[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 125 (Friday, June 28, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54061-54065]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-14201]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 23-14]


Arash M. Padidar, M.D.; Decision and Order

    On December 5, 2022, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or 
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Arash M. Padidar, 
M.D. (Applicant) of San Jose, California. OSC, at 1, 3. The OSC 
proposed the denial of Applicant's application for a DEA Certificate of 
Registration (COR or registration), Control No. W22106685C, alleging 
that Applicant materially falsified his application for registration. 
Id. at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1)).
    A hearing was held before DEA Administrative Law Judge Teresa A. 
Wallbaum (the ALJ), who on May 24, 2023, issued her Recommended 
Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision (RD). The 
RD recommended denial of Applicant's application for registration. RD, 
at 26. Applicant did not file exceptions to the RD. Having reviewed the 
entire record, the Agency adopts and hereby incorporates by reference 
the entirety of the ALJ's rulings, credibility findings,\1\ findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, sanctions analysis, and recommended sanction 
as found in the RD and as summarized herein.
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    \1\ The Agency adopts the ALJ's summary of each of the 
witnesses' testimonies as well as the ALJ's assessment of each of 
the witnesses' credibility. See RD, at 3-14. The Agency agrees with 
the ALJ that the Diversion Investigator (DI) ``presented as an 
objective witness, with no motive to fabricate''; however, as noted 
by the ALJ, the DI was unable to recall some details regarding the 
relevant events and at times gave inconsistent answers. The ALJ 
found, and the Agency agrees, that the DI ``was consistent on key 
issues and her core testimony was corroborated by the documentary 
evidence and, in many respects, by [Applicant] himself.'' Id. at 4-
5. Accordingly, the Agency agrees with the ALJ that the DI was 
credible and her testimony warrants full weight on the key, 
corroborated issues. Id. at 5. Regarding Applicant, the ALJ found, 
and the Agency agrees, that Applicant's testimony was acceptable to 
the extent that it was corroborated by the DI's testimony and 
documentary evidence; however, the ALJ also found, and the Agency 
agrees, that Applicant's testimony as to his mental state during the 
relevant events was self-serving and internally inconsistent. Id. at 
7. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Applicant's recollection of 
events tended to be either extremely clear or extremely murky 
depending on which better suited a particular purpose, and 
Applicant's various explanations for his false application answer 
were inconsistent to each other as well as inconsistent to 
Applicant's other statements and actions. Id. at 7-8. Accordingly, 
the Agency agrees with the ALJ that Applicant's testimony that is 
consistent with the DI's testimony or documentary evidence warrants 
acceptance, while Applicant's testimony regarding his mental state 
during the relevant events warrants only limited weight. Id. at 8.
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I. Findings of Fact

Search of Applicant's Residence and Surrender of Applicant's Previous 
COR

    On October 7, 2020, at approximately 7:00 a.m., DEA and local law 
enforcement executed a search of Applicant's residence based on a 
criminal search warrant.\2\ RD, at 8; Tr.

[[Page 54062]]

