[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 102 (Friday, May 24, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 45944-45977]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-11192]



[[Page 45943]]

Vol. 89

Friday,

No. 102

May 24, 2024

Part II





 Department of Transportation





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





 Federal Aviation Administration





-----------------------------------------------------------------------





14 CFR Part 21





Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for the 
Archer Aviation, Inc. Model M001 Powered-Lift; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 102 / Friday, May 24, 2024 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 45944]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 21

[Docket No. FAA-2022-1548]


Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for 
the Archer Aviation, Inc. Model M001 Powered-Lift

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Issuance of final airworthiness criteria.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA announces the special class airworthiness criteria for 
the Archer Aviation, Inc. (Archer) Model M001 powered-lift. This 
document sets forth the airworthiness criteria the FAA finds to be 
appropriate and applicable for the powered-lift design.

DATES: These airworthiness criteria are effective June 24, 2024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Clary, Emerging Technology 
Coordination Section, AIR-611, Policy and Standards Division, Aircraft 
Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 10101 Hillwood 
Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177; telephone 817-222-5138; email 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On March 30, 2022, Archer applied for a type certificate for the 
Model M001 powered-lift. The Archer Model M001 powered-lift has a 
maximum gross takeoff weight of 6,500 lbs. and is capable of carrying a 
pilot and four passengers. The aircraft has a high-wing and V-tail \1\ 
configuration with fixed tricycle landing gear. The aircraft uses 12 
electric engines powered by onboard batteries for propulsion instead of 
conventional air and fuel combustion. Six engines with five-bladed 
variable-pitch propellers are mounted on the forward edge of the main 
wing, three to each side, which are capable of tilting to provide both 
vertical and forward thrust. The other six electric engines drive two-
bladed fixed-pitch propellers and are mounted on the aft edge of the 
main wing, three to each side; they are fixed in place to provide only 
vertical thrust. The aft-mounted engines operate only during thrust-
borne or semi-thrust- borne flight; in wing-borne forward flight, these 
engines are switched off and the propellers are faired in line with the 
aircraft fuselage. The aircraft structure and propellers are 
constructed of composite materials. The Archer Model M001 powered-lift 
is intended to be used for Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 
CFR) parts 91 and 135 operations, with a single pilot onboard, under 
visual flight rules (VFR).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ A V-Tail aircraft design incorporates two slanted tail 
surfaces instead of the horizontal and vertical fins of a 
conventional aircraft empennage. The two fixed tail surfaces of a V-
Tail act as both horizontal and vertical stabilizers and each has a 
moveable flight-control surface referred to as a ruddervator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA issued a notice of proposed airworthiness criteria for the 
Model M001 powered-lift, which published in the Federal Register on 
December 20, 2022 (87 FR 77749).

Discussion

    Because the FAA has not yet established powered-lift airworthiness 
standards in 14 CFR, the FAA type certificates powered-lift as special 
class aircraft. Under the procedures in Sec.  21.17(b), the 
airworthiness requirements for special class aircraft, including the 
engines and propellers installed thereon, are the portions of the 
requirements in 14 CFR parts 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and 35 found by 
the FAA to be appropriate and applicable to the specific type design 
and any other airworthiness criteria found by the FAA to provide an 
equivalent level of safety to the existing standards. These final 
airworthiness criteria announce the applicable regulations and other 
airworthiness criteria developed, under Sec.  21.17(b), for type 
certification of the Model M001 powered-lift.
    The Model M001 powered-lift has characteristics of both a 
rotorcraft and an airplane. It is designed to function as a rotorcraft 
for takeoff and landing and as an airplane cruising at speeds higher 
than a rotorcraft during the enroute portion of flight operations. The 
electric engines on the Model M001 powered-lift will use electrical 
power instead of air and fuel combustion to propel the aircraft through 
six five-bladed composite variable-pitch propellers for all phases of 
flight, and six two-bladed fixed-pitch propellers for vertical and 
transitional flight modes only. Accordingly, the Archer Model M001 
powered-lift proposed airworthiness criteria contained standards from 
parts 23, 33, and 35 as well as other proposed airworthiness criteria 
specific for a powered-lift and the electric engines and propellers 
installed thereon.
    For the existing regulations that were included without 
modification, the proposed airworthiness criteria included all 
amendments to the existing parts 23, 33, and 35 airworthiness standards 
in effect as of the application date of March 30, 2022. These are part 
23, amendment 23-64, part 33, amendment 33-34, and part 35, amendment 
35-10.
    The Archer Model M001 powered-lift proposed airworthiness criteria 
also included new performance-based airworthiness criteria. The FAA 
developed these criteria because no existing standard captured the 
powered-lift's various flight modes and electric engines and some 
unique characteristics of their propellers. The new requirements 
specific to the Archer Model M001 in the proposed airworthiness 
criteria used an ``AM1.xxxx'' section-numbering scheme.
    Because many of the proposed airworthiness criteria are 
performance-based, like the regulations found in part 23, the FAA has 
proposed to adopt Sec.  23.2010 by reference, which would require that 
the means of compliance used to comply with the airworthiness criteria 
be accepted by the Administrator. Because no powered-lift consensus 
standards are currently accepted by the Administrator, the means of 
compliance will be accepted through the issue paper process.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ See Order 8110.112A, Standardized Procedures for Usage of 
Issue Papers and Development of Equivalent Levels of Safety 
Memorandums.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of Changes From the Proposed Airworthiness Criteria

    These final airworthiness criteria reflect the following changes, 
in addition to others as explained in more detail under Discussion of 
Comments: The FAA made changes to the aircraft performance section to 
incorporate an optional, ``increased performance'' approval, which 
requires greater aircraft performance capabilities beyond that of the 
baseline ``essential performance'' approval. The expectations for 
aircraft performance at both levels are clearly defined at the 
requirement level. Requirements to address various scenarios involving 
failures that can lead to loss of thrust were clarified and 
consolidated into a consistent terminology across all airworthiness 
criteria. Expectations were added for the aircraft to be capable of a 
controlled emergency landing following any condition where the aircraft 
can no longer provide the commanded power or thrust required for 
continued safe flight and landing (CSFL). The proposed requirement to 
incorporate a bird strike deterrent system was not adopted in these 
final airworthiness criteria, nor were other requirements not 
applicable to the Model M001, such as requirements for operations on 
water, approval for aerobatic flight, and others, as discussed in 
further detail under

[[Page 45945]]

Discussion of Comments. The FAA modified and developed revised 
aeroelasticity criteria to more directly address concerns expressed by 
commenters related to ``whirl flutter'' and aeromechanical stability. 
The FAA revised requirements in response to numerous comments 
requesting clarification or recommending changes to address safety gaps 
in the proposed criteria, particularly in the areas of aircraft 
handling and control, structural airframe loads and durability, flight 
controls, protection of occupants, and protection of systems from high-
intensity radiated fields (HIRF) and lightning. The FAA updated 
requirements for electric engines in response to requests for improved 
clarity on applicability and relationship to the airframe requirements. 
The FAA also updated definitions for ``controlled emergency landing,'' 
``CSFL,'' and ``sources of lift'' and added a definition for ``local 
events.''
    Lastly, the FAA clarified that, should Archer apply to amend the 
type certificate to include another model powered-lift, these 
airworthiness criteria would apply to that model also, provided the 
criteria remain appropriate to the changed aircraft in accordance with 
part 21, subpart D. This change was necessary so that each future 
change to the aircraft will not necessarily require an application for 
a new type certificate.

Discussion of Comments

    The FAA received responses from 22 commenters. The majority of 
commenters were government agencies, private companies, and 
organizations as follows: Ag[ecirc]ncia Nacional de 
Avia[ccedil][atilde]o Civil (ANAC); Airbus; Air Line Pilots Association 
(ALPA); Alaka[revaps]i Technologies Corporation (Alaka[revaps]i); 
Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD-
Europe); Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International 
(AUVSI); United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (UKCAA); European 
Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); General Aviation Manufacturers 
Association (GAMA); IPR; Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB); Leonardo 
Helicopters (Leonardo); Lilium eAircraft GmbH (Lilium); Odys Aviation 
(Odys); Overair Inc. (Overair); Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG 
(Rolls-Royce); SkyDrive, Inc. (SkyDrive); Transport Canada Civil 
Aviation (TCCA); Vertical Aerospace; and Volocopter GmbH (Volocopter). 
The FAA received comments from one individual commenter and from one 
anonymous commenter as well.

Support

    AUVSI and ASD-Europe expressed support for type certification of 
the Model M001 as a special class of aircraft and establishing 
airworthiness criteria under Sec.  21.17(b). ALPA expressed support for 
the use of 14 CFR part 35 propeller airworthiness standards.

Definitions

    The FAA proposed criteria that created new or modified definitions 
for the Model M001 powered-lift. The FAA received and reviewed comments 
from ASD-Europe, ALPA, Alaka[revaps]i, ANAC, EASA, GAMA, Leonardo, 
Lilium, Odys, Overair, TCCA, UKCAA, and an individual commenter that 
requested the FAA clarify, revise, or adopt as proposed certain 
definitions. Specifically, these comments were focused on the topic 
areas of ``CSFL,'' ``controlled emergency landing (CEL),'' and ``loss 
of power/thrust,'' along with requests for clarification on other uses 
of the term ``thrust.'' GAMA and Overair also proposed modifications to 
the ``source of lift'' definition. Additionally, comments from Airbus, 
ALPA, ASD-Europe, EASA, Odys, TCCA, UKCAA, and an individual commenter 
requested the establishment of a higher safety target for powered-lift 
like the Model M001. In response, the FAA created an ``increased 
performance'' approval that may be granted based on the aircraft's 
ability to meet higher performance standards for continued flight under 
certain failure conditions. The FAA modified AM1.2000(a) to provide for 
the higher safety target of ``increased performance'' as well as to 
establish the proposed minimum safety target for CSFL as ``essential 
performance.'' The Model M001 must meet either the essential or 
increased performance requirements in this certification basis. 
Additionally, the Model M001 may be approved for both essential and 
increased performance with appropriate and different operating 
limitations.
    The FAA has modified the definition of ``CSFL'' to establish the 
different expected outcomes based on the performance approval sought. 
The definition of ``CSFL'' was modified slightly for the essential 
performance approval to include pilot alertness; however, the ability 
to continue to the planned destination or alternate is a requirement to 
meet the increased performance approval. Increased performance is a 
higher level of safety that guarantees fly-away capability after any 
failure not shown to be extremely improbable. Essential performance 
does not require the aircraft to have the capability to land at the 
planned or an alternate landing site as is required for increased 
performance.
    Several commenters suggested the FAA adopt EASA's special condition 
for vertical take-off and landing aircraft (SC-VTOL) requirements for 
powered-lift. The FAA disagrees and has instead adopted ``essential'' 
and ``increased'' performance approvals. Although the FAA's 
``essential'' and increased'' performance approvals are similar to 
EASA's ``Category Basic'' and ``Category Enhanced'' approvals, 
differences remain. The FAA is establishing these airworthiness 
criteria for the Model M001 to provide a certification basis for 
aircraft design approval, while the operational approval is 
accomplished outside of the aircraft certification process. 
Additionally, both the FAA's and EASA's performance levels include the 
aircraft's ability to conduct a controlled emergency landing after a 
condition when the aircraft can no longer provide the commanded power 
or thrust required for CSFL as specified in AM1.2105(g). To complete 
the integration of these defined levels of safety requirements, the FAA 
modified AM1.2115 ``Takeoff performance,'' AM1.2120 ``Climb 
requirements,'' and AM1.2130 ``Landing'' to incorporate the essential 
and increased performance requirements.
    The FAA received several comments that the proposed definition of a 
``CEL'' was not sufficient to ensure that the relevant instances that 
may be encountered in operation are addressed beyond a ``critical loss 
of thrust'' as required under the proposed AM1.2105(g). The FAA agrees 
with the concerns raised by these commenters. As such, the FAA revised 
the proposed CEL definition and the requirements of AM1.2105(g) to 
establish the minimum level of safety required when the aircraft can no 
longer provide the commanded power or thrust required for CSFL.
    One commenter requested the FAA remove the part of the CEL 
definition that requires that the pilot be capable of choosing the 
direction and area of touchdown and instead require a controlled 
descent. As indicated by the term itself, ``controlled emergency 
landing'' is a defined airworthiness attribute in which the design 
maintains sufficient control to change direction to an area of 
touchdown, while reasonably protecting occupants from serious injury. 
However, the FAA has updated the definition of CEL by relocating the 
pilot reference to focus the requirement on aircraft functionality. 
Overall pilot controllability requirements are addressed in AM1.2135, 
which requires that the aircraft be controllable and maneuverable 
without requiring

[[Page 45946]]

exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength. The intent of the 
definition of CEL is to provide equivalency to the part 23 airplane 
gliding requirements and the part 27 rotorcraft autorotation 
requirements. Both minimize the aircraft's speed (forward and 
vertically) while still allowing directional control of the aircraft to 
an emergency landing.
    One commenter requested the FAA clarify the statement ``reasonably 
protecting occupants'' in the definition of ``CEL'' and further 
commented that non-participants should also be protected since these 
aircraft plan to operate in highly-populated urban environments. The 
FAA agrees with the need to provide additional clarity and has modified 
the definition of CEL to clarify that the expected safety outcome is 
protection from serious injury, which inherently provides a level of 
protection for non-participants on the ground. This approach is similar 
to the level of safety in Sec. Sec.  23.2270, 23.2320, and 23.2510 for 
normal category airplanes. The FAA also received comments seeking 
clarification of the term ``some damage'' in the definition of CEL. The 
allowance for some damage to the aircraft exists in the 14 CFR 23.2000 
definition of CSFL. For the Archer Model M001, this allowance was moved 
to the definition for CEL. The intent is that, although there may be 
aircraft damage, the occupants remain protected to the extent that 
egress may still be achieved following the landing.
    The FAA received several comments requesting clarity on the meaning 
of ``loss of thrust'' and ``critical loss of thrust'' in AM1.2000 and 
throughout the airworthiness criteria. These terms were inherited from 
the existing airworthiness standards used to create the proposed 
airworthiness criteria. The FAA agrees that the ``loss of thrust'' term 
is inadequate for the Model M001, which incorporates distributed 
propulsion with an integrated flight and propulsion control system. 
Historically, this terminology was used to convey an assumed complete 
engine failure because of the critical nature that engines, propellers, 
and transmissions provided regarding continued flight or CSFL 
capability. With the advent of distributed propulsion, the underlying 
assumptions of design features, mitigations, and substantiation of 
capability under endurance testing established within the legacy 
requirements are no longer valid, requiring revision.
    Distributed propulsion with an integrated flight and propulsion 
control system adjusts the aircraft's flight path using aerodynamic 
and/or propulsive forces. In addition to addressing the complete loss 
of thrust at any individual location and its effects, the design must 
address additional failures from the flight and propulsion control 
system that may inadvertently generate more or less thrust than 
commanded by a pilot. For powered-lift with tilting nacelle designs 
like the Model M001, the design must also address the possibility of 
any given nacelle to fail in an orientation that does not match its 
commanded position, and account for the subsequent thrust vector that 
results. In part, some of these failures are identified through the 
system safety process. However, other considerations exist outside of 
that process that are necessary for identifying other critical 
failures. As such, the FAA has included a definition of ``critical 
change of thrust'' to address the thrust's magnitude and orientation. 
Critical change of thrust may consist of more than one condition 
depending on what flight conditions it adversely affects (performance, 
handling qualities, or both). A critical change of thrust will require 
a dedicated assessment encompassing all the above elements.
    Further, the proposed definition for ``loss of power/thrust'' was 
not adopted in these final airworthiness criteria. Since this term was 
only used in the proposed AM1.2105(g), the final AM1.2105(g) 
requirement was rewritten to directly incorporate the previous ``loss 
of power/thrust'' definition language and clarify that the condition 
represents any scenario in which commanded thrust is insufficient to 
ensure CSFL, regardless of cause.
    The FAA also received recommendations to modify the proposed 
``source of lift'' definition to use terminology consistent with the 
powered-lift definition in 14 CFR part 1. The FAA agrees and has 
revised this definition to align with the powered-lift definition more 
closely.
    One commenter requested the FAA clarify the meaning of 
``predominately'' and what was meant by ``combination'' in the 
definition of ``source of lift.'' The FAA has changed ``predominantly'' 
to ``principally'' in AM1.2000(b)(3) of these final criteria, as the 
term ``principally'' is used in the part 1 definitions of powered-lift 
and rotorcraft. The FAA intended for the definition of ``source of 
lift'' in AM1.2000(b)(3) to be aligned with the existing regulatory 
definitions of powered-lift and rotorcraft. The FAA intends the term 
``combination'' to capture instances where the sources of lift involve 
both engine driven lift devices (e.g., rotors) and non-rotating 
airfoils (e.g., fixed wings), generally in a manner in which the 
balance between the two is varying during transition from wing-borne 
flight to thrust-borne flight and vice-versa. The FAA received a 
comment asking to replace the term ``hover'' with ``taxi'' in the 
listed phases of flight in AM1.2000(b)(2). The FAA disagrees as the 
term ``hover'' refers to an airborne flight condition and ``taxi'' 
refers to movement while on the ground. Another commenter requested 
that the FAA add ``taxi'' to the criteria, since the term is also used 
in AM1.2225. The FAA disagrees as the term ``ground operations'' in 
AM1.2000(b)(2) includes taxi operations. No changes were made as a 
result of this comment.
    The FAA received comments asking that the terms ``shutdown,'' 
``start,'' ``restart,'' and ``idle'' be defined for electric engines. 
The FAA disagrees. The FAA intends that these terms have the same 
meaning as for existing engine technology, but recognizes that there 
may be some differences based on the specific design of the Model M001 
and its engine operations. The FAA received a comment questioning the 
applicability of part 33 requirements that used the term 
``rotorcraft.'' Upon further review, the FAA found similar issues with 
the references to ``airplane'' within part 33 and part 35. The FAA 
agrees with the concern and updated AM1.2000(c) to clarify that part 33 
and part 35 requirements that use the terms ``airplane'' and 
``rotorcraft'' mean ``aircraft.'' This also prompted the FAA to remove 
the inappropriate reference to typical airplane installations in Sec.  
35.37(c)(2). The FAA also received a comment questioning the use of the 
term ``of this part'' in part 33. The FAA agrees; the revision to 
AM1.2000(c) also clarifies that ``this part'' means ``these 
airworthiness criteria'' when used in part 33 and part 35 requirements.
    Lastly, the FAA added a definition for the term ``local events'' in 
response to comments requesting clarification of this term as used in 
requirements in subparts H and I.

Applicable Criteria

    The FAA proposed applicable criteria by determining the appropriate 
airworthiness requirements that apply to the Model M001 powered-lift. 
These criteria are tailored to the powered-lift's design, including its 
engines and propellers, as well as its construction, intended use, and 
suitability for compliance with operational requirements.
    EASA, GAMA, Lilium, Overair, TCCA, Vertical Aerospace, Volocopter, 
and an anonymous commenter requested the FAA remove sections and terms 
from the proposed airworthiness criteria that do not specifically apply 
to the Model M001 design. The FAA

[[Page 45947]]

agrees and did not adopt the following in these final airworthiness 
criteria as they were not specifically applicable to the Model M001:
     AM1.2225(c);
     AM1.2240(b) (a new AM1.2240(b) has been added);
     Sec.  23.2310;
     AM1.2320(d), (e) (the remaining requirements of AM1.2320 
have been transitioned to Sec.  23.2320);
     AM1.2325(h);
     Sec.  23.2420;
     Sec.  23.2435;
     Sec.  23.2530(e);
     AM1.2540; and
     Sec.  35.43.
    The following phrases were not adopted in these final airworthiness 
criteria as they are not specifically applicable to the Model M001 
design:
     AM1.2400(a): ``or provides auxiliary power to the 
aircraft;''
     AM1.2405(a), (b), (c): ``reverser system;''
     AM1.2430(a)(3): ``and auxiliary power unit;'' and
     AM1.2430(c), (c)(1), (c)(3): ``refilling or.''
    The FAA received comments that questioned the inclusion of HIRF and 
lightning requirements for aircraft approved for Instrument Flight 
Rules (IFR) operations. The requirements are conditional for IFR 
approved designs. The FAA found it prudent to specify basic design 
requirements for HIRF and lightning based on the expectation that 
future design modifications could include an IFR approval. However, 
additional design and installation requirements beyond those specified 
in these airworthiness criteria would be needed for the aircraft to be 
approved to operate under IFR.
    Lastly, the FAA received numerous comments noting that the airplane 
levels prescribed by Sec.  23.2005 should no longer be referenced in 
these criteria, as they apply to conventional airplanes and not to a 
powered-lift. The FAA agrees and has revised the airworthiness criteria 
accordingly.

Technical Areas in General Order of the Airworthiness Criteria Sections

Aircraft Performance, Handling, and Control

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from Alaka'i, Airbus, ALPA, 
ANAC, ASD-Europe, EASA, GAMA, Leonardo, Lilium, Odys, Overair, Rolls-
Royce, Skydrive, TCCA, Vertical Aerospace, Volocopter, and an anonymous 
commenter requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed 
airworthiness criteria related to aircraft performance, handling, and 
control for the Model M001.
    The FAA received a comment noting the inconsistent use of terms 
when referring to the applicable atmospheric references proposed in 
AM1.2105, AM1.2115, and AM1.2130. Under AM1.2105(a), performance 
requirements at atmospheric conditions must be applied to all 
requirements in Subpart B unless otherwise prescribed, including 
AM1.2115 and AM1.2130. The FAA modified AM1.2115 and AM1.2130 to 
include fixed performance parameters for takeoff and landing, 
respectively; however, this does not negate the requirement to account 
for atmospheric conditions as denoted in AM1.2105(a). One commenter 
suggested adding ``at sea level'' to AM1.2105(a), consistent with the 
language for levels 1 and 2 low-speed airplanes in part 23. The FAA 
disagrees. AM1.2105(a) as proposed achieves the intended safety 
objectives and aligns the airworthiness criteria with the appropriate 
level of safety intended by utilizing appropriate standards from both 
parts 23 and part 27, with revisions specific to the Model M001. The 
FAA did not modify AM1.2105(a) as a result of this comment.
    The FAA received comments that stated a concern that proposed 
AM1.2105(b)(1) inadvertently limits airport altitudes to 10,000 ft. The 
FAA agrees and has changed the airworthiness requirement to develop 
performance data to the maximum altitude for which certification is 
being sought.
    The FAA also received a comment requesting clarification whether 
the 10,000 feet specified in AM1.2105(b)(1) should be expressed in 
either mean sea level or above ground level. The language in AM1.2105 
is consistent with the existing airworthiness standard Sec.  23.2105 
and is referenced to the altitude above sea level. No change was made 
as a result of this comment.
    One commenter requested revision of AM1.2105(c), stating the rule 
is too vague and recommending that a minimum crosswind limit be 
established similar to parts 27 and 29. The FAA agrees with the need 
for a minimum crosswind limit and revised AM1.2135(a)(6) in response to 
similar comments to specify a minimum of 17 knots all azimuth 
capability. The FAA did not change AM1.2105(c) as a result of these 
comments.
    The FAA received comments about AM1.2105(f) expressing confusion 
about what the phrase ``critical loss of thrust'' means relative to a 
powered-lift design of the Archer M001 type.'' As mentioned previously, 
the FAA replaced the phrase ``critical loss of thrust,'' with a new 
term ``critical change of thrust'' which is defined in AM1.2000.
    Several commenters noted inconsistent utilization of the term 
``flight envelope'' and requested clarification. One such instance was 
identified in AM1.2135(a), where the criteria referenced an ``operating 
envelope.'' The FAA's intent was not to imply this flight envelope was 
different from others referenced in these airworthiness criteria. To be 
consistent, the FAA has generally replaced ''operating envelope'' with 
``approved flight envelope'' where applicable such as AM1.2105(f) and 
AM1.2135(a), except for AM1.2425(b) and AM1.2710(d), where the proposed 
requirements define operating envelopes specific to the engine. 
Additionally, the FAA included AM1.2135(a)(7) to incorporate the 
steepest approach gradient within the approved flight envelope.
    The FAA received several comments requesting clarification of the 
new term ``loss of power or thrust'' defined in proposed AM1.2000(b)(4) 
and used in proposed AM1.2105(g) to specify the required level of 
safety after a condition when the aircraft can no longer provide 
commanded power or thrust required for CSFL. This proposed term 
generated confusion with similar terminology referring to loss of 
thrust in other sections of the criteria. The FAA agrees that 
clarification is necessary and therefore has not adopted the ``loss of 
power/thrust'' definition in final AM1.2000. The FAA has also revised 
AM1.2105(g) by replacing the term ``loss of power or thrust'' with the 
definitional language from proposed AM1.2000(b)(4).
    Several commenters asked for clarification on AM1.2105(g) and the 
use of system safety or operational mitigations as the compliance 
showing. The FAA modified AM1.2105(g) to provide additional clarity. 
Revised AM1.2105(g) is intended to assure that in the event of cockpit 
mismanagement, energy exhaustion, improper maintenance, or other 
failures, a controlled emergency landing can be achieved. AM1.2105(g) 
establishes safety objectives and the FAA's acceptance of a specific 
means of compliance is beyond the scope of these airworthiness 
criteria.
    A commenter asked for clarification on AM1.2105(g) as to whether a 
conventional forward landing would be an acceptable mitigation for loss 
of power or thrust. A conventional forward landing may be acceptable if 
the aircraft is capable of a controlled emergency landing in that 
configuration. No

