[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 72 (Wednesday, April 16, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15996-15999]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-06452]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration


Ajumobi Agu, M.D.; Decision and Order

I. Introduction

    On November 14, 2023, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or 
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of 
Registration (OSC/ISO) to Ajumobi Agu, M.D., of Las Vegas, Nevada 
(Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 
1, at 1. The OSC/ISO informed Registrant of the immediate suspension of 
his DEA Certification of Registration, Control No. FA4195459, pursuant 
to 21 U.S.C. 824(d), alleging that Registrant's continued registration 
constitutes `` `an imminent danger to the public health or safety.' '' 
Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. 824(d)). The OSC/ISO also proposed the 
revocation of Registrant's registration, alleging that Registrant's 
registration should be revoked because Registrant lacks state authority 
to handle controlled substances and Registrant's continued registration 
is inconsistent with the public interest. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 
823(g)(1), 824(a)(3), 824(a)(4)).
    Specifically, the OSC/ISO alleged that Registrant continued to 
dispense controlled substances after his state medical and controlled 
substances licenses were suspended. Id. at 3. The OSC/ISO alleged that 
Registrant's misconduct violated both the implementing regulations of 
the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and Nevada state law. Id. at 2.
    The OSC/ISO notified Registrant of his right to file a written 
request for hearing and an answer, and that if he failed to file such a 
request, he would be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and 
be in default. Id. at 4-5 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did 
not request a hearing. RFAA, at 2.\1\ ``A default, unless excused, 
shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the registrant's/applicant's 
right to a hearing and an admission of the factual allegations of the 
[OSC/ISO].'' 21 CFR 1301.43(e); see also RFAAX 1, at 4-5 (providing 
notice to Registrant).
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    \1\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated 
August 22, 2024, the Agency finds that service of the OSC/ISO on 
Registrant was adequate. Specifically, the included Declaration from 
a DEA Diversion Investigator indicates that Registrant was 
personally served with a copy of the OSC/ISO at his residential 
address on November 17, 2023. RFAAX 2, at 1-2, see also RFAAX 3.
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    Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be 
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action 
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In 
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order 
pursuant to [21 CFR] Sec.  1316.67.'' Id. Sec.  1301.43(f)(1). Here, 
the Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's 
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(a), (c), (f), 1301.46. RFAA, at 1; 
see also 21 CFR 1316.67.

II. Lack of State Authority

A. Findings of Fact

    The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the 
factual allegations in the OSC/ISO are admitted. Accordingly, 
Registrant admits that on July 14, 2023, the Nevada State Board of 
Pharmacy suspended Registrant's Nevada controlled substance license. 
RFAAX 1, at 3. Further, on September 19, 2023, the Nevada Board of 
Medical Examiners suspended Registrant's Nevada medical license. Id. at 
2-3.
    According to Nevada's online records, of which the Agency takes 
official notice, Registrant's Nevada controlled substance license is 
now revoked.\2\ Nevada State Board of Pharmacy License Verification, 
https://online.nvbop.org/#/verifylicense (last visited date of 
signature of this Order). Further, Registrant's Nevada medical license 
remains suspended. Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners Licensee 
Search, https://nsbme.us.thentiacloud.net/webs/nsbme/register/# (last 
visited date of signature of this Order).
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    \2\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take 
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the 
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney 
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm. 
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
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    Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant is not licensed to 
practice medicine nor to handle controlled substances in Nevada, the 
state in which he is registered with DEA.\3\
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    \3\ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ``[w]hen an agency decision 
rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the 
evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to 
an opportunity to show the contrary.'' The material fact here is 
that Registrant, as of the date of this decision, is not licensed to 
practice medicine and/or handle controlled substances in Nevada. 
Registrant may dispute these facts by filing a properly supported 
motion for reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen 
calendar days of the date of this Order. Any such motion and 
response shall be filed and served by email to the other party and 
to Office of the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, at 
[email protected].
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B. Discussion

    Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized 
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a 
finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or 
registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State 
authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . 
. dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect to a 
practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority 
to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which 
a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental 
condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration. 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General 
can register a physician to dispense controlled