30, 93, 145.\3\ According to Applicant, law enforcement entered the 
house, handcuffed both Applicant, who was unclothed, and his wife, and 
took Applicant downstairs to the kitchen. RD, at 8; Tr. 148-49, 152. 
According to Applicant, he remained in the kitchen with an unarmed 
Diversion Program Manager (DPM), mostly alone, until 1:00 p.m. RD, at 
9; Tr. 150-52. Applicant testified that the DPM showed him the search 
warrant while other law enforcement officers began searching the house. 
RD, at 9; Tr. 155.
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    \2\ Applicant testified that law enforcement began investigating 
him after a former employee alleged Applicant was writing codeine 
prescriptions for himself; Applicant testified that he had been 
addicted to codeine, which he took to treat pain from knee injuries, 
but denied ever selling codeine to third parties. RD, at 6; Tr. 145, 
211-13, 215. Applicant asserted that the execution of the search 
warrant was a ``wake-up call'' and the next day he voluntarily 
entered a treatment program. RD, at 6; Tr. 212-13.
    \3\ Applicant testified that his memory of the execution of the 
search warrant ``was extremely vivid,'' and the experience was 
``scary''; however, his memory of the interview was weaker and 
because he was so scared, he ``couldn't even think straight.'' RD, 
at 6; Tr. 145, 148, 161, 164, 257, 260. Applicant testified that the 
police had flashlights, wore military clothing, and had weapons with 
lasers attached. Applicant also testified that he saw two police 
cars outside as well as a SWAT van and estimated that there were 
eighteen officers on his property (including outside), with the 
majority of the officers carrying weapons. RD, at 8; Tr. 147, 149-
50.
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    Testifying for the Government, the Diversion Investigator (DI) 
recalled that she waited in her car when law enforcement first entered 
the house but that she entered and began participating in the search at 
around 7:20. RD, at 9, 18; Tr. 30-31, 66-67, 75-78.\4\ Sometime between 
1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m., DEA personnel spoke with Applicant in the 
living room; there were five DEA personnel present, including the DI, a 
second Diversion Investigator (DI2), a Group Supervisor (GS), the DPM, 
and a Task Force Officer (TFO). RD, at 10; Tr. 31-32, 61, 88, 151-53, 
156, 165. DI2 and the TFO conducted the interview of Applicant. RD, at 
10; Tr. 32-33, 162. According to the DI, DI2 presented Applicant with a 
Form DEA-104, which is titled ``SURRENDER FOR CAUSE OF DEA CERTIFICATE 
OF REGISTRATION,'' (emphasis in original) and allows registrants to 
surrender their DEA registration for cause and immediately terminates 
their registration. RD, at 10-11; Tr. 34, 36; Government Exhibit (GX) 
2, at 1.\5\ Applicant had been given his Miranda rights and was not in 
handcuffs during the interview. RD, at 11; Tr. 81, 98-99, 162-63, 170, 
194. The DI testified that it appeared to her that Applicant ``read the 
form a little bit and then eventually signed the form''; she did not 
recall Applicant asking any questions or refusing to sign the form, nor 
did she recall DI2 explaining the word ``cause'' to Applicant. RD, at 
11; Tr. 35, 38, 69, 78, 80, 82, 85, 100. According to Applicant, he was 
told repeatedly that the surrender was voluntary and he ``could apply 
again.'' RD, at 10 n.8; Tr. 164. According to Applicant, he had the 
opportunity to read the form but did not do so, though he confirmed 
looking over the form ``quickly''; Applicant testified, ``all I 
remember it was such a blur because my hands were shaking. I looked 
where my signature area [was]. I signed it and they asked me to date 
it.'' RD, at 11; Tr. 163-165, 262. Nonetheless, Applicant acknowledged 
that he did sign the form and did not challenge the surrender of his 
registration as being under duress. RD, at 10 n.8; Tr. 161, 258, 261. 
DEA did not leave Applicant a copy of the Form DEA-104 (consistent with 
DEA practice) nor did DEA explain the meaning of ``for cause'' to 
Applicant. RD, at 11; Tr. 42, 69-70, 83, 85, 164. According to the DI, 
at the end of the interview, the DPM and DI2 both provided their 
business cards to Applicant, and then the DI and the others moved on to 
execute the search warrant at Applicant's clinic. RD, at 11; Tr. 41-
42.\6\
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    \4\ By the time the DI entered the house, she saw two police 
vehicles and was not sure how many officers were surrounding the 
house or inside the house. RD, at 9; Tr. 75-77. The DI testified 
that some of the officers did have weapons but she could not recall 
if they were holstered. RD, at 9; Tr. 75-76.
    \5\ Paragraph one of the Form DEA-104 signed by Applicant on 
October 7, 2020, reads: ``In view of my alleged failure to comply 
with the Federal requirements pertaining to controlled substances or 
listed 1 chemicals and as an indication of my good faith in desiring 
to remedy any incorrect or unlawful practices on my part, I hereby 
surrender for cause my Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
Certificate of Registration''; paragraph two reads: ``I understand 
that submission of this document to DEA, including any employee of 
DEA, shall result in the immediate termination of my registration.'' 
RD, at 11; Tr. 40-41; GX 2, at 1.
    \6\ Applicant initially testified that only the DPM provided a 
business card, but later acknowledged that he also had DI2's 
``name'' from the search; Applicant also emailed DI2 directly at her 
email address, suggesting that he had her business card. RD, at 11-
12; Tr. 163, 196; Respondent (Applicant) Exhibit (RX) 6.
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Applicant's August 12, 2022 Application

