[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 48 (Monday, March 11, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 17622-17692]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-04458]



[[Page 17621]]

Vol. 89

Monday,

No. 48

March 11, 2024

Part III





Environmental Protection Agency





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40 CFR Part 68





Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs 
Under the Clean Air Act; Safer Communities by Chemical Accident 
Prevention; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 48 / Monday, March 11, 2024 / Rules 
and Regulations  

[[Page 17622]]


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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 68

[EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174; FRL-5766.6-02-OLEM]
RIN 2050-AH22


Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management 
Programs Under the Clean Air Act; Safer Communities by Chemical 
Accident Prevention

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is amending its Risk 
Management Program (RMP) regulations as a result of Agency review. The 
revisions include several changes and amplifications to the accident 
prevention program requirements, enhancements to the emergency 
preparedness requirements, improvements to the public availability of 
chemical hazard information, and several other changes to certain 
regulatory definitions or points of clarification. As major and other 
serious and concerning RMP accidents continue to occur, the record 
shows and EPA believes that this final rule will help further protect 
human health and the environment from chemical hazards through 
advancement of process safety based on lessons learned. These 
amendments seek to improve chemical process safety; assist in planning, 
preparedness, and response to Risk Management Program-reportable 
accidents; and improve public awareness of chemical hazards at 
regulated sources. While many of the provisions of this final rule 
reinforce each other, it is EPA's intent that each one is merited on 
its own, and thus severable.

DATES: This final rule is effective on May 10, 2024.

ADDRESSES: EPA has established a docket for this action under Docket ID 
No. EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174. All documents in the docket are listed on 
the https://www.regulations.gov website. Although listed in the index, 
some information is not publicly available, e.g., Confidential Business 
Information (CBI) or other information whose disclosure is restricted 
by statute. Certain other material, such as copyrighted material, is 
not placed on the internet and will be publicly available only in hard 
copy form. Publicly available docket materials are available 
electronically through https://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Deanne Grant, Office of Emergency 
Management, Mail Code 5104A, Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 
Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20460; telephone number: 202-
564-1096; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
    Preamble acronyms and abbreviations. EPA uses multiple acronyms and 
terms in this preamble. While this list may not be exhaustive, to ease 
the reading of this preamble and for reference purposes, EPA defines 
the following terms and acronyms here:

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANSI American National Standards Institute
API American Petroleum Institute
CAA Clean Air Act
CAAA Clean Air Act Amendments
CBI Confidential Business Information
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act
CFATS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CISA Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
CSB Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
CSISSFRRA Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels 
Regulatory Relief Act
CVI Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOJ Department of Justice
DOT Department of Transportation
EHS Extremely Hazardous Substances
EJ Environmental Justice
E.O. Executive Order
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPCRA Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FR Federal Register
GDC General Duty Clause
HF hydrofluoric acid
HHC highly hazardous chemical
ICR Information Collection Request
IIAR International Institute of Ammonia Refrigeration
IPAWS Integrated Public Alert & Warning System
ISD inherently safer design
IST inherently safer technology
LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee
LOPA Layers of Protection Analysis
NAICS North American Industry Classification System
NASTTPO National Association of SARA Title III Program Officials
NECI National Enforcement and Compliance Initiative
NJDEP New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
NRC National Response Center
NRI National Risk Index
NTTAA National Technology and Transfer Advancement Act
OCA offsite consequence analysis
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PES Philadelphia Energy Solutions
PHA process hazard analysis
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
PRA Paperwork Reduction Act
PSI process safety information
PSM process safety management
RAGAGEP recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices
RCA root cause analysis incident investigation
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis
RMP Risk Management Program or risk management plan
SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
SCCAP Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention
SDS Safety Data Sheet
SERC State Emergency Response Commission
STAA safer technology and alternatives analysis
TCPA Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act
TMA trimethylamine
TQ threshold quantity
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

    The contents of this preamble are:

I. Executive Summary
    A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action
    B. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action
    C. Costs and Benefits
II. General Information
    A. Does this action apply to me?
    B. What action is the Agency taking?
    C. What is the Agency's authority for taking this action?
    D. What are the incremental costs and benefits of this action?
III. Background
    A. Overview of EPA's Risk Management Program
    B. Events Leading to This Action
    C. EPA's Authority To Revise the RMP Rule
IV. Discussion of General Comments
    A. General Comments
    B. EPA Responses
V. Prevention Program Requirements
    A. Hazard Evaluation Amplifications
    B. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)
    C. Root Cause Analysis
    D. Third-Party Compliance Audits
    E. Employee Participation
VI. Emergency Response
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments
VII. Information Availability
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
VIII. Other Areas of Technical Clarification/Enforcement Issues
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

[[Page 17623]]

    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
IX. Compliance Dates
    A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
    B. Summary of Final Rule
    C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
X. Statutory and Executive Orders Reviews
    A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and 
Executive Order 14094: Modernizing Regulatory Review
    B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
    C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
    D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
    E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
    F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With 
Indian Tribal Governments
    G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From 
Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks
    H. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
    I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA)
    J. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 
Populations
    K. Congressional Review Act (CRA)

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

    The purpose of this action is to make changes to the Risk 
Management Program (RMP) rule in order to improve safety at facilities 
that use and distribute hazardous chemicals. Because major and other 
serious and concerning RMP accidents continue to occur, this final rule 
aims to better identify and further regulate risky facilities to 
prevent accidental releases before they can occur. As explained in 
further detail in following sections of this preamble, EPA maintains 
that by taking a rule-based, prevention-focused approach in this action 
rather than the so-called ``compliance-driven,'' mostly post-incident, 
approach in the 2019 reconsideration rule (84 FR 69834, December 19, 
2019), this rule will further protect human health and the environment 
from chemical hazards through process safety advancement without undue 
burden.
    EPA proposed changes to its RMP regulations (40 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) part 68) on August 31, 2022 (87 Federal Register (FR) 
53556), after publishing a ``Notice of virtual public listening 
sessions; request for public comment'' (86 FR 28828) that solicited 
comments and information from the public regarding potential changes to 
the RMP regulations. EPA also hosted a series of virtual public 
hearings on September 26-28, 2022, to provide interested parties the 
opportunity to present data, views, or arguments concerning the 
proposed action.

B. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action

    This action amends EPA's RMP regulations at 40 CFR part 68. These 
regulations apply to stationary sources (also referred to as 
``facilities'') that hold specific ``regulated substances'' in excess 
of threshold quantities. These facilities are required to assess their 
potential release impacts, undertake steps to prevent releases, plan 
for emergency response to releases, and summarize this information in a 
risk management plan (RMP) submitted to EPA. The release prevention 
steps vary depending on the type of process, but progressively gain 
granularity and rigor over three program levels (i.e., Program 1, 
Program 2, and Program 3).
    The major provisions of this rule include several changes to the 
accident prevention program requirements, as well as enhancements to 
the emergency response requirements, and improvements to the public 
availability of chemical hazard information. Each of these provisions 
is introduced in the following paragraphs of this section and described 
in greater detail in sections V through VIII of this preamble.
    Additionally, certain revised provisions apply to a subset of the 
processes based on program levels described in 40 CFR part 68 (or in 
one case, to a subset of processes within a program level). A full 
description of these program levels is provided in section III.A. of 
this preamble. Additional provisions are targeted at subgroups of 
processes that pose an elevated likelihood of impacting nearby 
communities. Factors elevating the likelihood of impacting nearby 
communities include source-specific accident history, industry accident 
history, and co-location with multiple facilities. Furthermore, some 
sectors are targeted for additional provisions due to recent accidents 
and widely known safer alternative technologies.

C. Costs and Benefits

    Approximately 11,740 facilities have filed current RMPs with EPA 
and are potentially affected by the rule. These facilities include 
petroleum refineries and large chemical manufacturers; water and 
wastewater treatment systems; chemical and petroleum wholesalers and 
terminals; food manufacturers, packing plants, and other cold storage 
facilities with ammonia refrigeration systems; agricultural chemical 
distributors; midstream gas plants; and a limited number of other 
sources, including Federal installations that use RMP-regulated 
substances.
    In total, EPA estimates annualized final rule costs of $256.9 
million at a 3% discount rate and $296.9 million at a 7% discount rate 
over a 10-year period. The largest annualized cost of the final rule is 
the Safer Technologies and Alternatives Analysis (STAA) implementation 
cost ($168.7 million at a 3% discount rate and $204.9 million at a 7% 
discount rate), followed by the practicability study ($27.0 million at 
a 3% discount rate and $28.6 million at a 7% discount rate), the STAA 
initial evaluation ($18.5 million at a 3% discount rate and $19.7 
million at a 7% discount rate), information availability ($12.8 million 
at both 3% and 7% discount rates), employee participation plans ($11.5 
million at both 3% and 7% discount rates), third-party audits ($7.5 
million at both 3% and 7% discount rates), rule familiarization ($5.8 
million at a 3% discount rate and $6.8 million at a 7% discount rate), 
and community notification systems ($4.0 million at both 3% and 7% 
discount rates). The remaining provisions impose annualized costs under 
$1 million, including root cause analysis ($0.7 million at both 3% and 
7% discount rates), emergency backup power for perimeter monitors ($0.3 
million at both 3% and 7% discount rates), and RMP justifications for 
natural hazards, facility siting, recognized and generally accepted 
good engineering practices (RAGAGEP), and no backup power, each have 
annualized costs below $0.1 million (at both 3% and 7% discount rates).
    The Agency has determined that among the 2,636 potentially 
regulated private sector small entities impacted, 2,393, or 90.8 
percent, may experience a cost of revenue impact of less than one 
percent, with an average small entity cost of $72,525; 167, or 6.3 
percent, may experience an impact of between 1 and 3 percent of 
revenues with an average small entity cost of $629,271; and 75, or 2.8 
percent, may experience an impact of greater than 3 percent with an 
average small entity cost of $1,083,823. The industry sectors of Farm 
Supplies Merchant Wholesalers and Farm Product Warehousing and Storage 
had the most entities potentially affected, with 146 and 96 entities, 
respectively. Within the Farm Supplies Merchant Wholesalers sector, the 
Agency determined that only 8 of the 146 small entities (6 percent of 
small entities) will experience impacts of between 1 and 3 percent of 
revenues and only 2 small entities (1 percent of small entities) will

[[Page 17624]]

experience impacts of more than 3 percent of revenue. Within the Farm 
Product Warehousing and Storage sector, the Agency determined that only 
5 of the 96 small entities (5 percent of small entities) will 
experience impacts of between 1 and 3 percent of revenues and no small 
entities will experience impacts of more than 3 percent of revenue.
    Among the 630 small government entities potentially affected, the 
minimum cost any entity will incur is $2,000; 365, or 58 percent, would 
incur costs ranging from $2,000 to $3,000; 248, or 39 percent, will 
incur costs ranging from $3,000 to $10,000; and 17, or 3 percent, will 
incur costs greater than $10,000. EPA estimated that for the rule to 
have a larger than 1 percent impact on the government entity with the 
largest cost impact, the entity would need to have revenue of less than 
$120 per resident. For the rule to have a larger than 1 percent impact 
on the smallest government entity identified in the data, the entity 
would need to have revenue of less than $650 per resident. Details of 
these analyses are presented in Chapter 8 of the RIA, which is 
available in the docket.
    Major and other serious and concerning RMP accidents have continued 
to occur. EPA anticipates that promulgation and implementation of this 
final rule will reduce the risk of such accidents and the severity of 
the impacts when they occur. RMP accident data show past accidents have 
generated highly variable impacts, so the impacts of future accidents 
are difficult to predict. Nevertheless, it is clear from RMP accident 
data \1\ and other relevant data from RMP regulated industry 
sectors,\2\ that chemical accidents can impose substantial costs on 
firms, employees, emergency responders, the community, and the broader 
economy.
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    \1\ EPA estimated monetized damages from RMP facility accidents 
of $540.23 million per year.
    \2\ Marsh JLT Specialty, ``100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon 
Industry,'' 27th Edition, March 2022. Accessed from https://www.marsh.com/uk/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses.html. Marsh provides estimates of large property damage 
losses in the hydrocarbon industry from 1974 to 2021 in current and 
2021 dollars and in a few cases, business loss costs.
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    Specifically, the EPA expects the final rule provisions to result 
in a reduced frequency and magnitude of damages from releases, 
including damages that are quantified for the baseline period such as 
fatalities, injuries, property damage, hospitalizations, medical 
treatment, sheltering in place, and evacuations. EPA also expects the 
final rule provisions to reduce baseline damages that are not 
quantified. These damages include potential health risks from toxic 
chemical exposure, lost productivity at affected facilities, emergency 
response costs, transaction costs from potential subsequent legal 
battles, property value losses in nearby neighborhoods, environmental 
damage and costs of evacuation and sheltering-in-place events, and 
others. They have not been quantified because there is either limited 
or no information in the RMP data that could allow for precise 
quantification. However, in some cases, these damages could be even 
more detrimental to the facility and community than those damages that 
can be quantified. For example, regarding lost productivity, costs are 
highly variable based on the type of release, the extent of the damage, 
the location of the facility, and product being produced. Yet, Marsh 
Specialty, a risk management and energy consultancy, has collected data 
on 10,000 accidents in the petrochemical sector over 40 years and 
published 27 editions of its ``100 Largest Losses'' reports.\3\ Their 
data suggest that lost productivity is typically two or three times the 
cost of property damage.\4\ Another example of unquantified impacts can 
be examined with property value impacts. A recent hedonic property 
value analysis has examined the impact of RMP facility accidents on 
residential property values (Guignet et al. 2023a, b).\5\ The analysis 
found that accidents with only onsite impacts reduced nearby property 
values between zero and two percent. However, accidents with impacts 
that occurred offsite, including fatalities, hospitalizations, people 
in need of medical treatment, evacuations, sheltering in place events, 
and/or property and environmental damage, reduced home values by two to 
three percent. The lower values persisted for about 10 to 12 years on 
average. The paper estimates an average loss of $5,350 per home in 
2021-year values. Aggregating across the communities near the 661 
facilities that experienced an offsite impact accident in their data, 
they calculate a total $39.5 billion loss. These studies strongly 
suggest that preventing or mitigating an accident at a chemical 
facility may prevent or mitigate lost productivity at RMP facilities 
and property value losses in nearby neighborhoods.
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    \3\ Marsh JLT Specialty, ``100 Largest Losses in the Hydrocarbon 
Industry,'' 27th Edition, March 2022. Accessed from https://www.marsh.com/uk/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses.html. Marsh provides estimates of large property damage 
losses in the hydrocarbon industry from 1974 to 2021 in current and 
2021 dollars and in a few cases, business loss costs.
    \4\ Marsh JLT Specialty, ``100 Largest Losses 1974-2015: Large 
property damage losses in the hydrocarbon industry,'' 24th Edition, 
March 2016. Accessed from https://www.marsh.com/uk/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses.html. Marsh provides 
estimates of large property damage losses in the hydrocarbon 
industry and in a few cases, business loss costs.
    \5\ Guignet, Dennis, Robin R. Jenkins, Christoph Nolte, and 
James Belke. 2023a. The External Costs of Industrial Chemical 
Accidents: A Nationwide Property Value Study. Journal of Housing 
Economics. 62 (2023) 101954.
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    Further, in enacting section 112(r), Congress was focused on 
catastrophic accidents such as the 1984 Union Carbide industrial 
disaster in Bhopal, India,\6\ which are extremely rare, but very high 
consequence events. While large chemical facility accidents that have 
occurred in the U.S. and Europe have not approached this level of 
damage, it is possible that could happen. For example, one of the most 
consequential chemical accidents in the U.S.\7\ was the 1989 explosion 
at the Phillips facility in Pasadena, TX, that killed 23 workers ($239 
million in 2022 dollars), injured at least 150 more ($7.5 million), and 
caused $1.8 billion in property damage.\8\
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    \6\ Union Carbide release of approximately 40 tons of methyl 
isocyanate into the air killed over 3,700 people. Most of the deaths 
and injuries occurred in a residential area near the plant.; Lees, 
Frank P. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 3, 2nd 
ed. Appendix 5, Bhopal (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996).
    \7\ As compared to consequences resulting from RMP accidents 
2004-2020 listed in Appendix A of the Technical Background Document 
for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under 
the Clean Air Act, section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical 
Accident Prevention (April 19, 2022).
    \8\ EPA estimated the values of injuries and deaths that 
occurred in Pasadena using the same values applied to injuries and 
deaths at RMP facility-reported accidents. See Exhibit 3-15 in the 
accompanying RIA for specific values and section 3.2.5.1 
``Fatalities and Injuries'' in the RIA for detailed explanations of 
how those values were estimated. The $1.8 billion in property damage 
was estimated by Marsh JLT Specialty, ``100 Largest Losses in the 
Hydrocarbon Industry,'' 27th ed., March 2022. https://www.marsh.com/us/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses/100-largest-losses-report-download.html.
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    The five-year baseline period accident costs included in EPA's 
analysis is $540 million per year. This cost was estimated using 
impacts from accidents during 2016 through 2020 (the last year with 
complete data) reported to the RMP plan reporting database by facility 
owners and operators. EPA used this dataset due to a lack of 
alternative data describing accident impacts more comprehensively. This 
estimate does not include a major catastrophe on the scale of Union 
Carbide-Bhopal, or even Phillips-Pasadena. If the final rule provisions 
were to prevent or substantially mitigate even one accident of this 
magnitude, the benefits generated, quantified and unquantified, will be 
dramatic. Further, some

[[Page 17625]]

accidents that occurred at RMP facilities during the five-year period 
were not reported to EPA because the facility either closed after the 
accident, decommissioned the process, or removed the regulated 
substance from the process involved in the accident before it was 
required to submit a report to the RMP Database.\9\ Additionally, the 
many baseline accident impacts that are not reflected in the $540 
million baseline accident cost estimate because EPA was unable to 
monetize them,\10\ yet are expected to be avoided as a benefit of the 
final provisions, include responder costs, transaction costs, property 
value reductions, unmonetized costs of evacuations and sheltering-in-
place, the costs of potential health effects from exposure to toxic 
chemicals, and productivity losses, among others. The $540 million 
estimate also does not reflect the full set of baseline inefficiencies 
that may be mitigated due to the improved information offered by 
several of the final provisions such as the community notification 
requirements and the back-up power for monitors. As the range of 
monetized accident impacts suggests (from $100 to $700 million for 2016 
to 2020 \11\), the variation in monetized damages is substantial. 
Preventing a single high-cost accident annually would offset annual 
rule costs.
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    \9\ For example, the Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refining and 
Marketing LLC facility in Philadelphia, PA, had a fire and 
explosions in the PES Girard Point refinery HF alkylation unit on 
June 21, 2019, which resulted in the release of HF. This facility 
deregistered the affected process before the deadline for their 
subsequent RMP report. For a description of damages from this 
accident see section 3.2.1 of the RIA and the CSB Report, Fire and 
Explosions at Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refinery Hydrofluoric 
Acid Alkylation Unit, Factual Update, October 16, 2019, https://www.phila.gov/media/20191204161826/US-CSB-PES-Factual-Update.pdf.
    \10\ For descriptions on why EPA was unable to monetize each of 
these impacts, see Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer Communities by 
Chemical Accident Prevention: Final Rule. This document is available 
in the docket for this rulemaking (EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174). Chapter 
6, Section 6.2.
    \11\ Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer Communities by Chemical 
Accident Prevention: Final Rule. This document is available in the 
docket for this rulemaking (EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174).
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    When considering this final rule's likely benefits of avoiding some 
portion of the monetized accident impacts, as well as the additional 
nonmonetized benefits, EPA believes the costs of the rule are 
reasonable in comparison to its expected benefits. When assessing the 
reasonableness of the benefits and burdens of various regulatory 
options, EPA places weight on both preventing more common accidental 
releases captured in the accident history portion of the RMP database 
while also placing weight on less quantifiable potential catastrophic 
events. The Agency's judgment as to what regulations are ``reasonable'' 
is informed by both quantifiable and unquantifiable burdens and 
benefits as discussed more fully in section III.C of this preamble.

II. General Information

A. Does this action apply to me?

    This rule applies to those facilities (referred to as ``stationary 
sources'' under the Clean Air Act, or CAA (42 U.S.C. 7412(r))) that are 
subject to the chemical accident prevention requirements at 40 CFR part 
68. This includes stationary sources holding more than a threshold 
quantity (TQ) of a regulated substance in a process. Nothing in this 
rule impacts the scope and applicability of the General Duty Clause 
(GDC) in CAA section 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(1). See 40 CFR 68.1. 
Table 1 provides industrial sectors and the associated North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes for entities potentially 
affected by this action. The Agency's goal is to provide a guide on 
entities that might be affected by this action. However, this action 
may affect other entities not listed in this table. If you have 
questions about the applicability of this action to a particular 
entity, consult the person(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this preamble.

                            Table 1--Entities Potentially Affected by the Final Rule
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                                                                              Number of
               Sector                              NAICS codes                facilities       Chemical uses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administration of environmental       92, 2213 (government-owned)..........        1,449  Use chlorine and other
 quality programs (i.e.,                                                                   chemicals for water
 governments, government-owned                                                             treatment.
 water).
Agricultural chemical distributors/   11, 424 (except 4246, 4247)..........        3,315  Store ammonia for
 wholesalers.                                                                              sale; some in NAICS
                                                                                           111 and 115 use
                                                                                           ammonia as a
                                                                                           refrigerant.
Chemical manufacturing..............  325..................................        1,502  Manufacture, process,
                                                                                           store.
Chemical wholesalers................  4246.................................          317  Store for sale.
Food and beverage manufacturing.....  311, 312.............................        1,571  Use (mostly ammonia)
                                                                                           as a refrigerant.
Oil and gas extraction..............  211..................................          719  Intermediate
                                                                                           processing (mostly
                                                                                           regulated flammable
                                                                                           substances and
                                                                                           flammable mixtures).
Other...............................  21 (except 211), 23, 44, 45, 48, 491,          246  Use chemicals for
                                       54, 55, 56, 61, 62, 71, 72, 81, 99.                 wastewater treatment,
                                                                                           refrigeration, store
                                                                                           chemicals for sale.
Other manufacturing.................  313, 314, 315, 326, 327, 33..........          375  Use various chemicals
                                                                                           in manufacturing
                                                                                           process, waste
                                                                                           treatment.
Other wholesale.....................  421, 422, 423........................           39  Use (mostly ammonia)
                                                                                           as a refrigerant.
Paper manufacturing.................  321, 322.............................           55  Use various chemicals
                                                                                           in pulp and paper
                                                                                           manufacturing.
Petroleum and coal products           324..................................          156  Manufacture, process,
 manufacturing.                                                                            store (mostly
                                                                                           regulated flammable
                                                                                           substances and
                                                                                           flammable mixtures).
Petroleum wholesalers...............  4247.................................          367  Store for sale (mostly
                                                                                           regulated flammable
                                                                                           substances and
                                                                                           flammable mixtures).
Utilities/water/wastewater..........  221 (non-government-owned water).....          519  Use chlorine (mostly
                                                                                           for water treatment)
                                                                                           and other chemicals.
Warehousing and storage.............  493..................................        1,110  Use (mostly ammonia)
                                                                                           as a refrigerant.
                                                                            -------------
    Total...........................  .....................................       11,740  ......................
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[[Page 17626]]

B. What action is the Agency taking?

    EPA is amending its RMP regulations as a result of Agency review. 
The revisions include several changes and amplifications to the 
accident prevention program requirements, enhancements to the emergency 
preparedness requirements, improvements to the public availability of 
chemical hazard information, and several other changes to certain 
regulatory definitions or points of clarification. Because major and 
other serious and concerning RMP accidents continue to occur, EPA 
believes that this final rule will help further protect human health 
and the environment from chemical hazards through advancement of 
process safety based on lessons learned. These amendments seek to 
improve chemical process safety; assist in planning, preparedness, and 
response to RMP-reportable accidents; and improve public awareness of 
chemical hazards at regulated sources.

C. What is the Agency's authority for taking this action?

    The statutory authority for this action is provided by section 
112(r) of the CAA as amended (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)). Each modification of 
the RMP rule that EPA finalizes in this document is based on EPA's 
rulemaking authority under CAA section 112(r)(7) (42 U.S.C. 
7412(r)(7)). When promulgating rules under CAA section 112(r)(7)(A) and 
(B), EPA must follow the procedures for rulemaking set out in CAA 
section 307(d) (see CAA sections 112(r)(7)(E) and 307(d)(1)(C)). Among 
other things, CAA section 307(d) sets out requirements for the content 
of proposed and final rules, the docket for each rulemaking, 
opportunities for oral testimony on proposed rulemakings, the length of 
time for comments, and judicial review.

D. What are the incremental costs and benefits of this action?

1. Summary of Estimated Costs
    Table 2 presents a summary of the annualized final rule costs 
estimated in the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA).\12\ In total, EPA 
estimates annualized costs of $256.9 million at a 3% discount rate and 
$296.9 million at a 7% discount rate.
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    \12\ Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer Communities by Chemical 
Accident Prevention: Final Rule. This document is available in the 
docket for this rulemaking (EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174).

          Table 2--Summary of Estimated Annualized Costs [Millions, 2022 Dollars] Over a 10-Year Period
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Total           Total
          Cost elements                Total        discounted      discounted      Annualized      Annualized
                                   undiscounted        (3%)            (7%)            (3%)            (7%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third-party Audits..............           $75.2           $64.2           $52.8            $7.5            $7.5
Root Cause Analysis.............             7.3             6.2             5.1             0.7             0.7
Safer Technology and
 Alternatives Analysis (STAA):
    Initial Evaluation..........           176.4           158.2           138.3            18.5            19.7
    Practicability Study........           256.9           230.2           201.0            27.0            28.6
    Implementation..............         1,700.4         1,438.9         1,172.6           168.7           204.9
Backup Power for Perimeter                   3.3             2.8             2.3             0.3             0.3
 Monitors.......................
Employee Participation Plan.....           114.7            97.9            80.6            11.5            11.5
RMP Justifications:
    No Backup Power.............              .2             0.1             0.1          ** 0.0          ** 0.0
    Natural Hazards.............              .4             0.4             0.3          ** 0.0          ** 0.0
    Facility Siting.............              .4             0.4             0.3          ** 0.0          ** 0.0
    RAGAGEP.....................              .3             0.2             0.2          ** 0.0          ** 0.0
Community Notification System...            39.7            33.9            27.9             4.0             4.0
Information Availability........           127.6           108.8            89.6            12.8            12.8
Rule Familiarization............            50.9            49.5            47.6             5.8             6.8
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total Cost *................         2,554.0         2,191.7         1,818.9           256.9           296.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Totals may not sum due to rounding.
** Costs are zero due to rounding, Unrounded costs are $42,307 for Natural Hazards and Facility Siting, $27,582
  for RAGAGEP, and $15,798 for No Backup Power.

    The largest annualized cost of the final rule is the STAA 
implementation cost ($168.7 million at a 3% discount rate and $204.9 
million at a 7% discount rate), followed by practicability study ($27.0 
million at a 3% discount rate and $28.6 million at a 7% discount rate), 
STAA initial evaluation ($18.5 million at a 3% discount rate and $19.7 
million at a 7% discount rate), information availability ($12.8 million 
at both 3% and 7% discount rates), employee participation plans ($11.5 
million at both 3% and 7% discount rates), third-party audits ($7.5 
million at both 3% and 7% discount rates), rule familiarization ($5.8 
million at a 3% discount rate and $6.8 million at a 7% discount rate), 
and community notification systems ($4.0 million at both 3% and 7% 
discount rates). The remaining provisions impose annualized costs under 
$1 million, including root cause analysis ($0.7 million at both 3% and 
7% discount rates), emergency backup power for perimeter monitors ($0.3 
million at both 3% and 7% discount rates), and RMP justifications for 
natural hazards, facility siting, RAGAGEP, and no backup power, that 
each have annualized costs below $0.1 million (at both 3% and 7% 
discount rates).
    The Agency has determined that among the 2,636 potentially 
regulated private sector small entities impacted by this rule, 2,393, 
or 90.8 percent, may experience an impact of less than 1 percent of 
revenue with an average small entity cost of $72,525; 167, or 6.3 
percent, may experience an impact of between 1 and 3 percent of 
revenues with an average small entity cost of $629,271; and 75, or 2.8 
percent, may experience an impact of greater than 3 percent with an 
average small entity cost of $1,083,823. Among the 630 small government 
entities potentially affected, none would incur costs of less than 
$2,000; 365, or 58 percent, would incur costs ranging from $2,000 to 
$3,000; 248, or 39 percent, would incur costs ranging from $3,000 to 
$10,000; and 17, or 3 percent, would incur costs greater

[[Page 17627]]

than $10,000. EPA estimated that for the rule to have a larger than 1 
percent impact on the government entity with the largest cost impact, 
it would need to have revenue of less than $120 per resident. For the 
rule to have a larger than 1 percent impact on the smallest government 
entity identified in the data, it would need to have revenue of less 
than $650 per resident.\13\
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    \13\ The Regulatory Flexibility Act defines small governments as 
governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school 
districts, or special districts, with a population of less than 
50,000. Most governmental RMP facilities are water and wastewater 
treatment systems and listed a city or county as the owner entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Baseline Damages
    Accidents and chemical releases from RMP facilities occur every 
year. They cause fires and explosions, damage to property, acute and 
chronic exposures of workers and nearby residents to hazardous 
materials, and serious injuries and fatalities. EPA is able to present 
data on the total damages that currently occur at RMP facilities each 
year. In this final rule, EPA presents the data based on a 5-year 
baseline period (2016-2020), summarizes RMP accident impacts and, when 
possible, monetizes them. Due to a lack of alternative data describing 
RMP accident impacts more comprehensively, EPA chose this five-year 
dataset to reflect the most recent trends regarding RMP accidents.\14\ 
It is important to note, however, that many accident costs are not 
required to be reported under the RMP accident reporting provisions (40 
CFR 68.42(b)) and thus are not reflected in the data. These include 
responder costs, transaction costs, property value reductions, 
unmonetized costs of evacuations and sheltering-in-place, the costs of 
potential health effects, and productivity losses, among others.\15\ In 
addition, some accidents that occurred at RMP facilities during the 
five-year period were not reported to EPA because the facility either 
closed after the accident, decommissioned the process, or removed the 
regulated substance from the process involved in the accident before it 
was required to submit a report to the RMP Database. For example, the 
Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES) Refining and Marketing LLC facility 
in Philadelphia, PA, had a fire and explosions in the PES Girard Point 
refinery hydrofluoric acid (HF) alkylation unit on June 21, 2019, which 
resulted in the release of HF.\16\ This facility deregistered the 
affected process before the deadline for their subsequent RMP report. 
Due to the omission of such accidents and the omission of the cost 
categories listed in the beginning of this paragraph, the monetized 
costs of RMP accidents to society underestimate the number and 
magnitude of RMP chemical accidents. Nonetheless, EPA expects that some 
portion of future damages will be prevented through implementation of 
the final rule. Table 3 presents a summary of the quantified damages 
identified in the analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ EPA used the August 1, 2021, version of the RMP database to 
complete its analysis because under 40 CFR 68.195(a), facilities are 
required to report RMP accidents and specific associated information 
within six months to the RMP database. Therefore, the RMP database 
as of August 1, 2021, is expected to include RMP accidents and their 
specific associated information as of December 31, 2020. However, 
because accident data are reported to the RMP database by facility 
owners and operators, EPA acknowledges the likelihood of late-
reported accidents affecting these last few years of data because 
some facilities may have not reported their RMP accidents as they 
are required to do. See sections 3.2 and 3.3 of the RIA for more on 
this and other limitations on the number and costs of baseline 
accidents.
    \15\ Further discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of the RIA.
    \16\ For a description of damages from this case see section 
3.2.1 of the RIA and the CSB Report, Fire and Explosions at 
Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refinery Hydrofluoric Acid Alkylation 
Unit, Factual Update, October 16, 2019, https://www.phila.gov/media/20191204161826/US-CSB-PES-Factual-Update.pdf.

                                     Table 3--Summary of Quantified Damages
                                            [Millions, 2022 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                     Average/
                                                    Unit value     5-Year total    Average/ year     accident
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     On site
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatalities......................................           $10.4          $187.9          $37.57           $0.38
Injuries........................................            0.05           28.75            5.75            0.06
Property Damage.................................  ..............           2,273          454.58            4.66
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Onsite Total................................  ..............        2,489.49          497.90            5.10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Off site
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fatalities......................................            10.4            0.00            0.00            0.00
Hospitalizations................................           0.045            1.40            0.28           0.003
Medical Treatment...............................           0.001            0.13            0.03          0.0003
Evacuations *...................................            0.00           18.99            3.80           0.039
Sheltering in Place *...........................            0.00           12.58            2.52           0.026
Property Damage.................................  ..............          178.55           35.71            0.37
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Offsite Total...............................  ..............          211.66           42.33            0.43
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
        Total...................................  ..............        2,701.14          540.23            5.54
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The unit value is $293 for evacuations and $147 for sheltering in place, so when expressed in rounded millions
  the value represented in the table is zero.

    In total, EPA estimated monetized damages from RMP facility 
accidents of $540.23 million per year, which are divided into onsite 
and offsite categories where possible. EPA estimated total, average 
annual onsite damages from chemical releases at RMP facilities of 
$497.90 million. The largest monetized category was onsite property 
damage, valued at $454.58 million. The next largest impacts were onsite 
fatalities ($37.57 million) and injuries ($5.75 million).
    EPA estimated total, average annual offsite damages of $42.33 
million. Property damage again was the highest value category, 
estimated at

[[Page 17628]]

approximately $35.71 million. In decreasing order, the next largest 
average annual offsite impact was from evacuations ($3.80 million), 
then sheltering in place ($2.52 million), hospitalizations ($0.28 
million), and medical treatment ($0.03 million).
    Regarding small entities, there were 86 accidents at facilities 
owned by small entities in the 2016-2020 period, or about 18 percent of 
all accidents.\17\ These accidents cost $141.14 million in total over 
the 5-years, with an average cost of $28.23 million per year, and 
average per accident cost of $0.29 million. These accidents costs 
represent about 5% of the costs of all accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ There are accidents at 97 facilities that were not matched 
in the small entity analysis, so it is not possible to determine if 
they are owned by small or large entities with the data EPA has.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA also evaluated the range of significant baseline damages in 
Table 3 that could not be quantified. These damages include major 
catastrophic releases, potential health risks from toxic chemical 
exposure, lost productivity at affected facilities, emergency response 
costs, transaction costs from potential subsequent legal battles, 
property value losses in nearby neighborhoods, environmental damage, 
unquantified costs of evacuation and sheltering-in-place events, and 
others. They have not been quantified because there is either limited 
or no information in the RMP data. However, in some cases, these 
damages could be even more detrimental to the facility and community 
than those damages that can be quantified. For example, regarding lost 
productivity, costs are highly variable based on the type of release, 
the extent of the damage, the location of the facility, and product 
being produced. Yet, Marsh Specialty, a risk management and energy 
consultancy, has collected data on 10,000 accidents in the 
petrochemical sector over 40 years and published 27 editions of its 
``100 Largest Losses'' reports.\18\ The data suggest that lost 
productivity may range from zero to four to five is typically two to 
three times the cost of property damage.\19\ Another example of 
unquantified impacts can be examined with property value impacts. A 
recent hedonic property value analysis has examined the impact of RMP 
facility accidents on residential property values (Guignet et al. 
2023a, b).\20\ The analysis found that accidents with only onsite 
impacts reduced nearby property values between zero and two percent. 
However, accidents with impacts that occurred offsite, including 
fatalities, hospitalizations, people in need of medical treatment, 
evacuations, sheltering in place events, and/or property and 
environmental damage, reduced home values by two to three percent. The 
lower values persisted for about 10 to 12 years on average. The paper 
estimates an average loss of $5,350 per home in 2021-year values. 
Aggregating across the communities near the 661 facilities that 
experienced an offsite impact accident in their data, they calculate a 
total $39.5 billion loss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Marsh JLT Specialty, ``100 Largest Losses in the 
Hydrocarbon Industry,'' 27th Edition, March 2022. Accessed from 
https://www.marsh.com/uk/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses.html. Marsh provides estimates of large property 
damage losses in the hydrocarbon industry from 1974 to 2021 in 
current and 2021 dollars and in a few cases, business loss costs.
    \19\ Marsh JLT Specialty, ``100 Largest Losses 1974-2015: Large 
property damage losses in the hydrocarbon industry,'' 24th Edition, 
March 2016. Accessed from https://www.marsh.com/uk/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses.html. Marsh provides 
estimates of large property damage losses in the hydrocarbon 
industry and in a few cases, business loss costs.
    \20\ Guignet, Dennis, Robin R. Jenkins, Christoph Nolte, and 
James Belke. 2023a. The External Costs of Industrial Chemical 
Accidents: A Nationwide Property Value Study. Journal of Housing 
Economics. 62 (2023) 101954.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the five-year baseline period included in this analysis 
($540 million per year) does not include a major catastrophe. In 
enacting section 112(r), Congress was focused on catastrophic accidents 
such as Union Carbide-Bhopal, which are extremely rare, but very high 
consequence events. The large chemical facility accidents that have 
occurred in the U.S. and Europe have not approached this level of 
damage, although it is possible that could happen. As mentioned 
previously, one of the most consequential accidents in the U.S.,\21\ 
the explosion at the Phillips facility in Pasadena, TX, in 1989, killed 
23 workers ($239 million in 2022 dollars), injured at least 150 more 
($7.5 million), and caused $1.8 billion in property damage. These 
baseline damages are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 of the 
RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ As compared to consequences resulting from RMP accidents 
2004-2020 listed in Appendix A of the Technical Background Document 
for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under 
the Clean Air Act, section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical 
Accident Prevention (April 19, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Summary of Estimated Benefits
    RMP accident data show past accidents have generated highly 
variable impacts, so the impacts of future accidents are difficult to 
predict. Nevertheless, it is clear from RMP accident data \22\ and 
other relevant data from RMP regulated industry sectors,\23\ that 
chemical accidents can impose substantial costs on firms, employees, 
emergency responders, the community, and the broader economy. 
Notwithstanding EPA's current rules, RMP accidents have continued to 
occur. EPA anticipates that promulgation and implementation of this 
final rule will improve the health and safety protection provided by 
the RMP rule and result in a reduced frequency and magnitude of damages 
from releases, including damages that are quantified in Table 3 such as 
fatalities, injuries, property damage, hospitalizations, medical 
treatment, sheltering in place, and so on. EPA also expects that the 
final rule provisions will reduce baseline damages that are not 
quantified in Table 3 such as lost productivity, responder costs, 
property value reductions, damages from catastrophes, transaction 
costs, environmental impacts, and so on. Although EPA was unable to 
quantify the reductions in damages that may occur as a result of the 
final rule provisions, EPA expects that a portion of future damages 
will be prevented by the final rule.\24\ Table 4 summarizes five broad 
social benefit categories related to accident prevention and 
mitigation, including prevention of RMP accidents, mitigation of RMP 
accidents, prevention and mitigation of non-RMP accidents at RMP 
facilities, and prevention of major catastrophes. The table explains 
each and identifies thirteen associated specific benefit categories, 
ranging from avoided fatalities to avoided emergency response costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ EPA estimated monetized damages from RMP facility accidents 
of $540.23 million per year.
    \23\ Marsh JLT Specialty, ``100 Largest Losses in the 
Hydrocarbon Industry,'' 27th Edition, March 2022. Accessed from 
https://www.marsh.com/uk/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses.html. Marsh provides estimates of large property 
damage losses in the hydrocarbon industry from 1974 to 2021 in 
current and 2021 dollars and in a few cases, business loss costs.
    \24\ For the discussion of how final rule provisions are 
intended to lower the likelihood of future accidents of the same or 
similar type, see section 6.1.1 of the RIA.

[[Page 17629]]



      Table 4--Summary of Social Benefits of Final Rule Provisions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Specific benefit
     Broad benefit category           Explanation         categories
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accident Prevention.............  Prevention of        Reduced
                                   future RMP          Fatalities.
                                   facility            Reduced
                                   accidents.          Injuries.
                                                       Reduced
                                                       Property Damage.
                                                       Fewer
                                                       People Sheltered-
                                                       in-Place.
Accident Mitigation.............  Mitigation of        Fewer
                                   future RMP          Evacuations.
                                   facility            Avoided
                                   accidents.          Health Risks from
                                                       Exposure to
                                                       Toxics.
Non-RMP Accident Prevention and   Prevention and       Avoided
 Mitigation.                       mitigation of       Lost
                                   future non-RMP      Productivity.
                                   accidents at RMP    Avoided
                                   facilities.         Emergency
                                                       Response Costs.
                                                       Avoided
                                                       Transaction
                                                       Costs.
                                                       Avoided
                                                       Property Value
                                                       Impacts.*
Avoided Catastrophes............  Prevention of rare   Avoided
                                   but extremely       Environmental
                                   high consequence    Impacts.
                                   events.
Information Availability........  Provision of         Improved
                                   information to      Efficiency of
                                   the public and      Property Markets.
                                   emergency           Improved
                                   responders.         Resource
                                                       Allocation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These impacts partially overlap with several other categories.

    For details on how quantified benefits were estimated or discussion 
on unquantified benefits, including the difficulty in their 
quantification see Chapter 6 of the RIA.
    When considering this final rule's likely benefits of this of 
avoiding some portion of the monetized accident impacts, as well as the 
additional nonmonetized benefits, EPA believes the costs of the rule 
are reasonable in comparison to its expected benefits. When assessing 
the reasonableness of the benefits and burdens of various regulatory 
options, EPA places weight on both preventing more common accidental 
releases captured in the accident history portion of the RMP database 
while also placing weight on less quantifiable potential catastrophic 
events. The Agency's judgment as to what regulations are ``reasonable'' 
is informed by both quantifiable and unquantifiable burdens and 
benefits.

III. Background

A. Overview of EPA's Risk Management Program

    EPA originally issued the RMP regulations in two stages. First, the 
Agency published the list of regulated substances and TQs in 1994: 
``List of Regulated Substances and Thresholds for Accidental Release 
Prevention; Requirements for Petitions Under Section 112(r) of the 
Clean Air Act as Amended'' (59 FR 4478, January 31, 1994), hereinafter 
referred to as the ``list rule.'' \25\ The Agency then published the 
RMP regulations, containing risk management requirements for covered 
sources, in 1996: ``Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk 
Management Programs Under Clean Air Act Section 112(r)(7)'' (61 FR 
31668, June 20, 1996), hereinafter referred to as the ``1996 RMP 
rule.'' 26 27 Subsequent modifications to the list rule and 
the 1996 RMP rule were made as discussed in the 2017 amendments rule 
(``Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs 
Under the Clean Air Act''; 82 FR 4594 at 4600, January 13, 2017, 
hereinafter referred to as the ``2017 amendments rule''). In addition 
to requiring implementation of management program elements, the RMP 
rule requires any covered source to submit (to EPA) a document 
summarizing the source's risk management program--called a risk 
management plan (or RMP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Documents and information related to development of the 
list rule can be found in the EPA docket for the rulemaking, docket 
number A-91-74.
    \26\ Documents and information related to development of the 
1996 RMP rule can be found in EPA docket number A-91-73.
    \27\ The regulation at 40 CFR part 68 applies to owners and 
operators of stationary sources that have more than a TQ of a 
regulated substance within a process. The regulations do not apply 
to chemical hazards other than listed substances held above a TQ 
within a regulated process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prior to development of EPA's 1996 RMP rule, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) published its Process Safety 
Management (PSM) standard in 1992 (57 FR 6356, February 24, 1992), as 
required by section 304 of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), 
using its authority under 29 U.S.C. 653. The OSHA PSM standard can be 
found in 29 CFR 1910.119. Both the OSHA PSM standard and EPA's RMP rule 
aim to prevent or minimize the consequences of accidental chemical 
releases through implementation of management program elements that 
integrate technologies, procedures, and management practices.
    EPA's RMP requirements include conducting a worst-case scenario 
analysis and a review of accident history, coordinating emergency 
response procedures with local response organizations, conducting a 
hazard assessment, documenting a management system, implementing a 
prevention program and an emergency response program, and submitting a 
risk management plan that addresses all aspects of the RMP for all 
covered processes and chemicals. A process at a source is covered under 
one of three different prevention programs (Program 1, Program 2, or 
Program 3) based directly or indirectly on the threat posed to the 
community and the environment. Program 1 has minimal requirements and 
is for processes that have not had an accidental release with offsite 
consequences in the last 5 years before submission of the source's risk 
management plan, and that have no public receptors within the worst-
case release scenario vulnerable zone for the process. Program 3 
applies to processes not eligible for Program 1, has the most 
requirements, and applies to processes covered by the OSHA PSM standard 
or classified in specified industrial sectors. Program 2 has fewer 
requirements than Program 3 and applies to any process not covered 
under Programs 1 or 3. Programs 2 and 3 both require a hazard 
assessment, a prevention program, and an emergency response program, 
although Program 2 requirements are less extensive and more 
streamlined. For example, the Program 2 prevention program was intended 
to cover, in many cases, simpler processes at smaller businesses and 
does not require the following process safety elements: management of 
change, pre-startup review, contractors, employee participation, and 
hot work permits. The Program 3 prevention program is similar to the 
OSHA PSM standard and designed to cover those processes in the

[[Page 17630]]

chemical industry. EPA notes that nothing in this final rule changes 
the applicability determinations or designations of whether a process 
at a stationary source is covered under one of the three different 
prevention programs.

B. Events Leading to This Action

    On January 13, 2017, EPA published amendments to the RMP rule (82 
FR 4594). The 2017 amendments rule was prompted by E.O. 13650, 
``Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security,'' \28\ which 
directed EPA (and several other Federal agencies) to, among other 
things, modernize policies, regulations, and standards to enhance 
safety and security in chemical facilities. The 2017 amendments rule 
contained various new provisions applicable to RMP-regulated facilities 
addressing prevention program elements (STAA, incident investigation 
root cause analysis, and third-party compliance audits); emergency 
response coordination with local responders (including emergency 
response exercises); and availability of information to the public. EPA 
received three petitions for reconsideration of the 2017 amendments 
rule under CAA section 307(d)(7)(B).\29\ In December 2019, EPA 
finalized revisions to the RMP regulations to reconsider the rule 
changes made in January 2017 (``Accidental Release Prevention 
Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act,'' 84 FR 
69834, December 19, 2019, hereinafter referred to as the ``2019 
reconsideration rule''). The 2019 reconsideration rule rescinded 
certain information disclosure provisions of the 2017 amendments rule, 
removed most new accident prevention requirements added by the 2017 
amendments rule, and modified some other provisions of the 2017 
amendments rule. The rule changes made by the 2019 reconsideration rule 
reflect the current RMP regulations to date. There are petitions for 
judicial review of both the 2017 amendments and the 2019 
reconsideration rules. The 2019 reconsideration rule challenges are 
being held in abeyance until March 1, 2024, by which time the parties 
must submit motions to govern. The case against the 2017 amendments 
rule is in abeyance pending resolution of the 2019 reconsideration rule 
case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/01/executive-order-improving-chemical-facility-safety-and-security.
    \29\ https://www.epa.gov/petitions/petitions-office-land-and-emergency-management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On January 20, 2021, President Biden issued E.O. 13990, 
``Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to 
Tackle the ClimateCrisis.'' \30\ E.O. 13990 directed Federal agencies 
to review existing regulations and take action to address priorities 
established by the Biden Administration, which include bolstering 
resilience to the impacts of climate change and prioritizing EJ. As a 
result, EPA was tasked to review the current RMP regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-protecting-public-health-and-environment-and-restoring-science-to-tackle-climate-crisis/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the Agency reviewed the RMP rule under E.O. 13990, the E.O. 
did not specifically direct EPA to publish a solicitation for comment 
or information from the public. Nevertheless, EPA held virtual public 
listening sessions on June 16 and July 8, 2021, and had an open docket 
for public comment (86 FR 28828, May 28, 2021). In the request for 
public comment, the Agency asked for information on the adequacy of 
revisions to the RMP regulations completed since 2017, incorporating 
consideration of climate change risks and impacts into the regulations 
and expanding the application of EJ. EPA received a total of 27,828 
public comments in response to the request for comments. This included 
27,720 received at regulations.gov,\31\ 35 provided during the 
listening session on June 16, 2021,\32\ and 73 provided during the 
listening session on July 8, 2021.\33\ Most of the comments received in 
the docket were copies of form letters related to four different form 
letter campaigns. The remaining comments included 302 submissions 
containing unique content. Of the 302 unique submissions, a total of 
163 were deemed to be substantive (i.e., the commenters presented both 
a position and a reasoned argument in support of the position). 
Information collected through these comments informed the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312.
    \32\ EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0011.
    \33\ EPA-HQ-OLEM-2021-0312-0020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA published the ``RMP Safer Communities by Chemical Accident 
Prevention,'' (SCCAP) proposed rulemaking on August 31, 2022 (87 FR 
53556), hereinafter referred to as the ``2022 SCCAP proposed rule.'' 
The 2022 SCCAP proposed rule included several changes and 
amplifications to the accident prevention program requirements, 
enhancements to the emergency preparedness requirements, improvements 
to the public availability of chemical hazard information, and several 
other changes to certain regulatory definitions or points of 
clarification. EPA hosted virtual public hearings on September 26, 27, 
and 28, 2022 to provide interested parties the opportunity to present 
data, views or arguments concerning the proposed action.
    EPA received a total of 494 discrete public comments deemed as 
substantive (i.e., the commenters presented both a position and a 
reasoned argument in support of the position) on the proposed 
rulemaking. Of the 494 comments, 370 were written submitted comments 
and 124 were from members of the public that provided verbal comments 
at the public hearings on September 26, 27, and 28, 2022. Of the 370, 
142 were from 101 unique organizations, 6 were the result of various 
mass mail campaigns and contained numerous copies of letters or 
petition signatures (approximately 57,505 letters and signatures were 
contained in these several comments), and 31 were from individual 
citizens. Discussion of public comments can be found in topics included 
in this final rule and in the Response to Comments document,\34\ 
available in the docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ 2023. EPA Response to Comments on the 2022 SCCAP Proposed 
Rule (August 31, 2022; 87 FR 53556). This document is available in 
the docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) discussed how the various 
proposed provisions amendments to the RMP rule were not only 
integrated, reinforcing, and complementary but also how each was 
merited on its own and severable. 87 FR 53566 (August 31, 2022). For 
example, EPA noted that new substantive prevention requirements like 
STAA and third-party audits triggered by NAICS, location, and accident 
history were reinforced by provisions like local information access and 
enhanced employee participation. Nevertheless, in the body of the 
preamble for the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule, the Agency explained how 
each of these provisions would help prevent accidents and improve 
release mitigation and emergency response on its own merits.

