[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 146 (Tuesday, July 30, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61211-61222]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-16661]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-100584; File No. SR-OCC-2024-009]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation; 
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by The Options Clearing 
Corporation Regarding Its Backtesting Framework and To Establish a 
Resource Backtesting Margin Charge

July 24, 2024.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Exchange Act'' or ``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice 
is hereby given that on July 11, 2024, The Options Clearing Corporation 
(``OCC'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC'' or 
``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, 
and III below, which Items have been prepared primarily by OCC. The 
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the 
proposed rule change from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the 
Proposed Rule Change

    This proposed rule change would (i) amend OCC's Margin Policy to 
more comprehensively describe OCC's approach to backtesting, including 
how OCC establishes and reviews assumptions underlying OCC's 
backtesting and criteria for escalating backtesting results; (ii) 
provide for a new category of backtesting designed to evaluate whether 
OCC maintains sufficient margin resources to cover its credit exposure 
to the liquidation portfolio of each Clearing Member from the last 
margin collection until the end of the liquidation horizon following 
the default of that Clearing Member with a high degree of confidence 
(as defined below, ``Resource Backtesting''); (iii) implement a 
Resource Backtesting Margin Charge that OCC would collect from Clearing 
Members who experience Resource Backtesting deficiencies that bring 
their margin coverage rates below a 99% coverage target; and (iv) make 
certain conforming changes to other OCC rules to reflect these proposed 
changes.
    Proposed changes to OCC's Rules are contained in Exhibit 5A to File 
No. SR-OCC-2024-009. Proposed changes to OCC's Margin Policy, Model 
Risk Management Policy and STANS Methodology Description are contained 
in confidential Exhibits 5B, 5C, and 5D to File No. SR-OCC-2024-009, 
respectively. Material proposed to be added is marked by underlining 
and material proposed to be deleted is marked with strikethrough text. 
All terms with initial capitalization that are not otherwise defined 
herein have the same meaning as set forth in the OCC By-Laws and 
Rules.\3\
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    \3\ OCC's By-Laws and Rules can be found on OCC's public 
website: https://www.theocc.com/Company-Information/Documents-and-Archives/By-Laws-and-Rules.
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II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis 
for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, OCC included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. OCC has prepared summaries, set forth in sections (A), 
(B), and (C) below, of the most significant aspects of these 
statements.

(A) Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis 
for, the Proposed Rule Change

    OCC is the sole clearing agency for standardized equity options 
listed on national securities exchanges registered with the Commission. 
OCC also clears certain stock loan and futures transactions. In its 
role as a clearing agency, OCC is the guarantor for all contracts 
cleared through OCC; that is, OCC becomes the buyer to every seller or 
the seller to every buyer (or the lender to every borrower and the 
borrower to every lender, in the case of stock loans). As a central 
counterparty, OCC is exposed to credit risk in the event of the failure 
of one its members because OCC is obligated to perform on the contracts 
it clears even when one of its members defaults.
    OCC manages this credit risk through various safeguards to ensure 
that it has sufficient financial resources in the event of a Clearing 
Member failure. For example, OCC periodically collects margin 
collateral from its Clearing Members, which is used to cover the credit 
exposures they individually present to OCC. OCC has established a 
proprietary system, the System for

[[Page 61212]]

Theoretical Analysis and Numerical Simulation (``STANS''), that runs 
various models used to calculate margin requirements, as described in 
the STANS Methodology Description.
    To monitor whether margin requirements calculated by STANS are 
adequate, OCC compares the margin derived from its use of the STANS 
margin models against the amount it could have lost if a Clearing 
Member had failed (``backtesting''). OCC relies on backtesting to 
evaluate the accuracy of its margin models by comparing the calculated 
margin coverage for each margin account against the actual profit and 
loss on the margined portfolios. OCC performs backtesting at least once 
each day using standard predetermined parameters and assumptions. While 
backtesting does not directly establish Clearing Members' margin 
requirements, OCC maintains broad authority under its rules to collect 
additional margin if OCC identifies issues with its margin coverage.\4\ 
In addition, backtesting may reveal opportunities to enhance OCC's 
credit risk management and margin methodology or to adjust model 
parameters.
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    \4\ See OCC Rule 601(c) (``Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this Rule 601, [OCC] may fix the margin requirement for an 
account or any class of cleared contracts at such amount as it deems 
necessary or appropriate under the circumstances to protect the 
respective interests of Clearing Members, [OCC], and the public.''); 
OCC Rule 609(a) (providing OCC's authority to issue intra-day margin 
calls to protect OCC, other Clearing Members and the general public, 
among other reasons); see also OCC Rule 307C (authorizing OCC to 
impose protective measures, including to ``adjust the amount or 
composition of margin'' when, under Rule 307, a Clearing Member 
``presents increased credit or liquidity risk to OCC,'' among other 
reasons).
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    This proposed rule change would make three enhancements to OCC's 
backtesting framework. First, OCC proposes to amend its rule-filed 
Margin Policy to comprehensively describe material aspects of its 
backtesting framework. As a self-regulatory organization, OCC is 
subject to requirements to submit filings with its regulators in 
connection with changes to its rules, which include material aspects of 
the facilities of OCC. OCC has filed as rules certain frameworks and 
policies that describe OCC's approach for credit risk management, 
including OCC's Margin Policy. Specifically, the Margin Policy 
establishes a process for ongoing monitoring, review, testing and 
verification of OCC's risk-based margin system, including by requiring 
OCC to conduct daily backtesting, conduct analysis of exceedances, and 
report results at least monthly through OCC's governance process,\5\ as 
required by SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi).\6\ However, the Margin Policy 
does not currently provide detail concerning (i) how OCC establishes 
and modifies its assumptions for backtesting; or (ii) how OCC 
establishes and reviews criteria and thresholds for escalating 
backtesting results and reviews of backtesting assumptions to 
appropriate decisionmakers. This proposal would amend the Margin Policy 
to provide further detail about those aspects of OCC's backtesting 
framework, as well as a more comprehensive description of the different 
types of backtesting OCC performs and their respective purposes.
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    \5\ See Exchange Act Release No. 82658 (Feb. 7, 2018), 83 FR 
6646, 6649 (Feb. 14, 2018) (SR-OCC-2017-007) (Commission order 
approving OCC's Margin Policy, inclusive of its provision for 
backtesting of each margin account).
    \6\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi).
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    Second, OCC is proposing to add another category of backtesting to 
its backtesting framework. OCC's current backtesting assesses whether 
OCC's margin model achieves a 99% coverage rate for each marginable 
account, which is the level at which OCC's models calculate margin 
requirements.\7\ However, under OCC's By-Laws and Rules,\8\ each 
Clearing Member may have multiple marginable accounts on which OCC 
maintains different liens designed to facilitate Clearing Members' 
compliance with the SEC's customer protection regime.\9\ Accordingly, 
in order to conduct backtesting at the level of each Clearing Member 
Organization, OCC proposes to amend the Margin Policy to add Resource 
Backtesting, as defined below, as a separate category of backtesting 
within OCC's backtesting framework to assess the adequacy of OCC's 
margin resources to cover its credit exposure at the Clearing Member 
level. OCC has designed its Resource Backtesting to assess whether OCC 
maintains sufficient margin resources, among other prefunded financial 
resources,\10\ to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully 
with a high degree of confidence, consistent with SEC Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(4)(i).\11\ Specifically, Resource Backtesting would test whether 
the liquidation portfolio of each Clearing Member from the last margin 
collection until the end of the liquidation horizon following the 
Clearing Member's default achieves a 99% coverage rate, in line with 
the coverage standard for the current backtesting of OCC's margin 
models.
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    \7\ See Exchange Act Release No. 82658, supra note 5, 83 FR at 
6647.
    \8\ See OCC By-Laws, Art. VI, Sec. 3 (providing for the various 
accounts and their respective lien structures).
    \9\ See, e.g., 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(e) (providing for the reserve 
formula used in calculating the amounts of funds a clearing member 
is required to deposit in a special reserve bank account for the 
exclusive benefit of customers, including a debit for ``[m]argin 
required and on deposit with [OCC] for all option contracts written 
or purchased in customer accounts'').
    \10\ Such other prefunded financial resources include, in order 
of contribution within OCC's default waterfall: (i) the Clearing 
Fund deposit of the defaulting Clearing Member, which would be at 
least $500,000; (ii) OCC's skin-in-the-game in the form of OCC's 
Minimum Corporate Contribution and its liquid net assets funded by 
equity in excess of 110% of its Target Capital Requirement (which, 
as of December 31, 2023, was more than $130 million); and (iii) the 
Clearing Fund deposits of non-defaulting Clearing Members (as of 
December 31, 2023, the Clearing Fund was more than $16.7 billion) 
and the EDCP Unvested Balance (i.e., the unvested funds held in 
respect of OCC's Executive Deferred Compensation Plan Trust that OCC 
would be charged on a proportionate basis with the Clearing Fund 
deposits of non-defaulting Clearing Members).
    \11\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(i).
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    Third, OCC proposes to amend its rules to establish a margin add-on 
that OCC would charge a Clearing Member if Resource Backtesting 
coverage for that Clearing Member falls below 99% (``Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge''). Accordingly, OCC's new backtesting 
framework would impact the total margin collected from certain Clearing 
Members depending on the performance of OCC's margin models and the 
activity those members clear through OCC. As discussed further below, 
OCC believes that the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge would help OCC 
ensure it collects margin sufficient to cover its potential future 
exposure to participants in the interval between the last margin 
collection and the close out of positions following a participant 
default, consistent with SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii).\12\
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    \12\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii).
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    In connection with these three backtesting enhancements, OCC would 
also make certain conforming changes to the Model Risk Management 
Policy and STANS Methodology Description to reflect changes in defined 
terms associated with backtesting and changes to the underlying 
procedures.
(1) Purpose
Background
Backtesting Procedures
    STANS is OCC's proprietary risk management system for calculating 
Clearing Member margin requirements.\13\ The STANS

