Meeting Procedures

The meeting will provide interested parties an opportunity to present views, recommendations, and comments on the proposed airspace.

(a) Registration: To attend the meeting, the public can register here: https://airportnetwork.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_v-ZwjHMtTc6DxRjewMawAg.

(b) The meeting will be open to all persons on a space-available basis. There will be no admission fee or other charge to attend and participate. The meeting will be informal in nature and will be conducted by one or more representatives of the FAA Eastern Service Area. A representative from the FAA will present a briefing on the planned airspace modifications.

(c) Each participant will be given an opportunity to deliver comments or make a presentation, although a time limit may be imposed to accommodate closing times. Only comments concerning the plan to amend the Palm Beach International Airport Class C airspace area will be accepted.

(d) Each person wishing to make a presentation will be asked to note their intent when registering for the meeting so those time frames can be established. This meeting will not be adjourned until everyone registered to speak has had an opportunity to address the panel. This meeting may be adjourned at any time if all persons present have had an opportunity to speak.

(e) Position papers or other handout material relating to the substance of the meeting will be accepted. Participants submitting papers or handout materials should send them to the mail or email address noted in the COMMENTS section, above.

(f) This meeting will be formally recorded and available on the FAA YouTube channel. A summary of the comments made at the meeting will be filed in the rulemaking docket.

Information gathered through this meeting will assist the FAA in drafting a NPRM that would be published in the Federal Register . The public will be afforded the opportunity to comment on any NPRM published on this matter.

A graphic depiction of the proposed airspace modifications may be viewed at the following URL: www.faa.gov/go/palmbeach.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g); 40103, 40113, 40120; E.O. 10854, 24 FR 9565, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 389.

The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, section 106 describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority. This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace. This regulation is within the scope of that authority as it amends the route structure to maintain the efficient flow of air traffic within the NAS.

The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, aeronautical, economic, environmental, and energy-related aspects of the proposal. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters should submit only one time if comments are filed electronically, or commenters should send only one copy of written comments if comments are filed in writing.

The FAA will file in the docket all comments it receives, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed after the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. The FAA may change this proposal in light of the comments it receives.

Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts these comments, without edit, including any personal information the commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at www.dot.gov/privacy.

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded through the internet at www.regulations.gov. Recently published rulemaking documents can also be accessed through the FAA's web page at www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/airspace_amendments/.

You may review the public docket containing the proposal, any comments received and any final disposition in person in the Dockets Operations office (see ADDRESSES section for address, phone number, and hours of operations). An informal docket may also be examined during normal business hours at the office of the Eastern Service Center, Federal Aviation Administration, Room 210, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College Park, GA, 30337.

United States Area Navigation Routes (Q-Routes) are published in paragraph 2006 of FAA Order JO 7400.11, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 on an annual basis. This document proposes to amend the current version of that order, FAA Order JO 7400.11J, dated July 31, 2024, and effective September 15, 2024. These updates would be published in the next update to FAA Order JO 7400.11. That order is publicly available as listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document.

FAA Order JO 7400.11J lists Class A, B, C, D, and E airspace areas, air traffic service routes, and reporting points.

The FAA is proposing an amendment to 14 CFR part 71 to establish RNAV Route Q-161 and amend RNAV Routes Q-97, Q-133, Q-437, Q-439, Q-445, and Q-481 in the eastern United States This action supports the NEC ACR Optimization Project to improve the efficiency of the NAS. The proposed route changes are described below.

Additionally, the FAA identified that the route descriptions of RNAV Routes Q-133 and Q-437 list the KALDA, VA; VILLS, NJ; and LLUND, NY route points as Fixes, in error. These route points were modified on June 20, 2023, from a Fix to become a waypoint (WP). The KALDA, VILLS, and LLUND route points are identified as a WP in the National Airspace System Resource (NASR) database and charted as a WP accordingly. This proposal would correct these errors and refer to the KALDA, VILLS, and LLUND route points as a WP.

In place of a two-letter state abbreviation for multiple listed route points in route descriptions the “OA” means “Offshore Atlantic”.

Q-97: Q-97 currently extends between the TOVAR, FL, WP and the Presque Isle, ME (PQI), Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/Distance Measuring Equipment (VOR/DME). The FAA proposes to remove the BYSEL, MD, WP from the route description as it is a turn of less than one degree. Additionally, the FAA proposes to add six route points between the ZJAAY, MD, WP and the Calverton, NY (CCC), VOR/DME. The route points that would be added are the PAJET, DE, WP; CAANO, DE, WP; TBONN, OA, WP; ZIZZI, NJ, WP; YAZUU, NJ, WP; and HEADI, NJ, WP. The proposed route modification would move RNAV Route Q-97 to the east to eliminate traffic conflicts between aircraft flying southbound on RNAV Route Q-97 and aircraft flying northbound on RNAV Route Q-439 descending into the New York and Connecticut areas. As amended, the route would continue to extend between the TOVAR WP and the Presque Isle VOR/DME.

Q-133: Q-133 currently extends between the CHIEZ, NC, WP and the PONCT, NY, WP. The FAA proposes to remove the airway segments between the CHIEZ WP and the CONFR, MD, WP and replace it with the airway segment between the JAMIE, VA, Fix and the CONFR WP. The route segment between the CHIEZ WP and the KALDA, VA, WP is still needed for navigation, and this action proposes to continue to provide this RNAV connectivity to the KALDA WP as new RNAV Route Q-161 proposed in this action. Additionally, the FAA proposes to remove the airway segment between the Kennedy, NY (JFK) VOR/DME and the PONCT WP and replace it with the airway segments between the Kennedy VOR/DME and the PBERG, NY, WP. These proposed changes improve the connectivity of multiple airports along the east coast of the United States to the Montreal-Trudeau Airport, Canada, where the preferred arrival route is over the PBERG WP. As amended, the route would be changed to extend between the JAMIE Fix and the PBERG WP.

Q-161: Q-161 is a new RNAV route proposed to extend between the CHIEZ, NC, WP and the KALDA, VA, WP. This new proposed RNAV route overlays a portion of RNAV Route Q-133, proposed to be amended in this action, but would provide additional efficiency by becoming its own distinct route. The new proposed route would continue to provide RNAV connectivity between the CHIEZ WP and the KALDA WP.

Q-437: Q-437 currently extends between the VILLS, NJ, WP and the LLUND, NY, WP. The FAA proposes to remove the airway segments between the VILLS WP and the LLUND WP and replace it with the airway segments between the CRPLR, VA, WP and the PONCT, NY, WP due to high traffic density over the New York City area. These proposed changes would move aircraft from being directly over New York City to an area west of Newark, NJ. Additionally, the proposed would expand RNAV connectivity further to the south to Norfolk, VA area, and further to the north to the Albany, NY area. As amended, the route would be changed to extend between the CRPLR WP and the PONCT WP.

Q-439: Q-439 currently extends between the HOWYU, DE, WP and the Presque Isle, ME (PQI), VOR/DME. The FAA proposes to remove the airway segments between the HOWYU WP and the MANTA, NJ, Fix and replace it with the airway segments between the KALDA, VA, WP and the MANTA Fix due to a need to separate aircraft arriving to the John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY from aircraft arriving to other airports in the New York City area. As amended, the route would be changed to extend between the KALDA WP and the Presque Isle VOR/DME.

Q-445: Q-445 currently extends between the SHAUP, OA, WP and the KYSKY, NY, WP. The FAA proposes to extend RNAV Route Q-445 to the south between the KALDA, VA, WP and the SHAUP WP. The proposed route extension would provide RNAV connectivity from the KALDA WP to the eastern Massachusetts area. As amended, the route would be changed to extend between the KALDA WP and the KYSKY WP.