C. EPA's Authority To Revise the RMP Rule

    The statutory authority for this action is provided by CAA section 
112(r) (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)). Each of the portions of the RMP regulations 
we are amending in this action are based on EPA's rulemaking authority 
under CAA section 112(r)(7). Under CAA section 112(r)(7)(A), EPA may 
set rules addressing the prevention, detection, and correction of 
accidental releases of substances listed by EPA (``regulated

[[Page 17631]]

substances'' listed in the tables 1 through 4 to 40 CFR 68.130). Such 
rules may include requirements related to monitoring, data collection, 
training, design, equipment, work practice, and operations. In 
promulgating its regulations, EPA may draw distinctions between types, 
classes, and kinds of facilities by taking into consideration various 
factors including size and location. A more detailed discussion of the 
underlying statutory authority for the current RMP regulations appears 
in the initial 1993 action that proposed the RMP regulations (58 FR 
54190-3, October 20, 1993).
    Under CAA 112(r)(7)(B)(i), Congress authorized EPA to develop 
``reasonable regulations and appropriate guidance'' that provide for 
the prevention and detection of accidental releases and the response to 
such releases, ``to the greatest extent practicable.'' Congress 
required an initial rulemaking under this paragraph by November 15, 
1993. Section 112(r)(7)(B) sets out a series of mandatory subjects to 
address, interagency consultation requirements, and discretionary 
provisions that allowed EPA to tailor requirements to make them 
reasonable and practicable. The prevention program provisions discussed 
in this action (hazard evaluations of natural hazards, power loss and 
stationary source siting, safer technologies and alternatives analysis, 
root cause analysis incident investigation, third party compliance 
auditing, and employee participation) derive from EPA's authority to 
promulgate reasonable regulations for the ``prevention and detection of 
accidental releases'' (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(i)). Similarly, the 
emergency coordination and exercises provisions in this rule derive 
from EPA's authority to promulgate reasonable regulations to address 
``response to such [accidental] releases by the owners or operators of 
the source of such releases'' Id. Section 112(r)(7)(B)(i) calls for 
EPA's regulations to recognize differences in ``size, operations, 
processes, class and categories of sources.'' For that reason, this 
action maintains distinctions in prevention program levels and in 
response actions authorized by this provision. Finally, the information 
availability provisions discussed in this action generally assist in 
the development of ``procedures and measures for emergency response 
after an accidental release of a regulated substance in order to 
protect human health and the environment.'' Id. These information 
availability provisions include requirements to disclose information to 
the public within a 6-mile radius of sources, and are designed to 
ensure that emergency plans for impacts on the community are based on 
more relevant and accurate information than would otherwise be 
available and ensures that the public can become an informed 
participant in such emergency planning. Also, as noted in the 2022 
SCCAP proposed rule, requiring that information be made available to 
the public strengthens the prevention program by leveraging public 
oversight of facilities--especially prevention provisions that are 
triggered by source-specific accident history (87 FR 53566, August 31, 
2022).
    This rulemaking action finalizes substantive amendments to 40 CFR 
part 68 and is authorized by CAA sections 112(r)(7)(A) and (B), as 
explained in more detail in the proposed action (87 FR 53563-6), and as 
explained herein. In considering whether it is legally permissible for 
EPA to modify provisions of the RMP regulations while continuing to 
meet its obligations under CAA section 112(r), the Agency notes that it 
has made discretionary amendments to the 1996 RMP rule several times 
without dispute over its authority to issue discretionary amendments. 
(See 64 FR 640, January 6, 1999; 64 FR 28696, May 26, 1999; 69 FR 
18819, April 9, 2004.) According to the decision in Air Alliance 
Houston v. EPA, 906 F.3d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2018), ``EPA retains the 
authority under Section 7412(r)(7) [CAA section 112(r)(7)] to 
substantively amend the programmatic requirements of the [2017 RMP 
amendments] . . . subject to arbitrary and capricious review'' (906 
F.3d at 1066). Therefore, EPA is authorized to modify the provisions of 
the current RMP regulations if it finds that it is reasonable to do 
so.\35\
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    \35\ See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers. Association of the United 
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983). In addressing the standard of review to reconsider a 
regulation, the Supreme Court stated that the rescission or 
modification of safety standards ``is subject to the same test'' as 
the ``agency's action in promulgating such standards [and] may be 
set aside if found to be `arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law' '' (463 U.S. at 
41, quoting 5 U.S.C. 706). The same standard that applies to the 
promulgation of a rule applies to the modification or rescission of 
that rule.
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    The Supreme Court has also recognized that agencies have broad 
discretion to reconsider a regulation at any time so long as the 
changes in policy are ``permissible under the statute, . . . there are 
good reasons for [them], and that the agency believes [them] to be 
better'' than prior policies. (See Federal Communications Commission v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); emphasis in 
quote original.\36\) As explained in detail above and throughout this 
notice, the policy changes finalized in this action are permissible 
under the statute.
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    \36\ The full quote from Fox states: ``But [the Agency] need not 
demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new 
policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that 
the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good 
reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which 
the conscious change of course adequately indicates'' (Federal 
Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 
at 515; emphasis original).
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    Additionally, there are good reasons for the policies adopted in 
this rule. Accidental releases remain a significant concern to 
communities and cost society more than $540 million yearly.\37\ EPA 
monetized both onsite and offsite damages from RMP facility accidents 
from 2016-2020,\38\ when possible, to determine this amount. It is 
important to note, however, that many accident costs are not required 
to be reported under the RMP accident reporting provisions (40 CFR 
68.42(b)) and thus are not reflected in the data. These include 
responder costs, transaction costs, property value reductions, 
unmonetized costs of evacuations and sheltering-in-place, the costs of 
potential health risks from exposure to toxic chemicals, and 
productivity losses, among others.\39\ As mentioned previously, some 
accidents that occurred at RMP facilities during the five-year period 
were not reported to EPA because the facility either closed after the 
accident, decommissioned the process, or removed the regulated 
substance from the process involved in the accident before it was 
required to submit a report to the RMP Database. For example, the 
Philadelphia Energy

[[Page 17632]]

Solutions Refining and Marketing LLC facility in Philadelphia, PA, had 
a fire and explosions in the PES Girard Point refinery HF alkylation 
unit on June 21, 2019, which resulted in the release of HF.\40\ This 
facility deregistered the affected process before the deadline for 
their subsequent RMP report. Due to the omission of such accidents and 
the omission of the cost categories listed in the beginning of this 
paragraph, the monetized costs of RMP accidents to society 
underestimate the number and magnitude of RMP chemical accidents.
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    \37\ A full description of costs and benefits for this final 
rule can be found in the Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer 
Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention: Final Rule. This 
document is available in the docket for this rulemaking (EPA-HQ-
OLEM-2022-0174).
    \38\ Due to a lack of alternative data describing RMP accident 
impacts more comprehensively, EPA chose this five-year dataset to 
reflect the most recent trends regarding RMP accidents. EPA used the 
August 1, 2021, version of the RMP database to complete its analysis 
because under 40 CFR 68.195(a), facilities are required to report 
RMP accidents and specific associated information within six months 
to the RMP database. Therefore, the RMP database as of August 1, 
2021, is expected to include RMP accidents and their specific 
associated information as of December 31, 2020. However, because 
accident data are reported to the RMP database by facility owners 
and operators, EPA acknowledges the likelihood of late-reported 
accidents affecting these last few years of data because some 
facilities may have not reported their RMP accidents as they are 
required to do. See sections 3.2 and 3.3 of the RIA for more on this 
and other limitations on the number and costs of baseline accidents.
    \39\ Further discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of the RIA.
    \40\ For a description of damages from this case see section 
3.2.1 of the RIA and the CSB Report, Fire and Explosions at 
Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refinery Hydrofluoric Acid Alkylation 
Unit, Factual Update, October 16, 2019, https://www.phila.gov/media/20191204161826/US-CSB-PES-Factual-Update.pdf.
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    EPA estimated total average annual onsite damages of $497.9 
million. The largest monetized, average annual, onsite damage category 
was property damage, which resulted in average annual damage of 
approximately $454.58 million. The next largest impact was onsite 
fatalities ($37.57 million) and injuries ($5.75 million). EPA estimated 
total average annual offsite damages of $42.33 million. The largest 
monetized, average annual, offsite damage category was property damage, 
which resulted in average annual damage of approximately $35.71 
million. The next largest impact was from evacuations ($3.80 million), 
sheltering in place ($2.52 million), hospitalizations ($0.28 million), 
and medical treatment ($0.03 million).
    The risk of being impacted by an accidental release is even more 
apparent in communities where multiple RMP facilities are in close 
proximity to residential areas.\41\ The 2022 SCCAP proposed rule not 
only discussed data demonstrating this elevated risk, but also noted 
that a higher frequency of accidental releases in such communities is 
consistent with the common-sense notion that, while accidental releases 
are low-probability, high consequence events, the more facilities near 
a community, the higher the likelihood that the community will be faced 
with such an event, or multiple events (all other factors being equal). 
Lowering the probability and magnitude of accidents by putting more of 
a focus on prevention reduces the risks posed by these RMP 
facilities,\42\ which is one of the objectives of the present RMP 
amendments.
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    \41\ Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 
section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention 
(April 19, 2022).
    \42\ EPA notes that the two industrial sectors that are the 
focus of more requirements under the SCCAP rule, petroleum 
refineries (NAICS 324) and chemical manufacturers (NAICS 325) have 
been responsible for 42% of the accidental releases in the RMP 
database over the years 2016-2020. Approximately 83% of the costs of 
RMP accidental releases during 2016-2020 are attributed to these 
sectors. More details on the number and costs of baseline RMP 
accidents can be found in the Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer 
Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention: Final Rule. This 
document is available in the docket for this rulemaking (EPA-HQ-
OLEM-2022-0174).
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    EPA received various comments indicating that EPA has appropriate 
authority to revise RMP regulations. For the reasons stated directly 
above and throughout the proposal where we outline EPA's statutory 
authority under CAA section 112(r)(7), EPA agrees with these comments. 
Conversely, EPA also received comments that EPA is exceeding its 
statutory authority because it does not have jurisdiction over worker 
safety issues. EPA disagrees that it has exceeded its statutory 
authority in this way in this rulemaking. EPA acknowledges that both 
EPA and OSHA have separate mandates under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (29 U.S.C. 651), the CAA, and the requirements enacted in 
the CAAA. In the 1990s, both Agencies fulfilled their mandatory duties 
to promulgate and issue the rules required by CAA sections 112(r)(3)-
(5) and 112(r)(7)(B), as well as section 304 of the CAAA. The focus of 
OSHA's regulations in the PSM standard is on workplace safety, while 
EPA's focus in the RMP regulations has been primarily on minimizing the 
public impacts of accidental releases through prevention and response. 
This rule maintains EPA's focus on minimizing the public impacts of 
accidental releases even as it also reduces impacts on facilities and 
workers. As explained throughout the proposal and in this final action, 
the OSHA PSM standard and EPA RMP regulations are closely aligned in 
content, policy interpretations, and enforcement. This is not 
surprising, as accident prevention steps that make a process safe for 
workers often will be similar, or the same as, steps that would prevent 
deleterious impacts on the public. Congress recognized this 
relationship by requiring EPA to coordinate its requirements with those 
of OSHA in developing accident prevention regulations and requiring 
OSHA to coordinate with EPA when developing its PSM standard (see CAA 
section 112(r)(7)(D) and CAAA section 304(a)). Therefore, since the 
inception of these regulations, EPA and OSHA have coordinated closely 
on their implementation in order to minimize regulatory burden and 
avoid conflicting requirements for regulated facilities. This 
coordination has continued throughout the development of this rule and 
is explained further in the relevant sections below.
    A couple of commenters called on EPA to exercise its ``full 
statutory authority'' to issue measures that prevent disasters `` `to 
the greatest extent practicable.' ''EPA disagrees with these comments. 
As mentioned above, while EPA is authorized to promulgate regulations 
that provide for the prevention and detection of accidental releases to 
the greatest extent practicable, so too must these regulations be 
reasonable. The relevant statutory phrase describing EPA's authority to 
regulate under CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(i), authorizes ``reasonable 
regulations . . . to provide, to the greatest extent practicable,'' for 
the prevention and detection of and response to accidental releases of 
substances listed in 40 CFR 68.130. EPA interprets the term 
``practicable'' in this context to include concepts such as cost-
effectiveness of the regulatory and implementation approach, as well as 
the availability of relevant technical expertise and resources to the 
implementing and enforcement agencies and the owners and operators who 
must comply with the rule. Further, an interpretation of the statute 
that does not give meaning to the qualifier ``reasonable'' to the 
authority to regulate ``to the greatest extent practicable,'' as the 
commenters suggest, would be inconsistent with the structure of the 
statute. The terms ``reasonable'' and ``practicable'' operate both as 
authorization for EPA's regulations and as limitations on the scope of 
EPA's authority under CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(i), while the phrase 
``greatest extent practicable'' directs EPA to select the regulatory 
option that ``provide[s] the greatest level of practicable protection'' 
from ``among those regulatory options that are reasonable.'' 84 FR 
69849 (Dec. 19, 2019); see also 87 FR 53566 (Aug. 31, 2022). To the 
extent both the 2019 compliance-driven and the 2022 rule-based, 
prevention-focused approaches are reasonable, the approach of this 
final rule would be more protective and therefore be `` `to the 
greatest extent practicable' among the reasonable approaches.''
    As recognized by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 
2699, 2707 (2015), ``reasonable regulation'' generally involves some 
sort of examination of the benefits and the burdens of a rule. 
Nevertheless, the Court in Michigan v. EPA did not mandate a strict 
analysis of quantified

[[Page 17633]]

cost and benefits and limit the Agency to adopting only those measures 
that have quantified costs exceeding benefits. In assessing the types 
of benefits EPA should consider in a rulemaking under CAA 112(r)(7), 
EPA recognizes that a major purpose of the accidental release 
provisions of the CAA is to help mitigate and prevent large scale 
catastrophic incidents that are rare and therefore difficult to 
quantify.\43\ Both the Senate and the House committee reports on the 
CAAA specifically identify the Union Carbide-Bhopal incident as one 
that demonstrated the need for the accidental release prevention 
provision (House Report at 155-57; Senate Report at 134-35, 143-44). 
The congressional reports and floor debates also cite an EPA study 
identifying 17 events that, based only the volume and toxicity of the 
chemicals involved (and not accounting for factors such as location, 
climate, and operating conditions) had the potential for more damage 
than the Union Carbide-Bhopal incident.\44\ Therefore, when assessing 
the reasonableness of the benefits and burdens of various regulatory 
options, EPA places weight on both preventing more common accidental 
releases captured in the accident history portion of the RMP database 
while also placing weight on less quantifiable potential catastrophic 
events. Our judgment as to what regulations are ``reasonable'' is 
informed by both quantifiable and unquantifiable burdens and benefits.
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    \43\ Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer Communities by Chemical 
Accident Prevention: Final Rule. This document is available in the 
docket for this rulemaking (EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174).
    \44\ Senate Report at 135; House Report at 155; Representative 
Richardson, 136 Congressional Record 35082 (1990) (statement of 
Representative Richardson); 136 Congressional Record 36057 (1990) 
(statement of Senator Durenberger).
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    The fact that accidents continue to occur shows that we still have 
reason to exercise statutory authority to promulgate reasonable 
regulations to provide for the prevention and detection of those 
accidents to the greatest extent practicable when the opportunity 
exists to improve the performance of our regulatory program. In 
determining what is ``reasonable'' when developing regulations under 
CAA section 112(r)(7)(B), EPA acknowledges that some facilities are 
less likely to have an accidental release than others and that the 
statute gives the Agency the authority to distinguish among classes of 
facilities. When developing this rulemaking, EPA therefore had the 
authority to include multiple factors when determining what is 
reasonable, such as frequency of RMP accidents or proximity to both 
nearby communities and other RMP facilities that could, as a result, 
make the communities and other facilities be more susceptible when it 
comes to being exposed to a worst-case scenario. For example, as 
mentioned in the proposed rulemaking, the per facility accident rate 
between 2016 and 2020 \45\ for all regulated facilities was 3 percent 
(n = 382 facilities reporting at least one accident out of 12,855 
unique facilities reporting between 2016 and 2020), the sector accident 
rates (number of unique facilities with accidents per sector divided by 
the number of unique facilities in each sector) for petroleum and coal 
manufacturing were seven times higher (23 percent, n = 41 out of 177) 
and two times higher for chemical manufacturing (6 percent, n = 96 out 
of 1631). Also, based on accidents occurring between 2016 and 2020, 
communities located near facilities in NAICS 324/325 that are located 
within 1 mile of another 324/325 facility are 1.5 times more likely to 
have been exposed to accidents at these facilities as compared to 
communities near facilities in NAICS 324/325 that are not located 
within 1 mile of another 324/325 facility (87 FR 53578).\46\ Also 
mentioned in the proposed rulemaking, these surrounding communities 
would benefit from rule-based prevention prior to incidents, rather 
than the case-by-case oversight approach of the 2019 reconsideration 
rule (87 FR 53565). Therefore, EPA now believes the benefits of rule-
based prevention for certain high-risk classes of facilities could help 
prevent high consequence accidents that affect communities and are 
therefore reasonable and necessary to meet the statutory objective ``to 
the greatest extent practicable.''
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    \45\ Due to a lack of alternative data describing RMP accident 
impacts more comprehensively, EPA chose this five-year dataset to 
reflect the most recent trends regarding RMP accidents. EPA used the 
August 1, 2021, version of the RMP database to complete its analysis 
because under 40 CFR 68.195(a), facilities are required to report 
RMP accidents and specific associated information within six months 
to the RMP database. Therefore, the RMP database as of August 1, 
2021, is expected to include RMP accidents and their specific 
associated information as of December 31, 2020. However, because 
accident data are reported to the RMP database by facility owners 
and operators, EPA acknowledges the likelihood of late-reported 
accidents affecting these last few years of data because some 
facilities may have not reported their RMP accidents as they are 
required to do. While some commenters have suggested that late 
reporting may impact the count of total accidents in recent years, 
neither the commenters nor EPA have identified any impacts of late 
reporting on the distribution of accidents by sector. See sections 
3.2 and 3.3 of the RIA for more on this and other limitations on the 
number and costs of baseline accidents.
    \46\ In the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule, EPA acknowledged the 
likelihood of late-reported accidents affecting the last few years 
of data. Based on its prior experience, EPA judged that there would 
be a slight increase in the number of accidents in the last few 
years of data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As mentioned in the proposed rulemaking, in contrast to the 
approach in the 2019 reconsideration rule, the approach taken in this 
action for the new prevention program provisions--STAA, root cause 
analysis incident investigation (RCA), and third-party compliance 
audits--refines the focused regulatory approach found in the 2017 
amendments rule, and finalizes provisions to better identify risky 
facilities to prevent accidental releases before they can occur. As 
explained in further detail in following sections of this preamble, EPA 
therefore maintains that by taking a rule-based, prevention-focused 
approach in this action rather than the so-called ``compliance-driven'' 
approach in the 2019 reconsideration rule, this rule will further 
protect human health and the environment from chemical hazards through 
process safety advancement without undue burden. Similarly, other 
modifications to approaches adopted in 2019 to information disclosure 
and emergency response will also better balance security concerns with 
improved community awareness and lead to better community preparedness 
for accidents. By contrast with the prior approach, the approach of 
this final rule is expected to be both reasonable and more protective, 
and thus provide for release prevention, detection, and response to the 
greatest extent practicable. EPA has determined, based on the updated 
factual and scientific record now before the agency, including a 
thorough evaluation of public comments, and in view of its statutory 
responsibilty and legal authority, to be the approach it needs to take, 
among the potentially available or reasonable approaches.

IV. Discussion of General Comments

    This section of this preamble focuses on general comments on the 
2022 SCCAP proposed rule in its entirety and EPA's response to those 
comments. Comments and discussion on provision-specific topics can be 
found under each individual provision heading. Comments received on 
additional considerations posed in the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule but 
outside the scope of this rulemaking are included the Response to 
Comments document,\47\ available in the docket for this

[[Page 17634]]

rulemaking.\48\ In the proposal EPA acknowledged the need for reviewing 
the list of RMP-regulated substances. Section 112(r)(3) requires 
periodic review of the RMP regulated substance list. A priority 
chemical for EPA's upcoming review will be ammonium nitrate. EPA 
continues to review the stakeholder input from this solicitation.
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    \47\ 2023. EPA Response to Comments on the 2022 SCCAP Proposed 
Rule (August 31, 2022; 87 FR 53556). This document is available in 
the docket for this rulemaking.
    \48\ For example, one such consideration posed outside the scope 
of this rulemaking was the need for reviewing the list of RMP-
regulated substances. EPA still acknowledges the need for reviewing 
the list and will consider received comments when determining 
whether to take further action on this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. General Comments

    Many commenters provided general comments about the proposed 
rulemaking. Several commenters supported EPA's proposed rule, including 
some offering suggestions for improvement. Several commenters requested 
EPA consider making the proposed rule stronger than it is currently 
written. Several of these commenters provided detailed examples of 
recent accidents and incidents, including health impacts to the 
community, dating back to 2004 that they hope stronger RMP regulations 
would prevent. A few commenters provided additional steps EPA should 
take in tandem with the proposed rule. Another commenter stated that 
the current process puts the onus on community members in close 
proximity to facilities to protect themselves when it is EPA's 
responsibility to regulate these facilities and ensure that the public 
is safe. The commenter noted that there needs to be more enforcement by 
the Federal Government to hold facilities accountable, especially in 
States lacking enforcement. Several commenters stated that the proposed 
rule relies too much on voluntary commitments from RMP facilities. One 
commenter noted that the current process remains reactive rather than 
proactive and corrective rather than preventative.
    Several commenters opposed EPA's proposed rule, including some 
recommending that EPA withdraw the proposed rule. A few commenters 
opposed the proposed rule due to what the commenters asserted are vague 
standards and definitions that could create uncertainties. Several 
commenters stated that the new requirements under the 2022 SCCAP 
proposed rule would impose unnecessary burdens to facilities, including 
new training and analyses, higher costs, or lower effectiveness of the 
program. Several commenters asserted that there is no basis or evidence 
that the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule is necessary.

B. EPA Responses

    EPA is finalizing several amendments to the RMP rule to further 
protect human health and the environment from RMP accidents. The final 
rule's emphasis is on protecting communities most at risk of having an 
accidental release from a facility in their midst. Under the final 
rule, facilities in these communities will be required to do more to 
prevent chemical accidents, including conducting an STAA, more thorough 
incident investigations, and third-party audits. The final rule also 
includes new prevention provisions that have not been addressed in 
prior RMP rules, including empowering workers to make safety decisions 
and report non-compliance. The Agency is also increasing access to RMP 
facility information for fenceline communities in commonly spoken 
languages. EPA believes this final rule promotes transparency and gives 
more opportunities for the public and workers to be involved in 
accident prevention and emergency planning. EPA believes that in most 
cases, facilities needing to adopt the finalized provisions from 
scratch are most likely facilities that have not fully developed strong 
programs to ensure their commitment to process safety; strengthening 
prevention and response programs at such facilities will help to 
prevent and minimize accidental releases of toxic and flammable 
regulated substances.
    EPA disagrees that that there is no basis or evidence that the 
proposed rule is necessary. Congress charged EPA to promulgate 
reasonable regulations to provide to the greatest extent practicable 
for the prevention and detection of accidental releases. Even when EPA 
has discharged its mandatory duty under CAA section 112(r)(7)(B), the 
Agency retains the discretion to amend the regulations when they can be 
improved to further the intent of the statute. Therefore, when major 
concerning RMP accidents, including major accidents, continue to occur 
as they have,\49\ it is EPA's responsibility to further protect human 
health and the environment, if there are reasonable opportunities to do 
so. Many of the amendments being finalized in this action, some 
stronger than what was proposed, were informed by commenters, including 
many that suffer the consequences of accidents occurring at RMP 
facilities or work in RMP-covered processes. The amendments are also 
informed by RMP accident data which indicate trends in accident 
occurrence. For example, as discussed in the proposal, recent accidents 
highlight that while the annual count of accidents decreased overall 
between 2016 and 2020, in 2019, the TPC Group (TPC) explosion and fire 
in Port Neches, Texas, reported the largest number of persons ever 
evacuated (50,000 people) as the result of an RMP-reportable incident, 
as well as $153 million in offsite property damage.\50\ EPA did not 
conduct an inspection at TPC just prior to this accident because as 
indicated in the 2019 reconsideration rule, EPA prioritizes inspections 
at facilities that have had accidental releases. TPC had no recent 
prior RMP accidental release and was not otherwise due for inspection 
under EPA's routine oversight plan. Therefore, we believe our current 
enforcement resources, and even prioritizing inspections, are not 
capable of effectively addressing accident-prone facilities without 
additional regulatory requirements mandates.
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    \49\ As part of this rule, EPA analyzed accidents from 2016 to 
2020. The impacts of high consequence RMP-reportable accident events 
between 2016 and 2020 demonstrate the impact of low probability, 
high consequence events on annual averages. For more information see 
the Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer Communities by Chemical 
Accident Prevention: Final Rule.
    \50\ The U.S. Chemical Safety Board's TPC incident investigation 
report outlines the safety issues contributing to the incident, 
conclusions, recommendations, and key lessons for the industry. 
https://www.csb.gov/tpc-port-neches-explosions-and-fire/.
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    While large events are rare, CAA section 112(r) was intended as a 
prevention program for large catastrophic releases as well as more 
common accidental releases. Post-event compliance measures such as 
outreach and enforcement are ``too little, too late'' for such large, 
but rare, events. Therefore, this final rule provides additional 
prevention program provisions reasonably calculated for stationary 
sources handling dangerous chemicals to prevent potentially 
catastrophic incidents. EPA therefore believes the provisions of this 
final rule will be generally effective to help improve chemical process 
safety by preventing accidents that result in harm and damage; assist 
in planning, preparedness, and responding to RMP-reportable accidents; 
and improve public awareness of chemical hazards at regulated sources. 
Thus, these are necessary updates to the existing RMP rule to ensure 
chemical accident prevention and mitigation. Further, while many of the 
provisions of this final rule reinforce each other, it is EPA's intent 
that each one is merited on its own, and they are thus severable.

[[Page 17635]]

    EPA also believes that because of the performance-based nature of 
the regulation, and the similar nature of these amendments, the 
requirements provide facility owners with latitude in their methods of 
implementing the requirements. This type of regulation does not create 
uncertainties or unnecessary burdens, but rather offers reasonable 
flexibilities in adopting the most effective measures to prevent and 
mitigate accidents. For example, while EPA requires implementation of 
at least one practicable passive measure, or its equivalent, the new 
STAA requirements are not prescriptive in nature as to what a facility 
can choose as its measure. The rule gives facilities flexibility and 
allows facility owners and operators to exercise reasonable judgement 
to determine what technology or risk reduction measures work best for 
their particular chemical uses, processes, or facility. The final 
rule's emergency exercise requirements also give owners and operators 
significant flexibility in establishing exercise schedules and exercise 
scenarios. Other provisions of the final rule afford similar 
flexibilities.
    EPA agrees assistance, outreach, and enforcement will help ensure 
compliance with the rule. For example, enforcement of the RMP 
regulation has and will continue to occur. Because of that fact, EPA 
expects most facilities will proactively make the necessary prevention 
improvements in order to comply with the rule and thus avoid 
enforcement. Enforcement of RMP facilities remains an Agency priority, 
as indicated by its adoption as a National Enforcement and Compliance 
Initiative (NECI) since 2017. The goal of this NECI is to reduce the 
risk to human health and the environment by decreasing the likelihood 
of chemical accidents. Activities under the initiative include having 
regulated facilities and industry associations work to improve safety; 
increase compliance with RMP; and promote coordination and 
communication with State and local responders and communities. The 
capacity built by the NECI will continue to benefit oversight by EPA 
and its partner implementing agencies even after the NECI. Furthermore, 
EPA intends to publish guidance for certain provisions, such as STAA, 
root cause analysis, third-party audits, and employee participation. 
Once these materials are complete, owners and operators can familiarize 
themselves with resources and best practices that EPA has gathered and 
found to be useful in helping to develop and maintain strong prevention 
programs. The Agency views these compliance activities as a complement 
to strong accidental release prevention and response, but they are not 
a substitute for the stronger prevention measures and response 
provisions set forth in the final rule.

V. Prevention Program Requirements

A. Hazard Evaluation Amplifications

1. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
a. Natural Hazards, 40 CFR 68.50 and 68.67
    EPA proposed to require that hazard evaluations under 40 CFR 
68.50(a)(5) and 68.67(c)(8) explicitly address external events such as 
natural hazards, including those caused by climate change or other 
triggering events that could lead to an accidental release. EPA 
proposed to define natural hazards as naturally occurring events with 
the potential for negative impacts, including meteorological hazards 
due to weather and climate, as well as geological hazards.
    In addition to the proposed approach, EPA requested comment on 
whether the Agency should specify geographic areas most at risk from 
climate or other natural events by adopting the list of areas exposed 
to heightened risk of wildfire, flooding storm surge, or coastal 
flooding. EPA further asked whether the Agency should require sources 
in areas exposed to heightened risk of wildfire, flooding, storm surge, 
coastal flooding, or earthquake, to conduct hazard evaluations 
associated with climate or earthquake as a minimum, while also 
requiring all sources to consider the potential for natural hazards 
unrelated to climate or earthquake in their specific locations.
b. Power Loss, 40 CFR 68.50 and 68.67
    EPA proposed to require that hazard evaluations under 40 CFR 
68.50(a)(3) and 68.67(c)(3) explicitly address the risk of power 
failure, as well as standby or emergency power systems. EPA also 
proposed to require that air pollution control or monitoring equipment 
associated with prevention and detection of accidental release from 
RMP-regulated processes have standby or backup power to ensure 
compliance with the intent of the rule. In addition to the proposed 
approach for standby or backup power for air pollution control or 
monitoring equipment, EPA requested comment on any potential safety 
issues associated with the requirement.
c. Stationary Source Siting, 40 CFR 68.50 and 68.67
    EPA proposed to require that hazard evaluations under 40 CFR 
68.50(a)(6) and 68.67(c)(5) explicitly define stationary source siting 
as inclusive of the placement of processes, equipment, buildings within 
the facility, and hazards posed by proximate facilities, and accidental 
release consequences posed by proximity to the public and public 
receptors.
d. Hazard Evaluation Information Availability, 40 CFR 68.170 and 68.175
    EPA proposed to require that risk management plans under 40 CFR 
68.170(e)(7) and 68.175(e)(8) include declined natural hazard, power 
loss, and siting hazard evaluation recommendations and their associated 
justifications. In addition to the proposed approach, EPA requested 
comment on whether the Agency should require declined natural hazard, 
power loss, and siting hazard evaluation recommendations to be included 
in narrative form and whether the Agency should provide specific 
categories of recommendations for facilities to choose from when 
reporting or allowing the owner or operator to post this information 
online and provide a link to their information within their submitted 
RMP. Further, EPA requested comment on methods to provide justification 
for declining relevant hazard evaluation recommendations.
2. Summary of Final Rule
    Based on comments on both the proposed options and alternative 
approaches presented, EPA is finalizing the proposed provisions with 
the following modifications:
     Revising the definition of ``natural hazards'' at 40 CFR 
68.3 to mean meteorological, environmental, or geological phenomena 
that have the potential for negative impact, accounting for impacts due 
to climate change.
     Revising the hazard evaluation regulatory text at 40 CFR 
68.50(a)(5) and 68.67(c)(8) to focus amplifying language on natural 
hazards rather than ``external hazards'' and include ``exacerbate'' as 
an influence on an accidental release from natural hazards in addition 
to ``cause.'' EPA is also removing the description of climate change in 
this section of regulatory text because the definition of natural 
hazards at 40 CFR 68.3 now includes accounting for climate change.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.50(a)(3) and 68.67(c)(3) to require 
monitoring equipment associated with prevention and detection of 
accidental releases from covered processes to have standby or backup 
power.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.52(b)(9) and 68.69(a)(4) to require 
documentation of

[[Page 17636]]

removal of monitoring equipment associated with prevention and 
detection of accidental releases from covered processes during imminent 
natural hazards.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.50(a)(6) and 68.67(c)(5) to correct the 
technical term of ``facilities'' to ``stationary sources.''
3. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
    The discussion and basis for each provision is below. The section 
is organized by including comments and EPA's responses grouped by the 
various aspects of each provision the Agency received comments on 
(italicized headings). The same organization is used for the Discussion 
of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions sections throughout 
this preamble.
a. Natural Hazards
EPA's Proposed Approach
i. Comments
    Several commenters expressed support for EPA requiring facilities 
to conduct natural hazard assessments since natural hazards have the 
potential to initiate accidents at RMP facilities. A few commenters 
provided examples of natural disasters that have resulted in chemical 
accidents and stated that natural hazard assessments could better 
protect workers and surrounding communities from these types of 
incidents. One commenter suggested that EPA require that RMP facilities 
act to address all natural hazard threats as they will only worsen in 
the face of climate change. The commenter also suggested that the 
requirement should apply to all RMP facilities.
    One commenter noted that improving the resilience of facilities to 
extreme weather events is warranted because of the direct, substantial, 
and cumulative risk to EJ communities with EJ concerns that are more 
likely to be located in areas susceptible to flooding. One commenter 
noted that EPA's findings on risks to facilities from natural hazards 
is consistent with States' and municipalities' analysis. The commenter 
noted that several States have already taken steps to require 
facilities to consider threats from extreme weather, including 
Massachusetts and New York. A couple of commenters expressed support 
for the inclusion of natural hazard analysis but recommended that EPA 
clarify the language in the proposed rule to better define natural 
hazards and climate-related hazards. One of the commenters suggested 
that the definition of natural hazard assessments provided in the 
Center for Chemical Process Safety's (CCPS), ``Guidelines for Hazard 
Evaluation Procedures,'' 3rd edition (2008) is suitable.
    Several commenters expressed opposition to the inclusion of natural 
hazard assessments. For example, several commenters stated that EPA has 
not provided sufficient justification for these new requirements. One 
of the commenters stated that EPA has not indicated why the existing 
regulations are inadequate. Similarly, several commenters noted that 
facilities are managing natural hazards well, and therefore the 
commenters suggested that additional requirements are not necessary.
    Several commenters noted that the number of accidental releases 
caused by natural hazards is small compared to other causes, and small 
compared to how many natural hazards occur daily, and therefore does 
not justify EPA adding additional requirements for assessing natural 
hazards or other external events. One of the commenters noted that the 
small number of accidents may be attributed to the effectiveness of 
existing regulations and voluntary measures regarding emergency 
planning.
    Several commenters noted that the natural hazard assessment 
provisions are already considered in the process hazard analysis (PHA) 
or other current regulations and are, therefore, redundant. Several 
commenters indicated that the natural hazard provisions in the proposed 
rule overlap with or are redundant of existing OSHA regulations and 
recommended that EPA not conflict or compete with OSHA standards, as 
including them in EPA's rules would create duplicative work for 
facilities and introduce uneven enforcement between the two agencies.
    Several commenters stated that the proposed natural hazard 
assessment provisions are overly burdensome to facilities. One of the 
commenters stated that EPA does not have authorization from Congress to 
transform the PHA program to include natural hazards ``caused by 
climate change or other triggering events.'' One commenter suggested 
that the determination of whether or not to implement additional layers 
of protection from natural hazards should be left to the facility and 
not subject to regulatory scrutiny.
    One commenter stated that the reference to external events should 
be removed because it is an undefined and vague term. The commenter 
added that the proposed requirement that the PHA include natural 
hazards ``caused by climate change or other triggering events'' is 
overly broad in that it appears to include events that go well beyond 
the proposed definition of natural hazards. The commenter stated that 
these broadly defined and ambiguous terms in the regulatory text could 
lead to an infinite list of external events and associated 
recommendations from the PHA a facility must consider. The commenter 
urged that EPA must provide much-needed clarity and explanation for the 
proposed language.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA agrees that natural hazards are hazards for chemical facilities 
because they have the potential to initiate accidents that threaten 
human health and the environment and disagrees with comments that the 
Agency did not provide sufficient justification for the new 
requirements. In the proposal, the Agency provided data which indicate 
that, while not all, some RMP accidents are being reported as having a 
natural cause as the initiating event and include unusual weather 
conditions as a contributing factor.\51\ EPA believes that adding 
clarifying language to a provision is a simple way to promote awareness 
of these potential accidents which should help prevent some. 
Additionally, EPA agrees that climate change increases the threat of 
extreme weather as a natural hazard and should be taken into account at 
covered facilities when evaluating hazard frequency and severity. EPA 
is finalizing the proposed provisions because the Agency believes that 
making the requirement more explicit to evaluate natural hazards, which 
includes taking into account climate change, in hazard evaluations for 
Program 2 and Program 3 RMP-regulated processes will ensure that the 
threats of natural hazards are properly evaluated and managed to 
prevent or mitigate releases of RMP-regulated substances at covered 
facilities. EPA agrees that doing so will better protect surrounding 
communities from these types of incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 
section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention 
(April 19, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the comment that improving the resilience of 
facilities to extreme weather events is warranted due to the risk posed 
to communities with EJ concerns, EPA agrees that accidental releases of 
regulated chemicals from RMP-regulated facilities likely pose 
disproportionate risks to historically marginalized communities. EPA 
expects that the benefits of this clarified provision may lower 
potential exposure for fenceline communities with historically 
underserved and

[[Page 17637]]

overburdened populations by reducing disproportionate damages that RMP-
reportable accidents might otherwise inflict on those populations.
    EPA agrees with the comment that the Agency's findings on risks to 
facilities from natural hazards are consistent with those of States 
that already require facilities to consider threats from extreme 
weather. However, because not all States require facilities to consider 
natural hazards, and because EPA continues to see natural hazards as a 
factor in RMP accidents, the Agency believes the requirement to 
evaluate and control natural hazards should be explicitly stated in the 
RMP regulation. Moreover, EPA notes that doing so is consistent with 
other countries that are also expanding efforts to address natural 
hazards at chemical facilities, as discussed in the 2022 SCCAP proposed 
rule (87 FR 53568).
    In response to the comments requesting that EPA better define 
natural hazards and climate-related hazards, EPA notes that it has 
revised its definition to be more closely align with language used in 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) National Risk Index 
(NRI) \52\ and Climate Essentials for Emergency Managers \53\ 
resources. For this final rule, EPA is defining natural hazards to mean 
meteorological, climatological, environmental, or geological phenomena 
that have the potential for negative impact, accounting for impacts due 
to climate change. Examples of such hazards include, but are not 
limited to, avalanche, coastal flooding, cold wave, drought, 
earthquake, hail, heat wave, hurricane, ice storm, landslide, 
lightning, riverine flooding, strong wind, tornado, tsunami, volcanic 
activity, wildfire, and winter weather. EPA believes CCPS' definition 
and guidance \54\ presented in the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule, is still 
useful for facilities' evaluation of natural hazards for process 
safety, however, the Agency believes these FEMA resources reflect a 
more comprehensive base to identify, evaluate and understand relative 
natural hazard risk, particularly how natural hazards must account for 
a changing climate. For example, the NRI identifies 18 specific natural 
hazards, which EPA has identified in its definition, that are further 
supported as their designation as natural hazards and are able to be 
represented in terms of expected annual loss, which incorporate data 
for exposure, annualized frequency, and historic loss ratio.\55\ 
Additionally, the Climate Essentials for Emergency Managers points to 
many climate change resources including the Climate Risk & Resilience 
Portal \56\ and the Climate Mapping for Adaption and Resilience Tool 
\57\ that allows users to examine simulated future climate conditions 
associated with the natural hazards identified in the NRI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ https://hazards.fema.gov/nri/natural-hazards.
    \53\ https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_climate-essentials_072023.pdf.
    \54\ CCPS, CCPS Monograph: Assessment of and Planning For 
Natural Hazards (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2019), 
https://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/html/536181/NaturalDisaster-CCPSmonograph.html.
    \55\ https://hazards.fema.gov/nri/natural-hazards.
    \56\ https://disgeoportal.egs.anl.gov/ClimRR/.
    \57\ https://resilience.climate.gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA disagrees that the natural hazard assessment provisions are 
redundant and will result in uneven enforcement due to them already 
being considered in both the PHA requirements and current OSHA 
regulations. EPA's goal of this provision is to better reflect the 
Agency's longstanding regulatory requirement, rather than to impose 
additional regulatory requirements (and thus potential additional 
costs) that conflict with the OSHA PSM regulatory requirements. In 
fact, EPA has coordinated with OSHA throughout the rulemaking process 
to ensure the intent of adding explicit natural hazard regulatory text 
does not create conflicting requirements between the two regulatory 
programs.
    In response to comments that the natural hazard assessment 
provisions are overly burdensome to facilities, and that the Agency 
does not have authorization from Congress to transform the PHA program 
to include natural hazards ``caused by climate change or other 
triggering events'', EPA disagrees. EPA has stated this provision makes 
more explicit what is already required in the RMP regulations. As noted 
in the proposed rule, since the 1996 RMP rule, EPA has said events such 
as floods and high winds should be considered as potential release-
initiating events when conducting a PHA, and the RMP guidance further 
expands on this point.\58\ Furthermore, the hazard evaluation 
amplifications reflect existing industry practice, and therefore, EPA 
assumes that these hazard evaluation amplifications impose no new 
requirements or costs on facilities that are in compliance with the RMP 
rule and common industry practice. By amplifying and making more 
explicit the need to evaluate natural hazards as potential causes of 
releases, EPA expects those facilities that are currently not 
performing such evaluations will better understand what the rule 
requires. Additionally, each modification of the RMP rule that EPA 
proposed and is finalizing is based on EPA's rulemaking authority under 
CAA section 112(r)(7). EPA has outlined its authority for all the 
changes to the regulation in section III.C of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ 87 FR 53567, August 31, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments that the determination of whether to 
implement additional layers of protection from natural hazards should 
be left to the facility and not subject to regulatory scrutiny, EPA 
notes that it is not requiring implementation of protective measures. 
At this time, EPA is simply emphasizing the already-existing 
requirement that the evaluation of natural hazards be explicitly 
included in hazard reviews and PHAs for Program 2 and Program 3 RMP-
regulated processes. The Agency expects stationary source management to 
make reasonable decisions based on the information collected through 
this provision, like other provisions in the PHA. EPA acknowledges that 
natural hazards and process operations vary throughout the United 
States, and implementation of protective measures will therefore also 
vary among RMP processes. However, because the RMP rule is performance-
based, EPA believes that all regulated RMP facilities can ultimately be 
successful in addressing natural hazards for their locations within 
their risk management programs.
    In response to the comment that the reference to external events 
should be removed because it is vague and overly broad, EPA 
acknowledges that analysis of external events may be broader than 
expected. EPA is therefore revising the regulatory language in the 
final rule to focus on natural hazards rather than external hazards. 
Additionally, EPA is including ``exacerbate'' as an influence of an 
accident from natural hazards in addition to ``cause'' to further 
clarify the regulatory language. As a few commenters discussed, and EPA 
agrees, in some cases natural hazards can be a contributing factor for 
accidental releases, making them more extreme or likely, rather than 
causing them independently. Finally, EPA is removing the description of 
climate change in the hazard evaluation regulatory language to 
eliminate redundancy, as EPA is defining natural hazard as taking into 
account climate change impacts.

[[Page 17638]]

Alternative Approaches for Specifying Areas Most at Risk and 
Identifying Sources With Heightened Risk of Climate Events or 
Earthquakes
i. Comments
    Several commenters expressed support for EPA specifying areas most 
at risk from climate or other natural events. One of the commenters 
indicated that adopting the list of areas exposed to heightened risk of 
wildfire, flooding, storm surge, or coastal flooding is necessary 
because facilities would face difficulties in assessing future climate 
risks without this additional guidance from EPA. A couple of commenters 
recommended that EPA use the list in the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office's 2022 report, ``Chemical Accident Prevention: EPA Should Ensure 
Regulated Facilities Consider Risks from Climate Change.'' \59\ One of 
the commenters also recommended using the list in the 2021 report, 
``Preventing Double Disasters,'' from David Flores et al.\60\ A couple 
of commenters suggested that the list of at-risk facilities or 
geographic areas should be regularly updated using the latest available 
data. A couple of commenters clarified that such a list of at-risk 
areas should not be used to limit the number of facilities that are 
required to conduct a natural hazard or climate change hazard analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104494.pdf.
    \60\ https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/preventing-double-disasters%20FINAL.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A couple of commenters expressed opposition to the development of a 
list of geographic areas most at risk from natural hazards or climate-
related hazards. One of the commenters indicated that such a list is 
not necessary because facilities in these areas are generally aware of 
the potential for those hazards. The commenter stated that EPA has not 
demonstrated sufficient need to apply geographic distinctions as a part 
of the regulatory approach. One commenter stated that according to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's reporting, there are 
challenges with attributing events to climate change; therefore, the 
commenter stated that they oppose EPA specifying geographic areas most 
at risk from climate impacts.
    One commenter expressed support for EPA requiring sources in areas 
exposed to heightened risk of natural disasters to conduct hazard 
evaluations associated with climate or earthquakes as a minimum, while 
also requiring all sources to consider the potential for natural 
hazards unrelated to climate or earthquakes in their specific 
locations. Similarly, another commenter urged that it is EPA's 
responsibility to regulate chemical facilities appropriately. The 
commenter noted that the co-location of multiple polluting sites in 
climate vulnerable areas is common, with roughly a third of the 
nation's RMP facilities at increased risk from climate impacts; 
however, despite known risks, RMP facilities are not currently required 
to plan for scenarios such as inland flooding, coastal flooding, storm 
surge, and wildfires.
    Conversely, one commenter stated that EPA does not need to apply 
different regulatory requirements based on geography, since EPA has not 
demonstrated sufficient need to apply such geographic distinctions as 
part of any regulatory approach. Instead, the commenter stated that a 
general provision to require hazard reviews and PHAs to evaluate the 
potential for natural hazards, such as (but not necessarily limited to) 
specific examples, would be more practical.
ii. EPA Response
    While EPA agrees it could be useful to specify areas most at risk 
from natural events and identify sources with heightened risk of 
climate events, EPA is not finalizing a regulatory provision that will 
adopt these approaches at this time. Rather, EPA will use these 
comments, as well as those received on guidance development, to update 
the current hazard evaluation guidance and initiate ways to share 
natural hazard resources with facility owners and operators to help 
them identify and evaluate potential natural hazard risks. EPA expects 
to develop and release this guidance approximately one year after this 
final rule. The 2022 SCCAP proposed rule identified relevant new 
studies for RMP facilities and the threat of natural hazards to them. 
Those studies included the Center for Progressive Reform, Earthjustice, 
and the Union of Concerned Scientists' report ``Preventing Double 
Disasters'' \61\ and the Government Accountability Office's report 
``Chemical Accident Prevention: EPA Should Ensure Regulated Facilities 
Consider Risks from Climate Change.'' \62\ EPA also believes CCPS' 
guidance presented in the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule, is still useful for 
facilities' evaluation of natural hazards for process safety. Lastly, 
EPA now also recognizes the identification of hazards in FEMA's NRI 
\63\ and Climate Essentials for Emergency Managers \64\ as the most 
comprehensive foundation to identify, evaluate and understand relative 
natural hazard risk, particularly how natural hazards must account for 
a changing climate. EPA intends to incorporate and further evaluate 
other resources as a minimum in its guidance and expects that 
information available in these resources can be helpful to be consulted 
to complement a facility's more localized information available from 
the State and local government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ David Flores, et al., Preventing ``Double Disasters'' 
(2021), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/preventing-double-disasters%20FINAL.pdf.
    \62\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, Chemical Accident 
Prevention: EPA Should Ensure Regulated Facilities Consider Risks 
from Climate Change (2022), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104494.pdf.
    \63\ https://hazards.fema.gov/nri/.
    \64\ https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_climate-essentials_072023.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Power Loss
EPA's Proposed Approach
i. Comments
    One commenter agreed with EPA's approach to add regulatory text to 
emphasize that loss of power is among the hazards that must be 
addressed within hazard review. A few commenters expressed support for 
facilities having contingency plans to handle potential power loss. A 
few commenters noted that power loss has been identified as the cause 
of hazardous chemical releases, such as the Shell East Site and Arkema 
incidents, and stated it is clear that more stringent requirements are 
needed. One commenter stated that they did not oppose requiring hazard 
reviews and PHAs to address power loss, but noted that in many cases, a 
company's RMP already considers both natural hazards and power loss. 
One commenter stated that facilities should provide information to 
local responders about their backup power capabilities during a hazard 
event, including the backup generation source, fuel type, capacity 
(operational hours), and process consequences for extended power loss. 
The commenter stated that the information provided should address how 
long a facility can maintain the RMP process(es) safely with backup 
power. Several commenters urged EPA to require facilities to have 
backup power systems. A few commenters noted that EPA should require 
facilities to have enough backup power to safely run or shut down the 
entire facility in the event of power loss.
    Several commenters noted that EPA has not provided data showing 
that power loss is a significant cause of accidents, and therefore the 
proposed

[[Page 17639]]

rule is unwarranted. A few commenters stated that from 2016-2020, only 
7 out of 448 reported accidents were linked to power loss. A few 
commenters stated that EPA did not adequately consider the costs and 
benefits of the proposed power loss provisions.
    A couple commenters noted that EPA's proposal to explicitly require 
evaluation of standby and emergency power systems diverges with OSHA's 
PSM requirements in the PHA. The commenter stated that this proposal 
would inappropriately create an inconsistency between the two 
regulatory programs, injecting ambiguity and uncertainty into the PHA 
process. Another commenter urged EPA to not include these additional 
provisions in RMP regulations and instead allow OSHA to continue its 
oversight of these hazards.
    One commenter strongly supported requiring air pollution control or 
monitoring equipment associated with prevention and detection of 
accidental releases from RMP-regulated facilities to have standby or 
backup power. The commenter claimed, however, that the proposed 
amendments to 40 CFR 68.50 and 68.67 are extremely vague regarding this 
requirement.
    Another commenter noted that, while fenceline monitors could detect 
an accidental release in some circumstances, high wind events such as 
hurricanes can render them useless such that a loss of power to 
monitors would have no adverse effect on the source or the surrounding 
community. A couple of commenters stated that a focus on maintaining 
air pollution control or monitoring equipment during a power loss, 
while important, may detract from the fundamental purpose of the RMP.
    One commenter requested that the final rule require all facilities 
to have real-time fenceline air monitors with enforcement mechanisms 
and robust penalties for intentionally removing air monitors from 
service. The commenter stated that there are currently no penalties for 
facilities that shut down their monitoring during an incident. The 
commenter requested that EPA strengthen the proposed rule to require 
expanded fenceline monitoring and adequate backup power for air 
monitors to operate continuously and that this be documented in a 
written plan that includes the location of the monitors. Conversely, a 
couple of commenters claimed that EPA made an unjustified assumption in 
the preamble of the proposed rule that facilities will remove air 
monitoring and control equipment from service prior to a natural 
disaster to evade monitoring requirements. The commenters stated that 
the suggestion that facilities attempt to evade regulatory agency 
requirements in the event of a natural disaster is improper and 
inappropriate.
    A few commenters stated that EPA's proposal to explicitly require 
backup and emergency power systems exceeds the scope of RMP without 
proper justification. One commenter expressed concern that the proposed 
backup power requirements exceed EPA's statutory authority and lack a 
reasoned basis. A couple of commenters also questioned whether EPA's 
statutory authority allows it to require such actions. The commenters 
contended that air emission monitoring equipment is typically regulated 
under other EPA CAA regulatory programs (New Source Performance 
Standards, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 
and Title V permitting program).
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA agrees that power loss can threaten RMP-regulated processes and 
cause accidental releases if not properly managed, and therefore 
disagrees that the provisions are unwarranted. In the proposed rule, 
EPA provided data showing that power loss has resulted in serious 
accidental release incidents at RMP-regulated facilities (87 FR 53569), 
and EPA believes making more explicit this already-existing accident 
prevention program requirement to evaluate hazards of the process \65\ 
will ensure that threats of power loss are properly evaluated and 
managed to prevent or mitigate releases of RMP-regulated substances at 
covered facilities. Therefore, EPA is finalizing the proposed 
revisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ Existing requirements of the hazards to be evaluated in 
hazard evaluations are found at 40 CFR 68.50(a) for Program 2 
processes and at 40 CFR 68.67(a) through (c) for Program 3 
processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the comment that facilities should provide local 
responders with their backup power capabilities during a hazard event, 
EPA maintains that it is very important to ensure that Local Emergency 
Planning Committees (LEPCs) or local emergency response officials have 
the information necessary for developing local emergency response 
plans; however, EPA believes it is not necessary to specify in the RMP 
rule the types or format of information that LEPCs or emergency 
response officials may request. Section 303(d)(3) of the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act already provides the necessary 
authority to allow LEPCs to request information needed to develop the 
local emergency response plan. Furthermore, as part of the annual 
coordination between facilities and local emergency responders, 
responders may obtain information on backup power as appropriate.
    In response to the comments requesting that EPA require facilities 
to have enough backup power to safely run in the event of power loss, 
EPA is not requiring implementation of standby or emergency power for 
the entirety of an RMP process at this time. However, the Agency is 
requiring the source to consider the appropriateness of backup power 
for their process and to explain decisions not to implement backup 
power. There may be situations where backup power is not critical to 
chemical release prevention, so the rule provides sources the 
opportunity to explain their decision-making. Such an approach is 
consistent with the performance-based structure of the rule that relies 
on examination of process safety issues by the source, rational 
decision-making on the part of owners and operators, and oversight by 
implementing agencies through compliance assistance and enforcement and 
the public through disclosure. EPA takes a slightly different approach 
with respect to backup power for monitors. EPA is requiring standby or 
backup power for air pollution control or monitoring equipment 
associated with prevention and detection of accidental releases from 
RMP-regulated processes and has amended regulatory language to reflect 
the requirement. EPA believes that doing so will help ensure compliance 
with the intent of the rule and ensure that the RMP-regulated 
substances at covered processes are continually being monitored so that 
potential exposure to chemical substances can be measured during and 
following a natural disaster. While the Agency acknowledges that there 
may be processes that do not require backup power, the Agency believes 
that once a facility has made and documented the determination that it 
is appropriate to have monitors for accidental releases, then ensuring 
their operation through requiring backup power is an appropriate 
operational requirement.
    In response to comments that the requirements would create 
inconsistency between EPA and OSHA regulatory programs, EPA seeks only 
to better reflect its longstanding regulatory requirement that loss of 
power is among the hazards that must be addressed within hazard 
evaluations, rather than impose additional regulatory requirements (and 
thus potential additional costs) that conflict with the OSHA PSM 
regulatory requirements.

