Federal Register, Volume 90 Issue 56 (Tuesday, March 25, 2025)

[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 56 (Tuesday, March 25, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13611-13622]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-05128]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, Haitians,
Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (``DHS'') is terminating
the categorical parole programs for inadmissible aliens from Cuba,
Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela and their immediate family members
(hereinafter referred to as ``CHNV parole programs'') that DHS
announced in 2022 and 2023. This Federal Register notice is intended to
provide context and guidance to the public regarding the termination of
the CHNV parole programs and related employment authorization.

DATES: DHS is terminating the CHNV parole programs as of March 25,
2025. The temporary parole period of aliens in the United States under
the CHNV parole programs and whose parole has not already expired by
April 24, 2025 will terminate on that date unless the Secretary makes
an individual determination to the contrary. Parolees without a lawful
basis to remain in the United States following this termination of the
CHNV parole programs must depart the United States before their parole
termination date.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ihsan Gunduz, Border and Immigration
Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, Department of Homeland
Security, 2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20528-
0445; telephone (202) 447-3459 (not a toll-free number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

Over the previous two years, DHS has implemented programs through
which inadmissible aliens who are citizens or nationals of designated
countries, and their immediate family members, could request
authorization to travel to the United States in order to be considered
for parole into the country.\1\ Under these categorical parole
programs, potentially eligible beneficiaries were adjudicated on a
case-by-case basis, for advance authorization to travel to a U.S. port
of entry (``POE'') in the interior of the country to seek a
discretionary grant of parole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ Implementation of a Parole Process for Cubans, 88 FR 1266
(Jan. 9, 2023); Implementation of a Change to the Parole Process for
Cubans, 88 FR 26329 (Apr. 28, 2023); Implementation of a Parole
Process for Haitians, 88 FR 1243 (Jan. 9, 2023); Implementation of a
Change to the Parole Process for Haitians, 88 FR 26327 (Apr. 28,
2023); Implementation of a Parole Process for Nicaraguans, 88 FR
1255 (Jan. 9, 2023); Implementation of a Parole Process for
Venezuelans, 87 FR 63507 (Oct. 19, 2022); Implementation of Changes
to the Parole Process for Venezuelans, 88 FR 1279 (Jan. 9, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14165,
``Securing Our Borders.'' \2\ Section 2 of the Order establishes a
policy of the United States to take all appropriate action to secure
the borders of our Nation through a range of means, including deterring
and preventing the entry of illegal aliens into the United States, and
removing promptly all aliens who enter or remain in violation of
Federal law. Section 7 of the Order directs the Secretary of Homeland
Security to, consistent with applicable law, take all appropriate
action to ``[t]erminate all categorical parole programs that are
contrary to the policies of the United States established in [the
President's] Executive Orders, including the program known as the
`Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans.' ''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\2\ See Executive Order 14165, Securing Our Borders, 90 FR 8467
(Jan. 20, 2025) (published Jan. 30, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consistent with the President's direction, and for the independent
reasons stated in this notice, this notice terminates the CHNV parole
programs. Although DHS established the categorical programs for each
country through a separate notice in the Federal Register, the
justification for the establishment of each of the four categorical
programs was very similar,\3\ and the rationale for termination is
largely consistent for all four parole programs. Thus, DHS is
announcing the termination of all four parole programs by publishing
this single notice in the Federal Register.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\3\ Compare, e.g., 88 FR at 1260-63, with 88 FR at 1248-52
(setting out the justifications for the parole programs for
Nicaragua and Haiti, respectively).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. DHS Parole Authority

The Immigration and Nationality Act (``INA'') confers upon the
Secretary of Homeland Security (``Secretary'') the narrow discretionary
authority to parole inadmissible aliens into the United States
``temporarily under such conditions as [DHS] may prescribe only on a
case-by-case basis for urgent

[[Page 13612]]

humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.'' See INA
212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 CFR 212.5(a) and (c)
through (e) (discretionary authority for establishing conditions of
parole and for terminating parole). Additionally, upon a finding by DHS
that the purpose of the temporary, discretionary parole has been
served, the alien is required to depart the United States ``or be
returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his
case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any
other applicant for admission to the United States.'' INA 212(d)(5)(A),
8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
A review of the history of the parole authority supports the
contention that discretionary parole determinations were intended by
Congress to be narrowly tailored to specific instances and not based on
a set of broadly applicable eligibility criteria.\4\ Under the law, the
determination to parole an alien into the country should only be made
on a case-by-case basis, taking into account each alien's unique
circumstances. The ultimate determination whether to parole an alien
into the United States upon the alien's arrival at a POE is made by
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (``CBP'') officers. See 8 CFR
212.5(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\ Parole was codified into immigration law in the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952. As envisioned then, the 1952 Act
authorized the Attorney General to parole aliens temporarily under
such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or reasons
deemed strictly in the public interest. As expressed then, ``the
parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through which
needless confinement is avoided while administrative proceedings are
conducted.'' See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1958).
However, the parole authority, whether intended to be narrow or
broad, has in fact been used in an increasingly broad manner since
its inception, often earning the criticism of Congress, which in
1996 wrote, ``[i]n recent years, however, parole has been used
increasingly to admit entire categories of aliens who do not qualify
for admission under any other category in immigration law, with the
intent that they will remain permanently in the United States. This
contravenes the intent of section 212(d)(5), but also illustrates
why further, specific limitations on the Attorney General's
discretion are necessary.'' See H.R. Rep. 104-469, pt. 1, at 140
(1996). Furthermore, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act of 1996 (``IIRIRA'') struck from INA
212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A), the phrase, ``for emergent
reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest'' as
grounds for granting parole into the United States and inserted
``only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit.'' See Public Law 104-208, div. C, Sec.
602(a). ``The legislative history indicates that this change was
animated by concern that parole under 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A) was
being used by the executive to circumvent congressionally
established immigration policy.'' Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650 F.3d
189, 199 n.15 (2d Cir. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Parole is inherently temporary, and parole alone is not an
underlying basis for obtaining any immigration status, nor does it
constitute an admission to the United States. See INA 101(a)(13)(B),
212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(B), 1182(d)(5)(A). Once an alien is
paroled into the United States, the parole allows the alien to stay
temporarily in the United States for the duration of the parole period
unless and until the parole expires or is otherwise terminated. See 8
CFR 212.5(e).
Paroled aliens, including those paroled under the CHNV parole
programs, may apply for any immigration benefit or status for which
they may be eligible, including discretionary employment authorization
under the (c)(11) employment eligibility category. See 8 CFR
274a.12(c)(11). In the absence of any subsequent application conferring
an immigration benefit or status, and upon termination of parole, such
alien will remain an arriving alien. See 8 CFR 1.2; see also INA
101(a)(13)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(B).

III. Rationale for Initial Implementation

When DHS established the CHNV parole programs, DHS provided several
justifications for their promulgation. See, e.g., 88 FR at 1248-51
(Implementation of a Parole Process for Haitians). Overall, DHS stated
that the programs would provide a significant public benefit for the
United States and address the urgent humanitarian reasons underlying
the high levels of migration from those countries.
With respect to the significant public benefit, DHS wrote that the
CHNV parole programs would: (i) enhance border security by reducing
illegal immigration between the POEs, (ii) minimize the domestic impact
of high levels of illegal immigration by CHNV nationals, particularly
in border communities; (iii) improve vetting for national security and
public safety; (iv) reduce the strain on DHS personnel and resources;
(v) disincentivize a dangerous journey that puts migrant lives and
safety at risk and enriches smuggling networks; and (vi) fulfill
important foreign policy goals to manage migration collaboratively in
the hemisphere.
For the reasons discussed below, DHS has determined that it is now
appropriate and necessary to terminate the CHNV parole programs. These
programs do not serve a significant public benefit, are not necessary
to reduce levels of illegal immigration, did not sufficiently mitigate
the domestic effects of illegal immigration, are not serving their
intended purposes, and are inconsistent with the Administration's
foreign policy goals.\5\ Regarding previous arguments or determinations
that these programs were consistent with the requirement of ``urgent
humanitarian reasons'' for granting parole, DHS believes that
consideration of any urgent humanitarian reasons for granting parole is
best addressed on a case-by-case basis consistent with the statute, and
taking into consideration each alien's specific circumstances. These
reasons, independently and cumulatively, support termination of the
CHNV parole programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\ See INA 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A) (``. . . when
the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion the Secretary of
Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith return
or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Accordingly, the Secretary, in her discretion, is terminating the
CHNV parole programs. Consistent with her statutory authority, the
Secretary retains discretion to continue to extend parole to any alien
paroled under CHNV--temporarily under such conditions as she may
prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons
or significant public benefit. See INA 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)(A). The decision to do so, or not do so, is committed to the
Secretary's sole discretion.