Q-481: Q-481 currently extends between the CONFR, MD, WP and the Deer Park, NY (DPK), VOR/DME. The FAA proposes to extend RNAV Route Q-481 to the south between the JAMIE, VA, WP and the CONFR WP; and remove the LEEAH, NJ, Fix from the route and replace it with the SOSBY, OA, WP and the ECOIL, OA, WP. These proposed route modifications are necessary to ensure adequate separation with other parallel RNAV routes in the Atlantic City, NJ area. As amended, the route would be changed to extend between the JAMIE WP and the Deer Park VOR/DME.

The FAA has determined that this proposed regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. It, therefore: (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that will only affect air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this proposed rule, when promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

This proposal will be subject to an environmental analysis in accordance with FAA Order 1050.1F, “Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures” prior to any FAA final regulatory action.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

Please note that all comments received in response to this docket are considered part of the public record. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) will make comments available for public inspection online at https://www.regulations.gov. Such information includes personal or business identifying information (such as name, address, State or Federal identifiers, etc.) voluntarily submitted by the commenter. Generally, all information voluntarily submitted by the commenter, unless clearly marked as Confidential Information in the method described below, will be publicly posted. Comments may be submitted anonymously. The Freedom of Information Act applies to all comments received.

Commenters submitting comments which include personal identifying information (PII), confidential, or proprietary business information that the commenter does not want made publicly available should submit two copies of the comment. One copy must be marked “CONTAINS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION” and should clearly identify all PII or business information the commenter does not want to be made publicly available, including any supplemental materials. DEA will review this copy, including the claimed PII and confidential business information, in its consideration of comments. The second copy should be marked “TO BE PUBLICLY POSTED” and must have all claimed PII and business information already redacted. DEA will post only the redacted comment on https://www.regulations.gov for public inspection.

For easy reference, an electronic copy of this document and a plain language summary of this advanced notice of proposed rulemaking are available at https://www.regulations.gov.

The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) authorizes the Attorney General to specify, by regulation, chemicals as list I chemicals. 1 The Attorney General has delegated his authority to designate list I chemicals to the Administrator of DEA (Administrator). 2 A “list I chemical” is a chemical that is used in manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of the CSA and is important to the manufacture of the controlled substances. 3 The current list of all listed chemicals is published at 21 CFR 1310.02. DEA regulations set forth the process by which DEA may add a chemical as a listed chemical. As set forth in 21 CFR 1310.02(c), the agency may do so by publishing a final rule in the Federal Register following a published notice of proposed rulemaking with at least 30 days for public comments.

The clandestine manufacture of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances remains extremely concerning as the distribution of illicit fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances continues to drive drug-related overdose deaths in the United States. Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid and was first synthesized in Belgium in the late 1950s. Fentanyl was introduced into medical practice and is approved for medical practitioners in the United States to prescribe lawfully for anesthesia and analgesia. Yet, due to its pharmacological effects, fentanyl can be used as a substitute for heroin, oxycodone, and other opioids in opioid dependent individuals. Therefore, despite its accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, DEA controls fentanyl as a schedule II controlled substance due to its high potential for abuse and dependence. 4

Moreover, there are a substantial number of fentanyl analogues  5 and fentanyl-related substances  6 that are being distributed on the illicit drug market despite DEA's recent actions adding them as scheduled controlled substances. 7 Illicit manufacturers of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances attempt to utilize unregulated precursor chemicals to evade law enforcement detection and precursor chemical controls in order to keep manufacturing these substances. This strategy allows for the synthesis of a variety of fentanyl analogues and fentanyl-related substances by making slight modifications to the core fentanyl structure while maintaining the same synthetic methodology used to synthesize fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances.

The unlawful trafficking of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances in the United States continues to pose an imminent hazard to public safety. Since 2012, fentanyl has shown a dramatic increase in the illicit drug supply as a single substance, in mixtures with other illicit drugs ( i.e., heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine), and in forms that mimic pharmaceutical preparations including prescription opiates and benzodiazepines. 8

DEA has noted a significant increase in overdoses and overdose fatalities from fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances in the United States in recent years. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), opioids, mainly synthetic opioids (which includes fentanyl), are predominantly responsible for drug overdose deaths in recent years. According to CDC WONDER, 9 drug-induced overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids (excluding methadone) in the United States increased from 36,359 in 2019, to 56,516 in 2020, and to 70,601 in 2021. Based on provisional data, the predicted number of drug overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids (excluding methadone) in the United States for the 12 months ending March 2023 is 76,472 individuals, or approximately 69.2 percent of all drug-induced overdose deaths for that time period. 10 The increase in overdose fatalities involving synthetic opioids coincides with a dramatic increase in law enforcement encounters of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances. According to the National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS-Drug), 11 reports from forensic laboratories of drug items containing fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances increased dramatically since 2014, as shown in Table 1.

Fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances are not naturally occurring substances. As such, the manufacture of these substances requires them to be produced through synthetic organic chemistry. Synthetic organic chemistry is the process in which a new organic molecule is created through a series of chemical reactions, which involve precursor chemicals. Through chemical reactions, the chemical structures of precursor chemicals are modified in a desired fashion. These chemical reaction sequences, also known as synthetic pathways, are designed to create a desired substance. Several synthetic pathways to fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances have been identified in clandestine laboratory settings; these include the original “Janssen method,” the “Siegfried method,” and the “Gupta method.” In response to the illicit manufacture of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances using these methods, DEA controlled N -phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP), 12 N -(1-benzylpiperidin-4-yl)- N -phenylpropionamide (benzylfentanyl), N -phenylpiperidin-4-amine (4-anilinopiperidine; including its amides and carbamates), 13 and 4-piperidone (piperidin-4-one)  14 as list I chemicals, and 4-anilino- N -phenethylpiperidine (ANPP)  15 and N -phenyl- N -(piperidin-4-yl)propionamide (norfentanyl)  16 as schedule II immediate precursors under the CSA.

In 2017, the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs placed NPP and ANPP in Table I of the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (1988 Convention) in response to the international reintroduction of fentanyl on the illicit drug market. As such, member states of the United Nations are required to regulate these precursor chemicals at the national level. Importantly, the People's Republic of China regulated NPP and ANPP on February 1, 2018. 17 Subsequently, in 2022, the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs placed norfentanyl, 1-boc-4-anilinopiperidine, and 4-anilinopiperidine in Table I of the 1988 Convention in response to the international reintroduction of fentanyl on the illicit drug market and the introduction of new precursors used in the illicit manufacture of fentanyl.

The original published synthetic pathway to fentanyl, known as the Janssen method, involves the list I chemical benzylfentanyl  18 and schedule II immediate precursor norfentanyl. 19 In this synthetic pathway, benzylfentanyl, a list I chemical under the CSA, is then converted to norfentanyl, the schedule II immediate precursor in this synthetic pathway. Norfentanyl is reacted with phenethyl bromide (also known as 2-bromoethyl benzene) to complete the synthesis of fentanyl. This synthetic pathway can also be easily modified to produce fentanyl analogues and fentanyl-related substances.

Phenethyl bromide also serves as a precursor chemical in the Siegfried method. In this synthetic pathway, phenethyl bromide is reacted with 4-piperidone, a list I chemical under the CSA, to produce NPP, another list I chemical, which is further converted to ANPP, 20 the schedule II immediate precursor in the Siegfried method. One additional step completes the synthesis of fentanyl. This synthetic pathway can also be easily modified to produce fentanyl analogues and fentanyl-related substances.

In addition to the Janssen and Siegfried methods, clandestine manufacturers are using other methods to synthesize fentanyl, one of which is known as the Gupta method. In this synthetic pathway, 4-piperidone, a list I chemical under the CSA, is used to synthesize 4-anilinopiperidine, another list I chemical under the CSA, 21 which serves as an alternative precursor chemical to NPP, a list I chemical, in the synthesis of ANPP, a schedule II immediate precursor, albeit through a different synthetic process. 4-Anilinopiperidine is reacted with phenethyl bromide to produce ANPP, which is then converted to the schedule II controlled substance, fentanyl. This synthetic pathway can also be easily modified to produce fentanyl analogues and fentanyl-related substances.