[[Page 61213]]

methodology utilizes large-scale Monte Carlo simulations to forecast 
price and volatility movements in determining a Clearing Member's 
margin requirement.\14\ OCC has conducted daily backtesting of margin 
accounts subject to STANS margining since 2006.
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    \13\ See Exchange Act Release No. 91079 (Feb. 8, 2021), 86 FR 
9410 (Feb. 12, 2021) (File No. SR-OCC-2020-016). OCC makes its STANS 
Methodology Description available to Clearing Members. An overview 
of the STANS methodology is on OCC's public website: https://www.theocc.com/Risk-Management/Margin-Methodology.
    \14\ See OCC Rule 601.
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    In 2014, OCC filed proposed changes to its backtesting 
procedures.\15\ Among other things, the changes included: (1) the 
addition of certain industry-standard statistical tests, including the 
Kupiec Test \16\ and Christoffersen Independence Test; \17\ (2) 
backtesting of hypothetical portfolios (which OCC currently refers to 
as ``Model Backtesting''), in addition to actual portfolios (which OCC 
currently refers to as ``Business Backtesting''), to provide more 
comprehensive insight into the adequacy of the underlying model 
assumptions under market conditions prevailing in the backtesting 
observation periods, as well as stressed market conditions; (3) 
adjustments to the forecasted horizon used for backtesting to better 
reflect the two-day liquidation period (OCC's margin period of risk or 
``MPOR'') used in margin calculations and to provide OCC with a more 
accurate view of the sufficiency of its margin methodology; and (4) 
system changes to give OCC's backtesting staff additional tools to help 
identify the root cause of backtesting exceedances. The Commission 
issued a notice of no objection with respect to those proposed 
changes.\18\
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    \15\ See Exchange Act Release No. 73749 (Dec. 5, 2014), 79 FR 
73673 (Dec. 11, 2014) (SR-OCC-2014-810).
    \16\ The Kupiec Test is a proportion of failures test that 
compares the actual number of exceedances with the number that would 
be expected in light of the confidence level associated with the 
calculation of margin. See Kupiec, P. ``Techniques for Verifying the 
Accuracy of Risk Management Models,'' Journal of Derivatives, v3, 
P73-84. (1995).
    \17\ The Christoffersen Independence Test measures the extent to 
which exceedances are independent of each other. See Christoffersen, 
P. ``Evaluating Interval Forecasts.'' International Economic Review, 
39 (4), 841-862 (1998).
    \18\ See Exchange Act Release No. 75290 (June 24, 2015), 80 FR 
37323 (June 30, 2015) (SR-OCC-2014-810).
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    OCC currently maintains its Model Backtesting and Business 
Backtesting procedures in internal OCC procedures and technical 
documents. Among other things, those procedures address data 
acquisition, application of statistical tests, analyses initiated to 
address root causes of exceedances, reporting of results, annual 
methodology reviews, and issue escalation. The technical documents are 
similar in nature to the margin model whitepapers that support OCC's 
STANS methodology.\19\
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    \19\ As described in the rule filing establishing the STANS 
Methodology Description, the whitepapers describe how the various 
quantitative components of STANS were developed and operate, 
including the various parameters and assumptions contained within 
those components and the mathematical theories underlying the 
selection of those quantitative methods. See Exchange Act Release 
No. 91079, supra note 13, 80 FR at 9410 n.5 and accompanying text. 
The model whitepapers are not filed as rules of OCC.
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Backtesting Framework
    In addition to the procedural documents noted above, OCC considers 
its backtesting framework to include its Margin Policy, among other 
rule-filed documents established after OCC last filed changes to its 
backtesting procedures.\20\ The Margin Policy provides that OCC's 
Financial Risk Management Department (``FRM'') continually evaluates 
the effectiveness of its margin models through daily backtesting of 
each margin account as provided in the Business Backtesting Procedure, 
analyzing in detail all accounts exhibiting losses in excess of 
calculated margin requirements.\21\ The Margin Policy further directs 
OCC's Quantitative Risk Management business unit (``QRM'') to design 
backtests to focus on: (i) satisfying OCC's regulatory obligations; 
(ii) identifying potential opportunities to improve the margin 
methodology; and (iii) identifying trends in exceedances that may be 
indicative of behavioral changes by market participants. In addition, 
the Margin Policy directs QRM to design backtests to find potential 
opportunities to improve OCC's risk-assessment processes, noting that 
problems may arise from both technical and model-related issues. With 
respect to the former, the Margin Policy notes that technical issues 
may arise from corporate actions and special dividends, for example. 
The Margin Policy provides that FRM performs Business Backtesting to 
measure whether the losses observed for a constant set of positions 
over OCC's MPOR were in excess of the total risk charges (i.e., 
aggregate of expected shortfall, stress test charges and add-on 
charges) required for the account. The Margin Policy directs FRM to 
classify any observation in which losses are in excess as an 
exceedance.
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    \20\ For example, the rule-filed STANS Methodology Description 
describes ongoing model performance monitoring and backtesting in 
that document's executive summary, noting that further detail on 
such model monitoring activity is found in the Margin Policy and the 
Model Risk Management Policy. See Exchange Act Release No. 90763 
(Dec. 21, 2020), 85 FR 85788, 85790 n. 18 and accompanying text 
(Dec. 29, 2020) (SR-OCC-2020-016). In addition, the Model Risk 
Management Policy provides that margin models will be monitored 
``according to the Model Backtesting Procedure [and] Business 
Backtesting Procedure,'' among other procedures. See Exchange Act 
Release No. 82473 (Jan. 9, 2018), 83 FR 2271, 2273 (Jan. 16, 2018) 
(SR-OCC-2017-011).
    \21\ See Exchange Act Release No. 82658, supra note 5, 83 FR at 
6648.
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    While the Margin Policy contemplates that backtesting results and 
analyses of backtesting assumptions may require escalation, it does not 
provide for established escalation criteria or thresholds. The absence 
of specific guidance, thresholds or criteria for escalation could lead 
to inconsistencies in the escalation of similar backtesting 
exceedances. For example, the Margin Policy currently directs QRM to 
report identified problems and overall performance to FRM and the Model 
Risk Working Group (``MRWG''),\22\ and that the MRWG determines 
``whether the results require escalation'' to the Management Committee. 
The Margin Policy further provides that QRM presents MRWG monthly 
reporting, or more frequently when determined by MRWG, and quarterly 
reporting that accumulate daily backtesting results and detailed 
descriptions of the accounts that have incurred exceedances, trends and 
causes of the exceedances. As with the escalation of identified 
problems and overall performance, the Margin Policy directs QRM to 
provide notable results from these reviews to the Chief Financial Risk 
Officer (i.e., the head of FRM) and MRWG, and that MRWG determines 
whether ``escalation is warranted'' to the Management Committee, which 
may determine what remedial actions may be taken.\23\ In addition, the 
Margin Policy provides for a monthly review of the parameters and 
assumptions for Business Backtesting, the results of which are reported 
to the MRWG to discuss and escalate issues ``as necessary.'' \24\
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    \22\ The MRWG is a cross-functional group responsible for 
assisting OCC's management in overseeing OCC's model-related risk 
comprised of representatives from relevant OCC business units 
including Quantitative Risk Management, Model Risk Management, and 
Corporate Risk Management.
    \23\ Remedial actions could take various forms including, but 
not limited to, margin add-on charges to account for risk that may 
not be captured appropriately by OCC's margin models, adjustments to 
model parameters, or other changes to OCC's margin models or margin 
methodology, subject to any necessary approvals by OCC's Risk 
Committee, Board of Directors, and regulators.
    \24\ See Exchange Act Release No. 82658, supra note 5, 83 FR at 
6647 (discussing how the backtesting results are ``reported to [the 
MRWG] and may be escalated to OCC's Management Committee'').