    According to Applicant, when he read the application, he ``saw 
certain questions that became very concerning, [ ] especially the same 
question that we're here for'' (referring to Liability Question 2) \7\ 
and he tried to obtain a copy of the Form DEA-104 to resolve his 
concerns. RD, at 12; Tr. 172-73, 200. Applicant testified that he 
called DEA multiple times to get the form but was never able to reach 
anyone.\8\ Applicant also tried to find the form online (both before 
and after completing the application) and found what he thought was an 
older form with the title ``voluntary surrender.'' RD, at 12; Tr. 173-
74, 176-78. On August 10, 2022, Applicant emailed DI2, who forwarded 
the email to the DI. RD, at 12; Tr. 45. Applicant's email read: ``It 
has been almost two years since you asked me to surrender my DEA [COR] 
and c[a]me to my office. I would like to ask if you have concluded your 
investigation or closed it? Any word you can give me would be 
appreciated.'' RD, at 12; RX 6.\9\ On August 11, 2022, the DI responded 
\10\ with the following email: ``Please apply for a new DEA 
Registration. A new registration is required because the previous 
registration was surrendered and is no longer valid. The application 
forms can be found at Registration (usdoj.gov) under `New Application.' 
'' RD, at 12-13; Tr. 45, 265; RX 6. Applicant testified that he emailed 
DEA before filling out his application because he ``wanted to clarify, 
and get copies of what [he] had signed'' but he admitted that he did 
not ask whether his registration had been surrendered for cause nor did 
he ask for a copy of his signed Form DEA-104. RD, at 13; Tr. 266-67; RX 
6.\11\ According to Applicant, he interpreted the DI's reply email as 
an ``invitation'' to apply and noted that it only said ``surrendered,'' 
not ``surrendered for cause.'' RD, at 13; Tr. 197, 203; RX 6.
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    \7\ The application contains four ``liability questions,'' which 
require a ``yes'' or ``no'' answer and ask an applicant whether he: 
(1) has a criminal background; (2) has previously surrendered a 
registration for cause; (3) has any issues with his state licenses; 
or (4) has any affiliations with any entities or corporations that 
have criminal histories. RD, at 13; Tr. 46-47. If an applicant 
answers ``yes'' to any of these questions, the application provides 
a box that allows the applicant to explain his answer. RD, at 13; 
Tr. 47; GX 3, at 1. If an applicant has any other questions, he may 
contact the registration support section at the phone number or 
email address provided on the DEA Diversion website homepage. RD, at 
13; Tr. 47-48.
    \8\ According to the DI, the first time she knew of Applicant 
attempting to contact DEA was July 2022 when Applicant emailed the 
DPM. RD, at 12; Tr. 43-45. When asked whether anyone from DEA 
replied to Applicant's email, the DI stated ``[n]ot that I know 
of.'' Tr. 44-45.
    \9\ Applicant's exhibit does not include the date of the email, 
but Applicant testified that he sent the email in August before 
submitting his application. RD, at 12; Tr. 265.
    \10\ The DI responded to Applicant's email using the general San 
Jose Resident Office email. RD, at 12; Tr. 45; RX 6.
    \11\ Applicant also admitted that he never reached out to DEA to 
challenge the surrender of his COR. RD, at 13; Tr. 264-67.
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    On August 12, 2022, Applicant electronically signed and submitted 
an application for a new DEA registration through the DEA website. RD, 
at 13; Tr. 51-53; GX 3.\12\ Liability Question 2 on