[[Page 45948]]

changes were made as a result of this comment.
    The FAA received comments requesting that the FAA more explicitly 
state that the speed for thrust-borne flight in AM1.2110 and AM1.2150 
may include hover. The minimum safe speed determined in AM1.2110 must 
cover all phases of flight (including hover) and all sources of lift, 
and AM1.2150 uses that minimum safe speed. As such, no change to the 
criteria is necessary.
    The FAA also received a request to revise AM1.2110 to require 
minimum safe speed for ``each flight condition and configuration'' 
instead of only for each flight condition. The FAA disagrees. The 
phrase ``flight condition'' includes the aircraft configuration, phases 
of flight, and the sources of lift. No change to the criteria is 
necessary.
    Several commenters stated that the proposed airworthiness criteria 
for takeoff performance in AM1.2115, climb performance in AM1.2120, and 
landing performance in AM1.2130 do not establish sufficient minimum 
performance requirements to meet the public's expectations and levels 
of safety. One commenter recommended rewording paragraph (b) of 
AM1.2115, AM1.2120, and AM1.2130 to require the applicant to account 
for a range of engine or distributed propulsion system failures instead 
of accounting for loss of thrust.
    As explained previously, the FAA recognizes the need to clarify the 
difference in requirements for ``essential'' and ``increased'' 
performance levels as defined in AM1.2000(b)(1) for the Model M001 with 
respect to the takeoff, climb, and landing performance criteria of 
AM1.2115, AM1.2120, and AM1.2130, respectively. The FAA has revised 
these performance requirements to include scenarios for all engines 
operating and for critical changes of thrust. As revised, AM1.2115, 
``Takeoff performance'' addresses all engines operating, as well as 
critical change of thrust conditions, for both essential and increased 
performance levels. Essential performance level requirements ensure all 
engines operating takeoff capability and the capability to perform 
either a safe stop or safe landing following a critical change of 
thrust. Increased performance, while similar for safe stops, defines 
the requirements for continued takeoff following a critical change of 
thrust, including the capability to continue the climb and then 
subsequently achieve the configuration and airspeed specified for 
increased performance in AM1.2120, ``Climb Performance.''
    The FAA revised AM1.2120 to establish targets for both essential 
and increased climb performance for all engines operating, as well as 
after a critical change of thrust, as defined in AM1.2000. The FAA 
developed essential and increased climb performance requirements with 
all engines operating using part 23 requirements. Essential performance 
also requires that the applicant assess critical change of thrust 
impacts on takeoff and climb performance capabilities. Increased 
performance after a critical change of thrust defines minimum criteria 
utilizing part 23 and part 27 Category A climb requirements, dependent 
on the takeoff flight path and sources of lift defined in AM1.2000 
along that path.
    Multiple commenters requested clarity on where glide and 
autorotation performance are captured. The FAA added AM1.2120(e), which 
requires the applicant determine the performance for gliding or 
autorotation.
    The FAA received a number of comments noting the lack of 
specificity in proposed AM1.2130. The comments noted that AM1.2130 was 
overly vague and did not provide enough substantive detail to support 
the intent of the criteria. The FAA agrees and has revised AM1.2130 to 
ensure the level of safety and capability for essential and increased 
performance for takeoff in AM1.2115 is consistent with the level of 
safety and capability for essential and increased performance for 
landing in AM1.2130. Landing under AM1.2130 now contains requirements 
for both essential and increased performance levels, such that the 
aircraft must be able to make a landing upon a critical change of 
thrust. For increased performance, the FAA has also included a minimum 
criterion to safely transition to a balked landing condition following 
a critical change of thrust.
    The FAA received a comment that determining the performance for all 
potential partial loss of power conditions in proposed subpart B may be 
impractical. The FAA agrees. As mentioned previously, a new term, 
``critical change of thrust'' has been defined in AM1.2000 to identify 
the most critical thrust-related failure condition(s) for the Model 
M001 powered-lift. This term requires consideration of the most adverse 
effect on performance or handling qualities. The FAA modified AM1.2115, 
AM1.2120, AM1.2125, and AM1.2130 to use this new definition of critical 
loss of thrust.
    A commenter requested clarification on the phrase ``applicable 
sources of lift'' in AM1.2135(a)(2). During a specific phase of flight, 
an aircraft design may only allow for a singular source of lift during 
that phase of flight. In other phases of flight, one or more sources of 
lift may be possible. Therefore, ``applicable sources of lift'' refers 
to only those allowable by the aircraft design. No changes were made as 
a result of the comment.
    Multiple commenters requested the FAA establish an additional limit 
flight envelope which would establish the controllability limits of the 
aircraft. The FAA does not agree with this request. The FAA intended 
proposed AM1.2135 to establish the regulatory requirement for 
controllability that is used to define the approved flight envelope. 
The FAA recognizes that excursions outside of the aircraft's approved 
flight envelope can occur and must be considered from a safety 
perspective. The FAA has replaced the proposed requirement of Sec.  
23.2160(a) with new AM1.2160 to address speed excursions beyond the 
approved flight envelope.
    The FAA received multiple comments requesting the FAA utilize the 
multiple flight envelope concept in EASA's SC-VTOL, in lieu of the 
proposed minimum safe speed requirement in AM1.2110. The commenters 
stated that the FAA's proposed requirement may be appropriate for wing-
borne flight, but it is not appropriate for other aircraft 
configurations. The FAA determined that the establishment of a minimum 
safe speed and an approved flight envelope establishes a level of 
safety for the Model M001 that is consistent with the safety levels as 
established in parts 23 and 27.
    The FAA also received comments seeking clarification on atmospheric 
effects, scoping, and sources of lift in regard to AM1.2110. The intent 
of that requirement is to address flight conditions in normal operation 
considering the most adverse conditions, which includes adverse 
atmospheric effects. Accordingly, no change to this requirement is 
necessary. Establishment of minimum safe speeds in regard to specific 
sources of lift will be established through the issue paper process.
    Regarding controllability, the FAA received comments asking the FAA 
to adopt the requirement in Sec.  23.2135(a)(3), to address ``likely 
reversible flight control or propulsion system failure,'' instead of 
proposed AM1.2135(a)(3), which requires addressing ``likely flight-
control or propulsion-system failure.'' Commenters further clarified 
that they believed flight controls are fully addressed by the proposed 
requirement that the Model M001 comply with

[[Page 45949]]

Sec.  23.2510. The FAA disagrees and determined that specific 
airworthiness criteria for controllability are needed to address the 
integration of the advanced flight-control system and the propulsion-
system. In addition, AM1.2135(a)(3) is to ensure that likely failures 
not included in the system safety process of Sec.  23.2510 are 
addressed and that failures that are included have an adequate handling 
quality assessment which is outside the scope of Sec.  23.2510. No 
changes were made as a result of these comments.
    The FAA also received a comment requesting that the flight control 
system be subjected to the same requirements found in AM1.2705, 
AM1.2710, AM1.2713, and AM1.2727 for the engine control system due to 
the highly integrated nature of these systems. The FAA disagrees as the 
engine control system and flight control system are not integrated into 
one system. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
    One commenter asked the FAA to remove AM1.2135(a)(5) because the 
requirements of proposed Subpart F would sufficiently mitigate this 
hazard. The FAA disagrees. AM1.2135(a)(5) requires controllability 
evaluation using approved flight test methods of compliance. The 
requirements in Subpart F, which apply to equipment, do not adequately 
address this concern. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
    The FAA received a comment to modify AM1.2135(a)(5) to remove the 
phrase ``not shown to be extremely improbable.'' The FAA disagrees. 
Removing this phrase would require the applicant to address all failure 
conditions regardless of their probability. The FAA included this 
phrase to limit the cases where handling qualities are evaluated to 
those conditions not shown to be extremely improbable to limit the 
applicant's burden. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
    Several commenters requested that a minimum level of safety be 
established with respect to proposed AM1.2135(a)(6), which requires 
that the aircraft can land safely in wind conditions. Multiple 
commenters questioned whether AM1.2135(a)(6) was only applicable to 
thrust-borne flight. The FAA concurs that a minimum level of safety 
should be defined and has amended AM1.2135(a)(6) to contain a more 
prescriptive all-azimuth minimum wind speed requirement of 17 knots. 
This minimum wind limit is applicable to the thrust-borne operations 
and is consistent with requirements for parts 27 and 29 rotorcraft.
    The FAA received a comment that the term ``loading'' in proposed 
AM1.2135(a)(1) needed to be revised to include energy level 
considerations (i.e., degraded or low battery). Energy level 
considerations are covered under AM1.2135(a)(3), (a)(5), and (b), which 
address propulsion system failures, flight control system operating 
modes and critical control parameters such as limited-control power 
margins, respectively. Propulsion system failures include the 
electrical distribution and batteries. The same commenter proposed 
adopting a new requirement to address a rolling takeoff in maximum 
crosswind. The situation noted by the commenter is already addressed by 
AM1.2135(a)(2), which covers all phases of flight (e.g., takeoff for 
the approved flight envelope including crosswinds). No changes were 
made as a result of these comments.
    Multiple commenters asked for clarity on the phrases ``critical 
control parameters'' and ``limited control power margins'' in 
AM1.2135(b). The phrase ``critical control parameters, such as limited 
control power margins'' is intended to capture parameters or limits in 
which the aircraft is control or performance limited. The applicant 
must define these parameters as they apply to their unique design. No 
changes were made as a result of these comments.
    The FAA received a comment recommending that ``change from one 
flight condition to another'' be replaced with ``transition from one 
flight condition to another'' in AM1.2135(c). The FAA agrees and has 
updated AM1.2135(c) accordingly.
    Several commenters stated that the language utilized from part 23, 
pre-amendment 23-64, in the development of proposed AM1.2145 did not 
provide appropriate granularity between static and dynamic stability 
and sources of lift for a powered-lift. The FAA agrees and has revised 
the requirements in AM1.2145 to account for the difference in stability 
requirements that arise between wing-borne, semi-thrust-borne, and 
thrust-borne flight for the Model M001.
    The FAA received comments asking the FAA to provide specific likely 
failure cases to be considered in addition to more detailed control 
feel requirements in proposed AM1.2145(a). The FAA partially concurs 
with these comments. The intent of AM1.2145(a) is for the applicant to 
identify likely failures that may be encountered in service that are 
not addressed by system safety analysis; those could include mechanical 
or other single point failures. The FAA has revised the language in 
AM1.2145(a) to improve clarity but did not concur with the commenters' 
request to identify specific failure conditions, including detailed 
control feel requirements.
    The FAA also received a comment seeking clarity on the term 
``unstable'' in AM1.2145(b). The FAA revised proposed AM1.2145(b) (now 
AM1.2145(c), due to changes discussed previously) to clarify that the 
intent is to ensure dynamic stability characteristics. The FAA intends 
``unstable'' to mean the same as is stated in the criteria: that the 
characteristics do not increase the pilot's workload or otherwise 
endanger the aircraft and its occupants.
    The FAA also received comments regarding aerobatics and whether 
such proposed criteria are applicable to this class of vehicle or if 
instead the criteria should be better tailored to Archer's design. The 
FAA agreed and revised AM1.2145 and AM1.2150 accordingly with the 
recognition that Archer is not seeking approval for aerobatics for the 
Model M001.
    The FAA received a comment that proposed AM1.2150 may be adequate 
for wing-borne operation but not thrust-borne operation. The FAA agrees 
and has revised AM1.2150 to address all sources of lift.
    The FAA also received a comment questioning the terminology 
``critical loss of thrust'' in proposed AM1.2150(b). The FAA agrees 
this term was inappropriate for an aircraft capable of vertical takeoff 
and landing operations because it requires a hazardous test condition 
that would result in an initial adverse environment, which was not the 
intent. The FAA has updated AM1.2150(c) (previously proposed 
AM1.2150(b)) to replace ``critical loss of thrust'' with ``sudden 
change of thrust'' to remove this hazardous condition and to 
distinguish it from the term ``critical change of thrust'' defined in 
AM1.2000. The FAA intends the term ``sudden change of thrust'' to refer 
to short-term commanded thrust changes, whether directly by the pilot 
or from the flight control system in normal operation. The FAA received 
comments on proposed AM1.2150 that a maximum speed limitation may be 
necessary to prevent loss of control on a powered-lift. The FAA agrees 
with the commenters, but because AM1.2150 relates to minimum safe speed 
requirements, the FAA has revised AM1.2160 to include this safety 
requirement in AM1.2160(b).
    The FAA received a comment requesting clarification on the 
applicability of Sec.  23.2155. The commenter questioned the necessity 
for

[[Page 45950]]

this requirement with the assumption that powered-lift do not taxi 
under their own power. The FAA disagrees that this requirement should 
not be adopted as proposed, as the Model M001 has the ability to taxi. 
No changes were made as a result of the comment.
    The FAA also received a comment on proposed AM1.2140(c) suggesting 
the removal of ``multi-engine.'' The commenter stated that because the 
Model M001 is a multi-engine aircraft, including this term adds no 
value and may create confusion. The FAA agrees and did not adopt the 
reference to ``multi-engine aircraft.''
    Finally, the FAA received several comments about AM1.2140(c)'s use 
of the language, ``loss of thrust not shown to be extremely 
improbable'' in the context of trim system requirements. As mentioned 
previously, a new term, ``critical change of thrust'' was defined in 
AM1.2000 to provide an equivalent term adapted to the Model M001 
design. The FAA modified AM1.2140(c) to use ``critical change of 
thrust'' as a result.
    One commenter noted that proposed AM1.2140(a) should not be limited 
to just cruise flight. The FAA agrees and has removed the reference 
limiting the requirement to cruise flight. Additionally, commenters 
expressed a concern that normal phases of flight utilized in proposed 
AM1.2140(a) and the flight conditions identified in proposed 
AM1.2140(b) may create some confusion. The FAA agrees and has revised 
the language in AM1.2140(a) to specify ``normal operations'' instead of 
``normal phases of flight.''
    One commenter requested the FAA change the phrase ``level flight'' 
to ``cruise'' in AM1.2140(b)(2). AM1.2140(b)(2) references flight 
conditions and not phases of flight, and therefore ``level flight'' is 
appropriate. The commenter also requested the FAA add ``hover'' to 
AM1.2140(b). Hover does not have a longitudinal component, and as such 
trim in that axis is not applicable. Adjustments of trim may not apply 
any discontinuities as identified in AM1.2140(c). No changes were made 
as a result of these comments.
    The FAA received comments concerning the use of the term ``trim'' 
in proposed AM1.2140 and questioning its appropriateness with fly-by-
wire control systems that do not use traditional trimming arrangements. 
The FAA finds the requirements in AM1.2140 applicable because the Model 
M001 fly-by-wire flight controls may implement a trimming function 
rather than conventional trim device tabs or bias springs. Such a 
function would be equivalent to a trim or auto-trim device. No changes 
were made as a result of these comments.
    One commenter requested that the FAA replace the term ``primary 
flight controls'' in proposed AM1.2140(a) and (b) with the term 
``inceptor.'' The FAA disagrees. Although inceptors and effectors may 
fall under the term ``primary flight controls,'' the FAA does not find 
this change necessary as it prescribes a specific implementation of 
technology. No changes were made as a result of this comment.

Icing

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from Airbus, ALPA, EASA, 
GAMA, Overair, and TCCA requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify 
proposed airworthiness criteria related to flight into known icing 
(FIKI) conditions as well as inadvertent icing encounters. 
Specifically, commenters requested the FAA explain why references to 
icing conditions requirements were excluded, revise the level of 
prescriptiveness of the criteria, and remove FIKI requirements because 
the Model M001 is not seeking FIKI approval at this time. At the same 
time, the FAA received comments requesting the FAA include more 
specific requirements for FIKI conditions.
    Based on numerous comments received noting that Archer does not 
seek approval for FIKI on the Model M001 at this time, the FAA did not 
adopt proposed AM1.2165(a). Proposed AM1.2165(b) and (c), which address 
inadvertent icing encounters, remain applicable to the Model M001, and 
have been renumbered to AM1.2165(a) and (b), accordingly. AM1.2415 is 
similarly intended to capture any aircraft icing during an inadvertent 
encounter that adversely affects powerplant operation.
    The FAA received comments requesting the FAA include requirements 
for recirculating snow and accumulation of ice and snow, because 
smaller rotors and airfoils, such as those on the Model M001, are known 
to be susceptible to the effects of snow and icing. The FAA agrees with 
concerns regarding the effect of scale on ice accretion, but finds they 
are addressed by proposed AM1.2165(b) (AM1.2165(a) in these final 
criteria) for an inadvertent icing encounter. Recirculating and 
accumulation of snow are foreseeable conditions addressed by Sec.  
23.2415(a) for engine operation and by AM1.2600(a) for flightcrew 
visibility considering accumulations on the windshield due to 
recirculating snow.
    The FAA received requests to remove proposed AM1.2165(b) since the 
Model M001 powered-lift is not seeking FIKI approval. The FAA does not 
agree, as proposed AM1.2165(b) (AM1.2165(a) in these final criteria) 
addresses inadvertent icing encounters, not FIKI. The relatively low 
revolution speed and resulting low centrifugal acceleration effect on 
ice shedding capability, as well as the effect of increased torque on 
electric engines, need to be addressed in an inadvertent icing 
encounter.
    Lastly, the FAA received several comments on proposed AM1.2165(a), 
requesting that the FAA explain why the reference to the icing 
conditions defined in appendix C of part 25 was excluded from these 
airworthiness criteria. Because Archer is not seeking FIKI approval at 
this time, the FAA determined in response to comments from EASA, GAMA, 
and Overair, that proposed AM1.2165(a) should not be adopted in these 
final airworthiness criteria. Should Archer seek icing certification 
through an amendment to their type certificate after initial type 
certification, appropriate icing standards will be defined as part of 
that project. This will allow Archer to seek a standard that reflects 
their operating limitations and specifics of their design.

Structural Design Loads

    The FAA received comments from Airbus, ALPA, EASA, Rolls-Royce, and 
TCCA requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed 
airworthiness criteria related to structural design loads for the Model 
M001, including vibration and buffeting, flight modes, and wing borne 
vs. thrust-borne design loads.
    The FAA received a comment to modify Sec.  23.2215(a) to cover the 
whole operational envelope of the aircraft. The FAA does not agree. The 
objective of this criteria covers the structural design envelope, which 
may exceed the operational envelope requirement recommended by the 
commenter. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
    A commenter recommended the FAA include the structural requirement 
for vibration and buffeting and harmonize with EASA's SC-VTOL.2215(b) 
for powered-lift, by adding ``Vibration and buffeting must not result 
in structural damage up to dive speed, within the limit flight 
envelope'' to Sec.  23.2215.
    The FAA agrees that vibration and buffeting must not result in 
structural damage, but the FAA does not agree to use the SC-
VTOL.2215(b) language. The FAA finds that EASA's scope for vibration 
and buffeting in SC-VTOL is not sufficient for powered-lift. The FAA 
instead moved the proposed requirement to comply with Sec.  23.2215 to 
AM1.2215(a) and added a new paragraph (b), which states, ``There

[[Page 45951]]

must be no vibration or buffeting severe enough to result in structural 
damage, at any speed up to dive speed, within the structural design 
envelope, in any configuration and power-setting.''
    Two commenters requested the FAA clarify the transitional flight 
mode for engine-driven lifting-device assembly provisions per 
AM1.2225(d). The commenters pointed out that the structural loads 
requirements for this special class of aircraft include loads resulting 
from the transitional flight phase that are not considered under 
loading conditions in parts 23 and 27. Specifically, the commenters 
were concerned that propellers, when repositioned in-flight relative to 
the aircraft primary axis, may introduce unique load cases relative to 
conventional propeller loads that would impact the static strength 
evaluations. The commenters recommended the FAA capture requirements 
for loads in all phases of flight by revising AM1.2225(d). One 
commenter requested revising AM1.2225(d) to read ``Engine-driven 
lifting-device assemblies, considering loads resulting from flight 
(including transitional flight mode) and ground conditions, as well 
limit input torque at any lifting-device rotational speed.'' Another 
commenter requested revising AM1.2225(d) to read ``Engine-driven 
lifting device assemblies, considering loads resulting from flight and 
ground conditions, limit input torque at any lifting-device rotational 
speed as well as propeller holding or clocking (locking) conditions of 
applicable.''
    The FAA agrees that all powered-lift flight configurations need 
clarification for the calculation of structural design loads for 
transitional flight phases. The FAA also recognizes that changes in 
propeller ``disk'' orientation during flight will affect aircraft loads 
resulting from the aerodynamic influence of the propellers on the 
aircraft. Similarly, the FAA considers it likely that aircraft 
aerodynamics loads will influence the propeller aerodynamic loads. 
Therefore, the FAA concluded that proposed AM1.2200 Structural Design 
Envelope should be revised instead of AM1.2225 (as suggested by the 
commenters) to include, ``Thrust[hyphen]borne, wing[hyphen]borne, and 
semi[hyphen]thrust[hyphen]borne flight configurations, with associated 
flight load envelopes.'' The FAA added AM1.2200(g) accordingly.
    Multiple commenters asked for clarity on the requirements in 
AM1.2225(d) and whether the intent of that criteria could be shown 
through means of compliance with AM1.2225(a). The FAA disagrees. 
AM1.2225(a) is specific to loads for the engine mount, whereas 
AM1.2225(d) is specific to lifting device assemblies.
    Multiple commenters requested the FAA provide clarification in 
AM1.2200(b) with respect to appropriate design maneuvering load factors 
for powered-lift designs. The intent of AM1.2200 is to describe the 
various design envelopes that must be considered by the applicant in 
the loads analysis. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
    One commenter requested that the FAA define the term 
``sufficiently'' in AM1.2200(a)(1) and (2). As explained in the notice 
of proposed criteria, the FAA based proposed AM1.2200 on Sec.  23.2200, 
with revisions to address the powered-lift structural design envelope. 
The terms ``be sufficiently greater'' in AM1.2200(a)(1) and ``provide 
sufficient margin'' in AM1.2200(a)(2) have the same meaning, and will 
be applied to the Model M001 in the same manner, as in Sec.  
23.2200(a)(1) and (2). No changes were made as a result of the comment.
    EASA stated that AM1.2200(e), which proposed to require that the 
applicant account for each critical altitude up to the maximum 
altitude, does not consider redistribution of loads if deflections 
under load would significantly change the distribution of external or 
internal loads. EASA also requested the FAA revise AM1.2200(e) similar 
to EASA SC-VTOL.2200(e). The FAA does not concur, as the critical 
altitude and redistribution of loads requirement in SC-VTOL.2200(e) is 
already captured by AM1.2200(e) and Sec.  23.2210. No changes were made 
as a result of this comment.
    The FAA received multiple comments questioning the requirement to 
use service history in the development of the design load maneuvering 
factors in AM1.2200(b), since the Model M001 has no service history. 
One commenter requested the FAA add specific language to the 
airworthiness criteria that points to using service history from 
existing normal category aircraft. The FAA agrees that the service 
history utilized in this showing should come from service experience 
from both rotorcraft and small airplane service history. However, the 
FAA disagrees that a change to the airworthiness criteria is necessary.
    One commenter recommended the FAA revise proposed AM1.2225 to be 
more generic by specifying source of loads for any relevant structural 
components, and not only the components specific to the Model M001. The 
FAA disagrees, as these airworthiness criteria are specific to the 
applicant's design.

