[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 29 (Monday, February 12, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 9968-10004]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-01667]



[[Page 9967]]

Vol. 89

Monday,

No. 29

February 12, 2024

Part III





Federal Communications Commission





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47 CFR Part 64





Data Breach Reporting Requirements; Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 29 / Monday, February 12, 2024 / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 9968]]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 64

[WC Docket No. 22-21; FCC 23-111, FR ID 198806]


Data Breach Reporting Requirements

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission) modifies the Commission's data breach notification rules 
to better ensure that providers of telecommunications, interconnected 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), and telecommunications relay 
services (TRS) are held accountable in their obligations to safeguard 
sensitive customer information, and to provide customers with the tools 
needed to protect themselves in the event that their data is 
compromised.

DATES: This rule is effective March 13, 2024, except for the amendments 
codified at 47 CFR 64.2011 and 64.5111, instructions 3 and 4, 
respectively, which are delayed indefinitely. The Commission will 
publish a document in the Federal Register announcing the effective 
dates for the amendments to 47 CFR 64.2011 and 64.5111.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mason Shefa, Competition Policy 
Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at (202) 418-2494, 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report 
and Order in WC Docket No. 22-21; FCC 23-111, adopted on December 13, 
2023 and released on December 21, 2023. The document is available for 
download at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-111A1.pdf. 
To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities 
(Braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), send an email 
to [email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 
202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).

Final Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis

    This document contains new or modified information collection 
requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), 
Public Law 104-13. All such new or modified requirements will be 
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under 
section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, the general public, and other Federal 
agencies will be invited to comment on any new or modified information 
collection requirements contained in this proceeding.

Congressional Review Act

    The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, OMB, concurs, that this rule is 
non-major under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The 
Commission will send a copy of this Report and Order to Congress and 
the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

Synopsis

I. Report and Order

    1. In this Order, the Commission adopts several proposals from the 
Data Breach Notice, 88 FR 3953 (Jan. 23, 2023), to modernize its data 
breach requirements. The Commission's breach notification rule provides 
an important protection against improper use or disclosure of customer 
data, helping to ensure that carriers are held accountable and 
providing customers with the tools to protect themselves in the event 
that their data is compromised. However, in the 16 years since the 
Commission adopted its data breach reporting rule--designed to protect 
customers against the threat of ``pretexting''--data breaches have only 
grown in frequency and severity. As discussed below, the Commission 
finds that these changes will better protect consumers from improper 
use or disclosure of their customer information and harmonize its rules 
with new approaches to protecting the public already deployed by the 
Commission's partners in Federal and State government. To the extent 
that this Report and Order does not expressly address a topic that was 
subject to comment in the Data Breach Notice, that issue remains 
pending.
    2. The Commission first expands the scope of its breach 
notification rules to cover not just CPNI, but all PII. The Commission 
next adopts its proposal to expand its definition of ``breach'' for 
telecommunications carriers to include inadvertent access, use, or 
disclosure of customer information, except in those cases where such 
information is acquired in good faith by an employee or agent of a 
carrier, and such information is not used improperly or further 
disclosed. The Commission also adopts its proposal to require carriers 
to notify the Commission, in addition to the Secret Service and FBI, as 
soon as practicable, but no later than seven business days, after 
reasonable determination of a breach. The Commission next eliminates 
the requirement that carriers notify customers of a breach in cases 
where a carrier can reasonably determine that no harm to customers is 
reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach. The Commission 
also eliminates the mandatory waiting period for carriers to notify 
customers, and instead requires carriers to notify customers of 
breaches of covered data without unreasonable delay after notification 
to Federal agencies, and in no case more than 30 days following 
reasonable determination of a breach, unless a delay is requested by 
law enforcement. Finally, to ensure that TRS consumers enjoy the same 
level of protection under its rules as consumers of telecommunications 
services, the Commission adopts equivalent requirements for TRS 
providers.

A. Defining ``Breach''

1. Scope of Protected Consumer Information
    3. In the Data Breach Notice, the Commission recognized that 
carriers possess proprietary information of customers other than CPNI, 
which customers have an interest in protecting from public exposure; 
the notice sought comment on requiring carriers to report breaches of 
such information. The Commission concludes that carriers should be 
obligated to comply with its breach notification rule whenever such 
information is the subject of a breach, whether or not the information 
is CPNI.
    4. The pervasiveness of data breaches and the frequency of breach 
notifications have evolved and increased since the Commission first 
adopted its breach notification rule in 2007. As discussed in the Data 
Breach Notice, the Commission's requirement is one of several sector-
specific Federal breach notification laws in the United States. All 
State data breach notification requirements explicitly include 
categories of sensitive personal information within their scope, as do 
sector-specific Federal laws. The Commission believes that the 
unauthorized exposure of sensitive personal information that the 
carrier has received from the customer (i.e., information ``of the 
customer''), or about the customer (i.e., information ``relating to'' 
the customer), in connection with the customer relationship (e.g., 
initiation, provision, or maintenance, of service), such as social 
security numbers or financial records, is reasonably likely to pose 
risk of customer harm. Accordingly, any unauthorized disclosure of such 
information warrants

[[Page 9969]]

notification to the customer, the Commission, and other law 
enforcement. Consumers expect that they will be notified of substantial 
breaches that endanger their privacy, and businesses that handle 
sensitive personal information should expect to be obligated to report 
such breaches.
    5. The Commission requires notification of breaches that involve 
PII, which is a well-understood concept and thus a readily 
administrable way of requiring breach notifications in the case of 
proprietary information. The Commission rejects claims that it did not 
provide sufficient notice to define the scope of protected consumer 
information in this manner. In the Data Breach Notice the Commission 
sought comment on ``requir[ing] telecommunications carriers to report 
breaches of proprietary information other than CPNI under Section 
222(a),'' in which case commenters were asked to address ``how broadly 
or narrowly [the Commission should] define that category of 
information.'' This provided notice that the Commission could define 
the scope of protected information to encompass all or any subset of 
the universe of proprietary information encompassed by section 222(a). 
And as the Commission explains below, the scope of customer information 
encompassed by section 222(a) is best interpreted to include PII, and 
the Commission defines the scope of its breach notification rules to 
include PII subject to the additional limitations that the Commission 
adopts below. The Commission therefore concludes that there was 
sufficient notice for the approach the Commission adopt. The definition 
of PII is aptly described in OMB Circular A-130, ``Managing Information 
as a Strategic Resource,'' as ``information that can be used to 
distinguish or trace an individual's identity, either alone or when 
combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a 
specific individual.'' CPNI is a subset of PII. As discussed below, 
this approach of holding carriers responsible for reporting breaches of 
PII is supported independently and alternatively by construing the 
phrase ``proprietary information of . . . customers'' in section 222(a) 
as covering all information defined as PII, and by recognizing that 
section 201(b)'s just-and-reasonable-practices obligation requires 
protection of PII.
    6. For the purposes of its breach notification rules, the 
Commission further defines the scope of covered PII as (1) first name 
or first initial, and last name, in combination with any government-
issued identification numbers or information issued on a government 
document used to verify the identity of a specific individual 
(including, but not limited to, Social Security Number, driver's 
license number or State identification number, Taxpayer Identification 
Number, passport number, military identification number, Tribal 
identification card, or any other Federal or State government-issued 
identification card), or other unique identification number used for 
authentication purposes (including, but not limited to, a financial 
institution account number, student identification number, or medical 
identification number); (2) user name or email address, in combination 
with a password or security question and answer, or any other 
authentication method or information necessary to permit access to an 
account (including, but not limited to, Personal Identification 
Numbers, private keys that are unique to an individual and are used to 
authenticate or sign an electronic record; unique electronic 
identifiers or routing codes, in combination with any required security 
code, access code, or password that would permit access to an 
individual's financial account; or shared secrets or security tokens 
that are known to be used for data-based authentication); or (3) unique 
biometric, genetic, or medical data (including, but not limited to, 
fingerprints, faceprint, a retinal or iris scan, hand geometry, 
voiceprint analysis, or other unique biometric data generated from a 
measurement or analysis of human body characteristics to authenticate 
or ascertain an individual's identity; genetic data such as 
deoxyribonucleic acid data; and medical records, or other information 
regarding an individual's medical history, mental or physical 
condition, or medical treatment or diagnosis by a health care 
professional). Moreover, dissociated data that, if linked, would 
constitute PII is to be considered PII if the means to link the 
dissociated data were accessed in connection with access to the 
dissociated data, and any one of the discrete data elements listed 
above or any combination of the discrete data elements listed above is 
PII if the data element or combination of data elements would enable a 
person to commit identity theft or fraud against the individual to whom 
the data element or elements pertain.
    7. This approach brings the Commission's definition of covered data 
in line with the approaches taken at the State level, and responds to 
concerns raised in the record by certain parties regarding 
harmonization with existing breach notification regimes. In order to 
further harmonize its approach with analogous State law, the Commission 
also adopts an exception from its definition of PII for publicly 
available information that is lawfully made available to the general 
public from Federal, State, or local government records or widely 
distributed media. Notwithstanding these limitations, the Commission 
will monitor the data security landscape and will not hesitate to 
revisit and revise the list of data elements in a future rulemaking as 
necessary to ensure that carriers adequately protect sensitive customer 
data.
    8. Without an FCC rule requiring breach notifications for the above 
categories of PII, there would be no requirement in Federal law that 
telecommunications carriers report non-CPNI breaches to their 
customers. CTIA's objection that doing so would ``[c]reat[e] a system 
of dual jurisdiction between the FCC and the FTC'' is unpersuasive. 
CTIA asserts that ``[c]ustomers do not expect different privacy 
protections for the same data depending on which entity holds the data 
or the kind of product or service that is being marketed'' but concedes 
the FTC's lack of authority in the common carrier context. By the 
statutory design of the Communications Act and the FTC Act, Congress 
assigned differing areas of responsibility to the FCC and FTC, and CTIA 
identifies no grounds for the Commission to ignore its responsibilities 
with respect to common carriers. By ensuring that the same data breach 
notification requirements also apply to interconnected VoIP and TRS 
providers, the Commission advances the interest of ensuring that 
consumers can have the same expectations regarding services that they 
view as similar. The approach the Commission adopts therefore not only 
reflects the practical expectations of consumers but also honors the 
intention of Congress. For example, as discussed in more detail below, 
Congress ratified the Commission's 2007 decision to extend section 222-
based privacy protections for telecommunications service customers to 
the customers of interconnected VoIP providers. And ensuring equivalent 
protections for TRS subscribers advances Congress' directive to 
endeavor to ensure functionally equivalent service. Despite NCTA's 
suggestion that ``there is no other `proprietary information' between a 
provider and its customer that is not CPNI but is covered by Section 
222,'' the Commission has investigated several instances of breaches 
involving

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sensitive personal information about customers held by 
telecommunications carriers that was not or may not have been CPNI. The 
Commission has also in the past concluded that names, addresses, and 
telephone numbers are not CPNI, even when a customer has elected not to 
have them disclosed publicly, and that such information therefore would 
not be subject to the CPNI-specific restrictions on use in section 
222(c). The Commission finds that such information can be sensitive and 
warrants protection, including a requirement that the Commission, law 
enforcement, and customers be notified about breaches. Indeed, because 
consumers expect to be notified of substantial breaches that endanger 
their privacy, it better protects customers that breach notifications 
not turn on whether a particular breached element is or is not CPNI.
2. Inadvertent Access, Use, or Disclosure of Covered Data
    9. Consistent with the Data Breach Notice's proposal, the 
Commission expands the Commission's definition of ``breach'' to include 
inadvertent access, use, or disclosure of covered data. Specifically, 
the Commission defines ``breach'' as any instance in which a person, 
without authorization or exceeding authorization, has gained access to, 
used, or disclosed covered data. While the practice of pretexting that 
spurred the Commission to act in 2007 necessarily involves an intent to 
gain access to customer information, the record before the Commission 
here amply demonstrates that the inadvertent exposure of customer 
information can result in the loss and misuse of sensitive information 
by scammers and phishers, and trigger a need to inform the affected 
individuals so that they can take appropriate steps to protect 
themselves and their information. The Commission agrees with the wide 
range of commenters that recognize that any exposure of customer data 
can risk harming consumers, regardless of whether the exposure was 
intentional. As the Accessibility Advocacy and Research Organizations 
(AARO) argue, ``[t]he Commission must adapt to an ever changing 
technological environment, which implicates all kinds of privacy 
concerns, and adopt measures that can effectively counter increasingly 
complex and evolving breaches.'' In order to address these risks, 
carriers not only must reasonably protect covered information as 
required by the Act and the Commission's rules, but also must inform 
affected individuals so that they can take appropriate steps to protect 
themselves and their information where breaches occur. In addition, 
notification of both intentional and unintentional breaches to the 
Commission and other Federal law enforcement will aid investigations 
and help prevent new breaches or further harm to consumers. The 
Commission expects that its broadening of ``breach'' to include 
inadvertent exposure will encourage telecommunications carriers to 
adopt stronger data security practices, and will help Federal agencies 
identify and address systemic network vulnerabilities.
    10. The record supports the Commission's observation in the Data 
Breach Notice that breaches have become more prevalent and more severe 
in recent years. In 2021, the Identity Theft Resource Center 
``estimated a record-breaking 1,862 data breaches,'' and a survey from 
IBM has exposed ``a recent decline in response capabilities'' due to 
``informal or ad hoc'' data security plans. This rising tide of data 
breaches has affected the telecommunications sector as well. As the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) points out, the 
proprietary information of subscribers of each of the three largest 
carriers ``has been breached at least once within the last five 
years.'' Indeed, in February 2020, the Commission proposed more than 
$200 million in fines against AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile, and Verizon, for 
apparently failing to adequately protect consumer location data. In 
each case, the Commission found that the carriers' apparently lacked 
adequate oversight over third-party location aggregators' use of their 
phone subscribers' location data, leading to the disclosure of their 
respective customers' location information, without consent, to third 
parties who were not authorized to receive it.
    11. Given these worrying trends, the Commission agrees with EPIC 
that its expansion of ``breach'' to include inadvertent exposures is a 
necessary first step to galvanize carriers to strengthen their data 
security policies and oversight of customer data. In particular, 
broadening the breach definition will better enable the marketplace to 
respond to the relative strengths of particular carriers' practices and 
enhance the Commission's ability to identify where additional 
regulatory oversight might be needed. Removing the intent limitation in 
the Commission's breach reporting rule will reduce ambiguity regarding 
whether reporting a breach is necessary, and therefore decrease the 
risk of underreporting. Finally, the Commission's expansion of 
``breach'' to include inadvertent access, use, or disclosure of 
customer information brings the Commission's rules in line with the 
overwhelming majority of State and Federal breach notification laws and 
regulations that lack such an intent limitation, ensuring that 
consumers nationwide--along with the Commission and other relevant 
Federal authorities--likewise receive critical breach notifications in 
a timely manner.
    12. Notwithstanding these benefits, the Commission acknowledges 
concerns expressed by carriers that its expansion of the ``breach'' 
definition to include inadvertent disclosures, on its own, could lead 
to ``notice fatigue'' for consumers, deplete Commission and law 
enforcement resources, or increase the burden of reporting obligations. 
The Commission is unpersuaded by the arguments of Lincoln Network, 
which goes even further and contends that data breach reporting 
requirements would implicate the major questions doctrine. Lincoln 
Networks focuses solely on the alleged economic impact of the 
requirement to the exclusion of other considerations, and even then 
provides no meaningful sense of the likely magnitude of such effects--
citing total estimated economic costs of breaches and asserting in a 
conclusory manner that ``it is reasonable to conclude that at least 
some of the cost per breach is assignable to notification,'' without 
quantifying the cost associated with such notifications, let alone any 
portion attributable specifically to FCC breach notification rules. The 
Commission thus is unpersuaded that the major questions doctrine is 
implicated here. In any case, the Commission explains below why these 
rules fall comfortably within the Commission's statutory authority. In 
response to these concerns, as discussed below, the Commission exempt 
from its expanded definition of ``breach'' a good-faith acquisition of 
customer data by an employee or agent of a carrier where such 
information is not used improperly or further disclosed. The Commission 
also adopts a ``harm-based notification trigger,'' such that 
notification of a breach to consumers is not required in cases where a 
carrier can reasonably determine that no harm to customers is 
reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach, or where the 
breach solely involves encrypted data and the carrier has definitive 
evidence that the encryption key was not also accessed, used, or 
disclosed. As discussed below, the Commission also finds that its 
adoption of a minimum threshold for the number of customers affected to 
trigger its requirement to notify the Commission and other Federal law

