[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 54 (Tuesday, March 19, 2024)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 19646-19726]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-04938]



[[Page 19645]]

Vol. 89

Tuesday,

No. 54

March 19, 2024

Part II





Commodity Futures Trading Commission





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17 CFR Parts 37 and 38





Requirements for Designated Contract Markets and Swap Execution 
Facilities Regarding Governance and the Mitigation of Conflicts of 
Interest Impacting Market Regulation Functions; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 54 / Tuesday, March 19, 2024 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 19646]]


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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 37 and 38

RIN 3038-AF29


Requirements for Designated Contract Markets and Swap Execution 
Facilities Regarding Governance and the Mitigation of Conflicts of 
Interest Impacting Market Regulation Functions

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'' or 
``CFTC'') is proposing new rules and amendments to its existing 
regulations for designated contract markets (``DCMs'') and swap 
execution facilities (``SEFs'') that would establish governance and 
fitness requirements with respect to market regulation functions, as 
well as related conflict of interest standards. The proposed new rules 
and amendments include minimum fitness standards, requirements for 
identifying, managing, and resolving conflicts of interest, and 
structural governance requirements to ensure that SEF and DCM governing 
bodies adequately incorporate an independent perspective. The proposal 
also address requirements relating to the following: composition 
requirements for board of directors and disciplinary panels; 
limitations on the use and disclosure by employees and certain others 
of material non-public information; requirements relating to Chief 
Regulatory Officers, Chief Compliance Officers, and Regulatory 
Oversight Committees; and notification of certain changes in the 
ownership or corporate or organizational structure of a SEF or DCM.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before April 22, 2024.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by ``Requirements for 
Designated Contract Markets and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding 
Governance and the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest'' and RIN 3038-
AF29, by any of the following methods:
     CFTC Comments Portal: https://comments.cftc.gov. Select 
the ``Submit Comments'' link for this rulemaking and follow the 
instructions on the Public Comment Form.
     Mail: Send to Christopher Kirkpatrick, Secretary of the 
Commission, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette 
Centre, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20581.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: Follow the same instructions as for 
Mail, above.
    Please submit your comments using only one of these methods. 
Submissions through the CFTC Comments Portal are encouraged.
    All comments must be submitted in English, or if not, accompanied 
by an English translation. Comments will be posted as received to 
https://comments.cftc.gov. You should submit only information that you 
wish to make available publicly. If you wish the Commission to consider 
information that you believe is exempt from disclosure under the 
Freedom of Information Act (``FOIA''), a petition for confidential 
treatment of the exempt information may be submitted according to the 
procedures established in Sec.  145.9 of the Commission's 
regulations.\1\
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    \1\ 17 CFR 145.9.
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    The Commission reserves the right, but shall have no obligation, to 
review, pre-screen, filter, redact, refuse, or remove any or all of 
your submission from https://www.comments.cftc.gov that it may deem to 
be inappropriate for publication, such as obscene language. All 
submissions that have been redacted or removed that contain comments on 
the merits of the rulemaking will be retained in the public comment 
file and will be considered as required under the Administrative 
Procedure Act and other applicable laws, and may be accessible under 
FOIA.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rachel Berdansky, Deputy Director, 
[email protected], 202-418-5429; Swati Shah, Associate Director, 
[email protected], 202-418-5042; Marilee Dahlman, Special Counsel, 
[email protected], 202-418-5264; Jennifer L. Tveiten-Rifman, Special 
Counsel, [email protected], 312-802-3848; Lillian Cardona, 
[email protected], Assistant Chief Counsel, 202-418-5012.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
II. Background
    a. Statutory Requirements for SEFs and DCMs
    b. Proposed and Final Rules Addressing SEF and DCM Governance 
and Conflicts of Interest
    1. 2001 Regulatory Framework
    2. 2007 Final Release, Conflicts of Interest Acceptable 
Practices for DCMs
    3. 2009 Final Release, Definition of Public Director
    4. 2010 Conflicts of Interest Rule Proposal
    5. 2011 Governance and Conflicts of Interest NPRM
    6. 2012 Part 38 Final Rule
    7. 2013 Part 37 Final Rule
    8. 2021 Part 37 Amendments--CCO Duties and Annual Compliance 
Report
    c. Industry Changes and Impact on Regulatory Developments
    d. Conflicts of Interest Relating to Market Regulation Functions
    1. Market Regulation Functions
    2. Questions for Comment
    3. Conflicts of Interest Between Market Regulation Functions and 
Commercial Interests
III. Proposed Governance Fitness Requirements
    a. Overview
    b. Minimum Fitness Standards--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 
38.801
    1. Existing Regulatory Framework
    2. Proposed Rules
    3. Questions for Comment
IV. Proposed Substantive Requirements for Identifying, Managing and 
Resolving Actual and Potential Conflicts of Interest
    a. General Requirements for Conflicts of Interest and 
Definitions--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201 and 38.851
    1. Existing Regulatory Framework and Definitions
    2. Proposed Rules
    b. Conflicts of Interest in Decision-Making--Proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1202 and 38.852
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment
    c. Limitations on the Use and Disclosure of Material Non-Public 
Information--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment
V. Proposed Structural Governance Requirements for Identifying, 
Managing and Resolving Actual and Potential Conflicts of Interest
    a. Composition and Related Requirements for Board of Directors--
Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204 and 38.854
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment
    b. Public Director Definition--Proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1201(b)(12) and 38.851(b)(12)
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment
    c. Nominating Committee and Diverse Representation--Proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment
    d. Regulatory Oversight Committee--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206 
and 38.857
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment
    e. Disciplinary Panel Composition--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1207 
and 38.858
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment

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    f. DCM Chief Regulatory Officer--Proposed Sec.  38.856
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment
    g. Staffing and Investigations--Proposed Changes to Sec. Sec.  
38.155, 38.158, and 37.203
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment
    h. SEF Chief Compliance Officer--Proposed Changes to Sec.  
37.1501
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment
VI. Conforming Changes
    a. Commission Regulations Sec. Sec.  37.2, 38.2, and Part 1
    b. Transfer of Equity Interest--Commission Regulations 
Sec. Sec.  37.5(c) and 38.5(c)
    1. Background
    2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Questions for Comment
VII. Effective and Compliance Dates
VIII. Related Matters
    a. Cost-Benefit Considerations
    1. Introduction
    2. Baseline
    3. Proposed Rules
    4. Question for Comment
    b. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    c. Paperwork Reduction Act
    d. Antitrust Considerations
IX. Proposed Rule Text

I. Introduction

    The Commission proposes to establish governance fitness regulations 
related to market regulation functions,\2\ and related conflict of 
interest requirements, for swap execution facilities (``SEFs'') and 
designated contract markets (``DCMs''). Although SEFs and DCMs have 
similar obligations with respect to market regulation functions, they 
are subject to different obligations with respect to governance fitness 
standards and mitigating conflicts of interest. SEFs and DCMs are 
required to minimize and resolve conflicts of interest pursuant to 
identical statutory core principles.\3\ However, SEF and DCM regulatory 
requirements addressing governance fitness standards currently differ. 
With respect to governance fitness standards, DCMs are subject to 
specific statutory core principles addressing governance,\4\ while SEFs 
do not have parallel core principle requirements. Additionally, SEFs 
and DCMs currently have different regulatory obligations with respect 
to governance fitness standards.\5\ Further, while both SEFs and DCMs 
are subject to equity transfer requirements,\6\ the applicable 
regulatory provisions currently have different notification thresholds 
and obligations.
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    \2\ As discussed further below, the Commission is proposing to 
define ``market regulation functions'' to include the SEF functions 
required by SEF Core Principles 2 (Compliance with Rules), 4 
(Monitoring of Trading and Trade Processing), and 6 (Position Limits 
or Accountability), the DCM functions required by DCM Core 
Principles 2 (Compliance with Rules), 4 (Prevention of Market 
Disruption), 5 (Position Limitations or Accountability), 10 (Trade 
Information), 12 (Protection of Markets and Market Participants), 
and 13 (Disciplinary Procedures), and regulations thereunder. These 
responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the 
responsibilities of SEFs and DCMs to conduct trade practice 
surveillance, market surveillance, real-time market monitoring, 
audit trail enforcement, investigations of possible SEF or DCM rule 
violations, and disciplinary actions. See proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1201(b)(9) and 38.851(b)(9).
    \3\ See SEF Core Principle 12, Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') 
section 5h(f), 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f), and DCM Core Principle 16, CEA 
section 5(d), 7 U.S.C. 7(d).
    \4\ See DCM Core Principles 15 and 17, CEA section 5(d)(15), 7 
U.S.C. 7(d)(15), and CEA section 5(d)(17), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(17), 
respectively.
    \5\ As discussed below, SEFs, but not DCMs, are required to 
comply with requirements under part 1 of the Commission's 
regulations addressing the sharing of nonpublic information, service 
on the board or committees by persons with disciplinary histories, 
board composition, and voting by board or committee members where 
there may be a conflict of interest.
    \6\ Commission regulation Sec.  37.5(c) (SEFs) and Commission 
regulation Sec.  38.5(c) (DCMs).
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    In this proposal, the Commission is drawing on staff experience in 
conducting its routine oversight of SEF and DCM ``market regulation 
functions,'' which include responsibilities related to trade practice 
surveillance, market surveillance, real-time market monitoring, audit 
trail data and recordkeeping enforcement, investigations of possible 
SEF or DCM rule violations, and disciplinary actions. Commission staff 
conducts oversight of these market regulation functions in a number of 
ways, including rule enforcement reviews,\7\ SEF regulatory 
consultations and registration application reviews, DCM designation 
application reviews, and regular engagement with SEFs and DCMs.\8\
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    \7\ See Rule Enforcement Reviews of Designated Contract Markets, 
https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/TradingOrganizations/DCMs/dcmruleenf.html.
    \8\ As explained below, this proposal is not addressing SEF and 
DCM obligations relating to core principles that specifically 
address the financial integrity of transactions under SEF Core 
Principle 7 and DCM Core Principle 11.
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    Through its oversight, Commission staff has identified areas where 
it preliminarily believes that SEF and DCM regulations should be 
enacted, in lieu of existing guidance and acceptable practices, to 
further support the statutory objective of ensuring that conflicts of 
interest are appropriately mitigated. The Commission is proposing 
enhanced substantive requirements for identifying, managing, and 
resolving conflicts of interest related to a SEF's or DCM's market 
regulation functions, and structural governance requirements to ensure 
that SEF and DCM governing bodies adequately incorporate an independent 
perspective. The Commission is also proposing additional amendments to 
address governance standards as they relate to the performance of the 
market regulation function. The Commission is further proposing 
enhanced notification requirements with respect to changes in the 
ownership or corporate or organizational structure of a SEF or DCM.
    More specifically, the Commission proposes: (1) new rules to 
implement DCM Core Principle 15 (Governance Fitness Standards) that are 
consistent with the existing guidance on compliance with DCM Core 
Principle 15; \9\ (2) new rules to implement DCM Core Principle 16 
(Conflicts of Interest) that are consistent with the existing guidance 
on, and acceptable practices in, compliance with DCM Core Principle 16; 
\10\ (3) new rules to implement SEF Core Principle 2 (Compliance With 
Rules) that are consistent with the DCM Core Principle 15 Guidance; 
\11\ (4) new rules to implement SEF Core Principle 12 (Conflicts of 
Interest) that are consistent with the DCM Core Principle 16 Guidance 
and Acceptable Practices; (5) new rules under part 37 of the 
Commission's regulations for SEFs and part 38 of the Commission's 
regulations for DCMs that are consistent with existing conflicts of 
interest and governance requirements under Commission regulations 
Sec. Sec.  1.59 and 1.63; \12\ (6) new rules for DCM Chief Regulatory 
Officers (``CROs''); (7) amendments to certain requirements relating to 
SEF Chief Compliance Officers (``CCOs''); and (8) new rules for SEFs 
and DCMs relating to the establishment and operation of a Regulatory 
Oversight Committee (``ROC''). The Commission also is proposing to 
remove the guidance on

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compliance with DCM Core Principle 15, as well as the guidance on, and 
acceptable practices in, compliance with DCM Core Principle 16.
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    \9\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 15 Guidance.
    \10\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices.
    \11\ As discussed further below, SEF Core Principle 2 requires 
SEFs to establish rules governing the operations of the facility. To 
effectuate this requirement, the Commission preliminarily believes 
it is necessary to establish governance fitness standards for the 
individuals responsible for directing the operations of the SEF. See 
Section III(a) herein.
    \12\ The Commission is also proposing conforming amendments to 
remove SEFs and DCMs from the scope of these part 1 requirements. 
See Section V(a) herein.
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    The Commission also proposes amendments to existing rules in part 
37 and part 38 of its regulations regarding the notification of a 
transfer of equity interest in a SEF or DCM. The proposal would 
harmonize and enhance the rules for SEFs and DCMs, and would also 
harmonize these SEF and DCM rules with the corollary rules for 
derivatives clearing organizations (``DCOs'') under part 39 of the 
Commission's regulations.\13\ The proposal would further confirm the 
Commission's authority to obtain information concerning continued 
regulatory compliance in the event of changes in the ownership or 
corporate or organizational structure of a SEF or DCM.
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    \13\ See, e.g., part 39 of the Commission's regulations, adopted 
pursuant to Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and 
Core Principles, 76 FR 39333 (Nov. 8, 2011).
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    Finally, the Commission is proposing certain technical and 
conforming changes to SEF and DCM rules relating to disciplinary 
panels, staffing, and investigations.\14\
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    \14\ See Section V(e)-(g) herein.
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    In developing the rules proposed in this NPRM, the Commission has 
consulted with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC''), 
pursuant to section 712(a)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act.\15\
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    \15\ 15 U.S.C. 8302 (Providing that before commencing any 
rulemaking or issuing an order regarding swaps, swap dealers, major 
swap participants, swap data repositories, derivative clearing 
organizations with regard to swaps, persons associated with a swap 
dealer or major swap participant, eligible contract participants, or 
swap execution facilities pursuant to the applicable subtitle, the 
CFTC must consult and coordinate to the extent possible with the SEC 
and the prudential regulators for the purposes of assuring 
regulatory consistency and comparability, to the extent possible).
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II. Background

a. Statutory Requirements for SEFs and DCMs

    Section 5h \16\ of the CEA sets forth requirements for SEFs. CEA 
section 5h(f)(1)(A) provides that in order to be registered, and to 
maintain registration, with the Commission, a SEF must comply with (1) 
15 core principles, and (2) any requirement that the Commission may 
impose by rule or regulation pursuant to section 8a(5) of the CEA.\17\ 
Unless otherwise determined by the Commission by rule or regulation, a 
SEF has reasonable discretion to establish the manner in which it 
complies with a particular core principle. As of January 2024, there 
were 21 registered SEFs.
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    \16\ 7 U.S.C. 7b-3.
    \17\ 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f).
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    Similarly, Section 5 of the CEA sets forth requirements for DCMs. 
CEA section 5(d)(1)(A) requires that to be designated, and to maintain 
designation, by the Commission, a DCM must comply with (1) 23 core 
principles, and (2) any requirement that the Commission may impose by 
rule or regulation pursuant to section 8a(5) of the CEA.\18\ Unless 
otherwise determined by the Commission by rule or regulation, a DCM has 
reasonable discretion to establish the manner in which it complies with 
a particular core principle.\19\ As of January 2024, there were 17 
registered DCMs.
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    \18\ CEA section 8a(5), 7 U.S.C. 12a(5), authorizes the 
Commission to make and promulgate such rules and regulations as, in 
the judgment of the Commission, are reasonably necessary to 
effectuate any of the provisions or to accomplish any of the 
purposes of the CEA. The CEA contains a finding that the 
transactions subject to the CEA are affected with a ``national 
public interest by providing a means for managing and assuming price 
risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information 
through trading in liquid, fair and financially secure trading 
facilities,'' and among the CEA's purposes are to serve the 
aforementioned public interests through a system of ``effective 
self-regulation of trading facilities.'' See CEA section 3.
    \19\ CEA section 5(d)(1)(B), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(1)(B).
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    Both SEFs and DCMs are subject to a respective core principle 
addressing conflicts of interest. Pursuant to SEF Core Principle 12 and 
DCM Core Principle 16, both SEFs and DCMs must establish and enforce 
rules to minimize conflicts of interest in their decision-making 
processes, and must establish a process for resolving such 
conflicts.\20\
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    \20\ CEA sections 5(d)(16), 5h(f)(12). DCM Core Principle 16 and 
SEF Core Principle 12 are substantively identical in the statute.
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    SEFs are also subject to a Chief Compliance Officer core principle. 
SEF Core Principle 15 requires SEFs to designate an individual to serve 
as a CCO, sets forth CCO duties,\21\ including a duty to resolve 
conflicts of interest,\22\ and requires CCOs to prepare and submit an 
annual report to the Commission describing the SEF's compliance with 
the CEA and the SEF's policies and procedures, including the SEF's code 
of ethics and conflicts of interest policies.\23\ There is no 
equivalent statutory core principle for DCMs.\24\
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    \21\ The duties include to report directly to the board or 
senior officer of the SEF; review compliance with the core 
principles; resolve conflicts of interest in consultation with the 
board, a body performing a function similar to that of a board, or 
the senior officer of the facility; be responsible for establishing 
and administering the SEF's self-regulatory policies and procedures; 
ensure compliance with the CEA and rules and regulations issued 
thereunder; and establish a procedure for remedying noncompliance 
issues found during compliance office reviews, look backs, internal 
or external audit findings, self-reported errors, or validated 
complaints. See CEA section 5h(f)(15)(B), 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(B).
    \22\ The CCO must fulfill this duty in consultation with the 
board of directors, a body performing a function similar to that of 
a board, or the senior officer of the SEF. CEA section 
5h(f)(15)(B)(iii), 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(B)(iii).
    \23\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(D), 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(D).
    \24\ The Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices specify that 
DCMs should have a Regulatory Oversight Committee that, among other 
things, supervises the DCM's chief regulatory officer, who will 
report directly to the Regulatory Oversight Committee. See section 
V(f)(3) herein for a discussion of the difference between a chief 
regulatory officer and a chief compliance officer.
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    DCMs are additionally subject to three core principles addressing 
governance.\25\ DCM Core Principle 15 requires a DCM to establish and 
enforce appropriate fitness standards for members of its board of 
directors, disciplinary committee members, members of the DCM, persons 
with direct access to the DCM, and any party affiliated with of any of 
the foregoing persons. DCM Core Principle 17 establishes that a DCM's 
governance arrangements ``shall be designed to permit consideration of 
the views of market participants.'' \26\ DCM Core Principle 22 requires 
publicly-traded DCMs to endeavor to recruit individuals to serve on the 
board of directors and other decision-making bodies of the DCM from 
among, and to have the composition of these bodies reflect, a broad and 
culturally diverse pool of qualified candidates.\27\ While there are no 
SEF core principles directly addressing governance, the Commission 
believes a SEF cannot effectively manage its SEF Core Principle 2 
obligations without effective governance.
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    \25\ Related governance requirements for SEFs exist in part 1 of 
the Commission's regulations. Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(b) 
requires SEFs to adopt rules requiring any member of the board of 
directors, disciplinary committee or oversight panel to abstain from 
deliberating and voting on any matter involving a conflict of 
interest. Commission regulation Sec.  1.69 applies to ``self-
regulatory organizations'' (``SRO''), as defined in Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.3, which includes SEFs and DCMs. However, 
pursuant to Commission regulation Sec.  38.2, DCMs are exempt from 
the requirements of Commission regulation Sec.  1.69.
    \26\ Commission regulation Sec.  38.900, DCM Core Principle 17, 
Composition of Governing Boards of Contract Markets.
    \27\ This proposal is not addressing the requirements identified 
in DCM Core Principles 17 and 22.
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b. Proposed and Final Rules Addressing SEF and DCM Governance and 
Conflicts of Interest

    Since 2001, the Commission has proposed and adopted guidance and 
acceptable practices addressing conflicts

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of interest and governance standards for SEFs and DCMs.
1. 2001 Regulatory Framework
    On August 10, 2001, the Commission adopted a regulatory framework 
(``2001 Regulatory Framework'') implementing the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 (``CFMA''), effective October 9, 2001.\28\ 
The CFMA required the Commission to implement a framework of flexible 
core principles in lieu of detailed regulatory prescriptions. Section 
110 of the CFMA, codified in section 5(d)(1) of the CEA, stated that a 
DCM shall have reasonable discretion in establishing the manner in 
which it complies with the core principles.
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    \28\ A New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities, 
Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 66 FR 42256 (Aug. 10, 
2001) (``2001 Regulatory Framework'').
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    The CFMA contained core principles, that among other things, 
related to governance fitness standards and conflicts of interest. DCM 
Core Principle 14 (Governance Fitness Standards) \29\ provided that 
boards of trade shall establish and enforce appropriate fitness 
standards for directors, members of any disciplinary committee, members 
of the contract market, and any other persons with direct access to the 
facility (including any parties affiliated with any of the persons 
described in this paragraph).\30\ DCM Core Principle 15 (Conflicts of 
Interest) \31\ provided that boards of trade shall establish and 
enforce rules to minimize conflicts of interest in the decision-making 
process of the contract market and shall establish a process for 
resolving such conflicts of interest.\32\
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    \29\ In 2001, DCM Core Principle 14 addressed governance fitness 
standards. In the Dodd-Frank Act, the DCM conflicts of interest core 
principle was renumbered to be Core Principle 15. See Dodd-Frank 
Act, section 735(b); 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(15).
    \30\ See CFMA section 110, codified at CEA section 5(d)(14).
    \31\ In 2001, DCM Core Principle 15 addressed conflicts of 
interest. In the Dodd-Frank Act, the DCM conflicts of interest core 
principle was renumbered to be Core Principle 16. See Dodd-Frank 
Act, section 735(b); 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(16).
    \32\ See CFMA section 110, codified at CEA section 5(d)(15).
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    The 2001 Regulatory Framework implemented guidance for DCM Core 
Principles 14 (Governance Fitness Standards) and 15 (Conflicts of 
Interest). Guidance provides contextual information regarding the core 
principles, including important concerns which the Commission believes 
should be taken into account in complying with specific core 
principles.\33\ The guidance for a core principle is illustrative only 
of the types of matters a DCM may address, and is not intended to be 
used as a mandatory checklist.\34\
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    \33\ The 2001 Regulatory Framework described the guidance 
contained therein as ``application guidance,'' but the concept is 
substantively similar to the ``guidance'' in part 38, Appendix B, 
sec. 1. See 2001 Regulatory Framework, 66 FR 42256 at 42278.
    \34\ Part 38, Appendix B, sec 1.
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    The guidance for DCM Core Principle 14 states that minimum fitness 
standards for ``persons who have member voting privileges, governing 
obligations or responsibilities, or who exercise disciplinary 
authority,'' and ``natural persons who directly or indirectly have 
greater than a ten percent ownership interest in a designated 
contract'' should include those bases for refusal to register a person 
under section 8a(2) of the CEA.\35\ Additionally, the guidance states 
that persons who have governing obligations or responsibilities, or who 
exercise disciplinary authority, should not have a significant history 
of serious disciplinary offenses, such as those that would be 
disqualifying under Commission regulation Sec.  1.63.\36\ The guidance 
further states that fitness standards should include providing the 
Commission with fitness information for such persons, whether 
registration information, certification to the fitness of such persons, 
an affidavit of such persons' fitness by the contract market's counsel 
or other information substantiating the fitness of such persons.\37\ 
Finally, the guidance provides that if a contract market provides 
certification of the fitness of such a person, the Commission believes 
that such certification should be based on verified information that 
the person is fit to be in his or her position.\38\
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    \35\ See 2001 Regulatory Framework, 66 FR 42256 at 42283.
    \36\ Id. The DCM Core Principle 14 Guidance states that members 
with trading privileges but having no or only minimal equity in the 
DCM and non-member market participants who are not intermediated 
``and do not have these privileges, obligations, or responsibilities 
or disciplinary authority'' could satisfy minimum fitness standards 
by meeting the standards that they must meet to qualify as a 
``market participant.''
    \37\ 2001 Regulatory Framework, 66 FR 42256 at 42283.
    \38\ Id.
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    The guidance for DCM Core Principle 15 (Conflicts of Interest) 
provides that the means to address conflicts of interest in a DCM 
should include methods to ascertain the presence of conflicts of 
interest and to make decisions in the event of such a conflict.\39\ The 
guidance also states that a DCM should provide appropriate limitations 
on the use or disclosure of material non-public information gained 
through the performance of official duties by board members, committee 
members, and contract market employees, or gained through an ownership 
interest in the contract market.
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    \39\ Id. In 2001, DCM Core Principle 15 addressed conflicts of 
interest. In the Dodd-Frank Act, the DCM conflicts of interest core 
principle was renumbered to be Core Principle 16. See Dodd-Frank 
Act, section 735(b); 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(16).
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    In the 2001 Regulatory Framework, the Commission adopted Commission 
regulation Sec.  38.2, which exempted ``agreements, contracts, or 
transactions'' traded on a DCM, as well as the ``contract market'' 
itself, and the ``contract market's operator'' from all Commission 
regulations for such activity, except for the requirements of part 38 
and Sec. Sec. thnsp;1.3, 1.12(e), 1.31, 1.38, 1.52, 1.59(d), 1.63(c), 
1.67, 33.10, part 9, parts 15 through 21, part 40, and part 190.\40\ 
The Commission did so in the context of the CFMA, which provided DCMs 
with a framework of flexible core principles in lieu of detailed 
regulatory prescriptions.\41\
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    \40\ See 2001 Regulatory Framework, 66 FR 42256 at 42277. See 
also id. at 42257.
    \41\ See Section II(b)(6) herein for a description of a revised 
version of Commission regulation 38.2.
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2. 2007 Final Release, Conflicts of Interest Acceptable Practices for 
DCMs
    On February 14, 2007, the Commission adopted ``acceptable 
practices'' \42\ as a way for DCMs to demonstrate compliance with the 
conflicts of interest core principle (``2007 Final Release'').\43\ 
Acceptable practices are more detailed examples of how DCMs may satisfy 
particular requirements of the core principles.\44\ Similar to 
guidance, acceptable practices are for illustrative purposes only and 
do not establish a mandatory or exclusive means of compliance with a 
core principle. Acceptable practices, however, are intended to assist 
DCMs by outlining specific practices for core principle compliance. As 
the Commission has stated, acceptable practices provide examples of how 
DCMs may satisfy particular requirements of the core principles; they 
do not, however, establish mandatory

[[Page 19650]]

means of compliance.\45\ Acceptable practices apply only to compliance 
with specific aspects of a core principle, and do not protect the DCM 
with respect to charges of violations of other sections of the CEA or 
other aspects of the core principle.\46\
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    \42\ See Section II(b)(1) herein for a description of acceptable 
practices, and how acceptable practices compare to guidance.
    \43\ Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation and Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 72 FR 6936 (Feb, 14, 2007) (``2007 Final 
Release'').
    \44\ See 2001 Regulatory Framework, 66 FR 42256 at 42279; Part 
38, Appendix B, sec 2. Acceptable practices were adopted in the 2001 
Regulatory Framework for core principles other than those relating 
to governance fitness standards and conflicts of interest. For 
example, acceptable practices were adopted for DCM Core Principles 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, and 17. See 2001 Regulatory Framework, 66 
FR 42256 at 42279-83.
    \45\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated 
Contract Markets, 77 FR 36612 at 36614 n.13 (June 19, 2012); 7 
U.S.C. 7(d)(1) (amended 2010).
    \46\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The DCM Core Principle 16 acceptable practices have several key 
provisions. First, the acceptable practices provided that DCM boards of 
directors, and any executive committees or similarly empowered bodies, 
be comprised of at least 35 percent ``public directors.'' Second, the 
acceptable practices also established a definition of who would 
constitute a ``public director'' for purposes of the acceptable 
practices. Third, the acceptable practices provided that a DCM 
establish a ROC comprised exclusively of public directors, which would 
have among its duties to supervise the contract market's CRO, who will 
report directly to the ROC.\47\ The Commission explained that properly 
functioning ROCs should be robust oversight bodies capable of firmly 
representing the interests of vigorous, impartial, and effective self-
regulation. ROCs should also represent the interests and needs of 
regulatory officers and staff; the resource needs of regulatory 
functions; and the independence of regulatory decisions. In this 
manner, ROCs will insulate DCM self-regulatory functions, decisions, 
and personnel from improper influence, both internal and external.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Id. at 6951 n.80.
    \48\ Id. at 6950-51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also underscored the importance of a DCM's ROC being 
composed of 100 percent public directors, particularly given the 
industry shift toward demutualization.\49\ The Commission stated that 
it strongly believed that new structural conflicts of interest within 
self-regulation require an appropriate response within DCMs. The 
Commission further stated that it believed that ROCs, consisting 
exclusively of public directors, are a vital element of any such 
response. The Commission observed that ROCs make no direct commercial 
decisions, and therefore, have no need for industry directors as 
members. The public directors serving on ROCs are a buffer between 
self-regulation and those who could bring improper influence to bear 
upon it.\50\
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    \49\ By 2007, the futures industry had been shifting away from 
mutually owned exchanges, starting in 2000 with the rule amendment 
approvals for CME and NYMEX to move from not-for-profit corporations 
to for-profit corporations. See Commission Release #4407-00 (June 
16, 2000) https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press00/opa4407-00.htm and Commission Release #4427-00 (July 28, 2000) 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press00/opa4427-00.htm, 
respectively. The Commission also approved a demutualization plan 
for the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) on April 18, 2005. See 
Certified Rule Submissions, https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/IndustryFilings/deaapprovalofrulestable.html.
    \50\ See 2007 Final Release, 72 FR 6936 at 6951.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, the acceptable practices specified that DCM disciplinary 
panels should not be dominated by any group or class of DCM members or 
participants, and provided that at least one person who would qualify 
as a public director be included on the panel.
    The Commission provided existing DCMs with a phase-in period of the 
lesser of two years or two regularly scheduled elections of the board 
of directors to demonstrate full compliance with the conflicts of 
interest core principle for DCMs.\51\ Then, on March 26, 2007, the 
Commission proposed certain amendments to the ``public director'' 
definition.\52\ With the ``public director'' definition in flux, the 
Commission stayed the phase-in period for existing DCMs to demonstrate 
full compliance with the conflicts of interest core principle.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See id.
    \52\ Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation and Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 72 FR 14051 (March 26, 2007).
    \53\ Id. at 65659.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. 2009 Final Release, Definition of Public Director
    On April 27, 2009, the Commission adopted final amendments to the 
acceptable practices for complying with the conflicts of interest core 
principle for DCMs (``2009 Final Release).\54\ The amendments 
established a final definition of who constitutes a ``public director'' 
for purposes of the acceptable practices and the stay for demonstrating 
full compliance with the conflicts of interest core principle was 
lifted.\55\ In adopting the amendments, the Commission stated that 
``self-regulation must be vigorous, effective, and impartial.'' \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation and Self-
Regulatory Organizations, 74 FR 18982 (Apr. 27, 2009) (``2009 Final 
Release'').
    \55\ Id. at 18983.
    \56\ Id. at 18984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The most important component of the ``public director'' definition 
is an overarching materiality test, which provides that a public 
director must have no material relationship with the DCM. Certain 
circumstances are specified under which a director would be deemed to 
have a material relationship. A director would be deemed to have a 
material relationship by virtue of: (1) being an officer or employee of 
the DCM, or an officer or employee of an affiliate of the DCM; (2) 
being a member, or an officer or director of a member, of the DCM; or 
(3) receiving more than $100,000 in annual payments from the DCM or an 
affiliate of the DCM for legal, accounting, or consulting services. The 
director would also have a material relationship if a family member had 
any of the aforementioned relationships. Whether a director or family 
member had any such relationship would be subject to a one-year look-
back period.
4. 2010 Conflicts of Interest Rule Proposal
    On October 18, 2010, the Commission issued a rule proposal (the 
``Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest NPRM''), which proposed 
prophylactic measures aimed to mitigate conflicts of interest in the 
operation of a SEF or DCM.\57\ After identifying certain potential 
conflicts of interest, the Commission made rule proposals for SEFs and 
DCMs concerning (1) governance, and (2) ownership of voting equity and 
the exercise of voting rights. With respect to governance, the 
Commission proposed, as rules, enhanced versions of the acceptable 
practices that had previously been adopted for the DCM core principle 
on conflicts of interest.\58\ Specifically, the Commission proposed to 
require that each SEF or DCM have:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, 
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding 
the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 FR 63732 (Oct. 18, 
2010).
    \58\ Id. at 63733. See also 2009 Final Release, 74 FR 18982 
(which defined ``public director''); 2007 Final Release, 72 FR 6936 
(Feb. 14, 2007) (which adopted final acceptable practices for the 
DCM core principle on conflicts of interest); 71 FR 38740 (July 7, 
2006) (which proposed acceptable practices for such DCM core 
principle).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     a board of directors with at least 35 percent, but no less 
than two, public directors;
     a nominating committee with at least 51 percent public 
directors, and with a public director as chair;
     one or more disciplinary panels, with a public participant 
as chair;
     a ROC with all public directors; and
     a membership or participation committee, with 35 percent 
public directors.
    The Commission also proposed, as rules, certain limitations with 
respect to the ownership of voting equity in the SEF or DCM and the 
exercise of voting rights. These proposals limited SEF participants or 
DCM members (and related persons) to: (1) beneficially

[[Page 19651]]

owning no more than 20 percent of any class of voting equity in the SEF 
or DCM; and (2) exercising (whether directly or indirectly) no more 
than 20 percent of the voting power of any class of equity interest in 
the SEF or DCM.
    The Commission never adopted the proposed rules as final rules.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ The proposal was withdrawn on the Fall 2020 Unified Agenda 
and Regulatory Plan. The withdrawal entry is available at: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202010&RIN=3038-AD37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. 2011 Governance and Conflicts of Interest NPRM
    On January 6, 2011, the Commission issued a post-Dodd-Frank Act 
rule proposal (the ``2011 Governance and Conflicts of Interest NPRM'') 
to establish the manner in which DCMs, SEFs and DCOs must comply with 
their respective core principle obligations with regard to conflicts of 
interest.\60\ The rule proposal aimed to mitigate conflicts of interest 
through requirements regarding reporting, transparency in decision-
making, and limitations on the use or disclosure of non-public 
information, among other things.\61\ The 2011 Governance and Conflicts 
of Interest NPRM also proposed rules to establish the manner in which 
DCMs and DCOs must comply with their respective core principle 
obligations with regard to governance fitness standards \62\ and the 
composition of governing bodies,\63\ and proposed rules to establish 
the manner in which publicly traded DCMs must comply with their core 
principle obligation with regard to the diversity of their board of 
directors.\64\ The Commission never adopted the 2011 Governance and 
Conflicts of Interest NPRM as final rules.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing 
Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution 
Facilities; Additional Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of 
Conflicts of Interest, 76 FR 722 (January 6, 2011).
    \61\ Id.
    \62\ See section 5(d)(15) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(15) (DCM 
core principle on governance fitness standards), as redesignated by 
section 735 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
    \63\ See section 5(d)(17) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(17) (DCM 
core principle on composition of governing boards), as added by 
section 735 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
    \64\ See section 5(d)(22) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(22) (DCM 
core principle on diversity of board of directors), as added by 
section 735 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
    \65\ The proposal was withdrawn on the Fall 2019 Unified Agenda 
and Regulatory Plan. The withdrawal entry that appeared in the Fall 
2019 Agenda is available at: https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201910&RIN=3038-AD36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. 2012 Part 38 Final Rule
    The Dodd-Frank Act overhauled or reversed key aspects of the 
regulatory framework under the CFMA, but retained the core principles 
framework. Importantly, however, the Dodd-Frank Act specifically 
empowered the Commission to determine by rule or regulation, the manner 
in which a DCM may comply with core principles. Section 735 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act amended section 5 of the CEA to include the proviso that 
``[u]nless otherwise determined by the Commission by rule or regulation 
. . .'' boards of trade shall have reasonable discretion in 
establishing the manner in which they comply with the core 
principles.\66\ On June 19, 2012, the Commission adopted a rulemaking 
to implement the Dodd-Frank Act's amendments to section 5 of the CEA 
pertaining to the designation and operation of contract markets (the 
``2012 Part 38 Final Rule'').\67\ Similar to the Commission's approach 
in this rule proposal, the Commission's implementation of the new 
provisions under the Dodd-Frank Act substituted rules in lieu of 
guidance and acceptable practices for several of the DCM core 
principles.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See CEA section 5(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
    \67\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated 
Contract Markets, 77 FR 36612 (June 19, 2012) (the ``2012 Part 38 
Final Rule'').
    \68\ In 2007, DCM Core Principle 15 addressed conflicts of 
interest. In the Dodd-Frank Act, the DCM conflicts of interest core 
principle was renumbered to be Core Principle 16. See Dodd-Frank 
Act, section 735(b); 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, the Commission adopted rules 
establishing the manner in which a DCM must comply with several of the 
DCM core principles. The Commission also adopted revised guidance and 
acceptable practices for certain of the DCM core principles. The 
Commission chose to maintain the existing guidance \69\ on compliance 
with the DCM core principle on governance fitness standards, and to 
maintain the existing guidance on,\70\ and acceptable practices in, 
compliance with the DCM conflicts of interest core principle.\71\ This 
included the acceptable practice that the DCM's ROC supervise the DCM's 
CRO, who reports directly to the ROC. While the Commission did not 
adopt rules to establish this as an affirmative requirement for all 
DCMs, the Commission stated in the adopting release that current 
industry practice is for DCMs to designate an individual as chief 
regulatory officer, and it will be difficult for a DCM to meet the 
compliance staff and resources requirements of Sec.  38.155 without a 
chief regulatory officer or similar individual to supervise its 
regulatory program, including any services rendered to the DCM by a 
regulatory service provider.\72\ In the 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, the 
Commission contemplated that rules implementing the DCM conflicts of 
interest core principle might be adopted in the future.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See section II(b)(1) herein for a description of the 
guidance adopted in 2001 relating to governance fitness standards.
    \70\ See section II(b)(1) herein for a description of the 
guidance adopted in 2001 relating to conflicts of interest.
    \71\ 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, 77 FR 36612 at 36655-56. The 
Commission added Commission regulation Sec.  38.851 to permit DCMs 
to continue to rely on the conflicts of interest guidance in 
Appendix B to part 38. See section II(b)(2)-(3) herein for a 
description of acceptable practices adopted in 2007 and 2009 
relating to conflicts of interest.
    \72\ 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, 77 FR 36612 at 36628.
    \73\ The Commission explained that until such time as it may 
adopt the substantive rules implementing Core Principle 16, the 
Commission was maintaining the current guidance and acceptable 
practices under part 38 applicable to Conflicts of Interest 
(formerly Core Principle 15). Accordingly, the existing Guidance and 
Acceptable Practices from Appendix B of part 38 applicable to Core 
Principle 16 were codified in the revised Appendix B adopted in the 
final rulemaking. The Commission noted that at such time as it may 
adopt the final rules implementing Core Principle 16, Appendix B 
would be amended accordingly. 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, 77 FR 36612 
at 36656.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, the Commission also adopted equity 
transfer notification requirements for DCMs. Pursuant to Sec.  38.5(c), 
DCMs must notify the Commission when they enter into a transaction 
involving the transfer of 10 percent or more of the equity interest in 
the DCM.\74\ DCMs must notify the Commission of such a transfer at the 
earliest possible time, but in no event later than the open of business 
10 business days following the date upon which the DCM enters into a 
firm obligation to transfer the equity interest.\75\ In particular, the 
Commission explained that while DCMs may take up to 10 business days to 
submit a notification, the DCM must provide Commission staff with 
sufficient time, prior to consummating the equity interest transfer, to 
review and consider the implications of the change in ownership, 
including whether the change in ownership will adversely impact the 
operations of the DCM or the DCM's ability to comply with the core 
principles and the Commission's regulations thereunder.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ See Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(c).
    \75\ See id.
    \76\ 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, 77 FR 36612 at 36619.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(c)'s equity 
interest transfer requirements, the Commission adopted regulations 
requiring DCMs to submit certain information to the Commission.

[[Page 19652]]

Pursuant to Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(a), upon request, a DCM 
must file with the Commission information related to its business as a 
DCM, including information relating to data entry and trade details, in 
the form and manner and within the time specified by the Commission in 
its request.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission notes that in the 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, pursuant 
to Sec.  38.5(d), the Commission delegated ``the authority set forth in 
paragraph (b) of this section'' (demonstration of compliance) to the 
Director of the Division of Market Oversight.\78\ This differs from the 
corresponding regulation for SEFs.\79\ Existing Commission regulation 
Sec.  37.5(d) provides that the Commission delegates ``the authority 
set forth in this section'' to the Director of the Division of Market 
Oversight, which is a broader delegation compared to the Part 38 
regulation. In particular, the delegation provision in Sec.  37.5(d) 
includes the authority to request information pursuant to both 
regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(a) (requests for information) and (b) 
(demonstration of compliance).\80\ The delegation provision in Sec.  
38.5(d) does not apply to Sec.  38.5(a) (requests for information).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ See Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(d).
    \79\ See Section II(b)(7) for a description of the rulemaking 
implementing regulatory obligations of SEFs in which the current 
version of Commission regulation 37.5 was adopted.
    \80\ See Commission regulation Sec.  37.5(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, in the 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, the Commission adopted a 
revised version of Sec.  38.2 that specified ``the Commission 
regulations from which DCMs will be exempt'' as opposed to listing the 
regulations that DCMs were obligated to comply with.\81\ The Commission 
made this change to add clarity and to eliminate the need for the 
Commission to continually update Sec.  38.2 when new regulations with 
which DCMs must comply are codified.\82\ The Commission exempted DCMs 
from certain provisions within part 1 of the Commission's regulations 
that address conflicts of interest and governance for self-regulatory 
organizations (``SROs''). In particular, the Commission exempted DCMs 
from all or part of the following provisions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ See 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, 77 FR 36612 at 36615. See 
Section II(b)(1) herein for a description of the previous version of 
Commission regulation Sec.  38.2.
    \82\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Commission regulation Sec.  1.59, which addresses 
limitations on the use and disclosure of non-public information; \83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ Commission regulation Sec.  38.2 exempts DCMs from 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.59(b) (requiring self-regulatory 
organizations to, by rule, prohibit employees from trading in 
certain contracts traded on or cleared by the self-regulatory 
organization or related to those traded on or cleared by the self-
regulatory organization, and from trading on or disclosing material 
non-public information), and Commission regulation Sec.  1.59(c) 
(requiring self-regulatory organizations to, by rule, prohibit 
governing board members, committee members, and consultants from 
disclosing material non-public information gained as a result of 
official duties). DCMs remain subject to Commission regulations 
Sec. Sec.  1.59(a) (definitions) and 1.59(d) (prohibiting self-
regulatory organization employees, governing board members, 
committee members, and consultants from trading on or disclosing 
material non-public information).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Commission regulation Sec.  1.63, which restricts persons 
with certain disciplinary histories from serving on governing boards or 
committees; \84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ Commission regulation Sec.  38.2 exempts DCMs from all 
paragraphs of Commission regulation Sec.  1.63 except for Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.63(c), which states that no person may serve on a 
disciplinary committee, arbitration panel, oversight panel or 
governing board of a self-regulatory organization if such person is 
subject to any of the conditions listed in Commission regulation 
Sec.  1.63(b)(1) through (6), which lists certain disqualifying 
offenses, suspensions, settlements, revocations, bars, and denials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Commission regulation Sec.  1.64, which addresses 
composition of governing boards and disciplinary committees; \85\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ Commission regulation Sec.  38.2 exempts DCMs from the 
entirety of Commission regulation Sec.  1.64.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Commission regulation Sec.  1.69, which addresses voting 
by conflicted members of governing boards and committees.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ Commission regulation Sec.  38.2 exempts DCMs from the 
entirely of Commission regulation Sec.  1.69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In exempting DCMs from the provisions listed above, the Commission 
noted that Commission regulation Sec.  38.2 will likely be amended if 
and when the referenced rules are eliminated from the regulations or 
modified.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ See 2012 Part 38 Final Rule, 77 FR 36612 at 36615.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. 2013 Part 37 Final Rule
    On June 4, 2013, the Commission adopted a final rulemaking (the 
``Part 37 Final Rule'') which established regulatory obligations that 
SEFs--a new category of regulated entity introduced under the Dodd-
Frank Act.\88\ In the Part 37 Final Rule, the Commission adopted rules 
establishing the manner in which a SEF must comply with several of the 
SEF core principles, and also adopted guidance and acceptable practices 
for certain of the SEF core principles. In the Part 37 Final Rule, the 
Commission did not adopt the guidance on, and acceptable practices in, 
compliance with the conflicts of interest core principle that the 
Commission had adopted to date for DCMs. In the adopting release, the 
Commission explained that, as noted in the notice of proposed 
rulemaking for the Part 37 Final Rule, the substantive regulations 
implementing SEF Core Principle 12 (Conflicts of Interest) were 
proposed in a separate release, the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest 
NPRM. The Commission noted that until such time as it may adopt the 
substantive rules implementing Core Principle 12, SEFs have reasonable 
discretion to comply with this core principle as stated in Sec.  
37.100.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap 
Execution Facilities, 78 FR 33476 (June 4, 2013) (the ``Part 37 
Final Rule'').
    \89\ Id. at 33538.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the Commission never adopted the Mitigation of 
Conflicts of Interest NPRM as final rules.
    Pursuant to Commission regulation Sec.  37.2, adopted in the Part 
37 Final Rule, SEFs are subject, in their entirety, to Commission 
regulations Sec. Sec.  1.59, 1.63, 1.64 and 1.69 which, as discussed 
above, address conflicts of interest and governance for self-regulatory 
organizations. Therefore, SEFs are currently subject to a different set 
of conflicts of interest and governance requirements than DCMs.
    In the Part 37 Final Rule, the Commission adopted rules to 
implement the Chief Compliance Officer core principle for SEFs that, 
among other things, addressed the CCO's duties and the annual 
compliance report requirement, provided that the CCO's duties include 
supervising the SEF's self-regulatory program with respect to, among 
other regulatory responsibilities, trade practice surveillance, market 
surveillance, real-time market monitoring, compliance with audit trail 
requirements, enforcement and disciplinary proceedings, audits, and 
examinations.\90\ In addition, the rules provided that the CCO's duties 
included supervising the effectiveness and sufficiency of any 
regulatory services provided to the SEF by a permitted

[[Page 19653]]

regulatory service provider.\91\ With respect to the annual compliance 
report, the rules provided that the CCO must, prior to submission to 
the Commission, provide the report for review to the SEF's board of 
directors or, in the absence of a board of directors, to the senior 
officer of the SEF.\92\ Members of the board of directors or the SEF's 
senior officer (as applicable) must not require the CCO to make any 
changes to the report.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ See Part 37 Final Rule, 78 FR 33476, which adds CCO duties 
beyond those contained in SEF Core Principle 15, including (1) 
providing examples of the types of conflicts of interest that a CCO 
must resolve, including conflicts between business considerations 
and compliance requirements, and (2) supervising the SEF's self-
regulatory program with respect to trade practice surveillance, 
market surveillance, real-time market monitoring, compliance with 
audit trail requirements, enforcement and disciplinary proceedings, 
audits, examinations, and other regulatory responsibilities with 
respect to members and market participants (including ensuring 
compliance with, if applicable, financial integrity, financial 
reporting, sales practice, recordkeeping, and other requirements), 
and (3) supervising the effectiveness and sufficiency of any 
regulatory services provided by a regulatory service provider 
pursuant to Commission regulation Sec.  37.204.
    \91\ Id. at 33594. Commission regulation Sec.  37.204(a) permits 
a SEF to utilize another registered entity, a registered futures 
association, and, in the case of SEFs, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, for the provision of services to assist in 
complying with the CEA and Commission regulations. Commission 
regulation Sec.  37.204(b) provides that a SEF that chooses to use a 
regulatory service provider shall retain sufficient staff to 
supervise the regulatory services, that SEF compliance staff shall 
hold regular meetings with the regulatory service provider to 
discuss matters of regulatory concern, and that the SEF must conduct 
periodic reviews of the services provided. Further, Commission 
regulation Sec.  37.204(b) requires that the SEF carefully document 
such periodic reviews and provide them to the Commission upon 
request. Commission regulation Sec.  37.204(c) states that a SEF 
that chooses to use a regulatory service provider shall retain 
exclusive authority in all substantive decisions made by the 
regulatory service provider, and that the SEF must document any 
instances where its actions differ from those recommended by the 
regulatory service provider.
    \92\ See Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(e)(1).
    \93\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Part 37 Final Rule adopted equity transfer notification 
requirements for SEFs, but they differ in three areas from those 
applicable to DCMs pursuant to the 2012 Part 38 Final Rule. First, 
under Commission regulation Sec.  37.5(c), SEFs must notify the 
Commission when they enter into a transaction involving the transfer of 
50 percent or more of the equity interest in the SEF.\94\ This is a 
higher percentage than the 10 percent or more percentage that applies 
with respect to DCM equity interest transfers, and is therefore 
effectively a lower notification standard. Second, Commission 
regulation Sec.  37.5(c) specifically authorizes the Commission, upon 
receipt of notification from a SEF of an equity interest transfer, to 
request supporting documentation regarding the transaction; this 
authority also is delegated to the Director of the Division of Market 
Oversight or such other employee(s) as the Director may designate from 
time to time. Finally, upon an equity interest transfer, SEFs are 
affirmatively required to certify to the Commission, no later than two 
business days after the transfer takes place, that the SEF meets all of 
the requirements of section 5h of the CEA (which includes the statutory 
SEF core principles) and the Commission's regulations thereunder.\95\ 
There is currently no analogous certification requirement that applies 
to a DCM under Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(c).\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ See Commission regulation Sec.  37.5(c).
    \95\ See Commission regulation Sec.  37.5(c)(4).
    \96\ In 2018, as part of a notice of proposed rulemaking 
relating to SEFs and the trade execution requirement, the Commission 
proposed to amend Commission regulation Sec.  37.5 to (i) require 
notification in the event of any transaction that results in the 
transfer of direct or indirect ownership of 50 percent or more of 
the equity interest in the SEF; and (ii) delete the part 40 filing 
requirement. See Swap Execution Facilities and the Trade Execution 
Requirement, 83 FR 61946, 71-72 (Nov. 30, 2018). The Commission 
withdrew this proposal in 2021. See 86 FR 9304 (Feb. 12, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. 2021 Part 37 Amendments--CCO Duties and Annual Compliance Report
    On May 12, 2021, the Commission adopted final rules amending SEF 
requirements related to audit trail data, financial resources, and CCO 
obligations, including the rules addressing the CCO's obligation to 
submit an annual report to the Commission (``Part 37 Updates'').\97\ 
The Commission stated that the purpose of the CCO amendments was to 
streamline requirements for the CCO position, allow SEF management to 
exercise greater discretion in CCO oversight, and simplify the 
preparation and submission of the required annual compliance 
report.\98\ Among other changes, the Commission clarified that a CCO 
did not need to include in the annual compliance report a review of all 
the Commission regulations applicable to a SEF or an identification of 
the written policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with 
the CEA and Commission regulations. The amendments clarified that the 
CCO was required to include in the annual report a description and 
self-assessment of the effectiveness of the written policies and 
procedures of the SEF to ``reasonably ensure'' compliance with the CEA 
and applicable Commission regulations. Additionally, the amendments 
clarified that CCOs are required to discuss only ``material'' 
noncompliance matters in the annual report, instead of all 
``noncompliance issues.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ Swap Execution Facilities, 86 FR 9224 (Feb. 11, 2021) (the 
``Part 37 Updates'').
    \98\ Id. at 9225.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Part 37 Updates, the Commission also modified SEF CCO 
requirements in several other ways, including by: (1) consolidating 
certain CCO duties; \99\ (2) eliminating ROC-related components of part 
37; \100\ (3) allowing the CCO to consult with the board of directors 
or senior officer of the SEF in developing the SEF's policies and 
procedures; (4) allowing a CCO to meet with the senior officer of the 
SEF on an annual basis, in lieu of an annual meeting with the board of 
directors; and (5) allowing a CCO to provide self-regulatory program 
information to the SEF's senior officer, in addition to the board of 
directors. The modifications identified as (3), (4) and (5) in the 
preceding sentence enhance the role of the SEF's senior officer, 
providing for an oversight role over the CCO equivalent to that of the 
board of directors. The Commission considered this change to be 
consistent with SEF Core Principle 15, which requires a CCO to report 
to the SEF's board of directors or senior officer.\101\
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    \99\ The Commission explained that the rules would allow a CCO 
to identify non-compliance matters through ``any means'' in addition 
to the means previously provided in the rule, which were by 
compliance office review, look-back, internal or external audit 
finding, self-reported error, or validated complaint. Id. at 9235 
n.171. The Commission modified the duty for a CCO to establish 
procedures for the remediation of noncompliance issues to clarify 
that a CCO must establish procedures reasonably designed to handle, 
respond, remediate, retest, and resolve noncompliance issues, based 
on an acknowledgement that a CCO may not be able to design 
procedures that detect all possible noncompliance issues and noted 
that a CCO may utilize a variety of resources to identify 
noncompliance issues beyond a limited set of means. Id. at 9235.
    \100\ The ROC-related components of part 37 included a mandatory 
quarterly meeting of the CCO with the ROC, and the requirement that 
a CCO provide self-regulatory program information to the ROC. Id. at 
9233-34. In determining to eliminate the ROC-related components of 
the regulation, the Commission stated that Core Principle 15 does 
not require a SEF to establish a ROC and the Commission has not 
finalized a rule that establishes requirements for a ROC. See id. at 
9234. Pursuant to proposed Sec.  37.1206 in this proposed 
rulemaking, the Commission now seeks to establish explicit 
requirements for a SEF ROC.
    \101\ See Commission regulation Sec.  37.1500(b)(1).
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    In addition, the Commission amended the rules addressing the 
removal of a CCO. The rules previously had restricted CCO removal 
authority to a majority of the board of directors, or in the absence of 
a board, to a senior officer. In the Part 37 Updates, the Commission 
amended the requirement to establish that either the board or senior 
officer of the SEF may remove the CCO. The Commission stated that in 
many instances, the senior officer may be better positioned than the 
board of directors to provide day-to-day oversight of the SEF and the 
CCO, as well as to determine whether to remove a CCO.\102\
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    \102\ Part 37 Updates, 86 FR 9224 at 9234.
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    The Part 37 Updates also amended the duties of the CCO to allow a 
CCO to identify noncompliance issues through ``any means'' and 
clarified that the procedures that the CCO takes to address 
noncompliance issues must be ``reasonably designed'' to handle,

[[Page 19654]]

respond to, remediate, retest, and resolve those issues.\103\ Such 
changes provide the CCO with additional flexibility in identifying and 
addressing noncompliance, and recognize that a CCO may not be able to 
design procedures that detect all possible noncompliance issues and may 
utilize a variety of resources to identify noncompliance issues.\104\
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    \103\ See id. at 9235.
    \104\ See id.
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    In addition, the Commission amended the CCO's duty to resolve 
conflicts of interest, requiring the CCO to take ``reasonable steps'' 
to resolve ``material'' conflicts of interest that may arise.\105\ In 
adding the concepts of reasonableness and materiality, the Commission 
stated that the current requirement was overly broad and impractical 
because a CCO cannot be reasonably expected to successfully resolve 
every potential conflict of interest that may arise.\106\
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    \105\ See id.
    \106\ See id.
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c. Industry Changes and Impact on Regulatory Developments
    By 2007, when the Commission adopted the acceptable practices 
relating to conflicts of interest and governance standards,\107\ the 
futures industry had begun shifting from mutually-owned exchanges into 
for-profit institutions.\108\ For example, in 2000, the Commission 
approved rules relating to plans by CME,\109\ NYMEX,\110\ and CBOT 
\111\ to convert from non-profit corporations owned by their members to 
for-profit corporations.\112\ Given that demutualization was relatively 
new and evolving, the Commission provided flexibility regarding 
governance structures and conflicts of interest provisions.\113\ In 
contrast to many of the other SEF and DCM core principles, to date the 
Commission has not adopted rules to prescribe the manner in which 
compliance with the conflicts of interest core principle for SEFs or 
DCMs, or the governance fitness standards core principle for DCMs, must 
be demonstrated. While the guidance on compliance with the relevant DCM 
core principles sets forth important considerations that the Commission 
believes should be taken into account by DCMs in complying with those 
core principles, and the acceptable practices \114\ for the DCM 
conflicts of interest core principle additionally set forth examples of 
how DCMs may satisfy particular requirements under that core principle, 
neither the guidance nor the acceptable practices establish mandatory 
compliance obligations for DCMs. With respect to the conflicts of 
interest core principle for SEFs, the Commission to date has not 
adopted guidance or acceptable practices for compliance with the core 
principle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ See Section II(b)(2).
    \108\ In 2007, DCM Core Principle 15 addressed conflicts of 
interest. In the Dodd-Frank Act, the DCM conflicts of interest core 
principle was renumbered to be Core Principle 16. See Dodd-Frank 
Act, section 735(b); 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(16).
    \109\ See Commission Release #4407-00, https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press00/opa4407-00.htm.
    \110\ See Commission Release #4427-00, https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press00/opa4427-00.htm.
    \111\ See Commission Release #4434-00, https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press00/opa4434-00.htm.
    \112\ The process continued through 2020, when MGEX went through 
demutualization. https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/filings/documents/2020/orgdcmmgexordertransfer201124.pdf; https://www.mgex.com/documents/MIAX_MGEX_SeatVote_PressRelease_000.pdf.
    \113\ On July 7, 2006, the Commission proposed the acceptable 
practices that it finalized in the 2007 Final Release. Conflicts of 
Interest in Self-Regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations, 71 FR 
38739 (July 7, 2006). In that proposal, the Commission acknowledged 
that the U.S. futures industry was being transformed by, among other 
things, the demutualization of member-owned exchanges and their 
conversion to publicly traded stock corporations. Id. at 38740-
38741. The Commission noted that the acceptable practices would, 
among other things, ensure that industry expertise, experience, and 
knowledge continue to play a vital role in self-regulatory 
organization governance and administration and thus, preserve the 
``self'' in self-regulation. Id. at 38741-38742. In the 2007 Final 
Release, the Commission reiterated that the acceptable practices 
were being adopted in response to, among other things, 
demutualization. The Commission observed that it did identify 
industry changes that it believed create new structural conflicts of 
interest within self-regulation, increase the risk of customer harm, 
could lead to an abuse of self-regulatory authority, and threaten 
the integrity of, and public confidence in, self-regulation in the 
U.S. futures industry. The Commission further noted that increased 
competition, demutualization and other new ownership structures, 
for-profit business models, and other factors are highly relevant to 
the impartiality, vigor, and effectiveness with which DCMs exercise 
their self-regulatory responsibilities. 2007 Final Release, 72 FR 
6936 at 6944.
    \114\ Through its acceptable practices, the Commission provides 
exchanges with specific practices that DCMs may adopt to demonstrate 
a safe harbor for compliance with selected requirements aspects of a 
core principle, but such acceptable practices were not intended as 
the exclusive means of compliance. See CEA section 5c(a)(1), 7 
U.S.C. 7a-2(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the statutory core principles are intended to be broad and 
flexible, the Commission is mindful that, in certain circumstances, 
flexibility in the manner of compliance may create confusion. 
Practically speaking, while this flexibility exists, Commission staff 
has found that all DCMs have chosen to adopt the acceptable practices 
to demonstrate compliance with DCM Core Principle 16.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that establishing 
affirmative, harmonized requirements for governance fitness standards 
and the mitigation of conflicts of interest are necessary to promote 
the integrity of SEFs and DCMs as self-regulatory organizations and to 
ensure the effective and impartial fulfillment of those functions. In 
particular, the Commission has recently observed an increase in the 
number of SEFs and DCMs that are part of corporate families that also 
have other Commission registrants and other market participants. In 
conducting SEF regulatory consultations that were completed in 2021, 
Commission staff identified several SEFs that were in the same 
corporate family as intermediaries that also traded on the SEF. 
Similarly, in 2021, Commission staff conducted an informal inquiry into 
which DCMs were in corporate families with intermediaries who traded on 
the DCM, and identified three such DCMs.
    Where multiple Commission registrants or other market participants 
exist in the same corporate family, the risk of conflicts of interest 
may increase. For example, when a SEF or DCM is in the same corporate 
family as an intermediary, like an introducing broker (``IB'') or a 
futures commission merchant (``FCM''), that trades on or brings trades 
to the SEF or DCM for execution, the SEF's or DCM's market regulation 
obligations \115\ may conflict with interests of the intermediary, such 
as in circumstances where there are questions about the intermediary's 
compliance with a SEF or DCM rule.\116\ The emergence of these 
affiliations could also affect certain key components of a SEF's or 
DCM's framework for addressing conflicts of interest that may impact 
market regulation functions. With respect to determining whether an 
individual satisfies the public director standard, as outlined in the 
DCM Core Principal 16 Acceptable Practices, certain relationships that 
the individual may have with an affiliate of the DCM would need to be 
evaluated. Furthermore, officers and members of the board of director 
may need to evaluate whether certain relationships with an affiliate of

[[Page 19655]]

the DCM or SEF would give rise to an actual or potential conflict of 
interest that could impact decision-making. Accordingly, the Commission 
is herein proposing conflict of interest rules that focus on the 
identification, management and resolution of conflicts of interest 
related to a SEF's or DCM's market regulation functions, as 
preliminarily defined by the Commission below, as well as related 
governance standards that the Commission believes support the 
mitigation of such conflicts of interest. The set of rules proposed 
herein draw on many years of Commission staff's experience conducting 
its routine oversight of SEFs and DCMs, and reflect the Commission's 
identification of specific, harmonized measures that it preliminarily 
believes will help to ensure that SEFs and DCMs fulfill their market 
regulation functions in an effective and impartial manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ For example, Commission regulation Sec.  38.152 requires 
DCMs that allow intermediation to prohibit customer-related abuses 
such as trading ahead of customer orders, trading against customer 
orders, accommodation trading, and improper cross trading. 
Commission regulation Sec.  37.203 imposes a similar requirement on 
SEFs.
    \116\ In contrast to situations in which a DCM and DCO are in 
the same corporate family--which the Commission has observed over 
the past two decades--a SEF or DCM being in the same corporate 
family as an intermediary registrant raises unique issues. Rena S. 
Miller, Congressional Research Service, Conflicts of Interest in 
Derivatives Clearing (2011), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41715/4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Separately, on June 28, 2023, Commission staff issued a Request for 
Comment on the Impact of Affiliations Between Certain CFTC-Regulated 
Entities (``RFC'').\117\ The RFC sought public comment in order to 
better inform Commission staff's understanding of a broad range of 
potential issues that may arise if a DCM, DCO or SEF is affiliated with 
an intermediary, such as an FCM or IB, or other market participant such 
as a trading entity.\118\ The Commission also notes that on December 
18, 2023, its Divisions of Clearing and Risk, Market Oversight, and 
Market Participants issued a staff advisory on affiliations between a 
DCM, DCO or a SEF and an intermediary, such as an FCM, or other market 
participant, such as a trading entity. The advisory reminds DCOs, DCMs, 
and SEFs that have an affiliated intermediary or trading entity, as 
well as the affiliated intermediary or trading entities themselves, of 
their obligations to ensure compliance with existing statutory and 
regulatory requirements with this affiliate relationship in mind.\119\
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    \117\ Request for Comment on the Impact of Affiliations of 
Certain CFTC-Regulated Entities, CFTC Release 8734-23, June 28, 
2023. https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8734-23.
    \118\ The Commission received a number of comments raising 
concerns about the impact of affiliation, and anticipates proposing 
regulations that will address issues identified as a result of the 
RFC, including additional concerns raised by commenters about the 
conflicts of interest, specifically relating to market regulation 
functions, posed by affiliations. This rulemaking does not reflect 
the comments submitted in response to the Commission staff's RFC. 
Those comments will not be made part of the administrative record 
before the Commission in connection with this proposal.
    \119\ Staff Advisory on Affiliations Among CFTC-Regulated 
Entities, CFTC Release 8839-23, Dec. 18, 2023. https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8839-23. In addition to the increased focus 
on affiliate relationships, another market structure development 
relates to the participation of intermediaries on SEF and DCM 
markets. With limited exceptions, derivatives trading today is 
conducted through regulated intermediaries who perform many 
important functions, such as providing customers with access to 
exchanges and clearinghouses, processing transactions, ensuring 
compliance with federal regulations, and guaranteeing performance of 
the derivatives contract to the clearinghouse. Recently, the 
Commission has observed a trend in which registered entities pursue 
a ``non-intermediated'' model, or direct trading and clearing of 
margined products to retail customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Conflicts of Interest Relating to Market Regulation Functions

1. Market Regulation Functions
    This rule proposal addresses certain conflicts of interest that may 
impact a SEF's or DCM's market regulation functions. For purposes of 
this rule proposal, the Commission is proposing to define as ``market 
regulation functions'' the responsibilities related to trade practice 
surveillance, market surveillance, real-time market monitoring, audit 
trail data and recordkeeping enforcement, investigations of possible 
SEF or DCM rule violations, and disciplinary actions.\120\ The 
Commission believes that effective performance of these market 
regulation functions require SEFs and DCMs, consistent with their core 
principle obligations, to establish a process for identifying, 
minimizing, and resolving actual and potential conflicts of interest 
that may arise between and among any of the SEF's or DCM's market 
regulation functions and its commercial interests; or the several 
interests of its management, members, owners, customers and market 
participants, other industry participants, and other constituencies.
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    \120\ See proposed Sec. Sec.  38.851(b)(9) and 37.1201(b)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec.  37.1201(b)(9) defines ``market regulation 
functions'' as the SEF functions required by SEF Core Principle 2 
(Compliance with Rules), SEF Core Principle 4 (Monitoring of Trading 
and Trade Processing), SEF Core Principle 6 (Position Limits or 
Accountability), SEF Core Principle 10 (Recordkeeping) and the 
Commission's regulations thereunder. Proposed Sec.  38.851(b)(9) 
defines ``market regulation functions'' as the DCM functions required 
by DCM Core Principle 2 (Compliance with Rules), DCM Core Principle 4 
(Monitoring of Trading), DCM Core Principle 5 (Position Limits or 
Accountability), DCM Core Principle 10 (Trade Information), DCM Core 
Principle 12 (Protection of Markets and Market Participants), DCM Core 
Principle 13 (Disciplinary Procedures), DCM Core Principle 18 
(Recordkeeping) and the Commission's regulations thereunder.
    The Commission's proposed definition of ``market regulation 
functions'' does not include certain other SEF or DCM obligations. For 
example, the proposed definition does not include DCM Core Principle 11 
(Financial Integrity of Transactions), the related financial 
surveillance requirements for DCMs under Commission regulation Sec.  
1.52, or a SEF's obligations under Core Principle 7 (Financial 
Integrity of Transactions).
    As noted above, the Commission staff's RFC sought public comment on 
a range of potential issues that may arise if a DCM, DCO or SEF is 
affiliated with an intermediary, such as an FCM or IB, or other market 
participant such as a trading entity. While the scope of the proposed 
term ``market regulation functions'' in this rulemaking is limited to 
SEF and DCM functions under specific core principles, the Commission 
notes that public comment in response to the RFC may inform future 
Commission action. The Commission may further address SEF or DCM 
conflicts of interest obligations that may impact broader self-
regulation functions of SEFs and DCMs, including their obligations 
under SEF Core Principle 7 and DCM Core Principle 11. The Commission 
notes that any future action impacting broader self-regulatory 
functions may consider whether those self-regulatory functions should 
be subject to requirements that are similar or different to the 
requirements being proposed in this rulemaking. As discussed further 
below, the main objective of this rulemaking is to establish 
requirements to mitigate certain conflicts of interest that may impact 
those SEF and DCM functions most closely tied to the SEF's or DCM's 
market regulation function.
2. Questions for Comment
    The Commission seeks comment on the questions set forth below 
regarding the proposed definition of ``market regulation functions.''
    1. Has the Commission appropriately defined ``market regulation 
functions'' for purposes of this rule proposal? Are there additional 
functions that should be included in the proposed definition?
    2. In this rule proposal, and for purposes of the conflicts of 
interest that it is intended to address, has the Commission 
appropriately distinguished ``market regulation functions'' from the 
broader self-regulatory functions of a SEF or DCM?