[[Page 54063]]

the application asks: ``Has the applicant ever surrendered for cause or 
had a federal controlled substance registration revoked, suspended, 
restricted or denied or is any such action pending? '' RD, at 13; Tr. 
53; GX 3, at 1. On his application, Applicant answered Liability 
Question 2 with ``N'' for ``no.'' RD, at 13; Tr. 53; GX 3, at 1. 
Additionally, the bottom of the application reads: ``By typing my full 
name in the space below, I hereby certify the foregoing information 
furnished on this electronic DEA application is true and correct and 
understand that this constitutes an electronic signature,'' and 
Applicant's name, as an e-signature, is at the bottom of his 
application. RD, at 13; Tr. 54; GX 3, at 2.
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    \12\ The Registration Specialist assigned to review Applicant's 
application knew that Applicant had previously surrendered his 
registration for cause, so she informed the GS of the application 
and the GS assigned the investigation to the DI. RD, at 13; Tr. 48, 
50.
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    Here, the ALJ found, and the Agency agrees, that ``it is beyond 
dispute that [Applicant] surrendered his registration for cause and 
[thus] falsely answered Liability Question 2 on his application for a 
new COR.'' RD, at 14.\13\ Regarding his false answer, Applicant 
asserted that he did not intentionally submit a false statement and 
that it was instead a misunderstanding resulting from multiple factors. 
Tr. 209, 254. According to Applicant, he misunderstood because: (1) DEA 
did not provide him with a copy of the Form DEA-104 and he could not 
reach anyone by phone to ask about it so he was going by memory (Tr. 
163, 172-73, 194-96, 202, 255-56); (2) he searched on Google and found 
a form stating that surrender was voluntary (Tr. 173, 177-78, 268-69); 
(3) he considered voluntary surrender ``for cause'' to be an oxymoron, 
problematic, and to not make sense (Tr. 201, 255, 256); (4) his 
experience from medical disciplinary boards led him to believe that 
voluntary surrender would not be ``for cause'' (Tr. 177-178, 201-202, 
272-73); \14\ (5) he thought that DEA would already have the 
information about his surrender because DEA was the body that he 
surrendered to (Tr. 204); (6) English is his second language so he 
sometimes interprets things incorrectly (Tr. 209); and (7) he 
surrendered his registration under duress after an excessive search and 
had he obtained advice, he would not have surrendered (Tr. 161, 258, 
261). RD, at 6. Applicant asserted that he did not understand that when 
he surrendered his registration he was surrendering for cause and 
testified, ``[u]ntil [now], I would have still answered it no. But now 
that I understand what is meant in your world, I would answer very 
differently.'' Id.; Tr. 203, 211.\15\
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    \13\ Regarding the phrase ``for cause,'' as noted by the ALJ, 
``[w]hile the phrase `for cause' is not defined by federal 
regulations, Agency decisions have held that a [registrant] 
surrendered for cause when he voluntarily surrendered in the wake of 
allegations of misconduct or after the execution of a criminal 
search warrant.'' RD, at 16 (citing JM Pharmacy Grp., Inc., 80 FR 
28667, 28668-69 (2015); Shannon L. Gallentine, D.P.M., 76 FR 45864, 
45866 (2011)). ``Moreover, in this case, the Form DEA-104 
[Applicant] signed specifically use[d] the phrase `for cause.''' 
Id.; GX 2.
    \14\ Applicant testified that in the ``medical staff world,'' 
``for cause'' means ``an individual has caused some act . . . that 
they shouldn't have,'' and the disciplinary authority ``would revoke 
that privilege for that cause.'' RD, at 6 n.5; Tr. 201. Applicant 
testified, ``[i]f a physician wants to voluntarily surrender their 
privilege just to leave, and it wasn't being revoked for a reason, 
that would be a voluntary surrender.'' Id.
    \15\ Applicant also noted that he cannot practice medicine 
without a registration and that his practice provides an important 
service to the community. RD, at 7; Tr. 206-208, 214.
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II. Discussion