[[Page 17640]]

    In response to the comment that the amendments to 40 CFR 68.50 and 
68.67 are vague, EPA again notes these amplifications are already 
preexisting requirements. Also, EPA's general approach in 40 CFR part 
68 has been to recognize that process safety requires owners and 
operators to exercise reasonable judgement in making their facility 
safer. Therefore, EPA has, and continues to, allow substantial 
flexibility for sources on how to comply with the RMP rule. As noted in 
the proposal, EPA believes many facilities are already managing the 
hazard of power loss well and thus does not believe the amplification 
of power loss in the hazard evaluation regulatory text will negatively 
affect evaluation of this hazard.
    In response to comments regarding facilities' removal of air 
monitoring equipment,\66\ EPA notes that the final rule is revising 40 
CFR 68.52(b)(9) and 68.69(a)(4) to require documentation of the removal 
of monitoring equipment for accidental releases during disasters in 
facility operating procedures. In doing so, the Agency addresses the 
concern that the threat of extreme weather events has, and will 
continue to be, used by some owners or operators to justify disabling 
equipment designed to monitor and detect chemical releases of RMP-
regulated substances at their facility (87 FR 53571). To prevent 
accidental releases, RMP owners or operators are required to develop a 
program that includes monitoring for such releases. EPA does not 
believe all natural disasters should be treated as an exception to this 
requirement. However, EPA understands that, in some situations, such as 
hurricane winds, there is a potential for damage to, or by, monitoring 
equipment if not secured and allows a source to shut down monitoring 
equipment in such cases provided that an explanation is included in its 
RMP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ The backup power requirement of this rule only addresses 
monitors for accidental releases of regulated substances under 40 
CFR 68.130. This rule does not create any obligation to provide 
backup power to monitors that may be required by other CAA programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA disagrees that the backup and emergency power system 
requirements exceed the scope of the RMP rule and EPA's statutory 
authority and also disagrees that the monitoring requirements may 
detract from the fundamental purpose of the RMP rule. Each modification 
of the RMP rule that EPA proposed and is finalizing is based on EPA's 
rulemaking authority under CAA section 112(r)(7). Both paragraph (A) 
and subparagraph (B)(i) of section 112(r)(7) explicitly grant EPA the 
authority to require monitoring for accidental releases. See CAA 
section 112(r)(7)(A)) (EPA ``authorized to promulgate release 
prevention, detection, and correction requirements which may include 
monitoring''); CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(I) (as appropriate, the 
accidental release regulations shall cover the use, operation, and 
upkeep of equipment to monitor accidental releases). The original rule 
established, through its statutory authority, the requirement to 
monitor for accidental releases to help prevent and mitigate releases. 
Therefore, backup and emergency power system requirements being 
finalized in this rule simply ensure proper operation of monitors and 
continuous compliance with the existing requirement.
    In response to comments that EPA did not adequately consider the 
costs and benefits of the power loss provisions, EPA notes that it is 
not finalizing additional regulatory requirements from what already 
exists in the RMP regulations. The current RMP rule's PHA requirements 
include determining and evaluating ``the hazards of the process'' as 
well as ``engineering . . . controls applicable to the hazards and 
their interrelationships such as appropriate application of detection 
methodologies.'' (40 CFR 68.67(c)(1) and (3)) Loss of power is one such 
hazard, and backup power is an engineering control applicable to the 
hazard and detection methodologies. Similar but less detailed 
requirements apply to Program 2 processes (40 CFR 68.50(a)). The hazard 
evaluation requirements reflect not only the OSHA and EPA rules but 
also existing industry recommended practices, and therefore, EPA 
assumes that these hazard evaluation amplifications impose no new 
requirements or costs on facilities. As EPA has discussed in prior RMP 
rulemaking RIAs, it is not possible to estimate quantitative benefits 
for proposed rule provisions as EPA has no data to project the specific 
contribution of each to an accident's impacts. As shown by accident 
trends, accident frequency and severity are difficult to predict. 
However, the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule and the accompanying Technical 
Background Document show that past accidents have been caused by power 
failure, and the backup power provisions target these events. Based on 
RMP-reportable accident and other data from RMP regulated industry 
sectors,\67\ chemical accidents can impose substantial costs on firms, 
employees, emergency responders, the community, and the broader 
economy. Reducing the risk of such accidents, the severity of the 
impacts when accidents occur, and improving information availability, 
as the provisions of this final rule intend, will provide benefits to 
the potentially affected members of society.
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    \67\ Marsh JLT Specialty, ``100 Largest Losses in the 
Hydrocarbon Industry,'' 27th Edition, March 2022. Accessed from 
https://www.marsh.com/uk/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses.html. Marsh provides estimates of large property 
damage losses in the hydrocarbon industry from 1974 to 2021 in 
current and 2021 dollars and in a few cases, business loss costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Stationary Source Siting
EPA's Proposed Approach
i. Comments
    A few commenters expressed support for EPA's proposal to amend 
regulatory text for Program 2 and 3 processes to define stationary 
source siting evaluations as including placement of processes, 
equipment, buildings, and hazards posed by proximate facilities and 
accident release consequences posed by proximity to the public. One 
commenter stated that doing so would ensure the protection of human 
health and the environment. Another commenter stated that EPA should 
require implementation of stationary source siting recommendations 
found in the analysis to the greatest extent practicable to assure 
protection for fenceline communities. Similarly, another commenter 
suggested that if it is practicable for a facility to take an action to 
eliminate or lessen hazards associated with RMP processes through 
different siting, it should be required to do so.
    Several commenters expressed concerns about the proposed 
requirements related to siting evaluations. Several commenters noted 
that implementing the facility siting requirements are unnecessary and 
duplicative because facilities covered by OSHA's PSM regulations 
already undergo similar requirements. The commenters stated that this 
creates the opportunity for inconsistent enforcement between EPA and 
OSHA.
    Several commenters expressed concern that EPA did not define the 
term ``proximate facilities.'' Many commenters were also concerned that 
when these facilities are identified, it is not practical to expect 
them to share information with each other due to confidential business 
information (CBI) and security concerns. One of the commenters 
suggested that EPA update the regulatory text to make an allowance for 
instances where neighboring facilities do not cooperate in the siting 
evaluation.

[[Page 17641]]

    A couple of commenters stated that it is impracticable for EPA to 
require existing facilities to move processes to comply with any new 
siting requirements. The commenters suggested that EPA clarify that 
these requirements do not apply to existing facilities. One commenter 
stated that imposing new siting requirements after a facility that has 
been established would raise fundamental fairness issues, as well as 
possible regulatory ``takings'' issues, potentially requiring 
compensation to the affected sources. One commenter noted that 
conducting a siting analysis is a significant undertaking for existing 
sources who do not have potential to cause offsite consequences. The 
commenter stated that it would be a costly and arduous undertaking to 
determine exactly what facilities are proximate and understand their 
internal operations.
    One of the commenters noted that the proposed requirements should 
be narrowly interpreted to preserve local zoning authority. Another 
commenter mentioned that neither the facility nor EPA have any 
authority or control over local zoning ordinances that may have allowed 
development within an area that EPA's new criteria may deem to have 
inappropriate buffers or setbacks. Another commenter stated that the 
facility siting provision could negatively affect where facilities 
could be built, depending on the distance between a facility process 
and offsite populations. The commenter encouraged EPA to consider a 
policy restricting outside populations from building close to a 
facility which could interfere with real estate plans and impact local 
building regulations.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA agrees that amending the regulatory text to make more explicit 
the requirement that process hazard evaluations for both Program 2 
(hazard review) and Program 3 (PHA) include in the siting evaluation 
the placement of processes, equipment, buildings, and hazards posed by 
proximate facilities, and accident release consequences posed by 
proximity to the public, will help ensure the protection of human 
health and the environment. As discussed in the proposal, siting of 
processes and equipment within a stationary source can impact the 
surrounding community, not only through the proximity of the accidental 
release to offsite receptors adjacent to the facility boundary (e.g., 
people, infrastructure, environmental resources), but also through 
increasing the likelihood of a secondary ``knock-on'' release by 
compromising nearby processes. The proposal offered several examples of 
accidental releases which illustrate the significant effects of the 
lack of sufficient distance between the source boundary and neighboring 
residential areas.
    In response to comments that EPA should require implementation of 
stationary source recommendations, EPA notes that, at this time, the 
Agency is only choosing to make more explicit what is required to be 
addressed in a stationary source siting evaluation. Rather than propose 
additional requirements, EPA is instead expounding on the current 
regulatory text to ensure that siting evaluations properly account for 
hazards resulting from the location of processes, equipment, building, 
and proximate facilities, and their effects on the surrounding 
community. EPA continues to believe the performance-based nature of 
both this provision and the overall rule allow facility owners and 
operators the discretion to determine what risk reduction measures work 
best for their particular chemical use, process, or facility. 
Furthermore, EPA disagrees with comments that implementing the facility 
siting requirements would create the opportunity for inconsistent 
enforcement between EPA and OSHA. The OSHA PSM standard and RMP rule 
both require that facility siting be addressed as one element of a PHA 
(29 CFR 1910.119(e)(3)(v) and 40 CFR 68.67(c)(5)). In response to 
comments on the proposed PSM rule, OSHA indicated that facility siting 
should always be considered during PHAs and therefore decided to 
emphasize this element by specifically listing siting evaluation in 
regulatory text.\68\ EPA's approach to the siting requirement is 
consistent with its general approach to PSM in the 1996 RMP rule: 
sound, comprehensive PSM systems can protect workers, the public, and 
the environment.\69\
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    \68\ OSHA, Final Rule on Process Safety Management of Highly 
Hazardous Chemicals; Explosives and Blasting Agents, 29 CFR part 
1910 (1992), 57 FR 6356 (February 24, 1991), https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/federalregister/1992-02-24.
    \69\ 61 FR 31687, June 20, 1996.
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    In response to the comments regarding the definition of ``proximate 
facilities'' and CBI, EPA notes that the provision is for facility 
owners and operators to be aware of and consider the apparent presence 
of facilities within release impact zones that could occur from their 
facility, and how those releases would be affected because of the 
presence of nearby facilities. While EPA encourages sharing of chemical 
and process information between facilities, particularly for emergency 
response purposes, EPA does not believe this is required in order to 
comply with the provision. Nevertheless, when conducting siting 
evaluations, EPA would reasonably expect sources to consult publicly 
accessible information on nearby sources, such as RMPs and information 
available through LEPCs. This type of information is not CBI.
    EPA disagrees that it is impracticable to require existing 
facilities to comply with siting requirements. EPA notes that there is 
a breadth of guidance on siting, and the Agency therefore believes 
there is adequate information available for facilities to comply with 
the text in this final rule. EPA expects facilities to continue to use 
available resources and any additional industry-specific guidance to 
properly evaluate siting hazards. The rule does not mandate that 
existing sources modify their footprint as a result of a siting 
analysis. The approach taken in this rule is similar to how hazard 
evaluations have proceeded in the past: require the analysis of hazards 
and rely upon owners and operators to use the information reasonably 
when determining what measures should be undertaken. The Agency also 
notes that Program 1 processes are not covered by this requirement; 
Program 2 and 3 sources subject to this requirement will have 
undertaken offsite consequence analyses and determined that they may 
have offsite impacts that disqualify them from Program 1. Finally, 
while EPA has in the past discussed the potential for requiring minimal 
setbacks and other specific location restrictions, notwithstanding 
local zoning, the siting requirement in this rule does not contain such 
a restrictions on location.
d. Hazard Evaluation Information Availability
EPA's Proposed Approach
i. Comments
    Several commenters expressed support for EPA's proposed hazard 
evaluation information availability requirements. One commenter stated 
that failing to finalize the proposal would be arbitrary and capricious 
because owners and operators can continue to ignore recommendations 
from hazard evaluations with no justification, even if the 
recommendations are feasible and effective. One commenter strongly 
supported EPA's decision to require RMP facilities to report declined 
recommendations in hazard evaluations but also suggested there should 
be a baseline checklist of natural hazard mitigation measures. A couple 
of the commenters noted that facilities should

[[Page 17642]]

be required to implement practicable recommendations.
    Several commenters expressed concern that there is no reasonable 
explanation for requiring the reporting of rejected recommendations. A 
few commenters mentioned that the proposed requirements are unnecessary 
because this information is already documented as part of the PHA or 
Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and adding it to the RMP only 
produces double documentation without added benefit. Some commenters 
mentioned that EPA did not consider the labor costs and time that would 
be devoted to preparing a written justification for rejected 
recommendations. One of the commenters stated that the time and 
resources could be better spent on implementing accepted 
recommendations. A few commenters suggested that there is no evidence 
that requiring individual facilities to provide such documentation will 
reduce accident rates and may lead some to believe that it is possible 
to eliminate all risks, including potential risks, which could lead to 
a release.
    Some commenters noted that the requirement will likely cause 
facilities to consider a narrower scope of recommendations to avoid 
making this exercise more burdensome. Similarly, one commenter 
expressed concern that the proposed requirement will discourage 
facility leaders from pushing their PHA/LOPA teams from identifying 
unmitigated hazards to limit the amount of information they are 
required to report to EPA. Another commenter recommended that EPA make 
clear that an appropriately justified denial during initial review of a 
facility's RMP plan should not have to be re-justified in subsequent 
reviews of the plan.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA believes that finalizing the hazard evaluation recommendation 
information availability provisions will enable the public to ensure 
facilities have conducted appropriate evaluations to address potential 
hazards that can affect communities near the fenceline of facilities. 
At this time, EPA is not requiring facilities to implement practicable 
recommendations from natural hazard, power loss, and siting hazard 
evaluations, as long as facilities list in their risk management plans 
the recommendations that were not implemented and the justification for 
those decisions. EPA disagrees that the requirements are unnecessary 
and provide no benefits. EPA believes the requirements are important to 
help the public understand how facilities address the hazards that may 
affect their community to keep the risk at or below an ``acceptable 
level,'' which include adherence to RAGAGEP, and the reasonable 
judgments and efforts of compliance programs aimed at preventing or 
mitigating accidental releases. In response to comments that requiring 
such documentation will not reduce accident rates, EPA believes that 
when local citizens have adequate information and knowledge about the 
risks associated with facility hazards, facility owners and operators 
may be motivated to further improve their safety performance in 
response to community oversight. At a minimum, better community 
understanding of identified hazards and remedies not implemented will 
promote better community emergency planning.
    In response to comments that EPA did not consider the costs of 
preparing written justifications for rejected recommendations, EPA 
notes that the RIA for the final rule estimates anticipated costs for 
preparing written justifications.
    In response to the comments that the requirement will discourage 
facilities from considering recommendations and identifying unmitigated 
hazards, EPA notes that the hazard evaluation requirements for Program 
2 (40 CFR 68.50) and Program 3 (40 CFR 68.67) processes remain 
unchanged--to identify, evaluate, and control hazards involved in the 
process, assuring the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner. 
When facilities fail to conduct these activities, they will not be in 
compliance with the hazard evaluation provisions. EPA believes the 
flexibility permitted in hazards evaluations, that is, allowing 
facility owners and operators to choose which recommendations will be 
implemented, is the best approach for exercising reasonable judgement 
to determine what risk reduction measures work best for their 
particular chemical use, process, or facility. However, EPA views 
choosing to leave hazards unaddressed out of fear of public scrutiny as 
not exercising reasonable judgement, particularly when it may leave the 
process more vulnerable to accidental releases.
Methods To Provide Justification
i. Comments
    A few commenters expressed support for using categories, such as 
those in OSHA's 1994 Compliance Directive,\70\ for declining to adopt a 
PHA recommendation. One of the commenters noted that requiring owners 
and operators to choose one of four pre-selected categories makes it 
easier for owners and operators to understand and comply with their 
duties. The commenter suggested that EPA should not include alternative 
categories or a catch-all ``other'' category because doing so would 
dilute the purpose of the amendment by allowing facilities to decline 
recommendations for potentially insufficient reasons. Another commenter 
expressed concern that the list of possible natural hazards, loss of 
power, and siting evaluation recommendations that might not be adopted 
could be expansive; therefore, the commenter suggests EPA should 
provide specific categories of recommendations for facilities to choose 
from when reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ https://www.osha.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/directives/CPL02-02-045_CH-1_20150901.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter recommended that the information be presented in a 
public and easily accessible space across many different sites and 
locations. Similarly, another commenter suggested that owners of RMP 
facilities should be obligated to post hazard-related information 
online and provide a link in risk management plans so responders and 
local communities can access this information.
    A commenter recommended that EPA require owners and operators to 
include not only documentation that one of the four justifications is 
met, but also a narrative explaining how the documentation shows that 
the justification has been met. Conversely, another commenter noted 
that requiring covered facilities to provide declined hazard evaluation 
recommendations in narrative form is an unnecessary intrusion into 
internal practices at a facility that does not improve that facility's 
safety.
    One commenter noted that the proposed requirement for selection of 
``preselected categories'' does not appear in the proposed regulatory 
text and recommended that if EPA intends to make the use of these 
categories mandatory, it must put them into the regulatory text. The 
commenter also noted that these categories are good conclusions for 
internal facility evaluations that assess complex considerations, but 
they provide little to no useful information to LEPCs and local 
communities.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA agrees that requiring owners and operators to choose one of 
four pre-selected categories makes it easier for owners and operators 
to understand and comply with their duties and is thus finalizing this 
component in the rule. EPA is not requiring narrative

[[Page 17643]]

explanations to be reported as there is concern that such explanations 
may be greatly inconsistent as they would require large amounts of 
technically challenging and varying information to be comparably 
condensed. The Agency believes the four pre-selected categories ensures 
a balanced approach to providing beneficial data to the public as well 
as a straightforward method of reporting for facility owners/operators. 
While EPA is not adding the categories to the regulatory text, EPA will 
plan to revise its online RMP submission system, RMP*eSubmit,\71\ to 
include the categories,\72\ similar to the those in OSHA's 1994 
Compliance Directive, which will mimic the approach for other data 
components required by 40 CFR 68.170 and 68.175. Sources will therefore 
be able to update their RMPs with the information once the additional 
data field is incorporated into the system, and in accordance with 
applicable compliance dates. EPA also plans to update the RMP*eSubmit 
User's Manual \73\ to provide guidance for entering declined 
recommendations and applying these categories to them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ https://www.epa.gov/rmp/rmpesubmit.
    \72\ These changes will be made to the submission system prior 
to the 4-year compliance date as described further in section 
IX.C.8. of this preamble.
    \73\ https://www.epa.gov/rmp/rmpesubmit-users-manual.
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B. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis (STAA)

1. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
a. Definitions, 40 CFR 68.3
    EPA proposed to define ``inherently safer technology or design'' 
(IST/ISD) to mean risk management measures that minimize the use of 
regulated substances, substitute less hazardous substances, moderate 
the use of regulated substances, or simplify covered processes in order 
to make accidental releases less likely, or the impacts of such 
releases less severe.
    EPA also proposed definitions for ``passive,'' ``active,'' and 
``procedural'' measures. EPA proposed to define ``passive measures'' as 
risk management measures that use design features that reduce either 
the frequency or consequence of the hazard without human, mechanical, 
or other energy input. EPA proposed to define ``active measures'' as 
risk management measures or engineering controls that rely on 
mechanical, or other energy input to detect and respond to process 
deviations. Lastly, EPA proposed a definition for ``procedural 
measures'' as risk management measures such as policies, operating 
procedures, training, administrative controls, and emergency response 
actions to prevent or minimize incidents.
    Finally, EPA proposed to define ``practicability'' as the 
capability of being successfully accomplished within a reasonable time, 
accounting for technological, environmental, legal, social, and 
economic factors.
b. Process Hazard Analysis, 40 CFR 68.67
    EPA proposed to modify the PHA provisions by adding an additional 
paragraph (c)(9) to 40 CFR 68.67 to require that the owner or operator 
of a facility with Program 3 processes in NAICS codes 324 and 325 
located within 1 mile of another 324 and 325 regulated facility process 
address safer technology and alternative risk management measures 
applicable to eliminating or reducing risk from process hazards. EPA 
proposed that ``1 mile'' be interpreted to mean ``1 mile to the nearest 
fenceline'' for a facility with a NAICS 324 or 325 process. EPA 
proposed to add paragraph (c)(9)(i) to specify that the analysis 
include, in the following order, IST or ISD, passive measures, active 
measures, and procedural measures. EPA also proposed that all 
facilities with 324 processes using hydrofluoric acid (HF) in an 
alkylation unit conduct an STAA for the use of safer alternatives 
compared to HF alkylation, regardless of proximity to another NAICS 
324- or 325-regulated facility process.
    EPA proposed to require owners and operators subject to the STAA 
provision to include an evaluation, including the results of the STAA 
analysis, as part of the PHA requirements in 40 CFR 68.67(e). In 
addition, EPA proposed to add paragraph (c)(9)(ii) to require that the 
owner or operator determine and document the practicability of the IST 
or ISD considered. This process would be separate and additional to the 
PHA requirements in 40 CFR 68.67(e). As part of this analysis, owners 
and operators would be required to identify, evaluate, and document the 
practicability of implementing inherent safety measures, including 
documenting the practicability of publicly available safer 
alternatives. Lastly, EPA proposed to add paragraph (c)(9)(iii) to 
require that a facility's STAA team include, and document the inclusion 
of, one member who works in the process and has expertise in the 
process being evaluated.
    In addition to the proposed approach to STAA, EPA sought feedback 
on the industry understanding of the practicability assessment, and how 
this might differ from the findings identified in the PHA, as well as 
the additional benefit of such a provision. EPA solicited comment on 
whether the Agency should only require the STAA as part of the PHA, 
without the additional practicability assessment. EPA also sought 
comment on other alternative approaches considered. One approach was 
applying STAA requirements to facility processes in NAICS codes 324 and 
325 with a reportable accident within the last 5 years. Another 
approach was applying these provisions to all NAICS codes 324 and 325 
facility processes. Lastly, EPA sought comment on whether the Agency 
should require implementation of technically practicable IST/ISD and 
STAAs.
c. STAA Technology Transfer, 40 CFR 68.175(e)(7)
    EPA proposed to add 40 CFR 68.175(e)(7) to require owners or 
operators to report whether their current PHA addresses the STAA 
requirement proposed in 40 CFR 68.67(c)(9), whether any IST/ISD was 
implemented as a result of 40 CFR 68.67(c)(9)(ii), and if any IST/ISD 
was implemented, to identify the measure and technology category.
2. Summary of Final Rule
    As discussed below, the final rule adopts three measures related to 
STAA: a broad requirement to conduct a STAA applicable to two sectors, 
petroleum refining (NAICS 324) and chemical manufacturing (NAICS 325); 
a requirement to conduct a practicability assessment for IST/ISD for a 
subset of facilities with processes in these sectors (co-located 
sources within 1 mile, refinery HF alkylation processes, and those that 
have had a reportable accident within the 5 preceding years); and a 
requirement for the same subset of facilities to implement at least one 
practicable passive measure or similarly protective active or 
procedural measure(s) after each STAA. These measures also are 
severable from each other. Even without a mandate to implement any 
measures resulting from an STAA or to conduct a formal, documented 
practicability assessment, an owner or operator of a facility may 
identify and decide to implement new prevention measures resulting from 
the STAA. Similarly, even without a requirement to implement 
practicable IST/ISD measures or conduct a broader STAA review, a 
practicability assessment may lead to the adoption of an IST or ISD at 
the subset of sources required to conduct such an assessment. Finally, 
the requirement for a subset of sources to implement a passive measure 
or an equally protective active

[[Page 17644]]

measure(s) or procedural control(s) does not depend on whether an IST/
ISD practicability assessment was performed or whether the broader 
industry is performing a STAA. While each of these measures relate to 
STAA generally, they are distinct regulatory requirements of value 
independent of each other.
    The Agency acknowledges that, prior to this final rule, EPA has not 
made implementation of any IST/ISD or any measure identified in a STAA 
either a preferred option at proposal or an adopted requirement in a 
final rule. Our prior rulemakings have discussed our policy view of the 
merits of requiring implementation. Our prior decisions have not 
questioned what we view to be clear on the face of the statute: that 
the CAA authorizes EPA to require implementation of IST/ISD and other 
STAA measures. As discussed below (section V.B.3--Hydrogen fluoride), 
both subparagraphs (A) and (B) of CAA section 112(r)(7) authorize 
requiring implementation of safer technologies, and as discussed in the 
``safeguard implementation'' section, EPA has appropriately justified 
our change in our view of the policy merits of the requirement 
promulgated in this final rule. The 2017 amendments rule, the 2019 
reconsideration rule, and the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule all had vigorous 
discussion of the merits of implementing STAA throughout the rulemaking 
process, and the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule solicited comment on whether 
implementation should be required. Therefore, sources were on notice 
that the decision was an open matter and any reliance that we would not 
adopt an implementation requirement in response to comments and data 
was not reasonable. Moreover, to the extent sources relied on our 
preferred option regarding implementation at proposal, EPA believes the 
compliance period is adequate to allows sources to meet the rule 
requirements.
    Based on comments on both the proposed options and the alternative 
approaches presented, EPA is finalizing the proposed provisions for 
STAA with the following modifications:
     Revising 40 CFR 68.67(c)(9) to expand the STAA evaluation 
to all regulated facilities with Program 3 processes in NAICS codes 324 
and 325.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.67(c)(9)(ii) to expand the IST/ISD 
practicability assessment to regulated facilities with Program 3 
processes in NAICS codes 324 and 325 that also have had at least one 
RMP-reportable accident under 40 CFR 68.42 since the facility's most 
recent PHA.
     Adding 40 CFR 68.67(h) to require implementation of at 
least one passive measure at an applicable facility, or an inherently 
safer technology or design, or a combination of active and procedural 
measures equivalent to or greater than the risk reduction of a passive 
measure.
3. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
a. General STAA Provision Comments
STAA as Part of PHA
i. Comments
    A couple of commenters stated that they support EPA's proposal that 
owners and operators of RMP-covered facilities be required to include 
consideration and documentation of the feasibility of applying safer 
technologies and alternatives in their PHAs. One of the commenters 
noted, however, that only doing STAAs within the PHA will limit the 
effectiveness of the evaluations, and therefore, STAA should be 
evaluated within the PHA process as well as outside of the PHA in a 
separate study to evaluate each existing process.
    Some commenters expressed opposition to EPA requiring a mandatory 
STAA component in the PHA. A few commenters noted that mandating a full 
IST or ISD review would require a completely different PHA team, 
extensively increase the time and resources necessary to complete a 
PHA, require the PHA team to perform hazard assessments of ever-
changing technology they may not be familiar with, and dilute a PHA's 
core purpose.
    One commenter noted that the proposed rule's STAA requirements do 
not acknowledge the value of the PHA risk assessment function. Another 
commenter stated that the analysis of passive measures, active 
measures, and procedural measures already occurs as part of the PHA, as 
required by 40 CFR 68.67(c)(3) and (4) and (6) and (7), and no 
modification of the current regulations is thus required to ensure that 
this analysis occurs. The commenter added that STAA requirements will 
detract from and reduce the effectiveness of PHAs as it will divert 
resources from PHA processes that are currently working well at 
regulated facilities. The commenter noted the effectiveness of a PHA 
depends heavily upon the availability of high-quality process safety 
information (PSI), yet the proposed rule provides no direction on how 
the PHA team is to assemble the PSI needed to perform the STAA. The 
commenter explained that facilities would not normally have information 
about processes not in use there. The commenter added this detracts 
from the PHA focus on existing facility processes and potentially 
reduces the effectiveness of the analysis.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA believes that STAA analysis can be incorporated in the existing 
RMP PHAs by using PHA techniques such as the Hazard and Operability 
Study, What-If? Method, checklists, a combination of these, or other 
appropriate equivalent methodologies. (See 40 CFR 68.67(b)) These 
techniques themselves are not requirements, but tools available to help 
the facility owner or operator to identify, evaluate, and control the 
hazards involved in the process. The Agency also notes that, when EPA 
previously considered an IST requirement, commenters noted that ``PHA 
teams regularly suggest viable, effective (and inherently safer) 
alternatives for risk reduction,'' and EPA observed that ``good PHA 
techniques often reveal opportunities for continuous improvement of 
existing processes and operations'' (61 FR 31699-700).
    Therefore, EPA agrees with commenters expressing support for 
including a STAA in the PHA and disagrees with commenters that argue it 
is not appropriate to include a STAA in the PHA. In fact, the RMP PHA 
requirements include other aspects of analysis that are typically 
associated with process design. For example, the PHA must also address 
stationary source siting issues, which involve the location and 
proximity of the source relative to local populations.
    Nevertheless, EPA agrees that for situations where a STAA involves 
a novel process that is entirely different from the current process, 
the process design must exist or be developed within the industry, and 
PSI be compiled, to conduct a PHA for this new process. EPA does not 
expect facility owners or operators to research and create new 
processes or conduct research into all possibilities for the use of new 
chemicals. Instead, the STAA should focus on the industry known and 
existing substitute processes and chemicals that have been demonstrated 
to be safe in commercial use.
    If a facility is considering an IST chemical substitution or 
process change from their STAA that involves a significant redesign of 
their process, such efforts involved with redesign and its evaluation 
may need to be undertaken as part of a practicability study. The 
definition of practicability allows for consideration of technological 
factors, which could include whether the potential safer

[[Page 17645]]

alternative can be designed and operated to meet the process functions 
needed. However, not all IST involves substituting a chemical or an 
entirely new process. Also, there are other types of IST measures 
(minimization, moderation, or simplification) that can be considered to 
address various points within the current process where hazards and 
risks exist.
    Facilities may, if desired, conduct a separate STAA analysis of 
each entire process, outside of the PHA process, as long as it is done 
in the same timeframe as the PHA, and the results are documented. If a 
facility does not have staff capable to identify and evaluate 
alternatives, the facility owner or operator may obtain outside 
assistance from engineering firms or consultants. Furthermore, the 
Agency has accounted for the technical capabilities of facilities in 
the sectors targeted for STAA when determining reasonable requirements 
that provide for the prevention of accidents to the greatest extent 
practicable.
    Due to the performance-based approach of the current RMP PHA 
requirements at 40 CFR 68.67(c)(3), to identify, evaluate, and control 
the hazards involved in the process, EPA believes some facilities may 
have already performed a STAA-type analysis as part of their PHA. If 
the facility has already performed such STAA analysis in the past, then 
the owner or operator should consider these analyses when updating or 
revalidating their PHAs and determine whether there is new information 
that should be considered as part of conducting the current STAA.
Costs and Benefits of Implementing STAA as Part of PHA
i. Comments
    A couple of commenters stated that the STAA provisions would not be 
cost-effective. The commenters stated that the STAA represents 70 
percent of the total costs EPA estimated apply to the proposed rule. 
The commenters noted that the proposed STAA requirement is solely for 
consideration of possible alternatives and has unproven and 
unquantified benefits that do not justify the annual cost of $51.8 
million. One of the commenters added that EPA stated that they expect 
``some portion of future damages would be prevented through 
implementation of a Final Rule,'' but they did not identify any 
benefits specifically tied to the STAA provision. The commenter stated 
that there is consensus on the theoretical value of STAA as a tool to 
inform future investment decisions and said that once a facility has 
committed to a particular production technology, STAA is not 
particularly useful nor informative. In contrast, another commenter 
stated that the costs of transitioning to safer alternatives are not 
sufficiently weighed against the costs of a major incident. The 
commenter provided an example that indicates that safety improvements 
could avoid major incidents costing owners $220 million on average. The 
commenter also noted that this figure does not include costs to 
society, such as human lives, economic stress, and health care and 
emergency service costs.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA disagrees that the benefits of the STAA requirements do not 
justify the costs. EPA believes that the STAA should identify potential 
IST process changes that, if implemented, would result in owners or 
operators using less hazardous substances, minimizing the amount of 
regulated substances present in a process, moderating process 
conditions and reducing process complexity. The STAA also should 
identify potential passive, active, or procedural safeguards that, when 
implemented, will result in changes to make processes safer. Such 
changes help reduce the prevalence of higher risk processes and thereby 
prevent accidents by either: (1) Eliminating the possibility of an 
accidental release entirely, by making a process more fault-tolerant, 
such that a minor process upset, or equipment malfunction does not 
result in a serious accidental release; and (2) reducing the severity 
of releases that do occur.
    RMP accident data show past accidents have generated highly 
variable impacts, so the impacts of future accidents are difficult to 
predict. Nevertheless, it is clear from RMP accident data \74\ and 
other data from RMP regulated industry sectors,\75\ that chemical 
accidents can impose substantial costs on firms, employees, emergency 
responders, the community, and the broader economy. Because major and 
other concerning RMP accidents continue to occur, by lowering risk of 
accidents, the benefits include: reductions in the number of fatalities 
and injuries both onsite and offsite and residents evacuated or 
otherwise inconvenienced by sheltering in place; reductions in the 
damage caused to property onsite and offsite of the facility including 
damages to product, equipment, and buildings; reductions in damages to 
the environment and ecosystems; and reductions in resources diverted to 
extinguish fires and clean up affected areas. Preventing serious 
accidents avoids numerous direct costs, including worker, responder, 
and public fatalities and injuries, public evacuations, public 
sheltering in place, and property and environmental damage. It also 
avoids indirect costs, such as lost productivity due to lost or damaged 
property and business interruption both onsite and offsite, expenditure 
of emergency response resources and attendant transaction costs, and 
reduced offsite property values. Actions that prevent or reduce the 
severity of accidents in RMP-covered processes are also likely to 
prevent or mitigate non-RMP accidents at the same facilities because 
the same or similar actions can be taken for processes and equipment 
not subject to the regulation, often at minimal additional cost.
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    \74\ EPA estimated monetized damages from RMP facility accidents 
of $540.23 million per year.
    \75\ Marsh JLT Specialty, ``100 Largest Losses in the 
Hydrocarbon Industry,'' 27th Edition, March 2022. Accessed from 
https://www.marsh.com/uk/industries/energy-and-power/insights/100-largest-losses.html. Marsh provides estimates of large property 
damage losses in the hydrocarbon industry from 1974 to 2021 in 
current and 2021 dollars and in a few cases, business loss costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, for IST/ISD practicability and implementation of certain 
measures, EPA recognizes facilities will most likely implement IST/ISD 
when an IST/ISD's net cost is less than a passive measure's cost. The 
Agency assumes owners and operators will likely explore specific 
benefits to their facility when making decisions and expects the 
evaluation to consider several factors, such as:
     Operating and Maintenance (O&M) cost--IST/ISD may have a 
change in O&M costs compared to passive measures. For example, 
chemicals used in the process may change, which could cause changes in 
recurring input costs, including potentially lower those costs.
     Productivity improvements--IST/ISD could result in 
productivity improvements from more efficient process and changes to 
input costs.
     Safety improvements--IST/ISD may reduce risks of an 
accident more than would a passive-equivalent measure. A lower accident 
risk will result in facility safety benefits and social benefits from 
fewer accidents.
     Capital/facility reduced losses--Similar to safety, a 
lower accident risk will reduce losses to capital as well as shorter 
than expected facility shutdown time from accidents.
    These facility specific factors will further help owners and 
operators justify identify facility-specific benefits associated with 
the costs to comply with this provision. EPA continues to believe the 
performance-based nature of both this provision and the overall rule 
allow facility owners and operators the

[[Page 17646]]

discretion to determine which IST/ISDs and passive, active and 
procedural safeguard measures work best for their particular chemical 
use, process, or facility and for protecting the community potentially 
affected.
    EPA disagrees that the benefits of the STAA requirements are 
unproven. Since 1996, EPA has seen that advances in ISTs and safer 
alternatives are becoming more widely available and are being adopted 
by some companies. Voluntary implementation of some ISTs has been 
identified through surveys and studies and potential opportunities have 
been identified through EPA enforcement cases and the U.S. Chemical 
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) incident investigations. As 
discussed in the 2017 amendments rule (82 FR 4645, Jan. 13, 2017), the 
Contra Costa County Health Services and New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (NJDEP) IST regulations have resulted in some 
facilities adopting IST measures.
    EPA disagrees that STAA is not useful or informative for facilities 
that have committed to a particular production technology. Innovations 
and research in chemical process safety have evolved and continue to 
evolve. For those facilities who have not considered adopting any IST 
or have only done so in limited fashion, EPA believes that there is 
value in requiring facilities with regulated substances to evaluate 
whether they can improve risk management of current hazards through 
potential implementation of ISTs or risk management measures that are 
more robust and reliable than ones currently in use at the facility. 
For those facilities who have already considered IST, EPA believes 
facilities should re-evaluate whether any improvements in hazard or 
risk reduction can be made.
    In response to the comment that EPA did not identify any benefits 
specifically tied to the STAA provision, EPA was able to qualitatively 
judge that the risk reduction from STAA implementation \76\ reasonably 
justified the costs. In principle, the STAA eliminates or minimizes the 
opportunities for a chemical release because identification and 
implementation of ``safer'' technologies and alternatives, should 
result in a hazard or risk reduction for a particular RMP chemical or 
process. EPA recognizes that neither IST nor other procedural, active, 
or passive measures alone will eliminate all hazards or risks and that 
reliance on a combination of risk reduction measures will probably be 
needed for other points in a process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ This is further discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6 of 
the RIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Hydrogen Fluoride
i. Comments
    Some commenters were concerned that the proposed rule leaves the 
continued use of HF up to owners/operators. A few commenters urged EPA 
to strengthen the proposed rule by requiring facilities to switch from 
HF or other acutely toxic substances to a safer alternative whenever 
feasible, since safer alternatives are available. One of the commenters 
noted the CSB's 2022 report recommendations that HF in remaining 
alkylation units in the U.S. be eliminated and replaced, if necessary, 
with less hazardous chemicals that are consistent with ISD. One 
commenter requested that safer alternatives to HF be implemented across 
all oil refineries in the U.S.
    One commenter stated that the proposed rule was not comprehensive 
enough to adequately mitigate the inherent risks associated with using 
HF. The commenter stated that asking these facilities to merely 
consider switching from HF alkylation to safer alternatives and 
requiring them to include an STAA as part of their PHA was not enough 
to eliminate the inherent risk of having HF onsite. A couple of 
commenters recommended that the use of HF in refineries be banned. One 
of the commenters urged EPA to establish an aggressive timeline to 
phase out HF's use and said that further study is a waste of time. 
Another commenter contended that adding a larger scale ban of HF across 
all the oil refineries in the U.S. would safeguard millions of 
Americans from facing disaster in the event of an accidental release. 
Several commenters stated that the history of HF use and accidents 
supported the idea that stronger EPA action was necessary to protect 
communities.
    Several commenters stated a range of concerns regarding the dangers 
of HF. A few of the commenters specifically noted near misses or 
releases of HF and their associated harms and costs. One commenter 
noted the dangers of HF and the risks to communities, workforces, 
wildlife, hospitals, and first responders. Another commenter noted the 
risk of a catastrophic event caused not only by accidents and human 
error, but also from terrorism and natural disasters, which the 
commenter claimed cannot be mitigated. One commenter noted that 
earthquakes could cause the release of HF from refineries. One 
commenter noted the prevalence of refineries using HF near urban 
centers. Another commenter noted their concerns regarding the hazards 
of HF, specifically the dangers for nearby school children and a lack 
of emergency preparedness in schools.
    Conversely, one commenter urged EPA not to advance requirements 
specific to HF alkylation units. The commenter claimed that EPA has no 
legal authority to mandate STAA on existing processes and that the 
proposed STAA requirements on all HF alkylation processes at petroleum 
refineries are arbitrary and unlawful. The commenter claimed that EPA 
did not provide a meaningful account of the benefits associated with 
this requirement, failed to state specifically how this requirement 
would fulfill any statutory requirements of the RMP, and has little or 
no data to support its proposal. The commenter further claimed that the 
data indicates that the industry is safely managing the risks with HF.
    One commenter claimed that data show that HF alkylation processes 
are well managed by refiners. The commenter noted EPA's 1993 report on 
HF \77\ and the continuous improvement of industry-developed HF 
management policy American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended 
Practice 751, ``Safe Operation of Hydrofluoric Acid Alkylation Units'' 
(RP 751).\78\ The commenter stated that RP 751 is recognized by OSHA 
and the CSB as providing effective guidance for the safe operation of 
HF alkylation units and management of HF catalyst. The commenter 
claimed that there have never been life-threatening injuries to people 
in surrounding communities stemming from HF-related incidents at 
refineries, which the commenter noted was because of multiple layers of 
mitigation technologies and emergency procedures. The commenter claimed 
that the benefits of STAA are flawed because the commenter noted that 
EPA failed to consider the measures taken at facilities that follow or 
audit against RP 751.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ EPA, Hydrogen Fluoride Study, Report to Congress section 
112(n)(6) Clean Air Act As Amended, https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/10003920.PDF?Dockey=10003920.PDF.
    \78\ API, Recommended Practice 751 (2021), https://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/healthand-safety/refinery-and-plant-safety/process-safety/process-safety-standards/rp-751.
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ii. EPA Responses
    EPA notes that HF is an extremely toxic chemical used for 
alkylation at 27 percent of facilities in NAICS 324 (45 of 163). EPA is 
requiring that all HF alkylation processes at petroleum refineries 
(NAICS 324) conduct an initial STAA evaluation, a practicability 
assessment for IST/ISD, and

[[Page 17647]]

implementation of at least one passive measure (or combination of 
active or procedural measures equivalent to the risk reduction of a 
passive measure), primarily due to recent incidents where HF was nearly 
released when there were explosions, fires, and other releases that 
could have triggered releases of HF. While API RP 751 offers industry 
guidance to help safely manage HF alkylation process and its hazards, 
those process hazards still exist. In contrast, there are recognized 
potentially safer chemical alternatives available for HF alkylation 
that have been successfully implemented by refineries, such as sulfuric 
acid alkylation, ionic liquid alkylation, or solid acid catalyst 
alkylation. These eliminate the hazard. With several known alternatives 
and with recent incident history, EPA believes the process of HF 
alkylation merits a rule-based prevention approach rather than only 
selective oversight. In response to the comments urging EPA to require 
facilities to switch from HF to a safer alternative whenever feasible, 
the practicability of these potentially safer alternatives is 
situation-specific, and owners and operators are usually in the best 
position to make these determinations.
    EPA summarized its legal authority for the various provisions of 
this final rule in the preamble to the proposed rule, specifically 
identifying STAA as a prevention measure authorized under CAA section 
112(r)(7) (87 FR 53563-64, Aug. 31, 2022). EPA's legal authority to 
require an STAA evaluation and implementation of reasonable STAA 
measures is well-established under both paragraphs (A) and (B) of CAA 
section 112(r)(7). In authorizing rules for the prevention of 
accidental releases of regulated substances, subparagraph (A) of 
section 112(r)(7) specifically allows for rules that address design, 
equipment, and operations while permitting EPA to distinguish among 
classes of facilities based on factors ``including, but not limited to 
. . . location [and] process.'' This language authorizes EPA to put 
restrictions on and impose requirements for permissible design of a 
process and the types of equipment used as well as continuing operation 
of such designs and technologies. With respect to HF alkylation 
processes, not only does the statute authorize consideration of 
location when identifying classes to regulate, it also provides that 
EPA may consider the ``potency of substances'' when making distinctions 
among facilities that are covered by regulations under section 
112(r)(7)(A). As discussed in the proposed rule, HF is a particularly 
potent regulated substance. 87 FR 53576 (Aug. 31, 2022).
    In addition to the authority granted by subparagraph (A), the 
authority in subparagraph (B) to develop ``reasonable regulations 
[that] provide, to the greatest extent practicable, for the prevention 
and detection of accidental releases'' authorizes reasonable 
regulations to mandate examination of potential methods to prevent 
releases, to examine the practicability of alternative designs and 
technologies, and to require adoption of release prevention measures 
when practicable. Many of the same terms appear in both subparagraph 
(B)(i) as in subparagraph (A)--the requirement to cover ongoing 
operations, the authority to recognize ``differences in . . . 
operations, processes and class . . . of sources,'' while also granting 
authority to regulate ``use'' of regulated substances. Subparagraph 
(7)(B)(ii) authorizes rules to ``minimize'' accidental releases, which 
encompasses a mandate to implement practicable passive mitigation 
measures or their equivalent active and procedural measures. STAA is a 
``safety precaution'' under the prevention program. CAA 
112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(II).
    As noted in the 2017 amendments rule (82 FR 4630, Jan 13, 2017), 
both the Conference Report for the 1990 CAAA \79\ and the 1989 Senate 
Report related to the CAAA \80\ provide substantial support for the 
concepts of STAA. The Conference Report included support for ``a review 
of the efficacy of various prevention and control measures, including 
process changes or substitution of materials'' (Conference Report pp. 
340-41). Further, the Senate Report supported ``release prevention 
measures'' that contemplate IST and STAA (Senate Report p. 242). While 
neither the 1996 RMP rule nor the 2019 reconsideration rule required 
IST or STAA, neither action based those decisions on a lack of 
authority under CAA section 112(r)(7) to require examination of safer 
alternatives at either existing or new processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ H.R. Rep. No. 101-952 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
    \80\ S. Rep. No. 101-228 (1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, in discussing the purpose of the chemical accident 
provisions, the Senate Report identified a preference for measures that 
promote safer technologies to those that merely mitigate or respond to 
releases (pp. 208-209):
    Systems and measures which are effective in preventing accidents 
are preferable to those which are intended to minimize the consequences 
of a release. Measures which entirely eliminate the presence of 
potential hazards (through substitution of less harmful substances or 
by minimizing the quantity of an extremely hazardous substance present 
at any one time), as opposed to those which merely provide additional 
containment, are the most preferred.
    The Senate Report is entirely consistent with a preference for the 
hierarchy of controls that forms the basis of STAA.
b. STAA Evaluation
Applicability
i. Comments
    Several commenters recommended that EPA expand STAA requirements to 
cover more facilities. Some of the commenters highlighted that the 
proposed rule would only require approximately 5 percent of RMP 
facilities to conduct STAAs, which is a small subset of facilities. 
Some of the commenters suggested EPA require all RMP facilities to 
develop a hierarchy of hazard controls in sequence and priority order 
to eliminate risks of catastrophic releases. One commenter noted that 
EPA has failed to justify excluding any refineries, chemical 
manufacturing plants, pulp/paper mills, wastewater treatment, 
agricultural chemical or fertilizer plants, or thousands of other 
hazardous facilities where safer technologies are available.
    One commenter claimed that there was no valid justification not to 
require a refinery or chemical manufacturer to assess IST and consider 
ways to operate more safely simply because it was not within 1 mile of 
another refinery or chemical plant. The commenter claimed that the 1-
mile radius restriction was unworkable as well as unjustifiable and 
that it was unclear how to determine the distance restriction. The 
commenter stated that a 1-mile radius restricted the likely impact area 
for severe hazards and releases from refineries and chemical plants 
especially for communities where there are many facilities within a 1-
to-10-mile radius that can impact health, the ability of communities to 
evacuate, and the ability of first responders to assist. The commenter 
additionally noted that a hurricane, flooding, wildfire, or earthquake 
tended to have impacts greater than a 1-mile radius.
    Several commenters stated that the use of the 1-mile distance from 
fencelines instead of process location is unreasonable as there are 
facilities that have processes hundreds of yards from their fenceline. 
The commenters suggested that this additional distance should be 
accounted for in this