Phenethyl bromide is attractive to illicit manufacturers due to the lack of regulations on this chemical; it is readily available from chemical suppliers. Additionally, related phenethyl halides ( i.e., phenethyl chloride, phenethyl iodide, etc.) and phenethyl sulfonates ( i.e., phenethyl tosylate, phenethyl mesylate, etc.) can be used as substitutes for phenethyl bromide in many of the known synthetic pathways. These pathways can be easily used, and modified, in the illicit manufacture of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and fentanyl-related substances.

With this advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, DEA is soliciting information on any possible legitimate uses of phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates, unrelated to fentanyl production (including industrial uses) in order to assess the potential economic impact of controlling phenethyl bromide as a list I chemical. DEA seeks to document any unpublicized use(s) and other proprietary use(s) of phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates, that are not in the public domain. Therefore, DEA is soliciting comment on the uses of phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates, in the legitimate marketplace.

DEA is soliciting input from all potentially affected parties regarding: (1) the types of legitimate industries using phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates; (2) the legitimate uses, legitimate needs, and quantities produced, used, and distributed of phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates; (3) the size of the domestic market for phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates, if any; (4) the number of manufacturers of phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates; (5) the number of distributors of phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates; (6) the level of import and export of phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates; (7) the potential burden that controlling phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates, as a list I chemical may have on any legitimate industry and trade; (8) the potential number of individuals/firms that may be adversely affected by such regulatory controls (particularly with respect to the impact on small businesses); and (9) any other information on the manner of manufacturing, distribution, consumption, storage, disposal, and uses of phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates, by industry and others. DEA invites all interested parties to provide any information on any legitimate uses of phenethyl bromide, and related halides and sulfonates, in industry, commerce, academia, research and development, or other applications. DEA seeks both quantitative and qualitative data.

Such information may be submitted electronically to the address listed above and is requested by November 27, 2024. This information will be used to properly determine the effect that proposed regulations to make phenethyl bromide a list I chemical under the CSA would have on industry.

Confidential or proprietary information may be submitted as part of a comment regarding this advanced notice of proposed rulemaking. Please see the “POSTING OF PUBLIC COMMENTS” section above for a discussion of the identification and redaction of confidential business information and personally identifying information.

This ANPRM was developed in accordance with the principles of Executive Order (E.O.) 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” E.O. 13563, “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,” and E.O. 14094, “Modernizing Regulatory Review.” Because this action is an ANPRM, the requirement of E.O. 12866 to assess the costs and benefits of this action does not apply.

Furthermore, the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act do not apply to this action because, at this stage, it is an ANPRM and not a “rule” as defined in 5 U.S.C. 601. Following review of the comments received in response to this ANPRM, if DEA proceeds with a notice of proposed rulemaking regarding this matter, DEA will conduct all relevant analyses as required by statute or E.O.

This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on October 10, 2024, by Administrator Anne Milgram. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the Federal Register .

Section 20157 of title 49 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) mandates each Class I railroad, and each entity providing regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation, to implement an FRA-certified PTC system on: (1) its main lines over which poison- or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials are transported, if the line carries five million or more gross tons of any annual traffic; (2) its main lines over which intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation is regularly provided; and (3) any other tracks the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) prescribes by regulation or order. 1 By law, PTC systems must be designed to prevent certain accidents or incidents, including train-to-train collisions, over-speed derailments, incursions into established work zones, and movements of trains through switches left in the wrong position. 2

Currently, 37 host railroads  3 —including 7 Class I railroads, 4 24 entities that provide regularly scheduled intercity or commuter rail passenger transportation (hereinafter referred to as “intercity passenger railroads or commuter railroads,” respectively), and 6 Class II or III, short line, or terminal railroads—are directly subject to the statutory mandate. On December 29, 2020, FRA announced that railroads had fully implemented FRA-certified and interoperable PTC systems on all PTC-mandated main lines. 5 49 U.S.C. 20157(a); 49 CFR 236.1005(b)(7).

Today, PTC technology is governing rail operations on nearly 59,000 route miles. Based on FRA's oversight of PTC technology since FRA last amended its PTC regulations in 2021, FRA identified three aspects of its existing PTC regulations that warrant revision to address ongoing challenges. Overall, the proposed amendments would benefit the railroad industry, the public, and FRA by facilitating repairs, maintenance, upgrades, and capital improvements; expanding certain railroad informational requirements; reducing costs; and enabling the safe, reliable, and resilient movement of people and goods, while preserving rail safety.

This NPRM proposes to establish strict parameters and operating restrictions under which railroads may continue to operate safely in three specific scenarios when PTC technology is temporarily not governing rail operations:

1. When non-revenue passenger equipment needs to operate to a maintenance facility or yard, for the sole purpose of repairing or exchanging PTC technology;

2. When a PTC system needs to be temporarily disabled to facilitate repair, maintenance, an infrastructure upgrade, or a capital project; and

3. When a system-level or widescale problem occurs resulting in multiple trains' PTC systems failing to initialize.

FRA's objective in this rulemaking is to establish clear, uniform processes, rather than addressing issues that arise in a reactive and piecemeal manner. FRA expects that establishing predictable, prescriptive processes will both enable continued operations and improve railroad safety by facilitating prompt repairs, upgrades, and restoration of PTC system service and eliminating uncertainty and inconsistent application of FRA's regulations. FRA's proposed parameters and operating restrictions in this NPRM are intended to be sufficiently strict to ensure that railroads and PTC system suppliers and vendors proactively identify and remedy problems before they arise and immediately correct any problems that may surface despite proactive measures.

First, FRA is proposing to establish an exception, under 49 CFR 236.1006(b)(6), to permit, under certain conditions, non-revenue passenger equipment to operate to maintenance facilities or yards, without being governed by PTC technology. This NPRM proposes to extend the exception currently afforded to certain freight movements to movements of non-revenue passenger equipment, including equipment that is owned or controlled by an intercity passenger railroad or commuter railroad.

This proposed exception would enable non-revenue passenger equipment, including a locomotive, locomotive consist, or train without passengers onboard, to operate to a maintenance facility or yard for the sole purpose of repairing or exchanging  6 a PTC system or component. Commuter railroads have informed FRA this proposed exception would be beneficial and necessary, as it would enable them, for example, to operate a PTC-equipped locomotive, where the onboard PTC technology is not functioning and requires repair, to a maintenance facility or yard to repair or exchange the PTC system. To ensure rail safety, FRA is proposing to impose six conditions on each movement of non-revenue passenger equipment subject to this exception, including speed and distance restrictions, the requirement to establish an absolute block (meaning no other traffic may be present in the area), and other protections of the route.

Second, FRA proposes to improve the existing process, under 49 CFR 236.1021(m), that railroads currently utilize to request and obtain FRA's approval to disable their PTC systems temporarily when necessary to facilitate repair, maintenance, infrastructure upgrades, and capital projects. This NPRM proposes to add paragraph (m)(4) to existing § 236.1021 to focus on this specific type of request for amendment (RFA) to PTC systems ( i.e., where a temporary PTC system outage is proposed), as it is different from the other types of RFAs that railroads submit under § 236.1021 and requires additional FRA oversight.

FRA proposes to require railroads to provide additional, essential information in an RFA that seeks to temporarily disable a PTC system to enable FRA to evaluate more fully the scope, circumstances, and necessity of a proposed temporary outage and properly determine whether granting the request is in the public interest and consistent with railroad safety. For example, this NPRM proposes to impose nine additional content requirements for this specific type of RFA, including certain justifications, safety analyses, mitigations, and other documentation to demonstrate the proposed outage is as narrow in scope, impact, and duration, as possible.