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enforcement regarding breaches where there is no reasonable likelihood 
of harm will further reduce carriers' reporting burdens, and make more 
efficient use of agencies' resources. Although carriers' obligation to 
protect covered information under section 222 of the Act and the 
Commission's implementing rules is not limited just to scenarios where 
there is actual evidence of consumer harms, these common-sense 
limitations on the Commission's disclosure requirements are well-
supported by the record and are consistent with most State and Federal 
data breach notification regimes. Taken together, the Commission finds 
that these carve-outs will mitigate any legitimate concerns expressed 
by commenters in the record regarding the potential for consumer notice 
fatigue and undue burdens on Federal agencies and carriers by 
triggering the requirements in situations where the Commission finds 
disclosures most strongly justified.
    13. In the Data Breach Notice, the Commission also sought comment 
on whether it should ``expand the definition of a breach to include 
situations where a telecommunications carrier or a third party 
discovers conduct that could have reasonably led to exposure of 
customer CPNI, even if it has not yet determined if such exposure 
occurred.'' Commenters generally oppose such an expansion, arguing that 
it could result in over-notification to customers and to government 
entities, impeding carriers' and the government's investigation of 
actual breaches, and needlessly frightening consumers. While the 
Commission believes that notification of situations in which customer 
data are put at risk has value, no commenter in the record provides 
evidence in support of such an approach. The Commission nevertheless 
expects that in such situations, carriers will work reasonably and 
efficiently to confirm whether or not actual exposure has occurred. 
While the Commission declines at this time to amend the definition of 
breach to include situations where a carrier or third party has not yet 
determined if an exposure of covered data has occurred, the Commission 
also notes that it does not prohibit carriers from providing notice in 
such situations to their customers if, for example, they determine that 
doing so is appropriate under the circumstances. While the Commission 
has not expanded the definition of data breach to include situations 
where customer data is put at risk but not exposed, it notes that the 
threshold for reporting a breach is separate from the obligation to 
``protect the confidentiality of proprietary information'' and to 
``take reasonable measures to discover and protect against attempts to 
gain unauthorized access to CPNI.'' 47 U.S.C. 222(a); 47 CFR 
64.2010(a). Not only may a breach that does not meet the reporting 
threshold still reflect a violation of section 222 of the Act or an 
unreasonable practice in violation of 64.2010(a) of the rules, but a 
carrier can violate section 222 of the Act or section 64.2010(a) of the 
rules even in the absence of any breach. The Commission also will 
continue to monitor how such situations impact customers, and reserve 
the ability to expand the breach definition to cover such situations in 
the future, should the Commission find such an expansion is warranted.
3. Good-Faith Exception
    14. The Commission excludes from the definition of ``breach'' a 
good-faith acquisition of covered data by an employee or agent of a 
carrier where such information is not used improperly or further 
disclosed. In the Data Breach Notice, the Commission used the term 
``exemption'' instead of ``exception'' when asking commenters whether 
the Commission should exclude from the definition of ``breach'' a good-
faith acquisition of covered data. For the purpose of clarity, the 
Commission instead uses the word ``exception'' here to describe this 
exclusion. While the Commission makes this exception to its definition 
of ``breach,'' it nevertheless expects carriers to ``take reasonable 
measures'' in such scenarios to protect such customer information from 
improper use or further disclosure, which may, for example, involve 
requiring that such an employee or agent destroy the data upon 
realizing that the data was disclosed without, or in excess of, 
authorization. As noted above and in the Data Breach Notice, the vast 
majority of State statutes include a similar exception from the 
definition of ``breach,'' and commenters overwhelmingly agree that such 
an exception is appropriate. As Blooston Rural Carriers argues, a good-
faith exception will prevent carriers from ``unnecessarily confus[ing] 
and alarm[ing] consumers'' in such low-risk situations. The Commission 
also agrees with National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 
(NRECA) that, without this exception, ``more serious data breaches 
[will potentially] become lost in the `noise' of multiple 
notifications.'' The Commission therefore finds that its good-faith 
exception will help avoid excessive notifications to consumers, and 
reduce reporting burdens on carriers. CTIA and NCTA's arguments about 
the Commission's allegedly overly broad definition of harm to trigger 
customer notifications of breaches of covered data, and their expressed 
concerns about excessive reporting to Federal agencies, do not account 
for the fact that this good-faith exception removes an entire category 
of breaches from the scope of reporting covered by the Commission's 
rules as a threshold matter. As a result, the Commission is unpersuaded 
by these parties' cursory claims about possible notice fatigue, 
consumer confusion or frustration, and interference with data breach 
investigations.
    15. The Commission disagrees with EPIC that its adoption of a good-
faith exception would ``weaken privacy and data security protections 
for consumers.'' In support of these claims, EPIC cites instances in 
which employees, ``either through bribery or inadequate training, were 
illegally disclosing consumer information to pretexters claiming to 
have authorization to access subscriber information.'' The Commission 
does not find that these situations justify taking a different 
approach; indeed, the exception the Commission adopts would not apply 
in the scenarios outlined by EPIC. First, the good-faith exception 
relieves carriers from reporting obligations only where customer 
information is not used improperly or further disclosed, and in EPIC's 
example, the information was, intentionally or not, further disclosed 
to a pretexter. Second, in circumstances where an employee improperly 
discloses consumer information due to bribery, the employee disclosing 
the information is, by definition, not acting in ``good faith,'' and 
therefore such an incident would still be considered a breach under the 
Commission's rules.

B. Notifying the Commission and Other Federal Law Enforcement of Data 
Breaches

1. Requiring Notification to the Commission
    16. As proposed in the Data Breach Notice, the Commission requires 
telecommunications carriers to notify the Commission of a breach in 
addition to notification to the Secret Service and FBI. The Commission 
continues to require carriers to notify the Secret Service and the FBI 
because doing so enables law enforcement to investigate the breach, 
``which could result in legal action against the perpetrators, thus 
ensuring that they do not continue to breach CPNI.'' Moreover, law 
enforcement investigations into how breaches occurred would enable law

[[Page 9972]]

enforcement to advise the carrier and the Commission to take steps to 
prevent future breaches of that kind. The Commission will maintain a 
link to the reporting facility at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/cpni or a 
successor URL designated by the Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau). 
As the Commission found when it adopted the current data breach rules, 
notifying law enforcement of a breach is consistent with the goal of 
protecting customers' personal data because it enables such agencies to 
investigate the breach, ``which could result in legal action against 
the perpetrators,'' thus ensuring that they do not continue to breach 
sensitive customer information. The Commission also anticipated that 
law enforcement investigations into how breaches occurred would enable 
law enforcement to advise providers and the Commission to take steps to 
anticipate and prevent future breaches of a similar nature. Addition of 
the Commission as a recipient of Federal-agency breach notifications is 
consistent with other Federal sector-specific laws, which require 
prompt notification to the relevant subject-matter agency. As large-
scale security breaches resulting from lax or inadequate data security 
practices and employee training have become more common since the 2007 
CPNI Order, notifying the Commission of breaches will provide 
Commission staff with important information about data security 
vulnerabilities and threat patterns that Commission staff can help 
address and remediate. Commission notification will also shed light on 
carriers' ongoing compliance with the Commission's rules. Consistent 
with its proposal and the record in response to the Data Breach Notice, 
the Commission requires carriers to notify the Commission of a 
reportable breach contemporaneously with the Secret Service and FBI. As 
stated in the Data Breach Notice, requiring carriers to notify the 
Commission, Secret Service, and FBI at the same time will minimize 
burdens on carriers, eliminate confusion regarding obligations, and 
streamline the reporting process, allowing carriers to free up 
resources that can be used to address the breach and prevent further 
harm. Commenters support a single, contemporaneous notification to the 
Commission, Secret Service, and FBI.
    17. The majority of commenters support including the Commission in 
data breach notifications. WISPA opposes contemporaneous notification 
to the Commission ``[i]f the Commission were to require separate 
notice.'' Because the Commission is not requiring separate notification 
to the Commission, but are merely adding the Commission as a recipient 
of breach notifications submitted through the preexisting central 
reporting facility, the Commission expects that this should allay 
WISPA's concern. Many of these commenters agree, however, that this new 
notification requirement should not create new obligations which are 
duplicative or inconsistent with the preexisting requirement to notify 
law enforcement agencies, and should instead entail one notification 
sent to all three. The Commission agrees with these suggestions, as the 
Commission sees no need for carriers to file separate or differing 
notifications to the Commission. As discussed below, the Commission 
delegates authority to the Bureau to coordinate with the Secret Service 
to adapt the existing central reporting facility for reporting breaches 
to the Commission and other Federal law enforcement agencies. 
Additionally, as discussed below, the Commission does not impose 
differing content requirements for notifications to the different 
agencies.
    18. The Commission disagrees with commenters that oppose requiring 
breach notification to the Commission. For example, ITI and WISPA argue 
that the existing requirement to notify the Secret Service and the FBI 
is sufficient, and that notification to the Commission is unnecessary. 
WISPA also argues that notification to the Commission would hinder law 
enforcement investigation efforts, and attempts to distinguish the 
other Federal regulations that require notification to sector-specific 
agencies as less burdensome than the Commission notification adopted 
here. The Commission is unpersuaded by these arguments. First, as 
mentioned above, the requirement to notify the Commission of covered 
data breaches is necessary to ensure that Commission staff are informed 
of new types of security vulnerabilities that arise in today's fast-
changing data security environment. Additionally, the Commission 
disagrees with WISPA that adding the Commission as a recipient of 
Federal-agency notifications would hinder law enforcement investigation 
efforts, given the lack of impact the addition will have on the timing, 
content, or format of notification to the other law enforcement 
agencies. Indeed, the Secret Service is supportive of the Commission 
receiving such notifications. Furthermore, the Commission's action here 
avoids adding any additional burden on filers by merely adding the 
Commission to the list of recipients of the same breach notifications 
Commission rules already require carriers to submit, and, as discussed 
in further detail below, further streamlines the filing process by 
adapting the existing reporting facility for submission. This should 
also address WISPA's concern that a contemporaneous, but separate, 
notice to the Commission would impact initial efforts to assess a 
breach. For these reasons, the Commission does not expect carriers of 
any size to experience increased regulatory burdens as a result of the 
Commission notification requirement. Moreover, to the extent that 
carriers are faced with any minimal burdens, such burdens are well 
justified by the value of these reports to Federal law enforcement 
agencies and the Commission.
2. Threshold Trigger for Federal-Agency Notification
    19. The Commission requires carriers to inform Federal agencies, 
via the central reporting facility, of all breaches, regardless of the 
number of customers affected or whether there is a reasonable risk of 
harm to customers. For breaches that affect 500 or more customers, or 
for which a carrier cannot determine how many customers are affected, 
the Commission requires carriers to file individual, per-breach 
notifications as soon as practicable, but no later than seven business 
days, after reasonable determination of a breach. As described below, 
these notifications must include detailed information regarding the 
nature of the breach and its impact on affected customers. This same 
type of notification, and the seven business day timeframe for 
submission, will also be required in instances where the carrier has 
conclusively determined that a breach affects fewer than 500 customers 
unless the carrier can reasonably determine that no harm to customers 
is reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach. As discussed 
below, for breaches affecting fewer than 500 customers and which do not 
meet the harm-based trigger, the Commission instead requires carriers 
to submit an annual summary of such incidents. For breaches in which a 
carrier can reasonably determine that a breach affecting fewer than 500 
customers is not reasonably likely to harm those customers, the 
Commission requires the carrier to file an annual summary of such 
breaches via the central reporting facility, instead of a notification. 
To ensure that carriers may be held accountable regarding their 
determinations of a breach's likelihood of harm and number of affected 
customers, the Commission requires carriers to keep records of the 
bases of those determinations for two years. The

[[Page 9973]]