1. The CHNV Parole Programs Are Unnecessary To Achieve Border Security
Goals

From the announcement of the parole program for Venezuelans and
their immediate family members on October 12, 2022, through the
subsequent addition of the programs for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans,
and their immediate family members in January 2023, and until January
22, 2025, approximately 532,000 inadmissible aliens were granted
advance authorization to travel to the United States and receive
consideration for parole into the United States.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\6\ Office of Homeland Security Statistics (``OHSS'') analysis
of advanced travel authorizations data provided by CBP Passenger
Systems Program Directorate and valid as of January 22, 2025.
Beneficiary travel authorizations excluded expired applications. The
Venezuelan program started on October 18, 2022, and the Cuba, Haiti,
Nicaragua parole programs started January 6, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One justification for these 532,000 discretionary paroles was to
``enhance border security'' at the southwest border of the United
States.\7\ DHS reasoned that by ``incentivizing individuals to seek a
lawful, orderly means of traveling to the United States, while imposing

[[Page 13613]]

consequences to irregular migration, . . . the new parole process will
mitigate anticipated future surges'' of illegal immigration. See, e.g.,
88 FR at 1249 (Implementation of a Parole Process for Haitians). DHS
pointed to past experience with rapidly increasing ``encounters of
Guatemalan and Honduran nationals from January 2021 until August 2021''
along the southwest border, explaining that the resumption of
repatriation flights to Guatemala and Honduras helped reduce the amount
of illegal immigration but was insufficient to address the sheer
numbers.\8\ Accordingly, the CHNV parole programs contemplated
enhancing border security by combining ``a consequence for [nationals
seeking] to enter the United States [in an unlawful manner between POEs
(i.e., removal or return to a third country, such as Mexico), while
introducing] an incentive to use [a] lawful process to request
authorization to travel by air to and enter the United States, without
making the dangerous journey to the border.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\ See, e.g., 88 FR at 1255 (``The [Nicaraguan] parole process
is intended to enhance border security by reducing the record levels
of Nicaraguan nationals entering the United States between POEs.'').
\8\ See, e.g., 87 FR at 63509.
\9\ See, e.g., 87 FR at 63510.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Upon review, DHS concludes that this ``deterrent'' and
``incentive'' approach did not result in a sufficient and sustained
improvement in border security, and has exacerbated challenges
associated with interior enforcement of the immigration laws.
Encounters of CHNV nationals, particularly at POEs, remained
unacceptably high while the CHNV parole programs were in effect, and
overall migration of CHNV nationals to the United States increased
between October 12, 2022 and January 22, 2025. In addition, the CHNV
parole programs have at best traded an unmanageable population of
unlawful migration along the southwest border for the additional
complication of a substantial population of aliens in the interior of
the United States without a clear path to a durable status.
As an initial matter, DHS acknowledges that in establishing the
CHNV parole programs, and in subsequent DHS evaluations of these
programs, DHS focused, in part, on a goal of reducing encounters of
CHNV nationals between POEs.\10\ And it is true that there was a
reduction in encounters of CHNV nationals between POEs from FY 2022
through FY 2024--from around 600,000 encounters in FY 2022 to 416,000
in FY 2023 and 183,000 in FY 2024.\11\ But in implementing the CHNV
parole programs, DHS also focused on the importance of reducing
pressures at the southwest border generally. It was for this reason
that the CHNV parole programs required, for instance, that CHNV
nationals ``fly at their own expense to an interior [POE] rather than
entering at a land POE'' \12\ and rendered ineligible those CHNV
nationals who irregularly entered the United States, Mexico, or Panama
after the programs' announcement.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\10\ See, e.g., 87 FR at 63507 (``The parole process is intended
to enhance border security by reducing the record levels of
Venezuelan nationals entering the United States between POEs, while
also providing a process for certain such nationals to lawfully
enter the United States in a safe and orderly manner.''); see also
Circumvention of Lawful Pathways 88 FR 31314, 31317 (May 16, 2023)
(noting that in the first weeks following implementation of the CHNV
parole programs, encounters of CHNV nationals between POEs dropped
significantly).
\11\ OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist Dataset.
\12\ See, e.g., 87 FR at 63507; see also id. at 63512
(explaining that by ``diverting flows of Venezuelan nationals to
interior POEs through a safe and orderly process,'' DHS could
relieve pressure on border communities).
\13\ See, e.g., 87 FR at 63515.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consistent with that focus and in light of the reality that DHS's
border security mission involves activities at southwest border POEs as
well, DHS has concluded that the present assessment of the efficacy of
the CHNV parole programs should include encounters at such land POEs.
If one includes encounters of CHNV nationals at POEs, the actual
reduction in southwest border encounters of CHNV nationals is much more
muted: encounters of CHNV nationals at and between southwest border
POEs dropped from approximately 626,000 in FY 2022 only to 584,000 in
FY 2023 and to 535,000 in FY 2024.\14\ This is due to a significant
increase in encounters of such aliens at southwest border POEs over
that time period: from 26,250 in FY 2022 to 168,010 in FY 2023 and
352,790 in FY 2024.\15\ The increase can be attributed to the use of
the CBP One mobile application (``CBP One app'' or ``CBP One'') to
schedule appointments at southwest border POEs,\16\ which resulted in
very high numbers of CHNV nationals placed into removal proceedings
pursuant to section 240 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1229a, (``section 240
removal proceedings'') and released into U.S. border communities,\17\
exacerbating the immigration court backlog and the poor incentives that
the backlog creates.\18\ Finally, it is important to emphasize that in
addition to these southwest border encounters, DHS must also consider
the 532,000 parolees who entered the United States under the CHNV
parole programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\14\ OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist Dataset.
\15\ OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist Dataset.
\16\ Section 7 of Executive Order 14165 also directed the
Secretary to, consistent with applicable law, take all appropriate
action to cease using the CBP One app. as a method of paroling or
facilitating the entry of otherwise inadmissible aliens into the
United States. DHS has ceased the use of the CBP One app for this
purpose. See CBP, Press Release, CBP Removes Scheduling
Functionality in CBP One^TM App (Jan. 21, 2025), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-removes-scheduling-functionality-cbp-one-app (last updated Jan. 22, 2025).
\17\ A total of 582,800 CHNV nationals with CBP One registration
numbers were encountered at southwest border POEs from Jan. 1, 2023-
Jan. 31, 2025, including 576,900 (99 percent) that were issued NTAs.
OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist Dataset.
\18\ See, e.g., Securing the Border, 89 FR 81156, 81181 (Oct. 7,
2024) (explaining that particularly in light of the immigration
court backlog, ``releasing individuals who may otherwise be referred
for expedited removal may inadvertently incentivize increased
irregular migration and the exploitation of the asylum system,
especially by human smugglers who encourage migrants to claim fear
once they are encountered by USBP as it will allow them to remain in
the United States for years pending resolution of their case and,
where appropriate, removal.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The decision to terminate the discretionary and temporary parole
programs is further informed by the actions of the prior
administration, which found the CHNV parole programs, even when paired
with the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule, to be insufficient to
address very high levels of illegal immigration.\19\ For example, DHS
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated the Securing the Border
framework \20\ as an emergency measure to address ongoing high levels
of unlawful immigration between southwest border POEs.\21\ The
Departments explained that ``at the current levels of encounters and
with current resources, [DHS] cannot predictably and swiftly deliver
consequences to most noncitizens who cross the border without a lawful
basis to remain . . . [DHS's] ability to refer and process noncitizens
through expedited removal thus continues to be overwhelmed, creating a
vicious cycle.'' \22\ This conclusion--that DHS's ability to swiftly
impose consequences for illegal immigration ``continue[d] to be
overwhelmed'' \23\--followed nearly two years of the CHNV parole
programs, whose chief justification had been facilitating operational
control of the