Third, FRA proposes to reintroduce as a permanent provision a version of a temporary provision regarding PTC system initialization failures, which expired on December 31, 2022. 7 The expired regulatory provision previously permitted any train, including an individual train, to keep operating subject to certain restrictions, if the train failed to initialize for any reason prior to the train's departure from its initial terminal. In FRA's 2014 final rule, FRA authorized this provision temporarily, recognizing that “there may be issues that could be identified and resolved in the early days following PTC system implementation and revenue service operation.”  8 In 2014, FRA also observed that “[e]xperience over these intervening years will provide more empirical data on PTC system reliability, and may be a basis for FRA to revisit this issue at a later date should circumstances warrant.”  9

FRA's intention in this NPRM, by proposing to reintroduce an updated version of this provision, is to address only system-level outages or failures that result in multiple trains' PTC systems failing to initialize, impacting the trains of the host railroad and often most, if not all, of its tenant railroads. Currently, if a PTC system fails to initialize, trains are generally prohibited from operating, which has resulted in situations where passengers could be stranded, and vital freight shipments halted.

Although PTC technology is generally reliable and robust, it is a complex technology, composed of many subsystems and dependent on external networks, and it continues to experience unplanned outages. For example, railroads' Quarterly Reports of PTC System Performance  10 show that PTC technology failed to initialize on approximately 236 intercity passenger or commuter trains and 894 freight trains in 2023. 11 Additionally, based on voluntary reporting by railroads, FRA is aware of eight (8) system-level outages that occurred in 2023 that caused multiple trains to fail to initialize.

FRA is proposing to impose two tiers of operating restrictions that would become increasingly restrictive as time passes, to ensure both that railroads utilize any operating flexibility only when necessary and that railroads and their vendors and suppliers identify and resolve issues promptly. FRA expects this will help strike the appropriate balance between enabling continued operations subject to speed restrictions, pending resolution of a PTC failure, and restoring PTC systems as quickly as possible. In short, if a PTC system fails to initialize, impacting multiple trains, FRA proposes to permit railroads to continue operating for 24 hours, subject to the operating restrictions, including speed limits, that previously applied to initialization failures and that currently apply to en route failures. 12 After the first 24 hours, FRA proposes to impose a significant speed limit of restricted speed, among other restrictions, both to help ensure rail safety and to propel the industry to act quickly to restore PTC system service.

FRA analyzed the economic impact of this proposed rule over a 10-year period and estimated its benefits and costs, which are shown in the table below. The total estimated 10-year net benefits would be $81.8 million (discounted at 2 percent), and the annualized net benefits would be $9.1 million (discounted at 2 percent). The industry benefits associated with FRA's proposal to amend three provisions— i.e., to introduce a new exception for certain non-revenue passenger equipment movements, improve the RFA process regarding temporary PTC system outages, and permit continued operations following certain initialization failures, subject to operating restrictions—would outweigh the industry costs and government administrative costs associated with FRA's proposal to expand the content requirements for RFAs related to temporary outages.

Section 104(a) of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 required the Secretary to prescribe PTC regulations necessary to implement the statutory mandate, including regulations specifying the essential technical functionalities of PTC systems and how FRA certifies PTC systems. 13 The Secretary delegated to the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration the authority to carry out the functions and exercise the authority vested in the Secretary by the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008. 49 CFR 1.89(b).

In accordance with its authority under 49 U.S.C. 20157(g) and 49 CFR 1.89(b), FRA published its first final PTC rule on January 15, 2010, which is set forth, as amended, under 49 CFR part 236, subpart I. 14 FRA's PTC regulations under 49 CFR part 236, subpart I, prescribe “minimum, performance-based safety standards for PTC systems . . . including requirements to ensure that the development, functionality, architecture, installation, implementation, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and modification of those PTC systems will achieve and maintain an acceptable level of safety.” 49 CFR 236.1001(a). FRA subsequently amended its PTC regulations via final rules published in 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2021. 15

Most recently, on July 27, 2021, FRA amended its PTC regulations to improve the process by which railroads submit, and FRA reviews, RFAs to railroads' FRA-certified PTC systems and their associated PTC Safety Plans (PTCSPs), and to establish more robust reporting requirements to enable FRA to oversee the reliability and performance of railroads' PTC systems effectively. Also, in January 2023, FRA announced that it issued a guidance document addressing requirements related to the submission of requests for waivers, applications to modify or discontinue a signal system, and other special approval requests to FRA, and FRA underscored the importance of ensuring that railroads' filings contain sufficient, non-confidential information for the public to review and on which to comment. 16

In this proposed rule, FRA proposes to revise three sections, 49 CFR 236.1006, 236.1021, and 236.1029, of FRA's existing PTC regulations pursuant to its specific authority under 49 CFR 1.89 and 49 U.S.C. 20157(g), and its general authority under 49 U.S.C. 20103 to prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety.

FRA regularly engages with host railroads, tenant railroads, PTC system vendors and suppliers, industry associations, and labor organizations, as part of FRA's oversight of railroads' operation of PTC systems on the mandated main lines under 49 U.S.C. 20157 and the other lines where railroads are voluntarily implementing PTC technology. The purpose of this section is to summarize FRA's pertinent meetings prior to the issuance of this NPRM, pursuant to 49 CFR 5.5.

From November 2023 to February 2024, FRA met with the following four industry associations and their member railroads to discuss the objectives of this NPRM and solicit their feedback: the American Public Transportation Association (APTA), the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA), the Association of American Railroads (AAR), and the Commuter Rail Coalition (CRC).

Representatives from the following 35 Class I railroads, commuter and passenger railroads, and short line and regional railroads, listed alphabetically, attended one or more of the AAR, APTA, 17 ASLRRA, and CRC meetings referenced immediately above: Alaska Railroad; Altamont Corridor Express; BNSF Railway (BNSF); Canadian National Railway (CN); Canadian Pacific Kansas City Limited (CPKC); Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority (CMTY); Central Florida Rail Corridor (CFRC); CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX); Denton County Transportation Authority; Genesee & Wyoming Inc. (G&W); Long Island Rail Road (LIRR); Maryland Area Rail Commuter (MARC); Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA); Metro-North Railroad (Metro-North); National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak); New Jersey Transit (NJT); New Mexico Rail Runner Express; Norfolk Southern Railway (NS); North County Transit District (NCTD); Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra); Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District (NICD); Northstar Commuter Rail; Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (Caltrain); Regional Transportation District (Denver RTDC); Sonoma-Marin Area Rail Transit (SMART); Sound Transit; South Florida Regional Transportation Authority (SFRTA); Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA); Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink); TEXRail; Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon (TriMet); Trinity Railway Express (TRE); Union Pacific Railroad (UP); Utah Transit Authority (UTA FrontRunner); and Virginia Railway Express (VRE).

In addition, for the same purpose, FRA met with the following 10 labor organizations in February 2024: the American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA); the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, a Division of the Rail Conference of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (BLET); the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (BMWED); the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS); the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen Division, Transportation Communications International Union (BRC); the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM); the International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers—Transportation Division (SMART-TD); the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW); the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU); and the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO (TTD).

In general, the four industry associations and 35 railroads strongly supported the three objectives of this NPRM. The labor organizations FRA met with supported FRA's objective of enabling operations while maintaining rail safety, but they expressed concern that regulatory flexibility might have the unintended consequence of degrading safety or delaying repairs to PTC technology. Accordingly, with all feedback in mind, FRA drafted its proposed requirements and restrictions in 49 CFR 236.1006(b)(6), 236.1021(m)(4), and 236.1029(g) to prioritize rail safety, address limited circumstances for facilitating repairs, maintenance, and infrastructure upgrades, and enable the safe, reliable, and resilient movement of passengers, commuters, and freight.