Commission also notes that carriers may voluntarily file notification 
of such a breach in addition to, but not in place of, this annual 
summary filing. In circumstances where a carrier initially determines 
that contemporaneous breach notification to Federal agencies is not 
required under these provisions, but later discovers information that 
would require such notice, the Commission clarifies that a carrier must 
report the breach to Federal agencies as soon as practicable, but no 
later than seven business days of their discovery of this new 
information. For example, if a carrier initially determines that 
Federal agency notification within seven business days is not required 
because a breach affects fewer than 500 customers and harm to customers 
is not reasonably likely to occur, but later discovers new information 
suggesting that more than 500 customers were affected, or that harm to 
customers has occurred, or is likely to occur, as a result of the 
breach, then the carrier must notify Federal agencies as soon as 
practicable, but no later than within seven business days of this 
discovery.
    20. Given the Commission's expansion of the definition of 
``breach'' in today's Order to include inadvertent exposure of CPNI and 
other types of data, allowing carriers to file information regarding 
smaller, less risky breaches in a summary format on an annual basis 
will tailor administrative burdens on carriers to reflect those 
scenarios where reporting is most critical. The Commission is 
unpersuaded by NCTA's contention that its rule for data breach 
reporting to Federal agencies is ``likely to tax resources and limit 
the regulator's ability to identify the most problematic practices and 
act to protect consumers'' and result in harm due to lack of 
harmonization. The Commission is likewise unpersuaded by CTIA's similar 
contention that ``the FCC is not currently equipped to `become a 
repository for threat detection and monitoring' '' and that the ``flood 
of information threatens to distract FCC and Law Enforcement staff from 
real and potentially harmful security threats.'' These parties offer 
only generalized assertions in that regard without any evidence or 
analysis demonstrating concrete harms that are likely to result in 
practice. At the same time, NCTA and CTIA appear to neglect the 
potential the Commission anticipates for Federal agencies to gain 
useful insight into trends or particular activities that can lead to 
consumer harm even if, in a given instance, the reported breach 
happened not to involve consumer harm (whether under the standard set 
by Commission rules or in NCTA's and/or CTIA's own subjective 
judgment). The Commission's setting of a notification threshold is 
consistent with many State statutes that similarly do not have an 
intentionality requirement and require notice to State law enforcement 
authorities. The Commission's adoption of a 500-affected-customer 
threshold is also consistent with an analogous breach of health records 
notification required by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
    21. The vast majority of commenters are supportive of the need for 
a threshold trigger generally, but are divergent regarding what the 
numerical threshold should be. NCTA supports a threshold of 500 
affected customers for Federal-agency notifications, noting that such a 
threshold would ``minimize paperwork burdens on providers that wish to 
focus their resources on protecting customers,'' and cites a variety of 
State laws that use that threshold. CTIA and Verizon, however, argue 
that the Commission should set the threshold to be higher than 1,000 to 
reflect the larger customer bases of larger carriers. CTIA and Verizon 
do not provide additional reasoning as to why the size of the carrier's 
customer base is relevant in determining the threshold for Federal-
agency notification. If the rationale for adopting a higher threshold 
for larger carriers is to reduce reporting burdens, the Commission 
notes that larger carriers likely have more resources than smaller 
carriers to respond to breach incidents. Verizon, for example, admits 
that it has ``a team of more than 1,000 professionals dedicated to 
implementing corporate-wide security controls and constantly monitoring 
networks to identify and respond to threats.'' Additionally, the 
Commission and other Federal law enforcement agencies would likely have 
an investigative interest in breaches affecting 500 or more customers, 
regardless of the percentage of the overall customer base those 
customers represent.
    22. The Commission finds that the reporting threshold it adopts 
will both enable the Commission to receive more granular information 
regarding larger breaches to aid its investigations while also being 
able to study trends in breach activity through reporting of smaller 
breaches in annual submissions. Given that a number of States have 
found such a balance with a 500-affected-customer threshold, the 
Commission's adoption of this threshold also carries the additional 
benefit of ``increas[ing] harmonization with [S]tate breach 
notification statutes.'' The Commission therefore also rejects rural 
carriers' suggestion that it adopt a 5,000-affected-customer threshold.
    23. Finally, as supported by the record, the Commission applies 
this threshold trigger only to notifications to Federal agencies, and 
not to customer notifications. Breaches affecting even just a few 
customers can pose just as much risk to those customers as could 
breaches with wider impact. For this reason, as discussed above, the 
Commission continues to require carriers to notify Federal agencies 
within seven business days of breaches that implicate a reasonable risk 
of customer harm, regardless of the number of customers affected. Doing 
so will permit Federal agencies to investigate smaller breaches where 
there is a risk of customer harm, and also allow law enforcement 
agencies to request customer notification delays where such notice 
would ``impede or compromise an ongoing or potential criminal 
investigation or national security,'' as specified in the Commission's 
rules.
3. Notification Timeframe
    24. The Commission retains its existing requirement that carriers 
notify Federal agencies of a reportable breach as soon as practicable, 
but no later than seven business days, after reasonable determination 
of the breach. As commenters point out, in the text of the Data Breach 
Notice, the Commission occasionally used the phrase ``after discovery 
of a breach,'' rather than ``after reasonable determination of a 
breach'' when discussing the appropriate timeframe for Federal-agency 
notification. However, as the Proposed Rules Appendix makes clear, 
``after discovery'' was intended as shorthand, rather than a proposal 
to substantively change the existing ``after reasonable determination 
of a breach'' standard. While the Data Breach Notice proposed 
eliminating the seven business day deadline, based on the record in 
response, the Commission finds that the existing timeframe provides 
greater certainty for carriers and customers affected by breaches. The 
Commission agrees with ACA Connects that retaining the seven business 
day deadline properly balances the need to give carriers ``reasonable 
time to prioritize remediation efforts before submitting 
notifications'' with the need to ensure customers receive timely 
notifications regarding breaches affecting their data. The Commission 
also agrees with NTCA that there is insufficient evidence that the 
current timeline ``is inadequate to accomplish the Commission's 
goals.'' Particularly given its historical

[[Page 9974]]

experience with a seven day deadline, the Commission is unpersuaded by 
conclusory assertions that meeting that deadline might not always be 
feasible. Additionally, the Commission agrees with NTCA that 
eliminating the seven business day deadline and only ``requiring 
breaches to be reported `as soon as practicable' can be interpreted 
differently by different carriers or even by law enforcement and the 
Commission, thereby placing carriers at risk of inadvertently violating 
the Commission's rules if they construe `as soon as practicable' 
differently than the Commission.''
    25. The Commission disagrees with the arguments of other commenters 
that removing the seven business day deadline is necessary to afford 
carriers of different sizes and means the flexibility to respond to an 
evolving breach situation and minimize consumer harm, while also 
providing accurate and detailed notifications to Federal agencies. 
Given agencies' ability to calibrate their resources based on the 
volume of notifications, and the Commission's practical experience 
dealing with investigations at a stage where information might only be 
preliminary or incomplete, the Commission rejects arguments that 
burdens on the Commission and other law enforcement agencies justify 
eliminating the seven day reporting deadline. Carriers have long been 
subject to the existing seven business day deadline, which was adopted 
in 2007, and, as EPIC notes, some State jurisdictions require 
notification to the State attorney general within 3 days. As the 
Commission points out above, ACA Connects and NTCA--both associations 
of small-to-medium-sized carriers with presumably fewer resources than 
larger carriers such as Verizon--support retaining the seven business 
day time limit. Even assuming, arguendo, that the seven business day 
deadline is a more burdensome or inflexible timeframe for small 
carriers with ``limited personnel and/or resources,'' the Commission 
still finds that the countervailing interest in ensuring customers are 
notified quickly of breaches affecting them outweighs this tailored 
burden. For this reason, as discussed below, the Commission also 
removes the seven business day mandatory waiting period between 
Federal-agency notification and customer notification. The Commission 
lastly clarifies that ``reasonabl[y] determin[ing]'' a breach has 
occurred does not mean reaching a conclusion regarding every fact 
surrounding a data security incident that may constitute a breach. 
Rather, a carrier will be treated as having ``reasonabl[y] 
determin[ed]'' that a breach has occurred when the carrier has 
information indicating that it is more likely than not that there was a 
breach.
    26. While the Commission sets this outer bound for Federal-agency 
notifications, it expects that larger carriers with significant 
resources and staffing will routinely be providing notification of 
breaches to the Commission well within the seven business day deadline, 
and that other carriers should strive to do so as well. Indeed, the 
``as soon as practicable'' standard may require such notifications be 
made in fewer days than the seven business day deadline, and a failure 
to swiftly report breaches may, depending on the circumstances, be 
untimely and unreasonable, even if within the seven business day 
deadline. For example, if a carrier has made all the determinations 
necessary to conclude that a breach should be reported to law 
enforcement after only a few days, it would be inconsistent with the 
``as soon as practicable'' standard for the carrier to wait until the 
seventh business day--merely because that is the outer limit--before 
providing the required notice. The Enforcement Bureau will continue to 
investigate carriers that have neglected to provide timely notification 
to Federal agencies after a breach incident pursuant to its delegated 
authority.
    27. Annual Reporting of Certain Small Breaches. The Commission 
requires carriers to submit, via the existing central reporting 
facility and no later than February 1, a consolidated summary of 
breaches that occurred over the course of the previous calendar year 
which affected fewer than 500 customers, and where the carrier could 
reasonably determine that no harm to customers was reasonably likely to 
occur as a result of the breach. The Commission delegates authority to 
the Bureau to coordinate with the Secret Service regarding any 
modification to the portal that may be necessary to permit the filing 
of this annual summary. The Commission also delegates authority to the 
Bureau, working in conjunction with the Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau, and based on the record of this proceeding--or any 
additional notice and comment that might be warranted--to determine the 
content and format requirements of this filing and direct the Bureau to 
release a public notice announcing these requirements. The Commission 
instructs the Bureau to minimize the burdens on carriers by, for 
example, limiting the content required for each reported breach to that 
absolutely necessary to identify patterns or gaps that require further 
Commission inquiry. At a minimum, the Bureau should develop 
requirements that are less burdensome than what is required for 
individual breach submissions to the reporting facility, and consider 
streamlined ways for filers to report this summary information. The 
first annual report will be due the first February 1 after the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) approves the annual reporting 
requirement under the Paperwork Reduction Act. The first report should 
cover all breaches between the effective date of the annual reporting 
requirement and the remainder of the calendar year.
    28. The Commission disagrees with CTIA's argument that ``there is 
no regulatory goal served by mandating record keeping'' for incidents 
affecting fewer customers than the notification threshold. NCTA argues 
that the annual reporting requirement would ``not provide the 
Commission with meaningful information to serve its goals of 
identifying data breach patterns,'' but does not provide more detail as 
to why such information would not be helpful. Breaches that are limited 
in scope may still reveal patterns or provide evidence of security 
vulnerabilities at an early stage. As noted in the Data Breach Notice 
and the 2007 CPNI Order, notification of all breaches, regardless of 
the number of customers affected or a carrier's determination of harm, 
``could allow the Commission and Federal law enforcement to be `better 
positioned than individual carriers to develop expertise about the 
methods and motives' '' associated with breaches. The Commission 
therefore finds that this annual summary of smaller breaches will 
continue to enable the Commission and its Federal law enforcement 
partners to investigate, remediate, and deter smaller breaches.
    29. The Commission also disagrees with NTCA and Southern Linc who 
argue that ``requiring carriers to maintain records of any breaches 
that fall below the notification threshold `will place an unnecessary 
burden on carriers. . . .' '' On the contrary, the Commission finds 
that any burdens associated with the annual reporting requirement are 
likely to be well justified by the countervailing benefits discussed 
above. Nor do commenters objecting to the burden of the Commission's 
rules as unwarranted provide a quantification of their anticipated 
burdens that would overcome the benefits anticipated from those rules. 
Moreover, this single annual report containing a summary of such

[[Page 9975]]

breaches will likely end up replacing numerous smaller breach 
notifications individually submitted via the central reporting facility 
throughout the year. Additionally, Commission rules already require 
carriers to ``maintain a record of all instances where CPNI was 
disclosed or provided to third parties, or where third parties were 
allowed access to CPNI.'' The first part of this requirement 
encompasses all disclosures of CPNI to third parties resulting from a 
data breach, and thus is broader than the small-breach reporting 
requirement the Commission adopts today, at least with regard to CPNI.
4. Notification Contents
    30. The Commission maintains its existing requirements regarding 
the contents of data breach notifications to Federal law enforcement 
agencies, with a minor modification as noted below, and applies these 
same requirements to notifications to the Commission. The Commission 
agrees with comments submitted by WISPA arguing that ``the information 
currently submitted through the FBI/Secret Service reporting facility 
is largely sufficient and that generally the same information should be 
reported'' under its updated rules. The Commission also takes this 
opportunity to codify these categories of information in its rules to 
improve the ease of identifying the information that will be needed by 
regulated entities. Specifically, the Commission requires carriers to 
report, at a minimum, information relevant to the breach, including: 
carrier address and contact information; a description of the breach 
incident; the method of compromise; the date range of the incident; the 
approximate number of customers affected; an estimate of financial loss 
to the carrier and customers, if any; and the types of data breached. 
The Commission believes that these disclosures are sufficient to give 
the Commission and other Federal law enforcement agencies the 
information needed to determine appropriate next steps, such as, for 
example, conducting an investigation, determining and advising on how 
such a breach may be prevented in the future, and informing future 
rulemakings to protect consumers and businesses from harm. Carriers 
must update their initial breach notification report if: (1) the 
carrier learns that, in some material respect, the breach notification 
report initially submitted was incomplete or incorrect; or (2) 
additional information is acquired by or becomes known to the carrier 
after the submission of its initial breach notification report.
    31. A number of carriers request changes to, or elimination of, 
certain fields contained in the notification. In its comments, CCA 
states that, while it ``does not take a position on the specific 
contents that should be included in all notifications to law 
enforcement, to the Commission, or to customers[,] . . . . [t]he 
detailed information currently reported to law enforcement for purposes 
of investigation and potential criminal charges is significantly 
broader than what is necessary and appropriate for the Commission's 
use. Indeed, over-reporting of such information outside the law 
enforcement context can introduce additional data-security risks and 
privacy concerns''. See CCA Comments at 7. The Commission notes that 
CCA does not provide further detail on ``what is necessary and 
appropriate'' in support of its argument or to aid its consideration. 
As discussed below, the Commission is unpersuaded by these arguments, 
and declines to alter the fields of information collected through the 
notification portal.
    32. Customer Billing Addresses. ACA Connects, CTIA, and WTA request 
elimination of the requirement to include the billing addresses of 
affected customers in notifications. ACA Connects states that this 
reporting requirement has unclear investigative value, and its 
elimination would ``minimize the personal information reported to the 
Commission and law enforcement agencies.'' While the Commission 
acknowledges that Federal agencies have been directed to minimize the 
collection, use, storage, and disclosure of personal information to 
only that which is relevant and necessary to accomplish an authorized 
purpose, carriers are not in a position to know, in the absence of 
input from law enforcement agencies in this proceeding, which fields 
hold investigative value. Furthermore, because the portal was designed 
by law enforcement agencies themselves, the Commission must assume that 
their inclusion of this field reflects a determination that such 
information holds some investigative value. Finally, the Commission 
notes that the field is not currently marked as a required field. For 
this reason, the field does not present a reporting burden to carriers, 
but instead gives carriers an opportunity to provide Federal agencies 
more detail, should they wish to do so or find such detail relevant. 
WTA argues that ``billing names and addresses . . . are not classified 
as CPNI,'' and thus should be omitted from the form. The Commission's 
expansion of covered data to include information beyond CPNI renders 
this argument moot.
    33. Estimate of Financial Loss. WTA argues that ``estimated 
financial loss'' is ``impossible to determine or predict with any 
degree of accuracy during the brief and chaotic period immediately 
following discovery of a data breach.'' The Commission declines to 
modify or remove this field. While it understands that estimating 
financial loss is a complex and context-specific calculation, the 
Commission emphasizes the critical importance of this data point in 
helping Federal agencies allocate their resources. Additionally, while 
carriers should strive to provide in their notifications as accurate a 
value as possible, the Commission notes that even a ballpark estimate 
or a range of quantities can help agencies determine an incident's 
priority for the purposes of opening or conducting investigations, and 
understand the magnitude of future risk posed by certain 
vulnerabilities.
    34. Other Fields. CTIA identifies two fields which it argues are no 
longer necessary given the Commission's change to the reporting 
threshold for Federal-agency notifications, as discussed below. 
Specifically, CTIA requests that the Commission remove the fields 
regarding whether the breach ``resulted from a change of [a customer's] 
billing address'' or was based on ``a personal issue between two 
individuals.'' The Commission declines to do so. First, these fields 
are not marked as ``required'' on the form, and thus create no burden 
on reporting carriers that do not wish to complete them, while 
providing an opportunity for carriers to submit that information where 
applicable if they find it helpful or appropriate to do so. Second, 
under the Commission's revised rules, a breach stemming from a personal 
issue between two individuals or a change of a single customer's 
billing address may still trigger notification to Federal agencies. The 
reporting threshold only impacts the need to notify Federal agencies of 
breaches affecting fewer than 500 customers that do not implicate harm. 
As stated below, even small breaches may cause harm for the few 
customers affected by them. CTIA also requests elimination of the field 
that asks whether ``the carrier believes that there is an 
extraordinarily urgent need to notify any class of affected customers'' 
before ``7 full business days have passed.'' CTIA argues that 
``[r]emoving this field is consistent [with] the NPRM's proposal to 
eliminate the seven-business-day waiting period.'' The Commission 
agrees with this suggestion as its abrogation of the seven