Structures

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from ASD-Europe, Airbus, 
EASA, GAMA, Leonardo, Lilium, Overair, Odys, TCCA, Volocopter, and an 
anonymous commenter requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify 
proposed airworthiness criteria related to aircraft structure for the 
Model M001.
    Several commenters suggested adding the level 4 airplane 
requirements for damage tolerance in Sec.  23.2240(b) to AM1.2240 to 
incorporate damage tolerance principles. The FAA partially concurs with 
the recommendations of the commenters and has clarified AM1.2240(b) 
consistent with the FAA's long-standing policies regarding use of fail-
safe methodology in conjunction with damage tolerance inspections. 
Fail-safe methodologies, also referred to as safety-by-design, 
incorporate multi-load-path structure (i.e., redundant load paths) to 
act as back-up structure should any one of the original load paths 
(i.e., fail-safe structure) fail. Damage tolerance (i.e., safety-by-
inspection) is a property of structure relating to its ability to 
sustain defects safely until those defects can be detected.
    The FAA does not agree that adoption of Sec.  23.2240(b) is 
necessary or appropriate, as this requirement is specific to airplanes 
that meet the definition in Sec.  23.2005 for a Level 4 airplane that 
can carry 10-19 passengers. The Sec.  23.2240(b) requirement for Level 
4 airplanes was derived from Sec.  23.574 at amendment 23-48 and 
excluded the option to use fail-safe methodologies for commuter 
category airplanes (Level 4). In addition, Sec.  23.574(a) requires the 
use of damage tolerance and allows the use of safe-life in Sec.  
23.574(b) only when damage tolerance is found to be impractical.
    Damage tolerance is one available option to use when complying with 
AM1.2240(a), along with the options to use safe-life and fail-safe 
methodologies, provided the fail-safe option relies on damage tolerance 
or safe life as stipulated in numerous FAA policies including AC 27-1B, 
``Certification of Normal Category Rotorcraft''; AC 23-13A, ``Fatigue, 
Fail-Safe, and Damage Tolerance Evaluation of Metallic Structure for 
Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter Category Airplanes''; and AC 
91-82A, ``Fatigue Management Programs for In-Service Issues.'' The FAA 
notes further that the intent of adding AM1.2240(b) to these final 
criteria was to incorporate inspection when the fail-safe method is 
used. Incorporating inspections addresses long-standing and known 
deficiencies with fail-safe methodologies on all part

[[Page 45952]]

23 airplanes, as clarified in the preamble to the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) for amendment 23-64, in which the FAA identified 
potential shortcomings in the ability to detect all possible failure 
scenarios and ensure that all structural failures would be immediately 
obvious and corrected before further flight. The intent of structural 
durability requirements in both Sec. Sec.  23.2240(a) and 27.571 is to 
use the appropriate application of safe-life or damage tolerance 
principles to ensure that fail-safe structure maintains the required 
safety margins without extended periods of operation with reduced 
safety margins.
    The FAA agrees with the commenters that further clarification on 
the stipulations that govern the use of fail-safe methodologies should 
be included in the Model M001 criteria to reiterate the FAA's 
requirements in this regard. Consequently, the FAA has added a new 
AM1.2240(b) that reflects the intent of Sec.  27.571(d) together with 
amendment 23-64 and associated policies to incorporate damage tolerance 
principles into powered-lift. The requirements in AM1.2240(b) will 
mitigate deficiencies in the fail-safe option and will apply to the 
Model M001 structure beyond those elements specifically identified by 
Sec.  27.571. This is consistent with Sec.  21.17(b), which directs the 
FAA to use the requirements from existing airworthiness standards, as 
appropriate, to determine the level of safety for the aircraft.
    Multiple commenters requested that the FAA align AM1.2240(c) with 
EASA SC-VTOL.2240(d). The FAA notes that AM1.2240(c) is similar to SC-
VTOL.2240(d), although SC-VTOL.2240(d) refers to ``lift/thrust unit'' 
instead of ``engine.'' The EASA term ``lift/thrust unit'' includes the 
engine and propeller or rotor assembly. This topic is an ongoing 
discussion with foreign certification authorities. For the Model M001, 
other rotating parts within the system, except for propeller blades or 
rotors, should be evaluated using typical rotor burst methods, 
including shielding where practical.
    The FAA received a comment to move AM1.2240(c) to outside of 
Subpart C Structures. The FAA disagrees as AM1.2240(c) is a requirement 
specific to structural durability and is appropriately included in 
AM1.2240, which is consistent with Sec.  23.2240. No changes were made 
as a result of this comment.
    Several commenters requested the FAA align Sec.  23.2250(c) with 
the failure criteria in EASA SC-VTOL.2250(c). SC-VTOL.2250(c) contains 
a requirement for Category Enhanced that a single failure must not have 
a catastrophic effect upon the aircraft. The FAA's airworthiness 
criteria do not contain requirements equivalent to EASA's ``Category 
Enhanced'' requirements. However, the changes to AM1.2240(b) in these 
final criteria require inspections capable of reliably detecting damage 
before it leads to structural failure, thereby mitigating the 
occurrence of catastrophic failures. The FAA also changed the proposed 
requirement to comply with Sec.  23.2250(c) to new AM1.2250(c) to 
require the applicant to prevent single failures from resulting in a 
catastrophic effect upon the aircraft.
    The FAA received a comment requesting the airworthiness criteria 
include a requirement to address corrosion on metallic or semi-metallic 
structure components resulting from high voltage difference of electric 
potential. The FAA does not concur. AM1.2240(a) provides an appropriate 
regulatory framework for addressing corrosion, as it embodies the 
safety intent of the prescriptive requirements in pre-amendment 64 
regulations Sec. Sec.  23.573 and 23.574, which directly address 
corrosion, among other factors, in both composite and metallic 
structure. This framework will be applied to the Model M001 in the same 
manner as Sec.  23.2240 for normal category airplanes to address 
corrosion resulting from any source, including high voltage difference 
of electric potential. No changes were made as a result of this 
comment.
    Multiple commenters requested clarification on the lack of 
environmental requirements in Sec.  23.2260(e), which applies to only 
thermal effects. Environmental effects are addressed in Sec.  
23.2260(a), and as such the FAA made no change as a result of these 
comments.

Aeroelasticity & Aeromechanical Stability

    The FAA received and reviewed a comment from Volocopter requesting 
the FAA revise the proposed requirement to comply with Sec.  23.2245 to 
provide further clarity regarding definitions used in the requirement, 
specifically whether the probabilities of malfunctions that can affect 
aeroelastic stability are aligned with those in EASA's SC-VTOL.2245. 
The FAA has revised the proposed requirement as new AM1.2245 to 
specifically require that component and rotating surfaces be free of 
any aeroelastic instability under each appropriate speed and power 
condition. Additionally, the FAA determined that the related issue of 
aeromechanical stability should similarly be addressed but does not 
consider it to be covered under the subject of aeroelasticity. 
Therefore, the FAA created a new section AM1.2241, ``Aeromechanical 
stability,'' incorporating requirements from rotorcraft airworthiness 
standards, similar to ground resonance requirements in Sec.  27.241, to 
address aeromechanical instabilities considered possible for the Model 
M001 when operating in thrust-borne and semi-thrust-borne flight.

Flight Controls

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from Airbus, ANAC, ASD-
Europe, EASA, GAMA, Leonardo, Lilium, Overair, and TCCA, requesting the 
FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related 
to flight controls for the Model M001.
    The FAA received a comment stating that 14 CFR part 23 amendment 
23-64's requirements for flight controls should be sufficient for the 
Model M001 and the FAA should use those requirements. The FAA 
disagrees. Part 23 at amendment 23-64 did not envision the type or 
complexity of the design of powered-lift flight controls, such as those 
on the Model M001. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
    The FAA received several comments that raised concerns with the 
suitability of proposed AM1.2300(b), which was developed from part 23 
requirements for trim systems on normal category airplanes, for fly-by-
wire powered-lift with distributed propulsion. The FAA concurs with the 
comments and modified proposed AM1.2300(b)(2) by replacing the specific 
trim indications with a requirement that the trim systems and functions 
provide information necessary for safe operation. The specific 
indications listed in proposed AM1.2300(b)(2)(i)-(b)(2)(iv), which 
summarize the prescriptive indications from 23.677(a) and ASTM F3232 
section 4.4, may be used as means of compliance with final 
AM1.2300(b)(2) if they are applicable, or they may be modified for the 
novel implementation of trim functions on the Archer Model M001.
    Commenters raised concerns over the flightcrew control margin 
awareness for fly-by-wire flight control systems and recommended 
including a requirement addressing this issue. The FAA concurs with the 
comments and has added AM1.2300(a)(3) requiring the flightcrew to be 
made suitably aware whenever the means of primary flight control 
approaches the limits of control authority. For the context of this 
airworthiness criteria, ``suitably aware'' indicates an appropriate 
balance

[[Page 45953]]

between nuisance alerting and necessary operation.
    Two commenters asked for clarification of the term ``indirect 
flight-control systems'' in AM1.2300(c). The FAA agrees that this term 
caused confusion. The FAA did not adopt this term and instead revised 
AM1.2300(c) for clarity.
    Several commenters stated that proposed AM1.2300 was overly 
prescriptive because the requirements could be better addressed in 
means of compliance and could conflict with automation in fly-by-wire 
flight controls. In contrast, other commenters stated that proposed 
AM1.2300 was insufficiently prescriptive and noted that regulations 
need to explicitly guide applicants, especially for novel aircraft, and 
specific requirements for awareness of reduced flight envelopes should 
be provided.
    The FAA considered these comments and revised proposed AM1.2300 to 
be less prescriptive in instances where other requirements adequately 
address the same safety objective. The FAA did not adopt the proposed 
requirements in AM1.2300(c)(1), (c)(2)(i), and (c)(2)(iii) because they 
were redundant with other requirements and were unnecessarily 
prescriptive. The FAA added a more prescriptive requirement 
specifically for control margin awareness in response to these 
recommendations.
    One commenter suggested a revision to the phrase ``the onset 
characteristics of each protection feature is appropriate for the phase 
of flight and type of maneuver'' in proposed AM1.2300(c)(2)(i). The FAA 
notes there should be no discontinuous inputs into the flight control 
system from envelope protection systems, but agrees that abrupt inputs 
may be necessary in some situations (e.g., preventing stall in response 
to an atmospheric disturbance). The FAA determined that this 
requirement is adequately addressed by AM1.2300(a)(1) and therefore did 
not adopt proposed AM1.2300(c)(2)(i).
    The FAA received comments requesting clarification as to why the 
term ``catastrophic'' is not used in proposed AM1.2300(c)(2)(iii) while 
the term ``hazardous'' is used in proposed AM1.2710(f)(3). The FAA 
reviewed the comments and determined that AM1.2300(c)(2)(iii) is 
redundant to Sec.  23.2510, and therefore did not adopt proposed 
AM1.2300(c)(2)(iii). For clarification, the FAA notes that AM1.2710 
applies to the engines and addresses failure effects up to the 
hazardous level, whereas Sec.  23.2510 applies to the aircraft and 
addresses failure effects up to the catastrophic level. These safety 
levels are intentionally different. No engine failure is allowed to 
result in a catastrophic aircraft event. In addition, unlike Sec.  
23.2510, AM1.2710 does not permit using a probabilistic means to manage 
certain single-element parts that can fail and cause hazardous engine 
effects.
    A commenter recommended defining the term ``simultaneous limiting 
event'' in AM1.2000. The FAA notes this term originates from unique 
conditions applied to fly-by-wire systems with envelope protection. It 
pertains to scenarios where multiple envelope limits could be exceeded. 
The FAA does not consider it necessary to define this term in AM1.2000.
    The FAA received a comment on Sec.  23.2305 requesting that the FAA 
add a requirement for parking brakes. The FAA disagrees. Section 
23.2305(b) requires a reliable means of stopping the aircraft. One 
means to accomplish this may include a parking brake; however, the 
applicant may propose other means. No changes were made as a result of 
this comment.

Occupant System Design Protection

    The FAA received comments from ALPA, EASA, GAMA, Lilium, Overair, 
Rolls-Royce, and TCCA on occupant system design protection 
requirements.
    The FAA received comments seeking clarification on the proposed 
inclusion of the ditching exclusion in Sec.  23.2315(a)(1) and a 
comment that this contradicts the proposed requirement to comply with 
Sec.  23.2310 for seaplanes and amphibians. The FAA concurs that the 
language proposed caused confusion and has revised these proposed 
requirements. The FAA did not adopt the proposed requirement to comply 
with Sec.  23.2310 as it is not applicable to the Model M001. The FAA 
maintained the scope of Sec.  23.2315 (now AM1.2315) specific to the 
``cabin configured for takeoff or landing'' but did not adopt the 
exclusion for ditching because the Model M001 is not seeking ditching 
approval. One commenter requested that the FAA require shrouding on 
propellers as these aircraft are planned to operate close to people or 
property. The FAA does not concur with the comment. AM1.2315(a)(1), 
originally proposed as Sec.  23.2315, requires that passenger doors are 
not located where propellers would endanger persons using the door. 
Operational requirements are also used to ensure safety of passengers, 
ground crews, and property, as required for existing aircraft. No 
changes were made as a result of the comment.
    The FAA received comments regarding aerobatics and whether such 
criteria are applicable to this class of vehicle or if the proposed 
criteria for aerobatics should be removed. The FAA removed the proposed 
requirement to comply with Sec.  23.2315(b) because the Model M001 does 
not seek approval for aerobatics.
    The FAA received comments asking the FAA to include the protection 
of occupants in proposed AM1.2320(a)(2). Another commenter asked for 
clarification of proposed AM1.2320(a)(2). Another commenter asked the 
FAA to modify proposed AM1.2320(a)(2) to protect the pilot, flight 
controls, and propulsion electrical power and control from propellers. 
The intent of proposed AM1.2320(a)(2) (now Sec.  23.2320(a)(2) in these 
final criteria) is to protect the pilot and systems so the pilot can 
land the aircraft in the event of a propeller failure. Protection of 
the occupants embarking and disembarking is required by AM1.2315. 
Propulsion control is required by Sec.  23.2320(a)(2) as a part of the 
flight controls on the Model M001. No changes were made as a result of 
these comments.

Bird Strike

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from Airbus, Alaka[revaps]i, 
ALPA, ASD-Europe, EASA, GAMA, JCAB, Leonardo, Overair, TCCA, UKCAA, 
Vertical Aerospace, and Volocopter, requesting the FAA revise, remove, 
or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related to bird strike 
requirements for the Model M001.
    Some commenters requested that the FAA increase the bird-impact 
size, while other commenters requested that the bird mass should not be 
prescribed, or a lower bird mass should be used with considerations for 
multiple bird strikes. Some commenters requested complete removal of 
the requirement, while other commenters only requested removal of the 
requirement for bird deterrence devices. Several commenters questioned 
the bird mass differences between the aircraft level requirement in 
proposed AM1.2320, the propeller requirement in Sec.  35.36, and the 
bird ingestion evaluation in AM1.2718. One commenter requested the FAA 
align bird strike requirements with those in EASA SC-VTOL.
    The FAA maintains the rationale presented in the notice of proposed 
airworthiness criteria for the proposed level of bird strike protection 
for the Model M001. The proposed requirements were based on the 
increased exposure to birds in the environment in which the Model M001 
is expected to operate, the expectation of public safety, and the 
recommendations presented in the

[[Page 45954]]

Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Rotorcraft Bird Strike 
Working Group (RBSWG) report.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ ARAC RBSWG Report, Rev. B, May 8, 2019, page 15, Section 
``Bird Mass'' (ARAC RBSWG Report), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/ARAC%20RBSWG%20Final%20Report%20Rev.%20B.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The safety level obtained with the 2.2-lb bird strike requirement 
for transport category rotorcraft (as established in Sec.  29.631) has 
been demonstrated in service to be sufficient. Similarly, the existing 
bird strike requirement with a 4.0-lb bird for type certificated 
propellers (established in Sec.  35.36) has also been demonstrated in 
service to be sufficient. The bird ingestion requirements in AM1.2718 
are not driven by either of these bird sizes. Therefore, the proposed 
bird impact protection requirement remains unchanged and will retain 
the proposed 2.2-lbs at the aircraft level, while maintaining propeller 
requirements at 4.0-lbs in Sec.  35.36.
    The FAA also considered the comments received on the bird deterrent 
system requirement in proposed AM1.2320(b), and the FAA concurs with 
not adopting this proposal. Although the FAA is aware of some research 
supporting the use of such devices, the FAA agrees the data is 
insufficient to mandate such a system at this time. The FAA encourages 
applicants such as Archer to consider voluntary implementation of these 
systems or similar bird deterrence mitigations, as good design 
practice.
    The FAA also received comments that questioned whether the bird 
strike requirement should be listed under proposed AM1.2320, ``Occupant 
Physical Environment,'' since as written, it applies to more than just 
the occupant physical environment. The FAA agrees with these comments. 
The bird strike requirement placed in proposed AM1.2320 was intended 
and described in the notice as an aircraft-level requirement. 
Therefore, the FAA did not adopt proposed AM1.2320(b) and instead 
placed some of the requirements from proposed AM1.2320(b) into a new 
AM1.2311, ``Bird Strike'' in Subpart D, ``Design and Construction,'' to 
reinforce its intent as a general, aircraft-level requirement. Lastly, 
several commenters expressed concern with flocking bird strikes that 
could affect multiple engines at the same time and recommended this be 
addressed by the ingestion requirements in AM1.2718(a). The FAA notes 
that the airworthiness criteria in Subpart H apply to each single 
engine used in the aircraft distributed propulsion system. The 
requirements in AM1.2718(a) address ingestion from likely sources such 
as foreign objects, birds, ice, and hail, and are intended to capture 
engine effects from any ingestion source determined to be applicable to 
the Archer electric engine design. Common cause effects across multiple 
engines will be addressed under the applicable aircraft-level 
requirements, including Sec.  23.2510, so no change to the engine 
airworthiness criteria is necessary.

Fire and High Energy Protection

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from Airbus, EASA, GAMA, 
JCAB, Lilium, Odys, Overair, TCCA, and Volocopter requesting that the 
FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related 
to fire and high energy protection on the Model M001.
    Several commenters recommended the FAA revise Sec. Sec.  23.2325 
and 23.2270 to protect against fires in baggage and cargo compartments 
propagating and creating an unsafe condition. The commenters suggested 
incorporating requirements similar to those in EASA SC-VTOL.2270, and 
further recommended clarifying proposed Sec.  23.2325 by removing the 
references to part 23 airplane certification levels.
    The FAA agrees with the need to mitigate the risk of fires in 
baggage and cargo compartments, commensurate with the intended level of 
safety for the Model M001. The FAA reviewed the baggage and cargo 
compartment fire protection requirements in parts 23 and 27, the 
intended operational uses of the Model M001, and the EASA SC-VTOL 
requirements. The proposed airworthiness criteria did not require the 
design to alert the pilot of a fire in a baggage or cargo compartment, 
or require these compartments be constructed of or lined with fire 
resistant materials to protect the aircraft and occupants if the pilot 
was unaware of a baggage or cargo compartment fire. However, part 27 
contains requirements to protect rotorcraft occupants from the risk of 
fire in a baggage compartment through the use of flame and fire 
resistant materials in its construction. The FAA revised proposed Sec.  
23.2325 (now AM1.2325) by removing the part 23 airplane certification 
levels. The FAA also added AM1.2325(e) requiring that the Model M001 
baggage and cargo compartments be constructed of or lined with fire 
resistant materials, similar to Sec.  27.855(a)(2), or be equipped with 
a fire or smoke detection system to allow the pilot to take immediate 
action to land, or be located where a fire would be visible to the 
pilots and accessible for the manual extinguishing of a fire, which 
adopts some elements of SC-VTOL.2270.
    A commenter recommended the FAA revise proposed Sec.  23.2325 to be 
more generic by specifying performance-based safety objectives. The FAA 
does not agree, as the revisions to proposed Sec.  23.2325 (now 
AM1.2325) discussed previously are specific to the Model M001.
    The FAA received comments recommending retaining the language in 
Sec.  23.2330 of ``designated fire zone'' in lieu of the proposed 
AM1.2330 ``fire zone.'' The term ``fire zone'' includes designated fire 
zones and new fire zones developed to address fire threats from new 
technologies. Much of existing guidance is defined for designated fire 
zones, which assume a fire involving kerosene or aviation gasoline. 
Other terms will be determined by the applicant, including designated 
fire zones, to distinguish between different types of fire zones and 
the fire threat that exists in those zones. The difference in language 
does not impose requirements beyond the intent of part 23, and also 
allows new fire zones to be established for aircraft using non-
conventional propulsion and energy supply. No changes were made as a 
result of these comments.
    The FAA received a comment to align the language in AM1.2330(a) and 
AM1.2330(b) (``fire zone'') with the language in SC-VTOL.2330 
(``designated fire zone''). As discussed above, the FAA has moved away 
from using the term ``designated fire zone.'' EASA SC-VTOL.2330(a) is 
broader than AM1.2330(a) and includes additional components by applying 
to ``flight critical systems'' instead of only ``flight controls.'' 
Although AM1.2330 is not as broad as EASA SC-VTOL.2330(a) as far as the 
scope of components, it is broader with respect to the types of fire 
zones that those components must address, by using the term ``fire 
zone'' instead of ``designated fire zone.'' Protection of flight 
critical systems other than flight controls and ensuring CSFL after a 
fire or release of stored energy are addressed in AM1.2440 and Sec.  
23.2510.
    The FAA received multiple comments to add survivable emergency 
landing fire protection requirements to Sec.  23.2325. The FAA notes 
that such conditions are already covered by AM1.2430(a)(6), which 
states that each energy system must be ``. . . designed to retain 
energy under all likely operating conditions and to minimize hazards to 
occupants and first responders following an emergency landing or 
otherwise survivable impact (crash landing).'' No changes are necessary 
as a result of these comments.

[[Page 45955]]

    The FAA received a comment to add a requirement to AM1.2335 to 
minimize the risk of electrical shock to the crew, passengers, and 
service and maintenance personnel, similar to the requirement in Sec.  
27.610(d)(2). This concern is adequately addressed by proposed 
AM1.2335(b), which requires the appropriate protection against 
hazardous effects caused by accumulation of electrostatic charge. No 
changes were made as a result of this comment.
    The FAA also received a comment to revise AM1.2335(b) to require 
protection against catastrophic and hazardous effects. The proposed 
airworthiness criteria state that the aircraft must be protected from 
hazardous effects, which represent the minimum hazard level that must 
be addressed; by definition, this requires that catastrophic effects 
must also be addressed. No changes are necessary as a result of this 
comment.
    The FAA received comments questioning proposed AM1.2440 in lieu of 
requiring compliance with Sec.  23.2440 for powerplant fire protection. 
AM1.2440 is more performance-based, allowing for all powerplant related 
fire protection concerns to be covered by a singular airworthiness 
criteria. No changes are necessary as a result of this comment. The FAA 
received comments recommending replacing the term ``powerplant system'' 
in AM1.2440 with ``powerplant'' or ``powerplant installation.'' The FAA 
does not concur as the proposed terminology is consistent with Sec.  
23.2410. No changes were made as a result of these comments.

Propulsion Safety and Integration

    The FAA received comments from Airbus, ASD-Europe, EASA, GAMA, 
Leonardo, Lilium, Odys, Overair, TCCA, Rolls-Royce, and Volocopter 
requesting that the FAA revise, remove, or clarify the proposed 
airworthiness criteria related to propulsion safety and integration on 
the Model M001.
    Proposed AM1.2405(d) specifies ``extremely remote'' as an 
acceptable probability of failure for power or thrust control systems, 
assuming manual backup capability. Several commenters stated that 
reliance on manual backup control of power or thrust on distributed 
propulsion powered-lift is unlikely to be acceptably achievable to 
ensure CSFL, and that failure of the propulsion control system is 
potentially catastrophic. Commenters also stated that specifying the 
power or thrust control system failure probability as extremely remote 
may be inconsistent with the extremely improbable requirement in 
AM1.2135.
    The FAA agrees the airworthiness criteria should not specify an 
acceptable failure probability for power or thrust controls systems on 
a distributed propulsion powered-lift. Additionally, the FAA agrees 
that control of distributed propulsion powered-lift, using manual 
control of individual engines and propellers, should not be assumed. 
The FAA revised AM1.2405 by not adopting proposed paragraph (d). The 
appropriate hazard classification and failure probability for power or 
thrust control systems will be determined using the aircraft-level 
system safety process in Sec.  23.2510, as well as AM1.2135, if 
controllability is affected.
    The FAA received a comment that AM1.2405(b) and Sec.  23.2410(a) 
contradict one another, with the suggestion to remove the phrase ``if 
continued safe flight and landing cannot be ensured, the hazard has 
been minimized'' from Sec.  23.2410(a). The FAA disagrees. AM1.2405 
establishes the safety objective for power or thrust control systems, 
whereas Sec.  23.2410 is applicable to all powerplant systems and 
permits minimization of the hazard in limited cases. No changes were 
made as a result of this comment.
    Multiple commenters recommended the FAA replace proposed AM1.2405 
(power or thrust control systems) and AM1.2425 (powerplant operational 
characteristics) with a requirement to comply with Sec. Sec.  23.2405 
(automatic power or thrust control systems) and 23.2420 (reversing 
systems), or otherwise address those systems under the safety analysis 
requirements of Sec.  23.2510. Commenters also recommended the 
airworthiness criteria be revised to allow the propulsion-control 
system to be evaluated along with the flight control system within the 
aircraft-level safety analyses required by Sec.  23.2510. The FAA does 
not agree with these recommendations and notes that Sec. Sec.  23.2405 
and 23.2420 are not limited to functions defined in former Sec. Sec.  
23.904 and 23.933, as discussed in the preamble to part 23 amendment 
23-64.\4\ As noted previously, the FAA agrees that for the Model M001, 
the engines and propellers should be considered part of the flight 
control system, to include at a minimum all equipment and systems used 
for control of pitch, roll, yaw, and vertical motion. Furthermore, the 
subsystem analysis required by AM1.2405 for the engine power or thrust 
control system does not relieve the applicant from aircraft-level 
requirements such as AM1.2300, Sec.  23.2500, or Sec.  23.2510 when 
incorporated into a system such as the flight control system. 
Conversely, specific subsystem requirements, such as AM1.2405, are not 
imposed on other subsystems that make up a higher-level system simply 
because they become part of a higher-level system. The FAA did not 
change the proposed criteria as a result of these comments; however, as 
noted previously, references to the ``reverser system'' in proposed 
AM1.2405 have not been adopted because that system is not applicable to 
the Model M001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ 81 FR 96639 (Dec. 30, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Multiple commenters requested the FAA consider modifying 
AM1.2425(b), ``Powerplant Operational Characteristics,'' to include 
wording from SC-VTOL.2425(b) that would only require inflight engine 
shutdown and restart capability if the safety benefits outweigh the 
hazards. Another commenter requested clarity on AM1.2425, which 
requires a means for shutdown and restart of the powerplant within an 
established operational envelope. It does not prohibit procedures or 
control logic that would restrict engine restart under certain 
conditions. The FAA disagrees with modifying the criteria. The FAA will 
address the requirements of appropriate shutdown and restart procedures 
through the aircraft flight manual limitations and operating 
procedures. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
    One commenter suggested the FAA change AM1.2430(a)(1) to include 
``control and management systems'' along with energy storage and supply 
systems. The FAA agrees that battery control and management systems are 
covered by AM1.2430(a)(1) in addition to Sec.  23.2525, but does not 
consider a change necessary as the FAA considers the term ``energy 
storage and supply systems'' to include battery control and management 
systems. The FAA received another comment requesting to remove Sec.  
23.2525(b) as it was duplicative to AM1.2340(a)(1). The FAA does not 
agree with this request and made no changes from the comment as Sec.  
23.2525 addresses required power for intended operations for all 
aircraft systems that use the electrical storage system, whereas 
AM1.2430(a)(1) contains propulsion criteria that ensures the 
independence between multiple electrical storage systems providing 
electrical power to the propulsion system.

