[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 137 (Wednesday, July 17, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58243-58245]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-15691]
[[Page 58243]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2023-01; Evaluation of Policies and Procedures
Related to the Use and Maintenance of Hot Bearing Wayside Detectors
(Second Supplement)
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory; Notice No. 3.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing this Second Supplement to Safety Advisory 2023-
01 to reiterate and expand upon the recommendations in its previously
published Safety Advisories related to hot bearing wayside detectors
(HBDs). This Safety Advisory reiterates FRA's previous recommendations
in Safety Advisory 2023-01 and its June 14, 2023 Supplement, and
expands on the recommendations to incorporate the findings of FRA's
ongoing evaluations by emphasizing: the importance of trend analysis
and the opportunity to integrate wayside detector data types to
evaluate railcar health; the need to establish and follow appropriate
processes in analyzing and responding to HBD data; the need for
railroads to ensure that adequate staff are assigned to monitor and
respond to wayside detector data; and the need for railroads to
maximize the use of HBD data, including sharing wayside detector data
between railroads, as a train travels from one railroad's tracks to
another railroad's track.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information concerning
this Safety Advisory, please contact Karl Alexy, Associate
Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Office of
Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590,
(202) 493-6282. Disclaimer: This Safety Advisory is considered guidance
pursuant to DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing
laws, regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety
Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not meant to
bind the public in any way. This document revises and expands upon the
previously issued guidance in Safety Advisory 2023-01 published on
March 3, 2023 and the first supplement to that Safety Advisory
published on June 14, 2023.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On February 21, 2023, in response to a series of rail accidents,
including the February 3, 2023, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS)
train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, U.S. DOT Secretary Pete
Buttigieg, while calling on the freight rail industry and Congress to
take action to improve rail safety, reiterated the Department's
commitment to enhancing rail safety through specific targeted
actions.\1\ In addition to various regulatory and other activities FRA
already had underway at the time of Secretary Buttigieg's announcement,
one of the actions announced included a focused inspection program of
routes over which high-hazard flammable trains (HHFTs) \2\ and other
trains transporting large volumes of hazardous materials travel (Route
Assessment). Subsequently, consistent with the commitments in the
Secretary's call to action and in response to continued derailments and
the death of an NS worker, FRA launched a supplemental safety
assessment of NS and issued multiple safety advisories and safety
bulletins,\3\ calling attention to the risks FRA identified in recent
accidents.
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\1\ See https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/us-department-transportation-fact-sheet-steps-forward-freight-rail-industry-safety.
\2\ An HHFT is ``a single train transporting 20 or more loaded
tank cars of a Class 3 flammable liquid in a continuous block or a
single train carrying 35 or more loaded tank cars of a Class 3
flammable liquid throughout the train consist.'' 49 CFR 171.8.
\3\ https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/safety-advisory-2023-01-evaluation-policies-and-procedures-related-use-and-maintenance-hot;
https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/safety-advisory-2023-02-train-makeup-and-operational-safety-concerns; https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/safety-advisory-2023-03-accident-mitigation-and-train-length; https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/safety-bulletin-2023-01-switching-operation-accident; https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2023-03/Safety%20Bulletin%202023-02%20%28031623%29.pdf.
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On March 3, 2023, FRA published Safety Advisory 2023-01 (88 FR
13494) and on June 14, 2023, FRA published a Supplement to that Safety
Advisory (88 FR 38933). Both Safety Advisory 2023-01 and the June 14,
2023, Supplement to that Safety Advisory recommended that railroads
take certain actions relative to HBDs to enhance the mechanical
reliability of their rolling stock and improve the overall safety of
railroad operations. Since publication of those advisories, FRA has
continued to evaluate railroads use of HBDs and investigate accidents
relating to journal bearings on railcars.
Additionally, FRA proposed a task statement to the Rail Safety
Advisory Committee (RSAC) to lead the development of best practices in
the use of wayside detectors that may include recommendations to update
existing regulations and guidance, and/or develop new regulations and
guidance regarding wayside detector equipment and operations.