[[Page 9976]]

business day waiting period rule will cause such a field to be 
unnecessary.
    35. Harmonizing Reporting Contents with CIRCIA. In the Data Breach 
Notice, the Commission sought comment on whether it should require 
telecommunications carriers to report, at a minimum, the information 
required under the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure 
Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) as part of their notifications to Federal 
agencies. While a few commenters support the alignment or harmonization 
of these data breach notifications with the requirements under CIRCIA, 
the Commission declines to take action in this regard at this early 
stage. CIRCIA directs the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency (CISA) to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking implementing 
its notification provisions by March 15, 2024. The CISA must issue 
final rules no later than 18 months after the publication of the notice 
of proposed rulemaking. At the time of this Order, the CISA has not yet 
released the notice of proposed rulemaking. Therefore, the Commission 
finds it is too early to determine the precise contours of the final 
reporting requirements, and in the interest of preventing duplicative 
or inconsistent fields, and consistent with the approach advocated by 
ACA Connects, Blooston Rural Carriers, and CCA, the Commission will 
refrain from making additional changes based on CIRCIA and continue to 
monitor whether such changes may be required in the future.
    36. The Commission does not find CTIA's comparison of its reporting 
trigger to that of the Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) 
compelling. CIRCIA is concerned with the category of ``incidents.'' 
CIRCIA does not define ``breaches.'' But under Federal guidance to 
agencies, a breach is a specific type of incident--an incident that 
involves the loss of control, compromise, unauthorized disclosure, 
unauthorized acquisition (etc.) of PII. And it would not be 
inconsistent for only some incidents to be reportable under CIRCIA but 
for all breaches to be reportable under the Commission's rules. For 
example, for Federal agencies, for an incident to qualify as a ``major 
incident'' it must be likely to result in demonstrable harm to the 
national security interests, foreign relations, or the economy of the 
United States, or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public 
health and safety of the American people. But for a ``breach'' to 
qualify as a major incident, it can either satisfy that qualitative 
threshold, or it can involve the PII of 100,000 or more people. Thus, 
the individual privacy concerns implicated by a breach justify a 
broader reporting trigger.
    37. The Commission also disagrees with CTIA's characterization of 
CIRCIA's incident reporting framework. CTIA argues that CIRCIA's 
reporting framework ``only applies--in a risk-based way--to `covered 
cyber incidents,' which must be `substantial' and do not include all 
incidents.' '' This argument misconstrues the statute. Section 
2242(c)(2)(A) of CIRCIA sets a minimum on the types of ``substantial 
cyber incidents that constitute covered cyber incidents'' and 
implicitly allows the CISA to expand the definition beyond that in the 
course of its rulemaking. For example, one of those required minimums 
is to report ``cyber incident[s] that lead[ ] to substantial loss of 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information system 
or network, or a serious impact on the safety and resiliency of 
operational systems and processes.'' While a rulemaking implementing 
CIRCIA is still pending, the CISA may define ``loss of 
confidentiality'' to include data breaches. The Commission further 
notes that the two statutory exceptions to ``substantial cyber 
incidents that constitute covered cyber incidents'' are narrow, and 
likely would not prevent the CISA from adopting implementing 
regulations that broaden the scope of covered cyber incidents that 
trigger the statute's reporting obligations.
5. Other Issues
    38. Harm-based Trigger for Federal-Agency Notifications. In the 
Data Breach Notice, the Commission sought comment on whether to forego 
requiring notification of a breach to customers or Federal agencies in 
those instances where a telecommunications carrier can reasonably 
determine that no harm to customers is reasonably likely to occur as a 
result of the breach. While the Commission adopts such a harm-based 
notification trigger for breach notifications to customers generally, 
as discussed below, it declines to do so for Federal-agency 
notifications of breaches that meet or exceed the 500-affected-customer 
threshold described above. For breaches that do not meet its reporting 
threshold of at least 500 affected customers, the Commission do not 
require notification to Federal agencies via the central reporting 
facility in those instances where a carrier can reasonably determine 
that no harm to customers is reasonably likely to occur as a result of 
the breach. The Commission does not believe that the rationale for 
adopting a harm-based notification trigger for customer notifications 
applies in the Federal-agency context. Specifically, unlike customers, 
Federal agencies do not have the same vulnerability to notice fatigue, 
confusion, stress, or financial hardship that would cause the burdens 
they experience from additional reporting to outweigh the benefits. 
CTIA argues that by not extending the harm-based trigger to Federal-
agency notifications, the Commission risks that notifications will 
``inundate the Commission's breach reporting facility with 
information'' and the ``flood of information threatens to distract FCC 
and Law Enforcement staff from real and potentially harmful security 
threats.'' As an initial matter, the Commission notes that, as private 
entities, CTIA and its members lack any particular insight into, or 
expertise regarding, the administrative burdens affecting Federal 
agencies with respect to these rules. Contrary to CTIA's unsupported 
assertions, the agencies affected by these breach notification rules do 
not anticipate significant costs associated with the breach reporting 
requirements the Commission adopts today. While the Commission agrees 
that receiving notifications or reports of breaches that carriers have 
reasonably concluded do not trigger customer notification under the 
harm-based trigger will require the use of some resources by the 
Commission and law enforcement agencies, the Commission finds the value 
of enabling Federal agencies to identify patterns and insecurities and 
monitor all breaches of covered data outweigh the marginal costs of 
receiving notifications or reports for breaches that fall in this 
category. Additionally, as mentioned above, a report regarding a breach 
that does not result in harm to customers could nevertheless aid 
Federal agencies in identifying patterns and potential vulnerabilities 
and develop expertise across the industry. Commenters argue that the 
Commission should adopt a harm-based notification trigger for all 
Federal-agency notifications to avoid draining carrier resources. While 
commenters are correct that a general harm-based trigger would likely 
serve to reduce carriers' reporting burdens, so too would a reporting 
threshold. The Commission finds that its adoption of a reporting 
threshold is better tailored to reducing carriers' burdens in the 
Federal-agency-notification context while maintaining appropriate 
benefits of reporting. Commenters also argue that a harm-based 
notification trigger is necessary to reduce burdens on government 
resources. Even assuming, arguendo, that such burdens exist, they would 
likely be outweighed by the countervailing public interest in Federal

[[Page 9977]]

agencies receiving information concerning all breaches for 
investigative or trend analysis purposes. The Commission's threshold 
trigger ensures that Federal agencies receive breach information with 
the appropriate level of detail at the appropriate time given a 
breach's harmful impact or magnitude. the Commission's targeted 
application of a harm-based trigger to breaches affecting fewer than 
500 customers ensures that Federal agencies are notified before 
customers and thereby have an opportunity to request a delay if 
necessary. This trigger also permits Federal agencies to investigate 
small breaches that are harmful sooner after the breach incident than 
in a carrier's annual report, as described above.
    39. Method of Notification. In the Data Breach Notice, the 
Commission proposed to create and maintain a centralized portal for 
reporting breaches to the Commission and other Federal law enforcement 
agencies. After reviewing the record, the Commission instead requires 
carriers to use the existing data breach reporting facility for 
notifications to the Secret Service and FBI and delegate authority to 
the Bureau to coordinate with the Secret Service, the current 
administrator of the reporting facility, and the FBI, to the extent 
necessary, to ensure that the Commission will be notified when data 
breaches are reported and to implement the targeted modifications to 
the content of breach notifications that the Commission adopts today. 
The Commission's decision to require the same content and timing for 
notification to the Commission as for notification to the Secret 
Service and FBI supports the use of a single portal for notifying all 
three agencies. Consistent with the Secret Service's request, the 
Commission also delegates authority to the Bureau, working in 
conjunction with the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau and the 
Office of Managing Director, to collaborate with the Secret Service to 
explore the possibility of the Commission assuming control and 
responsibility for the reporting facility in the future, and to 
transition control of the facility to the Commission should the Bureau 
and Secret Service agree that such a transition is desirable.
    40. Commenters widely supported the use of a single portal for all 
Federal-agency notifications. ACA Connects argues that using the 
preexisting portal for Commission notification will save government 
resources that would otherwise be spent developing a redundant portal. 
NCTA also advocates for the use of the preexisting portal, noting that 
the portal ``works well for service providers.'' The Commission agrees 
with commenters' analysis and thus requires carriers to submit their 
breach notifications to the Commission and other Federal law 
enforcement agencies through the existing portal. The Commission 
disagrees with John Staurulakis' suggestion that the Commission should 
instead require carriers to maintain a summary of inadvertent breaches 
for inclusion in their annual CPNI certification. The Commission finds 
that this approach would significantly delay notification of such 
breaches to Federal agencies, preventing law enforcement from acting 
quickly to investigate inadvertent breaches that may have widespread, 
harmful impact on customers.

C. Customer Notification

1. Harm-Based Notification Trigger
    41. The Commission adopts a harm-based trigger for notification of 
breaches to customers so that they may focus their time, effort, and 
financial resources on the most important and potentially harmful 
incidents. The Commission agrees with commenters that adopting a harm-
based trigger serves the public interest by protecting customers from 
over-notification and notice fatigue, specifically in instances where 
the carrier has reasonably determined that no harm is likely to occur. 
As the Commission recognized in the Data Breach Notice, it is not only 
distressing, but time consuming and expensive, to deal with a data 
breach, costing customers time, effort, and financial difficulty to 
change their passwords, purchase fraud alerts or credit monitoring, and 
freeze their credit in instances where the breach is not reasonably 
likely to result in any harm. Therefore the Commission finds that 
adopting a harm-based notification trigger, along with the expanded 
definition of breach, will ensure that customers are made aware of 
potentially harmful instances of breach, whether intentional or not, 
while preventing unnecessary financial and emotional difficulty in no-
harm situations. The Commission agrees with those commenters that argue 
that the risk of notice fatigue to customers is important in light of 
its decision to expand the definition of breach. The Commission's 
adoption of the harm-based notification trigger will ensure that 
customer notification is focused on the incidents which are likely to 
cause harm, whether the incident was the result of intentional or 
inadvertent conduct. A harm-based trigger for notification to customers 
also allows carriers, particularly small and rural providers, to focus 
their resources on data security and mitigating any harms caused by 
breaches rather than generating notifications where harm was unlikely. 
The Commission's decision to adopt a harm-based notification trigger is 
also consistent with the majority of State laws, which generally do not 
require covered entities to notify customers of breaches when a 
determination is made that the breach is unlikely to result in harm.
    42. While the record overwhelmingly supports the adoption of a 
harm-based notification trigger, some commenters worry that such a 
framework could result in legal ambiguity or lead to underreporting of 
breaches. The Commission takes several actions to mitigate these 
concerns. First, the Commission clarifies that where a carrier is 
unable to make a reasonable determination of whether or not harm to 
customers is likely, the obligation to notify customers remains. In 
making this determination, the Commission does not require carriers to 
consult Federal law enforcement or the Commission, as suggested by some 
commenters. Rather, carriers must determine using the factors outlined 
below whether harm to customers is likely to occur. If a provider 
concludes that harm to customers was unlikely and therefore customer 
notification was not required, but the Commission finds that conclusion 
to be unreasonable, the Commission will notify the provider. Stated 
differently, the Commission establishes a rebuttable presumption of 
harm and require carriers to notify customers of a breach in situations 
where the carrier is unable to reasonably determine that harm is 
reasonably unlikely to occur. ACA Connects argues that the Commission 
should decline to establish a rebuttable presumption of consumer harm 
because having to make filings in the interest of overcoming such a 
presumption would be burdensome for small providers. However, the 
Commission does not require any such filing. Rather, carriers must 
determine, based on the specific facts of a breach, whether consumer 
harm is reasonably unlikely to occur. The Commission provides further 
guidance to carriers on what constitutes harm to consumers below. The 
Commission rejects NCTA's proposal to limit the rebuttable presumption 
of harm to ``instances where the breach involves a risk of tangible, 
financial harm, identity theft or theft of service.'' NCTA's list is 
underinclusive in that it omits other harms that are significant. Nor 
does the record enable the Commission to readily draw a line that