[[Page 17648]]

provision and requested that EPA use distances between the covered 
processes at the adjacent stationary source as opposed to fencelines.
    A couple of commenters stated that STAA is inappropriate and cost-
prohibitive for existing processes. These and other commenters urged 
that EPA should limit any STAA requirement to the design and 
development phases of new processes. A couple of commenters stated that 
the reasons different technologies are not implemented after a facility 
is already built are complex--ranging from chemical production or 
storage capability to life expectancy of operating equipment, capital 
expenditures, and market demands. Some commenters noted that EPA does 
not have the statutory authority under CAA section 112(r) to impose 
facility design requirements at any stage of a regulated facility's 
lifespan, much less for existing facilities.
    A couple of commenters noted that the considerations of STAA would 
have little relevance among the diverse processes, formulations, and 
applications relevant to the fertilizer industry, specifically. The 
commenters added that forcing companies to incorporate this ill-fitting 
approach in their PHAs would lead to higher RMP-compliance costs that 
would be passed on to farmers and consumers. One of the commenters 
further added these increased costs provide no benefit to the 
communities in which regulated facilities are located.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA agrees in part with commenters requesting that the 
applicability of the STAA provision be expanded to apply to more 
facilities compared to the requirements included in the proposed rule. 
In this final rule, EPA is expanding the initial STAA evaluation to all 
Program 3 facilities with NAICS 324 and 325 processes. EPA believes 
that high RMP accident frequency among NAICS 324 and 325 processes as 
shown by recent data \81\ presented in the proposed rule, is reasonable 
justification for requiring RMP owners and operators to evaluate safer 
technologies and alternatives to help prevent accidental releases. As 
noted in the proposed rule, between 2016 and 2020,\82\ sector accident 
rates (unique facilities having accidents) for NAICS 324 and 325 were, 
respectively, seven times higher (23 percent, n = 41 out of 177) and 
two times higher (6 percent, n = 96 out of 1631) than the rate for all 
RMP-regulated facilities (87 FR 53578).\83\ By expanding applicability 
of the STAA evaluation to these additional NAICS 324 and 325 processes, 
EPA expects to also capture complex facilities in less facility-dense 
areas that nonetheless may cause significant harm to human health and 
the environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Such data are also consistent with accident frequency data 
that formed part of the basis for the STAA applicability provisions 
in the 2017 amendments rule. See 81 FR 13668-69, March 14, 2016 
(amendments rule NPRM); 82 FR 4632-34, January 13, 2017.
    \82\ Due to a lack of alternative data describing RMP accident 
impacts more comprehensively, EPA chose this five-year dataset to 
reflect the most recent trends regarding RMP accidents. EPA used the 
August 1, 2021, version of the RMP database to complete its analysis 
because under 40 CFR 68.195(a), facilities are required to report 
RMP accidents and specific associated information within six months 
to the RMP database. Therefore, the RMP database as of August 1, 
2021, is expected to include RMP accidents and their specific 
associated information as of December 31, 2020. However, because 
accident data are reported to the RMP database by facility owners 
and operators, EPA acknowledges the likelihood of late-reported 
accidents affecting these last few years of data because some 
facilities may have not reported their RMP accidents as they are 
required to do. See sections 3.2 and 3.3 of the RIA for more on this 
and other limitations on the number and costs of baseline accidents.
    \83\ The list of these accidents and their details can be found 
in the Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 
section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention 
(April 19, 2022), Appendix A, https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174-0065. These accidents are specifically 
identified in Column BZ.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to the comment stating that EPA has failed to justify 
excluding any hazardous facilities where safer technologies or 
alternatives are available, EPA notes that it has provided 
justification for applying the STAA requirement to facilities with 
NAICS 324 and 325 processes and does not believe that the final 
provisions have been limited arbitrarily, or that the Agency's decision 
to limit applicability of the STAA provisions to the petroleum refining 
and chemical manufacturing sectors implies that other sectors do not 
have viable safer technology alternatives. EPA notes that sources 
involved in complex manufacturing operations have the greatest range of 
opportunities to identify and implement safer technologies, 
particularly in the area of inherent safety, because these sources 
generally produce, transform, and consume large quantities of regulated 
substances under sometimes extreme process conditions and using a wide 
range of complex technologies. Therefore, such sources can often 
consider the full range of inherent safety options, including 
minimization, substitution, moderation, and simplification, as well as 
passive, active, and procedural measures. Further, EPA notes that RMP 
facilities in the selected sectors have been responsible for a 
relatively large number of accidents, deaths, injuries, and property 
damage and have significantly higher accidents rates as compared to 
other sectors. The 5 percent of sources mentioned by the commenter, 
augmented by those refineries and chemical manufacturer sources that 
have had accidents in the past 5 years, are responsible for 42% of the 
total accidents from RMP-covered sources over the period from 2016-
2020, and 83% of the accident damage. Concentrating the most demanding 
requirements on this subset of sources recognizes the track record of 
heightened risk presented by these sources to their nearby communities.
    While EPA is not requiring all Program 3 sources, or all sources in 
industry sectors where feasible safer technology alternatives have been 
identified to perform a STAA, the Agency encourages such sources to 
consider performing a STAA, and to determine practicability of IST or 
ISD considered, even if they are not subject to the STAA provisions of 
the final rule. EPA expects guidance for this provision and the data 
resulting from the STAA Technology Transfer described in section e. of 
this section will be useful for all facilities to adopt to identify 
potential IST/ISD and safeguards. As noted in the preamble of the 2016 
proposed amendments rule, provisions in the existing rule provides 
several incentives to encourage the use of STAA and the adoption of 
safer technologies, including having applicability based on a chemical 
threshold, allowing a source to take credit for passive mitigation in 
calculating its worst-case scenario and both passive and active 
controls when calculating its alternative scenarios (81 FR 13663, Mar. 
14, 2016). Consistent with EPA's general approach to the RMP 
regulations, the Agency allows flexibility for owners and operators to 
adopt various methods to meet performance standards, with more 
specific, demanding standards for sources that pose a greater 
likelihood of an accidental release and have greater complexity, and 
for sources that pose a greater risk to nearby communities.
    In the final rule, the definition of the 1-mile radius is relevant 
to the applicability of the IST/ISD practicability assessment and 
safeguard implementation only. Acknowledging that refineries and 
chemical manufacturers have sector accident rates that are higher than 
the general rates for RMP-covered facilities, close co-location of 
sources in NAICS codes 324 and 325 further increases the risk to the 
public that may be potentially exposed to a

[[Page 17649]]

release from multiple sources. It is appropriate to increase the 
stringency and transparency of the requirement for so situated sources. 
Discussion of the application of the 1-mile criteria is later discussed 
in the Practicability Assessment and Safeguard Implementation sections 
of this preamble.
    In response to the comments that the STAA requirement should be 
limited to the design and development phases of new Program 2 and 
Program 3 processes, EPA disagrees. While the greatest potential 
opportunities for using IST may exist early in process design and 
development, many IST options may still be practicable after the 
initial design phase. Furthermore, STAA involves more than just IST. 
Safer technology alternatives also include passive measures, active 
measures, and procedural measures, and these measures can be modified 
and improved after the initial design of a facility. EPA notes that 
while many RMP-regulated facilities were originally constructed decades 
ago, major enhancements have been reported in some plants that have 
been operating for many years. Moreover, to the extent that particular 
measures are cost-prohibitive, the rule allows for that to be a factor 
in assessing whether a measure is practicable.
    The Agency disagrees with the comments that the CAA does not 
authorize the STAA provisions of this final rule. Both paragraphs (A) 
and (B) of CAA section 112(r)(7) authorize STAA and IST in particular. 
EPA cited all of section 112(r)(7) as authority for ``[e]ach of the 
portions of the Risk Management Program rule we propose to modify'' (81 
FR 13646, March 14, 2016). The authority section for 40 CFR part 68 
references CAA section 112(r) and is not limited to particular 
paragraphs. The proposed rule also noted that paragraph 112(r)(7)(A) 
had been invoked in the rulemaking petition on IST. Therefore, EPA 
provided sufficient notice that the Agency contemplated action under 
any authority under CAA section 112(r)(7). Nevertheless, EPA also views 
its authority to require STAA assessments or an IST review, or 
implementation of safeguards to reduce risk as being consistent with 
paragraph 112(r)(7)(B). Under paragraph (B), EPA has authority to 
develop ``reasonable regulations . . . for the prevention of accidental 
releases.'' The reduction in severity of conditions in a process 
plainly impacts the accidental release conditions and thus the modeling 
called for in section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(I). Moreover, section 
112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(II) specifically mentions that prevention programs in 
risk management plans shall provide for ``safety precautions;'' STAA 
measures are a type of safety precaution. Finally, as noted above, the 
Conference Report for the 1990 CAAA and the Senate Report both 
demonstrate that Congress intended the regulations to prioritize STAA 
as a prevention measure.
    With regard to comments relating to STAA requirements for the 
fertilizer industry, EPA is not requiring agricultural fertilizer 
retail facilities to perform a STAA, and thus there should be no burden 
to this particular industry as a result of the STAA provision. The STAA 
requirement in the PHA will only apply to Program 3 facilities in 
chemical manufacturing (NAICS code 325) and petroleum and coal products 
manufacturing (NAICS code 324).
c. Practicability Assessment
i. Comments
    One commenter expressed support for EPA's proposal to require 
owners and operators to identify, evaluate, and document the 
practicability of implementing inherent safety measures, including 
documenting the practicability of publicly available safer 
alternatives. Another commenter stated that EPA should include the STAA 
practicability assessment as part of the PHA because such an assessment 
will provide additional context to the public, local officials, and 
emergency managers regarding a facility's consideration of risk 
management. The commenter added that the assessment should be used 
internally by the facility to plan future process and technology 
improvements to increase safety. One commenter urged EPA to move beyond 
just the assessment and reporting of safer technologies and require 
that facilities implement the identified alternatives when practicable, 
working with employees and communities to do so expeditiously.
    One commenter opposed the proposed new 40 CFR 68.67(c)(9)(ii) and 
stated that EPA should not adopt the proposed practicability assessment 
requirement. The commenter expressed opposition to any requirement to 
consider IST in existing processes at covered stationary sources. A 
couple of commenters questioned how EPA, focused on process safety, 
would be able to assess social and economic factors as part of the PHA 
STAA component. The commenters noted that the consideration of 
``social'' factors extend far beyond the traditional, performance-
oriented ``process safety'' scope of a PHA, presenting a conflict with 
the scope of the PHA required by the OSHA PSM standard. The commenters 
also noted that EPA's ``practicability'' definition and evaluation does 
not distinguish between technologies or practices that have been 
proffered in research papers or demonstrated in pilot plants versus at 
the large-scale facilities subject to the RMP and required to perform a 
STAA. The commenters emphasized that ``real-world'' technologies should 
be the focus of the STAA, not theoretical or possible technologies that 
have not been tested or tried at RMP-regulated sources.
ii. EPA Responses
    In this final rule, EPA is expanding the applicability of the IST/
ISD practicability assessment to apply to more facilities compared to 
the requirements included in the proposed rule. The IST/ISD 
practicability assessment will also apply to the owner or operator of a 
facility with Program 3 processes in NAICS codes 324 and 325 that has 
had an accidental release that meets the accident history reporting 
requirements under 40 CFR 68.42 since the facility's most recent PHA. 
As EPA noted in the 2019 reconsideration rule, a past accident is one 
of the best predictors of future accidents that could potentially 
threaten a facility's nearby community. Additionally, as indicated in 
the proposal, of the 70 facilities experiencing 2 or more incidents 
between 2016 and 2020, 43 (60 percent) were in NAICS 324 and 325. The 
facilities required to conduct practicability assessments for IST/ISDs 
identified in the STAA accounted for 42% of all accidents and 83% of 
the cost of accidents among all RMP facilities during the period from 
2016-2020.\84\ A more in-depth look at implementation of IST/ISD by: 
(1) These facilities with accidents; (2) those identified in the 
proposal at facilities with processes in NAICS 324 and 325 located 
within 1 mile of another NAICS 324 or 325 facility; (3) and facilities 
with hydrofluoric alkylation, should lead to avoiding or reducing 
hazards at these facilities. At this time, EPA believes it is best to 
further focus the practicability assessment of IST/ISD on this subset 
of facilities as they present an even more heightened risk to a 
facility's surrounding community than other facilities with NAICS 324 
and 325 processes.
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    \84\ Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer Communities by Chemical 
Accident Prevention: Final Rule. This document is available in the 
docket for this rulemaking (EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA agrees that the practicability assessment will provide the 
public and local emergency managers with important context regarding a 
facility's

[[Page 17650]]

consideration of safer technologies and alternatives. In response to 
the comment that the practicability assessment should be used by 
facilities to increase safety, EPA believes that the final rule will 
allow the owner or operator to consider the potential for risk 
reduction, risk transfers, and tradeoffs when determining whether it is 
practicable to implement ISTs or ISDs considered. IST is a relative 
concept dependent on the hazard, the technology, and the facility. 
Therefore, EPA is requiring facilities to only consider IST as a 
possibility for addressing hazards rather than requiring ISTs be 
implemented. The final rule will give the facility owner or operator 
the flexibility to assess and to determine the practicability of any 
measures considered based on various factors for IST (including those 
involving risk transference).
    In response to the comment that EPA should require facilities to 
implement identified alternatives when practicable, in this final rule, 
EPA is requiring implementation of at least one passive measure at an 
applicable facility, or an inherently safer technology or design, or a 
combination of active and procedural measures equivalent to or greater 
than the risk reduction of a passive measure; further discussion of 
this requirement is below in the Safeguard Implementation section 
(V.B.3.d) of this preamble. EPA is not requiring implementation of 
identified IST. EPA believes facility owners and operators will adopt 
IST even in the absence of a mandate when it is practicable technically 
and economically and when the hazard reduction is significant. Part of 
the basis for this belief is the likelihood that most of the economic 
savings resulting from reduced accidents will be from reduced onsite 
property damage to the owner or operator's facility.
    In response to the comment that the consideration of ``social'' 
factors extends far beyond the traditional, performance-oriented 
``process safety'' scope of a PHA, EPA disagrees. While the PHA 
identifies the hazards, the RMP PHA requires the facility to identify 
the risk management measures applicable to eliminating or reducing the 
risks from the process hazards. EPA believes that it is appropriate for 
a facility to consider the five practicability factors (i.e., economic, 
environmental, legal, social and technological) for evaluating the 
appropriateness of implementing for potential IST measures because some 
IST can involve significant costs or involve impacts that go beyond the 
facility. These factors are recognized and further discussed in in 
CCPS' 2019 ``Guidelines for Inherently Safer Chemical Processes, A Life 
Cycle Approach,'' 3rd edition, and NJDEP's Guidance for Toxic 
Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA), ``Inherently Safer Technology (IST) 
Review,'' Attachment 1 ``Feasibility guidance.'' \85\
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    \85\ https://www.nj.gov/dep/enforcement/tcpa/downloads/istguidance_rev2.pdf.
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    In response to comments stating that ``real-world'' technologies 
should be the focus of the STAA, not theoretical or possible 
technologies that have not been tested or tried at RMP-regulated 
sources, EPA expects that facilities will only evaluate chemical 
substitutes that have already been shown to be commercially viable and 
does not expect facility owners or operators to expend a major effort 
on hypothetical or untested chemical substitutes or uses. This approach 
is consistent with EPA's authority to require reasonable regulations 
that prevent accidental releases to the greatest extent practicable.
    In the final rule, the definition of the 1-mile radius is relevant 
to the applicability of the practicability assessment and safeguard 
implementation only. Acknowledging that refineries and chemical 
manufacturers have sector accident rates that are higher than the 
general rates for RMP-covered facilities, close co-location of sources 
in NAICS codes 324 and 325 further increases the risk to the public 
that may be potentially exposed to a release from multiple sources. In 
these sectors, the worst-case scenarios of 80 percent of sources extend 
at least 1 mile, therefore the communities surrounding these sources 
will typically face multiple threats. It is appropriate to increase the 
stringency and transparency of the requirement for so situated sources. 
In the proposal, EPA proposed to define facility location based on 
distance to the facility fenceline but sought comment on other 
definitions of facility proximity. Recognizing that the distance from a 
process is a more accurate way to calculate a release scenario than the 
distance from a fenceline, EPA will nevertheless retain 1 mile from the 
fenceline as the applicability criterion, as opposed to 1 mile from 
process locations, both for simplicity in implementation and also in 
deference to restrictions on source-specific information on release 
scenarios. The Agency believes that regulated facilities, the public, 
and implementing agencies can more easily calculate and verify a 
fenceline-to-fenceline measurement than a process-to-process 
measurement because it does not require access to facility-specific 
process information.
d. Safeguard Implementation
i. Comments
    A couple of commenters recommended EPA require industries to seek 
out solutions that pose less inherent risk and danger to their 
employees and surrounding communities and that they implement all 
practicable alternatives that could eliminate risks of a catastrophic 
release. A couple of commenters urged EPA to require that facilities 
work with employees and communities to implement the identified 
alternatives when practicable. A few commenters called on EPA to add a 
requirement to implement recognized safer alternatives. One of the 
commenters stated that relying on voluntary measures alone does not 
satisfy the requirement of the Act for EPA to assure prevention ``to 
the greatest extent practicable.'' The commenter noted the proposal is 
inconsistent with the CSB recommendation requiring both assessment and 
implementation of IST. One commenter claimed that relying on voluntary 
implementation alone is insufficient to protect fenceline communities 
who have seen nearby facilities repeatedly refuse to implement safer 
ways to operate, no matter how inexpensive or easy they may be. Because 
risks faced by nearby communities impose costs that are external to the 
firm, there is a market failure and firms do not face an appropriate 
level of incentive to reduce these risks. The commenter stated that 
voluntary measures cannot be relied upon given that market failure has 
delayed and prevented common-sense solutions. The commenter stated 
that, while the STAA, practicability assessment, and justification 
report are all valuable and should be expanded and finalized, the rule 
should require the implementation of practicable IST through careful 
consultation with workers and worker representatives and community 
members.
    Some of the commenters asserted that EPA does not have the 
statutory authority, under section 112(r) of the CAA, to impose 
facility design requirements at any stage of a regulated facility's 
lifespan, much less for existing facilities. Several commenters noted 
IST and ISD are in the best interest of facilities to implement where 
there are practical and effective; therefore, there is no reason to 
require it. The commenters also expressed concern over excessive costs 
to implement unnecessary technologies if required to implement 
inherently safer technologies.

[[Page 17651]]

    The commenters urged EPA to allow facilities to decide what is best 
on a case-by-case basis due to instances where adopting an inherently 
safer process may not actually make a process safer when put into 
practice. One commenter added there are cases where there are no safer 
alternatives and conducting an STAA is not necessary, does little to 
improve safety, and creates extra complexity for employers to present a 
case to regulators for their processes. The commenter also said that 
regulations should be straightforward and easy to understand, so a 
vague requirement to require facility owners to present a case that 
their processes are safe will create confusion and not improve safety.
    Some commenters noted that the proposed STAA requirement is solely 
for consideration of possible alternatives and has unproven and 
unquantified benefits that do not justify the annual cost of $51.8 
million. One of the commenters added that EPA stated that they expect 
``some portion of future damages would be prevented through 
implementation of a Final Rule,'' but they do not identify any benefits 
specifically tied to the STAA provision. The commenter expressed 
concern that EPA did not review and summarize literature on STAA in the 
proposed rule since there are a large amount of studies on its 
practical effectiveness; the commenter stated that there is consensus 
on its theoretical value as a tool to inform future investment 
decisions, and that once a facility has committed to a particular 
production technology, STAA is not particularly useful nor informative.
ii. EPA Responses
    The CAA directs EPA to ``promulgate reasonable regulations . . . to 
provide, to the greatest extent practicable, for the prevention and 
detection of accidental releases . . .'' In some circumstances, solely 
relying on voluntary implementation of STAA measures is not reasonable 
and would be inadequate to prevent accidents ``to the greatest extent 
practicable.'' This is particularly true when safeguards are identified 
and generally deemed practicable, but not implemented. A reasonable 
decision to not implement such safeguards at a facility must be 
supported with a comprehensive review of factors like cost, risk 
reduction, risk transfer, employee input, and engineering that 
concludes the technology is not practicable contextually. EPA's 2022 
SCCAP proposed rule emphasized the importance of identifying ``new risk 
reduction strategies, as well as revisit[ing] strategies that were 
previously evaluated to determine whether they are now practicable as a 
result of changes in cost and technology.'' Safer design and technology 
information and lessons learned are continually being generated, and 
facilities should integrate such updated information to help prevent 
accidents.
    Taking an important step to reinforce these crucial factors, this 
final rule is requiring processes subject to the IST practicability 
assessment to also implement at least one practicable passive measure 
resulting from the STAA evaluation. For this provision, practicable 
active and procedural measures or their combination can be implemented 
as a substitute to practicable passive measures if no practicable 
passive measures are identified or if they achieve layers of protection 
equivalent to or greater than the risk reduction of passive measures. 
This provision is intended to reduce the risks of the accidental 
releases by requiring processes that EPA has identified to present a 
heightened risk to a community to implement reliable safeguards 
necessary to help prevent or mitigate chemical releases and their 
consequences; in particular, the provision requires RMP-regulated 
facilities with P3 processes: (1) In NAICS codes 324 and 325 located 
within 1 mile of another NAICS 324 or 325 facility; (2) in NAICS codes 
324 and 325 that has had an accidental release that meets the accident 
history reporting requirements under 40 CFR 68.42 since the facility's 
most recent PHA; and (3) in NAICS 324 with hydrofluoric alkylation 
processes--to implement practicable safeguards that help prevent or 
mitigate chemical releases and their consequences.
    The PHA requirements at 40 CFR 68.67 have always required sources 
to ``identify, evaluate and control the hazards involved in the 
process.'' Currently the provision does not prescribe exactly which 
type or what measures must be implemented to control the hazards. In 
guidance, the Agency discusses how sources can resolve hazard 
evaluation recommendations after identifying and evaluating solutions 
to control hazards, stating that, ``EPA does not require that you 
implement every recommendation. It is up to you to make reasonable 
decisions about which recommendations are necessary and feasible. You 
may decide that other steps are as effective as the recommended actions 
or that the risk is too low to merit the expense. You must, however, 
document your decision on each recommendation.'' \86\ Guidance further 
indicates, ``You may not always agree with your PHA team's 
recommendations and may wish to reject a recommendation. OSHA's 
compliance directive CPL 2-2.45A(revised) states that you may decline a 
team recommendation if you can document one of the following: (1) The 
analysis upon which the recommendation is based contains relevant 
factual errors; (2) the recommendation is not necessary to protect the 
health of employees or contractors; (3) an alternative measure would 
provide a sufficient level of protection; or (4) the recommendation is 
infeasible. For part 68, you may also decline a recommendation if you 
can show that it is not necessary to protect public health and the 
environment.'' \87\ While EPA continues to believe that the source has 
the primary expertise and resources to weigh decisions on process 
design, process safety and accident prevention, EPA is concerned that 
controlling hazards and adopting reasonable safety measures and layers 
of protection necessary to keep the public and environment safe from 
chemical releases based on reasoned, documented decision-making do not 
always occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ EPA, General RMP Guidance--Chapter. 6: Prevention Program 
(Program 2) (2004), pp. 6-11, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2013-11/documents/chap-06-final.pdf.
    \87\ EPA, General RMP Guidance--Chapter 7: Prevention Program 
(Program 3) (2004), pp. 7-7, https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2013-11/documents/chap-07-final.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In two recent CSB accident reports, ``FCC Unit Explosion and 
Asphalt Fire at Husky Superior Refinery'' \88\ and ``Fire and 
Explosions at Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refinery Hydrofluoric Acid 
Alkylation Unit,'' \89\ the CSB addresses safeguards that should have 
been in place to prevent or mitigate major accidents at refineries. 
These cases highlight the consequences to workers and the surrounding 
community when sources do not take the necessary steps to implement 
safeguards to control known hazards.
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    \88\ https://www.csb.gov/husky-energy-superior-refinery-explosion-and-fire/.
    \89\ https://www.csb.gov/philadelphia-energy-solutions-pes-refinery-fire-and-explosions-/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On April 26, 2018, an explosion and subsequent fire occurred at 
Husky Energy's Superior Refining Company LLC refinery in Superior, 
Wisconsin (Husky). The incident occurred during a planned maintenance 
event when flammable hydrocarbons inadvertently mixed with air. As a 
result of the explosion and fire, 36 refinery and contract workers were 
injured and sought medical attention. The CSB found that Husky failed 
to properly

[[Page 17652]]

implement safeguards that could have prevented the inadvertent mixing 
of air and hydrocarbons during the shutdown. The safeguards CSB 
identified, a steam barrier, gas purge, and slide valves, are typically 
vital to this type of process and are generally known and broadly 
applied within the refining industry. Not applying these safeguards 
allowed oxygen to enter and accumulate in process equipment containing 
flammable material, which ignited and exploded.
    On Friday June 21, 2019, Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES) 
refinery in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, had a release of propane and 
toxic hydrofluoric acid vapor from a ruptured pipe in the PES refinery 
alkylation unit. The vapor found an ignition source, causing a fire and 
multiple explosions. Five workers and a firefighter experienced minor 
injuries during the incident and response. The incident also resulted 
in estimated property damage of $750 million. The CSB determined the 
cause of rupture was from a piping component that corroded. CSB 
indicated that the absence of safeguards, remotely operated emergency 
isolation valves, and passive safeguards to prevent incident-induced 
damage to the water mitigation system, contributed to the severity of 
the incident.
    As discussed in previous rulemakings, the hierarchy of control 
methods in an STAA analysis--IST/ISD, passive, active, procedural--
systematically provides for the identification of practicable control 
methods. The Agency expects the STAA analyses to lead to new hazard 
control approaches at sources where management finds such approaches to 
be reasonable and practicable. The Agency acknowledges requiring 
facilities to implement IST can involve extensive changes to a 
facility's process, depending on the IST, especially if it involves 
substitution of alternative chemicals and/or major process redesign to 
existing processes. EPA believes that measures lower on the hierarchy 
of controls, passive, active and procedural measures, when implemented 
appropriately, can be used to help operate a hazardous chemical process 
safely and can also reduce hazard risks of that process. When compared 
with IST, these measures could also more likely be added, modified, and 
improved after the initial design or operation of a facility.
    Nothing in this rule forces the adoption or abandonment of any 
technology or design. The mandate we adopt is limited to selecting 
additional mitigation periodically for specific processes so long as 
the risk of an impact release persists,\90\ with a preference 
consistent with the well-understood hierarchy of controls.
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    \90\ If passive mitigation or other adopted mitigation measures 
would be sufficient to change all NAICS 324 or 325 processes to 
Program 1, then the source no longer would have an obligation to add 
additional mitigation measures in future PHAs, as the mandate for 
safeguard implementation only applies to Program 3 processes. If the 
adopted mitigation measure is insufficient to meet Program 1 at all 
NAICS 324 and 325 processes at the source, then the potential for 
offsite impacts presenting risk would remain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA is requiring implementation of passive measures as a priority 
rather than active and procedural because it is the next highest level 
below IST on the hierarchy of controls and the most reliable in 
comparison to active and procedural safeguards, as they reduce risks 
without human, mechanical, or other energy input. As discussed in CSB's 
PES report, active safeguards that require a person or technology to 
trigger their activation have the potential to fail in major incidents 
involving fire or explosions, which was the case in the PES accident 
and could be a likely release scenario for flammable substances, which 
are regulated substances often present at refineries and chemical 
manufacturers.
    EPA recognizes that passive safeguards may not exist or may not be 
practicable for a variety of reasons and other safeguards are needed to 
cover gaps in process safety risk reduction. EPA also recognizes that a 
passive measure may be even more effective when applied appropriately 
with other measures. This concept of layers of protection acknowledges 
that individual safeguards are not completely reliable or effective, 
and thus multiple safeguards (``layers'') may be needed to minimize the 
chances of an initial fault propagating to a full-blown incident with 
potential for harm. This is often illustrated using the ``Swiss 
Cheese'' model for incidents. In this model, each safeguard layer has 
the potential to fail, with highly reliable safeguards (e.g., 
``inherent'' ones) having relatively few ``holes'', and less reliable 
safeguards (e.g., ``procedural'') having more. While no single layer 
can adequately control the hazard, having enough adequately reliable 
safeguards can greatly reduce the chance of all of the ``holes'' lining 
up so that an incident actually occurs. This final rule will give the 
facility owner or operator the flexibility to assess and potentially 
implement IST, implement passive measures, or implement a combination 
of active and procedural measures to reduce risk associated with a 
process. The approach adopted in this final rule does not require a 
facility to implement a hazard reduction approach beyond what is to the 
greatest extent practicable among the reasonable options.
    EPA acknowledges that because the requirement to control hazards 
has been a PHA requirement since the inception of the rule, some 
passive (or equivalent) safeguards to control hazards are likely 
already in place within facility processes. Facilities that have 
already implemented passive measures or an equivalent level of risk 
reduction should document their implementation in their next PHA, 
determine whether there is additional information that should be 
considered in their STAA, and continue to consider additional passive 
(or equivalent) measures during subsequent PHA re-validation cycles.
    The Agency recognizes that requiring any implementation of STAA 
measures is a departure from both the 2017 amendments rule (82 FR 4648-
49, Jan. 13, 2017) and the 2022 proposed rule and that the Agency 
identified reasons for not requiring implementation of any STAA in the 
2022 proposed rule (87 FR 53580, Aug. 31, 2022).\91\ However, the 2017 
amendments rule and the 2022 proposed rule primarily focused discussion 
on the reasonableness of mandating adoption of IST/ISD rather than 
passive, active, or procedural measures. For example, in 2017, EPA 
explained that one reason the Agency did not require implementation of 
IST/ISD is that a source may reasonably decide to employ more than one 
method of hazard reduction to address a hazard or that a given type of 
safer technology may not exist for a particular hazard point (82 FR 
4649, Jan. 13, 2017); consistent with these observations, this rule 
allows a source to adopt layering active and procedural measures to 
achieve the equivalent risk reduction a passive measure would achieve 
and does not adopt a requirement for an IST/ISD at each hazard point. 
The Agency retains substantial flexibility for owners and operators to 
select among passive measures they deem appropriate for their 
stationary sources. The final rule allows for consideration of factors 
highlighted in the 2017 amendments rule like chemical formula 
specifications for toll manufacturers, the potential for risk transfer, 
supply chain

[[Page 17653]]

limitations, and the need to address security implications of any 
change when assessing whether to reject particular passive measures. 
See 82 FR 4635-36 (toll manufacturers), 4643 (risk transfer), 4648 
(supply chain), and 4649 (security).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ The 2019 reconsideration rule did not specifically discuss 
requiring or not requiring implementation of measures identified in 
a STAA because it more generally rescinded all prevention measures 
promulgated in 2017. With no requirement to perform an STAA, there 
was no need to assess whether implementation of measures identified 
in such an analysis needed to be implemented. The proposed rule and 
this final rule discuss the reasons for adopting a different broad 
approach to prevention than that adopted in 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 2022 proposed rule contended that a requirement for 
implementation of IST/ISD or any measure was unnecessary because 
sources were likely to implement practicable measures when economically 
and technically reasonable and risk reduction would be significant. EPA 
partially based this contention on the observation that most of the 
economic savings from reducing accidents would accrue to the source 
itself (87 FR 53580, Aug. 31, 2022). However, not all damages accrue to 
the source responsible for the accident. For example, offsite impacts 
such as injuries, sheltering in place events, evacuations, 
environmental damage, and so on are experienced by people other than 
the regulated facility. Because these costs are external to the 
facility, there is a market failure, and firms do not have an 
appropriate level of incentive to prevent them. This market failure has 
been noted by commenters with respect to catastrophic events, the 
prevention of which is a primary purpose of enacting CAA section 
112(r). Catastrophic events impose extensive burdens on people external 
to the source responsible for the accident. Moreover, these incidents 
are low probability, high consequence events that are difficult for 
owners and operators to assess; therefore, it may be unreasonable to 
rely primarily on sources to make the ultimate decision on whether to 
adopt any measures at all. The standard adopted in this final rule for 
sources presenting elevated risks to communities, wherein EPA mandates 
adoption of at least one passive measure at the facility, or an 
inherently safer technology or design, or a combination of active and 
procedural measures equivalent to or greater than the risk reduction of 
a passive measure, reasonably addresses the potential market failure 
that would lead to less implementation than would be necessary for risk 
reduction.
    EPA disagrees with commenters indicating implementation of STAA 
measures has no proven benefits. A review of corrective actions 
following RMP accidents provides insight that practicable methods to 
address hazards are not infrequently found after accidents, which 
suggests the rule could be strengthened by providing incentives to 
implement those controls in advance of the accident. In reviewing RMP 
data from facilities subject to the practicability assessment and this 
STAA safeguard implementation provision (621 facilities), 59 percent of 
facilities indicated in their most recent PHA, some type of change was 
implemented. On average, 1.2 process safety changes \92\ were 
implemented because of the PHA, but of those facilities having 
accidents (16.8 percent), an average of 2.2 process safety changes were 
made after an accident occurred.\93\ This review was one piece of 
evidence supporting EPA's reasoned judgment that the risk reduction 
benefits of the STAA implementation justified the costs. Therefore, as 
RMP facility process change data has shown, EPA expects there are 
benefits to make risk reduction changes through the PHA prior to an 
accident occurring.
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    \92\ Changes include chemical reduction, chemical increase, 
change in process parameters, installation of process controls, 
installation of process detection, installation of perimeter 
monitoring, installation of mitigation systems, revised maintenance, 
revised training, revised operating procedures, or other changes not 
included in these categories. These change categories are those 
reported in RMPs under 40 CFR 68.175(e)(6).
    \93\ The list of RMP facilities whose most current RMP plans (as 
of December 31, 2020) were reviewed is provided in the docket for 
this rulemaking, EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-0174, RMP facilities in 
PHA_accident change analysis.
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    In response to comments concerning costs for implementing STAA 
measures, EPA believes there is an overemphasis on initial costs 
leading to less consideration of safer, reliable methods to reduce 
process risks. CCPS' 2019 ``Guidelines for Inherently Safer Chemical 
Processes, A Life Cycle Approach'' discusses the tradeoff of initial 
and operating costs of implementing different STAA measures. CCPS 
indicates that while inherently safer and passive measures do tend to 
have higher initial capital costs, operating costs are usually lower 
than those for the other measures. For active measures as compared to 
inherently safer and passive measures, reliability is typically lower, 
and complexity is greater. Operating costs are also actually likely to 
be the greatest for active solutions. While procedural measures are 
most often tempting solutions due to their initial very low capital 
cost and typically lower complexity, they are often also the least 
reliable and should be considered only after other solutions have been 
explored. Similarly, EPA believes passive measures (or active/
procedural equivalent) measures that reduce risk and are practicable 
should be implemented.
    The Agency is not requiring formal practicability assessments (as 
is now required for IST) for passive, active, or procedural measures. 
Since evaluation of passive, active and procedural measures have been a 
part of the RMP rule, leading to implementation of some, it is expected 
that the determination of their practicability already occurs. The 
Agency believes the requirement to determine what actions are to be 
taken in 40 CFR 68.67(e) suffices as a practicability determination for 
the less extensive upgrades or changes to the process as compared to 
IST. However, to ensure the assessment determining a measure is not 
practicable complies with the final rule definition, sources will be 
required to document this conclusion to the implementing agency's 
satisfaction; this requirement will help ensure costs alone are not the 
sole factor in determining practicability.
    Finally, contrary to the assertion that the statute does not 
authorize regulations that impose design standards, the Agency notes 
that the statute explicitly provides the Administrator with the 
authority to promulgate ``design, equipment, work practice, and 
operational requirements'' in CAA section 112(r)(7)(A), as well as 
requirements for ``preventing accidental releases of regulated 
substances, including safety precautions and maintenance'' in CAA 
section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(II). The regulation promulgated in this final 
rule simply imposes standards on continuing safe operations and 
equipment. Furthermore, the regulations required by CAA section 
112(r)(7)(B)(i), ``shall cover the use, operation, repair, replacement, 
and maintenance of equipment to monitor, detect, inspect, and control'' 
accidental releases of regulated substances as appropriate (emphasis 
added). Terms such as ``use'' and ``operation'' necessarily allow EPA 
to address ongoing activities and not simply the pre-construction 
phase, and ``replacement'' of ``equipment'' to ``control'' releases 
authorizes EPA to require upgrades to release prevention measure such 
as practicable passive control measures. As discussed above, the 
Conference Report and the Senate Report provide ample support for 
requiring implementation of process and control measures to lessen the 
likelihood and impact of accidental releases.
e. STAA Technology Transfer
i. Comments
    Several commenters supported EPA's proposed technology transfer 
provisions. A few commenters stated that EPA should require every RMP 
facility to routinely report the safer technologies/designs evaluated, 
implemented, or planned because, as

[[Page 17654]]

proposed, 95 percent of RMP facilities will not report any solutions 
data. One of the commenters stated this will allow EPA to better assess 
the impacts of its own activities for promoting prevention of 
catastrophic releases. Another commenter suggested that this reporting 
occur as a regular part of semi-annual CAA compliance reports, and at a 
minimum, as a regular part of RMP reporting to EPA. One commenter 
stated that EPA should require the STAA-exempt 95 percent of RMP 
facilities to report whether they have evaluated IST/ISD and, if so, 
identify the major options evaluated, implemented, or planned. The 
commenter stated that this approach would be low cost, fill a major 
information gap, and yield invaluable insights. Another commenter 
supported expanding the technology transfer provision to cover more 
facilities and gather additional valuable information, including on 
wastewater and water treatment plants.
    A couple of commenters opposed the submission of STAA findings as 
part of the STAA technology transfer section. One commenter noted that 
any submitted STAA findings would probably not consider the nuance of 
the real practicality of switching between technologies, and if 
facilities are not required to switch to alternate technologies, it is 
unclear how EPA intends to effectively use these data. Another 
commenter stated that EPA should not require reporting of STAA measures 
implemented in facilities' risk management plans because this 
requirement would create significant potential for third parties to 
insert themselves into what is a highly technical and site-specific 
analysis. The commenter added that EPA does not provide a clear basis 
in the proposed rule for its assumption that reporting and public 
availability of information on IST/ISD measures implemented will 
improve facility safety or mitigate the potential for accidental 
releases in any measurable way; therefore, determining that reporting 
this information in the RMP is simply not justified.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA is requiring that basic information on IST, facility 
information, categories of safer design identified and implemented and 
causal factor for initiating safer design implementation be provided in 
the RMP submission in accordance with 40 CFR 68.175(e)(7). Facilities 
must provide in their RMP any IST/ISD measures implemented since the 
last PHA, if any, and the technology category (substitution, 
minimization, simplification and/or moderation). These technology 
transfer provisions apply to all facilities required to conduct any 
component of STAA (evaluation or practicability) under the final rule. 
This reporting is also voluntary for all other facilities, including 
deregistered facilities, by which EPA expects to capture useful 
information about how some facilities, on their own accord, choose to 
make their processes safer. EPA intends for this not to be a cumbersome 
exercise, but rather, one that is based on information facilities 
likely already have. The intended fields of check boxes, dates, and 
numbers that summarize STAA activities for this provision will help 
facilitate data analysis for EPA to compile and make available for 
other industries to identify safer alternatives.
    EPA believes that the primary utility of STAA information for the 
public is to identify whether facilities are implementing IST and the 
nature of that change. In addition to information exchanged through an 
information request under 40 CFR 68.210, EPA encourages facilities to 
provide information about any IST or other safer technology 
alternatives that the facility is using or could be using at the public 
meeting forum under 40 CFR 68.210 or any other community outreach 
opportunity. Facilities should expect that a community wants to discuss 
hazards and risks associated with their chemical processes. Effective 
communication with the public can be an opportunity to develop robust 
relationships with communities, and trust is gained when considering 
the needs and challenges facing those potentially affected by 
accidents. Additionally, as will be discussed further in the 
Information Availability section (VII) of this preamble, having 
information available to the public builds upon the planning approach 
of Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) and 
Agency studies of the value of right-to-know in emergencies, and 
promotes accident prevention by facilitating public participation at 
the local level. The Agency expects a more informed and involved public 
to have less fear of the unknown.

C. Root Cause Analysis

1. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
a. Definition of ``Root Cause'' in 40 CFR 68.3
    EPA proposed to define ``root cause'' in 40 CFR 68.3 to mean a 
fundamental, underlying, system-related reason why an incident 
occurred.
    EPA did not propose a definition of ``near miss'' as part of the 
proposed rulemaking. Nevertheless, EPA solicited comments on a 
potential definition of ``near miss'' that would address difficulties 
in identifying the variety of incidents that may occur at RMP 
facilities that could be considered near misses that should be 
investigated. EPA solicited comments on a universal ``near miss'' 
definition, as well as comments on strengths and limitations of the 
definition provided by NJDEP and how the definition may clarify 
requirements for incident investigations. EPA stated that, based on 
these comments, EPA may propose a definition of ``near miss'' in a 
future rulemaking.
b. Incident Investigation/Root Cause Analysis, 40 CFR 68.60 and 68.81
    EPA proposed to revise 40 CFR 68.60, which is applicable to Program 
2 processes, and 40 CFR 68.81, which is applicable to Program 3 
processes, by adding a new paragraph (h) which would require the owner 
or operator to investigate specific factors that contributed to an 
incident, for incidents that meet the accident history reporting 
requirements under 40 CFR 68.42. Proposed paragraph (h)(1) would 
require that a report be prepared at the conclusion of the 
investigation and completed within 12 months of the incident (though it 
allowed for facility owners or operators to request an extension from 
the implementing agency). Proposed paragraph (h)(2) would require 
specific factors to be investigated, including the initiating event, 
direct and indirect contributing factors, and root causes. 
Additionally, determination of root causes would be required by 
conducting an analysis for each incident using a recognized method.
2. Summary of Final Rule
    EPA is finalizing the definition of root cause under 40 CFR 68.3 
with modifications. Root cause will be defined as a fundamental, 
underlying, system-related reason why an incident occurred that 
identifies a correctable failure(s) in management systems and, if 
applicable, in process design.
    EPA is finalizing the provisions of the incident investigation 
sections at 40 CFR 68.60(h) and 68.81(h) as proposed.
    Although EPA solicited comments on a potential definition of ``near 
miss,'' EPA is not finalizing a definition of ``near miss.''

[[Page 17655]]

3. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
a. Definitions
i. Comments
    Root cause. A couple of commenters expressed support for the 
proposed definition of ``root cause.'' However, a commenter requested 
that if EPA determines that all incident investigations require a root 
cause analysis, EPA update the definition for ``root cause'' to remove 
the ``system-related'' and ``in management systems'' language. The 
commenter suggested that by focusing on system-related releases, EPA 
ignores that humans or environmental causes could be the cause of an 
incident. Conversely, another commenter suggested EPA revise the 
definition to state, ``Root cause means a fundamental, underlying, 
system-related reason why an incident occurred that identifies a 
correctable failure(s) in process design and/or management systems.''
    Near miss. Several commenters supported the development of a 
definition of ``near miss.'' Additionally, one commenter expressed a 
concern about selective enforcement in the absence of a clarifying 
definition, while another commenter said that without specificity to 
define a near miss, the language might have established due process 
concerns as the proposal failed to provide adequate notice to the 
regulated community. However, several commenters opposed the 
development of a definition for ``near miss,'' stating that they oppose 
a definition due to the broad nature of facilities subject to the rule 
and that developing a definition would be difficult due to the context 
required to determine what a near miss is. Another commenter suggested 
that EPA provide guidance on near misses but allow facilities to 
determine their own definition. Additionally, several commenters 
opposed a universal definition of near miss, as a one-size-fits-all 
approach will be overburdensome and challenging for facilities to 
implement.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA is finalizing the proposed definition of ``root cause'' with 
modifications to include that the root cause must identify a 
correctable failure(s) in management systems, and if applicable, in 
process design. In finalizing this definition, EPA recognizes that an 
incident may have more than one root cause. EPA acknowledged in the 
proposal that the CCPS root cause definition identified that a root 
cause includes a correctable failure in management systems. EPA 
intended to use CCPS' definition in its entirety due to its wide use 
among the process safety industry. As such, EPA will include management 
systems as a correctable failure that must be identified when 
determining root causes for incident investigations. EPA also believes 
adding process design to the definition of root cause is useful as 
process design points to a specific management system failure that may 
offer facilities an opportunity to design their process more safely.
    EPA did not propose a definition of near miss in the proposal. 
However, EPA will consider these comments when determining whether to 
develop a regulatory definition of ``near miss'' to identify incidents 
that require investigation in a future action.
b. Root Cause Analysis
i. Comments
    Many commenters supported the proposed approach to require 
facilities to conduct root cause analyses after an incident. One of the 
commenters suggested that the proposed requirements would likely 
prevent harm from repeated incidents. Another commenter noted that root 
cause analyses provide an additional opportunity to better understand 
the processes, procedures, and culture that may contribute to 
accidents.
    Several commenters did not support the revision of the incident 
investigation provision to include root cause analysis requirements. 
Several commenters suggested that EPA has not justified the additional 
regulation, shown that the current rules are ineffective, or proven 
that root cause analysis is effective at reducing accidents. A couple 
of the commenters stated that EPA does not provide data to show that 
repeat accidents are partially or fully caused by a facility's failure 
to conduct a root cause analysis. A commenter also stated that the 
concept of ``root cause'' can be misleading, as there is not always a 
singular reason for why an incident occurred. The commenter said EPA 
should recognize that a root cause analysis is not always the most 
appropriate post-incident investigation method. Several commenters 
noted that the inclusion of the root cause analysis requirements is 
duplicative of existing regulations or common industry practices, is 
unnecessary, and thus will not result in meaningful benefits. Several 
commenters stated that OSHA PSM programs already include root cause 
analysis as a part of incident investigations. A couple of commenters 
suggested that EPA not expand incident investigation thresholds without 
coordination with OSHA's anticipated updates to the PSM standard. One 
commenter noted that OSHA has primary jurisdiction on this issue, and 
therefore EPA should ensure consistency with current and future changes 
to the PSM.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA is finalizing the requirements as proposed. EPA agrees with 
those comments supporting the proposed provision and believes that 
requiring root cause analyses after RMP-reportable accidents, and 
including root cause information in incident investigation reports, is 
vital for understanding the nature of these events and how they may 
occur.
    In response to comments asserting that EPA has not justified the 
root cause analysis requirement or provided data to show that repeat 
accidents are partially or fully caused by a facility's failure to 
conduct a root cause analysis, EPA acknowledges that such data has not 
been provided to show causation, but notes that EPA has not previously 
required a root cause analysis for incident investigations, and 
therefore, does not have data available to compare the frequency of 
repeat accidents at facilities conducting (or failing to conduct) root 
cause analyses. However, EPA did perform an analysis of EPA's RMP 
accident reporting data and identified repeat accidents at facilities 
within the same process.\94\ The result of this analysis demonstrates 
that, among facilities reporting accidents, facilities that reported 
one accident often have a history of multiple accidents, thus 
indicating a failure to properly address circumstances leading to 
subsequent accidents. These accidents may have been preventable if root 
cause analyses had been required. EPA believes multiple accidents 
result, in part, from a failure to thoroughly investigate and learn 
from prior accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 
section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention 
(April 19, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to comments about the appropriateness of a root cause 
analysis as a post-incident investigation method, EPA has provided 
detailed background information on the usefulness of root cause 
analysis in both the 2016 amendments proposed rule (81 FR 13638) and 
the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule (87 FR 53556). EPA also notes that the 
final rule does not require facilities to use a specific root cause 
analysis method, select from a predetermined list of root causes, or 
force-fit investigation findings into an inappropriate category.