[[Page 45956]]

    Commenters requested the FAA clarify ``where the exposure to 
lightning is likely'' in AM1.2430(a)(2), which they believe could be 
interpreted in different ways. One interpretation suggested by 
commenters is to consider ``likely'' as it applies to areas of the 
aircraft where lightning may strike, while another interpretation is in 
reference to operating environments where lightning is likely. The FAA 
agrees with this concern and has revised the airworthiness criteria by 
removing the phrase ``where the exposure to lightning is likely.'' The 
FAA notes that AM1.2430(a)(2) and Sec.  35.38 assume the aircraft will 
be exposed to lightning regardless of any environmental operating 
limitations and require protection of the energy system from 
catastrophic events. The applicant will show compliance with 
AM1.2430(a)(2) for the Model M001 consistent with other type 
certificated products by identifying areas of the powered-lift where 
direct attachment of lightning is ``likely,'' and evaluating the 
resulting effects.
    The FAA received a comment asking the FAA to consider the failure 
due to overload of the landing system in AM1.2430(a)(6). The Model M001 
is not required to address specific failures due to overload of the 
landing system since its landing system is not located near its energy 
storage systems. No changes were made as a result of the comment.
    The FAA received a comment requesting that airworthiness criteria 
be added to protect occupants from possible hazards from the energy 
systems. The FAA notes that proposed AM1.2430(a)(6), as written, covers 
this and therefore did not make changes as a result of this comment.
    The FAA also received a comment recommending that AM1.2430(a)(6) be 
expanded to include minimizing hazards to emergency service responders 
in addition to occupants. The FAA concurs with this suggestion and adds 
first responders to the airworthiness criteria.
    Commenters requested the FAA explain the reservation of proposed 
AM1.2430(a)(7) and AM1.2430(c)(2). A commenter also recommended the FAA 
adopt EASA SC-VTOL.2430(a)(7) and add it as AM1.2430(a)(7) to ensure 
appropriate power quality within the energy system. The FAA did not 
incorporate the requirements from 23.2430(a)(7), which are similar to 
the requirements from EASA SC-VTOL.2430(a)(7), or (c)(2) into the Model 
M001 proposed criteria, and instead listed them as ``Reserved,'' 
because they cover physical contamination of stored energy. Stored 
electrical energy is not susceptible to physical contamination in the 
way that convention fuel is. Damaged or failed electrical storage and 
distribution systems may prevent delivery of stored electrical energy 
to an intended load, which is a different condition than contaminated 
energy. The FAA notes these concerns are covered by uninterrupted 
energy supply and fluctuation requirements under AM1.2430(a)(4). To 
avoid confusion, the FAA did not adopt the proposal to ``reserve'' 
paragraphs AM1.2430(a)(7) and (c)(2) and renumbered (c)(3) accordingly.
    The FAA received a comment that likely hazards for energy systems 
are not limited to temperature influences as mentioned in 
AM1.2430(b)(2). The FAA agrees and did not adopt the qualifier ``due to 
unintended temperature influences'' in these final airworthiness 
criteria.
    Several commenters suggested clarification on the application of 
system safety requirements, propulsion requirements, and flight control 
system requirements due to the integration of these functions on the 
aircraft. The commenters questioned whether power or thrust control 
system requirements need to be applied to flight control systems or if 
flight control system requirements need to be applied to power or 
thrust control systems. The FAA concurs with the commenters' request to 
consider the engines and propellers as part of the flight control 
system. The flight control system includes, at a minimum, all equipment 
and systems used for control of pitch, roll, yaw, and vertical motion. 
The FAA notes that the subsystem analysis required by AM1.2405 for the 
engine power or thrust control system does not relieve the applicant 
from higher-level requirements such as those in AM1.2300, Sec.  
23.2500, or Sec.  23.2510, when engine or thrust control systems are 
incorporated into a higher-level system such as the flight control 
system. Conversely, specific subsystem requirements such as AM1.2405 
would not be imposed on other subsystems that make up a higher-level 
system simply because they become part of that higher-level system. The 
safety requirements in Sec.  23.2510 apply at the aircraft level to the 
integrated functions of all systems on the aircraft, in addition to 
specific system requirements such as AM1.2300 and AM1.2405.
    Several commenters expressed concern regarding the appropriateness 
of the system-level safety objectives in proposed AM1.2405 and Sec.  
23.2425 for such highly integrated systems. The commenters suggested 
AM1.2405 and AM1.2425 are not necessary, since compliance with Sec.  
23.2510 can require the applicant to define both system and aircraft 
level safety objectives.
    The FAA recognizes there may be inconsistencies between safety 
objectives required at the powerplant installation level and those at 
the aircraft level, but notes this is the case for type certificated 
airplanes and rotorcraft. Existing powerplant rules define a minimum 
level of safety that permits certification of a broad range of products 
for single and multi-engine aircraft. One common requirement for 
powerplant installations has been the ``no single failure'' concept, 
which is practically applied given the number of engines installed. 
This concept remains critical even for highly integrated and 
distributed powerplant systems. Aircraft level safety objectives may 
not drive the level of safety typically provided in a powerplant 
installation, such as isolation between all engines on a multi-engine 
aircraft with more than two engines, so the powerplant requirements 
establish a minimum safety objective that may not always align with 
those at the aircraft level. As powered-lift and distributed propulsion 
systems evolve, there may be less need to capture powerplant 
installation unique safety requirements. Until then, the FAA will use 
AM1.2405 to capture those requirements for the Model M001 and ensure 
the powerplant installation level of safety is appropriate regardless 
of the aircraft level safety objectives.
    Multiple commenters requested clarification regarding the 
definition of ``energy'' and the instances in the criteria where liquid 
fuel is still relevant, despite the consideration of electric 
propulsion systems. The term ``fuel'' is used in part 23 and includes 
any form of energy used by an engine or powerplant installation such as 
provided by carbon-based fuels or electrical potential.\5\ The FAA 
recognizes that using the term ``fuel'' instead of ``energy'' has 
implied the criteria are limited to non-fossil-fuel-based propulsion 
systems and is inconsistent with language used by other airworthiness 
authorities. As such, the FAA has replaced the term ``fuel'' with 
``energy'' throughout these Model M001 airworthiness criteria. The FAA 
notes that ``energy'' includes any form of energy, including carbon-
based fuels, electrical potential, and other means of energy storage or 
power generation for propulsion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ 81 FR 96641 (Dec. 30, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters requested that the FAA revise proposed 
AM1.2400(b) to clarify that the Model M001 engines

[[Page 45957]]

and propellers will not be individually issued type certificates, but 
rather approved under the aircraft's type certificate, and as such, any 
requirements mentioning the ``type certificate'' should be excluded. 
The FAA agrees and has revised AM1.2400(b) to remove the requirement 
that each engine and propeller installed on the Model M001 have a type 
certificate.
    The FAA received a comment to distinguish between airplane and 
engine hazards in AM1.2000(e). The requirement in AM1.2400(e) addresses 
powerplant components at the aircraft level. Engines are one of many 
powerplant components installed at the aircraft level, each of which 
must meet any limitations or installation instruction provided with 
that component or be shown to not to create a hazard. Engine specific 
hazards for the Model M001 are found in subpart H of the airworthiness 
criteria. The FAA disagrees that the distinction requested by the 
commenter is necessary, and no changes were made as a result of this 
comment.
    The FAA received comments requesting the FAA either remove Sec.  
23.2525(c) and modify AM1.2430(a)(3) to explicitly include energy 
storage systems, or revise Sec.  23.2525(c) to remove the primary 
source failure consideration. The FAA disagrees. Section 23.2525 
addresses required power considering the failures and malfunctions of 
the primary source at the aircraft level, whereas the requirements in 
AM1.2430(a)(3) are specific to energy systems used for propulsion. No 
changes were made as a result of these comments.

System Safety

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from ASD-Europe, Airbus, 
ALPA, EASA, Leonardo, Lilium, Odys, Vertical Aerospace, Rolls-Royce, 
TCCA, Volocopter, an individual commenter, and an anonymous commenter, 
requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness 
criteria related to system safety and cybersecurity requirements for 
the Model M001.
    Several commenters cited differences between EASA's SC-VTOL and the 
proposed FAA airworthiness criteria for the Model M001 with regard to 
EASA's creation of a ``Category Enhanced'' set of requirements. EASA 
included a structural requirement in SC-VTOL.2250, ``Design and 
construction principles,'' that for Category Enhanced a single failure 
must not have a catastrophic effect upon the aircraft. The FAA 
acknowledges that the airworthiness criteria for the Model M001 as a 
special class aircraft differ from the requirements in EASA's SC-VTOL, 
which is a set of generalized requirements intended to cover a class of 
aircraft. The FAA's long-standing technical practice manages risk due 
to structural failures through the use of critical or life-limited 
parts, which mitigates any need to address potential catastrophic 
structural failure modes under the system safety requirements of Sec.  
23.2510. While this practice differs from that of EASA's approach, the 
FAA finds both approaches comparable and acceptable for risk 
mitigation. As discussed previously, the FAA revised proposed Sec.  
23.2250(c) (now AM1.2250(c)) to add a requirement that single failures 
must not result in a catastrophic effect upon the aircraft.
    Several commenters identified that these criteria do not include 
specific failure condition probability targets or required development 
assurance level criteria and requested that they be included with 
appropriate rationale. The FAA does not agree, as existing aircraft 
airworthiness standards (parts 23, 25, 27, and 29) also do not 
prescribe specific failure condition probability targets or development 
assurance level criteria. This guidance may be found in advisory 
circulars or industry consensus standards, which provide one means, but 
not the only means, for showing compliance with the regulatory 
requirements. These means will likely need to be modified to consider 
powered-lift designs such as the Model M001.
    One commenter recommended the FAA revise the proposed requirement 
to comply with Sec.  23.2510 to include a clarification on the 
applicability of the standard, as it pertains to systems and equipment 
installed in the aircraft and how it relates to other requirements 
contained in other sections of the airworthiness standards. The FAA 
disagrees. The FAA proposed that the Model M001 comply with Sec.  
23.2510 without modification because the FAA intentionally developed 
that rule as a regulation of general requirements that do not supersede 
any requirements contained in other part 23 sections. The FAA intends 
the same application for the Model M001.
    Several commenters expressed concern over the absence of a ``no 
single failure'' catastrophic failure condition criteria in these 
airworthiness criteria, citing its inclusion in EASA SC-
VTOL.2510(a)(1). The FAA does not agree that a specific requirement 
prohibiting catastrophic single failures is necessary in the 
airworthiness criteria. Existing parts 23, 25, 27, and 29 airworthiness 
standards do not contain a ``no single failure'' requirement for 
catastrophic failure conditions, and the FAA considers these 
longstanding existing airworthiness standards acceptable. Although 
preventing ``single failures'' is addressed in FAA guidance material 
(e.g., Advisory Circulars 25.1309-1A and Advisory Circular 27-1B), it 
is one means, but not the only means, for showing compliance with the 
regulatory requirements. The FAA intends the same application for the 
Model M001.
    Several commenters recommended the FAA clarify requirements for 
addressing cybersecurity. The FAA acknowledges that these aircraft 
involve many new technologies which are highly integrated, and any 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities must be appropriately assessed and 
addressed. The FAA is addressing cybersecurity through AM1.1529 and 
Sec.  23.2500, Sec.  23.2505, and Sec.  23.2510. No changes were made 
as a result of these comments.

Lightning Protection

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from EASA, GAMA, Lilium, 
Overair, and TCCA requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify 
proposed airworthiness criteria intended to address hazards that may 
result from a lightning attachment on the Model M001. These 
requirements include consideration for lightning common cause effects 
due to the potential for simultaneously affecting multiple systems. The 
proposed airworthiness criteria considered inadvertent exposure to 
lightning producing environments, including flight into clouds, as well 
as cold or icy weather conditions. The FAA determined that the highly 
integrated systems of the Model M001 aircraft require lightning 
protection.
    One commenter requested the FAA clarify why the lightning indirect 
effects requirements are not applicable to systems with major failure 
conditions. The FAA notes that the lightning requirements are intended 
to be applicable to systems with major failure conditions for aircraft 
approved for IFR operations. For aircraft approved for IFR operations, 
proposed AM1.2515(b) is applicable to systems with hazardous or major 
failure conditions, similar to Sec.  27.1316(b).
    Multiple commenters recommended the FAA revert proposed AM1.2515 to 
Sec.  23.2515 to limit the applicability of lightning requirements to 
aircraft approved for IFR operations that cannot show exposure to 
lightning is unlikely. The Model M001 incorporates systems that are 
critical in VFR and IFR operations that require protection

[[Page 45958]]

against indirect effects of a lightning strike. A lightning attachment 
may occur during flight, when operating through or in the vicinity of 
lightning producing environments. Aircraft operating in instrument 
meteorological conditions (IMC) may encounter lightning, and aircraft 
operating in day or night visual meteorological conditions may 
inadvertently encounter lightning producing environments such as flight 
into clouds and freezing or icy weather conditions. Systems that 
perform functions essential to CSFL must demonstrate immunity to 
lightning for all operations to achieve the intended safety objectives 
for catastrophic failure conditions. The FAA finds the requirements in 
AM1.2515 to be appropriate for the systems on the Model M001 and made 
no changes as a result of these comments.
    The FAA received a comment asking for clarification of 
AM1.2515(a)(2) stating that it could be incorrectly interpreted as the 
system could be allowed to fail when exposed to lightning without 
recovery after exposure. The FAA does not agree that AM1.2515(a)(2) may 
be misinterpreted. Demonstration of lightning immunity is required for 
systems with catastrophic failure conditions. The exception for 
recovery conflicts in AM1.2515(a)(2) is based on aircraft operational 
or functional requirements independent of lightning exposure. The 
expectation is that a system recovers normal operation of a function 
without impact to safety of flight by design. No changes were made as a 
result of this comment.
    Multiple commenters recommended the FAA consider whether systems 
with hazardous and major failure conditions meet lightning requirements 
for aircraft not approved for IFR operations. The FAA notes that 
aircraft not approved for IFR operations are restricted from flight 
into IMC and must use outside visual references. An aircraft operating 
in IMC may encounter lightning producing environments, a hazard which 
requires more stringent requirements than aircraft certified 
exclusively for VFR operations. Limiting AM1.2515(b) to IFR operations 
therefore maintains the level of safety intended for protection against 
lightning threats. Section AM1.2515(b) is applicable to IFR operations 
and systems with hazardous (level B) or major (level C) failure 
conditions. Section AM1.2515(a) is applicable to all operations and 
systems with catastrophic failure conditions. This approach achieves 
the intended safety objectives.
    Commenters recommended deleting the word ``significantly'' from the 
text of AM1.2515(b) so that the requirement is clearly identified as 
applicable to electrical and electronic systems with hazardous and 
major failure conditions. The FAA concurs since AM1.2515(b) is 
applicable to IFR operations and systems with hazardous or major 
failure conditions. The FAA did not adopt the term ``significantly'' 
from proposed AM1.2515(b) to ensure both major and hazardous failure 
conditions are appropriately assessed.

HIRF

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from EASA, Overair, and TCCA 
requesting the FAA revise, remove, and clarify proposed airworthiness 
criteria related to HIRF exposure.
    Commenters requested consideration for HIRF common cause effects 
due to the potential of affecting multiple systems simultaneously, 
since radio frequency transmitters are continuously evolving, and 
future spectrum expansions are anticipated. The FAA agrees that the 
HIRF environment and sources are unpredictable and that the aircraft 
and highly integrated systems require robust HIRF protection, but 
considers the proposed requirements adequate to address this concern.
    One commenter requested the FAA clarify why operation under IFR is 
considered to relax the HIRF requirements, but not the lightning 
criteria. Another commenter requested the FAA clarify why the HIRF 
requirements are not applicable to systems with major failure 
conditions. Several commenters also requested the FAA remove the 
limitation that Sec.  23.2520(b) be only applicable for aircraft 
approved for IFR operations, similar to SC-VTOL.2520(b).
    The FAA notes that proposed AM1.2515 and AM1.2420 provide 
consistent requirements for the protection of electrical and electronic 
systems from the effects of lightning and HIRF, respectively. The FAA 
does not concur that the HIRF requirements are relaxed for IFR. The FAA 
changed the proposed requirement to comply with Sec.  23.2520(a) and 
(b) to new AM1.2520, to remove the qualifier ``significantly'' from 
Sec.  23.2520(b). AM1.2520(a) is applicable for all operations and 
systems with catastrophic failure conditions, aligned with AM1.2515(a). 
Limiting AM1.2520(b) to IFR operations maintains an acceptable level of 
safety, as AM1.2520(b) is intended to be applicable to systems with 
hazardous or major failure conditions. This also aligns with similar 
requirements in AM1.2515(b) for lightning. The FAA did not adopt the 
term ``significantly'' from proposed AM1.2420(b), similar to 
AM1.2515(b), to ensure that major and hazardous failure conditions are 
appropriately assessed for HIRF as well as for lightning. This approach 
achieves the intended safety objectives and aligns the airworthiness 
criteria with the appropriate level of safety intended by utilizing 
appropriate standards from both parts 23 and 27, revised to be 
appropriate for the Model M001.

Flightcrew Interface

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from ALPA, ANAC, EASA, GAMA, 
Lilium, Odys, Overair, TCCA, and an anonymous commenter requesting the 
FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria related 
to flightcrew interface requirements on the Model M001.
    The FAA received comments requesting that the FAA replace the 
language in AM1.2600(a) and (b) with the language in Sec.  23.2600(a) 
and (b). The Model M001 is capable of using one or more sources of lift 
to perform a particular phase of flight. Therefore, using the unchanged 
wording from Sec.  23.2600(a) is not sufficient and does not include 
hover. AM1.2000 incudes definitions for ``sources of lift'' and 
``phases of flight,'' and those defined terms were used in proposed 
AM1.2600(a). The FAA included ``without excessive concentration, skill, 
alertness, or fatigue'' in proposed AM1.2600(b) to address the human 
factors elements used to control the aircraft. The Model M001 includes 
increased levels of automation and technology that may impact pilot 
concentration, alertness, and fatigue, so the inclusion of ``without 
excessive concentration, skill, alertness, or fatigue'' language is 
necessary. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
    The FAA also received a comment requesting clarification between 
human factor differences in AM1.2135(a) and AM1.2600(a). The same 
commenter suggested revising AM1.2160(a). AM1.2135(a) describes human 
factors requirements as they relate to controllability of the aircraft 
while AM1.2160(a) focuses on the human factors in the context of the 
flightcrew interface. No changes were made as a result of these 
comments.
    The FAA received a comment to restructure the header paragraph of 
AM1.2620 such that the manufacturer must present pertinent information 
for the aircraft for all possible configurations of thrust or flight. 
The FAA disagrees as the requirement is applicable to the overall 
aircraft and must contain information concerning

[[Page 45959]]

aircraft configurations as necessary for defining the required 
information in AM1.2620. No change is necessary as a result of this 
comment.
    One commenter requested clarification on procedures for the 
flightcrew following an abnormal battery anomaly. The FAA notes that 
AM1.2620(a)(5) addresses this concern by requiring information 
necessary for safe operation because of design, operating, or handling 
characteristics to be specified in the Airplane Flight Manual, which 
provides procedural guidance for flightcrew. Procedures following an 
abnormal battery anomaly are necessary for safe operation. No changes 
were made as a result of this comment.
    One commenter requested that the FAA include AM1.2620(a)(5) as 
information that must be approved by the FAA. The FAA disagrees, as 
this requirement is consistent with the existing airworthiness 
standards for normal category aircraft. No changes were made as a 
result of this comment.
    One commenter requested clarification on whether the requirements 
in proposed AM1.1529 (ICA) and AM1.2615 (flight, navigation, and 
powerplant instruments) would also address EASA SC-VTOL.2445, Lift/
thrust system installation information. Although the Model M001 
airworthiness criteria do not contain a requirement that directly 
aligns with EASA's SC-VTOL.2445, the commenter is correct that AM1.1529 
and AM1.2615 address the lift/thrust installation requirements in EASA 
SC VTOL.2445. In addition, the lift/thrust installation requirements in 
EASA SC-VTOL.2445 would be addressed for the Model M001 by the 
requirements in Sec. Sec.  23.2605 and 23.2610. The FAA received 
multiple comments to modify Sec.  23.2605 to add a requirement that 
information related to safety equipment must be easily identifiable and 
its method of operation must be clearly marked, as specified in SC-
VTOL.2605(d). The language requested by the commenters is already 
required by Sec.  23.2535 and therefore no changes are necessary as a 
result of these comments.
    One commenter requested the FAA revise proposed AM1.2615(b)(2) to 
delete criteria for single failure and probability. The FAA does not 
agree and notes that this requirement is essential for CSFL after 
probable failures, both singular and in combination.

Electric Engines

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from Airbus, ANAC, EASA, 
GAMA, JCAB, Lilium, Odys, Overair, Rolls-Royce, TCCA, Vertical 
Aerospace, and Volocopter requesting the FAA revise, remove, or clarify 
proposed airworthiness criteria related to electric engines for the 
Model M001.
    One commenter recommended replacing the phrase ``intended aircraft 
application'' throughout subpart H with language specific to the Model 
M001 design. Another commenter recommended replacing ``declared 
environmental limits'' with ``aircraft environmental and operating 
limitations'' throughout subpart H. The FAA does not agree that more 
specific language is necessary, as ``intended aircraft application'' 
and ``declared environmental limits'' are sufficient to meet the 
electric engine certification requirements. No changes were made as a 
result of these comments.
    The FAA received comments recommending the removal of Sec.  
33.5(a), (b), and (c) and Sec.  33.29 from the engine requirements in 
Subpart H. One commenter stated these requirements should not be 
imposed for an engine that is not being type certificated as an 
independent product, as is the case for the Model M001. This commenter 
also stated the engines for the Model M001 are being certified under 
the umbrella of the aircraft type certificate; as a result, the 
installation and operating instructions will already be part of the 
type design data package at the aircraft level. Other commenters stated 
that no additional burden from individual ``engine-only'' requirements 
for data sheet content is necessary, from Sec.  33.5(a), (b), and (c), 
AM1.2702, AM1.2706, AM1.2710(j)(2), AM1.2718(c) and (d), AM1.2719(b) 
and (e), and AM1.2733(d)(2). The FAA recognizes the engines will be 
approved with the Model M001 aircraft, but instructions for installing 
and operating the engines are required, as well as other engine 
airframe interfaces such as instruments, connections, sensors, etc., 
whether the engines are approved with the aircraft or certificated 
under their own type certificate. The FAA made no changes in response 
to these recommendations.
    The FAA received comments on the applicability of subsystems 
equipment installed in an electric hybrid propulsion system (EHPS), as 
referenced in EASA Special Condition E-19 EHPS.330. The FAA 
acknowledges these comments but notes that they are not applicable to 
the Model M001, since the Archer engine architecture does not include 
the electric hybrid propulsions systems associated with E-19 EHPS.330.
    One commenter questioned whether the requirements of EASA Special 
Condition E-19 EHPS.80, which accounts for the complete inability to 
isolate components that could cause a hazard to aircraft, should be 
added to the airworthiness criteria for the Model M001. The FAA does 
not agree, as the requirement to isolate components that could cause a 
hazard to the aircraft is in EHPS.350(d), EHPS Control System, not in 
EHPS.80. The requirement in EHPS.350 raised by the commenter is 
addressed by AM1.2710 Engine Control Systems, AM1.2717 Safety Analysis, 
and AM1.2733 Engine Electrical Systems. Since the Archer M001 is a 
special class aircraft and the engines will be approved with the 
aircraft, the means by which components prevent a hazard from 
developing may be implemented either at the engine-level or at the 
aircraft-level. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
    Another commenter noted the proposed requirement to comply with 
Sec.  33.75(e)(1) includes a reference to Sec.  33.4 (ICA), although 
the proposed airworthiness criteria do not include a requirement to 
comply with Sec.  33.4. The commenter recommended either removing the 
reference to Sec.  33.4 or adding a reference to Appendix 1, AAM1.2701, 
A33.2, A33.3, and A33.4. The FAA agrees with the comment. The FAA 
proposed AM1.2717 to include those safety analysis standards from Sec.  
33.75 that could not be required directly for the Model M001 without 
modification. Proposed AM1.2717(c) contained requirements for how the 
applicant must comply with Sec.  33.75(e). The FAA has modified 
proposed AM1.2717(c) to reference the ICA in AM1.1529 for compliance 
with Sec.  33.75(e)(1). During the review of this comment, it was 
determined that Sec.  33.75(a)(1) should be included in AM1.2717(a) and 
the applicability of AM1.2717(b) should be clarified using information 
from the existing standard Sec.  33.75(c). The FAA has revised AM1.2717 
accordingly.
    The FAA received a comment asking for clarification of the term 
``duty cycle'' in proposed AM1.2702(b). The FAA also received a comment 
to remove the requirement in proposed AM1.2702(b) to list the duty 
cycle on the type certificate data sheet. The FAA disagrees. A duty 
cycle is intrinsic with engine ratings. Engine ratings are declared to 
support aircraft performance objectives, whereas duty cycles are an 
electric engine property that limits the usage of the ratings. The duty 
cycle, combined with the rating at that duty cycle, establishes the 
capability and the limits for engine usage. A commenter also noted that 
the takeoff power time limitation is not defined. While traditional 
combustion engines adhere to ``takeoff power time limitations,'' the