[[Page 19656]]

3. Conflicts of Interest Between Market Regulation Functions and 
Commercial Interests
    SEFs' and DCMs' obligations to perform market regulation functions 
may conflict with their commercial interests. For example, performing 
market regulation functions requires the use of staff and resources 
that might otherwise be dedicated to commercial functions, such as 
seeking new market participants or promoting new products.\121\ In 
addition, SEFs and DCMs have a commercial interest to earn fees from 
market participants, and to avoid deterring participants from trading 
on their platforms. Fulfillment by a SEF or DCM of its market 
regulation functions may result in the SEF or DCM taking actions, such 
as enforcement actions or the imposition of fines, that may deter the 
use of the platform by certain market participants, and therefore run 
counter to commercial interests of the platform. Commercial pressure, 
such as competition among SEFs and among DCMs, may strain market 
regulation obligations.\122\
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    \121\ See Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  38.155 (DCM) and 
37.203(c) (SEF).
    \122\ Proposed Acceptable Practices for compliance with section 
5(d)(15) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 71 FR 38740, 38741 n.10 
(July 7, 2006) (citing five separate domestic and international 
studies reaching the same conclusion); See also Kristin N. Johnson, 
Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 Wash. L.Rev. 
185, 221 (2013) (``While clearinghouses and exchanges are private 
businesses, these institutions provide a critical, public, 
infrastructure resource within financial markets. The self-
regulatory approach adopted in financial markets presumes that 
clearinghouses and exchanges will provide a public service and 
engage in market oversight. The owners of exchanges and 
clearinghouses may, however, prioritize profit-maximizing strategies 
that de-emphasize or conflict with regulatory goals.'')
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III. Proposed Governance Fitness Requirements

a. Overview

    The Commission is proposing rules that would require SEFs and DCMs 
to establish minimum fitness standards for certain categories of 
individuals who are responsible for exchange governance, management, 
and disciplinary functions, or who have potential influence over those 
functions. These proposed requirements are intended to help ensure that 
SEFs and DCMs effectively fulfill their critical role as self-
regulatory organizations by excluding individuals with a history of 
certain disciplinary or criminal offenses from serving in roles with 
influence over the governance and operations of the exchange. The 
integrity of these functions is critically important to their 
respective operations, markets, and market regulation functions. 
Accordingly, it is essential that the individuals responsible for 
governing a SEF or DCM, such as officers and members of the board of 
directors, committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution 
panels, are ethically and morally fit to serve in their roles. 
Similarly, the Commission believes it is important that minimum fitness 
standards be applicable to an individual who owns 10 percent or more of 
a SEF or DCM and has the ability to control or direct the SEF's or 
DCM's management or policies.
    The Commission also believes establishing the same minimum fitness 
requirements for both SEFs and DCMs is necessary given that their 
officers and members of the board of directors, committees, 
disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution panels have identical 
responsibilities for governing and administering operations, including 
the operations of the market regulation functions. Straightforward and 
consistent minimum fitness requirements are reasonably necessary to 
promote the hiring and designation of officers and members of the board 
of directors, committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution 
panels that have the appropriate character and integrity to perform 
their duties.

b. Minimum Fitness Standards--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801

1. Existing Regulatory Framework
    DCM Core Principle 15 requires a DCM to establish and enforce 
appropriate fitness standards for members of the board of directors, 
members of any disciplinary committee, members of the DCM, other 
persons with direct access to the DCM, and ``any party affiliated'' 
with any of the foregoing persons. The DCM Core Principle 15 Guidance 
states that minimum fitness standards for ``persons who have member 
voting privileges, governing obligations or responsibilities, or who 
exercise disciplinary authority,'' and ``natural persons who directly 
or indirectly have greater than a ten percent ownership interest in a 
designated contract'' should include those bases for refusal to 
register a person under section 8a(2) of the CEA.\123\ Additionally, 
the DCM Core Principle 15 Guidance states that persons who have 
governing obligations or responsibilities, or who exercise disciplinary 
authority, should not have a significant history of serious 
disciplinary offenses, such as those that would be disqualifying under 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.63 \124\ The DCM Core Principle 15 
Guidance also states that DCMs should have standards for the collection 
and verification of information supporting compliance with the DCM's 
fitness standards. Pursuant to Commission regulation Sec.  38.2, DCMs 
are exempt from some of the provisions of Commission regulation Sec.  
1.63. They are not exempt, however, from Commission regulation Sec.  
1.63(c), which prohibits persons that are subject to any of the 
disciplinary offenses set forth in Commission regulation Sec.  1.63(b) 
from serving on a disciplinary committee, arbitration panel, oversight 
panel or governing board of a self-regulatory organization.
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    \123\ Appendix B to Part 38, Guidance on, and Acceptable 
Practices in, Compliance with Core Principles; Core Principle 15, 
Governance Fitness Standards. This Guidance was promulgated under 
the 2001 Regulatory Framework in direct response to the recognition 
that with the de-mutualization of DCMs, the governance role of 
``members'' is exercised by the DCM's owner or owners. The 
Commission has previously noted that the 10 percent ownership 
threshold is consistent with the same 10 percent threshold for 
fitness standards that Congress itself adopted for exempt commercial 
markets in section 2(h)(5)(A)(iii) of the CEA, prior to the Dodd 
Frank amendments. See 2001 Regulatory Framework, 66 FR 42255, 42262 
n.40. Exempt commercial markets were eliminated as a category in the 
CEA pursuant to Title VII of the Dodd Frank Act, which also 
introduced SEFs as a new category of CFTC-regulated exchange. Public 
Law 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (Dec. 21, 2000); See also Repeal of the 
Exempt Commercial Market and Exempt Board of Trade Exemptions, 80 FR 
59575 (Oct. 2, 2015).
    \124\ Id. The DCM Core Principle 15 Guidance states that members 
with trading privileges but having no or only minimal equity in the 
DCM and non-member market participants who are not intermediated 
``and do not have these privileges, obligations, or responsibilities 
or disciplinary authority'' could satisfy minimum fitness standards 
by meeting the standards that they must meet to qualify as a 
``market participant.''
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    SEFs are not subject to a specific core principle requirement to 
establish fitness standards. However, as authorized by the CEA,\125\ 
SEFs must comply with all requirements in Commission regulation Sec.  
1.63, which sets forth requirements and procedures to prevent persons 
with certain disciplinary histories from serving in certain governing 
or oversight capacities at a self-regulatory organization.
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    \125\ Commission Regulation Sec.  1.63 was adopted pursuant to 
the following statutory authority: 7 U.S.C. 2, 2a, 4, 4a, 6, 6a, 6b, 
6c, 6d, 6e, 6f, 6g, 6h, 6i, 6j, 6k, 6l, 6m, 6n, 6o, 7, 7a, 8, 9, 12, 
12a, 12c, 13a, 13a-l, 16,19, 21, 23, and 24, Service on Self-
Regulatory Organization Governing Boards or Committees by Persons 
with Disciplinary Histories, 55 FR 7884, 7890 (March 6, 1990, Final 
Rule).
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2. Proposed Rules
    The Commission is proposing identical fitness requirements for SEFs 
and DCMs. The Commission believes the proposed rules are reasonably 
necessary to effectuate a DCM's

[[Page 19657]]

obligations to establish and enforce appropriate fitness standards 
under DCM Core Principle 15, and to effectuate a SEF's obligations to 
establish and enforce rules governing the operation of the SEF under 
SEF Core Principle 2.\126\ A SEF's ability to effectively operate as 
both a market and SRO, and to perform its market regulation functions, 
is largely dependent upon the individuals who govern or control the 
SEF's operations, including officers, and members of the board of 
directors, disciplinary committees, dispute resolution panels, members 
and controlling owners. Given this relationship, the Commission 
believes that it is reasonably necessary to extend the same governance 
fitness standards to SEFs as to DCMs.\127\
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    \126\ CEA section 5h(f)(2); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2).
    \127\ The Commission is proposing to exercise its authority 
under CEA section 8a(5) to establish the SEFs fitness standards; 
DCMs are already subject to a similar requirement to set appropriate 
fitness standards. CEA section 5(d); 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Categories of Persons Subject to Minimum Fitness Standards
    In proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(a) and 38.801(a), the Commission is 
requiring that SEFs and DCMs establish and enforce appropriate fitness 
standards for officers; for members of its board of directors, 
committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution panels (or 
anyone performing functions similar to the foregoing); for members of 
the SEF or DCM; for any other person with direct access to the SEF or 
DCM; and for any person who owns 10 percent or more of a SEF or DCM and 
who, either directly or indirectly, through agreement or otherwise, in 
any other manner, may control or direct the management or policies of 
the SEF or DCM, and any party affiliated with any of those persons.
    Specifically, the Commission notes that proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.207(a) and 38.801(a) would extend minimum fitness requirements to 
certain individuals, including officers and owners of 10 percent or 
more of a SEF or DCM, and SEF and DCM members with voting privileges, 
who were not historically subject to DCM fitness requirements under DCM 
Core Principle 15, or SEF and DCM fitness requirements under Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.63(c). However, as discussed below, the Commission 
believes applying consistent minimum fitness standards to classes of 
individuals enumerated in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(a) and 38.801(a) 
is reasonably necessary given that these individuals have: (1) 
obligations with respect to a SEF's or DCM's governance or disciplinary 
process; or (2) the ability to exercise control over a SEF or DCM.
    First, officers of a SEF or DCM would be subject to the minimum 
fitness requirements in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(a) and 
38.801(a).\128\ The Commission believes this is reasonably necessary 
because officers--like members of the board of directors, committee 
members, or members of disciplinary or dispute resolution panels, and 
members with voting privileges \129\--also have governing, decision-
making, and disciplinary responsibilities within a SEF or DCM, and 
therefore must be able to demonstrate standards of integrity and 
rectitude in order to effectively perform their duties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ Officers are also subject to the 8a(2) and 8a(3) minimum 
fitness requirements in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(b) and 38.801(b), 
and the disqualifying offenses in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c) and 
38.801(c).
    \129\ In addition to the three categories of individuals 
highlighted in this section, members of its board of directors, 
committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution panels, all 
members of the SEF or DCM, and any other person with direct access 
to the SEF, are subject to the requirement to have appropriate 
fitness requirements in Sec. Sec.  37.207(a) and 38.801(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, members with voting privileges would also be subject to the 
minimum fitness requirements in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(a) and 
38.801(a).\130\ Although DCM Core Principle 15 applies to a broad class 
of individuals associated with a DCM, including members with voting 
privileges, there is no parallel application for SEFs. The Commission 
acknowledges that SEF and DCM members with voting privileges may not 
have the same governing duties as officers and members of its board of 
directors, committees, disciplinary panels, or dispute resolution 
panels. Nevertheless, they may have the ability to influence or 
control, either directly through their voting privileges or through 
other indirect means, the operations or decision-making of the SEF or 
DCM. Accordingly, the Commission believes it is reasonably necessary to 
establish and enforce certain minimum standards of fitness for such 
individuals.
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    \130\ Members with voting privileges are also subject to the 
8a(2) and 8a(3) minimum fitness requirements in proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.207(b) and 38.801(b).
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    Third, certain owners of 10 percent or more of a SEF or DCM would 
also be subject to the minimum fitness requirements in proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.207(a) and 38.801(a).\131\ Although the guidance to DCM 
Core Principle 15 lists a broad class of individuals, including natural 
persons who directly or indirectly have greater than a 10 percent 
ownership interest in a DCM, there is no parallel application for a 
SEF. While individuals who own 10 percent or more of a SEF or DCM may 
not be involved in the daily operations of a SEF or DCM, their sizeable 
ownership interest may, either directly or indirectly, enable them to 
exert influence or control over various aspects of decision-making, 
including decisions that may impact market regulation functions.\132\ 
As an example, a person with a 10 percent ownership interest in the SEF 
or DCM may have competing business interests that are improperly 
prioritized, particularly if that person has influence in selecting 
officers or members of the board of directors. Similarly, a person with 
10 percent ownership may have influence or control over the SEF's or 
DCM's contracts with third party service providers, or, even the 
ability to wield his or her influence in determining whether to 
investigate potential rule violations. Therefore, the Commission 
believes it is reasonably necessary to require that persons owning 10 
percent or more of the SEF or DCM, and who, either directly or 
indirectly, through agreement or otherwise, in any other manner, 
control or direct the management or policies of the SEF or DCM \133\ be 
subject to certain minimum fitness requirements, as described below.
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    \131\ Owners of 10 percent or more of a SEF or DCM, who also may 
control or direct the management or policies of a SEF or DCM, are 
also subject to the 8a(2) and 8a(3) minimum fitness requirements in 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(b) and 38.801(b).
    \132\ As noted below concerning the proposed changes to 
Commission regulations Sec.  37.5(c), if one entity holds a 10 
percent equity share in a SEF it may have a significant voice in the 
operation and/or decision-making of the SEF.
    \133\ The language of the proposed fitness standards for owners 
of 10 percent or more of a SEF or DCM intentionally generally 
mirrors the language from the Appendices to Part 37 and 38, Form SEF 
and Form DCM, Exhibit A. Exhibit A to Form SEF and Form DCM require 
disclosure of owners of 10 percent or more of the applicant's stock 
as part of the application for registration or designation. A 
similar 10 percent or more ownership threshold is found in other 
Commission regulations, e.g., the definition of Principal in 
Commission regulation Sec.  3.1 and section 8a(2)(H) of the CEA, 
which effectively prevent individuals subject to the grounds for 
refusal to register in CEA section 8a(2) or section 8a(3) from 
owning 10 percent of voting stock in an intermediary subject to 
registration requirements. The 10 percent ownership interest 
threshold is similarly found in the reporting requirements for 
``insiders'' in section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
See also 17 CFR 240.16a-2.
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ii. Minimum Fitness Standards
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(b) and 38.801(b) would set forth minimum 
standards of fitness SEFs and DCMs must establish and enforce for 
officers and members of its board of directors,\134\ committees,

[[Page 19658]]

disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution panels (or anyone 
performing functions similar to the foregoing), for members with voting 
privileges,\135\ and any person who owns 10 percent or more of the SEF 
or DCM and who, either directly or indirectly, through agreement or 
otherwise, in any other manner, may control or direct the management or 
policies of the DCM,\136\ to include the bases for refusal to register 
a person under sections 8a(2) and 8a(3) of the CEA.\137\ DCM Core 
Principle 15 Guidance includes the bases for refusal to register under 
CEA section 8a(2), but it does not include the bases for refusal to 
register a person under section 8a(3). However, as described below, the 
Commission believes inclusion of the section 8a(3) disqualifications 
for individuals with governance or disciplinary responsibilities at the 
SEF or DCM, or the ability to control or direct the management or 
policies of the SEF or DCM, is reasonably necessary for SEFs and DCMs 
to fulfill their responsibilities as SROs without influence from 
individuals with backgrounds incompatible with such responsibility.
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    \134\ For purposes of the rules proposed herein, the Commission 
is proposing to define ``board of directors'' as a group of people 
serving as the governing body of a SEF or DCM, or--for SEFs or DCMs 
whose organizational structure does not include a board of 
directors--a body performing a function similar to a board of 
directors. See proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(2) and 38.851(b)(2).
    \135\ Consistent with current Core Principle 15 Guidance, 
members with voting privileges have the same minimum fitness 
standards as other individuals with the ability to directly affect 
the operations or governance of the Exchange, whereas members 
without voting privileges are subject only to the requirement that 
the DCM or SEF set appropriate fitness standards for them, as set 
out in proposed regulations Sec. Sec.  37.207(a) and 38.801(a). In 
light of industry changes, the Commission is requesting comment on 
whether ``members with voting privileges'' remains a relevant 
category that should be subject to this distinction.
    \136\ These categories of individuals are similar to those 
subject to the 8a(2) standards in the DCM Core Principle 15 
Guidance.
    \137\ Section 8a(2) and 8a(3) bases include, for example, 
revocation of registration, convictions or guilty pleas for 
violations of the CEA, the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, misdemeanors involving embezzlement, theft, or 
fraud, past failure to supervise, willful misrepresentations or 
omissions, and ``other good cause.''
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    Sections 8a(2) and 8a(3) of the CEA provide a consistent, minimum 
industry framework to promote high ethical standards among officers, 
directors and other individuals with controlling influence over 
intermediaries or other registrants in the futures and swaps 
industry.\138\ In proposing to extend the sections 8a(2) and 8a(3) 
minimum fitness standards to individuals subject to the fitness 
requirements in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(a) and 38.801(a), the 
Commission is extending the same consistent, minimum industry framework 
\139\ to promote high ethical standards among individuals with similar 
control or influence over the important self-regulatory functions at 
SEFs and DCMs. These standards are reasonably necessary to promote 
consistent high ethical industry standards for a SEF or DCM to serve as 
an effective SRO.
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    \138\ CEA sections 8a(2) and (3), 7 U.S.C. 12a(2) and (3); 
Principals, including officers, managing members, directors and 
owners of 10 percent or more voting stock of FCMs, IBs, and other 
registrants, may already be disqualified from registration pursuant 
to CEA sections 8a(2) and 8a(3), which in turn may result in the 
revocation of the registration of the FCM, IB or other registrant. 
(CEA section 8a(2)(H), 7 U.S.C. 12a(2)(H), defining ``Principal,'' 
to include any officer, director, or beneficial owner of at least 10 
percent of the voting shares of the corporation, and any other 
person that the Commission by rule, regulation, or order determines 
has the power, directly or indirectly, through agreement or 
otherwise, to exercise a controlling influence over the activities 
of such person which are subject to regulation by the Commission. 
Both sections 8a(2) and 8a(3) provide for the revocation of 
registration of an FCM, IB, or other registrant where a principal of 
the registrant is subject to a statutory disqualification found in 
CEA sections 8a(2) or 8a(3).) As stated in the interpretative 
statement to CEA section 8a(3)(M), in Appendix A to part 3, which 
provides the Commission with the authority to refuse registration of 
any person for other good cause, any inability to deal fairly with 
the public and consistent with the just and equitable principles of 
trade may render an applicant or registrant unfit for registration, 
given the high ethical standards which must prevail in the industry.
    \139\ Individuals serving as officers, board members, 
disciplinary committee members, members with voting privileges, and 
owners with 10 percent or more of a DCM or SEF and with the ability 
to control or direct the management or policies of the SEF or DCM 
should not be subject to lower fitness standards than the fitness 
standards applied to principals of intermediaries facilitating 
trading on SEF or DCM. Otherwise, an individual could be 
disqualified from serving as the principal of an FCM or IB, due to 
the factors set out under CEA 8a(2) or 8a(3), but be allowed to 
serve in a role exercising influence or control over the self-
regulatory functions of a SEF or DCM; the SEF or DCM is the front-
line regulator of the trading activity facilitated by FCMs and IBs 
on a SEF or DCM.
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    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c) and 38.801(c) would require SEFs and 
DCMs to establish and enforce additional minimum fitness standards for 
certain individuals--officers and for members of its board of 
directors, committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution 
panels (or anyone performing functions similar to the foregoing). These 
additional fitness requirements include ineligibility based on six 
types of disciplinary offenses that generally track the disciplinary 
offenses listed in Sec. Sec.  1.63(b)(1)-(6), with certain 
modifications. In effect, the proposed rules would apply the fitness 
requirements of Commission regulation Sec.  1.63 consistently to both 
SEFs and DCMs, subject to certain enhancements as further described 
below.
    The six disciplinary offenses in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c)(1)-
(6) and 38.801(c)(1)-(6) are substantially similar to the existing 
ineligibility requirements in Sec.  1.63(b).
     Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c)(1) and 38.801(c)(1), require 
that an individual would be ineligible if they were found, in a final, 
non-appealable \140\ order by a court of competent jurisdiction, an 
administrative law judge, the Commission, a self-regulatory 
organization,\141\ or the SEC, to have committed any of four offenses 
described in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c)(1)(i)-(iv) and 
38.801(c)(1)(i)-(iv) within the previous three years.\142\ This 
requirement is substantially the same as the ineligibility requirement 
found in Sec.  1.63(b)(1), except for the addition of findings by the 
SEC.
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    \140\ The final, non-appealable order language comes from the 
definition of ``final decision'' found in Commission regulation 
Sec.  1.63(a)(5).
    \141\ With the exception of the addition of the SEC, these are 
the same categories as in the definition of ``final decision'' found 
in Commission regulation Sec.  1.63(a)(5).
    \142\ Pursuant to Commission regulation Sec.  1.63(b)(1), an 
individual is ineligible to serve on disciplinary committees, 
arbitration panels, oversight panels or governing board if, within 
the past three years, that individual was found to have committed a 
``disciplinary offense.''
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     Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c)(1)(i)-(iv) and 
38.801(c)(1)(i)-(iv), include, in substance, the same four disciplinary 
offenses listed in Sec.  1.63(a)(6)(i)-(iv).
     Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c)(2)-(6) and 38.801(c)(2)-(6) 
mirror, in substance, the disciplinary offenses found in Sec.  
1.63(b)(6)(2)-(6), with minor enhancements to expressly include both 
SEFs and DCMs when referencing suspensions from trading on a contract 
market.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c) and 38.801(c) also enhance the 
existing minimum fitness requirements in several ways, compared to the 
requirements in Commission regulation Sec.  1.63. The language in 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c) and 38.801(c) does not use the limiters 
``significant history'' or ``serious disciplinary offenses'' in setting 
forth disqualifying offenses. These terms appear in DCM Core Principle 
15 Guidance \143\ and the Commission proposes to clarify which 
disciplinary offenses are included by specifying which offenses would 
automatically be

[[Page 19659]]

disqualifying. As described above, the list of disciplinary offenses in 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c) and 38.801(c) includes, in substance, the 
same offenses identified in Commission regulation Sec.  1.63,\144\ and 
expands the disqualifying offenses to include agreements not to apply 
for, or to be disqualified from applying for, registration in any 
capacity with the SEC, or any self-regulatory organization, including 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (``FINRA'').\145\
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    \143\ DCM Core Principle 15 Guidance provides that, among other 
things, persons who have governing obligations or responsibilities, 
or who exercise disciplinary authority, should not have a 
significant history of serious disciplinary offenses, such as those 
that would be disqualifying under Commission regulation Sec.  1.63.
    \144\ The disciplinary offenses generally include a decision by 
a court or a self-regulatory organization (or a settlement) of: 
violations of the substantive rules of a self-regulatory 
organization, felonies, convictions involving fraud or deceit, 
violations of the CEA or Commission regulations, or a suspension or 
denial by a self-regulatory organization to serve on a board or 
disciplinary panel.
    \145\ Commission regulation Sec.  1.63(b)(6) provides as 
disqualifying anyone who is currently subject to a denial, 
suspension or disqualification from serving on the disciplinary 
committee, arbitration panel or governing board of any self-
regulatory organization as that term is defined in section 3(a)(26) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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iii. Verification and Documentation of Minimum Fitness Standards
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(d) and 38.801(d) would require each SEF 
and DCM to establish appropriate procedures for the collection and 
verification of information supporting compliance with appropriate 
fitness standards. The Commission believes that, to be effective, such 
procedures must be written, must be in a location where people who 
would use them can find them, and must be preserved and ready for the 
Commission to review.\146\ The Commission anticipates staff will review 
the procedures and fitness determinations as part of its routine 
oversight.
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    \146\ The Commission believes that in the absence of a cohesive 
set of SEF or DCM conflicts of interest policies and procedures, 
individuals with potential conflicts of interest may have difficulty 
ascertaining the policies and procedures that apply to a given 
situation. The Commission believes that similar concerns would be 
raised where there is not a cohesive set of procedures related to 
the verification fitness information.
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    In conducting its oversight of SEFs and DCMs, Commission staff has 
learned that some SEFs and DCMs accepted fitness representations from 
the individual subject to the fitness standard without any practice of 
independent verification. Independent verification of fitness 
information is particularly important because certain individuals could 
be disincentivized from self-reporting fitness information that could 
disqualify them from service.\147\ The Commission believes SEFs and 
DCMs should verify fitness information provided by individuals by 
collecting information from third parties, for example, via the 
National Futures Association's (``NFA'') Background Affiliation Status 
Information Center (``BASIC'') system or background checks.
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    \147\ Both the NFA and FINRA conduct background checks to 
confirm information provided in the Form U4 is accurate, and FINRA 
Rule 3110(e) requires SEC-registered member firms to verify the 
information provided in a Form U4 using ``reasonably available 
public records, or a third-party provider.''
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    Commission staff also discovered during the course of its oversight 
that some SEFs and DCMs did not have a practice to verify an 
individual's compliance with applicable fitness standards prior to the 
individual starting to serve in the capacity requiring the fitness 
standard. Additionally, some SEFs and DCMs lacked practices for regular 
verification of fitness standards, allowing fitness information to 
become stale. Without these practices for verifying and documenting 
fitness information, the Commission believes there is an increased risk 
that individuals will serve in a capacity for which they are not fit. 
Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(d)(1)(i)-(iv) and 38.801(d)(1)(i)-(iv) would 
address these practices by requiring: (i) fitness information be 
verified at least annually, (ii) the SEF or DCM have procedures 
providing for immediate notice to the SEF or DCM if an individual no 
longer meets the minimum fitness standards to serve in their role, 
(iii) the initial verification of information supporting an 
individual's compliance with relevant fitness standard be completed 
prior to the individual serving in the capacity with fitness standards, 
and (iv) the SEF and DCM to document their findings with respect to the 
verification of fitness information.
    The Commission further proposes to clarify the applicability of the 
governance fitness requirements to SEFs and DCMs by locating them, 
respectively, within parts 37 and 38 of the Commission's regulations, 
rather than within part 1 of the Commission's regulations. The 
Commission also proposes to make conforming amendments to Commission 
regulations Sec. Sec.  37.2 and 38.2 to exempt SEFs and DCMs from 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.63 in its entirety.
iv. Additional Considerations for Minimum Fitness Requirements
    The Commission is considering whether additional fitness 
requirements would enhance the performance and accountability of the 
individuals who are charged with governing a SEF or DCM or its 
operations, or have the ability to influence such functions. Therefore, 
the Commission is seeking comment on whether SEFs and DCMs should 
consider additional eligibility criteria to prevent individuals from 
serving as an officer or member of the board of directors if their 
background, although not automatically disqualifying under proposed 
Sec. Sec.  38.801(c) or 37.207(c), raises concerns about the 
individual's ability to effectively govern, manage, or influence the 
operations or decision-making of a SEF or DCM. For example, the 
Commission notes that at least three SEFs have already implemented a 
``good repute'' requirement for members of their board of 
directors,\148\ and the same requirement exists for members of the 
management body of regulated markets in the European Union.\149\ The 
purpose of a ``sufficiently good repute'' standard would be to identify 
individuals with a well-established history of honesty, integrity, and 
fairness in their personal, public, and professional matters. The 
Commission's potential standard could be as follows:
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    \148\ See CBOE SEF Rulebook, Rule 202; Bloomberg SEF Rulebook, 
Rule 201; ICAP Global Derivatives SEF Rulebook, Annex 1, Governance 
Policy. Additionally, at least five DCMs and one SEF require their 
members or market participants to be of ``good repute,'' ``good 
moral character,'' or ``good reputation.''
    \149\ Article 45(2)(a) to (c) of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive 2014/65/EU (``MiFID II'') (requiring members 
of the management body of market operators to be of ``sufficiently 
good repute''); Article 4(36) defines ``management body'' to include 
the individuals ``empowered to set the entity's strategy, 
objectives, and overall direction, and which oversee and monitor 
management decision-making . . .'').

    Minimum standards of fitness for the SEF's and DCM's officers 
and for members of its board of directors must include the 
requirement that each such individuals be of sufficiently good 
repute; provided, however, that SEFs and DCMs have flexibility to 
establish the criteria for how individuals demonstrate good repute, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
as appropriate for their respective markets.

    The Commission also seeks comment on whether SEFs and DCMs should 
also consider, in defining ``good repute,'' the type of information 
that is subject to disclosure in the Uniform Application for Securities 
Regulation (``Form U4'') for consideration by FINRA for 
registration.\150\ Other examples for consideration include instances 
where the license of a licensed professional (such as a certified 
public accountant or attorney) has been involuntarily suspended or 
revoked, or where an individual is suspended by an order of

[[Page 19660]]

a foreign regulator or court in foreign jurisdiction.
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    \150\ The Form U4 includes information such as criminal charges, 
pending regulatory cases, license suspensions or revocations, and 
decisions by foreign courts.
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3. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed 
fitness standards for SEFs and DCMs. The Commission further requests 
comment on the questions set forth below.
    1. Should SEFs and DCMs be required to establish additional fitness 
standards for officers or members of the board of directors whose 
background, although not automatically disqualifying under proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.207 or 38.801, raises concerns about the individual's 
ability to effectively govern, manage, or influence the operations or 
decision-making of a SEF or DCM? If so, is ``sufficiently good repute'' 
an appropriate fitness standard for officers and members of the board 
of directors (or anyone performing similar functions) of a SEF or DCM?
    2. The Commission quoted above a ``sufficiently good repute'' 
standard, for purposes of a potential requirement that SEFs and DCMs 
require members of their boards of directors and officers be of good 
repute. Please explain whether you agree with that standard. Does such 
standard provide sufficient flexibility to SEFs and DCMs? Should such 
standard be more detailed and list specific criteria or factors 
evidencing good repute? Would ``sufficiently good repute,'' already be 
encompassed in CEA section 8a(3)(M), ``other good cause?''
    3. Is a 10 percent or more ownership interest the appropriate 
threshold to trigger minimum fitness requirements for owners? Is the 
ability to control or direct the management or policies of the DCM the 
appropriate qualifier to trigger minimum fitness standards for 10 
percent or more owners of a SEF or DCM?
    4. Should owners of 10 percent or more be subject to the 
disqualifying disciplinary offenses in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(c) 
and 38.801(c)?
    5. Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(b) and 38.801(b) apply to ``members 
of the designated contract market with voting privileges'' and 
``members of the swap execution facility with voting privileges,'' 
respectively. Is this an appropriate category of persons to subject to 
the proposed minimum fitness standard requirements? Does this category 
remain relevant to current SEF and DCM governance and business 
structures, or is it no longer applicable?

IV. Proposed Substantive Requirements for Identifying, Managing and 
Resolving Actual and Potential Conflicts of Interest

a. General Requirements for Conflicts of Interest and Definitions--
Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201 and 38.851

1. Existing Regulatory Framework and Definitions
    As described above, SEFs and DCMs must establish and enforce rules 
to minimize conflicts of interest in their decision-making processes 
and establish a process for resolving such conflicts, pursuant to SEF 
Core Principle 12 and DCM Core Principle 16. SEFs and DCMs have 
different standards for addressing conflicts of interest. The DCM Core 
Principle 16 Acceptable Practices provide specific practices that DCMs 
may adopt to demonstrate compliance with aspects of DCM Core Principle 
16. The Commission has not adopted guidance on, or acceptable practices 
in, compliance with the conflicts of interest requirements under SEF 
Core Principle 12. Commission regulation Sec.  1.59, however, addresses 
the management of conflicts of interest for SEFs in connection with 
protecting material non-public information from misuse and 
disclosure.\151\
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    \151\ Commission regulation Sec.  1.59 addresses the management 
of conflicts of interest for self-regulatory organizations, 
including SEFs and DCMs, in connection with protecting material, 
non-public information from use and disclosure. Pursuant to 
Commission regulation Sec.  38.2, DCMs are exempt from Sec.  1.59(b) 
and (c), but must comply with Sec.  1.59(a) and (d); SEFs must 
comply with all subparts of Sec.  1.59.
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    There are several terms defined in the DCM Core Principle 16 
Acceptable Practices and Commission regulation Sec.  1.59(a) which the 
Commission believes are relevant to identifying and resolving conflicts 
of interest that may impact a SEF's or DCM's market regulation 
functions, and which the Commission is proposing to adopt in these 
proposed new conflict of interest rules with certain minor 
modifications as discussed below. The DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices defines a ``public director'' as an individual with no 
material relationship to the DCM and describes the term ``immediate 
family'' to include spouse, parents, children, and siblings. The terms 
``material information,'' ``non-public information,'' ``commodity 
interest,'' ``related commodity interest,'' and ``linked exchange'' are 
defined in Commission regulation Sec.  1.59. ``Material information'' 
is defined in Sec.  1.59(a)(5) to mean information which, if such 
information were publicly known, would be considered important by a 
reasonable person in deciding whether to trade a particular commodity 
interest on a contract market or a swap execution facility, or to clear 
a swap contract through a derivatives clearing organization.\152\ 
``Non-public information'' is defined in Sec.  1.59(a)(6), as 
information which has not been disseminated in a manner which makes it 
generally available to the trading public. Commission regulations 
Sec. Sec.  1.59(a)(8) and (9) define ``commodity interest,'' to include 
all futures, swaps, and options traded on or subject to the rules of a 
SEF or DCM \153\ and ``related commodity interest'' to include any 
commodity interest which is traded on or subject to the rules of a SEF, 
DCM, linked exchange, or other board of trade, exchange, or market, or 
cleared by a DCO, other than the self-regulatory organization \154\ by 
which a person is employed, and which is subject to a self-regulatory 
organization's intermarket spread margins or other special margin 
treatment.
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    \152\ The definition of material information in Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.59(a)(5) also provides that as used in that 
section, ``material information'' includes, but is not limited to, 
information relating to present or anticipated cash positions, 
commodity interests, trading strategies, the financial condition of 
members of self-regulatory organizations or members of linked 
exchanges or their customers, or the regulatory actions or proposed 
regulatory actions of a self-regulatory organization or a linked 
exchange.
    \153\ The definition of commodity interest also includes futures 
or swaps cleared by a Designated Clearing Organization. Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.59(a)(8).
    \154\ Commission regulation Sec.  1.3 defines this term as a 
contract market (as defined in Sec.  1.3(h)), a swap execution 
facility (as defined in Sec.  1.3(rrrr)), or a registered futures 
association under section 17 of the CEA.
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2. Proposed Rules
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(a) and 38.851(a) would set forth the 
foundational requirement that SEFs and DCMs, respectively, must 
establish a process for identifying, minimizing, and resolving actual 
and potential conflicts of interest that may arise, including, but not 
limited to, conflicts between and among any of the SEF's or DCM's 
market regulation functions; its commercial interests; and the several 
interests of its management, members, owners, customers and market 
participants, other industry participants, and other constituencies. 
These proposed rules would largely codify existing language from the 
DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices.\155\
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    \155\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16.
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    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b) and 38.851(b) would establish 
definitions. As discussed above, many of the terms are already defined 
in existing Commission regulations, and in the acceptable

[[Page 19661]]

practices for compliance with the DCM conflicts of interest core 
principle, and would be duplicated with minor modifications. The 
Commission believes that specifically defining these terms in parts 37 
and 38 of its regulations would provide greater clarity to SEFs and 
DCMs, and to the public, regarding regulatory requirements applicable 
to these entities. Additional reasons for proposing these defined terms 
are discussed below.
    First, the terms ``material information,'' ``non-public 
information,'' ``commodity interest,'' ``related commodity interest,'' 
and ``linked exchange'' would be defined in proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1202(b) and 38.851(b) as they are in Sec.  1.59(a), but modified 
specifically to reference SEFs and DCMs, respectively. Additionally, as 
addressed below, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202(b) and 38.851(b) would 
define ``public director'' and ``family relationship.'' \156\ ``Family 
relationship'' would replace the term ``immediate family'' that is 
currently used in the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices.\157\ 
As discussed above,\158\ proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201 and 38.851 focus 
on conflicts of interests involving a subset of a SEF or DCM's self-
regulatory functions--those that are generally related to the SEF's or 
DCM's obligations to ensure market integrity and proper and orderly 
conduct in its markets, and to deter abusive trading practices. Those 
functions include trade practice surveillance, market surveillance, 
real-time market monitoring, audit trail and recordkeeping enforcement, 
investigations of possible rule violations, and disciplinary actions. 
As discussed above, the Commission is proposing to define ``market 
regulation functions'' in Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(9) and 38.851(b)(9) to 
describe the self-regulatory functions addressed in this rule proposal.
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    \156\ See Section V(b)(3) (addressing the term public director) 
and Section IV(b)(3) (addressing the term family relationship).
    \157\ Section IV(c)(3) herein provides details regarding the 
proposed definitions for public director and family relationship.
    \158\ See Section II(d) herein.
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    Finally, the Commission is proposing a new definition for the term 
``affiliate.'' The Commission recognizes that this term is defined 
elsewhere in the Commission regulations. However, the definition of 
``affiliate'' elsewhere in Commission regulations does not apply to 
SEFs or DCMs.\159\ For the limited purpose of this rule proposal, the 
Commission proposes defining ``affiliate'' in proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1201(b)(1) and 38.851(b)(1), to mean a person that directly or 
indirectly controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control 
with, the SEF or DCM (as applicable). The definition of affiliate in 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(1) and 38.851(b)(1) would establish 
that, for purposes of this rule proposal, ``affiliate'' broadly 
includes direct or indirect common ownership or control.
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    \159\ For example, Sec.  162.2(a) defines ``affiliate'' 
specifically in relation to futures commission merchant, retail 
foreign exchange dealer, commodity trading advisor, commodity pool 
operator, introducing broker, major swap participant, or swap 
dealer.
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b. Conflicts of Interest in Decision-Making--Proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1202 and 38.852

1. Background
    Officers, members of the board of directors, committees, and 
disciplinary panels, are the key decision-makers at a SEF or DCM that 
can directly affect the day-to-day execution of market regulation 
functions. Therefore, the Commission believes individuals fulfilling 
these roles must have the ability to make informed and impartial 
decisions. If any of these decision-makers have an actual or potential 
conflict of interest, it can impair the decision-making process of the 
SEF or DCM. Accordingly, the Commission is proposing to codify and 
harmonize for SEFs and DCMs, in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 38.852, 
respectively, certain elements of Commission regulation Sec.  1.69 that 
require a self-regulatory organization to address the avoidance of 
conflicts of interest in the execution of its self-regulatory 
functions. As noted above, SEFs are currently subject to the 
requirements of Commission regulation Sec.  1.69; however, DCMs are 
exempt from these requirements pursuant to Commission regulation Sec.  
38.2. Nonetheless, Commission staff has found that as a matter of 
practice, most DCMs have adopted rules that voluntarily implement these 
requirements.
2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    Commission regulation Sec.  1.69 generally requires self-regulatory 
organizations to have rules requiring any member of the board of 
directors, disciplinary committee, or oversight panel, to abstain from 
deliberating and voting on certain matters that may raise conflicts of 
interest. Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(a) includes a list of 
definitions relevant to the section, including the definition of 
``named party in interest,'' which means a person or entity that is 
identified by name as a subject of any matter being considered by a 
governing board, disciplinary committee, or oversight panel. Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.69(b)(1)(i)(A)-(E) enumerates a list of 
relationships. If a member of the board of directors, disciplinary 
committee, or oversight panel, has such a relationship with a named 
party in interest, then this would require the member to abstain from 
deliberating and voting on that matter. Prior to the consideration of 
any matter involving a named party in interest, Commission regulation 
Sec.  1.69(b)(1)(ii) requires members of a governing board, 
disciplinary committee or oversight panel to disclose their 
relationships with the named party in interest. Commission regulation 
Sec.  1.69(b)(1)(iii) requires self-regulatory organizations to 
establish procedures for determining whether any members of governing 
boards, disciplinary committees or oversight panels are subject to a 
conflicts restriction in any matter involving a named party in 
interest, and specifies certain requirements for making such 
determinations.
    Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(b)(2) requires members of 
governing boards, disciplinary committees or oversight panels to 
abstain from deliberating and voting in any significant action if the 
member knowingly has a direct and substantial financial interest in the 
result of the vote. Additional requirements for disclosure of interest 
and the procedures for making a conflicts determination are addressed 
in Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  1.69(b)(2)(ii) and (iii), 
respectively. Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(b)(3) permits members of 
governing boards, disciplinary committees or oversight panels, who 
otherwise would be required to abstain from deliberations and voting on 
a matter because of a conflict under Commission regulation Sec.  
1.69(b)(2), to deliberate but not vote on the matter under certain 
circumstances.\160\ Finally, Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(b)(4) 
requires self-regulatory organizations to document certain conflicts 
determination requirements.
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    \160\ Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(b)(3)(ii) lists the 
following factors for the deliberating body to consider in 
determining whether to allow such member to participate in 
deliberations: (1) if the member's participation is necessary to 
achieve a quorum; and (2) whether the member has unique or special 
expertise, knowledge or experience in the matter under 
consideration.
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3. Proposed Rules
    The Commission proposes to include certain elements of Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.69 in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 38.852, and to 
make a conforming amendment to Commission regulation

[[Page 19662]]

Sec.  37.2 to exempt SEFs from Commission regulation Sec.  1.69. While 
the intent behind Commission regulation Sec.  1.69 remains relevant, 
the Commission believes that certain modifications and enhancements are 
necessary to reflect the current state of the futures and swaps 
markets. For example, Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(b)(1)(i)(C) 
describes a relationship with a named party in interest through a 
``broker association'' as defined in Sec.  156.1. While this 
relationship may have been significant at the time Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.69 was adopted, the Commission does not believe it 
is necessary to include it in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 38.852 
given the decline of open outcry trading. Furthermore, the scope of 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 38.852 would require a relationship 
with an individual as part of a broker association, as well as other 
professional associations, to be disclosed regardless of whether it is 
an enumerated relationship. The scope of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 
and 38.852 expressly covers officers, as well as members of boards of 
directors, committees, and disciplinary panels,\161\ to accurately 
reflect the individuals and governing bodies that are involved in the 
decision-making processes of a SEF or DCM and that may therefore be 
subject to the same conflicts of interest.
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    \161\ Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(a) defines ``disciplinary 
committee(s),'' ``governing board(s),'' and ``oversight panel(s).''
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    The Commission notes that Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(a)(2) 
currently includes ``family relationship'' as one of the enumerated 
relationships, which is defined as a person's spouse, parent, 
stepparent, child, stepchild, sibling, stepbrother, stepsister, or in-
law. The Commission proposes redefining ``family relationship,'' as the 
person's spouse, parents, children, and siblings, in each case, whether 
by blood, marriage, or adoption, or any person residing in the home of 
the person, as set forth in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(7) and 
38.851(b)(7). This proposed definition focuses on the closeness of the 
relationship that the committee member has with the subject of the 
matter being considered. The proposed definition also reflects a more 
modern description of the relationships intended to be covered. The 
Commission emphasizes that the relationships listed in this proposed 
definition are not exhaustive; rather, each relationship should be 
viewed in light of the particular circumstances surrounding the 
relationship and the closeness of the relationship.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202(a) and 38.852(a) require SEFs and DCMs, 
respectively, to establish policies and procedures requiring any 
officer or member of its board of directors, committees, or 
disciplinary panels to disclose any actual or potential conflicts of 
interest that may be present prior to considering any matter. The 
proposed language is a modernized version of the requirement in 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(b). Although not exhaustive, proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1202(a)(1) and 38.852(a)(1) enumerate certain conflicts 
in which the member or officer: (1) is the subject of any matter being 
considered; (2) is an employer, employee, or colleague \162\ of the 
subject of any matter being considered; (3) has a family relationship 
with the subject of any matter being considered; or (4) has any ongoing 
business relationship with or a financial interest in the subject of 
any matter being considered.\163\ The Commission is proposing 
Sec. Sec.  37.1202(a)(2) and 38.852(a)(2) to extend the conflicts of 
interest enumerated in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202(a)(1) and 
38.852(a)(1) to also apply to relationships that an officer or member 
of its board of directors, committees, or disciplinary panels has with 
an affiliate of the subject of any matter being considered.
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    \162\ The Commission proposes replacing the current term 
``fellow employee'' with ``colleague'' to include individuals with 
whom the officer or director may have a collegial relationship, but 
may not be employed by the same employer. As an example, two 
individuals who worked in the same office, where the first is a 
full-time employee of the organization, and the other works 
alongside the first but is employed by an outside contractor, would 
be considered colleagues for purposes of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 
and 38.852.
    \163\ The Commission believes that this relationship, along with 
the overarching requirement in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202(a) and 
38.852(a) requiring an officer or member of its board of directors, 
committees, or disciplinary panels to disclose any actual or 
potential conflicts of interest that may be present prior to 
considering any matter, are sufficient for addressing conflicts of 
interest involving financial interest. Accordingly, the Commission 
is not proposing to include in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 or 38.852 
a parallel to existing Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(b)(2)'s 
requirements concerning financial interests in significant actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the evolution of market structures has 
increased the interconnectedness between SEFs, DCMs, and their 
affiliates. This relationship between a SEF or DCM and its affiliates--
and by extension, the officers, members of the board of directors, 
committees, or disciplinary panels--could create, in the Commission's 
view, an actual or potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, the 
Commission believes proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202(a)(2) and 38.852(a)(2) 
is necessary to mitigate conflicts of interest in a SEF's or DCM's 
decision-making.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202(b) and 38.852(b) largely track existing 
requirements in Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(b)(4) and require the 
board of directors, committee, or disciplinary panel to document its 
processes for complying with the requirements of the proposed rules, 
and such documentation must include: (1) the names of all members and 
officers who attended the relevant meeting in person or who otherwise 
were present by electronic means; and (2) the names of any members and 
officers who voluntarily recused themselves or were required to abstain 
from deliberations or voting on a matter and the reason for the recusal 
or abstention. To ensure the intent of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 
38.852 is captured, the Commission continues to require voluntary 
recusals to be documented, in addition to the instances in which a 
determination was made to require the abstention of an officer or 
member of a board of directors, committee, or disciplinary panel.
    In a limited number of circumstances, Commission regulation Sec.  
1.69(b)(3) permits members of governing boards, disciplinary committee, 
or oversight panel, who otherwise would be required to abstain from 
deliberations and voting on a matter because of a conflict under 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(b)(2), to deliberate but not vote on 
the matter. The Commission is not proposing to adopt this exemption. If 
a board of directors, committee or panel believes that it has 
insufficient expertise to consider a matter, the Commission encourages 
the committee to seek information from an expert or consultant that is 
not subject to a conflicts restriction. The Commission believes it is 
imperative for boards of directors, committees, and disciplinary panels 
to have access to unbiased, conflict-free information to assist in 
decision-making.
4. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed 
conflicts of interest in decision-making rules. The Commission further 
requests comment on the questions set forth below.
    1. Should the Commission enumerate certain other relationships or 
circumstances that may give rise to an actual or potential conflict of 
interest? If so, which relationships or circumstances?
    2. Does the proposed definition of ``family relationship'' cover 
the appropriate types of relationships?

[[Page 19663]]

Should any relationships be added or removed from the proposed 
definition?

c. Limitations on the Use and Disclosure of Material Non-public 
Information--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853

1. Background
    Preventing the misuse and disclosure of material non-public 
information at SEFs and DCMs further the objectives of promoting self-
regulation of exchanges and maintaining public confidence in SEF and 
DCM markets. The CEA includes prohibitions on the misuse and disclosure 
of material non-public information. It is unlawful for any person who 
is an employee, member of the governing board, or member of any 
committee of a board of trade, to willfully and knowingly (1) trade for 
such person's own account, or for or on behalf of any other account, in 
contracts for future delivery or option thereon on the basis of any 
material non-public information obtained through special access related 
to the performance of such person's official duties as an employee or 
member; or (2) to disclose for any purpose inconsistent with the 
performance of such person's official duties as an employee or member, 
any material non-public information obtained through special access 
related to the performance of such duties.\164\ Furthermore, a 
potential conflict of interest arises when employees or insiders with 
access to material non-public information leverage their insider access 
to advance their personal interests, or the interests of others, to the 
detriment of the decision-making process of the contract market. The 
Commission believes reducing the potential for such misuse of material 
nonpublic information helps to mitigate conflicts of interest. 
Accordingly, the Commission is proposing new rules to implement 
elements of the conflicts of interest core principles for SEFs and 
DCMs, within parts 37 and 38, respectively, that are consistent with 
existing requirements under current Commission regulation Sec.  1.59, 
which establishes limitations on the use and disclosure of material 
non-public information. The proposed rules would establish prohibitions 
on the use or disclosure of material non-public information by: (1) 
employees of the SEF or DCM; and (2) members of the board of directors, 
committee members, consultants and those with an ownership interest of 
10 percent or more in the SEF or DCM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ CEA section 9(e), 7 U.S.C. 13(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, the Commission is proposing to harmonize and streamline 
SEF and DCM requirements related to the safeguarding of material non-
public information by proposing rules under Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 
38.853, and to make conforming amendments to Commission regulation 
Sec.  37.2 to exempt SEFs from Commission regulation Sec.  1.59. As 
discussed in more detail below, the proposal would establish consistent 
rules for SEFs and DCMs related to the use and disclosure of material 
non-public information.
2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    Commission regulation Sec.  1.59 generally requires self-regulatory 
organizations to adopt rules prohibiting employees, governing board 
members, committee members or consultants from trading commodity 
interests on the basis of material non-public information obtained in 
the course of their official duties. Under Commission regulation Sec.  
1.59, employees of self-regulatory organizations are subject to 
stricter trading prohibitions than governing board members, committee 
members or consultants. Specifically, employees are prohibited from 
trading in any commodity interest traded on or cleared by the employing 
SEF, DCM or DCO, or from trading in any related commodity interest. 
Additionally, employees having access to material non-public 
information concerning a commodity interest are prohibited from trading 
in any such commodity interest that is traded on or cleared by any SEF, 
DCM or DCO, or any linked exchange.\165\
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    \165\ Commission regulation Sec.  1.59(a)(7) defines linked 
exchange to include any exchange or board of trade outside of the 
United States that lists products traded on the SEF or DCM, or that 
has an agreement with a SEF or DCM to permit positions in one 
commodity interest to be liquidated on the other market, or any 
clearing organizations that clears the products in any of the 
foregoing markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Members of the board of directors, committee members, and 
consultants of a self-regulatory organization, on the other hand, are 
prohibited from using material non-public information for any purpose 
other than the performance of their official duties. The possession of 
material non-public information, therefore, does not absolutely bar 
these individuals from trading commodity interests. Rather, under 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.59(d), members of the board of directors, 
committee members, or consultants of a self-regulatory organization are 
directly prohibited from trading for their own account, or for or on 
behalf of any other account, based on this material non-public 
information.
    The direct prohibitions under Commission regulation Sec.  1.59(d) 
were adopted in 1993 to effectuate section 214 of the Futures Trading 
Practices Act (``FTPA'') of 1992, which, among other things, makes it a 
felony for employees and governing members of self-regulatory 
organizations to disclose or trade on inside information and for 
tippees of such insiders to trade on inside information so 
disclosed.\166\ Historically, the Commission has adopted a more lenient 
standard for governing board members and committee members.\167\ A more 
lenient standard helps to ensure that a trading prohibition does not 
impair the ability or diminish willingness of knowledgeable industry 
members who also are active traders from serving on a self-regulatory 
organization's board of directors or its major policy or disciplinary 
committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ Final Rule, Prohibition on Insider Trading, 58 FR 54966 
(Oct. 25, 1993).
    \167\ When Commission regulation Sec.  1.59 was first proposed, 
it proposed to apply the same standard to employees and governing 
board members and committee members. Activities of Self-Regulatory 
Organization Employees and Governing Members Who Possess Material, 
Nonpublic Information, 50 FR 24533 (June 11, 1985). In response to 
public comment, however, the Commission initially finalized Sec.  
1.59 without addressing what obligations applied to members of the 
governing board of committee members. Instead, the Commission 
adopted the more lenient standard in a separate rulemaking. 
Activities of Self-Regulatory Organization Employees Who Possess 
Material, Non-Public Information, 51 FR 44866 (Dec. 12, 1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While Sec.  1.59(b) prohibits trading in commodity interests or 
related commodity interests by employees, the rule also provides that 
exemptions may be granted. Under current Sec.  1.59(b)(2)(ii)(b), a 
self-regulatory organization may adopt rules setting forth 
circumstances under which exemptions may be granted, as long as those 
exemptions are consistent with the CEA, the purposes of Sec.  1.59, 
just and equitable principles of trade, and the public interest. 
Exemptions also may be granted, under rules adopted by a self-
regulatory organization, in situations where an employee participates 
in a pooled investment vehicle without direct or indirect control of 
such vehicle.\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ Commission regulation Sec.  1.59(b)(ii)(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The prohibitions and requirements under Sec.  1.59 apply 
differently to SEFs and DCMs. As a result of the core principles 
framework promulgated under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 
2000, DCMs were relieved from many rule-based requirements in favor of 
core principles. Consequently, DCMs were exempted from Sec.  1.59(b) 
and (c). However, employees, governing board members, committee 
members, and consultants at DCMs are not exempted from

[[Page 19664]]

Sec.  1.59(d).\169\ In addition to the Commission's statutory authority 
on insider trading,\170\ the DCM Core Principle 16 Guidance states that 
DCMs should provide for appropriate limitations on the use or 
disclosure of material non-public information gained through 
performance of official duties by members of the board of directors, 
committee members, and DCM employees or gained by those through an 
ownership interest in the DCM.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ Under the provisions of Commission regulation Sec.  
1.59(d), no employee, governing board member, committee member, or 
consultant shall trade for such person's own account, or for or on 
behalf of any other account, in any commodity interest, on the basis 
of any material, non-public information obtained through special 
access related to the performance of such person's official duties 
as an employee, governing board member, committee member, or 
consultant. Furthermore, such persons must not disclose for any 
purpose inconsistent with the performance of their official duties 
as an employee, governing board member, committee member, or 
consultant any material, non-public information obtained through 
special access related to the performance of such duties. In 
addition, no person shall trade for their own account, or for or on 
behalf of any other account, in any commodity interest, on the basis 
of any material, non-public information that such person knows was 
obtained in violation of paragraph (d)(1) of Sec.  1.59 from an 
employee, governing board member, committee member, or consultant.
    \170\ CEA section 9(e).
    \171\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16.
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    In contrast, Commission regulation Sec.  1.59 applies in its 
entirety to SEFs. Unlike for DCMs, the Commission did not adopt any 
guidance or acceptable practices addressing how a SEF may demonstrate 
compliance with SEF Core Principle 12 related to appropriate 
limitations on the use and disclosure of material non-public 
information.
3. Proposed Rules
    The Commission is proposing harmonized rules for SEFs and DCMs 
related to the use and disclosure of material non-public information 
from Sec.  1.59.\172\ Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(a) and 38.853(a) 
require SEFs and DCMs to establish and enforce policies and procedures 
on safeguarding the use and disclosure of material non-public 
information. These policies and procedures must, at a minimum, prohibit 
a SEF or DCM employee, member of the board of directors, committee 
member, consultant, or owner with a 10 percent or more interest in the 
SEF or DCM, from trading commodity interests or related commodity 
interests based on, or disclosing, any non-public information obtained 
through the performance of their official duties. As discussed in more 
detail below, the scope of individuals subject to trading limitations 
under this proposed rule is consistent with those individuals subject 
to the trading limitations under both existing Sec.  1.59 and existing 
Core Principle 16 Guidance. The proposal codifies existing Core 
Principle 16 Guidance which considers appropriate limitations on those 
with an ownership interest in the exchange. The proposal clarifies that 
the limitation would apply to those with an ownership interest of 10 
percent or more in the SEF or DCM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ This rule proposal would not amend Commission regulation 
Sec.  1.59, which will remain unchanged and continue to be 
applicable to registered futures associations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(b) and 38.853(b) require SEFs and DCMs, 
respectively, to prohibit employees from certain types of trading \173\ 
or disclosing for any purpose inconsistent with the performance of the 
person's official duties as an employee any material non-public 
information obtained as a result of such person's employment. The 
Commission believes that such a stringent restriction is necessary for 
employees, who, by virtue of their official position, have access to 
material non-public information. However, the Commission also 
recognizes that there may be limited circumstances under which 
employees should be exempted from the trading restrictions, so long as 
the subject trading is not pursuant to material non-public information. 
Accordingly, the Commission is proposing rules requiring SEFs and DCMs 
to oversee exemptions from the trading prohibition granted to 
employees.\174\ Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(c) and 38.853(c) would 
allow SEFs and DCMs, respectively, to grant exemptions that are (1) 
approved by the SEF or DCM ROC; (2) granted only in limited 
circumstances in which the employee requesting the exemption can 
demonstrate that the trading is not being conducted on the basis of 
material non-public information gained through the performance of their 
official duties; and (3) individually documented by the SEF or DCM in 
accordance with requirements in existing Commission regulations 
Sec. Sec.  37.1000 and 37.1001 or Sec. Sec.  38.950 and 38.951, 
respectively.
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    \173\ Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(b)(1) and 38.853(b)(1) 
restrict trading directly or indirectly, in the following: (1) Any 
commodity interest traded on the employing designated contract 
market; (2) Any related commodity interest; (3) A commodity interest 
traded on designated contract markets or swap execution facilities 
or cleared by derivatives clearing organizations other than the 
employing designated contract market if the employee has access to 
material non-public information concerning such commodity interest; 
or (4) A commodity interest traded on or cleared by a linked 
exchange if the employee has access to material non-public 
information concerning such commodity interest.
    \174\ The exemptions, applicable only to SEF or DCM employees 
trading on the SEF or DCM, or trading in the same or related 
commodity interests, would be administered on a case-by-case basis, 
at the level of granularity appropriate for the situation, 
considering all relevant factors. The exemptions would be reviewed 
by Commission staff as part of its routine oversight of SEFs and 
DCMs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its routine oversight, Commission staff has observed certain 
deficiencies in the manner in which DCMs evaluated, granted, and 
documented exemptions from their trading prohibitions. As a result, the 
Commission is proposing Sec. Sec.  37.1203(d) and 38.853(d) to require 
SEFs and DCMs, respectively, to establish and enforce policies and 
procedures to diligently monitor the trading activity conducted under 
any exemptions granted to ensure compliance with any applicable 
conditions of the exemptions and the SEF's or DCM's policies and 
procedures on the use and disclosure of material non-public 
information. The Commission believes that SEFs and DCMs have an 
obligation to monitor and ensure compliance with any applicable 
conditions of the exemptions that may be granted by the exchange. 
Moreover, SEFs and DCMs must ensure that any granted exemptions are in 
accordance with the exchange's policies and procedures governing 
employees' use and disclosure of material non-public information, as 
well as the CEA and Commission regulations. The Commission believes 
that SEFs and DCMs should already have existing programs to monitor, 
detect, and deter abuses that may arise from trading conducted pursuant 
to an exemption from the employee trading prohibition. Accordingly, a 
SEF or DCM should utilize its existing surveillance program to monitor 
trading by employees or other insiders who are granted trading 
exemptions pursuant to proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(c) and 38.853(c). 
Such surveillance should focus on the commodity interests or related 
commodity interests to which the non-public information relates and the 
time period during which misuse of such information reasonably could be 
expected to occur.
    The Commission continues to believe it is an important policy 
objective to ensure that the trading prohibition does not impair the 
ability or diminish the willingness of knowledgeable members of the 
industry who also are active traders from serving on a SEF's or DCM's 
board of directors or its major policy or disciplinary committees. The 
Commission, therefore, is maintaining its historical policy of allowing 
SEFs and DCMs flexibility, within limits, to establish rules that may 
restrict governing board members, committee members, employees, and 
consultants from trading in commodity interests for their own account, 
or for or on behalf

[[Page 19665]]

of any other account, based on this material non-public information. 
Accordingly, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(e) and 38.853(e) require SEFs 
and DCMs, respectively, to establish and enforce policies and 
procedures that, at a minimum, prohibit members of the board of 
directors, committee members, employees, consultants, and those with an 
ownership interest of 10 percent or more from: (1) trading in any 
commodity interest or related commodity interest on the basis of any 
material non-public information obtained through the performance of 
such person's official duties; (2) trading in any commodity interest or 
related commodity interest on the basis of any material non-public 
information that such person knows was obtained in violation of this 
section; or (3) disclosing for any purpose inconsistent with the 
performance of the person's official duties any material non-public 
information obtained as a result of their official duties.
    The Commission is expanding the scope of the direct prohibition on 
trading based on material non-public information under proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1203(e) and 38.853(e) as compared to existing Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.59 in three ways. First, the Commission is proposing 
to apply the prohibitions already applicable to employees in Sec.  
1.59(b), regarding trading in ``related commodity interests,'' to 
governing board members, committee members, and consultants who are in 
possession of material non-public information.\175\ Consistent with the 
definition of ``related commodity interests,'' in Sec.  1.59(a)(9), the 
Commission believes that the direct prohibitions on trading while in 
the possession of material non-public information should include 
related commodity interests whose price movements correlate with the 
price movements of a commodity interest traded on or subject to the 
rules of a SEF or DCM to such a degree that intermarket spread margins 
or special margin treatment is recognized or established by the 
employer SEF or DCM.\176\ Second, the Commission is proposing to codify 
existing DCM Core Principle 16 Guidance related to those with an 
ownership interest in Sec. Sec.  37.1203(e)(3) and 38.853(e)(3). While 
this expands the scope of individuals subject to trading limitations as 
compared to existing Commission regulation Sec.  1.59, it is codifying 
existing Core Principle 16 Guidance, with one clarification. 
Specifically, with regards to owners, the Commission is clarifying that 
the direct prohibition under Sec. Sec.  37.1203(e) and 38.853(e) would 
only apply to those with an ownership interest of 10 percent or more in 
the SEF or DCM.\177\ Third, while the proposed rules continue to 
maintain a restriction on the disclosure of material non-public 
information, the proposal would address differences in the existing 
language between Sec. Sec.  1.59(b)(1)(D)(ii) and 1.59(d)(ii) regarding 
the restrictions on the disclosure of material non-public information. 
The Commission is proposing the same restriction on disclosure for both 
employees under Sec. Sec.  37.1203(b)(2) and 38.853(b)(3) and members 
of the board of directors, committee members, consultants, and those 
with an ownership interest of 10 percent or more under Sec. Sec.  
37.1203(e)(3) and 38.853(e)(3), to make clear that these ``insiders'' 
would be subject to the same restriction from disclosing material non-
public information obtained as a result of their official duties at a 
SEF or DCM.
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    \175\ Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(e)(1) and 38.853(e)(1).
    \176\ See proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(15) and 38.851(b)(15) 
(defining ``related commodity interests'').
    \177\ Owners of 10 percent or more of a company are considered 
``insiders'' pursuant to section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. See section IV(C) herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As mentioned in Section IV.b, the Commission is proposing to 
include substantial sections of existing definitions from Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.59 in proposed parts 37 and 38. For example, the 
proposal includes, for purposes of Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853, the 
same historical definitions of (1) ``commodity interest,'' (2) ``linked 
exchange,'' (3) ``material information,'' (4) ``non-public 
information,'' and (5) ``pooled investment vehicle.'' The Commission is 
proposing non-substantive changes to the (1) ``commodity interest'' and 
(2) ``related commodity interest'' definitions. The proposal would 
update the definition of a commodity interest by removing the phrase 
``of a board of trade which has been designated as a'' and keep the 
reference to ``designated contract market.'' For the ``related 
commodity interest'' definition, the proposal replaces the reference to 
``self-regulatory organization'' with a reference to either a SEF or 
DCM in the regulatory text in parts 37 and 38. The Commission believes 
that it is appropriate for a SEF or DCM to have the ability to grant an 
exemption from the trading prohibition where an employee is 
participating in pooled investment vehicles where the employee has no 
direct or indirect control with respect to transactions executed for or 
on behalf of such vehicles.\178\
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    \178\ In particular, that it would be appropriate to grant an 
employee an exemption to trade in a pooled investment vehicle 
organized and operated as a commodity pool within the meaning of 
Sec.  4.10(d) of the Commission regulations, and whose units of 
participation have been registered under the Securities Act of 1933, 
or a trading vehicle for which Commission regulation Sec.  4.5 makes 
available relief from registration as a commodity pool operation.
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4. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed 
rules regarding the use and disclosure of material non-public 
information. The Commission further requests comment on the questions 
set forth below.
    1. Has the Commission proposed an appropriate definition for 
``material''? If not, why not? What would be a better alternative?
    2. Has the Commission proposed an appropriate definition for ``non-
public information''? If not, why not? What would be a better 
alternative?
    3. Has the Commission proposed appropriate limitations on the use 
and disclosure of material non-public information for SEF and DCM board 
of directors, committee members, employees, consultants, and those with 
an ownership interest of 10 percent or more? If not, why not? What 
would be a better alternative?
    4. With regards to owners, has the Commission proposed an 
appropriate limitation in applying the restrictions under Sec. Sec.  
37.1203(e) and 38.853(e) to those with an ownership interest of 10 
percent or more in the SEF or DCM? Should the restriction be applied to 
all those with an ownership interest in the SEF or DCM? If not, why 
not? What would be a better alternative?