As the detailed feedback the associations, railroads, and labor organizations provided during the meetings was directed at a specific proposal in this NPRM, FRA discusses the feedback in the appropriate portions of Section III ( Section-by-Section Analysis ) of this NPRM.

The proposals in this NPRM are based on FRA's own review and analysis and, in part, on the feedback provided during the meetings in 2023 and 2024, specified above. FRA seeks comments on all proposals made in this NPRM.

Existing paragraph (b) in § 236.1006 contains a list of exceptions to the general requirement under paragraph (a) that each locomotive, locomotive consist, or train that operates on any PTC-governed track segment “be controlled by a locomotive equipped with an onboard PTC apparatus that is fully operative and functioning in accordance with the applicable PTCSP approved under this subpart.” 49 CFR 236.1006(a), (b)(1) through (5).

FRA proposes to add a new exception, under proposed paragraph (b)(6), to permit non-revenue passenger equipment to operate to maintenance facilities or yards, without being governed by PTC technology, under certain conditions. Currently, a similar exception is available only to freight railroads under existing paragraph (b)(5) of this section. The purpose of new proposed paragraph (b)(6) is to extend that type of exception to movements of certain non-revenue passenger equipment, which would include equipment owned or controlled by an intercity passenger railroad or commuter railroad.

The sole purpose of new proposed paragraph (b)(6) is to enable non-revenue passenger equipment, including a locomotive, locomotive consist, or train, to operate to a maintenance facility or yard for the purpose of repairing or exchanging a PTC system. During FRA's APTA and CRC meetings in February 2024, several commuter railroads, including CMTY, MARC, Metro-North, NICD, and NJT, commented that this proposed exception would be beneficial and necessary, as it would enable them, for example, to operate a PTC-equipped locomotive, where the onboard PTC technology is not functioning and requires repair, to a maintenance facility or yard to repair or exchange the PTC system or component. Without this proposed provision, intercity passenger railroads and commuter railroads would need to utilize rescue trains or, in other words, use an operative, PTC-equipped locomotive, locomotive consist, or train to move the non-operative, PTC-equipped equipment to a maintenance facility or yard. This proposed provision will enable a railroad to repair the equipment more efficiently, thus helping improve rail safety.

During FRA's meetings in February 2024, commuter railroads cited often experiencing issues with transporting equipment requiring repair to their maintenance facilities, including unavailability of equipment and cascading schedule delays, and they supported this proposed exception, even though it would potentially constrain some operations. For example, the introductory text of proposed paragraph (b)(6) makes it clear that this proposed exception would apply only to non-revenue movements, meaning no intercity passenger or commuter rail service could be provided while moving this equipment not governed by a PTC system.

Proposed paragraphs (b)(6)(i) through (v) and (vii) outline the six additional conditions FRA proposes an intercity passenger railroad or commuter railroad must satisfy while utilizing this proposed exception. First, proposed paragraph (b)(6)(i) would limit the speed of the locomotive, locomotive consist, or train to a maximum of 49 miles per hour (mph), which is significantly slower than the normal maximum authorized speed for passenger equipment, which generally ranges between 79 mph and 150 mph.

Second, proposed paragraph (b)(6)(ii) would require an absolute block  18 to be established in front of the locomotive, locomotive consist, or train. This would help ensure safety by essentially eliminating the possibility of a train-to-train collision. During FRA's February 2024 meetings, CMTY, SMART, and UTA FrontRunner commented that they currently use absolute blocks in similar circumstances and supported the proposal of this condition.

Third, proposed paragraph (b)(6)(iii) specifies that there cannot be any working limits established under part 214 of this chapter on any part of the route. FRA proposes to eliminate the risk of an incursion into an established work zone by not permitting work zones or any roadway workers at all on the route the non-revenue passenger equipment uses to reach the maintenance facility or yard to repair or exchange its PTC technology. To be clear, roadway workers may not perform any work on the route where the non-revenue passenger equipment operates subject to this proposed exception, until after the equipment arrives at its destination, the maintenance facility or yard.

Fourth, proposed paragraph (b)(6)(iv) specifies that the locomotive, locomotive consist, or train could operate in non-revenue service no farther than the next forward location designated in the railroad's PTCSP for the repair or exchange  19 of PTC technology. During FRA's meeting with labor organizations in February 2024, BLET and BRS commented that they were concerned a railroad might utilize this proposed exception to avoid repairing the PTC system or to delay repairing the PTC system by operating the equipment to a more distant repair location than available.

Relatedly, during a meeting in February 2024, NICD observed that the structure of commuter rail operations would inherently prevent railroads from overusing any exception or provision that involves speed restrictions because of the negative impact that has on their operations. For example, even a single train operating at a slower speed can create scheduling issues and cascading delays for commuter trains. In addition, FRA expects that its proposed conditions, including the imposition of a speed restriction, the prohibition against work zones, and an absolute block requirement, would prevent overuse of this exception. Also, FRA crafted proposed paragraph (b)(6)(iv) with BLET and BRS's comments in mind, and this proposed condition would explicitly prohibit the non-revenue passenger equipment from operating farther than the next forward designated location in the railroad's FRA-approved PTCSP.

Fifth, similar to a condition in the existing freight version of this exception in paragraph (b)(5) of this section, proposed (b)(6)(v) would require the railroad to protect the route against conflicting operations and establish and comply with sufficient operating rules to protect against a train-to-train collision and the movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong or improper position. This condition would further reduce the possibility of a train-to-train collision as it would address traffic on intersecting tracks. Furthermore, to protect against the movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong or improper position, a railroad's operating rules could, for example, explain that the railroad utilizes a system or technology capable of monitoring switches. If a railroad does not have such a system or technology, a switch's position must be manually verified before any movement over the switch points. To accomplish this, a switch tender must check the switch, or the train crew must stop and then confirm the switch position before operating over the switch.

During an FRA meeting in February 2024, SFRTA inquired whether FRA intends to limit the distance of the movement of non-revenue passenger equipment in this proposed exception, as it does in the freight railroad exception in existing paragraph (b)(5). FRA notes that the purpose of the two exceptions is different: the purpose of the freight exception in paragraph (b)(5) is to facilitate freight switching and freight transfer train service, including in revenue service, in or near yards, whereas the purpose of the proposed paragraph (b)(6) exception would be to enable non-revenue passenger equipment to reach maintenance facilities or yards, without being governed by PTC technology, for the specific purpose of repairing or exchanging a PTC system. The commuter railroad SMART commented that it would not be possible to identify a specific distance that applies to all cases because the distance to each intercity passenger or commuter railroad's maintenance facilities and yards, based on the starting point, is unique. FRA agrees, as the applicable distance varies greatly based on case-by-case circumstances. Accordingly, rather than imposing an exact distance limit, FRA expects that the five conditions in proposed paragraphs (b)(6)(i) through (v) would sufficiently define the scope of this exception.

Proposed paragraph (b)(6)(vi) provides that FRA may, in its discretion, approve alternative criteria and conditions, in a PTCSP or an RFA to a PTCSP, if the railroad demonstrates that the alternative criteria and conditions would provide an equivalent or greater level of safety than the default criteria and conditions. FRA is proposing to add this paragraph to mirror that discretionary element of the freight yard movements exception in existing paragraph (b)(5)(vii). Proposed paragraph (b)(6)(vi) provides the opportunity for railroads to propose alternative applications of this exception to FRA for review and approval. An intercity passenger railroad or commuter railroad must obtain FRA's approval only if it seeks to use alternative exception criteria or conditions under proposed paragraph (b)(6)(vi), whereas the standard exception for non-revenue passenger equipment movements would be immediately available for use for any movement that meets all default criteria and conditions in proposed paragraphs (b)(6)(i) through (v). 20

Finally, proposed paragraph (b)(6)(vii) imposes a notification requirement that a railroad must satisfy before moving non-revenue passenger equipment pursuant to this exception. Specifically, this paragraph proposes that before utilizing the default exception under paragraphs (b)(6)(i) through (v) or the discretionary exception under paragraph (b)(6)(vi), the railroad must notify each person involved with the movement of the non-revenue passenger equipment, including any dispatchers and train crews, in addition to any roadway workers who may no longer work on that segment during the movement subject to this exception.

