[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 55 (Monday, March 24, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13503-13506]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-04921]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 72-29, 50-277, and 50-278; NRC-2025-0033]
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC; Peach Bottom Atomic Power
Station Units 2 and 3; Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation;
Exemption
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued an
exemption to Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, permitting Peach
Bottom Atomic Power Station (PB) Units 2 and 3 to use the Holtec HI-
STORM Flood/Wind (FW) Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) Storage System,
including the use of the HI-TRAC VW transfer cask during loading and
transport operations, at the PB independent spent fuel storage
installation, for seven 89 multi-purpose canisters, in a near-term
loading campaign beginning in June 2025, where the terms, conditions,
and specifications in Certificate of Compliance No. 1032, Amendment No.
1, Revision No. 1, are not met.
DATES: The exemption was issued on March 6, 2025.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2025-0033 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2025-0033. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Bridget Curran;
telephone: 301-415-1003; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the For Further Information
Contact section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Yen-Ju Chen, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555; telephone: 301-415-1018; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: March 19, 2025.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Yoira Diaz-Sanabria,
Chief, Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch, Division of Fuel
Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety, and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket Nos. 72-29, 50-277, and 50-278
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC; Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
Units 2 and 3; Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
I. Background
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC (CEG) is the holder of renewed
facility operating license Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56, which authorize
operation of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PB) Units 2 and 3
in Delta, Pennsylvania, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of Production and
Utilization Facilities.'' The licenses provide, among other things,
that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now or hereafter in
effect.
Consistent with 10 CFR part 72, subpart K, ``General License for
Storage of Spent Fuel at Power Reactor Sites,'' a general license is
issued for the storage of spent fuel in an independent spent fuel
storage installation (ISFSI) at power reactor sites to persons
authorized to possess or operate nuclear power reactors under 10 CFR
part 50. CEG is authorized to operate nuclear power reactors under 10
CFR part 50 and holds a 10 CFR part 72 general license for storage of
spent fuel at the PB ISFSI. Under the terms of the general license, CEG
stores spent fuel at its PB ISFSI using the HI-STORM Flood/Wind (FW)
Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) Storage System in accordance with
Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1032, Amendment No. 1, Revision No.
1.
II. Request/Action
By a letter dated January 24, 2025 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number No. ML25024A148), as
supplemented on February 4, 2025 (ML25036A335), CEG requested an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(a)(2), 72.212(b)(3),
72.212(b)(5)(i), 72.212(b)(11), and 72.214 that require PB to comply
with the terms, conditions, and specifications of CoC No. 1032,
Amendment No. 1, Revision No. 1 (ML15152A358). If approved, CEG's
exemption request would accordingly allow PB to load seven MPC-89 at
the PB ISFSI site in a near-term loading campaign beginning in June
2025, in the HI-STORM FW MPC system, including the use of the HI-TRAC
VW transfer cask (HI-TRAC) during loading and transport operations,
where the terms, conditions, and specifications in CoC No. 1032,
Amendment No. 1, Revision No. 1 are not met.
Before using a CoC, general licensees are required to perform a
site-specific evaluation to establish that, once loaded with spent
fuel, the cask will conform to the terms, conditions, and
specifications of the CoC, including following the NRC-approved final
safety analysis report (FSAR) methodology. CEG currently uses the HI-
STORM FW MPC Storage System under CoC No. 1032, Amendment No. 1,
Revision No. 1, for dry storage of spent nuclear fuel in MPC-89 at the
PB ISFSI. The HI-STORM FW MPC Storage System CoC provides the
requirements, conditions, and operating limits necessary for use of the
system to store spent fuel. One of the operating limits established in
the CoC involves potential tornado-generated missile impacts. The HI-
STORM FW FSAR table 2.2.5 evaluates a generic set of tornado-generated
missile impacts (ML24327A229). CEG discovered that PB's site-specific
analysis performed to demonstrate
[[Page 13504]]
protection of the loaded MPC-89, while in the HI-TRAC, against tornado-
generated missiles was not performed consistent with the NRC-approved
method of evaluation in the FSAR. Contrary to CEG's site specific
analysis, the NRC-approved evaluation in the FSAR does not take credit
for the missile resistance offered by the HI-TRAC water jacket shell,
and assumes that the small and intermediate missiles will penetrate the
water jacket shell with no energy loss.
