[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 48 (Monday, March 11, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17520-17524]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-05099]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 22-51]
Mark Fenzl, D.O.; Decision and Order
On August 11, 2022, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) and Immediate
Suspension Order (ISO) to Mark Fenzl, M.D. (Respondent), of Florida
immediately suspending and seeking to revoke his DEA Certificate of
Registration, Control No. FF7471840, and alleging that his ``continued
registration is inconsistent with the public interest.'' OSC, at 1
(citing 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1) \1\).
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\1\ Effective December 2, 2022, the Medical Marijuana and
Cannabidiol Research Expansion Act, Public Law 117-215, 136 Stat.
2257 (2022) (Marijuana Research Amendments or MRA), amended the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and other statutes. Relevant to this
matter, the MRA redesignated 21 U.S.C. 823(f), cited in the OSC, as
21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Accordingly, this Decision cites to the current
designation, 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), and to the MRA-amended CSA
throughout.
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A hearing was held before DEA Administrative Law Judge Teresa A.
Wallbaum (the ALJ). On April 10, 2023, the ALJ issued her Recommended
Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision (RD), which
recommended that the Agency revoke Respondent's registration. RD, at
40. Respondent did not timely file exceptions to the RD.\2\ Having
reviewed the entire record, the Agency, except as noted below,\3\
adopts and hereby incorporates by reference the entirety of the ALJ's
rulings, credibility findings,\4\ findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and recommended sanction in the RD and summarizes, expands upon, and
clarifies portions thereof herein.
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\2\ On May 8, 2023, after the deadline to file exceptions passed
and the ALJ certified the record to the Administrator, Respondent
submitted a document entitled ``Appeal to the Drug Enforcement
Agency Administrator.'' Respondent's document appears to be an
untimely attempt to file exceptions to the RD. See 21 CFR
1316.66(a), 1316.67. On that basis, they were not considered in this
Decision. Further, even if these exceptions had been timely
submitted, they contain arguments raised by Respondent in earlier
filings that were addressed by the ALJ, lack the required specific
and complete citations to the record, are contradicted or
unsupported by the record, and/or otherwise lack merit. Accordingly,
the Agency finds these untimely exceptions to be unpersuasive. See
Yogeshwar Gill, M.D., 88 FR 55,076, 55,076 n.3 (2023).
\3\ See footnote 14, infra.
\4\ The Agency adopts the ALJ's summary of each of the
witnesses' testimonies as well as the ALJ's assessment of each of
the witnesses' credibility. See RD, at 3-11. The Agency agrees with
the ALJ that the testimony by the Diversion Investigator (DI), which
focused on the investigative steps completed in the case and
establishing the foundations for many of the exhibits received into
the record, was sufficiently detailed, plausible, and internally
consistent to be afforded full credibility. See id. at 5-6. The
Agency also agrees with the ALJ's assessment that Dr. Paul Lynch,
M.D., the Government's expert witness, was reliable and persuasive.
See id. at 6. His testimony was based on extensive relevant
experience and consistent with applicable Florida law, and
Respondent was unpersuasive in his efforts to challenge Dr. Lynch's
objectivity and reliability. See id. at 7. Regarding Respondent's
testimony, the Agency adopts the ALJ's assessment that although
Respondent testified candidly, his recollection was unreliable and
at times contradicted by documentary evidence. See id. at 11.
Therefore, the ALJ appropriately gave his testimony limited weight.
See id. at 11. As the ALJ noted, Respondent's testimony on Florida's
standard of care was vague, and he characterized pain management as
an ``area of weakness'' for him. See id. at 11 (quoting Tr. 516-17).
Accordingly, consistent with the ALJ's findings, to the extent that
Respondent disagreed with Dr. Lynch's testimony regarding the
Florida standard of care governing pain management, the Agency gives
controlling weight to Dr. Lynch's testimony. See id. at 11.
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I. Findings of Fact
The Agency finds from clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence
that Respondent committed numerous failures in his prescribing conduct
that fell below the standard of care in Florida. Specifically, the
Agency finds that from June 2020 through April 2022, Respondent issued
controlled substances to Patients J.H., C.K., G.K., and J.K. without a
legitimate medical purpose, outside the usual course of professional
practice, and beneath the standard of care in Florida. See RD, at 17-
30.