    The Administrator is authorized to revoke a registration or deny an 
application if the registrant/applicant has materially falsified an 
application for registration. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1); Farmacia Yani, 80 FR 
29053, 29058 (2015) (``[J]ust as materially falsifying an application 
provides a basis for revoking an existing registration without proof of 
any other misconduct . . . it also provides an independent and adequate 
ground for denying an application.'').\16\ Agency decisions have 
repeatedly held that false responses to the liability questions on an 
application for registration are material. Kevin J. Dobi, APRN, 87 FR 
38184, 38184 (2022) (collecting cases).\17\
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    \16\ See also RD, at 14 n.12 (explaining that the grounds for 
revocation of a registration under 21 U.S.C. 824(a) can also be 
grounds for denying an application for registration under 21 U.S.C. 
823).
    \17\ Even so, the Agency agrees with the ALJ's conclusion 
rejecting Applicant's arguments that his false statement was not 
material. See RD, at 20-21. Applicant argues that his false 
statement was not material because in reviewing his application, the 
Agency would have checked his history with DEA anyway, and the 
Registration Specialist who processed Applicant's application knew 
that Applicant had surrendered his previous registration. RD, at 20. 
However, as noted by the ALJ, the standard regarding materiality 
``does not require proof that the Government actually relied on or 
believed the false statement; it is sufficient that the false 
statement could have influenced the decisionmaker.'' Id. at 20-21. 
Further, ``the mere fact that someone caught [Applicant's] 
misstatement does not make it immaterial.'' Id. at 21; see Narciso 
A. Reyes, M.D., 83 FR 61678, 61680 (2018).
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    Regarding proof of material falsification, Agency precedent has 
found that the Government must prove an allegation of material 
falsification ``by evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing.'' Richard J. Settles, D.O., 81 FR 64940, 64946 (2016) 
(quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 772 (1998)). Agency 
precedent has also established that the Government need not show that 
an applicant actually knew that his response to a liability question 
was false. Rather, it is sufficient that the Government shows that an 
applicant should have known that his response to a liability question 
was false. Reyes, 83 FR 61680 (citing Samuel S. Jackson, D.D.S., 72 FR 
23848, 23852 (2007)). When the Government has made such a showing, 
i.e., that an applicant should have known that his response to a 
liability question was false, an applicant's claim that he actually 
misunderstood a liability question, or otherwise inadvertently provided 
a false answer to a liability question, is not a defense. Id. (citing 
Alvin Darby, M.D., 75 FR 26993, 26999 (2010)). Indeed, the applicant 
bears the responsibility to carefully read the liability questions and 
to answer them honestly; ``[a]llegedly misunderstanding or 
misinterpreting liability questions does not relieve the applicant of 
this responsibility.'' Zelideh I. Cordova-Velazco, M.D., 83 FR 62902, 
62906 (2018) (internal citations omitted).
    Here, the ALJ found, and the Agency agrees, that the Government has 
met its burden of proving by clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence that Applicant surrendered his previous registration for 
cause, that Applicant should have known that the surrender was for 
cause, and thus that Applicant's answer to a liability question 
(Liability Question 2) was false. RD, at 16; Tr. 40; GX 2, at 1. The 
ALJ found, and the Agency agrees, that Applicant knew or should have 
known that his answer was incorrect because the Form DEA-104 that he 
signed on October 7, 2020, clearly stated in multiple places that he 
was surrendering his registration for cause and because Applicant 
surrendered his registration amidst what he knew or should have known, 
by his own testimony and submitted evidence, was a criminal 
investigation against him. RD, at 16-18; Tr. 40, 155, 162-63, 170, 194; 
GX 2, at 1; RX 6.\18\ Regarding any