Therefore, CEG requests this exemption to allow it to conduct the
planned loading and transport operations of the seven MPC-89 in the HI-
STORM FW MPC Storage System at PB ISFSI beginning in June 2025, even
though, because of the different tornado-generated missile analysis of
the HI-TRAC in PB's site specific review, the terms, conditions, and
specifications of the CoC will not be met.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the
regulations of 10 CFR part 72 as it determines are authorized by law
and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and
security and are otherwise in the public interest.
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
This exemption would allow CEG to use the HI-STORM FW MPC Storage
System, including the use of the HI-TRAC during loading and transport
operations, for seven MPC-89 at its PB ISFSI, beginning in June 2025,
where the terms, conditions, and specifications in CoC No. 1032,
Amendment No. 1, Revision No. 1, are not met. CEG is requesting an
exemption from the provisions in 10 CFR part 72 that require the
licensee to comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications of
the CoC for the approved cask model it uses. Section 72.7 allows the
NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 72. This
authority to grant exemptions is consistent with the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, and is not otherwise inconsistent with the NRC's
regulations or other applicable laws. Additionally, no other law
prohibits the activities that would be authorized by the exemption.
Therefore, the NRC concludes that there is no statutory prohibition on
the issuance of the requested exemption, and the NRC is authorized to
grant the exemption by law.
B. The Exemption Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common
Defense and Security
CEG is requesting an exemption to use the HI-STORM FW MPC Storage
System, including the use of the HI-TRAC during loading and transport
operations for seven MPC-89 at the PB ISFSI, beginning in June 2025,
where the terms, conditions, and specifications in CoC No. 1032,
Amendment No. 1, Revision No. 1, are not met. In support of its
exemption request, CEG asserts that issuance of the exemption would not
endanger life or property because the evaluation of PB's postulated
tornado-generated missiles demonstrates that all FSAR acceptance
criteria are met. According to CEG, the site-specific analysis follows
the same mathematical approach as the generic approach in the FSAR but
takes credit for the additional resistance provided by the HI-TRAC
water jacket shell. Additionally, CEG notes that the water jacket shell
is an Important-to-Safety (ITS) component and meets all the criteria as
analyzed. Therefore, CEG contends the site-specific analysis, although
different from the FSAR methodology, demonstrates that the loading and
transport operations of the system using the HI-TRAC provides adequate
protection against PB's design basis tornado-generated missiles. As
such, according to CEG, the proposed exemption does not endanger life
or property or the common defense and security.
The NRC staff reviewed the requested exemption and determined that
the request does not change the fundamental design, components, or
safety features of the storage system. The NRC staff evaluated the
applicable potential safety impacts of granting the exemption to assess
the potential for any danger to life or property or the common defense
and security. Specifically, the NRC staff reviewed the applicant's
structural, confinement, thermal, criticality, shielding, and radiation
protection evaluations for the proposed exemption.
Structural and Confinement Review for the Requested Exemption: The
staff noted that this exemption does not involve any change to the
physical design or construction of the HI-STORM FW overpack, HI-TRAC,
or MPC-89, nor to any operating procedures. Instead, the exemption is
to allow the use of the CoC system despite the different methodology
used by PB regarding the tornado-generated missile impact analysis than
that approved by the NRC and reflected in the CoC FSAR. Therefore, the
staff's structural review focused on the analysis and methodology
followed to demonstrate that the design of the MPC-89 and the HI-TRAC
can withstand the governing PB site-specific tornado-generated missile
impact without impairing their capability to perform their intended
functions. The MPC and the HI-TRAC are deemed to perform their intended
design functions if the following performance objectives, as described
in HI-STORM FW FSAR section 3.1.2 (ML24327A229), can be satisfied:
(i) The postulated tornado generated missiles do not compromise the
integrity of the MPC confinement boundary while the MPC is contained
within the HI-TRAC.
(ii) No geometry changes occur under the postulated tornado-
generated missiles impact during handling conditions that may preclude
ready retrievability of the contained MPC.
(iii) The radiation shielding remains properly positioned under all
applicable handling service conditions for the HI-TRAC.
In general, the above performance objectives are deemed to be
satisfied for the MPC and the HI-TRAC if (1) the missile does not
penetrate the inner shell of the HI-TRAC, MPC or MPC lid, and does not
breach the confinement boundary, (2) the stresses (stress intensities
or strains, as applicable) calculated by the appropriate structural
analyses are less than the allowable defined in FSAR subsection
3.1.2.3, and (3) the geometry change in the HI-TRAC, if any, after any
event of structural consequence to the transfer cask, does not preclude
ready retrievability of the contained MPC.