Florida Standard of Care
Dr. Lynch provided expert testimony on the applicable standard of
care for prescribing controlled substances in Florida.\5\ RD, at 6-7,
11-17; Tr. 141-
[[Page 17521]]
473. According to Dr. Lynch, the standard of care stems from state
statutes and additional, established practices that supplement, or
expand upon, those statutes. RD, at 11; Tr. 149, 263-64. The standard
of care requires the pain management practitioner to take a ``complete
medical history.'' RD, at 13; Fla. Stat. Sec. 456.44(3)(a). A thorough
medical history should include a review of prior treatments and tests
and a social history regarding possible substance abuse or mental
health issues. RD, at 13; Tr. 157-59. The Florida standard of care also
requires a physical examination before prescribing controlled
substances and at each subsequent visit where controlled substances are
prescribed. RD, at 13; Tr. 165-66, 349; see also Fla. Stat. Sec.
456.44(3)(a). For any visit, the standard of care requires taking and
recording vital signs. RD, at 13; Tr. 308. The physician must document
and discuss abnormal vital signs, and failing to follow up on a patient
with higher-than-normal vital signs is ``significantly outside the
standard of care.'' RD, at 13-14; Tr. 310, 345-48, 394-95.
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\5\ The Agency adopts and incorporates by reference the entirety
of the ALJ's findings regarding the standard of care in Florida and
the related summary of Dr. Lynch's expert testimony.
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For pain management, the physical examination must involve a
targeted examination of the area of pain and a ``neurologic or
behavioral interaction with the patient'' to look for signs of
intoxication. RD, at 13; Tr. 166, 437-38. When patients have a spinal
issue, the standard of care includes an examination of all four
extremities for strength, sensation, reflexes, and range of motion. RD,
at 13; Tr. 166. The failure to even touch a patient in a physical exam
for more than two years ``is considerably outside the standard of
care.'' RD, at 13; Tr. 312. While the standard of care ``is pretty
broad on how frequent imaging should be,'' it typically requires new
images every two to three years. RD, at 13; Tr. 321. It is not,
however, sufficient to simply order imaging; the patient must obtain
the image. RD, at 13; Tr. 339-40. In this case, the physical
examinations often stated simply that a patient was ``Alert,
Responsive, Interactive, which means they're just there, that they
showed up, that they're alive.'' RD, at 13; Tr. 261-62. Such a physical
examination is ``not an appropriate exam,'' and does not satisfy the
requirement in Florida Statutes Section 456.44 that a physician must
conduct a physical examination sufficient to establish an appropriate
diagnosis that justifies prescribing controlled substances. RD, at 14;
Tr. 262.
The Florida standard of care requires a pain management physician
to engage in regular patient visits and ongoing monitoring ``to look
for risk factors of abuse or misuse or diversion of the medications.''
RD, at 14; Tr. 164-65; see also Fla. Stat. Sec. 456.44(3)(d). One
method of monitoring is the legal requirement to check the Prescription
Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP) each time a practitioner writes a
controlled substance prescription, which allows a practitioner to
determine if the patient is obtaining the same drugs from another
doctor or frequenting different pharmacies. RD, at 14; Tr. 169-70.
Another method of monitoring is urine drug screening and testing with
documentation of the results in the patient's record. RD, at 14; Tr.
216-18, 223-24. If there are signs of an abnormal or aberrant drug test
result, Florida law establishes the steps a practitioner must take to
address that aberrant result. RD, at 15; Tr. 169, 224, 247-48; see also
Fla. Stat. Sec. 456.44(3)(g). Evidence of diversion exists if a
patient fails to test positive for a controlled substance that is
currently being prescribed. RD, at 15; Tr. 224. If there are signs of
diversion, Florida Statutes Section 456.44 requires that the
practitioner stop prescribing the controlled substance and discharge
the patient. RD, at 15; Tr. 169, 247-48; see also Fla. Stat. Sec.
456.44(3)(g). Evidence of abuse exists if a patient tests positive for
a substance that is not prescribed or for an illicit substance. RD, at
15; Tr. 224-25, 370-71. If there is evidence of abuse, Section 456.44
requires the practitioner to refer the patient to an addiction medicine
specialist.\6\ RD, at 15; Tr. 169, 224-25; see also Fla. Stat. Sec.
