CSPs can select which facilities they
operate from a drop-down menu, to reduce the burden of having to
complete inapplicable portions of a form to answer ``not applicable''
and to provide a narrative explanation of why. Additionally, the FNPRM
proposes to consolidate portions of rule 9.19 concerning alternative
measures for reasonable reliability in order to reduce the complexity
of complying with the certification form. The Commission specifically
directs PSHSB to consider revisions to the certification form that, (1)
allow CSPs to specify the type(s) of 911 facilities they are
operating--legacy and/or NG91--in a way that constrains which best
practice standard they are certifying to, (2) that will ensure NG911
CSPs do not have to submit narrative explanations of alternative
measures for IP-based facilities if those facilities meet the
regulatory best practice benchmarks for IP-based networks, and (3) that
contain specified drop-down menu answers to replace the current free-
form text reporting option for alternative measures or ``not
applicable'' responses.
Finally, today's FNPRM proposes measures to minimize the burden on
regulated entities subject the proposed requirements of Sec. 9.19 by
for example seeking to consolidate the paragraphs addressing
alternative measures reporting in Sec. 9.19(c)(1) to (3) to capture
both legacy and NG911 providers. We also propose to consolidate and
streamline the recordkeeping requirements in Sec. 9.19(d)(3), to
simplify compliance and better apply to all legacy 911 and NG911 CSPs.
F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules
None.
Ordering Clauses
Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4(i), 201,
214, 225, 251(e), 301, 303, 316, and 332 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i), 201, 214, 225, 251(e),
301, 303, 316, 332; the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act
of 1999, Public Law 106-81, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 615 note, 615, 615a,
615a-1, 615b; and section 106 of the Twenty-First Century
Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010, Public Law 111-260,
47 U.S.C. 615c, that this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is
adopted.
It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of the Secretary
shall send a copy of this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
List of Subjects
47 CFR Part 0
Authority delegations (Government agencies), Classified
information, Communications, Communications common carriers, Equal
access to justice, Freedom of information, Government publications,
Infants and children, Investigations, Organization and functions
(Government agencies), Penalties, Postal Service, Privacy, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Sunshine Act, Telecommunications.
47 CFR Part 9
Communications, Communications common carriers, Communications
equipment, Internet, Radio, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Satellites, Security measures, Telecommunications, Telephone.
Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
Proposed Rules
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal
Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR parts 0 and 9 as
follows:
PART 0--COMMISSION ORGANIZATION
0
1. The authority citation for part 0 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 155, 225, 409, and
1754, unless otherwise noted.
0
2. Amend Sec. 0.392 by revising paragraph (j) to read as follows:
Sec. 0.392 Authority delegated.
* * * * *
(j) The Chief of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau is
delegated authority to administer the communications reliability,
interoperability, and redundancy rules and policies contained in part
9, subpart H, of this chapter, develop and revise forms and procedures
as may be required for the administration of part 9, subpart H, of this
chapter, review certifications filed in connection therewith, and order
remedial action on a case-by-case basis to ensure the reliability and
interoperability of 911 service in accordance with such rules and
policies.
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec. 0.457 by revising paragraph (d)(1)(viii) to read as
follows:
Sec. 0.457 Records not routinely available for public inspection.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) * * *
(viii) Information submitted in connection with a 911 reliability
and interoperability certification pursuant to 47 CFR 9.19 that
consists of non-public information or descriptions of networks or
facilities, compliance plans, or supplemental information requested by
[[Page 23808]]
the Commission with respect to such certification.
* * * * *
PART 9--911 REQUIREMENTS
0
4. The authority citation for part 9 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151-154, 152(a), 155(c), 157, 160, 201,
202, 208, 210, 214, 218, 219, 222, 225, 251(e), 255, 301, 302, 303,
307, 308, 309, 310, 316, 319, 332, 403, 405, 605, 610, 615, 615
note, 615a, 615b, 615c, 615a-1, 616, 620, 621, 623, 623 note, 721,
and 1471, and Section 902 of Title IX, Division FF, Pub. L. 116-260,
134 Stat. 1182, unless otherwise noted.
0
5. The heading for subpart H is revised to read as follows:
Subpart H--Resiliency, Redundancy, Interoperability, and
Reliability of 911 Communications
0
6. Amend Sec. 9.19 by:
0
a. Revising the section heading;
0
b. Revising the heading of paragraph (a)(1);
0
c. Revising paragraphs (a)(2)(iv), and (a)(4)(i)(A) and (B);
0
d. Adding paragraphs (a)(4)(i)(C) through (G);
0
e. Revising paragraphs (a)(4)(ii)(A) and (B), (a)(5), (6), and (8);
0
f. Removing paragraphs (a)(9) and (10), and redesignating paragraph
(a)(11) as paragraph (a)(9);
0
g. Adding paragraphs (a)(10) through (18);
0
h. Revising paragraphs (b), (c), and (d); and
0
i. Adding paragraphs (e) through (g).