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[[Page 61214]]

Proposed Changes
(i) Backtesting Framework
    OCC is proposing amendments to its Margin Policy to describe more 
comprehensively its approach to backtesting, including OCC's:
     backtesting framework, which includes (i) the purpose and 
scope of the backtesting OCC performs and (ii) the assumptions 
underlying OCC's backtesting and the process for reviewing and 
modifying those assumptions; and
     backtesting reporting, including how OCC establishes and 
reviews criteria for escalating exceedances.
    Specifically, OCC would replace the first two paragraphs of the 
section of the Margin Policy that concerns margin monitoring, which 
currently address OCC's Business Backtesting, and a subsection that 
concerns backtesting reporting, with two new subsections: one that more 
comprehensively describes OCC's backtesting framework and another that 
describes backtesting reporting, as described below. The current third 
paragraph of that section, which concerns the monthly review of margin 
model parameters and sensitivity analyses of the margin model, would be 
relocated to its own subsection below the new subsection on backtesting 
reporting with certain edits discussed below related to the review of 
backtesting assumptions and the conditions for more frequent review.
Purpose and Scope of Model Backtesting
    With respect to OCC's current backtesting processes, the new 
backtesting framework subsection in the Margin Policy would provide 
that FRM will continue to conduct daily backtesting of actual and 
hypothetical portfolios to evaluate the performance of its margin 
methodology, as it does today. OCC would refer to such backtesting as 
``Model Backtesting,'' which would distinguish such backtesting from 
the proposed Resource Backtesting discussed below. As such, Model 
Backtesting under the proposed amendments would encompass what OCC 
currently refers to as ``Business Backtesting'' (i.e., backtesting of 
its margin model performance using actual portfolios) and ``Model 
Backtesting'' (i.e., backtesting of its margin model performance using 
hypothetical portfolios). With respect to the latter, the Margin Policy 
would explain that FRM conducts Model Backtesting of hypothetical 
portfolios to target specific aspects of the models that may be masked 
by the backtesting of actual portfolios because margin accounts may 
have thousands of positions in many diverse products. With respect to 
the former, the Margin Policy would explain that OCC conducts Model 
Backtesting of actual portfolios to determine whether the losses 
observed for a constant set of positions over OCC's liquidation horizon 
were in excess of margin requirements forecasted by OCC's margin 
methodology for each margin account. This description aligns with OCC's 
current Business Backtesting practices. Accordingly, OCC would continue 
to conduct Model Backtesting at the level of each marginable account, 
which is the level at which OCC calculates margin requirements. As the 
Margin Policy would explain, OCC conducts Model Backtesting at this 
level because Model Backtesting exceedances potentially indicate issues 
that could be actively impacting OCC's margin requirements for the 
margin accounts. In addition, backtesting at this level is consistent 
with OCC's obligations in its capacity as a derivatives clearing 
organization (``DCO'') registered with the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission.\25\
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    \25\ See 17 CFR 39.13(g)(7)(i)(C) (requiring a DCO to conduct 
daily backtests for ``each account'' held by a clearing member at 
the DCO).
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    The Margin Policy would further provide that FRM conducts Model 
Backtesting, as it does today, to evaluate whether margin requirements 
forecasted by OCC's margin methodology are sufficient to cover the 
realized loss of a portfolio at the maximum exposure estimated to occur 
at the end of the liquidation period with an established single-tailed 
confidence level of at least 99 percent with respect to the estimated 
distribution of future exposure--the coverage standard identified in 
SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii).\26\ This is the regulatory standard that 
OCC's current Business Backtesting was designed to evaluate. The Margin 
Policy would also provide that FRM will classify as an ``exceedance'' a 
daily outcome in which the loss in portfolio value over the applicable 
time horizon is larger in magnitude than what the STANS model 
predicted. In addition, the Margin Policy would explain that Model 
Backtesting is limited to those components of margin requirements that 
capture changes in market risk factors when assessing OCC's compliance 
with SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii).\27\
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    \26\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii).
    \27\ Id.
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    OCC would continue to exclude collateral from Model Backtesting 
that is not modeled by STANS (commonly referred to as ``non-Collateral 
in Margin'' or ``non-CiM'' collateral),\28\ or that does not capture 
changes in market risk factors. OCC's current backtesting analyses are 
not designed to assess the sufficiency of non-CiM collateral, which OCC 
values instead using the more traditional method of fixed collateral 
haircuts.\29\ This limitation reflects that backtesting's purpose is to 
assess the performance of OCC's margin models in calculating margin 
requirements,\30\ as opposed to the performance of other aspects of 
OCC's credit risk management. As such, Model Backtesting would continue 
to exclude collateral that is valued using collateral haircuts outside 
of the STANS margin methodology. In addition, the particular Model 
Backtesting analysis used to assess OCC's compliance with SEC Rule 
17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii) \31\ would exclude certain add-on charges that are 
not tied to changes in market risk factors.\32\ However, as discussed 
below, Resource Backtesting would take into account non-CiM collateral 
and the margin collected through add-on charges not related to market 
risk when assessing the sufficiency of the financial resources OCC 
collects from each Clearing Member. In addition, as discussed below, 
OCC may maintain variations of Model Backtesting for diagnostic or 
informational purposes that include such add-ons.
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    \28\ Following the implementation of STANS in 2006, OCC filed 
and the Commission approved a proposed rule change to include equity 
securities deposited by Clearing Members to satisfy margin 
requirements in STANS margin calculations, referred to as 
``Collateral in Margin'' or ``CiM.'' See Exchange Act Release No. 
58158 (July 15, 2008), 73 FR 42646, 42646-47 (SR-OCC-2007-020). OCC 
implemented CiM, in part, to incentivize Clearing Members to deposit 
risk reducing assets and to better risk manage collateral deposits 
using the more sophisticated STANS treatment versus a fixed haircut 
rate.
    \29\ See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 98101 (Aug. 10, 2023), 
88 FR 55775 (Aug. 16, 2023) (SR-OCC-2022-012) (approving OCC's 
procedures-based approach for setting and adjusting fixed haircuts 
for Government securities and GSE debt securities deposited by 
Clearing Members).
    \30\ See Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act 
Release No. 78961 (Sept. 28, 2016), 81 FR 70786, 70819 (Oct. 13, 
2016) (S7-03-14) (``[B]acktests are conducted with respect to the 
margin model and not the margin resources themselves.''); 17 CFR 
240.17Ad-22(a) ``Backtesting'' (``Backtesting means an ex-post 
comparison of actual outcomes with expected outcomes derived from 
the use of margin models.'').
    \31\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii).
    \32\ For example, OCC may collect additional margin from a 
Clearing Member as a protective measure under Rule 307 when OCC 
determines that the Clearing Member's operational or financial 
condition presents elevated risk to OCC, other Clearing Members, and 
the public.
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Backtesting Assumptions
    The proposed backtesting framework subsection to the Margin Policy 
would

[[Page 61215]]