456.44(3)(g). While there is a gray area on whether it could be
acceptable to continue to prescribe opioids when there are signs of
abuse, in ``most cases of abuse of cocaine [and] methamphetamine'' the
continued prescribing would not be within the standard of care because
of the risk of death. RD, at 15; Tr. 248-50.
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\6\ An addiction medicine specialist is defined as a board-
certified psychiatrist with a subspecialty certification or eligible
for certification in addiction medicine, an addiction medicine
physician certified or eligible for certification by the American
Society of Addiction Medicine, or an osteopathic physician who holds
a certificate of added qualification in addiction medicine through
the American Osteopathic Association. RD, at 15 n.16; Fla. Stat.
Sec. 456.44(1)(b).
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Prescribing doses of opioids with a high Morphine Milligram
Equivalent (MME) \7\ caries significant risks, including risk of death.
RD, at 16; Tr. 257-58. Moreover, prescribing a combination of an
opioid, a benzodiazepine, and a muscle relaxant (here, carisoprodol) is
dangerous because together they produce a risk of synergistic
respiratory depression; this ``leads to a patient that's heavily
sedated and is [at] high risk for overdose and death.'' \8\ RD, at 16
(quoting Tr. 256-57). The combination, known as ``the cocktail, the
Houston cocktail, the trinity, [or] the holy trinity,'' is ``sought
after'' due to the ``particularly powerful high to the patient.'' RD,
at 16 (quoting Tr. 256).
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\7\ MME is a standard that determines how powerful a particular
medication is by comparing the prescribed medication and dosage to
the original standard of morphine, historically used to manage pain.
RD, at 16; Tr. 257-58.
\8\ The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has issued a
warning--the so-called ``Black Box Warning''--regarding the risks of
prescribing opioids and benzodiazepines in combination. RD, at 16;
Tr. 173-80, 182; GX 15-17.
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Documentation is a requirement under the Florida standard of care.
RD, at 17; Tr. 160-61. ``The medical record shall . . . document the
presence of one or more recognized medical indications for the use of a
controlled substance.'' Fl. Stat. Sec. 456.44(3)(a); RD, at 17; see
also Fl. Stat. Sec. 456.44(3)(f); Tr. 160-61. In addition to
documenting the physical examination, ``the medical record must, at a
minimum, document the nature and intensity of the pain, current and
past treatments for pain, underlying or co-existing diseases or
conditions, the effect of the pain on physical and psychological
function, a review of previous medical records, previous diagnostic
studies, and history of alcohol and substance abuse.'' RD, at 17
(quoting Tr. 160); Fla. Stat. Sec. 456.44(3)(a). Documentation is also
important for the purposes of periodic review of the plan and
continuation of treatment by another physician. RD, at 17; Tr. 159-60.
Generally, having a ``clear and complete and accurate'' medical record
``is really important for the practice of medicine.'' RD, at 17
(quoting Tr. 171).
The Florida standard of care does not create a separate standard
for practitioners who ``inherit'' patients on controlled substance
prescriptions. RD, at 12; Tr. 298-99. In other words, regardless of
whether a patient is currently on controlled substance medications
prescribed by another doctor, the Florida statute and standard of care
require any practitioner to take a medical history and conduct an
appropriate physical examination before prescribing and require
practitioners to revisit prior plans on a regular basis to see if the
controlled substance prescriptions are effective. RD, at 12; Tr. 213,
298-99.
The Patients
Patient J.H.
Regarding Patient J.H., the Agency finds that Respondent issued
controlled substance prescriptions for morphine,
[[Page 17522]]
oxycodone, carisoprodol,\9\ and diazepam \10\ from July 2020 through
February 2022 without a legitimate medical purpose, outside the usual
course of professional practice, and beneath the standard of care in
Florida. See RD, at 17-21; GX 6, 20; Tr. 200, 262-63. Based on Dr.
Lynch's testimony and the record as a whole, these prescriptions were
issued without a legitimate medical purpose, outside the usual course
of professional practice, and beneath the standard of care because
Respondent failed to (1) establish an appropriate diagnosis to justify
the controlled substance prescriptions (RD, at 17-18; GX 6, 20; Tr.