On December 31, 2022, the regulatory provision under 49 CFR 236.1029(g)(3) expired, which previously permitted a railroad to temporarily disable its PTC system when necessary to perform PTC system repair or maintenance, after notifying an FRA regional office. As § 236.1029(g)(3) has expired, a simple notification to FRA no longer suffices, and a railroad must obtain FRA's approval through an RFA pursuant to 49 CFR 236.1021(m) before a railroad temporarily disables its PTC system and continues rail operations.

The purpose of existing § 236.1021, in relevant part, is to prohibit a railroad from making certain changes to its PTC system or disabling or discontinuing its PTC system, unless the railroad first submits an RFA to its PTC system with certain information and obtains FRA's approval.

This NPRM proposes to add a new paragraph (m)(4) to § 236.1021 to clarify that the RFA process under existing paragraph (m) applies to a case where a railroad seeks to temporarily disable its PTC system, and to continue operations during that time, to facilitate repair, maintenance, infrastructure upgrades, or capital projects. During FRA's meetings with AAR, APTA, ASLRRA, CRC, and their member railroads in November 2023 and February 2024 to discuss this NPRM, these four associations and several railroads, including all Class I railroads, Alaska Railroad, Amtrak, G&W, Metra, Metro-North, Metrolink, and SFRTA, expressed general support for FRA's proposal to revise existing paragraph (m) to acknowledge explicitly that it covers RFAs to PTC systems involving temporary outages.

Specifically, proposed paragraph (m)(4) clarifies that a host railroad must utilize the RFA process under paragraph (m) to request and obtain FRA's approval of a temporary PTC system outage, during which train movements may continue, including a short-term outage related to repair, maintenance, an infrastructure upgrade, or a capital project. 21 To provide non-exhaustive examples of what a temporary PTC system outage includes, proposed paragraph (m)(4) clarifies that the term includes, but is not limited to, any scenario when the onboard PTC apparatus or subsystem, wayside subsystem, communications subsystem, or back office subsystem would be disabled. FRA interprets the term “disabled” broadly and acknowledges the industry also uses the verb “disengage” interchangeably in this context.

Consistent with the current process under existing paragraph (m), proposed paragraph (m)(4)(i) provides that a railroad may temporarily disable PTC technology pursuant to this paragraph only after it obtains approval from the Director of FRA's Office of Railroad Systems and Technology.

Based on FRA's experience reviewing RFAs involving temporary outages throughout 2023 and 2024 to date, FRA found that the current content requirements for RFAs to PTC systems under existing paragraph (m)(2) do not yield sufficient information for FRA to assess the full scope and circumstances of each proposed temporary outage. Accordingly, proposed paragraphs (m)(4)(ii)(A) through (I) identify nine additional content elements this type of RFA must include, in addition to the standard content requirements under paragraph (m)(2), which apply to a broader cross-section of RFAs to PTC systems and PTCSPs.

Proposed paragraph (m)(4)(ii)(A) would require this specific type of RFA to describe the necessity for the proposed temporary outage. For example, in 2023 and 2024, railroads have filed RFAs seeking to temporarily disable a PTC system to facilitate the installation of automatic train control or a new interlocking, or to execute an upgrade of a computer-aided dispatch system, a back office server migration or replacement, or an electrical infrastructure upgrade. This section of the RFA would explain why temporarily disabling a PTC system is technically necessary to perform that type of repair, maintenance, infrastructure upgrade, or capital project.

Proposed paragraph (m)(4)(ii)(B) would require the RFA to describe the physical limits and PTC system functions that would be affected by the proposed temporary outage. This section of the RFA would require an analysis that demonstrates the affected physical limits and affected functions pose the least risk to railroad safety, compared to other options. To assess the RFA, FRA needs to understand the exact location(s) that will be impacted, including milepost limits and other descriptors. Identifying the precise PTC system functions that would be impacted is also essential for FRA to understand the scope of the temporary outage, as an outage might impact only a narrow set of PTC system capabilities.

Proposed paragraph (m)(4)(ii)(C) would require the RFA to include an explanation about how the proposed temporary outage is in the public interest and consistent with railroad safety. Existing § 236.1021(f) requires FRA to determine whether granting a request is in the public interest and consistent with railroad safety, and it is important for an RFA to provide such information.

Proposed paragraph (m)(4)(ii)(D) would require the railroad to provide the proposed timeframe of the temporary outage and an analysis that demonstrates the proposed period poses the least risk to railroad safety, compared to other times. This proposal mirrors a similar requirement under former § 236.1029(g)(3)(ii), which expired in December 2022. FRA has seen railroads prudently identify the timeslot of a specific day of the week with the least traffic, which is what FRA expects this content requirement will help ensure in future RFAs.

As a note, FRA has also seen cases where a railroad avoids needing to submit and obtain FRA's approval of an RFA involving a temporary outage, as the railroad either ceases all operations until it finishes the relevant work, or the railroad selects a time when no trains will operate. FRA commends railroads for structuring their projects that way and expects railroads to submit an RFA, seeking to disable its PTC system temporarily with continued rail service, under proposed paragraph (m)(4) only when ceasing operations would not be feasible.

Relatedly, proposed paragraph (m)(4)(ii)(E) would require the RFA to include both a justification and an analysis that show how the proposed duration of the temporary outage is the minimum time necessary to complete the pertinent work, test the PTC system, and place the PTC system back into service without undue delay. FRA highlights that proposed paragraph (m)(4) is intended to address short-term outages only, and FRA will deny an RFA that seeks to disable a PTC system for an unreasonable, extensive period. In general, PTC-mandated main lines must be governed by PTC technology, given the presence of intercity passenger rail, commuter rail, or certain freight transportation. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 20157(a); 49 CFR 236.1005(b), 236.1006(a). Railroads must show how the length of the proposed temporary outage is the minimum amount of time needed based on the circumstances, which could include outlining a precise schedule and the number of hours involved in each phase and justifications for each timeframe.

Proposed paragraph (m)(4)(ii)(F) would require the RFA to outline the type and frequency of rail operations that would continue during the proposed temporary outage, including those of the host railroad and each tenant railroad.

Proposed paragraph (m)(4)(ii)(G) would require the RFA to identify the applicable speed limit of any train that would operate during the proposed temporary outage, and any other operating restrictions in place to ensure rail safety. For example, a properly drafted RFA will outline the railroad's proposed reduced speed for each type of freight train, based on the commodity transported, and each intercity passenger or commuter train, compared to the normal authorized speeds.

Proposed paragraph (m)(4)(ii)(H) would require the railroad to specify in its RFA the additional safety measures that the host railroad and each tenant railroad must comply with during the proposed temporary outage, to ensure each type of PTC-preventable accident or incident does not occur. Specifically, such safety measures must be designed to prevent a train-to-train collision, an over-speed derailment, an incursion into an established work zone, and a movement of a train through a switch left in the wrong position. It is integral that FRA understands exactly how the railroad will mitigate and eliminate the risk of each type of PTC-preventable accident and incident during the short-term PTC system outage. For example, a railroad might propose to utilize an absolute block to mitigate and eliminate the risk of a train-to-train collision, enforce speed limits through the use of other technology, suspend the establishment of work zones, and protect switches through other specific means.