[[Page 45960]]

operational considerations for electric aircraft engines, such as duty 
cycle and rating, are more pertinent due to their distinct propulsion 
system characteristics. A duty cycle and rating at each duty cycle must 
be declared, which covers this concern. No changes were made as a 
result of these comments.
    The FAA received a comment to add specific operating limits to 
proposed AM1.2702. The FAA also received a comment to add Sec.  33.7(d) 
to the airworthiness criteria to address the accuracy of the engine 
control system and necessary instrumentation. Section 33.7(d) applies 
to engine performance and operating limitations. The FAA did not 
propose to require that the Model M001 comply with Sec.  33.7(d), 
because Sec.  33.7(d) focuses on engine control system components 
(e.g., speed sensors, actuators, feedback mechanisms) that typically 
operate using low voltage power and hydraulic systems. Electric 
engines, such as those that are part of the Model M001 design, are 
controlled differently. In addition, the Model M001 engine electrical 
systems are integrated with aircraft systems instruments that are 
necessary for control of the engine, which would not be addressed by 
Sec.  33.7(d). Instead, for the Model M001, the engine performance and 
operating limitations referenced by Sec.  33.7(d) are addressed by the 
airworthiness criteria for the engine control system in AM1.2710 and 
the engine electrical system in AM1.2733. No changes were made as a 
result of these comments.
    The FAA also received a comment that proposed AM1.2702 provided a 
redundant definition of the engine ratings with that in Sec.  33.8. The 
FAA disagrees. These two engine requirements accomplish different 
objectives. AM1.2702 establishes the engine's ratings and limits, while 
Sec.  33.8 ensures each rating applies to the lowest power that all 
engines of the same type may be expected to produce under the 
conditions used to determine that rating. No changes were made as a 
result of this comment.
    A commenter suggested the FAA remove the word ``turbine'' from 
Sec.  33.17(a), as it is not applicable to the Archer Model M001. The 
FAA notes that proposed AM1.2704, ``Fire Protection,'' was initially 
drafted to consider potential arc-fault-initiated fires occurring 
anywhere inside or outside the electric engine. However, the commenter 
highlighted that the second statement in Sec.  33.17(a) specifically 
applies to internal fires in turbine engines and is not relevant to 
Archer engines. Consequently, the FAA has modified the airworthiness 
criteria to remove the applicability of Sec.  33.17(a) to the Model 
M001 and add a new statement to AM1.2704 emphasizing the design and 
construction requirements to minimize the occurrence and spread of fire 
during normal operation and failure conditions. This modification 
results in AM1.2704 having two paragraphs, (a) and (b). This 
modification makes a suggestion by another commenter to change the 
title of the airworthiness criteria to ``High Voltage Arc Faults and 
Fire Protection'' inapplicable.
    The FAA received a comment questioning the applicability of Sec.  
33.17(b) through (g), which address flammable fluids. The FAA notes 
that flammable fluids and flammable fluid storage components could be 
used in the Model M001 design. As such, the FAA finds these criteria 
applicable and no changes were made. Another commenter suggested that 
the requirements of Sec.  33.17 be made more prescriptive, specifically 
to require fireproof materials. The FAA notes that this concern is 
addressed overall in the Archer design through requirements specified 
in AM1.2704, Sec.  33.75(g)(2)(iv), and AM1.2733. Additionally, Sec.  
33.17 applies to engine fires resulting from ignition of flammable 
fluids. No changes were necessary as a result of this comment.
    The FAA received a comment that pass and fail criteria should be 
defined for the requirement in proposed AM1.2705 to minimize the 
development of an unsafe condition in the engine and recommended using 
the criteria in AM1.2717(d)(2). The FAA does not concur. An unsafe 
condition is determined by a risk assessment and not solely by the 
hazards identified by the hazardous effects in AM1.2717(d)(2). No 
changes were made as a result of this comment.
    The FAA also received a comment to add ``removal from service'' to 
the maintenance actions in proposed AM1.2705. The FAA disagrees. The 
statement ``removal from service'' is appropriate to address simple 
engine designs that are life limited. However, this statement is not 
needed in the Model M001 airworthiness criteria because any maintenance 
involving a life limited engine is addressed by AM1.2729(b) and 
AM1.2713. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
    The FAA received a comment asking why proposed AM1.2720 did not 
include ``engine fault conditions.'' The FAA determined it was 
necessary to revise AM1.2720(b) to clarify the vibration sources 
applicable to this requirement.
    The FAA received two comments requesting clarification regarding 
whether proposed AM1.2729 (b) allows the applicant the option of not 
performing the teardown inspection. The FAA clarifies that the agency 
intends AM1.2729(b) to require a teardown inspection except for any 
engine parts or components that cannot be torn down. The FAA has 
changed proposed AM1.2729(b) to clarify that it only applies to engine 
components where a teardown cannot be performed in a non-destructive 
manner.
    A commenter requested clarification on the difference between the 
durability requirements of proposed AM1.2705 and AM1.2726. AM1.2705 is 
criteria for durability requirements for design and construction of the 
engine, whereas AM1.2726 provides requirements for a durability 
demonstration. The FAA modified AM1.2726 to distinguish it from 
AM1.2705 by explaining its purpose, which is to establish when the 
initial maintenance is required.
    A commenter questioned where the requirements in EASA's E-19 
EHPS.200 are captured. The FAA notes that Sec.  33.23 establishes the 
loads associated with the engine mounting attachments and structure 
similar to what would be expected under EHPS.200 for an electric engine 
such as in the Model M001. No changes were made as a result of this 
comment.
    Multiple commenters requested clarification on proposed AM1.2709 
concerning failure conditions leading to rotor overspeed. Proposed 
AM1.2709 was based on Sec.  33.27 ``Turbine, Compressor, Fan, and 
Turbosupercharger Rotor Overspeed.'' The FAA intended the approach used 
for establishing the highest possible rotor overspeed in proposed 
AM1.2709 to be consistent with the approach in Sec.  33.27(b), except 
for the prescriptive overspeed margins. The margins in Sec.  33.27(b) 
are based on the physics of what drives the rotors in turbine engines 
and turbosupercharger rotors. The mechanisms that can drive electric 
engines to an overspeed condition are different from those that govern 
combustion engines. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
    One commenter recommended that the pertinent characteristics and 
capabilities of the Model M001 the applicant must analyze should be 
prescriptively included in proposed AM1.2710(g) and AM1.2717(e). The 
FAA does not agree that all the pertinent aircraft details that must be 
analyzed under AM1.2710(g) and AM1.2717(e) should be prescribed within 
the airworthiness criteria as existing aircraft airworthiness standards

[[Page 45961]]

also do not prescribe these pertinent aircraft details. This guidance 
may be found in advisory circulars or industry consensus standards, 
which provide one means, but not the only means, for showing compliance 
with the existing regulatory requirements. These means will likely need 
to be modified to consider powered-lift designs such as the Model M001.
    During review of the requirements of AM1.2710(j), the FAA also 
identified an error in AM1.2710(j)(2), which was originally intended to 
cover all engine electrical systems, leading to confusion regarding the 
applicability in paragraph (a). The FAA clarifies that the engine 
control requirements in AM1.2710 apply to any aspects of the engine 
control that interface with aircraft control systems that are necessary 
for safe flight and landing. The FAA has corrected this error in the 
final criteria by removing the reference to electrical power supplied 
to the aircraft by energy regeneration from paragraph (j)(2).
    The FAA received a comment to update proposed AM1.2710(e) to 
declare the engine control system and the engine electrical 
environmental limits, similar to proposed AM1.2823(a)(2). This concern 
is already addressed by the airworthiness criteria. Since the engines 
are approved with the aircraft, environmental conditions and limits 
that were used to substantiate the Model M001 aircraft and its engines 
will be used to develop compliance with AM1.2620, ``Aircraft Flight 
Manual.'' No changes were made to AM1.2710(e) as a result of this 
comment. However, this comment revealed a need to clarify the 
requirement in proposed AM1.2727. The purpose of AM1.2727 is to 
supplement engine testing with additional component-level and systems-
level tests that expose engine components and systems to operational 
conditions that cannot not be achieved in the engine test environment 
or with the specified test duration. Also, demonstration shortfalls for 
certain electrical properties might occur with other engine tests, such 
as the durability demonstration, because the test duration required to 
show deterioration in electrical hardware may be impracticable.
    One commenter requested the FAA remove proposed AM1.2711(b)(2), 
which specifies that the aircraft design is not required to enable the 
flight crew to monitor the engine cooling system for a cooling system 
failure that would not result in a hazardous engine effect. The FAA 
disagrees. Not adopting proposed AM1.2711(b)(2) would result in a 
requirement for instrumentation enabling the flightcrew to monitor the 
engine cooling system regardless of the hazard level resulting from a 
cooling system failure. Although monitoring the engine cooling system 
would enable the crew to respond to leading indicators of an overheated 
engine and prevent the aircraft from the subsequent effects, the 
severity of the effects from an overheated engine, and the appropriate 
engine-level protection and mitigation standards, are addressed by the 
engine safety analysis. No changes were made as a result of the 
comment.
    One commenter suggested changing the word ``electromagnetic'' to 
``electrical'' in proposed AM1.2712(a). The FAA does not concur with 
this change, as electrical system hazards are covered in AM1.2733. 
However, the FAA acknowledges that the requirement in proposed 
AM1.2712(a) could be clarified and made changes to that effect.
    Multiple commenters recommended adding the demonstration to operate 
above temperature limits on turbine engines for short-duration ratings 
in proposed AM1.2724, and to consider updating proposed AM1.2709 and 
AM1.2730 to add the requirements in E-19 EHPS.250(a), ``the failure of 
any rotating component or part of an equipment, electric engine or 
generator must not lead to the release of high energy debris.'' The FAA 
has revised AM1.2724 to remove its applicability to all engine ratings 
and also revised the introductory text of AM1.2730 to be more aligned 
with part 33 subpart B. The FAA did not find the recommended language 
appropriate for AM1.2709 and did not make any changes to AM1.2709.
    The FAA received a comment asking for clarification on whether 
proposed AM1.2715(c) only applies to engines having torque operating 
limitations. AM1.2715(c) applies to an electric engine regardless of 
whether the engine is torque limited. Archer can propose ratings and 
limits in accordance with AM1.2702 using relevant engine parameters 
such as horsepower, torque, rotational speed, and temperature. AM1.2715 
and AM1.2725 require tests that range from ground idle and flight idle, 
to the rated power or thrust prescribed by these rules. Electric 
engines can create torque much faster than combustion engines, and 
sudden changes in torque could present a hazard to the aircraft 
installation. Therefore, the power response characteristics must 
account for the intended aircraft application to ensure the torque 
characteristics of the engine and intended aircraft are compatible. 
These requirements correspond to Sec. Sec.  33.73 and 33.89 
respectively, so the minimum torque or power settings are established 
in the procedures that assess the operational capabilities of the 
electric engines. The FAA modified proposed AM1.2715(c) to clarify that 
this is an engine-level requirement.
    One commenter requested the FAA consider EASA's Special Condition 
E-19 EHPS.260. The commenter states that proposed AM1.2716 only 
addresses hazardous engine effects and applicants should evaluate, as 
required by EHPS.260, the effects of any continued rotation on the 
system, such as windmilling propellers. The concerns raised by the 
commenter are addressed by AM1.2733, ``Engine Electrical Systems.'' 
AM1.2733(b) (both proposed and final) ensures that the generation and 
transmission of electrical power, and electrical load shedding, do not 
result in any unacceptable engine operating characteristics or cause 
the engine to exceed its operating limits. New AM1.2733 (e)(2) requires 
the characteristics of any electrical power supplied from the engine to 
the aircraft via energy regeneration to be identified and declared in 
the engine installation manual.
    The FAA received multiple comments to change the proposed 
definition of a minor engine effect in proposed AM1.2717(d)(1). The 
commenters recommended using the criteria in Sec.  33.75(g)(1) to 
classify the effects of a partial or total loss of engine power in the 
Model M001. The Model M001 engine airworthiness criteria do not 
classify the engine effect from a complete loss of engine power because 
the aircraft level assumptions are different than those used in Sec.  
33.75(g)(1). The Model M001 engine airworthiness criteria allow a 
complete loss of power in one engine to be classified based on the 
effects on the aircraft. No changes were made as a result of these 
comments.
    Multiple commenters stated that due to the integrated nature of the 
Model M001, the system safety analyses required in support of Sec.  
23.2510 are adequate and sufficient, and that Sec.  33.75, AM1.2717, 
and AM1.2733(f) and (g) should be removed from these airworthiness 
criteria. The FAA does not agree with this recommendation, and notes 
that Sec.  23.2510 establishes the safety objective for aircraft 
systems and equipment ``whose failure or abnormal operation has not 
been specifically addressed by another requirement.'' The proposed 
subpart H and I requirements include specific engine and propeller 
design and testing requirements not covered under aircraft-level 
airworthiness criteria and establish a minimum level of safety 
equivalent to the existing part 33 and part 35

[[Page 45962]]

airworthiness standards as required under Sec.  21.17(b). Additionally, 
these airworthiness criteria prescribe the same requirements for 
installed engines and propellers on the Model M001 that would apply to 
these engines and propellers if they received separate type 
certificates under parts 33 and 35, respectively. The aircraft-level 
requirements of Sec.  23.2510 are not sufficient on their own to ensure 
engines and propellers will meet the intended level of safety required 
by Sec.  21.17(b) for parts 33 and 35. Since the engines will be 
approved with the Archer aircraft, these compliance details may be 
documented in the appropriate aircraft-level documents with references 
to the engine-level requirements in Subpart H.
    One commenter recommended removing the prescriptive airworthiness 
criteria of subparts H and I and to defer their development to the 
means of compliance. Another commenter proposed to use performance-
based aircraft requirements that consign the engines and propellers to 
aircraft equipment or systems and relegate engine and propeller 
certification requirements to a means of compliance to an aircraft 
requirement. The FAA does not agree with these comments and considers 
the requirements in subparts H and I to provide an equivalent level of 
safety for the Model M001. No changes were made as a result of these 
comments.
    A commenter requested the FAA reword proposed AM1.2717(d)(1) to 
remove an extraneous phrase ``does not prohibit the engine from meeting 
its type-design requirements.'' The FAA concurs that the phrase was 
unclear and updated AM1.2717(d)(1) for clarity.
    A commenter requested clarification regarding why blockage of a 
cooling system as described in proposed AM1.2717(d)(2)(ii) is 
considered a hazardous engine effect. The FAA notes that the blockage 
of a cooling system is not by itself a hazardous engine condition, but 
it could contribute to the development of one. Accordingly, the FAA 
modified AM1.2717(d)(2)(ii).
    A commenter requested the FAA align proposed AM1.2713 with the 
safety expectations in EASA's SC-VTOL. The commenter recommended 
changing proposed AM1.2713 to specify that no single failure may lead 
to a catastrophic event and to exclude the criteria for critical parts. 
The FAA does not find the level of safety outlined in SC-VTOL for 
``Category Enhanced'' to be applicable to the Model M001 engine failure 
classifications, which could be minor, major, or hazardous, but not 
catastrophic. The FAA will apply failure classifications that are 
consistent with those established in part 33 to provide the equivalent 
level of safety required by Sec.  21.17(b). No changes were made as a 
result of this comment.
    A commenter requested clarification as to whether proposed AM1.2713 
would require the same activity for both critical parts and life-
limited parts. An engineering plan, manufacturing plan, and service 
management plan will be needed for critical parts and for life-limited 
parts as stated in AM1.2713(b).
    Commenters requested the FAA clarify what is meant by the 
definition of a ``life limited part'' in proposed AM1.2713(a)(2), as it 
includes phrases that make it open-ended and indistinguishable from the 
definition of a critical part in proposed AM1.2713(a)(1). The FAA 
agrees regarding the need for clarification in the definition of life-
limited parts. While retaining the examples in the definition, the FAA 
has revised the definition of life-limited part in AM1.2713(a)(2) to be 
distinguished by the failure mode related to low-cycle fatigue (LCF) 
mechanisms. The revised definition specifies that life-limited parts 
may involve rotors or major structural static parts, among other parts 
with failure potentially leading to hazardous engine effects due to LCF 
mechanisms.
    A commenter noted that the FAA made a reference to Sec.  33.70 in 
proposed AM1.2713(b) when Sec.  33.70 was not included as a part of the 
Model M001 airworthiness criteria and recommended adding Sec.  33.70. 
The FAA agrees and Sec.  33.70(a), (b), and (c) have been added to the 
airworthiness criteria. The introductory paragraph of Sec.  33.70, 
however, is not part of the airworthiness criteria.
    A commenter also requested that the FAA specifically address high-
cycle fatigue (HCF) effects in proposed AM1.2713. The FAA notes that 
HCF effects are included in the life limit calculation under Sec.  
33.70. The influence of HCF on life limits is addressed as part of the 
vibration requirement in AM1.2720, which characterizes and quantifies 
all vibration stresses in a part. It also requires the vibration 
stresses to be less than the material endurance limits, when combined 
with steady stresses. No changes were made as a result of this comment.
    A commenter noted that the FAA has historically not applied the 
classification of ``critical part'' in FAA airworthiness standards and 
asked for clarification. The use of critical parts is consistent with 
the FAA's certification approach for electric engines and is necessary 
for an acceptable level of safety. No changes were made as a result of 
this comment.
    One commenter questioned why the FAA included transient maximum 
overtemperature and transient maximum overspeed as part of the 
endurance demonstration in proposed AM1.2721. The FAA notes that 
electric engines typically establish power or thrust ratings using 
shaft torque. Therefore, torque is managed directly, or by another 
governing parameter, such as electrical current. The airworthiness 
criteria in AM1.2721 are performance-based, but the applicant may use 
the procedures in Sec.  33.84(a) as a means of compliance with the 
overtorque requirement. Transient rotor speed in electric and 
combustion engines is controlled by different technologies. Transient 
overspeed in a combustion engine is typically a design feature that 
allows an engine to exceed a maximum steady state rotor speed 
temporarily in order to meet certain performance requirements. Electric 
engines use electrical current and have fast response times, so 
transient rotor overspeed is not typically needed to meet performance 
requirements and would most likely occur from a failure or design flaw, 
which are occurrences within the scope of AM1.2721. No changes were 
made as a result of this comment.
    The FAA received a comment requesting clarity on the endurance 
demonstration requirement in proposed AM1.2723(b). The FAA notes that 
the endurance demonstration is an accelerated severity test intended to 
demonstrate the engine has acceptable performance characteristics 
throughout the operating range, up to and including engine ratings and 
operating limits without the need for maintenance after being exposed 
to these extreme conditions. Therefore, the engine cycles that are used 
for the endurance demonstration do not correlate well with the engine 
cycles that are used during in-service operation. The FAA concurs with 
the commenter that additional clarification is needed and modified 
AM1.2723(b) to require that the endurance demonstration must be for a 
duration sufficient to verify the limit capabilities of the engine.
    One commenter identified a need for clarification regarding 
electromagnetic stresses in proposed AM1.2712, ``Stress Analysis,'' 
which also corresponds to Sec.  33.62. The FAA has updated AM1.2712(a) 
to address the interaction between electrical systems and magnetic 
components, specifically considering electromagnetic forces, which are 
not covered in existing airworthiness standards for aircraft engines. 
The revised paragraph (a) requires a

[[Page 45963]]

comprehensive stress analysis, including mechanical, thermal, and 
electromagnetic forces, to ensure an adequate design margin that 
prevents hazardous engine effects and unacceptable operating 
characteristics.
    Another commenter requested that the FAA add ``at the declared 
operating limits'' to proposed AM1.2712(a). The FAA does not concur. 
AM1.2712 includes mechanical, thermal, and electromagnetic stress. 
These criteria were created to account for design limits specific to 
electric engines that, if exceeded, could develop into hazardous engine 
conditions. The airworthiness criteria ensure design margins account 
for any relevant declared operating limits. No changes were made as a 
result of this comment.
    A commenter asked for clarification of the term ``minimum material 
properties'' in proposed AM1.2712(b). AM1.2712(b) requires determining 
maximum stresses in the engine without exceeding minimum material 
properties. The Model M001 must comply with Sec.  33.15, which 
establishes the requirements for engine materials. Compliance with 
Sec.  33.15 will determine ``minimum material properties.'' No changes 
were made as a result of this comment.
    One commenter proposed that the FAA consider that the single fault 
tolerance criteria in proposed AM1.2710(f)(2) be understood at the 
aircraft ``propulsion system level'' rather than at the engine level 
when addressing Loss of Power Control (LOPC). Commenters requested 
similar clarification regarding the single fault criteria in proposed 
AM1.2733(f)(2). The FAA disagrees that the requested change would be 
appropriate. The airworthiness criteria in Subpart H apply to a single 
engine, not to the entire distributed propulsion system. No changes 
were made to the airworthiness criteria in response to these comments.
    Multiple commenters requested that the FAA qualitatively and 
quantitively define LOPC in the airworthiness criteria. The FAA does 
not agree. The LOPC airworthiness criteria for the Model M001 are 
contained in portions of Sec.  33.28 and AM1.2710. Existing engine 
airworthiness standards in part 33 do not prescribe the level of detail 
requested by the commenters. LOPC will depend on the performance data 
and system analysis for the Model M001 and its intended aircraft 
application. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
    One commenter noted that Sec.  33.28(d)(4) effectively requires 
that the engine control system be resilient to local events, while the 
proposed airworthiness criteria in AM1.2710(f)(4) does not allow local 
events to occur. The commenter requested the FAA revise AM1.2710(f)(4) 
to maintain the safety intent of Sec.  33.28(d)(4). The FAA agrees with 
the suggested change. AM1.2710(f)(4) has been changed to require the 
engine control system to ``ensure failures or malfunctions that lead to 
local events in the aircraft do not result in hazardous engine effects 
as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2) due to engine control system failures or 
malfunctions.''
    One commenter proposed that the FAA differentiate between the 
ingestions that must not lead to a hazardous event (such as a large 
bird impact) and the ones that cannot lead to a loss of power that 
would become incompatible with the aircraft performances and CSFL 
capabilities. Another commenter questioned the use of the broad term 
``foreign objects'' in proposed AM1.2718. The FAA modified AM1.2718 to 
incorporate ingestion sources identified in Sec. Sec.  33.68, 33.76, 
33.77, and 33.78. Revised AM1.2718 uses general terminology when 
distinguishing abnormal operation, hazardous engine effects, and 
unacceptable power loss which accounts for aircraft level effects and 
clarifies the term ``foreign objects'' by specifying the ingestion 
source.
    Multiple commenters requested clarification regarding applicability 
differences between Sec.  33.28 and proposed AM1.2710. The FAA notes 
that the applicability of both requirements is covered by AM1.2710(a). 
The FAA intends the applicant to employ the elements of Sec.  33.28 
specified as applicable to the Model M001 in combination with the 
additional requirements of AM1.2710.
    Another commenter requested the FAA clarify whether Sec.  33.29(f) 
applies to the Model M001. Section 33.29(f) requires a safety 
assessment of incorrect fit of instruments, sensors, or connectors, and 
references a Sec.  33.75 turbine engine safety analysis that is not 
applicable to the Archer M001 electric engines. The airworthiness 
criteria have been revised to exclude paragraph (f) from the 
requirement to comply with certain paragraphs of Sec.  33.29.
    One commenter asked if compliance with Sec.  33.64 is necessary to 
satisfy the proposed pressurized cooling requirements in Sec.  33.21 
and AM1.2706, as stated in ASTM Standard F3338-21 section 5.7.4. The 
ASTM Standard applies to liquid engine cooling systems, but the 
requirements in Sec.  33.21 and AM1.2706 apply to air and liquid engine 
cooling systems. The FAA notes that although Sec.  33.64, which 
contains requirements for pressurized engine static parts, is not part 
of the Archer airworthiness criteria, pressurized engine static parts 
are addressed by AM1.2719. Paragraph (a) specifies requirements for 
systems used for lubrication or cooling engine components. Paragraph 
(c) includes airworthiness criteria for static parts subjected to 
pressurized systems. The FAA also revised the heading of AM1.2719 from 
``Liquid Systems'' to ``Liquid and Gas Systems'' to clarify the 
applicability of the requirement and to differentiate it from ASTM 
Standard F3338-21.
    Another commenter requested the FAA generalize the terminology in 
proposed AM1.2728 to recognize electro-mechanical implementations in 
addition to traditional mechanisms and functions. The commenter 
proposed replacing ``locking'' with ``holding'' and ``unlocking'' with 
``release.'' AM1.2728 does not prescribe specific implementation of the 
rotor lock, other than the prevention of the rotor from turning. A 
rotor locking (or holding) function in an electric engine could have 
both mechanical and electro-mechanical purposes. The FAA determined the 
criteria in AM1.2728 will achieve the intended objectives for the Model 
M001. No changes are necessary as a result of the comment.
    A commenter questioned the use of service limits in determining 
acceptability during the teardown evaluation in proposed 
AM1.2729(a)(1), as the service limits can be lower than those 
demonstrated as a part of the certification process. The FAA agrees 
that the intent is that each engine part must conform to the type 
design and be eligible for incorporation into an engine for continued 
operation and updated AM1.2729(a)(1) to remove the reference to service 
limits.
    The FAA received multiple comments asking to define or qualify what 
would be an acceptable margin for purposes of proposed AM1.2730(a) and 
whether a rotor burst analysis is required at the aircraft level. The 
FAA disagrees. The FAA will determine an acceptable margin similar to 
the way the agency determines acceptable margins for engines under part 
33. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
    In regard to compliance with the functional demonstrations required 
by proposed AM1.2731, a commenter asked whether there will be a basic 
standard test-run program, or whether the demonstration will depend on 
the individual case. The FAA notes that AM1.2731 uses performance-based 
language to describe the functional demonstrations if they are not

[[Page 45964]]

accomplished concurrent with other required engine tests. Currently, 
there are no industry-wide accepted standards for conducting electric 
engine tests with variable pitch propellers, so the demonstration will 
depend on the individual case.
    A commenter requested the FAA merge proposed AM1.2733(c)(1), which 
addresses the electrical-power distribution system, and proposed 
AM1.2733(d)(1), which addresses protection systems. Paragraph (c) 
addresses the safe transfer of power throughout the power plant whereas 
paragraph (d) addresses a protection system's response to power 
conditions that exceed design limits. These systems perform different 
functions, and therefore they are treated by separate airworthiness 
criteria. No changes were made as a result of the comment.
    The same commenter noted that the type of electrical fault 
isolation required in proposed AM1.2733(c)(3) should be linked to the 
possible effects of the fault on the safety of flight and the aircraft. 
AM1.2733(c) protects engine electrical systems from faulted electrical 
energy generation or storage devices. The means of compliance should be 
tied to the safety assessment, which includes aircraft-level effects 
from faulted electrical-energy generation or storage device. The FAA 
updated AM1.2733(c)(3) to recognize this link.
    A commenter questioned the numbering scheme of the airworthiness 
criteria in proposed AM1.2733(d). The FAA agrees that the numbering 
scheme needed better clarity. AM1.2733(d)(1) was merged with the 
introductory text of AM1.2733(d). Proposed AM1.2733(d)(2) does not fit 
under Protection Systems and was moved to AM1.2733(e). Proposed 
AM1.2733(e) through (g) have been renumbered as AM1.2733(f) through 
(h).
    The same commenter noted that proposed AM1.2733(d) was too 
prescriptive in specifically requiring transmission interruption. The 
FAA agrees and changed the language to reflect that the Model M001 must 
be designed such that certain conditions would not result in a 
hazardous engine effect.
    Lastly, the commenter requested that the FAA revise proposed 
AM1.2733(e), which addresses environmental limits, to make it less 
prescriptive. The commenter suggested that proposed AM1.2733(e) contain 
similar language as that in the equivalent requirement for the 
propeller control system in AM1.2823(a)(2). The FAA disagrees. 
AM1.2733(e) and AM1.2823(a)(2) are not equivalent requirements as 
stated by the commenter. Proposed AM1.2733(e) (AM1.2733(f) in these 
final criteria) requires demonstrating environmental limits through 
system and component tests when substantiation methods are 
insufficient, while AM1.2823(a)(2) requires ensuring propeller control 
system functionality remains unaffected by declared environmental 
conditions and documenting validated environmental limits in propeller 
manuals. No changes were made as a result of this comment.

