[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 154 (Friday, August 9, 2024)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 65226-65242]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-17598]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 154 / Friday, August 9, 2024 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 65226]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50, 52, and 73
[NRC-2017-0227]
RIN 3150-AK19
Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule and guidance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to
amend its regulations to provide certain alternative, risk-informed,
performance-based physical security requirements for advanced reactors
that would result in greater regulatory stability, predictability, and
clarity in the licensing process and reduce the need for exemptions.
The term ``advanced reactors,'' as used in this rulemaking, refers to
nuclear power reactors that are light-water small modular reactors or
non-light-water reactors. Concurrently, the NRC is issuing for public
comment a draft regulatory guide, DG-5072, ``Guidance for Alternative
Physical Security Requirements for Small Modular Reactors and Non-
Light-Water Reactors.'' The NRC also developed DG-5071, ``Target Set
Identification and Development for Nuclear Power Reactors,'' which is
withheld from public disclosure and can be made available to those
members of the public with a need to know.
DATES: Submit comments by October 23, 2024. Comments received after
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received
before this date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods
(unless this document describes a different method for submitting
comments on a specific subject); however, the NRC encourages electronic
comment submission through the Federal rulemaking website:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2017-0227. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Dawn Forder; telephone: 301-415-3407;
email: [email protected]. For technical questions contact the
individuals listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
Email Comments to: [email protected]. If you do
not receive an automatic email reply confirming receipt, then contact
us at 301-415-1677.
Fax Comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission at 301-415-1101.
Mail Comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff.
Hand Deliver Comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland 20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. eastern time, Federal
workdays; telephone: 301-415-1677.
You can read a plain language description of this proposed rule at
https://www.regulations.gov/docket/NRC-2017-0227. For additional
direction on obtaining information and submitting comments, see
``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Technical information: Dennis Andrukat, Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, telephone: 301-415-3561, email:
[email protected]; and Beth Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, telephone: 301-415-2130, email: [email protected].
Both are staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001.
Guidance information: Lou Cubellis, Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response, telephone: 301-287-3670, email:
[email protected]; or Stanley Gardocki, Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research, telephone: 301-415-1067, email:
[email protected]. Both are staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Please do not include any
potentially classified or sensitive information in your email.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments
A. Obtaining Information
B. Submitting Comments
II. Background
A. Existing Physical Security Framework for Nuclear Power
Reactors
B. Emerging Interest in Advanced Reactor Technology
C. Rulemaking Activity
D. Public Comments on Regulatory Basis
E. Public Interactions During Proposed Rule Development
III. Discussion
A. Scope
B. Objective
C. Licensing
D. New or Modified Requirements in 10 CFR Part 73
E. Conforming Changes--10 CFR 73.55(b)(9)(i), (e)(10)(i), and
(k)(1) and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73
F. Contents of Application
G. Change Control
H. Regulatory Requirements for Documentation and Technical
Analysis
IV. Specific Requests for Comment
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
VII. Regulatory Analysis
VIII. Backfitting and Issue Finality
IX. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
X. Plain Writing
XI. Environmental Assessment and Proposed Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act
XIII. Availability of Guidance
XIV. Public Meeting
XV. Availability of Documents
I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments
A. Obtaining Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2017-0227 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain
publicly available information related to this action by any of the
following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2017-0227.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to
[[Page 65227]]
[email protected]. For the convenience of the reader, instructions
about obtaining materials referenced in this document are provided in
the ``Availability of Documents'' section of this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make
an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time, Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
B. Submitting Comments
The NRC encourages electronic comment submission through the
Federal rulemaking website (https://www.regulations.gov). Please
include Docket ID NRC-2017-0227 in your comment submission.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your
comment submission. The NRC will post all comment submissions at
https://www.regulations.gov as well as enter the comment submissions
into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove identifying or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to
remove such information before making the comment submissions available
to the public or entering the comment into ADAMS.
II. Background
A. Existing Physical Security Framework for Nuclear Power Reactors
The NRC has established physical security requirements for the
protection of production and utilization facilities licensed under 10
CFR part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization
Facilities,'' or 10 CFR part 52, ``Licenses, Certifications, and
Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.'' The NRC requires these licensees
to design, implement, and maintain a physical protection program that
provides high assurance \1\ that operation of the facility is not
inimical to the common defense and security and does not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. To satisfy this
performance objective, a licensee's physical protection program must
protect against the design-basis threat (DBT) of radiological sabotage
as set forth in Sec. 73.1 of title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), ``Purpose and scope.'' The physical security
requirements that a licensee must implement to protect against the DBT
of radiological sabotage are primarily set forth in 10 CFR part 73,
``Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.'' The Commission-
approved DBT describes the type, composition, and capabilities of an
adversary that a licensee can reasonably be expected to defend against.
Development of the DBT is based on threat assessments of the tactics,
techniques, and procedures used by international and domestic terrorist
groups and organizations.
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\1\ The Commission stated in staff requirements memorandum (SRM)
``SRM-SECY-16-0073--Options and Recommendations for the Force-On-
Force Inspection Program in Response to SRM-SECY-14-0088,'' dated
October 5, 2016, that ``the concept of `high assurance' of adequate
protection found in the NRC security regulations is equivalent to
`reasonable assurance' when it comes to determining what level of
regulation is appropriate.'' The Commission re-iterated this point
in ``SRM-SECY-18-0076--Options and Recommendation for Physical
Security for Advanced Reactors,'' dated November 19, 2018.
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The physical security requirements for the protection of nuclear
power reactors against the DBT of radiological sabotage can be found in
Sec. 73.55, ``Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.''
These requirements contain a mixture of performance-based and
prescriptive security requirements that provide applicants and
licensees with the flexibility to determine how to meet the established
performance objective.
The focus of this proposed rule is on the physical security
requirements related to protection against radiological sabotage for
advanced reactors. The term ``advanced reactors,'' as used in this
document, refers to nuclear power reactors that are non-light-water
reactors (non-LWRs) or small modular reactors (SMRs) as SMR is defined
in Sec. 171.5, ``Definitions.''
The current physical protection program for power reactors is
designed to protect the plant features needed to provide fundamental
safety functions, such as maintaining reactor core cooling to prevent
significant core damage from the DBT of radiological sabotage. The loss
of plant features providing these safety functions can lead to damage
of a reactor core or spent nuclear fuel sabotage, with a potential
subsequent release of radioactive materials. When compared to operating
large LWRs, many of the advanced reactor designs have smaller power
outputs and a correspondingly smaller inventory of fission products
available for potential release. In comparison to large LWRs, some
advanced reactor designs may include attributes that could result in
smaller and slower releases of fission products following the loss of
certain safety functions. Accordingly, some designs may warrant
different methods for meeting the NRC's physical security requirements,
commensurate with the potential radiological consequences resulting
from radiological sabotage.
B. Emerging Interest in Advanced Reactor Technology
Concurrent with large LWR deployment and design evolution, nuclear
power reactor vendors have developed several different reactor designs
that are either light-water SMRs with passive safety features or
reactors that do not use light water as a coolant. This latter category
is commonly referred to as non-LWR technology. Advanced reactor designs
using non-LWR technology include liquid metal-cooled reactors, gas-
cooled reactors, and molten-salt-cooled reactors. These advanced
reactor designs could have rated thermal power outputs that range from
low to very high and may apply modular construction concepts.
As advanced reactor designs evolved in the 1980s and early 1990s,
the NRC considered the need for a revised regulatory regime
specifically for these emerging technologies. The NRC issued its
``Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Nuclear Power Plants''
on July 8, 1986 (51 FR 24643), to provide the Commission's policy
regarding the review of, and desired characteristics associated with,
advanced reactors. In this policy statement, the NRC identified
attributes that developers should consider in advanced designs,
including safety features that are highly reliable, the use of the
defense-in-depth philosophy of maintaining multiple barriers against
radiation release, and, as compared to large LWRs, less-complex heat
removal systems, longer time constants before reaching safety system
challenges, and reduced potential for severe accidents and their
consequences.
On October 14, 2008, the NRC issued a revised ``Policy Statement on
the Regulation of Advanced Reactors'' (73 FR 60612), describing
attributes that should be considered in advanced designs to establish
the acceptability or licensability of such designs, including designs
that include considerations for
[[Page 65228]]
safety and security requirements together in the design process such
that security issues (e.g., newly identified threats of terrorist
attacks) can be effectively resolved through facility design and
engineered security features, and formulation of mitigation measures,
with reduced reliance on human actions. The Commission also observed
that it will be in the interest of the public as well as the design
vendors and the prospective license applicants to address security
issues early in the design stage to achieve a more robust and effective
security posture for future nuclear power reactors.
Later, in SECY-10-0034, ``Potential Policy, Licensing, and Key
Technical Issues for Small Modular Nuclear Reactor Designs,'' dated
March 28, 2010, the NRC identified potential issues for SMRs based on
the preliminary design information supplied in pre-application
interactions and discussions with SMR designers and the U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE). The NRC noted that establishing physical security
requirements and guidance for SMRs and non-LWRs was a key policy issue
of high importance.
In SECY-11-0184, ``Security Regulatory Framework for Certifying,
Approving, and Licensing Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (M110329),''
dated December 29, 2011, the NRC staff reported that the current
security regulatory framework is adequate for SMRs, including related
elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. In the case of non-LWRs, the
staff's assessment of the suitability of the current security
regulatory framework was based on the limited information that was
available at the time on reactor and fuel designs and operations of
these technologies. Based on this information, the staff stated that it
was not aware of any area in which the existing security regulatory
framework would not apply to non-LWRs and that the staff would continue
to assess the suitability and adequacy of the security and material
control and accountability requirements for proposed non-LWR
technologies in order to identify any regulatory gaps and potential
technical or policy issues pertaining to certifying, approving, or
licensing non-LWR technologies.
The staff also indicated in SECY-11-0184 that the alternative
measures provision in Sec. 73.55(r), ``Alternative measures,'' allows
SMR and non-LWR designers and potential applicants to propose
alternative methods or approaches that provide a level of protection
that is at least equal to that which would otherwise be provided by the
specific security requirement in Sec. 73.55 for which an alternative
measure is being proposed. These alternative methods or approaches may
include increased reliance on engineered systems that reduce the need
to rely on operational requirements and staffing to meet regulatory
requirements.
