[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 86 (Tuesday, May 6, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 19160-19165]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-07856]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2024-2556; Project Identifier MCAI-2024-00247-T]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM).
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SUMMARY: The FAA is revising a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
that applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A300 series airplanes; Model
A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model A300 C4-
605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called Model A300-600 series
airplanes); and Model A310 series airplanes. This action revises the
NPRM by adding airplanes to the applicability. The FAA is proposing
this airworthiness directive (AD) to address the unsafe condition on
these products. Since this action would impose an additional burden
over those in the NPRM, the FAA is requesting comments on this SNPRM.
DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this SNPRM by June 20, 2025.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow
the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under
Docket No. FAA-2024-2556; or in person at Docket Operations between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD
docket contains the NPRM, this SNPRM, the mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI), any comments received, and other
information. The street address for Docket Operations is listed above.
Material Incorporated by Reference:
For European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) material
identified in this proposed AD, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3,
50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email
[email protected]. You may find this material on the EASA website at
ad.easa.europa.eu. It is also available at regulations.gov under Docket
No. FAA-2024-2556.
You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des
Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 206-231-3195.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Courtney Tuck, Aviation Safety
Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-
231-3986; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed
under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2024-2556;
Project Identifier MCAI-2024-00247-T'' at the beginning of your
comments. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the
proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include
supporting data. The FAA will consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this proposal because of those comments.
Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to
regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The
agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal
contact received about this SNPRM.
Confidential Business Information
CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this SNPRM contain
commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as
private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or
responsive to this SNPRM, it is important that you clearly designate
the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission
containing CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked
submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed
in the public docket of this SNPRM. Submissions containing CBI should
be sent to Courtney Tuck, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South
216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-231-3986; email:
[email protected]. Any commentary that the FAA receives which is
not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket
for this rulemaking.
Background
The FAA issued an NPRM to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that
would apply to certain Airbus SAS Model A300 series airplanes; Model
A300-600 series airplanes; and Model A310 series airplanes. The NPRM
published in the Federal Register on December 13, 2024 (89 FR 100926).
The NPRM was prompted by AD 2024-0092R1, dated July 10, 2024 (EASA AD
2024-0092R1) (also referred to as the MCAI), issued by EASA, which is
the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union. EASA
AD 2024-0092R1 states that investigations found cracks on the main deck
cargo door (MDCD) actuator bearing fitting caused by fatigue. There is
no unsafe condition during flight when the cargo door is fully closed,
latched, and locked. However, if not detected and corrected, this
cracking could lead to MDCD undamped free fall from the open position
during MDCD operations or during cargo loading/off-loading, resulting
in injury to people on the ground.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require an operational limitation
to the MDCD opening angle, repetitive detailed visual inspections of
the MDCD actuator bearing fittings, and replacement if any cracks are
found.
[[Page 19161]]
Actions Since the NPRM Was Issued
Since the FAA issued the NPRM, the FAA has determined the
applicability of the proposed AD must be revised to add airplanes. The
applicability of EASA AD 2024-0092R1 includes airplanes modified in
accordance with EASA supplemental type certificate (STC) 10014779 (any
revision), EASA STC 10013945 (any revision), or EASA STC 10013960 (any
revision). The FAA has determined those EASA STCs correspond to FAA
STCs ST00177LA-D, STC ST00178LA-D, STC ST01431NY, and STC ST00100NY.
Therefore, the FAA has revised paragraph (c) of the proposed AD to also
include airplanes modified in accordance with the FAA STCs.
The FAA is proposing this AD to address the unsafe condition on
these products.
You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under
Docket No. FAA-2024-2556.
Comments
The FAA received comments from Air Line Pilots Association,
International (ALPA), who supported the NPRM without change. The FAA
also received comments from United Parcel Service (UPS Airlines), who
supported the NPRM and had an additional comment.
The FAA also received additional comments from FedEx Express. The
following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's
response to each comment.
Request To Withdraw the NPRM
FedEx Express requested that the NPRM be withdrawn for several
reasons. First, FedEx Express requested that the NPRM be withdrawn
until Airbus has provided a modification to limit the MDCD operation to
70 degrees. FedEx Express stated the operational limitation requirement
will be difficult to monitor because door operators will not be
prohibited from opening the MDCD to 145 degrees as Airbus does not
provide any MDCD modifications to keep its 70-degree limitation. FedEx
Express stated it, and other airlines, do not monitor door positions
for cargo loading/unloading operations, and cargo loading personnel are
permitted to use both 70- and 145-degree positions. FedEx Express also
suggested that Airbus Alert Operators Transmission (AOT) A52W016-24,
Revision 01, dated July 1, 2024, be revised to include a modification
to limit the MDCD to 70 degrees so that FedEx Express and other
airlines would not mistakenly violate the proposed AD when released.