Propellers

    The FAA received and reviewed comments from ALPA, Airbus, ASD-
Europe, EASA, GAMA, Leonardo, Overair, TCCA, and Volocopter requesting 
the FAA revise, remove, or clarify proposed airworthiness criteria 
related to propellers for the Model M001.
    Multiple commenters requested changes to proposed AM1.2823 
regarding the causal direction of hazardous propeller effects and local 
events. The FAA concurs and has revised AM1.2823(b)(2) to require that 
local events not cause hazardous propeller effects. One commenter 
suggested that ``local event'' needs to be defined. Due to the comments 
received on ``local events,'' the FAA concurs that the definition of 
``local events,'' in the context of AM1.2823, should be as defined as 
it is in AC 33.28-3, ``Guidance Material for 14 CFR 33.28, Engine 
Control Systems,'' with minor wording changes that are appropriate for 
the Model M001. The FAA has added this definition to AM1.2000(b)(6). 
The FAA noted during review of AM1.2823 that two requirements from 
Sec.  35.23 were missing in the proposed airworthiness criteria and 
should be added. The FAA added Sec. Sec.  35.23(b)(3) and 35.23(b)(4) 
to the airworthiness criteria as paragraphs AM1.2823(b)(3) and 
AM1.2823(b)(4).
    One commenter asked why the functional test in proposed AM1.2840 is 
limited to forward pitch and not to the entire pitch range. The FAA 
notes that the test is limited because the Model M001 does not have 
reversible pitch capability. Additionally, commenters suggested that 
the number of propeller pitch cycles should be increased from thirteen 
hundred to fifteen hundred in proposed AM1.2840(a) to align it with 
Sec.  35.40(b). The FAA agrees and has revised AM1.2840(a) accordingly.
    Several commenters requested the FAA elaborate on how the FAA 
differentiated between requirements for lift generating rotors compared 
to propellers, and whether icing ingestion requirements are needed for 
propellers. The FAA does not concur with suggestions to add additional 
requirements for lift generating rotors or ice ingestion requirements 
for the AM1.2800 series criteria. The design and the expected failure 
modes of Archer's propellers are expected to be similar to conventional 
propellers type certificated under part 35 despite being used in the 
vertical thrust mode. Ice ingestion requirements for the engines 
already exist in other parts of the Model M001 airworthiness criteria.
    Commenters suggested that proposed AM1.2815, which requires a 
safety analysis of the propeller system, is inadequate because the rate 
of hazardous propeller effects was not conservative enough and 
propeller release and unbalance should be treated as catastrophic 
events and not as hazardous propeller effects. Further, commenters 
suggested that determining the rate of hazardous propeller effects 
should be less ambiguous. The FAA does not concur with the suggestion 
that the acceptable hazardous propeller failure rate is too high. The 
criteria are derived from part 35 requirements, which provide an 
acceptable level of safety for both part 23 and 25 airplanes. The FAA 
does not concur with the suggestion that propeller release and 
unbalance should be treated as catastrophic and not hazardous effects. 
Catastrophic effects are treated at the aircraft level and the criteria 
for single propellers provide an acceptable level of safety. The FAA 
does not concur with the request to make the quantitative prediction of 
a hazardous propeller effect less ambiguous due to inherent limitations 
on the availability of reliable data.
    One commenter questioned the need for a propeller critical part 
designation. The FAA does not concur with the suggestion to not make 
the propellers critical parts. The critical part requirements are 
integral for creating a propeller with an equivalent level of safety 
and are retained for the Model M001.
    Commenters suggested that the current Sec.  35.35 centrifugal load 
requirements are inappropriately prescriptive and that overspeed 
requirements derived from parts 27 or 29 rotorcraft rules are more 
appropriate. The FAA does not concur with the suggestion to substitute 
rotorcraft overspeed requirements for the propeller centrifugal load 
tests in Sec.  35.35(a) and (b) because the design and failure modes of 
Archer's propellers are expected to be similar to conventional 
propellers type certificated under part 35. The consequential propeller 
loads are expected to primarily be centrifugal loads, and therefore the 
prescriptive centrifugal

[[Page 45965]]

test requirement of Sec.  35.35, with its requirement for a large 
margin of safety, is needed to ensure an equivalent level of safety.
    A commenter stated that the propeller-specific lightning strike 
requirements of Sec.  35.38, which prevent major or hazardous effects, 
are inconsistent with aircraft-level lightning requirements in 
AM1.2335, which prevents catastrophic effects. The commenter proposed 
modifying the airworthiness criteria to remove the inconsistency. The 
FAA disagrees. The propeller requirements prescribe a particular safety 
level for an uninstalled propeller only; an uninstalled propeller does 
not need the same safety requirements as the aircraft. The aircraft 
safety analysis uses the propeller failure rate data to show that the 
aircraft will not experience any catastrophic effects. No changes were 
made as a result of this comment.
    One commenter requested a definition for maximum propeller 
overspeed and overtorque as used in Sec.  35.41. The FAA does not 
concur with the request to define propeller overspeed or overtorque 
because the applicant defines these ratings, if applicable, to show 
compliance with AM1.2805 and Sec.  35.41. No changes were made as a 
result of this comment.
    Another commenter requested a definition of acceptable ``propellers 
of similar design'' for purposes of compliance with AM1.2840(c). By a 
propeller of ``similar design'' in AM1.2840(c), the FAA means that 
expected failure modes, materials, construction, normal operating 
characteristics, and features of the propeller are unchanged or have 
only insignificant differences compared to another propeller. No 
changes were made as a result of this comment.

Requests To Include Additional Criteria

    The FAA received comments from Airbus, ALPA, ASD-Europe, EASA, 
GAMA, IPR, Lilium, and TCCA, that additional criteria should be added 
for the Model M001 powered-lift.
    One commenter requested the FAA provide reasoning on the omission 
of Sec.  23.2005, which defines certification levels for normal 
category airplanes based on maximum seating configuration and speed, or 
an equivalent airworthiness criterion. The commenter requested the FAA 
discuss how the agency is establishing the minimum safety requirements 
for various special class powered-lift products to provide an 
equivalent level of safety. The FAA did not include Sec.  23.2005 in 
these airworthiness criteria as that regulation was developed 
specifically for part 23 airplanes, and the Model M001 is a powered-
lift with novel flight phases that are not representative of airplanes; 
instead, the FAA is establishing a level of safety for the Model M001 
that is equivalent with the level of safety in both part 23 and part 27 
for airplanes and rotorcraft performing similar operations. 
Additionally, the criteria in this notice are specific for the Model 
M001 and are not generally applicable to powered-lift of various sizes.
    An individual requested more criteria for HIRF environment applied 
to urban air mobility operations and vertiports. The FAA notes 
AM1.2520(a), HIRF protection, requires compliance for systems 
associated with catastrophic failure conditions. No changes were made 
as a result of this comment.
    Several commenters requested the FAA require provisions for in-
service monitoring such as a Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) 
system to validate assumptions pertaining to airframe structure 
designs. The FAA is charged under Sec.  21.17(b) to provide an 
equivalent level of safety to the existing airworthiness standards. The 
FAA does not currently require in-service monitoring for critical parts 
on other aircraft types, and the FAA does not plan to require any 
provisions for in-service monitoring of critical parts for powered-
lift. No changes were made as a result of these comments.
    Several commenters noted that no specific requirement is mentioned 
for aircraft batteries and recommended the FAA create new, specific 
criteria to address topics such as fire protection, fire propagation, 
crashworthiness, high-voltage current disconnection, protection from 
lightning transients, punctures and leakage of toxic gas or liquid, and 
effects of temperature and battery health on battery performance. The 
FAA acknowledges the risk posed by these hazards but does not agree 
that additional specific requirements are necessary. All risks 
identified are adequately addressed by the requirements of Subparts E 
and F, AM1.1529, and the Appendix A ICA requirements for airframe, 
engines, and propellers, with specific safety objectives and means of 
compliance to address these risks that will be developed and tailored 
to the specific aspects of the Model M001 powered-lift.

Out of Scope Comments

    The FAA received and reviewed numerous comments that were general, 
stated the commenter's viewpoint or opposition without a suggestion 
specific to the proposed criteria, did not make a request the FAA can 
act on, requested clarification on existing airworthiness standards, 
requested changes or clarification to means of compliance, requested 
changes to type certification procedures defined in 14 CFR part 21, 
requested requirements for features not included on the Model M001, 
improperly assumed the Model M001 was an Unmanned Aircraft System, 
addressed issues covered by operational requirements including IFR 
under which the Model M001 will not be operating or other 14 CFR parts 
not related to airworthiness, or asked generalized questions about the 
Model M001 powered-lift. These comments are beyond the scope of this 
document. The FAA also reviewed several comments relating to the 
pursuit of future rulemaking for powered-lift, which is beyond the 
scope of these airworthiness criteria.

Additional Changes Made to the Proposed Criteria

    From October 31, 2023, through November 2, 2023, the FAA met with 
representatives from EASA regarding the proposed airworthiness 
criteria. This discussion did not pertain specifically to the Model 
M001, but instead concerned harmonization activities between EASA and 
the FAA on the requirements and means of compliance for type 
certification of powered-lift/VTOL aircraft generally. As a result of 
this meeting, and for consistency with the harmonized general criteria, 
the FAA changed the proposed requirement to comply with Sec.  
23.2250(c). The FAA added the sentence ``The applicant must prevent 
single failures from resulting in a catastrophic effect upon the 
aircraft'' to Sec.  23.2250(c) (now AM1.2250(c)) to clarify that while 
single point failures are allowed in the design, they must be prevented 
from resulting in a catastrophic effect on the aircraft.

Applicability

    These airworthiness criteria, established under the provisions of 
Sec.  21.17(b), are applicable to the Archer Model M001 powered-lift. 
Should Archer apply at a later date for a change to the type 
certificate to include another model, these airworthiness criteria 
would apply to that model as well, provided the FAA finds them 
appropriate in accordance with the requirements of subpart D to part 
21.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain airworthiness criteria for the 
Model M001 powered-lift. It is not a standard of general applicability.

[[Page 45966]]

Authority Citation

    The authority citation for these airworthiness criteria is as 
follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.

Airworthiness Criteria

    Pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the 
following airworthiness criteria are issued as part of the type 
certification basis for the Model M001 powered-lift. The FAA finds 
these criteria to be appropriate for the aircraft and applicable to the 
specific type design and provide an equivalent level of safety to 
existing airworthiness standards.

Aircraft-Level Requirements

Sec.  23.1457 Cockpit Voice Recorders

    (a) through (g) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.1459 Flight Data Recorders

    (a) through (e) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.1529 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

    The applicant must prepare Instructions for Continued Airworthiness 
(ICA), in accordance with Appendices A, A1, and A2, that are acceptable 
to the Administrator. ICA for the aircraft, engines, and propellers may 
be shown in a single aircraft ICA manual if the engine and propeller 
approvals are sought through the aircraft certification program. 
Alternatively, the applicant may provide individual ICA for the 
aircraft, engines, and propellers. The instructions may be incomplete 
at the time of type certification if a program exists to ensure their 
completion prior to delivery of the first aircraft, or issuance of a 
standard certificate of airworthiness, whichever occurs later.

Subpart A--General

AM1.2000 Applicability and Definitions

    (a) These airworthiness criteria prescribe airworthiness standards 
for the issuance of a type certificate, and changes to that type 
certificate, for the Archer Aviation, Inc. Model M001 powered-lift. 
This aircraft must be certificated in accordance with either the 
``essential performance'' or ``increased performance'' requirements of 
these airworthiness criteria. This aircraft may also be type 
certificated as both ``essential performance'' and ``increased 
performance'' with appropriate and different operating limitations for 
each approval.
    (b) For purposes of these airworthiness criteria, the following 
definitions apply:
    (1) Continued safe flight and landing--
    (i) for powered-lift approved for ``essential performance'' means 
the aircraft is capable of continued controlled flight and landing, 
possibly using emergency procedures, without requiring exceptional 
pilot skill, strength, or alertness.
    (ii) for powered-lift approved for ``increased performance'' means 
the aircraft is capable of climbing to a safe altitude, on a flightpath 
clear of obstacles, and maintaining level flight to a planned 
destination or alternate landing, possibly using emergency procedures, 
without requiring exceptional pilot skill, strength, or alertness.
    (2) Phases of flight means ground operations, takeoff, climb, 
cruise, descent, approach, hover, and landing.
    (3) Source of lift means one of three sources of lift: 
thrust[hyphen]borne, wing[hyphen]borne, and semi-thrust[hyphen]borne. 
Thrust[hyphen]borne is defined as when the weight of the aircraft is 
principally supported by lift generated by engine-driven lift devices. 
Wing[hyphen]borne is defined as when the weight of the aircraft is 
principally supported by aerodynamic lift from fixed airfoil surfaces. 
Semi[hyphen]thrust[hyphen]borne is the combination of 
thrust[hyphen]borne and wing[hyphen]borne, where both forms of lift are 
used to support the weight of the aircraft.
    (4) Controlled emergency landing means the aircraft design retains 
the capability to allow the pilot to choose the direction and area of 
touchdown while reasonably protecting occupants from serious injury. 
Upon landing, some damage to the aircraft may be acceptable.
    (5) Critical change of thrust means the most adverse effect on 
performance or handling qualities resulting from failures of the flight 
control or propulsive system, either singular or in combination, not 
shown to be extremely improbable.
    (6) Local events are failures of aircraft systems and components, 
other than the engine and propeller control system, that may affect the 
installed environment of the engine and propeller control system.
    (c) Terms used in the part 23, part 33, and part 35 provisions that 
are adopted in these airworthiness criteria will have the following 
meaning:
    ``Airplane'' means ``aircraft.''
    ``This part'' means ``these airworthiness criteria.''
    ``Rotorcraft'' means ``aircraft.''

Sec.  23.2010 Accepted Means of Compliance

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

Subpart B--Flight

Performance

Sec.  23.2100 Weight and Center of Gravity

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2105 Performance Data

    (a) Unless otherwise prescribed, the aircraft must meet the 
performance requirements of this subpart in still air and standard 
atmospheric conditions.
    (b) Unless otherwise prescribed, the applicant must develop the 
performance data required by this subpart for the following conditions:
    (1) Altitudes from sea level to the maximum altitude for which 
certification is being sought.; and
    (2) Temperatures above and below standard day temperature that are 
within the range of operating limitations, if those temperatures could 
have a negative effect on performance.
    (c) The procedures used for determining takeoff and landing 
performance must be executable consistently by pilots of average skill 
in atmospheric conditions expected to be encountered in service.
    (d) Performance data determined in accordance with paragraph (b) of 
this section must account for losses due to atmospheric conditions, 
cooling needs, installation losses, downwash considerations, and other 
demands on power sources.
    (e) The hovering ceiling, in and out of ground effect, must be 
determined over the ranges of weight, altitude, and temperature, if 
applicable.
    (f) Continued safe flight and landing must be possible from any 
point within the approved flight envelope following a critical change 
of thrust.
    (g) The aircraft must be capable of a controlled emergency landing, 
following a condition when the aircraft can no longer provide the 
commanded power or thrust required for continued safe flight and 
landing, by gliding or autorotation, or an equivalent means to mitigate 
the risk of loss of power or thrust.

AM1.2110 Minimum Safe Speed

    The applicant must determine the aircraft minimum safe speed for 
each flight condition encountered in normal operations, including 
applicable sources of lift and phases of flight, to maintain controlled 
safe flight. The minimum safe speed determination must account

[[Page 45967]]

for the most adverse conditions for each flight configuration.

AM1.2115 Takeoff Performance

    (a) The applicant must determine takeoff performance accounting 
for:
    (1) All sources of lift for each takeoff flight path for which 
certification is sought,
    (2) Minimum safe speed safety margins,
    (3) Minimum control speeds, and
    (4) Climb requirements.
    (b) For aircraft approved for essential performance, the applicant 
must determine the takeoff performance to 50 feet above the takeoff 
surface such that a rejected takeoff resulting in safe stop or landing 
can be made at any point along the takeoff flight path following a 
critical change of thrust.
    (c) For aircraft approved for increased performance, the applicant 
must determine the takeoff performance so that--
    (1) Following a critical change of thrust prior to reaching the 
takeoff decision point, a rejected takeoff resulting in a safe stop or 
landing can be made. The takeoff decision point may be a speed, an 
altitude, or both.
    (2) Following a critical change of thrust after passing the takeoff 
decision point, the aircraft can--
    (i) Continue the takeoff and climb to 50 feet above the takeoff 
surface; and
    (ii) Subsequently achieve the configuration and airspeed used in 
compliance with AM1.2120.

AM1.2120 Climb Requirements

    (a) The applicant must demonstrate minimum climb performance at 
each weight, altitude, and ambient temperature within the operating 
limitations using the procedures published in the flight manual.
    (b) For aircraft approved for essential and increased performance, 
the applicant must determine the following all engines operating (AEO) 
climb performance requirements:
    (1) A steady climb gradient at sea level of at least 8.3 percent in 
the initial takeoff configuration(s) and a climb speed selected by the 
applicant or Vy, and
    (2) For a balked landing, a climb gradient of 3 percent without 
creating undue pilot workload with the landing gear extended and flaps 
in the landing configuration(s).
    (c) For aircraft approved for essential performance, the climb 
performance after a critical change of thrust must be determined--
    (1) Using applicable sources of lift along the takeoff flight path 
for which certification is being sought at the speeds and 
configurations selected by the applicant; and
    (2) For the transition from the takeoff to the enroute 
configuration. The total altitude loss must be determined for the 
weight, altitude, and ambient temperature where level flight cannot be 
maintained.
    (d) For aircraft approved for increased performance, the climb 
performance after a critical change of thrust must be such that--
    (1) In thrust-borne and semi-thrust-borne flight:
    (i) The steady rate of climb without ground effect, 200 feet above 
the takeoff surface, is at least 100 feet per minute,
    (ii) The steady rate of climb without ground effect, 1000 feet 
above the takeoff surface, is at least 150 feet per minute,
    (iii) The steady rate of climb (or descent) enroute is determined 
in feet per minute, at each weight, altitude, and temperature at which 
the aircraft is expected to operate for which certification is 
requested.
    (2) In wing-borne flight, the steady gradient of climb:
    (i) During takeoff at the takeoff surface, is at least 0.5 percent 
with the aircraft in its takeoff configuration(s),
    (ii) During takeoff at 400 feet above the takeoff surface, is at 
least 2.6 percent with the aircraft in its second segment 
configuration,
    (iii) Enroute at 1,500 feet above the takeoff or landing surface, 
as appropriate, is at least 1.7 percent with the aircraft in a cruise 
configuration, and
    (iv) During a discontinued approach at 400 feet above the landing 
surface, is not less than 2.7 percent in an approach configuration.
    (e) The applicant must determine the performance accordingly for 
the appropriate sources of lift for gliding, autorotation, or the 
equivalent means established under AM1.2105(g).

AM1.2125 Climb Information

    (a) The applicant must determine climb performance at each weight, 
altitude, and ambient temperature within the operating limitations 
using the procedures published in the flight manual.
    (b) The applicant must determine climb performance accounting for 
any critical change of thrust.

AM1.2130 Landing

    The applicant must determine the following, for standard 
temperatures at critical combinations of weight and altitude within the 
operational limits:
    (a) The approach and landing speeds and procedures, which allow a 
pilot of average skill to land within the published landing distance 
consistently and without causing damage or injury, and which allow for 
a safe transition to the balked landing conditions of these 
airworthiness criteria accounting for:
    (1) All sources of lift for each approach and landing flight path 
for which certification is sought,
    (2) Any minimum or maximum speed safety margins, and
    (3) Minimum control speeds.
    (b) For aircraft approved for essential performance, the applicant 
must determine the landing performance from a height of 50 feet above 
the landing surface. Additionally, the aircraft must be capable of 
performing a safe landing at any point along the approach flight path 
following a critical change of thrust.
    (c) For aircraft approved for increased performance, the applicant 
must determine the landing performance from a height of 50 feet above 
the landing surface so that, following a critical change of thrust that 
occurs prior to the landing decision point, the aircraft can-
    (1) Land and stop safely on the landing surface; or
    (2) Transition to the balked landing condition and performance 
established in AM1.2120.

Flight Characteristics

AM1.2135 Controllability

    (a) The aircraft must be controllable and maneuverable, without 
requiring exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength, within 
the approved flight envelope--
    (1) At all loading conditions for which certification is requested;
    (2) During all phases of flight while using applicable sources of 
lift;
    (3) With likely flight control or propulsion system failure;
    (4) During configuration changes;
    (5) In all degraded flight control system operating modes not shown 
to be extremely improbable;
    (6) In thrust-borne operation, and must be controllable in wind 
velocities from zero to at least 17 knots from any azimuth angle; and
    (7) The aircraft must be able to safely complete a landing using 
the steepest approach gradient procedures.
    (b) The applicant must determine critical control parameters, such 
as limited control power margins, and if applicable, account for those 
parameters in appropriate operating limitations.
    (c) It must be possible to make a smooth transition from one flight 
condition to another (changes in configuration and in source of lift 
and phase of flight) without exceeding the approved flight envelope.

[[Page 45968]]

AM1.2140 Trim

    (a) The aircraft must maintain lateral and directional trim without 
further force upon, or movement of, the primary flight controls or 
corresponding trim controls by the pilot, or the flight control system, 
under all normal operations while using applicable sources of lift.
    (b) The aircraft must maintain longitudinal trim without further 
force upon, or movement of, the primary flight controls or 
corresponding trim controls by the pilot, or the flight control system, 
under the following conditions:
    (1) Climb.
    (2) Level flight.
    (3) Descent.
    (4) Approach.
    (c) Residual control forces must not fatigue or distract the pilot 
during normal operations of the aircraft and likely abnormal or 
emergency operations, including a critical change of thrust.

AM1.2145 Stability

    (a) The aircraft must exhibit static stability characteristics 
inclusive of likely failures.
    (b) The aircraft must exhibit suitable short period dynamic 
stability inclusive of likely failures.
    (c) For wing borne and semi-thrust-borne operations:
    (1) No aircraft may exhibit any divergent longitudinal dynamic 
stability characteristics so unstable as to increase the pilot's 
workload or otherwise endanger the aircraft and its occupants, and
    (2) The aircraft must exhibit lateral-directional dynamic stability 
inclusive of likely failures.
    (d) For thrust borne operations, no aircraft may exhibit any 
divergent dynamic stability characteristics so unstable as to increase 
the pilot's workload or otherwise endanger the aircraft and its 
occupants.

