[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 65 (Monday, April 7, 2025)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 15041-15109]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-06063]
[[Page 15039]]
Vol. 90
Monday,
No. 65
April 7, 2025
Part II
The President
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Executive Order 14257--Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To
Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual
United States Goods Trade Deficits
Presidential Documents
Federal Register / Vol. 90 , No. 65 / Monday, April 7, 2025 /
Presidential Documents
___________________________________________________________________
Title 3--
The President
[[Page 15041]]
Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025
Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To
Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and
Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, including the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)(NEA),
section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19
U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States
Code,
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of
America, find that underlying conditions, including a
lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade
relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff
barriers, and U.S. trading partners' economic policies
that suppress domestic wages and consumption, as
indicated by large and persistent annual U.S. goods
trade deficits, constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and economy of the
United States. That threat has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States in the
domestic economic policies of key trading partners and
structural imbalances in the global trading system. I
hereby declare a national emergency with respect to
this threat.
On January 20, 2025, I signed the America First Trade
Policy Presidential Memorandum directing my
Administration to investigate the causes of our
country's large and persistent annual trade deficits in
goods, including the economic and national security
implications and risks resulting from such deficits,
and to undertake a review of, and identify, any unfair
trade practices by other countries. On February 13,
2025, I signed a Presidential Memorandum entitled
``Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs,'' that directed further
review of our trading partners' non-reciprocal trading
practices, and noted the relationship between non-
reciprocal practices and the trade deficit. On April 1,
2025, I received the final results of those
investigations, and I am taking action today based on
those results.
Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits
have led to the hollowing out of our manufacturing
base; inhibited our ability to scale advanced domestic
manufacturing capacity; undermined critical supply
chains; and rendered our defense-industrial base
dependent on foreign adversaries. Large and persistent
annual U.S. goods trade deficits are caused in
substantial part by a lack of reciprocity in our
bilateral trade relationships. This situation is
evidenced by disparate tariff rates and non-tariff
barriers that make it harder for U.S. manufacturers to
sell their products in foreign markets. It is also
evidenced by the economic policies of key U.S. trading
partners insofar as they suppress domestic wages and
consumption, and thereby demand for U.S. exports, while
artificially increasing the competitiveness of their
goods in global markets. These conditions have given
rise to the national emergency that this order is
intended to abate and resolve.
For decades starting in 1934, U.S. trade policy has
been organized around the principle of reciprocity. The
Congress directed the President to secure reduced
reciprocal tariff rates from key trading partners first
through bilateral trade agreements and later under the
auspices of the global trading system. Between 1934 and
1945, the executive branch negotiated and signed 32
bilateral reciprocal trade agreements designed to lower
tariff rates on a
[[Page 15042]]
reciprocal basis. After 1947 through 1994,
participating countries engaged in eight rounds of
negotiation, which resulted in the General Agreements
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and seven subsequent tariff
reduction rounds.
However, despite a commitment to the principle of
reciprocity, the trading relationship between the
United States and its trading partners has become
highly unbalanced, particularly in recent years. The
post-war international economic system was based upon
three incorrect assumptions: first, that if the United
States led the world in liberalizing tariff and non-
tariff barriers the rest of the world would follow;
second, that such liberalization would ultimately
result in more economic convergence and increased
domestic consumption among U.S. trading partners
converging towards the share in the United States; and
third, that as a result, the United States would not
accrue large and persistent goods trade deficits.
This framework set in motion events, agreements, and
commitments that did not result in reciprocity or
generally increase domestic consumption in foreign
economies relative to domestic consumption in the
United States. Those events, in turn, created large and
persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits as a
feature of the global trading system.
Put simply, while World Trade Organization (WTO)
Members agreed to bind their tariff rates on a most-
favored-nation (MFN) basis, and thereby provide their
best tariff rates to all WTO Members, they did not
agree to bind their tariff rates at similarly low
levels or to apply tariff rates on a reciprocal basis.
Consequently, according to the WTO, the United States
has among the lowest simple average MFN tariff rates in
the world at 3.3 percent, while many of our key trading
partners like Brazil (11.2 percent), China (7.5
percent), the European Union (EU) (5 percent), India
(17 percent), and Vietnam (9.4 percent) have simple
average MFN tariff rates that are significantly higher.