[[Page 15997]]

substances `if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled 
substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . 
The very definition of a `practitioner' eligible to prescribe includes 
physicians `licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United 
States or the jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense 
controlled substances. Sec.  802(21).''). The Agency has applied these 
principles consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371, 
71372 (2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).\4\
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    \4\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the 
CSA. First, Congress defined the term ``practitioner'' to mean ``a 
physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise 
permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . ., to 
distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a controlled 
substance in the course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 
802(21). Second, in setting the requirements for obtaining a 
practitioner's registration, Congress directed that ``[t]he Attorney 
General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is 
authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of 
the State in which he practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because 
Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state 
authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the CSA, DEA 
has held repeatedly that revocation of a practitioner's registration 
is the appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer authorized to 
dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which 
he practices. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371-72; 
Sheran Arden Yeats, M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A. 
Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 
11919, 11920 (1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR at 27617.
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    According to Nevada statute, ``[e]very practitioner or other person 
who dispenses any controlled substance within th[e] State or who 
proposes to engage in the dispensing of any controlled substance within 
th[e] State shall obtain biennially a registration issued by the 
[Nevada State Board of Pharmacy] in accordance with its regulations.'' 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec.  453.226(1) (2024). Further, according to Nevada 
statute, ``dispense'' means ``to deliver a controlled substance to an 
ultimate user, patient or research subject by or pursuant to the lawful 
order of a practitioner, including the prescribing, administering, 
packaging, labeling or compounding necessary to prepare the substance 
for that delivery.'' Id. Sec.  453.056(1).
    Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant 
lacks authority to dispense controlled substances in Nevada because his 
Nevada controlled substance license is now revoked. As discussed above, 
an individual must hold a Nevada controlled substance license to 
dispense a controlled substance in Nevada. Thus, because Registrant 
lacks authority to handle controlled substances in Nevada, the state in 
which he is registered with the DEA, Registrant is not eligible to 
maintain a DEA registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order that 
Registrant's DEA registration be revoked.

III. Public Interest

A. Applicable Law

    As discussed above, the OSC/ISO alleges that Registrant violated 
provisions of the CSA and its implementing regulations. As the Supreme 
Court stated in Gonzales v. Raich, ``the main objectives of the CSA 
were to conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and 
illegitimate traffic in controlled substances. . . . To effectuate 
these goals, Congress devised a closed regulatory system making it 
unlawful to . . . dispense[ ] or possess any controlled substance 
except in a manner authorized by the CSA.'' 545 U.S. 1, at 12-13 
(2005). In maintaining this closed regulatory system, ``[t]he CSA and 
its implementing regulations set forth strict requirements regarding 
registration, . . . drug security, and recordkeeping.'' Id. at 14. 
Here, the OSC/ISO's allegations concern the CSA's ``strict requirements 
regarding registration . . . '' and, therefore, go to the heart of the 
CSA's ``closed regulatory system'' specifically designed ``to conquer 
drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in 
controlled substances.'' Id.
Dispensing After State Authority Suspended (21 CFR 1306.04(a); Nev. 
Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec.  453.226(1), 630.160(1), 630.020)
    The OSC/ISO alleges that Registrant continued to dispense 
controlled substances after his state medical and controlled substances 
licenses were suspended. RFAAX 1, at 3. Under the CSA, a prescription 
for a controlled substance is valid only if ``issued for a legitimate 
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual 
course of his professional practice.'' 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Similarly, 
Nevada regulations prohibit the dispensing of controlled substances 
without a Nevada controlled substance license and prohibit the practice 
of medicine, which includes prescribing, without a Nevada medical 
license. Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec.  453.226(1), 630.160(1), 630.020 
(2024).

B. Findings of Fact

    Registrant is deemed to have admitted that following the initial 
suspension of Registrant's Nevada medical license on June 30, 2023, 
Registrant went on to issue approximately 22 prescriptions for 
controlled substances, including oxycodone (a Schedule II opioid), 
alprazolam (a Schedule IV benzodiazepine), and carisoprodol (a Schedule 
IV muscle relaxant). RFAAX 1, at 3. Registrant prescribed these 
medications to 14 patients from June 30, 2023, through at least 
September 11, 2023.\5\ Id. As noted in supra II.A., Registrant's Nevada 
controlled substance license was also suspended beginning on July 14, 
2023. Id.
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    \5\ Registrant's Nevada medical license was briefly reinstated 
on August 10, 2023, but then suspended again on September 19, 2023, 
based on findings that Registrant engaged in the practice of 
medicine after the initial June 30, 2023 suspension of his Nevada 
medical license. RFAAX 1, at 3. There is no evidence that 
Registrant's controlled substance license was reinstated after it 
was suspended on July 14, 2023.
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    Accordingly, the Agency finds substantial record evidence that 
Registrant issued at least 22 controlled substance prescriptions while 
his Nevada medical and/or controlled substance license(s) were 
suspended. Id.