Since the issuance of SECY-11-0184, discussions with external
stakeholders and within the NRC have turned to whether some type of
generic regulatory action would be preferable to the case-by-case
approach described in SECY-11-0184. Reactor designers and other
stakeholders have raised concerns that the current prescriptive
physical security requirements could impose unnecessary regulatory
burden for SMRs and non-LWRs that is not commensurate with the risks
posed by some of these designs. In response, the NRC assessed potential
regulatory changes that would modify existing physical security
requirements to make them commensurate with the risks associated with
advanced reactor designs. In proposing revisions to physical security
requirements for advanced reactors, the NRC considered the inherent
features of many advanced reactor designs, such as lower fission
product inventories and longer thermal time constants, as well as
safety and security features that could be incorporated into facility
designs. As discussed previously, these types of attributes and design
features have been mentioned in the Commission's Policy Statement to
reduce reliance on human actions in responding to attempted acts of
radiological sabotage. Initial interactions with the public related to
a possible rulemaking involved meetings on the Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) white paper, ``Proposed Physical Security Requirements for
Advanced Reactor Technologies,'' dated December 14, 2016. The NEI white
paper suggested consequence-oriented criteria for determining when an
advanced reactor design would be a candidate for alternative physical
security requirements. The NRC subsequently prepared a draft white
paper on potential changes to the physical security requirements for
advanced reactors in November 2017.
C. Rulemaking Activity
On August 1, 2018, the staff submitted SECY-18-0076, ``Options and
Recommendation for Physical Security for Advanced Reactors,''
presenting alternatives and a recommendation to the Commission on
possible changes to the regulations and guidance related to physical
security for advanced reactors. The staff evaluated the advantages and
disadvantages of each alternative and recommended a limited-scope
rulemaking to further assess and, if appropriate, develop a limited set
of alternative security requirements that licensees of certain advanced
reactor designs could implement. The staff also recommended developing
necessary guidance to address performance criteria used to determine an
advanced reactor applicant's eligibility for using one or more of the
alternative physical security requirements. In SRM-SECY-18-0076, dated
November 19, 2018, the Commission approved the staff's recommendation
to initiate a limited-scope rulemaking and to interact with
stakeholders to identify specific requirements within existing
regulations that would play a diminished role in providing physical
security for advanced reactors while at the same time contributing
significantly to capital and/or operating costs. The Commission also
directed the staff to use exemptions until the final rule is
implemented.
In response to SRM-SECY-18-0076, on July 16, 2019, the NRC
published a Federal Register notice of the issuance of the regulatory
basis for this rulemaking, ``Regulatory Basis for the Physical Security
of Advanced Reactors,'' for a 30-day public comment period. The
regulatory basis summarized the current physical security framework for
protecting large LWRs against radiological sabotage, described
regulatory issues that have motivated the NRC to pursue rulemaking,
evaluated various alternatives to address physical security for
advanced reactors, and identified the background documents related to
these issues. In the Federal Register notice that issued the regulatory
basis, the NRC requested feedback from the public on specific questions
related to the eligibility criterion (referred to as ``performance
criteria'' in the regulatory basis), offsite licensee response
approach, and cumulative effects of regulation (CER).
Non-Concurrence Process (NCP)
On April 28, 2022, during the NRC's internal review of this
proposed rule, a staff member from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Security
and Incident Response submitted a formal non-concurrence. This NCP,
identified as NCP-2022-003, was reviewed and closed without requiring
changes to the proposed rule.
D. Public Comments on Regulatory Basis
The public comment period closed on August 15, 2019, and the NRC
received nine comment letters from six commenters, including three
members of the public, one non-governmental organization, one potential
NRC
[[Page 65229]]
applicant, and one industry group. The letters provided various points
of view; suggestions for clarifications, additions, and deletions; and
comments outside the scope of this rulemaking. In general, the industry
group commenter and the potential NRC applicant expressed support for
the concept of alternative physical security requirements for advanced
reactors, while the public and non-governmental organization commenters
did not support the potential alternatives discussed in the regulatory
basis document.
The public comment documents are available as indicated in the
``Availability of Documents'' section of this document. As stated in
the Federal Register notice that issued the regulatory basis, the NRC
is not providing formal written responses to the comments received on
the regulatory basis.
As a result of SRM-SECY-18-0076, and in consideration of the public
comments received on the regulatory basis, the NRC is proposing this
limited-scope rule to provide a clear set of alternative performance-
based physical security requirements for advanced reactors licensed
under 10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52. This proposed rule would reduce
the need for advanced reactor applicants and licensees to request
alternative measures or exemptions from current physical security
requirements. This proposed rule also would provide benefits for
advanced reactor applicants by establishing greater regulatory
stability, predictability, and clarity in the licensing process while
maintaining a level of security commensurate with the risk associated
with these facilities.
E. Public Interactions During Proposed Rule Development
The NRC engaged with stakeholders throughout the development of the
proposed rule by holding public meetings, issuing draft versions of
preliminary proposed rule language, and requesting public feedback.
These interactions included discussions on the draft regulatory
guidance. The following table shows the public interactions conducted
during the proposed rule development.
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Interaction Date Topic
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NEI White Paper............... December 14, 2016 NEI white paper,
``Proposed Physical
Security
Requirements for
Advanced Reactor
Technologies''.
Public Meeting................ December 13, 2017 NRC draft white
paper, November
2017.
Public Meeting................ August 8, 2019... NRC's request for
additional potential
alternatives.
Public Meeting................ December 12, 2019 NRC's initial
proposed rule
approach and path
forward.
Stakeholder Letter............ January 10, 2020. NEI letter regarding
additional input for
the rule.
Public Meeting................ February 20, 2020 Periodic Advanced
Reactor Stakeholder
meeting; NRC's
proposed rule
approach, guidance
development, and
screening of public
comments.
Draft Guidance................ April 10, 2020... NEI 20-05, Draft A
submission.
Preliminary Proposed Rule April 13, 2020... Initial release of
Language. preliminary proposed
rule language that
incorporated public
comments.
Draft Guidance................ April 13, 2020... NEI 20-05, Draft B
submission.
Public Meeting................ April 22, 2020... Initial preliminary
proposed rule
language and draft
guidance.
Preliminary Proposed Rule September 14, Release of revised
Language. 2020. preliminary proposed
rule language.
Draft Guidance................ September 17, NRC letter to NEI
2020. regarding May 2020
comments.
Draft Guidance................ March 2, 2021.... NRC comments on NEI
20-05, Draft B.
Public Meeting................ April 21, 2021... Eligibility criteria,
unmitigated
terminology, and
NRC's review of NEI
20-05, Draft B.
Public Meeting................ May 14, 2021..... Eligibility criteria.
Draft Guidance................ May 14, 2021..... NEI 20-05, Draft D
submission.
Public Meeting................ August 17, 2021.. Eligibility criteria,
target set
terminology, and
guidance.
Public Meeting................ September 16, Three eligibility
2021. criteria.
Public Meeting................ September 29, Target set process,
2021. three eligibility
criteria,
consequence
analysis.
Public Meeting................ October 19, 2021. Single eligibility
criterion and
revised target set
process.
Draft Guidance................ November 24, 2021 NRC letter ceasing
review of NEI 20-05.
Preliminary Proposed Rule December 14, 2021 Release of revised
Language. preliminary proposed
rule language.
Public Meeting................ January 20, 2022. Revised preliminary
proposed rule
language and key
guidance elements.
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III. Discussion
A. Scope
This proposed rule would establish certain risk-informed and
performance-based alternative physical security requirements that
eligible advanced reactor applicants and licensees could elect to
implement. The physical security requirements under Sec. 73.55 for
which alternative security requirements have not been developed would
remain in effect and applicable to SMR and non-LWR power reactors.
This proposed rule does not include alternatives for large LWRs,
fuel cycle facilities, or non-power production and utilization
facilities. Large LWRs were not included in the scope of this proposed
rule because a physical security regulatory framework and provisions
for requesting alternative measures already exist for those reactors
under Sec. 73.55(r). Additionally, licensees for existing large LWRs
have not requested changes to the existing physical protection program
to adopt the proposed consequence-based alternatives. The current fleet
of operating nuclear power reactors, consisting entirely of large LWRs,
would continue to be regulated by the current established framework for
physical security in Sec. 73.55 and appendices B and C to 10 CFR part
73.
Fuel cycle facilities and non-power production and utilization
facilities are not subject to 10 CFR 73.55 and therefore were not
included in the scope of this proposed rule.
B. Objective
In accordance with the rulemaking plan approved by the Commission
in
[[Page 65230]]
SRM-SECY-18-0076, this limited-scope proposed rule would retain the
current overall security framework in Sec. 73.55 to protect against
radiological sabotage. This proposed rule would create specific
voluntary, risk-informed, and performance-based alternative physical
security requirements for SMR and non-LWR power reactors licensed under
10 CFR part 50 or 10 CFR part 52. These alternative physical security
requirements would (1) enhance regulatory effectiveness by providing
greater stability, predictability, and clarity in the licensing process
for implementing physical security for advanced reactors; (2) reduce
requests for exemptions from certain physical security requirements;
(3) consider technological advancements in reactor designs and their
associated design features impacting the possible loss of safety
functions from malicious acts and any resulting consequences; and (4)
provide alternatives for meeting certain physical security requirements
under Sec. 73.55 commensurate with the potentially lower risks posed
by advanced reactors.
The current fleet of large LWRs protects against the DBT of
radiological sabotage by preventing significant core damage and spent
fuel sabotage. However, this requirement may not be appropriate for all
SMRs or non-LWRs. Accordingly, this proposed rule would add a new
technology-inclusive requirement for advanced reactors to protect
against the DBT of radiological sabotage. This new provision would
require that an advanced reactor licensee's physical protection program
be designed to prevent a significant release of radionuclides from any
source. The proposed rule would establish certain alternative physical
security requirements available to those advanced reactor applicants
and licensees who can meet this performance standard and the proposed
eligibility criterion. The proposed eligibility criterion would be
based on demonstrating that the consequences of a postulated
radiological release are below prescribed dose reference values.
C. Licensing
There are differences between non-LWR and SMR designs, and large
LWR designs. These include potentially smaller reactor core sizes,
lower power densities, lower probability of severe accidents, slower
accident progression, different source term characteristics, and
smaller offsite consequences of accidents. These differences have led
DOE, designers, potential operators, and the NRC to examine the
physical security requirements necessary to safely operate such
advanced reactors.
The NRC anticipates that some advanced reactor vendors and
applicants may design their facilities and site protective strategy to
account for reliance on passive features, active engineered systems,
and automation to achieve security functions with less reliance on
human actions. Based on these design features, advanced reactor
applicants may seek alternative measures for achieving security
functions that differ substantially from the approach at the existing
fleet of large LWRs. Without this proposed rule, applicants for or
holders of advanced reactor licenses likely would request alternative
measures or exemptions from certain physical security requirements.