also provide that FRM maintains assumptions used in backtesting in its 
internal procedures. The existence of backtesting assumptions may be 
inferred from OCC's existing Margin Policy, which provides for their 
review. However, the Margin Policy does not currently identify the 
categories of relevant assumptions, provide for how they are 
established or modified, or explain how assumptions may differ across 
different types of backtesting depending on the purpose of those 
backtesting variants. The amended Margin Policy would provide that the 
assumptions include, but are not limited to, the timing of default, 
liquidation horizon, available resources, lookback period, backtesting 
portfolio, and the confidence level of the tests used to evaluate the 
statistical significance of an exceedance rate.\33\
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    \33\ As addressed in OCC's prior advance notice, OCC employs the 
Kupiec Test and the Christoffersen Independence Test to evaluate 
whether the exceedance rate is larger than the expected value. See 
supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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    In addition, the Margin Policy would explain that OCC may provide 
for backtesting variations for reporting, diagnostic and informational 
purposes, each of which may have different assumptions based on the 
purpose of the backtesting variant. For example, OCC plans to report 
Model Backtesting results for actual portfolios in connection with 
OCC's quantitative disclosures under the Principles for Financial 
Market Infrastructures (``PFMI'')--which OCC discloses in compliance 
with SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(23)--because such Model Backtesting at the 
margin account level aligns with the guidance for such disclosures.\34\
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    \34\ See Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures & 
Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(``CPMI-IOSCO''), Public quantitative disclosure standards for 
central counterparties, at 7 (Feb. 2015), available at https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d125.pdf (providing guidance on disclosure 6.5 
with respect to initial margin backtesting results for margin 
accounts).
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    The Margin Policy would further provide that changes to these 
backtesting assumptions would require escalation by MRWG and OCC's 
Management Committee, with ultimate approval by the Risk Committee. 
These assumptions relate to foundational aspects of OCC's margin 
methodology that may be tied to specific regulatory requirements \35\ 
or modification of which may require proposed rule changes.\36\ 
Accordingly, Board-level approval by the Risk Committee would be 
required to approve any necessary regulatory filing to modify OCC's 
margin methodology. The Margin Policy would further require that FRM 
would prepare and present to MRWG a review of the backtesting 
assumptions more frequently than monthly in the event of triggers 
related to high market volatility, low market liquidity, and 
significant increases or decreases in position size or concentration 
risk (as has been proposed to be defined in the Margin Policy, ``CCA 
Monitoring Thresholds''),\37\ as contemplated by regulation.\38\
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    \35\ For example, with respect to the confidence interval, SEC 
Rules require that OCC's risk-based margin system must be designed 
to calculate margin sufficient to cover the maximum exposure 
estimated to occur in the internal between the last margin 
collection and the close out of positions following a participant 
default with an established single-tailed confidence level of at 
least 99 percent with respect to the estimated distribution of 
future exposure. See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a) ``Potential future 
exposure'', (e)(6)(iii).
    \36\ For example, OCC's rule-filed Margin Policy codifies OCC's 
two-day MPOR assumption. See Exchange Act Release No. 82658, supra 
note 5, 83 FR at 6647-6648 (describing the Margin Policy discussion 
of OCC's two-day risk horizon).
    \37\ See Exchange Act Release No. 99393 (Jan. 19, 2024), 89 FR 
5062, 5066 (Jan. 25, 2024) (SR-OCC-2024-001). These thresholds are 
currently provided in procedures under OCC's Clearing Fund 
Methodology Policy with respect to the stress testing analyses that 
breaches of those thresholds would trigger. See Exchange Act Release 
No. 83406 (June 11, 2018), 83 FR 28018, 28026 (June 15, 2018) (SR-
OCC-2018-008) (``The [Clearing Fund Methodology] Policy would 
require that OCC maintain procedures for determining whether, and in 
what circumstances, such intra-month reviews shall be conducted, and 
would indicate the persons responsible for making the 
determination.''). Pursuant to those procedures, OCC's Stress Test 
and Liquidity Risk Management (``STLRM'') business unit currently 
monitors market activity against these thresholds, which are 
approved by OCC's Stress Test Working Group (``STWG'') and the MRWG.
    \38\ See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi)(C).
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    The Margin Policy would further provide that FRM's written 
procedures may include other triggers for evaluation of backtesting 
assumptions. OCC expects that one of the triggers it would establish 
under this rule would be the implementation of changes to OCC's margin 
methodology that may affect backtesting assumptions. For example, if 
MRWG were to approve a change to OCC's margin methodology in the form 
of a new margin add-on charge that was implemented following approval 
by the Risk Committee and any necessary regulatory filing, MRWG would 
review the backtesting assumptions and associated triggers to determine 
whether that add-on charge should be included in the portfolio 
composition assumption across OCC's backtesting variants, depending on 
their respective purposes.
    The Margin Policy would further provide that changes to the 
triggers for backtesting assumption reviews must be approved by MRWG. 
This is already true with respect to the CCA Monitoring Thresholds that 
trigger backtesting assumption reviews, changes to which must be 
approved by the MRWG and the STWG.\39\ In addition, MRWG approval would 
be required to change any other thresholds MRWG believes would be 
appropriate for triggering a review of backtesting assumptions. In the 
case of other triggers for backtesting assumptions, OCC believes that 
MRWG is the appropriate governing body to establish triggers that go 
beyond those prescribed by regulation because as between MRWG and STWG, 
MRWG is the internal governing body tasked with of its oversight of 
model risk related to margin models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ See supra note 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Backtesting Reporting
    As discussed above, the purpose of the proposed Model Backtesting 
is to provide OCC decisionmakers with timely information about OCC's 
margin coverage and potential opportunities to enhance OCC's credit 
risk management or margin methodology, or to adjust model parameters. 
Currently, the Margin Policy provides for monthly reviews to MRWG. In 
addition, the Margin Policy directs QRM to identify and report problems 
and overall performance to MRWG, which then in turn determines whether 
to escalate the issue to the Management Committee. OCC proposes to 
replace the current subsection that addresses reporting of backtesting 
results with a new subsection that more clearly provides that OCC 
maintains criteria for escalating backtesting results to relevant 
decisionmakers.
    Specifically, the new subsection would provide that FRM will 
maintain escalation criteria for backtesting exceedances according to 
which FRM will, if met, escalate exceedance information to the MRWG, 
Management Committee, or Risk Committee, as applicable. Accordingly, 
the procedures may provide for escalations to different governing 
bodies depending on the nature of the exceedances or issues such 
exceedances may evidence.\40\ The Margin Policy would provide that such 
required escalation criteria would include, but are not limited to: (i) 
thresholds related to the size and number of exceedances for Model 
Backtesting of actual portfolios, (ii) thresholds related to 
statistical tests

[[Page 61216]]

applicable to Model Backtesting of hypothetical portfolios; and (iii) 
thresholds related to the size of an individual Clearing Member's 
Resource Backtesting deficiency and the coverage rate across all 
Clearing Members in the aggregate. For example, OCC anticipates that 
such escalation criteria for Model Backtesting of actual portfolios 
would include an exceedance that is equal to or larger than 50% of the 
applicable Clearing Member's Clearing Fund contribution.\41\ With 
respect to Model Backtesting of hypothetical portfolios, escalation 
criteria would include criteria for escalation of results based on the 
Kupiec Test and Christoffersen Tests (e.g., for the Kupiec Test, when 
the coverage rate of instruments in a category of instruments falls 
below 99% with statistical significance of 90% \42\).
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    \40\ While the proposed change contemplates and allows for a 
tiered escalation approach, OCC anticipates that the escalation 
criteria it would initially implement would require escalation to 
each of the MRWG, Management Committee and Risk Committee when the 
criteria are met.
    \41\ OCC does not intend this example to be a statement that 
establishes or changes any standard, limit or guideline with respect 
to the rights, obligations, or privileges of specified persons or 
the meaning, administration, or enforcement of an existing rule.
    \42\ OCC does not intend this example to be a statement that 
establishes or changes any standard, limit or guideline with respect 
to the rights, obligations, or privileges of specified persons or 
the meaning, administration, or enforcement of an existing rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Outside of the escalation of backtesting exceedances that meet the 
escalation criteria, the Margin Policy would continue to provide for a 
review of all backtesting exceedances or deficiencies on an at-least 
monthly basis. Specifically, the subsection on backtesting reporting 
would provide that at least monthly, FRM will provide the MRWG a 
detailed analysis of any Model Backtesting exceedances or Resource 
Backtesting deficiencies, and a review of the backtesting assumptions. 
In addition, the Margin Policy would provide that FRM will prepare a 
review of assumptions for backtesting more frequently than monthly when 
the CCA Monitoring Thresholds, as discussed above, are breached. In 
addition to the CCA Monitoring Thresholds, the Margin Policy would 
provide that the Backtesting Procedure may identify other triggers 
that, if met, would require FRM to prepare and present to MRWG a review 
of assumptions for backtesting, including, but not limited to, 
implementation of rule changes to OCC's margin methodology that may 
affect backtesting assumptions. Changes to the triggers for review of 
backtesting assumptions must be approved by MRWG.
    The Margin Policy would also provide that QRM conducts an annual 
review of OCC's backtesting framework, including QRM's recommendations 
regarding whether OCC should change any of the backtesting assumptions 
and exceedance escalation criteria. With respect to the escalation 
criteria, the Margin Policy would provide that changes to the 
escalation criteria must be approved by the governing body to which the 
escalation must be made. For example, changes to the criteria for 
escalating exceedances to the Risk Committee must be approved by the 
Risk Committee.\43\ With respect to any proposed changes to the 
backtesting assumptions, the Margin Policy would provide that the MRWG 
would evaluate the results of the annual review and escalate any 
recommended changes to the backtesting framework, including any 
recommended changes to the backtesting assumptions, to the Management 
Committee for consideration. The Management Committee, in turn, would 
report the results of the annual review to the Risk Committee, 
including any changes it believes should be made to OCC's backtesting 
assumptions, which the Risk Committee would be authorized to approve 
for implementation. As part of this annual review process, MRWG, the 
Management Committee and the Risk Committee would also be authorized to 
approve changes to the escalation criteria applicable to each governing 
body, as discussed above. OCC believes these changes would provide 
greater clarity concerning the escalation of backtesting exceedances to 
appropriate OCC decisionmakers.
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    \43\ Because OCC anticipates that the initial escalation 
criteria it would adopt under this proposal would require escalation 
to each of the MRWG, Management Committee and Risk Committee, all 
such escalation criteria will require Risk Committee approval to 
change. See supra note 40. Should the MRWG or Management Committee 
adopt more sensitive escalation criteria for themselves, any change 
to the criteria for escalating to the Risk Committee would continue 
to require Risk Committee approval while the escalation criteria for 
the MRWG and Management Committee would be subject to approval by 
the MRWG or Management Committee, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Resource Backtesting
    In addition to formalizing its Model Backtesting in the Margin 
Policy, OCC proposes to enhance its backtesting framework by 
establishing Resource Backtesting designed to evaluate whether OCC 
maintains sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure 
to the liquidation portfolio of each Clearing Member following the 
default of that Clearing Member until the end of the liquidation 
horizon with a high degree of confidence. OCC would conduct Resource 
Backtesting using actual portfolios at the Clearing Member level. 
Accordingly, while Model Backtesting is conducted at the account level 
at which margin requirements are calculated under the STANS 
methodology, Resource Backtesting would consider OCC's credit exposure 
to a Clearing Member across that member's marginable accounts.
    Backtesting at the Clearing Member level would not be as simple as 
aggregating profit and loss (``P&L'') and margin resources across each 
marginable account maintained by a Clearing Member because OCC's By-
Laws and Rules provide OCC with different types of liens over different 
types of accounts. For example, a surplus in a securities customer 
account, for which OCC maintains a restricted lien, may not be used to 
offset a loss in the member's firm account.\44\ In contrast, a surplus 
in the member's firm account, for which OCC maintains a general lien, 
could be used to offset losses in any of the member's other 
accounts.\45\ OCC would consider the liens on a particular account when 
netting deficits and surpluses across account types to ensure that 
surpluses in an account over which OCC maintains a restricted lien do 
not offset losses in another account for purposes of assessing the 
sufficiency of OCC's financial resources to cover the default of a 
Clearing Member.
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    \44\ See By-Law Art. VI Sec.  3(e).
    \45\ See, e.g., OCC Rule 1104(e) (clarifying, for the avoidance 
of doubt, that margin assets in a firm lien account may be applied 
to cover losses in a segregated futures account).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Resource Backtesting would also take into account the value of 
other margin resources collected from a Clearing Member available to 
address default losses, including non-CiM margin collateral and certain 
margin add-ons. Conversely, OCC would exclude the Clearing Fund deposit 
of the applicable Clearing Member as a prefunded financial resource of 
that Clearing Member under Resource Backtesting.\46\