C. Discussion

The Controlled Substances Act's Public Interest Factors
    When the CSA's strict requirements are not met, the Attorney 
General ``may deny, suspend, or revoke [a] registration if . . . the 
[registrant's] registration would be `inconsistent with the public 
interest.' '' Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 251 (2006) (quoting 21 
U.S.C. 824(a)(4)). In the case of a ``practitioner,'' Congress directed 
the Attorney General to consider five factors in making the public 
interest determination. Id.; 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(A-E).\6\
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    \6\ The five factors are:
    (A) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board 
or professional disciplinary authority.
    (B) The [registrant's] experience in dispensing, or conducting 
research with respect to controlled substances.
    (C) The [registrant's] conviction record under Federal or State 
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 
controlled substances.
    (D) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances.
    (E) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and 
safety.
    21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(A-E).
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    The five factors are considered in the disjunctive. Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. at 292-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (``It is well 
established that these factors are to be considered in the 
disjunctive,'' quoting In re Arora, 60 FR 4447, 4448 (1995)); Robert A. 
Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). Each factor is weighed on a 
case-by-case basis. David H. Gillis, M.D., 58 FR 37507, 37508 (1993); 
see Morall v. Drug Enf't Admin.,

[[Page 15998]]

412 F.3d 165, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing the Agency's 
adjudicative process as ``applying a multi-factor test through case-by-
case adjudication,'' quoting LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. N.L.R.B., 357 F.3d 
55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Any one factor, or combination of factors, 
may be decisive, David H. Gillis, M.D., 58 FR at 37508, and the Agency 
``may give each factor the weight . . . deem[ed] appropriate in 
determining whether a registration should be revoked or an application 
for registration denied.'' Morall, 412 F.3d. at 185 n.2 (Henderson, J., 
concurring) (quoting Robert A. Smith, M.D., 70 FR 33207, 33208 (2007)); 
see also Penick Corp. v. Drug Enf't Admin., 491 F.3d 483, 490 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007).
    Moreover, while the Agency is required to consider each of the 
factors, it ``need not make explicit findings as to each one.'' MacKay 
v. Drug Enf't Admin., 664 F.3d 808, 816 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Volkman v. U. S. Drug Enf't Admin., 567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 2009)); 
Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf't Admin., 881 F.3d 
823, 830 (11th Cir. 2018); Hoxie v. Drug Enf't Admin., 419 F.3d 477, 
482 (6th Cir. 2005). ``In short, . . . the Agency is not required to 
mechanically count up the factors and determine how many favor the 
Government and how many favor the registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry 
which focuses on protecting the public interest; what matters is the 
seriousness of the registrant's misconduct.'' Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 
74 FR 459, 462 (2009). Accordingly, as the Tenth Circuit has 
recognized, Agency decisions have explained that findings under a 
single factor can support the revocation of a registration. MacKay, 664 
F.3d at 821.
    In this matter, while all of the 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1) factors have 
been considered,\7\ the Agency finds that the Government's evidence in 
support of its prima facie public interest revocation case regarding 
Registrant's violations of the CSA's implementing regulations is 
confined to Factors B and D. See RFAAX 1, at 2-3. Moreover, the 
Government has the burden of proof in this proceeding. 5 U.S.C.A. Sec.  
556(d); 21 CFR 1301.44.
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    \7\ As to Factor A, there is evidence in the record that 
Registrant's state medical license was suspended on September 19, 
2023, after Registrant engaged in the practice of medicine between 
June 30, 2023 and August 9, 2023 while his state license was 
suspended. RFAAX 1, at 3. Here, the Government has established that 
Registrant prescribed controlled substances after his Nevada medical 
license was suspended on June 30, 2023. See supra I. Prescribing is 
part of the practice of medicine, but does not make up the entire 
practice of medicine. See Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec.  630.020. 
Accordingly, the Agency finds that Factor A does not weigh for or 
against Registrant's continued registration.
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    Here, the Agency finds that the Government's evidence satisfies its 
prima facie burden of showing that Registrant's continued registration 
would be ``inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 
823(g)(1).
Factors B and/or D--Registrant Experience in Dispensing Controlled 
Substances and Compliance With Applicable Laws Related to Controlled 
Substances
    Evidence is considered under Public Interest Factors B and D when 
it reflects compliance or non-compliance with federal and local laws 
related to controlled substances and experience dispensing controlled 
substances. 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(B) and (D); see also Kareem Hubbard, 
M.D., 87 FR 21156, 21162 (2022).
    Here, the Registrant's conduct reflects negative experience in 
prescribing with respect to controlled substances. See supra III.B. 
Moreover, the Agency found substantial record evidence that Registrant 
issued at least 22 controlled substance prescriptions while his Nevada 
medical and/or controlled substance license(s) were suspended. Id. 
Accordingly, there is substantial record evidence that Registrant 
violated 21 CFR 1306.04(a) and Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec.  453.226(1), 
630.160(1).
    The Agency further finds that after balancing the factors of 21 
U.S.C. 823(g)(1), Respondent's continued registration would be 
``inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). 
Accordingly, the Government satisfied its prima facie burden of showing 
that Respondent's continued registration would be ``inconsistent with 
the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). The Agency also finds that 
there is insufficient mitigating evidence to rebut the Government's 
prima facie case. Thus, the only remaining issue is whether, in spite 
of the public interest determination, Respondent can be trusted with a 
registration.