This is because the current regulatory framework does not establish
alternative requirements for varying types and sizes of advanced
reactors and an eligibility criterion authorizing these applicants to
use alternative requirements.
This proposed rule would establish voluntary alternatives to
certain prescriptive physical security requirements under Sec. 73.55
for advanced reactor licensees. These alternative physical security
requirements would continue to provide high assurance of adequate
protection in the event of a security-initiated event. Although the
exemption process could also result in relief from requirements that
may not be necessary for a specific applicant or licensee, regulating
by exemption generally provides less opportunity for public engagement
and can lead to less regulatory certainty and increased costs for the
NRC and the applicant or licensee. Proceeding by rulemaking rather than
exemptions therefore supports the NRC's principles of good regulation,
including openness, clarity, and reliability.
D. New or Modified Requirements in 10 CFR Part 73
10 CFR 73.55(a)(5)--Watts Bar, Unit 2--Remove and Reserve
Although not specific to the scope of this rulemaking, the NRC is
proposing to remove the requirements under paragraph (a)(5) of Sec.
73.55 that relate to the Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar Nuclear
Plant, Unit 2 as a construction permit holder. This paragraph is no
longer necessary as the Tennessee Valley Authority now has an operating
license for this facility and no longer holds a construction permit.
10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)--General Requirements Revised To Address Advanced
Reactors
Currently, nuclear power reactors licensed under 10 CFR part 50 and
10 CFR part 52 must protect against the DBT of radiological sabotage.
The existing fleet of large LWRs meets this objective by preventing
significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage. This proposed rule
would not change this requirement for large LWRs.
The NRC anticipates that many of the non-LWR designs will not have
reactor cores similar to those of the existing fleet of LWRs.
Therefore, the objective of preventing significant core damage may not
be appropriate for these types of advanced reactors, although they
would still need to protect against the DBT of radiological sabotage.
Accordingly, this proposed rule would add a new technology-inclusive
requirement to the introductory text of paragraph (b)(3) of Sec. 73.55
to require that a non-LWR advanced reactor licensee's physical
protection program be designed to prevent a significant release of
radionuclides from any source.
Although SMRs are defined as LWRs for the purpose of this rule and
may therefore have reactor cores similar to those of the existing fleet
of LWRs, the NRC is proposing to apply this technology-inclusive
requirement of preventing a significant release of radionuclides from
any source to SMRs as well as to non-LWRs. While there would likely be
differences between non-LWR and SMR designs, both types of designs
could potentially result in smaller and slower releases of fission
products following the loss of certain safety functions when compared
to large LWRs.
In this context, the phrase ``a significant release of
radionuclides from any source'' would encompass a postulated security-
initiated event that would cause a release to the environment exceeding
that analyzed in the design basis accident licensing basis. This would
ensure that a licensee's physical protection program considers and
protects against significant release from all areas with high
radiological inventories, including reactor cores and spent fuel pools
common to LWRs, as well as other physical locations with radiological
inventories in non-LWR designs that need to be protected from a DBT
adversary (e.g., waste processing and storage systems).
[[Page 65231]]
10 CFR 73.55(s)--Alternative Physical Security Requirements
The proposed rule would establish new Sec. 73.55(s) to contain the
alternative physical security requirements, found in Sec. 73.55(s)(2).
These alternative physical security requirements could be used by
advanced reactor applicants and licensees who meet the proposed general
requirements in Sec. 73.55(s)(1).
10 CFR 73.55(s)(1)--General Requirements
Proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(i) would establish that an applicant for
or holder of a license for an advanced reactor under 10 CFR part 50 or
10 CFR part 52 may elect one or more of the alternative physical
security requirements specified in proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(2).
Proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(ii) would establish that, to be eligible
to use the alternative physical security requirements in Sec.
73.55(s)(2), the applicant or licensee must demonstrate that the
consequences of a postulated radiological release that results from a
postulated security-initiated event do not exceed the offsite dose
reference values defined in Sec. Sec. 50.34, ``Contents of
applications; technical information,'' and 52.79, ``Contents of
applications; technical information in final safety analysis report.''
Proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iii) would establish that the applicant
or licensee must identify the specific alternative physical security
requirement(s) it intends to implement as part of its physical
protection program and demonstrate how the requirements set forth in
Sec. 73.55 are met when the selected alternatives are used. The
applicant or licensee would be free to choose any combination of the
proposed physical security alternatives under proposed Sec.
73.55(s)(2). The applicant or licensee would not be required to elect
all of the alternatives, nor would it be restricted to only invoking a
single alternative.
Proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iv) would require that an applicant or
licensee perform a technical analysis to evaluate the potential offsite
radiological consequences from a postulated security-initiated event to
demonstrate eligibility to use the alternative physical security
requirements. The technical analysis would not need to be submitted to
the NRC for review and approval but would be subject to audit or
inspection. This proposed provision also would require the licensee to
maintain the analysis until the submittal of the licensee's
certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel required by Sec. 50.82(a)(1)
or Sec. 52.110(a).
10 CFR 73.55(s)(2)--Specific Alternative Physical Security Requirements
This proposed rule would provide new physical security
requirements, in proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(2), that are voluntary
alternatives to selected existing requirements in Sec. 73.55 for an
applicant or licensee satisfying the provisions of proposed Sec.
73.55(s)(1). The proposed requirements in Sec. 73.55(s)(2) would
include alternatives for armed responders, interdiction and
neutralization, physical barriers, onsite secondary alarm stations, and
vital areas that would provide flexibility in how applicants and
licensees would design their physical protection program to meet the
requirements of proposed Sec. 73.55(b)(3) for protecting against the
DBT of radiological sabotage. These proposed alternative physical
security requirements are intended to provide greater regulatory
stability, predictability, and clarity in the licensing process, reduce
the need for applicant or licensee requests for exemptions or
alternatives to current physical security requirements, and reduce
resources that would otherwise be required to review specific
exemptions in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 73.5, ``Specific
exemptions,'' or alternative measures under the provisions of Sec.
73.55(r), ``Alternative measures.''
Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(i)--Alternative Requirement for Armed Responders
The proposed physical security alternative in Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(i)
would permit a licensee to be relieved from the current requirement for
the minimum number of armed responders in Sec. 73.55(k)(5)(ii). Under
this proposal, a licensee would be permitted to design a physical
protection program that potentially could have fewer than ten onsite
armed responders, including no onsite armed responders, if appropriate.
This alternative would give an advanced reactor licensee the
flexibility to determine and use the number of onsite armed responders
necessary to meet the requirements of proposed Sec. 73.55(b)(3). The
number of onsite armed responders may be reduced to zero if the
licensee also implements the alternative requirements under proposed
Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(ii) that would allow the licensee to rely on law
enforcement or other offsite armed responders to fulfill the
interdiction and neutralization functions to protect against the DBT of
radiological sabotage. Licensees would use existing methods, such as
those currently used by operating reactor licensees, for determining
the necessary number of onsite armed responders.
For an applicant or licensee that designs its physical protection
system to rely on onsite armed responders to perform interdiction and
neutralization to achieve the performance objective and requirements of
Sec. 73.55(b), ``General performance objective and requirements,'' the
proposed physical security alternative only provides relief from the
prescriptive requirement for the minimum number of armed responders;
all other existing requirements associated with onsite armed personnel
would continue to apply.
Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(ii)--Alternative Requirements for Interdiction and
Neutralization
The proposed physical security alternative in Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(ii)
would permit a licensee, if appropriate, to rely on law enforcement or
other offsite armed responders, rather than using onsite licensee
security personnel, to fulfill the interdiction and neutralization
functions required by Sec. 73.55(b)(3)(i). Use of this alternative
would be available only if a licensee were to have no onsite armed
responders.
The current requirement in Sec. 73.55(b)(3)(i) states that the
physical security program must ensure that the capabilities to detect,
assess, interdict, and neutralize threats, up to and including the DBT
of radiological sabotage, are maintained at all times. An advanced
reactor applicant or licensee that demonstrates it meets proposed Sec.
73.55(s)(1) without relying on an onsite armed response force may use
this alternate approach for meeting the requirements for the
interdiction and neutralization capabilities required by Sec.
73.55(b)(3)(i). Such an applicant or licensee may, under proposed Sec.
73.55(s)(2)(ii), rely on law enforcement responders (local, State or
Federal) or other offsite armed responders (e.g., licensee proprietary
or contract security personnel who are positioned offsite), rather than
using onsite armed responders to fulfill the interdiction and
neutralization capabilities required in Sec. 73.55(b)(3)(i).
The proposed rule would not relieve a licensee from the
responsibility to interdict and neutralize threats up to and including
the DBT of radiological sabotage; rather, it would provide a licensee
with an alternative method of fulfilling these responsibilities.
Applicants and licensees relying on law enforcement responders to carry
out the interdiction and neutralization capabilities would be relieved
from the
[[Page 65232]]
majority of the training and qualification requirements in appendix B,
``General Criteria for Security Personnel,'' to 10 CFR part 73, except
for the performance evaluation program requirements in section VI.C.3.
The proposed rule would not create any NRC regulatory jurisdiction
over, or requirements for, law enforcement responders.
Associated requirements for security response personnel in current
Sec. 73.55(k)(3) through (7); Sec. 73.55(k)(8)(ii); 10 CFR part 73,
appendix B, section VI (except for section VI.C.3); and 10 CFR part 73,
appendix C, section II.B.3.c.(iv) would not be applicable where a
licensee's design of its physical protection system would require no
armed responders onsite and the licensee would rely on law enforcement
to fulfill the interdiction and neutralization functions required by
Sec. 73.55(b)(3)(i). For example, a licensee approved to implement the
proposed alternative in Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(ii) would be relieved from
the requirement in Sec. 73.55(k)(8)(ii) to initiate response actions
to interdict and neutralize threats when relying on law enforcement to
initiate the response actions to interdict and neutralize threats in
accordance with the requirements of part 73, appendix C, section II,
the safeguards contingency plan, and the licensee's response strategy.
The licensee would continue to be required to detect and assess the
threat and then communicate threat information to law enforcement.
The proposed requirements in Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)(1) through
(5) would establish specific requirements to ensure that the use of law
enforcement or other offsite armed responders to fulfill the
interdiction and neutralization functions would still enable the
licensee to protect against the DBT of radiological sabotage.
Consistent with the existing regulatory framework in Sec. 73.55, the
requirement in proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)(1) would reiterate a
licensee's responsibility to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize
threats up to and including the DBT of radiological sabotage. As
discussed below, allowing a licensee to rely on law enforcement
responders to fulfill the interdiction and neutralization capability
does not relieve the licensee of this responsibility and therefore
remains consistent with the existing regulatory framework.
Proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)(2) would establish that a
licensee must provide adequate delay for threats up to and including
the DBT of radiological sabotage to enable law enforcement or other
armed responders located offsite sufficient time to respond to the site
and to interdict and neutralize those threats. In other words, the
cumulative delay time would need to be equal to or greater than the
security bounding time for a specific SMR or non-LWR site. The proposed
calculation methodology for security bounding time for SMR and non-LWR
sites is contained in appendix C to DG-5072.
The proposed requirement in Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)(3) would
require a licensee to provide necessary information about the site and
make available periodic training to law enforcement or other offsite
armed responders to support site-specific preparedness to fulfill the
interdiction and neutralization functions in safeguards contingency
events at the licensee's site (i.e., within the owner controlled area,
the protected area(s), vital areas, and other site facilities). Neither
the NRC nor licensees can compel law enforcement to participate in the
periodic training; however, the proposed requirements would ensure that
licensees make the necessary information and training available to law
enforcement.
The proposed requirement in Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)(4) would
establish a requirement for a licensee relying on law enforcement or
other offsite armed responders to fulfill the interdiction and
neutralization functions to describe in its security contingency plan
the role that law enforcement or the other offsite armed responders
will play in the licensee's protective strategy. This would require a
licensee to identify and plan for the role of law enforcement or other
offsite armed responders in a safeguards contingency event. In
accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.55(c)(5), a licensee shall
establish, maintain, and implement a safeguards contingency plan that
describes how the criteria set forth in appendix C, section II, to 10
CFR part 73 will be implemented. In applying this alternative, the
licensee would address the role that law enforcement or other offsite
armed responders would fulfill as a substitute for what would otherwise
be the duty and responsibility of onsite armed responders associated
with implementing contingency responses to safeguards events.
The proposed requirement of Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)(5) would
establish that a licensee must identify criteria and measures to
compensate for the degradation or absence of law enforcement or other
offsite armed responders and propose suitable compensatory measures
that meet the requirements of Sec. 73.55(o)(2) and (3) to address this
degradation. Unlike armed responders and armed security officers for
currently operating power reactors, who are required by current
regulations to be available at the site for response, a licensee that
would rely upon law enforcement or other offsite armed responders must
consider the potential that offsite response may be impeded by events
outside of or independent from the safeguards event at the site. While
the existing requirement in Sec. 73.55(o), ``Compensatory measures,''
is specific to security systems and equipment performing required
functions, the addition of the proposed alternative in Sec.
73.55(s)(2)(ii) creates the new potential for degradation or
unavailability of the personnel relied on to perform security functions
such as interdiction and neutralization. The proposed requirement would
rely on the requirements in Sec. 73.55(o)(2) and (3) for establishing
suitable compensatory measures to address degradation or loss of
interdiction and neutralization functions.
A licensee would be relieved from the requirements in Sec.
73.55(k)(3) through (7), Sec. 73.55(k)(8)(ii), 10 CFR part 73,
appendix B, section VI (except for section VI.C.3.), and 10 CFR part
73, appendix C, section II.B.3.c.(iv) with respect to law enforcement
responders, when the licensee relies on the law enforcement responders
to fulfill the interdiction and neutralization functions required by
Sec. 73.55(b)(3)(i). When an applicant or licensee relies on other
offsite armed responders for interdiction and neutralization, the
applicant or licensee would be relieved from the location-related
requirements in Sec. 73.55(k)(5)(iii) and 10 CFR part 73, appendix C,
section II.B.3.c.(iv), because the armed responders would be housed
outside a facility's protected area. One requirement from which a
licensee would not be relieved would be the performance evaluation
program requirements related to armed response personnel in 10 CFR part
73, appendix B, section VI.C.3. A licensee would be required to satisfy
these performance evaluation program requirements for all armed
response personnel, including law enforcement. The performance
evaluation program requirements would continue to apply because
implementation of the performance evaluation program provides assurance
of the effectiveness of the requirements proposed in Sec.
73.55(s)(2)(ii)(A)(1) through (4) when a licensee relies on law
enforcement or other offsite armed responders to perform the
contingency response and interdiction and neutralization functions that
protect the site against the DBT of radiological
[[Page 65233]]
sabotage. The implementation of a performance evaluation program would
provide assurance that any vulnerabilities or weaknesses resulting from
the reliance on law enforcement or other offsite responses to
safeguards contingencies would be identified and corrected and that a
licensee would maintain an adequate response as is required to meet the
requirements of Sec. 73.55(b)(3).
Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(iii)--Alternative Requirements for Physical Barriers
The proposed alternative in Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(iii) would permit a
licensee to apply means other than physical barriers as defined in
Sec. 73.2, ``Definitions,'' in the design of its physical protection
system to achieve the intended delay functions and access denial and
meet the performance objective and requirements of Sec. 73.55(b) to
protect against the DBT of radiological sabotage. A licensee would be
permitted to consider other methods that include the use of engineered
systems or human actions, or both, where reliable and available, to
achieve delay functions necessary to facilitate security responses
after the successful detection and assessment of threats up to and
including the DBT of radiological sabotage. For example, a licensee
could potentially use engineered systems designed to disperse material
that physically impedes or physiologically interferes with the
adversary, such as obscurants and irritants, to achieve the delay
function rather than relying on physical barriers as defined in Sec.
73.2. The alternative methods would permit consideration of active
engineered security systems performing interdiction and neutralization
functions, which may delay the DBT adversary (e.g., increasing task
time, increase travel time, interrupt adversary action, etc.), as well
as serving other functions. A licensee may consider physical spatial
distances, terrain, and other natural features that increase adversary
task times, after successful detection and assessment, in order to
achieve delay functions in its design of a physical protection system.
The proposed alternative also would permit a licensee to consider
methods other than physical barriers for physical access controls in
implementing the access authorization program, including restricting
access to vital areas.
Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(iv)--Alternative Requirements for Onsite Secondary
Alarm Stations
The proposed alternative in Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(iv) would permit a
licensee to locate a secondary alarm station offsite, where the
capabilities of receiving and monitoring signals for intrusion
detection; receiving and monitoring video image signals to assess
intrusion; communicating with onsite security to assist with
implementing a security response; providing command and control of the
security response; and summoning offsite local, State, and Federal law
enforcement assistance are redundant and equivalent to that of the
onsite central alarm station. This could include, for example, having a
co-located alarm station offsite that provides secondary alarm station
functions for multiple reactor sites, using a commercial security
service certified by an independent testing organization, or other
approaches that provide the functions required of a secondary alarm
station.
The proposed alternative would require that an offsite secondary
alarm station be able to perform the same functions as the onsite
central alarm station, but a licensee would be relieved from the
requirements in Sec. 73.55(i)(4)(iii) to construct, locate, and
protect the secondary alarm station to the same standards as the
central alarm station. For example, an SMR or non-LWR licensee would
not need to locate the secondary alarm station inside a protected area,
ensure that the interior of the secondary alarm station is not visible
from the perimeter of the protected area, or construct the secondary
alarm station to be bullet resistant. A licensee would be permitted to
install equipment in the secondary alarm station that is different than
the central alarm station, as long as the secondary alarm station can
perform the equivalent and redundant functions of the central alarm
station.
Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(v)--Alternative Requirements for Vital Areas
The proposed alternative in Sec. 73.55(s)(2)(v) would permit
relief from the requirements to designate the secondary alarm station
as a vital area and locate the secondary power supply systems for the
offsite secondary alarm station in a vital area. The primary purpose of
designating areas as vital is to control access in order to protect
vital equipment or operations important to safety or security. This is
accomplished by limiting the number of site personnel that are
authorized unescorted access to these areas and requiring security
measures such as locks, alarms, and periodic armed security checks to
control physical access and detect unauthorized access. These control
measures, along with other controls implemented in accordance with a
licensee's insider mitigation program, protect against the DBT insider
threat. Locating the secondary alarm station offsite and separate from
the central alarm station minimizes the risk of the insider threat to
affect or disrupt alarm station functions. This reflects the assumption
that not every individual who is authorized unescorted access to an
onsite alarm station would have authorized unescorted access or
physical access to a secondary alarm station that would be located
offsite. In addition, a secondary alarm station does not include
activities that involve special nuclear material that would pose a risk
of significant release of radionuclides from any source. Thus, a
secondary alarm station would not be an element of a target set that an
adversary would likely seek to destroy.
E. Conforming Changes--10 CFR 73.55(b)(9)(i), (e)(10)(i), and (k)(1)
and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73
This proposed rule would establish that, for SMRs and non-LWRs, the
physical protection program must be designed to protect against a
significant release of radionuclides from any source and would
therefore be designed to protect against radiological sabotage as
defined in Sec. 73.2.
The NRC proposes to amend current requirements under Sec.
73.55(b)(9)(i), (e)(10)(i), and (k)(1) and section VI.A.1 of appendix B
to 10 CFR part 73 to provide conforming requirements for SMRs and non-
LWRs. The current requirement under Sec. 73.55(b)(3) of designing the
physical protection program to prevent significant core damage (e.g.,
non-localized fuel melting or core destruction) and spent fuel sabotage
was established as the means of protecting against radiological
sabotage for LWRs. However, the term ``core damage'' may not be
universally applicable to all advanced reactor designs, such as those
that are based on non-LWR technology. For example, in some
technologies, such as molten salt reactor technologies, the nuclear
fuel may be in a liquid form. Also, for some advanced reactor designs,
core damage may not result in a release of radionuclides that would
constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety. The
proposed conforming requirements for SMRs and non-LWRs under Sec.
73.55(b)(9)(i), (e)(10)(i), and (k)(1) and section VI.A.1 of appendix B
to 10 CFR part 73 continue to apply the definition of radiological
sabotage under Sec. 73.2, and establish the new requirement for the
design of the physical protection program to protect against
significant release of radionuclides from any source.
[[Page 65234]]
F. Contents of Application
The NRC is proposing to amend the requirements for the content of
applications for operating licenses under Sec. 50.34 and for combined
licenses under Sec. 52.79. The current regulations under Sec.
50.34(c), ``Physical security plan,'' and Sec. 52.79(a) require
license applicants to include in their applications a physical security
plan that describes how the applicant will meet the applicable
requirements of 10 CFR part 73. Therefore, an applicant's election of a
proposed alternative under Sec. 73.55(s) would be described in the
physical security plan included in the license application. The NRC is
proposing to add paragraph Sec. 50.34(c)(4) and Sec.