199, 201-03, 207, 211-14, 252, 255-56, 262); (2) establish an
appropriate medical justification for high-risk combination
prescriptions with high-risk MMEs (RD, at 20-21; GX 6, 20; Tr. 250,
253-54, 256-57, 259-61); (3) appropriately address potential signs of
abuse and diversion, despite at least seven aberrant drug test results
(RD, at 18-20; GX 6; Tr. 204, 217, 219, 221-25, 227-31, 233-35, 238,
246-48); and (4) maintain adequate medical records with sufficient
documentation \11\ (RD, at 21; GX 6; Tr. 261-62).
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\9\ Carisoprodol is a Schedule IV controlled substance sold
under the brand name Soma. Prehearing Ruling, at 2. The generic name
(carisoprodol) is used in this decision.
\10\ Diazepam is a Schedule IV controlled substance sold under
the brand name Valium. Prehearing Ruling, at 2. The generic name
(diazepam) is used in this decision.
\11\ Respondent asserted that some documentation related to the
four patients was missing from the medical files produced through
the Government's administrative subpoenas and admitted into evidence
as Government Exhibits 6, 8, 10, and 12. RD, at 36; Tr. 496-97, 500-
07. The Agency has considered Respondent's claims regarding missing
documentation. In agreement with the ALJ, any missing documentation
does not change the outcome of this Decision. See RD, at 36-37. As
Dr. Lynch reliably testified, any missing documents relate to only
portions of the patients' treatment, and there are numerous other
examples of prescribing that fell well below the standard of care.
RD, at 37.
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Patient C.K.
Regarding Patient C.K., the Agency finds that Respondent issued
controlled substance prescriptions for hydrocodone,\12\ carisoprodol,
and alprazolam \13\ from July 2020 through April 2022 without a
legitimate medical purpose, outside the usual course of professional
practice, and beneath the standard of care in Florida. See RD, at 22-
24; GX 8, 21; Tr. 312-15. Based on Dr. Lynch's testimony and the record
as a whole, these prescriptions were issued without a legitimate
medical purpose, outside the usual course of professional practice, and
beneath the standard of care because Respondent failed to (1) establish
an appropriate diagnosis to justify the controlled substance
prescriptions (RD, at 22; GX 8, 21; Tr. 269-74); (2) adequately address
signs of potential abuse and diversion, despite at least two aberrant
drug test results (RD, at 22-23; GX 8; Tr. 277-86, 502-03); (3)
appropriately address C.K.'s dangerous vital signs (RD, at 23; GX 8;
Tr. 300-01, 303-07, 309); (4) establish an appropriate medical
justification for high-risk combinations (RD at 23-24; GX 8, 21; Tr.
311-12); and (5) maintain adequate medical records with sufficient
documentation (RD, at 24; GX 8; Tr. 308-09, 311-12).
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\12\ Hydrocodone is a Schedule II controlled substance.
Prehearing Ruling, at 2. Norco is a brand name medication that
contains hydrocodone. Id. The generic name (hydrocodone) is used in
this decision.
\13\ Alprazolam is a Schedule IV controlled substance sold under
the brand name Xanax. Prehearing Ruling, at 2; Tr. 182. The generic
name (alprazolam) is used in this decision.
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Patient G.K.
Regarding Patient G.K., the Agency finds that Respondent issued
controlled substance prescriptions for morphine, oxycodone,
carisoprodol, and alprazolam from June 2020 through April 2022, without
a legitimate medical purpose, outside the usual course of professional
practice, and beneath the standard of care in Florida.\14\ See RD, at
25-27; GX 10, 22; Tr. 353-54.
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\14\ The ALJ noted that Respondent also issued prescriptions to
G.K. for the Schedule V controlled substance pregabalin (sold under
the brand name of Lyrica). RD, at 25-26. As Respondent's prescribing
of pregabalin was not included in the OSC/ISO, the Agency does not
make any findings on the prescribing of this controlled substance.