[[Page 13614]]

southwest border of the United States. Promulgation of the Securing the
Border interim final rule in June 2024 reflected the reality that the
CHNV parole programs and Circumvention of Lawful Pathways rule did not
sufficiently enhance border security.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\19\ 88 FR 31314 (May 16, 2023).
\20\ See 89 FR 48710 (June 7, 2024) (interim final rule); 89 FR
81156 (Oct. 7, 2024) (final rule).
\21\ ``On June 3, 2024, the President signed Proclamation 10773
under sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, finding that because
border security and immigration systems of the United States were
unduly strained, the entry into the United States of certain
categories of [aliens] was detrimental to the interests of the
United States, and suspending and limiting the entry of such
[aliens].'' See 89 FR at 81157-58.
\22\ 89 FR at 48714.
\23\ 89 FR at 48715.
\24\ DHS notes that on October 4, 2024, the prior administration
announced that there would be no ``re-parole'' beyond the initial
two-year period for the parolees who entered the United States under
the CHNV parole programs. The decision of the prior administration
to decline renewal or extension of the CHNV related parole coincided
in large part with other actions of DHS to promulgate policies to
reduce illegal immigration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, to whatever extent the CHNV parole programs could be
characterized as reducing encounters of CHNV nationals at the southwest
border from the very high levels that existed in late 2022, DHS does
not believe that the programs are necessary to achieve such reductions
at this time. In December 2022--the last full month prior to
implementation of all four programs--the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP)
encountered around 84,000 CHNV nationals at the southwest border.\25\
That figure has been below 12,000 every month since January 2024, and
below 6,000 every month since June 2024, when DHS and DOJ issued the
Securing the Border rule.\26\ In January 2025, even with the CHNV
parole programs paused, USBP encountered around 3,400 CHNV nationals at
the southwest border.\27\ Whatever the need for these programs may have
been in late 2022, the situation at the southwest border now, and the
set of tools implemented by DHS to deter illegal immigration, are quite
different.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\25\ OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist Dataset.
\26\ OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist Dataset.
\27\ OHSS analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist Dataset.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Moreover, with the implementation of President Trump's policies
beginning on January 20, 2025, border encounters generally have
continued to drop notwithstanding the ongoing pause on these programs.
Southwest border encounters between POEs fell from an average of about
1,180 aliens per day in the two-week period ending on January 20, 2025,
to an average of about 640 per day in the two-week period from January
21 to February 3, 2025, and fell further to an average just under 260
per day in the two-week period from February 12, 2025 to February 25,
2025.\28\ Over those same three time periods, southwest border releases
from USBP custody fell from an average of about 240 per day to an
average of about 50 per day and then an average of fewer than 5 per
day.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\28\ OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP February 25,
2025.
\29\ OHSS analysis of data downloaded from UIP Feb. 25, 2025.
DHS also notes that to whatever extent the incentives created by the
parole programs for Cubans and Haitians deterred illegal immigration
by sea--a particularly dangerous form of migration--the parole
programs are not necessary for such deterrence and raise other
issues, some of which are outlined in sections III.2-4 of this
notice. DHS has adopted a more robust enforcement posture in
general, and will monitor trends in maritime migration and respond
as appropriate. Through early February 2025, DHS has yet to see a
return to the very high levels of maritime migration observed in
2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The need to break the ``vicious cycle'' of unlawful immigration
supports this DHS action to terminate the CHNV parole programs in favor
of new presidential directives that address the demand for enhanced
border security beyond the 2024 Securing the Border framework.\30\
Executive Order 14165, ``Securing Our Borders,'' \31\ and Executive
Order 14159, ``Protecting the American People Against Invasion,'' \32\
exemplify more reasoned and realistic initiatives to control unlawful
immigration at the southwest border of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\30\ The streamlined procedures offered by the Securing the
Border framework and complementary actions permitted DHS to more
than triple the percentage of aliens processed for expedited removal
under INA 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1), and decrease the number of
aliens released by USBP pending immigration court proceedings by 89
percent, a number that has only improved further with the end of
``catch and release.'' Encounters and releases based on OHSS
analysis of January 2025 OHSS Persist Dataset. Processed for ER
based on OHSS analysis of September 2024 OHSS enforcement Lifecycle
and CBP data downloaded from UIP ER Daily Report Data Dashboard as
of February 4, 2025.
\31\ 90 FR 8611 (Jan. 20, 2025).
\32\ 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 20, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The Domestic Effects of Illegal Immigration Continued To Be Felt
Throughout Implementation of the CHNV Parole Programs

Although one goal of the CHNV parole programs was to ``help
minimize the burden on communities, state and local governments, and
NGOs who support the reception and onward travel of arriving migrants
at the SWB,'' the programs did not have this effect. As discussed in
the preceding section, overall levels of CHNV migration at and between
southwest border POEs did not fall dramatically year-over-year in FY
2023 and FY 2024. In addition, if one takes into account the 532,000
parolees who entered the United States at an interior POE, CHNV
migration may have increased over the relevant time period. Recent
policy interventions have proven more effective than the CHNV parole
programs in addressing very high levels of illegal immigration.
Over the past few years, there has been extensive public discussion
of the effects of high levels of illegal immigration and inadmissible
aliens arriving in local communities. Although public accounts of these
effects do not always distinguish between aliens strictly on the basis
of how they entered the country or their status (e.g., CHNV parolees;
aliens whom DHS encountered at a southwest border POE placed in section
240 removal proceedings; and aliens present without admission or
parole), localities nationwide have experienced the effects of very
high levels of migration.\33\ CHNV parolees and other recent arrivals
have competed for limited resources such as housing, food,
transportation, education, legal services, and public benefits.\34\
Some localities experienced surges of CHNV parolees in particular.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\33\ See, e.g., Adam Shaw, Fox News, Biden Admin Faces Mounting
Pressure to Dismantle Migrant Parole Program Amid `Stress' on Small
Towns (Oct. 31, 2024), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-admin-faces-mounting-pressure-dismantle-migrant-parole-program-stress-small-towns; Muzaffar Chishti & Colleen Putzel-Kavanaugh, After
Crisis of Unprecedented Migrant Arrivals, U.S. Cities Settle into
New Normal, Migration Policy Institute (Aug. 1, 2024), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/us-cities-innovations-integrate-arrivals.
\34\ See Muzaffar Chishti & Colleen Putzel-Kavanaugh, After
Crisis of Unprecedented Migrant Arrivals, U.S. Cities Settle into
New Normal, Migration Policy Institute (Aug. 1, 2024), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/us-cities-innovations-integrate-arrivals.
\35\ Nick Mordowanec, Map Shows Hotspots for Migrants Flying
Into U.S., Newsweek (May 1, 2024), https://www.newsweek.com/migrants-dhs-flying-border-illegal-1896239.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The domestic impact of the CHNV parole program was also felt at the
Federal level in at least three ways. First, the CHNV parole programs
resulted in expanded eligibility for Federal public benefits. This is
because, for instance, an alien who is paroled into the United States
under INA 212(d)(5) for a period of at least 1 year is considered a
``qualified alien.'' See 8 U.S.C. 1641(b)(4). Because DHS generally
issued two-year periods of parole from the outset, CHNV parolees
generally were considered qualified aliens. Although qualified aliens
are generally subject to a five-year waiting period before becoming
eligible for certain Federal public benefits, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
1613(a) (five-year waiting period for Federal means-tested public
benefits); 8 U.S.C. 1612(a)(2)(L) (general five-year waiting period
before a qualified alien can receive supplemental nutrition assistance
program (SNAP) benefits), such waiting periods do not apply to all CHNV
parolees with respect to all public benefit programs. For instance, a
parolee under the age of 18 may be eligible for SNAP benefits, see

[[Page 13615]]