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 9.19 Reliability and interoperability of covered 911 service
providers.
(a) * * *
(1) Monitoring aggregation point. * * *
(2) * * *
(iv) The term ``certification'' shall include the annual 911
reliability and interoperability certification under paragraph (c) of
this section.
* * * * *
(4) * * *
(i) * * *
(A) Provides 911, E911, or NG911 (where ``NG911'' has the meaning
given in Sec. 9.28) capabilities such as call routing, automatic
location information (ALI), automatic number identification (ANI), or
the functional equivalent of those capabilities (including, but not
limited to, NG911 Core Services (NGCS) Location Facilities or NGCS
Routing Facilities), directly, by contract or tariffed service, whether
via owned and operated facilities or leased or contracted facilities,
to a public safety answering point (PSAP), statewide default answering
point, or appropriate local emergency authority as defined in Sec.
9.3;
(B) Operates one or more central offices that directly serve a
PSAP. For purposes of this section, a central office directly serves a
PSAP if it hosts a selective router or ALI/ANI database, provides
equivalent NG911 capabilities (including NGCS Location Facilities or
NGCS Routing Facilities), or is the last service-provider facility
through which a 911 trunk or administrative line passes before
connecting to a PSAP;
(C) Operates a Location Information Server (LIS) as defined in
Sec. 9.28 or equivalent IP 911 location database;
(D) Operates a Legacy Network Gateway (LNG) used for conversion of
Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) 911 traffic to Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) as defined in Sec. 9.28;
(E) Operates a Major Transport Facility;
(F) Operates an IP Traffic Aggregation Facility; and/or
(G) Operates interstate interconnecting facilities between ESInets.
(ii) * * *
(A) Constitutes a PSAP, 911 Authority, or other governmental
authority to the extent that it provides 911 capabilities; or
(B) Offers the capability to originate 911 calls, except to the
extent the entity also operates the facilities or provides the services
described in paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section.
(5) Critical 911 circuits and paths. 911 facilities that either:
(i) Originate at a selective router or its functional equivalent
(including facilities that collect or aggregate 911 traffic from
multiple OSPs when performed at sites other than the central office
hosting a selective router) and terminate in the central office that
serves the PSAP(s) to which the selective router or its functional
equivalent delivers 911 calls, including all equipment in the serving
central office necessary for the delivery of 911 calls to the PSAP.
Critical 911 circuits also include ALI and ANI facilities that
originate at the ALI or ANI database and terminate in the central
office that serves the PSAP(s) to which the ALI or ANI databases
deliver 911 caller information, including all equipment in the serving
central office necessary for the delivery of such information to the
PSAP(s).
(ii) Transport 911 traffic via Major Transport Facilities to
ultimate delivery at an NG911 Delivery Point or ESInet, including any
intermediate paths in the chain of delivery.
(iii) Transport 911 traffic via IP Traffic Aggregation Facilities
towards ultimate delivery at an NG911 Delivery Point or ESInet,
including any intermediate paths in the chain of delivery.
(6) Diversity audit. A periodic analysis of the geographic routing
of network components to determine whether they are physically diverse.
Diversity audits may be performed through manual or automated means, or
through a review of paper or electronic records, as long as they
reflect whether critical 911 circuits and paths are physically diverse.
* * * * *
(8) Physically diverse. Circuits or paths are physically diverse if
they provide more than one physical route between end points with no
common points where a single failure at that point would cause both
circuits to fail. Circuits or paths that share a common segment such as
a fiber-optic cable or circuit board are not physically diverse even if
they are logically diverse for purposes of transmitting data. IP
routers create physically diverse paths if routers are redundant,
geographically diverse, load balanced, and each capable of automatic
reroutes to more than one path in the event of failure.