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Based on Dr. Lynch's testimony and the record as a whole, these
prescriptions were issued without a legitimate medical purpose, outside
the usual course of professional practice, and beneath the standard of
care because Respondent failed to (1) establish an appropriate
diagnosis to justify the controlled substance prescriptions (RD, at 25;
GX 10, 22; Tr. 322-23, 325-26, 328-29, 331-37); (2) appropriately
address G.K.'s dangerous vital signs (RD, at 25-26; GX 10; Tr. 344-47,
350-52); (3) establish an appropriate medical justification for high-
risk combination prescriptions with high-risk MMEs (RD, at 26; GX 10,
22; Tr. 340-43, 352-54); and (4) maintain adequate medical records with
sufficient documentation (RD, at 26; GX 10; Tr. 352-54).
Patient J.K.
Regarding Patient J.K., the Agency finds that Respondent issued
controlled substance prescriptions for morphine, oxycodone, and
lorazepam \15\ from August 2020 through April 2022 and carisoprodol
from July 2020 through January 2022 without a legitimate medical
purpose, outside the usual course of professional practice, and beneath
the standard of care in Florida. See RD, at 27-30; GX 12, 23; Tr. 397-
98. Based on Dr. Lynch's testimony and the record as a whole, these
prescriptions were issued without a legitimate medical purpose, outside
the usual course of professional practice, and beneath the standard of
care because Respondent failed to (1) establish an appropriate
diagnosis to justify the controlled substance prescriptions (RD, at 27-
28; GX 12, 23; Tr. 359-67, 387-89); (2) adequately address signs of
potential abuse and diversion, despite at least two aberrant drug test
results (RD, at 28; GX 12; Tr. 370-78, 385, 496-97); (3) appropriately
address J.K.'s dangerous vital signs (RD, at 29; GX 12; Tr. 391-96);
(4) establish an appropriate medical justification for high-risk
combination prescriptions with high-risk MMEs (RD, at 29; GX 12, 23;
Tr. 389-90); and (5) maintain adequate medical records with sufficient
documentation (RD, at 29-30; GX 12; Tr. 396-97).
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\15\ Lorazepam is a Schedule IV controlled substance sold under
the brand name Ativan. Prehearing Ruling, at 3; Tr. 355. The generic
name (lorazepam) is used in this decision.
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II. Discussion
Under the CSA, ``[a] registration . . . to . . . dispense a
controlled substance . . . may be suspended or revoked by the Attorney
General upon a finding that the registrant . . . has committed such
acts as would render his registration under section 823 of this title
inconsistent with the public interest as determined under such
section.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a). The CSA requires that the Agency consider
the following factors for the public interest determination:
(A) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or
professional disciplinary authority.
(B) The [registrant]'s experience in dispensing, or conducting
research with respect to controlled substances.
(C) The [registrant]'s conviction record under Federal or State
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances.
(D) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws
relating to controlled substances.
(E) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and
safety.
21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1).
[[Page 17523]]
The Agency considers these public interest factors in the
disjunctive. Robert A. Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). Each
factor is weighed on a case-by-case basis. Morall v. Drug Enf't Admin.,
412 F.3d 165, 173-74 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Any one factor, or combination
of factors, may be decisive. David H. Gillis, M.D., 58 FR 37507, 37508
(1993). The inquiry is ``focuse[d] on protecting the public interest.''
Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., 74 FR 459, 462 (2009).
The Government has the burden of proof in this proceeding. 21 CFR
1301.44. While the Agency has considered all of the public interest
factors in 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), the Government's evidence in support of
its prima facie case for revoking Respondent's registration is confined
to Factors B and D. See RD, at 31 n.50 (finding that Factors A, C, and
E do not weigh for or against the sanction sought by the Government).
Factors B and D
Evidence is considered under Public Interest Factors B and D when
it reflects compliance (or non-compliance) with laws related to
controlled substances and experience dispensing controlled substances.
See Sualeh Ashraf, M.D., 88 FR 1095, 1097 (2023); Kareem Hubbard, M.D.,
87 FR 21156, 21162 (2022). DEA regulations require that for a
controlled substance prescription to be effective, it must be issued
for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting
in the usual course of professional practice. 21 CFR 1306.04(a).