V. Proposed Structural Governance Requirements for Identifying, 
Managing and Resolving Actual and Potential Conflicts of Interest

    In general, the proposed structural governance requirements are 
intended to mitigate conflicts of interest at a SEF or DCM by 
introducing a perspective independent of competitive, commercial, or 
industry considerations to the deliberations of governing bodies (i.e., 
the board of directors and committees). The Commission believes that 
such independent perspective would be more likely to encompass 
regulatory considerations, and accord such considerations proper 
weight. The Commission believes that such independent perspective also 
would more likely contemplate the manner in which a decision might 
affect all constituencies, as opposed to

[[Page 19666]]

concentrating on the manner in which a decision affects the interests 
of one or a limited number of constituencies.\179\ The Commission 
further believes that independent decision-makers are necessary to 
protect a SEF's or DCM's market regulation functions from its 
commercial interests and that of its constituencies.
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    \179\ See 2007 Final Release, 72 FR 6936 at 6947 (stating that 
the public interest will be furthered if the boards and executive 
committees of all DCMs are at least 35% public. Such boards and 
committees will gain an independent perspective that is best 
provided by directors with no current industry ties or other 
relationships which may pose a conflict of interest. These public 
directors, representing over one-third of their boards, will 
approach their responsibilities without the conflicting demands 
faced by industry insiders. They will be free to consider both the 
needs of the DCM and of its regulatory mission, and may best 
appreciate the manner in which vigorous, impartial, and effective 
self-regulation will serve the interests of the DCM and the public 
at large. Furthermore, boards of directors that are at least 35% 
public will help to promote widespread confidence in the integrity 
of U.S. futures markets and self-regulation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Accordingly, the Commission is proposing to require a SEF's or 
DCM's board of directors, and any executive committee, to include at 
least 35 percent public directors. The Commission also proposes 
establishing two committees to further enhance the structural 
governance of SEFs and DCMs. First, the proposed rules would require a 
nominating committee that is comprised of at least 51 percent public 
directors to enhance the transparency of the board of directors. 
Second, the proposed rules would require a ROC comprised solely of 
public directors to protect the integrity of the market regulation 
function of SEFs and DCMs. The Commission is also proposing a new DCM 
CRO requirement, and updating the existing SEF CCO requirement, to 
clearly establish these roles as central to the SEF's or DCM's 
management of conflicts of interest that may impact market regulation 
functions.

a. Composition and Related Requirements for Board of Directors--
Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204 and 38.854

1. Background
    As the ultimate decision-maker of an exchange, governing boards are 
an essential component in an exchange's ability to identify, manage, 
and resolve conflicts of interest.\180\ In particular, the board of 
directors, along with senior management, set the ``tone at the top'' 
for a SEF's or DCM's governance and compliance culture.\181\ In its 
routine oversight, Commission staff has observed that board composition 
standards have become a key piece of SEFs' and DCMs' structural 
governance, and when coupled with clear, comprehensive policies and 
procedures to address conflicts of interest, have helped to minimize 
conflicts of interests faced by members of the board of directors. For 
example, the presence of public directors, both on the board of 
directors and the ROC, has created an avenue for DCMs, SEFs, their 
officers and employees to escalate, and eventually seek resolution of, 
conflicts of interest.
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    \180\ See 2007 Final Release, 72 FR 6936.
    \181\ Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 a.m. 
CRIM. L. REV. 933, 946-947 (2017); Group of Thirty, Banking Conduct 
and Culture, A Call for Sustained and Comprehensive Reform, 
Washington, DC, July 2015; The Role of the Board of Directors and 
Senior Management in Enterprise Risk Management, by Bruce C. 
Branson, Chapter 4, Enterprise Risk Management: Today's Leading 
Research and Best Practices for Tomorrow's Executives, 2nd Edition, 
edited by John R. S. Fraser, Rob Quail, Betty Simkins, Copyright 
2021 John Wiley & Sons; See also comments from former SEC Chair Mary 
Jo White, to the Stanford University Rock Center for Corporate 
Governance, June 23, 2014, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch062314mjw (accessed June 24, 2023) (``It is up to directors, 
along with senior management under the purview of the board, to set 
the all-important ``tone at the top'' [regarding compliance with 
federal securities laws] for the entire company.'').
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2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    Currently, the board of director composition component of the DCM 
Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices provides that a DCM's board of 
directors or executive committees include at least 35 percent public 
directors.\182\ In adopting this acceptable practice, the Commission 
stated that the 35 percent figure struck an appropriate balance between 
(1) the need to minimize conflicts of interest in DCM decision-making 
processes and (2) the need for expertise and efficiency in such 
processes.\183\
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    \182\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(1).
    \183\ 2007 Final Release, 72 FR 6936 at 6946-6947.
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    As compared to DCMs, SEFs are currently subject to substantially 
different board composition standards. Specifically, SEFs are subject 
to Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(b)(1), which establish a 20 percent 
``non-member'' requirement.\184\ This requirement was adopted in 1993 
for SROs when exchanges were member-owned. At the time, the Commission 
sought to ensure that an SRO governing board fairly represented the 
diversity of membership interest at such SRO \185\ and would not have 
an exclusively member perspective.\186\ While this was a laudable goal 
at the time, Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(b)(1) requirements are no 
longer relevant for SEFs and DCMs given that exchanges are no longer 
member-owned. The Commission's goal through this proposal is to ensure 
that SEFs and DCMs have sufficient independent perspective in their 
decision-making, taking into account that SEFs and DCMs are now for-
profit entities that also are charged with market regulation functions. 
Applying Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(b)(1) has created an 
unintentional consequence of allowing SEFs to compose their boards of 
directors with ``insiders.'' SEFs with no independent voice on the 
board, either through inclusion of public directors or other non-
affiliated directors, have been able to meet the requirements of 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(b)(1). For example, if an executive 
was seconded to the SEF from an affiliate (therefore, not a ``salaried 
employee''), and only spent a fraction of their time performing 
services for the SEF (therefore, not ``primarily performing services'' 
for the SEF), the executive could arguably be deemed to satisfy the 
``non-member'' requirement of Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(b)(1). 
Under the current DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices, however, 
the executive would not likely be considered a public director and 
therefore, to meet the acceptable practices, could not be included as a 
director that satisfies the board composition standards.
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    \184\ Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(b)(1) requires that 
twenty percent of the board of directors must be persons who are (1) 
knowledgeable of futures trading or financial regulation or 
otherwise capable of contributing to governing board deliberations; 
and (2) not members of the SEF, not currently salaried employees of 
the SEF, not primarily performing services for the SEF, and not 
officers, principals or employees of a member firm.
    \185\ Final Rule and Rule Amendments Concerning Composition of 
Various Self-Regulatory Organization Governing Boards and Major 
Disciplinary Committees, 58 FR 37644 at 37646 (July 13, 1993).
    \186\ Id. at 37647.
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    The Commission continues to believe that the practice of including 
in the board of directors at least 35 percent public directors, as 
reflected in the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices, is 
appropriate for DCMs, and that it is also is appropriate for SEFs. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Commission has considered the board 
composition requirements applicable to publicly-traded companies, which 
require that a majority of the board of directors must be 
``independent'' directors.\187\ However, the goal of this higher 
threshold, which is to protect shareholders of publicly-traded 
companies through boards of directors that are sufficiently independent 
from

[[Page 19667]]

management, is not entirely the same as the Commission's concern at 
hand.
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    \187\ NYSE American Company Guide Rule 802; Nasdaq Rule 5605(b).
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    The Commission's primary goal with respect to Core Principle 16 is 
to ensure that the commercial interests of SEFs and DCMs and of its 
constituencies do not compromise market regulation functions. 
Accordingly, the Commission recognizes the need to have individuals on 
the board of directors with sufficient background and expertise to 
support the SEF's or DCM's market functions. The Commission, however, 
also is cognizant of the importance of having individuals with 
sufficient independent perspectives on the board of directors to ensure 
that the SEF or DCM can properly manage conflicts in its decision-
making. Indeed, publicly-traded companies are moving towards requiring 
that a majority of the board of directors must be independent 
directors. However, the Commission believes that imposing a majority 
threshold in all circumstances may deny SEFs and DCMs the flexibility 
necessary to ensure that the board of directors includes individuals 
with adequate market expertise. The Commission is currently unaware of 
any circumstances that would support requiring public directors to 
constitute a majority of the board of directors of every SEF or DCM. 
Therefore, the Commission is proposing a bright-line threshold that 
would balance the need to ensure proper representation of impartial 
views with the need for market expertise. In doing so, the Commission 
recognizes that SEF and DCM boards of directors may vary in size. 
However, based on the Commission's observation of existing SEFs and 
DCMs, the Commission believes that a minimum threshold of 35 percent 
public directors would lead to at least two public directors on most 
SEF and DCM boards of directors. At the same time, the proposal would 
allow SEFs and DCMs the discretion to establish a higher threshold.
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed 35 
percent public director board composition requirements, including 
comments on the specific questions listed below in this section.
3. Proposed Rules
    The Commission proposes to enhance the existing board composition 
standards for both SEFs and DCMs by: (1) codifying in proposed Sec.  
38.854(a)(1) the practice under the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices that DCM boards of directors be composed of at least 35 
percent ``public directors;'' \188\ (2) extending this requirement to 
SEF boards of directors under proposed Sec.  37.1204(a)(1); \189\ and 
(3) adopting additional requirements to increase transparency and 
accountability of the board of directors. The Commission believes that 
in addressing these board of director composition requirements in 
proposed Sec.  37.1204, it is necessary to amend Commission regulation 
Sec.  37.2 to exempt SEFs from Commission regulation Sec.  1.64, 
including the board of directors composition requirements under 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(b)(1).
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    \188\ Proposed Sec.  38.854(a)(1).
    \189\ Proposed Sec.  37.1204(a)(1).
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    In addition to proposing board of director composition 
requirements, the Commission proposes the substantive requirements set 
forth below, which aim to enhance transparency and the accountability 
of the SEF and DCM board of directors regarding the manner in which 
such board of directors causes the SEF or DCM to discharge all 
statutory, regulatory, or self-regulatory responsibilities under the 
CEA, including the market regulation functions.
     A SEF or DCM must establish and enforce policies and 
procedures outlining the roles and responsibilities of the board of 
directors, including the manner in which the board of directors 
oversees compliance with all statutory, regulatory, and self-regulatory 
responsibilities under the CEA and the regulations promulgated 
thereunder.\190\
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    \190\ Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(a)(2) and 38.854(a)(2).
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     A SEF or DCM must have procedures to remove a member from 
the board of directors, where the conduct of such member is likely to 
be prejudicial to the sound and prudent management of the SEF or 
DCM.\191\
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    \191\ Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(e) and 38.854(e).
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     A SEF or DCM must notify the Commission within five 
business days of any changes to the membership of the board of 
directors or its committees.\192\
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    \192\ Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(f) and 38.854(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the complex nature of the SEF and DCM marketplace, their role 
as self-regulators over their markets, and the overall impact of such 
exchanges on the integrity, resilience, and vibrancy of U.S. 
derivatives and financial markets, the Commission proposes in 
Sec. Sec.  37.1204(b) and 38.854(b) to require that each member of a 
SEF or DCM board of directors have relevant expertise to fulfill the 
roles and responsibilities of their position. The Commission believes 
that experience in financial services, risk management, and financial 
regulation are examples of relevant expertise.
    The Commission proposes Sec. Sec.  37.1204(c) and 38.854(c) to 
prohibit linking the compensation of public directors and other non-
executive members of the board of directors to the business performance 
of the SEF or DCM, or any affiliate of the SEF or DCM. The Commission 
believes prohibiting compensation in this manner would help enable non-
executive directors to remain independent and focused on making 
objective decisions for the SEF or DCM. The Commission further believes 
it is necessary to capture all compensation--from either the SEF or the 
DCM or an affiliate--that a public director or non-executive member of 
the board could receive. Whether a specific compensation arrangement is 
``directly dependent on the business performance'' of the SEF or DCM, 
or its affiliates, as contemplated under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(c) 
and 38.854(c), would depend on specific facts and circumstances. The 
Commission understands that it may be industry practice to include some 
form of nominal equity in a compensation package. The Commission does 
not consider nominal equity ownership interest, in and of itself, to be 
compensation that is ``directly dependent on the business performance'' 
of the SEF or DCM or its affiliates. However, the Commission considers 
any equity ownership interest in a SEF or DCM or its affiliates that is 
more than nominal to be compensation that is ``directly dependent on 
the business performance'' of the SEF or DCM or its affiliates. In 
addition, the Commission believes that providing bonuses based on 
specific sales or customer acquisition targets would constitute 
compensation that is ``directly dependent on the business performance'' 
of the SEF or DCM or its affiliates. Finally, any equity ownership 
included as a component of public director compensation that reasonably 
could be viewed as being substantial enough to potentially compromise 
the impartiality of a public director would not be considered nominal.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(d) and 38.854(d) require SEFs' and 
DCMs' board of directors to conduct an annual self-assessment to review 
their performance. The Commission believes that such self-assessments 
will encourage boards of directors to reflect on their performance and 
will enhance their accountability to the Commission regarding the 
manner in which such board of directors causes the SEF or DCM to 
discharge all statutory, regulatory, and self-regulatory 
responsibilities under the CEA, including market regulation functions. 
For example, Commission staff may request to see the results of the 
self-

[[Page 19668]]

assessment during a rule enforcement review of the SEF or DCM. The 
Commission notes that many SEF and DCM boards of directors already 
conduct self-assessments, and that this proposal provides significant 
discretion to SEFs and DCMs to determine how best to implement such an 
assessment. The Commission believes that SEFs and DCMs should consider 
including the following in the self-assessment: (1) observations 
relating to the flow of information provided to the board of directors; 
(2) the effects of any changes to the board composition, succession 
planning and human capital management; (3) potential improvement to the 
SEF's or DCM's governance structure; and (4) any other information or 
analysis that would improve the board's ability to perform its duties 
and responsibilities.
4. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed 
board composition requirements. The Commission further requests comment 
on the questions set forth below.
    1. Have there been any industry changes since the adoption of the 
DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices that the Commission should 
consider in adopting board composition requirements for SEFs and DCMs?
    2. Is the 35 percent public director requirement sufficient to 
introduce an independent perspective on a SEF's or DCM's board of 
directors?
    3. Should the Commission increase the required percentage of public 
directors to 51 percent?
    4. Is there a number less than 51 percent but greater than 35 
percent that would be more appropriate?
    5. Should the Commission prohibit public director compensation from 
including any equity ownership?
    6. Should the Commission prescribe a specific numerical limit on 
the amount of equity ownership paid to a public director, and, if so, 
what is the appropriate limit?
    7. What are examples of compensation that would be more than 
nominal or directly dependent on the business performance of a SEF or 
DCM?

b. Public Director Definition--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) and 
38.851(b)(12)

1. Background
    Public directors can be a valuable governance tool for 
organizations, including SEFs and DCMs. As ``outsiders,'' public 
directors are in a unique position to bring an unbiased perspective. 
Their objectivity and independence may enhance the accountability of 
the board of directors and lend credibility to the organization, its 
leaders, and its governance arrangements. Since public directors do not 
have a material relationship with the SEF or DCM, the Commission 
believes they are well-suited to balance the commercial interests of 
the SEF or DCM and its regulatory obligations, including its market 
regulation functions.
2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    The current ``public director'' definition found in the DCM Core 
Principle 16 Acceptable Practices provides for the DCM's board of 
directors to determine, on the record, that the director has no 
``material relationship'' with the DCM (the ``overarching materiality 
test'').\193\ A ``material relationship'' is ``one that reasonably 
could affect the independent judgment or decision-making of the 
director.'' Additionally, the public director definition contains a 
list of per se material relationships (the ``bright-line 
disqualifiers'') that disqualify service as a public director if: (1) 
such director is an officer or an employee of the DCM or an officer or 
an employee of its affiliate; (2) such director is a member of the DCM; 
(3) such director, or a firm in which the director is an officer, 
director, or partner, receives more than $100,000 in aggregate annual 
payments \194\ for legal, accounting, or consulting services from the 
DCM, or an affiliate of the DCM.\195\ Such list is neither exclusive 
nor exhaustive; even if the bright-line disqualifiers are not 
triggered, each public director nominee must satisfy the overarching 
materiality test. Additionally, the bright-line disqualifiers apply to 
a member of the director's ``immediate family,'' which includes spouse, 
parents, children and siblings.\196\ Both the overarching materiality 
test and the bright-line disqualifiers are subject to a one-year look-
back period.\197\ The public director definition in the DCM Core 
Principle 16 Acceptable Practices provides that a DCM's public 
directors may also serve as directors of the DCM's affiliate, so long 
as they satisfy the requirements of the public director 
definition.\198\ Finally, a DCM is obligated to disclose to the 
Commission which members of its board of directors are public 
directors, and the basis for those determinations.\199\
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    \193\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(2)(i).
    \194\ However, compensation for services as a director of the 
DCM or as a director of an affiliate of the DCM does not count 
toward the $100,000 payment limit, nor does deferred compensation 
for services prior to becoming a director, so long as such 
compensation is in no way contingent, conditioned, or revocable.
    \195\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(2)(ii).
    \196\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(2)(ii)(D).
    \197\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(2)(iii).
    \198\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(2)(iv).
    \199\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(2)(v).
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3. Proposed Rules
    The Commission proposes to adopt in Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) and 
38.851(b)(12) a public director definition, similar to the definition 
in the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices, for SEFs and DCMs, 
respectively. The Commission believes that SEFs and DCMs must have a 
board of directors that includes sufficient representation of 
independent perspective through public directors. The Commission 
believes that, in determining whether an individual qualifies as a 
public director, it must be considered whether there are any specific 
interests that would affect the individual's decision-making. In the 
Commission's experience, through its routine oversight of SEFs and 
DCMs, a ``material relationship'' that is based on certain personal or 
professional interests or financial incentives, could affect an 
individual's decision-making.
    While Commission regulation Sec.  1.64 seeks to address the 
conflict of interest that was prevalent when SROs were member-owned--
i.e., that governing boards would have an exclusively member 
perspective \200\--this is no longer the predominant concern for 
existing SEFs and DCMs. In a demutualized exchange environment, the 
conflicts between commercial interests and market regulation functions 
are exacerbated. The Commission believes that the higher standard 
created by the proposed public director definition is reasonably 
necessary to ensure an independent perspective in a demutualized 
exchange environment. Commission staff has identified, through its 
oversight of SEFs, that some SEFs have voluntarily adopted board 
composition requirements that reflect the DCM Core Principle 16 
Acceptable Practices public director definition.
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    \200\ 58 FR 37644 at 37647.
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    The Commission proposes to codify the existing DCM Core Principle 
16 Acceptable Practices public director definition for both SEFs and 
DCMs, with some modifications. First, the proposed definition would 
amend the bright-line disqualifier that applies to a director receiving 
more than $100,000

[[Page 19669]]

in aggregate annual payments to remove the reference ``for legal, 
accounting, or consulting services'' from the SEF or DCM, or an 
affiliate of the SEF or DCM. The bright-line disqualifier would now 
limit receiving any payments in excess of $100,000 for any purpose. The 
proposed rule also would amend this bright-line disqualifier to apply 
to situations where a director is an employee of a firm receiving such 
payments.
    Second, the proposed rule expands the bright-line disqualifier that 
applies to a situation where a director is a member of the SEF or DCM 
or a director, an officer of a member, to also apply where: (1) such 
director is an employee of a member of the SEF or DCM; and (2) extends 
the disqualification to apply to the prospective director's 
relationships, as a director, officer or employee, with an affiliate of 
a member of the SEF or DCM. Third, the Commission proposes expanding 
the scope of the bright-line disqualifiers to account for relationships 
that the director may have with an affiliate of the SEF or DCM or an 
affiliate of a member of the SEF or DCM.
    Fourth, the Commission proposes to establish a new bright-line 
disqualifier that would prohibit an individual who, directly or 
indirectly, owns more than 10 percent of the SEF or DCM or an affiliate 
of the swap execution facility, or is an officer or employee of an 
entity that directly or indirectly owns more than 10 percent of the 
swap execution facility, from serving as a public director.
    Fifth, the proposed public director definition replaces the term 
``immediate family'' and expands the bright-line disqualifiers to apply 
to any person with whom the director has a ``family relationship,'' as 
set forth in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(7) and 38.851(b)(7). 
Finally, the proposed definition includes a new requirement to clarify 
that the public director determination must be made ``upon the 
nomination or appointment of the director and at least on an annual 
basis thereafter.'' Consistent with the proposed fitness requirements 
in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) and 38.851(b)(12), the Commission 
believes all determinations with respect to the public director status 
of members of the board of directors should be completed upon their 
nomination to the board of directors--i.e., prior to their appointment. 
Further, Commission staff's oversight has revealed that not all DCMs 
were diligently reviewing their public director determinations for 
existing directors on an annual basis.
    The Commission believes that the above-mentioned amendments to the 
public director definition are necessary to capture the full scope of 
the relationships that could affect a prospective director's ability to 
bring an independent perspective to the decision-making of a SEF or 
DCM. Eliminating ``legal, accounting, or consulting service'' from the 
bright-line disqualifier that applies to payments in excess of $100,000 
is necessary, as the provision of other services could also be 
``material'' for purposes of establishing whether an individual 
qualifies as a public director. The Commission also proposes to expand 
the bright-line disqualifiers to certain relationships in which the 
director is an employee of: (1) a member of a SEF or DCM or its 
affiliate; and (2) an entity that receives more than $100,000 in 
aggregate annual payments from the SEF or DCM or its affiliate. In 
these situations, the Commission believes the ties between the outside 
entity and the SEF or DCM are close enough to impact the actual or 
perceived ability of the prospective director to bring an independent 
perspective. Furthermore, the Commission notes that such employees 
would likely be restricted from serving as public directors under the 
overarching materiality test. Similarly, the Commission is also 
expanding the bright-line disqualifier to include certain relationships 
with affiliates. The Commission has found, as detailed above, as market 
structures have evolved, growing interconnectedness between SEFs, DCMs, 
and their affiliates. This relationship between a SEF or DCM and its 
affiliates--and by extension, their employees and officers--creates, in 
the Commission's view, a ``material relationship.'' Finally, although 
the 10 percent ownership bright-line disqualifier would be new, the 
Commission believes that an individual with an ownership interest 
greater than 10 percent would not currently qualify as a public 
director under the overarching materiality test. A 10 percent ownership 
of a SEF or DCM is significant enough to call into question, whether in 
actuality or perception, a public director's ability to act in an 
impartial manner to ensure business concerns do not impact market 
regulation functions.
4. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed 
public director definition. The Commission further requests comment on 
the questions set forth below.
    1. Are there other circumstances that the Commission should include 
as bright-line disqualifiers? Are there circumstances that the 
Commission should remove from such tests?
    2. Should the Commission increase or decrease the $100,000 in 
aggregate payment threshold?
    3. Is the one-year look back period sufficient, in order to protect 
market regulation functions from directors that are conflicted due to 
industry ties?
    4. Should the Commission continue to permit public directors to 
serve on the board of directors of a SEF's or DCM's affiliate? Why or 
why not?

c. Nominating Committee and Diverse Representation--Proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1205 and 38.855

1. Background
    As described herein,\201\ the structural governance requirements 
applicable to boards of directors of SEFs and DCMs aim to mitigate 
conflicts of interest through the representation of independent 
perspectives. Public director composition requirements alone may not be 
sufficient to ensure the representation of such independent 
perspective. Commission staff's routine oversight has found that many 
SEFs and DCMs do not currently have formal policies or procedures for 
identifying potential members of the board of directors, and instead 
rely entirely on the personal networks of members of their boards of 
directors or executives. The Commission believes that an independent 
perspective on the SEF or DCM board of directors is necessary to 
mitigate conflicts of interest. Lack of policies or procedures for 
identifying potential members of the board of directors may result in 
delays in the appointment process.
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    \201\ See Section V(a) herein; Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204 and 
38.854.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    DCM Core Principle 17 requires the governance arrangements of a 
board of directors of a DCM to permit consideration of the views of 
market participants. Similarly, pursuant to Commission regulation Sec.  
1.64(b)(3), members of self-regulatory organization governing boards, 
including SEF governing boards, must include a diversity of membership 
interests. However, neither DCMs nor SEFs are currently obligated by 
Commission regulations to have a nominating committee to identify or 
manage the process for nominating potential members of the board of 
directors.
    To help protect the integrity of the process by which a SEF or DCM 
selects members of its board of directors, the Commission proposes 
requiring each

[[Page 19670]]

SEF or DCM to have a nominating committee. The role of the nominating 
committee would be to: (1) identify a diverse pool of individuals 
qualified to serve on the board of directors, consistent with 
Commission regulations; and (2) administer a process for the nomination 
of individuals to the board of directors.
3. Proposed Rules
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855 would require a nominating 
committee to identify a pool of candidates who are qualified and 
represent diverse interests, including the interests of the 
participants and members of the SEF or DCM. Thus, proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1205 and 38.855 incorporate, and expand upon, the diversity of 
membership requirements found in Commission regulation Sec.  1.64, and, 
with respect to DCMs, are consistent with DCM Core Principle 17, and 
reasonably necessary to advance DCM Core Principle 16. Accordingly, the 
Commission proposes conforming amendments to Commission regulation 
Sec.  37.2 to exempt SEFs from Commission regulation Sec.  1.64.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855 would require that public 
directors comprise at least 51 percent of the nominating committee, 
that a public director chair the nominating committee, and that the 
nominating committee report directly to the board of directors. The 
Commission proposes that the nominating committee be at least 51 
percent public directors to limit the influence of non-public directors 
that are already involved in the governance and management of a SEF or 
DCM, and to help ensure a broader pool of candidates for consideration, 
in turn promoting diversity and independent perspectives in the 
governing bodies of SEFs and DCMs. The nominating committee takes the 
first steps in identifying the pool of future members of the board of 
directors, and a broad pool of candidates is critical to maintaining 
independent perspectives on the board of directors. Therefore, the 
Commission is proposing that public directors should represent a 
majority of members of the nominating committee.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855 also would require the 
nominating committee to administer a process for nominating individuals 
to the board of directors. This process must be adopted prior to 
registration as a SEF or designation as a DCM. Similarly, boards of 
directors must be appointed prior to registration or designation. 
However, as set out in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205(b) and 38.855(b) the 
initial members of the board of directors serving upon registration or 
designation would not be required to be appointed by the nominating 
committee.
4. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed 
nominating committee requirements.

d. Regulatory Oversight Committee--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206 and 
38.857

1. Background
    SEFs and DCMs are faced with commercial pressures to remain 
competitive in an industry where business models, trading practices, 
and products are rapidly evolving. As business enterprises, SEFs and 
DCMs are also tasked with maximizing shareholder value, generating 
profits, and satisfying the diverse needs of their constituencies. SEFs 
and DCMs, therefore, may face conflicts between their commercial 
interests and their market regulation obligations.
    Other competing demands may unduly influence a SEF's or DCM's 
market regulation functions, such as the interests of their ownership, 
management, market participants, membership, customers, and other 
constituencies. Externally, SEFs and DCMs may find themselves 
conflicted with affiliated entities--including affiliated entities that 
are directly or indirectly trading on or subject to the rules of the 
SEF or DCM, affiliated entities that are in possession of data acquired 
by or generated from the SEF or DCM, and affiliated entities to whom 
SEF or DCM employees owe duties based on participating in the functions 
of both the affiliated entities and the SEF or DCM. The Commission 
published the ROC component of the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices in 2007 to minimize these conflicts by helping to insulate 
core regulatory functions from improper influences and pressures.\202\ 
In the Commission's experience, ROCs can serve one of the most critical 
elements of a DCM's governance structure for mitigating conflicts of 
interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ 2007 Final Release, 72 FR 6936 at 6940.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    In proposing requirements for SEF and DCM ROCs, the Commission is 
largely codifying language found in the ROC component of the DCM Core 
Principle 16 Acceptable Practices.\203\ Currently, to demonstrate 
compliance under the acceptable practices, a DCM must establish a ROC, 
consisting of only public directors, to assist it in minimizing actual 
and potential conflicts of interest.\204\ A ROC is a standing committee 
of the board of directors.\205\ The purpose of the ROC is to oversee 
the DCM's regulatory program on behalf of the board of directors, which 
in turn delegates sufficient authority, dedicates sufficient resources, 
and allows sufficient time for the ROC to fulfill its mandate.\206\ The 
Acceptable Practices for DCM Core Principle 16 describe a ROC that is 
responsible for the following: (1) monitoring the DCM's regulatory 
program for sufficiency, effectiveness, and independence; (2) 
overseeing all facets of the program; \207\ (3) reviewing the size and 
allocation of the regulatory budget and resources; and the number, 
hiring and termination, and compensation of regulatory personnel; (4) 
supervising the DCM's CRO, who will report directly to the ROC; (5) 
preparing an annual report assessing the DCM's self-regulatory program 
for the board of directors and the Commission; (6) recommending changes 
that would ensure fair, vigorous, and effective regulation; and (7) 
reviewing regulatory proposals and advising the board of directors as 
to whether and how such changes may impact regulation.\208\ In 
performing these functions, the ROC plays a critical role in insulating 
the CRO and the DCM's self-regulatory function from undue influence 
that may exert pressure over the CRO to put a DCM's commercial 
interests ahead of its market regulation functions. The ROC's is 
specifically tasked with oversight of a SEF's or DCM's market 
regulation functions. Conversely, while the interests of the ROC and a 
DCM's CRO or a SEF's CCO are aligned, only the ROC carries with it the 
authority granted by the board of directors. Accordingly, the ROC, 
along with the board of directors and CCO or CRO, are all integral 
components of a SEF's or DCM's conflicts of interest framework.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \203\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices.
    \204\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(3)(i).
    \205\ Id.
    \206\ Id.
    \207\ This includes including trade practice and market 
surveillance; audits, examinations, and other regulatory 
responsibilities with respect to member firms (including ensuring 
compliance with financial integrity, financial reporting, sales 
practice, recordkeeping, and other requirements); and the conduct of 
investigations.
    \208\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(3)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given that SEFs and DCMs face similar pressures that may conflict 
with their market regulation functions--such as trade practice 
surveillance, market surveillance, real-time market monitoring, audit 
trail enforcement, investigations of possible rule violations, and 
disciplinary actions--the

[[Page 19671]]

Commission believes that SEFs and DCMs would benefit from the 
protections that are offered by a ROC.
3. Proposed Rules
i. Codifying DCM Core Principle 16 ROC Acceptable Practices
    Accordingly, the Commission proposes to require in Sec.  38.857(a) 
that DCMs must have a ROC composed of only public directors. Commission 
staff has found, through its general oversight of DCMs, that existing 
DCM ROCs are effective in providing structural governance protections 
that help DCMs to minimize conflicts of interest. For example, in their 
role as members of the ROC, these public directors are not tasked with 
making decisions on commercial matters or other interests of the SEF or 
DCM that may conflict with market regulation functions. Accordingly, 
Commission staff has found that ROC members have provided DCM CROs a 
``safe space'' to raise concerns and have advocated, when appropriate, 
for the CRO and the market regulation functions.
    Second, the Commission proposes in Sec.  37.1206(a) to include a 
ROC requirement for SEFs, which, like DCMs, also perform market 
regulation functions. Through its experience with SEF registrations, 
routine communications with SEFs, and regulatory consultations, 
Commission staff has found that some SEFs established ROCs that 
included non-public directors and SEF executives (or executives of SEF 
affiliates). As a result, a committee intended to insulate the market 
regulation function from commercial interests had its own potential 
conflicts of interest. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to include 
in Sec.  37.1206(a), just as it is proposing to include in Sec.  
38.857(a), a requirement that SEFs have a ROC composed only of public 
directors.
    Under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(d) and 38.857(d), both SEF and 
DCM ROCs would generally have identical oversight duties over market 
regulation functions, including: (1) monitoring the SEF's or DCM's 
market regulation functions for sufficiency, effectiveness, and 
independence; (2) overseeing all facets of the market regulation 
functions; \209\ (3) approving the size and allocation of the 
regulatory budget and resources; and the number, hiring and 
termination, and compensation of staff required pursuant to Sec. Sec.  
37.203(c) and 38.155(a); (4) recommending changes that would promote 
fair, vigorous, and effective self-regulation; and (5) reviewing all 
regulatory proposals prior to implementation and advising the board of 
directors as to whether and how such proposals may impact market 
regulation functions.\210\
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    \209\ The Commission is proposing a more simplified version of 
the ROC's current duties to oversee all facets of the regulatory 
program, including trade practice and market surveillance; audits, 
examinations, and other regulatory responsibilities with respect to 
member firms (including ensuring compliance with financial 
integrity, financial reporting, sales practice, recordkeeping, and 
other requirements); and the conduct of investigations.
    \210\ This includes, for example, proposed rules, and business 
initiatives, etc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission recognizes that SEFs are also subject to a statutory 
core principle requirement (SEF Core Principle 15) to designate a CCO 
to monitor the SEF's adherence to statutory, regulatory, and self-
regulatory requirements and to resolve conflicts of interest that may 
impede such adherence.\211\ Additionally, the CCO must report to the 
SEF board of directors (or similar governing body) or the senior SEF 
officer.\212\ To account for the standing CCO requirements and to 
integrate the addition of a ROC, the Commission envisions the CCO 
continuing their duties to supervise the SEF's self-regulatory 
program,\213\ as well as making recommendations in consultation with 
the ROC (in the event a conflict of interest involving the CCO 
exists).\214\ As further discussed below,\215\ the Commission believes 
involving the ROC in such matters will help to ensure that the CCO 
remains insulated from undue pressures and that conflicts of interest 
are appropriately managed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ See CEA section 5h(f)(15); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15).
    \212\ See CEA section 5h(f)(15)(B)(i); 7 U.S.C. 7b-
3(f)(15)(B)(i).
    \213\ See Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(c)(7), which 
requires the CCO to supervise the SEF's self-regulatory program with 
respect to trade practice surveillance, market surveillance, real-
time market monitoring, compliance with audit trail requirements, 
enforcement and disciplinary proceedings, audits, examinations, and 
other regulatory responsibilities with respect to members and market 
participants (including ensuring compliance with, if applicable, 
financial integrity, financial reporting, sales practice, 
recordkeeping, and other requirements). Part 37 Final Rule, 78 FR 
33476.
    \214\ Proposed Sec.  37.1501(c).
    \215\ See Section V(h)(3) herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To ensure that the ROC can fulfill its mandate, proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1206(c) and 38.857(c) require that the board of directors delegate 
sufficient authority, dedicate sufficient resources, and allow 
sufficient time for the ROC to perform its functions. The Commission 
has previously stated that the ROC should have the authority, 
discretion and necessary resources to conduct its own inquiries; 
consult directly with regulatory staff; interview employees, officers, 
members, and others; review relevant documents; retain independent 
legal counsel, auditors, and other professional services; and otherwise 
exercise its independent analysis and judgment to fulfill its 
regulatory obligations.'' \216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \216\ See DCM Core Principle 15 Release, 71 FR 38740 at 38744-
45, as it relates to the DCM acceptable practices in Appendix B to 
part 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Additional Proposed Requirements To Enhance SEF and DCM ROCs
    In addition to codifying the existing DCM ROC acceptable practices 
for both SEFs and DCMs, the Commission proposes enhancing the ROC 
requirements with best practices Commission staff has identified 
through the course of its routine oversight. Commission staff has found 
that DCMs have substantial differences in their implementation of ROC 
administrative and procedural standards. For example, some DCMs have 
limited individuals other than ROC members or DCM staff performing 
market regulation functions from attending the ROC meetings, while 
others have allowed DCM executives and non-ROC members of the board of 
directors to attend. The Commission believes the former practice is 
preferable as the latter practice invites to ROC meetings the very 
conflicts of interest that the establishment of a ROC is intended to 
address. Accordingly, as discussed below, the Commission is proposing 
certain requirements related to ROC procedures, meetings, and 
documentation to help ensure that the manner in which SEFs and DCMs 
structure and administer their ROCs does not give rise to conflicts of 
interest.
    In the DCM Core Principle 15 Release, the Commission stressed that 
ROCs conduct oversight and review, and are not intended to assume 
managerial responsibilities or to perform direct compliance work.\217\ 
Accordingly, the Commission is not proposing to adopt the existing 
component of the Acceptable Practices for DCM Core Principle 16 
addressing the ROC's supervision of the DCM CRO. As further discussed 
in proposed Sec.  38.856,\218\ proposed Sec.  38.856(b)(1) would 
require the CRO to report to the board or senior officer of the 
DCM.\219\ Similar to other employees and executives at SEFs and DCMs, 
the Commission expects that CCOs and CROs, respectively, would report 
up to a senior officer for

[[Page 19672]]

managerial and administrative matters. The Commission believes this 
approach allows the ROC to focus its resources on its core 
responsibilities related to overseeing a SEF's or DCM's market 
regulation functions. Finally, the ROC will be involved in matters 
related to the appointment, removal and compensation of the SEF CCO or 
DCM CRO, under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1501(a)(4) and (5) and 38.856(c) 
and (d), respectively.
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    \217\ See 2007 Final Release, 72 FR 6936 at 6950.
    \218\ See Section V(f) herein.
    \219\ The Commission is using the term ``report to'' in proposed 
Sec.  38.856(b) instead of the concept of supervision used in the 
DCM CP 16 Acceptable Practices because a board of directors, as an 
entity, cannot ``supervise'' a person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on Commission staff's routine oversight of SEFs and DCMs, the 
Commission's experience is that the ROC has served a crucial role in 
the management of conflicts of interest. As a board-of-directors-level 
committee of public directors, the Commission believes the ROC is well-
positioned to manage conflicts that may impact market regulation 
functions. The conflicts of interest with which the Commission 
envisions the ROC's involvement are not merely potential or 
hypothetical. The Commission's oversight of SEFs and DCMs has 
identified instances involving actual conflicts of interest impacting 
market regulation functions which were adequately managed and addressed 
only when the SEF or DCM had a strong governance structure and sound 
conflicts of interest policies and procedures. Accordingly, the 
Commission is including in the duties in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(d) 
and 38.857(d) that the ROC, a standing committee of the board of 
directors, is charged with consulting with the SEF CCO or DCM CRO with 
identifying, minimizing and resolving any actual or potential conflicts 
of interest involving market regulation functions.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(e) and 38.857(e) require the ROC to 
periodically report to the board of directors. The Commission expects 
that this reporting would occur, for example, in regularly scheduled 
board of director meetings.
    The Commission is also proposing several requirements related to 
procedures and documentation for ROC meetings. The Commission believes 
these requirements reflect best practices that certain DCMs already 
implement. Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f) and 38.857(f) address ROC 
meetings and communications. Both SEF and DCM ROCs would be required to 
meet quarterly. These meetings may include CROs or CCOs and will allow 
the ROC to share information, discuss matters of mutual concern, and 
speak freely about potentially sensitive issues that may relate to the 
SEF's or DCM's management. To facilitate this open line of 
communication, the proposed rules prohibit, except for the limited 
circumstances referenced below, any individuals with actual or 
potential conflicts of interest from attending ROC meetings.
    The Commission recognizes, however, that there may be limited 
circumstances in which it would be appropriate for individuals outside 
of the ROC-including business executives or employees whose interest 
may conflict in certain respects with the ROC's market regulation 
functions--to attend portions of ROC meetings. In particular, if a 
business executive or non-market-employee had a legitimate need \220\ 
to attend a portion of a ROC meeting, the Commission's preliminary view 
is that it would not be inappropriate for the ROC to elect to allow 
these individuals to attend such portion of the meeting. However, the 
Commission preliminarily believes these individuals should not attend 
any portion of the ROC meeting outside of the discussion of their 
business. These individuals should not be present, in any capacity, 
during discussions of the SEF's or DCM's market regulation functions, 
such as surveillance, investigation, or enforcement work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ For example, to present new product launches or discuss 
personnel or policy changes unrelated to market regulation 
functions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To account for these circumstances, the Commission proposes in 
Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f)(1)(iii) and 38.857(f)(1)(iii) that the following 
information must be included in ROC meeting minutes: (a) list of the 
attendees; (b) their titles; (c) whether they were present for the 
entirety of the meeting or a portion thereof (and if so, what portion); 
and (d) a summary of all meeting discussions. Finally, proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f)(2) and 38.857(f)(2) would require the ROC to 
maintain documentation of the committee's findings, recommendations, 
deliberations, or other communications related to the performance of 
its duties. If SEFs and DCMs make their ROC meeting minutes available 
for distribution, including to the board of directors or another 
committee, the Commission believes any information relating to the 
SEF's or DCM's market regulation functions, including surveillance, 
investigations, and pending enforcement actions should be redacted to 
avoid any undue influence on these market regulation functions.
    Finally, the Commission proposes to codify for both SEFs and DCMs, 
and to enhance, the existing annual report component of the ROC duties 
under the Acceptable Practices for DCM Core Principle 16.\221\ These 
acceptable practices contemplate that the ROC, as part of its duties, 
will prepare an annual report assessing the DCM's self-regulatory 
program for the board of directors and for the Commission, which sets 
forth the regulatory program's expenses, describes its staffing and 
structure, catalogues disciplinary actions taken during the year, and 
reviews the performance of disciplinary committees and panels. In 
addition to codifying and enhancing this as an annual report 
requirement, in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(1) and 38.857(g)(1), the 
Commission proposes requiring ROC annual reports to contain a list of 
any actual or potential conflicts of interest that were reported to the 
ROC, including a description of how such conflicts of interest were 
managed and resolved and an assessment of the impact of any conflicts 
of interest on the SEF's or DCM's ability to perform its market 
regulation functions, as well as requiring disclosure of details 
relating to all actions taken by the board of directors pursuant to 
recommendations of the ROC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ The Commission recognizes that SEF CCOs also prepare an 
annual report; however, the ROC annual report will provide a 
critically important, independent perspective to assess the market 
regulation function, including the CCO. Additionally, the ROC annual 
report expressly requires disclosures of actual or potential 
conflicts of interest reported to the ROC and details of any 
instances of the board of directors rejecting the recommendations of 
the ROC, regardless of whether the same information would qualify as 
``material non-compliance matters,'' subject to disclosure pursuant 
to Sec.  37.1501(d)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also proposes in Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(2) and 
38.857(g)(2) new SEF and DCM rules addressing filing requirements for 
the ROC annual report. The procedural requirements would mirror the SEF 
annual compliance report requirements \222\ including specifying a 
filing deadline no later than 90 days after the end of the SEF's or 
DCM's fiscal year, establishing a process for report amendments and 
extension requests, recordkeeping requirements, and providing to the 
Division of Market Oversight delegated authority to grant or deny 
extensions. Finally, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(3) and 38.857(g)(3) 
would establish a recordkeeping requirement for the SEF or DCM to 
maintain all records demonstrating compliance with the duties of the 
ROC and the preparation and submission of the annual report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ See Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed ROC 
requirements. The Commission further requests comment on the questions 
set forth below.

[[Page 19673]]

    1. Are there any additional duties that should be included within 
the scope of the ROC's duties under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206 and 
38.857? Are there any additional requirements the Commission should 
consider prescribing for the ROC annual report?
    2. Should business executives and employees working outside of the 
SEF's or DCM's market regulation functions be permitted to attend even 
portions of ROC meetings that relate to their business? Or should ROC 
meetings be strictly limited to ROC members and employees who perform 
work related to the SEF's or DCM's market regulation functions?

e. Disciplinary Panel Composition--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 
38.858

1. Background
    As part of its market regulation function, each SEF and DCM must 
have a disciplinary program to discipline, suspend, or expel members or 
market participants that violate the SEF's or DCM's rules.\223\ 
Disciplinary panels administer this program by conducting hearings, 
rendering decisions, and imposing sanctions with respect to 
disciplinary matters. The Commission believes that fair disciplinary 
procedures require SEF and DCM disciplinary panels to be: (1) 
independent of outside influences, (2) impartial, and (3) 
representative of a diversity of perspectives and experiences. 
Accordingly, the Commission is proposing rules implementing elements of 
the conflicts of interest obligations under DCM Core Principle 16 and 
SEF Core Principle 12 in order to promote and support these panel 
attributes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \223\ CEA section 5(d)(13); 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(13); CEA section 
5h(f)(2)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    Currently, the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices provide 
that DCMs establish disciplinary panel composition rules that preclude 
any group or class of industry participants from dominating or 
exercising disproportionate influence on such panels.\224\ Furthermore, 
the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices provide for all 
disciplinary panels (and appellate bodies) to include at least one 
person who would qualify as a public director, except in cases limited 
to decorum, attire, or the timely submission of accurate records 
required for clearing or verifying each day's transactions.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \224\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(4).
    \225\ Id.
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    Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(c), which applies to SEFs, 
requires each major disciplinary committee \226\ or hearing panel to 
include: (1) at least one member who is not a member of the SEF; and 
(2) sufficient different membership interests so as to ensure fairness 
and to prevent special treatment or preference for any person in the 
conduct of a committee's or the panel's responsibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(a)(2) defines a ``Major 
disciplinary committee'' as a committee of persons who are 
authorized by a self-regulatory organization to conduct disciplinary 
hearings, to settle disciplinary charges, to impose disciplinary 
sanctions or to hear appeals thereof in cases involving any 
violation of the rules of the self-regulatory organization subject 
to certain exceptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Proposed Rules
    The Commission is proposing to adopt rules in proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1207 and 38.858, respectively, that would codify, with certain 
enhancements, the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices with 
respect to disciplinary panel composition. While the Commission 
believes that both the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices and 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(c) seek to promote fairness in the 
disciplinary process by introducing a diversity of interests to serve 
on disciplinary panels, the Commission believes that the DCM Core 
Principle 16 Acceptable Practices establish more appropriate practices 
for achieving fairness in today's SEF and DCM environments. For 
example, providing for a public participant on the disciplinary panel 
to be the chair introduces an independent perspective in a steering 
role that the Commission believes will enhance the overall fairness of 
the disciplinary process. The Commission believes that if SEFs are 
subject to rules that codify the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices with respect to disciplinary panel composition, it would not 
be necessary for SEFs also to be subject to the requirements of 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(c). As noted above in Section V(c)(3) 
herein, the Commission is also proposing to amend Commission regulation 
Sec.  37.2 to exempt SEFs from Commission regulation Sec.  1.64 in its 
entirety.
    Proposed Sec.  38.858(a)(1) would require that DCMs adopt rules to 
preclude any group or class of participants from dominating or 
exercising disproportionate influence on a disciplinary panel, and 
proposed Sec.  37.1207(a)(1) would establish an analogous requirement 
for SEFs. Accordingly, the proposed rules would be consistent with the 
disciplinary panel component of the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices. The Commission believes the proposed rules are reasonably 
necessary to promote impartial disciplinary panels, which are critical 
decision-makers in fulfilling a SEF's or DCM's market regulation 
functions.
    The Commission is also proposing additional requirements to enhance 
the existing regulatory framework. First, the proposal would clarify in 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1207(a) and (b) and 38.858(a) and (b) that SEFs' 
and DCMs' disciplinary panels and appellate panels must consist of two 
or more persons. The Commission believes a disciplinary panel must have 
more than one person in order to preclude any group or class of 
participants from dominating or exercising disproportionate influence, 
as currently contemplated under the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices, and proposed in these rules. Second, proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1207 and 38.858 would prohibit any member of a disciplinary panel 
from participating in deliberations or voting on any matter in which 
the member has an actual or potential conflict of interest, consistent 
with the general conflicts of interest provisions proposed in 
Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 38.852. Third, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1207(b) 
and 38.858(b) would extend the public participant requirement to any 
SEF and DCM committee to which disciplinary panel decisions may be 
appealed. Fourth, the Commission proposes technical amendments to 
Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.206(b) and 38.702 to remove the 
references that disciplinary panels must meet the composition 
requirements of part 40,\227\ and replace these references with 
references to the composition requirements of proposed regulations 
Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 38.858, respectively. The Commission also 
proposes changing the reference to ``compliance'' staff to ``market 
regulation'' staff. This is intended for clarity and is consistent with 
proposed changes to Sec. Sec.  38.155(a) and 37.203(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \227\ There are currently no composition requirements in part 40 
of the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed 
disciplinary panel composition requirements. The Commission further 
requests comment on the questions set forth below.
    1. Are there any situations in which it would be appropriate for a 
disciplinary panel to be comprised of only one individual? If so, 
please describe.