Moreover, these average MFN tariff rates conceal much
larger discrepancies across economies in tariff rates
applied to particular products. For example, the United
States imposes a 2.5 percent tariff on passenger
vehicle imports (with internal combustion engines),
while the European Union (10 percent), India (70
percent), and China (15 percent) impose much higher
duties on the same product. For network switches and
routers, the United States imposes a 0 percent tariff,
but for similar products, India (10 percent) levies a
higher rate. Brazil (18 percent) and Indonesia (30
percent) impose a higher tariff on ethanol than does
the United States (2.5 percent). For rice in the husk,
the U.S. MFN tariff is 2.7 percent (ad valorem
equivalent), while India (80 percent), Malaysia (40
percent), and Turkey (an average of 31 percent) impose
higher rates. Apples enter the United States duty-free,
but not so in Turkey (60.3 percent) and India (50
percent).
Similarly, non-tariff barriers also deprive U.S.
manufacturers of reciprocal access to markets around
the world. The 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) details a great number of
non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports around the world on
a trading-partner by trading-partner basis. These
barriers include import barriers and licensing
restrictions; customs barriers and shortcomings in
trade facilitation; technical barriers to trade (e.g.,
unnecessarily trade restrictive standards, conformity
assessment procedures, or technical regulations);
sanitary and phytosanitary measures that unnecessarily
restrict trade without furthering safety objectives;
inadequate patent, copyright, trade secret, and
trademark regimes and inadequate enforcement of
intellectual property rights; discriminatory licensing
requirements or regulatory standards; barriers to
cross-border data flows and discriminatory practices
affecting trade in digital products; investment
barriers; subsidies; anticompetitive practices;
discrimination in favor of domestic state-owned
enterprises, and failures by governments in protecting
labor and environment standards; bribery; and
corruption.
Moreover, non-tariff barriers include the domestic
economic policies and practices of our trading
partners, including currency practices and value-added
taxes, and their associated market distortions, that
suppress domestic
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consumption and boost exports to the United States.
This lack of reciprocity is apparent in the fact that
the share of consumption to Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in the United States is about 68 percent, but it
is much lower in others like Ireland (27 percent),
Singapore (31 percent), China (39 percent), South Korea
(49 percent), and Germany (50 percent).
At the same time, efforts by the United States to
address these imbalances have stalled. Trading partners
have repeatedly blocked multilateral and plurilateral
solutions, including in the context of new rounds of
tariff negotiations and efforts to discipline non-
tariff barriers. At the same time, with the U.S.
economy disproportionately open to imports, U.S.
trading partners have had few incentives to provide
reciprocal treatment to U.S. exports in the context of
bilateral trade negotiations.
These structural asymmetries have driven the large and
persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficit. Even for
countries with which the United States may enjoy an
occasional bilateral trade surplus, the accumulation of
tariff and non-tariff barriers on U.S. exports may make
that surplus smaller than it would have been without
such barriers. Permitting these asymmetries to continue
is not sustainable in today's economic and geopolitical
environment because of the effect they have on U.S.
domestic production. A nation's ability to produce
domestically is the bedrock of its national and
economic security.
Both my first Administration in 2017, and the Biden
Administration in 2022, recognized that increasing
domestic manufacturing is critical to U.S. national
security. According to 2023 United Nations data, U.S.
manufacturing output as a share of global manufacturing
output was 17.4 percent, down from a peak in 2001 of
28.4 percent.
Over time, the persistent decline in U.S. manufacturing
output has reduced U.S. manufacturing capacity. The
need to maintain robust and resilient domestic
manufacturing capacity is particularly acute in certain
advanced industrial sectors like automobiles,
shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, technology products,
machine tools, and basic and fabricated metals, because
once competitors gain sufficient global market share in
these sectors, U.S. production could be permanently
weakened. It is also critical to scale manufacturing
capacity in the defense-industrial sector so that we
can manufacture the defense materiel and equipment
necessary to protect American interests at home and
abroad.
In fact, because the United States has supplied so much
military equipment to other countries, U.S. stockpiles
of military goods are too low to be compatible with
U.S. national defense interests. Furthermore, U.S.
defense companies must develop new, advanced
manufacturing technologies across a range of critical
sectors including bio-manufacturing, batteries, and
microelectronics. If the United States wishes to
maintain an effective security umbrella to defend its
citizens and homeland, as well as for its allies and
partners, it needs to have a large upstream
manufacturing and goods-producing ecosystem to
manufacture these products without undue reliance on
imports for key inputs.
Increased reliance on foreign producers for goods also
has compromised U.S. economic security by rendering
U.S. supply chains vulnerable to geopolitical
disruption and supply shocks. In recent years, the
vulnerability of the U.S. economy in this respect was
exposed both during the COVID-19 pandemic, when
Americans had difficulty accessing essential products,
as well as when the Houthi rebels later began attacking
cargo ships in the Middle East.