AM1.2150 Minimum Safe Speed Characteristics and Warning

    (a) When part of the lift is generated from a fixed wing, the 
aircraft must have controllable stall characteristics in straight 
flight, turning flight, and accelerated turning flight with a clear and 
distinctive stall warning that provides sufficient margin to prevent 
inadvertent stalling and not have a tendency to inadvertently depart 
controlled safe flight.
    (b) For other sources of lift, the aircraft must have controllable 
characteristics in straight flight, turning flight, and accelerated 
turning flight with a clear and distinctive warning that provides 
sufficient margin to prevent inadvertent departures from controlled 
safe flight.
    (c) For all sources of lift, the aircraft must not have the 
tendency to inadvertently depart controlled safe flight after a sudden 
change of thrust.

Sec.  23.2155 Ground and Water Handling Characteristics

    [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2160 Vibration, Buffeting, and High-Speed Characteristics

    (a) Each part of the aircraft must be free from excessive vibration 
and buffeting under each appropriate speed and power condition. 
Vibration and buffeting, for operations up to VD/
MD, must not interfere with the control of the aircraft or 
cause excessive fatigue to the flightcrew. Stall warning buffet within 
these limits is allowable.
    (b) For inadvertent excursions beyond the maximum approved speed, 
the aircraft must be able to safely recover back to its approved flight 
envelope without requiring exceptional piloting skill, strength, or 
alertness. This recovery may not result in structural damage or loss of 
control.

AM1.2165 Performance and Flight Characteristics Requirements for Flight 
in Atmospheric Icing Conditions

    (a) The applicant must provide a means to detect icing conditions 
for which certification is not requested and show the aircraft's 
ability to avoid or exit those icing conditions.
    (b) The applicant must develop an operating limitation to prohibit 
intentional flight, including takeoff and landing, into icing 
conditions for which the aircraft is not certified to operate.

Subpart C--Structures

AM1.2200 Structural Design Envelope

    The applicant must determine the structural design envelope, which 
describes the range and limits of aircraft design and operational 
parameters for which the applicant will show compliance with the 
requirements of this subpart. The applicant must account for all 
aircraft design and operational parameters that affect structural 
loads, strength, durability, and aeroelasticity, including:
    (a) Structural design airspeeds, landing descent speeds, and any 
other airspeed limitation at which the applicant must show compliance 
to the requirements of this subpart. The structural design airspeeds 
must--
    (1) Be sufficiently greater than the minimum safe speed of the 
aircraft to safeguard against loss of control in turbulent air; and
    (2) Provide sufficient margin for the establishment of practical 
operational limiting airspeeds.
    (b) Design maneuvering load factors not less than those, which 
service history shows, may occur within the structural design envelope.
    (c) Inertial properties including weight, center of gravity, and 
mass moments of inertia, accounting for--
    (1) Each critical weight from the aircraft empty weight to the 
maximum weight; and
    (2) The weight and distribution of occupants, payload, and energy-
storage systems.
    (d) Characteristics of aircraft control systems, including range of 
motion and tolerances for control surfaces, high lift devices, or other 
moveable surfaces.
    (e) Each critical altitude up to the maximum altitude.
    (f) Engine-driven lifting-device rotational speed and ranges, and 
the maximum rearward and sideward flight speeds.
    (g) Thrust[hyphen]borne, wing[hyphen]borne, and 
semi[hyphen]thrust[hyphen]borne flight configurations, with associated 
flight load envelopes.

Sec.  23.2205 Interaction of Systems and Structures

    [Applicable to Model M001]

Structural Loads

Sec.  23.2210 Structural Design Loads

(a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2215 Flight Load Conditions

    (a) The applicant must determine the structural design loads 
resulting from the following flight conditions:
    (1) Atmospheric gusts where the magnitude and gradient of these 
gusts are based on measured gust statistics.
    (2) Symmetric and asymmetric maneuvers.
    (3) Asymmetric thrust resulting from the failure of a powerplant 
unit.
    (b) There must be no vibration or buffeting severe enough to result 
in structural damage, at any speed up to dive speed, within the 
structural design envelope, in any configuration and power setting.

Sec.  23.2220 Ground and Water Load Conditions

    [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2225 Component Loading Conditions

    The applicant must determine the structural design loads acting on:
    (a) Each engine mount and its supporting structure such that both 
are

[[Page 45969]]

designed to withstand loads resulting from--
    (1) Powerplant operation combined with flight gust and maneuver 
loads; and
    (2) For non-reciprocating powerplants, sudden powerplant stoppage.
    (b) Each flight control and high-lift surface, their associated 
system and supporting structure resulting from--
    (1) The inertia of each surface and mass balance attachment;
    (2) Flight gusts and maneuvers;
    (3) Pilot or automated system inputs;
    (4) System induced conditions, including jamming and friction; and
    (5) Taxi, takeoff, and landing operations on the applicable 
surface, including downwind taxi and gusts occurring on the applicable 
surface.
    (c) [Reserved]
    (d) Engine-driven lifting-device assemblies, considering loads 
resulting from flight and ground conditions, as well limit input torque 
at any lifting-device rotational speed.

Sec.  23.2230 Limit and Ultimate Loads

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

Structural Performance

Sec.  23.2235 Structural Strength

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2240 Structural Durability

    (a) The applicant must develop and implement inspections or other 
procedures to prevent structural failures due to foreseeable causes of 
strength degradation, which could result in serious or fatal injuries, 
or extended periods of operation with reduced safety margins. Each of 
the inspections or other procedures developed under this section must 
be included in the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the ICA, 
required by AM1.1529.
    (b) If safety-by-design (fail-safe) is used to comply with 
paragraph (a) of this section, safety-by-inspection (damage tolerance) 
must also be incorporated to reliably detect structural damage before 
the damage could result in structural failure.
    (c) The aircraft must be designed to minimize hazards to the 
aircraft due to structural damage caused by high-energy fragments from 
an uncontained engine or rotating machinery failure.

AM1.2241 Aeromechanical Stability

    The aircraft must be free from dangerous oscillations and 
aeromechanical instabilities for all configurations and conditions of 
operation on the ground and in flight.

AM1.2245 Aeroelasticity

    (a) The aircraft must be free from flutter, control reversal, and 
divergence--
    (1) At all speeds within and sufficiently beyond the structural 
design envelope;
    (2) For any configuration and condition of operation;
    (3) Accounting for critical structural modes, and
    (4) Accounting for any critical failures or malfunctions.
    (b) The applicant must establish tolerances for all quantities that 
affect aeroelastic stability.
    (c) Each component and rotating aerodynamic surface of the aircraft 
must be free from any aeroelastic instability under each appropriate 
speed and power condition.

Design

AM1.2250 Design and Construction Principles

    (a) The applicant must design each part, article, and assembly for 
the expected operating conditions of the aircraft.
    (b) Design data must adequately define the part, article, or 
assembly configuration, its design features, and any materials and 
processes used.
    (c) The applicant must determine the suitability of each design 
detail and part having an important bearing on safety in operations. 
The applicant must prevent single failures from resulting in a 
catastrophic effect upon the aircraft.
    (d) The control system must be free from jamming, excessive 
friction, and excessive deflection when the aircraft is subjected to 
expected limit airloads.
    (e) Doors, canopies, and exits must be protected against 
inadvertent opening in flight, unless shown to create no hazard when 
opened in flight.

Sec.  23.2255 Protection of Structure

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.2260 Materials and Processes

    (a) through (g) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.2265 Special Factors of Safety

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

Structural Occupant Protection

Sec.  23.2270 Emergency Conditions

    (a) through (e) [Applicable to Model M001]

Subpart D--Design and Construction

AM1.2300 Flight Control Systems

    (a) The applicant must design flight control systems to:
    (1) Operate easily, smoothly, and positively enough to allow proper 
performance of their functions;
    (2) Protect against likely hazards; and
    (3) Ensure that the flightcrew is made suitably aware whenever the 
means of primary flight control approaches the limits of control 
authority.
    (b) The applicant must design trim systems or trim functions, if 
installed, to:
    (1) Protect against inadvertent, incorrect, or abrupt trim 
operation; and
    (2) Provide information that is required for safe operation.
    (c) Features that protect the aircraft against loss of control or 
exceeding critical limits must be designed such that there are no 
adverse flight characteristics in aircraft response to flight-control 
inputs, unsteady atmospheric conditions, and other likely conditions, 
including simultaneous limiting events.

Sec.  23.2305 Landing Gear Systems

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2311 Bird Strike

    The aircraft must be capable of continued safe flight and landing 
after impact with a 2.2-lb (1.0 kg) bird.

Occupant System Design Protection

AM1.2315 Means of Egress and Emergency Exits

    (a) With the cabin configured for takeoff or landing, the aircraft 
is designed to:
    (1) Facilitate rapid and safe evacuation of the aircraft in 
conditions likely to occur following an emergency landing.
    (2) Have means of egress (openings, exits, or emergency exits), 
that can be readily located and opened from the inside and outside. The 
means of opening must be simple and obvious and marked inside and 
outside the aircraft.
    (3) Have easy access to emergency exits when present.
    (b) [Reserved]

Sec.  23.2320 Occupant Physical Environment

    (a) and (c) [Applicable to Model M001]
    (b), (d), and (e) [Not applicable to Model M001]

Fire and High Energy Protection

AM1.2325 Fire Protection

    (a) The following materials must be self-extinguishing--
    (1) Insulation on electrical wire and electrical cable; and

[[Page 45970]]

    (2) Materials in the baggage and cargo compartments inaccessible in 
flight.
    (b) The following materials must be flame resistant--
    (1) Materials in each compartment accessible in flight; and
    (2) Any equipment associated with any electrical cable installation 
and that would overheat in the event of circuit overload or fault.
    (c) Thermal/acoustic materials in the fuselage, if installed, must 
not be a flame propagation hazard.
    (d) Sources of heat within each baggage and cargo compartment that 
are capable of igniting adjacent objects must be shielded and insulated 
to prevent such ignition.
    (e) Each baggage and cargo compartment must--
    (1) Be located where a fire would be visible to the pilots and be 
accessible for the manual extinguishing of a fire,
    (2) Be equipped with a smoke or fire detection system that warns 
the pilot, or
    (3) Be constructed of, or lined with, fire resistant materials.
    (f) There must be a means to extinguish any fire in the cabin such 
that the pilot, while seated, can easily access the fire extinguishing 
means.
    (g) Each area where flammable fluids or vapors might escape by 
leakage of a fluid system must--
    (1) Be defined; and
    (2) Have a means to minimize the probability of fluid and vapor 
ignition, and the resultant hazard, if ignition occurs.

AM1.2330 Fire Protection in Fire Zones and Adjacent Areas

    (a) Flight controls, engine mounts, and other flight structures 
within or adjacent to fire zones must be capable of withstanding the 
effects of a fire.
    (b) Engines in a fire zone must remain attached to the aircraft in 
the event of a fire.
    (c) In fire zones, terminals, equipment, and electrical cables used 
during emergency procedures must perform their intended function in the 
event of a fire.

AM1.2335 Lightning and Static Electricity Protection

    (a) The aircraft must be protected against catastrophic effects 
from lightning.
    (b) The aircraft must be protected against hazardous effects caused 
by an accumulation of electrostatic charge.

Subpart E--Powerplant

AM1.2400 Powerplant Installation

    (a) For the purpose of this subpart, the aircraft powerplant 
installation must include each component necessary for propulsion, 
which affects propulsion safety.
    (b) Each aircraft engine and propeller must be approved under the 
aircraft type certificate using standards found in subparts H and I.
    (c) The applicant must construct and arrange each powerplant 
installation to account for--
    (1) Likely operating conditions, including foreign-object threats;
    (2) Sufficient clearance of moving parts to other aircraft parts 
and their surroundings;
    (3) Likely hazards in operation including hazards to ground 
personnel; and
    (4) Vibration and fatigue.
    (d) Hazardous accumulations of fluids, vapors, or gases must be 
isolated from the aircraft and personnel compartments and be safely 
contained or discharged.
    (e) Powerplant components must comply with their component 
limitations and installation instructions or be shown not to create a 
hazard.

AM1.2405 Power or Thrust Control Systems

    (a) Any power or thrust control system or powerplant control system 
must be designed so no unsafe condition results during normal operation 
of the system.
    (b) Any single failure or likely combination of failures or 
malfunctions of a power or thrust control system or powerplant control 
system must not prevent continued safe flight and landing of the 
aircraft.
    (c) Inadvertent flightcrew operation of a power or thrust control 
system or powerplant control system must be prevented, or if not 
prevented, must not prevent continued safe flight and landing of the 
aircraft.

Sec.  23.2410 Powerplant Installation Hazard Assessment

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.2415 Powerplant Ice Protection

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2425 Powerplant Operational Characteristics

    (a) Each installed powerplant must operate without any hazardous 
characteristics during normal and emergency operation within the range 
of operating limitations for the aircraft and the engine.
    (b) The design must provide for the shutdown and restart of the 
powerplant in flight within an established operational envelope.

AM1.2430 Energy Systems

    (a) Each energy system must--
    (1) Be designed and arranged to provide independence between 
multiple energy-storage and supply systems, so that failure of any one 
component in one system will not result in loss of energy storage or 
supply of another system;
    (2) Be designed to prevent catastrophic events due to lightning 
strikes, taking into account direct and indirect effects on the 
aircraft;
    (3) Provide the energy necessary to ensure each powerplant 
functions properly in all likely operating conditions;
    (4) Provide the flightcrew with a means to determine the total 
useable energy available and provide uninterrupted supply of that 
energy when the system is correctly operated, accounting for likely 
energy fluctuations;
    (5) Provide a means to safely remove or isolate the energy stored 
in the system from the aircraft; and
    (6) Be designed to retain energy under all likely operating 
conditions and to minimize hazards to occupants and first responders 
following an emergency landing or otherwise survivable impact (crash 
landing).
    (b) Each energy-storage system must--
    (1) Withstand the loads under likely operating conditions without 
failure; and
    (2) Be isolated from personnel compartments and protected from 
likely hazards.
    (c) Each energy-storage recharging system must be designed to--
    (1) Prevent improper recharging; and
    (2) Prevent the occurrence of hazard to the aircraft or to persons 
during recharging.

AM1.2440 Powerplant Fire Protection

    There must be means to isolate and mitigate hazards to the aircraft 
in the event of a powerplant system fire or overheat in operation.

Subpart F--Equipment

Sec.  23.2500 Airplane Level Systems Requirements

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.2505 Function and Installation

    [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.2510 Equipment, Systems, and Installations

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

[[Page 45971]]

AM1.2515 Electrical- and Electronic-System Lightning Protection

    (a) Each electrical or electronic system that performs a function, 
the failure of which would prevent the continued safe flight and 
landing of the aircraft, must be designed and installed such that--
    (1) The function at the aircraft level is not adversely affected 
during and after the time the aircraft is exposed to lightning; and
    (2) The system recovers normal operation of that function in a 
timely manner after the aircraft is exposed to lightning unless the 
system's recovery conflicts with other operational or functional 
requirements of the system.
    (b) For an aircraft approved for operation under instrument flight 
rules (IFR), each electrical and electronic system that performs a 
function, the failure of which would reduce the capability of the 
aircraft or the ability of the flightcrew to respond to an adverse 
operating condition, must be designed and installed such that the 
system recovers normal operation of that function in a timely manner 
after the aircraft is exposed to lightning.

AM1.2520 High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Protection

    (a) Each electrical or electronic system that performs a function, 
the failure of which would prevent the continued safe flight and 
landing of the aircraft, must be designed and installed such that--
    (1) The function at the aircraft level is not adversely affected 
during and after the time the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF 
environment; and
    (2) The system recovers normal operation of that function in a 
timely manner after the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF environment, 
unless the system's recovery conflicts with other operational or 
functional requirements of the system.
    (b) For aircraft approved for IFR operations, each electrical and 
electronic system that performs a function, the failure of which would 
reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the flightcrew 
to respond to an adverse operating condition, must be designed and 
installed such that the system recovers normal operation of that 
function in a timely manner after the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF 
environment.

Sec.  23.2525 System Power Generation, Storage, and Distribution

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.2530 External and Cockpit Lighting

    (a) through (d) [Applicable to Model M001]
    (e) [Not applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.2535 Safety Equipment

    [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.2545 Pressurized Systems Elements

    [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.2550 Equipment Containing High-Energy Rotors

    [Applicable to Model M001]

Subpart G--Flightcrew Interface and Other Information

AM1.2600 Flightcrew Interface

    (a) The pilot compartment, its equipment, and its arrangement to 
include pilot view, must allow each pilot to perform their duties for 
all sources of lift and phases of flight and perform any maneuvers 
within the approved flight envelope of the aircraft, without excessive 
concentration, skill, alertness, or fatigue.
    (b) The applicant must install flight, navigation, surveillance, 
and powerplant controls and displays, as needed, so qualified 
flightcrew can monitor and perform defined tasks associated with the 
intended functions of systems and equipment, without excessive 
concentration, skill, alertness, or fatigue. The system and equipment 
design must minimize flightcrew errors, which could result in 
additional hazards.

Sec.  23.2605 Installation and Operation

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  23.2610 Instrument Markings, Control Markings, and Placards

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2615 Flight, Navigation, and Powerplant Instruments

    (a) Installed systems must provide the flightcrew member who sets 
or monitors parameters for the flight, navigation, and powerplant, the 
information necessary to do so during each source of lift and phase of 
flight. This information must--
    (1) Be presented in a manner that the crewmember can monitor the 
parameter and determine trends, as needed, to operate the aircraft; and
    (2) Include limitations, unless the limitations cannot be exceeded 
in all intended operations.
    (b) Indication systems that integrate the display of flight or 
powerplant parameters to operate the aircraft, or are required by the 
operating rules of title 14, chapter I, must--
    (1) Not inhibit the primary display of flight or powerplant 
parameters needed by any flightcrew member in any normal mode of 
operation; and
    (2) In combination with other systems, be designed and installed so 
information essential for continued safe flight and landing will be 
available to the flightcrew in a timely manner after any single failure 
or probable combination of failures.

AM1.2620 Aircraft Flight Manual

    The applicant must provide an Aircraft Flight Manual that must be 
delivered with each aircraft.
    (a) The Aircraft Flight Manual must contain the following 
information--
    (1) Aircraft operating limitations;
    (2) Aircraft operating procedures;
    (3) Performance information;
    (4) Loading information; and
    (5) Other information that is necessary for safe operation because 
of design, operating, or handling characteristics.
    (b) The portions of the Aircraft Flight Manual containing the 
information specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this 
section must be approved by the FAA in a manner specified by the 
Administrator.

Subpart H--Electric Engine Requirements

Sec.  33.5 Instruction Manual for Installing and Operating the Engine

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  33.7 Engine Ratings and Operating Limitations

    (a) [Applicable to Model M001]
    (b) through (d) [Not applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2702 Engine Ratings and Operating Limits

    Ratings and operating limits must be established and included in 
the type certificate data sheet based on:
    (a) Shaft power, torque, rotational speed, and temperature for:
    (1) Rated takeoff power;
    (2) Rated maximum continuous power; and
    (3) Rated maximum temporary power and associated time limit.
    (b) Duty cycle and the rating at that duty cycle. The duty cycle 
must be declared in the type certificate data sheet.
    (c) Cooling fluid grade or specification.
    (d) Power-supply requirements.
    (e) Any other ratings or limitations that are necessary for the 
safe operation of the engine.

[[Page 45972]]

Sec.  33.8 Selection of Engine Power and Thrust Ratings

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  33.15 Materials

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  33.17 Fire Protection

    (a) [Not applicable to Model M001]
    (b) through (g) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2704 Fire Protection

    (a) The design and construction of the engine and the materials 
used must minimize the probability of the occurrence and spread of fire 
during normal operation and failure conditions and must minimize the 
effect of such a fire.
    (b) High-voltage electrical wiring interconnect systems must be 
protected against arc faults that can lead to hazardous engine effects 
as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2). Non-protected electrical wiring 
interconnects must be analyzed to show that arc faults do not cause a 
hazardous engine effect.

AM1.2705 Durability

    The engine design and construction must minimize the development of 
an unsafe condition of the engine between maintenance intervals, 
overhaul periods, or mandatory actions described in the applicable ICA.

Sec.  33.21 Engine Cooling

    [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2706 Engine Cooling

    If cooling is required to satisfy the safety analysis as described 
in AM1.2717, the cooling-system monitoring features and usage must be 
documented in the engine installation manual.

Sec.  33.23 Engine Mounting Attachments and Structure

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  33.25 Accessory Attachments

    [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2709 Overspeed

    (a) A rotor overspeed must not result in a burst, rotor growth, or 
damage that results in a hazardous engine effect, as defined in 
AM1.2717(d)(2). Compliance with this paragraph must be shown by test, 
validated analysis, or a combination of both. Applicable assumed rotor 
speeds must be declared and justified.
    (b) Rotors must possess sufficient strength with a margin to burst 
above approved operating conditions and above failure conditions 
leading to rotor overspeed. The margin to burst must be shown by test, 
validated analysis, or a combination thereof.
    (c) The engine must not exceed the rotor-speed operational 
limitations that could affect rotor structural integrity.

Sec.  33.28 Engine Control Systems

    (b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(iii), and (b)(1)(iv) [Applicable to Model M001]
    (a), (b)(1)(ii), and (b)(2) through (m) [Not applicable to Model 
M001]

AM1.2710 Engine Control Systems

    (a) Applicability.
    These requirements apply to any system or device that is part of 
the engine type design that controls, limits, monitors, or protects 
engine operation and is necessary for the continued airworthiness of 
the engine.
    (b) Engine control.
    The engine control system must ensure the engine does not 
experience any unacceptable operating characteristics or exceed its 
operating limits, including in failure conditions where the fault or 
failure results in a change from one control mode to another, from one 
channel to another, or from the primary system to the back-up system, 
if applicable.
    (c) Design assurance.
    The software and complex electronic hardware, including 
programmable logic devices, must be--
    (1) Designed and developed using a structured and systematic 
approach that provides a level of assurance for the logic commensurate 
with the hazard associated with the failure or malfunction of the 
systems in which the devices are located; and
    (2) Substantiated by a verification methodology acceptable to the 
Administrator.
    (d) Validation.
    All functional aspects of the control system must be substantiated 
by test, analysis, or a combination thereof, to show that the engine 
control system performs the intended functions throughout the declared 
operational envelope.
    (e) Environmental limits.
    Environmental limits that cannot be adequately substantiated by 
endurance demonstration, validated analysis, or a combination thereof 
must be demonstrated by the system and component tests in AM1.2727.
    (f) Engine control system failures.
    The engine control system must--
    (1) Have a maximum rate of Loss of Power Control (LOPC) that is 
suitable for the intended aircraft application. The estimated LOPC rate 
must be specified in the engine installation manual;
    (2) When in the full-up configuration, be single fault tolerant, as 
determined by the Administrator, for electrical, electrically 
detectable, and electronic failures involving LOPC events;
    (3) Not have any single failure that results in hazardous engine 
effects as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2); and
    (4) Ensure failures or malfunctions that lead to local events in 
the aircraft do not result in hazardous engine effects as defined in 
AM1.2717(d)(2) due to engine control system failures or malfunctions.
    (g) System safety assessment.
    The applicant must perform a system safety assessment. This 
assessment must identify faults or failures that affect normal 
operation, together with the predicted frequency of occurrence of these 
faults or failures. The intended aircraft application must be taken 
into account to ensure the assessment of the engine control system 
safety is valid.
    (h) Protection systems.
    The engine control devices and systems' design and function, 
together with engine instruments, operating instructions, and 
maintenance instructions, must ensure that engine operating limits that 
can lead to a hazard will not be exceeded in-service.
    (i) Aircraft-supplied data.
    Any single failure leading to loss, interruption, or corruption of 
aircraft-supplied data (other than power command signals from the 
aircraft), or aircraft-supplied data shared between engine systems 
within a single engine or between fully independent engine systems, 
must--
    (1) Not result in a hazardous engine effect, as defined in 
AM1.2717(d)(2), for any engine installed on the aircraft; and
    (2) Be able to be detected and accommodated by the control system.
    (j) Engine control system electrical power.
    (1) The engine control system must be designed such that the loss, 
malfunction, or interruption of the control system electrical power 
source will not result in a hazardous engine effect, as defined in 
AM1.2717(d)(2), the unacceptable transmission of erroneous data, or 
continued engine operation in the absence of the control function. The 
engine control system must be capable of resuming normal operation when 
aircraft-supplied power returns to within the declared limits.
    (2) The applicant must identify and declare, in the engine 
installation manual, the characteristics of any electrical power 
supplied from the aircraft to the engine control system, including 
transient and steady-state

[[Page 45973]]

voltage limits, and any other characteristics necessary for safe 
operation of the engine.

Sec.  33.29 Instrument Connection

    (a), (e), and (g) [Applicable to Model M001]
    (b) through (d), (f), and (h) [Not applicable to the Model M001]

AM1.2711 Instrument Connection

    (a) In addition, as part of the system safety assessment of 
AM1.2710(g) and AM1.2733(h), the applicant must assess the possibility 
and subsequent effect of incorrect fit of instruments, sensors, or 
connectors. Where practicable, the applicant must take design 
precautions to prevent incorrect configuration of the system.
    (b) The applicant must provide instrumentation enabling the 
flightcrew to monitor the functioning of the engine cooling system 
unless evidence shows that:
    (1) Other existing instrumentation provides adequate warning of 
failure or impending failure;
    (2) Failure of the cooling system would not lead to hazardous 
engine effects, as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2), before detection; or
    (3) The probability of failure of the cooling system is extremely 
remote.