[[Page 19674]]

    2. Should the Commission exempt requiring a public participant on a 
disciplinary panel in cases solely involving decorum or attire?

f. DCM Chief Regulatory Officer--Proposed Sec.  38.856

1. Background
    The Commission is proposing to codify current DCM practices 
regarding the CRO position. The DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices do not provide that DCMs have a CRO. However, Commission 
staff has found through its oversight activities that all DCMs either 
have a CRO, or an individual performing the same functions as a CRO. 
DCM CROs generally are responsible for administering a DCM's market 
regulation functions.
2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    Although not expressly a component of the DCM Core Principle 
Acceptable Practices, the framework created under the DCM Core 
Principle 16 Acceptable Practices clearly envisioned the establishment 
of a CRO position. Specifically, supervising the ``the contract 
market's chief regulatory officer, who will report directly to the 
ROC'' is one of the ROCs enumerated duties.\228\ In adopting the DCM 
Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices, the Commission emphasized that 
the relationship between the ROC and the CRO is a key element of the 
insulation and oversight provided by the ROC structure, and that, along 
with the board of directors, it is intended to protect regulatory 
functions and personnel, including the CRO, from improper influence in 
the daily conduct of regulatory activities and broader programmatic 
regulatory decisions.\229\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \228\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(3)(ii)(D).
    \229\ 2007 Final Release, 72 FR 6936 at 6951 n.80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the Commission did not explicitly require DCMs to appoint 
CROs as part of the DCM Final Rules, the Commission noted that current 
industry practice is for DCMs to designate an individual as chief 
regulatory officer, and it will be difficult for a DCM to meet the 
staffing and resource requirements of Sec.  38.155 without a chief 
regulatory officer or similar individual to supervise its regulatory 
program, including any services rendered to the DCM by a regulatory 
service provider.\230\
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    \230\ The Commission understands that some DCMs use a slightly 
different title for their CRO position. For example, they may use 
the term Chief Compliance Officer, as opposed to Chief Regulatory 
Officer, but such position is the functional equivalent to the CRO 
role proposed herein.
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3. Proposed Rules
    Proposed Sec.  38.856(a)(1) requires each DCM to establish the 
position of CRO and designate an individual to serve in that capacity 
and to administer the DCM's market regulation functions. The proposed 
rule further requires that (1) the position of CRO must carry with it 
the authority and resources necessary to fulfill the duties set forth 
for CROs; and (2) the CRO must have supervisory authority over all 
staff performing the DCM's market regulation functions. The Commission 
believes that the above-described requirements of the proposed rule 
would ensure that a CRO has authority over any staff and resources 
while they are acting in furtherance of the DCM's market regulation 
functions. Of course, any such employees are subject to the DCM's 
conflicts of interest policies and procedures that DCMs must establish 
and enforce pursuant to DCM Core Principle 16 and corresponding 
proposed regulations Sec. Sec.  38.851 and 38.852.
    Proposed Sec.  38.856(a)(2) requires that the individual designated 
to serve as CRO must have the background and skills appropriate for 
fulfilling the duties of the position. The Commission notes that a DCM 
should identify the needs of its particular market regulation 
functions, and ensure that the CRO has the requisite surveillance and 
investigatory experience necessary to perform the CRO's role. In 
addition, proposed Sec.  38.856(a)(2) would provide that no individual 
disqualified from registration pursuant to sections 8a(2) or 8a(3) of 
the CEA may serve as a CRO.
    Proposed Sec.  38.856(b) sets forth reporting line requirements for 
the CRO, providing that the CRO must report directly to the DCM's board 
of directors or to a senior officer. This is a change from the existing 
supervisory structure contemplated under the DCM Core Principle 16 
Acceptable Practices, which provide for the ROC to supervise the 
CRO.\231\ Commission staff has found, through its RERs and general DCM 
oversight activities, that most CROs, like other exchange executives, 
report to a senior officer for purposes of performance evaluations and 
approval of administrative requests. The ROC may not be the appropriate 
body for a CRO to report to, as the ROC might meet only on a quarterly 
basis. The DCM's senior officer represents the highest level of 
authority at the exchange, other than the board of directors or its 
committees. Consequently, the Commission believes that it would be 
appropriate for the CRO to report to the senior officer.
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    \231\ Part 38, Appendix B, Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices (b)(3)(ii)(D). Additionally, the Commission is using the 
term ``report to'' in proposed Sec.  38.856(b) instead of the 
concept of supervision used in the DCM CP 16 Acceptable Practices 
because a board of directors, as an entity, cannot ``supervise'' a 
person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, proposed Sec.  38.856(b) should be interpreted in 
conjunction with proposed Sec.  38.856(f), discussed below, which 
specifies, among other things, that a CRO must disclose actual or 
potential conflicts of interest to the ROC, and that a qualified person 
temporarily serve in place of the CRO for any matter in respect of 
which the CRO has such a conflict. A DCM's ROC would therefore be 
involved in minimizing any actual or potential conflicts of interest of 
the CRO, which would include conflicts of interest between the duties 
of the CRO and the DCM's commercial interests. As the Commission 
previously stated, the CRO-ROC relationship permits regulatory 
functions and personnel, including the CRO, to continue operating in an 
efficient manner while simultaneously protecting them from any improper 
influence which could otherwise be brought to bear upon them.\232\ The 
DCM is responsible for establishing the reporting lines for the CRO to 
ensure that conflicts of interest are routed to the appropriate 
decision-makers.
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    \232\ 2007 Final Release, 72 FR 6936 at 6951 n.80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission notes generally that a CRO reporting 
structure in which the CRO has a direct line to the board of directors 
or the senior officer allows the CRO to more easily gain approval for 
any new policies related to the DCM's market regulation functions that 
the CRO needed to implement, to the extent that they required approval 
of a senior officer or the board of directors. Since DCM rule changes 
often need to be approved by the board of directors, having the CRO 
report to the board of directors or to the senior officer (who likely 
regularly communicates with the board) would allow the CRO to more 
easily explain the need for rule changes, and to answer questions from 
the board of directors or the senior officer about such changes.
    Proposed Sec.  38.856(c) provides the following CRO appointment and 
removal procedures: (1) the appointment or removal of a DCM's CRO must 
occur only with the approval of the DCM's ROC; (2) the DCM must notify 
the Commission within two business days of the appointment of any new 
CRO, whether interim or permanent; and (3) the DCM must notify the 
Commission within two business days of removal of the CRO. These 
procedures help ensure that the CRO is

[[Page 19675]]

properly insulated from undue influence, including commercial 
interests. For example, the requirement of ROC approval means that a 
senior officer of the DCM may not take unilateral action to replace the 
CRO if there is any dispute over the CRO's decisions or role in any 
market regulation function. In addition, the procedures requiring 
notification to the Commission ensure appropriate staff within the 
Commission are aware of who is fulfilling this key role and can 
initiate communications with the CRO as necessary. Moreover, the 
Commission will be aware if there is any lag in the appointment of a 
replacement CRO, and can take appropriate oversight action in such a 
scenario, as well.
    Proposed Sec.  38.856(d) provides that the board of directors or 
the senior officer of the DCM, in consultation with the DCM's ROC, must 
approve the compensation of the CRO. Involving the ROC in approving the 
compensation of the CRO further ensures that the CRO's role is 
insulated from improper influence or direction from the DCM's 
commercial interests. The Commission notes that while some portion of 
compensation may be in the form of equity, DCMs should avoid tying a 
CRO's salary to business performance in order to avoid potential 
conflicts of interest. The Commission believes the ROC is well-situated 
to determine whether specific compensation structures could raise 
potential conflicts of interest.
    Proposed Sec.  38.856(e) details the duties of the CRO, which 
include: (1) supervising the DCM's market regulation functions; (2) 
establishing and administering policies and procedures related to the 
DCM's market regulation functions; (3) supervising the effectiveness 
and sufficiency of any regulatory services provided to the DCM by a 
regulatory service provider in accordance with Sec.  38.154; (4) 
reviewing any proposed rule or programmatic changes that may have a 
significant regulatory impact on the DCM's market regulation functions, 
and advising the ROC on such matters; and (5) in consultation with the 
DCM's ROC, identifying, minimizing, managing, and resolving conflicts 
of interest involving the DCM's market regulation functions.
    The Commission views a CRO's role as being narrower than that of a 
CCO. As contemplated in these proposed rules, both CCOs and CROs would 
be required to have supervisory authority over certain staff,\233\ and 
supervise the quality of regulatory services received, as 
applicable.\234\ CCOs have additional responsibilities deriving from 
the statutory chief compliance officer core principle for SEFs, for 
which there is no DCM analogue. For example, CCOs are responsible for 
overall compliance of the SEF with section 5h of the CEA and related 
Commission rules,\235\ for establishing and administering written 
policies to prevent violation of the CEA and Commission rules,\236\ and 
for establishing procedures to address noncompliance issues identified 
through any means, such as look-back, internal or external audit 
findings, self-reported errors, or validated complaints.\237\ The 
Commission understands that in some instances, CROs may take on these 
additional responsibilities, such as supervising the DCM's financial 
surveillance program under Core Principle 11 and associated Commission 
regulations.
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    \233\ Proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(1)(ii) requires the SEF CCO to 
have supervisory authority over all staff acting at the CCO's 
direction. Proposed Sec.  38.856(a)(1)(iii) requires the DCM CRO to 
have supervisory authority over all staff performing the DCM's 
market regulation functions. Similarly, proposed Sec.  38.856(e)(1) 
specifies that the DCM CRO must supervise the DCM's market 
regulation functions.
    \234\ Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1501(b)(8) and 38.856(e)(3).
    \235\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(B)(v); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(B)(v).
    \236\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(B)(iv); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(B)(iv).
    \237\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(B)(vi); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(B)(vi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, and as discussed above, proposed Sec.  38.856(f) provides 
that each DCM must establish procedures for the CRO's disclosure of 
actual or potential conflicts of interest to the ROC and designation of 
a qualified person to serve in the place of the CRO for any matter in 
respect of which the CRO has such a conflict, and documentation of such 
disclosure and designation.
4. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed CRO 
regulatory requirements. The Commission further requests comment on the 
questions set forth below.
    1. Is the Commission correct that all DCMs have CROs or an 
individual performing CRO functions?
    2. Are there any additional duties that should be included under 
proposed Sec.  38.856(e)? Are there any that should be removed?

g. Staffing and Investigations--Proposed Changes to Sec. Sec.  38.155, 
38.158, and 37.203

1. Background
    The Commission is proposing amendments to existing SEF and DCM 
rules relating to staffing and investigations. As discussed below, 
Commission staff has found there is a lack of clarity that has led to 
inconsistent approaches with respect to compliance with SEF and DCM 
market regulation staff and resource requirements. The Commission 
proposes enhancing SEF staffing requirements to require annual 
monitoring of staff size and workload to ensure SEFs have sufficient 
staff and resources dedicated to performing market regulation 
functions.\238\ This would align SEF staffing obligations with existing 
DCM staffing obligations. Finally, for the purpose of clarity, staff is 
proposing certain non-substantive amendments.
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    \238\ As discussed below, the Commission also is proposing a 
technical amendment to existing Sec.  38.155(a) to replace the list 
of duties a DCM must have sufficient staff to perform with the term 
``market regulation functions.''
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2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    Commission regulation Sec.  38.155(a) provides that each DCM must 
establish and maintain sufficient compliance department resources and 
staff to ensure that it can conduct effective audit trail reviews, 
trade practice surveillance, market surveillance, and real-time market 
monitoring. A DCM's compliance staff also must be sufficient to address 
unusual market or trading events as they arise, and to conduct and 
complete investigations in a timely manner. Commission regulation Sec.  
38.155(b) provides that a DCM must monitor the size and workload of its 
compliance staff annually, and ensure that its compliance resources and 
staff are at appropriate levels. In determining the appropriate level 
of compliance resources and staff, the DCM should consider trading 
volume increases, the number of new products or contracts to be listed 
for trading, any new responsibilities to be assigned to compliance 
staff, the results of any internal review demonstrating that work is 
not completed in an effective or timely manner, and any other factors 
suggesting the need for increased resources and staff.
    Existing Commission regulation Sec.  37.203(c), similar to existing 
Commission regulation Sec.  38.155(a), provides that a SEF must have 
sufficient compliance staff and resources to ensure it can conduct 
effective audit trail reviews, trade practice surveillance, market 
surveillance, and real-time market monitoring. However, part 37 of the 
Commission's regulations does not include for SEFs a regulation 
parallel to Commission regulation Sec.  38.155(b)'s requirement for 
DCMs to annually

[[Page 19676]]

monitor the sufficiency of staff and resources.
    Existing regulations Sec. Sec.  38.158 and 37.203(f) relate to SEF 
and DCM obligations, respectively, regarding investigations and 
investigation reports. These provisions generally address investigation 
timeliness, substance of investigation reports, and how frequently 
warning letters may be issued.
3. Proposed Rules
    The Commission is proposing amendments to existing Sec. Sec.  
38.155(a) and 37.203(c). First, the Commission proposes to replace 
references to ``compliance staff'' with ``staff.'' Second, proposed 
Sec. Sec.  38.155(a) and 37.203(c) would amend the first sentence of 
the existing regulations to provide that SEFs and DCMs must establish 
and maintain sufficient staff and resources to ``effectively perform 
market regulation functions'' rather than listing the individual 
functions.\239\ The Commission does not view these as substantive 
changes. References to staff rather than compliance staff are intended 
for clarity. Compliance staff could be viewed as a broad term that 
encompasses individuals who have obligations for compliance with all of 
the CEA and Commission regulations. To avoid confusion and a lack of 
clarity about which staff might fall within the scope of this broad 
term, the Commission proposes simply to replace references to 
``compliance staff'' with ``staff.'' As noted, Commission regulations 
Sec. Sec.  38.155(a) and 37.203(c) solely are focused on staff 
dedicated to performing market regulation functions.
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    \239\ See Sections I and II(d)(1) herein for a description of 
the definition of ``market regulation functions'' in proposed 
Sec. Sec.  38.851(b)(9) and 37.1201(b)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also proposes to amend Sec.  37.203 to add a new 
paragraph (d). The proposed provision would require SEFs to annually 
monitor the size and workload of its staff, and ensure its resources 
and staff effectively perform market regulation functions at 
appropriate levels. In determining the appropriate level of resources 
and staff, the proposed rule lists factors SEFs should consider. These 
factors include trading volume increases, the number of new products or 
contracts to be listed for trading, any new responsibilities to be 
assigned to staff, any responsibilities that staff have at affiliated 
entities, the results of any internal review demonstrating that work is 
not completed in an effective or timely manner, any conflicts of 
interest that prevent staff from working on certain matters and any 
other factors suggesting the need for increased resources and staff. In 
addition, paragraph (d) would include a reference to paragraph (c) to 
clarify that it applies to staff responsible for conducting market 
regulation functions.
    Proposed Sec.  37.203(d) is virtually identical to existing Sec.  
38.155(b) for DCMs. Given that SEFs and DCMs have the same obligation 
to perform market regulation functions, the Commission believes it is 
equally important for SEFs to annually review their staffing and 
resources to ensure they are appropriate and sufficient to adequately 
perform market regulation functions. Accordingly, consistent with the 
language in proposed Sec.  37.203(d), the Commission is proposing to 
add to the list of factors that a DCM should consider in determining 
the appropriate level of resources and staff: (1) any responsibilities 
that staff have at affiliated entities; and (2) any conflicts of 
interest that prevent staff from working on certain matters. The 
Commission believes that the addition of these factors is necessary to 
account for potential constraints on resources and staff.
    Additionally, the Commission proposes the following non-substantive 
changes to existing Commission regulation Sec. Sec.  38.155 and 38.158. 
Proposed Sec.  38.155 would rename the regulation ``Sufficient staff 
and resources.'' Proposed Sec.  38.155(b) would add an internal 
reference to paragraph (a). This change is intended to clarify that the 
annual staff and resource monitoring requirement pertains to staff 
performing market regulation functions required under Sec.  38.155(a). 
Proposed Sec.  38.158(a) would replace the reference to ``compliance 
staff'' with ``staff responsible for conducting market regulation 
functions.'' Proposed Sec.  38.158(b) would delete the reference to 
``compliance staff investigation'' being required to be completed in a 
timely manner, and instead provide, more simply, that ``[e]ach 
investigation must be completed in a timely manner.'' Finally, proposed 
Sec. Sec.  38.158(c) and (d) would delete the modifier ``compliance'' 
when referencing to staff.
    Finally, the Commission proposes the following non-substantive 
changes to existing Commission regulation Sec.  37.203. Proposed Sec.  
37.203(c) would rename the paragraph ``Sufficient staff and 
resources.'' The addition of proposed Sec.  37.203(d) would result in 
renumbering the remaining provisions of Sec.  37.203. Proposed Sec.  
37.203(g)(1), which would replace existing Commission regulation Sec.  
37.203(f)(1), adds a reference to ``market regulation functions,'' 
consistent with the new proposed defined term. Similarly, to avoid lack 
of clarity, the Commission proposes to delete the modifier 
``compliance'' when referencing staff in existing Sec.  37.203(f)(2)-
(4).
4. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed 
changes to Sec. Sec.  38.155, 38.158 and 37.203.

h. SEF Chief Compliance Officer--Proposed Changes to Sec.  37.1501

1. Background
    The Commission is proposing amendments to Sec.  37.1501 for several 
reasons. First, the Commission proposes certain amendments to the 
existing SEF CCO requirements to ensure that, to the extent applicable, 
these requirements are consistent with the proposed DCM CRO 
requirements. Second, the Commission is proposing additional SEF CCO 
requirements to harmonize the language with other aspects of this rule 
proposal, namely proposed amendments that pertain to the board of 
directors and conflicts of interest procedures. Third, the Commission 
is proposing amendments that will more closely align Sec.  37.1501 with 
the language of SEF Core Principle 15, which is codified in Sec.  
37.1500.\240\
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    \240\ See Commission regulation Sec.  37.1500(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    The statutory framework for SEFs requires each SEF to designate an 
individual to serve as a CCO.\241\ The CCO must report to the SEF's 
board of directors or senior officer,\242\ and is responsible for 
certain enumerated duties, including compliance with the CEA and 
Commission regulations and resolving conflicts of interest.\243\ The 
CCO is also responsible for designing the procedures to establish the 
handling, management response, remediation, retesting, and closing of

[[Page 19677]]

noncompliance issues.\244\ Finally, the CCO is required to prepare an 
annual report describing the SEF's compliance with the CEA and the 
policies and procedures of the SEF.\245\ These statutory requirements 
also are codified in Commission regulation Sec.  37.1500.
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    \241\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(A); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(A).
    \242\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(B)(i); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(B)(i).
    \243\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(B) (ii)-(vi); 7 U.S.C. 7b-
3(f)(15)(B)(ii)-(vi) establishes the following CCO duties: (1) 
reviewing compliance with the core principles; (2) in consultation 
with the board, a body performing a function similar to that of a 
board, or the senior officer of the SEF, resolving any conflicts of 
interest that may arise; (3) being responsible for establishing and 
administering the policies and procedures required to be established 
pursuant to this section; (4) ensuring compliance with the CEA and 
the rules and regulations issued under the CEA, including rules 
prescribed by the Commission pursuant to section 5h of the CEA; and 
(5) establishing procedures for the remediation of noncompliance 
issues found during compliance office reviews, look backs, internal 
or external audit findings, self-reported errors, or through 
validated complaints.
    \244\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(C); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(C).
    \245\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(D); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501 further implements the 
statutory CCO requirements. First, Commission regulation Sec.  
37.1501(a) establishes definitions for the terms ``board of directors'' 
and ``senior officer.'' Second, Commission regulation Sec.  
37.1501(b)(1) addresses the authority of the CCO, stating that the 
position shall: (1) carry with it the authority and resources to 
fulfill the CCO's duties; and (2) have supervisory authority over all 
staff acting at the discretion of the CCO. Third, Commission regulation 
Sec.  37.1501(b)(2) establishes qualifications for the CCO, including a 
requirement that the CCO must: (1) have the appropriate background and 
skills; and (2) must not be disqualified from registration under CEA 
8a(2) or 8a(3). Fourth, Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(b)(3) 
outlines the appointment and removal procedures for the CCO, which 
state that: (1) only the SEF's board of directors or senior officer may 
appoint or remove the CCO; and (2) the SEF shall notify the Commission 
within two business days of a CCO's appointment or removal. Fifth, 
Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(b)(4) requires the SEF's board of 
directors or senior officer to approve the CCO's compensation. Sixth, 
Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(b)(5) requires the CCO to meet with 
the SEF's board of directors or senior officer at least annually. 
Seventh, Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(b)(6) requires the CCO to 
provide any information regarding the self-regulatory program of the 
SEF as requested by the board of directors or the senior officer.
    Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(c) further outlines the duties 
of the CCO, expanding on those already required under SEF Core 
Principle 15. For example, Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(c)(2) 
details that the CCO must take reasonable steps, in consultation with 
the board of directors or the senior officer of the SEF, to resolve any 
material conflicts of interest that may arise, including, but not 
limited to: (1) conflicts between business considerations and 
compliance requirements; (2) conflicts between business considerations 
and the requirement that the SEF provide fair, open, and impartial 
access as set forth in Sec.  37.202; and; (3) conflicts between a SEF's 
management and members of the board of directors. In connection with 
establishing and administering the requisite procedures under Core 
Principle 15, Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(c)(6) specifies that 
the CCO must establish and administer a compliance manual designed to 
promote compliance with the applicable laws, rules, and regulations and 
a written code of ethics for the SEF designed to prevent ethical 
violations and to promote honesty and ethical conduct by SEF personnel. 
Finally, Commission regulation Sec. Sec.  37.1501(c)(7) and (c)(8) 
detail the requirement that the CCO supervise the SEF's self-regulatory 
program as well as the effectiveness and sufficiency of any regulatory 
service provider, respectively.
    Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(d) addresses the statutory 
requirement under SEF Core Principle 15 requiring a CCO to prepare an 
annual compliance report. Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(d) 
details that the report must contain, at a minimum: (1) a description 
and self-assessment of the effectiveness of the written policies and 
procedures of the SEF; (2) any material changes made to compliance 
policies and procedures during the coverage period for the report and 
any areas of improvement or recommended changes to the compliance 
program; (3) a description of the financial, managerial, and 
operational resources set aside for compliance with the CEA and 
applicable Commission regulations; (4) any material non-compliance 
matters identified and an explanation of the corresponding action taken 
to resolve such non-compliance matters; and (5) a certification by the 
CCO that, to the best of his or her knowledge and reasonable belief, 
and under penalty of law, the annual compliance report is accurate and 
complete in all material respects.\246\
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    \246\ Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(d)(1)-(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(e) addresses the submission of 
the annual compliance report, stating that: (1) the CCO must provide 
the annual compliance report for review to the board of directors or 
senior officer, who shall not require the CCO to make any changes to 
the report; (2) the annual compliance report must be submitted 
electronically to the Commission no later than 90 calendar days after 
the end of the SEF's fiscal year; (3) promptly upon discovery of any 
material error or omission made in a previously filed annual compliance 
report, the CCO must file an amendment with the Commission; and (4) the 
SEF may request an extension of time to file its annual compliance 
report from the Commission. Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(f) 
requires the SEF to maintain all records demonstrating compliance with 
the duties of the CCO and the preparation and submission of annual 
compliance reports consistent with Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  
37.1000 and 37.1001.
    Finally, Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(g) delegates to the 
Director of the Division of Market Oversight the authority to grant or 
deny a request for an extension of time for a SEF to file its annual 
compliance report under Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(e).
3. Proposed Rules
    The Commission is proposing to move the terms ``board of 
directors'' and ``senior officer'' from existing regulation Sec.  
37.1501(a) to proposed Sec.  37.1201(b). The meaning of each term would 
remain unchanged, with one exception. Specifically, the Commission 
seeks to clarify the existing definition of ``board of directors'' by 
including the introductory language ``a group of people'' serving as 
the governing body of the SEF. The Commission notes that deleting the 
definitions from Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(a) will result in 
renumbering the remaining provisions of Commission regulation Sec.  
37.1501.
    The Commission is not proposing any changes to existing Commission 
regulation Sec.  37.1501(b)(1) or (b)(2).\247\ However, the Commission 
is proposing a new Sec.  37.1501(a)(3) that would require the CCO to 
report directly to the board or to the senior officer of the SEF. This 
would be a new provision in Sec.  37.1501, but it is consistent with 
the language of SEF Core Principle 15, which is codified in Sec.  
37.1500.\248\ Additionally, the language is consistent with the 
proposed supervisory requirements for a DCM CRO set forth in proposed 
Sec.  38.856(b)(1).
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    \247\ These provisions would be renumbered under the proposal as 
Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(a)(1) and (a)(2), respectively.
    \248\ See Commission regulation Sec.  37.1500(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(4)(i) would amend the language in 
existing Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(b)(3)(i) to provide that 
the board of directors or senior officer may appoint or remove the CCO 
with the approval of the SEF's regulatory oversight committee. This 
addition is intended to help insulate the position of CCO from improper 
or undue influence. Proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(4)(ii) would retain the 
two-business day notification

[[Page 19678]]

requirement to the Commission of the removal of a CCO under Commission 
regulation Sec.  37.1501(b)(3)(ii).
    Proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(5) would amend the existing requirement 
in Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(b)(4) that the board of 
directors or the senior officer of the SEF shall approve the 
compensation of the CCO, to now require this approval to occur in 
consultation with the SEF's ROC. The Commission believes this proposed 
requirement would help ensure that the CCO position will remain free of 
improper influence.
    The duties of the CCO under proposed Sec.  37.1501(b) are 
substantively similar to existing Commission regulation Sec.  
37.1501(c), with two exceptions. First, proposed Sec.  37.1501(b)(2) 
provides that the CCO must take reasonable steps in consultation with 
the SEF's board of directors ``or a committee thereof'' to manage and 
resolve material conflicts of interest. Regarding the CCO's duties to 
``manage and resolve'' material conflicts of interest, the Commission 
notes there are multiple ways a conflict of interest could be managed 
and resolved. One example would be simply replacing a conflicted 
individual with an independent and qualified back-up. Another method to 
manage and resolve a conflict would be not to pursue a business 
priority where there is no other way in which to resolve the conflict. 
The added reference to ``committee'' accounts for the ROC's role in 
resolving conflicts of interest, which is provided in proposed Sec.  
37.1206(d)(4).
    Second, proposed Sec.  37.1501(b)(2)(i) specifies that conflicts of 
interest between business considerations and compliance requirements 
includes, with respect to compliance requirements, the SEF's ``market 
regulation functions.'' \249\ The Commission believes that this 
proposed added language will help to clarify for SEFs and CCOs the 
obligation of CCOs to resolve conflicts of interest that relate to SEF 
Core Principle 2, SEF Core Principle 4, SEF Core Principle 6, Core 
Principle 10 and the applicable Commission regulations thereunder. 
Existing Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(c)(7) provides that the 
CCO must supervise the SEF's ``self-regulatory program,'' which 
includes trade practice surveillance; market surveillance; real time 
market monitoring; compliance with audit trail requirements; 
enforcement and disciplinary proceedings; audits, examinations, and 
other regulatory responsibilities (including taking reasonable steps to 
ensure compliance with, if applicable, financial integrity, financial 
reporting, sales practice, recordkeeping, and other requirements). 
Proposed Sec.  37.1501(b)(7) would amend this provision to state that 
the CCO is responsible for supervising the SEF's self-regulatory 
program, including the market regulation functions set forth in Sec.  
37.1201(b)(9). Proposed Sec.  37.1201(b)(9) defines ``market regulation 
functions'' to mean SEF functions required by SEF Core Principle 2, SEF 
Core Principle 4, SEF Core Principle 6, SEF Core Principle 10 and the 
applicable Commission regulations thereunder. The Commission is 
proposing this amendment for clarity and ease of reference.\250\ The 
Commission views the proposed change as being consistent with the CCO's 
duties as described in existing Commission regulation Sec.  
37.1501(c)(7).\251\
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    \249\ Proposed Sec.  37.1501(b)(2)(ii) includes a technical edit 
to add the words ``implementation of'' prior to the clause ``of the 
requirement that the swap execution facility provide fair, open, and 
impartial access as set forth in Sec.  37.202.''
    \250\ The CCO's market regulation function duties are referenced 
in various contexts throughout the proposed rules including proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1201, 37.1206(a), (d) and (f)).
    \251\ For avoidance of doubt, the term ``self-regulatory 
program,'' as used in proposed Sec.  37.1501(b)(7), continues to 
include the full scope of areas described in existing Commission 
regulation Sec.  37.1501(c)(7): trade practice surveillance, market 
surveillance, real time market monitoring, compliance with audit 
trail requirements, enforcement and disciplinary proceedings, 
audits, examinations, and other regulatory responsibilities 
(including financial integrity, financial reporting, sales practice, 
recordkeeping, and other requirements).
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    Proposed Sec.  37.1501(c) is an entirely new regulation that 
addresses conflicts of interest involving the CCO. The proposed rule 
requires the SEF to establish procedures for the disclosure of actual 
or potential conflicts of interest to the ROC. In addition, the SEF 
must designate a qualified person to serve in the place of the CCO for 
any matter for which the CCO has such a conflict, and maintain 
documentation of such disclosure and designation. As noted above, 
proposed Sec.  37.1206(d)(4) requires the ROC to consult with the CCO 
in managing and resolving any actual or potential conflicts of interest 
involving the SEF's market regulation functions. The CCO's disclosure 
of actual or potential conflicts of interest to the ROC will facilitate 
the ROC's assistance in managing and resolving conflicts of interest 
involving the SEF's market regulation functions. The requirement that 
the SEF have procedures to designate a qualified person to serve in the 
place of the CCO for any matter in which the CCO is conflicted will 
help ensure there is a person with sufficient independence, expertise 
and authority to address such matters. The Commission believes that a 
qualified substitute for the CCO must, at a minimum, meet the 
qualification provisions set forth in existing Commission regulation 
Sec.  37.1501(b)(2), but that a qualified substitute also should be 
free from conflicts of interest relating to the matter under 
consideration.
    Proposed Sec.  37.1501(d)(5) amends the existing annual compliance 
report requirement under Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(d) to 
require the annual report to include any actual or potential conflicts 
of interests that were identified to the CCO during the coverage period 
for the report, including a description of how such conflicts of 
interest were managed or resolved, and an assessment of the impact of 
any conflicts of interest on the swap execution facility's ability to 
perform its market regulation functions. The Commission proposes this 
requirement to help ensure it has sufficient notice of conflicts of 
interest, how they were resolved and whether they were resolved 
effectively.
4. Questions for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed 
changes to the SEF CCO regulatory requirements. The Commission further 
requests comment on the question set forth below.
    1. Has the Commission struck the appropriate balance between the 
responsibilities of the CCO and the ROC with respect to identifying, 
managing and resolving conflicts of interest? Are there ways in which 
this balance should be modified?
    2. Proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(5) provides that the board of 
directors or the senior officer of the SEF, in consultation with the 
ROC, shall approve the compensation of the CCO. Proposed Sec.  
38.856(d) provides the same requirement for the DCM's CRO. Should the 
Commission expand on this requirement, to also prohibit CCO and CRO 
compensation from being directly dependent on the SEF's or DCM's 
business performance?

VI. Conforming Changes

a. Commission Regulations Sec. Sec.  37.2, 38.2, and Part 1

    The Commission proposes adopting certain existing requirements from 
part 1, in particular those from Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  
1.59, 1.63, 1.64 and 1.69, into new regulations for SEFs and DCMs in 
parts 37 and 38, respectively. Accordingly, and as discussed in more 
detail above, the Commission is proposing to amend Commission

[[Page 19679]]

regulations Sec. Sec.  37.2 and 38.2 to clarify the specific part 1 
regulations that will no longer be applicable to SEFs and DCMs. 
Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  1.59, 1.63, 1.64 and 1.69 would then 
apply only to registered futures associations. As part of the proposed 
amendments to 38.2 in this release, the Commission is proposing a 
ministerial amendment to eliminate from 38.2 any references to sections 
that are either ``reserved'' or have been removed.\252\ Specifically, 
the Commission is proposing a ministerial amendment by eliminating 
references to (i) sections 1.44, 1.53, and 1.62, all of which have been 
reserved by the Commission, and (ii) part 8, which has been removed and 
reserved. Finally, consistent with the exemption language now included 
in proposed regulation Sec.  37.2, the Commission is renaming this 
``Exempt Provision.''
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    \252\ Final Rule that deleted part 8--Final Rule, Adaptation of 
Regulations to Incorporate Swaps, 77 FR 66288 (November 2, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Transfer of Equity Interest--Commission Regulations Sec. Sec.  
37.5(c) and 38.5(c)

1. Background
    The Commission proposes to amend regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c) and 
38.5(c) to: (1) ensure the Commission receives timely and sufficient 
information in the event of certain changes in the ownership or 
corporate or organizational structure of a SEF or DCM; (2) clarify what 
information is required to be provided and the relevant deadlines; and 
(3) conform to similar existing and proposed requirements applicable to 
DCOs. SEFs and DCMs can enter into transactions that result in a change 
in ownership or corporate or organizational structure. In those 
situations, Commission staff conducts due diligence to determine 
whether the change will impact adversely the operations of the SEF or 
DCM or its ability to comply with the CEA and Commission regulations. 
Similarly, Commission staff also considers whether any term or 
condition contained in a transaction agreement is inconsistent with the 
self-regulatory responsibilities of the SEF or DCM or with the CEA or 
Commission regulations. Commission staff's ability to undertake a 
timely and effective due diligence review of the impact, if any, of 
such transactions is essential.
    While SEFs and DCMs are registered entities subject to Commission 
oversight, many of these entities are part of larger corporate 
families. SEF and DCM affiliates, including parent entities that own or 
control the SEF or DCM, are not necessarily registered with the 
Commission or otherwise subject to Commission regulations. 
Understanding how these larger corporate families are structured and 
how they operate may be critical to Commission staff understanding how 
a change in ownership or corporate or organizational structure could 
impact a SEF's or DCM's ability to comply with the CEA and Commission 
regulations. For example, how finances and resources are connected or 
shared between a parent, affiliates, and the SEF or DCM are critical 
facts that can impact the SEF's or DCM's core principle compliance. 
Similarly, how much control the parent company or an affiliate can 
legally exert over a SEF or DCM may impact the exchange's compliance 
culture, including governance policies.
    Additionally, budgetary concerns might cause reductions in 
compliance staff, or a change in surveillance vendors. Changes in 
affiliate framework might also necessitate enhanced conflicts of 
interest procedures. In light of the corporate changes that can occur 
with respect to SEFs and DCMs, and the considerable impact such changes 
may have on the SEF's or DCM's business, products, rules, and overall 
compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission is 
proposing rules that will clarify and enhance the Commission's 
authority to request information and documents in the event of certain 
changes in a SEF's or DCM's ownership or corporate or organizational 
structure.
2. Existing Regulatory Framework
    Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) and 38.5(c)(1) require 
SEFs and DCMs, respectively, to notify the Commission in the event of 
an equity interest transfer. However, the notification requirement 
differs in two respects. First, the threshold that obligates a DCM to 
notify the Commission is when the DCM enters into a transaction 
involving the transfer of 10 percent or more of the equity interest in 
the DCM. In comparison, a SEF is required to notify the Commission when 
it enters into a transaction involving the transfer of 50 percent or 
more of the equity interest in the SEF. Second, Commission regulation 
Sec.  37.5(c)(1) provides that the Commission may, ``upon receiving 
such notification, request supporting documentation of the 
transaction.'' Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(c)(1) does not contain 
a similar explicit authority for the Commission to request such 
documentation for DCMs.
    Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(2) and 38.5(c)(2) set 
forth the timing of the equity interest transfer notification to the 
Commission. These regulations are substantively similar and require 
notification at the earliest possible time, but in no event later than 
the open of business 10 business days following the date upon which the 
SEF or DCM enters into a firm obligation to transfer the equity 
interest.
    Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(3) and 38.5(c)(3) govern 
rule filing obligations that may be prompted by the equity interest 
transfer. Specifically, if any aspect of the transfer necessitates the 
filing of a rule as defined part 40 of the Commission's regulations, 
then the SEF or DCM is required to comply with the rule filing 
requirements and procedures under section 5c(c) of the CEA and 
applicable Commission regulations.
    Commission regulation Sec.  37.5(c)(4) provides a certification 
requirement where a SEF is required to notify the Commission no later 
than two days after the equity transfer takes place that the SEF meets 
all of the requirements of section 5h of the CEA and the Commission 
regulations adopted thereunder. DCMs do not have an analogous 
certification requirement.
    Finally, Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(d) and 38.5(d) make 
certain delegations of authority to the Director of the Division of 
Market Oversight. Commission regulation Sec.  37.5(d) provides that the 
Commission delegates the authority ``set forth in this section'' to the 
Director of the Division of Market Oversight. Therefore, the delegation 
of authority applies to information requests related to the business of 
the SEF in regulation Sec.  37.5(a), demonstrations of compliance with 
the core principles and Commission regulations in Sec.  37.5(b), and 
equity interest transfers in Sec.  37.5(c). In contrast, the delegation 
of authority under Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(d) provides that 
the Commission delegates the authority ``set forth in paragraph (b) of 
this section'' to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight. The 
scope of the delegation of authority provisions under Sec.  38.5(d) is 
therefore limited to DCM demonstrations of compliance with the core 
principles and Commission regulations in Sec.  38.5(b) and does not 
extend to requests for information related to the business of the DCM 
in Sec.  38.5(a) and equity interest transfers in Sec.  38.5(c).
3. Proposed Rules
    The Commission proposes to amend regulation Sec.  37.5(c)(1) to 
require SEFs to file with the Commission notification of transactions 
involving the transfer of at least 10 percent of the equity interest in

[[Page 19680]]

the SEF.\253\ The proposed change to revise the reporting threshold 
from 50 percent to 10 percent would conform the SEF requirement with 
existing regulation Sec.  38.5(c)(1) for DCMs and Commission regulation 
Sec.  39.19(c)(4)(ix) for DCOs. As the Commission previously stated for 
DCMs, a 10 percent threshold is appropriate because a change in 
ownership of such magnitude may have an impact on the operations of the 
DCM.\254\ The Commission believes the same is true for SEFs. The 
Commission also believes that such impact may be present even if the 
transfer of equity interest does not result in a change in control. For 
example, if one entity holds a 10 percent equity share in a SEF it may 
have a more significant voice in the operation and/or decision-making 
of the SEF than five entities each with a minority two percent equity 
interest.
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    \253\ In 2011, the Commission proposed a 10 percent equity 
interest transfer threshold for SEFs. Core Principles and Other 
Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR 1214 (Jan. 7, 
2011). The final rule increased the threshold to 50 percent. Part 37 
Final Rule, 78 FR 33476 (June 4, 2013).
    \254\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated 
Contract Markets; Proposed Rule, 75 FR 80572 at 80576 n.32 (Dec. 22, 
2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given the potential impact that a change in ownership could have on 
the operations of a DCM, the Commission believes it is appropriate to 
require a DCM to certify after such change that it will continue to 
comply with all obligations under the CEA and Commission regulations. 
The Commission believes that conforming Sec.  38.5(c) to the SEF 
certification requirement will better allow the Commission to fulfill 
its oversight obligations, without undue burdens on DCMs.
    The Commission also is proposing to amend regulations Sec. Sec.  
37.5(c)(1) and 38.5(c)(1) to expand the types of changes of ownership 
or corporate or organizational structure that would trigger a 
notification obligation to the Commission. The proposed amendments 
would require SEFs and DCMs to report any anticipated change in the 
ownership or corporate or organizational structure of the SEF or DCM, 
or its respective parent(s) that would: (1) result in at least a 10 
percent change of ownership of the SEF or DCM, or a change to the 
entity or person holding a controlling interest in the SEF or DCM, 
whether through an increase in direct ownership or voting interest in 
the SEF or DCM, or in a direct or indirect corporate parent entity of 
the SEF or DCM; (2) create a new subsidiary or eliminate a current 
subsidiary of the SEF or DCM; or (3) result in the transfer of all or 
substantially all of the assets of the SEF or DCM to another legal 
entity. The proposed language generally tracks the current requirement 
for DCOs in Commission regulation Sec.  39.19(c)(4)(ix)(A), as amended 
by the Commission's Final Rule on Reporting and Information 
Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ Reporting and Information Requirements for Derivatives 
Clearing Organizations, 88 FR 53664 (Aug. 8, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This final rule amended Commission regulation Sec.  
39.19(c)(4)(ix)(A)(1) to require a DCO to notify the Commission of 
changes that result in at least a 10 percent change of ownership of the 
derivatives clearing organization or a change to the entity or person 
holding a controlling interest in the derivatives clearing 
organization, whether through an increase in direct ownership or voting 
interest in the derivatives clearing organization or in a direct or 
indirect corporate parent entity of the derivatives clearing 
organization.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \256\ Reporting and Information Requirements for Derivatives 
Clearing Organizations, 87 FR 76698, 76716-17 (Dec. 15, 2022). See 
id. at 76716-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In proposing this amendment, the Commission explained that it was 
proposing to amend the provision to require a DCO to report any change 
to the entity or person that holds a controlling interest, either 
directly or indirectly, in the DCO. The Commission noted that, because 
the current rule was tied to changes in ownership of the DCO by 
percentage share of ownership, DCOs are not currently required to 
report all instances in which there is a change in control of the DCO. 
It is possible that a change in ownership of less than 10 percent could 
result in a change in control of the DCO. For example, if an entity 
increases its stake in the DCO from 45 percent ownership to 51 percent, 
it is possible that control of the DCO would change without any 
required reporting. In addition, in some instances, a DCO is owned by a 
parent company, and a change in ownership or control of the parent was 
not required to be reported under the current rule despite the fact 
that it could change corporate control of the DCO. The Commission noted 
that the proposed changes to the rule would ensure that the Commission 
has accurate knowledge of the individuals or entities that control a 
DCO and its activities.\257\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ See id. at 76704.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes the same rationale is applicable to SEFs 
and DCMs. It is possible that an increase in equity interest in an 
exchange from 45 percent to 51 percent, would change control of the 
exchange without required reporting under the current SEF and DCM 
regulations. Similarly, a change in ownership or control of a SEF's or 
DCM's parent is not required to be reported under the current 
regulations even though it could change corporate control of the SEF or 
DCM. The proposed changes would help to ensure that the Commission has 
accurate knowledge of the individuals or entities that control a SEF or 
DCM and its activities.\258\
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    \258\ The Commission's Division of Market Oversight generally 
addressed concepts of ownership in another rulemaking. See, e.g., 
Ownership and Control Reports, Forms 102/102S, 40/40S, and 71; Final 
Rule, 78 FR 69178, 69261 (Parent--for purposes of Form 40, a person 
is a parent of a reporting trader if it has a direct or indirect 
controlling interest in the reporting trader; and a person has a 
controlling interest if such person has the ability to control the 
reporting trader through the ownership of voting equity, by 
contract, or otherwise.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is proposing to amend Commission regulations 
Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(2) and 38.5(c)(2) to clarify what information must 
be submitted to the Commission as part of a notification pursuant to 
Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) and 38.5(c)(1), as 
proposed to be amended. Existing Commission regulation Sec.  37.5(c)(1) 
provides that upon receiving notification of an equity interest 
transfer from a SEF, the Commission may request the SEF to provide 
``supporting documentation of the transaction.'' Although Commission 
regulation Sec.  38.5(c)(1) currently includes a notification 
requirement for DCMs regarding equity interest transfers, it does not 
grant the Commission the specific authority to request supporting 
documentation upon the receipt of such a notification. Accordingly, the 
Commission proposes to harmonize and enhance the requirements between 
SEFs and DCMs by amending Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(2) 
and 38.5(c)(2) to state that, as part of a notification pursuant to 
Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) or 38.5(c)(1), as proposed 
to be amended, a SEF or DCM must provide ``required information'' 
including: a chart outlining the new ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure, a brief description of the purpose or the 
impact of the change, and any relevant agreement effecting the change 
and corporate documents such as articles of incorporation and 
bylaws.\259\ Pursuant to proposed regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(2)(i) 
and 38.5(c)(2)(i), the Commission may,

[[Page 19681]]

after receiving such information, request additional supporting 
documentation related to the change in ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure, such as amended Form DCM or Form SEF 
exhibits, to demonstrate that the SEF or DCM will, following the 
change, continue to meet all the requirements in section 5 or 5h of the 
CEA (as applicable) and applicable Commission regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \259\ The Commission notes that regulation Sec.  
39.19(c)(4)(ix)(B) currently requires a DCO to provide the 
Commission with the following: A chart outlining the new ownership 
or corporate or organizational structure; a brief description of the 
purpose and impact of the change; and any relevant agreements 
effecting the change and corporate documents such as articles of 
incorporation and bylaws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that clarifying and enhancing its authority 
to request this information will encourage SEFs and DCMs to remain 
mindful of their self-regulatory and market regulation responsibilities 
when negotiating the terms of significant equity interest transfers or 
other changes in ownership or corporate or organizational structure. 
The Commission believes that it also will enhance Commission staff's 
ability to undertake a timely and effective due diligence review of the 
impact, if any, of such changes. In particular, parts 37 and 38 of the 
Commission's regulations require the filing of certain exhibits when a 
SEF or DCM applies for designation or registration. These include, 
among others, Exhibit A (the name of any person who owns ten percent 
(10%) or more of the Applicant's stock or who, either directly or 
indirectly, through agreement or otherwise, in any other manner, may 
control or direct the management or policies of the Applicant); Exhibit 
B (a list of the present owners, directors, governors or persons 
performing similar functions, including a description of any 
disqualifications or disciplinary actions related such persons under 
sections 8b and 8c of the Act); Exhibit E (a description of the 
personnel qualifications for each category of professional employees), 
Exhibit F (an analysis of staffing requirements necessary to carry out 
key operations), Exhibit H (a brief description of any material legal 
proceedings to which the SEF or DCM or any of its affiliates is a 
party), Exhibit M (the rulebook), Exhibit N (applicant agreements, 
including with third party service providers and member or user 
agreements), and Exhibit O (the compliance manual). In the event of a 
transfer of equity interest or similar ownership or corporate or 
organizational change to a SEF or DCM, the proposed amendments would 
strengthen Commission staff's authority to seek updated copies of such 
exhibits and other documents to confirm that the SEF or DCM will 
continue to be able to meet its regulatory obligations.
    Pursuant to proposed regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(2)(i) and 
38.5(c)(2)(i), Commission staff would have clear authority to request 
amended Form SEF or DCM exhibits, such as Exhibit A. Exhibit A requires 
the full name and address of each such person. One potential scenario 
is that such updated exhibit reflects a non-U.S. 10 percent owner. Such 
information may cause Commission staff to undertake further inquiry as 
to whether the SEF or DCM, with such new non-U.S. owner, can 
demonstrate it has the ability to continue satisfying all of the 
requirements of section 5 of the CEA and applicable Commission 
regulations. Additionally, an amended Exhibit B of the Form SEF or Form 
DCM may reflect that an officer or director is disqualified or had 
disciplinary action taken against them under the Act.\260\ The 
Commission also notes pursuant to proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(a) and 
38.801(a), SEFs and DCMs must establish and enforce appropriate fitness 
standards for, among others, their officers, directors and any person 
who owns 10 percent or more of the SEF or DCM and who, either directly 
or indirectly, through agreement or otherwise, in any other manner, may 
control or direct the management or policies of the SEF or DCM, and any 
party affiliated with any of those persons. Information obtained 
through proposed regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(2) and 38.5(c)(2) will 
inform the Commission as to whether the SEF or DCM remains compliant 
with such minimum fitness standards.
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    \260\ Exhibit B requires: a description of: (1) Any order of the 
Commission with respect to such person pursuant to section 5e of the 
CEA; (2) Any conviction or injunction against such person within the 
past ten (10) years; (3) Any disciplinary action with respect to 
such person within the last five (5) years; (4) Any disqualification 
under sections 8b and 8d of the CEA; (5) Any disciplinary action 
under section 8c of the CEA; and (6) Any violation pursuant to 
section 9 of the CEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Next, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(3) and 38.5(c)(3) will require a 
notification pursuant to Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) 
or 38.5(c)(1), as proposed to be amended, to be submitted no later than 
three months prior to the anticipated change, provided that the SEF or 
DCM may report the anticipated change later than three months prior to 
the anticipated change if it does not know and reasonably could not 
have known of the anticipated change three months prior to the 
anticipated change. In such event, the SEF or DCM shall immediately 
report such change to the Commission as soon as it knows of such 
change. The Commission believes the proposed timing requirement strikes 
the appropriate balance between allowing Commission staff sufficient 
time to review the impact of the change and assess compliance with 
applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, while also preserving 
flexibility to the SEF or DCM if the anticipated change occurs more 
quickly than within three months.
    In addition to the new reporting requirements, the proposal 
includes a new certification requirement for DCMs. Existing Commission 
regulation Sec.  37.5(c)(4) requires the SEF, upon a transfer of equity 
interest, to file a certification that it meets all of the requirements 
of section 5h of the CEA and the Commission regulations adopted 
thereunder. The certification must be filed no later than two business 
days following the date on which the subject equity interest was 
acquired. DCMs currently do not have an analogous certification 
requirement.\261\ Therefore, the Commission is proposing to amend 
Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(c) by adding a certification 
requirement in regulation Sec.  38.5(c)(5). The certification will 
require a DCM, upon a change in ownership or corporate organizational 
structure described in Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(c)(1), to file 
with the Commission a certification that the DCM meets all of the 
requirements of section 5 of the CEA and applicable Commission 
regulations. The certification must be filed no later than two business 
days following the date on which the change in ownership or corporate 
or organizational structure takes effect. This should be interpreted to 
mean two business days after the change contemplated by the 
effectuating agreements actually occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \261\ In the final rule implementing part 38 of the Commission's 
regulations, the Commission stated that the documentation that the 
Commission may request under Commission regulation Sec.  38.5 may 
include a certification that the DCM continues to meet all of the 
requirements of section 5(d) of the CEA and Commission regulations 
adopted thereunder. See Part 38 Final Rule, 77 FR 36612 at 36619.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that there is no substantive difference 
necessitating disparate treatment between SEFs and DCMs regarding the 
certification. Given their roles as self-regulatory organizations, in 
the event of a subject change in ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure, the Commission believes it is imperative for 
the SEF or DCM to certify its compliance with the CEA and Commission 
regulations. The certification will help ensure that any such changes 
do not result in non-compliance. Toward that end, proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.5(c)(6) and 38.5(c)(6) provide that a change in the ownership or 
corporate or organizational structure of a SEF or DCM that results in 
the failure of the SEF or DCM to comply with any

[[Page 19682]]

provision of the Act, or any regulation or order of the Commission 
thereunder, shall be cause for the suspension of the registration or 
designation of the SEF or DCM, or the revocation of registration or 
designation as a SEF or DCM, in accordance with sections 5e and 6(b) of 
the CEA. The proposed rule further provides that the Commission may 
make and enter an order directing that the SEF or DCM cease and desist 
from such violation, in accordance with sections 6b and 6(b) of the 
CEA.\262\ Section 6(b) of the CEA authorizes the Commission to suspend 
or revoke registration or designation of a SEF or DCM if the exchange 
has violated the CEA or Commission orders or regulations. Section 6(b) 
includes a number of procedural safeguards, including that it requires 
notice to the SEF or DCM, a hearing on the record, and appeal rights to 
the court of appeals for the circuit in which the SEF or DCM has its 
principal place of business. It is imperative that SEFs and DCMs, 
regardless of ownership or control changes, continue to comply with the 
CEA and all Commission regulations to promote market integrity and 
protect market participants.
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    \262\ 7 U.S.C 7b; 7 U.S.C. 13a; 7 U.S.C 8(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission proposes to amend existing regulation Sec.  
38.5(d) by extending the delegation of authority provisions to the 
Director of the Division of Market Oversight to include information 
requests related to the business of the DCM in Sec.  38.5(a) and equity 
interest transfers in Sec.  38.5(c). This amendment would conform Sec.  
38.5(d) to the existing delegated authority the Division of Market 
Oversight has with respect to SEFs under Sec.  37.5(d). Changes in 
ownership or control of a DCM can occur relatively quickly. Therefore, 
the Commission believes it is important for effective oversight to 
provide the Director of the Division of Market Oversight with the 
authority in such circumstances, to immediately request information and 
documents to confirm continued compliance by a DCM with the CEA and 
relevant Commission regulations.
4. Questions for Comment
    1. Proposed regulation Sec.  37.5(c)(1) revises the notification 
threshold for SEFs from 50 percent to 10 percent to align with the DCM 
requirement in Sec.  38.5(c)(1). Is there any reason why the threshold 
should be different for SEFs?
    2. Do the proposed rules provide sufficient notice and clarity to 
SEFs and DCMs regarding what documents and information may be requested 
by the Commission?
    3. Are the timing provisions for the required notification 
(proposed regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(3) and 38.5(c)(3)) and 
certification (proposed regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(5) and 
38.5(c)(5)) sufficiently clear? Do such timing provisions allow 
sufficient time for SEFs and DCMs to provide the required notification 
and certification?

VII. Effective and Compliance Dates

    The Commission is proposing that the effective date for the 
proposed rules be sixty days after publication of final regulations in 
the Federal Register. The Commission believes that the proposed 
effective date would be appropriate given that DCMs have implemented 
many of the proposed rules' requirements that are being adopted from 
the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices. Additionally, many SEFs 
have voluntarily adopted elements of these standards to demonstrate 
compliance with SEF Core Principle 12. The Commission also proposes a 
compliance date of one-year after the effective date of the final 
regulations. The Commission believes this will provide current SEFs and 
DCMs, as well as prospective SEF and DCM applicants, with sufficient 
time to comply with the final regulations.

Question for Comment

    The Commission requests comment on whether the proposed effective 
date is appropriate and, if not, the Commission further requests 
comment on possible alternative effective dates and the basis for any 
such alternative dates.

VIII. Related Matters

a. Cost-Benefit Considerations

1. Introduction
    As described above, the Commission proposes to establish governance 
standards and conflicts of interest rules related to market regulation 
functions, for SEFs and DCMs. Although SEFs and DCMs have similar 
obligations with respect to market regulation functions, they are 
subject to different obligations with respect to governance fitness 
standards and mitigating conflicts of interest. SEFs and DCMs are 
required to minimize and resolve conflicts of interest pursuant to 
identical statutory core principles.\263\ However, with respect to 
governance fitness standards, DCMs are subject to specific statutory 
core principles addressing governance,\264\ while SEFs do not have 
parallel core principle requirements. Additionally, SEFs and DCMs 
currently have different regulatory obligations with respect to 
governance fitness standards.\265\ Further, while both SEFs and DCMs 
are subject to equity transfer requirements,\266\ the applicable 
regulatory provisions currently have different notification thresholds 
and obligations.
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    \263\ See SEF Core Principle 12, Commodity Exchange Act 
(``CEA'') section 5h(f)(12), 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(12), and DCM Core 
Principle 16, CEA section 5(d)(16), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(16).
    \264\ See DCM Core Principles 15 and 17, CEA section 5(d)(15), 7 
U.S.C. 7(d)(15), and CEA section 5(d)(17), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(17), 
respectively.
    \265\ As discussed below, SEFs, but not DCMs, are required to 
comply with requirements under part 1 of the Commission's 
regulations addressing the sharing of nonpublic information, service 
on the board or committees by persons with disciplinary histories, 
board composition, and voting by board or committee members persons 
where there may be a conflict of interest.
    \266\ Commission regulation Sec.  37.5(c) (SEFs) and Commission 
regulation Sec.  38.5(c) (DCMs).
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    Section 15(a) of the CEA requires the Commission to consider the 
costs and benefits of its actions before promulgating a regulation 
under the CEA or issuing certain orders.\267\ Section 15(a) further 
specifies that the costs and benefits shall be evaluated in light of 
the following five broad areas of market and public concern: (1) 
protection of market participants and the public; (2) efficiency, 
competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets; (3) price 
discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other public 
interest considerations. The Commission considers the costs and 
benefits resulting from its discretionary determinations with respect 
to the section 15(a) factors (collectively referred to herein as 
``Section 15(a) Factors'') below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ 7 U.S.C. 19(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The goal of the proposed rulemaking is to provide SEFs and DCMs 
with a clear regulatory framework for implementing governance standards 
to promote the integrity of its self-regulatory functions and for 
identifying, managing, and resolving conflicts of interest related to 
their market regulation functions. Specifically, the proposed 
rulemaking harmonizes and enhances the existing SEF and DCM regulations 
by proposing: (1) new rules to implement DCM Core Principle 15 
(Governance Fitness Standards) that are consistent with the existing 
guidance on compliance with DCM Core Principle 15 (Governance Fitness 
Standards); (2) new rules to implement DCM Core Principle 16 (Conflicts 
of Interest) that are consistent with the DCM Core Principle 16 
Guidance and Acceptable Practices; (3) new rules to implement SEF Core 
Principle 2 (Compliance With Rules)

[[Page 19683]]

that are consistent with the DCM Core Principle 15 Guidance; (4) new 
rules to implement SEF Core Principle 12 (Conflicts of Interest) that 
are consistent with the DCM Core Principle 16 Guidance and Acceptable 
Practices; (5) new rules under part 37 of the Commission's regulations 
for SEFs and part 38 of the Commission's regulations for DCMs that are 
consistent with existing conflicts of interest and governance 
requirements under Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  1.59 and 1.63; (6) 
new rules for DCM Chief Regulatory Officers (``CROs''); (7) amendments 
to certain requirements relating to SEF Chief Compliance Officers 
(``CCOs''); and (8) new rules for SEFs and DCMs relating to the 
establishment and operation of a Regulatory Oversight Committee 
(``ROC'').
    The Commission recognizes that the proposed changes in this release 
could result in benefits, but also could impose costs. Any initial and 
recurring compliance costs for any SEF or DCM will depend on the size, 
existing infrastructure, practices, and cost structure of the entity. 
The Commission has endeavored to provide qualitative analysis of costs 
based on its experience overseeing SEFs and DCMs. The Commission 
generally requests comment on all aspects of its cost-benefit 
considerations, including the identification and assessment of any 
costs and benefits not discussed herein; data and any other information 
to assist or otherwise inform the Commission's ability to quantify or 
qualitatively describe the costs and benefits of the proposed 
amendments; and substantiating data, statistics, and any other 
information to support positions posited by commenters with respect to 
the Commission's discussion. The Commission welcomes comment on such 
costs and benefits.
2. Baseline
    The baseline for the Commission's consideration of the costs and 
benefits of this proposed rulemaking is the existing statutory and 
regulatory framework regarding conflicts of interests and governance 
standards for SEFs and DCMs. The existing governance requirements and 
conflicts of interest standards for SEFs are set forth in SEF Core 
Principles 2, 12 and 15,\268\ and certain regulations in part 1 of the 
Commission's regulations that apply to SROs, including SEFs. SEFs must 
comply with SEF Core Principle 2, requiring SEFs to establish and 
enforce rules governing the operation of the SEF.\269\ Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.59 provides limits on the use and disclosure of SEF 
material, non-public information. Commission regulation Sec.  1.63 
restricts persons with certain disciplinary histories from serving on 
disciplinary committees, arbitration panels, oversight panels or the 
governing board of a SEF. Commission regulation Sec.  1.64 sets forth 
requirements for the composition of SEF governing boards and major 
disciplinary committees. Commission regulation Sec.  1.69 requires a 
SEF to have rules to prevent members of the board of directors, 
disciplinary committees, or oversight panels, to abstain from 
deliberating and voting on certain matters that may raise conflicts of 
interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \268\ See CEA section 5h(f)(2), 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2), CEA section 
5h(f)(12), 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(12) and CEA section 5h(f)(15), 7 U.S.C. 
7b-3(f)(15).
    \269\ CEA section 5h(f)(2), 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The existing requirements for DCMs to minimize and resolve 
conflicts of interests are outlined in DCM Core Principle 16.\270\ DCMs 
must also comply with DCM Core Principle 15, which sets forth 
governance fitness standards for members of the board of directors or 
disciplinary committees, members of the contract market, any other 
person with direct access to the facility, and any person affiliated 
with those enumerated individuals. Additionally, DCM Core Principle 17 
requires a DCM's governance arrangements be designed to consider the 
views of market participants and DCM and Core Principle 22 requires 
DCMs that are publicly traded to endeavor to have boards of directors 
and other decision-making bodies composed of diverse individuals. DCMs 
are also subject to existing regulatory requirements in Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.63(c), that disqualifies individuals with certain 
disciplinary histories from serving on DCM governing boards, 
arbitration or oversight panels, or disciplinary committees. 
disciplinary committees, arbitration panels, oversight panels or the 
governing board of a DCM. Although DCMs are exempt from Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.59(b) and (c), Commission regulation Sec.  1.59(d) 
directly prohibits members of the board of directors, committee 
members, or consultants of a self-regulatory organization from trading 
for their own account, or for or on behalf of any other account, based 
on this material non-public information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \270\ The Commission, however, notes that--as a practical 
matter--all of the DCMs that are currently designated by the 
Commission rely on the acceptable practices to comply with Core 
Principle 16, in lieu of any other means for compliance. As such, 
the actual costs and benefits of the codification of those 
acceptable practices with respect to DCMs, as realized in the 
market, may not be as significant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Both SEFs and DCMs are subject to equity interest transfer 
requirements set forth in Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c) and 
38.5(c), respectively.
    The Commission notes that this cost-benefit consideration is based 
on its understanding that the derivatives market regulated by the 
Commission functions internationally with: (1) transactions that 
involve U.S. entities occurring across different international 
jurisdictions; (2) some entities organized outside of the United States 
that are registered with the Commission; and (3) some entities that 
typically operate both within and outside the United States and that 
follow substantially similar business practices wherever located. Where 
the Commission does not specifically refer to matters of location, the 
discussion of costs and benefits below refers to the effects of the 
proposed rules on all relevant derivatives activity, whether based on 
their actual occurrence in the United States or on their connection 
with, or effect on, U.S. commerce.\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Proposed Rules
i. Minimum Fitness Standards--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801
    SEFs must comply with SEF CP 2, which requires SEFs to establish 
and enforce rules governing the operation of its facility.\272\ 
Currently, SEFs must also comply with all requirements in Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.63, which restricts persons with certain 
disciplinary histories from serving on disciplinary committees, 
arbitration panels, oversight panels or the governing board of a SEF, 
because SEFs qualify as SROs and are not otherwise exempt. While DCMs 
are also SROs, they are exempt from Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  
1.63(a), (b), and (d)-(f), pursuant to Commission regulation Sec.  
38.2. DCMs are not, however, exempt from Commission regulation 1.63(c), 
which provides that persons are disqualified from serving on 
disciplinary committees, arbitration panels, oversight panels or the 
governing board of a DCM if they are subject to any of the disciplinary 
offenses found in Sec.  1.63(b). DCMs must also comply with DCM Core 
Principle 15, requiring DCMs to establish and enforce appropriate 
fitness standards for directors, members of any disciplinary committee, 
members of the contract market, and any other person with direct access 
to the facility (including

[[Page 19684]]

any party affiliated with any person described in this paragraph).\273\
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    \272\ CEA section 5h(f)(2); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2).
    \273\ CEA section 5(d)(15); 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207(a) and 38.801(a) would require SEFs and 
DCMs to establish and enforce appropriate fitness requirements for 
officers, members of its board directors, committees, disciplinary 
panels, dispute resolution panels, any other persons with direct access 
to the SEF or DCM, any person who owns 10 percent or more of the SEF or 
DCM and who, either directly or indirectly, through agreement or 
otherwise, in any other manner, may control or direct the management or 
policies of the SEF or DCM, and for any party affiliated with any of 
the foregoing. In subparts (b), and (c) of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 
and 38.801, the Commission has identified certain minimum fitness 
standards that SEFs and DCMs would be required to establish and 
enforce. First, under subpart (b), SEFs and DCMs would be required to 
include the basis for refusal to register a person under sections 
8(a)(2) and 8a(3) of the CEA as minimum fitness standards for members 
of its board of directors, committees, disciplinary panels, dispute 
resolution panels, for members with voting privileges, and any person 
who owns 10 percent or more of the SEF or DCM and who, either directly 
or indirectly, through agreement or otherwise, in any other manner, may 
control or direct the management or policies of the SEF or DCM. Second, 
under subpart (c), SEF and DCM minimum fitness standards would be 
required to include six offenses the Commission has identified as 
disqualifying for key decision-makers, including members of its board 
of directors, committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution 
panels.
    Commission regulation Sec.  1.63(d) requires each SRO to provide 
the Commission with a certified list of persons removed from a 
disciplinary committee, arbitration panel, or oversight panel, in the 
previous year. In addition to the above standards, proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.207(d) and 38.801(d) would require that SEFs and DCMs to establish 
new procedures for the initial and annual collection, verification, and 
preservation of information supporting compliance with appropriate 
fitness standards.
A. Benefits
    The Commission believes that requiring appropriate, minimum fitness 
standards for individuals with the ability to exercise influence or 
control over the operations of SEFs and DCMs, including their market 
regulation functions, will improve the integrity and effectiveness of 
SEFs and DCMs in their role as SROs. By establishing automatic 
disqualifiers, including disqualifications described in CEA sections 
8a(2) and 8a(3), or a history of disciplinary offenses described in 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.63, SEFs and DCMs may benefit by 
attracting individuals with demonstrated ethical conduct and sound 
decision-making to those influential roles. Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 
and 38.801 are likely to reduce the likelihood and the extent of harm 
caused by individuals with a history of disciplinary offenses to the 
operations of SEFs and DCMs, including their market regulation 
functions. In addition, clear minimum standards for individuals with 
the ability to influence or control the governance of SEFs and DCMs 
will provide market participants using exchange services, as well as 
exchange shareholders, with greater confidence in key SEF and DCM 
decision-makers. Ongoing verification of the fitness of these decision-
makers may also provide greater accountability and trust in the 
management and operations of SEFs and DCMs. Such requirements may also 
increase the trust of market participants using exchange services.
    Establishing automatic disqualifiers and establishing independent 
fitness verification procedures for SEFs and DCMs are likely to aid in 
identifying trustworthy individuals to serve in roles with the ability 
to control or influence the governance of the exchange or its market 
regulation functions. It is important that the individuals able to 
influence or control a SEF's and DCM's governance, management, and 
disciplinary standards have a record of integrity and rectitude. Such 
record provides confidence that those individuals will be able to 
effectuate a SEF's or DCM's obligations to establish and enforce its 
rules, and a DCM's obligation to establish and enforce appropriate 
minimum fitness requirements.\274\
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    \274\ The minimum fitness requirements facilitate a SEF's and 
DCM's ability to establish and enforce their rules, in accordance 
with SEF Core Principle 2 (Compliance with Rules), CEA section 
5h(f)(2); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2), DCM Core Principle 2 (Compliance with 
Rules), CEA section 5(d)(2); 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(2), and DCM Core 
Principle 15, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, as discussed above, SEFs currently must comply with all 
requirements in Commission regulation Sec.  1.63. To the extent SEFs 
are already compliant with this regulation, the benefits of proposed 
Sec.  37.207 may be less significant. Similarly, DCMs currently must 
comply with Commission regulation Sec.  1.63(c) and DCM Core Principle 
15. To the extent that DCMs are already compliant with Sec.  1.63(c) 
and DCM Core Principle 15, the benefits of proposed Sec.  38.801 may be 
less significant. Finally, to the extent that SEFs or DCMs have already 
implemented rules consistent with all aspects of the DCM Core Principle 
15 Guidance, the benefits of proposed Sec.  37.207 and Sec.  38.801 may 
be less significant.\275\
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    \275\ As described supra, Section III(a)(Proposed Governance 
Fitness Standards--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801), the 
proposed minimum fitness standards are consistent with the existing 
DCM Core Principle 15 Guidance, subject to certain enhancements 
described therein.
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B. Costs
    The Commission believes that SEFs and DCMs would incur additional 
costs from proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801 through the additional 
hours SEF and DCM employees might need to spend analyzing the 
compliance of their existing rules and procedures with these proposed 
requirements, and implementing new or amended rules and procedures, as 
necessary. Specifically, SEFs and DCMs may incur costs in the form of 
administrative time related to drafting new policies to comply with the 
proposed fitness standards and verification procedures. Costs 
associated with complying with proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801 
may further vary based on the size of the SEF or DCM, available 
resources, and existing practices and policies. Accordingly, those 
costs would be impracticable to reasonably quantify. The Commission 
believes that the policies and procedures required for implementing 
minimum fitness standards would likely not change significantly from 
year to year, so after the initial creation of the policies and 
procedures, the time required to maintain those policies and procedures 
would be negligible.
    When implementing proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801, to the 
extent that the current officers or membership of their board of 
directors, or committees do not meet the proposed minimum fitness 
requirements, SEFs and DCMs may need to make changes to their officers, 
members of their board of directors, or committees. This might lead to 
additional costs related to any time and efforts SEFs and DCMs may need 
to take to find suitable candidates.
    The Commission notes that, regarding DCMs, the above costs may be 
mitigated to the extent that a DCM is already complying with DCM Core 
Principle 15 and Commission regulation Sec.  1.63(c). Additionally, to 
the extent a DCM has already implemented practices