The decline of U.S. manufacturing capacity threatens
the U.S. economy in other ways, including through the
loss of manufacturing jobs. From 1997 to 2024, the
United States lost around 5 million manufacturing jobs
and experienced one of the largest drops in
manufacturing employment in history. Furthermore, many
manufacturing job losses were concentrated in specific
geographical areas. In these areas, the loss of
manufacturing jobs contributed
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to the decline in rates of family formation and to the
rise of other social trends, like the abuse of opioids,
that have imposed profound costs on the U.S. economy.
The future of American competitiveness depends on
reversing these trends. Today, manufacturing represents
just 11 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, yet it
accounts for 35 percent of American productivity growth
and 60 percent of our exports. Importantly, U.S.
manufacturing is the main engine of innovation in the
United States, responsible for 55 percent of all
patents and 70 percent of all research and development
(R&D) spending. The fact that R&D expenditures by U.S.
multinational enterprises in China grew at an average
rate of 13.6 percent a year between 2003 and 2017,
while their R&D expenditures in the United States grew
by an average of just 5 percent per year during the
same time period, is evidence of the strong link
between manufacturing and innovation. Furthermore,
every manufacturing job spurs 7 to 12 new jobs in other
related industries, helping to build and sustain our
economy.
Just as a nation that does not produce manufactured
products cannot maintain the industrial base it needs
for national security, neither can a nation long
survive if it cannot produce its own food. Presidential
Policy Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience), designates
food and agriculture as a ``critical infrastructure
sector'' because it is one of the sectors considered
``so vital to the United States that [its] incapacity
or destruction . . . would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination of those
matters.'' Furthermore, when I left office, the United
States had a trade surplus in agricultural products,
but today, that surplus has vanished. Eviscerated by a
slew of new non-tariff barriers imposed by our trading
partners, it has been replaced by a projected $49
billion annual agricultural trade deficit.
For these reasons, I hereby declare and order:
Section 1. National Emergency. As President of the
United States, my highest duty is ensuring the national
and economic security of the country and its citizens.
I have declared a national emergency arising from
conditions reflected in large and persistent annual
U.S. goods trade deficits, which have grown by over 40
percent in the past 5 years alone, reaching $1.2
trillion in 2024. This trade deficit reflects
asymmetries in trade relationships that have
contributed to the atrophy of domestic production
capacity, especially that of the U.S. manufacturing and
defense-industrial base. These asymmetries also impact
U.S. producers' ability to export and, consequentially,
their incentive to produce.
Specifically, such asymmetry includes not only non-
reciprocal differences in tariff rates among foreign
trading partners, but also extensive use of non-tariff
barriers by foreign trading partners, which reduce the
competitiveness of U.S. exports while artificially
enhancing the competitiveness of their own goods. These
non-tariff barriers include technical barriers to
trade; non-scientific sanitary and phytosanitary rules;
inadequate intellectual property protections;
suppressed domestic consumption (e.g., wage
suppression); weak labor, environmental, and other
regulatory standards and protections; and corruption.
These non-tariff barriers give rise to significant
imbalances even when the United States and a trading
partner have comparable tariff rates.
The cumulative effect of these imbalances has been the
transfer of resources from domestic producers to
foreign firms, reducing opportunities for domestic
manufacturers to expand and, in turn, leading to lost
manufacturing jobs, diminished manufacturing capacity,
and an atrophied industrial base, including in the
defense-industrial sector. At the same time, foreign
firms are better positioned to scale production,
reinvest in innovation, and compete
[[Page 15045]]
in the global economy, to the detriment of U.S.
economic and national security.
The absence of sufficient domestic manufacturing
capacity in certain critical and advanced industrial
sectors--another outcome of the large and persistent
annual U.S. goods trade deficits--also compromises U.S.
economic and national security by rendering the U.S.
economy less resilient to supply chain disruption.
Finally, the large, persistent annual U.S. goods trade
deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial
capacity, have compromised military readiness; this
vulnerability can only be redressed through swift
corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into
the United States. Such impact upon military readiness
and our national security posture is especially acute
with the recent rise in armed conflicts abroad. I call
upon the public and private sector to make the efforts
necessary to strengthen the international economic
position of the United States.