52.79(a)(35)(iii) to require each applicant electing to apply an
alternative in Sec. 73.55(s)(2) to provide a description of the
technical analysis required by Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iv). The technical
analysis itself does not have to be submitted to the NRC for review and
approval. Eligible licensees that would elect to use one of the
proposed alternative requirements under Sec. 73.55(s) would need to
amend their security plans in accordance with the requirements in Sec.
50.54(p).
G. Change Control
The NRC is proposing to amend the requirements for controlling
changes to the physical security plan in Sec. 50.54(p) by adding new
paragraph (p)(5). Proposed Sec. 50.54(p)(5) would apply to all
licensees who use the alternative physical security requirements of
Sec. 73.55(s). This proposal would require that the applicable
requirements proposed under Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(ii) continue to be met if
a licensee makes a change to plant features or becomes aware of a
change to offsite support resources described in the site-specific
analysis required by proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iv). In such cases, the
licensee would need to consider the effect of the change on the
analysis. The licensee would also need to amend the information in the
physical security plan prepared under Sec. 50.34(c) or Sec. 52.79(a)
to describe how the change continues to meet the requirements in
proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(ii), as applicable.
H. Regulatory Requirements for Documentation and Technical Analysis
Proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iii) would require the identification
and documentation of the alternative security requirements being
implemented as part of the physical protection program and
demonstration of how the requirements set forth in Sec. 73.55 are met
when one or more of the selected alternatives are used.
Proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iv) would require a technical analysis
be performed to demonstrate eligibility to use the alternative physical
security requirements. This technical analysis can use information from
both the safety analysis and the target set identification process to
support a finding of eligibility. This technical analysis would be
separate from the documentation in a licensee's physical security plan
describing how the licensee plans to implement any alternative physical
security requirements as part of its physical protection program. Under
proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iv), the licensee would be required to
maintain the technical analysis until the certifications required by
Sec. 50.82(a)(1) or Sec. 52.110(a) have been submitted. Proposed
Sec. 50.34(c)(4) and Sec. 52.79(a)(35)(iii) would require each
applicant electing to apply an alternative in Sec. 73.55(s)(2) to
provide a description of the technical analysis required by Sec.
73.55(s)(1)(iv). However, the technical analysis itself does not have
to be submitted to the NRC for review and approval but would be subject
to audit or inspection.
IV. Specific Requests for Comment
The NRC is seeking advice and recommendations from the public on
the proposed rule. We are particularly interested in comments and
supporting rationale from the public on the following:
(1) Some advanced reactors may have designs that are significantly
different from the current operating large LWRs. These large LWRs must
meet the requirement found in Sec. 73.55(b)(3) for preventing
``significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.'' The NRC is
proposing that advanced reactors meet a new technology-inclusive
requirement that would prevent a ``significant release of radionuclides
from any source.''
(a) If non-LWRs and SMRs should use a different requirement, then
what other suitable requirement besides preventing ``a significant
release of radionuclides from any source'' could be applicable to SMRs
and non-LWRs? Please provide the basis for your response.
(b) The NRC also considered using a more specific technology-
inclusive requirement, such as the dose reference values currently
found in Sec. Sec. 50.34(a)(1)(ii)(D) and 52.79(a)(1)(vi). How could
the NRC implement the use of such a dose-based requirement (e.g.,
offsite dose reference values) in the context of evaluating physical
security for a site? If there should be alternative value(s) (such as a
different dose-based or safety-based value(s)), what would be a
suitable alternative value(s)? Please provide the basis for your
response.
(2) The NRC is not proposing a hybrid approach that would allow a
licensee to rely on a combination of onsite armed responders and law
enforcement or other offsite armed responders to implement the
licensee's protective strategy. Why should or shouldn't the NRC
establish requirements and supporting guidance to allow for such a
hybrid approach? What changes are necessary to the proposed rule and
supporting guidance to address potential hybrid approaches? Please
provide the basis for your response.
(3) The NRC recognizes that allowing licensees to rely entirely or
partially on law enforcement, rather than onsite armed responders, to
interdict and neutralize threats up to and including the DBT of
radiological sabotage, is a novel approach to meeting the performance
objectives in Sec. 73.55(b). Has the NRC adequately addressed the
uncertainties associated with the proposed requirements at 10 CFR
73.55(s)(2)(ii)? Please provide the basis for your response.
(4) Some advanced reactors may have design characteristics or
engineered safety features that would contribute to the ability of a
designer to show that the criteria in proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1) are
met. However, the NRC is not currently proposing to add any submittal
requirements in this regard for standard design certification
applications under subpart B to 10 CFR part 52. What would be the
potential benefits and challenges if the NRC were to add optional
submittal requirements on such design characteristics or engineered
safety features to Sec. 52.47, ``Contents of applications; technical
information,'' similar to those for emergency plans for early site
permit applicants in Sec. 52.17(b)(2) and (3)? To what extent should
the NRC consider security matters resolved under Sec. 52.63(a)(5) for
a standard design certification when the information that would be
required to show that the criteria in proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1) are
met is provided by a design certification applicant and reviewed by the
NRC as part of the certification process?
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
The following paragraphs describe the specific changes within this
rulemaking.
Sec. 50.34 Contents of Applications; Technical Information
This proposed rule would add a new paragraph (c)(4) to add a
submission requirement that licensees of SMRs and non-LWRs electing to
use one or more
[[Page 65235]]
alternative security requirements in Sec. 73.55(s)(2) must provide a
description of the technical analysis required under Sec. 73.55(s)(1)
when submitting the application documentation required under Sec.
50.34.
Sec. 50.54 Conditions of Licenses
This proposed rule would add a new paragraph (p)(5) to add change
control requirements that licensees of SMRs and non-LWRs must follow
when there is a change that impacts the documentation required under
Sec. 73.55(s).
Sec. 52.79 Contents of Applications; Technical Information in Final
Safety Analysis Report
This proposed rule would add a new paragraph (a)(35)(iii) to add a
submission requirement that licensees of SMRs and non-LWRs electing to
use one or more alternative security requirements in Sec. 73.55(s)(2)
must provide a description of the technical analysis required under
Sec. 73.55(s)(1) when submitting the application documentation
required under Sec. 52.79.
Sec. 73.55 Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities
in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage
This proposed rule would remove and reserve paragraph (a)(5) as it
is no longer relevant since Tennessee Valley Authority now has an
operating license for Watts Bar Unit 2 and no longer holds a
construction permit.
This proposed rule also would revise paragraph (b)(3) introductory
text, revise paragraph (b)(9)(i) introductory text, add paragraphs
(b)(9)(i)(A) and (B), and revise paragraphs (e)(10)(i)(A) and (k)(1) to
add requirements for SMRs and non-LWRs and to distinguish between SMRs
and other LWRs.
This proposed rule also would add new paragraph (s) containing the
alternative physical security requirements for SMRs and non-LWRs.
Proposed paragraph (s) would include both the general and specific
requirements that must be met by those licensees who elect to apply the
alternatives to physical security requirements.
Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73--General Criteria for Security Personnel
This proposed rule would revise paragraph VI.A.1 to add
requirements for SMRs and non-LWRs and to distinguish between SMRs and
other LWRs.
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), as amended at 5
U.S.C. 601 et seq., requires that agencies consider the impact of their
rulemakings on small entities and, consistent with applicable statutes,
consider alternatives to minimize these impacts on the businesses,
organizations, and government jurisdictions to which they apply.
In accordance with the Small Business Administration's (SBA's)
regulation at 13 CFR 121.903(c), the NRC has developed its own size
standards for performing an RFA analysis and has verified with the SBA
Office of Advocacy that its size standards are appropriate for NRC
analyses. The NRC size standards at 10 CFR 2.810, ``NRC size
standards,'' are used to determine whether an applicant or licensee
qualifies as a small entity in the NRC's regulatory programs. Section
2.810 defines the following types of small entities:
A small business is a for-profit concern and is a--(1) Concern that
provides a service or a concern not engaged in manufacturing with
average gross receipts of $8.0 million or less over its last 5
completed fiscal years; or (2) Manufacturing concern with an average
number of 500 or fewer employees based upon employment during each pay
period for the preceding 12 calendar months.
A small organization is a not-for-profit organization which is
independently owned and operated and has annual gross receipts of $8.0
million or less.
A small governmental jurisdiction is a government of a city,
county, town, township, village, school district, or special district
with a population of less than 50,000.
A small educational institution is one that is--(1) Supported by a
qualifying small governmental jurisdiction; or (2) Not State or
publicly supported and has 500 or fewer employees.
Number of Small Entities Affected
The NRC is currently not aware of any known small entities as
defined in Sec. 2.810 that are planning to apply for an advanced
nuclear reactor construction permit or operating license under 10 CFR
part 50 or an early site permit or combined license under 10 CFR part
52, and would be impacted by this proposed rule. Based on this finding,
the NRC has preliminarily determined that the proposed rule would not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
Economic Impact on Small Entities
Depending on how the ownership and/or operating responsibilities
for such an enterprise were structured, applicants for an advanced
nuclear reactor rated 8 megawatts electric (MWe) or less could
conceivably meet the definition of small entities as defined by Sec.
2.810. Owners that operate power reactors rated greater than 8 MWe
could generate sufficient electricity revenue that exceeds the gross
annual receipts limit of $8 million, assuming a 90 percent capacity
factor and the June 2021 U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information
Administration U.S. average price of electricity to the ultimate
customer for all sectors of 11.3 cents per kilowatt-hour.
Although the NRC is not aware of any small entities that would be
affected by the proposed rule, there is a possibility that future
applications for an advanced nuclear reactor permit or license could be
submitted by small entities who plan to own and operate an advanced
nuclear reactor rated 8 MWe or less. Advanced nuclear reactors that are
rated 8 MWe or less would most likely be used to support electrical
demand for military bases or small remote towns, or would provide
process heat for a variety of industrial applications (e.g.,
desalination, oil refining, hydrogen production), so they would not
directly compete with larger advanced nuclear reactors that would
typically produce electricity for the grid. As a result of these
differing purposes, the NRC would expect that small and large entities
would not be in direct competition with each other.
Therefore, the NRC preliminarily concludes that this proposed rule
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities.
Request for Comments
The NRC is seeking comments on both its initial RFA analysis and on
its preliminary conclusion that this proposed rule would not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities
because of the likelihood that most expected applicants would not
qualify as a small entity. Additionally, the NRC is seeking comments on
its preliminary conclusion that if a small entity were to submit an
advanced nuclear reactor application, the small entity would not incur
a significant economic impact as it would most likely not be in
competition with a large entity.