Second, FedEx Express requested the NPRM be withdrawn until Airbus
and the FAA provide a consistent wind speed operation for the MDCD.
FedEx Express stated that Airbus AOT A52W016-24, Revision 01, dated
July 1, 2024, specifies the MDCD cannot be operated at wind speeds
equal to or greater than 40 knots. However, FedEx Express noted that
Airbus aircraft maintenance manual (AMM) 52-36-00-00 permits the door
to be operated at 40 knot wind speeds and furthermore, if the nose or
tail of the airplane is put into the wind, the maximum wind speed can
be 50 knots. FedEx Express stated the AMM specifies the door cannot be
operated at wind speeds exceeding 60 knots, at which time the door must
be closed immediately. Based on this information, FedEx Express
concluded the documents have contradictory language and that differing
wind speed limits could cause a regulatory burden on the airlines when
following original equipment manufacturer standards. FedEx Express also
suggested that the documents be revised to reflect a consistent wind
speed operation on the MDCD.
Third, FedEx Express requested the NPRM be withdrawn until Airbus
has provided an additional inspection procedure so that FedEx Express
can detect cracks with more confidence. FedEx Express stated that the
proposed method of inspection (i.e., a detailed visual inspection) is
inadequate because it does not fully detect cracks in these fittings
unless the forward and aft support bearings are removed. FedEx Express
noted that the bearings have a housing assembly that covers the side of
the fitting lug holes where it starts to crack. FedEx Express also
suggested that Airbus AOT A52W016-24, Revision 01, dated July 1, 2024,
be revised to include another set of inspection procedures that would
require removing the MDCD door actuating mechanisms and bearings for
inspection access. FedEx Express stated that the new inspection can be
accomplished with an extended compliance time to schedule the airplane
in a heavy check environment with proper tooling and personnel.
Finally, FedEx Express requested the NPRM be withdrawn until Airbus
has provided a temporary repair procedure to bridge all airplanes with
crack findings at the next C-check opportunity. FedEx Express stated
Airbus informed operators it is studying an alternative temporary
repair when a crack is found on these fittings that will bridge the
airplane until its next C-check for fitting replacement. FedEx Express
noted this will help all operators mitigate the operational burden and
schedule the airplane to a suitable base location for fitting
replacements.
The FAA does not agree with the request to withdraw the NPRM. To
delay this proposed AD would be inappropriate, since the FAA has
determined that an unsafe condition exists and that the actions
required by this proposed AD must be conducted to ensure continued
safety.
Regarding the request to wait until a modification is developed to
limit the MDCD operation to 70 degrees, the FAA notes that Airbus is
not planning a modification to block the door at max 70 degrees. The
FAA points out that the MDCD opening/closing operation occurs as
follows (as described in AMM 52-36-00): When the door toggle switch is
pushed to the open position and held, the MDCD stops automatically at
the 70-degree opening position and the indicator light comes on. The
MDCD toggle switch needs to be released and pushed again to the open
position to open the door beyond 70 degrees up to 145 degrees.
Therefore, an inadvertent opening of the MDCD beyond a 70-degree
opening angle is unlikely. During normal closing, the MDCD initially
moves in the open direction for approximately 15 seconds so that the
catch hook of the door actuator is released, so the doors slightly open
above the 70-degree position. Then the MDCD moves automatically in the
closed direction. However, for the purposes of this proposed AD, this
short opening is not a deviation from the requirement to not open the
door above 70 degrees. In regards to the commenter's statement that
operators do not monitor door positions and that cargo loading
personnel are permitted to use both 70- and 145-degree positions, the
FAA notes that this proposed AD takes precedence over service
information that is not mandated by an AD and the operator's current
maintenance practices. In order to deviate from the requirements of the
proposed AD, operators may request approval of an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) for the alternative actions under the provisions of
paragraph (j)(1) of this proposed AD.
Regarding the request to wait until Airbus and the FAA have
provided a consistent wind speed operation for the MDCD, the FAA
acknowledges the documents specify different winds speeds. However, the
AD takes precedence over service information that is not mandated by an
AD. The FAA concurs that the manufacturer should revise its service
information to align with the service information mandated by the
proposed AD. For
[[Page 19162]]
clarification, the manufacturer, not the FAA, revises service
information.