Based on Dr. Lynch's reliable and persuasive expert opinion, the
Agency finds that Respondent issued controlled substance prescriptions
outside of the usual course of professional practice and beneath the
Florida standard of care in violation of federal law. See supra Section
I. Further, the Agency finds that Respondent violated Florida Statutes
Section 456.44(3) with regard to Patients J.H., C.K., G.K., and J.K.,
by failing to take proper medical histories and conduct adequate
medical examinations that supported prescribing controlled substances
and/or failing to monitor the patients' medication compliance and
address signs of abuse and/or diversion.\16\ RD, at 34. The Agency also
finds that for each of the four patients at issue, Respondent failed to
maintain sufficiently detailed medical records that properly documented
a diagnosis for each patient that supported prescribing controlled
substances, thereby violating Florida Statutes Section 456.44(3) and
Florida Administrative Code Rule 64B8-9.003.
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\16\ While Respondent argued that the patients were being
treated by a drug and alcohol counselor, that counselor was not a
psychiatrist or an addiction medicine specialist under Florida law.
RD, at 34; Tr. 586; see Fla. Stat. Sec. 456.44; see also Tr. 168-
69.
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Respondent's arguments fail to refute the evidence of unlawful and
inappropriate prescribing. Although Respondent testified to his
positive behavior of discharging approximately forty percent of one
clinic's patients, such positive behavior cannot outweigh the evidence
of prescribing contrary to the public interest. RD, at 33; Tr. 486,
489-90; see, e.g., Ester Mark, M.D., 86 FR 16760, 16771 (2021); Randall
L. Wolff, M.D., 77 FR 5106, 5153 (2012). Nor do his broad arguments on
the effects of the Government's enforcement decisions on pain clinics
and the populations they serve undermine the Government's prima facie
case. RD, at 34-35; see Stephen E. Owusu, D.P.M., 87 FR 3343, 3351 n.21
(2022) (``the Agency has consistently held that community impact is not
a relevant consideration under the public interest factors''); George
Pursley, M.D., 85 FR 80162, 80188 n.82 (2020); Frank Joseph Stirlacci,
M.D., 85 FR 45229, 45239 (2020).
Regarding the Florida standard of care, Dr. Lynch credibly and
reliably refuted Respondent's various suggestions that he met that
standard, including the arguments that (1) titrating patients off
opioids creates a risk of suicide, especially if the patient has been
on opioids or benzodiazepines for a considerable period of time and/or
has comorbid conditions such as anxiety disorder \17\ (Tr. 29-30, 36-
40, 628-29); (2) the standard of care is different for patients who
cannot afford testing or alternative treatments (Tr. 30-32, 45, 429-30,
564); and (3) the standard of care is different when a practitioner
``inherits'' patients who are already on opioids (Tr. 41-44). RD, at
35. Moreover, Respondent's version of the standard of care is not
supported by the applicable Florida statutes. RD, at 35; see Fla. Stat.
Sec. 456.44(3).
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\17\ Dr. Lynch referenced Respondent's own exhibits and other
sources to discuss that there is also an association with a higher
likelihood of suicide for patients who start taking opioids,
patients who continue taking opioids, patients taking opioids at a
high MME level, patients with signs of abuse or misuse of
substances, and patients with mental health issues. RD, at 35; Tr.
458-61. Similarly, Dr. Lynch explained that while stopping a
benzodiazepine prescription is associated with a higher likelihood
of suicide, so too is prescribing benzodiazepines in the first
instance and maintaining benzodiazepines. RD, at 35; Tr. 459, 461,
463. Moreover, Respondent's numerous other failures, including his
lack of appropriate documentation of the justifications for
continued prescribing, violated federal and Florida law.
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In sum, and in agreement with the RD, the Agency finds that the
record contains substantial evidence that Respondent prescribed and
dispensed controlled substances in violation of both federal and state
law. See RD, at 34; 21 CFR 1306.04(a); Fla. Stat. Sec. 456.44(3); Fla.
Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.003. In weighing Factors B and D, the Agency
finds that the Government has established a prima facie case that
Respondent committed acts that render his registration inconsistent
with the public interest and support revocation of his registration.
See 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1).
III. Sanction
Where, as here, the Government has established grounds to revoke
Respondent's registration, the burden shifts to the respondent to show
why he can be entrusted with the responsibility carried by a
registration. Garret Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 18882, 18910 (2018).