Any small entity that could be subject to this regulation that
determines, because of its size, it is likely to bear a
disproportionate adverse economic impact should notify the Commission
of this opinion in a comment that indicates--
1. The applicant's size and how the proposed regulation would
impose a
[[Page 65236]]
significant economic burden on the applicant as compared to the
economic burden on a larger applicant;
2. How the proposed regulations could be modified to take into
account the applicant's differing needs or capabilities;
3. The benefits that would accrue or the detriments that would be
avoided if the proposed regulations were modified as suggested by the
applicant;
4. How the proposed regulation, as modified, would more closely
equalize the impact of NRC regulations or create more equal access to
the benefits of Federal programs as opposed to providing special
advantages to any individual or group; and
5. How the proposed regulation, as modified, would still adequately
demonstrate compliance with the NRC's obligations under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
VII. Regulatory Analysis
The NRC has prepared a draft regulatory analysis for this proposed
rule. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives
considered by the NRC. The conclusion from the analysis is that this
proposed rule and associated guidance would result in net averted costs
to the industry and the NRC of $80,000 using a 7-percent discount rate
and $130,000 using a 3-percent discount rate due to reductions in
exemption requests. The NRC requests public comment on the draft
regulatory analysis, which is available as indicated in the
``Availability of Documents'' section of this document. Comments on the
draft regulatory analysis may be submitted to the NRC as indicated
under the ADDRESSES caption of this document.
VIII. Backfitting and Issue Finality
This proposed rule would contain new alternative requirements for
advanced reactor applicants and licensees. Because these alternative
requirements would not be imposed upon current applicants and licensees
and would not prohibit any applicant or licensee from following
existing requirements, the proposed requirements would not constitute
backfitting under 10 CFR 50.109, ``Backfitting,'' or affect the issue
finality of any approval issued under 10 CFR part 52.
As described in the ``Availability of Guidance'' section of this
document, the NRC has prepared two draft regulatory guides (DG-5072 and
DG-5071) that, if finalized, would provide guidance on methods
acceptable to the NRC for complying with this proposed rule. Issuance
of these DGs in final form would not constitute backfitting under Sec.
50.109 and would not affect the issue finality of any approval issued
under 10 CFR part 52. As discussed in the ``Implementation'' section of
the DGs, the NRC staff does not intend to use the proposed guidance in
these draft regulatory guides to support NRC staff actions in a manner
that would constitute backfitting or affect the issue finality of an
approval under 10 CFR part 52. If, in the future, the NRC seeks to
impose positions stated in the DGs in a manner that would constitute
backfitting or forward fitting or affect the issue finality of an
approval under 10 CFR part 52, the NRC would need to make the showing
as required in Sec. 50.109 for backfitting or Management Directive
8.4, ``Management of Backfitting, Forward Fitting, Issue Finality, and
Information Requests,'' for forward fitting, or address the regulatory
criteria in the applicable issue finality provision, as applicable,
that would allow the NRC to impose the position.
IX. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
The NRC is following its CER process by engaging with external
stakeholders throughout this proposed rule and related regulatory
activities. Public involvement has included: (1) the publication of the
regulatory basis for public comment (84 FR 33861; July 16, 2019); (2)
numerous public meetings to examine potential performance-based
alternatives and eligibility requirements for physical security for
advanced reactors; and (3) the publication of numerous versions of
preliminary proposed rule language. The NRC is considering holding
additional public meetings during the remainder of the rulemaking
process.
In parallel with this proposed rule, the NRC is issuing two draft
implementing guidance documents for comment to support informed
external stakeholder feedback. Section XIII, ``Availability of
Guidance,'' of this document describes how the public can access the
draft implementing guidance.
In addition to the questions in the ``Specific Requests for
Comments'' section of this document, the NRC is requesting CER feedback
on the following questions:
1. In light of any current or projected CER challenges, does the
proposed rule's effective date provide sufficient time to implement the
new proposed requirements, including changes to programs, procedures,
and the facility? Please explain your answer.
2. If CER challenges currently exist or are expected, what should
be done to address them? For example, if more time is required for
implementation of the new requirements, what period of time is
sufficient?
3. Do other (NRC or other agency) regulatory actions (e.g., orders,
generic communications, license amendment requests, inspection findings
of a generic nature) influence the implementation of the proposed
rule's requirements? Please explain your answer.
4. Are there unintended consequences? Does the proposed rule create
conditions that would be contrary to the proposed rule's purpose and
objectives? If so, what are the unintended consequences, and how should
they be addressed?
5. Please comment on the NRC's cost and benefit estimates in the
regulatory analysis that supports this proposed rule. The draft
regulatory analysis is available as indicated under the ``Availability
of Documents'' section of this document.
X. Plain Writing
The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-274) requires Federal
agencies to write documents in a clear, concise, and well-organized
manner. The NRC has written this document to be consistent with the
Plain Writing Act as well as the Presidential Memorandum, ``Plain
Language in Government Writing,'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR
31885). The NRC requests comment on this document with respect to the
clarity and effectiveness of the language used.
XI. Environmental Assessment and Proposed Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in
subpart A, ``National Environmental Policy Act--Regulations
Implementing Section 102(2),'' of 10 CFR part 51, ``Environmental
Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory
Functions,'' that this proposed rule, if adopted, would not be a major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, and an environmental impact statement is not required.
This environmental assessment focuses on those aspects of the proposed
alternative physical security requirements for advanced reactors
rulemaking where there is a potential for the revised requirements to
affect the environment. The NRC has concluded that there would be no
significant environmental impacts associated with implementation of the
alternative security requirements for advanced reactors rule
requirements for the following reasons:
[[Page 65237]]
(1) The proposed alternative requirements for physical security
would provide an equivalent level of security as that for existing
requirements; therefore, the environmental impacts would be the same
because the resulting risk is similar.
(2) The proposed revision to the power reactor security
requirements would not result in changes to the design basis
requirements for the protection of structures, systems, and components
(SSCs) in potential licensee facilities that function to limit the
release of radiological effluents during and following postulated
accidents. All the SSCs associated with limiting the releases of
offsite radiological effluents would therefore continue to be able to
perform their functions, and as a result, there would be no significant
radiological effluent impact such that there would be no significant
release of radionuclides from any source.
(3) The standards and requirements applicable to radiological
releases and effluents would not be affected by the limited-scope
security rulemaking and would continue to apply to the SSCs affected by
the limited-scope security rulemaking.
The principal effect of this action is to revise the governing
regulations pertaining to power reactor security, create alternative
security requirements applicable to a certain class of licensees, and
add additional requirements consistent with the rulemaking objective
and requirements discussed earlier. None of the proposed revisions
would affect current occupational exposure requirements; consequently,
the NRC has concluded that this action would have no impact on
occupational exposure.
For the reasons discussed above, the action would not significantly
increase the probability or consequences of accidents, nor result in
changes being made in the types of any effluents that may be released
offsite, and there would be no significant increase in occupational or
public radiation exposure.
With regard to potential non-radiological impacts, implementation
of the rule requirements would not have a significant impact on the
environment. The proposed requirements would not affect any historic
sites and would not affect non-radiological plant effluents. Therefore,
there would be no significant non-radiological environmental impact
associated with this proposed rule. Accordingly, the NRC finds that
there would be no significant environmental impact associated with this
rulemaking action.
The determination of this environmental assessment is that there
would be no significant effect on the quality of the human environment
from this action. Public stakeholders should note, however, that
comments on any aspect of this environmental assessment may be
submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES caption. The
environmental assessment is available as indicated under the
``Availability of Documents'' section.
The NRC has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and this
proposed rule to all State Liaison Officers and has requested comments.
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act
This proposed rule contains new or amended collections of
information contained in parts 50, 52, and 73 that are subject to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The
collections of information have been submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget for review and approval. Existing collections of
information were approved by the Office of Management and Budget,
approval numbers 3150-0002 (part 73), 3150-0011 (part 50), and 3150-
0151 (part 52).
Type of submission, new or revision: Revision.
The title of the information collection: Alternative Physical
Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors.
The form number if applicable: Not Applicable.
How often the collection is required or requested: On occasion.
Who will be required or asked to respond: Future power reactor
licensees or license applicants for advanced reactors to be licensed
under 10 CFR part 50 or part 52.
An estimate of the number of annual responses: 6.66 (0.33 for part
50, 3 for part 52, and 3.33 for part 73).
The estimated number of annual respondents: 3.33 (0.33 for part 50,
3 for part 52, and 3.33 for part 73).
An estimate of the total number of hours needed annually to comply
with the information collection requirement or request: 9,437 (110 for
part 50, 1002 for part 52, and 8,325 for part 73).
Abstract: The proposed rule would result in changes in reporting,
recordkeeping, and third-party disclosure requirements relative to
existing rules by providing certain alternative, risk-informed,
performance-based physical security requirements for advanced reactors.
Part 50 and part 52 advanced reactor applicants electing to apply an
alternative would need to provide a description of the technical
analysis required by proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iv) relating to
eligibility to use the alternatives. These part 50 and part 52 advanced
reactor applicants or licensees would also be required to maintain a
record of the technical analysis related to eligibility until the
certifications of cessation of operations required by Sec. Sec.
50.82(a)(1) or 52.110(a) have been docketed by the NRC. In addition,
advanced reactor licensees relying on law enforcement or other offsite
armed responders would need to provide information about the facilities
and make available periodic training to these responders. Finally, the
proposed rule would require part 50 and part 52 advanced reactor
licensees, who make changes to or are aware of changes to plant
features or offsite support resources described in the technical
analysis, to prepare a report that considers the effect of changes and
describes how the licensee will continue to meet the requirements in
proposed Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(ii) that the consequences of a postulated
radiological release that results from a postulated security-initiated
event does not exceed the offsite dose reference values. These new and
amended information collections would be required to ensure the NRC has
the necessary information to review whether an applicant or licensee
has demonstrated they have met the proposed requirement to be eligible
to use any of the proposed alternatives. The collected information
would also be used by the NRC to review and determine whether the
applicant or licensee has met the requirements for each elected
alternative.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is seeking public comment on
the potential impact of the information collection(s) contained in this
proposed rule and on the following issues:
1. Is the proposed information collection necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the NRC, including whether the
information will have practical utility? Please explain your response.
2. Is the estimate of the burden of the proposed information
collection accurate? Please explain your response.
3. Is there a way to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of
the information to be collected? Please explain your response.
4. How can the burden of the proposed information collection on
respondents be minimized, including the use of automated collection
techniques or other forms of information technology?