[[Page 54064]]

purported confusion on Applicant's part, the ALJ found, and the Agency 
agrees, that ``Applicant had ample opportunity to ask questions and 
clarify his confusion'' but did not do so; moreover, as discussed 
above, misunderstanding a liability question is not a defense when the 
Government has established that the applicant knew or should have known 
that his answer was false.\19\ RD, at 19.\20\
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    \18\ The RD also noted, and the Agency agrees, that Applicant's 
own testimony establishes that he knew or should have known during 
the application process that he had surrendered his previous 
registration for cause because Applicant recognized a potential 
issue for himself concerning Liability Question 2; he testified that 
he called DEA to ask for a copy of the Form DEA-104 and even 
searched the form on Google in an attempt to clarify its 
terminology, suggesting that Applicant at the very least suspected 
that he may have surrendered his previous registration for cause. 
RD, at 18; Tr. 163, 173, 194-196, 202, 255-256, 269. The RD adds, 
``[e]ven if it was merely a suspicion at that point, [Applicant] 
could have easily asked DEA whether he had surrendered for cause, 
but he did not do so.'' RD, at 18; RX 6. ``[A]n applicant has an 
obligation to clarify any confusion[] if he has an opportunity to 
speak with DEA.'' RD, at 16 (citing Ester Mark, M.D., 88 FR 7,106, 
7,108 n.8 (2023)). Here, ``when presented with a clear opportunity 
to resolve his confusion'' via his email exchange with the DI, 
Applicant failed to initiate clarification. RD, at 18; RX 6. As 
such, the ALJ also found, and the Agency agrees, that Applicant's 
arguments regarding DI's ``minimalist responsive email'' are 
unpersuasive. RD, at 18-19.
    \19\ The ALJ also noted that Applicant's claims of confusion 
themselves were contradictory and implausible, such as how Applicant 
claimed to be confused about Liability Question 2 but did not seek 
clarification when given a clear opportunity, and how Applicant 
claimed to have incorrectly thought that he had surrendered his 
previous registration ``voluntarily'' (purportedly as opposed to 
``for cause''), while also arguing that he had surrendered his 
previous registration under duress. RD, at 19-20; see also id. at 
21.
    \20\ Applicant also argues that his application should be 
granted due to the benefit to society of allowing him to continue 
prescribing controlled substances as part of his medical practice. 
RD, at 22; Tr. 206-208, 214. As noted by the RD, ``such `community 
impact' evidence has been rejected as irrelevant by the Agency.'' 
RD, at 22 (citing Heavenly Care Pharmacy, 85 FR 53402, 53420 (2020); 
Linda Sue Cheek, M.D., 76 FR 66972, 66972-73 (2011)).
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    Having read and analyzed the record, the Agency finds from clear, 
unequivocal, convincing, and unrebutted evidence that Applicant's 
application for a new registration, submitted on August 12, 2022, 
contains a material falsification because Applicant gave a false answer 
to a liability question when he knew or should have known that his 
answer was false. Moreover, even if it is true that Applicant's false 
answer to Liability Question 2 was actually caused by confusion or was 
otherwise inadvertent, it is inconsequential under the facts of this 
case, as Applicant failed to take reasonable care to ensure he answered 
the liability questions honestly. See Reyes, 83 FR 61680. Accordingly, 
the Agency finds that the Government has established a prima facie case 
for denial of Applicant's application pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1).