HHFT Route Assessment
As noted above, in March 2023, FRA initiated the Route Assessment,
a nationwide comprehensive assessment of the rail routes over which
HHFTs and other trains carrying large volumes of hazardous materials
are transported. The Route Assessment included all FRA technical safety
disciplines (i.e., hazardous materials, track, signal and train
control, mechanical, operating practices, and grade crossing). The
Route Assessment was designed to evaluate the overall condition of the
rail infrastructure (including, but not limited to, track, rolling
stock, signal systems, and other equipment that affects or monitors the
safety of rail operations) and railroads' compliance with both FRA
safety regulations and the regulations of the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration.
FRA published the High-Hazard Flammable Train Route Assessment &
Legacy Tank Car Focused Inspection Program Summary Report on January
2024 (Summary Report).\4\ This Summary Report identified areas where
improvements are needed in railroads' practices, processes, and
procedures relating to the use of wayside detector technology to help
ensure effective use of that technology. For example, FRA found
inconsistencies in railroads' processes and procedures for handling
wayside detector data and recommended railroads develop and share with
industry best practices related to the inspection and maintenance
policies and procedures relating to wayside detectors. Similarly, FRA
found that the lack of detector data-sharing among railroads was
preventing individual railroads from identifying trends in equipment
condition as equipment is interchanged between railroads. The Summary
Report also highlighted the need for railroads to ensure sufficient
resources and infrastructure are in place to effectively process and
communicate detector data and alerts to all those involved in the
movement of trains.
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\4\ Available at: https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2024-01/HRA%20Final%20Report_01.22.24.pdf.
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Supplemental Safety Assessment of NS
On March 15, 2023, FRA initiated a supplemental safety assessment
of NS (NS Assessment), with a specific focus on safety culture and
training, as well as a deep dive into compliance with selected
regulations and the status of
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NS's responses to FRA recommendations resulting from FRA's 2022 System
Audit of the railroad.\5\ In August 2023, FRA published its findings
resulting from the NS Assessment \6\ that included several areas of
concern relating to NS's use of HBDs and included recommendations to
improve the resiliency of NS's processes and procedures for monitoring
and responding to bearing health information from the railroad's system
of HBDs.\7\
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\5\ FRA Audit No. 2022-NS Special Audit -01-1 available at
https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/fra-audit-report-norfolk-southern-railway-company.
\6\ https://railroads.dot.gov/about-fra/communications/newsroom/press-releases/supplemental-safety-assessment-norfolk-southern.
\7\ https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2023-08/2023%20NS%20Safety%20Culture%20Assessment_08.09.23.pdf.
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RSAC Wayside Detector Working Group
On April 21, 2023, RSAC accepted FRA's proposed task statement
related to wayside detectors (RSAC Task No. 2023-01).\8\ The RSAC
working group charged with carrying out this task includes
representatives from railroads, suppliers, and labor organizations. The
working group is analyzing current railroad processes and procedures,
as well as current industry standards and historical safety data. This
ongoing RSAC task is intended to lead to the development of best
practices in the use of wayside detectors that may include
recommendations to update existing regulations and guidance, and/or
develop new regulations and guidance regarding wayside detector
equipment and operations. FRA anticipates that the RSAC task will be
completed by the end of 2024.
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\8\ https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/tasks.
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Analysis of Recent Accidents and Safety Trends
Since publication of the first supplement to Safety Advisory 2023-
01 on June 14, 2023, five (5) FRA-reportable accidents suspected to be
caused by or attributable to a burnt journal bearing(s) have
occurred.\9\ Of these accidents, at least three might have been
prevented by improved decision-making processes or analyses using the
HBD data. Further, despite railroads reporting an increase in the use
of HBDs in recent years, the rate of bearing related accidents
(including reportable and non-reportable accidents) has remained
relatively constant over the years and shows no sign of improvement.
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\9\ The five derailments since publication of Safety Advisory
2023-01 Supplement on June 14, 2023, include the May 21, 2023, UP
derailment in Mecca, CA; the July 6, 2023, NS derailment in
Elliston, VA; the November 22, 2023, CSX derailment in Livingston,
KY; the February 10, 2024, CSX derailment in Aurora, NC; and the
February 17, 2024, CSX derailment in Pee Dee, SC.