[[Page 61217]]

In addition, such margin resources would be limited to required 
resources, and would therefore exclude any margin collateral held by 
OCC in excess of a Clearing Member's required margin.\47\ As discussed 
above, these details about the composition of the Resource Backtesting 
portfolios would be backtesting assumptions that the Margin Policy 
would require FRM to document in its procedures.
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    \46\ OCC considered including, but ultimately determined not to 
include a Clearing Member's Clearing Fund deposit as a financial 
resource for that Clearing Member in Resource Backtesting. The 
Clearing Fund deposit of a defaulting Clearing Member is a prefunded 
financial resource that OCC would use to cover any loss prior to 
charging other resources in the default waterfall, including OCC's 
skin-in-the-game or the mutualized Clearing Fund deposits of non-
defaulting Clearing Members. See OCC Rule 1006(b). Each Clearing 
Member's Clearing Fund deposit is comprised of a $500,000 minimum 
deposit and a variable component that is currently allocated to each 
Clearing Member based predominately on each Clearing Member's margin 
requirement. See OCC Rule 1003. Based on 2023 historic data, each 
Clearing Member would be above the 99% coverage target if the 
Clearing Fund deposit of that Clearing Member was included as a 
resource for Resource Backtesting. However, concerns were raised 
about including such resources in Resource Backtesting because the 
Clearing Fund, in the aggregate, is sized using stressed exposures. 
Accordingly, OCC is proposing to limit Resource Backtesting to 
margin resources.
    \47\ Because a Clearing Member is entitled to withdraw excess 
collateral, limiting Resource Backtesting to required resources 
addresses concerns that a Clearing Member may withdraw any excess 
collateral just prior to its default.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, while Model Backtesting assesses the performance of 
OCC's margin models in calculating margin requirements by evaluating 
P&L for a constant portfolio, Resource Backtesting would be designed to 
determine whether the liquidating value of a Clearing Member's 
portfolios was positive or negative at the end of OCC's liquidation 
horizon. Accordingly, Resource Backtesting would take into account 
observed intraday position changes from the time of the last good 
margin collection until the assumed point of default.
    OCC would assess Resource Backtesting with the expectation that 
exceedances of financial resources would be no more than one percent in 
the lookback period for each Clearing Member (i.e., 99% coverage). To 
distinguish between Model Resource exceedances, OCC would use the term 
``deficiency'' with respect to Resource Backtesting, which would result 
when the prefunded financial resources collected from the Clearing 
Member Organization (``CMO'') would have been insufficient to cover the 
potential loss if the CMO had defaulted. That is, OCC would classify a 
result as a Resource Backtesting deficiency when the liquidating value 
of the CMO's portfolios is negative.
    OCC would integrate Resource Backtesting into the Margin Policy's 
discussion of the backtesting framework and backtesting reporting. The 
purpose and scope of Resource Backtesting, as described above, would be 
added to the backtesting framework subsection. In addition, the Margin 
Policy would provide that FRM will maintain requirements with respect 
to backtesting assumptions, monthly backtesting reviews, and escalation 
criteria for Resource Backtesting deficiencies, and the same governance 
relating to review and changes to assumptions and escalation criteria 
for Model Backtesting would apply to Resource Backtesting. With respect 
to escalation criteria for Resource Backtesting deficiencies, the 
Margin Policy would provide that FRM will maintain written procedures 
that establish criteria including, but not limited to, thresholds 
related to the size of a Resource Backtesting deficiency and the 
coverage rate across all Clearing Members in the aggregate. For 
example, OCC anticipates establishing criteria under this rule to 
escalate when the aggregate cover rate across all Clearing Members 
(including any Resource Backtesting Margin Charges then in effect as a 
resource) falls below 99%.\48\ As another example, OCC anticipates 
establishing a threshold for any verified Resource Backtesting 
deficiency that exceeds the lesser of (i) 50% of the Clearing Member's 
individual Clearing Fund contribution, or, (ii) in the case of Clearing 
Members whose Clearing Fund contributions are in excess of $200 
million, $100 million.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ OCC does not intend this example to be a statement that 
establishes or changes any standard, limit or guideline with respect 
to the rights, obligations, or privileges of specified persons or 
the meaning, administration, or enforcement of an existing rule.
    \49\ OCC does not intend this example to be a statement that 
establishes or changes any standard, limit or guideline with respect 
to the rights, obligations, or privileges of specified persons or 
the meaning, administration, or enforcement of an existing rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iii) Resource Backtesting Margin Charge
    Based on OCC's analysis of Resource Backtesting results using the 
proposed methodology described above, OCC has observed that the 
Resource Backtesting for some Clearing Members falls below a 99% 
coverage threshold \50\ (i.e., greater than two Resource Backtesting 
deficiency days in a rolling 12-month period).\51\ Specifically, based 
on 2023 historical data, approximately 25% of Clearing Members would 
have fallen below the Resource Backtesting coverage target.\52\ The 
size of the third-largest deficiencies ranged from a few hundred 
dollars to an outlier of $35 million, with the majority below $100,000 
and all but a few below $1 million. Collectively, the amounts represent 
less than 0.1% on average of the aggregate margin OCC collects. In 
order to ensure that OCC's margin resources, among other prefunded 
financial resources,\53\ are sufficient to cover the 99% coverage 
target, OCC proposes to establish a Resource Backtesting Margin Charge. 
OCC notes that other covered clearing agencies under the SEC's 
jurisdiction have, with SEC approval, established similar charges 
designed to collect additional resources when a Clearing Member's 
margin coverage falls below the agencies' coverage target.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ OCC has included 2023 results of the proposed Resource 
Backtesting in confidential Exhibit 3A to File No. SR-OCC-2024-009.
    \51\ Based on 250 observation days per year, each observed 
Resource Backtesting deficiency reduces the coverage by 0.4%.
    \52\ See supra note 50.
    \53\ See supra note 46.
    \54\ See Exchange Act Release No. 79167 (Oct. 26, 2016), 81 FR 
75883, 75884 (Nov. 1, 2016) (SR-FICC-2016-006; SR-NSCC-2016-004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The thresholds for applying a Resource Backtesting Margin Charge, 
the method for calculating the charge, and the proposed rule changes 
proposed to reflect this new charge are discussed below.
    Thresholds for Applying the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge
    The Resource Backtesting Margin Charge would only apply to those 
Clearing Members whose 12-month trailing Resource Backtesting falls 
below 99% coverage based on confirmed Resource Backtesting deficiencies 
(i.e., three or more confirmed Resource Backtesting deficiencies over 
the last 12 months). On an at-least monthly basis, OCC would review and 
determine which Clearing Members may be subject to the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge, or whose Resource Backtesting Margin Charge 
amount is subject to change, based on each Clearing Member's trailing 
12-month Resource Backtesting coverage. Resource Backtesting Margin 
Charges would be applied on a daily basis for the applicable accounts 
of the Clearing Member that contributed to the deficiencies. If in a 
subsequent month an affected Clearing Member's trailing 12-month 
backtesting coverage rises above 99%, the Resource Backtesting Margin 
Charge would be removed.
    In conducting this analysis for purposes of identifying Clearing 
Members who should be subject to the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge 
and for determining the amount of the third-largest Resource 
Backtesting deficiency for purposes of calculating the charge, OCC 
would not take into account Resource Backtesting Margin Charges already 
in effect, but would take into account the number and size of 
deficiencies subsequent to the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge 
already applied. For example, if a Clearing Member subject to a 
Resource Backtesting Margin Charge experienced subsequent Resource 
Backtesting deficiencies that were smaller in size than a Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge currently in effect, such deficiencies would 
continue to count towards the overall deficiency count, even if they 
are covered by an existing Resource Backtesting Margin Charge. This 
approach ensures that Clearing

[[Page 61218]]

