[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 137 (Wednesday, July 17, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58243-58245]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-15691]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Safety Advisory 2023-01; Evaluation of Policies and Procedures 
Related to the Use and Maintenance of Hot Bearing Wayside Detectors 
(Second Supplement)

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory; Notice No. 3.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing this Second Supplement to Safety Advisory 2023-
01 to reiterate and expand upon the recommendations in its previously 
published Safety Advisories related to hot bearing wayside detectors 
(HBDs). This Safety Advisory reiterates FRA's previous recommendations 
in Safety Advisory 2023-01 and its June 14, 2023 Supplement, and 
expands on the recommendations to incorporate the findings of FRA's 
ongoing evaluations by emphasizing: the importance of trend analysis 
and the opportunity to integrate wayside detector data types to 
evaluate railcar health; the need to establish and follow appropriate 
processes in analyzing and responding to HBD data; the need for 
railroads to ensure that adequate staff are assigned to monitor and 
respond to wayside detector data; and the need for railroads to 
maximize the use of HBD data, including sharing wayside detector data 
between railroads, as a train travels from one railroad's tracks to 
another railroad's track.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information concerning 
this Safety Advisory, please contact Karl Alexy, Associate 
Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Office of 
Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, 
(202) 493-6282. Disclaimer: This Safety Advisory is considered guidance 
pursuant to DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing 
laws, regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety 
Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not meant to 
bind the public in any way. This document revises and expands upon the 
previously issued guidance in Safety Advisory 2023-01 published on 
March 3, 2023 and the first supplement to that Safety Advisory 
published on June 14, 2023.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On February 21, 2023, in response to a series of rail accidents, 
including the February 3, 2023, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS) 
train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, U.S. DOT Secretary Pete 
Buttigieg, while calling on the freight rail industry and Congress to 
take action to improve rail safety, reiterated the Department's 
commitment to enhancing rail safety through specific targeted 
actions.\1\ In addition to various regulatory and other activities FRA 
already had underway at the time of Secretary Buttigieg's announcement, 
one of the actions announced included a focused inspection program of 
routes over which high-hazard flammable trains (HHFTs) \2\ and other 
trains transporting large volumes of hazardous materials travel (Route 
Assessment). Subsequently, consistent with the commitments in the 
Secretary's call to action and in response to continued derailments and 
the death of an NS worker, FRA launched a supplemental safety 
assessment of NS and issued multiple safety advisories and safety 
bulletins,\3\ calling attention to the risks FRA identified in recent 
accidents.
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    \1\ See https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-department-transportation-fact-sheet-steps-forward-freight-rail-industry-safety.
    \2\ An HHFT is ``a single train transporting 20 or more loaded 
tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or a 
single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3 
flammable liquid throughout the train consist.'' 49 CFR 171.8.
    \3\ https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/safety-advisory-2023-01-evaluation-policies-and-procedures-related-use-and-maintenance-hot; 
https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/safety-advisory-2023-02-train-makeup-and-operational-safety-concerns; https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/safety-advisory-2023-03-accident-mitigation-and-train-length; https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/safety-bulletin-2023-01-switching-operation-accident; https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2023-03/Safety%20Bulletin%202023-02%20%28031623%29.pdf.
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    On March 3, 2023, FRA published Safety Advisory 2023-01 (88 FR 
13494) and on June 14, 2023, FRA published a Supplement to that Safety 
Advisory (88 FR 38933). Both Safety Advisory 2023-01 and the June 14, 
2023, Supplement to that Safety Advisory recommended that railroads 
take certain actions relative to HBDs to enhance the mechanical 
reliability of their rolling stock and improve the overall safety of 
railroad operations. Since publication of those advisories, FRA has 
continued to evaluate railroads use of HBDs and investigate accidents 
relating to journal bearings on railcars.
    Additionally, FRA proposed a task statement to the Rail Safety 
Advisory Committee (RSAC) to lead the development of best practices in 
the use of wayside detectors that may include recommendations to update 
existing regulations and guidance, and/or develop new regulations and 
guidance regarding wayside detector equipment and operations.