[[Page 17656]]

    With regard to comments that noted potential overlap with existing 
regulations, EPA notes that a regulated source already subject to 
another requirement that duplicates the RMP root cause analysis 
requirement may use its compliance with the other requirement to 
demonstrate compliance with the equivalent RMP root cause analysis 
requirement. Additionally, EPA continues to routinely coordinate with 
OSHA to ensure that any incident investigation root cause analysis 
provisions do not contradict OSHA PSM requirements.
c. Applicability of the Root Cause Analysis Requirements
i. Comments
    A commenter expressed support for EPA's proposal to limit the root 
cause analysis requirements to Program 2 and Program 3 processes. A 
couple of commenters recommended that EPA expand coverage of this 
requirement to apply to all RMP facilities. A couple of commenters 
proposed that EPA further limit facilities subject to the root cause 
analysis requirements. One of the commenters recommended that the root 
cause analysis requirement should only be mandated for Program 3 
facilities, since they have the most complex processes, which is where 
root cause analyses are most useful. The commenter suggested that 
conducting root cause analyses is resource intensive and costly, and 
imposing the requirements on other non-Program 3 facilities will be 
overly burdensome without commensurate benefits. Another commenter 
recommended that EPA only require root cause analyses for larger, more 
complex water systems, as the root cause analysis process is resource 
intensive and burdensome. Commenters asked EPA to clarify that root 
cause analysis is still required where a process is decommissioned or 
destroyed.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA is finalizing the applicability of the root cause analysis 
provision, as proposed. EPA believes this provision is most appropriate 
for Program 2 and 3 processes because facilities with these processes 
have RMP-reportable accidents more often (Program 2 = 15 percent, 
Program 3 = 83 percent of total accidents from 2004-2020) and pose a 
greater risk to the public because their worst-case scenario distance 
would affect public receptors. Program 1 processes only account for few 
of the total RMP-reportable accidents (3 percent of total accidents 
from 2004-2020), do not have recent accident history with specific 
offsite consequences, and have no public receptors within the worst-
case release scenario distance.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ Technical Background Document for Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, 
section 112(r)(7); Safer Communities by Chemical Accident Prevention 
(April 19, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While it is true that most RMP-reportable accidents occur at 
Program 3 processes, EPA decided that there was little justification 
for limiting the root cause requirements to only Program 3 processes, 
because serious accidents also occur at Program 2 processes (87 FR 
53593). Also, the Agency notes that some of the accidents at Program 2 
processes occur at publicly-owned water and wastewater treatment 
facilities that are not in Program 3 only because they are not located 
in a State with an OSHA-approved State Plan.\96\ While State and local 
government employees at facilities in States with OSHA-approved State 
Plans must comply with State Plan requirements that are at least as 
effective as the Federal OSHA PSM standard, State and local government 
employees at facilities in States under Federal OSHA authority are not 
covered by the OSHA PSM standard or any equivalent measures. This 
results in regulated processes at these sources being placed in Program 
2, even though the processes generally pose the same risk as similar 
processes at publicly owned water or wastewater treatment processes 
that are located at sources in States with an OSHA State Plan. With 
regard to those commenters that recommended narrowing the applicability 
of the root cause analysis requirement because of the burden associated 
with the requirement, EPA notes that the burden of the proposed root 
cause analysis is relatively small. Few sources will have to conduct a 
root cause analysis because accidents occur at only a small number of 
sources, and many sources already perform root cause analyses in a 
manner consistent with industry or company protocols. Therefore, EPA 
does not believe that the anticipated burden of this requirement is a 
rationale for revising the applicability of the requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ See 40 CFR 68.10 (Program 2 eligibility requirements).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regards to clarity on applicability of decommissioned or 
destroyed processes to the root cause analysis provision, the Agency 
did not propose, and therefore will not require, decommissioned or 
destroyed processes, as long as they remain in that decommissioned or 
destroyed state, to comply with this provision. As discussed in the 
previous rulemakings, commenters have not identified a significant 
number of release incidents at RMP facilities that had resulted in a 
destroyed or decommissioned process without any RMP accident report. 
The absence of a substantial number of examples leads the Agency to 
conclude that the gap is not significant enough to address at this 
time.
d. Use of a Recognized Investigation Method
i. Comments
    Several commenters provided feedback on the investigation methods 
and analysis elements described in the proposed rule. Several 
commenters noted that EPA should not mandate the use of a recognized 
method for the analysis, as there are many ways to conduct the 
analysis. One of the commenters indicated that prescribing a method may 
interfere with a facility's engineering judgement and use of 
investigative practices that are tailored to their unique facilities. 
Another commenter said EPA should ensure that owners and operators have 
flexibility to modify recognized investigation methods to reflect the 
context, which may involve very complex or relatively simple processes 
or incidents. A couple of commenters requested that EPA define 
``recognized investigation method'' to clarify what entity is approving 
a methodology. One of the commenters recommended revising the language 
to read ``investigation method recognized by applicable industry code 
writing or RAGAGEP establishing body.'' One commenter suggested that 
EPA require that incident investigations include staff with expertise 
in: the process involved, the facility's root cause analysis method, 
and overseeing incident investigation analysis.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA is finalizing, as proposed, the requirements that root causes 
must be determined through the use of a recognized method. The final 
rule will allow the owner or operator to determine root causes using a 
``recognized method'' that is appropriate for their facility and 
circumstance. EPA disagrees that the Agency should specify recognized 
investigation methods or point to specific entities for such methods. 
Investigation methods evolve over time, and new methods may be 
developed. Therefore, any list promulgated by EPA in this rule may soon 
be obsolete. The Agency took a similar approach in the PHA requirements 
for the existing rule, where it listed several potential methods, but 
also included the option to

[[Page 17657]]

use an appropriate equivalent methodology. EPA recommends that owners 
and operators consult available literature on root cause investigation 
methodologies to select those appropriate for their facility and 
processes. For example, CCPS has published ``Guidelines for 
Investigating Process Safety Incidents,'' which provides extensive 
guidance on incident investigations, near miss identification, root 
cause analysis, and other related topics.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ CCPS 2019. Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines 
for Investigating Process Safety Incidents, 3rd Edition, NY: AIChE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments requesting that the incident investigation 
team be required to include someone knowledgeable in the root cause 
analysis technique, EPA believes this is already required under 40 CFR 
68.60(c) and 68.81(c), where the incident investigation team is 
required to consist of ``persons with appropriate knowledge and 
experience to thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident.'' EPA 
intends this phrase to include a person knowledgeable in selection and 
use of root cause analysis techniques.
e. Investigation Timeframe
i. Comments
    Several commenters suggested a shorter investigation timeframe. A 
few commenters suggested an initial report/investigation be completed 
within 90 days, and a final report within a shorter timeframe, such as 
6 months. One commenter also suggested EPA require initiation of 
incident investigations and root cause analyses within 24 hours after 
the incident. Several commenters supported the 12-month requirement for 
completing an incident investigation. A couple of commenters also 
supported EPA allowing extensions, when necessary. One commenter also 
said EPA should not question extension requests from facilities, as 
some thorough investigations will require more than 12 months. Several 
commenters opposed the regulatory deadlines for root cause analysis 
investigations. A couple of commenters stated that based on the 
complexity of the incident and level of input needed from external 
technical experts, a 12-month timeline may not provide enough time. One 
commenter requested that EPA clarify that the 12-month timeline is only 
for the completion of the investigation, not when the recommendations 
must be implemented.
ii. EPA Responses
    After considering these comments, EPA has is finalizing the 
requirement to complete incident investigations within 12 months as 
proposed. EPA believes that this timeframe will provide a reasonable 
amount of time to conduct most investigations, while also ensuring that 
investigation findings are available relatively quickly in order to 
assist in preventing future incidents. For very complex incident 
investigations that cannot be completed within 12 months, EPA is 
allowing an extension of time if the implementing agency (i.e., EPA and 
delegated authorities) approves such an extension, in writing. EPA 
encourages owners and operators to complete incident investigations as 
soon as practicable and believes that 12 months is typically long 
enough to complete even complex incident investigations. However, EPA 
has provided flexibility for facilities to request more time to 
complete investigations when they consult with their implementing 
agency and receive written approval for an extension. EPA also re-
emphasizes the importance of implementing recommendations as soon as 
possible after incident investigation completion to prevent future 
similar incidents.

D. Third-Party Compliance Audits

1. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
a. Definitions, 40 CFR 68.3
    EPA proposed to define ``third-party audit'' to mean a compliance 
audit conducted pursuant to the requirements of 40 CFR 68.59 and/or 
68.80, performed or led by an entity (individual or firm) meeting the 
competency and independence requirements in those sections.
b. Compliance Audits, 40 CFR 68.58(a) and 68.79(a)
    EPA proposed to edit 40 CFR 68.58(a) and 68.79(a) to add the 
language ``for each covered process'' to compliance audits, self and 
third-party, to address compliance with the provisions of subpart C or 
D for each covered process.
    EPA also added a sentence at the end of the paragraph to reference 
when a compliance audit must be a third-party audit.
c. Third-Party Audit Applicability for Compliance Audits, 40 CFR 
68.58(f) and 68.79(f)
    EPA proposed to add paragraph (f) to 40 CFR 68.58 and 68.79 which 
identified third-party audit applicability. EPA proposed that the next 
required compliance audit for an RMP facility would be a third-party 
audit when one of the following conditions apply:
     Two accidental releases within five years meeting the 
criteria in 40 CFR 68.42(a), from a covered process have occurred.
     One accidental release within five years meeting the 
criteria in 40 CFR 68.42(a), from a covered process at a stationary 
source in NAICS code 324 or 325, located within 1 mile of another 
stationary source having a process in NAICS code 324 or 325, has 
occurred.
     An implementing agency requires a third-party audit due to 
conditions at the stationary source that could lead to an accidental 
release of a regulated substance, or when a previous third-party audit 
failed to meet the competency or independence criteria of 40 CFR 
68.59(c) or 68.80(c).
    In addition to the proposed approach for third-party audit 
applicability, EPA particularly sought comment on the two new 
conditions modified from the 2017 amendments rule, which applied 
increased accident severity, frequency, and consequences as a basis for 
the proposed provision.
d. Third-Party Audit Implementing Agency Notification and Appeals, 40 
CFR 68.58(g) and 68.79(g)
    EPA proposed to add paragraph (g) to 40 CFR 68.58 and 68.79 which 
described the procedure when an implementing agency requires a third-
party audit and proposed an internal appeals process. EPA proposed to 
require an implementing agency to provide written notice to the 
facility owner or operator stating the reasons for the implementing 
agency's preliminary determination that a third-party audit is 
necessary. The owner or operator would have an opportunity to respond 
by providing information to, and consulting with, the implementing 
agency. The implementing agency would then provide a final 
determination to the owner or operator. If the final determination 
requires a third-party audit, the owner or operator would have an 
opportunity to appeal the final determination. EPA proposed that the 
implementing agency would provide a written, final decision on the 
appeal to the owner or operator after considering the appeal.
e. Schedule for Conducting a Third-Party Audit, 40 CFR 68.58(h) and 
68.79(h)
    EPA proposed to add paragraph (h) to 40 CFR 68.58 and 68.79 which 
described the schedule for completing third-party audits. For third-
party audits required pursuant to paragraph (f)(1) of the section, the 
proposed language

[[Page 17658]]

required the audit and associated report to be completed within 12 
months of the second of 2 releases within 5 years. For third-party 
audits required pursuant to paragraph (f)(2) of the section, the 
proposed language required the audit and associated report to be 
completed within 12 months of the release. For third-party audits 
required pursuant to paragraph (f)(3) of the section, the proposed 
language required the audit and associated report to be completed 
within 12 months of the date of the final determination pursuant to 
paragraph (g)(3) of the section, or if the final determination is 
appealed pursuant to paragraph (g)(4) of the section, within 12 months 
of the date of the final decision on the appeal.
f. Third-Party Audits Applicability, 40 CFR 68.59(a) and 68.80(a)
    EPA proposed to add 40 CFR 68.59 and 68.80, which included 
requirements for both third-party audits and third-party auditors. In 
paragraph (a), EPA proposed that owners or operators engage a third-
party to conduct an audit that evaluates compliance with the provisions 
of subpart C or D (as applicable) when the applicability criteria of 40 
CFR 68.58(f) or 68.79(f) are met.
g. Third-Party Auditors and Auditing Teams, 40 CFR 68.59(b) and 
68.80(b)
    EPA proposed to include paragraph (b) to 40 CFR 68.59 and 68.80 
which provides that owners or operators either engage a third-party 
auditor meeting the competency and independence criteria of paragraph 
(c) of the section, or assemble an auditing team, led by a third-party 
auditor meeting the competency and independence criteria of paragraph 
(c) of the section. The team may include other employees of the third-
party auditing firm or other personnel, including facility personnel.
h. Third-Party Auditor Qualifications, 40 CFR 68.59(c) and 68.80(c)
    EPA proposed to include paragraph (c) to 40 CFR 68.59 and 68.80 
which includes qualifications for third-party auditors and required 
facility owners and operators to document that the third-party 
auditor(s) meet the competency and independence requirements. 
Specifically, EPA proposed that facility owners or operators determine 
and document that the third-party auditors meet the competency 
requirements set forth in paragraph (c)(1) and the independence 
requirements in paragraph (c)(2).
    The proposed competency requirements for auditors require third-
party auditors to be:
     Knowledgeable with the requirements of 40 CFR part 68.
     Experienced with the facility type and processes being 
audited and the applicable RAGAGEP; and
     Trained or certified in proper auditing techniques.
    The proposed independence requirements that would apply to the 
third-party auditors require the third-party auditors to:
     Act impartially when performing all activities under this 
section.
     Receive no financial benefit from the outcome of the 
audit, apart from payment for the auditing services.
     Ensure that all third-party personnel involved in the 
audit sign and date a conflict-of-interest statement documenting that 
they meet the independence criteria of this paragraph.
     Ensure that all third-party personnel involved in the 
audit do not accept future employment with the owner or operator of the 
stationary source for a period of at least two years following 
submission of the final audit report. For purposes of this requirement, 
employment does not include performing or participating in third-party 
audits pursuant to 40 CFR 68.59 or 68.80.
    In paragraph (c)(3), the proposed rule required the auditor to have 
written policies and procedures to ensure that all personnel comply 
with the competency and impartiality requirements.
    In addition to the proposed approach for third-party auditor 
qualifications, EPA particularly sought comment on the proposed 
independence criterion as it is modified from the 2017 amendments rule.
i. Third-Party Auditor Responsibilities, 40 CFR 68.59(d) and 68.80(d)
    EPA proposed to include paragraph (d) to 40 CFR 68.59 and 68.80 
which includes the responsibilities for third-party auditors. 
Specifically, EPA proposed that the owner or operator ensure that the 
third-party auditor:
     Manages the audit and participates in audit initiation, 
design, implementation, and reporting.
     Determines appropriate roles and responsibilities for the 
audit team members based on the qualifications of each team member.
     Prepares the audit report and where there is a team, 
documents the full audit team's views in the final audit report.
     Certifies the final audit report and its contents as 
meeting the requirements of this section.
     Provides a copy of the audit report to the owner or 
operator.
j. Third-Party Audit Report, 40 CFR 68.59(e) and 68.80(e)
    EPA proposed requirements for the audit report in paragraph (e) of 
40 CFR 68.59 and 68.80. Specifically, EPA proposed that the audit 
report:
     Identify all persons participating on the audit team, 
including names, titles, employers and/or affiliations, and summaries 
of qualifications. For third-party auditors, include information 
demonstrating that the competency requirements in paragraph (c)(1) of 
the section are met.
     Describe or incorporate by reference the policies and 
procedures required under paragraph (c)(3) of the section.
     Document the auditor's evaluation, for each covered 
process, of the owner or operator's compliance with the provisions of 
this subpart to determine whether the procedures and practices 
developed by the owner or operator under this rule are adequate and 
being followed.
     Document the findings of the audit, including any 
identified compliance or performance deficiencies.
     Summarize any significant revisions (if any) between draft 
and final versions of the report.
     Include the following certification, signed and dated by 
the third-party auditor or third-party audit team member leading the 
audit:
    I certify that this RMP compliance audit report was prepared under 
my direction or supervision in accordance with a system designed to 
assure that qualified personnel properly gather and evaluate the 
information upon which the audit is based. I further certify that the 
audit was conducted and this report was prepared pursuant to the 
requirements of subpart C of 40 CFR part 68 and all other applicable 
auditing, competency, independence, impartiality, and conflict of 
interest standards and protocols. Based on my personal knowledge and 
experience, and inquiry of personnel involved in the audit, the 
information submitted herein is true, accurate, and complete.
k. Third-Party Audit Findings, 40 CFR 68.59(f) and 68.80(f)
    EPA proposed requirements for the audit findings in paragraph (f) 
of 40 CFR 68.59 and 68.80. EPA proposed in paragraph (f)(1), to require 
owners or operators, as soon as possible, but no later than 90 days 
after receiving the final audit report, to determine an appropriate 
response to each of the findings in the audit report and develop and 
provide a findings response report. EPA proposed that the findings 
response report would include:

[[Page 17659]]

     A copy of the final audit report.
     An appropriate response to each of the audit report 
findings.
     A schedule for promptly addressing deficiencies.
     A statement, signed and dated by a senior corporate 
officer, certifying that appropriate responses to the findings in the 
audit report have been identified and deficiencies were corrected, or 
are being corrected, consistent with the requirements of subpart C or D 
of 40 CFR part 68.
    EPA proposed in paragraph (f)(2), to require the owner or operator 
to implement the schedule to address deficiencies identified in the 
audit findings response report, and document the action taken to 
address each deficiency, along with the date completed.
    Proposed paragraph (f)(3) required the owner or operator to provide 
a copy of documents required under paragraphs (f)(1) and (2) to the 
owner or operator's audit committee of the Board of Directors, or other 
comparable committee, if applicable.
l. Third-Party Audit Recordkeeping, 40 CFR 68.59(g) and 68.80(g)
    Finally, in paragraph (g) of 40 CFR 68.59 and 68.80, EPA proposed 
recordkeeping requirements for the owner or operator regarding third-
party audits. The proposal required the owner or operator to retain 
records at the stationary source, including: the two most recent final 
third-party audit reports, related findings response reports, 
documentation of actions taken to address deficiencies, and related 
records. EPA proposed that these requirements would not apply to any 
documents that are more than five years old.
2. Summary of Final Rule
    Based on review of comments, EPA is finalizing the proposed 
provisions for third-party audits with the following modifications:
     EPA is revising the requirements in paragraph (f) of 40 
CFR 68.58 and 68.79 that triggered when a third-party audit would be 
required. For the final rule, two of the three proposed conditions 
(i.e., two accidental releases within five years meeting the criteria 
in 40 CFR 68.42(a), from a covered process have occurred; or one 
accidental release within five years meeting the criteria in 40 CFR 
68.42(a), from a covered process at a stationary source in NAICS code 
324 or 325, located within 1 mile of another stationary source having a 
process in NAICS code 324 or 325, has occurred) are being replaced with 
one condition--one accidental release meeting the criteria in 40 CFR 
68.42(a), from a covered process. The other condition allowing an 
implementing agency to require a third-party audit is being finalized 
as proposed.
     EPA is not finalizing compliance audit language at 40 CFR 
68.58(a) and 68.79(a) which proposed auditing for every covered process 
at a facility. This corrects an error in the proposed rulemaking text. 
By not finalizing this language, compliance audits will remain 
consistent with the current practice, which allows for representative 
sampling. A discussion of representative sampling as an acceptable 
practice for compliance audits can be found in the reconsideration 
final rule.\98\
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    \98\ 84 FR 69834 (69882).
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     EPA is also not finalizing compliance audit language at 40 
CFR 68.58(h) and 68.79(h) which proposed a 12-month timeline for a 
third-party audit after a triggering criterion. The revised final 
requirement relies on the language at 40 CFR 68.58(f) and 68.79(f) 
which refers to the timeline of a third-party audit to be the ``next 
required compliance audit,'' which is at least every 3 years under 40 
CFR 68.58(a) and 68.79(a).
3. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
    In the proposed rule, EPA sought comment on several aspects of the 
Agency's proposed approach for third-party audits. As described in the 
proposed rule, third-party audits were included in the 2017 amendments 
rule, and at that time EPA addressed many general comments regarding 
the inclusion of third-party audits in the RMP rule, including the 
justification for and legality of, third party audits, and the benefits 
of third-party audits. This final rule contains some differences from 
both the 2017 amendments rule and the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule. EPA 
specifically sought comment on some of the changes, including: the 
proposed approach for third party audits; the proposed independence 
criteria, as modified from the 2017 amendments rule; whether the 
selected auditor should be mutually approved by the owner or operator 
and employees and their representatives; if direct participation from 
employees and their representative should be required when a third 
party conducts an audit; and, whether EPA should require declined 
findings be included in narrative form, or whether the Agency should 
provide specific categories of findings for facilities to choose from 
when reporting. The following discusses EPA's basis for the third-party 
audit provisions adopted in this final rule.
a. Proposed Approach for Third-Party Audits
    Regarding the proposed approach for third-party audits, EPA 
received comments supporting, opposing, and suggesting improvements to 
various aspects of the new proposed approach. Numerous commenters 
expressed support for restoring the third-party auditing requirements 
of the 2017 amendments rule. One of the commenters noted that third-
party auditing helps to ensure a systematic evaluation of the full 
prevention program for covered processes, while self-auditing may be 
insufficient to prevent accidents and ensure compliance. Another 
commenter emphasized that third-party audits will also ensure they are 
unbiased, compared to self-audits. Many commenters expressed opposition 
to the third-party audit provision. Some commenters argued that the 
third-party auditing requirements are unnecessary, would be too 
burdensome, and could be potentially costly for facilities. Some 
commenters proposed that the language in the provision should be 
revised to state that audits should be performed every three years, 
pointing out an inconsistency in when audits would be required.
    Several commenters recommended that the requirement triggering a 
third-party audit after 2 accidental releases within a 5-year period is 
not stringent enough, and facilities should be required to conduct a 
third-party audit after one accidental release or discovery of 
significant non-compliance. One of the commenters suggested that a 5-
year window for accident history is too narrow. A few commenters 
suggested that third-party audits be required for all RMP facilities 
without waiting for an incident to occur. Several commenters opposed 
the 2-accident trigger for third-party compliance audits due to its 
vague nature that could result in facilities conducting audits when 
they are not warranted. One of the commenters suggested that EPA narrow 
the third-party audit trigger from reportable accidents to catastrophic 
releases. Another commenter noted that accidental releases already 
trigger incident investigations, including the proposed root cause 
analysis; therefore, an additional third-party audit will unnecessarily 
dilute the investigation effort and will be overly burdensome to 
facilities.
    Comments were received regarding the 1-mile audit triggering 
criteria, mostly in opposition, for various

[[Page 17660]]

reasons, including that it is too vague and overly broad. Another 
commenter interpreted this requirement as emphasizing protecting select 
facilities over protecting the public. One commenter suggested that 
this requirement could penalize facilities with an otherwise 
outstanding environmental and safety record because a neighboring 
facility within one mile does not. One commenter suggested that that 
the requirement triggering a third-party audit should be required after 
one accidental release at a facility with a 324 or 325 NAICS code 
regardless of location to another facility. Another commenter suggested 
that EPA develop a more user friendly, up-to-date, and accessible 
method of determining if a facility is within 1 mile of another 
facility with a 324 or 324 NAICS code to ensure compliance with this 
provision.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA agrees with the comments in support of the third-party 
compliance audit requirement to be included in the final rule and 
believes it is appropriate to require a subset of RMP-regulated 
facilities to engage competent and independent third-party auditors 
following the conditions set forth in this final rule after: (1) One 
accidental release meeting the criteria in 40 CFR 68.42(a) from a 
covered process at a stationary source has occurred; or (2) an 
implementing agency requires a third-party audit due to conditions at 
the stationary source that could lead to an accidental release of a 
regulated substance, or when a previous third-party audit failed to 
meet the competency or independence criteria of 40 CFR 68.80(c). As 
indicated in the proposal, EPA RMP accident history data show that, 
while 97 percent of all RMP facilities had no RMP-reportable accidents 
from 2016-2020, 3 percent of all RMP facilities had at least 1 RMP-
reportable accident and 0.5 percent (n = 70) of all RMP facilities had 
2 or more RMP-reportable accidents. EPA views one 40 CFR 68.42(a) 
accidental release as a serious matter, considering the possible 
outcomes are deaths, injuries, or significant property damage on site, 
or known offsite deaths, injuries, evacuations, sheltering in place, 
property damage, or environmental damage. Further, the average per 
accident damage estimate from 2016-2020 is $5.5 million. It is arguable 
that having even one accident should be a cause for concern considering 
most RMP facilities have never had any accidents. Additionally, of 
these 70 facilities that had at least 1 RMP-reportable accident, 61 
percent (n = 43) had experienced another accident prior to 2016. EPA 
does not believe affected communities should have to experience the 
adverse consequences of a second reportable accident before an 
objective party comes in to evaluate the facility for compliance. The 
pattern of repeated accidents at RMP facilities provide a reasoned 
basis for EPA's focus on these facilities to apply a greater level of 
risk reduction measures.
    EPA notes that under 40 CFR part 68, sources with any Program 2 
and/or Program 3 processes are already required to conduct compliance 
audits every three years. This rule does not change the requirement 
that RMP facilities regularly conduct RMP compliance audits, but adds 
that, in specific situations, those audits must be performed by a 
third-party or a team led by a third-party, pursuant to the 
requirements and schedule in 40 CFR 68.58 and/or 68.79 of the rule. EPA 
notes that having a third-party conduct a compliance audit does not 
preclude the facility from conducting an in-house compliance audit in 
tandem. If the goal is to ensure that preventative measures are in 
place to prevent future accidents, EPA hopes that a facility would want 
to implement all such measures to ensure it is compliant. EPA disagrees 
that the third-party audit requirement should be expanded to include, 
as some commenters suggested, all RMP facilities without waiting for an 
accident. While independent third-party audits help to ensure an 
independent systematic evaluation of the full prevention program at an 
RMP facility, EPA is not making this a regulatory requirement for all 
RMP sources before an accident, at this time, due to the increased 
burden associated with these audits.
    EPA acknowledges the costs associated with third-party audit 
requirements. Although this final rule requires a larger group of 
stationary sources to conduct third-party audits than the proposal, the 
costs are justified. The Agency believes the affected group of 
stationary sources are sources that will benefit from an independent 
objective audit of their compliance with prevention program 
requirements, as they have already had one RMP-reportable accidental 
release. As described in the proposed rule, EPA recognizes that a 
relatively small number of RMP-regulated facilities have had RMP-
reportable accidents. EPA continues to be concerned with these RMP 
facilities that--despite current RMP regulations, enforcement, and 
lessons learned from previous accidents--continue to have accidents 
and, in some cases, multiple accidents, thereby continuing to put 
nearby communities at risk. Sources that have had one accident are 
substantially more likely to have another accident than the general 
population of RMP-regulated sources. EPA is concerned that those 
facilities may not have been able to identify measures on their own 
(through incident investigations, hazard evaluations, and compliance 
self-audits) to properly evaluate and apply appropriate prevention 
program measures to stop accident releases from occurring. Considering 
the goal of the RMP regulations is to prevent accidental releases, EPA 
believes that the increased cost of third-party compliance audits at 
such facilities is therefore justified.
    In response to comments on when third-party audits are required, 
EPA is clarifying and finalizing that, whichever criteria triggers the 
requirement, a third-party need only be engaged for the next required 
compliance audit(s), which is no later than 3 years from the previous 
compliance audit. The revised final requirement relies on the language 
at 40 CFR 68.58(f) and 68.79(f) which refer to the timeline of a third-
party compliance audit to be the ``next required compliance audit,'' 
which is at least every 3 years under 40 CFR 68.58(a) and 68.79(a). For 
example, if a facility conducted an internal compliance audit in August 
2024 and had an RMP-reportable accident in October 2024, the next 
compliance audit, required by August 2027, would be a third-party 
audit. EPA believes this approach is appropriate because it will allow 
the source to remain within their already required scheduled timing for 
audits. Further, when an accident occurs, the source will be required 
to conduct an RCA within 12 months; the 3-year finalized timeframe for 
the audit will give the source flexibility to accomplish both within 
their compliance due dates. If the third-party audit is completed after 
the RCA, it will give the source an additional opportunity to uncover 
deficiencies that led to the accident. In other words, the third-party 
audit will be a follow-up to review the RCA and ensure all practices to 
prevent an accident have been resolved.
    The third-party audit provision is intended to reduce the risk of 
future accidental releases by requiring an objective auditing process 
to assist owners and operators in determining whether facility 
procedures and practices comply with subparts C and/or D of the RMP 
rule (i.e., the prevention program requirements), are adequate, and are 
being followed. Thus, EPA is finalizing requirements for third-party 
audits under 40 CFR 68.58 and 68.79 to require that owners and 
operators

[[Page 17661]]

ensure that third-party auditors meet qualification criteria, that 
audits are conducted and documented, and that findings are addressed 
pursuant to the requirements of 40 CFR 68.59 and 68.80, as applicable.
b. Proposed Independence Criteria
    In the preamble to the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule, EPA sought comment 
on the proposed independence requirements modified from the 2017 
amendments rule. The modification was to remove the following auditor 
independence requirements contained in 40 CFR 68.59 and 
68.80(c)(2)(iii) and (iv) to allow more flexibility in choosing 
auditors:
     Auditors cannot have conducted past research, development, 
design, construction services, or consulting for the owner or operator 
within the last 2 years.
     Auditors cannot provide other business or consulting 
services to the owner or operator, including advice or assistance to 
implement the findings or recommendations of an audit report, for a 
period of at least 2 years following submission of the final audit 
report.
i. Comments
    Many of the comments received regarding independence requirements 
did not address the change, which removed these two requirements. As 
with the 2017 amendments rule, EPA has received comments generally in 
support of the proposed independence requirements, and some generally 
opposed to the independence requirements. Such general comments were 
previously addressed by EPA during the 2017 rulemaking.\99\
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    \99\ Response to Comments on the 2016 Proposed Rule Amending 
EPA's Risk Management Program Regulations; https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2016-12/documents/rmp_rtc_compiled_12-21-16.pdf.
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    However, EPA did receive some comments specifically regarding this 
proposal to remove these two independence requirements, generally in 
support of removing these requirements. One commenter supported 
removing these requirements, describing them as unrealistic and 
unworkable, and another commenter described them as onerous and 
unnecessary. This commenter further stated that these requirements 
would have resulted in an insufficient pool of qualified auditors, 
harmed the quality of audits, and significantly driven up costs. 
However, another commenter requested that EPA reconsider the proposal 
to remove the proposed auditor independence requirements, stating that 
auditor independence is of paramount importance.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA is finalizing the proposed independence requirements and 
believes this is an important and necessary aspect of third-party 
audits. EPA notes that these independence requirements were simplified 
and streamlined from the 2017 rule, which included a limitation for 
auditors who conducted consulting type services for the owner or 
operator within the last two years, or for a period of at least 2 years 
following the audit report. EPA believes the provision, as adopted, 
ensures additional available independent auditors to act in an 
independent and impartial manner, allowing more flexibility in choosing 
auditors.
c. Employee Participation
    In the preamble to the proposed rule, EPA sought comment on whether 
the selected auditor should be mutually approved by the owner or 
operator and employees and their representatives, and if direct 
participation from employees and their representative should be 
required when a third party conducts an audit.
i. Comments
    EPA received comments in support and in opposition to these 
provisions. One commenter supported the provision that the selection of 
a third-party auditor be mutually approved by the owner or operator and 
employee representatives and suggested that employees and their 
representatives be involved in all stages of the audit. However, 
several commenters expressed opposition to a requirement that the 
selected auditor be mutually approved by the owner/operator, employees, 
and employee representatives. One commenter noting that this 
requirement would increase the time needed to vet and approve auditors, 
causing unnecessary delays. Another commenter suggested that the 
auditor be selected by facility management and that bringing 
unknowledgeable employees into the decision-making process would be 
burdensome and will not improve compliance.
ii. EPA Responses
    While EPA encourages sources to include employee participation 
during third-party audits, EPA is not finalizing a provision that 
requires employee participation in third-party audits at this time. The 
Agency expects the enhancements to employee participation required by 
this rule will motivate owners and operators to recognize the benefit 
of involving their employees and their representatives in all aspects 
of the process safety management at their facility.
d. Format of Declined Third-Party Compliance Audit Findings
i. Comments
    EPA has received comments in support of, and in opposition to, 
requiring declined findings to be included in narrative form. One 
comment in support argued that more detailed information on the 
recommendations and decisions are needed to ensure that a facility does 
not avoid implementing necessary or practical recommendations. Another 
commenter noted that the suggested categories would fall short of 
capturing the reasons to decline an audit recommendation, such as a 
recommendation that is impractical or ineffective.
    Several commenters expressed opposition to requiring facilities to 
provide declined findings in narrative form in the RMP. Several 
commenters noted that this requirement would be overly burdensome. 
Several commenters raised concerns that the public release of this 
information would be confusing to those that are not knowledgeable 
about a facility's processes. Some commenters noted that public 
pressure may result in difficult technical debates about unfounded 
findings or cause facilities to address findings they disagree with. 
Another commenter recommended that the justification for declined 
findings should be consistent with the criteria outlined by OSHA's 1994 
Compliance Directive, asserting that this would make a narrative text 
in the RMP repetitive. One commenter noted concerns about releasing 
information to local responders, who may lack the expertise in chemical 
processes, could result in incorrect response activities during an 
accidental release. A couple of commenters suggested that this 
requirement would discourage facility leaders from encouraging audit 
teams to identify potential hazards to limit the information that must 
be reported to EPA. The commenters also suggested that audit findings 
are already readily available to EPA. Several commenters requested that 
EPA not mandate that facilities make declined findings publicly 
available online due to security concerns of releasing highly sensitive 
information.

[[Page 17662]]

ii. EPA Responses
    In the final rule, EPA is requiring facilities to choose from 
categories, similar to those in OSHA's 1994 Compliance Directive, as 
the Agency believes it will ease the use and general consistency for 
facilities to report and communities to review declined third-party 
audit recommendations. This format will also help EPA administer and 
track how facilities choose to comply with this provision.
e. Reporting Requirements
    A commenter suggested that EPA ensure that the reporting 
requirements for Program 3 facilities match those for Program 2 
facilities, noting that 40 CFR 68.175(k) is missing the key language in 
proposed 40 CFR 68.170(i): ``and findings declined from third-party 
compliance audits and justifications.''
    EPA notes that this was an error, and this has been corrected in 
the final rule.

E. Employee Participation

1. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking
a. Recommendation Decisions, 40 CFR 68.83(c)
    EPA proposed to revise 40 CFR 68.83, which is applicable to Program 
3 processes, by adding an additional provision, paragraph (c), to the 
written employee participation plan of action. Proposed paragraph (c) 
would require the owner or operator to consult with employees and their 
representatives on addressing, correcting, resolving, documenting, and 
implementing recommendations and findings of PHAs under 40 CFR 
68.67(e), compliance audits under 40 CFR 68.79(d), and incident 
investigations under 40 CFR 68.81(e).
b. Stop Work Authority, 40 CFR 68.83(d)
    EPA proposed to revise 40 CFR 68.83, which is applicable to Program 
3 processes, by adding an additional provision, paragraph (d), to the 
written employee participation plan of action. Proposed paragraph (d) 
would require the owner or operator to provide the following 
authorities to employees and their representatives, and to document and 
respond in writing, within 30 days of the authority being exercised:
     Refuse to perform a task when doing so could reasonably 
result in a catastrophic release.
     Recommend to the operator in charge of a unit that an 
operation or process be partially or completely shut down, in 
accordance with procedures established in 40 CFR 68.69(a), based on the 
potential for a catastrophic release.
     Allow a qualified operator in charge of a unit to 
partially or completely shut down an operation or process, in 
accordance with procedures established in 40 CFR 68.69(a), based on the 
potential for a catastrophic release.
c. Accident and Noncompliance Reporting, 40 CFR 68.62, 68.83(e)
    EPA proposed to add 40 CFR 68.62, which is applicable to Program 2 
processes, to require the owner or operator to:
     Develop a written plan of action regarding the 
implementation of the employee participation requirements.
     Develop and implement a process to allow employees and 
their representatives to anonymously report unaddressed hazards that 
could lead to a catastrophic release, unreported RMP-reportable 
accidents, or any other noncompliance.
     Provide employees and their representatives access to 
hazard reviews and to all other information required to be developed 
under this rule.
    EPA proposed to revise 40 CFR 68.83, which is applicable to Program 
3 processes, by adding an additional provision, paragraph (e), to the 
written employee participation plan of action. Proposed paragraph (e) 
would require the owner or operator to develop and implement a process 
to allow employees and their representatives to anonymously report 
unaddressed hazards that could lead to a catastrophic release, 
unreported RMP-reportable accidents, or any other noncompliance.
    In addition to the proposed approach to accident and noncompliance 
reporting, EPA solicited comment on whether owners and operators 
should: (1) Distribute an annual written or electronic notice to 
employees that employee participation plans and other RMP information 
is readily accessible upon request; (2) provide training for those 
plans; and (3) provide training on how to access the information.
2. Summary of Final Rule
    EPA is finalizing the proposed provisions for employee 
participation with the following modifications:
     Revising 40 CFR 68.83(c) to specifically apply only to 
those employees knowledgeable in the process.
     Removing from 40 CFR 68.83(d) the stop work criterion 
allowing an employee to refuse to perform a task when doing so could 
reasonably result in a catastrophic release.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.83(d) so that the two remaining stop 
work criteria specifically apply only to those employees knowledgeable 
in the process.
     Removing from 40 CFR 68.83(d) the requirement to document 
and respond in writing within 30 days of the stop work authority being 
exercised.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.62(b) and 68.83(e) to allow the person 
reporting an unaddressed hazard, unreported accident, or noncompliance 
to decide whether or not they wish to make an anonymous report or 
attribute their identity to the report.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.62(b) and 68.83(e) to specify the 
methods of making a report to the owner and operator and EPA.
     Adding a provision to 40 CFR 68.62(b) and 68.83(e) to 
require the owner or operator to keep a written record of the report of 
noncompliance.
     Adding a provision to 40 CFR 68.62(a)(1) and 68.83(a)(1) 
for the owner or operator to provide an annual written or electronic 
notice to employees indicating RMP information is available.
     Adding a provision to 40 CFR 68.62(a)(2) and 68.83(a)(2) 
requiring the owner or operator to provide training on the written 
employee participation plan.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.62(a) and 68.83(a) to add the word 
``requirements'' as a clarifying edit.
3. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions
a. Recommendation Decisions, 40 CFR 68.83(c)
i. Comments
    Many commenters expressed support for the proposed requirement in 
40 CFR 68.83(c) for the owner or operator to consult with employees and 
their representatives on addressing, correcting, resolving, 
documenting, and implementing recommendations and findings of PHAs, 
compliance audits, and incident investigations as a way of promoting 
collaboration between employees and management representatives. One 
State agency remarked that the goal of the provision is to ensure the 
team remains effective and is reflective of diverse viewpoints and 
backgrounds. However, other commenters opposed the provision, stating 
that transferring decision-making authority to employees presents 
additional legal issues in terms of employee responsibility and 
accountability, such as in the event an incident occurs, is 
investigated, and results in disciplinary action or legal liability. 
Another commenter noted that EPA's use of ``employees and their 
representatives'' can be viewed too broadly.

[[Page 17663]]

ii. EPA Responses
    EPA disagrees that this provision presents additional legal issues. 
This provision does not transfer decision-making responsibility to 
employees and their representatives. The provision also does not 
attempt to shift ultimate accountability to the employee for decisions 
that the owner or operator is responsible for. For example, at 40 CFR 
68.67(e), the PHA provision indicates the owner or operator shall 
establish a system to promptly address the team's findings and 
recommendations, to assure that the recommendations are resolved in a 
timely manner, and that the resolutions are documented. Despite this 
provision, the regulated entity remains the owner or operator of the 
stationary source. The requirement to consult with employees and their 
representatives does not make employees the decision-making authority. 
This provision does, however, provide for consultation that gives 
employees the opportunity to provide their input and perspective, based 
on their firsthand knowledge of specific process safety concerns, 
before final decisions are made regarding whether to implement 
recommended process safety solutions. This provision helps ensure that 
a well-informed approach is applied when finalizing resolutions for 
reducing hazards and mitigating process safety risks.
    In response to the comment that the term ``employees and their 
representatives'' can be viewed too broadly, EPA has amended the 
language to specify that the provision only applies to employees 
knowledgeable in the process and their representatives. EPA expects 
employees involved in the consultation to be knowledgeable in the 
process, as these employees are expected to have a better firsthand 
understanding of the process than employees who do not work in the 
process, who are new to the process, or who do not understand the 
process. EPA expects that these employees are likely to also be the 
employees that have the qualifications to participate as a team member 
when developing recommendations from incident investigations under 40 
CFR 68.81(c), compliance audits under 40 CFR 68.79(b), and PHAs under 
40 CFR 68.67(d). At 40 CFR 68.67(d), the PHA provision indicates that 
the PHA shall be performed by a team with expertise in engineering and 
process operations, and the team shall include at least one employee 
who has experience and knowledge specific to the process being 
evaluated. EPA believes it is prudent to apply at least the same 
qualification criterion to employees who can participate in developing 
recommendations as to those who can assist in deciding whether those 
recommendations will be implemented.
    After review of the comments, the Agency continues to believe that 
involving directly affected employees and their representatives in 
recommendation discussions and decisions will help ensure that the most 
effective recommendations for reducing hazards and mitigating risks to 
employees and the public are given the proper consideration. EPA is 
finalizing the proposed provision with the modification, for clarity, 
that those employees who are to be consulted on addressing, correcting, 
resolving, documenting, and implementing the recommendations and 
findings of PHAs, compliance audits, and incident investigations must 
be those knowledgeable in the process.
b. Stop Work Authority, 40 CFR 68.83(d)
i. Comments
    Several commenters supported the proposed stop work authority 
provision of the employee participation plan under 40 CFR 68.83(d). One 
Federal agency indicated that any program that does not appropriately 
enable workers to freely exercise stop work authority in necessary 
circumstances would allow risks to occur and accumulate. Some 
commenters supported the provision in principle but recommended 
modifications. A couple of commenters recommended removing the 30-day 
response period arguing that it should not be necessary when the 
authority is primarily used in imminently dangerous situations. A few 
commenters asserted that EPA should also require prompt reports of all 
stop-work authority usage so that EPA and the public are made aware and 
can evaluate whether additional quick action is needed to support the 
workers, assure compliance, and save lives.
    Some commenters did not support the proposed stop work authority 
provision of the employee participation plan. One commenter noted that 
having uniform requirements and procedures for an operation shutdown 
ignores the diverse array of regulated facilities in terms of industry 
and process. The commenter asserted that EPA should allow for 
operational flexibility in recognition of these circumstances and 
emphasized the risk an abrupt shutdown of complex chemical processes 
would pose. Another commenter asserted that the underlying intent of 
the provision can be better addressed by establishing clear written 
guidelines on how employees can raise such concerns in ``real time.'' 
Several commenters claimed that the stop work authority could result in 
increased safety risks, indicating the potential for employees to lack 
adequate knowledge or training to make such a decision. The commenters 
expressed further concern that the frequency of transient operations 
could increase, and that more unplanned or abrupt shutdowns could 
occur, which are often dangerous. A few of the commenters noted that 
giving this authority to all employees would leave facilities more 
susceptible to RMP incidents occurring and make the processes at RMP-
covered facilities less safe.
    A couple of commenters opposed the provision and noted that the 
language in the stop work authority provision would be too general, 
inevitably allowing every RMP covered process to be shut down by an 
employee. The commenters noted that this does not align with EPA's 
stated purpose of the RMP rule, which is to improve safety at 
facilities. One State agency expressed concerns about and opposed the 
provision allowing employees to refuse to perform a task when they 
believe doing so could reasonably result in a catastrophic failure. The 
commenter further stated that it is extremely important that any stop 
work authority be implemented in a manner that minimizes the chance for 
adverse unintended consequences.
ii. EPA Responses
    The proposed stop work provision within the employee participation 
section of this final rule is intended only to include the stop work 
authorities, established by the operating procedure provisions under 40 
CFR 68.69(a), into the written employee participation plan. This 
provision is not intended to create new authorities or require 
additional components to those already developed. The final rule 
conforms the amendments to this intent. Therefore, while EPA believes 
that it is useful to evaluate any stop work authority exercised, EPA 
expects these internal evaluations to already be occurring in the owner 
or operator's annual review of operating procedures, through training 
activities, or when conducting compliance audits. The final rule does 
not add a provision to require evaluations be included in the written 
plan. Additionally, EPA agrees that stop work authorities are expected 
to be carried out in imminently dangerous situations such that a 30-day 
response to an authority being exercised long after the threat has 
passed may not be practical. Regarding providing reports of stop work 
to EPA, the Agency disagrees

[[Page 17664]]

that this is necessary because stop work should be exercised to prevent 
imminently dangerous situations from resulting in catastrophic releases 
and therefore should not be contingent on or require quick action by 
outside parties. Furthermore, the Agency does not have the capability 
or resources to immediately respond to all instances of stop work being 
exercised. If, for some reason, quick action by outside parties was 
needed, EPA believes that the emergency response plans required by the 
rule should already outline a plan for responding to dangerous 
situations by the facility and/or local responders as they will be the 
most familiar with the source's processes and hazards.
    The proposed rule provided an extensive discussion of the stop work 
authority that is already inherent in the current RMP rule.\100\ As the 
proposed rule explained, the current RMP rule already addresses many 
aspects of a stop work authority that provides means for employees to 
identify and resolve imminent operational risks before they occur. 
Operating procedures, maintenance/mechanical integrity, and their 
associated training requirements, which are already mandatory under the 
rule, create a stop work authority as they address the circumstances 
and procedures to identify unsafe operations. EPA believes each 
facility's individual operating procedures and approach to correcting 
equipment deficiencies give owners and operators the flexibility to 
design a stop work authority for their process operations that remains 
adaptable to the procedures already in place. Therefore, EPA disagrees 
with the comments that a stop work authority documented in the employee 
participation plan would cause more shutdowns and possibly more 
accidents, as the authority that is being provided by the final rule's 
provisions leverages existing operating procedure and maintenance 
requirements. In reference to the comment citing the potential for an 
increase in safety risks when an employee lacks adequate knowledge to 
make a stop work decision, EPA has amended the provision to specify 
that this authority should be exercised only by employees knowledgeable 
in the process and their representatives.
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    \100\ 87 FR 53591.
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    EPA disagrees that the new stop work authority provision does not 
align with the purpose of the RMP rule. Under the existing RMP rule, 
operating procedures are designed for, and assigned to, employees who 
will be trained on performing the tasks described, thereby producing 
employees knowledgeable in the process they are working in. However, 
because of the significant disruption to process operations that can 
occur when stop work authority is exercised, EPA agrees that it is 
useful to explicitly state that these authorities are applicable only 
to employees who are knowledgeable in the process. Further, EPA 
believes a work culture that promotes process safety allows for 
opportunities for employees to refuse to perform work. In a scenario 
where there is a potential for a catastrophic release, EPA believes it 
is important to take further steps to shutdown a process to prevent an 
accident. Rather than refusing to perform work only, steps necessary to 
shut down the process should be set in motion. Therefore, the Agency is 
deleting the change noted below from 40 CFR 68.83(d) to ensure that 
potentially imminent catastrophic releases are followed through with 
properly. The basis for including stop work authorities in the employee 
participation plan is to enhance authorities already provided to 
employees under the rule.
    After review of comments, EPA maintains that it is important to 
ensure facilities' employees have authorities to manage unsafe work as 
they are one of the last lines of defense to protect human health and 
the environment from a catastrophic release. EPA, however, does agree 
with some recommendations offered in the comments to enhance the 
provision. Therefore, EPA is finalizing the proposed provision with the 
following modifications as discussed above:
     Removing from 40 CFR 68.83(d) the requirement to document 
and respond in writing within 30 days of the stop work authority being 
exercised.
     Removing from 40 CFR 68.83(d) the stop work criterion 
allowing an employee to refuse to perform a task when doing so could 
reasonably result in a catastrophic release.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.83(d) so that the two remaining stop 
work criteria specifically apply to those employees knowledgeable in 
the process and their representatives.
c. Accident and Non-Compliance Reporting, 40 CFR 68.62(b) and 68.83(e)
i. Comments
    EPA received comments supporting, opposing, and suggesting 
improvements to the accident and non-compliance reporting provision. 
One commenter supported EPA's proposal to require an anonymous 
reporting mechanism. The commenter stated that owners and operators 
should be required to make all employee participation plans and RMPs 
accessible and also should be required to provide annual training, at 
minimum, to facility employees. One of the labor commenters who 
supported the provision in principle also expressed concern that the 
language proposed does not adequately specify what the reporting 
process should be. The commenter also stated that the provision is of 
limited value since an employee could report anonymously without a 
formal process. The commenter likewise stated that the provision is 
restrictive since, as written, the requirement excludes reporting in 
situations where the reporter does not wish to remain anonymous. 
Although a couple of commenters agreed that it is important that 
employees can voice concern without fear of repercussions, these 
commenters stated that anonymous reports require someone to judge the 
validity of the report. Some of the industry commenters also stated 
that anonymous reports could create a burden. The commenters expressed 
further concern that, for example, reports could be filed by 
misinformed persons, thus necessitating the development of methods and 
time frames to determine the credibility of reports as well as when 
appropriate action should be taken. One of the commenters stated that a 
better approach is to allow RMP-regulated entities to continue efforts 
to improve safety cultures, strengthen safety teams, and foster 
employee communication in lieu of expending resources on anonymous 
reporting features.
ii. EPA Responses
    EPA does not expect to see a ``one-size fits-all'' plan developed 
by sources for reporting areas of non-compliance. Some RMP facilities 
are less complex, operating with a handful of employees, while other 
RMP facilities have very complex processes that involve hundreds of 
employees. Like other provisions of the RMP regulation, the employee 
participation provisions allow facility owners and operators the 
flexibility to exercise reasonable judgement in determining how to best 
engage their employees and make them aware of their facility's efforts 
to apply the RMP rule to process operations. In the absence of a more 
specific performance standard like RAGAGEP or a specific direction, the 
RMP rule relies on the reasonable judgments and efforts of regulated 
entities in designing compliance programs that are aimed at preventing 
or mitigating accidental releases. EPA agrees with commenters that it 
is useful for individual RMP facility owners and operators to 
continually improve their efforts to

[[Page 17665]]

enhance safety cultures, strengthen safety teams, and foster employee 
communication. EPA also agrees that the most effective programs 
probably already comply with most aspects of the provision. EPA 
believes that sources should create a welcoming atmosphere for 
employees to discuss safety concerns internally. However, commenters, 
particularly commenters from labor organizations who supported the 
provision, stated that this is not always the case. Therefore, EPA 
maintains that this provision is necessary to establish a minimum 
standard for conduct. To ensure a consistent understanding of EPA's 
expectations for this provision, modifications to the provision are 
discussed below.
    To clarify EPA's intent in the proposal, EPA is specifically 
defining in this final rule that the process developed to report 
noncompliance must detail how to report to the owner or operator and/or 
EPA. It is understandable that in some instances employees will feel 
more comfortable reporting to one or the other entity (or both), which 
will be up to the reporter, but the details provided in the plan should 
provide clear instructions for how to report to both entities. 
Reporting areas of non-compliance to the owner or operator allows 
employers to become aware of areas of concern and/or opportunities to 
improve process safety. It is expected that validating reports will not 
impose a heavy burden on the owner or operator as they should already 
be familiar with their level of compliance with the rule through 
regular compliance monitoring activities, such as triennial compliance 
audits. While EPA is not prescribing details of how a facility needs to 
follow-up with the report, the owner or operator will be required to at 
least maintain a record of the report. EPA believes it is in the owner 
or operator's best interest for the necessary follow-up to address 
employees' process safety concerns and/or areas where the owner or 
operator may have fallen short on compliance with the rule. When an 
employer is engaged first and does not resolve an issue, it is expected 
that the next step for reporting noncompliance will be to report to 
EPA. Reporting areas of non-compliance to EPA \101\ will allow the 
Agency's Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance to determine 
the validity of the report received through appropriate levels of 
follow-up, investigation, and enforcement, if necessary.
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    \101\ Some EPA resources to report RMP non-compliance include: 
https://echo.epa.gov/report-environmental-violations, https://www.epa.gov/rmp/epa-regional-rmp-contacts.
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    Regarding anonymous reporting, EPA recognizes both the concern for 
anonymity and the desire from employees wanting to identify themselves 
as the reporter. EPA believes this option to remain anonymous or not 
will be particularly useful if there are additional follow-up steps 
that the reporter and or the owner/operator must take in order to 
resolve an issue.
    Regarding the concern that reporting could create a burden or be 
performed by misinformed employees, EPA notes that the current Program 
3 employee participation provisions under 40 CFR 68.83 already provide 
employees access to all RMP-related information. The new requirement 
for Program 2 processes under 40 CFR 68.62(c) will allow this as well. 
However, EPA is concerned that some sources may provide RMP-related 
information to their employees without providing details or 
explanations of the information. EPA agrees with comments stating that 
workers without required information and training may be unaware of 
their opportunities and authorities to participate in hazard 
prevention, and that the lack of worker understanding will inevitably 
lead to less participation. Therefore, to ensure that employees are 
regularly reminded that RMP information is available to them, owners 
and operators of all Program 2 and Program 3 processes will be required 
to provide an annual written or electronic notice to employees 
indicating that RMP information is available.
    The Agency also believes that management, employees, and their 
representatives involved in the process could benefit from training on 
employee participation plans to ensure these facility stakeholders are 
aware of the information included in the plans or otherwise available. 
A more thorough understanding through the training may help reduce 
unvalidated non-compliance reports, some of which commenters indicated 
could become a concern associated with this noncompliance reporting 
provision. Ultimately EPA expects training on employee participation 
plans will help employees identify, and owners and operators correct, 
issues that may prevent and mitigate accidents.
    After review of EPA's preferred approach, options, and comments, 
the Agency maintains that workers can play an important role in 
promoting process safety through reporting noncompliance. EPA, however, 
does agree with some recommendations offered in the comments to enhance 
the clarity of the provision. Therefore, EPA is finalizing the proposed 
provision with the following modifications as previously discussed:
     Revising 40 CFR 68.62(b) and 68.83(e) to specify the 
report methods to either or both the owner and operator and EPA.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.62(b) and 68.83(e) to let anonymity be 
decided by the reporter.
     Adding a provision to 40 CFR 68.62(b) and 68.83(e) to 
require the owner or operator to keep a written record of the report of 
noncompliance.
     Adding a provision to 40 CFR 68.62(a)(1) and 68.83(a)(1) 
for the owner or operator to provide an annual written or electronic 
notice to employees indicating RMP information is available.
     Adding a provision to 40 CFR 68.62(a)(2) and 68.83(a)(2) 
for training on the written employee participation plan.