7 CFR 273.4(a)(6)(ii)(J), as might ``a Cuban or Haitian entrant (as
defined in section 501(e) of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of
1980),'' see 7 CFR 273.4(a)(6)(ii)(E). Similarly, some states have
extended Medicaid and Children's Health Insurance Program benefits
without a five-year waiting period to ``lawfully residing'' children
and pregnant women, which includes an alien who is paroled into the
United States under INA 212(d)(5) for a period of at least 1 year.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\36\ See 42 U.S.C. 1396b(v)(4) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C.
1397gg(e)(1)(O) (CHIP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Second, the CHNV parole programs have exacerbated backlogs, or
risked exacerbating backlogs, for the immigration system writ large.
For example, the population of aliens paroled into the United States
and who have filed an application for asylum contributes to an already
taxed immigration system with historically high backlogs before USCIS
and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (``EOIR'').\37\ Many
such parolees may not otherwise have come to the United States and have
exacerbated such backlogs or are likely to eventually do so. U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (``USCIS'') recently reported that
as of the end of December 2024, the USCIS asylum backlog had increased
to over 1.4 million cases.\38\ CHNV parolees account for approximately
75,000 affirmative asylum applications.\39\ In addition, when a CHNV
parolee's two-year parole period ends, if the CHNV parolee has no
lawful basis to remain in the United States, DHS may place the alien in
section 240 removal proceedings. But, due in part to the overwhelmed
expedited removal system, EOIR's immigration court backlog has already
been growing rapidly, and will be further strained by the initiation of
additional removal proceedings for the CHNV parolee population once
their parole period ends. The immigration court backlog increased by
approximately 44 percent between the end of FY 2023 (2.5 million cases)
and FY 2024 (3.6 million cases).\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\37\ See Holly Straut-Eppsteiner, Cong. Rsch. Serv. IN12492,
FY2024 EOIR Immigration Court Data: Caseloads and the Pending Cases
Backlog (2025); see also Elizabeth Jacobs, Affirmative Asylum
Backlog Exceeds One Million for the First Time (Center for
Immigration Studies) (July 26, 2024), https://cis.org/Jacobs/Affirmative-Asylum-Backlog-Exceeds-One-Million-First-Time.
\38\ USCIS, Performance Data, Asylum Division Monthly Statistics
Report (Dec. 2024), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/asylumfiscalyear2025todatestats_241231.xlsx (last
visited Feb. 25, 2025).
\39\ USCIS Office of Performance & Quality.
\40\ EOIR, Executive Office for Immigration Review Adjudication
Statistics (Jan. 16, 2025), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344791/dl?inline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Third, the CHNV parole programs had a disruptive impact for CBP
operations at interior air POEs. A progressive increase in
beneficiaries of the CHNV parole programs arriving at POEs with advance
travel authorizations ``(ATAs'') were ultimately not granted parole due
to CBP's determination that the alien did not warrant a discretionary
grant of parole, for instance due to evidence of fraud or confirmation
that the alien was a citizen or resident of a non-CHNV country. As a
result, CBP processed these aliens for another appropriate disposition
under Title 8, including detention or referral into expedited removal
proceedings or section 240 removal proceedings, as appropriate. This
caused further processing delays and coordination with air carriers for
return flights when appropriate, and further contributed to the
immigration court backlog.
The overwhelmed immigration systems in particular may incentivize
aliens to enter the United States, without regard to the strength of
any potential claims for immigration status, as aliens who are subject
to expedited removal may nevertheless be placed in section 240 removal
proceedings when the system is strained beyond its processing capacity.
As a result, many remain in the United States until their immigration
benefit requests are adjudicated or their section 240 removal
proceedings conclude and any resultant removal order is executed. Any
further strain to the immigration systems resulting from aliens
pursuing the CHNV parole programs exacerbates these detrimental
incentives.
In short, the domestic impact of the CHNV parole programs do not
warrant continuing to operate these programs. Implementation of these
programs coincided with an overall increase in CHNV migration,
significant pressures on localities throughout the country, an
expansion of public benefits eligibility, and a further exacerbation of
USCIS and immigration court backlogs.

3. The CHNV Parole Programs Are Inconsistent With the Administration's
Foreign Policy Goals

One of the stated goals of the CHNV parole programs was to promote
the foreign policy objectives of the prior administration. Indeed, DHS
explained repeatedly in its notices promulgating the CHNV parole
programs that their implementation would advance the foreign policy
objectives of the then-current administration.\41\ The foreign policy
objectives underlying the CHNV parole programs, however, are not
consistent with those of the current Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\41\ See e.g., 87 FR at 63516 (``the implementation of [the
Venezuela process] will advance the Administration's foreign policy
goals''); 88 FR at 1253 (``[the Haiti process] is fully aligned with
larger and important foreign policy objectives of this
Administration'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Executive Order 14150, ``America First Policy Directive to the
Secretary of State'' (Jan. 20, 2025) clearly sets out the President's
vision that ``the foreign policy of the United States shall champion
core American interests and always put America and American citizens
first.'' \42\ Executive Order 14159, ``Protecting the American People
Against Invasion'' (Jan. 20, 2025) states that it is the policy of the
United States to ``faithfully execute the immigration laws against all
inadmissible and removable aliens, particularly those aliens who
threaten the safety or security of the American people.'' Further, it
is the policy of the United States to achieve the ``total and efficient
enforcement of those laws, including through lawful incentives and
detention capabilities.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\42\ See Executive Order 14150, America First Policy Directive
to the Secretary of State, 90 FR 8337 (Jan. 20, 2025) (published
Jan. 29, 2025).
\43\ See Executive Order 14159, Protecting the American People
Against Invasion, 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 20, 2025) (published Jan. 29,
2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Whereas implementation of the CHNV parole programs was contingent
upon the Government of Mexico (``GOM'') making an independent decision
to accept the return or removal of CHNV nationals who migrated
illegally, the U.S. Government is pursuing a range of other policy
initiatives that would allow DHS to return, remove, or deter the
illegal migration of CHNV nationals and other aliens. Section 13 of
that Executive Order 14159 specifically addresses repatriation, and
directs the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security to take all
appropriate action to cooperate and effectively implement, as
appropriate, the sanctions provided by section 243(d) of the INA (8
U.S.C. 1253(d)), and ensure that diplomatic efforts and negotiations
with foreign states include the foreign states' acceptance of their
nationals who are subject to removal from the United States. Section 13
further directs the Secretaries to eliminate all documentary barriers,
dilatory tactics, or other restrictions that prevent the prompt
repatriation of aliens to any foreign state. The Order provides that
any failure or delay by a foreign state to verify the identity of a
national of that state shall be considered in carrying out section
243(d) sanctions and shall also be considered regarding the issuance of

[[Page 13616]]

any other sanctions that may be available to the United States.
Further, as noted above, Executive Order 14165, ``Securing Our
Borders'' states that DHS shall ``terminate all categorical parole
programs that are contrary to the policies of the United States
established in [the President's] Executive Orders, including the
program known as the `Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and
Venezuelans.' '' \44\ In the same Order, the President directed that as
soon as practicable, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
coordination with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General,
shall take all appropriate action to resume the Migrant Protection
Protocols in all sectors along the southern border of the United States
and ensure that, pending section 240 removal proceedings, aliens
described in section 235(b)(2)(C) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2)(C))
are returned to the territory from which they came.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\44\ See Executive Order 14165, Securing Our Borders, 90 FR 8467
(Jan. 20, 2025) (published Jan. 30, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The President has pursued the cooperation of foreign partners in
other ways as well. For instance:
On January 23, 2025, President Trump in his call with
Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele discussed working together to stop
illegal immigration and crack down on transnational gangs like Tren de
Aragua.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\45\ The White House, ``Readout of President Donald J. Trump's
Call with President Nayib Bukele'' (Jan. 23, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/01/readout-of-president-donald-j-trumps-call-with-president-bukele/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

On January 26, 2025, the Government of Colombia agreed to
the unrestricted acceptance of all illegal aliens from Colombia
returned from the United States, including on U.S. military aircraft,
without limitation or delay.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\46\ The White House, ``Statement From the Press Secretary''
(Jan. 26, 2025), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/01/statement-from-the-press-secretary/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

On January 27, 2025, President Trump had a productive
conversation with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who agreed to
``do what's right'' in regard to illegal migration.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\47\ Meryl Sebastian, Trump Says India 'Will Do What's Right' on
Illegal Immigration BBC News (Jan. 27, 2025), https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj91z842wlmo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Beginning on February 1, 2025, President Trump has issued
a number of tariff-related executive orders in connection with the
situation at the southern border.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\48\ See, e.g., Executive Order 14194, Imposing Duties to
Address the Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 FR 9117 (Feb. 1,
2025) (published Feb. 7, 2025); Executive Order 14198, Progress on
the Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 FR 9185 (Feb. 3, 2025)
(published Feb. 10, 2025); Executive Order 14227, Amendment to
Duties to Address the Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 FR 11371
(Mar. 2, 2025) (published Mar. 6, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