* * * * *
(10) Geographically distributed. 911 network architecture is
geographically distributed if 911 traffic can be delivered through more
than one critical facility in different geographic locations in
different physical facilities.
(11) Load balanced. 911 network architecture is load balanced if
call volume is dynamically distributed among multiple active databases
or call processing facilities to accommodate changes in traffic volume.
(12) Major Transport Facility. Dedicated SIP transport facilities
meeting or exceeding Optical Carrier 3 (OC3) in capacity that collect
and/or transmit IP 911 traffic, either segregated or mixed with non-911
traffic, originated from multiple OSPs and transported over interstate
routes, for ultimate transport and delivery to an NG911 Delivery Point
or ESInet.
(13) IP Traffic Aggregation Facility. Facilities that collect and
segregate IP 911 traffic from non-911 traffic for multiple OSPs, or
transport such traffic for ultimate delivery to an NG911 Delivery Point
or ESInet.
(14) Operational integrity. Network capability to ensure continuity
of services via necessary continuous power and automated switchover to
geographically diverse backup facilities
[[Page 23809]]
and configurations to prevent service disruption.
(15) NGCS Location Facilities. The Location Validation Function
(LVF) and the Geographic Information System (GIS).
(16) NGCS Routing Facilities. The Emergency Call Routing Function
(ECRF), Emergency Services Routing Proxy (ESRP), and the Policy Routing
Function (PRF).
(17) Interoperability standards testing. Testing of a covered 911
service provider facilities that validates its NG911 interoperability
solution conforms to a relevant commonly accepted standard in a way
that increases the likelihood of interoperability.
(18) Interoperability conformance testing. Testing conducted
between two or more NG911 covered 911 service providers in different
states that validate the interoperable exchange of information via
their facilities.
(b) Provision of reliable and interoperable 911 service. All
covered 911 service providers shall take reasonable measures to provide
reliable and interoperable 911 service that ensures physical diversity,
operational integrity, network monitoring, and interoperability for
their covered 911 facilities. Performance of the elements of the
certification set forth in paragraphs (c)(1) through (4) of this
section shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of this paragraph
(b). If a covered 911 service provider cannot certify that it has
performed a given element, the Commission may determine that such
provider nevertheless satisfies the requirements of this paragraph (b)
based upon a showing in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section
that it is taking alternative measures with respect to that element
that are reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of failure, or that
one or more certification elements are not applicable to its network.
(c) Annual 911 reliability and interoperability certification. A
certifying official of every covered 911 service provider shall submit
an annual certification to the Commission. The certification shall
address the following elements of reliability and interoperability:
(1) Physical diversity. (i) A covered 911 service provider shall
certify that it has physical diversity for all critical 911 circuits
and paths in its network. Physical diversity can be achieved for IP
facilities by ensuring automatic rerouting capabilities, load
balancing, and geographic distribution of routing facilities, transport
nodes, and node links sufficient to eliminate all single points of
failure; or for legacy facilities by conducting a diversity audit
within the current calendar year and that all of the critical 911
circuits and paths in its network are tagged and are physically diverse
such that no network or facility element constitutes a single point of
failure.
(ii) If a covered 911 service provider does not conform with the
applicable elements in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section, it must
certify with respect to its non-conforming facilities: whether it has
taken alternative measures to mitigate the risks of lack of physical
diversity; whether it believes that the physical diversity requirement
is not applicable to portions of its network; and to answer additional
questions about the non-conforming portions of its network as directed
by the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau).
(2) Operational integrity. (i) A covered 911 service provider shall
certify whether its central offices hosting selective routers, ALI/ANI,
or functioning as the last central office serving a PSAP; its LNG
facilities; and/or its LIS facilities achieve operational integrity,
which can be satisfied for IP facilities with automatic switchover
capability to geographically diverse facilities and continuous power
necessary to maintain operations; or with backup power facilities for
covered legacy 911 central office facilities for at least 24 hours at
full office load if the central office directly serves a PSAP, or, for
at least 72 hours at full office load if the central office hosts a
selective router, including all necessary testing, equipment
maintenance, generator design, and proper installation necessary to
ensure the automatic and independent function of backup power generator
facilities.