Members will continue to be subject to a Resource Backtesting Margin 
Charge while three or more deficiencies remain in the look-back period. 
If, in that example, the third-largest deficiency driving the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge fell out of the 12-month look-back period, 
the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge would then be reduced to the 
third largest of the remaining deficiencies, subject to OCC authority 
to adjust the amount as discussed further below. In addition, if a 
Clearing Member subject to the charge were to experience additional 
Resource Backtesting deficiencies that were greater in magnitude than 
the deficiency that had been driving the Resource Backtesting Margin 
Charge, OCC would increase the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge as 
necessary to achieve a 99% coverage target within the rolling 12-month 
lookback based on the methodology for sizing the Resource Backtesting 
Margin Charge discussed below.
Calculating the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge
    The Resource Backtesting Margin Charge would generally be equal to 
the third-largest Resource Backtesting deficiency in the rolling 12-
month lookback period rounded up to the nearest $1,000, subject to 
adjustments as further described below. Setting the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge to cover the third-largest deficiency would 
bring the Clearing Member's margin coverage back in line with OCC's 99% 
coverage target on a lookback basis. The Resource Backtesting Margin 
Charge would generally be allocated proportionally to the Clearing 
Member's accounts contributing to the third-largest Resource 
Backtesting deficiency.
    For Clearing Members with more than three deficiencies, however, 
such additional financial resources as allocated based on the accounts 
driving the third-largest deficiency may not necessarily cover Resource 
Backtesting deficiencies that are lower in dollar amount, but with a 
different allocation of accounts contributing to the remaining 
deficiencies. For example, if a customer account contributed more to 
the third-largest Resource Backtesting deficiency and the Clearing 
Member's firm account (or another account) contributed more to any 
lesser Resource Backtesting deficiency, then a charge allocated 
proportionally to accounts based on the third-largest deficiency may 
not cover the lesser Resource Backtesting deficiencies on a look-back 
basis because funds allocated to a customer account cannot be used to 
offset losses in any other account.\55\ In circumstances when applying 
and allocating the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge based on the 
third-largest deficiency would not bring the Clearing Member above 
OCC's coverage target on a look-back basis, OCC would have authority to 
increase the charge for a particular account in an amount necessary to 
meet the coverage target pursuant to establish procedures, as discussed 
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ In contrast, if the firm account, over which OCC maintains 
a general lien, was the driver of the third-largest deficiency, the 
charge allocated to the firm account can be used to cover a Resource 
Backtesting deficiency with a proportionally greater shortfall 
driven by any other account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with Commission-approved rules of other clearing 
agencies,\56\ OCC would also retain discretion to adjust the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge based on other circumstances (i.e., in 
addition to account for differences in the accounts contributing to a 
Clearing Member's Resource Backtesting deficiencies) that may impact 
the likelihood or estimated size of potential future backtesting 
deficiencies, consistent with achieving OCC's 99% Resource Backtesting 
coverage target. Such other circumstances may include, but are not 
limited to, differences in magnitude of the deficiencies observed over 
the last 12-month period, variability in the Clearing Member's activity 
since the observed deficiencies, cyclicality of observed deficiencies, 
and/or market volatility. MRWG approval would be required to approve 
such other adjustments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See Exchange Act Release No. 79167, supra note 54, 81 FR at 
75884 (``Although the third largest historical backtesting 
deficiency for a Member is used as the Backtesting Charge in most 
cases, [NSCC and FICC] retain[ ] discretion to adjust the charge 
amount based on other circumstances that may be relevant for 
assessing whether an impacted Member is likely to experience future 
backtesting deficiencies and the estimated size of such 
deficiencies.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Establishing the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge in OCC's Rules
    To implement the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge, OCC proposes 
to add OCC Rule 601(h) and amend the Margin Policy. Proposed Rule 
601(h)(1) would provide that OCC may require a Clearing Member to 
deposit additional margin assets to mitigate exposures to OCC that may 
not otherwise be covered by the margin requirements calculated in 
accordance with Rule 601 and OCC's policies and procedures. Rule 
601(h)(1) would further provide that OCC may assess the charge as part 
of the Clearing Member's daily margin requirement, as needed, to enable 
OCC to achieve its Resource Backtesting coverage target. Specifically, 
Rules 601(h)(1) would provide that the Resource Backtesting Margin 
Charge may apply when a Clearing Member has a 12-month trailing 
Resource Backtesting coverage below the 99 percent backtesting coverage 
target.
    With respect to calculation of the charge, Rule 601(h)(2) would 
provide that the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge generally will be 
equal to the third-largest Resource Backtesting deficiency during the 
previous 12 months, rounded up to the nearest $1,000. Like the 
Commission-approved rules of other clearing agencies,\57\ Rule 
601(h)(2) would also provide that OCC may, in its discretion, adjust 
such charge if OCC determines that circumstances particular to a 
Clearing Member's clearance and settlement activity and/or market 
volatility warrant a different approach to determining or applying such 
charge in a manner consistent with achieving OCC's backtesting coverage 
target. As discussed below, the governance concerning exercise of such 
discretion and the factors that may inform it would be addressed in the 
Margin Policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 601(h)(3) would provide that in calculating a Clearing 
Member's Resource Backtesting coverage for purposes of the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge and in calculating the third-largest Resource 
Backtesting deficiency, OCC would not include amounts already collected 
as a Resource Backtesting Margin Charge from that Clearing Member. As 
discussed above, OCC would continue to count future Resource 
Backtesting deficiencies for the purpose of determining whether a 
Clearing Member should remain subject to the charge by reviewing 
whether the Clearing Member would have had Resource Backtesting 
deficiencies had no Resource Backtesting Margin Charge been in effect. 
In addition, OCC would, as part of the at-least monthly review, 
determine the third-largest Resource Backtesting deficiency for 
purposes of increasing or decreasing a charge already in effect without 
including the existing Resource Backtesting Margin Charge as a 
resource. This provision mirrors the rules of other clearing agencies 
filed with the Commission.\58\ However, OCC would, in accordance with 
established procedures, test the sufficiency of the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge against a Resource Backtesting variant that 
includes that charge as a financial resource for

[[Page 61219]]