On February 16, 2025, Panama received a first U.S.
military plane transporting 119 deportees of various nationalities, who
will then be repatriated to their own respective countries. Panamanian
President Jose Raul Mulino has offered his country as a stopover for
aliens expelled from the United States.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\49\ Panama Receives First U.S. Deportation Flight Under Trump
Administration, The Tico Times (Feb. 16, 2025), https://ticotimes.net/2025/02/16/panama-receives-first-us-deportation-flight-under-trump-administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Multiple agencies of the U.S. Government are actively pursuing the
President's foreign policy goals. For instance, the Department of State
has announced multiple discussions with neighboring countries regarding
DHS's ability to remove or return illegal aliens,\50\ consistent with
Secretary of State Rubio's January 22, 2025 announcement that a key
priority of the Department of State is to curb mass migration and
secure our borders.\51\ In that announcement, the Department of State
made clear that it ``will no longer undertake any activities that
facilitate or encourage mass migration'' and that ``[o]ur diplomatic
relations with other countries, particularly in the Western Hemisphere,
will prioritize securing America's borders, stopping illegal and
destabilizing migration, and negotiating the repatriation of illegal
immigrants.'' \52\ Additionally, pursuant to his authority under
section 219 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1189,\53\ Secretary of State Rubio
designated the Venezuelan gang, Tren de Aragua, along with other
cartels and gangs, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\50\ See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Readout, Secretary
Rubio's Meeting with Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele (Feb. 3,
2025) (``President Bukele agreed to take back all Salvadoran MS-13
gang members who are in the United States unlawfully. He also
promised to accept and incarcerate violent illegal immigrants,
including members of the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang, but also
criminal illegal migrants from any country.''), https://www.state.gov/secretary-rubios-meeting-with-salvadoran-president-nayib-bukele/; U.S. Department of State, Readout, Secretary Rubio's
Meeting with Panamanian President Mulino (Feb. 2, 2025) (``Secretary
Rubio also emphasized the importance of collaborative efforts to end
the hemisphere's illegal migration crisis and thanked President
Mulino for his support of a joint repatriation program, which has
reduced illegal migration through the Darien Gap.''), https://www.state.gov/secretary-rubios-meeting-with-panamanian-president-mulino/.
\51\ U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Priorities and
Mission of the Second Trump Administration's Department of State
(Jan. 22, 2025).
\52\ Id.
\53\ See Executive Order 14157, Designating Cartels and Other
Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially
Designated Global Terrorists, 90 FR 8439 (Jan. 20, 2025) (published
Jan. 29, 2025).
\54\ Foreign Terrorist Organization Designations of Tren de
Aragua, Mara Salvatrucha, Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel de Jallisco
Nueva Generacion, Carteles Unidos, Cartel del Noreste, Cartel del
Golfo, and La Nueva Familia Michoacana, 90 FR 10030 (Feb. 20, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In other words, in addition to directly fulfilling the President's
directive to terminate the CHNV parole programs, this action
complements and underscores the Administration's pivot to a foreign
policy that prioritizes the United States' interests in a secure
border. Regardless of whether the prior Administration saw the CHNV
parole programs as a component of a regional migration management
strategy, the current Administration is not pursuing that strategy.
Rather, as described above, the current Administration has focused its
foreign policy attention on other measures to deter and prevent the
entry of illegal aliens into the United States and obtain complete
operational control of our borders.
These measures will allow DHS to better ``achieve the total and
efficient enforcement'' of U.S. immigration law and, as such, champion
a core American interest in accordance with the President's vision for
American foreign policy.\55\ In short, the continued implementation of
the CHNV parole programs no longer accords with the President's stated
priorities and foreign policy objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\55\ See Executive Order 14159, Protecting the American People
Against Invasion, 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 20, 2025) (published Jan. 29,
2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Other Factors Do Not Counsel in Favor of Maintaining the Programs

The other factors cited by DHS in promulgating the CHNV parole
programs also do not counsel in favor of maintaining the programs. For
instance:
DHS predicted that by allowing DHS to vet aliens before
they travel to the United States, the programs would enhance national
security as compared to high levels of illegal immigration. But as
discussed above, these programs are unnecessary to counter high levels
of illegal immigration. In addition, and critically, such vetting is
inherently limited and, as has been reported publicly, there were
significant gaps in the vetting process. In response to these problems,
the CHNV parole programs were paused briefly in July 2024 to evaluate
the program vulnerabilities.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\56\ Stephen Dinan, `Parole' program put on hold amid massive
fraud; Homeland Security promises to set up safeguards, Wash. Times
(Aug. 2, 2024), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/aug/2/dhs-suspends-parole-program-amid-rampant-fraud/.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 13617]]

DHS also initially reasoned that the CHNV parole programs
would disincentivize a dangerous journey that puts aliens' lives and
safety at risk and enriches smuggling networks. As noted above,
however, although these programs were accompanied by a significant
decrease in CHNV encounters between southwest border POEs, they were
also accompanied by a significant increase in CHNV encounters at
southwest land border POEs. This indicates that CHNV nationals
continued to engage in dangerous migration to the southwest border,
even if the overall level of migration to the southwest border dropped
somewhat and CHNV aliens did not cross between POEs with the same
frequency. And, as also noted above, the U.S. Government has
implemented other policies that have more effectively deterred illegal
immigration.
Another stated goal of the CHNV parole programs was to
reduce the burden on DHS personnel and resources that would otherwise
be required for detention, monitoring, processing, and removal.
However, as noted above, significant resource burdens persisted even
after the programs' implementation, including with respect to
encounters at and between POEs. Program implementation itself occupied
significant resources. For instance, there have been approximately
2,970,000 Forms I-134 and I-134A filed with USCIS since October
2022,\57\ which includes 2,140,000 pending review, 642,410 confirmed by
USCIS, and 181,820 non-confirmed by USCIS.\58\ Further, DHS needed
additional resources to counter the fraud, national security concerns,
and public safety concerns discussed above. In addition, due to the
originating location of beneficiaries of the CHNV parole programs and
available travel routes via commercial airlines, over 80 percent of the
aliens who were issued an ATA under the CHNV parole programs flew to
Florida POEs. The unexpected increase in approximately 25,000
inadmissible aliens per month resulted in CBP experiencing a decrease
in enforcement operations and an increase in wait times, overtime
expenditures, and other needs at Florida POEs. Processing an alien
requesting parole under the CHNV parole programs requires secondary
processing and enrollment of biometrics, resulting in a more extensive
and prolonged time in CBP facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\57\ Under the parole program for Venezuelans, a U.S.-based
supporter would initiate consideration for parole under the program
by filing Form I-134, Declaration of Financial Support (Online),
along with supporting evidence. 87 FR at 63515. In January 2023,
when DHS expanded the programs to cover Cubans, Haitians, and
Nicaraguans and their immediate family members as well, DHS
announced that it would instead begin accepting the Form I-134A
Online Request to be a Supporter and Declaration of Financial
Support, along with supporting evidence, to initiate consideration
for parole under all four programs. See, e.g., 88 FR at 1279.
Neither form could be filed on paper by mail and neither form
required the payment of a fee.
\58\ OHSS analysis of USCIS Form I-134/Form I-134A data as of
January 22, 2025. The Venezuelan parole program started on October
18, 2022, and the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua parole programs started
January 6, 2023. ``Confirmed'' in this context meant that that USCIS
had determined that the supporter was eligible to be a supporter and
that they demonstrated the ability to financially support the
beneficiary, while ``non-confirmed'' meant that USCIS had determined
that the potential supporter had been determined to be ineligible to
be a supporter or failed to demonstrate ability to financially
support the beneficiary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Reliance Interests of Prospective Supporters and Parolees

In deciding whether and how to terminate the CHNV parole programs,
DHS has considered potential reliance interests of a range of potential
supporters and beneficiaries of these programs. At the outset, however,
DHS observes that the temporary and discretionary nature of the
programs indicate that reliance on the continued existence of the CHNV
parole programs would be unwarranted. The notices establishing the CHNV
parole programs expressly advise the public that, ``[t]he Secretary
retains the sole discretion to terminate the [Parole Program] . . . at
any point'' \59\ and that ``DHS may terminate parole in its discretion
at any time.'' \60\ The CHNV parole programs were ``being implemented
as a matter of the Secretary's discretion. [They are] not intended to
and [do] not create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable
by any party in any matter, civil or criminal.'' \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\59\ E.g., 88 FR at 1268 (Cuba).
\60\ E.g., 88 FR at 1272 (Cuba).
\61\ E.g., 88 FR at 1277 (Cuba).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, DHS observes that on October 4, 2024, the prior
administration announced that there was no re-parole process under
CHNV, informing participants that, ``if you have not sought a lawful
status or period of authorized stay, you will need to leave the United
States before your authorized parole period expires, or you may be
placed in removal proceedings after your period of parole expires.''
\62\ Finally, as noted above, Executive Order 14165 directs the
Secretary to terminate the CHNV parole programs consistent with law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\62\ Camilo Montoya-Galvez, U.S. Won't Extend Legal Status For
530,000 Migrants Who Arrived Under Biden Program, CBS News (Oct. 4,
2024), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/venezuelans-legal-status-chnv-program/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notwithstanding that DHS made very clear that reliance on these
programs would be inappropriate, that DHS made clear months ago that
there would be no ``re-parole'' process under the CHNV parole programs,
and the additional notice provided in Executive Order 14165, DHS has
analyzed the effects of this action on any potential reliance interests
in an abundance of caution.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\63\ See USCIS, Frequently Asked Questions About the Processes
for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans (Oct. 4, 2024),
available at https://web.archive.org/web/20250104043158/https:/www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/frequently-asked-questions-about-the-processes-for-cubans-haitians-nicaraguans-and-venezuelans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Reliance Interests of Potential Supporters and Beneficiaries