Sec. 2. Reciprocal Tariff Policy. It is the policy of
the United States to rebalance global trade flows by
imposing an additional ad valorem duty on all imports
from all trading partners except as otherwise provided
herein. The additional ad valorem duty on all imports
from all trading partners shall start at 10 percent and
shortly thereafter, the additional ad valorem duty
shall increase for trading partners enumerated in Annex
I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to
this order. These additional ad valorem duties shall
apply until such time as I determine that the
underlying conditions described above are satisfied,
resolved, or mitigated.
Sec. 3. Implementation. (a) Except as otherwise
provided in this order, all articles imported into the
customs territory of the United States shall be,
consistent with law, subject to an additional ad
valorem rate of duty of 10 percent. Such rates of duty
shall apply with respect to goods entered for
consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for
consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight
time on April 5, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a
vessel at the port of loading and in transit on the
final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern
daylight time on April 5, 2025, and entered for
consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption
after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5,
2025, shall not be subject to such additional duty.
Furthermore, except as otherwise provided in this
order, at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9,
2025, all articles from trading partners enumerated in
Annex I to this order imported into the customs
territory of the United States shall be, consistent
with law, subject to the country-specific ad valorem
rates of duty specified in Annex I to this order. Such
rates of duty shall apply with respect to goods entered
for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for
consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight
time on April 9, 2025, except that goods loaded onto a
vessel at the port of loading and in transit on the
final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern
daylight time on April 9, 2025, and entered for
consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption
after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9,
2025, shall not be subject to these country-specific ad
valorem rates of duty set forth in Annex I to this
order. These country-specific ad valorem rates of duty
shall apply to all articles imported pursuant to the
terms of all existing U.S. trade agreements, except as
provided below.
(b) The following goods as set forth in Annex II to
this order, consistent with law, shall not be subject
to the ad valorem rates of duty under this order: (i)
all articles that are encompassed by 50 U.S.C. 1702(b);
(ii) all articles and derivatives of steel and aluminum
subject to the duties imposed pursuant to section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and proclaimed in
Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports
of Aluminum Into the United States), as amended,
Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports
of Steel Into the United States), as amended, and
Proclamation 9980 of January 24, 2020 (Adjusting
Imports of Derivative Aluminum Articles and Derivative
Steel Articles Into the United States), as amended,
Proclamation 10895 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting
Imports of Aluminum
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Into the United States), and Proclamation 10896 of
February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Steel into the
United States); (iii) all automobiles and automotive
parts subject to the additional duties imposed pursuant
to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as
amended, and proclaimed in Proclamation 10908 of March
26, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Automobiles and
Automobile Parts Into the United States); (iv) other
products enumerated in Annex II to this order,
including copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors,
lumber articles, certain critical minerals, and energy
and energy products; (v) all articles from a trading
partner subject to the rates set forth in Column 2 of
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTSUS); and (vi) all articles that may become subject
to duties pursuant to future actions under section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
(c) The rates of duty established by this order are
in addition to any other duties, fees, taxes,
exactions, or charges applicable to such imported
articles, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e)
of this section below.
(d) With respect to articles from Canada, I have
imposed additional duties on certain goods to address a
national emergency resulting from the flow of illicit
drugs across our northern border pursuant to Executive
Order 14193 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To
Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern
Border), as amended by Executive Order 14197 of
February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our
Northern Border), and Executive Order 14231 of March 2,
2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of
Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border). With respect
to articles from Mexico, I have imposed additional
duties on certain goods to address a national emergency
resulting from the flow of illicit drugs and illegal
migration across our southern border pursuant to
Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing
Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern
Border), as amended by Executive Order 14198 of
February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our
Southern Border), and Executive Order 14227 of March 2,
2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Situation at
Our Southern Border). As a result of these border
emergency tariff actions, all goods of Canada or Mexico
under the terms of general note 11 to the HTSUS,
including any treatment set forth in subchapter XXIII
of chapter 98 and subchapter XXII of chapter 99 of the
HTSUS, as related to the Agreement between the United
States of America, United Mexican States, and Canada
(USMCA), continue to be eligible to enter the U.S.
market under these preferential terms. However, all
goods of Canada or Mexico that do not qualify as
originating under USMCA are presently subject to
additional ad valorem duties of 25 percent, with energy
or energy resources and potash imported from Canada and
not qualifying as originating under USMCA presently
subject to the lower additional ad valorem duty of 10
percent.