purposes of: (i) confirming that the charge, as allocated 
proportionally to the accounts contributing to the third-largest 
Resource Backtesting deficiency, would be sufficient to achieve the 99% 
coverage target, and (ii) increasing the Resource Backtesting Margin 
Charge for a particular account that may be contributing a 
proportionally greater amount to other Resource Backtesting 
deficiencies if the coverage target is not met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See Exchange Act Release No. 93678 (Nov. 30, 2021), 86 FR 
69109, 69110 (Dec. 6, 2021) (SR-NSCC-2021-014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 601(h)(4) would further provide a definition of ``Resource 
Backtesting,'' which is not a term otherwise found in the By-Laws and 
Rules. Specifically, Rule 601(h)(4) would provide that for purposes of 
that Rule, ``Resource Backtesting'' means backtesting pursuant to OCC's 
policies and procedures designed to evaluate whether OCC maintains 
sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to the 
liquidation portfolio of each Clearing Member from the last margin 
collection until the end of the liquidation horizon following the 
Clearing Member's default with a high degree of confidence.
    OCC would also amend the section of the Margin Policy that 
addresses margin add-ons to reflect and reference the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge provisions of proposed OCC Rule 601(h). The 
Margin Policy would identify the governance processes related to the 
at-least monthly review of Resource Backtesting deficiencies for 
purposes of imposing or adjusting a Resource Backtesting Margin Charge. 
Specifically, the Margin Policy would provide that FRM would review 
Resource Backtesting results for the purposes of determining whether a 
Clearing Member should be assessed a Resource Backtesting Margin Charge 
and, if so, the amount to be charged. While the review and 
determination would be conducted at-least monthly, a Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge could be applied on an intramonth basis based 
on the daily backtesting results reviewed by FRM.
    The Margin Policy would further provide for the governance with 
respect to applying a Resource Backtesting Margin Charge. Specifically, 
based on the at-least monthly review of the Resource Backtesting 
deficiencies, an FRM Officer \59\ would be authorized to approve \60\ a 
Resource Backtesting Margin Charge equal to the third-largest Resource 
Backtesting deficiency rounded up to the nearest $1,000, excluding any 
Resource Backtesting Margin Charge currently in effect. The Margin 
Policy would further provide that the Resource Backtesting Margin 
Charge generally would be allocated proportionally to the Clearing 
Member's accounts contribution to the third-largest Resource 
Backtesting deficiency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ Officers are identified in OCC's By-Laws. See OCC By-Law 
Art. IV. In this context, an FRM Officer would include any member of 
FRM appointed by the Chief Executive Officer or Chief Operating 
Officer, including a Managing Director, Executive Director or 
Executive Principal. Id. Sec.  9.
    \60\ This type of FRM Officer approval is designed as a control 
to avoid imposing a charge based on erroneous information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To account for the circumstances when a charge allocated based on 
the third-largest Resource Backtesting deficiency may be insufficient 
to increase a Clearing Member's Resource Backtesting to OCC's 99% 
coverage target due to differences in the accounts contributing to 
Resource Backtesting deficiencies, the Margin Policy would identify 
such circumstances as one in which OCC may adjust the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge, consistent with proposed Rule 601(h)(2). In 
addition, the Margin Policy would provide that an FRM Officer would be 
authorized, in accordance with established procedures, to approve an 
additional amount for a particular account necessary to achieve OCC's 
99% coverage target at the Clearing Member level. These established 
procedures would utilize a Resource Backtesting variant that includes 
the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge as a financial resource to test 
whether, after applying the charge, the coverage for that Clearing 
Member would be above OCC's 99% coverage target on a look-back basis. 
If not, FRM would increase the charge for the accounts contributing to 
the third largest of the remaining Resource Backtesting deficiencies 
until the 99% coverage target has been achieved. The FRM Officer's 
authority to approve an adjustment to the Resource Backtesting Margin 
Charge would be limited to such increases. Any other adjustments, 
including any reduction other than a reduction due to a change in the 
third-largest Resource Backtesting deficiency in the rolling 12-month 
lookback period, would require MRWG approval.
    The Margin Policy would further provide that other adjustments to 
the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge may be made with approval of the 
MRWG. As provided in proposed Rule 601(h)(2), such adjustments must be 
consistent with achieving OCC's Resource Backtesting coverage target. 
The Margin Policy would provide that circumstances in which MRWG may 
approve such other adjustments include, but are not limited to, 
differences in magnitude of the deficiencies observed over the last 12-
month period, variability in the Clearing Member's activity since the 
observed deficiencies, cyclicality of observed deficiencies and/or 
market volatility.\61\
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    \61\ These circumstances are consistent with those identified by 
the Commission in approving authority of other clearing agencies to 
adjust similar backtesting margin charges. See Exchange Act Release 
No. 79167, supra note 54, 81 FR at 75884 (``Examples of relevant 
circumstances that would be considered in calculating the final, 
applicable Backtesting charge amount include material differences in 
the three largest backtesting deficiencies observed over the prior 
12-month period, variability in the net settlement activity after 
the collection of the Member's Required Deposit, seasonality in 
observed backtesting deficiencies and observed market price 
volatility in excess of the member's historical VaR charge.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Margin Policy would further provide that to the extent OCC 
implements changes to its margin methodology that affect Clearing 
Members' margin requirements, OCC would reevaluate Resource Backtesting 
coverage within the 12-month lookback period based on the margin 
resources it would have collected under the revised methodology to 
determine whether a Resource Backtesting Margin Charge for a particular 
Clearing Member is warranted and, if so, in what amount. For example, 
if OCC were to begin requiring the collection of additional margin 
resources through another add-on charge designed to capture some aspect 
of market risk not adequately captured under OCC's current models 
(other than the Resource Backtesting Margin Charge itself), the 
additional resources that OCC would have collected through that add-on 
may, if charged at the time, have covered observed Resource Backtesting 
deficiencies within the look-back period, either in whole or in part. 
In such circumstances, OCC would re-calculate the Resource Backtesting 
Margin Charge based on the deficiencies that would have remained had 
the additional resources been collected at the time of the 
deficiencies. As such, OCC believes the Margin Policy would be designed 
to avoid double-margining Clearing Members when OCC begins collecting 
additional margin resources following changes to its margin methodology 
implemented within the 12-month lookback period.
(iv) Conforming Changes
    In connection with the consolidation of OCC's current Business 
Backtesting and Model Backtesting, as well as the addition of Resource 
Backtesting, OCC proposes to consolidate its internal procedures for 
all backtesting into a

[[Page 61220]]

Backtesting Procedure and associated technical document.\62\ 
Accordingly, OCC would amend its Margin Policy and Model Risk 
Management Policy to refer to the new Backtesting Procedure, rather 
than the current Business Backtesting Procedure and Model Backtesting 
Procedure. In addition, OCC would update the description of ongoing 
model performance monitoring in the STANS Methodology Description to 
reflect OCC's Model Backtesting as provided in the Margin Policy and 
supporting procedure and technical document. OCC would also insert 
headings into the section of the Margin Policy that addresses add-on 
charges, including the proposed Resource Backtesting Margin Charge, to 
separate the discussion of add-on charges for which the Margin Policy 
already provides specific treatment, such as the add-on to address 
specific wrong-way risk (``SWWR''), (i.e., the risk that the value of a 
Clearing Member's positions is positively correlated with the 
creditworthiness of the Clearing Member).\63\
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    \62\ OCC has included anticipated drafts of these document in 
confidential Exhibit 3B and 3C to File No. SR-OCC-2024-009, 
respectively. OCC has also included in confidential Exhibit 3D to 
File No. SR-OCC-2024-009 a numerical example of how Resource 
Backtesting results are calculated using data for certain Clearing 
Members from an actual activity date.
    \63\ See Exchange Act Release No. 87718 (Dec. 11, 2019), 84 FR 
68992 (Dec. 17, 2019) (SR-OCC-2019-010) (approving OCC's SWWR Add-
On).
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Implementation Timeframe
    OCC will implement the proposed changes within sixty (60) days 
after the date that OCC receives all necessary regulatory approvals for 
the proposed changes. OCC will announce the implementation date of the 
proposed change by an Information Memorandum posted to its public 
website at least two (2 weeks prior to implementing the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge.
(2) Statutory Basis
    OCC believes the proposed changes are consistent with Section 17A 
of the Exchange Act \64\ and the rules and regulations thereunder 
applicable to OCC. Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act \65\ requires, in 
part, that the rules of a clearing agency be designed to promote the 
prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities 
transactions, and in general, to protect investors and the public 
interest. If a Clearing Member defaults on its obligations to OCC, OCC 
would use the margin collateral deposited by that Clearing Member, 
among other prefunded financial resources from that Clearing Member, to 
mitigate OCC's credit exposure. If OCC's margin models calculated 
margin requirements insufficient to address default losses, then OCC 
may need to utilize the mutualized funds deposited in OCC's Clearing 
Fund.\66\ The proposed changes are intended to enhance OCC's process 
for monitoring its margin coverage and the performance of its margin 
models, which would help OCC maintain sufficient financial resources to 
mitigate its credit exposure. To the extent that OCC identifies 
Resource Backtesting deficiencies that bring a Clearing Member's margin 
coverage below the target coverage level, the proposed Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge would require the impacted Clearing Member to 
deposit additional margin resources to absorb a potential loss that 
OCC's margin system may not otherwise capture. Collecting sufficient 
margin resources to cover potential losses would help to ensure that 
OCC may manage the default of a Clearing Member without disruption to 
its clearance and settlement services and avoid loss mutualization that 
could impose unanticipated costs on other Clearing Members and their 
customers. Accordingly, OCC believes the proposed changes are 
reasonably designed to promote the prompt and accurate clearance and 
settlement of securities transactions, and in general, to protect 
investors and the public interest, in accordance with Section 
17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act.\67\
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    \64\ See 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
    \65\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
    \66\ Prior to charging the Clearing Fund deposits of non-
defaulting Clearing Members, OCC would first contribute OCC's 
Minimum Corporate Contribution and its liquid net assets funded by 
equity in excess of 110% of OCC's Target Capital Requirement. See 
Exchange Act Release No. 92038 (May 27, 2021), 86 FR 29861 (June 3, 
2021), 29862 n.15 and accompanying text (SR-OCC-2021-003).
    \67\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
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    OCC also believes the proposed changes described above are 
consistent with SEC Rules under the Act for the following reasons.
(i) Backtesting Framework
    Paragraph (vi) of Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6) \68\ requires OCC to 
establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to cover its credit exposures to its 
participants by establishing a risk-based margin system that, at a 
minimum, is monitored by OCC's management on an ongoing basis and is 
regularly reviewed, tested, and verified by, in relevant part: (A) 
conducting backtests of its margin model at least once each day using 
standard predetermined parameters and assumptions; (B) conducting a 
review of its assumptions for backtesting on at least a monthly basis, 
and considering modifications to ensure the backtesting practices are 
appropriate for determining the adequacy of OCC's margin resources; (C) 
conducting a review of its assumptions for backtesting more frequently 
than monthly during periods of time when the products cleared or 
markets served display high volatility or become less liquid, or when 
the size or concentration of positions held by OCC's participants 
increases or decreases significantly; and (D) reporting the results of 
these analyses to appropriate OCC decisionmakers, including but not 
limited to, its Risk Committee or Board of Directors, and using these 
results to evaluate the adequacy of its margin methodology, model 
parameters, and any other relevant aspect of its credit risk management 
framework. As explained by the Commission, such backtesting ``is a 
technique used to compare the potential losses forecasted by a model 
with the actual losses that participants incurred'' that is ``intended 
to reveal the accuracy of models.'' \69\ Accordingly, the Commission 
promulgated Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6) \70\ to require covered clearing 
agencies to establish and maintain ``policies and procedures that 
provide for backtesting the margin models . . . to help uncover and 
address possible errors in model design, misapplication of models, or 
errors in the inputs to, and assumptions underlying, margin models.'' 
\71\
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    \68\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi).
    \69\ Exchange Act Release No. 71699 (Mar. 12, 2014), 79 FR 
29508, 29530 (May 22, 2014) (File No. S7-03-14).
    \70\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6).
    \71\ Exchange Act Release No. 71699, supra note 69, 79 FR at 
29530.
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    The proposed Margin Policy would describe how OCC conducts 
backtesting of its margin models at least once each day, as required by 
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi)(A).\72\ OCC believes that the proposed Model 
Backtesting is reasonably designed to assess the performance of OCC's 
margin models in order to provide decisionmakers with information about 
potential issues with or enhancements to those models. The proposed 
enhancements would provide greater clarity and transparency about how 
OCC establishes, reviews and adjusts the assumptions for backtesting, 
including the role of the MRWG, Management Committee and Risk Committee 
in approving changes thereto, as contemplated by paragraphs (B) and (C) 
of Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi).\73\