D. Sanction

    Here, the Government has met its prima facie burden of showing that 
Registrant's continued registration is inconsistent with the public 
interest due to his violations pertaining to controlled substance 
prescribing. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Registrant to show why 
he can be entrusted with a registration. Morall, 412 F.3d. at 174; 
Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf't Admin., 881 F.3d 
823, 830 (11th Cir. 2018); Garrett Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 18882, 
18904 (2018).
    The issue of trust is necessarily a fact-dependent determination 
based on the circumstances presented by the individual registrant. 
Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019); see also Jones Total 
Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 833. Moreover, as past performance is 
the best predictor of future performance, DEA Administrators have 
required that a registrant who has committed acts inconsistent with the 
public interest must accept responsibility for those acts and 
demonstrate that it will not engage in future misconduct. Jones Total 
Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 833; ALRA Labs, Inc. v. Drug Enf't 
Admin., 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995). A registrant's acceptance of 
responsibility must be unequivocal. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 
881 F.3d at 830-31. In addition, a registrant's candor during the 
investigation and hearing has been an important factor in determining 
acceptance of responsibility and the appropriate sanction. Id. Further, 
the Agency has found that the egregiousness and extent of the 
misconduct are significant factors in determining the appropriate 
sanction. Id. at 834 & n.4. The Agency has also considered the need to 
deter similar acts by the registrant and by the community of 
registrants. Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR at 46972-73.
    Here, Registrant failed to answer the allegations contained in the 
OSC/ISO and did not otherwise avail himself of the opportunity to 
refute the Government's case. As such, there is no record evidence that 
Registrant takes responsibility, let alone unequivocal responsibility, 
for the founded violations, meaning, among other things, that it is not 
reasonable to believe that Registrant's future controlled substance-
related actions will comply with legal requirements. Accordingly, 
Registrant did not convince the Agency that he can be entrusted with 
registration.
    Further, the interests of specific and general deterrence weigh in 
favor of revocation. Given the foundational nature of Registrant's 
violations, a sanction less than revocation would send a message to the 
existing and prospective registrant community that compliance with the 
law is not a condition precedent to maintaining a registration.
    Accordingly, the Agency will order the revocation of Registrant's 
registration.

Order

    Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 
U.S.C. 824(a) and 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby

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revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No. FA4195459 issued to Ajumobi 
Agu, M.D. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested 
in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a) and 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any 
pending applications of Ajumobi Agu, M.D., to renew or modify this 
registration, as well as any other pending application of Ajumobi Agu, 
M.D., for additional registration in Nevada. This Order is effective 
May 16, 2025.

Signing Authority

    This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on 
April 10, 2025, by Acting Administrator Derek Maltz. That document with 
the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For 
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of 
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal 
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the 
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document 
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect 
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.

Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2025-06452 Filed 4-15-25; 8:45 am]
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