[[Page 9978]]

separates the risks of some harms from others. The Commission clarifies 
that carriers do not need to disprove the potential for each type of 
harm in every instance to overcome the presumption, but must rather 
come to a reasonable fact-specific conclusion that, when considering 
all of the factors as a whole, harm is unlikely to occur. Second, as 
discussed above, the Commission declines to adopt a harm-based trigger 
for notification to Federal law enforcement agencies and the Commission 
for breaches affecting 500 or more customers. As such, carriers are 
required to provide notification for all incidents which meet the 
expanded definition of data breach and this affected-customer threshold 
to Federal law enforcement agencies and to the Commission. ACA Connects 
comments that the harm-based trigger should apply not only to customer 
breach notifications, but to Federal-agency notifications as well. The 
Commission disagrees. As ACA Connects notes, Federal agencies are not 
prone to notice fatigue in the same way that consumers are. 
Additionally, as discussed above, notifying Federal agencies of all 
breaches allows the Commission and law enforcement agencies to identify 
patterns and potential vulnerabilities and develop expertise across the 
industry, thereby enabling them to respond in appropriate and targeted 
ways. Moreover, under the rules the Commission adopts today, breaches 
falling below this threshold must be compiled and reported to Federal 
agencies annually. The Commission believes that this will serve as a 
backstop to any potential underreporting to customers, as the Federal 
agencies will have an opportunity to act even in instances where the 
provider may have concluded that harm to the consumer was unlikely.
    43. Evaluating Harm to Customers. To the extent that a provider has 
evidence of actual harm to customers, notification is required and the 
harm-based analysis is conclusive. In instances where there is no 
definitive evidence of actual harm, as suggested in the Data Breach 
Notice, the Commission identifies a set of factors that 
telecommunications carriers should consider when evaluating whether 
harm to customers is reasonably likely. WISPA and ACA Connects support 
the Commission adopting a set of factors to help guide providers in 
determining whether harm to consumers is reasonably likely. The 
Commission believes that establishing a set of guidelines and 
recommendations strikes the right balance between preventing ambiguity, 
versus adopting a rigid definition which is too inflexible. The 
Commission believes that identifying these factors will promote 
consistency and further remedy concerns about ambiguity.
    44. The Commission finds that ``harm'' to customers could include, 
but is not limited to: financial harm, physical harm, identity theft, 
theft of services, potential for blackmail, the disclosure of private 
facts, the disclosure of contact information for victims of abuse, and 
other similar types of dangers. Some parties raise administrability 
concerns about including harms such as ``disclosure of private facts'' 
on the theory that they are too speculative for providers. Beyond this 
bare assertion, these parties do not meaningfully explain what 
administrability problems would arise in practice. Additionally, they 
fail to account for the fact that providers only need make a reasonable 
determination of whether or not harm to customers is likely. Thus, even 
assuming arguendo that particular harms are challenging to evaluate in 
particular circumstances, a provider is not held to a standard of 
perfection, and any inherent challenges can be accounted for when 
evaluating the reasonableness of a given determination. The 
Commission's broad approach to the privacy harms that merit customer 
notice has ample legal support. First, OMB has noted that ``types of 
harms'' that individuals affected by a breach can experience have 
evolved: ``Identity theft can result in embarrassment, inconvenience, 
reputational harm, emotional harm, financial loss, unfairness, and, in 
rare cases, risks to public safety.'' While OMB was specifically 
describing harms arising from an identity theft, the fact that those 
harms go beyond financial supports the Commission's conclusion that 
other types of harm should be considered when assessing the risk of 
harm from a breach. Second, the Commission's approach finds support 
from case law--e.g., decisions holding that reputational harm can 
confer Article III standing. And third, the Commission's approach 
better reflects consumer expectations than a more cabined-approach to 
harm: Privacy harms that merit individual notice should be linked to 
those harms that individuals' experience, not those that carriers can 
most easily identify.
    45. The Commission finds that this broader conception of harm is 
consistent with previous Commission precedent, and disagrees with 
commenters arguing that ``harm'' should only include the risk of 
identity theft or financial harm. The limited types of harm suggested 
by these commenters is underinclusive in that it omits other harms that 
are significant, particularly in the aggregate. The Commission find 
thats adopting such a narrow definition of harm is not only 
inconsistent with the Commission's longstanding approach, but also 
could lead to underreporting of breaches, and disregards other 
important and potentially costly consequences of a breach to customers. 
The Commission believes that a tiered approach would be unnecessarily 
complicated for carriers to assess the various ``levels'' of harm. 
Nevertheless, many of the factors that Blooston Rural Carriers suggests 
as relevant to their proposed analysis (i.e., financial harm, 
encryption, risk of identity theft) are consistent with the approach 
that the Commission adopts. While a broader definition of harm may be 
more difficult for carriers to apply in certain cases, the Commission 
believes that carriers will be fully capable of understanding when to 
comply with its disclosure requirements in light of the Commission's 
decision to adopt a rebuttable presumption of harm.
    46. When assessing the likelihood of harm to customers, carriers 
should consider the following factors. Consistent with the Data Breach 
Notice, the Commission finds that no single factor on its own is 
sufficient to make a determination regarding harm to customers.
     The sensitivity of the information (including in totality) 
which was breached. For example, the disclosure of a phone number is 
less likely to create harm than if the number of calls to that phone 
number, the duration of those calls, the name of the caller, the 
content of the conversations, and/or other layers of information is 
also disclosed. This contextual approach to gauging the sensitivity of 
customer information is consistent with the definition of PII the 
Commission adopts above with respect to its breach notification rules, 
which considers whether information is disclosed in combination with 
other information which inherently increases the risk associated with 
the disclosure. Additionally, harm is more likely if financial 
information or sensitive personal information was included in the 
breach. Commenters agree that a breach implicating financial 
information is likely harmful. Some data elements are always considered 
sensitive, such as bank account numbers and Social Security Numbers. 
Other data elements (e.g., Date of Birth) become sensitive when paired 
with another data element (e.g., name, address, or phone number). And 
still other data elements may be sensitive in context (e.g., data 
identifying a subscriber in a TRS

[[Page 9979]]

program, because confirmed participation may be sufficient to reveal an 
individual's hearing- or speech-related disability). Consistent with 
the approach the Commission takes in this order, carriers must consider 
each element and all of the elements taken together, in context, to 
determine whether sensitive information was revealed in a breach. The 
data's potential for reuse should also be considered. For example, if a 
password is compromised, it is possible that the information could be 
reused to attack other accounts. Finally, if information is not able to 
be changed, it is more sensitive than information that is changeable. 
For example, a customer could change their password for an account, but 
the customer is unable to change their social security number, for 
instance. NCTA proposes an alternative approach under which the 
rebuttable presumption of harm only would apply ``where specific types 
of data are compromised.'' But the Commission's framework already 
factors in the sensitivity of the data as part of the overall analysis 
of harm. And as indicated by its guidance for evaluating harm, the 
Commission finds multiple considerations should be evaluated 
collectively to accurately gauge the likelihood of consumer harm. Thus, 
the Commission finds that its approach already accounts for potential 
differences in the risk of harm associated with specific types of data, 
but does so more effectively than NCTA's proposal by calling for a 
consideration of the broader relevant context, as well.
     The nature and duration of the breach. For example, if the 
information was widely accessible online over a long period of time, 
harm is more likely than if the information was only briefly accessible 
to a limited number of individuals. Information on a portable USB flash 
drive which does not require any special skill or knowledge to access 
is more likely to cause harm than information on a secured back-up 
device which is password protected. Covered data that was exposed for 
an extended period of time is more likely to have been accessed or used 
to the detriment of customers than data that was only briefly exposed.
     Mitigations. How quickly the carrier discovered the 
breach, and whether it took actions to mitigate any potential harm to 
the customers, is also a factor.
     Intentionality. In the case of an individual or entity 
intentionally obtaining access to covered data, such as by using the 
practice of pretexting, unauthorized intrusion into a physical or 
virtual space, theft of a device, or other similar activities, harm is 
more likely to occur. Conversely, an accidental breach, such as that 
resulting from a misdirected email, accidentally losing a device with 
covered data stored on it, or other similar activities, is less likely 
to result in harm.
    47. Encryption Safe Harbor. As requested by a number of parties, 
the Commission adopts a safe harbor under which customer notification 
is not required where a breach solely involves encrypted data and the 
carrier has definitive evidence that the encryption key was not also 
accessed, used, or disclosed. For the purposes of this safe harbor, the 
Commission defines encrypted data as covered data that has been 
transformed through the use of an algorithmic process into a form that 
is unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable through a security 
technology or methodology generally accepted in the field of 
information security. The Commission agrees with commenters that the 
risk of harm to customers is significantly reduced when the data was 
encrypted, provided that the carrier has evidence that the encryption 
key has not been compromised. While EPIC recommends that the Commission 
not exempt breaches solely involving encrypted data from its breach 
notification rules, EPIC does nonetheless acknowledge that ``a typical 
breach of encrypted data may present a lower risk of harm to 
consumers'', though ``encrypted data can nevertheless be compromised if 
a third party obtains access to the requisite encryption keys or is 
able to identify and exploit an additional security vulnerability.'' 
The Commission agrees. For those reasons, encrypted data is only 
exempted from the customer breach notification requirement where the 
carrier has definitive evidence that the encryption key was not 
compromised. Additionally, whether data was encrypted or not is 
irrelevant to the Federal-government breach notification requirement. 
As such, carriers are still required to report all breaches of covered 
data, whether that data was encrypted or not, to the Commission and law 
enforcement agencies. As the Commission has previously explained, data 
regarding breaches, even breaches with little or no risk of consumer 
harm, can be helpful to assist Federal agencies to determine data 
security vulnerabilities and threat patterns. Stated differently, 
encryption does not exempt an incident from the Commission's definition 
of breach, but rather only limits the instances where notification to a 
customer may be necessary. The Commission also agrees with commenters 
that its decision to implement a notification exception for encrypted 
data will incentivize and encourage the use of encryption to the 
benefit of the public, and further the goal of harmonization with State 
and other laws. Several States have established an exception for 
encrypted data from their breach notification requirements so long as 
the key has not been compromised or also breached. Additionally, in 
recent amendments to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act's Safeguards Rule, the 
FTC exempted encrypted data from its notification requirement. To the 
extent that a threat actor appears to have circumvented encryption, 
however, the carrier should conduct a harm-based analysis as if the 
data was never encrypted.
2. Customer Notification Timeframe
    48. Consistent with the Commission's proposal in the Data Breach 
Notice, the Commission requires telecommunications carriers to notify 
customers of covered data breaches without unreasonable delay after 
notification to Federal agencies. The Commission finds that the current 
framework, which imposes a mandatory seven business day waiting period, 
is out-of-step with current approaches regarding the urgency of 
notifying victims about breaches of their personal information, and 
that the public interest is better served by eliminating the waiting 
period and thereby increasing the speed at which customers can receive 
the important information contained in a notice. At the same time, the 
Commission recognizes the importance of law enforcement's ability to 
investigate a breach, and understands that in certain situations, 
notification of a breach may interfere with a criminal investigation or 
national security. Therefore, consistent with the Secret Service's 
request, the Commission will allow law enforcement to request an 
initial delay of up to 30 days in those specific circumstances where 
one is warranted. WISPA commented that the seven business day waiting 
period can be ``crucial for law enforcement to effectively investigate 
the breach.'' The Commission agrees that law enforcement requires an 
opportunity to investigate a breach, but does not find that a seven 
business day waiting period, applied to all breaches, is necessary. 
Under the framework that the Commission adopts today, law enforcement 
may request a delay when one would be useful, but in the many 
circumstances where a delay is not necessary, this rule will allow 
carriers to more promptly notify customers,

[[Page 9980]]

thereby empowering them to take action to mitigate any harms.
    49. The Commission finds that the ``without unreasonable delay'' 
standard encourages carriers to promptly notify customers of covered 
data breaches while offering the flexibility to be responsive to the 
specifics of a situation. This approach is consistent with many 
existing data breach notification laws that require expedited notice 
but refrain from requiring a specific timeframe. As suggested by 
commenters, the ``without unreasonable delay'' standard could take into 
account factors such as the provider's size, as a small carrier may 
have limited resources and could require additional time to investigate 
a CPNI data breach than a larger carrier.
    50. In order to ensure that carriers notify customers quickly even 
in complex situations, the Commission requires customer notification no 
later than 30 days after reasonable determination of a breach. While in 
many circumstances, the ``without unreasonable delay'' standard means 
that the customer will be notified in less than seven business days, 
the Commission notes that in some circumstances, this standard may lead 
to a longer waiting time than the previous seven days. For that reason, 
the Commission adopts the 30-day back-stop in order to prevent 
unnecessarily long delays, even in such instances as the one described 
by USTelecom, where the carrier is engaged in investigations of the 
incident. The 30-day maximum amount of time is consistent with many 
existing State laws. In the Data Breach Notice, the Commission also 
considered adopting an ``outside limit'' of 45 or 60 days after 
discovery of a breach. However, the Commission finds that 30 days 
offers providers enough flexibility while recognizing the urgency of 
notifying customers as quickly as possible and without unnecessary 
delays. Some commenters request that the Commission adopt a safe-harbor 
for customer notification after determination or discovery of a breach. 
The Commission declines to adopt such a safe harbor because the 
Commission encourages providers to notify customers as quickly as 
possible in each individual instance. However, the Commission does 
establish a requirement that carriers notify customers no later than 30 
days after reasonable determination of a breach to provide a clear 
outer bound to the ``without unreasonable delay'' standard.
3. Other Issues
    51. Content of Customer Breach Notification. Consistent with its 
current rules, the Commission declines to adopt specific minimum 
categories of information required in a customer breach notification. 
The Commission makes clear, however, that a notification must include 
sufficient information so as to make a reasonable customer aware that a 
breach occurred on a certain date, or within a certain estimated 
timeframe, and that such a breach affected or may have affected that 
customer's data. While all 50 States, the District of Columbia, Guam, 
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have laws requiring private or 
governmental entities to notify individuals of breaches involving their 
personal information, not all of those entities impose minimum content 
requirements for those notices. The Commission agrees with NTCA that 
adding requirements with the potential to differ from other customer 
notice requirements imposed by States or otherwise may create 
unnecessary burdens on carriers, particularly small ones, as well as 
confusion among customers. The Commission also finds persuasive 
arguments by commenters that specifying the required content of 
customer notifications beyond the basic standard described above would 
prevent carriers from having enough flexibility to craft notifications 
that are more responsive to, and appropriate for, the specific facts of 
a breach, the customers, and the carrier involved. The Commission finds 
this argument particularly persuasive as it relates to small and rural 
carriers. Finally, imposing minimum requirements may delay a carrier's 
ability to timely notify customers, as it may take time to gather all 
of the necessary details and information even where it would be in the 
customer's best interest to receive notification more quickly albeit 
with less detail.
    52. Instead, the Commission adopts as recommendations the following 
categories of information in security breach notices to customers: (1) 
the estimated date of the breach; (2) a description of the customer 
information that was used, disclosed, or accessed; (3) information on 
how customers, including customers with disabilities, can contact the 
carrier to inquire about the breach; (4) information about how to 
contact the Commission, FTC, and any State regulatory agencies relevant 
to the customer and the service; (5) if the breach creates a risk of 
identity theft, information about national credit reporting agencies 
and the steps customers can take to guard against identity theft, 
including any credit monitoring, credit reporting, or credit freezes 
the carrier is offering to affected customers; and (6) what other steps 
customers should take to mitigate their risk based on the specific 
categories of information exposed in the breach. Beyond the basic 
standard set by its rules, the Commission agrees with commenters that 
adopting guidance (rather than requirements) fosters the goal of 
ensuring that the customer has access to pertinent information about a 
breach while affording carriers flexibility to tailor the contents of a 
customer notification to the specific circumstances at hand. The 
Commission also agrees with some commenters that carriers may not know, 
with certainty, the precise date of a breach. For that reason, the 
Commission has modified this requirement from its original proposal by 
suggesting the estimated date of the breach. Breaches which involve 
data such as a social security number, birth certificate, taxpayer 
identification number, bank account number, driver's license number, 
and other similar types of personally identifiable information unique 
to each person create the highest level of risk of identity theft. 
While breaches involving the types of data listed here should be 
considered to create a risk of identity theft for customers, this is 
not an exclusive list and should not be considered as such. There may 
be other types of data not listed here that, either alone or in 
conjunction with other data, may potentially create a risk of identity 
theft for customers.
    53. The Commission believes that adopting recommendations will 
further the goals of consistently and sufficiently notifying customers 
of data breaches while maintaining some flexibility for carriers to 
tailor each notification to the specific facts and details of the 
breach. While some commenters such as EPIC suggest that the Commission 
should adopt minimum content requirements, the Commission believes that 
adopting recommendations furthers the same objective of ``inform[ing] 
the consumer of the risks they face but also equip[ping] the consumer 
with options for immediate steps to reduce the downstream harms that 
may result'' while also maintaining the flexibility that commenters 
overwhelmingly noted was important for effectively and quickly 
notifying customers.
    54. Method of Customer Breach Notification. The Commission declines 
to specify at this time the method of customer breach notification, and 
instead allows the carriers to assess for themselves how to best notify 
their customers of a data breach incident. Generally, carriers have 
pre-established methods of communicating with their customers about 
other important matters related to their service, such as outages

[[Page 9981]]

and scheduled repairs. These methods may differ among carriers based on 
their size, their unique relationship with their customers, the types 
of customers impacted, and other factors. Therefore, the Commission 
finds that maintaining flexibility in the method of customer breach 
notification both reduces the burden on the carriers and prevents 
customer confusion that could arise if carriers were required to 
provide disclosures in a way that differed from how customers were used 
to receiving important information from their carriers.