VI. Emergency Response

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

1. Community Emergency Response Plan Amplifications, 40 CFR 68.90(b), 
68.95(c)
    EPA proposed to revise 40 CFR 68.90(b)(1) and 68.95(c), which are 
applicable to non-responding and responding facilities respectively, to 
detail the required elements of the EPCRA community emergency response 
plan in RMP regulatory text. The proposed RMP regulatory text indicated 
that the EPCRA community emergency response plan should include: (1) 
Identification of facilities within the emergency planning district; 
(2) identification of routes likely to be used for the transportation 
of substances on the list of extremely hazardous substances (EHS); (3) 
identification of additional facilities contributing or subjected to 
additional risk due to their proximity to facilities, such as hospitals 
or natural gas facilities; (4) methods and procedures to be followed by 
facility owners and operators and local emergency and medical personnel 
to respond to any release of such substances; (5) designation of a 
community emergency coordinator and facility emergency coordinators, 
who shall make determinations necessary to implement the plan; (6) 
procedures providing reliable, effective, and timely notification by 
the facility emergency coordinators and the community emergency 
coordinator to persons designated in the emergency plan, and to the 
public, that a release has occurred; (7) methods for determining the 
occurrence of a release, and the area or population likely to be 
affected by such release; (8) description of

[[Page 17666]]

emergency equipment and facilities in the community and at each 
facility in the community, as well as an identification of the persons 
responsible for such equipment and facilities; (9) evacuation plans, 
including provisions for a precautionary evacuation and alternative 
traffic routes; (10) training programs, including schedules for 
training of local emergency response and medical personnel; and (11) 
methods and schedules for exercising the emergency plan. The proposed 
revisions also included that upon request of the LEPC or emergency 
response officials, the owner or operator would be required to promptly 
provide to the local emergency response officials information necessary 
for developing and implementing the community emergency response plan.
2. Community Notification of RMP Accidents, 40 CFR 68.90(b), 68.95(a), 
(c)
    EPA proposed to revise and add provisions to 40 CFR 68.90(b), 
paragraphs (b)(3) and (6) respectively, pertaining to non-responding 
facility designation qualifications. Revised proposed paragraph (b)(3) 
would have required the owner or operator to provide to emergency 
responders timely data and information detailing the current 
understanding and best estimates of the nature of a release when there 
is a need for a response. Proposed paragraph (b)(6) would require the 
owner or operator to maintain and implement, as necessary, procedures 
for informing the public and the appropriate Federal, State, and local 
emergency response agencies about accidental releases of RMP-regulated 
substances. Proposed paragraph (b)(6) would additionally require the 
owner or operator to ensure that a community notification system is in 
place to warn the public within the area potentially threatened by the 
release.
    EPA proposed to revise 40 CFR 68.95, which is applicable to 
responding facilities, by revising paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (c). 
Revised proposed paragraph (a)(1)(i) would have required the owner or 
operator to include in the procedures for informing the public about 
releases, assurance that a community notification system is in place to 
warn the public within the area threatened by the release. Revised 
proposed paragraph (c) would additionally require the emergency 
response plan to include providing timely data and information 
detailing the current understanding and best estimates of the nature of 
the release when a release occurs.
3. Emergency Response Exercise Program, 40 CFR 68.96(b)
    EPA proposed to revise 40 CFR 68.96, which is applicable to 
responding facilities, by revising the frequency requirement for field 
exercises under paragraph (b)(1)(i) and the documentation requirements 
for field and tabletop exercises under paragraph (b)(3). Proposed 
paragraph (b)(1)(i) would require the owner or operator to conduct a 
field exercise at least once every 10 years unless the appropriate 
Federal, State, and local emergency response agencies agree in writing 
that such frequency is impractical. If emergency response agencies 
agree, the owner or operator shall consult with emergency response 
officials to establish an alternate appropriate frequency for field 
exercises. Proposed paragraph (b)(3) would require the field and 
tabletop exercise reports to include a description of the exercise 
scenario, names and organizations of each participant, an evaluation of 
the exercise results including lessons learned, recommendations for 
improvement or revisions to the emergency response exercise program and 
emergency response program, and a schedule to promptly address and 
resolve recommendations.

B. Summary of Final Rule

    EPA is not finalizing the proposed community emergency response 
plan amplifications at 40 CFR 68.90(b)(1) and 68.95(c).
    EPA is finalizing the proposed provisions for community 
notification of RMP accidents and the emergency response exercise 
program with the following modifications:
     Revising 40 CFR 68.90(b)(3) and 68.95(c) to allow other 
existing notification mechanisms or regulations that satisfy the 
notification requirements, if applicable.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.90(b)(6) and 68.95(a)(1)(i) to specify 
that the owner or operator should partner with local response agencies 
to ensure a community notification system is in place, and to document 
the collaboration.
     Removing from 40 CFR 68.96(b)(1)(i) the requirement that 
Federal and State agencies require consultation when determining a 
field exercise frequency less than once every 10 years.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.95(a)(1)(i) to add the word 
``potentially'' as a clarifying edit.

C. Discussion of Comments

1. Community Emergency Response Plan Amplifications, 40 CFR 68.90(b), 
68.95(c)
a. Comments
    EPA received comments supporting and opposing the proposal to 
revise 40 CFR 68.90(b)(1) and 68.95(c) to detail the required elements 
of the EPCRA community response plan in RMP regulatory text. Some 
commenters in support of the amplifications indicated that it is 
important to reaffirm and ensure coordination with the EPCRA emergency 
response planning teams. Another commenter mentioned that the use of 
``should'' in the community response plan renders the entire section as 
voluntary while the commenter suggested that the section should instead 
be required. Some commenters stated that EPA should not expand the 
regulatory language. One commenter expressed concern that it is not 
reasonable to expect facilities to ensure that plans include the 
features in proposed 40 CFR 68.90(b). The same commenter also asked for 
greater clarity over the use of the word ``should,'' rather than 
``must.'' One commenter noted that it is inappropriate for EPA to put 
the responsibility of the community plan on the RMP facility. Some 
commenters expressed confusion over the requirement that RMP facilities 
assume responsibility for an emergency plan only if the LEPC's current 
plan is inadequate. These commenters further explained that this places 
the burden of being held accountable on the RMP facility for the 
adequacy of a plan that they have no control over.
b. EPA Responses
    EPA notes that the modification to 40 CFR 68.90(b)(1) and 68.95(c) 
in the proposed rule was intended only to include details of EPCRA's 
community emergency response plan requirements into RMP regulatory text 
for reference, not to ultimately transfer plan development and 
implementation responsibility to RMP facilities. Rather, EPA's goal was 
to make it simpler for RMP-regulated facilities to be knowledgeable 
about the components of the community emergency response plan to ensure 
that they understand how their facility's processes could impact the 
larger community emergency response plan and understand the facility's 
role in coordination of the required plan provisions. While this 
proposed modification did not include a new regulatory requirement, EPA 
acknowledges the confusion expressed by including EPCRA requirements in

[[Page 17667]]

the RMP regulatory text. Therefore, after reviewing the comments, the 
Agency has decided not to finalize this proposed regulatory text 
modification. EPA notes that 40 CFR 68.90(b)(1) and 68.95(c) will 
continue to reference the statutory citation for the EPCRA community 
response plan, 42 U.S.C. 11003. EPA encourages owners and operators to 
be familiar with all the elements of the community emergency response 
plan to effectively consider the potential impacts of a chemical 
release from their facility on the community.
2. Community Notification of RMP Accidents, 40 CFR 68.90(b), 68.95(a), 
(c)
Providing Timely Data to First Responders
a. Comments
    Some commenters supported the proposed provision for facility 
owners and operators to provide timely release data to local first 
responders when there is a need for such response. One commenter in 
support indicated that, while it is true that LEPCs and local first 
responders can utilize tools to perform analyses outside the fence 
line, the facility's own first-hand information will improve this 
process and increase first responder awareness and safety during a 
response. Some supporters also offered modifications to the provision. 
One commenter suggested that EPA require a follow-up notice of the 
actual final release information in the short-term in addition to the 
public meeting requirement. Similarly, another commenter pointed out 
that real-time air quality data should be made available to the public 
and not just select officials. Some commenters did not support the 
proposed provision. A few commenters stated that the requirement to 
provide ``necessary entities'' with ``accurate and timely data'' is 
duplicative and vague. These commenters urged EPA to remove this 
provision. Commenters added that facilities are already required to 
notify and provide information of certain releases to the National 
Response Center (NRC), State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs), 
and LEPCs under EPCRA and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
b. EPA Responses
    EPA disagrees that the provision is duplicative and vague. EPA 
believes that the provision offers the appropriate level of flexibility 
that may be needed during accidental release events. As stated in the 
proposal, the expectation for this provision is for owners and 
operators to provide initial information about their release to local 
responders as soon as possible, and to provide more accurate data or 
correct erroneous data that had been previously relayed when new 
information is available. EPA acknowledges that the time to gather and 
update release information can vary widely depending on the 
circumstances, extent and consequences of the release, and the status 
of individuals conducting the investigation during the accident. EPA 
also acknowledges that local responders may be different entities 
(e.g., fire department, Hazmat team, police, etc.) depending on the 
community. The initial and follow-up information required by this 
provision will help facilitate proper communication among responders 
and the facility to ensure the appropriate type and level of response 
is provided during a release.
    While EPA encourages follow-up communication with local responders 
and the public after conclusion of response activities, EPA does not 
believe that an interim written follow-up-notice of the actual final 
release information should be required after the response ends. EPA 
believes that the public meeting requirement at 40 CFR 68.210 and the 
five-year accident history requirement at 40 CFR 68.42 provide adequate 
time for the facility to gather and finalize information to share with 
the public. The Agency notes that sources are required to update their 
accident histories in their RMPs within 6 months of an RMP-reportable 
accident (40 CFR 68.195(a)). Additionally, many States separately 
require follow-up release reporting within a short time after response 
activities are concluded (e.g., 30 days), and this information may be 
publicly available.
    Regarding providing real time air quality data to the public, EPA 
acknowledges the need to consider expanding fenceline monitoring 
requirements for RMP-regulated facilities to provide real time data to 
local responders and the public. EPA took comment on this in the 
proposal and is reviewing the comments received in consideration for a 
future rulemaking.
    In response to the comment that facilities are already required to 
notify and provide information about imminent releases to the NRC, 
SERCs, and LEPCs under CERCLA and EPCRA, EPA has amended the language 
in the final rule to allow existing release notification requirements 
to satisfy this provision, if applicable. EPA acknowledges that EPCRA 
section 304, CERCLA section 103, and the CSB have similar Federal 
reporting requirements, and that there may also be State-only 
requirements for release notification and reporting that could meet 
this requirement. Therefore, EPA believes the amendment to this 
provision can help prevent any undue burden in complying with multiple 
requirements when a chemical release occurs. EPA believes this 
provision is particularly useful in closing regulatory gaps for 
chemical release notification where other statutory requirements do not 
apply. For example, reporting under EPCRA section 304 is required only 
to the SERC and LEPC, and reporting under CERCLA section 103 is 
required only to the NRC. Additionally, not all RMP regulated 
substances are EPCRA extremely hazardous substances and/or CERCLA 
hazardous substances (e.g., propane, butane, pentane, and hydrogen are 
regulated under RMP, but not under EPCRA section 304 or CERCLA section 
103); thus, while there might be some overlap, some chemicals will 
require only Federal release reporting under RMP.
    After review of comments, EPA maintains that the requirement to 
provide timely release data to responders in the case of an accidental 
release will help ensure that local responders have sufficient 
information to make the best decision on whether community notification 
is appropriate. Furthermore, EPA does agree with the recommendation 
offered in the comments to prevent undue burden in complying with 
multiple requirements when a chemical release occurs. EPA is therefore 
finalizing the proposed provision with the following modification as 
previously discussed--revising the proposed provisions for 40 CFR 
68.90(b)(3) and 68.95(c) to allow existing notification mechanisms or 
regulations to satisfy the RMP release notification requirements if 
applicable.
Ensure a Community Notification System is in Place
a. Comments
    Some commenters supported the provision that facilities ensure a 
community notification system is in place. One commenter explained that 
current notification procedures are inadequate, with some community 
members not learning about a release until hours afterward. One 
commenter noted that while they support the presence of State and/or 
local alerting authorities, EPA should consider that this notification 
system may not be appropriate for all communities, especially those 
that are dealing with systemic barriers to safety and justice. A few 
commenters suggested that, to remove the burden on facilities to

[[Page 17668]]

ensure the notification systems of local responders, EPA should change 
``and ensure that'' to ``and partner to ensure that.'' Some commenters 
opposed the language requiring RMP facilities to be responsible for 
community warning systems and notification of emergencies to the local 
community. Several commenters stated the requirements of public 
notification are better suited to third parties, LEPCs, and government 
agencies already tasked with this coordination. A couple of the 
commenters stated these agencies have the resources and infrastructure 
needed for disseminating emergency information to a community and 
coordinating local response. A few commenters noted that while 
Integrated Public Alert & Warning Systems (IPAWS) are in use in 
communities nationwide, many facilities are not in areas with these 
systems. Furthermore, a few commenters expressed that neither the 
burden of ensuring IPAWS capabilities nor providing direct notification 
to the public should fall on RMP facilities. Another commenter noted 
that IPAWS does not accept information from private entities, only 
government entities. One commenter stated that while they support the 
need for a community notification system, they believe EPA should 
ensure that RMP facilities covered under this rule are in areas already 
covered by the IPAWS and, if so, re-evaluate how this may impact local 
governments and their ability to allocate resources.
b. EPA Responses
    In response to comments that the language in this provision should 
be changed from ``and ensure that'' to ``and partner to ensure that'' a 
community notification system is in place, EPA has amended the language 
as suggested. It was not EPA's intention in the proposed provision to 
transfer inherent government responsibilities to RMP regulated 
facilities. Rather, EPA's intention for this provision has always been 
for facility owners and operators to work with the local responders to 
ensure that, during a release, a notification system is in place that 
will notify the public of the impending situation. The Agency expects 
that in most cases government emergency response officials will be the 
entities providing the notice. However, for the purposes of this rule, 
regulated facilities which have accidental releases are responsible for 
ensuring a prompt emergency response to any release at their facility's 
covered processes in order to protect human health and the environment. 
As discussed in the proposal, if local public responders are not 
capable of providing such a response, the owner or operator is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring effective emergency response to any 
release at their facility occurs.
    EPA expects the partnership between facility owners and operators 
and emergency response officials to ensure a public notification system 
is in place should occur at least during annual coordination 
discussions under 40 CFR 68.93. Under 40 CFR 68.93, owners and 
operators are required, among others, to annually coordinate response 
needs with local emergency planning and response organizations to 
determine how the facility is addressed in the community emergency 
response plan. A component of the community emergency response plan is 
public notification of chemical releases, and it is expected that this 
component will be discussed and documented by the facility owner or 
operator as part of the annual coordination obligations.
    With regard to specific comments about IPAWS, EPA acknowledges that 
while IPAWS is not currently operational in all communities, it could 
be. IPAWS is available in all States statewide, and, if not currently 
available in certain local communities, it can be made available if the 
local designated government authorities apply to be an Alerting 
Authority.\102\ While IPAWS is a well-known option as a notification 
system compliant with this provision, EPA is not requiring the use of 
this specific system to be the one solely used to notify the public. 
EPA encourages facility owners and operators to work with response 
agencies to determine how best to alert a potentially affected 
community about impending chemical releases.
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    \102\ A jurisdiction with the designated authority to alert and 
warn the public when there is an impending natural or human-made 
disaster, threat, or dangerous or missing person; https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/practitioners/integrated-public-alert-warning-system/public-safety-officials/sign-up.
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    After review of comments, EPA maintains that the requirement to 
ensure that, during a release, all necessary resources are in place for 
a community notification system to function and operate as expected 
will help protect the public from accidental releases. Furthermore, EPA 
agrees with the recommendation offered in the comments to enhance the 
provision. EPA is therefore finalizing the proposed provision with the 
following modification as previously discussed--revising the proposed 
provisions for 40 CFR 68.90(b)(6) and 68.95(a)(1)(i) to specify that 
the owner or operator should partner with local response agencies to 
ensure a community notification system is in place and to document the 
collaboration.
3. Emergency Response Exercises, 40 CFR 68.96(b)
Field Exercises
a. Comments
    Several commenters expressed support for the 10-year timeline for 
conducting field exercises. One of the commenters noted that the 
timeline would allow local responders to maintain capabilities and 
familiarity with facility processes for responding to accidental 
releases. The same commenters added that the timeline also would allow 
industry to obtain appropriate staff, experts, and funds. A few 
commenters particularly expressed support for EPA's efforts to 
encourage and require facilities to coordinate with LEPCs in 
circumstances where it is practical. Other commenters opposed the 
proposed provision, with some offering suggestions for improvement. 
Several commenters noted that EPA should recognize that not every 
location has a functioning LEPC that can coordinate field exercises 
with facilities and that clear carve outs should be established. The 
commenters suggested that EPA allow facilities to demonstrate a good 
faith effort to coordinate with LEPCs or demonstrate the absence of an 
LEPC as exemptions from this requirement. A few commenters expressed 
concerns regarding the proposed requirement for State and Federal 
approval of a change in frequency. The commenters noted that it would 
be inappropriate for EPA to provide Federal and State officials veto 
power over scheduling an exercise for which they have no required role. 
One of the commenters recommended that EPA remove the reference to 
Federal and State agencies, to clarify that RMP facilities do not need 
to obtain approval from Federal or State agencies if the local 
emergency responders have identified the frequency of an exercise is 
impractical.
b. EPA Responses
    EPA agrees with comments that describe the varying capabilities of 
LEPCs and responding agencies and believes the approach the Agency 
offers supports those comments. The Agency believes the frequency 
exemption provided, which allows facilities and communities that do not 
have resources to complete field exercises every 10 years to work 
together to determine a lesser frequency, is more useful than the 
Agency being more prescriptive about when the frequency does not apply.

[[Page 17669]]

EPA believes various communities have different concerns as to why they 
would need to conduct field exercises less frequently and therefore 
does not expect a one-size fits all approach to be appropriate in 
accommodating those various circumstances. Additionally, EPA 
understands that there may be cases where local emergency response 
agencies are unable or unwilling to coordinate with a regulated 
facility on exercise frequencies. In such cases, the owner or operator 
may establish appropriate exercise frequencies and plans on their own, 
provided they meet the minimum requirements set forth in 40 CFR 68.96. 
The final rule will not specifically require the owner or operator to 
document unsuccessful coordination attempts, but EPA believes it will 
be in the owner or operator's best interest to do so and allow the 
owner or operator to demonstrate their good faith efforts for 
consultation in the event that an implementing agency requests this 
information.
    In response to comments that EPA should remove the reference to 
consultation with Federal and State agencies when developing field 
exercise frequencies, EPA has amended the language to reflect that the 
consultation required for this provision need only be with local 
emergency responding agencies. EPA acknowledges that the emergency 
response exercise program provisions under 40 CFR 68.96(b), only 
require coordination with local public emergency response officials, 
and wants to remain consistent with activities that most likely will 
occur on the local level.
    Therefore, EPA is finalizing the requirement for facility owners 
and operators to coordinate with local emergency response officials to 
establish an appropriate frequency for field exercises at a minimum at 
least once every ten years unless the appropriate local emergency 
response agencies agree in writing that such frequency is impractical. 
EPA is not finalizing the requirement for Federal and State agencies to 
be consulted when coordinating the 10-year (or other determined) 
frequency.
Emergency Exercise Reports
a. Comments
    Several commenters expressed their support for the requirement that 
the current recommended field and tabletop exercise evaluation report 
components be mandatory. Other commenters opposed the provision. One of 
the commenters noted that EPA failed to consider the paperwork burden, 
hours and costs associated with requiring the reporting of such 
information. One commenter mentioned that, in 2019, EPA recognized that 
making the reporting requirements non-mandatory would reduce the 
regulatory burden and allow emergency response personnel the 
flexibility to decide which exercise documentation would be most 
appropriate for the facility and community. The commenter urged EPA to 
retain this flexibility and not add this requirement to the existing 
RMP rule. Another commenter noted that the proposed post-exercise 
reporting requirements provide little value to the program.
b. EPA Responses
    EPA disagrees that the requirement of this provision--to make the 
scope and documentation requirements of the exercise evaluation report 
mandatory--is overly burdensome. While the elements of the evaluation 
report were not previously mandatory, there was already a requirement 
to develop a report. In most cases, for those previously voluntary 
report elements, particularly lessons learned and recommendations for 
improvement, EPA had expected these to be included in the report, as 
they are advantageous in assuring that over time emergency response 
efforts improved. Other report elements such as names and organizations 
of each participant are expected to be collected using low-cost 
methods, such as sign-in sheets or registration websites. Local 
emergency response organizations participating in exercises will also 
likely be able to assist the owner or operator in collecting and 
providing this information. EPA has updated the RIA to consider the 
minimal paperwork hours and costs associated with this provision.
    The Agency acknowledges that it had previously stated in the 2019 
reconsideration rule that the scope and documentation provisions left 
as discretionary would allow owners and operators to coordinate with 
local responders to design exercises that are most suitable for their 
own situations. Different facilities use a variety of emergency 
response equipment types and may have many different actions specified 
in their emergency response plans. However, as discussed in the 
proposal, EPA now finds it beneficial to provide consistency between 
exercise evaluation and incident investigation documentation 
requirements, as incident investigation reports can be used to satisfy 
response exercise evaluation report requirements under the current 
rule. Since EPA cannot anticipate all variations of incidents that may 
occur, EPA also cannot anticipate all variations of appropriate 
exercises. The current provision for incident investigation reports 
under 40 CFR 68.60 and 68.81 identifies general topics that must be 
included in the report but does not contain further prescriptive 
requirements about how those topics need to be addressed. Similarly, so 
will similar general elements guide the content of exercise evaluation 
reports. The flexibility in both provisions allows participants to 
develop an evaluation that owners, operators, and responders can learn 
from.
    Upon consideration of comments, EPA is finalizing the provision to 
require mandatory reporting for exercise evaluation reports as 
proposed.

VII. Information Availability

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

    EPA proposed to amend 40 CFR 68.210 by adding new paragraphs (d), 
(e), and (f). Proposed 40 CFR 68.210(d) required the owner or operator 
of a stationary source to provide, upon request by any member of the 
public residing within six miles of the stationary source, certain 
chemical hazard information for all regulated processes in the language 
requested. EPA proposed to require the owner or operator to provide, as 
applicable:
     Names of regulated substances held in a process.
     Safety Data Sheets (SDS) for all regulated substances at 
the facility.
     The facility's five-year accident history required under 
40 CFR 68.42.
     Emergency response program information concerning the 
source's compliance with 40 CFR 68.10(f)(3) and the emergency response 
provisions of subpart E, as applicable, including: (1) Whether the 
source is a responding stationary source or a non-responding stationary 
source; (2) name and phone number of local emergency response 
organizations with which the owner or operator last coordinated 
emergency response efforts, pursuant to 40 CFR 68.180; and (3) for 
sources subject to 40 CFR 68.95, procedures for informing the public 
and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases.
     A list of scheduled exercises required under 40 CFR 68.96.
     LEPC contact information, including LEPC name, phone 
number, and web address as available.
    Proposed 40 CFR 68.210(e) required the owner or operator to provide 
ongoing notification on a company website, social media platforms, or 
through other publicly accessible means that:
     Information specified in proposed 40 CFR 68.210(d) is 
available to the

[[Page 17670]]

public residing within six miles of the stationary source upon request. 
This notification is required to: (1) Specify the information elements, 
identified in 40 CFR 68.210(b), that can be requested; and (2) provide 
instructions for how to request the information.
     Identifies where to access information on community 
preparedness, if available, including shelter-in-place and evacuation 
procedures.
    Proposed 40 CFR 68.210(f) required the owner or operator to provide 
the requested information under proposed 40 CFR 68.210(d) within 45 
days of receiving a request.
    In addition to the proposed approach to this information 
availability provision, EPA also sought feedback on if the 6-mile 
radius for requesting information is appropriate, or if other 
alternative distances would be more suitable. The Agency also requested 
specific information on the increased likelihood of security threats 
arising from dissemination of this information, and which data 
elements, or combinations of elements, may pose a security risk if 
released to the public.

B. Summary of Final Rule

    EPA is finalizing 40 CFR 68.210 with changes to address public 
comments, including potential security concerns. Under 40 CFR 
68.210(d), the final rule:
     Expands the population eligible to submit information 
requests to include members of the public residing, working, or 
spending significant time in a 6-mile radius from the fenceline of the 
facility, as opposed to just those residing in a 6-mile radius.
     Includes a verification process to confirm that members of 
the public submitting information requests reside, work, or spend 
significant time in the 6-mile radius, and a recordkeeping component of 
the requestors.
     Limits the language translations offered for information 
available upon request to at least two major languages used in the 
community (other than English), while the proposed rule would have 
required the owner or operator of a stationary source to provide 
information in any language requested.
     Excludes dates of exercises occurring within one year of 
the date of request.
     Expands the list of information required to be available 
upon request to include declined recommendations reported under 40 CFR 
68.170(e)(7) and 68.175(e)(7) through (9).

C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions

1. Requirement To Make Information Available to the Public
EPA's Proposed Approach
a. Comments
    Several commenters generally supported increasing information 
sharing and provided further recommendations in addition to the 
provisions outlined in the proposed rule.
    Several other commenters generally opposed the proposed information 
availability requirements, including those who opposed the provision 
because it may create unintended community anxiety. Several commenters 
noted that due to the complex technical information such as SDSs, it 
will have limited value or use to the public, and instead EPA's efforts 
should focus on improving the LEPC's ability to interpret the 
information. One commenter noted that the LEPC should be provided with 
relevant chemical hazard information, which then could be shared with 
local citizens. A commenter stated that the general premise that making 
the RMP more accessible to the public will encourage facility operators 
to be more safety-conscious via the imposition of ``community pressure 
and oversight'' is misguided. The commenter added that requiring 
members of the public to ``pull'' the information from the facility 
does little to promote proactive safety and accident/risk reduction at 
the fencelines as that public member must first have some idea that a 
facility presents a risk.
    Several commenters indicated that the proposed information 
availability requirements would be burdensome for facilities. A few 
commenters stated that EPA underestimates the costs to deliver 
community information requests. One commenter noted that facilities may 
not have the expertise for communicating the information as envisioned 
by EPA. One commenter stated that the requirement to disclose 
information would potentially make facilities with covered processes 
the target of high volumes of requests submitted by individuals or 
groups.
    A few commenters noted that the proposed requirements would be 
duplicative of EPCRA. Some commenters recommended EPA consider existing 
programs that already require facilities to report specific 
information.
b. EPA Responses
    EPA continues to believe that providing chemical hazard information 
to the general public will allow people that live or work near a 
regulated facility to improve their awareness of risks to the community 
and to be prepared to protect themselves in the event of an accidental 
release. The public's ability to participate in emergency planning and 
readiness is enhanced by being better informed about accident history, 
types of chemicals present, and how to interact with the stationary 
source. In drafting both the proposed and final rule, EPA has been 
selective in identifying what information a source must make available; 
for example, the Agency has not required the facility to provide an 
entire RMP to the public.
    The Agency disagrees that community involvement in prevention and 
response planning, which in effect is a form of oversight and may be 
perceived as ``pressure,'' does not have value in minimizing the 
likelihood of accidental releases and in improving the responses to 
such releases. The statute itself provides support for the Agency's 
position by generally making RMPs available to the public, subject to 
limited restrictions (42 U.S.C. 7414(c), 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(H)). In 
the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule, the Agency discussed its multiple means 
of access to information about a source to facilitate involvement about 
the risks a source presents (87 FR 53602). The Agency believes every 
RMP regulated source presents some level of risk, as each regulated 
source stores and manages toxic or flammable substances which may be 
accidentally released. Having the source provide the information set 
out in 40 CFR 68.210 directly to the public within the confines of the 
final rule promotes accident prevention and response by facilitating 
public participation at the local level.
    Under CAA section 112(r)(7)(H)(ii)(I)(bb), EPA conducted a benefits 
assessment in 2000, describing the benefits of providing community 
access to OCA information specifically but also addressing the benefits 
of public disclosure of risk management plan information. EPA found 
that public disclosure of risk management plan information would likely 
lead to a reduction in the number and severity of accidents.\103\ It 
also found that comparisons between facilities,

[[Page 17671]]

processes and industries would likely lead industry to make changes and 
would stimulate dialogue among facilities, the public, and local 
officials to reduce chemical accident risks. The approach taken in this 
final rule builds upon the planning approach of EPCRA and EPA studies 
of the value of ``right to know'' in emergencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ EPA. April 18, 2000. Assessment of the incentives created 
by public disclosure of off-site consequence analysis information 
for reduction in risk of accidental releases, at 2.
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    While EPA acknowledges the potential for ``community anxiety'' as a 
result from the affected public having easier access to information 
about safety risks, public participation in the pre-rulemaking 
listening sessions and during the public hearings in this rulemaking 
demonstrate that anxiety among the public near facilities already 
plainly exists as a result of the more cumbersome disclosure 
authorizations of the current rule. The Agency expects a more informed 
and involved public, as a result of this final rule, to have less fear 
of the unknown.
    In response to commenters recommending that the facility share the 
information with the LEPC, which would then be responsible for sharing 
the information with interested members of the public, EPA notes 
analysis of active facility risk management plan submissions 
demonstrates that 10 percent of active facilities have not provided the 
names or information about their LEPCs. Without further information as 
to why facilities left this portion of the risk management plan 
submission blank, it is possible that LEPCs may not exist for those 
facilities, that the LEPC may have existed but is inactive, or that the 
facility is not in communication with its LEPC. EPA routinely receives 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for OCA and non-OCA versions 
of the risk management plan database from local and State emergency 
response entities, which may indicate that local emergency response 
entities also have difficulty in obtaining this information from 
facilities. Therefore, EPA believes that providing information solely 
to LEPCs would not be sufficient or improve safety as effectively as 
additionally requiring that information be provided directly to the 
affected public.
    Regarding comments on the burden of the information availability 
requirements, EPA notes that other statutes and regulatory programs, or 
other provisions of the RMP, require the stationary source to assemble 
the information that the rule makes available upon request (e.g., 
accident history, SDSs, and aspects of the emergency response program). 
Thus, the burden of making this information directly available from the 
source is minimal.
    Regarding comments stating that the proposed requirements are 
duplicative of existing reporting requirements, EPA believes, for the 
reasons already stated, that this information should be more easily 
accessible to the public than the existing approaches to access 
information under EPCRA and other programs/regulations.
Translation Requirements
    A commenter stated that the information should be provided in plain 
language and in multiple languages. Another commenter stated it is 
difficult for facilities to translate technical information into 
multiple languages. A couple of commenters noted that the proposed 
translation requirements go beyond EPA authority and would be 
burdensome and costly.
    The final rule requires that language translations be offered in at 
least two other major languages in the community. EPA expects owners 
and operators to use the most recent Census Language Use data,\104\ or 
other recent authoritative information,\105\ to determine the two major 
languages spoken in a comparable size designation to the six-mile or 
worst-case release scenario distance radius of their facility. EPA 
believes this will provide the vast majority of the surrounding 
community with the information requested and account for language 
barriers while minimizing burden to facilities. Requiring translation 
in up to two of the major non-English languages of the community 
reflects a balance of the right-to-know purposes of CAA section 
112(r)(7)(B)(iii) with the time and financial burden of providing such 
translations. The Agency believes community involvement is integral to 
a well-functioning accident prevention program, and the translation 
requirement promotes accomplishing this objective.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ https://data.census.gov/table?t=Language+Spoken+at+Home.
    \105\ https://www.lep.gov/language-access-planning.
    \106\ While not the basis of this provision, these language 
translation requirements advance the policies in Executive Orders 
13166 and 14096: 88 FR 25251 (April 26, 2023), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/04/26/2023-08955/revitalizing-our-nations-commitment-to-environmental-justice-for-all; 65 FR 50121 (August 16, 2000), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/08/16/00-20938/improving-access-to-services-for-persons-with-limited-english-proficiency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notification Requirements
    One commenter noted that the information available to the public is 
meaningless if the public does not know it exists. Therefore, the 
commenter suggested that EPA require facilities to provide notice to 
communities within six miles that they have the right to request this 
information.
    EPA agrees with the commenter that the information availability 
requirements are most impactful if the public is aware of the 
availability of the information. Therefore, EPA is finalizing the 
proposed requirements that the owner or operator of the facility 
provide ongoing notification on either a company website, social media 
platforms, or through other publicly accessible means, that facility 
information is directly available to the public within six miles upon 
request.
45-Day Disclosure Timeline
    A few commenters suggested EPA shorten the required response time. 
A couple of commenters specifically expressed concern that the 45-day 
period to receive information once requested is too long for people to 
wait for that urgently needed information.
    EPA is finalizing the 40 CFR 68.210(g) requirement that the 
facility owner or operator provide the information under 40 CFR 
68.210(d) to the requester within 45 days of receiving a request. EPA 
selected 45 days because that timeframe is consistent with the 
requirement for the public availability provision of facility chemical 
inventory information (i.e., ``Tier II information'') under section 
312(e)(3)(D) of EPCRA, which states, ``a State emergency response 
commission or LEPC shall respond to a request for Tier II information 
under this paragraph no later than 45 days after the date of receipt of 
the request.'' EPA believes the 45-day timeline appropriately balances 
the burden imposed on facilities to keep chemical hazard information 
updated and the need to provide the public with timely access to this 
information. EPA encourages facilities to update their chemical hazard 
information as needed to ensure that accurate information can be made 
available to the requester within the required timeframe.
Suggestions for EPA To Disclose Facility Information
    Many commenters suggested that EPA create an online database to 
contain information from facilities. A couple of commenters stated that 
it is essential for EPA to take prompt action to provide publicly 
accessible information on RMP facility hazards and safety plans on the 
Agency's website. Similarly, a few commenters stated that EPA should 
develop, maintain, and update a public, multilingual online database 
containing non-protected RMP information.

[[Page 17672]]

    By policy, EPA has restricted access to the RMP database, even 
though only a portion of the database is restricted by CAA section 
112(r)(7)(H) and its implementing regulations in 40 CFR part 1400. As 
described in the 2022 SCCAP proposed rule, EPA intends to, at a 
prospective date, begin publishing non-OCA risk management plan data 
annually, less any CAA section 112(r)(7)(H) protected sensitive 
information (87 FR 53602). The discussion in the proposed rule was 
intended to highlight some of the issues that are relevant to relaxing 
restrictions on data availability.
Environmental Justice and Fenceline Communities
    Several commenters recommended EPA consider EJ and fenceline 
communities when developing information availability provisions, 
including, by championing community information as a fundamental EJ 
goal. One commenter suggested that EPA inform fenceline communities 
that they live near an RMP facility because, oftentimes, people are 
unaware that they live near RMP facilities.
    EPA has considered impacts and risks to local communities, 
including communities with EJ concerns and fenceline communities 
throughout the rulemaking process. EPA believes that the final 
information availability provision makes significant improvements to 
provide more information to the public, including communities with EJ 
concerns and fenceline communities.
2. 6-Mile Radius
a. Comments
    A few commenters supported EPA's proposed approach of the 6-mile 
radius for requesting information.
    Several commenters recommended EPA abandon any geographic 
limitation and instead make basic emergency preparedness information 
commonly available to the public. One commenter emphasized that the 
proposed rule violates FOIA as non-OCA RMP data are public information. 
The commenter noted that EPA cannot deny public access to this 
information. The commenter also noted that this restriction would 
violate 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(7)(B), which requires EPA to provide 
prevention, incident detection, and response ``to the greatest extent 
practicable.'' One commenter stated that the proposal's within 6-mile 
residency requirement creates an unnecessary obstacle to accessing 
information that could undermine EPA's goals to address EJ, especially 
as people in fenceline communities may not have a trusting relationship 
with government authorities, a home address, or documented status to 
demonstrate their residency. The commenter requested EPA eliminate the 
requirement that community members demonstrate they live within six 
miles of a facility to access information.
    Several commenters suggested that the 6-mile radius lacks 
justification and is arbitrary. Some of the commenters expressed 
concerns that residents could use a P.O. Box within 6-miles of a 
facility to obtain access to and share information. Several commenters 
noted there are no means to retain or prevent information from being 
shared outside of its intended use.
    Many of the commenters referenced social media and other web-based 
networks as means of quickly spreading sensitive information. Some 
commenters added that terrorists and criminals would be able to readily 
obtain sensitive information and could easily falsify their identity or 
location. Several commenters requested EPA to clarify what is meant by 
the requirement of a person to ``reside'' within six miles of a 
facility and how a facility will be able to verify the information.
    A couple of the commenters suggested EPA build upon existing 
programs and safeguards, such as LEPCs, to protect sensitive chemical 
information instead of choosing to impose an arbitrary 6-mile 
threshold. One commenter added that EPA did not explain how the 6-mile 
radius requirement builds on existing regulatory programs designed by 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and EPA to safeguard sensitive 
information. One commenter recommended that anyone requesting 
information should be required to complete a mandatory background check 
before any information is shared. Another commenter stated that EPA 
should not put the responsibility of vetting community members on 
facilities.
b. EPA Responses
    EPA believes the 6-mile radius restriction to be reasonable, as 90 
percent of all toxic worst-case distances to endpoints are within six 
miles or less, and almost all flammable worst-case distances are less 
than 1 mile (87 FR 53601). The 6-mile radius for being able to request 
information from facilities allows people in most areas potentially 
impacted by a worst-case scenario to have access to information while 
also providing a limit on widespread access to nationwide assembly of 
data. EPA agrees with commenters that allowing only those individuals 
that reside within the 6-mile radius to access information is too 
limited and has thus expanded the provision in the final rule to also 
allow members of the public working or otherwise spending significant 
time in the 6-mile radius to request information from a facility.
    The 6-mile radius limitation also seeks to limit the potential 
security risk of allowing anonymous confidential access to this 
information to the entire public that was of concern to EPA in the 2019 
reconsideration rule. This approach strikes a better balance between 
those security concerns and the interests of people spending 
significant time near facilities who could benefit from the 
information, including personal preparedness in the event of an 
accident, knowledge of potential risks and safety conditions where one 
lives, and more informed participation in community emergency and 
safety planning.
    EPA is also clarifying in the final rule that the 6-mile radius is 
from the fenceline of the facility. EPA expects that in most cases, six 
miles from the fenceline is the appropriate definition, as opposed to 
six miles from process locations or any other location at the facility, 
because this consistent approach captures the wide variations of 
facility size, process locations and any process movement within the 
facility. It is also simpler to verify for the public and oversight 
agencies and does not require revealing of the precise location of the 
place in the process from which a release could occur, which may raise 
security concerns.
    In response to comments requesting clarification on what it means 
for a person to ``reside'' within six miles of a facility, the final 
rule specifies that members of the public residing, working, or 
spending significant time in a 6-mile radius from the fenceline of the 
facility are able to submit information requests to a source. EPA 
interprets residing as occupying a dwelling (owning or renting), 
working as having paid employment, and spending significant time as 
frequently using services, volunteering, visiting with family or 
friends, etc.
    Regarding concerns about the verification of the identity of 
members of the public requesting information, EPA is requiring sources 
to provide instructions for how to request the information, which 
should include the necessary verification components for the public 
within a 6-mile radius of the facility. Nothing in the rule requires a 
facility to accept a mere P.O. Box address as evidence of residence, 
employment, or presence within the 6-mile radius. For this final rule, 
EPA is

[[Page 17673]]

also requiring owners and operators to maintain a record of the 
requestors. The final rule leaves substantial flexibility for 
facilities to design a process for obtaining verification and keeping 
records of requestors that allows for facilities to have a suitable, 
minimally burdensome process for themselves and the community. The 
final rule allows for a straightforward process that does not hinder 
the right of the public to access this information, allows facilities 
to be aware who has their information, and permits oversight by 
implementing agencies. However, as this is a performance-based 
provision, just as most components of the rule, EPA recognizes that 
there is not a one-size fits all approach that works best for notifying 
the public that this information is available and verifying presence 
within a 6-mile radius. EPA expects facility owners and operators to 
notify the public that information is available in a variety of ways, 
such as using free or low-cost internet platforms, and social media 
tools that are designed for sharing information with the public. EPA 
also expects verification of the population within the 6-mile radius to 
be carried out through many methods, such as asking a member of the 
public to provide a utility bill for verification of residence, pay 
stub for verification of employment, or specific documentation to 
verify significant time spent within the 6-mile radius. EPA encourages 
the facility owner or operator to coordinate information distribution 
and verification requirements with the LEPC or local emergency response 
officials to determine the best way to reach public stakeholders. EPA 
notes that the owner or operator shall document the method and the 
location of the notification in the RMP pursuant to 40 CFR 
68.160(b)(22).
    The 6-mile radius provision reasonably and practicably balances 
enhancing means of access for affected communities while also limiting 
security concerns about widespread, anonymous access that raised 
concerns in EPA's 2019 reconsideration rule. Further, the final 
provisions do not limit or violate FOIA rights of the public to obtain 
Government-held records.
3. Data Elements To Be Released to the Public
a. Comments
    In the preamble of the proposed rule, EPA solicited comment on its 
announcement of its policy decision that, at some future date, EPA 
would post online portions of the RMP database that do not contain 
legally restricted information or information that raises significant 
security concerns. The Agency solicited comments to help identify such 
information. The comment solicitation did not propose regulatory 
changes, but instead sought public input on a policy position. 
Nevertheless, because some of the data elements EPA is considering 
releasing through policy change are the same data elements facilities 
will be required to disclose under the information availability 
regulatory provision in this final rule, discussion of the comments and 
the Agency's rationale of releasing those data elements, through a 
future policy change and in this final rulemaking, is provided here.
    In response to this comment solicitation, many commenters discussed 
data elements that should not be publicly released in order to avoid 
security threats. One commenter stated that security sensitive 
information, such as OCA data, should only be publicly accessible 
through Federal Reading Rooms. A few commenters listed specific 
elements that should not be publicly available, citing a potential 
increased vulnerability to terrorist attacks.
    Data elements noted by commenters as posing security threats if 
released to the public, which the commenters argued should therefore 
not be disclosed, include:
     Chemical hazard information.
     Specific substance names and hazard characteristics.
     Names of regulated substances held in a process, SDSs, and 
any site-specific information.
     Information regarding hazardous substances on site.
     Storage location and transportation information.
     Emergency response details.
     Audit reports and exercise schedules and summaries.
     Accident history.
    One commenter stated that sensitive information, such as audit 
reports, exercise schedules and summaries, and emergency response 
details, does not prevent accidents or reduce potential harm, but does 
increase the vulnerability of a facility to attacks by terrorists or 
other criminals. One commenter stated that specific information 
regarding security threats is held by DHS, and providing documented 
security threats, or security risks from prior incidents or near 
misses, provides a road map for bad actors and propagates future 
security threats.
    A couple of commenters noted that some information, including CBI 
and trade secrets, should not be shared with the public. Another 
commenter stated that proprietary information about processes and 
chemicals should be in the safety plan without disclosing details that 
would allow the methods, procedures, or other intellectual property to 
be stolen. One commenter noted that EPA should reinstate previous 
language that enabled facilities to assert a claim of business 
confidentiality regarding any information they are required to make 
public under the RMP rule.
b. EPA Responses
    The responses below address comments concerning the data elements 
required to be released by the source upon request. Additionally, EPA 
will consider the input from the commenters when the Agency proceeds 
with a policy decision on whether to put some portions of the RMP 
database online again in the future. As such, the responses that 
immediately follow are also provided to facilitate public dialogue 
about implementing EPA's potential policy change.
    EPA agrees with commenters that suggested only information that 
could improve community awareness of risks should be made available to 
the public. Having the source provide the information set out in 40 CFR 
68.210 directly to the public promotes accident prevention by 
facilitating public participation at the local level. It should be 
noted that EPA has been selective in identifying what information a 
source must make available; for example, the Agency will not require 
the facility to provide an entire RMP to the public. EPA believes the 
public has a substantial interest in knowing what chemicals are present 
in the community and what it should do in the event of an accidental 
release involving facilities handling those chemicals. The public also 
has a substantial interest in having the opportunity to participate in 
an informed manner regarding emergency planning in its community. 
Facilitating access to information before an incident promotes more 
effective communication of information during responses to incidents, 
and thus promotes more effective response programs. (See the 
requirement in CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(ii)(III) for response programs 
to address informing the public.) The public's ability to participate 
in emergency planning and readiness is materially advanced by being 
better informed about accident history, types of chemicals present, and 
how to interact with the stationary source. Nevertheless, of the 
information options proposed, EPA acknowledges some security concerns 
with releasing

[[Page 17674]]

information identifying actual upcoming dates of tabletop or field 
exercises. EPA is therefore requiring facilities to provide a list of 
exercises that will occur within the year, indicating that they will 
occur, rather than identifying the specific date they will occur.
    Although commenters did not explicitly request that the list of 
information required to be available upon request should include 
declined recommendations from new provisions, EPA is including this 
within the final rule. EPA intended this information to be available as 
the Agency indicated in the proposal that including this information in 
the RMP would ultimately enable the public to ensure facilities have 
conducted appropriate evaluations to address potential hazards that can 
affect communities near facility fencelines. When local citizens have 
adequate information and knowledge about facility hazards, EPA believes 
that facility owners and operators may be motivated to further improve 
their safety in response to community pressure and oversight.
    At this time, EPA will not require the owner or operator to make 
additional information available to the public, such as STAA reports, 
incident investigation reports (with root cause analyses), and third-
party audit reports. EPA acknowledges there is public interest in 
having these reports available to them, but these documents, which can 
be lengthy (e.g., the sectors subject to STAA requirements have 
multiple processes and some PHAs are hundreds of pages), technically 
complex, and could contain not only CBI, but sensitive security 
information involving process or equipment vulnerabilities. Even 
sanitizing submitted documents and providing upfront justification of 
CBI claims would entail a significant level of burden upon industry and 
EPA. It would not be practical or a good use of resources to have 
thousands of documents submitted to EPA, to any other body, or with the 
RMP submission. However, EPA may explore opportunities to simplify this 
information for public access in a future rulemaking.
    EPA is committed to safeguarding OCA information in accordance with 
requirements specified in the CSISSFRRA, which allows for any member of 
the public to access paper copies of OCA information for a limited 
number of facilities. This OCA information remains accessible to the 
public only in Federal Reading Rooms \107\ or upon voluntary disclosure 
by the source itself. CAA section112(r)(7)(H)(v)(III).
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    \107\ https://www.epa.gov/rmp/federal-reading-rooms-risk-management-plans-rmp.
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    EPA has received comments in the past with concerns regarding CBI 
and directs these commenters to the requirements in 40 CFR 68.152 for 
substantive criteria set forth in 40 CFR 2.301. EPA acknowledges and 
shares industry's concerns pertaining to protection of CBI information, 
but EPA believes that the Agency has addressed these concerns by 
providing the same CBI protections for the public information 
availability provisions that exist for the RMP under 40 CFR 68.151 and 
68.152 as for information contained in the RMP required under subpart 
G. As provided under 40 CFR 68.151(b)(3), an owner or operator of a 
stationary source may not claim five-year accident history information 
as CBI. As provided in 40 CFR 68.151(c)(2), an owner or operator of a 
stationary source asserting that a chemical name is CBI shall provide a 
generic category or class name as a substitute. CBI disclosure under 
EPCRA is controlled by that statute and rules implementing the 
information access provisions of EPCRA. Furthermore, EPA is not 
requiring STAA reports to be submitted to LEPCs or the public in the 
final rule, and, therefore, no CBI concerns exist for these reports. If 
an owner or operator has already claimed CBI for a portion of the RMP, 
then that claim still applies for the disclosure elements in the 
information availability provisions of the rule. The owner or operator 
should provide a sanitized version as described in the RMP*eSubmit 
User's Manual. This policy is consistent with existing RMP guidance and 
practices.
4. Security Concerns
a. Comments
    A few commenters stated that there is no evidence that increasing 
information availability leads to security issues. Another commenter 
noted that there is no evidence that community members have caused a 
chemical disaster or that they pose any security risk. The commenter 
stated that a valuable way to address any security risks is to provide 
full public transparency and give facilities more incentive to prevent 
disasters by reducing or minimizing hazards up front. One commenter 
noted that eliminating chemical hazards and reducing risks present at 
industrial chemical facilities will not only prevent disasters in the 
event of an accident but will also prevent and reduce harm in the event 
of an intentional act, such as a cyberattack.
    Several commenters emphasized security risks of the proposed rule, 
including risks of terrorist attacks or criminal activity. One 
commenter stated that the proposed information disclosure requirements 
raise security risks and impose significant burdens with no added 
benefit. Another commenter noted that providing additional sensitive 
accident investigation and chemical information to the public could 
result in a national homeland security concern.
    Several commenters noted the additional risks of cybersecurity 
attacks. A commenter added that other Federal agencies opposed these 
requirements, citing security concerns detailed in a 2000 report issued 
by the Department of Justice (DOJ). A couple of commenters noted that 
other Federal agencies raised security concerns with the proposed 
disclosure requirements during interagency review.
    Several commenters recommended that EPA withdraw its proposed 
information sharing provisions due to conflicts with information 
security protocols under DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 
(CFATS) regulations. One commenter noted that the availability of 
information requirements included in the proposed rule are in conflict 
with CSISSFRRA, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Regulations, 
and DHS Regulations. A few commenters noted that the proposed public 
disclosure requirement is contrary to the Critical Infrastructure 
Information Act of 2002, and one commenter noted it is also in conflict 
with the Maritime Transportation Security Act. One commenter noted that 
EPA's proposed information disclosure requirements may conflict with 
existing DHS regulations restricting the disclosure of Chemical-
terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI).
b. EPA Responses
    EPA acknowledges the security concerns raised by commenters and is 
committed to ensuring a balance between making information available to 
the public while also safeguarding that information. EPA worked closely 
with Federal partners, including the DHS and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), to develop information availability requirements 
that strike a balance between security concerns and the need for 
sharing chemical hazard information with the public. EPA believes that 
the finalized approach is consistent with existing requirements to 
secure sensitive

[[Page 17675]]

information. EPA also believes the current approach to notify the 
public that information is available upon request strikes an 
appropriate balance between various concerns, including information 
availability, community right-to-know, minimizing facility disclosure 
burden, and minimizing information security risks.
    EPA believes the information disclosures required by the final rule 
are fully consistent with the statutes and regulatory programs 
identified by the commenters as enacted after the 1990 CAA Amendments. 
For example, CSISSFRRA specified that portions of RMPs containing 
``offsite consequence analysis information'' (OCA Information), any 
electronic data base created from those portions, and any statewide or 
national ranking derived from such information is subject to 
restrictions on disclosure under CAA sections 112(r)(7)(H)(i)(III) and 
112(r)(7)(H)(v). Regulations jointly promulgated by EPA and the DOJ 
further define OCA Information in 40 CFR 1400.2(j). The final rule will 
not require disclosure of release scenarios or rankings based on such 
scenarios, nor will it make available any information based on such 
scenarios. First, the Critical Infrastructure Information Act restricts 
information ``not customarily in the public domain.'' Further, CFATS 
creates a category of information, CVI, which protects certain 
information submitted to DHS and necessary to implement CFATS (see 6 
CFR 27.400). In promulgating CFATS, DHS announced its intent to 
preserve Federal release disclosure, emergency planning, and accident 
prevention statutes, including EPCRA and CAA section 112(r) (see 72 FR 
17714, April 9, 2007). In this final rule, EPA creates no tension 
between after-enacted programs and enhancement of the RMP. The 
information that the final rule requires facilities to disclose largely 
draws on information otherwise in the public domain and simplifies the 
public's access to it. EPA has acknowledged that there would be some 
value to assembling a centralized, anonymously accessible government 
database of already-public information relevant to identifying and 
prioritizing facilities for potential impacts. However, this final rule 
does not create a central database of the information required to be 
disclosed, nor does it permit anonymous access. The limits on 
disclosure and access are important steps to minimize security risks. 
EPA has therefore coordinated with both the DHS Cybersecurity & 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) which manages the CFATS program 
and the FBI in order to take steps that will balance accident 
prevention and security interests.
    There exists no publicly available database of intentional acts 
upon the chemical process industries in the United States. In a 2021 
study, researchers attempted to compile a database of such incidents, 
finding documentation of 84 incidents in the chemical and petrochemical 
industries.108 109 Root cause data on these incidents, which 
are not available, would be needed to determine if availability of 
information on the facility contributed to terrorist incidents, which 
were second to cybersecurity incidents as the most frequent overall 
cause. According to the database, no terrorist event in the process 
industries (excluding transportation and pipelines) has occurred in 
North America after the 1970s.\110\ However, a lack of incidents may 
result from the safeguards currently in place. DHS promulgated CFATS in 
accordance with the Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, owing 
to insufficient security at industrial facilities. In promulgating 
CFATS, DHS did not intend for information created under CAA section 
112(r) to constitute ``Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information,'' 
which is sensitive information pursuant to CFATS requirements (72 FR 
17714). EPA routinely coordinates with DHS as part of the Chemical 
Facility Security and Safety Working Group and commits to working with 
DHS to find regulatory solutions that balance community right-to-know 
with security concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ Valeria Casson Moreno et al., ``Analysis of Physical and 
Cyber Security-Related Events in the Chemical and Process 
Industry,'' Process Safety and Environmental Protection 116 (2018), 
621-31, doi:10.1016/j.psep.2018.03.026.
    \109\ Matteo Iaiani et al., ``Analysis of Events Involving the 
Intentional Release of Hazardous Substances from Industrial 
Facilities,'' Reliability Engineering & System Safety 212 (2021), 
107593, doi:10.1016/j.ress.2021.107593.
    \110\ This is not a complete dataset, because it was developed 
based on publicly available information. Available in the 
supplemental material of Matteo Iaiani et al., ``Analysis of Events 
Involving the Intentional Release of Hazardous Substances from 
Industrial Facilities,'' Reliability Engineering & System Safety 212 
(2021), 107593, doi:10.1016/j.ress.2021.107593.
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    Accidental releases occur much more often than intentional events 
(about 100 per year using EPA RMP-reportable accidents). Pre-incident 
information, such as the locations of facilities and potential 
disasters, allows communities to be more prepared for disasters,\111\ 
which DOJ also recognized in its 2000 risk assessment.\112\ With over 
20 years of data now, EPA has based many of the finalized provisions on 
prior accident information. EPA acknowledges that the Agency must 
consider whether some non-OCA data elements, or combinations of 
elements, may not be suitable for public release and should be 
restricted based on potential security risks. EPA has been and will 
continue to work with DHS, DOJ, and other Federal partners on 
identifying these risks.
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    \111\ Holly Carter, John Drury, and Richard Aml[ocirc]t, 
``Recommendations for Improving Public Engagement with Pre-incident 
Information Materials for Initial Response to a Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Incident: A Systematic 
Review,'' International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 51 
(2020), 101796, doi:10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101796.
    \112\ DOJ, Assessment of the Increased Risk of Terrorist or 
Other Criminal Activity Associated with Posting Off-Site Consequence 
Analysis Information on the internet (2000), https://www.regulations.gov/document/EPA-HQ-OEM-2015-0725-2003, EPA-HQ-OEM-
2015-0725-2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters have referred to certain comments from other agencies in 
connection with drafts of prior RMP rulemakings. The cited material 
appeared in the docket as required by CAA section 307(d)(4)(B)(ii). 
Such material is explicitly excluded from the record for judicial 
review under CAA section 307(d)(7)(A). The introduction of this 
material into the record by these commenters is an attempt to avoid the 
exclusion under CAA section 307(d)(7)(A). Moreover, the comments 
addressed early stages of the rules that prior Administrators signed, 
and not the versions of prior proposed and final rules that were 
published, and do not reflect the ultimate positions of sister agencies 
with respect to what was published.
    Regarding concerns that the 2000 DOJ report is in conflict with the 
information availability requirements, EPA believes the 6-mile radius 
provision ensures that, even if community members obtain information 
related to OCA data, it would require a difficult nationwide-
coordinated effort among people within six miles of each facility to 
create the type of online database described in DOJ's report. The 
provisions simply require RMP facilities to provide their chemical 
hazard information to communities within a 6-mile radius of the 
facility, when previously they were not required to. Because RMP 
facilities were, and will continue to be, in possession of this 
information, it is unlikely that such a change would result in any 
possible prejudice to the facilities based on their reliance on the 
2019 reconsideration rule provisions, which have only been in place for 
4 years.