[[Page 19685]]

consistent with DCM Core Principle 15 Guidance, some of the costs may 
have been already realized. The DCM Core Principle 15 Guidance states 
that minimum fitness standards for persons who have member voting 
privileges, governing obligations or responsibilities, or who exercise 
disciplinary authority, should include those bases for refusal to 
register a person under section 8a(2) of the CEA.\276\ Additionally, 
the DCM Core Principle 15 Guidance states that persons who have 
governing obligations or responsibilities, or who exercise disciplinary 
authority, should not have a significant history of serious 
disciplinary offenses, such as those that would be disqualifying under 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.63.\277\ As a practical matter, many DCMs 
may have already adopted practices consistent with the Core Principle 
15 Guidance. As such, the actual costs of the proposed rules amendments 
may be less significant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \276\ See Appendix B to part 38, Guidance to Core Principle 15 
of section 5(d) of the Act, Governance Fitness Standards.
    \277\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The costs to implement the proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801 
minimum fitness requirements for SEFs may be mitigated to the extent 
that they already have a framework in place to comply with existing 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.63, which sets forth requirements and 
procedures to prevent persons with certain disciplinary histories from 
serving in certain governing or oversight capacities as an SRO.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801 require each SEF and DCM to 
establish appropriate procedures for the collection and verification of 
information supporting compliance with appropriate fitness standards. 
Ongoing implementation of the proposed rules would also impose costs 
associated with the time required to collect and verify a candidate's 
fitness in a timely manner, to document the findings with respect to 
the fitness standards, to make the findings available to the Commission 
as a part of staff's oversight activities, and to re-verify fitness 
eligibility on an annual basis. Similar to above, a SEF's or DCM's 
costs may be less significant if it is already following the DCM Core 
Principle 15 Guidance, which states that DCMs should have standards for 
the collection and verification of information supporting compliance 
with the DCM's fitness standards.
    The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801, including any costs that would be imposed 
on SEFs, DCMs, other market participants, or the financial system more 
broadly.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801 with 
regard to the specific considerations identified in Section 15(a) of 
the CEA. The Commission believes that proposed Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 
38.801 may protect market participants and the public, as well as the 
financial integrity of the markets, by ensuring the integrity of 
individuals influencing the decisions made by SEFs and DCMs. By having 
fit and reputable decision-makers, the Commission believes SEFs and 
DCMs are likely able to increase industry and public trust in their 
organizations and markets. Minimum fitness standards also may increase 
the confidence in the decisions made by officers and members of its 
board of directors, committees, disciplinary panels, dispute resolution 
panels, and certain owners. The Commission believes that trust and 
confidence in SEF and DCM leadership fosters market participation, 
which could in turn enhance liquidity, price discovery, and the 
financial integrity of markets. The Commission has considered the other 
Section 15(a) Factors and believes that they are not implicated by the 
proposed amendments to Sec. Sec.  37.207 and 38.801.
ii. General Requirements for Addressing Conflicts of Interest and 
Definitions--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201 and 38.851
    Currently, both SEFs and DCMs have an obligation under SEF Core 
Principle 12 and DCM Core Principle 16 to minimize and resolve 
conflicts of interest in their decision-making. Additionally, DCM Core 
Principle 16 Acceptable Practices set forth practices for complying 
with Core Principle 16. By contrast, there are no acceptable practices 
or guidance for SEF Core Principle 12.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(a) and 38.851(a) require SEFs and DCMs 
to establish processes for identifying, minimizing, and resolving 
actual and potential conflicts of interest that may arise. Proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b) and 38.851(b) revise existing definitions \278\ 
and define two new terms. First, the term ``market regulation 
function,'' under Sec.  38.851(b)(9) means DCM functions required by 
DCM Core Principle 2, DCM Core Principle 4, DCM Core Principle 5, DCM 
Core Principle 10, DCM Core Principle 12, DCM Core Principle 13, DCM 
Core Principle 17 and the applicable Commission regulations thereunder. 
``Market regulation function'' under Sec.  37.1201(b)(9) means SEF 
functions required by SEF Core Principle 2, SEF Core Principle 4, SEF 
Core Principle 6, SEF Core Principle 10 and the applicable Commission 
regulations thereunder. Second, the proposed rules define the term 
``affiliate,'' which refers to a person that directly, or indirectly, 
controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the SEF 
or DCM.
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    \278\ The DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices defines a 
``public director'' as an individual with no material relationship 
to the DCM and describes the term ``immediate family'' to include 
spouse, parents, children, and siblings. The terms ``material 
information,'' ``non-public information,'' ``commodity interest,'' 
``related commodity interest,'' and ``linked exchange'' are defined 
in Commission regulation Sec.  1.59. ``Material information'' is 
defined in Sec.  1.59(a)(5) to mean information which, if such 
information were publicly known, would be considered important by a 
reasonable person in deciding whether to trade a particular 
commodity interest on a contract market or a swap execution 
facility, or to clear a swap contract through a derivatives clearing 
organization. ``Non-public information'' is defined in Sec.  
1.59(a)(6), as information which has not been disseminated in a 
manner which makes it generally available to the trading public. 
Commission regulations Sec.  1.59(a)(8) and (9) define ``commodity 
interest,'' to include all futures, swaps, and options traded on or 
subject to the rules of a SEF or DCM and ``related commodity 
interest'' to include any commodity interest which is traded on or 
subject to the rules of a SEF, DCM, linked exchange, or other board 
of trade, exchange, or market, or cleared by a DCO, other than the 
self-regulatory organization by which a person is employed, and 
which is subject to a self-regulatory organization's intermarket 
spread margins or other special margin treatment. Commission 
regulations Sec.  1.59(a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(8), and (a)(9).
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A. Benefits
    The Commission believes that SEF and DCM conflict of interest 
processes, as required by proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(a) and 38.851(a), 
are likely to provide the framework necessary for SEFs and DCMs to 
minimize conflicts of interest and comply with their core principle 
requirements. The specific conflicts of interest this proposal 
addresses relate to market regulation functions, i.e., SEF and DCM 
functions that promote market integrity and orderly conduct in the 
markets.\279\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \279\ E.g., trade practice surveillance, market surveillance, 
real-time market monitoring, audit trail data and recordkeeping 
enforcement, investigations of possible SEF or DCM rule violations, 
and disciplinary actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the new definitions for ``market 
regulation functions'' and ``affiliate'' in proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1201(b) and 38.851(b) will provide benefits, including operational 
efficiency. SEFs and DCMs will spend less time and resources in 
determining how to comply with regulatory requirements. Moreover, the 
definitions will provide additional regulatory certainty and risk 
reduction; delineate

[[Page 19686]]

the responsibilities addressed by SEF and DCM regulations, including 
which functions are considered self-regulatory versus market 
regulation; and clarify which relationships are affiliate 
relationships. Reducing ambiguities regarding the meaning of these 
terms should promote regulatory compliance.
B. Costs
    SEFs and DCMs may incur additional costs from proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1201(a) and 38.851(a) in terms of employee hours spent analyzing 
whether existing rules and procedures comply with the proposed 
requirements, and drafting and implementing new or amended rules and 
procedures, as necessary. Costs associated with complying with proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1201 and 38.851 may further vary based on the size of the 
SEF or DCM, available resources, and existing practices, rules, and 
procedures. Accordingly, those costs would be impracticable to 
reasonably quantify. Further, rules and procedures required for 
implementing the proposed conflict of interest requirements would 
likely not change significantly from year to year, so after the initial 
creation of such rules and procedures, the time required to maintain 
those rules and procedures would be negligible.
    The Commission does not believe that there any independent costs 
related to the amended and new definitions in proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1201(b) and 38.851(b). Costs that might be associated with the 
proposed definitions will likely arise in connection with implementing 
the conflict of interest requirements under proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1201(a) and 38.851(a).
    The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1201 and 38.851, including any costs that would be 
imposed on SEFs, DCMs, other market participants, or the financial 
system more broadly.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201 and 38.851 with 
regard to the specific considerations identified in Section 15(a) of 
the CEA. The Commission believes that proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201 and 
38.851 may have a beneficial effect on the protection of market 
participants and the public, as well as on the financial integrity of 
the markets by ensuring that SEFs and DCMs have an adequate framework 
for addressing potential conflicts of interest. Procedures for 
identifying conflicts of interest also may reduce the risk of decision-
makers being influenced by concerns that are not in the best interest 
of the SEF's or DCM's market regulation functions. Rules and processes 
to identify and manage conflicts of interest also aid in ensuring that 
decision-makers are accountable to SEFs and DCMs, and therefore, 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201 and 38.851 may lead to increased trust in 
SEF and DCM markets by market participants and the public. The 
Commission has considered the other Section 15(a) Factors and believes 
they are not implicated by proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201 and 38.851.
iii. Conflicts of Interest in Decision-Making--Proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1202 and 38.852
    As described above, SEFs are subject to the requirements of SEF 
Core Principle 12, requiring SEFs to establish and enforce rules and 
processes to identify and resolve conflicts of interest.\280\ 
Currently, SEFs are also required to comply with Commission regulation 
Sec.  1.69, which requires SROs to have rules requiring any member of 
its board of directors, disciplinary committees, or oversight panels to 
disclose conflicts of interest and abstain from deliberating and voting 
in actions with certain personal or financial conflicts of interest. 
DCMs, however, are exempt from these requirements pursuant to 
Commission regulation Sec.  38.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \280\ Supra Section II(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is proposing to make a conforming amendment to 
Commission regulation Sec.  37.2 to exempt SEFs from Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.69. However, the Commission is also proposing 
Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 38.852, which incorporate certain elements of 
existing Commission regulation Sec.  1.69, for both SEFs and DCMs, 
along with certain modifications and enhancements. Notably, the 
Commission proposes to redefine the term ``family relationship'' to 
enhance and modernize the conflict of interest disclosure requirements.
    For example, under Sec.  1.69, if a member of the board of 
directors, disciplinary committee, or oversight panel, has a 
relationship with a named party in interest \281\ that falls within the 
enumerated relationships in Sec.  1.69(b)(1)(i)(A)-(E), the member is 
required to abstain from deliberating and voting on that matter. One of 
the enumerated relationships is a ``family relationship,'' which is 
currently defined as a person's spouse, parent, stepparent, child, 
stepchild, sibling, stepbrother, stepsister, or in-law.\282\
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    \281\ As defined in Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(a).
    \282\ Commission regulation Sec.  1.69(a)(2).
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    In proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(7) and 38.851(b)(7), the 
Commission redefines ``family relationship,'' as the person's spouse, 
parents, children, and siblings, in each case, whether by blood, 
marriage, or adoption, or any person residing in the home of the 
person. This proposed definition focuses on the closeness of the 
relationship that the officer, or member of the board of directors, 
committee, or disciplinary panel has with the subject of the matter 
being considered. The proposed definition also reflects a more modern 
description of the relationships intended to be covered.
    More broadly, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202(a) and 38.852(a) require 
SEFs and DCMs to establish policies and procedures requiring any 
officer or member of their board of directors, committees, or 
disciplinary panels to disclose any actual or potential conflicts of 
interest that may be present prior to considering any matter. Proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1202(a)(1) and 38.852(a)(1) provide a list of enumerated 
relationships that are deemed to be conflicts of interest, and proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1202(a)(2) and 38.852(a)(2) would extend the 
applicability of these enumerated relationships that an officer or 
member of their board of directors, committees, or disciplinary panels 
has with an affiliate of the subject of any matter being considered. 
Similar to existing Sec.  1.69(b)(4), proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202(b) 
and 38.852(b) require documentation of conflict of interest 
determinations. Specifically, under the proposed rules, SEFs and DCMs 
must require members of their board of directors, committees, and 
disciplinary panels to document in meeting minutes, or otherwise 
document in a comparable manner, compliance with the applicable 
requirements.
A. Benefits
    Requiring SEF and DCM officers, and members of their board of 
directors, committees, or disciplinary panels to disclose conflicts of 
interests before considering a matter, under proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1202 and 38.852, is essential to implementing the goals of this 
proposed rulemaking. Given the governing authority bestowed upon key 
decision-makers, it is crucial that their decision-making is guided by 
the best interests of the SEF or DCM, and is not influenced by personal 
or financial gain. In requiring these key decisions-makers to be 
transparent about relationships that may raise conflicts of interest, 
SEFs and DCMs are better able to hold these individuals accountable. 
Additionally, the Commission believes that proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1202(a) and 38.852(a) are beneficial because requirements to 
disclose conflicts of interests promote transparency in the decision-
making

[[Page 19687]]

process relating to SEF and DCM market regulation functions, further 
promoting confidence in their markets.
    The Commission believes that the proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202(b) and 
38.852(b) documentation requirements have several additional benefits. 
First, documentation requirements identifying conflicts of interest and 
recusals promotes transparency, ensures that conflicts of interests 
have been managed, and provides useful precedent for how the SEF or DCM 
can manage similar types of conflicts of interest in the future. 
Second, requiring conflicts of interest to be documented, rather than 
simply disclosed, is likely to promote more accountability among 
members of the board of directors, committees, and disciplinary panels. 
Third, this documentation is important evidence demonstrating 
compliance efforts, which can aid the SEF, DCM, and the Commission, in 
conducting oversight.
    SEFs currently are subject to Commission regulation Sec.  1.69. 
Therefore, to the extent SEFs already are compliant with Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.69, the benefits of proposed Sec.  37.1202 may be 
less significant. Similarly, if DCMs, as a matter of industry practice, 
already have procedures in place consistent with Commission regulation 
Sec.  1.69 requirements, the benefits of proposed Sec.  38.852 may be 
less significant.
B. Costs
    The Commission believes that SEFs will not incur significant costs 
implementing proposed Sec.  37.1202 as the requirements of the proposed 
rule are similar to the existing Commission regulationSec.  1.69 
requirements. SEFs may incur some administrative costs of analyzing 
their existing rules and procedures to determine whether they comply 
with proposed Sec.  37.1202, as the proposed rule, as discussed above, 
contains some enhancements, such as the new definition of ``family 
relationship,'' that do not exist in Commission regulation Sec.  1.69.
    DCMs may incur costs implementing proposed Sec.  38.852, including 
the administrative costs of analyzing their existing rules and 
procedures to determine whether they comply with the proposed 
requirements, and drafting and implementing new or amended rules and 
procedures, as necessary. Additionally, proposed Sec.  38.852 requires 
disclosures to be made by DCM officers or members of the board of 
directors when any actual or potential conflict of interest may be 
present, and requires these officers or members of the board of 
directors to abstain from deliberations and voting on issues where the 
individual is conflicted. Costs will arise not only from administrative 
time in handling the disclosure, but also in the required documentation 
to ensure compliance with the intent of the proposed rules. 
Furthermore, there may be additional costs incurred when conflicted 
individuals abstain from deliberations and the DCM officers, and 
members of the board of directors, committees, and disciplinary panels 
potentially need to seek additional information from independent, non-
conflicted experts and consultants. Finally, the Commission believes 
that DCMs will incur costs related to collecting and storing documents 
evidencing conflicts of interest determinations. The Commission notes 
that some of these costs may be less significant to the extent that 
DCMs have voluntarily adopted the requirements of Commission regulation 
Sec.  1.69.
    Costs associated with complying with the proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1202 and 38.852 may further vary based on the size of the SEF or 
DCM, available resources, and existing practices and policies. Further, 
conflict of interest policies required for implementing proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 38.852, would likely not significantly change 
from year to year, so after the initial creation of the policies, the 
time required to maintain and amend rules and procedures would be 
negligible.
    The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 38.852, including any costs that would be 
imposed on SEFs, DCMs, other market participants, or the financial 
system more broadly.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 38.852 in 
light of the specific considerations identified in Section 15(a) of the 
CEA. The Commission believes that proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 
38.852 may have a beneficial effect on protection of market 
participants and the public, as well as on the financial integrity of 
the markets, by taking steps to help ensure the impartiality of key SEF 
and DCM decision-makers, particularly those persons responsible for the 
exchange's market regulation functions. Identifying and documenting 
actual and potential conflicts of interest before reviewing a matter 
may reduce the risk of decision-makers being influenced by personal 
interests rather than acting in best interest of the SEF or DCM, and, 
ultimately, market participants and the public. Such a requirement also 
is likely to hold decision-makers accountable to SEFs and DCMs and may 
foster market participant and public trust in the SEFs and DCMs, which 
is also essential to maintaining the integrity of markets. The 
Commission has considered the other Section 15(a) factors and believes 
that they are not implicated by proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202 and 38.852.
iv. Limitations on the Use and Disclosure of Material Non-Public 
Information--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853
    Currently, Commission regulation Sec.  1.59 generally requires SROs 
to adopt rules prohibiting employees, governing board members, 
committee members or consultants from trading commodity interests on 
the basis of material non-public information. DCMs are exempt from 
Commission regulation Sec.  1.59(b) and (c), but the entirety of Sec.  
1.59 applies to SEFs. As previously described in detail,\283\ both SEFs 
and DCMs must comply with the requirements of Commission regulation 
Sec.  1.59(d), which prohibits members of the board of directors, 
committee members, or consultants of the SRO from trading for their own 
account, or for or on behalf of any other account, based on material 
non-public information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ Supra Section IV(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the Commission's statutory authority on insider 
trading,\284\ DCMs are subject to Core Principle 16, which requires 
DCMs to establish and enforce rules to minimize conflicts of interest. 
DCM Core Principle 16 Guidance provides that DCMs should provide 
appropriate limitations on the use or disclosure of material non-public 
information gained through performance of official duties by members of 
the board of directors, committee members, and DCM employees, or gained 
by those through an ownership interest in the DCM.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \284\ See CEA section 9(e), 7 U.S.C. 13(e).
    \285\ See Appendix B to part 38, Core Principle 16 Guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853 would require SEFs and DCMs 
to establish and enforce policies and procedures for their employees, 
members of the board of directors, committee members, and consultants 
to prohibit the disclosure of material non-public information and to 
prohibit trading if the individual has access to material non-public 
information. Additionally, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853 would 
provide conditions under which exemptions to employee trading 
prohibitions could be granted.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(c) and 38.853(c) state that SEFs and 
DCMs may grant trading exemptions to employees pursuant to its policies 
and procedures,

[[Page 19688]]

on a case-by-case basis, only if certain requirements are met, 
including: (1) the ROC approves the trading exemption; (2) the employee 
can demonstrate that the trading is not being conducted on the basis of 
material non-public information gained through the performance of their 
official duties; and (3) the SEF or DCM documents the employee's 
exemption in accordance with requirements in existing Commission 
regulations Sec. Sec.  37.1000 and 37.1001, or 38.950 and 38.951, as 
applicable. Additionally, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(d) and 38.853(d) 
would require SEFs and DCMs to diligently monitor trading activity 
conducted pursuant to such exemptions.
A. Benefits
    The Commission believes proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(a) and 
38.853(a), requiring SEFs and DCMs to establish policies and procedures 
to safeguard the use and disclosure of material non-public information, 
will result in several benefits. Generally, the Commission believes 
that these proposed rules are likely to result in benefits by reducing 
the instances of conflicts of interest where persons responsible for 
exchange governance or market regulation functions take advantage of 
their roles for personal financial benefit. Establishing consistent and 
clearly defined standards is likely to reduce instances of the misuse 
and disclosure of material non-public information by employees, members 
of the board of directors, committee members, and consultants at SEFs 
and DCMs and promote public confidence in the markets. In addition, 
preventing SEF and DCM employees or insiders with access to material 
non-public information from leveraging their access to benefit 
themselves, or others, commercially or otherwise, promotes fair and 
transparent markets, which will benefit all the market participants.
    There also will be benefits from the requirements in proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1203(b) and 38.853(b), which prohibit employees from 
certain types of trading or disclosing for any purpose inconsistent 
with the performance of the person's official duties as an employee any 
material non-public information obtained as a result of such person's 
employment. Additionally, the parameters outlined in proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1203(c) and 38.853(c) for granting exemptions to the 
employee trading prohibition, along with the new requirement to monitor 
such exemptions under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(d) and 38.853(d), are 
likely to deter misuse of the employee trading exemptions. 
Additionally, these proposed rules may also promote confidence in the 
market regulation functions of SEFs and DCMs because they are: (1) 
requiring SEFs and DCMs to limit the issuance of exemptions to 
specific, case-by-case instances; and (2) protecting the markets from 
trading by employees with unfair, informational advantages.
    As noted above, Commission regulation Sec.  1.59 currently requires 
SEFs to adopt rules prohibiting employees, governing board members, 
committee members or consultants from trading commodity interests on 
the basis of material non-public information. Both SEFs and DCMs must 
comply with the requirements of Commission regulation Sec.  1.59(d), 
which prohibits members of the board of directors, committee members, 
or consultants of an SRO from trading for their own account, or for or 
on behalf of any other account, based on material non-public 
information. DCM Core Principle 16 Guidance states that DCMs should 
provide for appropriate limitations on the use or disclosure of 
material non-public information. To the extent that SEFs and DCMs have 
policies and procedures consistent with Commission regulation Sec.  
1.59, DCM Core Principle 16 Guidance, or have existing programs to 
monitor trading conducted pursuant to an exemption from the employee 
trading prohibition, the discussed benefits may be less significant.
    The Commission believes that enhancing SEFs' and DCMs' obligations 
regarding their oversight of the exemptions they grant is an 
appropriate balance between limiting the misuse of exemptions and 
ensuring that the employee trading prohibition is not overly broad. One 
of the benefits of the proposed requirements related to the permitted 
trading exemptions is that providing such exemptions, as appropriate, 
will not impair the ability or diminish willingness of potential 
employees to accept employment opportunities with a SEF or DCM. 
Similarly, the proposed regulatory limitations on the use and 
disclosure of material non-public information as well as the new 
requirements on administering the exemptions will result in a more 
efficient process where there is transparency of the trading conducted 
by SEF or DCM employees.
    The proposed rules' expansion of the trading prohibition to 
``related commodity interests'' at the product level, as well as the 
expansion of the trading prohibition on direct owners on the person/
entity level, are also likely to have benefits. The Commission believes 
that expanding these limitations are likely to prevent and reduce the 
instances of conflicts of interest even as to those contracts that are 
interconnected due to having price movements correlate with the price 
movements of a commodity interest traded on, or subject to the rules of 
a SEF or a DCM to such a degree that intermarket spread margins or 
special margin treatment is recognized or established by the SEF or 
DCM.
    The Commission also believes that proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203(e) 
and 38.853(e) prohibiting certain trading by members of the board of 
directors, committee members and consultants in possession of material 
non-public information and barring the release of material non-public 
information will have benefits by promoting confidence in SEF and DCM 
market regulation functions and the integrity of the marketplace. The 
Commission also believes that preventing decision-makers from trading 
on or disclosing material non-public information, is beneficial in that 
is further prevents such decision-makers from exploiting unfair 
informational advantages. In turn, that helps create integrity and 
fairness in the markets. Finally, by restricting the disclosure of 
material non-public information, SEF and DCM decision-makers are less 
likely to share information that might put other market participants at 
a disadvantage.
    Regarding proposed non-substantive changes to certain terms such as 
``commodity interest'' and ``related commodity interest,'' as fully 
discussed above,\286\ the Commission believes these changes enhance 
ease of reference for SEF and DCM staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \286\ Supra Section IV(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Costs
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853 would require that SEFs and 
DCMs implement policies and procedures to safeguard against the misuse 
of material non-public information. SEFs and DCMs would incur 
additional costs from this proposal through the additional hours SEF or 
DCM employees might need to spend analyzing the compliance of their 
rules and procedures with these requirements, and drafting and 
implementing new or amended rules and procedures, when necessary. Costs 
associated with complying with the proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 
38.853 may further vary based on the size of the SEF or DCM, available 
resources the SEF or DCM may have, and existing practices and policies 
the SEF or DCM may have in place.
    While the Commission believes that most SEFs and DCMs already have 
policies and procedures in place to

[[Page 19689]]

prevent the misuse and disclosure of material non-public information, 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853 would likely require SEFs and 
DCMs to allocate employee administrative time dedicated to either draft 
new or amend existing policies to ensure the SEF and DCM are complying 
with any regulatory proposed rules on the limitations on the use and 
disclosure of material non-public information. The amount of time 
required would vary based on a number of factors, including whether the 
SEF or DCM already has policies complying with the proposed rules and 
the amount of time needed for each SEF and DCM to draft new or amended 
polices where necessary. For example, there will likely be costs 
associated with ensuring the policies and procedures apply to each 
class of individuals described in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 
38.853. Costs associated with complying with proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1203 and 38.853 may further vary based on the size of the SEF or 
DCM, available resources, and existing practices, rules, and 
procedures. Accordingly, those costs would be impracticable to 
reasonably quantify. Further, the Commission believes that the rules, 
policies and procedures required to implement the limitations on the 
use and disclosure of material non-public information would likely not 
change significantly from year to year, so after the initial creation 
of the policies and procedures, the time required to maintain those 
policies and procedures would be negligible.
    Additionally, to the extent the SEF or DCM seeks to provide 
employee trading exemptions, there will likely be costs to revise or 
draft policies and procedures consistent with proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1203 and 38.853 requirements, and to evaluate those exemptions on a 
case-by-case basis. Furthermore, any exemptions being granted would 
require review by the ROC and be individually documented by the SEF or 
DCM, all which would take administrative time.
    SEFs and DCMs will incur additional costs if they grant employee 
trading exemptions, but do not already have processes in place to 
diligently monitor the trading by those employees. However, the 
Commission believes that SEFs and DCMs should have existing programs to 
monitor, detect, and deter abuses that may arise from trading conducted 
pursuant to an exemption from the employee trading prohibition. A SEF 
or DCM should, for example, utilize its existing surveillance program 
to monitor trading by employees or other insiders subject to proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853. Such existing resources may alleviate 
some of the burden and costs associated with compliance with proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853.
    The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853, including any costs that would be 
imposed on SEFs, DCMs, other market participants, or the financial 
system more broadly.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of the proposed amendments to Sec. Sec.  37.1203 
and 38.853 in light of the specific considerations identified in 
Section 15(a) of the CEA. The Commission believes that proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853 may have a beneficial effect on 
protection of market participants and the public, as well as on the 
financial integrity of the markets. The Commission believes that 
preventing members of the board of directors, committee members, 
employees, consultants, and those with an ownership interest of 10 
percent or more in the SEF or DCM with access to material non-public 
information from leveraging their access to benefit themselves, or 
others, commercially or otherwise, upholds the principle of fair 
markets. Furthermore, the Commission believes that the requirements 
related to granting and monitoring employee trading exemptions to will 
enhance employee accountability and promote transparency, which are 
essential for establishing the integrity of markets. The Commission has 
considered the other Section 15(a) Factors and believes that they are 
not implicated by proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853.
v. Composition and Related Requirements for Board of Directors--
Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204 and 38.854
    DCMs are not subject to a specific statutory or regulatory 
requirement to have a certain threshold of public directors.\287\ 
Existing Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(b)(1) requires SEFs to 
include at least 20 percent ``non-member'' directors in the board of 
directors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \287\ However, the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices 
set forth practices to demonstrate compliance with DCM Core 
Principle 16. Among other topics, the acceptable practices provide 
that a DCM's board of directors or executive committees would be 
comprised of at least 35 percent public directors. The Commission 
notes that currently all of the DCMs that are designated by the 
Commission rely on the acceptable practices to comply with Core 
Principle 16, in lieu of any other means for compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposes the following composition standards for the 
board of directors for both SEFs and DCMs by: (i) codifying in proposed 
Sec.  38.854(a)(1) the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practice 
standards that DCM boards of directors be composed of at least 35 
percent public directors; (ii) extending this requirement to SEF boards 
of directors under proposed Sec.  37.1204(a)(1); \288\ and (iii) 
adopting additional requirements to increase transparency and 
accountability of the board of directors. Proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1204(b) and 38.854(b) require that each member of a SEF's or DCM's 
board of directors, including public directors, have relevant expertise 
to fulfill the roles and responsibilities of being a director.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \288\ See proposed Sec.  37.1204(a)(1), herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(c) and 38.854(c) prohibit linking the 
compensation of public directors and other non-executive members of the 
board of directors, to either the business performance of the SEF or 
DCM or an affiliate. Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(d) and 38.854(d) 
require SEFs' and DCMs' board of directors to conduct an annual self-
assessment to review their performance.
A. Benefits
    In general, a board of directors plays a crucial role in an 
exchange's ability to identify, manage, and resolve conflicts of 
interest. Together with senior management, the board of directors set 
the ``tone at the top'' for a SEF's or DCM's governance and compliance 
culture. The Commission believes that the proposed 35 percent public 
director standard is likely to provide benefits for both SEFs and DCMs. 
For example, in comparison to the existing twenty-percent ``non-
member'' requirement for SEFs in existing Sec.  1.64(b)(1), which has 
created an unintentional consequence of allowing SEFs to compose their 
boards of directors entirely with ``insiders'' such as executives at 
the SEF's affiliate, the proposed rule will promote independent 
decision-making on the board of directors. Composition standards for 
the board of directors that promote a well-functioning governing body 
with the presence of directors that are independent from the executive 
team, coupled with clear, comprehensive policies and procedures, will 
minimize conflicts of interests at SEFs and DCMs, and the resulting 
impact that such conflicts could have on a SEF's or DCM's market 
regulation functions. Since all current DCMs have adopted the DCM Core 
Principle 16 Acceptable Practices, which include 35 percent public 
directors, the benefits of the proposed 35 percent composition 
requirement will be limited. It is important to note that the proposed 
35 percent threshold is less than the

[[Page 19690]]

composition requirements applicable to publicly-traded companies, which 
require that the majority of the board of directors to be 
``independent'' directors. While the proposed threshold is lower than 
the standard that applies to publicly-traded companies, the Commission 
seeks to strike the appropriate balance between promoting independence 
on the board of directors and providing enough flexibility to include 
directors with the necessary industry expertise.
    By setting the percentage of public directors at 35 percent and 
requiring enhanced accountability by board of directors through an 
annual self-assessment, the Commission believes that proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1204(a) and 38.854(a) will provide multiple benefits. 
First, public directors may offer perspectives and experiences that 
differ but complement the views of internal directors to aid decision-
making at exchanges. Second, establishing clear roles and 
responsibilities for board of directors will enhance accountability. 
Third, the proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(b) and 38.854(b) requirements 
that members of SEF's and DCM's board of directors have relevant 
expertise will ensure these individuals can contribute to a well-
functioning board of directors that is capable of addressing complex 
problems that SEFs and DCMs face.
    To further minimize conflicts of interest, proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1204(c) and 38.854(c) prohibit the compensation of public directors 
and other non-executive members of the board of directors from being 
directly dependent on the business performance of either the SEF or DCM 
or an affiliate. This requirement helps to ensure that non-executive 
directors remain independent and make objective decisions for the SEF 
or DCM--not for their own financial benefit. This also should promote 
public confidence in the ability of the board of directors to 
effectively govern the SEF or DCM.
    The Commission believes that proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(c) and 
38.854(c) requirements for SEF and DCM boards of directors to conduct 
annual self-assessments should enhance boards of directors' 
accountability and improve their ability to meet the standards of 
conduct expected by the proposed rules, which in turn will benefit 
SEFs, DCMs, market participants, and the financial system more broadly. 
The documentation process will also create benefits by allowing 
Commission staff to request to see the results of the self-assessment 
during the course of rule enforcement reviews. To the extent that SEFs 
and DCMs already conduct self-assessments of their boards of directors, 
these benefits will be limited or may already have been realized.
B. Costs
    The requirements in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(a)(1) and (3) and 
38.854(a)(1) and (3) requiring SEF and DCM board of directors and 
executive committees to be composed of 35 percent public directors 
could cause SEFs and DCMs to incur higher costs, compared to non-public 
directors, because public directors must meet additional qualifications 
and therefore it may take SEF and DCM staff additional time to identify 
such persons. Similarly, requiring members of the board of directors to 
have relevant expertise, under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(b) and 
38.854(b) and will impose costs in terms of SEF and DCM staff time. 
When the composition requirements are first established, some SEFs and 
DCMs will incur initial costs to identify and appoint new members for 
their boards of directors that satisfy the composition requirements of 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(b) and 38.854(b). Time requirements will 
vary based on SEFs and DCMs current composition of the board of 
directors.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(a)(2) and 38.854(a)(2) will require 
SEFs and DCMs to draft policies and procedures setting forth the 
requirements of the board of directors, including how the board 
oversees the entity's compliance with statutory, regulatory, and self-
regulatory responsibilities. At a minimum, existing board of directors' 
policies would need to be reviewed, and, as necessary, such policies 
would need to be revised. To the extent that such policies are approved 
by the board of directors, the board of directors would need to devote 
additional meeting time to approve such policies.
    Prohibiting compensation being directly linked to business 
performance, for public directors and other non-executive members, as 
required by proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(c) and 38.854(c) will impose 
costs in terms of time necessary to review existing compensation plans, 
and revise such plans if they are not in compliance.
    The requirements under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(d) and 38.854(d) 
for a SEF's and DCM's board of directors to conduct an annual self-
assessment will impose costs in terms of conducting such a review, 
including reviewing policies and procedures and interviewing SEF or DCM 
staff. Additionally, there will be costs of the time of the board of 
directors evaluating and approving the self-assessment at board 
meetings.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(e) and 38.854(e) require procedures for 
removing members of the board of directors, when the conduct of a 
member is likely to be prejudicial to the sound and prudent management 
of the SEF or DCM. The proposed requirements will impose costs relating 
to reviewing existing procedures, drafting new procedures if necessary, 
and board of director's time in assessing situations where a member's 
conduct may be problematic.
    The requirements in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(f) and 38.854(f) 
relating to reporting to the Commission within five business days of 
any change in board membership or any of its committees will require 
SEF and DCM staff time in notifying the Commission, as applicable, when 
changes to the membership of the board of directors or any of its 
committees occur.
    Generally, costs associated with complying with proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1204 and 38.854 may further vary based on the size of the SEF or 
DCM, available resources, and existing practices, rules, and 
procedures. Accordingly, those costs would be impracticable to 
reasonably quantify. Further, rules and procedures required for 
implementing the proposed board of director requirements would likely 
not change significantly from year to year, so after the initial 
creation of the rules and procedures, the time required to maintain 
those procedures would be negligible. To the extent that SEFs and DCMs 
have adopted existing board of director composition standards under DCM 
Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices, some of the costs identified 
above will have already been realized.
    The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1204 and 38.854, including any costs that would be 
imposed on SEFs, DCMs, other market participants, or the financial 
system more broadly.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204 and 38.854 in 
light of the specific considerations identified in Section 15(a) of the 
CEA. The Commission believes that proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204 and 
38.854 may have a beneficial effect on protection of market 
participants and the public, as well as on the financial integrity of 
the markets. Public directors, with their independent perspective, 
might consider and advocate for stakeholders that non-public directors 
do not consider. As a result, this might lead to greater protection of 
the wider public. The Commission has considered the other Section 15(a) 
Factors and believes that they are not implicated by proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1204 and 38.854.

[[Page 19691]]

vi. Public Director Definition--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) and 
38.851(b)(12)
    The definition of ``public director'' in proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1201(b)(12) and 38.851(b)(12) excludes a person who has a ``material 
relationship'' with the SEF or DCM from serving as a public director, 
and defines a ``material relationship'' as one that could affect the 
independent judgment or decision-making ability of the director. The 
public director definition enumerates certain relationships that are 
deemed to be material: (1) the director is an officer or an employee of 
the SEF or DCM, or an officer or an employee of its affiliate; (2) the 
director is a member of the DCM or is a director, officer, or an 
employee of either a member or an affiliate of a member; (3) the 
director directly or indirectly owns more than 10 percent of the SEF or 
DCM or an affiliate of the SEF or DCM, or is an officer or employee of 
an entity that directly or indirectly owns more than 10 percent of SEF 
or DCM; (4) the director, or an entity in which the director is a 
partner, an officer, an employee, or a director receives more than 
$100,000 in aggregate annual payments from the SEF or DCM, or an 
affiliate of the SEF or DCM. A material relationship disqualifies a 
person from being a public director. The material relationship 
disqualifier also applies to any person with whom the director has a 
``family relationship,'' as set forth in proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1201(b)(7) and 38.851(b)(7), and is subject to a one-year look-back 
period.
A. Benefits
    The Commission believes that codifying the public director 
definition for both SEFs and DCMs in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) 
and 38.851(b)(12) will provide several benefits. First, expanding the 
disqualifying factors to prohibit individuals who, directly or 
indirectly, own more than 10 percent of either the SEF or DCM or an 
affiliate will further prevent individuals with specific conflicts of 
interests, including personal financial interests, from serving as 
public directors and makes it more likely that decision-makers will 
remain independent. Second, applying the disqualifying factors to 
family relationships ensures that public directors are not influenced 
by familial connections. Third, requiring both an initial and annual 
review of the qualifications of public directors should reduce the risk 
that existing public directors may become disqualified in the course of 
the service on the board of directors and become conflicted in the 
SEFs' or DCMs' decision-making process.
B. Costs
    The Commission does not believe that there are costs associated 
with the definition of ``public director'' in proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1201(b)(12) and 38.851(b)(12). However, SEFs and DCMs will incur 
costs associated with making determinations on whether an individual is 
qualified to serve as a public director. Those costs include the 
process to identify, minimize, and resolve conflicts of interests as 
proposed by Sec. Sec.  37.1201(a) and 38.851(a), and to determine 
whether a person meets fitness standards under proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.207 and 38.801, discussed above. Finally, the Commission notes that 
if an individual is found not to be eligible to serve, the SEF or DCM 
can mitigate the costs incurred with making such determination if it 
chooses to nominate the individual as a non-public director. Costs 
associated with complying with the proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) 
and 38.851(b)(12) may vary based on the size of the SEF and DCM, its 
available resources, and its existing practices and policies. To the 
extent that SEFs and DCMs have voluntarily adopted existing public 
director standards under the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices, some of the costs identified above will have already been 
realized.
    The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) and 38.851(b)(12), including any costs that 
would be imposed on SEFs, DCMs, other market participants, or the 
financial system more broadly.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) and 
38.851(b)(12) in light of the specific considerations identified in 
Section 15(a) of the CEA. The Commission believes that the public 
director definition under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) and 
38.851(b)(12) may have a beneficial effect on the protection of market 
participants and the public, as well as on the financial integrity of 
the markets.\289\ Ensuring sufficient independent judgment through the 
inclusion of public directors will improve the overall decision-making 
of a SEF or DCM and protect the market regulation functions. The 
Commission has considered the other Section 15(a) Factors and believes 
that they are not implicated by proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) and 
38.851(b)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \289\ See supra, Section V(b), ``public director'' definition--
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1201(b)(12) and 38.851(b)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vii. Nominating Committee--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855
    Currently, neither SEFs nor DCMs are obligated by Commission 
regulations to have a nominating committee to identify or manage the 
process for nominating potential members of the board of directors. DCM 
Core Principle 17 requires the governance arrangements of a board of 
directors of a DCM to permit consideration of the views of market 
participants. Similarly, pursuant to Commission regulation Sec.  
1.64(b)(3), an SRO, such as a SEF, must include a diversity of 
membership interests on their governing boards.
    The Commission is proposing Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855 to 
require SEFs and DCMs to have a nominating committee. The role of the 
nominating committee would be to identify a pool of candidates who are 
qualified to serve on the board of directors who represent diverse 
interests, including the interests of the participants and members of 
the SEF or DCM. Furthermore, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855 
would require: at least 51 percent of the nominating committee be 
comprised of public directors, the nominating committee be chaired by a 
public director, and the nominating committee report directly to the 
board of directors.
A. Benefits
    The Commission believes that proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855 
establishing SEF and DCM nominating committees will help protect the 
integrity of selecting members for the board of directors and assist 
SEFs and DCMs in identifying qualified candidates. The Commission 
believes that requiring 51 percent of the nominating committee to be 
public directors will help maintain independence and objectivity in 
selecting nominees for the board of directors. Additionally, the 
requirement in proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855 that the 
nominating committee identify individuals that reflect the views of 
market participants will help ensure that a broader pool of candidates 
with more diverse viewpoints are considered to serve on the board of 
directors. The Commission believes that these diverse viewpoints may 
improve the decision-making of the SEF or DCM. These benefits, in turn, 
will improve the governance and public perception of the SEF or DCM.

[[Page 19692]]

B. Costs
    Since SEFs and DCMs are not currently required to have nominating 
committees, some entities would need to revise their existing policies 
and procedures to create a nominating committee in accordance with 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855. Accordingly, proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855 would impose some costs on these SEFs and 
DCMs, including costs that could arise from additional hours SEF and 
DCM employees might need to spend time reviewing existing SEF and DCM 
policies and procedures, and designing and implementing new or amended 
rules and procedures, as necessary.
    Specifically, drafting new policies and procedures to form a 
nominating committee would cost administrative time. Those 
administrative costs associated with complying with proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1205 and 38.855 may vary based on the size of the SEF or DCM, 
available resources, and existing practices, rules, and procedures. 
Accordingly, those costs would be impracticable to reasonably quantify. 
Further, rules and procedures required to administer a nominating 
committee would likely not change significantly from year to year, so 
after the initial creation of the rules and procedures, the time 
required to maintain those procedures would be negligible.
    When the nominating committee is first established, the SEF and DCM 
will incur initial costs related to identifying potential members for 
the nominating committee, including public directors that must comprise 
51 percent of the committee. Ongoing implementation of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855 would also impose costs whenever the 
nominating committee meets to identify new candidates for the board of 
directors, nominates individuals to the board of directors, and reports 
their decisions to the SEF or DCM board of directors.
    The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855, including any costs that would be 
imposed on SEFs, DCMs, other market participants, or the financial 
system more broadly.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855 in 
light of the specific considerations identified in Section 15(a) of the 
CEA. The Commission believes that proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 
38.855 may have a beneficial effect on protection of market 
participants and the public, as well as on the financial integrity of 
the markets. The Commission believes that the proposed rules requiring 
SEF and DCM nominating committees will have a beneficial effect on the 
identification of nominees for the board of directors who have 
independent and diverse experiences. Such characteristics, the 
Commission believes, will aid in recruiting members for the board of 
directors who will contribute to making sound decisions for SEFs and 
DCMs, and, ultimately, for the markets. The Commission has considered 
the other Section 15(a) Factors and believes that they are not 
implicated by proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1205 and 38.855.
viii. Regulatory Oversight Committee--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206 and 
38.857
    Currently, the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices provide 
that DCMs establish a ROC, consisting of only public directors, to 
assist in minimizing actual and potential conflicts of interest. The 
purpose of the ROC is to oversee the DCM's regulatory program on behalf 
of the board of directors, which in turn, delegates the necessary 
authority, resources, and time for the ROC to fulfill its mandate. The 
ROC is responsible for: (1) monitoring the DCM's regulatory program for 
sufficiency, effectiveness, and independence; (2) overseeing all facets 
of the regulatory program; (3) reviewing the size and allocation of the 
regulatory budget and resources; and the number, hiring and 
termination, and compensation of regulatory personnel; (4) supervising 
the DCM's CRO, who reports directly to the ROC; (5) preparing an annual 
report assessing the DCM's self-regulatory program for the board of 
directors and the Commission; (6) recommending changes that would 
ensure fair, vigorous, and effective regulation; and (7) reviewing 
regulatory proposals and advising the board as to whether and how such 
changes may impact regulation. In performing these functions, the ROC 
plays a critical role in insulating the CRO and the DCM's self-
regulatory function from undue influence.
    Currently, SEFs do not have any requirements for establishing a ROC 
but they are subject to Core Principle 15, which requires SEFs to 
designate a CCO to monitor its adherence to statutory, regulatory, and 
self-regulatory requirements and to resolve conflicts of interest that 
may impede such adherence. The CCO is required to report to the SEF 
board of directors (or similar governing body) or the senior SEF 
officer.
    The Commission is proposing to codify the ROC component of the DCM 
Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices for both SEFs and DCMs. Proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1206(a) and 38.857(a), respectively, require SEFs and 
DCMs to establish a ROC composed of only public directors. In addition, 
the Commission is proposing Sec. Sec.  37.1206(c) and 38.857(c), which 
require the board of directors to delegate sufficient authority, 
dedicate sufficient resources, and allow sufficient time to perform its 
functions to ensure that the ROC can fulfill its mandate and duties. 
Furthermore, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(d) and 38.857(d) would require 
SEF and DCM ROCs, respectively, to have oversight duties over the 
market regulation functions, including: (1) monitoring the SEF's or 
DCM's market regulation functions for sufficiency, effectiveness, and 
independence; (2) overseeing all facets of the market regulation 
functions; (3) approving the size and allocation of the regulatory 
budget and resources; and the number, hiring and termination, and 
compensation of staff; (4) recommending changes that would promote 
fair, vigorous, and effective self-regulation; and (5) reviewing all 
regulatory proposals prior to implementation and advising the board of 
directors as to whether and how such proposals may impact market 
regulation functions.
    The Commission also is proposing several new requirements related 
to procedures and documentation for ROC meetings that reflect the best 
practices that have been identified during the Commission's oversight 
of DCMs. Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f) and 38.857(f) would require SEF 
and DCM ROCs to meet quarterly. In addition, proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1206(f)(1)(iii) and 38.857(f)(1)(iii) would require that ROC meeting 
minutes include: (a) list of the attendees; (b) their titles; (c) 
whether they were present for the entirety of the meeting or a portion 
thereof (and if so, what portion); and (d) a summary of all meeting 
discussions. Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f)(2) and 38.857(f)(2) would 
require the ROC to maintain documentation of the committee's findings, 
recommendations, and any other discussions or deliberations related to 
the performance of its duties. The Commission also is proposing rules 
to require an annual ROC report, which would enhance the ROC report 
procedures currently set forth in the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices. Specifically, the Commission is proposing Sec. Sec.  
37.1206(g)(1) and 38.857(g)(1) to require that ROC annual reports 
include a list of any actual or potential conflicts of interest that 
were reported to the ROC and a description

[[Page 19693]]

of how such conflicts of interest were managed and resolved and an 
assessment of the impact of any conflicts of interest on the SEF's or 
DCM's ability to perform its market regulation functions. In addition, 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(2) and 38.857(g)(2) would establish a 
process for filing the ROC annual report which mirrors the existing SEF 
annual compliance report requirements in Commission regulation Sec.  
37.1501(e). These proposed requirements would establish the following: 
(1) a filing deadline no later than 90 days after the end of the fiscal 
year; (2) a process for amendments and extension requests; (3) 
recordkeeping requirements; and (4) delegated authority to the Division 
of Market Oversight to grant or deny extensions. Finally, proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(3) and 38.857(g)(3) require SEFs and DCMs to 
maintain all records demonstrating compliance with the duties of the 
ROC and the preparation and submission of its annual report.
A. Benefits
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206 and 38.857 establish the creation and 
duties for SEF and DCM ROCs. These proposed rules will generate 
benefits by establishing effective structural governance protections to 
assist SEFs and DCMs in minimizing conflicts of interest that may 
impact their market regulation functions. The ROC will help to ensure 
that improper influences and pressures from a SEF's or DCM's commercial 
interest do not denigrate the integrity of the market regulation 
functions. Because both SEFs and DCMs are SROs, these benefits extend 
well beyond the internal functioning of a SEF or DCM. Since SEFs and 
DCMs have similar commercial interests that may conflict with their 
market regulation functions, the Commission believes that applying 
similar ROC structures across SEFs and DCMs will result in a more level 
and resilient marketplace, which in turn will promote competition in 
the derivatives markets.
    The proposed rules address the types of conflicts of interest 
Commission staff has identified through its SEF and DCM oversight 
activities. Accordingly, the proposed rules are based on existing, 
identifiable solutions that have already benefitted SEFs and DCMs. To 
the extent that the existing SEF and DCM practices are similar to the 
proposed requirements, the benefits will be limited or already have 
been realized.
    The requirements under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f) and 38.857(f) 
relating to ROC meetings and documentation should provide a number of 
benefits. First, the quarterly meeting requirement facilitates the 
free-flow of information between the ROC and the SEF's CCO or the DCM's 
CRO. This is an opportunity to share information, discuss matters of 
mutual concern, and speak freely about potentially sensitive issues 
that may relate to the SEF's or DCM's management. Such communication 
may enable the SEF or DCM to more effectively fulfill its market 
regulation function. Similarly, restricting individuals with actual or 
potential conflicts of interest from attending ROC meetings ensures 
that sensitive information related to the market regulation function is 
not broadly disseminated. The documentation requirements, such as 
requiring ROC meeting minutes under proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1206(f)(1)(iii) and 38.857(f)(1)(iii), and the ROC annual reporting 
requirements under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(1) and 38.857(g)(1), 
are mechanisms to enhance the accountability of the ROC and promote 
transparency for all stakeholders. Ultimately, market participants will 
benefit from the improvements in SEF and DCM governance operations.
B. Costs
    The proposed rules would impose some costs on SEFs and DCMs. To the 
extent that DCMs and some SEFs already have established a ROC, they may 
incur some costs related to updating their ROC policies and procedures 
to comply with proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204 and 38.854. Costs could 
arise from additional hours SEF and DCM employees might need to spend 
analyzing the compliance of their rules and procedures with these 
requirements, drafting and implementing new or amended rules and 
procedures, when necessary. While some SEFs have chosen to create ROCs, 
those SEFs that do not current have ROCs may incur additional costs 
associated with establishing the committee and identifying the public 
directors that will serve on the committee. Specifically, drafting new 
policies to form this committee would cost administrative time. The 
amount of time required to establish this committee would vary based on 
a number of factors, including whether the SEF's or DCM's existing 
policies complying with the proposed rules, and the amount of time 
necessary for each SEF and DCM to draft and implement new or amended 
polices, where necessary. Further, policies required for implementing 
the proposed rules would likely not change significantly from year to 
year, so after the initial creation of the policies, the time required 
to create rules and procedures would be negligible.
    When the ROC is initially established, the SEF or DCM will incur 
costs for the time spent to identify potential members that meet public 
director composition requirement. Ongoing implementation of the 
proposed rules also would impose costs. For example, there may be costs 
associated with providing necessary information to the ROC for its 
consideration, and time spent by the members of a SEF's or DCM's board 
of directors or senior officer to meet and consult with the ROC, and 
consider and respond to any information requested by the ROC. A ROC's 
operation also would require time from its members to meet at least on 
a quarterly basis, as required by proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f) and 
38.857(f). ROC members also will spend time on the duties outlined in 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(d) and 38.857(d).
    There may be additional costs related to ROC meetings, reporting, 
and recordkeeping. Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f)(1)(iii) and 
38.857(f)(1)(iii) require ROCs to keep minutes of their meetings and 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f)(2) and 38.857(f)(2) require ROCs to 
maintain documentation of findings, recommendations, and any other 
discussions or deliberations. Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(1) and 
38.857(g)(1) require ROCs to prepare an annual report for the board of 
directors and the Commission. The time spent drafting the annual report 
will include time spent assessing the SEF's or DCM's self-regulatory 
program and preparing the report with the information required in 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(1)(i)-(vi) and 38.857(g)(1)(i)-(vi). 
Finally, SEFs and DCMs may incur some initial costs associated with 
establishing a process to maintain all records demonstrating compliance 
with the duties of the ROC and the preparation and submission of annual 
reports, as required by proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(3) and 
38.857(g)(3).
    Costs associated with complying with proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f) 
and 38.857(f) may vary based on the size of the SEF and DCM, available 
resources, and existing practices and policies. To the extent that SEFs 
and DCMs have adopted existing ROC standards under the DCM Core 
Principle 16 Acceptable Practices, some of the costs identified above 
will have already been realized.
    The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1206 and 38.857, including any costs that would be 
imposed on SEFs, DCMs, other market participants, or the financial 
system more broadly. In particular, for those SEFs and DCMs that 
already have ROCs in place, the

[[Page 19694]]

Commission requests comment on the extent to which the proposed rules 
would require changes to existing ROC policies and procedures.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206 and 38.857 in 
light of the specific considerations identified in Section 15(a) of the 
CEA. The Commission believes that proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206 and 
38.857 may have a beneficial effect on protection of market 
participants and the public, as well as on the financial integrity of 
the markets by strengthening the boards oversight of the market 
regulation functions of SEFs and DCMs. The Commission has considered 
the other Section 15(a) Factors and believes that they are not 
implicated by proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206 and 38.857.
ix. Disciplinary Panel Composition--Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 
38.858
    Currently, the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable Practices provide 
that DCMs establish disciplinary panel composition standards. Those 
acceptable practices state that no group or class of industry 
participants may dominate or exercise disproportionate influence on 
such panels. Furthermore, the DCM Core Principle 16 Acceptable 
Practices provide that all disciplinary panels (and appellate bodies) 
include at least one person who would qualify as a public director, 
except in cases limited to decorum, attire, or the timely submission of 
accurate records required for clearing or verifying each day's 
transactions. Currently, Commission regulation Sec.  1.64(c) requires 
SEF major disciplinary committees to include: (1) at least one member 
who is not a member of the SEF; and (2) sufficient different membership 
interests to ensure fairness and to prevent special treatment or 
preference for any person in the conduct of a committee's or the 
panel's responsibility.
    The Commission is proposing Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 38.858 for both 
SEFs and DCMs, respectively, to adopt disciplinary panel composition 
requirements which prohibit any member of a disciplinary panel from 
participating in deliberations or voting on any matter in which the 
member has an actual or potential conflict of interest. With this 
proposed rulemaking, SEFs will be exempt from complying with Commission 
regulation Sec.  1.64(c) since they will be subject to this new rule.
    In addition, the Commission is proposing Sec. Sec.  37.1207(a) and 
(b) and 38.858(a) and (b) to clarify that SEF and DCM disciplinary 
panels and appellate panels must consist of two or more persons. The 
Commission is also proposing Sec. Sec.  37.1207(b) and 38.858(b) to 
extend the public participant requirement to any SEF and DCM committee 
to which disciplinary panel decisions may be appealed. Finally, the 
Commission is proposing technical amendments to Commission regulations 
Sec. Sec.  37.206(b) and 38.702 to remove the references that 
disciplinary panels must meet the composition requirements of part 40 
and replace these references with references to proposed regulations 
Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 38.858, respectively. The Commission also 
proposes changing the reference to ``compliance'' staff to ``market 
regulation'' staff. This is intended for clarity and is consistent with 
proposed changes to Sec. Sec.  38.155(a) and 37.203(c).
A. Benefits
    The requirement under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 38.858 for 
SEFs and DCMs to establish disciplinary panel requirements is likely to 
provide a number of benefits. The composition requirements of 
Sec. Sec.  37.1207(a) and 38.858(a) instill fairness in the 
disciplinary process by requiring a minimum of two members, one of whom 
must be a public participant. This ensures that the disciplinary panels 
have a degree of independence from outside influences, and are capable 
of functioning impartially. Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1207(a)(1) and (2) 
and 38.858(a)(1) and (2) further these goals by precluding any group or 
class of participants from dominating or exercising disproportionate 
influence on a disciplinary panel, and prohibiting any member of a 
disciplinary panel from participating in deliberations or voting on any 
matter in which the member has an actual or potential conflict of 
interest. These safeguards increase the likelihood that disciplinary 
proceedings are handled by competent individuals that represent a 
diversity of perspectives, and are free of conflicts of interest. This, 
in turn, may benefit the overall integrity of the derivatives markets.
B. Costs
    SEFs and DCMs are already required to establish disciplinary panels 
pursuant to Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.206(b) and 38.702. 
Accordingly, the potential cost is limited to the changes necessary to 
comply with proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 38.858. Initial costs could 
arise from additional administrative hours SEF and DCM employees might 
need to spend analyzing the compliance of their rules and procedures 
with these requirements, and drafting and implementing new or amended 
rules, as necessary. Once these rules and policies are established, 
they would likely not change significantly from year to year.
    SEFs and DCMs may need to change the composition of their 
disciplinary panels to satisfy the requirements of proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1207(a) and 38.858(a), and ensure that these requirements are 
extended to appellate panels, as required by proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1207(b) and 38.858(b). Additionally, proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 
38.858 prohibit any member of the panel from voting on issues in which 
they have a conflict of interest, which may reduce the number of 
potential suitable individuals who may serve on the disciplinary panel.
    Costs associated with complying with the proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.1207(b) and 38.858(b) may further vary based on the size of the SEF 
and DCM, its available resources, its existing practices and policies. 
To the extent that SEFs and DCMs have adopted existing disciplinary 
panel standards under the Acceptable Practices for DCM Core Principle 
16, some of the costs identified above will have already been realized. 
The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 38.858, including any costs that would be 
imposed on SEFs, DCMs, other market participants, or the financial 
system more broadly. In particular, for those SEFs and DCMs that 
already have disciplinary panels in place, the Commission requests 
comment on the extent to which the proposed rules would require changes 
to existing policies and procedures regarding their disciplinary 
panels.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of the proposed amendments to Sec. Sec.  37.1207 
and 38.858 in light of the specific considerations identified in 
Section 15(a) of the CEA. The Commission believes that proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 38.858 may have a beneficial effect on 
protection of market participants and the public, as well as on the 
financial integrity of the markets. The Commission believes that by 
better ensuring the fairness of the disciplinary process, market 
participants can have greater trust in the oversight process of SEF and 
DCM rules. The Commission has considered the other Section 15(a) 
Factors and believes that they are not implicated by proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1207 and 38.858.