A copy of the OMB clearance package and proposed rule is available
in ADAMS under Accession Nos.
[[Page 65238]]
ML22131A161, ML22131A167, ML21334A009, and ML21334A003 or may be viewed
free of charge by contacting the NRC's Public Document Room reference
staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737, or by email to
[email protected]. You may obtain information and comment
submissions related to the OMB clearance package by searching on
https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2017-0227.
You may submit comments on any aspect of these proposed information
collection(s), including suggestions for reducing the burden and on the
above issues, by the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2017-0227.
Mail comments to: FOIA, Library, and Information
Collections Branch, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Mail Stop:
T6-A10M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001
or by email to [email protected] or to the OMB reviewer at:
OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (3150-0011, -0151, -
0002), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725
17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503.
Submit comments by September 9, 2024. Comments received after this
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC staff
is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before
this date.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting
or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control
number.
XIII. Availability of Guidance
The NRC is issuing for public comment draft guidance for the
implementation of the proposed requirements in this rulemaking: DG-
5072, ``Guidance for Alternative Physical Security Requirements for
Small Modular Reactors and Non-Light-Water Reactors.'' DG-5072 is
available at https://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-
2017-0227.
DG-5071, ``Target Set Identification and Development for Nuclear
Power Reactors,'' contains Official Use Only--Security Related
Information (OUO-SRI) and is withheld from public disclosure. This DG
may be made available to those affected stakeholders who have
established a need-to-know. For access to DG-5071, contact the
individuals listed for guidance information in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.
DG-5072, ``Guidance for Alternative Physical Security Requirements for
Small Modular Reactors and Non-Light-Water Reactors''
This draft regulatory guide describes an approach that the NRC
staff considers acceptable to develop the radiological consequence
analysis required to demonstrate eligibility for the use of any
alternative physical security requirement listed under Sec.
73.55(s)(2). This analysis is performed by the applicant or licensee to
determine radiation doses at the exclusion area boundary and the outer
boundary of the low population zone from postulated radiological
releases as a result of a postulated security-initiated event. This
draft regulatory guide includes a description of an acceptable approach
for demonstrating the ability to meet the requirements set forth in
Sec. 73.55 with the identified alternative physical security
requirements incorporated into the security plans. This draft
regulatory guide also provides a description of acceptable
implementation guidance for each physical security alternative listed
under Sec. 73.55(s)(2), including guidance for licensees to provide
information and conduct training and exercises with offsite law
enforcement.
DG-5071, ``Target Set Identification and Development for Nuclear Power
Reactors''
This draft regulatory guide describes an approach that the NRC
staff considers acceptable for applicant or licensee analysis,
development, documentation, and evaluation of target set elements and
target sets. This includes operator actions and mitigative measures
that may be credited to prevent: (1) the target set's high-level
objective, (2) significant core damage or (3) loss of spent fuel
coolant and exposure of spent fuel for large LWRs, and to prevent
significant release of radionuclides from any source for SMRs and non-
LWRs.
XIV. Public Meeting
The NRC may conduct a public meeting on the proposed rule for the
purpose of describing the proposed rule and implementation guidance to
the public and answering questions from the public on the proposed rule
and implementation guidance.
The NRC will publish a notice of the public meeting's location,
time, and agenda on the NRC's public meeting website at least 10
calendar days before the meeting. Stakeholders should monitor the NRC's
public meeting website for information about the public meeting at:
https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/index.cfm.
XV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as
indicated.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAMS Accession No/Federal
Document Register Citation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SRM-SECY-18-0076, ``Options and ML18324A478.
Recommendations for Physical Security for
Advanced Reactors,'' November 19, 2018.
SECY-22-0072, ``Proposed Rulemaking: ML21334A004.
Alternative Physical Security Requirements
for Advanced Reactors (RIN 3150-AK19),''
August 2, 2022.
SRM-SECY-22-0072, ``Staff Requirements-- ML24170A753 (Package).
Proposed Rulemaking: Alternative Physical
Security Requirements for Advanced
Reactors (RIN 3150-AK19),'' June 18, 2024.
Draft Environmental Assessment for the ML24178A374.
Proposed Rule--Advanced Reactor Security
Requirements, Docket No. NRC-2017-0227,
July 2024.
Draft Regulatory Analysis for the Proposed ML24178A372.
Rule: Alternative Physical Security
Requirements for Advanced Reactors, July
2024.
OMB Clearance Package...................... ML21334A009, ML22131A161,
ML22131A167.
DG-5072, ``Guidance for Alternative ML20041E037.
Physical Security Requirements for Small
Modular Reactors and Non-Light-Water
Reactors,'' July 2024.
NCP-2002-003 Non-concurrence on the ML22161A919.
Proposed Rule, April 28, 2022.
Policy Statement on the Regulation of 51 FR 24643.
Advanced Reactors, July 8, 1986.
[[Page 65239]]
Policy Statement on the Regulation of 73 FR 60612.
Advanced Reactors, October 14, 2008.
SECY-10-0034, ``Potential Policy, ML093290268.
Licensing, and Key Technical Issues for
Small Modular Nuclear Reactor Designs,''
March 28, 2010.
SECY-11-0184, ``Security Regulatory ML112991113.
Framework for Certifying, Approving, and
Licensing Small Modular Nuclear Reactors
(M110329),'' December 29, 2011.
NEI White Paper, ``Proposed Physical ML17026A474.
Security Requirements for Advanced Reactor
Technologies,'' December 14, 2016.
NRC ``Draft White Paper on Potential ML17333A524.
Changes to Physical Security Requirements
for Small Modular and Advanced Reactors,''
November 2017.
Regulatory Basis for the Physical Security 84 FR 33861.
of Advanced Reactors, July 16, 2019.
Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A144.
from Jordan Lewis, August 14, 2019.
Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A150.
from Pia Jensen, August 14, 2019.
Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A159.
from Alan Medsker, August 14, 2019.
Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A166.
from Pia Jensen, August 15, 2019.
Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A171.
from Pia Jensen, August 15, 2019.
Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A180.
from Phillip Hammond (NuScale Power, LLC),
August 15, 2019.
Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A184.
from Michael D. Tschiltz (Nuclear Energy
Institute), August 15, 2019.
Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A186.
from Edwin Lyman (Union of Concerned
Scientists), August 15, 2019.
Regulatory Basis Public Comment Submission ML19228A192.
from Pia Jensen, August 15, 2019.
Preliminary Proposed Rule Language, April ML20072F620.
13, 2020.
Revised Preliminary Proposed Rule Language, 85 FR 56548.
September 14, 2020.
Revised Preliminary Proposed Rule Language, ML21336A004.
December 14, 2021.
December 13, 2017, Public Meeting Summary.. ML17354B266.
August 8, 2019, Public Meeting Summary..... ML19221B611.
December 12, 2019, Public Meeting Notice... ML19344D035; https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do=details&Code=20191290 90.
NEI Additional Input for the Rulemaking for ML20029E959 (Package).
Physical Security for Advanced Reactors,
January 10, 2020.
February 20, 2020, Periodic Advanced ML20054A703 https://
Reactor Stakeholder Meeting Notice. www.nrc.gov/pmns/
mtg?do=details&Code=202001
35.
April 22, 2020, Public Meeting Notice...... ML20112F411 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do=details&Code=20200250 50.
April 21, 2021, Public Meeting Summary..... ML21183A004.
May 14, 2021, Public Meeting Notice........ ML21124A174 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do=details&Code=20210600 00.
August 17, 2021, Public Meeting Notice..... ML21218A150 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do=details&Code=20211046 46.
September 16, 2021, Public Meeting Notice.. ML21246A143 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do=details&Code=20211155 55.
September 29, 2021, Public Meeting Notice.. ML21260A177 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do=details&Code=20211158 58.
October 19, 2021, Public Meeting Notice.... ML21279A152 https://www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg?do=details&Code=20211310 10.
January 20, 2022, Public Meeting Summary... ML22024A063.
NEI 20-05, ``Methodological Approach and ML20104A306 (Package).
Considerations for a Security Assessment
to Demonstrate Compliance with the
Performance Criteria of 10 CFR
73.55(TBD),'' Draft A, April 10, 2020.
NEI 20-05, ``Methodological Approach and ML20107D894.
Considerations for a Technical Analysis to
Demonstrate Compliance with the
Performance Criteria of 10 CFR
73.55(a)(7),'' Draft B, April 13, 2020.
NEI 20-05, ``Methodological Approach and ML21137A057.
Considerations for a Technical Analysis to
Demonstrate Compliance with the
Eligibility Criteria of 10 CFR
73.55(a)(7),'' Draft D, May 14, 2021.
NRC Letter to NEI regarding May 2020 ML20212L397.
comments, September 17, 2020.
NRC Comments on NEI 20-05, Draft B, March ML21049A029 (Package).
2, 2021.
NRC Letter to NEI ceasing NRC review of ML21307A120.
draft NEI 20-05, November 24, 2021.
Management Directive 8.4, ``Management of ML18093B087 https://
Backfitting, Forward Fitting, Issue www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
Finality, and Information Requests,'' collections/management-
September 20, 2019. directives/volumes/vol-
8.html.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Throughout the development of this rule, the NRC may post documents
related to this rule, including public comments, on the Federal
rulemaking website at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-
2017-0227.
[[Page 65240]]
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 50
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting,
Classified information, Criminal penalties, Education, Emergency
planning, Fire prevention, Fire protection, Intergovernmental
relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalties, Radiation
protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Whistleblowing.
10 CFR Part 52
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Combined license,
Early site permit, Emergency planning, Fees, Inspection, Issue
finality, Limited work authorization, Manufacturing license, Nuclear
power plants and reactors, Probabilistic risk assessment, Prototype,
Reactor siting criteria, Redress of site, Penalties, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Standard design, Standard design
certification.
10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Exports, Hazardous materials transportation,
Imports, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security
measures.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is proposing
to amend 10 CFR parts 50, 52, and 73 as follows:
PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
0
1. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 11, 101, 102, 103,
104, 105, 108, 122, 147, 149, 161, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186,
187, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2014, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135,
2138, 2152, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236,
2237, 2239, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs.
201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, sec. 306 (42 U.S.C. 10226); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332); 44 U.S.C. 3504
note; Sec. 109, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 783.
0
2. Amend Sec. 50.34 by adding paragraph (c)(4) to read as follows:
Sec. 50.34 Contents of applications; technical information.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(4) Each applicant electing to apply an alternative in Sec.
73.55(s)(2) of this chapter must provide a description of the technical
analysis required by Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iv) of this chapter.