(e) Any ad valorem rate of duty on articles
imported from Canada or Mexico under the terms of this
order shall not apply in addition to the ad valorem
rate of duty specified by the existing orders described
in subsection (d) of this section. If such orders
identified in subsection (d) of this section are
terminated or suspended, all items of Canada and Mexico
that qualify as originating under USMCA shall not be
subject to an additional ad valorem rate of duty, while
articles not qualifying as originating under USMCA
shall be subject to an ad valorem rate of duty of 12
percent. However, these ad valorem rates of duty on
articles imported from Canada and Mexico shall not
apply to energy or energy resources, to potash, or to
an article eligible for duty-free treatment under USMCA
that is a part or component of an article substantially
finished in the United States.
(f) More generally, the ad valorem rates of duty
set forth in this order shall apply only to the non-
U.S. content of a subject article, provided at least 20
percent of the value of the subject article is U.S.
originating. For the purposes of this subsection,
``U.S. content'' refers to the value of an article
attributable to the components produced entirely, or
substantially transformed in, the United States. U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
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to the extent permitted by law, is authorized to
require the collection of such information and
documentation regarding an imported article, including
with the entry filing, as is necessary to enable CBP to
ascertain and verify the value of the U.S. content of
the article, as well as to ascertain and verify whether
an article is substantially finished in the United
States.
(g) Subject articles, except those eligible for
admission under ``domestic status'' as defined in 19
CFR 146.43, which are subject to the duty specified in
section 2 of this order and are admitted into a foreign
trade zone on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time
on April 9, 2025, must be admitted as ``privileged
foreign status'' as defined in 19 CFR 146.41.
(h) Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C.
1321(a)(2)(A)-(B) shall remain available for the
articles described in subsection (a) of this section.
Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C.
1321(a)(2)(C) shall remain available for the articles
described in subsection (a) of this section until
notification by the Secretary of Commerce to the
President that adequate systems are in place to fully
and expeditiously process and collect duty revenue
applicable pursuant to this subsection for articles
otherwise eligible for de minimis treatment. After such
notification, duty-free de minimis treatment under 19
U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall not be available for the
articles described in subsection (a) of this section.
(i) The Executive Order of April 2, 2025 (Further
Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid
Supply Chain in the People's Republic of China as
Applied to Low-Value Imports), regarding low-value
imports from China is not affected by this order, and
all duties and fees with respect to covered articles
shall be collected as required and detailed therein.
(j) To reduce the risk of transshipment and
evasion, all ad valorem rates of duty imposed by this
order or any successor orders with respect to articles
of China shall apply equally to articles of both the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau
Special Administrative Region.
(k) In order to establish the duty rates described
in this order, the HTSUS is modified as set forth in
the Annexes to this order. These modifications shall
enter into effect on the dates set forth in the Annexes
to this order.
(l) Unless specifically noted herein, any prior
Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, or other
Presidential directive or guidance related to trade
with foreign trading partners that is inconsistent with
the direction in this order is hereby terminated,
suspended, or modified to the extent necessary to give
full effect to this order.
Sec. 4. Modification Authority. (a) The Secretary of
Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the
Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, shall recommend to me additional action, if
necessary, if this action is not effective in resolving
the emergency conditions described above, including the
increase in the overall trade deficit or the recent
expansion of non-reciprocal trade arrangements by U.S.
trading partners in a manner that threatens the
economic and national security interests of the United
States.
(b) Should any trading partner retaliate against
the United States in response to this action through
import duties on U.S. exports or other measures, I may
further modify the HTSUS to increase or expand in scope
the duties imposed under this order to ensure the
efficacy of this action.
(c) Should any trading partner take significant
steps to remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and
align sufficiently with the United States on economic
and national security matters, I may further modify the
HTSUS to decrease or limit in scope the duties imposed
under this order.
(d) Should U.S. manufacturing capacity and output
continue to worsen, I may further modify the HTSUS to
increase duties under this order.
[[Page 15048]]
Sec. 5. Implementation Authority. The Secretary of
Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the
Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, the
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, and the Chair of the International Trade
Commission are hereby authorized to employ all powers
granted to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary
to implement this order. Each executive department and
agency shall take all appropriate measures within its
authority to implement this order.
Sec. 6. Reporting Requirements. The United States Trade
Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the
Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, and the
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and
final reports to the Congress on the national emergency
declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c)
of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of
IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).
Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order
shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the
head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and subject to the availability of
appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or in equity by any party against
the United States, its departments, agencies, or
entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any
other person.
(Presidential Sig.)
THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 2, 2025.
Billing code 3395-F4-P
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[FR Doc. 2025-06063
Filed 4-4-25; 11:15 am]
Billing code 7020-02-C