D. TRS Breach Reporting

    55. In 2013, the Commission adopted privacy rules applicable to 
telecommunications relay services (TRS) providers, to protect the CPNI 
of TRS users. In doing so, the Commission found that ``for TRS to be 
functionally equivalent to voice telephone services, consumers with 
disabilities who use TRS are entitled to have the same assurances of 
privacy as do consumers without disabilities for voice telephone 
services.'' The privacy rules for TRS include a breach notification 
rule that is equivalent to section 64.2011 in terms of the substantive 
protection afforded to TRS users.
    56. To maintain functional equivalency, the Commission amends 
section 64.5111 so that it continues to provide equivalent privacy 
protection for TRS users in line with its amendments to section 
64.2011. Thus, in this Order the Commission applies its breach 
notification and reporting obligations for TRS providers to covered 
data, including PII and CPNI. The Commission also expands the 
definition of ``breach'' in section 64.5111 to include inadvertent 
access, use, or disclosure of customer information, except in those 
cases where such information is acquired in good faith by an employee 
or agent of a TRS provider, and such information is not used improperly 
or further disclosed. The Commission also requires TRS providers to 
notify the Commission, in addition to the Secret Service and FBI, as 
soon as practicable, and in no event later than seven business days, 
after reasonable determination of a breach, except in cases where a 
breach affects fewer than 500 individuals, and a provider can 
reasonably determine that no harm to customers is reasonably likely to 
occur as a result of the breach. As with the Commission's breach 
reporting rules for telecommunications carriers, where a TRS provider 
is unable to reasonably determine that no harm to consumers is 
reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach, it must promptly 
notify the relevant Federal agencies regardless of the size of the 
breach. Any breach affecting fewer than 500 individuals where there is 
no reasonable likelihood of harm to customers must be reported 
simultaneously to the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI in a single, 
consolidated annual filing. The Commission further revises its rules to 
require TRS providers to report breaches to the Commission, Secret 
Service, and FBI contemporaneously via the existing centralized portal 
that providers already use and with which they are familiar. In terms 
of the content of such notifications, the Commission mandates that 
notifications to the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI must, at a 
minimum, include: TRS provider address and contact information; a 
description of the breach incident; a description of the customer 
information that was used, disclosed, or accessed; the method of 
compromise; the date range of the incident and approximate number of 
customers affected; an estimate of the financial loss to providers and 
customers, if any; and the types of data breached. More specifically, 
the Commission clarifies that, if any data, whether partial or 
complete, on the contents of conversations is compromised as part of a 
breach--such as call transcripts--the compromise must be disclosed as 
part of the notification to the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI.
    57. Regarding breach notifications furnished to TRS users, the 
Commission introduces a harm-based trigger and eliminate the 
requirement to notify TRS users of a breach in those instances where a 
TRS provider can reasonably determine that no harm to TRS users is 
reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach. The Commission 
further revises its rules to eliminate the mandatory seven business day 
waiting period to notify TRS users and instead require TRS providers to 
notify TRS users of breaches without unreasonable delay after 
notification to law enforcement, and in no case later than 30 days 
after reasonable determination of a breach, unless law enforcement 
requests a longer delay. The Commission also recommends minimum 
categories of information for inclusion in TRS user notifications. 
Notifications shall be provided in formats that are accessible to 
individuals with disabilities.
    58. As with its revisions to section 64.2011, the Commission finds 
that these changes will best protect and inform TRS users without 
resulting in overreporting or excessively burdening TRS providers or 
Federal agencies. These changes to Commission rules will also allow the 
Commission and its law enforcement partners to receive the information 
they require in a timely manner so that they can mitigate the harm and 
fallout of breaches while also taking action to deter future breaches.
1. Defining ``Breach''
    59. In this section, the Commission applies its breach notification 
and reporting obligations for TRS providers to covered data, including 
PII and CPNI. The Commission also takes the opportunity to emphasize 
that covered data under the TRS data breach notification rule includes 
call content given the unique concerns that arise with respect to call 
content in the TRS context. And, the Commission expands the definition 
of ``breach'' in section 64.5111 to include inadvertent access, use, or 
disclosure of customer information, except in those cases where such 
information is acquired in good faith by an employee or agent of a TRS 
provider, and such information is not used improperly or further 
disclosed.
    60. Covered Data. Consistent with the provisions the Commission 
adopts above for carriers, the Commission applies its breach 
notification and reporting obligations for TRS providers to covered 
data, including PII and CPNI. The Commission does so for the reasons 
discussed above with respect to its breach notification and reporting 
obligations for carriers. In addition, as discussed below, section 225 
of the Act directs the Commission to ensure that TRS are available to 
enable communication in a manner that is functionally equivalent to 
voice telephone services. The Commission has found that applying the 
privacy protections of the Commission's regulations to TRS users 
advances the functional equivalency of TRS. In order to ensure the 
functional equivalency of TRS, and to ensure that TRS users enjoy the 
same protections as customers of telecommunications carriers and 
interconnected VoIP providers, the Commission applies its TRS data 
breach obligations to the same scope of customer information, including 
both PII and CPNI. The Commission also incorporates, by reference, the 
scope of covered PII adopted above, for the same reasons as discussed 
above.
    61. The Commission disagrees with Hamilton Relay that the 
``assurances of privacy'' that TRS users can expect ``are limited to 
CPNI and should not be extended to other elements of personal 
information, including sensitive personal information.'' In the Data 
Breach Notice, the Commission

[[Page 9982]]

recognized that providers possess proprietary information of customers 
other than CPNI, which customers have an interest in protecting from 
public exposure. This interest is particularly acute in the case of TRS 
users. TRS providers have access to the contents of customers' 
conversations, and, as AARO notes, any potential disclosure of TRS 
conversation content is a ``grave privacy concern.'' While section 225 
and the Commission's TRS rules generally prohibit TRS providers from 
disclosing the content of any relayed conversation and from keeping 
records of the content of any such conversation beyond the duration of 
the call, that prohibition is not sufficient to protect TRS users from 
risks that may arise from data breaches. For instance, if a breach were 
to expose transcripts of TRS calls that were in progress at the time of 
the breach, the breaching party could obtain conversation contents 
between a TRS user and medical professionals, romantic partners, family 
members, friends, or professional colleagues, and as such may include 
sensitive details, such as a user's medical history, disability status, 
financial situation, political views, relationship status and dynamics, 
and religious beliefs. The disclosure of such information could lead to 
serious consequences, including embarrassment, ostracization from 
family and friends, and extortion by the breaching party or others who 
have gained access to the information.
    62. Indeed, information about call content is not commonly 
available to traditional voice service providers, and thus traditional 
voice service customers do not face the same privacy risks in this 
regard as TRS users. As a result, it is particularly important in the 
TRS context that the Commission emphasizes the need for breach 
notifications with respect to call content. CPNI, PII, and the contents 
of calls are non-exclusive, and potentially overlapping, categories of 
information. Consistent with the congressional directive that the 
Commission's TRS rules guard against the disclosure of call content, 
and to promote functional equivalence between TRS and traditional voice 
communications services, the Commission therefore makes explicit in the 
text of section 64.5111 of its rules that a breach involving call 
content implicates those notification requirements.
    63. Just as with telecommunications carriers, the Commission 
believes that the unauthorized exposure of sensitive personal 
information that the provider has received from the customer or about 
the customer in connection with the customer relationship (e.g., 
initiation, provision, or maintenance, of service) is reasonably likely 
to pose risk of customer harm. Accordingly, any unauthorized disclosure 
of such information warrants notification to the customer, the 
Commission, and other law enforcement. Consumers expect that they will 
be notified of substantial breaches that endanger their privacy, and 
businesses that handle sensitive personal information should expect to 
be obligated to report such breaches.
    64. The Commission further disagrees with Hamilton Relay's 
assertion that its privacy authority does not extend to other elements 
of personal information beyond CPNI, or that doing so would be 
inconsistent with the plain language of the Act or result in 
duplicative or inconsistent requirements between Commission rules and 
State laws. The Commission does so for the reasons discussed above, and 
because of the principle of functional equivalency. By ensuring that 
the same data breach notification requirements the Commission applies 
to traditional telecommunications carriers also apply to TRS providers, 
the Commission advances the interest of ensuring that consumers can 
have the same expectations regarding services that they view as 
similar. Thus, the approach the Commission adopts not only reflects the 
practical expectations of consumers but also honors the intention of 
Congress. For example, as discussed in more detail below, Congress 
ratified the Commission's 2007 decision to extend section 222-based 
privacy protections for telecommunications service customers to the 
customers of interconnected VoIP providers. And ensuring equivalent 
protections for TRS subscribers advances Congress' directive to 
endeavor to ensure functionally equivalent service.
    65. EPIC concurs with this approach. The Commission notes that 
covered data would include PII that a TRS provider collects to register 
a customer in the TRS User Registration Database in order to provide 
services. In November 2021 and March 2022 orders revoking the operating 
authority of certain telecommunications carriers, the Commission 
further stated that all communications service providers have ``a 
statutory responsibility to ensure the protection of customer 
information, including PII and CPNI.''
    66. Because TRS providers have access to proprietary information of 
customers other than CPNI, and customers have an interest in protecting 
that information from public exposure, the Commission finds that TRS 
providers should be obligated to comply with the Commission's breach 
notification rule whenever customers' personally identifiable 
information is the subject of a breach, whether or not the information 
is CPNI.
    67. Inadvertent Access, Use, or Disclosure. The Commission expands 
the definition of ``breach'' in section 64.5111 to include inadvertent 
access, use, or disclosure of covered data, except in those cases where 
such information is acquired in good faith by an employee or agent of a 
TRS provider, and such information is not used improperly or further 
disclosed. Section 64.5111(e) of the Commission's rules currently 
defines a breach more narrowly as occurring ``when a person, without 
authorization or exceeding authorization, has intentionally gained 
access to, used, or disclosed CPNI.'' As noted above, this construction 
was adopted in response to the practice of pretexting. As discussed 
above, in the years since, numerous data breaches have shown that the 
inadvertent exposure--as much as intentional exposure--of customer 
information can and does result in the loss and misuse of sensitive 
information by scammers, phishers, and other bad actors, and can thus 
trigger a need to inform the affected consumers so that they can take 
appropriate action to protect themselves and their sensitive 
information. Whether a breach was intentional may not be readily 
apparent, and continuing to require disclosure of only intentional 
breaches could thus lead to underreporting. It is moreover critical 
that the Commission and law enforcement be made aware of any 
unintentional access, use, or disclosure of covered data so that the 
Commission can investigate and advise TRS providers on how best to 
avoid future breaches and so that the Commission is prepared and ready 
to investigate if and when any of the affected information is accessed 
by malicious actors. Requiring notification for accidental breaches 
will encourage TRS providers to adopt stronger data security practices 
and will help the Commission and law enforcement to better identify and 
address systemic network vulnerabilities, consistent with the 
Commission's analysis above.
    68. The record in this proceeding confirms the need for the 
Commission to expand the definition of ``breach'' in section 64.5111 to 
include inadvertent disclosures. As AARO note in their comments, the 
Commission must keep pace with evolving threats to consumer privacy, 
and ``adopt measures that can effectively counter increasingly complex 
and evolving breaches.'' AARO further agrees with the Commission's 
assessment that an intentionality

[[Page 9983]]

requirement would lead to legal ambiguity and underreporting. According 
to AARO and EPIC, the industry will ``continue to witness breaches 
unless companies that operate in this area'' are required or 
incentivized to ``make proper investments in their `staff and 
procedures to safeguard the consumer data with which they have been 
entrusted.' '' The Commission agrees with these commenters that 
expanding the definition of ``breach'' in section 64.5111 to include 
inadvertent access, use, or disclosure of covered data will help 
provide this incentive. The only two commenters who opposed expanding 
the Commission's definition of ``breach'' in section 64.5111 to include 
inadvertent disclosures of customer information were Hamilton Relay and 
Sorenson, and both modified their opposition to state that they only 
opposed such an expansion unless accompanied by the introduction of a 
harm-based trigger for data breach notification. As the Commission 
adopts a harm-based trigger for data breach notifications to consumers 
below, there is no need to address these two comments further.
    69. Good-Faith Exception. While the Commission expands the 
definition of ``breach'' in section 64.5111 to include inadvertent 
access, use, or disclosure of covered data, consistent with its 
approach to the carrier data breach rule, the Commission carves out an 
exception for a good-faith acquisition of covered data by an employee 
or agent of a TRS provider where such information is not used 
improperly or further disclosed. No commenters opposed this amendment 
to the Commission's rules for TRS providers. The Commission rejected 
more general criticisms of such a rule above. With only a handful of 
exceptions, the vast majority of State statutes include a similar 
provision excluding from the definition of ``breach'' a good-faith 
acquisition of covered data by an employee or agent of a company where 
such information is not improperly used or disclosed further, and the 
Commission sees no reason not to include such an exception in the TRS 
rule. This good-faith exception will help reduce overreporting and, by 
extension, will avoid worrying consumers unnecessarily.
2. Notifying the Commission and Other Federal Law Enforcement of Data 
Breaches
    70. In this section, the Commission requires TRS providers to 
notify the Commission, in addition to the Secret Service and FBI, as 
soon as practicable, and in no event later than seven business days, 
after reasonable determination of a breach, except in those instances 
where a breach implicates fewer than 500 individuals and a TRS provider 
reasonably determines that no harm to customers is reasonably likely to 
occur as a result of the breach. Where a breach affects fewer than 500 
individuals and the TRS provider reasonably determines that no harm to 
customers is reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach, the 
Commission requires that providers report such breaches annually to the 
Commission, Secret Service, and FBI in a single, consolidated annual 
filing. The Commission also requires TRS providers to report breaches 
to the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI contemporaneously via the 
existing centralized portal maintained by the Secret Service, and 
implement mandatory minimum content requirements for notifications 
filed with the Commission and law enforcement.
    71. Notification to the Commission and Law Enforcement. The 
Commission requires TRS providers to notify the Commission, in addition 
to the Secret Service, and the FBI, of breaches through the central 
reporting facility. The Commission will maintain a link to the 
reporting facility at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/cpni or a successor URL 
designated by the Bureau. This requirement is consistent with other 
Federal sector-specific laws, including HIPAA and the Health Breach 
Notification Rule, which require prompt notification to the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), respectively.
    72. As the Commission found when it adopted the current data breach 
rules, notifying law enforcement of breaches is consistent with the 
goal of protecting customers' personal data because it enables such 
agencies to investigate the breach, ``which could result in legal 
action against the perpetrators,'' thus ensuring that they do not 
continue to breach sensitive customer information. The Commission also 
anticipated that law enforcement investigations into how breaches 
occurred would enable law enforcement to advise providers and the 
Commission to take steps to anticipate and prevent future breaches of a 
similar nature. While this reasoning remains sound, in the years since 
the Commission's rules were adopted it has become apparent that large-
scale security breaches need not be purposeful in order to be harmful. 
As discussed above, breaches that occur as a result of lax or 
inadequate data security practices and employee training can be just as 
devastating as those perpetrated by malicious actors. Notification to 
the Commission of breaches, including inadvertent breaches, will 
provide Commission staff with critical information regarding data 
security vulnerabilities, and will help to shed light on TRS providers' 
ongoing compliance with the Commission's data breach rules.
    73. The record in this proceeding supports requiring TRS providers 
to notify the Commission, the Secret Service, and the FBI of breaches. 
EPIC agrees that a breach impacting TRS users requires notification to 
the Commission in addition to the impacted user(s), and no commenter 
opposed amending the Commission's rules to require notification to the 
Commission concurrently with the Secret Service and FBI in the specific 
context of TRS. The Commission rejected more general criticisms of such 
a rule above.
    74. Reporting Threshold. The Commission requires providers to 
inform Federal agencies, via the central reporting facility, of all 
breaches, regardless of the number of customers affected or whether 
there is a reasonable risk of harm to customers. For breaches that 
affect 500 or more customers, or for which a TRS provider cannot 
determine how many customers are affected, the Commission requires 
providers to file individual, per-breach notifications as soon as 
practicable, but no later than seven business days after reasonable 
determination of a breach. As the Commission describes below, these 
notifications must include detailed information regarding the nature of 
the breach and its impact on affected customers. This same type of 
notification, and the seven business day timeframe for submission, will 
also be required in instances where the TRS provider has conclusively 
determined that a breach affects fewer than 500 customers unless the 
provider can reasonably determine that no harm to customers is 
reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach.
    75. For breaches in which a TRS provider can reasonably determine 
that a breach affecting fewer than 500 customers is not reasonably 
likely to harm those customers, the Commission requires the provider to 
file an annual summary of such breaches with the Commission, Secret 
Service, and FBI via the central reporting facility, instead of a 
notification. TRS providers must submit, via the existing central 
reporting facility and no later than February 1, a consolidated summary 
of breaches that occurred over the course of the previous calendar year 
which affected fewer than 500 customers, and where the provider