Regarding the request to wait until Airbus has provided an
additional inspection procedure, the FAA has determined that the
detailed visual inspection addresses the unsafe condition and is an
adequate means to detect a crack through the bearing fitting with no
need to remove forward and aft support bearings. The FAA notes that
even if there were a change to the inspection method, it would not
justify a change to the inspection compliance times. However, any
person may request approval of an AMOC for the inspection method or
compliance time under the provisions of paragraph (j)(1) of this
proposed AD.
Finally, regarding the request to wait until Airbus has provided a
temporary repair procedure, the temporary repair is being studied by
Airbus and stress computations are on-going. As such, the temporary
repair is not yet available. However, under the provisions of paragraph
(j)(1) of this proposed AD, the FAA will consider requests for approval
of an AMOC for a temporary repair or alternative repair if sufficient
data are submitted to substantiate that the repair would provide an
acceptable level of safety.
Request for Addressing a Certain Condition
UPS Airlines requested that the proposed AD address the condition
if the door is inadvertently opened beyond the 70-degree position. UPS
Airlines stated that the proposed AD requires an operational limitation
to 70 degrees of the MDCD opening angle. UPS Airlines further stated
that Airbus AOT A52W016-24, Revision 01, dated July 1, 2024, allows
opening the MDCD to the 145-degree (full-open) position and that there
is no electrical or mechanical means to prevent the door from being
opened beyond the 70-degree position. UPS Airlines recommended that the
proposed AD specify actions if this happens and include a statement to
accomplish the inspection mandated by the proposed AD within 10 days.
UPS Airlines stated it currently inspects per Airbus AOT A52W016-24,
Revision 01, dated July 1, 2024, if the MDCD is inadvertently opened
beyond the 70-degree position, in addition to the normal 640 flight
cycle inspection interval.
The FAA disagrees with the request because Note 1 of EASA AD 2024-
0092R1 allows for exceeding the 70-degree position for a short period.
However, in case the MDCD is opened beyond 70 degrees longer than a
short period or an operator wants to deviate from this AD and allow
opening the MDCD beyond 70 degrees, then the operator must request an
AMOC under the provisions of paragraph (j)(1) of this proposed AD. The
FAA has not changed this proposed AD in this regard.
Request for Extending the Compliance Time for Multiple Reasons
FedEx Express requested that the compliance times be extended for
multiple reasons. First, FedEx Express requested an exception be added
to paragraph (h) of the proposed AD that extends the compliance times
due to this subject not being a safety of flight condition. FedEx
Express stated it is concerned the proposed short inspection compliance
times will place a great burden on the airlines, especially if a crack
is found. FedEx Express noted that the crack on these fittings will not
cause the door to fall because the MDCD door is supported with piano
hinges hinged to the fuselage and by a door actuating mechanism that
locks in the center. FedEx Express stated it has 45 Airbus airplanes
above 13,000 flight cycles since the MDCD was installed and has had no
adverse door operations observed with these airplanes. FedEx Express
recommended the initial and repetitive inspections be revised to 1,000
flight cycles. FedEx Express concluded this will minimize the
operational burden and allow scheduling the airplane to a suitable base
location for inspections, including replacement of MDCD crack bearing
fittings with proper tooling, workforce, and parts availability.
Second, FedEx Express requested extending the compliance time until
Airbus secures all the replacement MDCD bearing fittings. FedEx Express
stated the replacement of MDCD bearing fittings in case of findings
would require a large number of fittings in stock to support all FedEx
Express airplanes and other airlines affected by this proposed AD.
FedEx Express stated that Airbus does not have enough spares of these
fittings to support FedEx Express and other operators.
Finally, FedEx Express requested extending the compliance time
until Airbus ensures associated replacement parts are in stock. FedEx
Express stated it has concerns about associated parts availability upon
replacing these MDCD bearing fittings when a crack is found. FedEx
Express stated that Airbus has low stock of most of the door actuating
mechanism parts attached to these bearing fittings, which might also
require replacement, e.g., bearings, support housings, bolts etc. FedEx
Express stated these parts are not secured in stock and are difficult
to procure currently from Airbus. FedEx Express provided an example of
a bearing that has a lead time of 194 days. FedEx Express recommended
extending the compliance time to a heavy check threshold.
The FAA does not agree with the commenter's request to extend the
compliance time. Regarding the statement that there is not an unsafe
condition, the FAA notes that the commenter's reasoning that ``the
crack on these fittings will not cause the door to fall because the
MDCD door is supported with piano hinges hinged to the fuselage and by
a door actuating mechanism that locks in the center'' is not correct
because when the connection of the 2 bearing housings to the bearing
fittings is lost then the door moves down. The piano hinge does not
prevent the MDCD from moving down because it has only the function to
attach the door to the fuselage and allows a rotational motion. The
actuation mechanism is equipped with a catching hook, which is located
directly on the actuator. The function of the catching hook is only to
prevent the MDCD closing if no hydraulic pressure is present. If both
bearing housings detach from the bearing fittings there is nothing to
prevent the door from moving down and this could lead to an undamped
freefall of the MDCD in a worst case. Thus, as specified in this
proposed AD, an unsafe condition exists and must be addressed within
the compliance times specified in this proposed AD.