[[Page 61221]]

Such reviews would occur on at least a monthly basis, but would occur 
more frequently when the CCA Monitoring Thresholds are breached, 
consistent with paragraph (C) of Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi).\74\ In 
addition, the enhancements would also provide greater clarity about the 
escalation of backtesting exceedances to appropriate OCC 
decisionmakers, including that OCC maintains thresholds for such 
escalations that are periodically reviewed and approved by the 
governing body to which the escalation must be made, including to OCC's 
Risk Committee, consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi)(D).\75\ 
Accordingly, OCC believes its proposed backtesting framework is 
reasonably designed in a manner consistent with Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(6)(vi).\76\
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    \72\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi)(A).
    \73\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi)(B), (C).
    \74\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi)(C).
    \75\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi)(D).
    \76\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi).
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(ii) Resource Backtesting
    OCC believes that the proposed expansion of backtesting to include 
Resource Backtesting is consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(i),\77\ 
which requires OCC to maintain sufficient financial resources to cover 
its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of 
confidence. OCC proposes to expand its backtesting analyses to include 
Resource Backtesting in order to ensure that OCC maintains sufficient 
margin resources collected from a Clearing Member, among other 
prefunded financial resources, to cover its credit exposures to that 
Clearing Member fully with a high degree of confidence. Such Resource 
Backtesting would take into account other resources collected from a 
Clearing Member, including non-CiM resources that are subject to fixed 
collateral haircuts rather than valued through OCC's margin models. In 
addition, Resource Backtesting would be done at the Clearing Member 
level, taking into consideration netting rules based on the types of 
liens OCC has on specific margin accounts. Accordingly, OCC believes 
that such Resource Backtesting is designed to assess the sufficiency of 
the margin resources collected from each Clearing Member, among other 
prefunded resources, available to cover the default of that Clearing 
Member at the Clearing Member level, consistent with Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(4)(i).\78\
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    \77\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(4)(i).
    \78\ Id.
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(iii) Resource Backtesting Margin Charge
    OCC believes the proposed Resource Backtesting Margin Charge and 
the changes to OCC's Rules and Margin Policy to effect it would be 
consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii), which requires OCC to 
establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to cover its credit exposures to its 
participants by, at a minimum, establishing a risk-based margin system 
that calculates margin sufficient to cover its potential future 
exposure to participants in the interval between the last margin 
collection and the close out of positions following a participant 
default.\79\ Rule 17Ad-22(a)(13), in turn, defines ``potential future 
exposure'' to mean the maximum exposure estimated to occur at a future 
point in time with an established single-tailed confidence level of at 
least 99% with respect to the estimated distribution of future 
exposures.\80\ The Resource Backtesting Margin Charge is designed to 
require additional margin resources when OCC identifies Resource 
Backtesting deficiencies that bring a Clearing Member's margin coverage 
below 99%. The Resource Backtesting Margin Charge applied generally 
would be equal to the third-largest Resource Backtesting deficiency 
during the lookback period in order to achieve OCC's Resource 
Backtesting coverage target, rounded up to the nearest $1,000. OCC 
would also retain discretion to adjust the Resource Backtesting Margin 
Charge based on facts and circumstances that would lead it to conclude 
that a different amount was appropriate and consistent with achieving 
its 99% coverage target. Accordingly, OCC believes that the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge is consistent with Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(6)(iii).\81\
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    \79\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii).
    \80\ 17 CFR 240.17ad-22(a) ``Potential future exposure''.
    \81\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii).
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(iv) Conforming Changes
    OCC also believes that the proposed changes are consistent with SEC 
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(2),\82\ which provides in relevant part that OCC must 
establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to provide for governance arrangements 
that are clear and transparent and specify clear and direct lines of 
responsibility.\83\ OCC would make conforming changes to the Margin 
Policy and Model Risk Management Policy that would reflect the 
consolidated backtesting procedures governed by those policies, thereby 
ensuring that cross-references in those rule-filed policies remain 
accurate. In addition, OCC believes the proposed rule change would 
provide greater clarity about OCC's backtesting framework, including 
OCC's governance arrangements for reviewing backtesting assumptions and 
escalating backtesting exceedances to appropriate decisionmakers within 
OCC. While OCC's current rule-filed policies provide for escalation of 
exceedances ``as necessary,'' for example, the proposed changes would 
provide greater clarity about governance processes currently maintained 
in OCC's internal procedures by providing that OCC will maintain 
thresholds for escalation that FRM will adhere to if the criteria are 
met. As discussed above, the Margin Policy would provide that such 
escalation criteria would include, but not be limited to: (i) 
thresholds related to the size and number of exceedances for Model 
Backtesting of actual portfolios, (ii) thresholds related to 
statistical tests applicable to Model Backtesting of hypothetical 
portfolios, and (iii) thresholds related to the size of Resource 
Backtesting deficiency and the coverage rate across all Clearing 
Members in the aggregate. The changes would also provide greater 
clarity about the lines of responsibility with respect to the MRWG's, 
Management Committee's and Risk Committee's roles in approving changes 
to the backtesting assumptions and escalation criteria. Accordingly, 
OCC believes the proposed changes are consistent with SEC Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(2).\84\
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    \82\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2).
    \83\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2)(i), (v).
    \84\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the above reasons, OCC believes that this proposed rule change 
is consistent with Section 17A of the Exchange Act \85\ and the rules 
and regulations thereunder applicable to OCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(B) Clearing Agency's Statement on Burden on Competition

    Section 17A(b)(3)(I) of the Exchange Act \86\ requires that the 
rules of a clearing agency not impose any burden on competition not 
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. 
With respect to the proposed changes to OCC's backtesting framework and 
the addition of Resource Backtesting, OCC does not believe that the 
proposed rule change would impact or impose any burden on competition. 
The proposed changes would provide greater clarity concerning OCC's 
backtesting framework, including how OCC monitors the performance of

[[Page 61222]]

margin models used to calculate margin requirements for each Clearing 
Member account and how OCC monitors the sufficiency of the margin 
collateral it collects to cover losses that may arise from the default 
of a Clearing Member. OCC does not believe that these changes would 
unfairly inhibit access to OCC's services or disadvantage or favor any 
particular user in relationship to another user.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the proposed Resource Backtesting Margin Charge, 
whether a particular Clearing Member would be charged and the amount it 
would be charged would depend on the Clearing Member's activity and the 
performance of OCC's margin models. OCC has designed the Resource 
Backtesting Margin Charge to ensure its compliance with regulations 
that require OCC to calculate margin resources sufficient to cover each 
Clearing Member's maximum exposure estimated to occur at a future point 
in time with an established single-tailed confidence level of at least 
99 percent with respect to the estimated distribution of future 
exposure in the interval between the last margin collection and the 
close out of positions following a participant default.\87\ To the 
extent a Clearing Member's margin coverage falls below OCC's coverage 
target, a Resource Backtesting Margin Charge would be applied. 
Accordingly, OCC believes that the proposed rule change would not 
impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the Act.
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    \87\ See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(C) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change 
Received From Members, Participants or Others

    Written comments were not and are not intended to be solicited with 
respect to the proposed change and none have been received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the 
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be 
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to 
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) by order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule 
change should be disapproved.
    The proposal shall not take effect until all regulatory actions 
required with respect to the proposal are completed.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/self-regulatory-organization-rulemaking); 
or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
file number SR-OCC-2024-009 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Vanessa Countryman, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to file number SR-OCC-2024-009. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/self-regulatory-organization-rulemaking). Copies of the 
submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with 
respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, 
and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change 
between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be 
withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 
552, will be available for website viewing and printing in the 
Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 
p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and 
copying at the principal office of OCC and on OCC's website at https://www.theocc.com/Company-Information/Documents-and-Archives/By-Laws-and-Rules.
    Do not include personal identifiable information in submissions; 
you should submit only information that you wish to make available 
publicly. We may redact in part or withhold entirely from publication 
submitted material that is obscene or subject to copyright protection.
    All submissions should refer to file number SR-OCC-2024-009 and 
should be submitted on or before August 20, 2024.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\88\
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    \88\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Sherry R. Haywood,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2024-16661 Filed 7-29-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P