[[Page 19695]]

x. DCM Chief Regulatory Officer--Proposed Sec.  38.856
    Commission regulations do not currently require DCMs to have a CRO. 
However, the framework created under the DCM Core Principle 16 
Acceptable Practices includes a reference to a CRO, who reports 
directly to the ROC.
    The Commission is proposing Sec.  38.856(a)(1) to require DCMs to 
establish the position of a CRO to administer a DCM's market regulation 
functions. The proposed rules would require that (i) the position of 
CRO must carry with it the authority and resources necessary to fulfill 
the duties set forth in this section for CROs; and (ii) the CRO must 
have supervisory authority over all staff performing the DCM's market 
regulation functions.
    In addition, the Commission is proposing Sec.  38.856(a)(2) to 
require that the individual designated to serve as CRO must have the 
background and skills appropriate for fulfilling the duties of the 
position. A DCM, therefore, is expected to identify the needs of its 
own market regulation functions and ensure that the CRO has the 
requisite surveillance and investigatory experience necessary to 
perform the role. Moreover, individuals disqualified from registration 
pursuant to sections 8a(2) or 8a(3) of the CEA are ineligible to serve 
as a CRO.
    Proposed Sec.  38.856(b) requires the CRO to report directly to the 
DCM's board of directors or senior officer. The Commission is also 
proposing Sec.  38.856(c) to require (1) the appointment or removal of 
a DCM's CRO to occur only with the approval of the DCM's ROC; (2) the 
DCM to notify the Commission within two business days of the 
appointment of any new CRO, whether interim or permanent; and (3) the 
DCM to notify the Commission within two business days of removal of the 
CRO. The Commission is proposing Sec.  38.856(d) to require the board 
of directors or the senior officer of the DCM, in consultation with the 
DCM's ROC, to approve the compensation of the CRO.
    The Commission is proposing Sec.  38.856(e) to establish the duties 
of the CRO, which include: (1) supervising the DCM's market regulation 
functions; (2) establishing and administering policies and procedures 
related to the DCM's market regulation functions; (3) supervising the 
effectiveness and sufficiency of any regulatory services provided to 
the DCM by a regulatory service provider in accordance with existing 
Sec.  38.154; (4) reviewing any proposed rule or programmatic changes 
that may have a significant regulatory impact and advising the ROC on 
such matters; and (5) in consultation with the DCM's ROC, identifying, 
minimizing, managing, and resolving conflicts of interest involving the 
DCM's market regulation functions.
    Finally, proposedSec.  38.856(f) requires DCMs to establish 
procedures for the CRO's disclosure of actual or potential conflicts of 
interest to the ROC, and designation of a qualified person to serve in 
the place of the CRO if the CRO has such a conflict of interest. The 
proposed rules also require documentation of any such disclosure 
regarding conflicts of interest.
A. Benefits
    The Commission preliminarily believes that establishing a position 
of a CRO under proposed Sec.  38.856(a)(1) will enable DCMs to comply 
with their statutory and regulatory obligation to fulfill their market 
regulation functions. Proposed Sec.  38.856(a)(2) provides that the CRO 
must have the necessary background and skills appropriate for 
fulfilling the responsibilities of the position. This requirement will 
benefit DCMs by ensuring CROs have the requisite experience necessary 
to oversee the DCM's market regulation functions. CROs who lack 
appropriate background and skills for their position would have a 
harder time effectively fulfilling their duties, which could be 
detrimental to the DCM's role as a SRO.
    Furthermore, proposed Sec.  38.856(b), which requires the CRO to 
directly report to the board of directors or to the senior officer, 
would make it easier for the CRO to fulfill the duties critical to the 
DCM's market regulation functions. For example, having a direct line to 
the board of directors or the senior officer would allow the CRO to 
more easily gain approval for any new policies related to the DCM's 
market regulation functions that the CRO needed to implement, to the 
extent that they required approval of a senior officer or the board of 
directors. Since DCM rule changes often need to be approved by the 
board of directors, having the CRO report to the board of directors or 
to the senior officer (who likely regularly communicates with the board 
of directors) would allow the CRO to more easily explain the need for 
rule changes, and to answer questions from the board of directors or 
the senior officer about such changes.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  38.856(c) and (d) require the ROC to (1) 
approve the appointment or removal of the CRO, and (2) consult with the 
board of directors or senior officer regarding the compensation of the 
CRO. The ROC is composed of exclusively public directors who have no 
material relationship with the exchange, and therefore, is well-
positioned to protect the CRO from interference from commercial 
interests. If the senior officer or the board of directors sought to 
terminate the CRO or decrease the CRO's compensation, as retaliation 
for not advancing the DCM's commercial interests ahead of the interests 
of the market regulation function, the ROC could step in to protect the 
CRO. By requiring the DCM to notify the Commission upon the appointment 
of a new CRO, the proposed rule will facilitate Commission staff being 
able to contact the new CRO to discuss regulatory concerns. 
Additionally, Commission staff can ask questions about the removal of 
the old CRO, and identify whether the ROC was involved.
    Additionally, proposed Sec.  38.856(e), which establishes the 
duties of a CRO, will provide benefits by establishing clear and 
transparent standards for the CRO duties, and may prevent the board of 
directors or senior officer from unreasonably limiting the CRO's role. 
For example, a board of directors or senior officer would be prohibited 
from taking over the market regulation functions in order to prioritize 
commercial interests.
    Finally, proposed Sec.  38.856(f), which requires the CRO to 
disclose to the ROC and document any actual or potential conflicts of 
interest identified by the CRO, is likely to provide benefits by 
promoting integrity and further allowing CROs to fulfill their duties. 
If the CRO did not have to disclose their own conflicts, the CRO's 
involvement in resolving conflicts of interest could exacerbate, rather 
than mitigate, conflicts of interest in the critical market regulation 
functions of the DCM. Therefore, proposed Sec.  38.856(f) may further 
mitigate potential conflicts of interests in the DCM's role as an SRO.
B. Costs
    Commission regulations do not currently require a DCM to appoint a 
CRO. However, the Commission noted that current industry practice is 
for DCMs to designate an individual to serve as CRO, and it would be 
difficult for a DCM to meet the staffing and resource requirements of 
Sec.  38.155 without a CRO. However, even if all DCMs currently have a 
CRO, it is possible that some DCMs may incur costs by having to adjust 
their existing staffing structure to ensure it complies with the 
specific regulatory requirements of proposed Sec.  38.856(a)(1). These 
costs could arise from additional hours DCM employees might need to 
spend analyzing their rules, policies,

[[Page 19696]]

and procedures for compliance with these requirements, and drafting and 
implementing new or amended rules, policies, and procedures, when 
necessary. Additionally, there may be costs incurred in implementing 
the appropriate policies and procedures to ensure that the CRO has the 
resources required to perform the duties set forth in proposed Sec.  
38.856(a)(1).
    DCMs may also expend administrative time finding a suitable 
candidate for the CRO position if the DCM either does not have a CRO, 
or does not have a CRO that meets the requirements of proposed Sec.  
38.856(a)(2). If a DCM does not already have a CRO, the costs to 
identify and hire a new CRO could be significant. Where DCMs have 
existing CROs, the cost of implementing the proposed rules may be 
lower. Nevertheless, there may costs related to ensuring the existing 
CRO role satisfies all of the requirements set forth in proposed Sec.  
38.856. Ongoing costs may include employment costs for the position 
itself, as well as time spent by the board of directors or senior 
officer to supervise the CRO and the administrative costs associated 
with notifying the Commission of the appointment of a new CRO or the 
removal of an existing CRO. The Commission requests comments on the 
potential costs of proposed Sec.  38.856, including any costs that 
would be imposed on DCMs, other market participants, or the financial 
system more broadly. In particular, for those DCMs that already have 
CROs, the Commission requests comment on the extent to which the 
proposed rules would require changes to existing policies and 
procedures regarding the CRO position.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of proposed Sec.  38.856 in light of the 
specific considerations identified in Section 15(a) of the CEA. The 
Commission believes that proposed Sec.  38.856 may have a beneficial 
effect on protection of market participants and the public, as well as 
on the financial integrity of the markets. The Commission believes that 
designating a CRO to administer the market regulation functions of the 
DCM will promote compliance with the proposed rules related to 
identifying and minimizing DCM conflicts of interest, which, in turn, 
will allow the DCMs to better provide services as an exchange. The 
Commission has considered the other Section 15(a) Factors and believes 
that they are not implicated by proposed Sec.  38.856.
xi. Staffing and Investigations--Proposed Changes to Commission 
Regulations Sec. Sec.  38.155, 38.158, and 37.203
    Commission regulation Sec.  38.155(a) requires a DCM to: (1) 
establish and maintain sufficient compliance department resources and 
staff to ensure that it can conduct effective audit trail reviews, 
trade practice surveillance, market surveillance, and real-time market 
monitoring; (2) maintain sufficient compliance staff to address unusual 
market or trading events as they arise; and (3) conduct and complete 
investigations in a timely manner. Furthermore, Commission regulation 
Sec.  38.155(b) requires a DCM to: (1) monitor the size and workload of 
its compliance staff annually and ensure that its compliance resources 
and staff are at appropriate levels; and (2) consider trading volume 
increases, the number of new products or contracts to be listed for 
trading, any new responsibilities to be assigned to compliance staff, 
the results of any internal review demonstrating that work is not 
completed in an effective or timely manner, and any other factors 
suggesting the need for increased resources and staff.
    Similarly, existing Commission regulation Sec.  37.203(c) requires 
SEFs to have sufficient compliance staff and resources to ensure it can 
conduct effective audit trail reviews, trade practice surveillance, 
market surveillance, and real-time market monitoring. Currently, SEFs 
are not subject to a regulation parallel to Commission regulation Sec.  
38.155(b) where DCMs are required to annually monitor the sufficiency 
of staff and resources.
    Finally, existing regulations Sec. Sec.  37.203(f) and 38.158, 
respectively, relate to SEF and DCM obligations regarding 
investigations and investigation reports. These provisions generally 
address investigation timeliness, substance of investigation reports, 
and the issuance of warning letters.
    The Commission is proposing amendments to existing Sec. Sec.  
37.203(c) and 38.155(a). First, the Commission proposes to replace 
references to ``compliance staff'' with ``staff.'' Second, proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.203(c) and 38.155(a) would amend the first sentence of 
the existing regulations to provide that SEFs and DCMs must establish 
and maintain sufficient staff and resources to ``effectively perform 
market regulation functions'' rather than listing the individual 
functions. The Commission does not view these as substantive changes. 
References to ``staff'' rather than ``compliance staff'' are intended 
for clarity. As noted, Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.203(c) and 
38.155(a) are solely focused on staff dedicated to performing market 
regulation functions.
    The Commission also proposes to amend Sec.  37.203 to add a new 
paragraph (d). The proposed provision would require SEFs to annually 
monitor the size and workload of their staff, and ensure its resources 
and staff effectively perform market regulation functions at 
appropriate levels. In addition, paragraph (d) would include a 
reference to paragraph (c) to clarify that it applies to staff 
responsible for conducting market regulation functions. In addition, 
with respect to both proposed Sec.  37.203(d) and amended Sec.  
38.155(b), the Commission is proposing to add to the list of factors 
that a SEF or DCM should consider in determining the appropriate level 
of resources and staff: (1) any responsibilities that staff have at 
affiliated entities; and (2) any conflicts of interest that prevent 
staff from working on certain matters.
    Additionally, the Commission proposes certain non-substantive 
changes to existing Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  38.155 and 
38.158. Proposed Sec.  38.155 would rename the regulation ``Sufficient 
staff and resources.'' Proposed Sec.  38.155(b) would add an internal 
reference to paragraph (a). This change is intended to clarify that the 
annual staff and resource monitoring requirement pertains to staff 
performing market regulation functions required under Sec.  38.155(a). 
Proposed Sec.  38.158(a) would replace the reference to ``compliance 
staff'' with ``staff responsible for conducting market regulation 
functions.'' Proposed Sec.  38.158(b) would delete the reference to 
``compliance staff investigation'' being required to be completed in a 
timely manner, and instead provide, more simply, that ``[e]ach 
investigation must be completed in a timely manner.'' Finally, proposed 
Sec. Sec.  38.158(c) and (d) would delete the modifier ``compliance'' 
when referencing to staff.
    Finally, the Commission also proposes certain non-substantive 
changes to existing Commission regulation Sec.  37.203. Proposed Sec.  
37.203(c) would rename the paragraph ``Sufficient staff and 
resources.'' The addition of proposed Sec.  37.203(d) would result in 
redesignating the remaining paragraphs of Sec.  37.203. Proposed Sec.  
37.203(g)(1), which would replace existing Commission regulation Sec.  
37.203(f)(1), and adds a reference to ``market regulation functions,'' 
consistent with the new proposed defined term. Proposed Sec.  
37.203(g)(1),

[[Page 19697]]

which would replace existing Commission regulation Sec.  37.203(f)(1), 
adds a reference to ``market regulation functions,'' consistent with 
the new proposed defined term. Proposed Sec.  37.203(g)(2)-(4) deletes 
the modifier ``compliance'' when referencing staff.
A. Benefits
    As explained above, the Commission is proposing certain non-
substantive changes to existing Sec. Sec.  37.203(c) and 38.155(a). 
These changes include replacing references to ``compliance staff'' with 
``staff.'' Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.203(c) and 38.155(a) would also amend 
the first sentence of the existing regulations to provide that SEFs and 
DCMs must establish and maintain sufficient staff and resources to 
``effectively perform market regulation functions'' rather than listing 
the individual functions. Additionally, as noted above, the Commission 
proposes non-substantive changes to existing Commission regulations 
Sec. Sec.  38.155, 38.158 and Sec.  37.203. Proposed Sec.  37.203(c) 
and Sec.  38.155 would both be renamed as ``Sufficient staff and 
resources.'' Proposed Sec.  37.203(g)(1) would add reference to 
``market regulation functions,'' and 38.155(b) would add an internal 
reference to paragraph (a) to achieve the same result. Proposed Sec.  
38.158(a) would replace the reference to ``compliance staff'' with 
``staff responsible for conducting market regulation functions.'' 
Proposed Sec.  38.158(b) would delete the reference to ``compliance 
staff investigation'' being required to be completed in a timely 
manner, and instead provide, more simply, that ``[e]ach investigation 
must be completed in a timely manner.'' Finally, proposed Sec. Sec.  
Sec.  37.203(g)(2)-(4) and 38.158(c) and (d) would delete the modifier 
``compliance'' when referencing to staff. These amendments provide 
additional clarity to those regulations. Such changes may provide 
benefits through enhanced regulatory clarity for SEFs and DCMs. 
However, as they are non-substantive changes, benefits will not be 
significant.
    The Commission also proposes to amend Sec.  37.203 to add a new 
paragraph (d). The proposed rule would require SEFs to annually monitor 
the size and workload of its staff, and ensure its resources and staff 
effectively perform market regulation functions at appropriate levels. 
In addition, paragraph (d) would include a reference to paragraph (c) 
to clarify that it applies to staff responsible for conducting market 
regulation functions. In addition, as noted above, with respect to both 
proposed Sec.  37.203(d) and amended Sec.  38.155(b), the Commission is 
proposing to add to the list of factors that a SEF or DCM should 
consider in determining the appropriate level of resources and staff: 
(1) any responsibilities that staff have at affiliated entities; and 
(2) any conflicts of interest that prevent staff from working on 
certain matters. Market regulation functions are critical for the 
performance of a SEF's self-regulatory obligations. This amendment is 
beneficial because it will help ensure sufficiency of SEF staff 
responsible for performing market regulation functions and identify in 
a timely way any potential conflicts of interest relating to market 
regulations staff, particularly regarding a SEF's or DCM's affiliates.
B. Costs
    The Commission also proposes to amend Sec.  37.203 to add a new 
paragraph (d). The proposed provision would require SEFs to annually 
monitor the size and workload of its staff, and ensure its resources 
and staff effectively perform market regulation functions at 
appropriate levels. SEFs may need to adjust their policies and 
procedures to comply with this new monitoring requirement. Costs could 
arise from additional hours SEF employees might need to spend analyzing 
the compliance of their rules and procedures with these requirements, 
drafting new or amended rules and procedures when necessary, and 
implementing these new or amended rules and procedures. Costs may 
further vary based on the size of the SEF, available resources the SEF 
may have, and with existing practices and policies the SEF may have in 
place. If a SEF has insufficient staff, it will need to find suitable 
candidates and hire staff as necessary. As noted above, the Commission 
proposes to amend Sec.  38.155(b), to add to the list of factors that a 
DCM should consider in determining the appropriate level of resources 
and staff: (1) any responsibilities that staff have at affiliated 
entities; and (2) any conflicts of interest that prevent staff from 
working on certain matters. The Commission believes that any costs 
imposed by such additional two factors will be negligible, as DCMs are 
currently obligated under existing Commission regulation Sec.  
38.155(b) to monitor the size and workload of its compliance staff 
annually, and already lists various factors they should consider in 
making that determination of sufficiency of resources.
    Finally, as noted above, the Commission proposes various non-
substantive changes to Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.203, 
38.155, and 38.158. These will provide additional clarity to SEFs and 
DCMs, and any costs associated with such changes will be negligible.
    The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of the 
proposed amendments to Sec. Sec.  37.203, 38.155, and 38.158, including 
any costs that would be imposed on SEFs, DCMs, other market 
participants, or the financial system more broadly. In particular, for 
those SEFs and DCMs that already have these requirements in place, the 
Commission requests comment on the extent to which the proposed rules 
would require changes to existing policies and procedures.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of the proposed amendments to Sec. Sec.  38.155, 
38.158, and 37.203 in light of the specific considerations identified 
in Section 15(a) of the CEA. The Commission believes that the proposed 
amendments to Sec. Sec.  38.155, 38.158, and 37.203 may have a 
beneficial effect on protection of market participants and the public, 
as well as on the financial integrity of the markets by requiring a 
more direct link between exchange management and the staff performing 
market regulation functions, hence providing a more direct way of 
effectuating compliance with Commission rules. The Commission has 
considered the other Section 15(a) Factors and believes that they are 
not implicated by the proposed amendments to Sec. Sec.  38.155, 38.158, 
and 37.203.
xii. SEF Chief Compliance Officer--Proposed Changes to Commission 
Regulation Sec.  37.1501
    In general, the statutory framework provided in SEF Core Principle 
15 requires each SEF to designate an individual to serve as a CCO.\290\ 
SEF Core Principle 15 also provides requirements relating to the CCO's 
reporting structure and duties.\291\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \290\ CEA section 5h(f)(15); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(A).
    \291\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501 further implements the 
statutory CCO requirements. In particular, Commission regulation Sec.  
37.1501 currently establishes definitions for the terms ``board of 
directors'' and ``senior officer;'' addresses the authority of the CCO; 
establishes qualifications for the CCO; outlines the appointment and 
removal procedures for the CCO; requires the SEF's board of directors 
or senior officer to approve the CCO's compensation; and requires the 
CCO to

[[Page 19698]]

meet with the SEF's board of directors or senior officer at least 
annually.\292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \292\ See Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(a)-(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(c) further outlines the duties 
of the CCO. For example, Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(c)(2) 
details that the CCO must take reasonable steps, in consultation with 
the board of directors or the senior officer of the SEF, to resolve any 
material conflicts of interest that may arise, including, but not 
limited to: (1) conflicts between business considerations and 
compliance requirements; (2) conflicts between business considerations 
and implementation of the requirement that the SEF provide fair, open, 
and impartial access as set forth in Sec.  37.202; and (3) conflicts 
between a SEF's management and members of the board of directors. 
Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(c)(6) specifies that the SEF's CCO 
must establish and administer a compliance manual designed to promote 
compliance with the applicable laws, rules, and regulations and a 
written code of ethics for the SEF designed to prevent ethical 
violations and to promote honesty and ethical conduct by SEF personnel. 
Finally, Commission regulation Sec. Sec.  37.1501(c)(7) and (c)(8) 
detail the requirement that the CCO supervise the SEF's self-regulatory 
program as well as the effectiveness and sufficiency of any regulatory 
service provider, respectively.
    Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(d) addresses the statutory 
requirement under SEF Core Principle 15 requiring a CCO to prepare an 
annual compliance report. Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(d) 
details the information the report must contain.\293\ Commission 
regulation Sec.  37.1501(e) addresses the submission of the annual 
compliance report; Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(f) requires the 
SEF to maintain all records demonstrating compliance with the duties of 
the CCO and the preparation and submission of annual compliance reports 
consistent with Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.1000 and 37.1001. 
Finally, Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(g) delegates to the 
Director of the Division of Market Oversight the authority to grant or 
deny a request for an extension of time for a SEF to file its annual 
compliance report under Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \293\ Commission regulation Sec.  37.1500(d)(1)-(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is proposing several amendments to Sec.  37.1501. 
First, the Commission proposes amendments to the existing SEF CCO 
requirements to ensure that, to the extent applicable, these 
requirements are consistent with the proposed DCM CRO requirements. 
Second, the Commission is proposing additional SEF CCO requirements to 
harmonize the language with other aspects of this proposal, namely 
proposed amendments that pertain to the board of directors and 
conflicts of interest procedures. Third, the Commission is proposing 
amendments that will more closely align Sec.  37.1501 with the language 
of SEF Core Principle 15.
    The Commission is proposing to move the terms ``board of 
directors'' and ``senior officer'' from existing regulation Sec.  
37.1501(a) to proposed Sec.  37.1201(b). The meaning of each term would 
remain unchanged, with one exception. Specifically, the Commission 
seeks to clarify the existing definition of ``board of directors'' by 
including the introductory language ``a group of people'' serving as 
the governing body of the SEF.
    The Commission also is proposing a new Sec.  37.1501(a)(3) that 
would require the CCO to report directly to the board of directors or 
to the senior officer of the SEF. This would be a new provision in 
Sec.  37.1501, but it is consistent with the language of SEF Core 
Principle 15, as set out in Sec.  37.1500. Proposed Sec.  
37.1501(a)(4)(i) would amend the language in existing Commission 
regulation Sec.  37.1501(b)(3)(i) to provide that the board of 
directors or senior officer may appoint or remove the CCO ``with the 
approval of the [SEF's] regulatory oversight committee.'' \294\ 
Finally, proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(5) would amend the existing 
requirement in Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(b)(4) that the board 
of directors or the senior officer of the SEF shall approve the 
compensation of the CCO, to now require this approval to occur ``in 
consultation with the [SEF's ROC].'' \295\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \294\ Proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(4)(i).
    \295\ Proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The duties of the CCO under proposed Sec.  37.1501(b) are 
substantively similar to existing Commission regulation Sec.  
37.1501(c), with two exceptions. First, proposed Sec.  37.1501(b)(2) 
provides that the CCO must take reasonable steps in consultation with 
the SEF's board of directors ``or a committee thereof'' to manage and 
resolve material conflicts of interest. The added reference to 
``committee'' accounts for the ROC's role in resolving conflicts of 
interest, which is provided in proposed Sec.  37.1206(d)(4). Second, 
proposed Sec.  37.1501(b)(2)(i) specifies that conflicts of interest 
between business considerations and compliance requirements includes, 
with respect to compliance requirements, the SEF's ``market regulation 
functions.''
    Existing Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(c)(7) provides that 
the CCO must supervise the SEF's ``self-regulatory program,'' which 
includes trade practice surveillance; market surveillance; real time 
market monitoring; compliance with audit trail requirements; 
enforcement and disciplinary proceedings; audits, examinations, and 
other regulatory responsibilities (including taking reasonable steps to 
ensure compliance with, if applicable, financial integrity, financial 
reporting, sales practice, recordkeeping, and other requirements). 
Proposed Sec.  37.1501(b)(7) would amend this provision to state that 
the CCO is responsible for supervising the SEF's self-regulatory 
program, including the market regulation functions set forth in Sec.  
37.1201(b)(9).
    Proposed Sec.  37.1501(c) is an entirely new rule that addresses 
conflicts of interest involving the CCO. The proposed rules requires 
the SEF to establish procedures for the disclosure of actual or 
potential conflicts of interest to the ROC. In addition, the SEF must 
designate a qualified person to serve in the place of the CCO for any 
matter for which the CCO has such a conflict, and maintain 
documentation of such disclosure and designation.
    Proposed Sec.  37.1501(d)(5) amends the existing annual compliance 
report requirement under Commission regulation Sec.  37.1501(d) to 
require the annual report to include any actual or potential conflicts 
of interests that were identified to the CCO during the coverage period 
for the report, including a description of how such conflicts of 
interest were managed or resolved, and an assessment of the impact of 
any conflicts of interest on the swap execution facility's ability to 
perform its market regulation functions.
A. Benefits
    The Commission believes that proposed Sec.  37.1201(b) and the 
proposed amendments to Sec.  37.1501(a) are likely to provide benefits 
as they enhance the existing definition for the board of directors to 
include the introductory language ``a group of people,'' which provides 
clarity and ease of reference. This, in turn, should enhance the SEF's 
ability to comply with the regulation. Proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(3), 
which requires the CCO to directly report to the SEF's board of 
directors or to the senior officer of the SEF, is likely to provide 
benefits by allowing the CCO to report directly to the ROC, which 
insulates the CCO's role from commercial interests and allows that

[[Page 19699]]

person to more effectively fulfill its critical market regulations 
functions and other self-regulatory obligations. This may result in 
improved overall SEF compliance with Commission regulations. It is, 
however, important to note that providing the SEF an option to have its 
CCO to report to a senior officer may introduce a possibility of 
interference by the management team, as senior officers are likely to 
have incentives that conflict with that of a CCO. For example, senior 
officers are sometimes responsible for performance evaluations and 
approving administrative requests, which might compromise the 
effectiveness of the CCO and may limit the benefits of the proposed 
rule.
    Proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(4)(i), which will allow the board of 
directors or a senior officer to appoint or remove the CCO with the 
approval of the SEF's ROC, is likely to generate benefits as it further 
insulates the CCO from improper or undue influence from the commercial 
interests of the SEF. These benefits, however, are likely to be limited 
as SEFs have been operating under an existing similar standard. 
Furthermore, by requiring the board of directors or the senior officer 
to consult with the ROC in approving the compensation of the CCO, 
proposed Sec.  37.1501(a)(5) is likely to provide benefits as it may 
further insulate the CCO from interference from the commercial 
interests of the SEF.
    In addition, by requiring the ROC's involvement in resolving 
conflicts of interest and by explicitly including the SEF's market 
regulation function in the list of conflicts considered for compliance 
requirements, proposed Sec.  37.1501(b) will allow the CCO to be in a 
better position to resolve conflicts of interest that relate to 
surveillance, investigations, and disciplinary functions which, in 
turn, will enhance the SEF's important role as an SRO.
    The proposed amendment to Sec.  37.1501(b)(7) will explicitly refer 
to a SEF's market regulation function in referring to the CCO's 
supervision responsibility. The term ``market regulation functions'' is 
defined in proposed Sec.  37.1201(b)(9), and will provide clarity and 
ease of reference to compliance standards. Such clarity and ease of 
reference should enhance a SEF's ability to comply with core principle 
and regulatory requirements. To the extent that a SEF's CCO is already 
carrying out such responsibilities, the benefits may be less 
significant.
    Proposed Sec.  37.1501(c), requires SEFs to establish procedures 
for disclosing conflicts of interest to the ROC, designate a qualified 
person to serve in the place of the CCO for any matter in which the CCO 
has a conflict, and maintain documentation of such designation. These 
requirements are likely to provide benefits by better facilitating the 
ROC's assistance in managing and resolving conflicts of interest. This 
will allow the SEF to effectively perform its market regulation 
functions and maintain regulatory compliance. In addition, the 
requirement in proposed regulation Sec.  37.1501(c) that the SEF have 
procedures to designate a qualified person to serve in the place of the 
CCO for any matter in which the CCO is conflicted is likely to provide 
benefits as it will increase the likelihood that the conflict of 
interest is managed and resolved by a person with sufficient 
independence, expertise and authority, which, in turn, will allow the 
SEF to effectively perform its market regulation functions.
    In addition, proposed Sec.  37.1501(d)(5), which amends the annual 
compliance report requirements to include a report of any actual or 
potential conflicts of interests and how such conflicts of interests 
were managed or resolved, will increase the chances that the Commission 
has timely notice and sufficient knowledge of conflicts of interest and 
how they are resolved. Such disclosures allow the Commission to have 
effective oversight over SEFs and enhances SEF governance transparency 
and accountability.
B. Costs
    In order to comply with the proposed amendments to Sec.  37.1501, 
SEFs may need to adjust their policies and procedures regarding CCOs. 
This may impose some administrative costs on SEFs. Costs could arise 
from additional hours SEF employees might need to spend analyzing the 
compliance of their rules and procedures with the proposed 
requirements, drafting new or amended rules and procedures when 
necessary, and implementing these new or amended rules and procedures.
    More specifically, SEFs may have additional costs associated with 
the CCO position resulting from the time requirements on the board of 
directors or senior officer meeting with the CCO, and administrative 
costs associated with the ROC actions being required to hire or remove 
a CCO and to approve CCO compensation. To the extent that SEFs already 
have such rules and procedures in place, costs may have been already 
realized.
    The Commission requests comment on the potential costs of the 
proposed amendments to Sec.  37.1501, including any costs that would be 
imposed on SEFs, other market participants, or the financial system 
more broadly.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of the proposed amendments to Sec.  37.1501 in 
light of the specific considerations identified in Section 15(a) of the 
CEA. The Commission believes that the proposed amendments to Sec.  
37.1501 may have a beneficial effect on protection of market 
participants and the public, as well as on the financial integrity of 
the markets because the proposed amendments should support and 
effectuate better compliance with core principles. Increased 
independence of the CCO position and additional requirements pertaining 
to the resolution and documentation of conflicts of interest will 
enhance SEF governance, accountability, and promote transparency, which 
is an essential factor for establishing the integrity of derivatives 
markets. The Commission has considered the other Section 15(a) Factors 
and believes that they are not implicated by the proposed amendments to 
Sec.  37.1501.
xiii. Transfer of Equity Interest--Proposed Changes to Commission 
Regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c) and 38.5(c)
    Currently, Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) and 
38.5(c)(1) require SEFs and DCMs, respectively, to notify the 
Commission in the event of an equity interest transfer. The threshold 
that triggers the notification requirement when a DCM enters a 
transaction is the transfer of 10 percent or more of the DCM's equity. 
In comparison, a SEF is required to notify the Commission when it 
enters a transaction to transfer 50 percent or more of the SEF's 
equity. Commission regulation Sec.  37.5(c)(1) provides that the 
Commission may ``upon receiving such notification, request supporting 
documentation of the transaction.'' Commission regulation Sec.  
38.5(c)(1) does not include a similar provision for DCMs.
    Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(2) and 38.5(c)(2) govern 
the timing of the equity interest transfer notification to the 
Commission. These provisions require notification at the earliest 
possible time, but in no event later than the open of business 10 
business days following the date upon which the SEF or DCM enters a 
firm obligation to transfer the equity interest. Commission regulations 
Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(3) and 38.5(c)(3) govern rule filing obligations 
that may be prompted by the equity interest transfer. Commission 
regulation Sec.  37.5(c)(4) requires a SEF to certify to

[[Page 19700]]

the Commission no later than two days after an equity transfer takes 
place that the SEF meets all of the requirements of section 5h of the 
CEA and applicable Commission regulations. Commission regulation Sec.  
38.5(c) does not have an analogous certification requirement for DCMs.
    Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(d) and 38.5(d) establish 
Commission delegation of authority provisions to the Director of the 
Division of Market Oversight. The delegation authority under Sec.  
37.5(d) permits the Director to request any of the information 
specified in Sec.  37.5, including information relating to the business 
of the SEF, information demonstrating compliance with the core 
principles, or with the SEF's other obligations under the CEA or the 
Commission's regulations, and information relating to an equity 
interest transfer. In contrast, the scope of the delegation of 
authority in Commission regulation 38.5(d) limits the Director to 
requesting information from a DCM pursuant to Commission regulation 
Sec.  38.5(b) demonstrating compliance with the DCM core principles and 
the CEA. The Director's delegation authority does not extend to 
requests for information related to the business of the DCM or to 
equity interest transfers.
    The Commission proposes to amend regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c) and 
38.5(c) to: (1) ensure the Commission receives timely and sufficient 
information in the event of certain changes in the ownership or 
corporate or organizational structure of a SEF or DCM; (2) clarify what 
information is required to be provided and the relevant deadlines; and 
(3) conform to similar requirements applicable to DCOs.
    The Commission proposes to amend regulation Sec.  37.5(c)(1) to 
require SEFs to file with the Commission notification of transactions 
involving the transfer of at least 10 percent of the equity interest in 
the SEF. The Commission also is proposing to amend regulations 
Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) and 38.5(c)(1) to expand the types of changes of 
ownership or corporate or organizational structure that would trigger a 
notification obligation to the Commission. The proposed amendments 
would require SEFs and DCMs to report any anticipated change in the 
ownership or corporate or organizational structure of the SEF or DCM, 
or its respective parent(s) that would: (1) result in at least a 10 
percent change of ownership of the SEF or DCM, or a change to the 
entity or person holding a controlling interest in the SEF or DCM, 
whether through an increase in direct ownership or voting interest in 
the SEF or DCM, or in a direct or indirect corporate parent entity of 
the SEF or DCM; (2) create a new subsidiary or eliminate a current 
subsidiary of the SEF or DCM; or (3) result in the transfer of all or 
substantially all of the assets of the SEF or DCM to another legal 
entity.
    The Commission also is proposing to amend regulations Sec. Sec.  
37.5(c)(2) and 38.5(c)(2) to clarify what information must be submitted 
to the Commission as part of a notification pursuant to Commission 
regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) and 38.5(c)(1), as proposed to be 
amended. The Commission proposes to harmonize and enhance the 
requirements between SEFs and DCMs by amending regulations Sec. Sec.  
37.5(c)(2) and 38.5(c)(2) to state that, as part of a notification 
pursuant to Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) or 38.5(c)(1), 
a SEF or DCM must provide ``required information'' including: a chart 
outlining the new ownership or corporate or organizational structure, a 
brief description of the purpose or the impact of the change, and any 
relevant agreement effecting the change and corporate documents such as 
articles of incorporation and bylaws. As proposed, the Commission may, 
after receiving such information, request additional supporting 
documentation related to the change in ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure, such as amended Form SEF or Form DCM 
exhibits, to demonstrate that the SEF or DCM will, following the 
change, continue to meet all the requirements in section 5 or 5h of the 
CEA (as applicable) and applicable Commission regulations.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(3) and 38.5(c)(3) will require a 
notification pursuant to Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) 
or 38.5(c)(1) to be submitted no later than three months prior to the 
anticipated change, provided that the SEF or DCM may report the 
anticipated change later than three months prior to the anticipated 
change if it does not know and reasonably could not have known of the 
anticipated change three months prior to the anticipated change. In 
such event, the SEF or DCM shall immediately report such change to the 
Commission as soon as it knows of such change.
    In addition to the new reporting requirements, the proposal 
includes a new certification requirement for DCMs. The Commission is 
proposing to amend Commission regulation Sec.  38.5(c) by adding a 
certification requirement in regulation Sec.  38.5(c)(5). The 
certification will require a DCM, upon a change in ownership or 
corporate organizational structure described in Commission regulation 
Sec.  38.5(c)(1), file with the Commission a certification that the DCM 
meets all of the requirements of section 5 of the CEA and applicable 
Commission regulations. The certification must be filed no later than 
two business days following the date on which the change in ownership 
or corporate or organizational structure takes effect.
    The Commission proposes a new Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(6) and 38.5(c)(6), 
which provide that a change in the ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure of a SEF or DCM that results in the failure of 
the SEF or DCM to comply with any provision of the Act, or any 
regulation or order of the Commission thereunder, shall be cause for 
the suspension of the registration or designation of the SEF or DCM, or 
the revocation of registration or designation as a SEF or DCM, in 
accordance with sections 5e and 6(b) of the CEA. The proposed rule 
further provides that the Commission may make and enter an order 
directing that the SEF or DCM cease and desist from such violation, in 
accordance with sections 6b and 6(b) of the CEA. Section 6(b) of the 
CEA authorizes the Commission to suspend or revoke registration or 
designation of a SEF or DCM if the exchange has violated the CEA or 
Commission orders or regulations. Section 6(b) includes a number of 
procedural safeguards, including that it requires notice to the SEF or 
DCM, a hearing on the record, and appeal rights to the court of appeals 
for the circuit in which the SEF or DCM has its principal place of 
business. It is imperative that SEFs and DCMs, regardless of ownership 
or control changes, continue to comply with the CEA and all Commission 
regulations to promote market integrity and protect market 
participants.
    Finally, the Commission proposes to amend existing regulation Sec.  
38.5(d) by extending the delegation of authority provisions to the 
Director of the Division of Market Oversight to include information 
requests related to the business of the DCM in Sec.  38.5(a) and 
changes in ownership or corporate or organizational structure in Sec.  
38.5(c).
A. Benefits
    The proposed change to revise the reporting threshold for SEFs from 
50 percent to 10 percent would harmonize the regulatory standard 
currently in place for DCMs and DCOs. In addition, lowering the 
notification standard for SEFs may better allow the Commission to 
fulfill its oversight obligations. The Commission recognizes that a 
notification based on a percentage of ownership change that is set too 
low will result in notifications of changes that do not have a 
consequential change

[[Page 19701]]

in who has control over the exchange or impact on SEF operations. In 
contrast, a threshold set too high will reduce the instances of 
notification of changes in ownership or corporate or organizational 
structure to the Commission that are consequential to the operations of 
a SEF. The Commission believes that lowering the threshold to 10 
percent results in an appropriate balance. In this connection, the 10 
percent threshold represents a level where the Commission would receive 
notice of a SEF's ownership or corporate or organizational structure 
changes, when such changes actually reflect meaningful changes in who 
potentially could impact a SEF's compliance with the CEA and Commission 
regulations. Therefore, the proposed amendment will benefit SEF market 
participants and the public given the increased transparency to the 
Commission in terms of who potentially controls the SEF.
    As discussed in the preamble above, under the existing regulations, 
an increase in equity interest of less than 10 percent could still 
result in change of control of the exchange. Proposed Sec. Sec.  
37.5(c)(1) and 38.5(c)(1) expand the scope of corporate changes that 
require notification to include changes not only in ownership, but also 
corporate and organizational structural changes. These proposed changes 
will help ensure that the Commission has accurate knowledge of the 
individuals or entities that control a SEF or DCM and its activities, 
thereby promoting market integrity. The Commission believes that 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(2) and 38.5(c)(2) will encourage SEFs and 
DCMs to remain mindful of their self-regulatory responsibilities when 
negotiating the terms of significant equity interest transfers or other 
changes in ownership or corporate or organizational structure. In 
addition, the proposed rules help maintain an orderly marketplace 
despite changes in the ownership or corporate or organizational 
structure of the exchange. The proposed amendments will enhance 
Commission staff's ability to undertake a timely and effective due 
diligence review of the impact, if any, of such changes. These enhanced 
requirements will allow Commission staff to seek updated copies of 
exhibits and other documents that provide valuable and timely 
information regarding the professional staff, legal proceedings, 
rulebook changes, third party service provider agreements, member and 
user agreements, and compliance manual changes. Those documents are 
important to confirm that the registrant will continue to be able to 
meet its regulatory obligations.
    The Commission believes that new provisions Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(3) 
and 38.5(c)(3) that require the SEF or the DCM notification three 
months prior to the anticipated change or immediately as soon as it 
knows of such a change, will allow the Commission staff sufficient time 
to review the change and confirm compliance with applicable statutory 
and regulatory requirements. The new rules will also provide 
flexibility to the SEF or DCM if the anticipated change occurs more 
quickly than within three months.
    Given their roles as SROs, the proposed amendments to Sec.  38.5(c) 
are likely to provide benefits by establishing consistent regulations 
among SEFs and DCMs in the manner they certify their compliance with 
the CEA and Commission regulations. Furthermore, to the extent that the 
certification requirement will help ensure any changes to ownership or 
corporate or organizational structure do not result in non-compliance, 
the certification requirement will improve confidence in the 
marketplace and promote market integrity.
    Finally, the proposal extends the delegation of authority 
provisions to the Director of the Division of Market Oversight 
regarding DCMs to include information requests related to the business 
and changes to ownership or corporate or organizational structure of a 
DCM. Proposed Sec.  38.5(d) provides a standard for DCMs that conforms 
to the existing standard for SEFs and establishes a consistent 
regulatory framework. Furthermore, since changes to ownership or 
corporate or organizational structure of a DCM can occur relatively 
quickly with significant consequences, the amendments are likely to 
provide benefits by providing the Director of the Division of Market 
Oversight with the authority to immediately request information and 
documents to confirm continued compliance with the CEA and relevant 
regulations, which in turn should result in more effective DCM 
oversight.
B. Costs
    As described above, the Commission proposes to amend regulations 
Sec. Sec.  37.5(c) and 38.5(c) to ensure the Commission receives timely 
and sufficient information in the event of certain changes in the 
ownership or corporate or organizational structure of a SEF or DCM.
    To comply with the proposed rules, SEFs and DCMs may need to adjust 
their policies and procedures, which would impose some costs. SEF and 
DCM costs could arise from additional hours employees might need to 
spend analyzing the compliance of their rules and procedures with these 
requirements, drafting new or amended rules and procedures when 
necessary, and implementing these new or amended rules and procedures. 
Costs associated with complying with the proposed Sec. Sec.  37.5(c) 
and 38.5(c) may further vary based on the size of the SEF and DCM, 
available resources, and the existing practices and policies they may 
already have in place. Finally, costs will depend significantly on how 
often a change in ownership or corporate or ownership structure occurs.
    More specifically, while DCMs are already required to notify the 
Commission in the event of a 10 percent change in ownership interest, 
this 10 percent threshold requirement is being extended to SEFs, which 
will impose additional costs whenever such a transfer occurs. 
Additionally, the proposed rules also require both SEFs and DCMs to 
report any anticipated change in the ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure of the SEF or DCM, or its respective parent(s) 
that would result in at least a 10 percent change of ownership of the 
SEF or DCM, or a change to the entity or person holding a controlling 
interest in the SEF or DCM. This additional reporting in the event of 
anticipated change will generate additional costs for both SEFs and 
DCMs. Under proposed Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(3) and 38.5(c)(3), this 
additional reporting is required to be submitted to the Commission no 
later than three months prior to the anticipated change which will add 
additional employee time and costs to any anticipated change in 
ownership or organizational structure event that requires notification 
under the proposed rules.
    With respect to DCMs, proposed Sec.  38.5(c)(5) will add a 
certification requirement in the event of a change in ownership or 
organizational structure similar to the existing requirements for SEFs. 
This certification must be no later than two business days following 
the date on which the change in ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure took effect, and will add direct costs to any 
such change event.
    Finally, the Commission proposes to amend existing Commission 
regulation Sec.  38.5(d) to delegate to the Director of the Division of 
Market Oversight the authority to request information related to the 
DCM's business and changes in ownership or corporate or organizational 
structure. Information or document requests initiated by the Director, 
as opposed to the Commission, should not, on its own, impose

[[Page 19702]]

additional costs on DCMs. Therefore, costs to DCMs relating to this 
change should be negligible. The Commission acknowledges that a 
streamlined process for requesting information and documents may result 
in more frequent information or document requests under Sec.  38.5. In 
that respect, direct costs to DCMs could increase.
    The Commission requests comments on the potential costs of the 
proposed amendments to Sec. Sec.  37.5(c) and 38.5(c) and (d), 
including any costs that would be imposed on SEFs, DCMs, other market 
participants, or the financial system more broadly.
C. Section 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of the proposed amendments to Sec. Sec.  37.5(c) 
and 38.5(c) and (d) in light of the specific considerations identified 
in Section 15(a) of the CEA. The Commission believes that the proposed 
amendments may have a beneficial effect on protection of market 
participants and the public, as well as on the integrity of the markets 
through improved Commission awareness and oversight of significant 
changes to ownership or corporate or organizational structure of SEFs. 
The Commission has considered the other Section 15(a) Factors and 
believes that they are not implicated by the proposed amendments to 
Sec. Sec.  37.5(c) and 38.5(c)-(d).
Summary 15(a) Factors
    In addition to the discussion above, the Commission has evaluated 
the costs and benefits of the proposed rules in light of the following 
five broad areas of market and public concern identified in Section 
15(a) of the CEA: (1) protection of market participants and the public; 
(2) efficiency, competitiveness, and financial integrity of markets; 
(3) price discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other 
public interest considerations. The Commission believes that the 
proposed rules will have a beneficial effect on sound risk management 
practices and on the protection of market participants and the public.
1. Protection of Market Participants and the Public
    The Commission believes that the proposed rules will enhance the 
protection of market participants and the public by improving the 
ability of SEFs and DCMs to identify, manage and resolve conflicts of 
interest. The proposed rules will allow the exchanges to properly and 
orderly perform their function in facilitating markets, which in turn 
will reduce the likelihood that market participants and the public face 
unanticipated costs. The proposed rules will enhance the transparency 
and consistency of governance fitness standards, which in turn 
increases the likelihood that exchanges provide reliable services to 
the market participants. Finally, the proposed rules will provide the 
public and the Commission with transparent information regarding 
changes in ownership of SEFs or DCMs, which enhances the protection of 
the public.
2. Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity
    The proposed rules will benefit the financial integrity of the 
derivatives markets by promoting the transparency and the integrity of 
the governance practices and proper identification and handling of 
conflicts of interest through the adoption of the proposed rules. The 
proposed rules will also benefit the marketplace by allowing a 
consistent approach on managing conflicts of interest and 
implementation of governance fitness standards. Additionally, the 
proposed rules will promote SEF's and DCM's ability to complete their 
self-regulatory obligations by promoting the resources necessary to 
effectively complete those obligations.
3. Price Discovery
    Price discovery is the process of determining the price level for 
an asset through the interaction of buyers and sellers and based on 
supply and demand conditions. The Commission has not identified any 
effect of the proposed rules on the price discovery process.
4. Sound Risk Management Practices
    The proposed rules seek to establish transparent and consistent 
governance fitness standards and proposes rules for proper 
identification and handling of conflicts of interest, which will 
support sound risk management practices at SEFs and DCMs. Nevertheless, 
the proposed rules will not necessarily impact the sound risk 
management practices by other market participants per se.
5. Other Public Interest Considerations
    The Commission has not identified any effect of the proposed rule 
on other public interest considerations.
4. Question for Comment
    As noted above regarding the regulatory baseline, the Commission's 
understanding is that all of the DCMs that are currently designated by 
the Commission rely on the acceptable practices to comply with Core 
Principle 16, and therefore the actual costs and benefits of the 
codification of those acceptable practices with respect to DCMs may not 
be as significant. Is this understanding correct in all cases or are 
there situations where DCMs using other means to satisfy the core 
principles? If so, what are these means?

b. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') requires Federal agencies 
to consider whether the regulations they propose will have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
and, if so, provide a regulatory flexibility analysis with respect to 
such impact.\296\ The regulations proposed herein will directly affect 
SEFs, DCMs, and their market participants. The Commission has 
previously established certain definitions of ``small entities'' to be 
used by the Commission in evaluating the impact of its regulations on 
small entities in accordance with the RFA.\297\ The Commission 
previously concluded that SEFs are not small entities for the purpose 
of the RFA.\298\ The Commission has also previously stated its belief 
in the context of relevant rulemakings that SEFs' market participants, 
which are all required to be eligible contract participants (``ECPs'') 
\299\ as defined in section 1a(18) of the CEA,\300\ are not small 
entities for purposes of the RFA.\301\ Similarly, Commission previously 
determined that DCMs are not small entities for purposes of the RFA 
because DCMs are required to demonstrate compliance with a number of 
core principles, including principles concerning the expenditure of 
sufficient financial resources to establish and maintain an adequate 
self-regulatory program.\302\ Therefore, the Chairman, on behalf of the 
Commission, hereby certifies, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), that the 
proposed rules will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.

[[Page 19703]]

The Commission invites the public and other federal agencies to comment 
on the above determination.
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    \296\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \297\ 47 FR at 18618-21 (Apr. 30, 1982).
    \298\ See Part 37 Final Rule, 78 FR 33476 at 33548 (citing 47 FR 
18618, 18621 (Apr. 30, 1982) (discussing DCMs)).
    \299\ Commission regulation 37.703.
    \300\ 7 U.S.C. 1(a)(18).
    \301\ Opting Out of Segregation, 66 FR 20740 at 20743 (Apr. 25, 
2001) (stating that ECPs by the nature of their definition in the 
CEA should not be considered small entities).
    \302\ See Policy Statement and Establishment of Definitions of 
``Small Entities'' for Purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 
47 FR 18618, 18619 (Apr. 30, 1982); See also, e.g., DCM Core 
Principle 21 applicable to DCMs under section 735 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.
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c. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'') \303\ imposes certain 
requirements on federal agencies, including the Commission, in 
connection with their conducting or sponsoring any ``collection of 
information,'' as defined by the PRA. Under the PRA, an agency may not 
conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a 
collection of information unless it displays a valid control number 
from the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'').\304\ The PRA is 
intended, in part, to minimize the paperwork burden created for 
individuals, businesses, and other persons as a result of the 
collection of information by federal agencies, and to ensure the 
greatest possible benefit and utility of information created, 
collected, maintained, sued, shared, and disseminated by or for the 
Federal Government.\305\ The PRA applies to all information, regardless 
of form or format, whenever the Federal Government is obtaining, 
causing to be obtained, or soliciting information, and includes 
required disclosure to third parties or the public, of facts or 
opinions, when the information collection calls for answers to 
identical questions posed to, or identical reporting or recordkeeping 
requirements imposed on, 10 or more persons.\306\
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    \303\ 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq.
    \304\ See 44 U.S.C. 3507(a)(3); 5 CFR 1320.5(a)(3).
    \305\ See 44 U.S.C. 3501.
    \306\ See 44 U.S.C. 3502(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This NPRM, if adopted, would result in a collection of information 
within the meaning of the PRA, as discussed below. The proposal affects 
three collections of information for which the Commission has 
previously received a control number from OMB: OMB Control No. 3038-
0052, ``Core Principles & Other Requirements for DCMs;'' \307\ OMB 
Control No. 3038-0074, ``Core Principles and Other Requirements for 
Swap Execution Facilities;'' \308\ and OMB Control No. 3038-0093, 
``Part 40, Provisions Common to Registered Entities.'' \309\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \307\ For the previously approved PRA estimates for DCMs under 
OMB Control No. 3038-0052, see ICR Reference No. 202207-3038-003, 
Conclusion Date Aug. 24, 2022, at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=202207-3038-003. The PRA analysis uses a count of 
16 DCMs based on Commission data accurate as of Sept. 29, 2023.
    \308\ For the previously approved estimates for SEFs under OMB 
Control No. 3038-0074, see ICR Reference No. 202201-3038-002, 
Conclusion Date Apr. 30, 2022, at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=202201-3038-002. The PRA analysis uses a count of 
23 SEFs based on Commission data accurate as of Sept. 29, 2023.
    \309\ OMB Control Number 3038-0093 has two Information 
Collections: Part 40, Provisions Common to Registered Entities; and 
Part 150, Position Limits. See https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=202102-3038-001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is therefore submitting this NPRM to OMB for 
review.\310\ Responses to this collection of information would be 
mandatory. The Commission will protect any proprietary information 
according to the Freedom of Information Act and part 145 of the 
Commission's regulations.\311\ In addition, CEA section 8(a)(1) 
strictly prohibits the Commission, unless specifically authorized by 
the CEA, from making public any data and information that would 
separately disclose the business transactions or market positions of 
any person and trade secrets or names of customers.\312\ Finally, the 
Commission is also required to protect certain information contained in 
a government system of records according to the Privacy Act of 
1974.\313\
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    \310\ See 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11.
    \311\ See 5 U.S.C. 552; see also 17 CFR part 145 (Commission 
Records and Information).
    \312\ 7 U.S.C. 12(a)(1).
    \313\ 5 U.S.C. 552a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    1. Burden Estimates
    For PRA purposes, there are 23 registered SEFs and 16 designated 
DCMs. The proposed amendments would impose new one-time and ongoing 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements on SEFs and DCMs related to 
conflict of interest requirements and associated governance 
requirements under parts 37 and 38, along with associated rule 
submissions under part 40. The estimated aggregate burden imposed by 
the proposed amendments is set out below.
    2. Fitness Documentation and Written Procedures (Sec. Sec.  
37.207(d) and 38.801(d))
    The proposed amendments would add requirements that SEFs and DCMs 
establish appropriate procedures for the collection of information 
supporting compliance with appropriate fitness standards, including the 
creation of written procedures that are preserved for Commission 
review. The new provisions would codify and enhance existing guidance 
covering DCMs (Core Principle 15 Guidance) and Commission regulation 
Sec.  1.63 covering SEFs and DCMs.
    The Commission estimates that each SEF and DCM will spend an 
additional 10 hours annually on recordkeeping for Sec. Sec.  37.207(d) 
and 38.801(d), plus a 40-hour one-time start-up cost for the initial 
written procedures. Accordingly, the aggregate annual estimate for the 
recordkeeping and reporting burden associated as with the proposal, is 
as follows:
DCMs--Recordkeeping Sec.  38.801(d)
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 10.
    Estimated gross annual recordkeeping burden (hours): 160.
    One-time start-up burden (hours): 40.
    Estimated gross one-time start-up burden (hours): 640.
SEFs--Recordkeeping Sec.  37.207(d)
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 10.
    Estimated gross annual recordkeeping burden (hours): 230.
    One-time start-up burden (hours): 40.
    Estimated gross one-time start-up burden (hours): 920.
3. Documentation of Conflict-of-Interest Provisions (Sec. Sec.  
37.1202(b) and 38.852(b))
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1202(b) and 38.852(b) require the board of 
directors, committee, or disciplinary panel to document its processes 
for complying with the requirements of the conflict-of-interest rules, 
and such documentation must include: (1) the names of all members and 
officers who attended the relevant meeting in person where a conflict 
of interest was raised; and (2) the names of any members and officers 
who voluntarily recused themselves or were required to abstain from 
deliberations or voting on a matter and the reason for the recusal or 
abstention. Although these provisions currently exist for SEFs in Sec.  
1.69, they are new for DCMs.
    The Commission estimates that each SEF and DCM will spend an 
additional one hour four times a year on recordkeeping associated with 
the proposal. Accordingly, the aggregate annual estimate for the 
reporting burden associated with proposed new Sec. Sec.  37.1202(b) and 
38.852(b) is as follows:
DCMs--Recordkeeping Sec.  38.852(b)
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 4.
    Average number of hours per report: 1.
    Estimated gross annual recordkeeping burden (hours): 64.
SEFs--Recordkeeping Sec.  37.1202(b)
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 4.

[[Page 19704]]

    Average number of hours per report: 1.
    Estimated gross annual recordkeeping burden (hours): 92.
4. Trading on Material Non-Public Information (Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 
38.853)
    The amendments include documentation and recordkeeping requirements 
connected to a new requirement that SEFs and DCMs take certain steps to 
prevent an employee, member of the board of directors, committee 
member, consultant, or owner with more than a 10 percent interest in 
the SEF or DCM, from trading commodity interests or related commodity 
interests based on, or disclosing, any non-public information obtained 
through the performance of their official duties. The proposal would 
replace an existing regulation applicable to SEFs and partially to DCMs 
(Sec.  1.59), and guidance applicable to DCMs (Core Principle 16 
Guidance). Under the proposed amendments, SEFs and DCMs must continue 
to document any exemptions from trading restrictions, in accordance 
with requirements in existing Commission regulations Sec. Sec.  37.1000 
and 37.1001 or 38.950 and 38.951, respectively.
    The Commission estimates that each SEF and DCM will spend an 
estimated additional 10 hours annually on recordkeeping associated with 
this proposal, with a one-time burden of 10 hours to review and update 
existing policies and procedures. Accordingly, the aggregate annual 
estimate for the reporting burden associated with proposed new 
Sec. Sec.  37.1203 and 38.853, is as follows:
DCMs--Recordkeeping Sec.  38.853
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 10.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 160.
    One-time start-up burden (hours): 10.
    Estimated gross one-time start-up burden (hours): 160.
SEFs--Recordkeeping Sec.  37.1203
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 10.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 230.
    One-time start-up burden (hours): 10.
    Estimated gross one-time start-up burden (hours): 230.
5. Annual Self-Assessment Sec. Sec.  37.1204(d) and 38.854(d)
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(d) and 38.854(d) are new requirements 
that SEF and DCM Boards perform an annual self-assessment and 
performance review, and document the results for possible Commission 
review.
    The Commission estimates that the documentation and recordkeeping 
for the annual review will take 25 hours. Accordingly, the aggregate 
annual estimate for the recordkeeping burden associated with Sec. Sec.  
37.1204(d) and 38.854(d) is as follows:
DCMs--Sec.  38.854(d)
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 25.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 400.
SEFs--Sec.  37.1204(d)
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 25.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 575.
6. Commission Notice of Membership Changes of the Board of Directors 
(Sec. Sec.  37.1204(f) and 38.854(f))
    This new proposed provision would require SEFs and DCMs to notify 
the Commission within five business days of any changes to the 
membership of the board of directors or its committees.
    The Commission believes that although the ongoing burden will be 
low, it constitutes a burden for PRA purposes. Each notification will 
take an estimated one hour, and each SEF and DCM will on average change 
two board or committee members a year (in total). Accordingly, the 
aggregate annual estimate for the reporting burden associated with 
proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1204(f) and 38.854(f) is as follows:
DCMs--Sec.  38.854(f) Reporting
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 2.
    Average number of hours per report: 1.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 32.
SEF--Sec.  37.1204(f) Reporting
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 2.
    Average number of hours per report: 1.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 46.
7. ROC Meeting Minutes and Documentation (Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f)(1)(iii) 
and 38.857(f)(1)(iii); Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f)(2) and 38.857(f)(2))
    The proposed provisions in Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f)(1)(iii) and 
38.857(f)(1)(iii) would require that SEF and DCM ROC meeting minutes 
include the following specific information: (a) list of the attendees; 
(b) their titles; and (c) whether they were present for the entirety of 
the meeting or a portion thereof (and if so, what portion); and (d) a 
summary of all meeting discussions. In addition, new Sec. Sec.  
37.1206(f)(2) and 38.857(f)(2) would require the ROCs to maintain 
documentation of the committee's findings, recommendations, and any 
other discussions or deliberations related to the performance of its 
duties.
    The Commission estimates that these new requirements will add an 
additional four hours of recordkeeping for an estimated four quarterly 
ROC meetings for each SEF and DCM. Accordingly, the aggregate annual 
estimate for the reporting burden associated with the proposal is as 
follows:
DCMs--Sec.  38.857(f)(1)(iii) and 38.857(f)(2) Recordkeeping
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 4.
    Average number of hours per report: 4.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 256.
SEFs--Sec. Sec.  37.1206(f)(1)(iii) and 37.1206(f)(2) Recordkeeping
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 4.
    Average number of hours per report: 4.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 368.
8. ROC Annual Report ((Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(1) and (g)(2) and 
38.857(g)(1) and (g)(2))
    Currently, DCMs prepare annual ROC reports pursuant to the 
Acceptable Practices for DCM Core Principle 16, but SEFs do not have a 
similar requirement. Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(1) and 38.857(g)(1) 
would codify annual report requirements for SEFs and DCMs. Proposed 
Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(2) and 38.857(g)(2) would set out the filing 
requirements for the reports.
    The current PRA estimated burden for the DCM ROC reports is 70 
hours for one annual report. The Commission has

[[Page 19705]]

reevaluated the ROC report burden and now revises its estimate down to 
40 hours, including the new requirements. In the Commission's recent 
experience, the ROC report is less extensive and burdensome to prepare 
than the SEF Annual Compliance Report, which has a burden of 52 hours. 
40 hours more accurately reflects the preparation required for the ROC 
report, including the new reporting requirements added by the proposal. 
The proposal would add a new burden of 40 hours for one annual SEF ROC 
report.
    Accordingly, the aggregate annual estimate for the reporting burden 
associated the proposal is as follows:
DCMs--Sec.  38.857(g)(1) and (g)(2) Reporting
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 40.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 640.
SEFs--Sec.  37.1206(g)(1) and (g)(2) Reporting
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 40.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 920.
9. ROC Recordkeeping (Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(3) and 38.857(g)(3))
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1206(g)(3) and 38.857(g)(3) establish a 
recordkeeping requirement to maintain all records demonstrating 
compliance with the duties of the ROC and the preparation and 
submission of the annual report.
    The Commission estimates that the proposal will add an additional 
two hours of burden per an estimated four quarterly ROC meetings. 
Accordingly, the aggregate annual estimate for the reporting burden 
associated with the proposal is as follows:
DCMs--Sec.  38.857(g)(3) Recordkeeping
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 4.
    Average number of hours per report: 2.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 128.
SEFs--Sec.  37.1206(g)(3) Recordkeeping
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 4.
    Average number of hours per report: 2.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 184.
10. DCM CRO Appointment and Removal Notification (Sec.  38.856(c))
    Under proposed new Sec.  38.856(c), DCMs must notify the Commission 
when a CRO is appointed or removed. A similar requirement for SEFs is 
proposed in Sec.  37.1501(a)(4)(ii), but does not add a reporting 
burden since the requirement already exists in Commission regulation 
Sec.  37.1501(b)(3)(ii) for SEF CCOs.
    The Commission estimates that a CRO would be replaced on average 
every two years at a maximum, and the required notice would require 0.5 
hours. Accordingly, the aggregate annual estimate for the reporting 
burden associated with the proposal is as follows:
DCMs--Sec.  38.856(c) Reporting
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 0.5.
    Average number of hours per report: 0.5.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 4.
11. Documentation of CCO/CRO Conflicts of Interest (Sec. Sec.  
37.1501(c) and 38.856(f))
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  37.1501(c) and 38.856(f) require SEFs and DCMs 
to maintain documentation when a CCO (SEF) or CRO (DCM) discloses a 
conflict of interest to the ROC.
    The Commission estimates that the proposal would require an 
additional four hours of recordkeeping for each SEF and DCM once per 
year. Accordingly, the aggregate annual estimate for the reporting 
burden associated with is as follows:
DCMs--Sec.  38.856(f) Recordkeeping
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 4.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 64.
SEFs--Sec.  37.1501(c) Recordkeeping
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 4.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 92.
12. Conflicts of Interests Reported in SEF Annual Compliance Report 
(Sec.  37.1501(d)(5))
    Proposed Sec.  37.1501(d)(5) requires any actual or potential 
conflicts reported to the CCO to be included in the SEF Annual 
Compliance Report (ACR) to the Commission. The Commission estimates 
that this new requirement would add one hour to the existing 52 hours 
burden associated with the SEF ACR, for a total of 53 hours. 
Accordingly, the aggregate annual estimate for the reporting burden 
associated with the proposal is as follows:
SEFs--Reporting
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 53.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 1,219.
13. Reports of Anticipated Changes in Ownership or Corporate Structure 
(Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) and 38.5(c)(1)); Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(2) and 
38.5(c)(2)
    The proposal would amend Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) and 38.5(c)(1) to 
require that SEFs and DCMs report anticipated changes of corporate 
structure or ownership that would result in certain significant changes 
to ownership, subsidiaries, or transfer of assets to another legal 
entity. The amendments to Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(1) and 38.5(c)(1) would 
require SEFs and DCMs to file with the Commission reports of 
anticipated changes in ownership or corporate structure that would (i) 
result in at least a 10 percent change of ownership of the SEF or DCM 
or a change to the entity or person holding a controlling interest in 
the SEF or DCM; (ii) create a new subsidiary or eliminate a current 
subsidiary of the SEF or DCM; or (iii) result in the transfer of all or 
substantially all of the assets of the SEF or DCM to another legal 
entity.
    The proposed amendments to Sec. Sec.  37.5(c)(2) and 38.5(c)(2) 
would set out the documents that must be submitted to the Commission in 
such reports, including a chart outlining the new ownership or 
corporate or organizational structure; a brief description of the 
purpose and impact of the change; and any relevant agreements effecting 
the change and corporate documents such as articles of incorporation 
and bylaws; and any additional supporting documents requested by the 
Commission.
    The Commission estimates that each SEF and DCM would file one 
report every four years, which would require

[[Page 19706]]

40 hours of burden. Accordingly, the aggregate annual estimate for the 
reporting burden associated with the proposal is as follows:
DCMs--Sec.  38.5(c)(1) and (c)(2) Reporting
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 0.25.
    Average number of hours per report: 40.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 160.
SEFs--Sec.  38.5(c)(1) and (c)(2)
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 0.25.
    Average number of hours per report: 40.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 230.
14. Change in Ownership/Structure Certification Requirement (Sec. Sec.  
37.4(c)(4) and 38.5(c)(5))
    The Commission is proposing to amend Sec.  38.5(c) by adding a 
certification requirement that will require a DCM, upon a change in 
ownership or corporate organizational structure, to certify that the 
DCM meets all of the requirements of section 5h of the Act and 
applicable Commission regulations. SEFs have an existing similar 
requirement in Sec.  37.4(c)(4) with no new increase in burden from the 
proposed rule. However, the SEF burden will be listed here for clarity, 
since it is not separately accounted for in the current PRA approval.
    The Commission estimates that each SEF and DCM would file one 
report under the proposed amendments every four years, and each report 
would require an additional two hours of burden. Accordingly, the 
aggregate annual estimate for the reporting burden associated with the 
proposed amendments is as follows:
DCMs--Sec.  38.5(c)(5) Reporting
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 0.25.
    Average number of hours per report: 2.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 8.
SEFs--Sec.  37.4(c)(4)--Reporting
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 0.25.
    Average number of hours per report: 2.
    Estimated gross annual reporting burden (hours): 11.5.
15. SEF and DCM Updates to Rulebooks and Internal Procedures 
(Sec. Sec.  40.5 and 40.6; Parts 37 and 38)
    The proposal would institute organizational changes that may 
require one-time updates to SEF and DCM rulebooks and internal 
procedures, such as compliance manuals, or require submissions to the 
Commission under part 40.
    Under Sec. Sec.  40.5 and 40.6, registered entities must submit a 
written certification to the Commission in connection with a new or 
amended rule. However, this burden is already covered in the existing 
part 40 PRA collection.\314\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \314\ The Commission accounts for the burden associated with the 
part 40 filings under Collection No. 3038-0093, ``Part 40, 
Provisions Common to Registered Entities,'' which includes updates 
to rulebooks in response to new Commission regulations and other 
actions. The CFTC bases its burden estimates under this clearance on 
the number of annual rule filings with the Commission. Based on 
those numbers, the Commission has estimated that these reporting 
requirements entail a burden of approximately 2,800 hours annually 
for covered entities (70 respondents x 20 reports per respondent x 2 
hours per report = 2,800 hours annually). The Commission is 
retaining its existing burden estimates under the existing 
clearance. The Commission believes that these estimates are adequate 
to account for any incremental burden associated with part 40 
filings that may result from the proposed organizational changes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To comply with parts 37 and 38, SEFs and DCMs must maintain 
policies and procedures for ensuring compliance with regulatory 
requirements, such as compliance manuals. The Commission estimates that 
the proposed rules would require one-time updates to SEF and DCM 
internal procedures, with an estimated burden of 20 hours. Accordingly, 
the aggregate annual estimate for the recordkeeping and reporting 
burden associated with the proposed amendments is as follows:
DCMs--Internal Procedures Recordkeeping and Reporting (Part 38)
    Estimated number of respondents: 16.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 20.
    Estimated gross one-time reporting and recordkeeping burden 
(hours): 320.
SEFs--Internal Procedures Manual Recordkeeping and Reporting (Part 37)
    Estimated number of respondents: 23.
    Estimated number of reports per respondent: 1.
    Average number of hours per report: 20.
    Estimated gross one-time reporting and recordkeeping burden 
(hours): 460.
16. Request for Comment
    The Commission invites the public and other Federal agencies to 
comment on any aspect of the proposed information collection 
requirements discussed above. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), the 
Commission will consider public comments on this proposed collection of 
information in:
    (1) Evaluating whether the proposed collection of information is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the 
Commission, including whether the information will have a practical 
use;
    (2) Evaluating the accuracy of the estimated burden of the proposed 
collection of information, including the degree to which the 
methodology and the assumptions that the Commission employed were 
valid;
    (3) Enhancing the quality, utility, and clarity of the information 
proposed to be collected; and
    (4) Minimizing the burden of the proposed information collection 
requirements on registered entities, including through the use of 
appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological 
information collection techniques, e.g., permitting electronic 
submission of responses.
    Copies of the submission from the Commission to OMB are available 
from the CFTC Clearance Officer, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 
20581, (202) 418-5160 or from https://RegInfo.gov. Organizations and 
individuals desiring to submit comments on the proposed information 
collection requirements should send those comments to:
     The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office 
of Management and Budget, Room 10235, New Executive Office Building, 
Washington, DC 20503, Attn: Desk Officer of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission;
     (202) 395-6566 (fax); or
     [email protected] (email).
    Please provide the Commission with a copy of submitted comments so 
that comments can be summarized and addressed in the final rulemaking, 
and please refer to the ADDRESSES section of this rulemaking for 
instructions on submitting comments to the Commission. OMB is required 
to make a decision concerning the proposed information collection 
requirements between 30 and 60 days after publication of this release 
in the Federal Register. Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of 
receiving full consideration if OMB receives it within 30 calendar days 
of publication of this release. Nothing in the foregoing affects

[[Page 19707]]

the deadline enumerated above for public comment to the Commission on 
the proposed rules.

d. Antitrust Considerations

    Section 15(b) of the CEA requires the Commission to take into 
consideration the public interest to be protected by the antitrust laws 
and endeavor to take the least anticompetitive means of achieving the 
purposes of the CEA, in issuing any order or adopting any Commission 
rule or regulation.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \315\ 7 U.S.C. 19(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the public interest to be protected by 
the antitrust laws is the promotion of competition. The Commission 
requests comment on whether the proposed amendments implicate any other 
specific public interest to be protected by the antitrust laws. The 
Commission has considered the proposed rulemaking to determine whether 
it is anticompetitive and has identified no anticompetitive effects. 
The Commission requests comment on whether the proposed rulemaking is 
anticompetitive and, if it is, what the anticompetitive effects are.
    Because the Commission has determined that the proposed rule 
amendments are not anticompetitive and have no anticompetitive effects, 
the Commission has not identified any less anticompetitive means of 
achieving the purposes of the CEA. The Commission requests comment on 
whether there are less anticompetitive means of achieving the relevant 
purposes of the CEA that would otherwise be served by adopting the 
proposed rule amendments.