(ii) If a covered 911 service provider does not conform with the
applicable elements in paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section it must
certify with respect to its non-conforming facilities: whether it has
taken alternative measures to mitigate the risk of a loss of service;
whether it believes that one or more of the requirements of paragraph
(c)(2)(i) of this section are not applicable to its facilities; and to
additional questions about the non-conforming facilities as directed by
the Bureau.
(3) Network monitoring. (i) A covered 911 service provider shall
certify whether it uses physically diverse monitoring systems to detect
outages and disruptions in its covered 911 facilities. Physically
diverse monitoring can be achieved for IP systems through the use of
geographically distributed automatic disruption detection and alarm
systems; or for legacy facilities, by maintaining and annually auditing
physically diverse monitoring aggregation points, monitoring links, and
NOCs.
(ii) If a covered 911 Service Provider does not conform with the
applicable elements in paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section, it must
certify with respect to its non-conforming facilities: whether it has
taken alternative measures to mitigate the risk of network monitoring
failures; whether it believes that one or more of the requirements of
paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section are not applicable to its network;
and to additional questions about the non-conforming facilities as
directed by the Bureau.
(4) Interoperability. (i) A covered 911 service provider shall
certify whether its interstate interconnecting ESInet facilities
achieve interoperability for exchanged 911 traffic, as defined in
section 9.28, sufficiently to enable complete transfers between
ESInets. Interoperability can be achieved by conducting annual
standards conformance testing and annual interoperability testing that
validate the covered 911 service provider's interoperability for its
interstate facilities.
(ii) If a covered 911 service provider does not conform with the
applicable elements in paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this section, it must
certify with respect to those facilities: whether it has taken
alternative measures to ensure interoperability between ESInets in
multiple states and providers to facilitate the exchange of 911
traffic, as defined in section 9.28; whether it believes that one or
more of the requirements of paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this section are not
applicable to its facilities; and to additional questions about the
non-conforming facilities as directed by the Bureau.
(d) Other matters--(1) NG911 reliability and interoperability
phase-in. Compliance for covered 911 service providers specified at
paragraphs (a)(4)(i)(C) through (G) of this section that are not
currently covered by paragraph (a)(4)(i)(A) or (B) will not be required
until one year after Commission announcement in the Federal Register of
approval of all information and recordkeeping requirements that may
require review of the Office of Management and Budget, at which time
this paragraph (d) will contain the compliance date.
(2) Confidential treatment and 911 Authority access. (i) The fact
of filing or not filing an annual 911 reliability and interoperability
certification and the responses on the face of such
[[Page 23810]]
certification forms shall not be treated as confidential.
(ii) Information submitted with such certifications shall be
presumed confidential to the extent that it consists of non-public
descriptions of networks or facilities, compliance plans, or additional
information requested by the Bureau in or with respect to a
certification.
(iii) 911 Authorities may request access to 911 reliability and
interoperability certification data from the Chief of the Public Safety
and Homeland Security Bureau, and such access shall be granted under
the same terms and conditions as provided for access to NORS data under
Sec. 4.2 of this chapter. Notwithstanding other 911 reliability
certifications data collection and reporting requirements in this
section, covered 911 service providers must provide 911 reliability and
interoperability certification information submitted to the Commission
to 911 Authorities, as defined in Sec. 9.28, upon request, except that
they may omit or redact information relating to portions of their
networks or facilities that are not located within and do not provide
any service directly to the requesting 911 Authorities' jurisdiction.
Covered 911 service providers must provide such information to 911
Authorities in the areas where they provide covered services or operate
covered facilities, and the information must be provided no later than
14 days after a request. Covered 911 service providers may condition
the granting of such requests on the 911 Authority executing a
confidentiality agreement under terms not more restrictive than those
set forth in Sec. 4.2 of this chapter.
(3) Record retention. A covered 911 service provider shall retain
records supporting the responses in a certification for two years from
the date of such certification, and shall make such records available
to the Commission upon request. To the extent that a covered 911
service provider maintains records in electronic format, records
supporting a certification hereunder shall be maintained and supplied
in an electronic format. Such records shall include, at a minimum, any
audit records, internal reports concerning reliability and
interoperability compliance, records of action to achieve reliability
and interoperability compliance, and testing and maintenance of
reliability and interoperability measures and technology.
(4) Covered service cessation notices. Covered 911 service
providers that cease covered operations under this section must notify
the FCC by filing a notification under penalty of perjury no later than
60 days after the cessation of service. Upon filing a notification with
the Commission, covered 911 service providers must provide the same
notifications to the 911 Authorities where their covered facilities are
located and provide service to the 911 Authority.