Finally, proposed paragraph (m)(4)(ii)(I) would require the railroad to confirm in its RFA that each impacted railroad (including the host railroad and any applicable tenant railroads) will notify all applicable dispatchers, train crews, and roadway workers about the temporary PTC system outage (if FRA authorizes it), including the specific location and duration of the temporary outage, the additional safety measures with which the railroad must comply, and any actions the individual must take during the temporary outage. FRA expects that the proposed specific information an RFA must contain under proposed paragraphs (m)(4)(ii)(A) through (H) would aid the railroad in these notifications. The railroad may make these notifications in accordance with the railroad's operating rules and practices, which may require, for example, such information to be provided via track bulletins, dispatcher bulletins, or special instructions.

Also, FRA notes that its 45-day review-and-decision period under existing paragraph (m) begins when a railroad properly files a complete RFA with all information required under paragraph (m). To be clear, the 45-day clock will not begin on that initial filing date, if an RFA to a PTC system, involving a temporary outage, fails to include any of the contents explicitly required under existing paragraphs (m)(2)(i) through (iv) or the additional content requirements FRA is proposing in paragraphs (m)(4)(ii)(A) through (I). 22 Instead, consistent with the current § 236.1021(m) process, the 45-day clock begins on the date the railroad or railroads properly submit any remaining information required under existing paragraph (m)(2)(i) through (iv) and proposed paragraphs (m)(4)(ii)(A) through (I). FRA expects this will help ensure a railroad submits a complete RFA, with all required information, in its initial filing.

In addition, FRA acknowledges that it currently publishes a notice in the Federal Register when a railroad submits an RFA to its PTC system under existing § 236.1021(m) and invites public comment on the RFA. See 49 CFR 236.1021(e). During FRA's meeting with labor organizations in February 2024, TTD requested confirmation that FRA will not eliminate the opportunity for the public to comment on these RFAs. FRA confirmed during that meeting that RFAs submitted pursuant to proposed paragraph (m)(4), like all RFAs submitted pursuant to paragraph (m), will be announced in the Federal Register , and the public will be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on such RFAs. That notice and comment requirement under § 236.1021(e) is outside the scope of this NPRM and will remain part of FRA's regulations. As a reminder, FRA's December 2022 guidance document underscores the importance of ensuring that railroads' filings contain sufficient, non-confidential information for the public to review and on which to comment. 23

Currently, paragraphs (g)(1) through (3), entitled “Temporary exceptions,” of this section set forth expired regulations. Specifically, existing paragraph (g) indicates that paragraphs (g)(1) through (3) were in effect from October 21, 2014, through December 31, 2022. FRA proposes to replace existing paragraphs (g)(1) through (3) with new provisions that deal directly with initialization failures. FRA's existing regulations, at 49 CFR 236.1003, define “initialization failure” as “any instance when a PTC system fails to activate on a locomotive or train, unless the PTC system successfully activates during a subsequent attempt in the same location or before entering PTC-governed territory.”  24 In relevant part, now-expired paragraph (g)(2) previously permitted any train to continue operating subject to certain speed limits, potentially indefinitely, if a PTC system failed to initialize for any reason.

FRA recognizes that unplanned outages and other technical issues continue to occur, causing PTC systems to fail to initialize, based on FRA's oversight and railroads' Quarterly Reports of PTC System Performance. 25 Railroads' Quarterly Reports of PTC System Performance show, for example, that PTC technology failed to initialize on approximately 236 intercity passenger or commuter trains and 894 freight trains in 2023. 26 Additionally, FRA, based on voluntary reporting by railroads, is aware of eight (8) system-level outages that occurred in 2023 that caused trains to fail to initialize.

During FRA's meetings in November 2023 and February 2024, AAR, APTA, ASLRRA, CRC, and many railroads  27 conveyed strong support for FRA's proposal to reintroduce requirements analogous to the provision that expired in 2022. Consistent with FRA's own observations, AAR, APTA, ASLRRA, CRC, and their member railroads underscored the need for FRA to establish a process to enable railroads to continue operating safely, following certain initialization failures, because otherwise freight, intercity passenger, and commuter trains will be unable to depart from their initial terminals or other locations and provide necessary transportation.

Specifically, FRA's intention in this NPRM is to address only system-level outages or failures that result in multiple trains' PTC systems failing to initialize, like when a back office server goes down, impacting the trains of the host railroad and most, if not all, of its tenant railroads. Accordingly, FRA proposes to provide a caveat in proposed paragraph (g)(4), which would specify that the relief under paragraph (g)(1), discussed below, does not apply to a single train that experiences an onboard PTC system failure when attempting to initialize. The purpose of proposed paragraph (g) is to address issues affecting multiple trains.

During FRA's meeting with labor organizations in February 2024, BLET, BRS, and TTD acknowledged that FRA's objective in proposed paragraph (g) is to enable operations while maintaining rail safety, but they expressed concern for the potential unintended consequence of degrading safety or delaying repairs to PTC technology. FRA agrees that it is important to structure proposed paragraph (g) to ensure railroads, vendors, and suppliers identify and fix any issues causing initialization failures immediately.

To ensure this provision is utilized only when necessary and railroads and their vendors and suppliers identify and promptly resolve the root cause of initialization failures, FRA is proposing to impose two tiers of operating requirements that would become increasingly restrictive over time. FRA expects this will help strike the appropriate balance between enabling continued operations, subject to restrictions, and restoring PTC systems as quickly as possible.

First, proposed paragraph (g)(1)(i) provides that when a PTC system fails to initialize as defined in § 236.1003, a train may proceed, during the first 24 hours, only as prescribed under existing paragraphs (b)(1) through (6) of § 236.1029. FRA is proposing to require railroads to utilize the current operating restrictions set forth in existing paragraphs (b)(1) through (6) because railroads, including train crews, are accustomed to complying with those speed limits and other restrictions when they experience en route failures, and those restrictions are based on the underlying signal or train control system still in effect. During FRA's meetings, the following railroads explicitly recommended this approach, based on industry's longstanding use of these operating restrictions when PTC technology fails or is otherwise cut out en route: Alaska Railroad, Amtrak, BNSF, CN, CPKC, CSX, G&W, MARC, Metra, Metrolink, NICD, NS, and UP.

Second, proposed paragraph (g)(1)(ii) states that after the first 24 hours, the train may proceed only as prescribed under paragraphs (b)(4) through (6) of this section and must not exceed restricted speed as defined in § 236.1003. FRA proposes to require compliance with existing paragraphs (b)(4) through (6) as they contain other applicable restrictions and communication requirements. 28 However, instead of the standard speed restrictions under existing paragraph (b), this stricter tier of operating restrictions would limit any train that utilizes this provision beyond 24 hours to restricted speed, which is defined as a “speed that will permit stopping within one-half the range of vision, but not exceeding 20 miles per hour.”  29

During FRA's meetings with APTA, CRC, and their member railroads in February 2024, several commuter railroads, including Denver RTD, MARC, Metra, NICD, NJT, TEXRail, TRE, and UTA FrontRunner supported FRA's intention to propose a two-tiered framework. For example, MARC and NICD noted that the unplanned outages they recently experienced were resolved in approximately two hours, which means those trains, in a similar scenario under this proposed framework, would be subject to the standard operating restrictions under existing paragraph (b). Furthermore, these commuter railroads expressed appreciation that this proposed framework—with more flexibility on day one—would enable them to transport commuters to their destination if PTC technology fails midday and trains are unable to initialize the PTC system for the remainder of the day. Without this proposed provision, if a train's PTC system fails midday and is not restored by the evening rush hour, commuters attempting to return home would be forced to rely on alternative modes of transportation, with little to no notice.