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Recommended Railroad Actions
In light of the above discussion and in response to FRA's ongoing
investigation of the derailment in East Palestine, Ohio, FRA is
supplementing the recommendations included in Safety Advisory 2023-01
and its June 14, 2023, Supplement to expand upon recommendations nos. 3
and 5 as well as adding two additional recommendations. For ease of
reference, FRA's existing recommendations nos. 1 through 5 are
reproduced below, with changes to recommendations no. 3 and no. 5 and
including the new recommendations nos. 6 and 7. Accordingly, FRA
recommends that railroads take the following actions:
1. Review existing HBD system inspection and maintenance policies
and procedures for compliance with existing industry standards and
manufacturer recommendations for HBDs.
2. Review existing procedures to train and qualify personnel
responsible for installing, inspecting, and maintaining HBDs to ensure
they have the appropriate knowledge and skills. Railroads should also
develop and implement appropriate training on the inspection and
maintenance requirements for HBDs and provide that training at
appropriate intervals to ensure the required knowledge and skill of
inspection and maintenance personnel. Further, railroads should
evaluate their training content and training frequency to ensure any
employee who may be called upon to evaluate a suspect bearing has the
necessary training, experience, and qualifications. FRA also encourages
railroads to ensure these individuals are available at all hours of
operations across a railroad's network.
3. Review current HBD detector trending logic and thresholds
considering recent derailments, and all other relevant available data
(including data from any close calls or near misses), to determine the
adequacy of the railroad's current trend analysis and thresholds
levels. Thresholds should be established for single measurement as well
as multiple measurements of individual bearings to enable temperature
trend analysis. Railroads should maximize the opportunity for journal
bearing trending and seek opportunities to integrate wayside detector
data types to evaluate railcar health and action critical issues,
including risks associated with burnt journal bearings.
4. Review current procedures governing actions responding to HBD
alerts to ensure required actions are commensurate with the risk of the
operation involved. With regard to trains transporting any quantity of
hazardous materials, FRA recommends railroads adopt the procedures
outlined in AAR's OT-55 for key trains as an initial measure.
5. Rigorously evaluate the resiliency and accuracy of the overall
process used to monitor and act upon information from wayside
detectors, with specific focus on steps and tasks that, if not
performed or performed incorrectly, could mislead decision makers. The
process of monitoring, reporting, inspecting, analyzing, and acting on
information from detectors includes tasks that, if incorrectly
executed, could introduce risk. Railroads should also evaluate each
step and task performed by railroad personnel to pinpoint any HBD
reporting failures to report potential problems and implement
appropriate safeguards to minimize their impact when monitoring,
analyzing, and responding to detector information. For example,
relating to the May 10, 2023, NS derailment in New Castle, PA
referenced in the June 14, 2023, Supplement to Safety Advisory 2023-01,
although the investigation is still ongoing, FRA is probing the
communication and timing of the alarm and alerts to both the
locomotive, wayside detector desk and the dispatch center, and if there
was a failure of the railroad's process that contributed to the
accident.
6. Ensure that desks for monitoring wayside detector reports,
advisories, and alerts are staffed during all hours of railroad
operation, including back-up personnel to ensure coverage when
personnel take breaks or step away from the desk to perform other
duties. All personnel that monitor the desks should be trained and
knowledgeable in railcar health and wayside detector capabilities,
capable of reviewing alerts and trends and corresponding with train
crews regarding potential unsafe conditions.
7. Maximize the use of HBD data, as well as data from other types
of wayside detectors, sharing data between railroads as a train travels
from one railroad's tracks to another railroad's track, s including
advising a receiving railroad when a railcar has a trending journal
bearing or other potentially unsafe conditions.
Conclusion
As noted in Safety Advisory 2023-01 and its June 14, 2023
Supplement, the issues identified in this second
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supplement to Safety Advisory 2023-01 are indicators of a railroad's
safety culture. Implementing procedures to ensure safety and adequately
train personnel so that those procedures become second nature, is
vital. Equally important is the commitment, throughout a railroad's
organization, to safety and empowerment of personnel to live up to that
commitment. Further, railroads must work together to maximize the use
of wayside detector data and information, sharing this information
openly to maximize safety.
FRA encourages railroads to take actions consistent with Safety
Advisory 2023-01, as originally published, as supplemented, and as
further amended in this second supplemental notice, as well as any
other complementary actions, to ensure the safety of rail
transportation. FRA may modify this notice, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other actions necessary to ensure the highest level
of safety on the Nation's railroads, including pursuing other
corrective measures under its authority.
Issued in Washington, DC.
Amitabha Bose,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2024-15691 Filed 7-16-24; 8:45 am]
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