List of Subjects

17 CFR Part 37

    Compliance with rules, Conflicts of interest, Designation of Chief 
Compliance Officer, General Provisions.

17 CFR Part 38

    Compliance with rules, Conflicts of Interest, Disciplinary 
procedures, General provisions.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission proposes to amend 17 CFR chapter I as follows:

PART 37--SWAP EXECUTION FACILITIES

0
1. The authority citation for part 37 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 5, 6, 6c, 7, 7a-2, 7b-3, and 12a, as 
amended by Titles VII and VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.

0
2. Revise Sec.  37.2 to read as follows:


Sec.  37.2  Exempt provisions.

    A swap execution facility, the swap execution facility's operator 
and transactions executed on or pursuant to the rules of a swap 
execution facility must comply with all applicable requirements under 
Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations, except for the 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  1.59(b) and (c), 1.63, 1.64, and 1.69.
0
3. In Sec.  37.5, revise paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  37.5  Information relating to swap execution facility compliance.

* * * * *
    (c) Change in ownership or corporate or organizational structure--
(1) Reporting requirement. A swap execution facility must report to the 
Commission any anticipated change in the ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure of the swap execution facility or its 
parent(s) that would:
    (i) Result in at least a ten percent change of ownership of the 
swap execution facility or a change to the entity or person holding a 
controlling interest in the swap execution facility, whether through an 
increase in direct ownership or voting interest in the swap execution 
facility or in a direct or indirect corporate parent entity of the swap 
execution facility;
    (ii) Create a new subsidiary or eliminate a current subsidiary of 
the swap execution facility; or
    (iii) Result in the transfer of all or substantially all of the 
assets of the swap execution facility to another legal entity.
    (2) Required information. The information reported under paragraph 
(c)(1) of this section must include: A chart outlining the new 
ownership or corporate or organizational structure; a brief description 
of the purpose and impact of the change; and any relevant agreements 
effecting the change and corporate documents such as articles of 
incorporation and bylaws.
    (i) The Commission may, after receiving such report, request 
additional supporting documentation relating to the anticipated change 
in the ownership or corporate or organizational structure of the swap 
execution facility, including amended Form SEF exhibits, to demonstrate 
that the swap execution facility will continue to meet all of the 
requirements of section 5h of the Act and applicable Commission 
regulations following such change.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (3) Time of report. The report under paragraph (c)(1) of this 
section must be submitted to the Commission no later than three months 
prior to the anticipated change, provided that the swap execution 
facility may report the anticipated change to the Commission later than 
three months prior to the anticipated change if the swap execution 
facility does not know and reasonably could not have known of the 
anticipated change three months prior to the anticipated change. In 
such event, the swap execution facility must immediately report such 
change to the Commission as soon as it knows of such change. The report 
must be filed electronically with the Secretary of the Commission at 
[email protected] and with the Division of Market Oversight at 
[email protected].
    (4) Rule filing. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 
(c)(1) through (3) of this section, if any aspect of a change in 
ownership or corporate or organizational structure described in 
paragraph (c)(1) of this section requires a swap execution facility to 
file a rule as defined in Sec.  40.1(i) of this chapter, then the swap 
execution facility must comply with the rule filing requirements of 
section 5c(c) of the Act and part 40 of this chapter, and all other 
applicable Commission regulations.
    (5) Certification. Upon a change in ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, 
a swap execution facility must file electronically with the Secretary 
of the Commission at [email protected] and with the Division of 
Market Oversight at [email protected], a certification that the 
swap execution facility meets all of the requirements of section 5h of 
the Act and applicable Commission regulations, no later than two 
business days following the date on which the change in ownership or 
corporate or organizational structure described in paragraph (c)(1) of 
this section takes effect.
    (6) Failure to comply. A change in the ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure of a swap execution facility that results in 
the failure of the swap execution facility to comply with any provision 
of the Act, or any regulation or order of the Commission thereunder--
    (i) Shall be cause for the suspension of the registration of the 
swap execution facility or the revocation of registration as a swap 
execution facility, in accordance with the procedures provided in 
sections 5e and 6(b) of the Act, including notice and a hearing on the 
record; or
    (ii) May be cause for the Commission to make and enter an order 
directing that the swap execution facility cease

[[Page 19708]]

and desist from such violation, in accordance with the procedures 
provided in sections 6b and 6(b) of the Act, including notice and a 
hearing on the record.
* * * * *
0
4. Amend Sec.  37.203 as follows:
0
a. Revise paragraph (c);
0
b. Redesignate paragraphs (d), (e), (f), and (g) as paragraphs (e), 
(f), (g), and (h);
0
c. Add a new paragraph (d); and
0
d. Revise newly redesignated paragraph (g).
    The revisions and addition read as follows:


Sec.  37.203  Rule enforcement program.

* * * * *
    (c) Sufficient staff and resources. A swap execution facility must 
establish and maintain sufficient staff and resources to effectively 
perform market regulation functions, as defined in Sec.  37.1201(b)(9). 
Such staff must be sufficient to address unusual market or trading 
events as they arise, and to conduct and complete investigations in a 
timely manner, as set forth in Sec.  37.203(g).
    (d) Ongoing monitoring of staff and resources. A swap execution 
facility must monitor the size and workload of its staff required under 
paragraph (c) of this section annually and ensure that its staff and 
resources are at appropriate levels. In determining the appropriate 
level of staff and resources, the swap execution facility should 
consider trading volume increases, the number of new products or 
contracts to be listed for trading, any new responsibilities to be 
assigned to staff, any responsibilities that staff have at affiliated 
entities, the results of any internal review demonstrating that work is 
not completed in an effective or timely manner, any conflicts of 
interest that prevent staff from working on certain matters, and any 
other factors suggesting the need for increased staff and resources.
* * * * *
    (g) Investigations and investigation reports--(1) Procedures. A 
swap execution facility shall establish and maintain procedures that 
require its staff responsible for market regulation functions to 
conduct investigations of possible rule violations. An investigation 
shall be commenced upon the receipt of a request from Commission staff 
or upon the discovery or receipt of information by the swap execution 
facility that indicates a reasonable basis for finding that a violation 
may have occurred or will occur.
    (2) Timeliness. Each investigation shall be completed in a timely 
manner. Absent mitigating factors, a timely manner is no later than 12 
months after the date that an investigation is opened. Mitigating 
factors that may reasonably justify an investigation taking longer than 
12 months to complete include the complexity of the investigation, the 
number of firms or individuals involved as potential wrongdoers, the 
number of potential violations to be investigated, and the volume of 
documents and data to be examined and analyzed by staff.
    (3) Investigation reports when a reasonable basis exists for 
finding a violation. Staff shall submit a written investigation report 
for disciplinary action in every instance in which staff determines 
from surveillance or from an investigation that a reasonable basis 
exists for finding a rule violation. The investigation report shall 
include the reason the investigation was initiated; a summary of the 
complaint, if any; the relevant facts; staff's analysis and 
conclusions; and a recommendation as to whether disciplinary action 
should be pursued.
    (4) Investigation reports when no reasonable basis exists for 
finding a violation. If after conducting an investigation, staff 
determines that no reasonable basis exists for finding a rule 
violation, it shall prepare a written report including the reason the 
investigation was initiated; a summary of the complaint, if any; the 
relevant facts; and staff's analysis and conclusions.
    (5) Warning letters. No more than one warning letter may be issued 
to the same person or entity found to have committed the same rule 
violation within a rolling twelve month period.
* * * * *
0
5. In Sec.  37.206, revise paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  37.206  Disciplinary procedures and sanctions.

* * * * *
    (b) Disciplinary panels. A swap execution facility must establish 
one or more disciplinary panels that are authorized to fulfill their 
obligations under the rules of this subpart. Disciplinary panels must 
meet the composition requirements of Sec.  37.1207, and must not 
include any members of the swap execution facility's market regulation 
staff or any person involved in adjudicating any other stage of the 
same proceeding.
* * * * *
0
6. Add Sec.  37.207 in subpart C to read as follows:


Sec.  37.207  Minimum fitness standards.

    (a) In general. A swap execution facility must establish and 
enforce appropriate fitness standards for its officers and for members 
of its board of directors, committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute 
resolution panels (or anyone performing functions similar to the 
foregoing), for members of the swap execution facility, for any other 
person with direct access to the swap execution facility, any person 
who owns 10 percent or more of the SEF and who, either directly or 
indirectly, through agreement or otherwise, in any other manner, may 
control or direct the management or policies of the SEF, and for any 
party affiliated with any person described in this paragraph.
    (b) Minimum standards for certain persons--bases for refusal to 
register. Minimum standards of fitness for the swap execution 
facility's officers and for members of its board of directors, 
committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution panels (or 
anyone performing functions similar to the foregoing), for members of 
the swap execution facility with voting privileges, and any person who 
owns 10 percent or more of the SEF and who, either directly or 
indirectly, through agreement or otherwise, in any other manner, may 
control or direct the management or policies of the SEF, must include 
the bases for refusal to register a person under sections 8a(2) and 
8a(3) of the Act.
    (c) Additional minimum fitness standards for certain persons--
history of disciplinary offenses. Minimum standards of fitness for the 
swap execution facility's officers and for members of its board of 
directors, committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution 
panels (or anyone performing functions similar to the foregoing), must 
include ineligibility based on the disciplinary offenses listed in the 
following paragraphs (c)(1) through (6):
    (1) Was found within the prior three years by a final, non-
appealable decision of a self-regulatory organization, an 
administrative law judge, a court of competent jurisdiction, the 
Securities Exchange Commission, or the Commission to have committed:
    (i) A violation of the rules of a self-regulatory organization, 
except rules related to decorum or attire, financial requirements, or 
reporting or recordkeeping resulting in fines aggregating $5,000 or 
less within a calendar year; or
    (ii) A violation of any rule of a self-regulatory organization if 
the violation involved fraud, deceit, or conversion, or resulted in 
suspension or expulsion; or
    (iii) Any violation of the Act or the regulations promulgated 
thereunder; or

[[Page 19709]]

    (iv) Any failure to exercise supervisory responsibility in 
violation of the rules of a self-regulatory organization, or the Act, 
or regulations promulgated thereunder.
    (2) Entered into a settlement agreement within the prior three 
years in which the acts charged, or findings included any of the 
violations described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section;
    (3) Currently is suspended from trading on any designated contract 
market or swap execution facility, is suspended or expelled from 
membership with any self-regulatory organization, is serving any 
sentence of probation, or owes any portion of a fine imposed due to a 
finding or settlement described in paragraphs (c)(1) or (2) of this 
section;
    (4) Currently is subject to an agreement with the Commission, the 
Securities Exchange Commission, or any self-regulatory organization, 
not to apply for registration with the Securities Exchange Commission, 
Commission or membership in any self-regulatory organization;
    (5) Currently is subject to or has had imposed on him or her within 
the prior three years a Commission registration revocation or 
suspension in any capacity for any reason, or has been convicted within 
the prior three years of any of the felonies listed in section 
8a(2)(D)(ii) through (iv) of the Act; or
    (6) Currently is subject to a denial, suspension or 
disqualification from serving on the disciplinary panel, arbitration 
panel or governing board of any self-regulatory organization as that 
term is defined in section 3(a)(26) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.
    (d) Collection and verification of fitness information. (1) A swap 
execution facility must have appropriate procedures for the collection 
and verification of information supporting compliance with appropriate 
fitness standards, including, at a minimum, the following:
    (i) A swap execution facility must, on at least an annual basis, 
collect and verify fitness information for each person acting in the 
capacity subject to the fitness standards;
    (ii) A swap execution facility must require each person acting in 
any capacity subject to the fitness standards to provide immediate 
notice if that person no longer meets the minimum fitness standards to 
act in that capacity;
    (iii) An initial verification of fitness information must be 
completed prior to the person commencing to act in the capacity for 
which the person is subject to fitness standards; and
    (iv) A swap execution facility must document its findings with 
respect to the verification of fitness information for each person 
acting in the capacity subject to the fitness standards.
    (2) [Reserved]
0
7. Add Sec.  37.1201 in subpart M to read as follows:


Sec.  37.1201  General requirements.

    (a) Establishment of process. A swap execution facility must 
establish a process for identifying, minimizing, and resolving actual 
or potential conflicts of interest that may arise, including, but not 
limited to, conflicts between and among any of the swap execution 
facility's market regulation functions; its commercial interests; and 
the several interests of its management, members, owners, customers and 
market participants, other industry participants, and other 
constituencies.
    (b) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
    (1) Affiliate means a person that directly or indirectly controls, 
is controlled by, or is under common control with, the swap execution 
facility.
    (2) Board of directors means a group of people serving as the 
governing body of a swap execution facility, or for a swap execution 
facility whose organizational structure does not include a board of 
directors, a body performing a function similar to a board of 
directors.
    (3) Commodity interest means any commodity futures, commodity 
option or swap contract traded on or subject to the rules of a 
designated contract market, a swap execution facility or linked 
exchange, or cleared by a derivatives clearing organization, or cash 
commodities traded on or subject to the rules of a designated contract 
market.
    (4) Disciplinary panel means a panel of two or more persons 
authorized to conduct hearings, render decisions, approve settlements, 
and impose sanctions with respect to disciplinary matters.
    (5) Dispute resolution panel means a panel of two or more persons 
authorized to resolve disputes involving a swap execution facility's 
members, market participants, and any intermediaries.
    (6) Executive committee means a committee of the board of directors 
that may exercise the authority delegated to it by the board of 
directors with respect to the decision-making of the company or 
organization.
    (7) Family relationship means a person's relationship with a 
spouse, parents, children, or siblings, in each case, whether by blood, 
marriage, or adoption, or the person's relationship with any person 
residing in the home of the person.
    (8) Linked exchange means:
    (i) Any board of trade, exchange or market outside the United 
States, its territories or possessions, which has an agreement with a 
designated contract market or swap execution facility in the United 
States that permits positions in a commodity interest which have been 
established on one of the two markets to be liquidated on the other 
market;
    (ii) Any board of trade, exchange or market outside the United 
States, its territories or possessions, the products of which are 
listed on a United States designated contract market, swap execution 
facility, or a trading facility thereof;
    (iii) Any securities exchange, the products of which are held as 
margin in a commodity account or cleared by a securities clearing 
organization pursuant to a cross-margining arrangement with a futures 
clearing organization; or
    (iv) Any clearing organization which clears the products of any of 
the foregoing markets.
    (9) Market regulation functions means SEF functions required by SEF 
Core Principle 2, SEF Core Principle 4, SEF Core Principle 6, SEF Core 
Principle 10 and the applicable Commission regulations thereunder.
    (10) Material information means information which, if such 
information were publicly known, would be considered important by a 
reasonable person in deciding whether to trade a particular commodity 
interest on a designated contract market or a swap execution facility, 
or to clear a swap contract through a derivatives clearing 
organization. As used in this section, ``material information'' 
includes, but is not limited to, information relating to present or 
anticipated cash positions, commodity interests, trading strategies, 
the financial condition of members of self-regulatory organizations or 
members of linked exchanges or their customers, or the regulatory 
actions or proposed regulatory actions of a swap execution facility or 
a linked exchange.
    (11) Non-public information means information which has not been 
disseminated in a manner which makes it generally available to the 
trading public.
    (12) Pooled investment vehicle means a trading vehicle organized 
and operated as a commodity pool within the meaning of Sec.  4.10(d) of 
this chapter, and whose units of participation have been registered 
under the Securities Act of 1933, or a trading vehicle for which Sec.  
4.5 of this chapter makes available relief from regulation as a 
commodity

[[Page 19710]]

pool operator, i.e., registered investment companies, insurance company 
separate accounts, bank trust funds, and certain pension plans.
    (13) Public director means a member of the board of directors who 
has been found, by the board of directors of the swap execution 
facility, on the record, to have no material relationship with the swap 
execution facility. The board of directors must make such finding upon 
the nomination of the director and at least on an annual basis 
thereafter.
    (i) For purposes of this definition, a ``material relationship'' is 
one that reasonably could affect the independent judgment or decision-
making of the member of the board of directors. Circumstances in which 
a member of the board of directors shall be considered to have a 
``material relationship'' with the swap execution facility include, but 
are not limited to, the following:
    (A) Such director is an officer or an employee of the swap 
execution facility or an officer or an employee of its affiliate;
    (B) Such director is a member of the swap execution facility, or a 
director, an officer, or an employee of either a member or an affiliate 
of a member. In this context, ``member'' shall have the meaning set 
forth in Sec.  1.3 of this chapter;
    (C) Such director directly or indirectly owns more than 10 percent 
of the swap execution facility or an affiliate of the swap execution 
facility, or is an officer or employee of an entity that directly or 
indirectly owns more than 10 percent of the swap execution facility;
    (D) Such director, or an entity in which the director is a partner, 
an officer, an employee, or a director, receives more than $100,000 in 
aggregate annual payments from the swap execution facility, or an 
affiliate of the swap execution facility. Compensation for services as 
a director of the swap execution facility or as a director of an 
affiliate of the swap execution facility does not count toward the 
$100,000 payment limit, nor does deferred compensation for services 
rendered prior to becoming a director of the swap execution facility, 
so long as such compensation is in no way contingent, conditioned, or 
revocable; or
    (E) The director shall be considered to have a ``material 
relationship'' with the swap execution facility when any of the 
circumstances described in paragraphs (b)(13)(i)(A) through (D) of this 
section apply to any person with whom the director has a family 
relationship.
    (ii) All of the circumstances described in paragraph (b)(13)(i) of 
this section shall be subject to a one-year look back.
    (iii) A public director of the swap execution facility may also 
serve as a public director of an affiliate of the swap execution 
facility if they otherwise meet the requirements of this section.
    (iv) A swap execution facility must disclose to the Commission 
which members of its board are public directors, and the basis for 
those determinations.
    (14) Related commodity interest means any commodity interest which 
is traded on or subject to the rules of a designated contract market, 
swap execution facility, linked exchange, or other board of trade, 
exchange, or market, or cleared by a derivatives clearing organization, 
other than the swap execution facility by which a person is employed, 
and with respect to which:
    (i) Such employing swap execution facility has recognized or 
established intermarket spread margins or other special margin 
treatment between that other commodity interest and a commodity 
interest which is traded on or subject to the rules of the employing 
swap execution facility; or
    (ii) Such other swap execution facility has recognized or 
established intermarket spread margins or other special margin 
treatment with another commodity interest as to which the person has 
access to material nonpublic information.
    (15) Self-regulatory organization shall have the meaning set forth 
in Sec.  1.3 of this chapter.
    (16) Senior officer means the chief executive officer or other 
equivalent officer of the swap execution facility.
0
8. Add Sec.  37.1202 in subpart M to read as follows:


Sec.  37.1202  Conflicts of interest.

    (a) Conflicts of interest in the decision-making of a swap 
execution facility. (1) A swap execution facility must establish 
policies and procedures that require any officer or member of its board 
of directors, committees, or disciplinary panels to disclose any actual 
or potential conflicts of interest that may be present prior to 
considering any matter. Such conflicts of interests include, but are 
not limited to, conflicts of interest that may arise when such member 
or officer:
    (i) Is the subject of any matter being considered;
    (ii) Is an employer, employee, or colleague of the subject of any 
matter being considered;
    (iii) Has a family relationship with the subject of any matter 
being considered; or
    (iv) Has any ongoing business relationship with or a financial 
interest in the subject of any matter being considered.
    (2) Any relationship of the type listed in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) 
through (iv) of this section that is with an affiliate of the subject 
of any matter being considered would be deemed an actual or potential 
conflict of interest for purposes of this section.
    (3) The swap execution facility must establish policies and 
procedures that require any officer or member of a board of directors, 
committee, or disciplinary panel of a swap execution facility that has 
an actual or potential conflict of interest, including any of the 
relationships listed in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section, to 
abstain from deliberating or voting on such matter.
    (b) Documentation of conflicts of interest determinations. The 
board of directors, committees, and disciplinary panels of a swap 
execution facility must document in meeting minutes, or otherwise 
document in a comparable manner, compliance with the applicable 
requirements of this section. Such documentation demonstrating 
compliance must also include:
    (1) The names of all members and officers who attended the relevant 
meeting in person or who otherwise were present by electronic means; 
and
    (2) The names of any members and officers who voluntarily recused 
themselves or were required to abstain from deliberations or voting on 
a matter and the reason for the recusal or abstention.
0
9. Add Sec.  37.1203 in subpart M to read as follows:


Sec.  37.1203  Limitations on the use and disclosure of material non-
public information.

    (a) In general. A swap execution facility must establish and 
enforce policies and procedures on safeguarding the use and disclosure 
of material non-public information. Such policies and procedures must 
provide for appropriate limitations on the use or disclosure of 
material non-public information gained through the performance of 
official duties by members of the board of directors, committee 
members, and employees, or through an ownership interest in the swap 
execution facility.
    (b) Prohibited conduct by employees. A swap execution facility must 
establish and enforce policies and procedures that, at a minimum, 
prohibit employees of the swap execution facility from the following:
    (1) Trading directly or indirectly, in the following:
    (i) Any commodity interest traded on the employing swap execution 
facility;
    (ii) Any related commodity interest;

[[Page 19711]]

    (iii) A commodity interest traded on designated contract markets or 
swap execution facilities or cleared by derivatives clearing 
organizations other than the employing swap execution facility if the 
employee has access to material non-public information concerning such 
commodity interest; or
    (iv) A commodity interest traded on or cleared by a linked exchange 
if the employee has access to material non-public information 
concerning such commodity interest.
    (2) Disclosing for any purpose inconsistent with the performance of 
the person's official duties as an employee any material non-public 
information obtained as a result of such person's employment at the 
swap execution facility; provided, however, that such policies and 
procedures shall not prohibit disclosures made in the performance by 
the employee, acting in the employee's official capacity or the 
employee's official duties, including to another self-regulatory 
organization, linked exchange, court of competent jurisdiction or 
representative of any agency or department of the federal or a state 
government.
    (c) Permitted exemptions. A swap execution facility may grant 
exemptions from the trading prohibitions contained in paragraph (b)(1) 
of this section. Such exemptions must be:
    (1) Consistent with policies and procedures established by the swap 
execution facility that set forth the circumstances under which such 
exemptions may be granted;
    (2) Administered by the swap execution facility on a case-by-case 
basis;
    (3) Approved by the swap execution facility's regulatory oversight 
committee;
    (4) Granted only in limited circumstances in which the employee 
requesting the exemption can demonstrate that the trading is not being 
conducted on the basis of material non-public information gained 
through the performance of official duties, which limited circumstances 
may include participation by an employee in pooled investment vehicles 
where the employee has no direct or indirect control with respect to 
transactions executed for or on behalf of such vehicles; and
    (5) Individually documented by the swap execution facility, with 
the documentation maintained by the swap execution facility in 
accordance with Sec. Sec.  37.1000 and 37.1001.
    (d) Monitoring for Permitted Exemptions. A swap execution facility 
must establish and enforce policies and procedures to diligently 
monitor the trading activity conducted under any exemptions granted 
under paragraph (c) of this section to ensure compliance with any 
applicable conditions of the exemptions and the swap execution 
facility's policies and procedures on the use and disclosure of 
material non-public information that are required pursuant to this 
section.
    (e) Prohibited conduct by members of the board of directors, 
committee members, employees, consultants, or owners. A swap execution 
facility must establish and enforce policies and procedures that, at a 
minimum, prohibit members of the board of directors, committee members, 
employees, consultants, and those with an ownership interest of 10 
percent or more in the swap execution facility, from the following:
    (1) Trading for such person's own account, or for or on behalf of 
any other account, in any commodity interest or related commodity 
interest, on the basis of any material non-public information obtained 
through the performance of such person's official duties as a member of 
the board of directors, committee member, employee, consultant, or 
those with an ownership interest of 10 percent or more in the swap 
execution facility;
    (2) Trading for such person's own account, or for or on behalf of 
any other account, in any commodity interest or related commodity 
interest, on the basis of any material non-public information that such 
person knows was obtained in violation of this section from a member of 
the board of directors, committee member, employee, consultant, or 
those with an ownership interest of 10 percent or more in the swap 
execution facility; or
    (3) Disclosing for any purpose inconsistent with the performance of 
the person's official duties any material non-public information 
obtained as a result of their official duties at the swap execution 
facility; provided, however, that such policies and procedures shall 
not prohibit disclosures made in the performance of such person's 
official duties, including to another self-regulatory organization, 
linked exchange, court of competent jurisdiction or representative of 
any agency or department of the federal or state government acting in 
their official capacity.
0
10. Add Sec.  37.1204 in subpart M to read as follows:


Sec.  37.1204  Board of directors.

    (a) In general. (1) The board of directors of a swap execution 
facility must be composed of at least thirty-five percent public 
directors.
    (2) A swap execution facility must establish and enforce policies 
and procedures outlining the roles and responsibilities of the board of 
directors, including the manner in which the board of directors 
oversees the swap execution facility's compliance with all statutory, 
regulatory, and self-regulatory responsibilities of the swap execution 
facility under the Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
    (3) Any executive committee (or any similarly empowered body) must 
be composed of at least thirty-five percent public directors.
    (b) Expertise. Each member of the board of directors, including 
public directors, of the swap execution facility, must have relevant 
expertise to fulfill the roles and responsibilities of such member.
    (c) Compensation. The compensation of public directors and other 
non-executive members of the board of directors of a swap execution 
facility must not be directly dependent on the business performance of 
such swap execution facility or any affiliate of the swap execution 
facility.
    (d) Annual self-assessment. The board of directors of a swap 
execution facility must annually conduct a self-assessment of its 
performance and that of its committees. Such self-assessments must be 
documented and made available to the Commission for inspection.
    (e) Removal of a member of the board of directors. A swap execution 
facility must have procedures to remove a member from the board of 
directors, where the conduct of such member is likely to be prejudicial 
to the sound and prudent management of the swap execution facility.
    (f) Reporting to the Commission. A swap execution facility must 
notify the Commission within five business days of any changes to the 
membership of the board of directors or any of its committees.
0
11. Add Sec.  37.1205 in subpart M to read as follows:


Sec.  37.1205  Nominating committee.

    (a) In general. A swap execution facility must have a board-level 
nominating committee, which must, at a minimum:
    (1) Identify a diverse panel of individuals qualified to serve on 
the board of directors, consistent with the fitness requirements set 
forth in Sec.  37.207, the composition requirements set forth in Sec.  
37.1204, and that reflect the views of market participants; and
    (2) Administer a process for the nomination of individuals to the 
board of directors.

[[Page 19712]]

    (b) Applicability. The requirements in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of 
this section apply to all nominations that occur after the initial 
establishment of the nominating committee and the appointment of 
members to the nominating committee.
    (c) Reporting. The nominating committee must report to the board of 
directors of the swap execution facility.
    (d) Composition. The nominating committee must be composed of at 
least fifty-one percent public directors. The chair of the nominating 
committee must be a public director.
0
12. Add Sec.  37.1206 in subpart M to read as follows:


Sec.  37.1206  Regulatory oversight committee.

    (a) In general. Each swap execution facility must establish a 
regulatory oversight committee, as a standing committee of the board of 
directors, to oversee the swap execution facility's market regulation 
functions on behalf of the board of directors.
    (b) Composition. The regulatory oversight committee must be 
composed entirely of public directors, and must include no less than 
two directors.
    (c) Delegation. The board of directors must delegate sufficient 
authority, dedicate sufficient resources, and allow sufficient time for 
the regulatory oversight committee to fulfill its mandate and duties.
    (d) Duties. The regulatory oversight committee must:
    (1) Monitor the sufficiency, effectiveness, and independence of the 
swap execution facility's market regulation functions;
    (2) Oversee all facets of the swap execution facility's market 
regulation functions;
    (3) Approve the size and allocation of the regulatory budget and 
resources, and the number, hiring, termination, and compensation of 
staff required pursuant to Sec.  37.203(c);
    (4) Consult with the chief compliance officer in managing and 
resolving any actual or potential conflicts of interest involving the 
swap execution facility's market regulation functions;
    (5) Recommend changes that would promote fair, vigorous, and 
effective self-regulation; and
    (6) Review all regulatory proposals prior to implementation and 
advising the board of directors as to whether and how such proposals 
may impact the swap execution facility's market regulation functions.
    (e) Reporting. The regulatory oversight committee must periodically 
report to the board of directors of the swap execution facility.
    (f) Meetings and documentation. (1) The regulatory oversight 
committee must have processes related to the conducting of meetings, 
including, but not limited to, the following:
    (i) The regulatory oversight committee must meet no less than on a 
quarterly basis;
    (ii) The regulatory oversight committee must not permit any 
individuals with actual or potential conflicts of interest to attend 
any discussions or deliberations in its meetings that relate to the 
swap execution facility's market regulation functions; and
    (iii) The regulatory oversight committee must maintain minutes of 
its meetings. Such minutes must include a list of the attendees; their 
titles; whether they were present for the entirety of the meeting or a 
portion thereof (and if so, what portion); and a summary of all meeting 
discussions.
    (2) The regulatory oversight committee must maintain documentation 
of the committee's findings, recommendations, deliberations, or other 
communications related to the performance of its duties.
    (g) Annual report--(1) Preparation. The regulatory oversight 
committee must prepare an annual report of the swap execution 
facility's market regulation functions for the board of directors and 
the Commission, which includes an assessment, at a minimum, of the 
following:
    (i) Details of all market regulation function expenses;
    (ii) A description of staffing, structure, and resources for the 
swap execution facility's market regulation functions;
    (iii) A description of disciplinary actions taken during the year;
    (iv) A review of the performance of the swap execution facility's 
disciplinary panels;
    (v) A list of any actual or potential conflicts of interests 
reported to the regulatory oversight committee, including a description 
of how such conflicts of interest were managed or resolved, and an 
assessment of the impact of any conflicts of interest on the swap 
execution facility's ability to perform its market regulation 
functions; and
    (vi) Details related to all actions taken by the board of directors 
of a swap execution facility pursuant to a recommendation of the 
regulatory oversight committee, which details must include the 
following:
    (A) The recommendation or action of the regulatory oversight 
committee;
    (B) The rationale for such recommendation or action of the 
regulatory oversight committee;
    (C) The rationale of the board of directors for rejecting such 
recommendation or superseding such action of the regulatory oversight 
committee, if applicable; and
    (D) The course of action that the board of directors decided to 
take that differs from such recommendation or action of the regulatory 
oversight committee, if applicable.
    (2) Submission of the annual report to the Commission--(i) Timing. 
The annual report must be submitted electronically to the Commission no 
later than 90 days after the end of the swap execution facility's 
fiscal year.
    (ii) Request for extension. A swap execution facility may request 
an extension of time to file its annual report from the Commission. 
Reasonable and valid requests for extensions of the filing deadline may 
be granted at the discretion of the Commission.
    (iii) Delegation of authority. The Commission hereby delegates, 
until it orders otherwise, to the Director of the Division of Market 
Oversight or such other employee or employees as the Director may 
designate from time to time, the authority to grant or deny a request 
for an extension of time for a swap execution facility to file its 
annual report under paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this section. The Director 
may submit to the Commission for its consideration any matter that has 
been delegated in this paragraph. Nothing in this paragraph prohibits 
the Commission, at its election, from exercising the authority 
delegated in this paragraph.
    (3) Records. The swap execution facility must maintain all records 
demonstrating compliance with the duties of the regulatory oversight 
committee and the preparation and submission of annual reports 
consistent with Sec. Sec.  37.1000 and 37.1001.
0
13. Add Sec.  37.1207 in subpart M to read as follows:


Sec.  37.1207  Disciplinary panel composition.

    (a) Composition. Each disciplinary panel must include at least two 
persons, including one public participant. A public participant is a 
person who would meet the eligibility requirements of a public director 
in Sec.  37.1201(b)(12), provided that such person need not be a member 
of the board of directors of the swap execution facility. A public 
participant must chair each disciplinary panel. In addition, a swap 
execution facility must adopt rules that would, at a minimum:
    (1) Preclude any group or class of participants from dominating or 
exercising disproportionate influence on a disciplinary panel; and
    (2) Prohibit any member of a disciplinary panel from participating 
in deliberations or voting on any matter in

[[Page 19713]]

which the member has an actual or potential conflict of interest as set 
forth in Sec.  37.1202(a).
    (b) Appeals. If the rules of the swap execution facility provide 
that the decision of a disciplinary panel may be appealed to another 
committee of the board of directors, then such committee must also 
include at least two persons, including one public participant, and 
such public participant must chair the committee.
    (c) Exception. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section do not apply 
to a disciplinary panel convened for cases solely involving decorum or 
attire.
* * * * *
0
14. In Sec.  37.1501, revise paragraphs (a) through (d) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  37.1501  Chief compliance officer.

    (a) Chief compliance officer--(1) Authority of chief compliance 
officer. (i) The position of chief compliance officer must carry with 
it the authority and resources to develop, in consultation with the 
board of directors or senior officer, the policies and procedures of 
the swap execution facility and enforce such policies and procedures to 
fulfill the duties set forth for chief compliance officers in the Act 
and Commission regulations.
    (ii) The chief compliance officer must have supervisory authority 
over all staff acting at the direction of the chief compliance officer.
    (2) Qualifications of chief compliance officer. (i) The individual 
designated to serve as chief compliance officer must have the 
background and skills appropriate for fulfilling the responsibilities 
of the position.
    (ii) No individual disqualified from registration pursuant to 
sections 8a(2) or 8a(3) of the Act may serve as a chief compliance 
officer.
    (3) Reporting line of the chief compliance officer. The chief 
compliance officer must report directly to the board of directors or to 
the senior officer of the swap execution facility.
    (4) Appointment and removal of chief compliance officer. (i) Only 
the board of directors or the senior officer, with the approval of the 
swap execution facility's regulatory oversight committee, may appoint 
or remove the chief compliance officer.
    (ii) The swap execution facility must notify the Commission within 
two business days of the appointment or removal, whether interim or 
permanent, of a chief compliance officer.
    (5) Compensation of the chief compliance officer. The board of 
directors or the senior officer, in consultation with the swap 
execution facility's regulatory oversight committee, must approve the 
compensation of the chief compliance officer.
    (6) Annual meeting with the chief compliance officer. The chief 
compliance officer must meet with the board of directors or senior 
officer of the swap execution facility at least annually.
    (7) Information requested of the chief compliance officer. The 
chief compliance officer must provide any information regarding the 
self-regulatory program of the swap execution facility as requested by 
the board of directors or the senior officer.
    (b) Duties of chief compliance officer. The duties of the chief 
compliance officer must include, but are not limited to, the following:
    (1) Overseeing and reviewing compliance of the swap execution 
facility with section 5h of the Act and any related rules adopted by 
the Commission;
    (2) Taking reasonable steps, in consultation with the swap 
execution facility's board of directors, or a committee thereof, or the 
senior officer of the swap execution facility, to manage and resolve 
any material conflicts of interest that may arise relating to:
    (i) Conflicts between business considerations and compliance 
requirements, including the swap execution facility's market regulation 
functions;
    (ii) Conflicts between business considerations and implementation 
of the requirement that the swap execution facility provide fair, open, 
and impartial access as set forth in Sec.  37.202; and
    (iii) Conflicts between a swap execution facility's management and 
members of the board of directors.
    (3) Establishing and administering written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Act and the rules of 
the Commission;
    (4) Taking reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the Act and 
the rules of the Commission;
    (5) Establishing procedures reasonably designed to handle, respond, 
remediate, retest, and resolve noncompliance issues identified by the 
chief compliance officer through any means, including any compliance 
office review, look-back, internal or external audit finding, self-
reported error, or validated complaint; and
    (6) Establishing and administering a compliance manual designed to 
promote compliance with the applicable laws, rules, and regulations and 
a written code of ethics for the swap execution facility designed to 
prevent ethical violations and to promote honesty and ethical conduct 
by personnel of the swap execution facility.
    (7) Supervising the swap execution facility's self-regulatory 
program, including the market regulation functions set forth in Sec.  
37.1201(b)(9); and
    (8) If applicable, supervising the effectiveness and sufficiency of 
any regulatory services provided to the swap execution facility by a 
regulatory service provider in accordance with Sec.  37.204.
    (c) Conflicts of interest involving the chief compliance officer. 
Each swap execution facility must establish procedures for the chief 
compliance officer's disclosure of actual or potential conflicts of 
interest involving the chief compliance officer to the regulatory 
oversight committee and designation of a qualified person to serve in 
the place of the chief compliance officer for any matter in which the 
chief compliance officer has such a conflict, and documentation of such 
disclosure and designation.
    (d) Preparation of annual compliance report. The chief compliance 
officer must, not less than annually, prepare and sign an annual 
compliance report that covers the prior fiscal year. The report must, 
at a minimum, contain:
    (1) A description and self-assessment of the effectiveness of the 
written policies and procedures of the swap execution facility, 
including the code of ethics and conflict of interest policies, to 
reasonably ensure compliance with the Act and applicable Commission 
regulations;
    (2) Any material changes made to policies and procedures related to 
the swap execution facility's self-regulatory functions during the 
coverage period for the report and any areas of improvement or 
recommended changes such policies and procedures;
    (3) A description of the financial, managerial, and operational 
resources set aside for compliance with the Act and applicable 
Commission regulations;
    (4) Any material non-compliance matters identified and an 
explanation of the corresponding action taken to resolve such non-
compliance matters;
    (5) Any actual or potential conflicts of interests that were 
identified to the chief compliance officer during the coverage period 
for the report, including a description of how such conflicts of 
interest were managed or resolved, and an assessment of the impact of 
any conflicts of interest on the swap execution facility's ability to 
perform its market regulation functions; and
    (6) A certification by the chief compliance officer that, to the 
best of his or her knowledge and reasonable

[[Page 19714]]

belief, and under penalty of law, the annual compliance report is 
accurate and complete in all material respects.
* * * * *

PART 38--DESIGNATED CONTRACT MARKETS

0
15. The authority citation for part 38 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 6, 6a, 6c, 6d, 6e, 6f, 6g, 6i, 6j, 
6k, 6l, 6m, 6n, 7, 7a-2, 7b, 7b-1, 7b-3, 8, 9, 15, and 21, as 
amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.

0
16. Revise Sec.  38.2 to read as follows:


Sec.  38.2  Exempt provisions.

    A designated contract market, the designated contract market's 
operator and transactions traded on or through a designated contract 
market under section 5 of the Act shall comply with all applicable 
regulations under Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations, except 
for the requirements of Sec. Sec.  1.39(b), 1.54, 1.59(b) and (c), 
1.63, 1.64, 1.69, 100.1, 155.2, and part 156 of this chapter.
0
17. In Sec.  38.5, revise paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  38.5  Information relating to contract market compliance.

* * * * *
    (c) Change in ownership or corporate or organizational structure--
(1) Reporting requirement. A designated contract market must report to 
the Commission any anticipated change in the ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure of the designated contract market or its 
parent(s) that would:
    (i) Result in at least a ten percent change of ownership of the 
designated contract market or a change to the entity or person holding 
a controlling interest in the designated contract market, whether 
through an increase in direct ownership or voting interest in the 
designated contract market or in a direct or indirect corporate parent 
entity of the designated contract market;
    (ii) Create a new subsidiary or eliminate a current subsidiary of 
the designated contract market; or
    (iii) Result in the transfer of all or substantially all of the 
assets of the designated contract market to another legal entity.
    (2) Required information. The information reported under paragraph 
(c)(1) of this section must include: A chart outlining the new 
ownership or corporate or organizational structure; a brief description 
of the purpose and impact of the change; and any relevant agreements 
effecting the change and corporate documents such as articles of 
incorporation and bylaws.
    (i) The Commission may, after receiving such report, request 
additional supporting documentation relating to the anticipated change 
in the ownership or corporate or organizational structure of the 
designated contract market, including amended Form DCM exhibits, to 
demonstrate that the designated contract market will continue to meet 
all of the requirements of section 5 of the Act and applicable 
Commission regulations following such change.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (3) Time of report. The report under paragraph (c)(1) of this 
section must be submitted to the Commission no later than three months 
prior to the anticipated change, provided that the designated contract 
market may report the anticipated change to the Commission later than 
three months prior to the anticipated change if the designated contract 
market does not know and reasonably could not have known of the 
anticipated change three months prior to the anticipated change. In 
such event, the designated contract market must immediately report such 
change to the Commission as soon as it knows of such change. The report 
must be filed electronically with the Secretary of the Commission at 
[email protected] and with the Division of Market Oversight at 
[email protected].
    (4) Rule filing. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 
(c)(1) through (3) of this section, if any aspect of a change in 
ownership or corporate or organizational structure described in 
paragraph (c)(1) of this section requires a designated contract market 
to file a rule as defined in Sec.  40.1(i) of this chapter, then the 
designated contract market must comply with the rule filing 
requirements of section 5c(c) of the Act and part 40 of this chapter, 
and all other applicable Commission regulations.
    (5) Certification. Upon a change in ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, 
a designated contract market must file electronically with the 
Secretary of the Commission at [email protected] and with the 
Division of Market Oversight at [email protected], a 
certification that the designated contract market meets all of the 
requirements of section 5 of the Act and applicable Commission 
regulations, no later than two business days following the date on 
which the change in ownership or corporate or organizational structure 
described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section takes effect.
    (6) Failure to comply. A change in the ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure of a designated contract market that results 
in the failure of the designated contract market to comply with any 
provision of the Act, or any regulation or order of the Commission 
thereunder--
    (i) Shall be cause for the suspension of the designation of the 
designated contract market or the revocation of designation as a 
designated contract market, in accordance with the procedures provided 
in sections 5e and 6(b) of the Act, including notice and a hearing on 
the record; or
    (ii) May be cause for the Commission to make and enter an order 
directing that the designated contract market cease and desist from 
such violation, in accordance with the procedures provided in sections 
6b and 6(b) of the Act, including notice and a hearing on the record.
    (d) Delegation of authority. The Commission hereby delegates, until 
it orders otherwise, the authority set forth in this section to the 
Director of the Division of Market Oversight or such other employee or 
employees as the Director may designate from time to time. The Director 
may submit to the Commission for its consideration any matter that has 
been delegated in this paragraph. Nothing in this paragraph prohibits 
the Commission, at its election, from exercising the authority 
delegated in this paragraph.
0
18. Revise Sec.  38.155 to read as follows:


Sec.  38.155  Sufficient staff and resources.

    (a) Sufficient staff and resources. A designated contract market 
must establish and maintain sufficient staff and resources to 
effectively perform market regulation functions, as defined in Sec.  
38.851(b)(9). Such staff must be sufficient to address unusual market 
or trading events as they arise, and to conduct and complete 
investigations in a timely manner, as set forth in Sec.  38.158(b).
    (b) Ongoing monitoring of staff and resources. A designated 
contract market must monitor the size and workload of its staff 
required under paragraph (a) of this section annually and ensure that 
its staff and resources are at appropriate levels. In determining the 
appropriate level of staff and resources, the designated contract 
market should consider trading volume increases, the number of new 
products or contracts to be listed for trading, any new 
responsibilities to be assigned to staff, any responsibilities that 
staff have at affiliated entities, the results of any internal review 
demonstrating that work is not completed in an effective or

[[Page 19715]]

timely manner, any conflicts of interest that prevent staff from 
working on certain matters, and any other factors suggesting the need 
for increased staff and resources.
0
19. In Sec.  38.158, revise paragraphs (a) through (d) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  38.158  Investigations and investigation reports.

    (a) Procedures. A designated contract market must establish and 
maintain procedures that require staff responsible for market 
regulation functions to conduct investigations of possible rule 
violations. An investigation must be commenced upon the receipt of a 
request from Commission staff or upon the discovery or receipt of 
information by the designated contract market that indicates a 
reasonable basis for finding that a violation may have occurred or will 
occur.
    (b) Timeliness. Each investigation must be completed in a timely 
manner. Absent mitigating factors, a timely manner is no later than 12 
months after the date that an investigation is opened. Mitigating 
factors that may reasonably justify an investigation taking longer than 
12 months to complete include the complexity of the investigation, the 
number of firms or individuals involved as potential wrongdoers, the 
number of potential violations to be investigated, and the volume of 
documents and data to be examined and analyzed by staff.
    (c) Investigation reports when a reasonable basis exists for 
finding a violation. Staff must submit a written investigation report 
for disciplinary action in every instance in which such staff 
determines from surveillance or from an investigation that a reasonable 
basis exists for finding a rule violation. The investigation report 
must include the reason the investigation was initiated; a summary of 
the complaint, if any; the relevant facts; staff's analysis and 
conclusions; and a recommendation as to whether disciplinary action 
should be pursued.
    (d) Investigation reports when no reasonable basis exists for 
finding a violation. If after conducting an investigation, staff 
determines that no reasonable basis exists for finding a violation, it 
must prepare a written report including the reason(s) the investigation 
was initiated; a summary of the complaint, if any; the relevant facts; 
and staff's analysis and conclusions.
* * * * *
0
20. Revise Sec.  38.702 to read as follows:


Sec.  38.702  Disciplinary panels.

    A designated contract market must establish one or more 
disciplinary panels that are authorized to fulfill their obligations 
under the rules of this subpart. Disciplinary panels must meet the 
composition requirements of Sec.  38.858, and must not include any 
members of the designated contract market's market regulation staff or 
any person involved in adjudicating any other stage of the same 
proceeding.
0
21. Revise Sec.  38.801 to read as follows:


Sec.  38.801  Minimum fitness standards.

    (a) In general. A designated contract market must establish and 
enforce appropriate fitness standards for its officers and for members 
of its board of directors, committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute 
resolution panels (or anyone performing functions similar to the 
foregoing), for members of the designated contract market, for any 
other person with direct access to the contract market, any person who 
owns 10 percent or more of the DCM and who, either directly or 
indirectly, through agreement or otherwise, in any other manner, may 
control or direct the management or policies of the DCM, and for any 
party affiliated with any person described in this paragraph.
    (b) Minimum standards for certain persons--bases for refusal to 
register. Minimum standards of fitness for the designated contract 
market's officers and for members of its board of directors, 
committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution panels (or 
anyone performing functions similar to the foregoing), for members of 
the designated contract market with voting privileges, and any person 
who owns 10 percent or more of the DCM and who, either directly or 
indirectly, through agreement or otherwise, in any other manner, may 
control or direct the management or policies of the DCM, must include 
the bases for refusal to register a person under sections 8a(2) and 
8a(3) of the Act.
    (c) Additional minimum fitness standards for certain persons--
history of disciplinary offenses. Minimum standards of fitness for the 
designated contract market's officers and for members of its board of 
directors, committees, disciplinary panels, and dispute resolution 
panels (or anyone performing functions similar to the foregoing), must 
include ineligibility based on the disciplinary offenses listed in the 
following paragraphs (c)(1) through (6):
    (1) Was found within the prior three years by a final, non-
appealable decision of a self-regulatory organization, an 
administrative law judge, a court of competent jurisdiction, the 
Securities Exchange Commission, or the Commission to have committed:
    (i) A violation of the rules of a self-regulatory organization, 
except rules related to decorum or attire, financial requirements, or 
reporting or recordkeeping resulting in fines aggregating $5,000 or 
less within a calendar year; or
    (ii) A violation of any rule of a self-regulatory organization if 
the violation involved fraud, deceit, or conversion, or resulted in 
suspension or expulsion; or
    (iii) Any violation of the Act or the regulations promulgated 
thereunder; or
    (iv) Any failure to exercise supervisory responsibility in 
violation of the rules of a self-regulatory organization, or the Act, 
or regulations promulgated thereunder.
    (2) Entered into a settlement agreement within the prior three 
years in which the acts charged, or findings included any of the 
violations described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section;
    (3) Currently is suspended from trading on any designated contract 
market or swap execution facility, is suspended or expelled from 
membership with any self-regulatory organization, is serving any 
sentence of probation, or owes any portion of a fine imposed due to a 
finding or settlement described in paragraphs (c)(1) or (2) of this 
section;
    (4) Currently is subject to an agreement with the Commission, the 
Securities Exchange Commission, or any self-regulatory organization, 
not to apply for registration with the Securities Exchange Commission, 
Commission or membership in any self-regulatory organization;
    (5) Currently is subject to or has had imposed on him or her within 
the prior three years a Commission registration revocation or 
suspension in any capacity for any reason, or has been convicted within 
the prior three years of any of the felonies listed in section 8a(2)(D) 
(ii) through (iv) of the Act; or
    (6) Currently is subject to a denial, suspension or 
disqualification from serving on the disciplinary panel, arbitration 
panel or governing board of any self-regulatory organization as that 
term is defined in section 3(a)(26) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.
    (d) Collection and verification of fitness information. (1) A 
designated contract market must have appropriate procedures for the 
collection and verification of information supporting compliance with 
appropriate fitness standards, including, at a minimum, the following:
    (i) A designated contract market must, on at least an annual basis, 
collect and verify fitness information for each person acting in the 
capacity subject to the fitness standards;

[[Page 19716]]

    (ii) A designated contract market must require each person acting 
in any capacity subject to the fitness standards to provide immediate 
notice if that person no longer meets the minimum fitness standards to 
act in that capacity;
    (iii) An initial verification of fitness information must be 
completed prior to the person commencing to act in the capacity for 
which the person is subject to fitness standards; and
    (iv) A designated contract market must document its findings with 
respect to the verification of fitness information for each person 
acting in the capacity subject to the fitness standards.
    (2) [Reserved]
0
22. Revise Sec.  38.851 to read as follows:


Sec.  38.851  General requirements.

    (a) Establishment of process. A designated contract market must 
establish a process for identifying, minimizing, and resolving actual 
or potential conflicts of interest that may arise, including, but not 
limited to, conflicts between and among any of the designated contract 
market's market regulation functions; its commercial interests; and the 
several interests of its management, members, owners, customers and 
market participants, other industry participants, and other 
constituencies.
    (b) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
    (1) Affiliate means a person that directly or indirectly controls, 
is controlled by, or is under common control with, the designated 
contract market.
    (2) Board of directors means a group of people serving as the 
governing body of a designated contract market, or for a designated 
contract market whose organizational structure does not include a board 
of directors, a body performing a function similar to a board of 
directors.
    (3) Commodity interest means any commodity futures, commodity 
option or swap contract traded on or subject to the rules of a 
designated contract market, a swap execution facility or linked 
exchange, or cleared by a derivatives clearing organization, or cash 
commodities traded on or subject to the rules of a designated contract 
market.
    (4) Disciplinary panel means a panel of two or more persons 
authorized to conduct hearings, render decisions, approve settlements, 
and impose sanctions with respect to disciplinary matters.
    (5) Dispute resolution panel means a panel of two or more persons 
authorized to resolve disputes involving a designated contract market's 
members, market participants, and any intermediaries.
    (6) Executive committee means a committee of the board of directors 
that may exercise the authority delegated to it by the board of 
directors with respect to the decision-making of the company or 
organization.
    (7) Family relationship means a person's relationship with a 
spouse, parents, children, or siblings, in each case, whether by blood, 
marriage, or adoption, or the person's relationship with any person 
residing in the home of the person.
    (8) Linked exchange means:
    (i) Any board of trade, exchange or market outside the United 
States, its territories or possessions, which has an agreement with a 
designated contract market or swap execution facility in the United 
States that permits positions in a commodity interest which have been 
established on one of the two markets to be liquidated on the other 
market;
    (ii) Any board of trade, exchange or market outside the United 
States, its territories or possessions, the products of which are 
listed on a United States designated contract market, swap execution 
facility, or a trading facility thereof;
    (iii) Any securities exchange, the products of which are held as 
margin in a commodity account or cleared by a securities clearing 
organization pursuant to a cross-margining arrangement with a futures 
clearing organization; or
    (iv) Any clearing organization which clears the products of any of 
the foregoing markets.
    (9) Market regulation functions means DCM functions required by DCM 
Core Principle 2, DCM Core Principle 4, DCM Core Principle 5, DCM Core 
Principle 10, DCM Core Principle 12, DCM Core Principle 13, DCM Core 
Principle 17 and the applicable Commission regulations thereunder.
    (10) Material information means information which, if such 
information were publicly known, would be considered important by a 
reasonable person in deciding whether to trade a particular commodity 
interest on a designated contract market or a swap execution facility, 
or to clear a swap contract through a derivatives clearing 
organization. As used in this section, ``material information'' 
includes, but is not limited to, information relating to present or 
anticipated cash positions, commodity interests, trading strategies, 
the financial condition of members of self-regulatory organizations or 
members of linked exchanges or their customers, or the regulatory 
actions or proposed regulatory actions of a designated contract market 
or a linked exchange.
    (11) Non-public information means information which has not been 
disseminated in a manner which makes it generally available to the 
trading public.
    (12) Pooled investment vehicle means a trading vehicle organized 
and operated as a commodity pool within the meaning of Sec.  4.10(d) of 
this chapter, and whose units of participation have been registered 
under the Securities Act of 1933, or a trading vehicle for which Sec.  
4.5 of this chapter makes available relief from regulation as a 
commodity pool operator, i.e., registered investment companies, 
insurance company separate accounts, bank trust funds, and certain 
pension plans.
    (13) Public director means a member of the board of directors who 
has been found, by the board of directors of the designated contract 
market, on the record, to have no material relationship with the 
designated contract market. The board of directors must make such 
finding upon the nomination of the director and at least on an annual 
basis thereafter.
    (i) For purposes of this definition, a ``material relationship'' is 
one that reasonably could affect the independent judgment or decision-
making of the member of the board of directors. Circumstances in which 
a member of the board of directors shall be considered to have a 
``material relationship'' with the designated contract market include, 
but are not limited to, the following:
    (A) Such director is an officer or an employee of the designated 
contract market or an officer or an employee of its affiliate;
    (B) Such director is a member of the designated contract market, or 
a director, an officer, or an employee of either a member or an 
affiliate of the member. In this context, ``member'' shall have the 
meaning set forth in Sec.  1.3 of this chapter;
    (C) Such director directly or indirectly owns more than 10 percent 
of the designated contract market or an affiliate of the designated 
contract market, or is an officer or employee of an entity that 
directly or indirectly owns more than 10 percent of the designated 
contract market;
    (D) Such director, or an entity in which the director is a partner, 
an officer, an employee, or a director, receives more than $100,000 in 
aggregate annual payments from the designated contract market, or an 
affiliate of the designated contract market. Compensation for services 
as a director of the designated contract

[[Page 19717]]

market or as a director of an affiliate of the designated contract 
market does not count toward the $100,000 payment limit, nor does 
deferred compensation for services rendered prior to becoming a 
director of the designated contract market, so long as such 
compensation is in no way contingent, conditioned, or revocable; or
    (E) The director shall be considered to have a ``material 
relationship'' with the designated contract market when any of the 
circumstances described in paragraphs (b)(13)(i)(A) through (D) of this 
section apply to any person with whom the director has a family 
relationship.
    (ii) All of the circumstances described in paragraph (b)(13)(i) of 
this section shall be subject to a one-year look back.
    (iii) A public director of the designated contract market may also 
serve as a public director of an affiliate of the designated contract 
market if they otherwise meet the requirements of this section.
    (iv) A designated contract market must disclose to the Commission 
which members of its board are public directors, and the basis for 
those determinations.
    (14) Related commodity interest means any commodity interest which 
is traded on or subject to the rules of a designated contract market, 
swap execution facility, linked exchange, or other board of trade, 
exchange, or market, or cleared by a derivatives clearing organization, 
other than the designated contract market by which a person is 
employed, and with respect to which:
    (i) Such employing designated contract market has recognized or 
established intermarket spread margins or other special margin 
treatment between that other commodity interest and a commodity 
interest which is traded on or subject to the rules of the employing 
designated contract market; or
    (ii) Such other designated contract market has recognized or 
established intermarket spread margins or other special margin 
treatment with another commodity interest as to which the person has 
access to material nonpublic information.
    (15) Self-regulatory organization shall have the meaning set forth 
in Sec.  1.3 of this chapter.
    (16) Senior officer means the chief executive officer or other 
equivalent officer of the designated contract market.
0
23. Add Sec.  38.852 in subpart Q to read as follows:


Sec.  38.852  Conflicts of interest.