DHS first considered the potential reliance interests of those
U.S.-based supporters who had intended to file or have filed a Form I-
134A in support of a potential parolee. In general, the costs
associated with such filings are minimal. The potential supporter may
have incurred the opportunity cost of completing Form I-134A, estimated
at 2.60 hours per response, and a few potential supporters who
submitted Form I-134A may have submitted their biometrics (photograph
and fingerprints) at a USCIS Application Support Center for biometric
screening and vetting by USCIS as part of the review of their Form I-
134A.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\64\ Biometrics submission is estimated to require 1.17 hours
per respondent. 89 FR 104557 (Dec. 23, 2024).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

At this early stage in the process, the costs incurred by a
potential beneficiary are also minimal. Once a supporter is confirmed,
the potential beneficiary receives instructions to create a USCIS
online account, confirm their biographic information in their online
account, and attest to meeting the eligibility requirements, including
public health requirements, and certain vaccination requirements. It is
also possible that a beneficiary who has received instructions to
create an online account may have obtained vaccinations in anticipation
of the required attestation. After confirming their biographic
information, the beneficiary received instructions to access the CBP
One mobile application to enter biographic information and submit a
live photo. CBP One was used to collect the beneficiary's biographic
information and photo and was an additional step in the process prior
to the alien being authorized to travel to the United States to seek
parole. The total estimated time to complete the CBP One part of the

[[Page 13618]]

ATA process was 10 minutes. See 88 FR 62810, 62812 (Sept. 13, 2023).
In general, these costs are not significant and pale in comparison
to the U.S. Government's sovereign interest in determining who is
paroled into the United States. DHS intends to issue a notice of non-
confirmation for all remaining pending Forms I-134A. DHS will also
rescind the confirmation of all Form I-134A that were previously
confirmed and issue updated notices of non-confirmation for any
potential beneficiaries who have not yet traveled to a POE to seek
parole. Potential beneficiaries will no longer be able to execute any
attestations or seek ATA through a USCIS online account based on a
previously confirmed Form I-134A.

2. Reliance Interests of Potential Beneficiaries With Approved ATAs and
Their Supporters

A beneficiary with an approved ATA may travel to the United States
to seek a discretionary grant of parole. Authorization is generally
valid for 90 days, and beneficiaries are responsible for securing their
own travel, at no cost to the U.S. government, via commercial air to
the United States.\65\ DHS intends to cancel all pending applications
for advance authorizations to travel to the United States to seek a
discretionary grant of parole under the CHNV parole programs. There are
no currently approved ATAs upon which an alien may travel under the
CHNV parole programs.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\65\ Authorization to travel does not guarantee parole. Parole
of the individual is a discretionary determination made by CBP when
the individual arrives at the interior POE. See, e.g., 88 FR 1255,
1264 (Jan. 9, 2023).
\66\ OHSS analysis of advance travel authorization data provided
by CBP PSPD and valid as of February 27, 2025.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A beneficiary whose application for an ATA is cancelled may have,
for example, provided notice to their landlord, sold property, and/or
resigned from employment. In addition, a confirmed Form I-134A
supporter may have incurred expenses, for example, to secure living
quarters or furniture for the beneficiary in anticipation of their
process being completed through parole into the United States.
DHS recognizes that the potential costs incurred by supporters and
potential beneficiaries at this point could be viewed as significant.
Nevertheless, as explained above, supporters and potential
beneficiaries were apprised that DHS could terminate the programs at
any point. Moreover, the notices for each parole program made it clear
that the approval of an ATA or grant of parole at a POE was entirely
discretionary. See, e.g., 88 FR 1243, 1252 (noting that a potential
beneficiary may be ``ineligible for advance authorization to travel to
the United States as well as parole under this process'' for a range of
reasons, including if the alien ``fails to pass national security and
public safety vetting or is otherwise deemed not to merit a favorable
exercise of discretion''); 88 FR at 1253 (``Approval of advance
authorization to travel does not guarantee parole into the United
States. Whether to parole the [aliens] is a discretionary determination
made by CBP at the POE at the time the [alien] arrives at the interior
POE''); 88 FR at 1253 (``[Aliens] who . . . otherwise do not warrant
parole pursuant to [section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA], and as a matter
of discretion upon inspection, . . . may be referred to ICE for
detention.''). While the termination of the CHNV parole programs as
provided in this notice may result in costs incurred by both the
supporter and potential beneficiary who have prepared to travel to the
United States, those parties chose to incur such expenses knowing that
completion of the process was never guaranteed by the terms of the
program, and the termination of the programs was possible at any time.
DHS has concluded that any such reliance interests are outweighed by
other interests and policy concerns as explained in this notice.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\67\ DHS has considered the alternative of allowing any approved
ATAs to remain in place until they were used or expired by their
terms. Even if there were currently approved ATAs, DHS would not
pursue this route, because DHS would not wish to incentivize aliens
flying to the United States to seek parole under policies that DHS
no longer supports or appear to encourage them to incur additional
expenses based on a belief that they will be paroled upon arrival at
the POE. Such an approach would risk exacerbating the problems
created by the CHNV parole programs. As is always the case, however,
CBP may consider a request for parole under DHS's existing parole
authority, on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons
or significant public benefit. If parole is not granted, the alien
may be returned to their home country at U.S. Government expense or
processed for another appropriate disposition under the INA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Effect of Termination on Current Parolees Under the CHNV Parole
Programs and Corresponding Reliance Interests

The notices establishing the CHNV parole programs explain that
parole is not an admission of the alien to the United States, and a
parolee remains an applicant for admission during the period of parole
in the United States. See also INA 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)(A). DHS may set the duration of the parole based on the
purpose for granting the parole request and may impose reasonable
conditions on parole. Id. Aliens may be granted advance authorization
to travel to the United States to seek parole. See 8 CFR 212.5(f). The
Secretary may terminate parole in her discretion at any time when, in
her opinion, neither urgent humanitarian reasons nor significant public
benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United
States, and parole shall be terminated when the purpose for which it
was authorized has been accomplished. See 8 CFR 212.5(e). And, finally,
aliens who are paroled into the United States, including those paroled
through the CHNV parole programs, may generally apply for and be
granted employment authorization under the (c)(11) employment
eligibility category. See 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(11).
As noted above, between October 19, 2022, and January 22, 2025,
approximately 532,000 inadmissible aliens received parole into the
United States pursuant to the CHNV parole programs. DHS has determined
that as one aspect of the termination of the CHNV parole programs,
consistent with the Secretary's statutory and regulatory authority,\68\
the parole of aliens who have been paroled into the United States under
the CHNV parole programs and whose parole has not already expired by
April 24, 2025 will terminate on that date unless the Secretary makes
an individual determination to the contrary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\68\ See INA 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A) (``when the
purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith return
or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and
thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United
States''); 8 CFR 212.5(e)(2)(i) (``[U]pon accomplishment of the
purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of
one of the officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section,
neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the
continued presence of the alien in the United States, parole shall
be terminated upon written notice to the alien. . . .'' (emphasis
added)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Following this termination, and consistent with the direction in
Executive Order 14165, DHS generally intends to remove promptly aliens
who entered the United States under the CHNV parole programs who do not
depart the United States before their parole termination date and do
not have any lawful basis to remain in the United States. DHS retains
its discretion to commence enforcement action against any alien at any
time, including during the 30-day waiting period created by this
notice. Parolees without a lawful basis to remain in the United States
following the termination of the CHNV programs must depart the United
States

[[Page 13619]]

before their parole termination date. Aliens departing the United
States via land border POEs should report their departure once outside
the United States via the CBP Home mobile app. Aliens should visit
https://i94.cbp.dhs.gov/home for more information about voluntarily
reporting their departure.
In implementing this approach, DHS intends to prioritize for
removal those who (1) have not, prior to the publication of this
notice, properly filed an immigration benefit request, with appropriate
fee (or fee waiver request, if available) to obtain a lawful basis to
remain in the United States (e.g., adjustment of status, asylum,
Temporary Protected Status, or T or U nonimmigrant status) and (2) are
not the beneficiary of an immigration benefit request properly filed by
someone else on their behalf (e.g., petition for alien relative,
fianc[eacute] petition, petition for immigrant employee), with
appropriate fee (or fee waiver request, if available). Aliens who have
since obtained a lawful immigration status or other basis that permits
them to remain in the United States are not required to depart the
United States pursuant to this notice.
Parole-based employment authorization under 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(11)
automatically terminates upon (1) the expiration date specified on the
employment authorization document, (2) DHS's institution of removal
proceedings against the alien, or (3) a grant of voluntary departure.
See 8 CFR 274a.14(a). Such employment authorization may also be revoked
on notice consistent with the procedures in 8 CFR 274a.14(b). DHS has
determined that, after termination of the parole, the condition upon
which the employment authorization was granted no longer exists and
thus DHS intends to revoke parole-based employment authorization
consistent with those revocation on notice procedures. 8 CFR
274a.14(b).
DHS has considered the impacts on parolees who are affected by this
discretionary decision to terminate their parole prior to the
expiration of the parole period. DHS recognizes the costs incurred by
some aliens who have been granted parole and traveled to the United
States.\69\ Parolees will have departed their native country; traveled
to the United States; obtained housing, employment authorization, and
means of transportation; and perhaps commenced the process of building
connections to the community where they reside.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\69\ See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221-22
(2016) (``Agencies are free to change their existing policies as
long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change. . . .
But the agency must at least display awareness that it is changing
position and show that there are good reasons for the new policy. In
explaining its changed position, an agency must also be cognizant
that longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance
interests that must be taken into account.'' (cleaned up)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