(e) Remedial action orders and procedures. When acting pursuant to
authority delegated under Sec. 0.392(j) of this Title to order
remedial actions, the Chief of the Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau (Bureau Chief) will initiate restricted non-public proceedings
with parties regulated under this subpart as follows:
(1) If certification filings or other information available to the
Commission indicate that a covered 911 service provider's actions are
deficient to demonstrate reasonable reliability or interoperability
addressed in this subpart, the Bureau Chief may issue and
electronically serve upon the covered 911 service provider a notice
that describes any apparent deficiencies and proposes different or
additional actions that the covered 911 service provider must take to
mitigate the apparent deficiencies.
(2) A covered 911 service provider may submit a written response to
a notice issued pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section within 30
days of service of such notice. Service shall be made as directed by
the Bureau.
(3) At any time after the 30th day following service of a notice
issued pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section, the Bureau Chief
or other Bureau official acting on the Chief's delegated authority may
issue and serve upon the covered 911 service provider an order setting
forth its findings as to such deficiencies and specifying the actions
that the covered 911 service provider is required to take to mitigate
the deficiencies. The order may specify deadlines by which the covered
911 service provider to complete the required actions and may identify
information that the provider must submit to demonstrate its compliance
with the order.
(4) In addition to the procedures in paragraphs (e)(1) through (3)
of this section, a 911 Authority may make referrals of concerns with
covered 911 service providers' use of alternative measures or claims of
inapplicability in the certification, or failure to accurately certify,
or other reliability or interoperability concerns in the 911
Authority's jurisdiction to the Bureau Chief, for the Bureau Chief's
evaluation, investigation, and other action at the Bureau Chief's
discretion.
(f) Petition process. A 911 Authority may file a petition with the
Bureau against a covered 911 service provider in its jurisdiction for
using insufficient alternative measures or claiming inapplicability in
its certification, or failure to accurately certify, or for other lack
of reasonable network practices in conformity with paragraph (b) of
this section. In such proceedings, the covered 911 service provider
will have the burden of demonstrating that its covered facilities and
network practices are reasonable, unless it has demonstrated
presumptive reasonability by affirmatively certifying it has met all
benchmarks specified in paragraph (c) of this section for all its
applicable covered facilities, in which case the burden shifts to the
petitioning 911 Authority. The Bureau may review the petition and
determine whether to order the requested relief, issue a remediation
order, or take other action as necessary.
(1) 911 Authorities may file petitions via the Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau's Public Safety Support Center. The petition
process shall be subject to the procedural requirements set forth in
Sec. Sec. 1.41, 1.45, and 1.47 of this chapter, and will be a
restricted non-public proceeding.
(2) Prior to filing a petition, a 911 Authority must provide the
covered 911 service provider with 30 days written notice, and the
service provider shall have an opportunity to address the issue
directly with the 911 Authority. If the issue has not been addressed to
the 911 Authority's satisfaction within 30 days, the 911 Authority may
file a petition with the Bureau Chief for relief, including the
correspondence with the covered 911 service provider and all
documentation on which to base a finding of lack of reasonableness.
After receiving a petition, the Bureau Chief may issue an order at any
time as specified in paragraph (e)(3) of this section, or take other
intermediate actions as warranted.
(3) The petition must be in the form of an affidavit signed by a
director or officer of the 911 Authority. The petition must contain all
relevant facts and references to this rule section alleging a violation
sufficient for the Bureau to make a determination or grant the
requested relief.
(4) The covered 911 service provider may file an opposition to the
911 Authority's petition, and the 911 Authority may file a reply to the
opposition in accordance with Sec. 1.45 of this chapter. A copy of the
document (petition, opposition, or reply) must be served on the other
party (911 Authority
[[Page 23811]]
or covered 911 service provider) at the time of the filing in
accordance with Sec. 1.47 of this chapter.
(g) Compliance dates. Paragraphs (c) through (f) of this section
may contain revised information collection and recordkeeping
requirements that require review by the Office of Management and
Budget. Compliance with paragraphs (c) through (f) of this section will
not be required until this paragraph (g) is removed or contains a
compliance date(s).
[FR Doc. 2025-09279 Filed 6-3-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P