The HI-TRAC body consists of two main layers: a water jacket layer
and a lead shield layer. Each layer is contained within different steel
shells: the water jacket shell (outermost shell of HI-TRAC), the outer
shell of the lead shield layer (between the water jacket layer and a
lead shield layer), and the inner shell (innermost shell of the lead
shield layer and the HI-TRAC). The proprietary Holtec Report HI-
2135869, ``Site-Specific Tornado Missile Analysis for HI-STORM FW
System,'' Revision No. 9, generically addresses the HI-TRAC structural
responses due to bounding site-specific small and intermediate tornado-
generated missile strikes, except for the governing tornado-generated
missile for PB, which is a 4-inch x 12-inch x 12-foot-long wooden plank
with an impact velocity of 300 miles per hour (mph). In support of this
exemption request, Holtec's ``HI-STORM FW Calculation Package to
Support Exemptions'' (PB site-specific analysis, ML25021A244) further
[[Page 13505]]
analyzed the governing site-specific wooden plank missile using the
same energy balance approach and assumptions relating to the missile
behavior and kinetic energy as other evaluated tornado-generated
missiles, with the exception of the credit given in the analysis for
the resistance provided by the HI-TRAC water jacket shell. Based on
this analysis, CEG concluded that the HI-TRAC inner shell is not
penetrated and is sufficient to absorb the remaining kinetic energy of
the wooden plank. Therefore, CEG concludes that the site-specific
governing tornado-generated missile does not penetrate the MPC-89
confinement boundary, and no significant deformation of the HI-TRAC is
expected that would prevent the MPC-89 from being retrieved or
maintaining shielding effectiveness.
The staff reviewed the sizes, mass, and velocities of the site-
specific tornado-generated missiles analyzed in the PB site-specific
analysis and verified that the analyzed tornado-generated missiles
bound the design basis tornado-generated missile spectrum specified in
section C.2.4 of the PB updated final safety analysis report, Appendix
C (ML23173A057). The staff's independent analysis of the missile
penetration by the wooden plank concluded that a greater margin of
safety is available for the inner shell penetration than the one
calculated in the PB site-specific analysis. Furthermore, based on the
review of the PB site-specific analysis, the staff finds that the
missile penetration depth by the wooden plank in the MPC lid remains
less than the minimum thickness of the MPC closure lid. Additionally,
the calculated global stress intensities for the HI-TRAC shell due to
the missile strike satisfy American Society of Mechanical Engineers,
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection
NF, Level D limits, as specified in the HI-STORM FW FSAR section
3.1.2.3. Therefore, in the event of a tornado-generated missile impact
from the wooden plank analyzed, damage to the cask or canister that
compromise confinement boundary, global plastic deformation in the cask
shell, or ovaling of the cask inner cavity, is not anticipated, and
will not affect the overall shielding effectiveness of the cask and the
retrievability of the MPC. The staff also noted that the analysis
results are conservative since they assume that the wooden plank is
rigid, and no kinetic energy dissipation is being credited due to
deformation of the wooden plank when it strikes the HI-TRAC at high
velocity.
Based on the staff's review of the analysis provided for the
exemption request, the staff finds the proposed methodology used for
the PB site-specific missile penetration analysis acceptable and
concludes that the site-specific analysis demonstrates that the MPC and
HI-TRAC can withstand the governing site-specific tornado-generated
missile impact without compromising their ability to perform their
intended safety functions at PB.
Thermal Review for the Requested Exemption: The thermal
consequences of a complete loss of water due to rupture of the HI-TRAC
water jacket from a tornado-generated missile has been analyzed in FSAR
sections 4.6 and 12.2.6.2 (ML24327A229). It demonstrates that the
consequences are within the short-term fuel cladding and material
temperature limits. The revised analysis with credit for the HI-TRAC
water jacket shell demonstrates that the FSAR acceptance criteria
continue to be met, and a complete loss of water continues to be
bounding for thermal evaluation. Therefore, no further thermal
evaluation is required to support this exemption request.
Criticality and Shielding Review for the Requested Exemption: A
complete loss of water due to rupture of the HI-TRAC water jacket from
a tornado-generated missile has been analyzed for shielding and no
effect on criticality control features as stated in FSAR section
12.2.6.2 (ML24327A229). The revised analysis with credit for the HI-
TRAC water jacket shell demonstrates that the FSAR acceptance criteria
continue to be met, and a complete loss of water continues to be
bounding for the shielding evaluation. Therefore, no further
criticality and shielding review is required to support this exemption
request.