HHFT Route Assessment

    As noted above, in March 2023, FRA initiated the Route Assessment, 
a nationwide comprehensive assessment of the rail routes over which 
HHFTs and other trains carrying large volumes of hazardous materials 
are transported. The Route Assessment included all FRA technical safety 
disciplines (i.e., hazardous materials, track, signal and train 
control, mechanical, operating practices, and grade crossing). The 
Route Assessment was designed to evaluate the overall condition of the 
rail infrastructure (including, but not limited to, track, rolling 
stock, signal systems, and other equipment that affects or monitors the 
safety of rail operations) and railroads' compliance with both FRA 
safety regulations and the regulations of the Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration.
    FRA published the High-Hazard Flammable Train Route Assessment & 
Legacy Tank Car Focused Inspection Program Summary Report on January 
2024 (Summary Report).\4\ This Summary Report identified areas where 
improvements are needed in railroads' practices, processes, and 
procedures relating to the use of wayside detector technology to help 
ensure effective use of that technology. For example, FRA found 
inconsistencies in railroads' processes and procedures for handling 
wayside detector data and recommended railroads develop and share with 
industry best practices related to the inspection and maintenance 
policies and procedures relating to wayside detectors. Similarly, FRA 
found that the lack of detector data-sharing among railroads was 
preventing individual railroads from identifying trends in equipment 
condition as equipment is interchanged between railroads. The Summary 
Report also highlighted the need for railroads to ensure sufficient 
resources and infrastructure are in place to effectively process and 
communicate detector data and alerts to all those involved in the 
movement of trains.
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    \4\ Available at: https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2024-01/HRA%20Final%20Report_01.22.24.pdf.
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Supplemental Safety Assessment of NS

    On March 15, 2023, FRA initiated a supplemental safety assessment 
of NS (NS Assessment), with a specific focus on safety culture and 
training, as well as a deep dive into compliance with selected 
regulations and the status of

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NS's responses to FRA recommendations resulting from FRA's 2022 System 
Audit of the railroad.\5\ In August 2023, FRA published its findings 
resulting from the NS Assessment \6\ that included several areas of 
concern relating to NS's use of HBDs and included recommendations to 
improve the resiliency of NS's processes and procedures for monitoring 
and responding to bearing health information from the railroad's system 
of HBDs.\7\
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    \5\ FRA Audit No. 2022-NS Special Audit -01-1 available at 
https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/fra-audit-report-norfolk-southern-railway-company.
    \6\ https://railroads.dot.gov/about-fra/communications/newsroom/press-releases/supplemental-safety-assessment-norfolk-southern.
    \7\ https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2023-08/2023%20NS%20Safety%20Culture%20Assessment_08.09.23.pdf.
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RSAC Wayside Detector Working Group

    On April 21, 2023, RSAC accepted FRA's proposed task statement 
related to wayside detectors (RSAC Task No. 2023-01).\8\ The RSAC 
working group charged with carrying out this task includes 
representatives from railroads, suppliers, and labor organizations. The 
working group is analyzing current railroad processes and procedures, 
as well as current industry standards and historical safety data. This 
ongoing RSAC task is intended to lead to the development of best 
practices in the use of wayside detectors that may include 
recommendations to update existing regulations and guidance, and/or 
develop new regulations and guidance regarding wayside detector 
equipment and operations. FRA anticipates that the RSAC task will be 
completed by the end of 2024.
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    \8\ https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/tasks.
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Analysis of Recent Accidents and Safety Trends

    Since publication of the first supplement to Safety Advisory 2023-
01 on June 14, 2023, five (5) FRA-reportable accidents suspected to be 
caused by or attributable to a burnt journal bearing(s) have 
occurred.\9\ Of these accidents, at least three might have been 
prevented by improved decision-making processes or analyses using the 
HBD data. Further, despite railroads reporting an increase in the use 
of HBDs in recent years, the rate of bearing related accidents 
(including reportable and non-reportable accidents) has remained 
relatively constant over the years and shows no sign of improvement.
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    \9\ The five derailments since publication of Safety Advisory 
2023-01 Supplement on June 14, 2023, include the May 21, 2023, UP 
derailment in Mecca, CA; the July 6, 2023, NS derailment in 
Elliston, VA; the November 22, 2023, CSX derailment in Livingston, 
KY; the February 10, 2024, CSX derailment in Aurora, NC; and the 
February 17, 2024, CSX derailment in Pee Dee, SC.
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Recommended Railroad Actions