[[Page 17676]]

VIII. Other Areas of Technical Clarification/Enforcement Issues

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

1. Process Safety Information, 40 CFR 68.65
    EPA proposed to refine the language of 40 CFR 68.65 to clarify that 
the requirement to keep PSI up to date explicitly applies to Program 3 
processes.
2. Program 2 and 3 Requirements for Compliance With RAGAGEP, 40 CFR 
68.48 and 68.65
    EPA proposed to harmonize 40 CFR 68.48(b) and 68.65(d)(2) so that 
the requirements for compliance with RAGAGEP for Program 2 and Program 
3 processes are identical. Specifically, EPA proposed to require that 
Program 2 processes and Program 3 processes document compliance rather 
than merely ``ensure'' compliance. EPA also proposed to remove the 
sentence ``Compliance with Federal or State regulations that address 
industry-specific safe design or with industry-specific design codes 
and standards may be used to demonstrate compliance with this 
paragraph.''
3. Retention of Hot Work Permits, 40 CFR 68.85
    EPA proposed to require retention of hot work permits for five 
years, in accordance with the recordkeeping requirements in 40 CFR 
68.200.\113\
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    \113\ 40 CFR 68.200: ``The owner or operator shall maintain 
records supporting the implementation of this part at the stationary 
source for five years, unless otherwise provided in subpart D of 
this part.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Storage Incident to Transportation, 40 CFR 68.3
    EPA proposed additional regulatory language that includes a 
specified number of hours that a transportation container may be 
disconnected from the motive power that delivered it to the site before 
being considered part of the stationary source. EPA proposed to apply a 
48-hour time frame to this term. EPA also proposed to modify the 
definition of ``stationary source'' to further clarify ``storage 
incident to transportation'' in 40 CFR 68.3 by adding an explanation to 
the transportation container language in the stationary source 
definition. The proposed regulatory text would add examples of what a 
transportation container could be, such as a truck or railcar, and 
clarify that for RMP purposes, railyards and other stationary sources 
actively engaged in transloading activities may store regulated 
substances up to 48 hours total in a disconnected transportation 
container without counting the regulated substances contained in that 
transportation container toward the regulatory threshold.
    In addition to the proposed approach, EPA requested comment on 
suggestions for other appropriate time frames and any safety concerns 
that may arise from transportation containers being exempt from the RMP 
rule when disconnected for less than 48 hours.
5. Retail Facility Exemption, 40 CFR 68.3
    EPA proposed to adjust the regulatory text to clarify that the 
definition of ``retail facility'' is one in which more than one-half of 
the ``annual'' income ``in the previous calendar year'' is obtained 
from direct sales to end users or at which more than one-half of the 
fuel sold over that period, by volume, is sold through a cylinder 
exchange program.
6. RAGAGEP Gap Analysis, 40 CFR 68.69 and 68.175
    EPA proposed that the RMP regulations clarify that PHAs must 
include an analysis of the most recently promulgated RAGAGEP in order 
to identify any gap between practices related to the facility's design, 
maintenance, and operation, and the most current version of RAGAGEP.
    EPA also proposed to require owners or operators to specify in 
their risk management plans why PHA recommendations associated with 
adopting practices from the most recent version of RAGAGEP were not 
implemented. EPA proposed to allow facilities to choose from pre-
selected categories to provide justification for not implementing 
recommendations.

B. Summary of Final Rule

    EPA is not finalizing the proposed supplementary storage incident 
to transportation language at 40 CFR 68.3.
    EPA is finalizing the provisions for PSI, Program 2 and 3 
requirements for compliance with RAGAGEP, and the RAGAGEP gap analysis 
as proposed.
    EPA is finalizing the retention of hot work permits and retail 
facility exemption proposed changes with the following modifications:
     Revising 40 CFR 68.85(b) to require retention of hot work 
permits for three years rather than five.
     Revising 40 CFR 68.3 to clarify that ``year,'' in the 
context of the definition of ``retail facility,'' can be calendar or 
fiscal year.

C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions

1. Process Safety Information
a. Comments
    A couple of commenters expressed support for EPA's proposal to 
clarify that the requirement to keep PSI up to date explicitly applies 
to Program 3 processes. Several commenters stated that the proposal to 
update the PSI requirements is unnecessary, redundant with OSHA PSM 
requirements, and burdensome. Another commenter asserted that EPA 
should not amend 40 CFR 68.65(a) as proposed and should instead adhere 
to the existing regulatory language for Program 3 sources to ensure 
that the long-standing consistency between the RMP and PSM standard 
remain. Some of the commenters also stated that implementation would 
result in unnecessary costs on facilities. One commenter noted that, as 
currently written, the regulation does not impose a continuing 
obligation to maintain PSI. The commenter noted that as PHAs are 
conducted on five-year cycles, the applicable PSI need only be compiled 
on a corresponding five-year cycle and requiring that PSI be kept up to 
date will have associated costs that need to be accounted for in the 
RIA.
b. EPA Responses
    EPA appreciates the support for the Agency's clarifications to the 
PSI requirements and is finalizing the provision as proposed. EPA 
believes that refining the language of 40 CFR 68.65 to reflect existing 
requirements clarifies that such PSI is required to be up to date for 
Program 3 processes--just as it is for Program 2 processes--without the 
need for evaluating compliance with management of change, conducting a 
pre-startup safety review, or meeting PHA requirements.
    EPA disagrees that clarifying the PSI requirements is unnecessary. 
For processes subject to Program 3 requirements, the PSI requirements 
under 40 CFR 68.65 do not explicitly address updating PSI. Instead, 
that subject is addressed in several other parts of the Program 3 
requirements, including the management of change requirements in 40 CFR 
68.75, the pre-startup review requirements in 40 CFR 68.77, and the 
requirement to document that equipment complies with RAGAGEP in 40 CFR 
68.65(d)(2). EPA is simply clarifying the PSI requirements in order to 
make the regulation more consistent throughout.
    Additionally, EPA disagrees that the regulation, as currently 
written, does

[[Page 17677]]

not impose a continuing obligation to maintain PSI. The requirement in 
40 CFR 68.75(d) that PSI must be updated to reflect changes implies 
that PSI must be maintained. Further, the requirement to ``document 
compliance with RAGAGEP'' additionally supports that current PSI shall 
be maintained, since compliance cannot be documented without the 
maintaining of current PSI documents.
    In response to comments that the updated PSI requirements would be 
inconsistent or redundant with OSHA's PSM requirements, EPA disagrees. 
EPA has coordinated with OSHA throughout the rulemaking process to 
ensure the intent of adding specificity and clarification to the RMP 
regulations does not create conflicting requirements with OSHA's PSM 
standard.
    EPA disagrees that this modification will result in unnecessary 
costs on facilities. The intent of the changes to the regulatory text 
is to simplify implementation for facilities, as well as oversight, 
thereby improving chemical safety. The amendments do not change the 
meaning of the RMP rule. Therefore, EPA does not expect the changes to 
result in any additional costs for facilities.
2. Program 2 and 3 Requirements for Compliance With RAGAGEP
a. Comments
    A couple of commenters supported EPA's proposal to clarify RAGAGEP 
requirements for Program 2 and Program 3 processes. One commenter 
stated that it is important to clarify the RAGAGEP requirements because 
codes, standards, and practices change over time. The commenter also 
urged EPA to strengthen the proposed changes by expanding the scope of 
applicability of the RAGAGEP requirement to cover all facilities. The 
commenter noted that the CAA directs EPA to ensure RAGAGEP is fully 
included in the assessment and process safety requirements, and 
mandates implementation ``to the maximum extent practicable.'' Another 
commenter stated that the industry-wide understanding of the RAGAGEP's 
meaning varies widely, and the proposed clarification may help 
alleviate this problem and address the concern that Federal and State 
regulations may lag behind recognized industry standards for safety.
    A couple of commenters stated that the requirement that owners 
ensure and document that processes are designed in compliance with 
RAGAGEP is an already-existing PSM requirement, and revisions to the 
text are therefore not necessary. A couple of commenters opposed 
removing the sentence, ``Compliance with Federal or State regulations 
that address industry-specific safe design or with industry-specific 
design codes and standards may be used to demonstrate compliance with 
this paragraph.'' One commenter stated that if EPA feels that Federal 
or State regulations lag behind current RAGAGEP, then the Agency should 
advocate for those specific Federal or State regulations to be updated. 
The other commenter stated that the CAA does not grant EPA the 
authority to substitute compliance with current RAGAGEP for compliance 
with promulgated OSHA regulations.
b. EPA Responses
    EPA is finalizing the proposed changes to the regulatory language. 
EPA agrees that doing so will clarify the requirements and address the 
concern that Federal or State regulations may lag behind current 
RAGAGEP. At this time, EPA is not expanding the scope of RMP 
applicability of RAGAGEP beyond Program 2 and 3 processes. EPA does, 
however, encourage all facilities to use RAGAGEP as it reflects well 
known industry practices and lessons learned shown to improve process 
safety and prevent accidents.
    EPA disagrees that the changes to the regulatory language are 
unnecessary. EPA has found that the distinction between ``ensure'' for 
Program 2 processes and ``document'' for Program 3 processes creates 
confusion, and requiring facilities to ``document'' compliance, rather 
than merely ``ensure'' compliance, removes this ambiguity. With regards 
to Federal or State regulations that lag behind current RAGAGEP, EPA 
notes there is a difference when updated codes augment existing 
regulations versus when they conflict. To the extent they conflict, 
existing regulations reign over new RAGAGEP. However, if a facility can 
comply with existing regulations and new RAGAGEP, then there is an 
obligation to comply with both. EPA believes this provision will help 
resolve confusion when more current RAGAGEP identify potential 
shortcomings in a facility's process.
    EPA has coordinated with OSHA throughout the rulemaking process to 
ensure the intent of adding specificity and clarification to the RMP 
regulations does not create conflicts with the requirements of the OSHA 
PSM standard.
3. Retention of Hot Work Permits
a. Comments
    A few commenters expressed support for the proposed five-year 
retention period for hot work permits. One of the commenters stated 
that the provision advances the rule's directive to ensure prevention 
and compliance to the greatest extent practicable and assures 
compliance as expeditiously as practicable. Another commenter stated 
that these simple recordkeeping requirements are not burdensome, 
contribute to further safety, and can help demonstrate compliance in 
the event of an audit.
    Several commenters stated that the retention of hundreds of expired 
hot work permits for five years is unnecessary and creates a 
substantial recordkeeping and administrative burden for facilities. A 
few commenters noted that retaining the hot work permits for five years 
provides no added safety benefits to the facility or surrounding 
community. A commenter pointed out that facilities are already required 
to conduct compliance audits on three-year intervals and to retain the 
two most recent compliance audit reports, meaning that compliance audit 
documentation will be retained for at least six years. The commenter 
stated that these audits will review hot work compliance and are 
available to implementing agency personnel; therefore, the proposed hot 
work permit retention requirement is excessive in proportion to the 
marginal benefit to implementing agencies.
    A couple of commenters noted that OSHA does not require that 
permits be retained beyond the completion of the hot work task. 
Similarly, another commenter pointed out that EPA failed to acknowledge 
that a five-year record retention period for hot work permits would 
break from the existing PSM rule, where OSHA requires hot work permits 
to be maintained only during the hot work. The commenter recommended 
that EPA maintain consistency with the PSM rule. Another commenter 
agreed that there should be no requirement to retain hot work permits 
beyond the completion of the hot work authorized by each permit.
    Some commenters suggested retaining hot work permits for periods of 
time other than five years. A few commenters specified that a one-year 
retention requirement would be more appropriate. One commenter 
recommended reducing the retention period from five years to three 
years, since the three-year period is consistent with the three-year 
audit period under 40 CFR 68.58 and 68.79 for Program 2 and 3 
facilities.

[[Page 17678]]

b. EPA Responses
    EPA agrees that adding a requirement to retain hot work permits 
after the completion of operations would help ensure prevention and 
compliance to the greatest extent practicable and contribute to further 
safety. However, based on comments on the proposed timeframe, EPA is 
finalizing a three-year retention period of hot work permits as opposed 
to the five years that were proposed.
    EPA does not agree that retention of hot work permits after the 
completion of operations is unnecessary. Under the existing RMP 
regulations, it can be difficult for implementing agencies, and the 
owner or operator, through the compliance audit provision (40 CFR 68.58 
and 68.79), to determine if the facility has been conducting hot work 
in compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 68.85, unless the 
facility is conducting hot work at the time of the inspection or audit 
and has hot work permits on file. Adding a requirement to retain hot 
work permits after the completion of operations will address this 
issue. EPA is finalizing a three-year retention period of hot work 
permits in order to make the requirement less burdensome for facilities 
conducting hot work often and to align the requirement with the three-
year audit period under 40 CFR 68.58 and 68.79.
    In response to comments that the proposed retention period would be 
inconsistent with OSHA's PSM rule, EPA has coordinated with OSHA 
throughout the rulemaking process to ensure the intent of adding 
specificity and clarification to the RMP regulations does not create 
conflicts with the requirements of the OSHA PSM standard.
4. Storage Incident to Transportation
EPA's Proposed Approach
a. Comments
    One commenter expressed support for the proposed additional 
regulatory language and the proposed 48-hour time frame. Other 
commenters supported EPA's proposal to continue to exclude facilities 
and equipment used in transportation and storage incident to 
transportation from the term ``stationary source.'' One commenter 
stated that doing so avoids duplication of the existing DOT regulations 
and continues the regulatory division of labor between EPA and DOT's 
Pipeline and Hazardous Safety Administration (PHMSA).
    One commenter stated that transloading can take up to two months 
due to a variety of safety and logistics reasons, and requiring 
transloaders to move more quickly might increase the risks of release 
that the proposed rule seeks to minimize. A couple of commenters stated 
that the proposed definition of ``stationary source'' would conflict 
with DOT requirements and could create confusion.
    One commenter requested that facilities be given a minimum of 72 
hours before a disconnected transportation container is considered part 
of the stationary source. Similarly, another commenter stated that a 
time frame of 48 hours is too short with respect to rail 
transportation. The commenter asked EPA to consider eliminating the 48-
hour requirement altogether, or at a minimum, extend it further for 
purposes of the RMP rule. The commenter noted that concerns over safety 
to the surrounding environment due to an extended timeframe should be 
mitigated by the fact that railcars designed to transport hazardous 
materials must meet rigorous design specifications as specified by 
PHMSA in 49 CFR part 179.
    A couple of commenters expressed safety concerns that arise from 
transportation containers being exempt from the RMP rule when 
disconnected for less than 48 hours. One commenter requested that EPA 
strengthen the proposed rule to immediately trigger threshold 
determination for the duration that a transportation container is on-
site, regardless of whether it is attached to a source of power or in 
motion. The commenter added that the presence of chemical railcars 
multiplies the risk for communities by blocking emergency evacuation 
routes and increasing air pollution. Another commenter stated that 
there are cumulative impacts and risks regardless of the length of time 
at a location and asked EPA to work with local community groups to best 
resolve the safety concern.
b. EPA Responses
    EPA is not finalizing the proposed regulatory language that 
includes a specified number of hours that a transportation container 
may be disconnected from the motive power that delivered it to the site 
before being considered part of the stationary source. As explained in 
the proposed rule, the term ``storage not incident to transportation'' 
is currently not defined in the RMP regulations. The proposed 
modification sought only to apply a specific timeframe to universally 
establish a structure to interpret the term. EPA hoped a specified 
timeframe would assist regulated entities and implementing agencies to 
more clearly determine when a transportation container used for onsite 
storage must be incorporated into a facility's risk management plan. 
Nevertheless, after review of comments, EPA acknowledges some of the 
concerns with establishing a timeframe and chooses to further consider 
the feedback received on the proposed modification before pursuing the 
effort. EPA encourages regulated entities and implementing agencies to 
continue to rely on guidance EPA has provided to determine if a 
transportation container is considered a part of a stationary source.
    EPA has demonstrated its intent and application of when 
transportation containers are and are not part of the stationary source 
in guidance and through court decisions. In the January 1998 amendments 
to the RMP rule (63 FR 640),\114\ the Agency explained that EPA 
considers a container to be in transportation as long as it is attached 
to the motive power that delivered it to the site (e.g., a truck or 
locomotive). If a container remains attached to the motive power that 
delivered it to the site, even after a facility accepts delivery, it 
would be considered as still in transportation, and the contents would 
not be subject to threshold determination. Additionally, EPA's guidance 
indicates that transportation containers used for storage which are not 
incident to transportation and transportation containers connected to 
equipment at a stationary source are considered part of the stationary 
source. Transportation containers that have been unhooked from the 
motive power that delivered them to the site (e.g., truck or 
locomotive) and left on a stationary source's site for short-term or 
long-term storage are part of the stationary source.\115\
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    \114\ https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1998-01-06/pdf/98-267.pdf.
    \115\ https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2013-10/documents/chap-01-final.pdf (page 1-5).
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    Since EPA's proposal, courts have also spoken to this issue. In 
February 2023, the U.S. Eastern District Court of Washington ruled in 
favor of the U.S. against Multistar Industries regarding RMP 
applicability to railcars used for stationary storage. The Court 
determined that railcars containing trimethylamine (TMA) in 2017 in 
Othello, WA, were used as storage outside the scope of 
transportation.\116\ The TMA-containing railcars sat for days or weeks 
before the TMA was eventually transloaded into trucks for transfer to 
the customer. Additionally, in 2017, the NC Department of Air Quality 
succeeded against Aberdeen Carolina & Western Railway in demonstrating 
that EPA's longstanding

[[Page 17679]]

interpretation of the term ``stationary source'' includes railcars 
disconnected from locomotive power and stored for extended periods of 
time. In that case, between 2012 and 2016, in Star, NC, railcars 
containing butane were stored on tracks awaiting placement at a nearby 
terminal for up to 360 days.\117\
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    \116\ United States v. Multistar Indus. Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00262-
TOR, 2023 WL 1802387 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 7, 2023).
    \117\ Aberdeen Carolina & Western Railway v. NC Dept of Air 
Quality, Final Decision on Summary Judgment, State of North 
Carolina, County of Montgomery, 16 EHR 07190, May 22, 2017.
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5. Retail Facility Exemption
a. Comments
    Several commenters opposed EPA's proposed changes to the definition 
of ``retail facility.'' A couple of commenters contended that the 
proposed changes to the definition lack justification. One of the 
commenters said that EPA failed to: (1) Provide any support for its 
assertion that owners and operators of facilities storing propane or 
other flammable substances are unclear how to determine whether they 
qualify as retail facilities, (2) provide any information to suggest 
that the current definition creates safety concerns, and (3) cite 
enforcement concerns at facilities claiming to be retail facilities.
    One commenter urged EPA to use the retail facility definition used 
for the RMP and OSHA PSM standard, which has been in place for a long 
time and is well understood by the industry and enforceable by the 
agencies. A couple of commenters urged EPA to maintain its existing 
definition of a retail facility, which is consistent with the 
definition set forth in the Fuels Regulatory Relief Act and OSHA PSM 
standard enforcement guidance and interpretations.
    A couple of commenters recommended that, if EPA moves forward to 
adjust the definition of retail facility, the Agency should provide 
businesses and/or facilities with the option of selecting either fiscal 
year or calendar year when determining annual income from direct sales 
to end users. Similarly, another commenter recommended changing 
``calendar year'' to ``fiscal year'' to facilitate the income 
calculation for those companies whose fiscal year may not coincide with 
the calendar year.
b. EPA Responses
    EPA disagrees that the proposed changes to the definition of 
``retail facility'' lack justification. With the current definition, 
the period of sales to end users is unclear; it lacks a definite time 
frame in which to calculate whether more than one-half of the 
facility's direct sales are to end users. Specifying a definite period 
of time eliminates this uncertainty and allows owners and operators to 
determine more accurately whether regulated substances in a process are 
subject to the RMP provisions. It also may reduce the amount of sales 
documentation that the owner or operator of a regulated facility must 
provide to establish its status as a retail facility. EPA is finalizing 
the ``one year of sales activity'' amendment because the Agency 
believes it captures the seasonality of propane sales at propane 
distribution facilities.
    EPA disagrees with comments arguing that EPA's proposed definition 
would be inconsistent with OSHA's PSM regulations. EPA has coordinated 
with OSHA throughout the rulemaking process to ensure the intent of 
adding specificity and clarification to the RMP regulations does not 
create conflicts with the requirements of the OSHA PSM. EPA believes 
that the provisions it proposed and is finalizing are compatible and do 
not conflict with the prevention provisions of OSHA's PSM regulations.
    In response to comments recommending that EPA adjust the definition 
to provide facilities the option of selecting either fiscal year or 
calendar year, EPA agrees with this suggestion and is adopting it in 
the final rule. The Agency believes this option provides flexibility in 
using records in the configuration that may already exist at 
facilities.
6. RAGAGEP Gap Analysis
a. Comments
    Many commenters expressed opposition to EPA's proposed RAGAGEP gap 
analysis provisions. One commenter stated that the existing RMP 
regulations already address gaps in RAGAGEP through the PSI requirement 
in 40 CFR 68.65(d)(3). Some commenters stated that conducting a gap 
analysis of RAGAGEP has no safety benefits. Another commenter contended 
that the proposal is an unnecessary intrusion into internal practices 
of a facility. The commenter added that, because EPA should not require 
disclosure of decisions not to implement RAGAGEP recommendations, there 
is no need to provide specific categories for reporting that 
information publicly.
    Several commenters stated that requiring facilities to include this 
information in their risk management plans would result in unnecessary 
costs on facilities. A few commenters noted that EPA's failure to 
consider costs in the RIA deprives the public of an opportunity to 
assess the full costs and benefits of the proposal. One commenter 
stated that EPA provided no reasonable explanation for its proposed 
RAGAGEP requirements, nor did it consider the cost, including resources 
that may be diverted because of this paperwork exercise, or benefits of 
the requirement in the RIA.
    One commenter noted that the proposed gap analysis provision 
ignores several practical difficulties in implementation, such as how 
facilities are to identify the most current version of applicable 
RAGAGEP, how they are to account for non-mandatory RAGAGEP provisions 
in the analysis, and how this analysis can be completed in a timely 
manner. The commenter added that the proposed requirement ignores 
existing obligations to determine and document that equipment designed 
and constructed is in accordance with RAGAGEP.
    Some commenters said that the RAGAGEP analysis is ill-suited for 
the PHA team to perform. One commenter pointed out that industry 
standards are locked into place once a facility is constructed and each 
facility is designed, engineered, and built according to the standards 
of that time. The commenter added that in some cases it would be 
impossible to document that equipment, which may be 20 or 30 years old, 
complies with RAGAGEP when RAGAGEP continually changes.
    A couple of commenters stated that the proposed gap analysis 
provision encroaches on OSHA's PSM regulation. Some commenters pointed 
out that EPA adopted their regulation verbatim from OSHA's PSM 
regulation, and OSHA has made clear that its regulations require the 
verification of safe equipment, not a continual review of RAGAGEP. 
Several commenters said that EPA did not explain how the proposed gap 
analysis provision would work in tandem with OSHA regulation, which the 
proposal fails to repeal or revise. One of the commenters added that 
ignoring existing regulations is arbitrary government action.
b. EPA Responses
    In response to comments that EPA provided no reasonable explanation 
for the requirement, there would be difficulty in implementing the 
provision, and costs for the requirement were not considered, EPA notes 
that this RAGAGEP gap analysis is already expected under 40 CFR 
68.65(d)(2) and (3) for Program 3 processes. EPA notes this PHA 
modification merely clarifies when facilities must, at minimum, conduct 
or review previous analyses when determining their compliance

[[Page 17680]]

with 40 CFR 68.65(d)(2) and (3). Therefore, EPA does not believe that 
the Agency must consider and assess the costs of this provision in the 
RIA.
    As indicated in a Frequently Asked Question,\118\ EPA expects 
owners and operators to regularly review new and updated RAGAGEP 
applicable to their industry to determine where safety gaps exist 
within their current process. If the updated document explicitly 
provides that new clauses or requirements are retroactive, those 
updates are relevant to determining whether the owner or operator's 
practice continues to conform to RAGAGEP per 40 CFR 68.65(d)(2). Where 
RAGAGEP are updated to be more protective, but are not explicitly 
retroactive, per 40 CFR 68.65(d)(3), the owner or operator should 
thoroughly evaluate how their process could still be considered safe 
amid new industry knowledge. Simply indicating that a process incident 
has yet to occur is an inappropriate evaluation for choosing not to 
adhere to updated RAGAGEP, especially considering changes to RAGAGEP 
may result from industry accidents, industry operating experience, and 
improved understanding of existing and newly recognized hazards. 
Oftentimes it will be difficult for the owner or operator to document 
equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, testing, and operating in 
a safe manner when there is extensive industry knowledge that indicates 
aspects of older process operations are no longer safe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ https://www.epa.gov/rmp/complying-process-safety-information-psi-resulting-new-and-updated-recognized-and-generally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Evaluation of updated RAGAGEP already is an RMP requirement, as 
shown in enforcement actions against facilities not complying with this 
provision. For example, in 2022, EPA took an enforcement action against 
a refinery in Hawaii that failed to comply with the latest versions of 
applicable refining industry standards, API Recommended Practice 941, 
``Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures'' (8th edition, 
February 2016), and 581, ``Risk Based Inspection'' (3rd edition, April 
2016).\119\ In February 2021, EPA also took an enforcement action 
against a seafood processing facility in Massachusetts that failed to 
comply with the latest version (at that time) of an applicable ammonia 
refrigeration industry standard, International Institute of Ammonia 
Refrigeration (IIAR) 2-2014, ``Safe Design of Closed-Circuit Ammonia 
Refrigeration Systems.'' \120\ In both cases, the processes at these 
facilities were built prior to the updated RAGAGEP cited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ https://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/rhc/epaadmin.nsf/Filings/
F8CDEF8A6F344043852588A90070FA45/$File/
Par%20Hawaii%20Refining%20(CAA112R-09-2022-0008)%20-%20Served.pdf.
    \120\ https://yosemite.epa.gov/oa/rhc/epaadmin.nsf/Filings/
0D26DA8B081A54008525867F00634AB2/$File/EPCRA-01-2021-
0037%20and%20CAA%20-01-2021-
0038%20ORPEL%20CAFO%20Respondent%20Signed-RJO-Signed02-17-
21%20(002).pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EPA disagrees that the RAGAGEP analysis is ill-suited for the PHA 
team to perform. PHA teams should include staff who are aware of 
industry design standards. The PHA team requirement under 40 CFR 
68.67(d) specifies that the PHA shall be performed by a team with 
expertise in engineering and process operations, and EPA expects an 
expert to be one that has knowledge of current industry standards. 
Additionally, industry trade associations are likely to ease the burden 
on facilities by identifying which of their current RAGAGEP should be 
broadly applied to the industry, regardless of when the process was 
designed. For example, the ammonia refrigeration industry has already 
done so, specifically in the ANSI/IIAR Standard 9-2020, ``American 
National Standard for Minimum System Safety Requirements for Existing 
Closed-Circuit Ammonia Refrigeration Systems.''
    In response to comments that the provisions encroach on OSHA's PSM 
regulations, EPA disagrees. This new PHA requirement is meant to 
complement OSHA's equivalent requirement in 29 CFR 1910.119(d)(3)(iii) 
and provide a framework for undertaking the analysis. While EPA favors 
consistency with OSHA's PSM standard, EPA must also ensure compliance 
with the CAA. CAA section 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(1), Purpose and 
general duty, states that, ``It shall be the objective of the 
regulations and programs authorized under this subsection to prevent 
the accidental release and to minimize the consequences of any such 
release of any substance listed pursuant to paragraph (3) or any other 
extremely hazardous substance.'' Congress further clarified in 
legislative history that it intended facility owners and operators to 
implement all feasible means to reduce the threat of death, serious 
injury, or substantial property damage to satisfy the requirements of 
the GDC.\121\ Obligations under the regulatory program authorized by 
CAA section 112(r)(7) build upon those under the general duty rather 
than undercut it. Accordingly, using the RMP regulations to permanently 
lock into place obsolete or out-of-date RAGAGEP is inconsistent with 
the purpose and intent of the CAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ S. Rep. 101-228 at 209, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3595 
(1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IX. Compliance Dates

    The initial RMP rule applied three years after promulgation of the 
rule on June 20, 1996, which is consistent with the last sentence of 
CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)(i). The statute does not directly address when 
amendments should become applicable. The provisions of this action 
modify terms of the existing rule, and, in some cases, clarify existing 
requirements.

A. Summary of Proposed Rulemaking

    EPA proposed modifications to 40 CFR 68.10 to establish compliance 
dates for an owner or operator to comply with the revised rule 
provisions as follows:
     Require regulated sources to comply with new STAA, 
incident investigation root cause analysis, third-party compliance 
audit, employee participation, emergency response public notification 
and exercise evaluation reports, and information availability 
provisions, unless otherwise stated, three years after the effective 
date of the final rule (i.e., three years after the FR effective date).
     Require regulated sources to comply with the revised 
emergency response field exercise frequency provision by March 15, 
2027, or within 10 years of the date of an emergency response field 
exercise conducted between March 15, 2017, and August 31, 2022, in 
accordance with 40 CFR 68.96(b)(1)(ii).
     Allow regulated sources one additional year (i.e., four 
years after the effective date of the final rule) to update and 
resubmit risk management plans to reflect new and revised data 
elements.

B. Summary of Final Rule

    EPA is finalizing the compliance dates as proposed with the 
following modification:
     Adding a compliance date to 40 CFR 68.10 to require 
standby or backup power for air monitoring and control equipment by 
three years after the effective date of the final rule (i.e., three 
years after the effective date of this action as provided in the 
Federal Register).

C. Discussion of Comments and Basis for Final Rule Provisions

1. General Comments
a. Comments
    One commenter expressed support for the compliance dates proposed 
by EPA. Another commenter recommended that the compliance period under 
the

[[Page 17681]]

proposed rule be shortened to two years, at least for the emergency 
response public notification and exercise evaluation reports, employee 
participation, and information availability provisions. The commenter 
added that statutory language reflects Congress's intent that EPA 
ensure adequate safeguards are promptly put in place to protect workers 
and surrounding communities from releases of dangerous chemicals. The 
commenter further stated that EPA's proposal should contain shorter 
compliance deadlines as compared to the 1996 RMP rule because the 
proposed rule is not as extensive as developing a full RMP program. 
Another commenter opposed allowing companies three years after the 
effective date of the proposed rule to comply. The commenter stated 
that this period is too long, given that most companies are already 
complying with an existing version of the RMP rule. The commenter 
suggested a one-year timeline is most appropriate.
    Several commenters stated that there are too many proposed changes 
to accomplish in three years and asked EPA to extend the compliance 
deadlines to five years after the effective date of the proposed rule. 
The commenter stated that to the extent that EPA intends to rely on 
forthcoming guidance in interpreting and enforcing the new RMP 
provisions, it is imperative that these new requirements not take 
effect until at least three years after the relevant guidance is 
issued, instead of three years after the effective date of the final 
rule, as EPA has proposed. One commenter, who objected to the effective 
dates in the proposed rule and said they are too restrictive, said EPA 
failed to meet its CAA obligation to set RMP effective dates in a 
manner that assures compliance as ``expeditiously as practicable.''
b. EPA Responses
    EPA disagrees that the compliance dates for some or all provisions 
should be shortened to one or two years or should be lengthened to five 
years or three years after guidance is issued. The Agency believes 
there is a good balance with three years as the compliance date for 
most new provisions while also assuring compliance as expeditiously as 
practicable. Moreover, the initial 1996 RMP rule required compliance 
per the statute within three years. EPA believes the provisions 
finalized in this rule are not as extensive as developing a full RMP 
program. Nevertheless, time is needed for facility owners and operators 
to understand the revised rule; train facility personnel on the revised 
provisions; learn new investigation techniques, as appropriate; 
research safer technologies; arrange for emergency response resources; 
incorporate changes into their RMPs; and establish a strategy to notify 
the public that certain information is available upon request. This 
time is necessary to achieve compliance with the new provisions because 
as a performance-based rule, EPA has not specified how facilities apply 
these provisions to manage and improve process safety at their 
facility, whether it involves conforming to minimum standards, such as 
codes, or trying to reduce risk to as low as reasonably practical, or 
whether it uses qualitative or quantitative assessments. Furthermore, 
EPA intends to publish guidance for certain provisions, such as STAA, 
root cause analysis, third-party audits, and employee participation, 
etc. Once these materials are complete, owners and operators can have 
time to familiarize themselves with the new materials if needing 
assistance in applying the provisions to improve process safety. EPA 
expects to develop and release this information approximately one year 
after this final rule. However, most provisions for a source are a 
site-specific determination, so EPA expects all regulated RMP 
facilities to be successful in beginning to address the provisions 
immediately.
2. Safer Technologies and Alternatives Analysis
    One commenter pointed out that the effective date for the STAA 
requirement would disrupt PHA cycles. The commenter stated that the 
proposed STAA deadline is impracticable for facilities scheduled to 
complete their PHA update and re-validation any time after August 1, 
2021. The commenter requested that EPA modify the effective date to 
perform a STAA as part of the next-scheduled PHA update and re-
validation that occurs any time after three years from EPA's issuance 
of the intended STAA guidance or the final rule's effective date, 
whichever is later.
    EPA disagrees with commenters and is finalizing a three-year 
compliance date for the STAA evaluation and IST/ISD practicability 
assessment. Sources subject to this provision are among the largest and 
most complex sources regulated under 40 CFR part 68, and therefore PHAs 
and PHA updates and revalidations at these sources typically require a 
significant level of planning. While PHA updates are normally done at 
five-year intervals, the Agency recognizes that some sources may be far 
enough along with their PHAs that they will not be able to schedule 
their STAAs as part of their PHAs. Such sources have the option of not 
performing STAA as part of their PHA so long as they perform a STAA 
within 3 years of the effective date of the final rule. Considering 
updates or revalidations to the initial STAA activities will likely 
require less effort, the Agency expects many of these sources will 
later incorporate further STAA updates on their normal PHA update 
schedule. Regarding the STAA safeguard implementation provision, since 
implementation (of at least one passive measure, or an inherently safer 
technology or design, or a combination of active and procedural 
measures equivalent to or greater than the risk reduction of a passive 
measure) is required each PHA cycle, EPA expects implementation to be 
commenced within that cycle and scheduled for completion as soon as 
practicable.
3. Incident Investigation Root Cause Analysis
    EPA did not receive any comments specific to the three-year 
compliance date for incident investigation root cause analysis. 
Therefore, EPA is finalizing the date for this provision, as proposed. 
The Agency continues to rely on the rationale expressed in the proposed 
rulemaking (87 FR 53606).
4. Third-Party Compliance Audits
    EPA did not receive any comments specific to the three-year 
compliance date for third-party compliance audits. Therefore, EPA is 
finalizing the date for this provision, as proposed. The Agency 
continues to rely on the rationale expressed in the proposed rulemaking 
(87 FR 53606).
5. Employee Participation
    EPA did not receive any distinct comments specific to this issue 
other than as a general comment. Therefore, EPA is finalizing a three-
year compliance date for this provision, as proposed. The Agency 
continues to rely on the rationale expressed in the proposed rulemaking 
(87 FR 53606).
6. Emergency Response
    Public Notification. Regarding the community public notification 
system requirements, a commenter said they will take more than three 
years to implement because it will be a significant undertaking 
requiring involvement of and coordination with several different 
parties.
    EPA disagrees with commenters that this provision will take longer 
than three years to implement. This provision is for facility owners 
and operators to work with the local responders to ensure that, during 
a

[[Page 17682]]

release, a notification system is in place that will notify the public 
of the impending situation. EPA expects the partnership to occur at 
least during annual coordination discussions under 40 CFR 68.93. Under 
40 CFR 68.93, owners and operators are required to annually coordinate 
response needs with local emergency planning and response organizations 
to determine how the facility is addressed in the community emergency 
response plan, among other things. A component of the community 
emergency response plan is public notification of chemical releases; 
therefore, it is expected that this component will be discussed and 
documented by the facility owner or operator as part of the annual 
coordination obligations. Therefore, EPA is finalizing the 3-year 
compliance date as proposed.
    Field Exercises. A couple of the commenters suggested that EPA 
speed up compliance because 10 years is too long to wait for essential 
emergency planning, especially in communities with multiple RMP 
facilities. One commenter noted that five- to ten-year deadlines allow 
more time than necessary to comply and would allow another generation 
of children to grow up without even the protection of a basic emergency 
response exercise at the facility near them.
    EPA disagrees that field exercises should be required on an annual, 
biennial, or triennial basis. Requiring field exercises to be held at 
shorter minimum frequencies, such as these would significantly increase 
compliance costs to both regulated facilities and local responder 
agencies. Such an approach would discourage the participation of local 
emergency responders in field exercises, which is voluntary under the 
RMP rule. Additionally, table-top exercises of the emergency plan have 
value for protecting the nearby community, and these occur every three 
years. The community would not be without a type of ``basic emergency 
response exercise.'' Therefore, EPA is finalizing the compliance date 
for owners or operators of sources to have planned, scheduled, and 
conducted their first field exercise by March 15, 2027.
    Exercise Evaluation Reports. EPA did not receive any comments 
specific to the three-year compliance date for exercise evaluation 
reports other than as a general comment. Therefore, EPA is finalizing 
the date for this provision, as proposed. The Agency continues to rely 
on the rationale expressed in the proposed rulemaking (87 FR 53606).
7. Information Availability
    A couple of commenters stated EPA's proposal to delay information 
access for 45 days after a request, and to require compliance after 
three years, is unlawful and arbitrary. These commenters stated that 
community members need information now--not three years from now--and 
that 45 days is far too long for a community member to have to wait for 
basic hazard information. The commenters also stated that EPA has 
failed to justify these delays when the provision would simply require 
a facility to provide only a portion of the information it already 
regularly reports to EPA itself, and that EPA has failed to show three 
years is the most expeditious compliance date practicable, or that 
three years is required to implement this provision.
    EPA disagrees with these commenters and is finalizing a three-year 
compliance date for the information availability provision. This means 
that three years after the effective date of the rule, the facility 
owner or operator must have notifications in place to inform the public 
that information specified in 40 CFR 68.210(b) is available upon 
request. EPA believes that this timeframe is needed to allow facility 
staff an opportunity to determine the best method for providing 
notifications to the public, to assemble and format information, 
including securing appropriate language translation services, and to 
prepare to respond to information requests. EPA is therefore finalizing 
the three-year compliance date for the information availability 
provision.
8. RMP Update
    A couple of commenters urged EPA to shorten the 4-year timeline for 
facilities to submit updated RMPs.
    EPA disagrees with commenters and is finalizing the four-year 
compliance date for this provision, as proposed. This timeframe will 
allow owners and operators an opportunity to begin to comply with 
revised rule provisions prior to certifying compliance in the RMP. 
Additionally, the Agency will revise its online RMP submission system, 
RMP*eSubmit, to include the additional data elements, and sources will 
not be able to update RMPs with new or revised data elements until the 
submission system is ready. Also, once it is ready, allowing an 
additional year for sources to update RMPs will prevent potential 
problems with thousands of sources submitting updated RMPs on the same 
day.
9. Hazard Review Amplifications and Other Areas of Technical 
Clarification
a. Comments
    One commenter asked EPA to clarify the required date for compliance 
with the natural hazard assessment and the power loss evaluations. The 
commenter asserted that this should occur as expeditiously as 
practicable, within one year after the effective date of the final 
rule, and facilities should be directed to report that they have 
completed these assessments soon after completion. Another commenter 
supported requiring backup power for air pollution control and 
monitoring equipment associated with the prevention and detection of 
accidental releases and suggested that EPA specify an appropriate 
compliance deadline, specifically no later than three years from the 
date of promulgation.
    One commenter pointed out that EPA's proposal would require 
facilities to comply with the proposed revisions in the PHAs upon the 
effective date of the rule. The commenter said that the deadline is 
infeasible because it would take years to address the host of expansive 
new PHA requirements that require analysis of a wide range of issues. 
Accordingly, the commenter asked EPA to clarify that the deadline for 
any new requirements is when the PHA becomes due as part of its five-
year cycle, or three years after the effective date of the final rule, 
whichever comes later. Referring to the natural hazards assessment, 
another commenter requested an implementation date of no sooner than 
five years after the effective date of the final rule.
b. EPA Responses
    EPA notes that components of the hazards evaluation amplifications 
and the other areas of technical clarification in sections V.A. and 
VIII of this preamble impose no new requirements on facilities because 
they codify existing industry practice and re-emphasize current RMP 
requirements and do not change the meaning of the RMP rule. Compliance 
for these provisions is therefore already required and should be 
updated on their normal schedule. For example, an evaluation of natural 
hazards on a process should already be occurring as part of the hazard 
review (40 CFR 68.50) or PHA (40 CFR 68.67) and should be updated at 
least once every 5 years. Additionally, any update to the RMP required 
by 40 CFR 68.190 should continue to occur as normal and should include 
updating the RMP with current information required by Subpart G. The 
intent of the amplifications and clarifications discussed in this final 
rule are to simplify implementation for

[[Page 17683]]

facilities, thereby improving chemical safety.
    In response to comments asking EPA to clarify the compliance date 
for requiring standby or backup power for continuous operation of air 
monitoring equipment associated with prevention and detection of 
accidental releases from covered processes, EPA has adopted the three-
year compliance date and has amended the regulatory language. EPA 
believes three years will allow time to evaluate and secure standby or 
backup power needs for air monitoring equipment and assure their safe 
operation.

X. Statutory and Executive Orders Reviews

    Additional information about these statutes and Executive orders 
can be found at https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders.

A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and Executive 
Order 14094: Modernizing Regulatory Review

    This action is a ``significant regulatory action'', as defined 
under section 3(f)(1) of Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive 
Order 14094. Accordingly, EPA, submitted this action to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for Executive Order 12866 review. 
Documentation of any changes made in response to the Executive Order 
12866 review is available in the docket. The EPA prepared an analysis 
of the potential costs and benefits associated with this action. This 
analysis, ``Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer Communities by Chemical 
Accident Prevention Final Rule'' (Docket ID Number EPA-HQ-OLEM-2022-
0174), is also available in the docket.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    The information collection activities in this rule will be 
submitted for approval to OMB under the PRA. The Information Collection 
Request (ICR) document that EPA prepared has been assigned EPA ICR 
number 2725.02. You can find a copy of the ICR in the docket for this 
rule, and it is briefly summarized here. The information collection 
requirements are not enforceable until OMB approves them.
    EPA believes that the RMP regulations, originally promulgated on 
June 20, 1996, codified as 40 CFR part 68, and later amended, have been 
effective in preventing and mitigating chemical accidents in the United 
States. However, EPA believes that revisions will likely further 
protect human health and the environment from chemical hazards through 
advancement of process safety based on lessons learned. The revisions 
in this final rule are a result of reviewing the existing RMP 
regulations and information gathered from the 2021 listening sessions. 
State and local authorities will use the information in RMPs to modify 
and enhance their community response plans. The agencies implementing 
the RMP rule use RMPs to evaluate compliance with 40 CFR part 68 and to 
identify sources for inspection because they may pose significant risks 
to the community. Citizens may use the information to assess and 
address chemical hazards in their communities and to respond 
appropriately in the event of a release of a regulated substance. These 
revisions are made under the statutory authority provided by section 
112(r) of the CAA as amended (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)).
    Respondents/affected entities: The industries that are likely to be 
affected by the requirements in the regulation fall into numerous NAICS 
codes. The types of stationary sources affected by the rule range from 
petroleum refineries and large chemical manufacturers to water and 
wastewater treatment systems; chemical and petroleum wholesalers and 
terminals; food manufacturers, packing plants, and other cold storage 
facilities with ammonia refrigeration systems; agricultural chemical 
distributors; midstream gas plants; and a limited number of other 
sources that use RMP-regulated substances. Among the stationary sources 
potentially affected, the Agency has determined that 2,636 are 
regulated private sector small entities and 630 are small government 
entities.
    Respondent's obligation to respond: Mandatory ((CAA sections 
112(r)(7)(B)(i) and (ii), CAA sections 112(r)(7)(B)(iii), 114(c), CAA 
114(a)(1))).
    Estimated number of respondents: 11,740.
    Frequency of response: Occasional.
    Total estimated burden: 1,190,991 hours (per year). Burden is 
defined at 5 CFR 1320.3(b).
    Total estimated cost: $126,796,471 (per year); includes $12,413,710 
annual operations and maintenance costs and $78,400 annual capital 
costs.
    An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required 
to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a 
currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control numbers for EPA's 
regulations in 40 CFR are listed in 40 CFR part 9. When OMB approves 
this ICR, the Agency will announce that approval in the Federal 
Register and publish a technical amendment to 40 CFR part 9 to display 
the OMB control number for the approved information collection 
activities contained in this final rule.