Radiation Protection Review for the Requested Exemption: There is
no degradation in confinement capabilities of the MPC when inside of
the HI-TRAC. The local dose rates of a complete loss of water due to
rupture of the HI-TRAC water jacket from a tornado-generated missile
has been analyzed in FSAR chapter 5 (ML24327A229). The revised analysis
with credit for the HI-TRAC water jacket shell demonstrates that the
FSAR acceptance criteria continue to be met, and a complete loss of
water continues to be bounding for radiation protection. The necessary
compensatory measures continue to be valid. Therefore, no further
radiation protection review is required to support this exemption
request.
Conclusion: Based on staff's analysis of the structural and
confinement review, and the otherwise bounding nature of the FSAR's
analysis in other areas, the NRC staff has concluded that under the
requested exemption, the storage system will continue to meet the
safety requirements of 10 CFR part 72 and the offsite dose limits of 10
CFR part 20 and, therefore, will not endanger life or property or the
common defense and security.
C. The Exemption Is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The proposed exemption would allow CEG to use the HI-STORM FW MPC
Storage System, including the use of the HI-TRAC solely during loading
and transport operations for seven MPC-89 at PB ISFSI, beginning in
June 2025, even though PB's tornado-generated missile analysis of HI-
TRAC, which takes credit for the water jacket shell, is not part of the
NRC-approved CoC No. 1032, Amendment No. 1, Revision No. 1. According
to CEG, the exemption is in the public interest because being unable to
load fuel into dry storage in the future loading campaign would impact
CEG's ability to offload fuel from the PB reactor, consequently
impacting continued safe reactor operation.
CEG states that not being able to use the HI-STORM FW MPC Storage
System, including the use of the HI-TRAC during loading and transport
operations for seven MPC-89 at the PB ISFSI in the June 2025 loading
campaign, would impact its ability to effectively manage the margin to
full core discharge capacity (FCDC) in the PB Units 2 and 3 spent fuel
pools (SFP). The low FCDC margin makes it difficult to stage a complete
reload batch of fuel in the SFPs in preparation for outages and
presents a potential reactivity management risk to fuel handling
operations during pre- and post-outage activities. In addition,
according to CEG, a crowded spent fuel pool would challenge the decay
heat removal demand of the pool and increase the likelihood of a loss
of fuel pool cooling event and a fuel handling accident. Furthermore,
CEG contends that PB planned the cask loading campaign years in advance
based on availability of the specialized work force and equipment that
is shared throughout the CEG fleet. These specialty resources support
competing activities and priorities, including fuel pool cleanouts and
refueling outages. Therefore, CEG asserts that the available windows to
complete the cask loading campaigns are limited, and any delays would
have a cascading impact on other scheduled specialized activities.
[[Page 13506]]
For the reasons described by CEG in the exemption request, the NRC
staff agree that it is in the public interest to grant the exemption.
If the exemption is not granted, in order to comply with the CoC, CEG
would have to keep spent fuel in the spent fuel pool if it is not
permitted to use the HI-TRAC during loading and transport operations
for seven MPC-89 at the PB ISFSI for the loading campaign beginning in
June 2025, thus impacting PB's ability to effectively manage the FCDC
margin. Moreover, should spent fuel pool capacity be reached, the
ability to refuel the operating reactor unit is challenged, thus
potentially impacting continued reactor operations.
Therefore, the staff concludes that approving the exemption is in
the public interest.
Environmental Consideration
The NRC staff also considered whether there would be any
significant environmental impacts associated with the exemption. For
this proposed action, the NRC staff performed an environmental
assessment pursuant to 10 CFR 51.30. The environmental assessment
concluded that the proposed action would not significantly impact the
quality of the human environment. The NRC staff concluded that the
proposed action would not result in any changes in the types or amounts
of any radiological or non-radiological effluents that may be released
offsite, and there would be no significant increase in occupational or
public radiation exposure because of the proposed action. The
environmental assessment and the finding of no significant impact was
published on March 6, 2025 (90 FR 11440).
IV. Conclusion
Based on these considerations, the NRC has determined that,
pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, the exemption is authorized by law, will not
endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is
otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the NRC grants CEG an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212(a)(2), 72.212(b)(3),
72.212(b)(5)(i), 72.212(b)(11), and 72.214 solely with respect to the
planned loading and transport operations for seven MPC-89 at PB ISFSI
for the loading campaign beginning in June 2025.
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated: March 6, 2025.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
/RA/
Thomas Boyce,
Acting Chief, Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch, Division
of Fuel Management, Office of Nuclear Material Safety, and
Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2025-04921 Filed 3-21-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P