When a respondent has committed acts inconsistent with the public
interest, he must both accept responsibility and demonstrate that he
has undertaken corrective measures. Holiday CVS, L.L.C., dba CVS
Pharmacy Nos 219 and 5195, 77 FR 62316, 62339 (2012). Trust is
necessarily a fact-dependent determination based on individual
circumstances; therefore, the Agency looks at factors such as the
acceptance of responsibility, the credibility of that acceptance as it
relates to the probability of repeat violations or behavior, the nature
of the misconduct that forms the basis for sanction, and the Agency's
interest in deterring similar acts. See, e.g., Robert Wayne Locklear,
M.D., 86 FR 33738, 33746 (2021).
Here, Respondent has failed to fully accept responsibility or offer
any basis for the Agency to trust him, despite his past misconduct,
with the responsibility of a registration. RD, at 37-39. Respondent did
not accept responsibility for most of the areas where his prescribing
history fell short of both the standard of care and his obligations
under federal and Florida law. RD, at 38. Although Respondent
acknowledged that he could have kept better notes and been more
diligent at detailing patients' care, this limited acceptance of
responsibility was inadequate in light of his repeated insistence that
the prescriptions were justified and issued within the standard of
care. RD, at 38, 40; Tr. 511, 518-20, 524, 529-30, 567, 600.
Additionally, Respondent's attempt to shift blame for his misconduct to
other employees of the clinic was unpersuasive and further highlighted
the insufficiency of his
[[Page 17524]]
limited acceptance of responsibility. RD, at 38; Tr. 503-04, 515, 590,
606-08.
While a respondent may present evidence of remedial measures taken
to prevent reoccurrence of behavior inconsistent with registration, it
is not necessary for the Agency to consider remedial measures when a
respondent lacks unequivocal acceptance of responsibility. Ajay S.
Ahuja, M.D., 84 FR 5479, 5498 n.33 (2019); Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S., 80
FR 74800, 74801, 74810 (2015). The Agency need not consider remedial
measures given the lack of acceptance of responsibility, nevertheless
Respondent did not present any evidence of remedial measures for
consideration. See RD, at 39; Ahuja, 84 FR at 5498 n.33; Glick, 80 FR
at 74801, 74810.
In addition to acceptance of responsibility, the Agency looks to
the egregiousness and extent of the misconduct, Garrett Howard Smith,
M.D., 83 FR at 18910 (collecting cases), and considers both specific
and general deterrence when determining an appropriate sanction. Glick,
80 FR at 74810. Here, Respondent's inappropriate and unlawful
prescribing of controlled substances was egregious and warrants a
sanction. See RD, at 39. The record contains substantial evidence that
Respondent improperly issued an extensive number of prescriptions to
four patients at two clinics over the course of nearly two years. RD,
at 9, 17-30; Tr. 490-91; see supra Section I. Respondent prescribed
controlled substances to patients without taking appropriate action to
address clear and repeated signs of diversion and abuse. RD, at 39; see
supra Section I. Even when patients arrived at their appointments with
vital signs indicating a medical crisis or emergency, Respondent failed
to address their dangerous medical situations and continued the same
prescribing in violation of the applicable standard of care. RD, at 39;
see, e.g., Tr. 303, 345-46, 392. In this case, the Agency believes that
revocation of Respondent's registration would deter Respondent and
encourage the general registrant community to properly manage patients'
treatment under the requirements of the CSA, including when faced with
evidence of abuse and diversion. See RD, at 39.
In light of the above considerations, there is insufficient
evidence that Respondent's behavior is unlikely to recur in the future
such that the Agency can entrust him with a registration. In sum,
Respondent has not offered sufficient mitigating evidence on the record
to rebut the Government's case for revocation of his registration. RD,
at 37-40. The public interest factors weigh in favor of revocation. RD,
at 40. Accordingly, the Agency will order that Respondent's
registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
FF7471840 issued to Mark Fenzl, M.D. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR
0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I
hereby deny any pending applications of Mark Fenzl, M.D., to renew or
modify this registration, as well as any other pending application of
Mark Fenzl, M.D., for additional registration in Florida. This Order is
effective April 10, 2024.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
February 20, 2024, by Administrator Anne Milgram. That document with
the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024-05099 Filed 3-8-24; 8:45 am]
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