[[Page 9984]]

could reasonably determine that no harm to customers was reasonably 
likely to occur as a result of the breach. To ensure that TRS providers 
may be held accountable regarding their determinations of a breach's 
likelihood of harm and number of affected customers, the Commission 
requires providers to keep records of the bases of those determinations 
for two years. The Commission also notes that TRS providers may 
voluntarily file notification of such a breach in addition to, but not 
in place of, this annual summary filing. In circumstances where a TRS 
provider initially determines that contemporaneous breach notification 
to Federal agencies is not required under these provisions, but later 
discovers information that would require such notice, the Commission 
clarifies that a TRS provider must report the breach to Federal 
agencies as soon as practicable, but no later than seven business days 
after their discovery of this new information. The Commission delegates 
authority to the Bureau to coordinate with the Secret Service regarding 
any modification to the portal that may be necessary to permit the 
filing of this annual summary. The Commission also delegates authority 
to the Bureau, working in conjunction with the Public Safety and 
Homeland Security Bureau and the Disability Rights Office, and based on 
the record of this proceeding--or any additional notice and comment 
that might be warranted--to determine the content and format 
requirements of this filing and directs the Bureau to release a public 
notice announcing these requirements. As above with respect to 
carriers, the Commission instructs the Bureau to minimize the burdens 
on TRS providers by, for example, limiting the content required for 
each reported breach to that absolutely necessary to identify patterns 
or gaps that require further Commission inquiry. At a minimum, the 
Bureau should develop requirements that are less burdensome than what 
is required for individual breach submissions to the reporting 
facility, and consider streamlined ways for filers to report this 
summary information. The first annual report will be due the first 
February 1 after the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approves the 
annual reporting requirement under the Paperwork Reduction Act. The 
first report should cover all breaches between the effective date of 
the annual reporting requirement and the remainder of the calendar 
year.
    76. As the Commission determined above, this reporting threshold 
will enable the Commission to receive more granular information 
regarding larger breaches to aid its investigations while also being 
able to study trends in breach activity through reporting of smaller 
breaches in annual submissions. Such a reporting threshold is also 
consistent with many State statutes that require notice of breaches to 
State law enforcement authorities. Moreover, given the Commission's 
expansion of the definition of ``breach'' in today's Order to include 
inadvertent exposure of CPNI and other types of data, allowing TRS 
providers to file information regarding certain smaller breaches in a 
summary format on an annual basis will tailor administrative burdens on 
TRS providers to reflect those scenarios where reporting is most 
critical. At the same time, requiring TRS providers to report breaches 
that fall below the threshold in a single, consolidated annual filing 
will continue to enable the Commission and its Federal law enforcement 
partners to investigate, remediate, and deter smaller breaches. The 
Commission notes that no commenter addressed this potential amendment 
to its rule for TRS providers in response to the Data Breach Notice, 
and addresses more general comments in this regard in Section III.B.2, 
above. As above, in circumstances where a TRS provider initially 
determines that contemporaneous breach notification to Federal agencies 
is not required under these provisions, but later discovers information 
that would require such notice, the Commission clarifies that the TRS 
provider must report the breach to Federal agencies as soon as 
practicable, but no later than within seven business days of their 
discovery of this new information.
    77. The Commission applies this threshold trigger only to 
notifications to Federal agencies, and not to customer notifications. 
Breaches affecting even just a few customers can pose just as much risk 
to those customers as could breaches with wider impact. For this 
reason, as discussed above, the Commission continues to require TRS 
providers to notify Federal agencies within seven business days of 
breaches that implicate a reasonable risk of customer harm, regardless 
of the number of customers affected. Doing so will permit Federal 
agencies to investigate smaller breaches where there is a risk of 
customer harm, and also allow law enforcement agencies to request 
customer notification delays where such notice would ``impede or 
compromise an ongoing or potential criminal investigation or national 
security,'' as specified in the Commission's rules.
    78. Timeframe. The Commission retains its existing rule and require 
TRS providers to notify the Commission of a reportable breach 
contemporaneously with the Secret Service and FBI, as soon as 
practicable, and in no event later than seven business days, after 
reasonable determination of a breach. While the Commission proposed 
eliminating the seven business day deadline in the Data Breach Notice, 
the record received convinced the Commission that it should instead 
retain the more definite timeframe. The Commission agrees with AARO 
that the earlier TRS users are notified of breaches, the more time they 
will have to take actions to reduce the extent of the potential damage, 
and that eliminating the seven business day deadline would potentially 
extend the period between a breach and notification far beyond the 
current deadline, thus ``leaving consumers unable to remediate harms.'' 
The Commission finds that retaining the seven business day deadline 
properly balances the need to afford TRS providers sufficient time to 
conduct remediation efforts prior to submitting notifications with the 
need to ensure that customers receive timely notifications regarding 
breaches affecting their data. There is insufficient evidence that the 
current timeline is inadequate to accomplish the Commission's goals, 
and requiring breaches to be reported ``as soon as practicable'' 
without a definite timeframe could potentially be interpreted 
differently by different TRS providers or even by law enforcement and 
the Commission, thereby placing TRS providers at risk of inadvertently 
violating the Commission's rules should they construct ``as soon as 
practicable'' to mean something different than the Commission.
    79. The Commission does not believe it is necessary to shorten the 
existing timeframe of seven business days. As Sorenson notes, 
businesses with any internet presence ``must routinely investigate 
large numbers of potential security events,'' and find that a shorter 
deadline would put tremendous pressure on providers to report all 
potential security incidents before having time to determine whether a 
breach is reasonably likely to have occurred. Such a result would 
distract providers from investigating and correcting any incident that 
may have occurred. As Sorenson notes, the current reporting timeline of 
seven business days allows providers a reasonable opportunity to 
investigate potential incidents and determine whether a breach is 
reasonably likely to have occurred.
    80. The Commission disagrees with Hamilton Relay that the rigid 
structure

[[Page 9985]]

in its current rules is ``out of step'' with other data breach 
notification obligations and ``does not provide TRS providers with 
sufficient flexibility to address the different circumstances that 
surround data breaches.'' To begin, numerous States as well as HIPAA, 
the Health Breach Notification Rule, and CIRCIA impose a specific time 
limit on when breach notifications must be made to the State or 
relevant Federal agency. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record 
beyond Hamilton Relay's unsupported assertion to indicate that TRS 
providers find the current seven day business deadline to be unduly 
burdensome or inflexible. Indeed, Sorenson advocates in favor of 
retaining the current seven business day deadline. Even if the 
Commission were to assume the seven business day deadline to be a more 
burdensome or inflexible standard than a more open-ended standard, the 
Commission still finds that the countervailing interest in ensuring 
customers are notified quickly of breaches affecting them outweighs 
this hypothetical burden. As above, the Commission clarifies that a 
reasonable determination that a breach has occurred does not mean 
reaching a conclusion regarding every fact surrounding a data security 
incident that may constitute a breach. Rather, a TRS provider will be 
treated as having ``reasonabl[y] determin[ed]'' that a breach has 
occurred when the provider has information indicating that it is more 
likely than not that there was a breach.
    81. Content of Notification. As currently structured, the existing 
central reporting facility requires TRS providers to report: 
information relevant to a breach, including TRS provider address and 
contact information; a description of the breach incident; the method 
of compromise; the date range of the incident and approximate number of 
customers affected; an estimate of the financial loss to providers and 
customers, if any; and the types of data breached. The record supports 
the imposition of minimum content requirements for breach notifications 
to the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI. Of the commenters who 
addressed this issue, only Hamilton Relay opposes minimum content 
requirements for TRS providers, and as their comments pertain 
specifically to the content of breach notifications to customers, the 
Commission addresses them below.
    82. While the Commission finds that these existing content 
requirements are largely sufficient, it agrees with AARO that the 
nature of TRS and the sensitive information involved warrants more 
granular clarification regarding the required disclosures as part of 
notifications in that context. As AARO notes, TRS users face privacy 
risks that voice telephone service users do not face because TRS 
providers and their commercial partners collect particularly sensitive 
data about TRS users that could be accessed in a data breach. In 
particular, TRS providers and their partners have direct access to call 
audio, transcripts, and other data on the contents of TRS users' 
conversations. Given this, the Commission finds that providers must 
include a description of the customer information that was used, 
disclosed, or accessed as part of their notification, including whether 
data on the contents of conversations, such as call transcripts, are 
compromised as part of a breach. The Commission notes that the actual 
call audio or transcripts themselves should not be disclosed as part of 
the notification, as doing so would be a violation of the Commission's 
rules. Because of the unique nature of TRS technology, which often 
result in the creation of transcripts or similar artifacts, the 
Commission finds that clarifying these additional details of the 
disclosures will better protect consumers and better enable the 
Commission and its Federal law enforcement partners to investigate, 
remediate, and deter breaches.
    83. Method of Notification. Under current Commission rules, TRS 
providers are required to notify the Secret Service and FBI ``through a 
central reporting facility'' to which the Commission maintains a link 
on its website. The Commission retains this requirement and revises it 
slightly to clarify that notifications filed through the existing 
central reporting facility will be transmitted to and accessible by the 
Disability Rights Office (DRO) of the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau (CGB), in addition to the Secret Service 
and FBI. The Commission delegates authority to the Bureau, working in 
conjunction with CGB, to ensure that the central reporting facility 
sufficiently relays notifications to DRO. The Commission finds that 
retaining the existing central reporting facility, rather than creating 
and operating a new centralized reporting facility as contemplated in 
the Data Breach Notice, will be the simplest and most efficient 
approach, and will not result in the unnecessary expenditure of 
resources needed to build and operate a new electronic reporting 
facility when one already exists. It will also reduce potential 
provider confusion and simplify regulatory compliance by allowing 
providers to continue filing notifications through the existing 
reporting facility. The Commission notes that no commenter addressed 
this potential amendment to its rule governing TRS providers in 
response to the Data Breach Notice, and the Commission discusses more 
general comments regarding the method of disclosure to the Commission 
in Section III.B.5, above.
3. Customer Notification
    84. In this section, the Commission introduces a harm-based trigger 
and eliminates the requirement to notify customers of a breach in any 
instance where a TRS provider can reasonably determine that no harm to 
customers is reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach. The 
Commission also eliminates the mandatory seven business day waiting 
period to notify customers and instead requires TRS providers to notify 
customers of breaches without unreasonable delay after notification to 
the Commission and law enforcement, and in no case later than 30 days 
after reasonable determination of the breach, unless law enforcement 
requests a longer delay. The Commission recommends minimum categories 
for information inclusion in customer notifications. The Commission 
declines to specify the method that notifications to customers must 
take, instead leaving such a determination to the discretion of TRS 
providers, except that such notifications must be accessible to TRS 
users.
    85. Harm-Based Notification Trigger. The Commission's current TRS 
data breach rule requires notification to customers in every instance 
where a breach of their information has occurred, regardless of the 
risk of harm. The Commission modifies that standard and foregoes the 
requirement to notify customers of a breach in those instances where a 
TRS provider can reasonably determine that no harm to customers is 
reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach. In order to 
ensure the functional equivalency of TRS, and to ensure that TRS users 
enjoy the same protections as customers of telecommunications carriers 
and interconnected VoIP providers, the Commission adopts here the same 
definition of ``harm'' as that adopted above in the context of 
telecommunications carriers, for the reasons stated above.
    86. In determining whether ``harm'' is likely to occur, providers 
should consider all the factors enumerated in the Commission's 
discussion above. In situations where call content--including call 
audio, transcripts, or other data on the contents of TRS users'