Regarding the availability of replacement bearing fittings, the FAA
has confirmed with Airbus that there is sufficient stock of bearing
fittings. Regarding the availability of associated replacement parts,
the FAA confirmed with Airbus that it is actively securing stock for
those parts. To the extent associated replacement parts may not exist
to replace parts that fail the inspection requirements of this AD, the
FAA cannot base its AD action on whether associated replacement parts
are available or can be produced. While every effort is made to avoid
grounding aircraft, the FAA must address the unsafe condition.
After considering the commenter's reasons, the FAA has determined
that the compliance time, as proposed, represents an appropriate
interval of time in which the required actions can be performed in a
timely manner within the affected fleet, while still maintaining an
adequate level of safety. However, under the provisions of paragraph
(j)(1) of this proposed AD, the FAA will consider requests for approval
of an extension of the compliance time if
[[Page 19163]]
sufficient data is submitted to substantiate that the new compliance
time would provide an acceptable level of safety. The FAA has not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request for Extending the Compliance Time Due to Operational Costs
FedEx Express requested extending the compliance time because of
the operational burden it will bring on operators once a crack is
found. FedEx Express stated the 500 work-hours stated in Airbus AOT
A52W016-24, Revision 01, dated July 1, 2024, is only an Airbus estimate
based on the assumption that only MDCD fittings are replaced and does
not include any damaged parts attached to these fittings. FedEx Express
stated that the vendor maintenance reported that the work-hours exceed
more than 1,000 work-hours depending on the damaged parts affected
(e.g., bearings, housings, frames etc.). FedEx Express asked the FAA to
evaluate the works-hours.
The FAA notes that the 500 work-hours is an estimate for the
bearing fitting replacement, which is required by the proposed AD if
cracking is found. The cost information specified in the proposed AD
describes only the direct costs of the specific actions required by
this AD, i.e., inspecting and replacing bearing fittings if necessary.
Based on the best data available, the manufacturer provided the number
of work-hours necessary to do the required actions. The FAA recognizes
that, in doing the actions required by an AD, operators might incur
incidental costs in addition to the direct costs, such as replacing
parts associated with the bearing fitting. The cost analysis in AD
rulemaking actions, however, typically does not include incidental
costs. Those incidental costs might vary significantly among operators.
The FAA notes that Airbus is unable to provide or consider estimates on
associated parts that are not required to be removed that might be
damaged during replacement activities. In developing an appropriate
compliance time for this action, the FAA considered the recommendations
of the state of design authority, the urgency associated with the
subject unsafe condition, the availability of required parts, and the
practical aspect of accomplishing the required inspections within a
period of time that corresponds to the normal scheduled maintenance for
most affected operators.
Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51
EASA AD 2024-0092R1 specifies procedures for an operational
limitation to the MDCD opening angle, repetitive detailed visual
inspections of the MDCD actuator bearing fittings, and replacement of
both MDCD actuator bearing fittings if any crack is found on any MDCD
actuator bearing fitting.
This material is reasonably available because the interested
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.
FAA's Determination
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to
the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, it
has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI
referenced above. The FAA is issuing this SNPRM after determining that
the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop
in other products of the same type design.
Certain changes described above expand the scope of the NPRM. As a
result, it is necessary to reopen the comment period to provide
additional opportunity for the public to comment on this SNPRM.
Proposed AD Requirements in This SNPRM
This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified
in EASA AD 2024-0092R1 described previously, except for any differences
identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of this proposed AD.
Explanation of Required Compliance Information
In the FAA's ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency of the AD
process, the FAA developed a process to use some civil aviation
authority (CAA) ADs as the primary source of information for compliance
with requirements for corresponding FAA ADs. The FAA has been
coordinating this process with manufacturers and CAAs. As a result, the
FAA proposes to incorporate EASA AD 2024-0092R1 by reference in the FAA
final rule. This proposed AD would, therefore, require compliance with
EASA AD 2024-0092R1 in its entirety through that incorporation, except
for any differences identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of
this proposed AD. Using common terms that are the same as the heading
of a particular section in EASA AD 2024-0092R1 does not mean that
operators need comply only with that section. For example, where the AD
requirement refers to ``all required actions and compliance times,''
compliance with this AD requirement is not limited to the section
titled ``Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s)'' in EASA AD 2024-
0092R1. Material required by EASA AD 2024-0092R1 for compliance will be
available at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2024-2556 after the
FAA final rule is published.