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec. 50.54 by adding paragraph (p)(5) to read as follows:
Sec. 50.54 Conditions of licenses.
* * * * *
(p) * * *
(5) A licensee that meets Sec. 73.55(s)(1) of this chapter and
makes changes to or becomes aware of a change to plant features or
offsite support resources described in the technical analysis prepared
under Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iv) of this chapter must consider the effect of
the change(s) on the analysis. The licensee must amend the information
in the application prepared under Sec. 50.34(c)(4) or Sec.
52.79(a)(35)(iii) of this chapter to describe how the licensee
continues to meet the requirements in Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(ii) of this
chapter.
* * * * *
PART 52--LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS
0
4. The authority citation for part 52 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 103, 104, 147, 149,
161, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134,
2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2235, 2236, 2239, 2273, 2282);
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42
U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
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5. Amend Sec. 52.79 by adding paragraph (a)(35)(iii) to read as
follows:
Sec. 52.79 Contents of applications; technical information in final
safety analysis report.
(a) * * *
(35) * * *
(iii) Each applicant electing to apply an alternative in Sec.
73.55(s)(2) of this chapter must provide a description of the technical
analysis required by Sec. 73.55(s)(1)(iv) of this chapter.
* * * * *
PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
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6. The authority citation for part 73 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 147, 149, 161,
161A, 170D, 170E, 170H, 170I, 223, 229, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073,
2167, 2169, 2201, 2201a, 2210d, 2210e, 2210h, 2210i, 2273, 2278a,
2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42
U.S.C. 5841, 5842); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, secs. 135, 141
(42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
Section 73.37(b)(2) also issued under Sec. 301, Public Law 96-
295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
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7. Amend Sec. 73.55 by:
0
a. Removing and reserving paragraph (a)(5);
0
b. Revising paragraph (b)(3) introductory text;
0
c. Revising paragraph (b)(9)(i) introductory text;
0
d. Adding paragraphs (b)(9)(i)(A) and (B);
0
e. Revising paragraphs (e)(10)(i)(A) and (k)(1); and
0
f. Adding paragraph (s).
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Sec. 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) A licensee holding an operating license under the provisions of
part 50 of this chapter or a combined license under the provisions of
part 52 of this chapter for a light-water reactor, other than a small
modular reactor, as defined in Sec. 171.5 of this chapter, must design
the physical protection program to prevent significant core damage and
spent fuel sabotage. A licensee holding an operating license under the
provisions of part 50 of this chapter or a combined license under the
provisions of part 52 of this chapter for a small modular reactor
licensee or a non-light-water reactor licensee, must design the
physical protection program to prevent a significant release of
radionuclides from any source. Specifically, the program must:
* * * * *
(9) * * *
(i) The insider mitigation program must monitor the initial and
continuing trustworthiness and reliability of individuals granted or
retaining unescorted access authorization to a protected or vital area,
and implement defense-in-depth methodologies to minimize the potential
for an insider to adversely affect, either directly or indirectly, the
licensee's capability to prevent the following:
(A) For light-water reactors, other than small modular reactors, as
defined in Sec. 171.5 of this chapter, significant core damage and
spent fuel sabotage.
(B) For small modular reactors, as defined in Sec. 171.5 of this
chapter, or for non-light-water reactors, a significant release of
radionuclides from any source.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(10) * * *
[[Page 65241]]
(i) * * *
(A) Design, construct, install, and maintain a vehicle barrier
system, to include passive and active barriers, at a stand-off distance
adequate to protect personnel, equipment, and systems necessary to
prevent:
(1) For light-water reactors, other than small modular reactors, as
defined in Sec. 171.5 of this chapter, significant core damage and
spent fuel sabotage due to the effects of the design basis threat of
radiological sabotage land vehicle bomb assault.
(2) For small modular reactors, as defined in Sec. 171.5 of this
chapter, or for non-light-water reactors, a significant release of
radionuclides from any source due to the effects of the design basis
threat of radiological sabotage land vehicle bomb assault.
* * * * *
(k) * * *
(1) The licensee shall establish and maintain, at all times,
properly trained, qualified and equipped personnel required to
interdict and neutralize threats up to and including the design basis
threat of radiological sabotage as defined in Sec. 73.1, to prevent:
(i) For light-water reactors, other than small modular reactors, as
defined in Sec. 171.5 of this chapter, significant core damage and
spent fuel sabotage.
(ii) For small modular reactors, as defined in Sec. 171.5 of this
chapter, or for non-light-water reactors, a significant release of
radionuclides from any source.
* * * * *
(s) Alternative physical security requirements.
(1) General requirements.
(i) Applicability. The requirements of this section apply to an
applicant for or holder of a license under part 50 of this chapter or
part 52 of this chapter for a small modular reactor, as defined in
Sec. 171.5 of this chapter, or a non-light-water reactor.
(ii) Eligibility. The applicant or licensee must demonstrate that
the consequences of a postulated radiological release that could result
from a postulated security-initiated event do not exceed the offsite
dose reference values defined in Sec. Sec. 50.34(a)(1)(D) and
52.79(a)(1)(vi) of this chapter.
(iii) Identification and documentation. The applicant or licensee
must identify the specific alternative physical security requirement(s)
it intends to implement as part of its physical protection program and
demonstrate how the requirements set forth in this section are met when
the selected alternative(s) is used.
(iv) Analysis. The applicant or licensee electing to meet one or
more of the alternative security requirements in paragraph (s)(2) of
this section must perform a technical analysis demonstrating how it
meets the criteria in paragraph (s)(1)(ii) of this section. The
licensee must maintain the analysis until submittal of the licensee's
certifications required by Sec. 50.82(a)(1) of this chapter or Sec.
52.110(a) of this chapter.
(2) Specific alternative physical security requirements.
(i) Alternative requirement for armed responders. A licensee that
meets paragraph (s)(1) of this section is relieved from the requirement
for the minimum number of armed responders in paragraph (k)(5)(ii) of
this section.
(ii) Alternative requirements for interdiction and neutralization.
A licensee that meets paragraph (s)(1) of this section and has no armed
response personnel onsite whose primary duty is to respond to,
interdict, and neutralize acts of radiological sabotage:
(A) May rely on law enforcement or other offsite armed responders
to fulfill the interdiction and neutralization functions required by
paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section.
(1) The licensee must maintain the capability to detect, assess,
interdict, and neutralize threats as required by paragraph (b)(3)(i) of
this section.
(2) The licensee must provide adequate delay for threats up to and
including the DBT of radiological sabotage to enable law enforcement or
other offsite armed responders to fulfill the interdiction and
neutralization functions.
(3) The licensee must provide necessary information about the
facility and make available periodic training to law enforcement or
other offsite armed responders who will fulfill the interdiction and
neutralization functions for threats up to and including the DBT of
radiological sabotage.
(4) The licensee must fully describe in the safeguards contingency
plan the role that law enforcement or other offsite armed responders
will play in the licensee's protective strategy when relied upon to
fulfill the interdiction and neutralization capabilities required by
paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section. The description must provide
sufficient detail to enable the NRC to determine that the licensee's
physical protection program provides high assurance of adequate
protection against threats up to and including the DBT of radiological
sabotage.
(5) The licensee must identify criteria and measures to compensate
for the degradation or absence of law enforcement or other offsite
armed responders and propose suitable compensatory measures that meet
the requirements of paragraphs (o)(2) and (3) of this section to
address this degradation.
(B) Is relieved from applying:
(1) The requirements in paragraphs (k)(3) through (7) of this
section and the requirement in paragraph (k)(8)(ii) of this section to
law enforcement responders.
(2) The training and qualification requirements related to armed
response personnel in section VI of appendix B to this part for law
enforcement responders, except for the performance evaluation program
requirements related to armed response personnel in section VI.C.3 of
appendix B to this part, which the licensee shall continue to satisfy
for all armed response personnel, including law enforcement.
(3) The location-related requirements in paragraph (k)(5)(iii) of
this section and in section II.B.3.c.(iv) of appendix C to this part
related to armed responders.
(iii) Alternative requirements for physical barriers. A licensee
that meets paragraph (s)(1) of this section may utilize means other
than physical barriers and barrier systems to satisfy the physical
protection program design requirements of paragraph (e) of this
section. Acceptable means can be any method(s) that accomplishes the
delay and access control functions necessary to allow the licensee to
implement its physical protection program.
(iv) Alternative requirements for onsite secondary alarm stations.
A licensee that meets paragraph (s)(1) of this section:
(A) May have one alarm station located offsite notwithstanding the
requirement in paragraph (i)(2) of this section to have at least two
alarm stations located onsite. The central alarm station must remain
onsite.
(B) Is relieved from the requirement in paragraph (i)(4)(iii) of
this section to construct, locate, and protect the offsite secondary
alarm station to the standards for the central alarm station. The
licensee is not relieved from the requirement in paragraph (i)(4)(iii)
of this section that both alarm stations shall be equipped and
redundant, such that all functions needed to satisfy the requirements
of paragraph (i)(4) of this section can be performed in both alarm
stations.
(v) Alternative requirements for vital areas. A licensee that meets
paragraph (s)(1) of this section:
(A) Is relieved from the requirement in paragraph (e)(9)(v)(D) of
this section
[[Page 65242]]
to designate an offsite secondary alarm station as a vital area.
(B) Is relieved from the requirement in paragraph (e)(9)(vi) of
this section to locate the secondary power supply systems for an
offsite secondary alarm station in a vital area.
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8. Amend appendix B to 10 CFR part 73 by revising paragraph VI.A.1 to
read as follows:
Appendix B to Part 73--General Criteria for Security Personnel
* * * * *
VI. * * *
A. * * *
1. For light-water reactors, other than small modular reactors,
as defined in Sec. 171.5 of this chapter, the licensee shall ensure
that all individuals who are assigned duties and responsibilities
required to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage,
implement the Commission-approved security plans, licensee response
strategy, and implementing procedures, meet minimum training and
qualification requirements to ensure each individual possesses the
knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively perform the
assigned duties and responsibilities. For small modular reactors, as
defined in Sec. 171.5 of this chapter, or for non-light-water
reactors, the licensee shall ensure that all individuals who are
assigned duties and responsibilities required to prevent a
significant release of radionuclides from any source, implement the
Commission-approved security plans, licensee response strategy, and
implementing procedures, meet minimum training and qualification
requirements to ensure each individual possesses the knowledge,
skills, and abilities required to effectively perform the assigned
duties and responsibilities.
* * * * *
Dated: August 5, 2024.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Carrie Safford,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2024-17598 Filed 8-8-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P