    (a) Conflicts of interest in the decision-making of a designated 
contract market. (1) A designated contract market must establish 
policies and procedures that require any officer or member of its board 
of directors, committees, or disciplinary panels to disclose any actual 
or potential conflicts of interest that may be present prior to 
considering any matter. Such conflicts of interests include, but are 
not limited to, conflicts of interest that may arise when such member 
or officer:
    (i) Is the subject of any matter being considered;
    (ii) Is an employer, employee, or colleague of the subject of any 
matter being considered;
    (iii) Has a family relationship with the subject of any matter 
being considered; or
    (iv) Has any ongoing business relationship with or a financial 
interest in the subject of any matter being considered.
    (2) Any relationship of the type listed in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) 
through (iv) of this section that is with an affiliate of the subject 
of any matter being considered would be deemed an actual or potential 
conflict of interest for purposes of this section.
    (3) The designated contract market must establish policies and 
procedures that require any officer or member of a board of directors, 
committee, or disciplinary panel of a designated contract market that 
has an actual or potential conflict of interest, including any of the 
relationships listed in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section, to 
abstain from deliberating or voting on such matter.
    (b) Documentation of conflicts of interest determinations. The 
board of directors, committees, and disciplinary panels of a designated 
contract market must document in meeting minutes, or otherwise document 
in a comparable manner, compliance with the applicable requirements of 
this section. Such documentation demonstrating compliance must also 
include:
    (1) The names of all members and officers who attended the relevant 
meeting in person or who otherwise were present by electronic means; 
and
    (2) The names of any members and officers who voluntarily recused 
themselves or were required to abstain from deliberations or voting on 
a matter and the reason for the recusal or abstention.
0
24. Add Sec.  38.853 in subpart Q to read as follows:


Sec.  38.853  Limitations on the use and disclosure of material non-
public information.

    (a) In general. A designated contract market must establish and 
enforce policies and procedures on safeguarding the use and disclosure 
of material non-public information. Such policies and procedures must 
provide for appropriate limitations on the use or disclosure of 
material non-public information gained through the performance of 
official duties by members of the board of directors, committee 
members, and employees, or through an ownership interest in the 
designated contract market.
    (b) Prohibited conduct by employees. A designated contract market 
must establish and enforce policies and procedures that, at a minimum, 
prohibit employees of the designated contract market from the 
following:
    (1) Trading directly or indirectly, in the following:
    (i) Any commodity interest traded on the employing designated 
contract market;
    (ii) Any related commodity interest;
    (iii) A commodity interest traded on designated contract markets or 
swap execution facilities or cleared by derivatives clearing 
organizations other than the employing designated contract market if 
the employee has access to material non-public information concerning 
such commodity interest; or
    (iv) A commodity interest traded on or cleared by a linked exchange 
if the employee has access to material non-public information 
concerning such commodity interest.
    (2) Disclosing for any purpose inconsistent with the performance of 
the person's official duties as an employee any material non-public 
information obtained as a result of such person's employment at the 
designated contract market; provided, however, that such policies and 
procedures shall not prohibit disclosures made in the performance by 
the employee, acting in the employee's official capacity or the 
employee's official duties, including to another self-regulatory 
organization, linked exchange, court of competent jurisdiction or 
representative of any agency or department of the federal or a state 
government.
    (c) Permitted exemptions. A designated contract market may grant 
exemptions from the trading prohibitions contained in paragraph (b)(1) 
of this section. Such exemptions must be:
    (1) Consistent with policies and procedures established by the 
designated contract market that set forth

[[Page 19718]]

the circumstances under which such exemptions may be granted;
    (2) Administered by the designated contract market on a case-by-
case basis;
    (3) Approved by the designated contract market's regulatory 
oversight committee;
    (4) Granted only in limited circumstances in which the employee 
requesting the exemption can demonstrate that the trading is not being 
conducted on the basis of material non-public information gained 
through the performance of official duties, which limited circumstances 
may include participation by an employee in pooled investment vehicles 
where the employee has no direct or indirect control with respect to 
transactions executed for or on behalf of such vehicles; and
    (5) Individually documented by the designated contract market, with 
the documentation maintained by the designated contract market in 
accordance with Sec. Sec.  38.950 and 38.951.
    (d) Monitoring for Permitted Exemptions. A designated contract 
market must establish and enforce policies and procedures to diligently 
monitor the trading activity conducted under any exemptions granted 
under paragraph (c) of this section to ensure compliance with any 
applicable conditions of the exemptions and the designated contract 
market's policies and procedures on the use and disclosure of material 
non-public information that are required pursuant to this section.
    (e) Prohibited conduct by members of the board of directors, 
committee members, employees, consultants, or owners. A designated 
contract market must establish and enforce policies and procedures 
that, at a minimum, prohibit members of the board of directors, 
committee members, employees, consultants, and those with an ownership 
interest of 10 percent or more in the designated contract market, from 
the following:
    (1) Trading for such person's own account, or for or on behalf of 
any other account, in any commodity interest or related commodity 
interest, on the basis of any material non-public information obtained 
through the performance of such person's official duties as a member of 
the board of directors, committee member, employee, consultant, or 
those with an ownership interest of 10 percent or more in the 
designated contract market;
    (2) Trading for such person's own account, or for or on behalf of 
any other account, in any commodity interest or related commodity 
interest, on the basis of any material non-public information that such 
person knows was obtained in violation of this section from a member of 
the board of directors, committee member, employee, consultant, or 
those with an ownership interest of 10 percent or more in the 
designated contract market; or
    (3) Disclosing for any purpose inconsistent with the performance of 
the person's official duties any material non-public information 
obtained as a result of their official duties at the designated 
contract market; provided, however, that such policies and procedures 
shall not prohibit disclosures made in the performance of such person's 
official duties, including to another self-regulatory organization, 
linked exchange, court of competent jurisdiction or representative of 
any agency or department of the federal or state government acting in 
their official capacity.
0
25. Add Sec.  38.854 in subpart Q to read as follows:


Sec.  38.854  Board of directors.

    (a) In general. (1) The board of directors of a designated contract 
market must be composed of at least thirty-five percent public 
directors.
    (2) A designated contract market must establish and enforce 
policies and procedures outlining the roles and responsibilities of the 
board of directors, including the manner in which the board of 
directors oversees the designated contract market's compliance with all 
statutory, regulatory, and self-regulatory responsibilities of the 
designated contract market under the Act and the regulations 
promulgated thereunder.
    (3) Any executive committee (or any similarly empowered body) must 
be composed of at least thirty-five percent public directors.
    (b) Expertise. Each member of the board of directors, including 
public directors, of the designated contract market, must have relevant 
expertise to fulfill the roles and responsibilities of such member.
    (c) Compensation. The compensation of public directors and other 
non-executive members of the board of directors of a designated 
contract market must not be directly dependent on the business 
performance of such designated contract market or any affiliate of the 
designated contract market.
    (d) Annual self-assessment. The board of directors of a designated 
contract market must annually conduct a self-assessment of its 
performance and that of its committees. Such self-assessments must be 
documented and made available to the Commission for inspection.
    (e) Removal of a member of the board of directors. A designated 
contract market must have procedures to remove a member from the board 
of directors, where the conduct of such member is likely to be 
prejudicial to the sound and prudent management of the designated 
contract market.
    (f) Reporting to the Commission. A designated contract market must 
notify the Commission within five business days of any changes to the 
membership of the board of directors or any of its committees.
0
26. Add Sec.  38.855 in subpart Q to read as follows:


Sec.  38.855  Nominating committee.

    (a) In general. A designated contract market must have a board-
level nominating committee, which must, at a minimum:
    (1) Identify a diverse panel of individuals qualified to serve on 
the board of directors, consistent with the fitness requirements set 
forth in Sec.  38.801, the composition requirements set forth in Sec.  
38.853, and that reflect the views of market participants; and
    (2) Administer a process for the nomination of individuals to the 
board of directors.
    (b) Applicability. The requirements in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of 
this section apply to all nominations that occur after the initial 
establishment of the nominating committee and the appointment of 
members to the nominating committee.
    (c) Reporting. The nominating committee must report to the board of 
directors of the designated contract market.
    (d) Composition. The nominating committee must be composed of at 
least fifty-one percent public directors. The chair of the nominating 
committee must be a public director.
0
27. Add Sec.  38.856 in subpart Q to read as follows:


Sec.  38.856  Chief regulatory officer.

    (a) Designation and qualifications of chief regulatory officer. (1) 
Each designated contract market must establish the position of chief 
regulatory officer, and designate an individual to serve in that 
capacity, to administer the designated contract market's market 
regulation functions.
    (i) The position of chief regulatory officer must carry with it the 
authority and resources necessary to fulfill the duties set forth in 
this section for chief regulatory officers.
    (ii) The chief regulatory officer must have supervisory authority 
over all staff

[[Page 19719]]

performing the designated contract market's market regulation 
functions.
    (2) The individual designated to serve as chief regulatory officer 
must have the background and skills appropriate for fulfilling the 
duties of the position. No individual disqualified from registration 
pursuant to sections 8a(2) or 8a(3) of the Act may serve as a chief 
regulatory officer.
    (b) Reporting line of the chief regulatory officer. (1) The chief 
regulatory officer must report directly to the board of directors or to 
the senior officer of the designated contract market.
    (2) The designated contract market's regulatory oversight committee 
must oversee the chief regulatory officer to minimize any actual or 
potential conflicts of interest, including conflicts of interest 
between the duties of the chief regulatory officer and the designated 
contract market's commercial interests.
    (c) Appointment and removal of the chief regulatory officer. (1) 
The appointment or removal of a designated contract market's chief 
regulatory officer must occur only with the approval of the designated 
contract market's regulatory oversight committee.
    (2) The designated contract market must notify the Commission 
within two business days of the appointment of any new chief regulatory 
officer, whether interim or permanent.
    (3) The designated contract market must notify the Commission 
within two business days of removal of the chief regulatory officer.
    (d) Compensation of the chief regulatory officer. The board of 
directors or the senior officer of the designated contract market, in 
consultation with the designated contract market's regulatory oversight 
committee, must approve the compensation of the chief regulatory 
officer.
    (e) Duties of the chief regulatory officer. The chief regulatory 
officer's duties must include, but are not limited to, the following:
    (1) Supervising the designated contract market's market regulation 
functions;
    (2) Establishing and administering policies and procedures related 
to the designated contract market's market regulation functions.
    (3) Supervising the effectiveness and sufficiency of any regulatory 
services provided to the designated contract market by a regulatory 
service provider in accordance with Sec.  38.154;
    (4) Reviewing any proposed rule or programmatic changes that may 
have a significant regulatory impact on the designated contract 
market's market regulation functions and advising the regulatory 
oversight committee on such matters; and
    (5) In consultation with the designated contract market's 
regulatory oversight committee, identifying, minimizing, managing, and 
resolving conflicts of interest involving the designated contract 
market's market regulation functions.
    (f) Conflicts of interest involving the chief regulatory officer. 
Each designated contract market must establish procedures for the chief 
regulatory officer's disclosure of actual or potential conflicts of 
interest involving the chief regulatory officer to the regulatory 
oversight committee and designation of a qualified person to serve in 
the place of the chief regulatory officer for any matter in which the 
chief regulatory officer has such a conflict, and documentation of such 
disclosure and designation.
0
28. Add Sec.  38.857 in subpart Q to read as follows:


Sec.  38.857  Regulatory oversight committee.

    (a) In general. Each designated contract market must establish a 
regulatory oversight committee, as a standing committee of the board of 
directors, to oversee the designated contract market's market 
regulation functions on behalf of the board of directors.
    (b) Composition. The regulatory oversight committee must be 
composed entirely of public directors, and must include no less than 
two directors.
    (c) Delegation. The board of directors must delegate sufficient 
authority, dedicate sufficient resources, and allow sufficient time for 
the regulatory oversight committee to fulfill its mandate and duties.
    (d) Duties. The regulatory oversight committee must:
    (1) Monitor the sufficiency, effectiveness, and independence of the 
designated contract market's market regulation functions;
    (2) Oversee all facets of the designated contract market's market 
regulation functions;
    (3) Approve the size and allocation of the regulatory budget and 
resources, and the number, hiring, termination, and compensation of 
staff required pursuant to Sec.  38.155(a);
    (4) Consult with the chief regulatory officer in managing and 
resolving any actual or potential conflicts of interest involving the 
designated contract market's market regulation functions;
    (5) Recommend changes that would promote fair, vigorous, and 
effective self-regulation; and
    (6) Review all regulatory proposals prior to implementation and 
advising the board of directors as to whether and how such proposals 
may impact the designated contract market's market regulation 
functions.
    (e) Reporting. The regulatory oversight committee must periodically 
report to the board of directors of the designated contract market.
    (f) Meetings and documentation. (1) The regulatory oversight 
committee must have processes related to the conducting of meetings, 
including, but not limited to, the following:
    (i) The regulatory oversight committee must meet no less than on a 
quarterly basis;
    (ii) The regulatory oversight committee must not permit any 
individuals with actual or potential conflicts of interest to attend 
any discussions or deliberations in its meetings that relate to the 
designated contract market's market regulation functions; and
    (iii) The regulatory oversight committee must maintain minutes of 
its meetings. Such minutes must include a list of the attendees; their 
titles; whether they were present for the entirety of the meeting or a 
portion thereof (and if so, what portion); and a summary of all meeting 
discussions.
    (2) The regulatory oversight committee must maintain documentation 
of the committee's findings, recommendations, deliberations, or other 
communications related to the performance of its duties.
    (g) Annual report--(1) Preparation. The regulatory oversight 
committee must prepare an annual report of the designated contract 
market's market regulation functions for the board of directors and the 
Commission, which includes an assessment, at a minimum, of the 
following:
    (i) Details of all market regulation function expenses;
    (ii) A description of staffing, structure, and resources for the 
designated contract market's market regulation functions;
    (iii) A description of disciplinary actions taken during the year;
    (iv) A review of the performance of the designated contract 
market's disciplinary panels; and
    (v) A list of any actual or potential conflicts of interests 
reported to the regulatory oversight committee, including a description 
of how such conflicts of interest were managed or resolved, and an 
assessment of the impact of any conflicts of interest on the swap 
execution facility's ability to perform its market regulation 
functions; and
    (vi) Details related to all actions taken by the board of directors 
of a designated

[[Page 19720]]

contract market pursuant to a recommendation of the regulatory 
oversight committee, which details must include the following:
    (A) The recommendation or action of the regulatory oversight 
committee;
    (B) The rationale for such recommendation or action of the 
regulatory oversight committee;
    (C) The rationale of the board of directors for rejecting such 
recommendation or superseding such action of the regulatory oversight 
committee, if applicable; and
    (D) The course of action that the board of directors decided to 
take that differs from such recommendation or action of the regulatory 
oversight committee, if applicable.
    (2) Submission of the annual report to the Commission--(i) Timing. 
The annual report must be submitted electronically to the Commission no 
later than 90 days after the end of the designated contract market's 
fiscal year.
    (ii) Request for extension. A designated contract market may 
request an extension of time to file its annual report from the 
Commission. Reasonable and valid requests for extensions of the filing 
deadline may be granted at the discretion of the Commission.
    (iii) Delegation of authority. The Commission hereby delegates, 
until it orders otherwise, to the Director of the Division of Market 
Oversight or such other employee or employees as the Director may 
designate from time to time, the authority to grant or deny a request 
for an extension of time for a designated contract market to file its 
annual report under paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this section. The Director 
may submit to the Commission for its consideration any matter that has 
been delegated in this paragraph. Nothing in this paragraph prohibits 
the Commission, at its election, from exercising the authority 
delegated in this paragraph.
    (3) Records. The designated contract market must maintain all 
records demonstrating compliance with the duties of the regulatory 
oversight committee and the preparation and submission of annual 
reports consistent with Sec. Sec.  38.950 and 38.951.
0
29. Add Sec.  38.858 in subpart Q to read as follows:


Sec.  38.858  Disciplinary panel composition.

    (a) Composition. Each disciplinary panel must include at least two 
persons, including one public participant. A public participant is a 
person who would meet the eligibility requirements of a public director 
in Sec.  38.851(b)(13), provided that such person need not be a member 
of the board of directors of the designated contract market. A public 
participant must chair each disciplinary panel. In addition, a 
designated contract market must adopt rules that would, at a minimum:
    (1) Preclude any group or class of participants from dominating or 
exercising disproportionate influence on a disciplinary panel; and
    (2) Prohibit any member of a disciplinary panel from participating 
in deliberations or voting on any matter in which the member has an 
actual or potential conflict of interest as set forth in Sec.  
38.852(a).
    (b) Appeals. If the rules of the designated contract market provide 
that the decision of a disciplinary panel may be appealed to another 
committee of the board of directors, then such committee must also 
include at least two persons, including one public participant, and 
such public participant must chair the committee.
    (c) Exception. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section do not apply 
to a disciplinary panel convened for cases solely involving decorum or 
attire.
0
30. Amend Appendix B to part 38 by revising ``Core Principle 15 of 
section 5(d) of the Act'' and ``Core Principle 16 of section 5(d) of 
the Act'' to read as follows:

Appendix B to Part 38--Guidance on, and Acceptable Practices in, 
Compliance With Core Principles

* * * * *
    Core Principle 15 of section 5(d) of the Act [Reserved]
    Core Principle 16 of section 5(d) of the Act [Reserved]
* * * * *

    Issued in Washington, DC, on March 4, 2024, by the Commission.
Christopher Kirkpatrick,
Secretary of the Commission.


    NOTE: The following appendices will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

Appendices to Requirements for Designated Contract Markets and Swap 
Execution Facilities Regarding Governance and the Mitigation of 
Conflicts of Interest Impacting Market Regulation Functions--Commission 
Voting Summary, Chairman's Statement, and Commissioners' Statements

Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary

    On this matter, Chairman Behnam and Commissioners Goldsmith 
Romero and Pham voted in the affirmative. Commissioners Johnson and 
Mersinger voted in the negative.

Appendix 2--Statement of Support of Chairman Rostin Behnam

    I support the proposed rules for designated contract markets 
(DCMs) and swap execution facilities (SEFs) that would establish 
governance and fitness requirements with respect to market 
regulation functions and related conflict of interest standards. 
This action continues my commitment to ensure that conflicts of 
interest are appropriately mitigated, and that SEF and DCM governing 
bodies adequately incorporate an independent perspective. 
Advancements in technology, coupled with demand for ever greater 
efficiency and speed, are pushing markets and market structure in 
new directions. This new disruption raises new and novel policy 
issues in all aspects of markets, including conflicts of interest. 
This proposal is just one step towards addressing potential and 
existing conflicts of interest in CFTC markets, to ensure markets 
remain strong, resilient, and transparent.
    The proposed rules would enhance substantive requirements for 
identifying, managing, and resolving conflicts of interest related 
to market regulation functions. The rules also establish structural 
governance requirements regarding the makeup of SEF and DCM 
governing bodies. Importantly, these proposed rules would simplify 
the CFTC's rules for conflicts and governance fitness standards by 
harmonizing the regulatory regimes for SEFs and DCMs. In addition, 
these proposed rules would harmonize and enhance rules for SEFs and 
DCMs regarding the notification of a transfer of equity interest in 
a SEF or DCM, and would confirm the CFTC's authority to obtain 
information concerning continued regulatory compliance in the event 
of a change in ownership of a SEF or DCM.
    I look forward to hearing the public's comments on the proposed 
amendments to the regulations for SEFs and DCMs. I thank staff in 
the Division of Market Oversight, Office of the General Counsel, and 
the Office of the Chief Economist for all of their work on the 
proposal.

Appendix 3--Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson

I. Introduction

    I dissent from this conflicts of interest and equity ownership 
transfer proposal (Proposed Rule). For nearly two years, in 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission or CFTC) public 
meetings, speeches, and engaged conversations with my fellow 
Commissioners, staff, and diverse market participants, I have 
advocated for the Commission to address two critical gaps in our 
regulations: incomplete and disparate conflicts of interest rules as 
well as Commission rules governing the transfer of ownership 
interests in a registered entity.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson, Keynote Address at Digital 
Assets @Duke Conference (Jan. 26, 2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opajohnson2; Commissioner Kristin N. 
Johnson, Statement Calling for the CFTC to Initiate a Rulemaking 
Process for CFTC Registered DCOs Engaged in Crypto or Digital Asset 
Clearing Activities (May 30, 2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/johnsonstatement053023; Commissioner Kristin N. 
Johnson, Keynote Speech at the Salzburg Global Finance Forum (June 
29, 2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opajohnson4; Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson, Opening Statement 
Before the Market Risk Advisory Committee (July 10, 2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/johnsonstatement071023; 
Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson, Opening Statement Before the Market 
Risk Advisory Committee Meeting (Dec. 11, 2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/johnsonstatement121123; 
Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson, Opening Statement Regarding the 
Open Commission Meeting on December 13, 2023 (Dec. 13, 2023), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/johnsonstatement121323; Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson, A Call for 
the CFTC to Begin a Formal Rulemaking to Address Vertical 
Integration (Dec. 18, 2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/
johnsonstatement121823c#:~:text=I%20strongly%20advocate%20for%20the,r
isk%20or%20financial%20stability%20concerns.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 19721]]

    In the Commission's December 2023 open meeting, I expressly 
stated that I cannot support the Commission in permitting conflicts-
laden market structures without effective regulation.\2\ It is 
imperative to note that this Proposed Rule will not address the 
conflicts of interest that I and many others have advocated for the 
Commission to address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Opening Statement Regarding the Open Commission Meeting on 
December 13, 2023, supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Proposed Rule is materially incomplete. The Proposed Rule 
ignores conflicts of interest in novel segments of our markets where 
the Commission lacks visibility and the market lacks the benefit of 
robust regulatory oversight. While the Commission could have used 
this rulemaking to address endemic conflicts of interest in emerging 
markets such as cryptocurrency or digital asset markets, this 
Proposed Rule does not address these deeply concerning, pernicious 
conflicts of interest.
    The Proposed Rule undermines harmonization of conflicts 
regulations across our markets. Over a century ago, in passing the 
Grain Futures Act and, later, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 
Congress expressly emphasized the necessity of governing conflicts 
of interest and registration standards in the oversight of the 
derivatives markets.
    In 2010, in the wake of the financial crisis, Congress passed 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act) and expressly tasked the Commission with introducing 
clearing infrastructure regulation in the bespoke, bilateral over-
the-counter (OTC) swaps market. In 2011, the Commission adopted a 
rule proposal to establish conflicts of interest regulations for 
derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs), derivatives contract 
markets (DCMs) and swap execution facilities (SEFs).\3\ This 
proposal was withdrawn. In an approach that splintered the proposed 
rule and may have stymied harmonization, the Commission proceeded 
with separate, disparate conflicts of interest final rulemakings. It 
adopted conflicts requirements in 2012 for DCMs, in 2013 for SEFs, 
and in 2020 for all DCOs.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing 
Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution 
Facilities; Additional Requirements Regarding the Mitigation of 
Conflicts of Interest, 76 FR 722 (Jan. 6, 2011).
    \4\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated 
Contract Markets, 77 FR 36612 (June 19, 2012); Core Principles and 
Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 78 FR 33476 (June 
4, 2013); Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and 
Core Principles, 85 FR 4800 (Jan. 27, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This fractured approach has led to entrenched challenges and 
resulted in different rules for different registered entities.
    While some tailoring may be appropriate to acknowledge 
differences in market design and the role and obligation of 
registered entities, the Commission should not permit weaker 
conflicts rules in certain segments of our markets. It is imperative 
that any final rule governing conflicts address conflicts of 
interest comprehensively across our existing regulatory landscape.
    Conflicts of interest have the potential to create governance 
risks. Governance plays a critical role in operational, market, 
credit and general risk management decision-making. Any post-mortem 
of the financial crisis offers dozens of illustrations regarding the 
potential for conflicts of interest to trigger the very types of 
disruption that may undermine enterprise risk management, market 
stability and integrity, and potentially generate risks that may be 
antecedents to systemic crises. Because we know well the 
consequences of failing to introduce effective risk management and 
governance regulation, the Commission must act now.
    I have repeatedly called on the Commission to initiate a 
rulemaking that addresses the conflicts of interest that may arise 
from adopting vertically integrated market structures. This concern 
is intimately connected with the previously articulated concern. The 
CFTC's enforcement actions filed in the wake of FTX's bankruptcy 
detail the potential for a market participant to interface with 
retail market participants through a series of affiliated entities 
that share a common ownership structure among the exchange, market 
maker, broker dealer, and custodian. These concerns should prompt 
the Commission to act within our existing authority and as part of 
this conflicts rulemaking.
    In an increasing number of instances, businesses with no history 
of operating in derivatives markets, no track record of compliance 
with federal financial market regulations, and limited evidence of 
corporate governance and risk management infrastructure have 
expressed interest in acquiring or have acquired CFTC-registered 
entities. Some may conclude that it is cheaper to purchase a 
business licensed to operate in our markets than to engage with the 
Commission in the rigorous and extensive licensing application 
process.
    It is important for the Commission to carefully consider 
regulations governing equity interest transfers and ensure that 
anyone acquiring a registered entity is prepared to comply with the 
entire regulatory regime applicable to CFTC-registered firms. 
Similar to the proposed conflicts of interest rules, I am concerned 
that the Commission's actions are not commensurate with the risks 
presented by emerging market conditions.
    For these reasons and as explained below, I dissent from the 
Commission's decision to adopt the Proposed Rule.

II. Background of the Proposed Rule

    I support the Commission's efforts to enhance the integrity of 
the decision-making process of SEFs and DCMs and reduce conflicts of 
interest. The Proposed Rule seeks to ensure that conflicts of 
interest are mitigated for SEFs and DCMs. The Commission proposes 
enhancing conflicts of interest requirements to ensure that SEFs and 
DCMs identify, manage, and resolve conflicts related to ``market 
regulation functions.'' In the Proposed Rule, the Division of Market 
Oversight (DMO) identifies a set of issues that the Commission has 
carefully considered addressing for over a decade. I deeply respect 
and appreciate the tireless efforts and expertise of the Commission 
staff.
    I applaud the staff's identification of and focus on addressing 
conflicts of interest in certain self-regulatory functions of SEFs 
and DCMs. The carefully developed rule text seeks to impose 
heightened governance fitness and structural standards to ensure 
that a SEF and DCM board of directors and disciplinary panels 
incorporate independent and expert perspectives.
    For almost two decades, I have advocated for the Commission to 
enhance conflicts regulations. The Proposed Rule reflects a 
thoughtful commitment to addressing an area of conflicts that has 
not received sufficient attention. The Commission is also proposing 
to strengthen the notification requirements with respect to changes 
in the ownership or corporate or organizational structure of a SEF 
or DCM.
    The Commission is proposing:
     new rules to implement DCM Core Principle 15 
(Governance Fitness Standards) that are consistent with the existing 
Guidance on compliance with DCM Core Principle 15;
     new rules to implement DCM Core Principle 16 (Conflicts 
of Interest) that are consistent with the existing Guidance on, and 
Acceptable Practices in, compliance with DCM Core Principle 16;
     new rules to implement SEF Core Principle 2 (Compliance 
with Rules) that are consistent with the existing DCM Core Principle 
15 Guidance;
     new rules to implement SEF Core Principle 12 (Conflicts 
of Interest) that are consistent with the existing DCM Core 
Principle 16 Guidance and Acceptable Practices;
     new rules under Part 37 of the Commission's regulations 
for SEFs and Part 38 of the Commission's regulations for DCMs that 
are consistent with existing conflicts of interest and governance 
requirements under Commission Regulations 1.59 and 1.63;
     new rules for DCM chief regulatory officers (CROs);
     amendments to certain requirements relating to SEF 
chief compliance officers (CCOs); and
     new rules for SEFs and DCMs relating to the 
establishment and operation of a Regulatory Oversight Committee 
(ROC).

[[Page 19722]]

    I thank the staff for their constructive engagement and 
cooperation with my office. DMO staff addressed and incorporated my 
comments into the Proposed Rule, which materially improve and 
strengthen both the conflicts of interest and governance 
requirements. Through coordinated efforts with my office, we have 
made our markets stronger and safer.
    Section 5h of the CEA sets forth requirements for SEFs.\5\ To be 
registered and maintain registration with the Commission, a SEF must 
comply with 15 core principles and any requirement that the 
Commission may impose by rule or regulation pursuant to Section 
8a(5) of the CEA.\6\ Similarly, Section 5 of the CEA sets forth 
requirements for DCMs.\7\ The CEA requires that to be designated and 
maintain designation by the Commission, a DCM must comply with 23 
core principles, and any requirement that the Commission may impose 
by rule or regulation pursuant to Section 8a(5) of the CEA.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ 7 U.S.C. 7b-3.
    \6\ 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f).
    \7\ 7 U.S.C. 7.
    \8\ 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(1)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 8a(5) authorizes the Commission to make and promulgate 
rules and regulations that, in the judgment of the Commission, are 
reasonably necessary to effectuate any of the provisions or to 
accomplish any of the purposes of the CEA.\9\ As noted in the 
Preamble to the Proposed Rule, the CEA contains a finding that the 
transactions subject to the CEA are affected with a ``national 
public interest by providing a means for managing and assuming price 
risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information 
through trading in liquid, fair and financially secure trading 
facilities,'' and among the CEA's purposes are to serve the 
aforementioned public interests through a system of ``effective 
self-regulation of trading facilities.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ 7 U.S.C. 12a(5).
    \10\ 7 U.S.C. 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A SEF or DCM has reasonable discretion to establish the manner 
in which it complies with a particular core principle unless the 
Commission adopts more prescriptive requirements by rule or 
regulation. In the Proposed Rule, the Commission is prescribing 
heightened requirements for SEFs and DCMs.

III. Limitations of the Conflicts Rules

    SEFs, DCMs, and DCOs, as self-regulatory organizations, are 
tasked with the important responsibility of regulating the 
derivatives market and fostering market integrity. The CEA requires 
effective self-regulation of trading facilities, clearing systems 
(clearinghouses), market participants and market professionals under 
the oversight of the Commission.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A SEF's or DCM's decision-making process encompasses a broad 
range of regulatory functions, including certain self-regulatory 
obligations subject to the influence or capture of interested 
decision-makers. Under the existing conflicts of interest framework, 
both SEFs and DCMs are subject to a respective core principle (DCM 
Core Principle 16 and SEF Core Principle 12) to minimize and have a 
process to resolve conflicts of interest in their decision-making 
processes.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ 7 U.S.C.A. 7, 7b-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the Proposed Rule, SEFs and DCMs will be required, by 
regulation, to establish a process for identifying, managing, and 
resolving actual and potential conflicts of interest that may arise 
between and among any of the SEF's or DCM's ``market regulation 
functions'' and its commercial interests as well as the interests of 
its management, members, owners, customers, market participants, 
other industry participants, and other constituencies.
    Specifically, both SEFs and DCMs are required to establish a 
ROC, a standing committee of the board consisting of only public 
directors tasked with minimizing conflicts of interest, overseeing 
the DCM's market regulation functions, and preparing an annual 
report assessing the market regulation functions for the Commission 
(among other responsibilities). The DCM is required to designate a 
CRO responsible for the market regulation function. A SEF is 
required to designate a CCO or a similar senior officer. The CRO and 
CCO must report to the board or a senior officer. SEFs and DCMs must 
also limit the use or disclosure of material non-public information 
by certain decision-makers, employees, and owners.
    Notwithstanding my general support for the conflicts regulation 
that the Proposed Rule advances, I am unable to support the 
conflicts provisions in the Proposed Rule for several reasons.
    First, the Proposed Rule is incomplete. The Proposed Rule fails 
to modernize similar conflicts of interest rules for DCOs. The 
Commission should take a comprehensive approach to conflicts of 
interest across our various market structures to avoid potential 
inconsistencies, contradictions, and inefficiencies.
    Second, last year in a series of public statements and speeches, 
I clearly and unequivocally signaled to the Commission that we must 
adopt comprehensive conflicts rules.\13\ The proposed conflicts 
regulation overlooks the need for conflicts regulation for certain 
market participants adopting vertically integrated market 
structures. I repeat my call for the Commission to commit to engage 
in a public rulemaking with formal notice and comment period on 
vertically integrated structures.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ See supra note 1.
    \14\ A Call for the CFTC to Begin a Formal Rulemaking to Address 
Vertical Integration, supra note 1 (``I strongly advocate for the 
Commission to initiate a rulemaking. More market participants are 
adopting a vertically-integrated market structure, and the 
Commission must ensure that such structure does not raise systemic 
risk or financial stability concerns.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Failure To Address Conflicts of Interest for DCOs

    The Commission should adopt enhanced conflicts of interest rules 
that parallel today's proposed conflicts rules for DCOs. DCOs play a 
central role in derivatives markets. Since the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act, market participants have cleared significant volumes of 
OTC derivatives transactions through DCOs. Clearing OTC derivatives 
through registered clearinghouses may lead to greater concentration 
of risk.
    In the Preamble to the Proposed Rule, DMO cited to an article I 
published a decade ago that explores how CCP boards of directors 
face persistent and pernicious conflicts of interest that impede 
objective risk oversight. The preamble acknowledges my view that:
    While clearinghouses and exchanges are private businesses, these 
institutions provide a critical, public, infrastructure resource 
within financial markets. The self-regulatory approach adopted in 
financial markets presumes that clearinghouses and exchanges will 
provide a public service and engage in market oversight. The owners 
of exchanges and clearinghouses may, however, prioritize profit-
maximizing strategies that de-emphasize or conflict with regulatory 
goals.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See also Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: 
Regulating Conflicts, 88 Wash. L.Rev. 185, 221 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is imperative that, to the extent the Commission advances the 
Proposed Rule, it also adopts well-tailored governance reforms to 
address conflicts and prevent DCO owners' self-interested commercial 
incentives or other institutional constraints from triggering 
systemic risk concerns.
    DCOs are subject to Core Principle P regarding conflicts of 
interest.\16\ CFTC Regulation 39.25 implements DCO Core Principle P 
and is identical in all material respects to the existing SEF and 
DCM core principles and implementing regulations on conflicts of 
interest. A DCO is also required ``to establish and enforce rules to 
minimize conflicts of interest in the decision-making process,'' 
``establish a process for resolving conflicts of interest,'' and 
``have procedures for identifying, addressing, and managing 
conflicts of interest involving their members.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ 7 U.S.C. 7a-1.
    \17\ 17 CFR 39.25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has improved the conflicts requirements for SEFs 
and DCMs but did not propose parallel revised rules for DCOs. For 
example, the Proposed Rule introduces common scenarios in which a 
conflict of interest may arise and imposes requirements to document 
conflicts of interest determinations.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Proposed 17 CFR 37.1202, 38.852.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At a minimum, the Commission should advance parallel rules to 
assist DCOs in identifying, managing, and resolving conflicts of 
interest in their decision-making process.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson, Statement of Commissioner 
Kristin N. Johnson Regarding the CFTC's Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking on Operational Resilience Program for FCMs, SDs, and MSPs 
(Dec. 18, 2023); https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/johnsonstatement121823.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Commit to a Conflicts Rulemaking on Vertical Integration

    It is essential that the Commission adopt a comprehensive 
approach to addressing deep-seated conflicts of interest concerns, 
instead of its piece-meal and fragmented approach. I

[[Page 19723]]

have repeatedly called for the Commission to initiate a 
comprehensive rulemaking process across all market infrastructures--
DCOs, SEFs, and DCMs--to address inherent conflicts of interest 
issues that arise in vertically integrated structures, including, 
most recently, in my statement on the Bitnomial DCM application 
where I outlined numerous important Commission conflicts of interest 
regulations.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Opening Statement Regarding the Open Commission Meeting on 
December 13, 2023, supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A Rulemaking on Vertical Integration Is Essential

    The Preamble to the Proposed Rule notes that in 2021, Commission 
staff identified several SEFs and three DCMs that were in the same 
corporate family as intermediaries engaged in trading on the 
affiliated-SEF or DCM. Such organizational structures increase the 
risk of conflicts of interest.
    The Commission's request for comment and staff advisory are 
helpful initial steps. On June 28, 2023, Commission staff issued a 
Request for Comment on the Impact of Affiliations Between Certain 
CFTC-Regulated Entities (RFC on Vertical Integration) to better 
understand a broad range of potential issues that may arise if a 
DCO, DCM, or SEF is affiliated with an intermediary that uses its 
platform.\21\ On December 18, 2023, the Commission issued a staff 
advisory on affiliations between a DCM, DCO, or a SEF and an 
intermediary or other market participant to remind them of their 
regulatory obligations.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Request for Comment on the Impact of Affiliations of 
Certain CFTC-Regulated Entities, CFTC Release 8734-23, June 28, 
2023, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8734-23.
    \22\ Staff Advisory on Affiliations Among CFTC-Regulated 
Entities, CFTC Release 8839-23, Dec. 18, 2023, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8839-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission staff indicates that we should anticipate 
proposed conflicts regulations addressing vertical integration, 
including responses to concerns related to market regulation 
functions posed by affiliations. It is, however, unacceptable that 
this commitment note appears only in a footnote that fails to 
provide a clear and unambiguous commitment to undertake a 
rulemaking.
    Industry comments related to SEFs and DCMs with affiliated 
trading members highlight the urgent need for a regulatory response. 
Many of the comments to the RFC on Vertical Integration echo these 
concerns. It is particularly disappointing that the Commission is 
delaying a resolution of the matter when certain questions in the 
RFC on Vertical Integration directly implicate the narrowly-defined 
``market regulation functions.''

A Piecemeal Approach Risks Inconsistencies and Contradictions

    The Proposed Rule's significant gaps are likely to demand future 
rulemakings addressing them. For example, the Proposed Rule is 
silent on the sharing of certain key executive functions and other 
key personnel, which is not an unusual operating model for 
vertically integrated structures.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ See CME Comment Letter in response to General CFTC Request 
for Comment on the Impact of Affiliations of Certain CFTC-Regulated 
Entities at 16-17 (Sept. 20, 2023), https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=7401; Global Association of 
Central Counterparties Comment Letter in response to General CFTC 
Request for Comment on the Impact of Affiliations of Certain CFTC-
Regulated Entities at 3 (Sept. 28, 2023), https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=7401.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the Proposed Rule requires a DCM's CRO and an SEF's CCO to 
report to the board of directors or a senior officer of the SEF or 
DCM, it does not require that the CCO report to the ROC, which is 
comprised of only public directors.\24\ A member of the board, 
including a shared officer--e.g., the chief executive officer--may 
have supervisory authority over the CRO and CCO. This raises the 
question of whether the Commission has adequately insulated the CRO 
and CCO from commercial pressures when a CRO or CCO is required to 
make decisions about a member that is affiliated with the SEF or 
DCM. Compounding this issue, the Commission is allowing the CRO and 
CCO to be paid based on the profits of the SEF or DCM, which could 
create perverse incentives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See Futures Industry Association Comment Letter in response 
to General CFTC Request for Comment on the Impact of Affiliations of 
Certain CFTC-Regulated Entities at 10 (Sept. 28, 2023), https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=7401.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I am disappointed that the Commission has elected to proceed 
with the Proposed Rule on conflicts concerns without initiating a 
formal rulemaking to establish effective conflicts rules in the 
context of vertically integrated structures.\25\ The Commission's 
piecemeal approach to regulating the derivatives market leaves key 
issues unaddressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ A Call for the CFTC to Begin a Formal Rulemaking to Address 
Vertical Integration, supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Failure To Adequately Reinforce the Commission's Right To Take 
Regulatory Action Upon a Change of Ownership

    Since the early months of my tenure as a Commissioner, I have 
raised questions regarding a change of control in the ownership of a 
registered entity.
    I welcome the Commission's efforts to address the disparate 
regulations that govern the two approaches for acquiring access to 
our markets. I find, however, that the Proposed Rule advances and 
codifies deficiencies and reinforces an antiquated understanding of 
markets.
    In any instance in which an applicant seeks to register with the 
CFTC, transfer a designation, or acquire a controlling percentage of 
the equity interest in a licensed registrant, the CFTC must be 
confident that the party assuming control over a registrant will 
continue to comply with our regulations in a manner consistent with 
the Commission's expectations of the registrant at the time of the 
approval of the registrant's initial application.
    While the Commission retains the authority to suspend or revoke 
the registration of or impose a cease and desist order on a SEF or 
DCM that fails to comply with the CEA and Commission regulations, 
our regulations should clearly state that the Commission will object 
to a transfer of ownership in such circumstances or has an outright 
approval right.
    The efforts of the Commission staff are commendable but not 
sufficient. With respect to a change in ownership or corporation or 
organizational structure of the SEF or DCM, if a SEF or DCM does not 
have the ability to comply with the CEA and Commission regulations 
in connection with such a change, the Commission should have the 
ability to approve or object to such change.

New Equity Transfer Provisions

    Commission Regulation 38.5(c)(1) currently provides that a DCM 
must file with the Commission a notification of each transaction it 
enters into involving the transfer of ten percent or more of the 
equity interest in the DCM.\26\ The regulation does not indicate 
that Commission approval is required for the acquisition. Similar 
provisions apply to SEFs in CFTC Regulation 37.5(c), but the 
threshold that triggers a notice event is fifty percent or more of 
the equity interest of the SEF. Under Regulation 37.5(c), a SEF must 
also certify as to its compliance with the CEA and Commission 
regulations.\27\ DMO staff review the relevant notifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ 17 CFR 38.5(c).
    \27\ 17 CFR 37.5(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposes to amend CFTC Regulations 37.5(c) and 
38.5(c) to:
     ensure the Commission receives timely and sufficient 
information in the event of certain changes in the ownership or 
corporate or organizational structure of a SEF or DCM;
     clarify what information is required to be provided and 
the relevant deadlines;
     conform to similar existing and proposed requirements 
applicable to DCOs; and
     impose a certification requirement.
    The Proposed Rule emphasizes the importance of disclosures 
related to the ownership structure of registrants. In our 
registration process, staff carefully evaluates significant volumes 
of data regarding an entity that seeks to be licensed by and subject 
to the Commission's authority. The disclosures enable the Commission 
to assess whether the entity demonstrates the requisite ability to 
comply with our regulation.
    The Proposed Rule acknowledges the significant business 
organizational shifts in our markets. For many years market 
participants were organized as cooperative structures or private 
partnerships. Demutualization and an increase in registrants 
choosing to become publicly-traded companies alters the market 
landscape. In addition to a transformation in how risks and default 
risks are managed, this approach has led to significant 
consolidation in some contexts.
    A ten percent change in the equity ownership may create a 
notable difference in governance and risk management decision-making 
authority within a firm. Finally, our regulations note that an asset 
purchase may have the same effect as an equity interest

[[Page 19724]]

transfer. The Proposed Rule requires SEFs and DCMs to notify the 
CFTC if substantially all of the assets of the SEF or DCM are 
transferred to another legal entity.

Limitations of the Equity Transfer Provisions

    The Proposed Rule should clearly state that the Commission has 
the regulatory authority to take traditional and well-recognized 
regulatory action in the context of a change in the ownership or 
corporate or organizational structure of a SEF or DCM. From as early 
as 2022, I have raised alarms with respect to the Commission's 
explicit and express authority under Commission regulations to 
engage in a robust dialogue with a registrant planning a significant 
equity interest transfer.\28\ The Proposed Rule fails to fully 
address my concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Commissioner Kristin N. Johnson, Keynote Address at UC 
Berkeley Law Crypto Regulation Virtual Conference (Feb. 8, 2023), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opajohnson3 
(``During a more recent speech at Duke University. . . I also called 
for Congress to consider including in any legislation expanding the 
CFTC's authority a provision that enables the Commission to have 
greater authority including, in the least, a robust dialogue in 
advance of the acquisition of a controlling equity ownership stake 
in any registered market participant.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I am deeply concerned that some may mistakenly interpret the 
Proposed Rule to indicate that the Commission has no explicit or 
express legal authority to take regulatory action upon disclosure of 
an acquisition of our registrant where the Commission believes that 
the registrant will no longer comply with the CEA or Commission 
regulations.
    In addition to this concern, I strongly believe that the 
Commission has missed an opportunity to ensure that all entities 
entering in our markets are subject to the same rules whether they 
are acquiring a significant equity interest in a registered entity 
or registering as a registrant. The best method of addressing these 
twin concerns is to first clarify the Commission's existing 
authority and to ensure that across our markets the equity interest 
transfer regulations are similar and that these regulations involve 
inquiries as robust and effectively enforced as disclosures provided 
at the time that an entity registers with the Commission.

Objecting to a Change in Equity Ownership

    As part of the registration process, SEFs and DCMs are required 
to demonstrate, prior to registration, compliance with the CEA and 
related core principles. An entity seeking designation as a SEF or 
DCM must include ownership information in its Form DCM or Form SEF 
application. This authority is parallel to the authority the 
Commission exercises when a registered entity experiences a change 
of control.
    The Proposed Rule should clarify that the Commission may object 
to a proposed change in ownership or corporate or organizational 
structure for SEFs and DCMs if such change could result in a failure 
of a registrant to comply with the CEA or Commission regulations. In 
parallel to the Commission's authority to grant registration is the 
Commission's authority to revoke registration.

Approving a Change in Ownership

    The Proposed Rule should state that the Commission has an 
approval right in the event of a change in ownership or corporate or 
organizational structure. This approval authority parallels the 
authority that the Commission exercises at the time of registration. 
Rule text that explicitly states the same would clarify the 
Commission's authority for market participants.
    For example, certain prudential regulations are consistent with 
this understanding. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), for example, requires that any party seeking to acquire 
control of a national bank give notice of such change to the OCC. 
Upon the filing of such notice, the OCC has the power to disapprove 
(i.e., object to) such changes set out in the notice.\29\ Similarly, 
under FINRA Rule 1017, a member is required to file an application 
with FINRA for approval of a 25% change in equity ownership of the 
member.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ 12 CFR 5.50(f)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Conclusion

    I believe the Commission should adopt parallel conflicts 
regulations across our markets and must adopt conflicts rules that 
effectively govern conflicts among affiliated entities. I believe 
that the Commission has notable authority with respect to any entity 
seeking to acquire a controlling equity interest in a business in 
our markets, including the authority to suspend, revoke, or enter a 
cease and desist order, should the ownership change result in a 
violation of a statutory or regulatory requirement or a Commission 
order. I would like to see the Commission go farther and adopt a 
rulemaking that gives the Commission the right to approve or object 
to a change in ownership or corporate or organizational structure to 
the same extent.
    I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the DMO team, 
including Rachel Berdansky, Swati Shah, Marilee Dahlman, Jennifer 
Tveiten-Rifman, David Steinberg, Lillian Cardona, Caitlin Holzem, 
and Rebecca Mersand.

Appendix 4--Statement of Commissioner Christy Goldsmith Romero

    Conflicts of interest at exchanges and swap execution facilities 
(SEFs) present serious risk to market fairness, integrity, and 
financial stability. The CFTC plays a critical role in implementing 
strong rules to prevent conflicts from hurting customers, markets, 
market participants, and end users. As designated self-regulatory 
organizations, exchanges serve as the front line for market 
integrity.\1\ And given the contribution to the financial crisis of 
opaque caveat emptor swaps markets,\2\ the Dodd-Frank Act created 
SEFs and gave them important regulatory responsibilities to ensure 
transparency in the swaps markets.\3\ In order for markets to 
function well and fairly, these important regulatory 
responsibilities must be performed free of conflicts of interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Exchanges are responsible for setting financial and 
reporting rules, including involving customer funds. Exchanges must 
also supervise compliance with exchange rules and Commission 
regulations related to capital, customer protection, risk 
management, financial reporting, and record keeping. They have a 
responsibility to investigate and discipline those who violate those 
requirements.
    \2\ See Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major 
Swap Participants with Counterparties, 77 FR 9734, 9805 (Feb. 17, 
2012) (Comment of CFA/AFR).
    \3\ SEFs have important regulatory responsibilities, including 
reporting transactions and maintaining an audit trail. SEFs are 
required to establish and enforce rules for trading or processing 
swaps, and to have the capacity to investigate violations and 
enforce these rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Existing CFTC rules already require exchanges and SEFs to 
establish and enforce rules to minimize conflicts of interest, and 
we have issued accompanying guidance to exchanges. Though I support 
the rule, I consider it to be a baseline minimum, largely codifying 
existing guidance,\4\ extending it to swap execution facilities, and 
adding a few additional requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ See 17 CFR part 38, Appendix B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule would not create an adequate conflicts of 
interest regulatory regime to cover conflicts that come from 
affiliated entities serving multiple functions (i.e. broker, 
exchange, clearinghouse, etc.)-so called ``vertical integration,'' 
which the proposal acknowledges.\5\ Therefore, this rule does not 
serve as a basis for future approval of additional vertically 
integrated structures that break from the traditional structure on 
which the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC rules are based.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ See Proposal at note 118 (``The Commission received a number 
of comments raising concerns about the impact of affiliation, and 
anticipates proposing regulations that will address issues 
identified as a result of the [request for comment] RFC, including 
additional concerns raised by commenters about the conflicts of 
interest, specifically relating to market regulation functions, 
posed by affiliations. This rulemaking does not reflect the comments 
submitted in response to the Commission staff's RFC. Those comments 
will not be made part of the administrative record before the 
Commission in connection with this proposal'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal purposely attempts to carve out vertical 
integration from this rulemaking and commits to addressing it in the 
future in light of the recently completed request for comment on 
affiliated entities. By September, the CFTC received more than 100 
comments expressing significant concern over conflicts of interest 
with vertically integrated market structures.\6\ Serious concerns 
about vertically integrated market structures in digital assets had 
already been expressed by the White House in the Economic Report of 
the President,\7\ the Financial Stability Oversight

[[Page 19725]]

Council (FSOC),\8\ Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen,\9\ then-Federal 
Reserve Vice Chair Lael Brainard,\10\ and Acting Comptroller of the 
Currency Michael Hsu before we issued the request for comment.\11\ 
The CFTC has not issued any new rules or guidance based on those 
comments. Last month, the Commission approved a vertically 
integrated market structure for the first time (on which I dissented 
given that we were in the middle of studying the risks and had not 
engaged in rulemaking),\12\ and it was said in the open meeting that 
there are other pending applications. As this proposal's record will 
not reflect comments submitted in response to the request for 
comment on vertical integration, I encourage commenters to resubmit 
relevant sections of those comments in response to this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ The comments were in response to a request for comment on 
the impact of affiliated entities. I have raised concerns about the 
risk posed by these arrangements, including the immediately apparent 
risk of conflict of interest. See CFTC Commissioner Christy 
Goldsmith Romero, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/romerostatement062823, (June 28, 2023); See also CFTC Commissioner 
Christy Goldsmith Romero, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/oparomero3, (Oct. 26, 2022).
    \7\ See The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/ERP-2023.pdf, (Mar. 2023).
    \8\ See Financial Stability Oversight Council, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC-Digital-Assets-Report-2022.pdf, (Oct. 3, 2022).
    \9\ See https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/remarks-by-secretary-of-the-treasury-janet-l-yellen-at-the-national-association-for-business-economics-39th-annual-economic-policy-conference, (Mar. 30, 2023).
    \10\ See Federal Reserve Board Vice-Chair Lael Brainard, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20220708a.htm, 
(July 8, 2022).
    \11\ See Acting Comptroller of the Currency Michael J. Hsu, 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2022/pub-speech-2022-125.pdf, (Oct. 11, 2022).
    \12\ See CFTC Commissioner Christy Goldsmith Romero, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/romerostatement121823b, 
(December 18, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Requirements of the Proposed Rule

    The rule would require an exchange or SEF to report any change 
to the entity or person that holds a controlling interest, either 
directly or indirectly, as opposed to the more limited notification 
requirements (10% change in ownership of an exchange or 50% 
ownership of a SEF). Any owners of exchanges and SEFs may have other 
interests (financial or otherwise) that may not align with the 
exchange's or SEF's responsibilities.
    The rule would require officers or directors with an actual or 
potential conflict of interest in the subject of a matter to abstain 
from both voting and deliberation. The proposal also creates a 
baseline definition of what is a conflict of interest, and requires 
documentation of compliance with the rule, which facilitates 
oversight.
    Officers, directors, those with an ownership interest in the 
exchange of at least 10%, and employees would be banned from trading 
on or disclosing material non-public information. I would like to 
hear from commenters if the 10% ownership threshold is appropriate 
or should be lowered. I would also like to hear whether commenters 
think the proposed requirements are sufficient to prevent the misuse 
of non-public information, especially in cases where employees, 
officers, directors or owners are also employed by a company that 
trades in contracts for commodities traded on the exchange. I am 
especially interested in comments about whether the Commission 
should ban use of material non-public information for trades on a 
spot exchange by an officer, director, owner or employee of an 
affiliated derivatives exchange.\13\
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    \13\ The Commission currently requires an exchange to provide 
for ``appropriate'' limitations on the use of material non-public 
information by employees, officers, and directors, but does not 
include a spot exchange trading ban as one of its specific 
requirements for such limitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal would codify guidance by requiring establishment of 
a regulatory oversight committee, comprised entirely of independent 
public directors tasked with monitoring the effectiveness of an 
exchange or SEF's regulatory functions and minimizing and resolving 
conflicts of interest, and requires every exchange to have a Chief 
Regulatory Officer (``CRO'').\14\ Requirements for the regulatory 
oversight committee include approving the size and allocation of 
resources and the number of market regulation staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ SEFs are required to have a Chief Compliance Officer with 
similar duties and responsibilities. The regulatory oversight 
committee would be required to minimize any conflicts of interest 
involving the CRO or CCO. Compensation of the position would require 
consultation with the public directors in the ROC. The exchange 
would also be required to disclose and minimize any conflicts of 
interest involving the CRO or CCO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal does not address the issue of shared resources of 
affiliated entities, including for example dual-hatted employees. 
Shared resources lead to concerns about whose interest will dominate 
when it counts the most, during times of stress. Shared resources 
also raise concerns over capacity to fulfill regulatory 
responsibilities, including for example, a derivatives exchange's 
ability to fulfill its front-line market integrity responsibility 
when using shared resources of an affiliated spot exchange.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See CFTC Commissioner Christy Goldsmith Romero, https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/romerostatement062823, 
(June 28, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I want to thank the staff for working with me to strengthen this 
proposal, including in the way it incorporates affiliates in certain 
areas, particularly given that affiliated entities can raise 
conflicts of interest even outside of the vertical integration 
structure. I continue to urge further rulemaking to address 
conflicts of interest, including those associated with vertically 
integrated market structures.

Appendix 5--Statement of Commissioner Caroline D. Pham

    I am voting to publish the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
Requirements for Designated Contract Markets (DCMs) and Swap 
Execution Facilities (SEFs) Regarding Governance and the Mitigation 
of Conflicts of Interest Impacting Market Regulation Functions (DCM 
and SEF Conflicts of Interest Proposal or NPRM) because the public 
must have an opportunity to weigh in on these important issues that 
raise serious concerns. I would like to thank Lillian Cardona, 
Jennifer Tveiten-Rifman, Marilee Dahlman, Swati Shah, and Rachel 
Berdansky in the Division of Market Oversight for their time and 
efforts, and I take this opportunity to recognize the importance of 
their rule enforcement reviews program for DCMs and SEFs. I 
appreciate the staff working with me to make revisions to address my 
concerns. Unfortunately, while the NPRM has been improved, it is far 
from perfect.
    Overall, I believe the public comment process is a critical 
component of good government. That is why, although I have serious 
concerns about the DCM and SEF Conflicts of Interest Proposal, I am 
voting to publish it for transparency and public engagement on this 
flawed rulemaking.
    The CFTC cannot haphazardly codify guidance as rules. That goes 
against the very essence of the statutory framework to regulate 
derivatives markets under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). Here, 
public input will serve as a valuable tool in refining the NPRM by 
providing insights that may not have been considered in changing the 
CFTC's longstanding principles-based approach to oversight of self-
regulatory organizations (SROs) such as DCMs and SEFs, who establish 
their own rule books and bring enforcement actions against market 
participants for violations.\1\ In 2012, when the CFTC first adopted 
its DCM rules and decided to leave certain areas as guidance on 
acceptable best practices, the CFTC thoroughly examined each 
regulation and explained where guidance was more appropriate than a 
rule in recognition of the need to maintain flexibility for DCMs to 
establish rules that are appropriate for their products, markets, 
and participants, including associated risks.\2\ I have serious 
concerns with the CFTC proceeding down a path to finalizing a rule 
that is overly prescriptive and unsupported by data or other 
evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ See Statement of Commissioner Caroline D. Pham Regarding 
Request for Comment on the Impact of Affiliations Between Certain 
CFTC-Regulated Entities (June 28, 2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/phamstatement062823; Statement of 
Commissioner Caroline D. Pham on Effective Self-Regulation and 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Amend Part 40 Regulations (July 26, 
2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/phamstatement072623b.
    \2\ See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated 
Contract Markets, 77 FR 36612, 36614 (June 19, 2012), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/06/19/2012-12746/core-principles-and-other-requirements-for-designated-contract-markets 
(explaining the process as ``In determining whether to codify a 
compliance practice in the form of a rule or guidance/acceptable 
practice, the Commission was guided by whether the practice 
consisted of a commonly-accepted industry practice. Where there is a 
standard industry practice that the Commission has determined to be 
an acceptable compliance practice, the Commission believes that the 
promulgation of clear-cut regulations will provide greater legal 
certainty and transparency to DCMs in determining their compliance 
obligations, and to market participants in determining their 
obligations as DCM members, and will facilitate the enforcement of 
such provisions. Several of the rules adopted in this notice of 
final rulemaking largely codify practices that are commonly accepted 
in the industry and are currently being undertaken by most, if not 
all, DCMs.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Specific Areas for Public Comment

    Separately, I am highlighting two additional issues for 
commenters:

[[Page 19726]]

Material Non-Public Information

    The Commission is refusing to fix the references to ``material 
non-public information'' in Parts 37 and 38. Even though the NPRM 
cites Regulation 1.59(d) and its use of ``material, non-public 
information,'' and that the intent is to copy the requirements in 
Regulation 1.59(d) to Parts 37 and 38 purely for housekeeping 
purposes, the Commission is potentially creating a loophole by 
making a small but very substantive change in using ``material non-
public information'' in Parts 37 and 38. The former--with a comma--
broadly captures information that is material and non-public. The 
latter--with no comma--is an incorrect usage of a well-established 
term of art under securities laws that is too narrow to address the 
potential conflicts in derivatives markets, creates unnecessary 
confusion for market participants, and undermines robust compliance 
programs by introducing uncertainty.\3\ ``Consistency'' is a goal 
repeated throughout the NPRM, and I do not understand why we are 
refusing to resolve the inconsistency here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Caroline D. Pham on 
Misappropriation Theory in Derivatives Markets (Sept. 27, 2023), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/phamstatement092723.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission must protect all confidential information--not 
just material information--in order to effectively mitigate, 
prevent, or avoid conflicts of interest. In some circumstances, 
there must be a complete information barrier or segregation of 
activities between business units or personnel to protect sensitive 
and confidential information about customer trades or positions in 
order to prevent potential market manipulation or other abusive 
trading practices. The Commission's misguided approach is not enough 
to protect our markets from misconduct.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Revocation of Registration

    I am deeply concerned about proposed Regulations 37.5(c)(6) and 
38.5(c)(6).\5\ This is the first time that the CFTC has decided to 
promulgate a rule to revoke the registration of a registered entity 
since section 5e of the Commodity Exchange Act was enacted in 1998, 
with insufficient explanation to demonstrate a reasonable basis and 
reasoned decision-making as required by the Administrative Procedure 
Act,\6\ and insufficient procedural safeguards to ensure due process 
for DCMs and SEFs. The government must ensure due process under the 
Constitution, including judicial review, before taking away the 
rights of the public in what may well be a death knell for trading 
venues. Anything less is an abuse of power.\7\
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    \5\ The language is the same for both SEFs and DCMs, so for 
brevity I will only include it for SEFs here: Reg. 37.5(c)(6) A 
change in the ownership or corporate or organizational structure of 
a SEF that results in the failure of the SEF to comply with any 
provision of the CEA, or any regulation or order of the Commission 
thereunder--(i) shall be cause for the suspension of the 
registration of the SEF or the revocation of registration as a SEF, 
in accordance with the procedures provided in sections 5e and 6(b) 
of the CEA, including notice and a hearing on the record; or (ii) 
may be cause for the Commission to make and enter an order directing 
that the SEF cease and desist from such violation, in accordance 
with the procedures provided in sections 6b and 6(b) of the CEA, 
including notice and a hearing on the record.
    \6\ The only justification provided is ``[i]t is imperative that 
SEFs and DCMs, regardless of ownership or control changes, continue 
to comply with the CEA and all Commission regulations to promote 
market integrity and protect market participants.''
    \7\ See Statement of Commissioner Caroline D. Pham on Effective 
Self-Regulation and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Amend Part 40 
Regulations (July 26, 2023), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/phamstatement072623b.
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    Further, the rules are clearly overbroad because the CFTC could 
revoke registration due to changes ``in the ownership or corporate 
or organizational structure'' of a DCM or SEF (emphasis added). This 
could include simple changes in headcount and other staffing 
reorganizations, making it all too easy for the CFTC to manufacture 
a reason to revoke registration. I sincerely hope that this is not 
the Commission's intent. What is even more puzzling is that the CFTC 
is choosing to propose structural changes as cause to revoke 
registration, but not grave misconduct such as fraud, abuse, or 
manipulation. This is nonsensical. I urge commenters to pay close 
attention to the full import of the revocation of registration 
proposed rules.
    I look forward to reviewing the comments on the DCM and SEF 
Conflicts of Interest Proposal.

[FR Doc. 2024-04938 Filed 3-18-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P