Interim Action
The FAA considers that this proposed AD would be an interim action.
If final action is later identified, the FAA might consider further
rulemaking then.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD, if adopted as proposed, would
affect 243 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following
costs to comply with this proposed AD:
Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 work-hour x $85 per hour = $85.................. $0 $85 $20,655
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary on-
condition actions that would be required based on the results of any
required actions. The FAA has no way of determining the number of
airplanes that might need this on-condition action:
[[Page 19164]]
Estimated Costs of On-Condition Actions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product
------------------------------------------------------------------------
500 work-hours x $85 per hour = $34,600 $77,100
$42,500.............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Would not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:
Airbus SAS: Docket No. FAA-2024-2556; Project Identifier MCAI-2024-
00247-T.
(a) Comments Due Date
The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive
(AD) by June 20, 2025.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to the Airbus SAS airplanes identified in
paragraphs (c)(1) through (6) of this AD, certified in any category,
manufactured in freighter model configuration, or modified in
accordance with supplemental type certificate (STC) ST00177LA-D, STC
ST00178LA-D, STC ST01431NY, or STC ST00100NY.
(1) Model A300 B4-2C, B4-103, and B4-203 airplanes.
(2) Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, B4-620, and B4-622 airplanes.
(3) Model A300 B4-605R and B4-622R airplanes.
(4) Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes.
(5) Model A300 F4-605R and F4-622R airplanes.
(6) Model A310-203, -204, -221, -222, -304, -322, -324, and -325
airplanes.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 52, Doors.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by investigations that found cracks on the
main deck cargo door (MDCD) actuator bearing fitting caused by
fatigue. The FAA is issuing this AD to address potential cracking of
the MDCD actuator bearing fittings. The unsafe condition, if not
addressed, could lead to MDCD undamped free fall from open position
during MDCD operations or during cargo loading/off-loading,
resulting in injury to people on the ground.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Requirements
Except as specified in paragraphs (h) and (i) of this AD: Comply
with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in
accordance with, European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD
2024-0092R1, dated July 10, 2024 (EASA AD 2024-0092R1).
(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2024-0092R1
(1) Where EASA AD 2024-0092R1 refers to April 26, 2024 (the
effective date of the original issue of EASA AD 2024-0092R1), this
AD requires using the effective date of this AD.
(2) This AD does not adopt the ``Remarks'' section of EASA AD
2024-0092R1.
(i) No Reporting Requirement
Although the material referenced in EASA AD 2024-0092R1
specifies to submit certain information to the manufacturer, this AD
does not include that requirement.
(j) Additional AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, AIR-
520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found
in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request
to your principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office,
as appropriate. If sending information directly to the Manager,
Continued Operational Safety Branch, send it to the attention of the
person identified in paragraph (k) of this AD and email to:
[email protected]. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your
appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector,
the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD
to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, AIR-520,
Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA; or EASA; or Airbus SAS's
EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA, the
approval must include the DOA-authorized signature.
(3) Required for Compliance (RC): Except as required by
paragraph (j)(2) of this AD, if any material referenced in EASA AD
2024-0092R1 contains paragraphs that are labeled as RC, the
instructions in RC paragraphs, including subparagraphs under an RC
paragraph, must be done to comply with this AD; any paragraphs,
including subparagraphs under those paragraphs, that are not
identified as RC are recommended. The instructions in paragraphs,
including subparagraphs under those paragraphs, not identified as RC
may be deviated from using accepted methods in accordance with the
[[Page 19165]]
operator's maintenance or inspection program without obtaining
approval of an AMOC, provided the instructions identified as RC can
be done and the airplane can be put back in an airworthy condition.
Any substitutions or changes to instructions identified as RC
require approval of an AMOC.
(k) Additional Information
For more information about this AD, contact Courtney Tuck,
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA
98198; phone: 206-231-3986; email: [email protected].
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the material listed in this paragraph
under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions
required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2024-0092R1,
dated July 10, 2024.
(ii) [Reserved].
(3) For EASA material identified in this AD, contact EASA,
Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221
8999 000; email [email protected]. You may find this material on
the EASA website at ad.easa.europa.eu.
(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St.,
Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material
at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.
(5) You may view this material at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations or email [email protected].
Issued on May 1, 2025.
Victor Wicklund,
Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate Management Division, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2025-07856 Filed 5-5-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P