These eight commuter railroads also recognized that a clear, tiered approach—which introduces additional restrictions, including restricted speed, 24 hours after the onset of the technical issue—would enable railroads to communicate effectively with their customers if the railroad finds that an issue cannot be remedied within the first 24 hours. Commuter railroads emphasized the importance of being able to provide advance notice to their customers about the speed restrictions that would apply the following day, as that could result in service reductions.

Several stakeholders, including ASLRRA, ATD, NJT, and UTA FrontRunner, stressed that the operating restrictions FRA proposes in paragraph (g) should be as simple, straightforward, and objective as possible given the complexity of other PTC regulations. Furthermore, FRA recognizes that predictability and transparency are vital when it comes to a process that will govern whether and how intercity passenger, commuter, and freight rail transportation may continue.

Proposed paragraph (g)(2) imposes a notification requirement that a railroad must, as early as is possible, ensure workers are aware of PTC system-level outages and corresponding operating restrictions. Specifically, proposed paragraph (g)(2) requires each railroad operating in accordance with (g)(1) to notify, as early as is possible, all dispatchers, train crews, and roadway workers about PTC system-level outages or failures that result in multiple trains' PTC systems failing to initialize, which result in trains proceeding in accordance with operating restrictions. Railroads must ensure job safety briefings reflect such operations.

Proposed paragraph (g)(3) proposes to require railroads to attempt to initialize the PTC system again, when the reason it is not initializing is loss of communications or lack of navigational information, like temporary lack of access to the Global Positioning System (GPS) TM . FRA is aware of multiple PTC systems that rely on GPS, like I-ETMS and the Incremental Train Control System. Specifically, proposed paragraph (g)(3) would require, notwithstanding the relief under paragraph (g)(1), that when a PTC system fails to initialize due to loss of communications or lack of navigational information, the train must attempt to initialize the PTC system again at the next forward, available location. The next forward, available location, depending on the circumstances, could be a segment of a main line, a siding, a yard, or a station, whichever is closest.

In addition, FRA acknowledges that PTC systems are comprised of many subsystems and are often interfaced with other technology. For example, at an AAR meeting in November 2023, CN emphasized that the nature of a system of subsystems, like PTC technology, means there is always the possibility of an outage, as a PTC system relies or depends on the proper functioning of many subsystems. Similarly, FRA is also aware that PTC systems have failed to initialize due to a failure of an interfaced system, like a dispatching system or an electronic storage system. Accordingly, FRA wants to clarify that proposed paragraphs (g)(1) through (5) of this section likewise apply to cases in which a PTC system fails to initialize due to an issue or failure arising from a subsystem or an interfaced system.

In addition, FRA wants to offer a clarification about the application of proposed paragraphs (g)(1) to (5) to the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System II (ACSES II). An initialization failure is defined in existing § 236.1003 as “any instance when a PTC system fails to activate on a locomotive or train, unless the PTC system successfully activates during a subsequent attempt in the same location or before entering PTC-governed territory.” Section 236.1003 specifies that for the types of PTC systems that do not initialize by design, like ACSES II, a failed departure test is considered an initialization failure, unless the PTC system successfully passes the departure test during a subsequent attempt in the same location or before entering PTC-governed territory. ACSES II typically encompasses automatic train control (ATC), and FRA wants to emphasize that the FRA-certified PTC system, however, is ACSES II. 30 If ACSES II fails to initialize ( i.e., fails its departure test), an ACSES II-equipped train may utilize the relief outlined in proposed paragraph (g) of § 236.1029. By contrast, however, if ATC fails its departure test, a railroad must comply with all applicable signal and train control prohibitions and restrictions in other subparts of part 236. FRA wants to address this nuance to clarify that proposed paragraph (g) does not supersede other existing signal and train control regulations that directly govern ATC.

Finally, proposed paragraph (g)(5) recognizes that FRA may impose additional operating restrictions and other conditions to address recurring issues that result in multiple trains' PTC systems failing to initialize. For example, under proposed paragraph (g)(5), FRA could require the applicable railroads and PTC system vendors and suppliers to take certain actions or satisfy additional reporting requirements, as they resolve the recurring issues. In addition, proposed paragraph (g)(4) would clarify that FRA reserves the right to deny the relief under proposed paragraph (g)(1) for recurring issues that result in multiple trains' PTC systems failing to initialize. Although the relief under proposed paragraph (g)(1) is generally self-executing, FRA may choose to intervene under proposed paragraph (g)(5) and deny such relief if, for example, a railroad and/or its applicable PTC system vendor and supplier are not sufficiently correcting a recurrent problem.

This proposed rule is a nonsignificant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Order 14094, Modernizing Regulatory Review, 31 and DOT Order 2100.6A (“Rulemaking and Guidance Procedures”). FRA made this determination by finding that the economic effects of this proposed regulatory action would not exceed the $100 million annual threshold defined by Executive Order 12866.

FRA complied with OMB Circular A-4 when accounting for benefits, costs, and cost savings relative to a baseline condition. Typically, a baseline represents a best judgement about what the world would be like in the absence of the regulatory interventions. 32

In this analysis, discount rates are used to account for differences in the timing of the estimated benefits and costs. Benefits and costs that accrue further in the future are more heavily discounted than those impacts that occur today. Discounting reflects individuals' general preference to receive benefits sooner rather than later (and defer costs) and recognizes that costs incurred today are more expensive than future costs because businesses must forgo an expected rate of return on investment of that capital. 33 OMB recommends using a discount rate of 2 percent. 34 This represents the real (inflation-adjusted) rate of return on long-term Federal Government debt over the last 30 years, calculated between 1993 and 2022, and is considered a reasonable approximation of the social rate of time preference.

FRA analyzed the economic impact of this proposed rule over a 10-year period and estimated its costs and benefits, as shown in the table below. The total estimated 10-year net benefits of this proposed rule would be $81.8 million (discounted at 2 percent), and the annualized net benefits would be $9.1 million (discounted at 2 percent). The industry benefits associated with FRA's proposal to amend three provisions— i.e., to introduce a new exception for certain non-revenue passenger equipment movements, improve the RFA process regarding temporary PTC system outages, and permit continued operations following certain initialization failures, subject to operating restrictions—would outweigh the industry costs and government administrative costs associated with FRA's proposal to expand the content requirements for RFAs related to temporary outages.

The following table shows the estimated 10-year benefits, net benefits, and costs of the proposed rule. The total 10-year estimated benefits would be $83.5 million (discounted at 2 percent), with annualized benefits at $9.3 million (discounted at 2 percent). The total 10-year estimated costs would be $1.8 million (discounted at 2 percent), with annualized costs at $0.2 million (discounted at 2 percent).

FRA analyzed the potential industry benefits of the three proposed amendments. Overall, the three proposed amendments would benefit the railroad industry, the public, and FRA by facilitating repairs, maintenance, upgrades, and capital improvements; expanding certain railroad informational requirements; reducing costs; and enabling the safe, reliable, and resilient movement of people and goods, while preserving rail safety.

The proposed exception under § 236.1006(b)(6) would enable non-revenue passenger equipment, including a locomotive, locomotive consist, or train without passengers onboard, to operate to a maintenance facility or yard for the sole purpose of repairing or exchanging a PTC system. To ensure rail safety, FRA is proposing to impose five conditions on each movement of non-revenue passenger equipment subject to this exception, including speed and distance restrictions, the requirement to establish an absolute block, and other protections of the route.

In assessing the potential benefits of the proposed provision, FRA focused on the impact on train operations in the absence of this proposed rule. The methodology employed involved estimating the transportation costs associated with relocating non-operative, PTC-equipped passenger equipment to a maintenance facility or yard to repair or exchange the PTC technology. For example, without this proposed provision, intercity passenger railroads and commuter railroads would need to use an operative, PTC-equipped locomotive, locomotive consist, or train to move the non-operative, PTC-equipped equipment to a maintenance facility or yard.