    In light of the above discussion and in response to FRA's ongoing 
investigation of the derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, FRA is 
supplementing the recommendations included in Safety Advisory 2023-01 
and its June 14, 2023, Supplement to expand upon recommendations nos. 3 
and 5 as well as adding two additional recommendations. For ease of 
reference, FRA's existing recommendations nos. 1 through 5 are 
reproduced below, with changes to recommendations no. 3 and no. 5 and 
including the new recommendations nos. 6 and 7. Accordingly, FRA 
recommends that railroads take the following actions:
    1. Review existing HBD system inspection and maintenance policies 
and procedures for compliance with existing industry standards and 
manufacturer recommendations for HBDs.
    2. Review existing procedures to train and qualify personnel 
responsible for installing, inspecting, and maintaining HBDs to ensure 
they have the appropriate knowledge and skills. Railroads should also 
develop and implement appropriate training on the inspection and 
maintenance requirements for HBDs and provide that training at 
appropriate intervals to ensure the required knowledge and skill of 
inspection and maintenance personnel. Further, railroads should 
evaluate their training content and training frequency to ensure any 
employee who may be called upon to evaluate a suspect bearing has the 
necessary training, experience, and qualifications. FRA also encourages 
railroads to ensure these individuals are available at all hours of 
operations across a railroad's network.
    3. Review current HBD detector trending logic and thresholds 
considering recent derailments, and all other relevant available data 
(including data from any close calls or near misses), to determine the 
adequacy of the railroad's current trend analysis and thresholds 
levels. Thresholds should be established for single measurement as well 
as multiple measurements of individual bearings to enable temperature 
trend analysis. Railroads should maximize the opportunity for journal 
bearing trending and seek opportunities to integrate wayside detector 
data types to evaluate railcar health and action critical issues, 
including risks associated with burnt journal bearings.
    4. Review current procedures governing actions responding to HBD 
alerts to ensure required actions are commensurate with the risk of the 
operation involved. With regard to trains transporting any quantity of 
hazardous materials, FRA recommends railroads adopt the procedures 
outlined in AAR's OT-55 for key trains as an initial measure.
    5. Rigorously evaluate the resiliency and accuracy of the overall 
process used to monitor and act upon information from wayside 
detectors, with specific focus on steps and tasks that, if not 
performed or performed incorrectly, could mislead decision makers. The 
process of monitoring, reporting, inspecting, analyzing, and acting on 
information from detectors includes tasks that, if incorrectly 
executed, could introduce risk. Railroads should also evaluate each 
step and task performed by railroad personnel to pinpoint any HBD 
reporting failures to report potential problems and implement 
appropriate safeguards to minimize their impact when monitoring, 
analyzing, and responding to detector information. For example, 
relating to the May 10, 2023, NS derailment in New Castle, PA 
referenced in the June 14, 2023, Supplement to Safety Advisory 2023-01, 
although the investigation is still ongoing, FRA is probing the 
communication and timing of the alarm and alerts to both the 
locomotive, wayside detector desk and the dispatch center, and if there 
was a failure of the railroad's process that contributed to the 
accident.
    6. Ensure that desks for monitoring wayside detector reports, 
advisories, and alerts are staffed during all hours of railroad 
operation, including back-up personnel to ensure coverage when 
personnel take breaks or step away from the desk to perform other 
duties. All personnel that monitor the desks should be trained and 
knowledgeable in railcar health and wayside detector capabilities, 
capable of reviewing alerts and trends and corresponding with train 
crews regarding potential unsafe conditions.
    7. Maximize the use of HBD data, as well as data from other types 
of wayside detectors, sharing data between railroads as a train travels 
from one railroad's tracks to another railroad's track, s including 
advising a receiving railroad when a railcar has a trending journal 
bearing or other potentially unsafe conditions.

Conclusion

    As noted in Safety Advisory 2023-01 and its June 14, 2023 
Supplement, the issues identified in this second

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supplement to Safety Advisory 2023-01 are indicators of a railroad's 
safety culture. Implementing procedures to ensure safety and adequately 
train personnel so that those procedures become second nature, is 
vital. Equally important is the commitment, throughout a railroad's 
organization, to safety and empowerment of personnel to live up to that 
commitment. Further, railroads must work together to maximize the use 
of wayside detector data and information, sharing this information 
openly to maximize safety.
    FRA encourages railroads to take actions consistent with Safety 
Advisory 2023-01, as originally published, as supplemented, and as 
further amended in this second supplemental notice, as well as any 
other complementary actions, to ensure the safety of rail 
transportation. FRA may modify this notice, issue additional safety 
advisories, or take other actions necessary to ensure the highest level 
of safety on the Nation's railroads, including pursuing other 
corrective measures under its authority.
    Issued in Washington, DC.

Amitabha Bose,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2024-15691 Filed 7-16-24; 8:45 am]
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