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)

    I certify that this action will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities under the RFA. The 
small entities subject to the requirements of this action are small 
businesses and small governmental entities. The Agency has determined 
that among the 2,636 potentially regulated private sector small 
entities so impacted, 2,393, or 90.8 percent, may experience an impact 
of less than one percent with an average small entity cost of $72,525; 
167, or 6.3 percent, may experience an impact of between 1 and 3 
percent of revenues with an average small cost entity of $629,271; and 
75, or 2.8 percent, may experience an impact of greater than 3 percent 
with an average small entity cost of $1,083,823. The industry sectors 
of Farm Supplies Merchant Wholesalers and Farm Product Warehousing and 
Storage had the most entities potentially affected, with 146 and 96 
entities, respectively. Within the Farm Supplies Merchant Wholesalers 
sector, the Agency determined that only 8 of the 146 small entities (6 
percent of small entities) will experience impacts of between 1 and 3 
percent of revenues and only 2 small entities (1 percent of small 
entities) will experience impacts of more than 3 percent of revenue. 
Within the Farm Product Warehousing and Storage sector, the Agency 
determined that only 5 of the 96 small entities (5 percent of small 
entities) will experience impacts of between 1 and 3 percent of 
revenues and no small entities will experience impacts of more than 3 
percent of revenue.
    Among the 630 small government entities potentially affected, the 
minimum cost any entity will incur is $2,000; 365, or 58 percent, would 
incur costs ranging from $2,000 to $3,000; 248, or 39 percent, will 
incur costs ranging from $3,000 to $10,000; and 17, or 3 percent, will 
incur costs greater than $10,000. EPA estimated that for the rule to 
have a larger than 1 percent impact on the government entity with the 
largest cost impact, the entity would need to have revenue of less than 
$120 per resident. For the rule to have a larger than 1 percent impact 
on the smallest government entity identified in the data, the entity 
would need to have revenue of less than $650 per resident.
    Details of these analyses are presented in Chapter 8 of the RIA, 
which is available in the docket.

[[Page 17684]]

D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)

    This action contains a Federal mandate under UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531-
1538, that may result in expenditures of $100 million or more for 
State, local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or the private 
sector in any one year. Accordingly, EPA has prepared a written 
statement required under section 202 of UMRA that is included in the 
RIA and briefly summarized here.
    Over the 23 years of implementing the RMP program and, most 
recently through E.O. 13990 listening sessions, meetings, and public 
hearings, EPA has engaged States and local communities to discuss 
chemical safety issues. In the two E.O. 13990 listening sessions and 
three proposal hearings, held between July 2021 and September 2022, 
States and local communities identified lack of facility coordination 
with local responders and the community as a key barrier to successful 
local community preparedness. Additionally, EPA has held consultations 
with States and local communities through participation in the National 
Association of SARA Title III Program Officials (NASTTPO) annual 
meetings to discuss key issues related to chemical facility and local 
community coordination and the areas of the RMP regulations which need 
to be modernized to facilitate this coordination and improve local 
emergency preparedness and prevention. Key priority options discussed 
with NASTTPO States and local communities included improving emergency 
response coordination between RMP facilities and LEPCs/first 
responders.
    This action is not subject to the requirements of section 203 of 
UMRA because it contains no regulatory requirements that might 
significantly or uniquely affect small governments. On April 7, 2022, 
September 1, 2022, and September 5, 2023, EPA met with small 
governments concerning the regulatory requirements that might affect 
them. Also, through the May 28, 2021, notice of virtual public 
listening sessions; request for public comment (86 FR 28828) and August 
31, 2022, NPRM (87 FR 53556), EPA sought feedback from governmental 
entities while formulating the revisions in this action.
    With regard to section 205 of UMRA, the Agency considered 
finalizing the regulatory requirements as proposed as well as the 
regulatory alternatives considered in Chapter 7 of the RIA. However, 
none of the alternative options successfully fulfilled the objectives 
of the rule, which seek to prevent or reduce the impacts of RMP 
accidents on communities near facilities. These objectives are 
accomplished by promoting prevention generally and through targeted 
enhanced measures at the most accident-prone facilities, which 
historically have had a disproportionate share of accidents and the 
costliest accidents. Some of these same facilities have widely known 
safer alternatives available. The objectives are also accomplished by 
enhancing emergency response training and planning through better 
information access and exchange among the facility, emergency 
responders, and the community potentially exposed to accidents. A 
market failure results when RMP accidents impose burdens on nearby 
communities. Firms do not have an appropriate level of incentive to 
prevent and/or mitigate these external costs. The Agency believes that 
the rule objectives to prevent or reduce the impacts of accidents on 
communities near facilities are best achieved by the selected 
provisions for this final rule, particularly, implementation of process 
safeguards or IST/ISD to prevent accidents and allowing a wider segment 
of the public potentially affected by accidents to access emergency 
preparedness information.

E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism

    This action does not have federalism implications. It will not have 
substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between 
the National Government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian 
Tribal Governments

    This action has tribal implications. However, it will neither 
impose substantial direct compliance costs on federally recognized 
Tribal governments, nor preempt tribal law. There are approximately 260 
RMP facilities located on tribal lands. Tribes could be impacted by the 
final rule either as an owner or operator of an RMP-regulated facility 
or as a Tribal government when the Tribal government conducts emergency 
response or emergency preparedness activities under EPCRA.
    EPA consulted with Tribal officials under the EPA Policy on 
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribes early in the process 
of developing this regulation to permit them to have meaningful and 
timely input into its development. On August 31, 2022, EPA sent a 
notification letter via email to Tribal leaders of all 574 federally 
recognized Tribes to inform them of the proposed rulemaking and to 
provide an opportunity to comment on the action through a Tribal 
consultation meeting on September 21, 2022. Approximately 4 Tribal 
attendees participated in the meeting. During the consultation meeting, 
EPA presented information on the proposed action. A few Tribes provided 
comments during the webinar. No Tribes requested government to 
government consultation with EPA following the meeting. Additionally, 
EPA had an open docket for public comment on the proposal from August 
31-October 31, 2022. The Agency did not receive any comments from 
federally recognized Tribes. The notification letter and a list of 
attendees at the meeting is provided in the docket for this action.

G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental 
Health Risks and Safety Risks

    Executive Order 13045 directs Federal agencies to include an 
evaluation of the health and safety effects of the planned regulation 
on children in Federal health and safety standards and explain why the 
regulation is preferable to potentially effective and reasonably 
feasible alternatives. This action is not subject to Executive Order 
13045 because the EPA does not believe the environmental health risks 
or safety risks addressed by this action present a disproportionate 
risk to children. EPA believes that the revisions to the RMP 
regulations made by this final rule will further protect human health, 
including the health of children, through advancement of process 
safety. However, EPA's Policy on Children's Health applies to this 
action.

H. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

    This action is not a ``significant energy action'' because it is 
not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy. This action is not anticipated to have 
notable impacts on emissions, costs, or energy supply decisions for the 
affected electric utility industry.

I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA)

    This rulemaking does not involve technical standards.

[[Page 17685]]

J. Executive Order 14096: Revitalizing Our Nation's Commitment to 
Environmental Justice for All Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To 
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 
Populations

    EPA believes that the human health or environmental conditions that 
exist prior to this action result in or have the potential to result in 
disproportionate and adverse human health or environmental effects on 
communities with environmental justice concerns.
    EPA conducted an EJ analysis using the Agency's EJ screening tool, 
EJSCREEN and the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS). 
The EJ analysis shows that historically underserved and overburdened 
populations live within proximity to RMP-regulated facilities and thus 
are at greater risk than other populations. The analysis also found 
evidence that regulated facilities are disproportionately located 
within historically underserved and overburdened communities. Thus, EPA 
recognizes that accidental releases of regulated chemicals from 
facilities regulated by this action will likely pose disproportionate 
risks to historically marginalized communities. However, EPA has 
concluded that the regulatory requirements will advance just treatment 
of those populations by reducing the disproportionate damages from 
accidental releases that RMP-regulated facilities might otherwise 
inflict on those populations. EPA's full EJ analysis is documented in 
``Regulatory Impact Analysis: Safer Communities by Chemical Accident 
Prevention Final Rule,'' which is available in the docket.
    EPA believes that this action is likely to reduce existing 
disproportionate and adverse effects on communities with EJ concerns. 
Because populations living closer to facilities are more likely to be 
exposed if an accidental release at an RMP facility occurs, these 
releases pose a greater risk to these communities. Therefore, the 
benefits of this regulation will include reduced risk for historically 
underserved and overburdened populations.
    EPA additionally identified and addressed EJ concerns by holding 
virtual public listening sessions on June 16 and July 8, 2021, and had 
an open docket for public comment (86 FR 28828). In the request for 
public comment, the Agency asked for information on the adequacy of 
revisions to the RMP regulations completed since 2017, incorporating 
consideration of climate change risks and impacts into the regulations, 
and expanding the application of EJ in the RMP. Following publication 
of the proposed rule, EPA held three public hearings (September 26, 27, 
and 28, 2022) and had a 60-day open public comment period. Participants 
in the virtual public listening sessions and hearings included a wide 
range of stakeholders including environmental and community groups, 
individual regulated facilities, industry groups, local and State 
governments, Federal agencies, and private citizens. Information 
collected through oral testimonies and written comments from the 
listening sessions and hearings respectively informed the proposed and 
final rule.
    The information supporting this E.O. review is contained in Chapter 
9 of the RIA, which is available in the docket for this action.

K. Congressional Review Act (CRA)

    This action is subject to the CRA, and the EPA will submit a rule 
report to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of 
the United States. This action meets the criteria set forth in defined 
by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 68

    Environmental protection, Administrative practice and procedure, 
Air pollution control, Chemicals, Hazardous substances, 
Intergovernmental relations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Michael S. Regan,
Administrator.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, title 40, chapter I, part 
68, of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

PART 68--CHEMICAL ACCIDENT PREVENTION PROVISIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 68 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  42 U.S.C. 7412(r), 7601(a)(1), 7661-7661f.

Subpart A--General

0
2. Amend Sec.  68.3 by:
0
a. Adding in alphabetical order the definitions for ``Active 
measures,'' ``Inherently safer technology or design,'' ``Natural 
hazard,'' ``Passive measures,'' ``Practicability,'' and ``Procedural 
measures'';
0
b. Revising the definition of ``Retail facility''; and
0
c. Adding in alphabetical order the definitions for ``Root cause'' and 
``Third-party audit''.
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  68.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Active measures mean risk management measures or engineering 
controls that rely on mechanical or other energy input to detect and 
respond to process deviations. Examples of active measures include 
alarms, safety instrumented systems, and detection hardware (such as 
hydrocarbon sensors).
* * * * *
    Inherently safer technology or design means risk management 
measures that minimize the use of regulated substances, substitute less 
hazardous substances, moderate the use of regulated substances, or 
simplify covered processes in order to make accidental releases less 
likely, or the impacts of such releases less severe.
* * * * *
    Natural hazard means meteorological, climatological, environmental 
or geological phenomena that have the potential for negative impact, 
accounting for impacts due to climate change. Examples of such hazards 
include, but are not limited to, avalanche, coastal flooding, cold 
wave, drought, earthquake, hail, heat wave, hurricane, ice storm, 
landslide, lightning, riverine flooding, strong wind, tornado, tsunami, 
volcanic activity, wildfire, and winter weather.
* * * * *
    Passive measures mean risk management measures that use design 
features that reduce either the frequency or consequence of the hazard 
without human, mechanical, or other energy input. Examples of passive 
measures include pressure vessel designs, dikes, berms, and blast 
walls.
* * * * *
    Practicability means the capability of being successfully 
accomplished within a reasonable time, accounting for environmental, 
legal, social, technological, and economic factors. Environmental 
factors would include consideration of potential transferred risks for 
new risk reduction measures.
    Procedural measures mean risk management measures such as policies, 
operating procedures, training, administrative controls, and emergency 
response actions to prevent or minimize incidents.
* * * * *
    Retail facility means a stationary source at which more than one-
half of the annual income (in the previous calendar or fiscal year) is 
obtained from direct sales to end users or at which

[[Page 17686]]

more than one-half of the fuel sold, by volume, is sold through a 
cylinder exchange program.
* * * * *
    Root cause means a fundamental, underlying, system-related reason 
why an incident occurred that identifies a correctable failure(s) in 
management systems, and if applicable, in process design.
* * * * *
    Third-party audit means a compliance audit conducted pursuant to 
the requirements of Sec.  68.59 and/or Sec.  68.80, performed or led by 
an entity (individual or firm) meeting the competency and independence 
requirements described in Sec.  68.59(c) or Sec.  68.80(c).
* * * * *

0
3. Amend Sec.  68.10 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a) introductory text;
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (g) through (k) as paragraphs (j) through 
(n);
0
c. Adding new paragraphs (g) through (i); and
0
d. In newly redesignated paragraphs (j) through (l), removing the 
paragraph heading.
    The revisions and additions read as follows:


Sec.  68.10  Applicability.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) through (i) of this 
section, an owner or operator of a stationary source that has more than 
a threshold quantity of a regulated substance in a process, as 
determined under Sec.  68.115, shall comply with the requirements of 
this part no later than the latest of the following dates:
* * * * *
    (g) By May 10, 2027, the owner or operator shall comply with the 
following provisions promulgated on May 10, 2024:
    (1) Standby or backup power for continuous operation of monitoring 
equipment associated with prevention and detection of accidental 
releases from covered processes in Sec. Sec.  68.50(a)(3) and 
68.67(c)(3);
    (2) Third-party audit provisions in Sec. Sec.  68.58(f) through 
(h), 68.59, 68.79(f) through (h), and 68.80;
    (3) Incident investigation root cause analysis provisions in 
Sec. Sec.  68.60(h) and 68.81(h);
    (4) Safer technology and alternatives analysis provisions in Sec.  
68.67(c)(9) and (h);
    (5) Employee participation provisions in Sec. Sec.  68.62 and 
68.83;
    (6) Emergency response provisions in Sec. Sec.  68.90(b) and 
68.95(a); and
    (7) Availability of information provisions in Sec.  68.210(d) 
through (h).
    (h) By March 15, 2027, or within 10 years of the date of an 
emergency response field exercise conducted between March 15, 2017, and 
August 31, 2022, in accordance with Sec.  68.96(b)(1)(ii).
    (i) By May 10, 2028, the owner or operator shall comply with the 
risk management plan provisions of subpart G of this part promulgated 
on May 10, 2024.
* * * * *

Subpart C--Program 2 Prevention Program

0
4. Amend Sec.  68.48 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  68.48  Safety information.

* * * * *
    (b) The owner or operator shall ensure and document that the 
process is designed in compliance with recognized and generally 
accepted good engineering practices.
* * * * *

0
5. Amend Sec.  68.50 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a)(3);
0
b. Removing the period at the end of paragraph (a)(4) and adding a 
semicolon in its place; and
0
c. Adding paragraphs (a)(5) and (6).
    The revision and addition read as follows:


Sec.  68.50  Hazard review.

    (a) * * *
    (3) The safeguards used or needed to control the hazards or prevent 
equipment malfunction or human error including standby or emergency 
power systems; the owner or operator shall ensure monitoring equipment 
associated with prevention and detection of accidental releases from 
covered processes has standby or backup power to provide continuous 
operation;
* * * * *
    (5) Natural hazards that could cause or exacerbate an accidental 
release; and
    (6) Stationary source siting, including the placement of processes, 
equipment, and buildings within the facility, and hazards posed by 
proximate stationary sources, and accidental release consequences posed 
by proximity to the public and public receptors.
* * * * *

0
6. Amend Sec.  68.52 by:
0
a. Removing the word ``and'' at the end of paragraph (b)(7);
0
b. Removing the period at the end of paragraph (b)(8) and adding ``; 
and'' in its place; and
0
c. Adding paragraph (b)(9).
    The addition reads as follows:


Sec.  68.52  Operating procedures.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (9) Documentation when monitoring equipment associated with 
prevention and detection of accidental releases from covered processes 
is removed due to safety concerns from imminent natural hazards.
* * * * *

0
7. Amend Sec.  68.58 by revising paragraph (a) and adding paragraphs 
(f) through (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  68.58  Compliance audits.

    (a) The owner or operator shall certify that they have evaluated 
compliance with the provisions of this subpart, at least every three 
years to verify that the procedures and practices developed under this 
subpart are adequate and are being followed. When required as set forth 
in paragraph (f) of this section, the compliance audit shall be a 
third-party audit.
* * * * *
    (f) The next required compliance audit shall be a third-party audit 
when one or more of the following conditions applies:
    (1) An accidental release meeting the criteria in Sec.  68.42(a) 
from a covered process at a stationary source has occurred; or
    (2) An implementing agency requires a third-party audit due to 
conditions at the stationary source that could lead to an accidental 
release of a regulated substance, or when a previous third-party audit 
failed to meet the competency or independence criteria of Sec.  
68.59(c).
    (g)(1) If an implementing agency makes a preliminary determination 
that a third-party audit is necessary pursuant to paragraph (f)(2) of 
this section, the implementing agency will provide written notice to 
the owner or operator that describes the basis for this determination.
    (2) Within 30 days of receipt of such written notice, the owner or 
operator may provide information and data to, and may consult with, the 
implementing agency on the determination. Thereafter, the implementing 
agency will provide a final determination to the owner or operator.
    (3) If the final determination requires a third-party audit, the 
owner or operator shall comply with the requirements of Sec.  68.59, 
pursuant to the schedule in paragraph (h) of this section.
    (4) The owner or operator may appeal a final determination made by 
an implementing agency under paragraph

[[Page 17687]]

(g)(3) of this section within 30 days of receipt of the final 
determination. The appeal shall be made to the EPA Regional 
Administrator or, for determinations made by other implementing 
agencies, the administrator or director of such implementing agency. 
The appeal shall contain a clear and concise statement of the issues, 
facts in the case, and any relevant additional information. In 
reviewing the appeal, the implementing agency may request additional 
information from the owner or operator. The implementing agency will 
provide a written, final decision on the appeal to the owner or 
operator.
    (h) The audit and audit report shall be completed as in paragraph 
(a) of this section, unless a different timeframe is specified by the 
implementing agency.

0
8. Section 68.59 is added to subpart C to read as follows:


Sec.  68.59  Third-party audits.

    (a) Applicability. The owner or operator shall engage a third party 
to conduct an audit that evaluates compliance with the provisions of 
this subpart in accordance with the requirements of this section when 
any criterion of Sec.  68.58(f) is met.
    (b) Third-party auditors and auditing teams. The owner or operator 
shall either:
    (1) Engage a third-party auditor meeting all of the competency and 
independence criteria in paragraph (c) of this section; or
    (2) Assemble an auditing team, led by a third-party auditor meeting 
all of the competency and independence criteria in paragraph (c) of 
this section. The team may include:
    (i) Other employees of the third-party auditor firm meeting the 
independence criteria of paragraph (c)(2) of this section; and
    (ii) Other personnel not employed by the third-party auditor firm, 
including facility personnel.
    (c) Third-party auditor qualifications. The owner or operator shall 
determine and document that the third-party auditor(s) meet the 
following competency and independence requirements:
    (1) The third-party auditor(s) shall be:
    (i) Knowledgeable with the requirements of this part;
    (ii) Experienced with the stationary source type and processes 
being audited and applicable recognized and generally accepted good 
engineering practices; and
    (iii) Trained and/or certified in proper auditing techniques.
    (2) The third-party auditor(s) shall:
    (i) Act impartially when performing all activities under this 
section;
    (ii) Receive no financial benefit from the outcome of the audit, 
apart from payment for auditing services. For purposes of this 
paragraph (c)(2)(ii), retired employees who otherwise satisfy the 
third-party auditor independence criteria in this section may qualify 
as independent if their sole continuing financial attachments to the 
owner or operator are employer-financed or managed retirement and/or 
health plans;
    (iii) Ensure that all third-party personnel involved in the audit 
sign and date a conflict of interest statement documenting that they 
meet the independence criteria of this paragraph (c)(2); and
    (iv) Ensure that all third-party personnel involved in the audit do 
not accept future employment with the owner or operator of the 
stationary source for a period of at least two years following 
submission of the final audit report. For purposes of the requirement 
in this paragraph (c)(2)(iv), employment does not include performing or 
participating in third-party audits pursuant to Sec.  68.80 or this 
section.
    (3) The auditor shall have written policies and procedures to 
ensure that all personnel comply with the competency and independence 
requirements of this section.
    (d) Third-party auditor responsibilities. The owner or operator 
shall ensure that the third-party auditor:
    (1) Manages the audit and participates in audit initiation, design, 
implementation, and reporting;
    (2) Determines appropriate roles and responsibilities for the audit 
team members based on the qualifications of each team member;
    (3) Prepares the audit report and, where there is a team, documents 
the full audit team's views in the final audit report;
    (4) Certifies the final audit report and its contents as meeting 
the requirements of this section; and
    (5) Provides a copy of the audit report to the owner or operator.
    (e) Audit report. The audit report shall:
    (1) Identify all persons participating on the audit team, including 
names, titles, employers and/or affiliations, and summaries of 
qualifications. For third-party auditors, include information 
demonstrating that the competency requirements in paragraph (c)(1) of 
this section are met;
    (2) Describe or incorporate by reference the policies and 
procedures required under paragraph (c)(3) of this section;
    (3) Document the auditor's evaluation of the owner or operator's 
compliance with the provisions of this subpart to determine whether the 
procedures and practices developed by the owner or operator under this 
subpart are adequate and being followed;
    (4) Document the findings of the audit, including any identified 
compliance or performance deficiencies;
    (5) Summarize any significant revisions (if any) between draft and 
final versions of the report; and
    (6) Include the following certification, signed and dated by the 
third-party auditor or third-party audit team member leading the audit:

    I certify that this RMP compliance audit report was prepared 
under my direction or supervision in accordance with a system 
designed to assure that qualified personnel properly gather and 
evaluate the information upon which the audit is based. I further 
certify that the audit was conducted and this report was prepared 
pursuant to the requirements of subpart C of 40 CFR part 68 and all 
other applicable auditing, competency, independence, impartiality, 
and conflict of interest standards and protocols. Based on my 
personal knowledge and experience, and inquiry of personnel involved 
in the audit, the information submitted herein is true, accurate, 
and complete.

    (f) Third-party audit findings--(1) Findings response report. As 
soon as possible, but no later than 90 days after receiving the final 
audit report, the owner or operator shall determine an appropriate 
response to each of the findings in the audit report, and develop a 
findings response report that includes:
    (i) A copy of the final audit report;
    (ii) An appropriate response to each of the audit report findings;
    (iii) A schedule for promptly addressing deficiencies; and
    (iv) A certification, signed and dated by a senior corporate 
officer, or an official in an equivalent position, of the owner or 
operator of the stationary source, stating:

    I certify under penalty of law that I have engaged a third party 
to perform or lead an audit team to conduct a third-party audit in 
accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR 68.59 and that the 
attached RMP compliance audit report was received, reviewed, and 
responded to under my direction or supervision by qualified 
personnel. I further certify that appropriate responses to the 
findings have been identified and deficiencies were corrected, or 
are being corrected, consistent with the requirements of subpart C 
of 40 CFR part 68, as documented herein. Based on my personal 
knowledge and experience, or inquiry of personnel involved in 
evaluating the report findings and determining appropriate responses 
to the findings, the information submitted herein is true, accurate, 
and

[[Page 17688]]

complete. I am aware that there are significant penalties for making 
false material statements, representations, or certifications, 
including the possibility of fines and imprisonment for knowing 
violations.

    (2) Schedule implementation. The owner or operator shall implement 
the schedule to address deficiencies identified in the audit findings 
response report in paragraph (f)(1)(iii) of this section and document 
the action taken to address each deficiency, along with the date 
completed.
    (3) Submission to Board of Directors. The owner or operator shall 
immediately provide a copy of each document required under paragraphs 
(f)(1) and (2) of this section, when completed, to the owner or 
operator's audit committee of the Board of Directors, or other 
comparable committee or individual, if applicable.
    (g) Recordkeeping. The owner or operator shall retain at the 
stationary source, the two most recent final third-party audit reports, 
related findings response reports, documentation of actions taken to 
address deficiencies, and related records. The requirement in this 
paragraph (g) does not apply to any document that is more than five 
years old.

0
9. Amend Sec.  68.60 by adding paragraph (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  68.60  Incident investigation.

* * * * *
    (h) The owner or operator shall ensure the following are addressed 
when the incident in paragraph (a) of this section meets the accident 
history reporting requirements under Sec.  68.42:
    (1) The report shall be completed within 12 months of the incident, 
unless the implementing agency approves, in writing, to an extension of 
time; and
    (2) The report in paragraph (d) of this section shall include 
factors that contributed to the incident including the initiating 
event, direct and indirect contributing factors, and root causes. Root 
causes shall be determined by conducting an analysis for each incident 
using a recognized method.

0
10. Section 68.62 is added to subpart C to read as follows:


Sec.  68.62  Employee participation.

    (a) The owner or operator shall develop a written plan of action 
regarding the implementation of the employee participation requirements 
required by this section.
    (1) An annual written or electronic notice shall be distributed to 
employees and their representatives indicating that the plan is readily 
available to view, and how to access the information.
    (2) Training shall be provided as often as necessary to ensure 
employees and their representatives, and management involved in the 
process, are informed of the details of the plan.
    (b)(1) The owner or operator shall develop and implement a process 
to allow employees and their representatives to report to either or 
both the owner or operator and EPA unaddressed hazards that could lead 
to a catastrophic release, accidents covered by Sec.  68.42(a) but not 
reported under Sec.  68.195(a), and any other noncompliance with this 
part.
    (2) The employee and their representatives may choose to report 
either anonymously or with attribution.
    (3) When a report is made to the owner or operator, a record of the 
report shall be maintained for three years.
    (c) The owner or operator shall provide to employees and their 
representatives access to hazard reviews and to all other information 
required to be developed under this subpart.

Subpart D--Program 3 Prevention Program

0
11. Amend Sec.  68.65 by revising paragraphs (a) and (d)(2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  68.65  Process safety information.

    (a) The owner or operator shall complete a compilation of written 
process safety information before conducting any process hazard 
analysis required by this part and shall keep process safety 
information up to date. The compilation of written process safety 
information is to enable the owner or operator and the employees 
involved in operating the process to identify and understand the 
hazards posed by those processes involving regulated substances. This 
process safety information shall include information pertaining to the 
hazards of the regulated substances used or produced by the process, 
information pertaining to the technology of the process, and 
information pertaining to the equipment in the process.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) The owner or operator shall ensure and document that the 
process is designed and maintained in compliance with recognized and 
generally accepted good engineering practices.
* * * * *

0
12. Amend Sec.  68.67 by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (c)(3) and (5);
0
b. Removing the word ``and'' at the end of paragraph (c)(6);
0
c. Removing the period at the end of paragraph (c)(7) and adding a 
semicolon in its place; and
0
d. Adding paragraphs (c)(8) through (10) and (h).
    The revisions and additions read as follows:


Sec.  68.67  Process hazard analysis.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (3) Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the 
hazards and their interrelationships such as appropriate application of 
detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases and 
standby or emergency power systems. (Acceptable detection methods might 
include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and 
detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors.) The owner or operator 
shall ensure monitoring equipment associated with prevention and 
detection of accidental releases from covered processes has standby or 
backup power to provide continuous operation;
* * * * *
    (5) Stationary source siting, including the placement of processes, 
equipment, and buildings within the facility, and hazards posed by 
proximate stationary sources, and accidental release consequences posed 
by proximity to the public and public receptors;
* * * * *
    (8) Natural hazards that could cause or exacerbate an accidental 
release;
    (9) Safer technology and alternative risk management measures 
applicable to eliminating or reducing risk from process hazards for the 
following covered processes and shall meet all of the following 
requirements:
    (i) For covered processes in NAICS codes 324 and 325, the owner or 
operator shall consider and document, in the following order of 
preference, inherently safer technology or design, passive measures, 
active measures, and procedural measures. A combination of risk 
management measures may be used to achieve the desired risk reduction.
    (ii) For covered processes in paragraphs (c)(9)(ii)(A) through (C) 
of this section, the owner or operator shall consider and document, in 
the following order of preference, inherently safer technology or 
design, passive measures, active measures, and procedural measures. A 
combination of risk management measures may be used to achieve the 
desired risk reduction. The owner or operator shall also determine and 
document the practicability of the inherently safer technologies and 
designs considered.

[[Page 17689]]

The owner or operator shall include in documentation any methods used 
to determine practicability. For any inherently safer technologies and 
designs implemented, the owner or operator shall document and submit to 
EPA a description of the technology implemented.
    (A) In NAICS codes 324 and 325, located within 1 mile of another 
stationary source having a covered process in NAICS code 324 or 325;
    (B) In NAICS code 324 with hydrofluoric acid alkylation covered 
processes; and
    (C) In NAICS codes 324 and 325 that have had one accident that 
meets the accident history reporting requirements under Sec.  68.42 
since the most recent process hazard analysis under this section.
    (iii) The analysis shall be performed by a team that includes 
members with expertise in the process being evaluated, including at 
least one member who works in the process. The team members shall be 
documented; and
    (10) Any gaps in safety between the codes, standards, or practices 
to which the process was designed and constructed and the most current 
version of applicable codes, standards, or practices.
* * * * *
    (h)(1) Of the covered processes listed under paragraphs (h)(1)(i) 
through (iii) of this section, the owner or operator shall implement at 
least one passive measure at the stationary source, or an inherently 
safer technology or design, or a combination of active and procedural 
measures equivalent to or greater than the risk reduction of a passive 
measure, resulting from paragraph (c)(9)(i) of this section:
    (i) In NAICS codes 324 and 325, located within 1 mile of another 
stationary source having a covered process in NAICS code 324 or 325;
    (ii) In NAICS code 324 with hydrofluoric acid alkylation covered 
processes; and
    (iii) In NAICS codes 324 and 325 that have had one accident that 
meets the accident history reporting requirements under Sec.  68.42 
since the most recent process hazard analysis under this section.
    (2) If no passive measures are identified or all are not 
practicable, and no inherently safer technology or design is 
implemented, then the owner or operator shall implement at least one 
active measure. If no active measures are identified or all are not 
practicable, the owner or operator shall implement at least one 
procedural measure.
    (3) For passive and active measures not implemented, the owner or 
operator shall document sufficient evidence to demonstrate to the 
implementing agency's satisfaction that implementing the measures is 
not practicable and the reasons for this conclusion. A claim that 
implementation is not practicable shall not be based solely on evidence 
of reduced profits or increased costs.

0
13. Amend Sec.  68.69 by revising paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  68.69  Operating procedures.

    (a) * * *
    (4) Safety systems and their functions, including documentation 
when monitoring equipment associated with prevention and detection of 
accidental releases from covered processes is removed due to safety 
concerns from imminent natural hazards.
* * * * *

0
14. Amend Sec.  68.79 by revising paragraph (a) and adding paragraphs 
(f) through (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  68.79  Compliance audits.

    (a) The owner or operator shall certify that they have evaluated 
compliance with the provisions of this subpart, at least every three 
years to verify that the procedures and practices developed under this 
subpart are adequate and are being followed. When required as set forth 
in paragraph (f) of this section, the compliance audit shall be a 
third-party audit.
* * * * *
    (f) The next required compliance audit shall be a third-party audit 
when one or more of the following conditions applies:
    (1) An accidental release meeting the criteria in Sec.  68.42(a) 
from a covered process at a stationary source has occurred; or
    (2) An implementing agency requires a third-party audit due to 
conditions at the stationary source that could lead to an accidental 
release of a regulated substance, or when a previous third-party audit 
failed to meet the competency or independence criteria of Sec.  
68.80(c).
    (g)(1) If an implementing agency makes a preliminary determination 
that a third-party audit is necessary pursuant to paragraph (f)(2) of 
this section, the implementing agency will provide written notice to 
the owner or operator that describes the basis for this determination.
    (2) Within 30 days of receipt of such written notice, the owner or 
operator may provide information and data to, and may consult with, the 
implementing agency on the determination. Thereafter, the implementing 
agency will provide a final determination to the owner or operator.
    (3) If the final determination requires a third-party audit, the 
owner or operator shall comply with the requirements of Sec.  68.80, 
pursuant to the schedule in paragraph (h) of this section.
    (4) The owner or operator may appeal a final determination made by 
an implementing agency under paragraph (g)(3) of this section within 30 
days of receipt of the final determination. The appeal shall be made to 
the EPA Regional Administrator or, for determinations made by other 
implementing agencies, the administrator or director of such 
implementing agency. The appeal shall contain a clear and concise 
statement of the issues, facts in the case, and any relevant additional 
information. In reviewing the appeal, the implementing agency may 
request additional information from the owner or operator. The 
implementing agency will provide a written, final decision on the 
appeal to the owner or operator.
    (h) The audit and audit report shall be completed as in paragraph 
(a) of this section, unless a different timeframe is specified by the 
implementing agency.

0
15. Section 68.80 is added to subpart D to read as follows:


Sec.  68.80  Third-party audits.

    (a) Applicability. The owner or operator shall engage a third party 
to conduct an audit that evaluates compliance with the provisions of 
this subpart in accordance with the requirements of this section when 
any criterion of Sec.  68.79(f) is met.
    (b) Third-party auditors and auditing teams. The owner or operator 
shall either:
    (1) Engage a third-party auditor meeting all of the competency and 
independence criteria in paragraph (c) of this section; or
    (2) Assemble an auditing team, led by a third-party auditor meeting 
all of the competency and independence criteria in paragraph (c) of 
this section. The team may include:
    (i) Other employees of the third-party auditor firm meeting the 
independence criteria of paragraph (c)(2) of this section; and
    (ii) Other personnel not employed by the third-party auditor firm, 
including facility personnel.
    (c) Third-party auditor qualifications. The owner or operator shall 
determine and document that the third-party auditor(s) meet the 
following competency and independence requirements:
    (1) The third-party auditor(s) shall be:

[[Page 17690]]

    (i) Knowledgeable with the requirements of this part;
    (ii) Experienced with the stationary source type and processes 
being audited and applicable recognized and generally accepted good 
engineering practices; and
    (iii) Trained and/or certified in proper auditing techniques.
    (2) The third-party auditor(s) shall:
    (i) Act impartially when performing all activities under this 
section;
    (ii) Receive no financial benefit from the outcome of the audit, 
apart from payment for auditing services. For purposes of this 
paragraph (c)(2)(ii), retired employees who otherwise satisfy the 
third-party auditor independence criteria in this section may qualify 
as independent if their sole continuing financial attachments to the 
owner or operator are employer-financed or managed retirement and/or 
health plans;
    (iii) Ensure that all third-party personnel involved in the audit 
sign and date a conflict of interest statement documenting that they 
meet the independence criteria of this paragraph (c)(2); and
    (iv) Ensure that all third-party personnel involved in the audit do 
not accept future employment with the owner or operator of the 
stationary source for a period of at least two years following 
submission of the final audit report. For purposes of the requirement 
in this paragraph (c)(2)(iv), employment does not include performing or 
participating in third-party audits pursuant to Sec.  68.59 or this 
section.
    (3) The auditor shall have written policies and procedures to 
ensure that all personnel comply with the competency and independence 
requirements of this section.
    (d) Third-party auditor responsibilities. The owner or operator 
shall ensure that the third-party auditor:
    (1) Manages the audit and participates in audit initiation, design, 
implementation, and reporting;
    (2) Determines appropriate roles and responsibilities for the audit 
team members based on the qualifications of each team member;
    (3) Prepares the audit report and, where there is a team, documents 
the full audit team's views in the final audit report;
    (4) Certifies the final audit report and its contents as meeting 
the requirements of this section; and
    (5) Provides a copy of the audit report to the owner or operator.
    (e) Audit report. The audit report shall:
    (1) Identify all persons participating on the audit team, including 
names, titles, employers and/or affiliations, and summaries of 
qualifications. For third-party auditors, include information 
demonstrating that the competency requirements in paragraph (c)(1) of 
this section are met;
    (2) Describe or incorporate by reference the policies and 
procedures required under paragraph (c)(3) of this section;
    (3) Document the auditor's evaluation of the owner or operator's 
compliance with the provisions of this subpart to determine whether the 
procedures and practices developed by the owner or operator under this 
part are adequate and being followed;
    (4) Document the findings of the audit, including any identified 
compliance or performance deficiencies;
    (5) Summarize any significant revisions (if any) between draft and 
final versions of the report; and
    (6) Include the following certification, signed and dated by the 
third-party auditor or third-party audit team member leading the audit:

    I certify that this RMP compliance audit report was prepared 
under my direction or supervision in accordance with a system 
designed to assure that qualified personnel properly gather and 
evaluate the information upon which the audit is based. I further 
certify that the audit was conducted and this report was prepared 
pursuant to the requirements of subpart D of 40 CFR part 68 and all 
other applicable auditing, competency, independence, impartiality, 
and conflict of interest standards and protocols. Based on my 
personal knowledge and experience, and inquiry of personnel involved 
in the audit, the information submitted herein is true, accurate, 
and complete.

    (f) Third-party audit findings--(1) Findings response report. As 
soon as possible, but no later than 90 days after receiving the final 
audit report, the owner or operator shall determine an appropriate 
response to each of the findings in the audit report, and develop a 
findings response report that includes:
    (i) A copy of the final audit report;
    (ii) An appropriate response to each of the audit report findings;
    (iii) A schedule for promptly addressing deficiencies; and
    (iv) A certification, signed and dated by a senior corporate 
officer, or an official in an equivalent position, of the owner or 
operator of the stationary source, stating:

    I certify under penalty of law that I have engaged a third party 
to perform or lead an audit team to conduct a third-party audit in 
accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR 68.80 and that the 
attached RMP compliance audit report was received, reviewed, and 
responded to under my direction or supervision by qualified 
personnel. I further certify that appropriate responses to the 
findings have been identified and deficiencies were corrected, or 
are being corrected, consistent with the requirements of subpart D 
of 40 CFR part 68, as documented herein. Based on my personal 
knowledge and experience, or inquiry of personnel involved in 
evaluating the report findings and determining appropriate responses 
to the findings, the information submitted herein is true, accurate, 
and complete. I am aware that there are significant penalties for 
making false material statements, representations, or 
certifications, including the possibility of fines and imprisonment 
for knowing violations.

    (2) Schedule implementation. The owner or operator shall implement 
the schedule to address deficiencies identified in the audit findings 
response report in paragraph (f)(1)(iii) of this section and document 
the action taken to address each deficiency, along with the date 
completed.
    (3) Submission to Board of Directors. The owner or operator shall 
immediately provide a copy of each document required under paragraphs 
(f)(1) and (2) of this section, when completed, to the owner or 
operator's audit committee of the Board of Directors, or other 
comparable committee or individual, if applicable.
    (g) Recordkeeping. The owner or operator shall retain at the 
stationary source the two most recent final third-party audit reports, 
related findings response reports, documentation of actions taken to 
address deficiencies, and related records.

0
16. Amend Sec.  68.81 by adding paragraph (h) to read as follows:


Sec.  68.81  Incident investigation.

* * * * *
    (h) The owner or operator shall ensure the following are addressed 
when the incident in paragraph (a) of this section meets the accident 
history reporting requirements under Sec.  68.42:
    (1) The report shall be completed within 12 months of the incident, 
unless the implementing agency approves, in writing, an extension of 
time; and
    (2) The report in paragraph (d) of this section shall include 
factors that contributed to the incident including the initiating 
event, direct and indirect contributing factors, and root causes. Root 
causes shall be determined by conducting an analysis for each incident 
using a recognized method.

0
17. Revise Sec.  68.83 to read as follows:


Sec.  68.83  Employee participation.

    (a) The owner or operator shall develop a written plan of action 
regarding the implementation of the employee participation requirements 
required by this section.

[[Page 17691]]

    (1) An annual written or electronic notice shall be distributed to 
employees and their representatives indicating that the plan is readily 
available to view and how to access the information.
    (2) Training shall be provided as often as necessary to ensure 
employees and their representatives, and management involved in the 
process, are informed of the details of the plan.
    (b) The owner or operator shall consult with employees and their 
representatives on the conduct and development of process hazards 
analyses and on the development of the other elements of process safety 
management in this part.
    (c) The owner or operator shall consult with employees 
knowledgeable in the process and their representatives on addressing, 
correcting, resolving, documenting, and implementing recommendations 
and findings of process hazard analyses under Sec.  68.67(e), 
compliance audits under Sec.  68.79(d), and incident investigations 
under Sec.  68.81(e).
    (d) The owner or operator shall provide the following authorities 
to employees knowledgeable in the process and their representatives:
    (1) Recommend to the operator in charge of a unit that an operation 
or process be partially or completely shut down, in accordance with 
procedures established in Sec.  68.69(a), based on the potential for a 
catastrophic release; and
    (2) Allow a qualified operator in charge of a unit to partially or 
completely shut down an operation or process, in accordance with 
procedures established in Sec.  68.69(a), based on the potential for a 
catastrophic release.
    (e)(1) The owner or operator shall develop and implement a process 
to allow employees and their representatives to report to either or 
both the owner or operator and EPA unaddressed hazards that could lead 
to a catastrophic release, accidents covered by Sec.  68.42(a) but not 
reported under Sec.  68.195(a), and any other noncompliance with this 
part.
    (2) The employee and their representatives may choose to report 
either anonymously or with attribution.
    (3) When a report is made to the owner or operator, a record of the 
report shall be maintained for three years.
    (f) The owner or operator shall provide to employees and their 
representatives access to process hazard analyses and to all other 
information required to be developed under this part.

0
18. Amend Sec.  68.85 by revising paragraph (b) and adding paragraph 
(c) to read as follows:


Sec.  68.85  Hot work permit.

* * * * *
    (b) The permit shall document that the fire prevention and 
protection requirements in 29 CFR 1910.252(a) have been implemented 
prior to beginning the hot work operations; it shall indicate the 
date(s) authorized for hot work; and identify the object on which hot 
work is to be performed.
    (c) The permit shall be retained for three years after the 
completion of the hot work operations.

Subpart E--Emergency Response

0
19. Amend Sec.  68.90 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (b)(3);
0
b. Removing the word ``and'' at the end of paragraph (b)(4);
0
c. Removing the period at the end of paragraph (b)(5) and adding ``; 
and'' in its place; and
0
d. Adding paragraph (b)(6).
    The revision and addition read as follows:


Sec.  68.90  Applicability.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (3) Appropriate mechanisms are in place to notify emergency 
responders when there is a need for a response, including providing 
timely data and information detailing the current understanding and 
best estimates of the nature of the accidental release. The owner or 
operator may satisfy the requirement in this paragraph (b)(3) through 
notification mechanisms designed to meet other Federal, State, or local 
notification requirements, provided the notification meets the 
requirements of this paragraph (b)(3), as appropriate;
* * * * *
    (6) The owner or operator maintains and implements, as necessary, 
procedures for informing the public and the appropriate Federal, State, 
and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases and 
partnering with these response agencies to ensure that a community 
notification system is in place to warn the public within the area 
potentially threatened by the accidental release. Documentation of the 
partnership shall be maintained in accordance with Sec.  68.93(c).

0
20. Amend Sec.  68.95 by revising paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (c) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  68.95  Emergency response program.

    (a) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) Procedures for informing the public and the appropriate 
Federal, State, and local emergency response agencies about accidental 
releases, including partnering with these response agencies to ensure 
that a community notification system is in place to warn the public 
within the area potentially threatened by the accidental release. 
Documentation of the partnership shall be maintained in accordance with 
Sec.  68.93(c);
* * * * *
    (c) The emergency response plan developed under paragraph (a)(1) of 
this section shall include providing timely data and information 
detailing the current understanding and best estimates of the nature of 
the release when an accidental release occurs and be coordinated with 
the community emergency response plan developed under 42 U.S.C. 11003. 
The owner or operator may satisfy the requirement of this paragraph (c) 
through notification mechanisms designed to meet other Federal, State, 
or local notification requirements, provided the notification meets the 
requirements of this paragraph (c), as appropriate. Upon request of the 
LEPC or emergency response officials, the owner or operator shall 
promptly provide to the local emergency response officials information 
necessary for developing and implementing the community emergency 
response plan.

0
21. Amend Sec.  68.96 by revising paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(3) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  68.96  Emergency response exercises.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (i) Frequency. As part of coordination with local emergency 
response officials required by Sec.  68.93, the owner or operator shall 
consult with these officials to establish an appropriate frequency for 
field exercises, and shall conduct a field exercise before March 15, 
2027, and at a minimum at least once every ten years thereafter, unless 
the appropriate local emergency response agencies agree in writing that 
such frequency is impractical. If local emergency response agencies so 
agree, the owner or operator shall consult with local emergency 
response officials to establish an alternate appropriate frequency for 
field exercises.
* * * * *
    (3) Documentation. The owner or operator shall prepare an 
evaluation report within 90 days of each field and tabletop exercise. 
The report shall include a description of the exercise scenario, names 
and organizations of each participant, an evaluation of the exercise 
results including lessons

[[Page 17692]]

learned, recommendations for improvement or revisions to the emergency 
response exercise program and emergency response program, and a 
schedule to promptly address and resolve recommendations.
* * * * *

Subpart G--Risk Management Plan

0
22. Amend Sec.  68.160 by:
0
a. Removing the semicolons at the ends of paragraphs (b)(1) through 
(11) and adding periods in their place;
0
b. Removing ``; and'' at the end of paragraph (b)(12) and adding a 
period in its place;
0
c. Removing the semicolons at the ends of paragraphs (b)(13) through 
(19) and adding periods in their place; and
0
d. Adding paragraph (b)(22).
    The addition reads as follows:


Sec.  68.160  Registration.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (22) Method of communication and location of the notification that 
chemical hazard information is available to the public residing, 
working, or spending significant time within 6 miles of the stationary 
source, pursuant to Sec.  68.210(d).

0
23. Amend Sec.  68.170 by:
0
a. Removing the word ``and'' at the end of paragraph (e)(5);
0
b. Removing the period at the end of paragraph (e)(6) and adding ``; 
and'' in its place;
0
c. Adding paragraph (e)(7); and
0
d. Revising paragraph (i).
    The addition and revision read as follows:


Sec.  68.170  Prevention program/Program 2.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (7) Recommendations declined from natural hazard, power loss, and 
siting hazard evaluations and justifications.
* * * * *
    (i) The date of the most recent compliance audit; the expected date 
of completion of any changes resulting from the compliance audit and 
identification of whether the most recent compliance audit was a third-
party audit, pursuant to Sec. Sec.  68.58 and 68.59; and findings 
declined from third-party compliance audits and justifications.
* * * * *

0
24. Amend Sec.  68.175 by:
0
a. Removing the word ``and'' at the end of paragraph (e)(5);
0
b. Removing the period at the end of paragraph (e)(6) and adding a 
semicolon in its place;
0
c. Adding paragraphs (e)(7) through (9); and
0
d. Revising paragraph (k).
    The addition and revision read as follows:


Sec.  68.175  Prevention program/Program 3.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (7) Inherently safer technology or design measures implemented 
since the last PHA, if any, and the technology category (substitution, 
minimization, simplification and/or moderation);
    (8) Recommendations declined from natural hazard, power loss, and 
siting hazard evaluations and justifications; and
    (9) Recommendations declined from safety gaps between codes, 
standards, or practices to which the process was designed and 
constructed and the most current version of applicable codes, 
standards, or practices.
* * * * *
    (k) The date of the most recent compliance audit; the expected date 
of completion of any changes resulting from the compliance audit and 
identification of whether the most recent compliance audit was a third-
party audit, pursuant to Sec. Sec.  68.79 and 68.80; and findings 
declined from third-party compliance audits and justifications.
* * * * *

Subpart H--Other Requirements

0
25. Amend Sec.  68.210 by adding paragraphs (d) through (h) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  68.210  Availability of information to the public.

* * * * *
    (d) Chemical hazard information. The owner or operator of a 
stationary source shall provide, upon request by any member of the 
public residing, working, or spending significant time within 6 miles 
of the fenceline of a stationary source, the following chemical hazard 
information for all regulated processes:
    (1) Regulated substances information. Names of regulated substances 
held in a process;
    (2) Safety Data Sheets. SDSs for all regulated substances located 
at the facility;
    (3) Accident history information. Provide the five-year accident 
history information required to be reported under Sec.  68.42;
    (4) Emergency response program. The following summary information 
concerning the stationary source's compliance with Sec.  68.10(f)(3) 
and the emergency response provisions of subpart E of this part as 
applicable:
    (i) Whether the stationary source is a responding stationary source 
or a non-responding stationary source;
    (ii) Name and phone number of local emergency response 
organizations with which the owner or operator last coordinated 
emergency response efforts, pursuant to Sec.  68.180; and
    (iii) For stationary sources subject to Sec.  68.95, procedures for 
informing the public and local emergency response agencies about 
accidental releases;
    (5) Exercises. A list of scheduled exercises, excluding dates, 
required under Sec.  68.96 occurring within one year from the date of 
request;
    (6) LEPC contact information. Include LEPC name, phone number, and 
web address as available; and
    (7) Declined recommendations and justifications. Include declined 
recommendations and justifications required under Sec. Sec.  
68.170(e)(7) and 68.175(e)(7) through (9).
    (e) Languages. The information shall be made available in English 
or in at least any two other commonly spoken languages by the 
population potentially affected, as requested.
    (f) Notification of availability of information. The owner or 
operator shall provide ongoing notification on a company website, 
social media platforms, or through other publicly accessible means 
that:
    (1) Information specified in paragraph (d) of this section is 
available to the public residing, working, or spending significant time 
within 6 miles of the stationary source upon request. The notification 
shall:
    (i) Specify the information elements, identified in paragraph (d) 
of this section, that can be requested; and
    (ii) Provide instructions for how to request the information 
including verification of presence within 6-miles (e.g., email, mailing 
address, and/or telephone or website request); and
    (2) Identify where to access information on community preparedness, 
if available, including shelter-in-place and evacuation procedures.
    (g) Timeframe to provide requested information. The owner or 
operator shall provide the requested information under paragraph (d) of 
this section within 45 days of receiving a request.
    (h) Recordkeeping. The owner or operator shall maintain a record of 
the members of the public requesting chemical hazard information for 
five years.

[FR Doc. 2024-04458 Filed 3-8-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P