However, any assessment of the reliance interests of CHNV parolees
must account for CHNV parolees' knowledge at the outset that (1) the
Secretary retained the discretion to terminate the parole programs at
any point in time, and to terminate any grants of parole at any time
when, in her opinion, the purposes of such parole have been served
\70\; and that (2) the initial term of parole would be limited to a
maximum of two years. These clear, limiting conditions of the parole
programs served to attenuate any long-term expectations and interests
amongst CHNV parolees. Accordingly, DHS has taken these limiting
conditions, along with CHNV parolees' knowledge of them, into
consideration when weighing their reliance interests.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\70\ As explained throughout this notice, the Secretary has
determined that the purposes of parole under the CHNV programs have
been served because, inter alia, the CHNV parole programs are
unnecessary to achieve border security goals; the domestic impact of
the CHNV parole programs was too great; and the programs are
inconsistent with this Administration's foreign policy goals.
\71\ See DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 32
(2020) (noting that DHS could conclude that reliance is
``unjustified in light of the express limitations'' in relevant
immigration policy).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

DHS has concluded that the potential reliance interests among
aliens paroled into the United States under the CHNV parole programs do
not outweigh the U.S. government's strong interest in promptly removing
parolees when the basis for the underlying program no longer exists. To
effectuate their prompt removal, the U.S. government may in its
discretion initiate expedited removal proceedings where appropriate.
Expedited removal is available only when an alien has not been
continuously present in the United States for at least the two years
preceding the date of the inadmissibility determination. INA
235(b)(1)(iii)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(iii)(II); 8 CFR 235.3.\72\ If
DHS were to allow the CHNV parolee population to remain for the full
duration of their two-year parole, DHS would be compelled to place a
greater proportion of this population in section 240 removal
proceedings to effectuate their removal, further straining the already
over-burdened immigration court system discussed in Section III.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\72\ See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 FR 8139
(Jan. 24, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To the extent that current parolees have obtained housing and
employment authorization, or created new ties within the community
while in the United States, DHS notes these interests are qualitatively
less than any reliance interests that might be attributed to the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) recipient population
consistent with the discussion in DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal.\73\ In Regents, the Supreme Court reviewed whether DHS had
appropriately considered the reliance interests of DACA recipients when
rescinding DACA.\74\ The reliance interests of DACA recipients, all of
whom had been present in the United States for far longer than two
years, included their enrollment in degree programs, the beginning of
their careers, the starting of businesses, and the purchase of
homes.\75\ As the Court noted, these interests, though noteworthy, were
not ``necessarily dispositive,'' and ``DHS may determine, in the
particular context before it, that other interests and policy concerns
[in rescinding DACA] outweigh any reliance interests.'' \76\ For the
purposes of the actions announced in this notice, DHS notes the
reliance interests of those paroled under the CHNV parole programs are
far less than the population in Regents. Further, as stated above, the
reliance interests under the CHNV parole programs must take into
account the express, discretionary terms of the parole program.
Accordingly, the reliance interests are outweighed by the U.S.
government's strong interest in promptly returning parolees when the
basis for the underlying parole no longer exists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\73\ 591 U.S. 1 (2020).
\74\ Id. at 31.
\75\ Id.
\76\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Third parties, including employers, landlords, and others, may also
have indirect reliance interests in the availability of individual CHNV
parolees, but even if DHS had allowed the grants of parole to expire at
the end of their designated terms, such third parties would have
experienced the effects of such expiration. By providing 30 days'
notice, DHS balances the benefits of a wind-down period for aliens and
third parties with the exigency of promptly enforcing the law against
those aliens lacking a lawful basis to remain in the United States. For
the same reasons set forth above, DHS finds the U.S. government's
interest in terminating these grants of parole outweigh any reliance
interest of third parties.
DHS has considered the alternative of permitting CHNV participants'
parole to remain in effect until the natural expiration of the parole,
as DHS has in

[[Page 13620]]

the past done with some parole terminations. See, e.g., 82 FR 38926,
38927 (Aug. 16, 2017). However, DHS has opted to not pursue this route.
As explained above, this would essentially foreclose DHS's ability to
expeditiously remove those CHNV parolees with no lawful basis to remain
in the United States. Under this alternative, CHNV parolees may begin
to accrue more than two years of continuous presence in the United
States, such that DHS would have to initiate section 240 removal
proceedings to effectuate their removal. See INA 235(b)(1)(iii)(II), 8
U.S.C. 1235(b)(1)(iii)(II). As a result, the already overburdened
immigration court system would be further taxed with adjudicating the
section 240 removal proceedings for the pertinent CHNV beneficiary
population, a result DHS finds unacceptable.
DHS has also considered the alternative of a longer than 30-day
wind-down period. After due consideration, DHS has also decided not to
pursue this option. As discussed above, DHS has a strong interest in
preserving the ability to initiate expedited removal proceedings to the
maximum extent possible for the appropriate CHNV population to prevent
further straining of the over-burdened immigration court system. Any
lengthening of the wind-down period will increase the likelihood that
additional CHNV parolees are no longer subject to expedited
removal.\77\ DHS has determined that a 30-day wind-down period provides
affected parties sufficient notice while also preserving DHS's ability
to enforce the law promptly against those CHNV parolees lacking a
lawful basis to remain in the United States. Accordingly, DHS is opting
not to increase the wind-down period to more than 30 days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\77\ According to OHSS analysis of data provided by USCIS, for
each month from March 2025 through September 2026, there are
thousands of CHNV parolees who will become ineligible for expedited
removal upon the natural expiration of their two-year parole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Federal Register Notice as Constructive Notice

This Federal Register notice serves as notice of the termination of
the CHNV parole programs and satisfies the requirement that DHS provide
written notice upon the termination of parole. See 8 CFR 212.5(e)(2)(i)
(``. . . Upon accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was
authorized or when in the opinion of one of the officials listed in
paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor public
benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United
States, parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien. .
. .'' (emphasis added)). For the reasons set forth above, the Secretary
has concluded that neither urgent humanitarian reasons nor significant
public benefit warrants the continued presence of aliens paroled under
the CHNV programs and the purposes of such parole therefore have been
served. This notice accordingly serves as written notice to CHNV
parolees.
DHS has determined that publication of this notice in the Federal
Register is legally sufficient notice to all interested or affected
persons regardless of actual knowledge or hardship resulting from
ignorance. See 44 U.S.C. 1507; Friends of Sierra R.R., Inc. v. I.C.C.,
881 F.2d 663, 667-68 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v.
Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947) (``Congress has provided that the
appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Register gives legal
notice of their contents.'').
DHS finds Federal Register publication of the decision to terminate
existing grants of parole to be the most practicable approach in light
of the size of the affected population and potential noncompliance with
change-of-address reporting requirements. See 8 U.S.C. 1305; 8 CFR
265.1. Because all CHNV parolees should have a USCIS online account and
all processing under these parole programs took place electronically,
DHS will also provide individual notice to each parolee through their
USCIS online account. Cf., e.g., 8 CFR 103.2(b)(19)(ii)(B) (``For
applications or petitions filed electronically, USCIS will notify both
the applicant or petitioner and the authorized attorney or accredited
representative electronically of any notices or decisions. . . .'').
This notice, and the individual notice through the USCIS online
account, each independently constitute ``written notice to the alien''
under 8 CFR 212.5(e)(2)(i).