AM1.2712 Stress Analysis

    (a) A mechanical and thermal stress analysis, as well as an 
analysis of the stress caused by electromagnetic forces, must show a 
sufficient design margin to prevent unacceptable operating 
characteristics and hazardous engine effects as defined in 
AM1.2717(d)(2).
    (b) Maximum stresses in the engine must be determined by test, 
validated analysis, or a combination thereof, and must be shown not to 
exceed minimum material properties.

Sec.  33.70 Engine Life Limited Parts

    Introductory paragraph [Not applicable to Model M001]
    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2713 Critical and Life-Limited Parts

    (a) The applicant must show, by a safety analysis or means 
acceptable to the Administrator, whether rotating or moving components, 
bearings, shafts, static parts, and non-redundant mount components 
should be classified, designed, manufactured, and managed throughout 
their service life as critical or life-limited parts.
    (1) Critical part means a part that must meet prescribed integrity 
specifications to avoid its primary failure, which is likely to result 
in a hazardous engine effect as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2).
    (2) Life-limited parts may include but are not limited to a rotor 
and major structural static part, the failure of which can result in a 
hazardous engine effect, as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2), due to low-cycle 
fatigue.
    (b) In establishing the integrity of each critical part or life-
limited part, the applicant must provide to the Administrator the 
following three plans for approval: an engineering plan, a 
manufacturing plan, and a service-management plan, as defined in Sec.  
33.70.

AM1.2714 Lubrication System

    (a) The lubrication system must be designed and constructed to 
function properly between scheduled maintenance intervals in all flight 
attitudes and atmospheric conditions in which the engine is expected to 
operate.
    (b) The lubrication system must be designed to prevent 
contamination of the engine bearings and lubrication system components.
    (c) The applicant must demonstrate by test, validated analysis, or 
a combination thereof, the unique lubrication attributes and functional 
capability of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.

AM1.2715 Power Response

    The design and construction of the engine, including its control 
system, must enable an increase--
    (a) From the minimum power setting to the highest rated power 
without detrimental engine effects;
    (b) From the minimum obtainable power while in flight, and while on 
the ground, to the highest rated power within a time interval 
determined to be appropriate for the intended aircraft application; and
    (c) From the minimum torque to the highest rated torque without 
detrimental engine effects in the intended aircraft application.

AM1.2716 Continued Rotation

    If the design allows any of the engine main rotating systems to 
continue to rotate after the engine is shut down while in-flight, this 
continued rotation must not result in hazardous engine effects, as 
specified in AM1.2717(d)(2).

Sec.  33.75 Safety Analysis

    (a)(1) through (a)(2), (d), (e), and (g)(2) [Applicable to Model 
M001]
    (a)(3) through (c), (f), (g)(1), and (g)(3) [Not applicable to 
Model M001]

AM1.2717 Safety Analysis

    (a) The applicant must comply with Sec.  33.75(a)(1) and (2) using 
the failure definitions in paragraph (d) of this section.
    (b) The primary failure of certain single elements cannot be 
sensibly estimated in numerical terms. If the failure of such elements 
is likely to result in hazardous engine effects as defined in paragraph 
(d)(2) of this section, then the applicant may show compliance by 
reliance on the prescribed integrity requirements such as Sec.  33.15, 
AM1.2709, AM1.2713, or combinations thereof, as applicable. The failure 
of such elements and associated prescribed integrity requirements must 
be stated in the safety analysis.
    (c) The applicant must comply with Sec.  33.75(d) using the failure 
definitions in paragraph (d) of this section, Sec.  33.75(e)(1) using 
the ICA in AM1.1529 Appendix 1, and with Sec.  33.75(e)(4) using the 
failure definitions in paragraph (d) of this section.
    (d) Unless otherwise approved by the Administrator, the following 
definitions apply to the engine effects when showing compliance with 
these airworthiness criteria:
    (1) A minor engine effect does not prohibit the engine from 
performing its intended functions in a manner consistent with Sec.  
33.28(b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(iii), and (b)(1)(iv), and the engine complies 
with the operability requirements such as AM1.2715, AM1.2725, and 
AM1.2731, as appropriate.
    (2) The engine effects in Sec.  33.75(g)(2) are hazardous engine 
effects, as are:
    (i) Electrocution of the crew, passengers, operators, maintainers, 
or others; and
    (ii) Blockage of cooling systems that could cause the engine 
effects described in Sec.  33.75(g)(2) and paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this 
section.
    (3) Any other engine effect is a major engine effect.
    (e) The intended aircraft application must be taken into account to 
assure that the analysis of the engine system safety is valid.

AM1.2718 Ingestion

    (a) Rain, ice, and hail ingestion must not result in an abnormal 
operation such as shutdown, power loss, erratic operation, or power 
oscillations throughout the engine operating range.
    (b) Ingestion from other likely sources (birds, induction system 
ice, foreign objects--ice slabs) must not result in hazardous engine 
effects, as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2), or unacceptable power loss.
    (c) If the design of the engine relies on features, attachments, or 
systems that the installer may supply, for the prevention of 
unacceptable power loss

[[Page 45974]]

or hazardous engine effects as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2) following 
potential ingestion, then the features, attachments, or systems must be 
documented in the engine installation manual.
    (d) Ingestion sources described in paragraph (b) of this section 
that are not evaluated must be declared in the engine installation 
manual.

AM1.2719 Liquid and Gas Systems

    (a) Each system used for lubrication or cooling of engine 
components must be designed and constructed to function properly in all 
flight attitudes and atmospheric conditions in which the engine is 
expected to operate.
    (b) If a system used for lubrication or cooling of engine 
components is not self-contained, the interfaces to that system must be 
defined in the engine installation manual.
    (c) The applicant must establish by test, validated analysis, or a 
combination of both, that all static parts subject to significant 
pressure loads will not:
    (1) Exhibit permanent distortion beyond serviceable limits or 
exhibit leakage that could create a hazardous condition when subjected 
to normal and maximum working pressure with margin.
    (2) Exhibit fracture or burst when subjected to the greater of 
maximum possible pressures with margin.
    (d) Compliance with paragraph (c) of this section must take into 
account:
    (1) The operating temperature of the part;
    (2) Any other significant static loads in addition to pressure 
loads;
    (3) Minimum properties representative of both the material and the 
processes used in the construction of the part; and
    (4) Any adverse physical geometry conditions allowed by the type 
design, such as minimum material and minimum radii.
    (e) Approved coolants and lubricants must be listed in the engine 
installation manual.

AM1.2720 Vibration Demonstration

    (a) The engine must be designed and constructed to function 
throughout its normal operating range of rotor speeds and engine output 
power, including defined exceedances, without inducing excessive stress 
in any of the engine parts because of vibration and without imparting 
excessive vibration forces to the aircraft structure.
    (b) Each engine design must undergo a vibration survey to establish 
that the vibration characteristics of those components that may be 
subject to induced vibration are acceptable throughout the approved 
flight envelope and engine operating range for the specific 
installation configuration. The possible sources of the induced 
vibration that the survey must assess are mechanical, aerodynamic, 
acoustical, internally induced electromagnetic, installation induced 
effects that can affect the engine vibration characteristics, and 
likely environmental effects. This survey must be shown by test, 
validated analysis, or a combination thereof.

AM1.2721 Overtorque

    When approval is sought for a transient maximum engine overtorque, 
the applicant must demonstrate by test, validated analysis, or a 
combination thereof, that the engine can continue operation after 
operating at the maximum engine overtorque condition without 
maintenance action. Upon conclusion of overtorque tests conducted to 
show compliance with this subpart, or any other tests that are 
conducted in combination with the overtorque test, each engine part or 
individual groups of components must meet the requirements of AM1.2729.

AM1.2722 Calibration Assurance

    Each engine must be subjected to calibration tests to establish its 
power characteristics and the conditions both before and after the 
endurance and durability demonstrations specified in AM1.2723 and 
AM1.2726.

AM1.2723 Endurance Demonstration

    (a) The applicant must subject the engine to an endurance 
demonstration, acceptable to the Administrator, to demonstrate the 
engine's limit capabilities.
    (b) The endurance demonstration must include increases and 
decreases of the engine's power settings, energy regeneration, and 
dwellings at the power settings or energy regeneration for sufficient 
durations that produce the extreme physical conditions the engine 
experiences at rated performance levels, operational limits, and at any 
other conditions or power settings that are required to verify the 
limit capabilities of the engine.

AM1.2724 Temperature Limit

    The engine design must demonstrate its capability to endure 
operation at its temperature limits plus an acceptable margin. The 
applicant must quantify and justify the margin to the Administrator. 
The demonstration must be repeated for all declared duty cycles and 
ratings, and operating environments, that would impact temperature 
limits.

AM1.2725 Operation Demonstration

    The engine design must demonstrate safe operating characteristics, 
including but not limited to power cycling, starting, acceleration, and 
overspeeding throughout its declared flight envelope and operating 
range. The declared engine operational characteristics must account for 
installation loads and effects.

AM1.2726 Durability Demonstration

    The engine must be subjected to a durability demonstration to show 
that each part of the engine has been designed and constructed to 
minimize any unsafe condition of the system between overhaul periods or 
between engine replacement intervals if the overhaul is not defined. 
This test must simulate the conditions in which the engine is expected 
to operate in service, including typical start-stop cycles, to 
establish when the initial maintenance is required.

AM1.2727 System and Component Tests

    The applicant must show that systems and components that cannot be 
adequately substantiated in accordance with the endurance demonstration 
or other demonstrations will perform their intended functions in all 
declared environmental and operating conditions.

AM1.2728 Rotor Locking Demonstration

    If shaft rotation is prevented by locking the rotor(s), the engine 
must demonstrate:
    (a) Reliable rotor locking performance;
    (b) Reliable unlocking performance; and
    (c) That no hazardous engine effects, as specified in 
AM1.2717(d)(2), will occur.

AM1.2729 Teardown Inspection

    (a) Teardown evaluation.
    (1) After the endurance and durability demonstrations have been 
completed, the-engine must be completely disassembled. Each engine 
component and lubricant must be eligible for continued operation in 
accordance with the information submitted for showing compliance with 
AM1.1529.
    (2) Each engine component having an adjustment setting and a 
functioning characteristic that can be established independent of 
installation on or in the engine must retain each setting and 
functioning characteristic within the established and recorded limits 
at the

[[Page 45975]]

beginning of the endurance and durability demonstrations.
    (b) Non-Teardown evaluation.
    If a teardown cannot be performed for all engine components in a 
non-destructive manner, then the inspection or replacement intervals 
for these components and lubricants must be established based on the 
endurance and durability demonstrations and documented in the ICA in 
accordance with AM1.1529.

AM1.2730 Containment

    The engine must be designed and constructed to protect against 
likely hazards from rotating components as follows--
    (a) The design of the case surrounding rotating components must 
provide for the containment of the rotating components in the event of 
failure, unless the applicant shows that the margin to rotor burst 
precludes the possibility of a rotor burst.
    (b) If the margin to burst shows the case must have containment 
features in the event of failure, the case must provide for the 
containment of the failed rotating components. The applicant must 
define by test, validated analysis, or a combination thereof, and 
document in the engine installation manual, the energy level, 
trajectory, and size of fragments released from damage caused by the 
main rotor failure, and that pass forward or aft of the surrounding 
case.

AM1.2731 Operation With a Variable-Pitch Propeller

    The applicant must conduct functional demonstrations including 
feathering, negative torque, negative thrust, and reverse thrust 
operations, as applicable, with a representative propeller. These 
demonstrations may be conducted in a manner acceptable to the 
Administrator as part of the endurance, durability, and operation 
demonstrations.

AM1.2732 General Conduct of Tests

    (a) Maintenance of the engine may be made during the tests in 
accordance with the service and maintenance instructions submitted in 
compliance with AM1.1529, ICA.
    (b) The applicant must subject the engine or its parts to 
maintenance and additional tests that the Administrator finds necessary 
if--
    (1) The frequency of the service is excessive;
    (2) The number of stops due to engine malfunction is excessive;
    (3) Major repairs are needed; or
    (4) Replacement of a part is found necessary during the tests or 
due to the teardown inspection findings.
    (c) Upon completion of all demonstrations and testing specified in 
these airworthiness criteria, the engine and its components must be--
    (1) Within serviceable limits;
    (2) Safe for continued operation; and
    (3) Capable of operating at declared ratings while remaining within 
limits.

AM1.2733 Engine Electrical Systems

    (a) Applicability.
    Any system or device that provides, uses, conditions, or 
distributes electrical power, and is part of the engine type design, 
must provide for the continued airworthiness of the engine and maintain 
electric engine ratings.
    (b) Electrical systems.
    The electrical system must ensure the safe generation and 
transmission of power, electrical load shedding, and that the engine 
does not experience any unacceptable operating characteristics or 
exceed its operating limits.
    (c) Electrical-power distribution.
    (1) The engine electrical-power distribution system must be 
designed to provide the safe transfer of electrical energy throughout 
the electrical power plant. The system must be designed to provide 
electrical power so that the loss, malfunction, or interruption of the 
electrical power source will not result in a hazardous engine effect, 
as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2).
    (2) The system must be designed and maintained to withstand normal 
and abnormal conditions during all ground and flight operations.
    (3) The system must provide mechanical or automatic means to 
mitigate a faulted electrical-energy generation or storage device from 
leading to hazardous engine effects, as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2), or 
detrimental effects in the intended aircraft application.
    (d) Protection systems.
    The engine electrical system must be designed such that the loss, 
malfunction, interruption of the electrical power source, or power 
conditions that exceed design limits will not result in hazardous 
engine effects, as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2), or detrimental effects in 
the intended aircraft application.
    (e) Electrical Power Characteristics.
    The applicant must identify and declare, in the engine installation 
manual, the characteristics of any electrical power--
    (1) Supplied from the aircraft to the engine electrical system, for 
starting and operating the engine, including transient and steady-state 
voltage limits, or
    (2) Supplied from the engine to the aircraft via energy 
regeneration, and any other characteristics necessary for safe 
operation of the engine.
    (f) Environmental limits.
    Environmental limits that cannot be adequately substantiated by 
endurance demonstration, validated analysis, or a combination thereof 
must be demonstrated by the system and component tests in AM1.2727.
    (g) Electrical-system failures.
    The engine electrical system must--
    (1) Have a maximum rate of Loss of Power Control (LOPC) that is 
suitable for the intended aircraft application;
    (2) When in the full-up configuration, be single fault tolerant, as 
determined by the Administrator, for electrical, electrically 
detectable, and electronic failures involving LOPC events;
    (3) Not have any single failure that results in hazardous engine 
effects as defined in AM1.2717(d)(2); and
    (4) Not have any likely failure or malfunction that leads to local 
events in the intended aircraft application.
    (h) System safety assessment.
    The applicant must perform a system safety assessment. This 
assessment must identify faults or failures that affect normal 
operation, together with the predicted frequency of occurrence of these 
faults or failures. The intended aircraft application must be taken 
into account to assure the assessment of the engine system safety is 
valid.

Subpart I--Propeller Requirements

AM1.2805 Propeller Ratings and Operating Limitations

    Propeller ratings and operating limitations must be established by 
the applicant and approved by the Administrator, including ratings and 
limitations based on the operating conditions and information specified 
in this subpart, as applicable, and any other information found 
necessary for safe operation of the propeller.

Sec.  35.7 Features and Characteristics

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2815 Safety Analysis

    (a) The applicant must:
    (1) Analyze the propeller system to assess the likely consequences 
of all failures that can reasonably be expected to occur. This analysis 
will take into account, if applicable:
    (i) The propeller system when installed on the aircraft. When the 
analysis depends on representative components, assumed interfaces, or 
assumed installed conditions, the assumptions must be stated in the 
analysis.
    (ii) Consequential secondary failures and dormant failures.

[[Page 45976]]

    (iii) Multiple failures referred to in paragraph (d) of this 
section, or that result in the hazardous propeller effects defined in 
paragraph (g)(1) of this section.
    (2) Summarize those failures that could result in major propeller 
effects or hazardous propeller effects defined in paragraph (g) of this 
section, and estimate the probability of occurrence of those effects.
    (3) Show that hazardous propeller effects are not predicted to 
occur at a rate in excess of that defined as extremely remote 
(probability of 10-7 or less per propeller flight hour). 
Because the estimated probability for individual failures may be 
insufficiently precise to enable the applicant to assess the total rate 
for hazardous propeller effects, compliance may be shown by 
demonstrating that the probability of a hazardous propeller effect 
arising from an individual failure can be predicted to be not greater 
than 10-8 per propeller flight hour. In dealing with 
probabilities of this low order of magnitude, absolute proof is not 
possible, and reliance must be placed on engineering judgment and 
previous experience, combined with sound design and test philosophies.
    (b) If significant doubt exists as to the effects of failures or 
likely combination of failures, the Administrator may require 
assumptions used in the analysis to be verified by test.
    (c) The primary failures of certain single propeller elements (for 
example, blades) cannot be sensibly estimated in numerical terms. If 
the failure of such elements is likely to result in hazardous propeller 
effects, those elements must be identified as propeller critical parts. 
For propeller critical parts, the applicant must meet the prescribed 
integrity specifications of AM1.2816. These instances must be stated in 
the safety analysis.
    (d) If reliance is placed on a safety system to prevent a failure 
progressing to hazardous propeller effects, the possibility of a safety 
system failure, in combination with a basic propeller failure, must be 
included in the analysis. Such a safety system may include safety 
devices, instrumentation, early warning devices, maintenance checks, 
and other similar equipment or procedures.
    (e) If the safety analysis depends on one or more of the following 
items, those items must be identified in the analysis and appropriately 
substantiated.
    (1) Maintenance actions being carried out at stated intervals. This 
includes verifying that items that could fail in a latent manner are 
functioning properly. When necessary to prevent hazardous propeller 
effects, these maintenance actions and intervals must be published in 
the ICA required under AM1.1529. Additionally, if errors in maintenance 
of the propeller system could lead to hazardous propeller effects, the 
appropriate maintenance procedures must be included in the relevant 
propeller manuals.
    (2) Verification of the satisfactory functioning of safety or other 
devices at pre-flight or other stated periods. The details of this 
satisfactory functioning must be published in the appropriate manual.
    (3) The provision of specific instrumentation not otherwise 
required. Such instrumentation must be published in the appropriate 
documentation.
    (4) A fatigue assessment.
    (f) If applicable, the safety analysis must include, but not be 
limited to, assessment of indicating equipment, manual and automatic 
controls, governors and propeller-control systems, synchrophasers, 
synchronizers, and propeller thrust reversal systems.
    (g) Unless otherwise approved by the Administrator and stated in 
the safety analysis, the following failure definitions apply to 
compliance with these airworthiness criteria.
    (1) The following are regarded as hazardous propeller effects:
    (i) The development of excessive drag.
    (ii) A significant thrust in the opposite direction to that 
commanded by the pilot.
    (iii) The release of the propeller or any major portion of the 
propeller.
    (iv) A failure that results in excessive unbalance.
    (2) The following are regarded as major propeller effects for 
variable-pitch propellers:
    (i) An inability to feather the propeller for feathering 
propellers.
    (ii) An inability to change propeller pitch when commanded.
    (iii) A significant uncommanded change in pitch.
    (iv) A significant uncontrollable torque or speed fluctuation.

AM1.281 Propeller Critical Parts

    The integrity of each propeller critical part identified by the 
safety analysis required by AM1.2815 must be established by:
    (a) A defined engineering process for ensuring the integrity of the 
propeller critical part throughout its service life,
    (b) A defined manufacturing process that identifies the 
requirements to consistently produce the propeller critical part as 
required by the engineering process, and
    (c) A defined service-management process that identifies the 
continued airworthiness requirements of the propeller critical part as 
required by the engineering process.

Sec.  35.17 Materials and Manufacturing Methods

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  35.19 Durability

    [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2821 Variable- and Reversible-Pitch Propellers

    (a) No single failure or malfunction in the propeller system will 
result in unintended travel of the propeller blades to a position below 
the in-flight low-pitch position. The extent of any intended travel 
below the in-flight low-pitch position must be documented by the 
applicant in the appropriate manuals. Failure of structural elements 
need not be considered if the occurrence of such a failure is shown to 
be extremely remote under AM1.2815.
    (b) For propellers incorporating a method to select blade pitch 
below the in-flight low-pitch position, provisions must be made to 
sense and indicate to the flightcrew that the propeller blades are 
below that position by an amount defined in the installation 
instructions. The method for sensing and indicating the propeller blade 
pitch position must be such that its failure does not affect the 
control of the propeller.

Sec.  35.22 Feathering Propellers

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

AM1.2823 Propeller Control System

    The requirements of this section apply to any system or component 
that controls, limits, or monitors propeller functions.
    (a) The propeller control system must be designed, constructed and 
validated to show that:
    (1) The propeller control system, operating in normal and 
alternative operating modes and in transition between operating modes, 
performs the functions defined by the applicant throughout the declared 
operating conditions and approved flight envelope.
    (2) The propeller control system functionality is not adversely 
affected by the declared environmental conditions, including 
temperature, electromagnetic interference (EMI), high intensity 
radiated fields (HIRF), and lightning. The environmental limits to 
which the system has been satisfactorily validated must be documented 
in the appropriate propeller manuals.
    (3) A method is provided to indicate that an operating mode change 
has

[[Page 45977]]

occurred if flightcrew action is required. In such an event, operating 
instructions must be provided in the appropriate manuals.
    (b) The propeller control system must be designed and constructed 
so that, in addition to compliance with AM1.2815:
    (1) No single failure results in a hazardous propeller effect;
    (2) Local events in the intended aircraft installation will not 
result in hazardous propeller effects;
    (3) The loss of normal propeller pitch control does not cause a 
hazardous propeller effect under the intended operating conditions; and
    (4) The failure or corruption of data or signals shared across 
propellers does not cause a hazardous propeller effect.
    (c) Electronic propeller-control-system embedded software must be 
designed and implemented by a method approved by the Administrator that 
is consistent with the criticality of the performed functions and that 
minimizes the existence of software errors.
    (d) The propeller control system must be designed and constructed 
so that the failure or corruption of aircraft-supplied data does not 
result in hazardous propeller effects.
    (e) The propeller control system must be designed and constructed 
so that the loss, interruption, or abnormal characteristic of aircraft-
supplied electrical power does not result in hazardous propeller 
effects. The power quality requirements must be described in the 
appropriate manuals.

Sec.  35.24 Strength

    [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  35.33 General

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  35.34 Inspections, Adjustments, and Repairs

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  35.35 Centrifugal Load Tests

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  35.36 Bird Impact

    [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  35.37 Fatigue Limits and Evaluation

    (a) through (c)(1) [Applicable to Model M001, except replace the 
reference to Sec.  35.15 with AM1.2815, and the reference to ``Sec.  
23.2400(c) or Sec.  25.907'' with AM1.2400(c)]
    (c)(2) [Not applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  35.38 Lightning Strike

    [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  35.39 Endurance Test

    (a) through (c) [Applicable to Model M001, except replace the 
reference to ``part 33'' with ``these airworthiness criteria'']

AM1.2840 Functional Test

    The variable-pitch propeller system must be subjected to the 
applicable functional tests of this section. The same propeller system 
used in the endurance test of Sec.  35.39 must be used in the 
functional tests and must be driven by a representative engine on a 
test stand or on the aircraft. The propeller must complete these tests 
without evidence of failure or malfunction. This test may be combined 
with the endurance test for accumulation of cycles.
    (a) Governing and reversible-pitch propellers. Fifteen hundred 
complete cycles must be made across the range of forward pitch and 
rotational speed. In addition, 200 complete cycles of control must be 
made from lowest normal pitch to maximum reverse pitch. During each 
cycle, the propeller must run for 30 seconds at the maximum power and 
rotational speed selected by the applicant for maximum reverse pitch.
    (b) Feathering propellers. Fifty cycles of feather and unfeather 
operation must be made.
    (c) An analysis based on tests of propellers of similar design may 
be used in place of the tests of this section.

Sec.  35.41 Overspeed and Overtorque

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

Sec.  35.42 Components of the Propeller Control System

    [Applicable to Model M001]

Appendix A to Part 23--Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

    A23.1 through A23.3(g) and A23.4 [Applicable to Model M001]
    A23.3(h) [Not applicable to Model M001]

Appendix A1--Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (Electric Engine)

AAM1.2701 General

    (a) This appendix specifies requirements for the preparation of 
ICA for the engines as required by AM1.1529.
    (b) The ICA for the engine must include the ICA for all engine 
parts.
    (c) The applicant must submit to the FAA a program to show how 
the applicant's changes to the ICA will be distributed, if 
applicable.

A33.2 Format

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

A33.3 Content

    (a) and (b) [Applicable to Model M001]
    (c) [Not applicable to Model M001]

A33.4 Airworthiness Limitations Section

    (a) [Applicable to Model M001]
    (b) [Not applicable to Model M001]

Appendix A2--Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (Propellers)

AAM1.2801 General

    (a) This appendix specifies requirements for the preparation of 
ICA for the propellers as required by AM1.1529.
    (b) The ICA for the propeller must include the ICA for all 
propeller parts.
    (c) The applicant must submit to the FAA a program to show how 
changes to the ICA made by the applicant or by the manufacturers of 
propeller parts will be distributed, if applicable.

A35.2 Format

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

A35.3 Content

    (a) through (b) [Applicable to Model M001]

A35.4 Airworthiness Limitations Section

    [Applicable to Model M001]

    Issued in Des Moines, WA, on May 14, 2024.
Caspar K. Wang,
Acting Manager, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and Standards Division, 
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2024-11192 Filed 5-23-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P