III. Sanction

    Where, as here, the Government has established sufficient grounds 
to deny Applicant's application, the burden shifts to Applicant to show 
why he can be entrusted with the responsibility carried by a 
registration. Garret Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 18882, 18910 (2018). 
When a respondent (Applicant) has committed acts inconsistent with the 
public interest, he must both accept responsibility and demonstrate 
that he has undertaken corrective measures. Holiday CVS, L.L.C., dba 
CVS Pharmacy Nos 219 and 5195, 77 FR 62316, 62339 (2012) (internal 
quotations omitted). Trust is necessarily a fact-dependent 
determination based on individual circumstances; therefore, the Agency 
looks at factors such as the acceptance of responsibility, the 
credibility of that acceptance as it relates to the probability of 
repeat violations or behavior, the nature of the misconduct that forms 
the basis for sanction, and the Agency's interest in deterring similar 
acts. See, e.g., Robert Wayne Locklear, M.D., 86 FR 33738, 33746 
(2021).
    In the current matter, the Agency agrees with the ALJ that 
Applicant failed to unequivocally accept responsibility. RD, at 23. 
While Applicant said multiple times that he accepted responsibility 
(Tr. 208-09, 254), ``his other testimony made it very clear that he had 
a series of reasons why he did not, in fact, think he was to blame,'' 
such as that DEA did not give him proper guidance, he surrendered his 
registration under duress, and his false statement did not matter 
anyway. RD, at 23; Tr. 161, 172-73, 194-96, 202, 204, 258, 261. As 
noted by the ALJ, ``Agency precedent requires that a respondent [ ] 
unequivocally accept responsibility for all of his misconduct.'' RD, at 
22 (citing Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 46972-73 (2019); Mohammed 
Asgar, M.D., 83 FR 29569, 29572 (2018); Lon F. Alexander, 82 FR 49704, 
49728 (2017)). Here, Applicant's statements went beyond explaining his 
actions and were instead ``an attempt to shift blame that undermines an 
unequivocal acceptance of responsibility.'' RD, at 23.\21\
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    \21\ When a respondent (Applicant) fails to make the threshold 
showing of acceptance of responsibility, the Agency need not address 
the respondent's remedial measures. Ajay S. Ahuja, M.D., 84 FR 5479, 
5498 n.33 (2019) (citing Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, L.L.C. & 
SND Health Care, L.L.C., 81 FR 79188, 79202-03 (2016)); Daniel A. 
Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR 74800, 74801, 74,810 (2015). Even so, in the 
current matter, Applicant offered no testimony or evidence of any 
remedial measures, other than stating that he now understands the 
meaning of ``for cause'' and will not make the same mistake again. 
RD, at 24; Tr. 203. Because Applicant has not offered evidence of 
any additional measures that he has taken to ensure that he will 
correctly answer any liability questions in the future--such as 
promising to clarify any future misunderstandings before submitting 
a signed document to a federal agency--Applicant has not 
sufficiently demonstrated that he is ready to be entrusted with the 
responsibility of registration. RD, at 24.
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    In addition to acceptance of responsibility, the Agency considers 
both specific and general deterrence when determining an appropriate 
sanction. Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR 74810. In this case, the 
Agency agrees with the ALJ that denial of Applicant's application would 
deter Applicant and the general registrant community from failing to 
meet their obligations to provide accurate and truthful responses on an 
application for a DEA registration and to seek clarification when 
needed prior to submitting an application. Kareem Hubbard, M.D., 87 FR 
21156, 21164 (2022); RD, at 25.
    As noted by the ALJ, ``[m]aking a false statement on the 
registration application goes `to the heart of the CSA.''' RD, at 24 
(quoting Crosby Pharmacy and Wellness, 87 FR 21,212, 21,215 (2022)). 
``[T]he liability questions are critical to the closed system of 
distribution, as the Agency must rely upon the candor of its applicants 
and registrants.'' Id. (citing The Lawsons, Inc., 72 FR 74334, 74377 
(2007); Kuen H. Chen, M.D., 58 FR 65401, 65402 (1993); Bobby Watts, 
M.D., 58 FR 46995, 46995 (1993)). And even if Applicant's claim that 
his incident was inadvertent and the result of a misunderstanding was 
true, ``[Applicant's] actions were at the very least negligent and 
careless''; he had clear reasons to know that he had surrendered his 
previous registration for cause and had various opportunities-which he 
did not take--to clarify any lingering confusion that may have 
remained. RD, at 24-25.
    In sum, Applicant has not offered any credible evidence on the 
record to rebut the Government's case for denial of his application and 
Applicant has not demonstrated that he can be entrusted with the 
responsibility of registration. RD, at 26. Accordingly, the Agency will 
order that Applicant's application for registration be denied.

Order

    Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 
U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny the pending application for a 
Certificate of Registration, Control Number W22106685C, submitted by 
Arash M. Padidar, M.D., as well as any other pending application of 
Arash M. Padidar, M.D., for additional registration in California. This 
Order is effective July 29, 2024.

Signing Authority

    This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on 
June 21, 2024, by Administrator Anne Milgram. That document with the 
original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative 
purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the 
Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal

[[Page 54065]]

Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the 
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document 
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect 
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.

Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024-14201 Filed 6-27-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P