VII. Administrative Procedure Act

This notice is exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking
requirements because DHS is merely adopting a general statement of
policy, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). i.e., a ``statement [ ] issued by an agency
to advise the public prospectively of the manner in which the agency
proposes to exercise a discretionary power.'' Lincoln v. Vigil, 508
U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
302 n.31 (1979)). By terminating the CHNV parole programs--which
themselves constituted general statements of policy, see, e.g., 88 FR
at 1277--DHS is explaining how it will implement the Secretary's broad
discretion for exercising her narrow parole authority. Accordingly,
this notice of termination constitutes a general statement of policy
and is exempt from the notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\78\ Cf. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 101
(``Because an agency is not required to use notice-and-comment
procedures to issue an initial interpretive rule, it is also not
required to use those procedures when it amends or repeals that
interpretive rule.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

When an agency merely explains how it will enforce a statute or
regulation by describing how it will exercise its broad enforcement
discretion, as was the case with the CHNV parole programs, it is a
general statement of policy. See Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 197. Section
212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A) provides the Secretary
broad discretion in exercising the parole authority, with parole
decisions made by the Secretary of Homeland Security ``in [her]
discretion.'' The CHNV parole programs therefore were general
statements of policy.
Because the CHNV parole programs constitute general statements of
policy and were exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements
under the APA, their termination likewise is a mere general statement
of policy exempt from the notice and comment rulemaking requirements.
Through the termination of the CHNV parole programs and for the reasons
given, DHS is merely making a change to a previous policy statement on
the exercise of its discretionary parole authority.\79\ Accordingly,
there is no requirement to publish notice prior to the termination's
effective date, and it is therefore amenable to immediate issuance and
implementation.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\79\ See Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 221 (``Agencies are free
to change their existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned
explanation for the change.'').
\80\ See 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Even if the changes were considered to be a legislative rule that
would normally be subject to notice and comment rulemaking and a
delayed effective date, these changes--like the implementation of the
parole programs themselves \81\--pertain to a foreign affairs function
of the United States, and are exempt from such procedural requirements
on that basis.\82\ Consistent

[[Page 13621]]

with the Secretary of State's February 21, 2025 determination that
``all efforts, conducted by any agency of the federal government, to
control the status, entry, and exit of people, and the transfer of
goods, services, data, technology, and other items across the borders
of the United States, constitute a foreign affairs function of the
United States[,]'' DHS finds that these changes are connected to the
entry and exit of people and thereby constitute a foreign affairs
function.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\81\ See 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1); 88 FR at 1277; 88 FR at 1253; 88 FR
at 1264; 87 FR at 63516 (as modified by 88 FR 1279).
\82\ See Am. Ass'n of Exps. & Imps.-Textile & Apparel Grp. v.
United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that
foreign affairs exception covers agency actions ``linked intimately
with the Government's overall political agenda concerning relations
with another country''); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1361
(9th Cir. 1980) (because an immigration directive ``was implementing
the President's foreign policy,'' the action ``fell within the
foreign affairs function and good cause exceptions to the notice and
comment requirements of the APA'').
\83\ U.S. Secretary of State, Determination: Foreign Affairs
Functions of the United States, 90 FR 12200 (Feb. 21, 2025)
(published Mar. 14, 2025). The Secretary of State's determination
references and implements numerous Presidential actions reflecting
the President's top foreign policy priorities, including Executive
Order 14165. As noted above, Executive Order 14165 specifically
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to, consistent with
applicable law, take all appropriate action to terminate the CHNV
parole programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Moreover, although the APA does not require the agency to show that
such procedures may result in ``definitely undesirable international
consequences'' to invoke the foreign affairs exemption to notice-and-
comment rulemaking, some courts have required such a showing,\84\ and
DHS can make one here. Delaying rescission of the CHNV parole programs
to undertake rulemaking would undermine the U.S. Government's ability
to conduct foreign policy, including the ability to shift governmental
policies and engage in delicate and time-sensitive negotiations
following a change in Administration. It is the view of the United
States that the termination of these parole programs will fulfill
important foreign policy goals that the President has repeatedly
articulated and urged DHS to implement swiftly; any delay in achieving
such goals is definitely undesirable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\84\ See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 437 (2d Cir.
2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As explained in Section III.3 of this notice, the CHNV parole
programs were implemented as an integral part of negotiations with
regional neighbors, including Mexico, to address unlawful migratory
flows challenging immigration systems throughout the region. For
instance, in announcing the Venezuela parole program, DHS explained
that even if the program were considered to be a legislative rule that
would normally be subject to requirements for notice-and-comment
rulemaking and a delayed effective date, the program would be exempt
from such requirements because it involves a foreign affairs function
of the United States.\85\ DHS cautioned that it ``will not implement
the new parole process without the ability to return Venezuelan
nationals who enter [unlawfully] to Mexico, and the United States'
ability to execute this process thus requires the GOM's willingness to
accept into Mexico those who bypass this new process and enter the
United States [unlawfully] between POEs.'' DHS explained that
``initiating and managing this process will require careful,
deliberate, and regular assessment of the GOM's responses to this
unilateral U.S. action and ongoing, sensitive diplomatic engagements.''
\86\ DHS noted that the program was ``not only responsive to the
interests of key foreign partners--and necessary for addressing
migration issues requiring coordination between two or more
governments--[but] also fully aligned with larger and important foreign
policy objectives of [the prior] Administration and fits within a web
of carefully negotiated actions by multiple governments.'' \87\ When
implementing the Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua parole programs, DHS
invoked the foreign affairs exemption on similar grounds.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\85\ See 87 FR at 63516.
\86\ Id.
\87\ Id.
\88\ See 88 FR at 1277 (Cuba), 88 FR at 1253-54 (Haiti), 88 FR
at 1265 (Nicaragua).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Yet, as also discussed in Section III.3 of this notice, U.S.
foreign policy has changed in critical respects, and DHS must
expeditiously align its policies to that change. Whereas implementation
of the CHNV parole programs was contingent upon the GOM making an
independent decision to accept the return or removal of CHNV nationals
who migrated illegally, the U.S. Government is pursuing a range of
other policy initiatives that would allow DHS to return or remove CHNV
nationals, including re-implementation of the Migrant Protection
Protocols and improved cooperation and coordination with other
countries regarding return or removal of their or third country
nationals.
In the context of these complex and time-sensitive diplomatic
negotiations, it would be counterproductive to retain vestiges of a
foreign policy approach that the United States is no longer pursuing,
even temporarily, to allow for a period of public comment about matters
that implicate our foreign affairs and are ultimately within the
Executive's discretion. Continuing to administer the CHNV parole
programs pending notice-and-comment would adversely affect the United
States' ability to pivot rapidly to a more effective approach in these
negotiations and may result in an even greater number of CHNV nationals
requiring removal or return. Further delay in pursuing these more
effective approaches would be particularly pernicious in the context of
ongoing negotiations, as discussed in section III.3 of this notice,
with countries to accept the removal of illegal aliens, including
inadmissible CHNV nationals.
Finally, and for the same reasons that a delay in implementing this
action would result in undesirable international consequences, even if
notice-and-comment and a delayed effective date were required, DHS has
determined that the good cause exemptions to notice-and-comment
rulemaking and the 30-day effective date apply and that the delay
associated with implementing these changes through notice-and-comment
rulemaking or delaying the effective date would be impracticable and
contrary to the public interest. Any delay for such procedures would
harm the U.S. Government's ability to timely implement the current
Administration's foreign policy approach and exacerbate the challenges
associated with the CHNV parole programs, as explained throughout this
notice, contrary to the President's direction to protect the American
people against invasion and to secure the border. Such an outcome would
also be inconsistent with the fundamentally discretionary nature of
DHS's parole authority.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\89\ See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), 553(d)(3); see Util. Solid Waste
Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749, 754-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (``a
situation is `impracticable' when an agency finds that due and
timely execution of its functions would be impeded by the notice
otherwise required''); see also Executive Order 14159, 90 FR 8443
(Jan. 20, 2025) (published Jan. 29, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VIII. Severability

DHS intends for the decisions announced in this notice to be
severable from each other and to be given effect to the maximum extent
possible, such that if a court holds that any provision is invalid or
unenforceable--whether in their entirety or as to a particular person
or circumstance--the other provisions will remain in effect as to any
other person or circumstance.\90\ The various decisions in this notice
are designed to function sensibly without the others, and DHS intends
for them to be severable so that each can operate independently.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\90\ Courts have uniformly held that the APA, 5 U.S.C. 706(2),
authorizes courts to sever and set aside ``only the offending parts
of the rule.'' Carlson v. Postal Regulatory Comm'n, 938 F.3d 337,
351 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 294 (1988).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 13622]]

For example, DHS would intend that the termination of the CHNV
parole programs be implemented immediately, even if the termination of
ATAs or existing grants of parole were to be enjoined in whole or in
part. This approach ensures that DHS is able to implement its policy
choices, and the President's direction in Executive Order 14165, to the
maximum extent possible.

IX. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

This rule does not promulgate new or revise existing
``collection[s] of information'' as that term is defined under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13, 109 Stat. 163, 44
U.S.C. chapter 35, and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR part 1320.

Kristi Noem,
Secretary of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2025-05128 Filed 3-21-25; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 9110-9M-P