[[Page 9986]]

conversations--has been or has the potential to be disclosed as a 
result of a breach, a TRS provider must assume that harm has or is 
reasonably likely to occur, and the obligation to notify customers of a 
breach would remain. As with the rules the Commission adopts for 
telecommunications services above, where a TRS provider is unable to 
make a determination regarding harm, the obligation to notify customers 
of a breach would remain. For the reasons discussed above, and in order 
to ensure functional equivalency for TRS users, the Commission also 
adopts a safe harbor under which customer notification is not required 
where a breach solely involves encrypted data and the TRS provider has 
definitive evidence that the encryption key was not also accessed, 
used, or disclosed. To the extent that a threat actor appears to have 
circumvented encryption, however, the TRS provider should conduct a 
harm-based analysis as if the data was never encrypted.
    87. The Commission finds that introducing a harm-based trigger for 
notifications to customers of TRS data breaches will benefit customers 
by avoiding confusion and ``notice fatigue'' with respect to breaches 
that are unlikely to cause harm. Given that it is not only emotionally 
distressing, but also time consuming and expensive to deal with the 
fallout of a data breach, the Commission believes that introducing a 
harm-based trigger will spare customers the time, effort, and financial 
strain of changing their passwords, purchasing fraud alerts or credit 
monitoring, and freezing their credit in the wake of any breach that is 
not reasonably likely to result in harm. A harm-based notification 
trigger also has a basis in the data breach notification frameworks 
employed by States, many of which do not require covered entities to 
notify customers of breaches when a determination has been made that 
the breach is unlikely to cause harm.
    88. The Commission finds further that employing a harm-based 
notification trigger will not only benefit customers, but also assist 
TRS providers by allowing them to better focus their resources on 
improving data security and ameliorating the harms caused by data 
breaches rather than providing notifications to customers in instances 
where harm is unlikely to occur. Nor will the introduction of a harm-
based trigger overburden providers by saddling them with the task of 
determining whether particular breaches are reasonably likely to cause 
harm. By making the standard for notification a rebuttable presumption 
of harm, providers must assume that harm is reasonably likely to occur 
as a result of a breach except where they can reasonably determine 
otherwise.
    89. When determining whether a breach is reasonably likely to 
result in harm, TRS providers should consider the same factors laid out 
in the discussion above. In addition, in situations where call 
content--including call audio, transcripts, or other data on the 
contents of TRS users' conversations--has been or has the potential to 
be disclosed as a result of a breach, a TRS provider must assume that 
harm has or is reasonably likely to occur, and the obligation to notify 
customers of a breach would remain. TRS providers must construe 
``harm'' in this context broadly. Even in those instances where no harm 
to customers is reasonably likely to occur, and thus the requirement to 
notify customers of a data breach is not triggered, TRS providers must 
still notify the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI of any such breach 
affecting 500 or more customers as soon as practicable and in any event 
no later than seven business days after reasonable determination of the 
breach via the central reporting facility. In the case of such breaches 
affecting fewer than 500 customers, they must be reported annually in a 
single, consolidated filing to the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI. 
While a harm-based trigger will help reduce customer notice fatigue and 
spare customers the time, effort, and financial strain of dealing with 
the fallout of a breach that is not reasonably likely to result in 
harm, the Commission and its law enforcement partners can still garner 
critical information regarding data security vulnerabilities by 
analyzing larger breaches, even those that are not reasonably likely to 
result in harm to customers.
    90. The record generally supports the adoption of a harm-based 
trigger for TRS consumer breach notifications. AARO, however, argues 
that ``harm-based triggers should not be used in the context of TRS 
breach reporting to customers . . . because of the inherent privacy 
risks faced by TRS users.'' AARO goes on to argue that, because TRS 
involves the collection of data on the content of a user's 
conversation, the Commission should presume that any data breach of a 
TRS provider is harmful and require the disclosure of that breach to 
customers and law enforcement. While the Commission agrees that the 
Commission and law enforcement should be apprised of all breaches, it 
disagrees that customers must be made aware of breaches where no harm 
to customers is reasonably likely to result. While the Commission 
agrees that TRS users face heightened privacy risks because of the 
nature of the technology involved, such risk alone does not justify a 
requirement that customers receive notification of breaches in 
instances where a provider can reasonably determine that no harm to 
customers is reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach. TRS 
providers can and must take the heightened risks inherent to TRS users 
into account when determining whether harm is likely to result in the 
wake of a breach, and the Commission reiterates that providers must 
assume, in every case, that harm is reasonably likely to occur as a 
result of a breach except where they can reasonably determine 
otherwise. Moreover, the Commission reiterates that, in situations 
where call content--including call audio, transcripts, or other data on 
the contents of TRS users' conversations--has been or has the potential 
to be disclosed as a result of a breach, a TRS provider must assume 
that harm has or is reasonably likely to occur, and the obligation to 
notify customers of a breach would remain. The Commission agrees with 
AARO that, given the sensitive data at stake, ``it is conceivable that 
a TRS user would want to be aware of a data breach, even if the harm of 
that breach is not fully determined, so that they can take remedial 
measures,'' which is why the Commission imposes a rebuttable 
presumption of harm that requires notification in cases where the harm 
of a breach cannot be fully determined, or where call content has been 
or has the potential to be disclosed. The Commission finds that 
imposing a rebuttable presumption of harm, and requiring TRS providers 
to consider the heightened privacy risks experienced by TRS users when 
attempting to rebut this presumption, sufficiently addresses AARO's 
concerns without the need for mandatory consumer notifications that may 
result in notice fatigue and obligate consumers to expend time, effort, 
and resources dealing with the fallout of breaches that are not 
reasonably likely to result in harm.
    91. The Commission agrees with Sorenson that, without a harm-based 
trigger, these rules could result in over-notification regarding non-
critical security events without any corresponding benefit to 
consumers. The Commission also agrees with Hamilton Relay that such 
over-notification could very well result in notice fatigue and consumer 
indifference, which would perversely cause consumers to ignore or 
discount notifications, leading to failure to take

[[Page 9987]]

action even in those instances where a breach is substantially likely 
to result in harm, and thus eliminating the main benefit of requiring 
consumer notifications. The Commission therefore concludes that a harm-
based trigger strikes the correct balance between keeping TRS users 
adequately informed, and reducing over-notification and notice fatigue 
while reducing the attendant burdens on TRS providers.
    92. The Commission disagrees with EPIC that a harm-based trigger 
will lead to ``legal ambiguity and underreporting,'' or that it will 
delay reporting ``as it may take time to assess whether the minimum 
threshold for reportable harm has been met.'' By adopting a rebuttable 
presumption of harm and requiring consumer notification except in those 
instances where a provider can reasonably determine that no harm to 
customers is reasonably likely to occur, the Commission does not think 
that underreporting is a likely risk, as customers will still be made 
aware of breaches where protective action from the consumer is 
required. While the Commission does not here include a specific 
definition of how or under what circumstances this presumption may be 
rebutted--finding that such an approach would be too prescriptive--the 
Commission nevertheless provides guidance for evaluating customer harm, 
as outlined above. And, as discussed below, the rules require 
notification to customers without unreasonable delay after notification 
to law enforcement, and in no case later than 30 days after reasonable 
determination of a breach unless law enforcement requests a longer 
delay.
    93. Notifying Customers of Data Breaches Without Unreasonable 
Delay. The Commission's current TRS data breach rule prohibits TRS 
providers from notifying customers or disclosing a breach to the public 
until at least seven full business days after notification to the 
Secret Service and FBI. The Commission eliminates this mandatory 
waiting period and instead requires TRS providers to notify customers 
of CPNI breaches without unreasonable delay after notification to law 
enforcement, and in no case later than 30 days after reasonable 
determination of a breach, unless law enforcement requests a longer 
delay.
    94. In adopting the current rule, the Commission concluded that 
once customers have been notified of a breach, it becomes public 
knowledge, ``thereby impeding law enforcement's ability to investigate 
the breach, identify the perpetrators, and determine how the breach 
occurred.'' The Commission found that ``immediate customer notification 
may compromise all the benefits of requiring carriers to notify law 
enforcement of CPNI breaches,'' and that a short delay was thus 
warranted.
    95. As discussed above, given the sheer volume of personal data at 
risk, and the proliferation of malicious schemes designed to exploit 
that data, the Commission finds that the need to notify victims of 
breaches as soon as possible has grown exponentially in the years since 
these rules were adopted. The rules adopted in this Order will better 
serve the public interest by increasing the speed at which customers 
may receive the important information contained in a notification, 
except in those circumstances when law enforcement specifically 
requests otherwise. The Commission finds that a requirement to notify 
customers of data breaches without unreasonable delay after discovery 
of a breach and notification to law enforcement appropriately balances 
legitimate law enforcement needs with customers' need to take swift 
action to protect their information in the wake of a breach.
    96. The revised rule is consistent with many existing data breach 
notification laws that require expedited notice but refrain from 
requiring a specific timeframe. While requiring notification to 
customers without unreasonable delay will increase the speed at which 
customers receive important information related to a breach, the 
Commission declines to adopt a specific timeframe, and finds that such 
an approach would be overly prescriptive. Because each data breach is 
different, providers must be given sufficient latitude to address each 
breach separately, in the manner best befitting the nature of the 
breach. Even so, the Commission finds it appropriate to impose an 
outside limit on when customers must be notified of a breach. Requiring 
providers to notify customers no later than 30 days after reasonable 
determination of a breach, unless a longer delay is requested by law 
enforcement, will allow TRS providers sufficient flexibility to deal 
with each breach on an individual basis while simultaneously installing 
a backstop to ensure that customers are not made unaware of a breach 
indefinitely.
    97. This approach is generally consistent with HIPAA, which 
requires notification to individuals ``without unreasonable delay and 
in no case later than 60 calendar days after discovery of a breach,'' 
as well as the Health Breach Notification Rule, which requires 
notification to individuals ``without unreasonable delay and in no case 
later than 60 calendar days after the discovery of a breach of 
security.'' Additionally, many States impose an outside limit on when 
customers must be notified of a breach following discovery of said 
breach.
    98. Consistent with the Commission's current rules implementing 
section 222, the rule adopted here will allow law enforcement to direct 
a TRS provider to delay customer notification for an initial period of 
up to 30 days if such notification would interfere with a criminal 
investigation or national security. The Commission finds that in those 
instances where a provider reasonably decides to consult with law 
enforcement, a short initial delay of no longer than 30 days pending 
such consultation is reasonable under the ``without unreasonable 
delay'' standard the Commission adopts for customer notification. The 
Commission notes that HIPAA, the GLBA, and the Health Breach 
Notification Rule all allow for a delay of customer notification if law 
enforcement determines notification to customers would ``impede a 
criminal investigation or cause damage to national security,'' but only 
if law enforcement officials request such a delay. More specifically, 
both HIPAA and the Health Breach Notification Rule allow for 
notification delays of up to 30 days if orally requested by law 
enforcement. Similarly, most, if not all, States permit delays in 
notifying affected customers for legitimate law enforcement reasons. 
The Commission finds that the rule it adopts here strikes the 
appropriate balance between the needs of law enforcement to have 
sufficient time to investigate criminal activity and the needs of 
customers to be notified of data breaches without unreasonable delay.
    99. The record supports reconfiguring the Commission's rules in 
this manner. As Hamilton Relay notes, TRS providers require flexibility 
when addressing data breaches, and a standard requiring providers to 
notify customers of a breach as soon as practicable will allow TRS 
providers sufficient time to determine the nature of the incident, 
``including what consumer data may be implicated, if any. And the 
Commission agrees with Sorenson that imposing a rigid timeline on 
providers without offering sufficient time to investigate runs the risk 
of placing ``tremendous pressure on providers to report all potential 
security incidents before having time to determine whether a breach is 
reasonably likely to have occurred,'' and that such a result would not 
only overload the Commission but ``also distract providers from 
investigating and correcting any incident that may have occurred.'' The

[[Page 9988]]

Commission finds that retaining the seven business day deadline for 
Federal-agency notifications will allow TRS providers a reasonable 
opportunity to investigate potential incidents, determine whether a 
breach is reasonably likely to have occurred, and report it to the 
Commission and its law enforcement partners, if necessary, while the 
elimination of the mandatory seven business day waiting period and 
imposition of a 30-day backstop will ensure that customers receive 
notification of any such breach in a timely fashion.
    100. The Commission disagrees with AARO that the timeframe 
revisions it makes will result in unwarranted delays of notifications 
to customers. On the contrary, the Commission finds that the pairing of 
an unreasonable delay standard with the elimination of the mandatory 
seven business day waiting period between notification of law 
enforcement and notification of customers is more likely to result in 
consumers receiving notice of a breach more quickly than they would 
under the Commission's current rule in many instances. By requiring TRS 
providers to issue consumer notifications without unreasonable delay, 
but in no case later than 30 days after a breach has been detected 
unless a longer delay is requested by law enforcement, the Commission 
believes that the revised rule balances the needs of law enforcement 
and TRS providers--to respond flexibly, with sufficient time to 
investigate data breaches--and customers--to take swift action in the 
wake of a breach.
    101. Content of Customer Breach Notification. Consistent with the 
Commission's current TRS data breach rule, the Commission declines to 
adopt specific minimum categories of information required in a customer 
breach notification. The Commission makes clear, however, that a 
notification must include sufficient information so as to make a 
reasonable customer aware that a breach occurred on a certain date, or 
within a certain estimated timeframe, and that such a breach affected 
or may have affected that customer's data. While all 50 States, the 
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands 
have laws requiring private or governmental entities to notify 
individuals of breaches involving their personal information, of these, 
less than half impose minimum content requirements on the notifications 
that must be transmitted to affected individuals in the wake of a data 
breach. As noted above regarding carriers, adding requirements with the 
potential to differ from such a high number of State requirements may 
create unnecessary burdens on small TRS providers. The Commission also 
finds that specifying the required content of customer notifications 
beyond the basic standard described above would inhibit TRS providers 
from having the flexibility to craft notifications that are more 
responsive to, and appropriate for, the specific facts of a breach, the 
customers, and the provider involved. A stricter standard could 
conflict with other customer notice requirements--thus burdening 
providers and potentially sowing confusion among consumers--and could 
delay providers' ability to timely notify their customers of a breach, 
since it could take time to gather all of the necessary details and 
information even in cases where it would be in customers' best 
interests to receive notification more quickly, albeit with less 
detail.
    102. Instead, the Commission adopts as recommendations the 
following categories of information in security breach notifications to 
TRS customers: (1) the date of the breach; (2) a description of the 
customer information that was used, disclosed, or accessed; (3) whether 
data on the contents of conversations, such as call transcripts, was 
compromised as part of the breach; (4) information on how customers can 
contact the provider to inquire about the breach; (5) information about 
how to contact the Commission, FTC, and any State regulatory agencies 
relevant to the customer and the service; (6) if the breach creates a 
risk of identity theft, information about national credit reporting 
agencies and the steps customers can take to guard against identity 
theft, including any credit monitoring, credit reporting, or credit 
freezes the provider is offering to affected customers (Breaches which 
involve data such as a social security number, birth certificate, 
taxpayer identification number, bank account number, driver's license 
number, and other similar types of personally identifiable information 
unique to each person create the highest level of risk of identity 
theft. While breaches involving the types of data listed here should be 
considered to create a risk of identity theft for customers, this is 
not an exclusive list and should not be considered as such. There may 
be other types of data not listed here that, either alone or in 
conjunction with other data, may potentially create a risk of identity 
theft for customers.); and (7) what other steps customers should take 
to mitigate their risk based on the specific categories of information 
exposed in the breach.
    103. The Commission finds that adopting recommendations for minimum 
consistent fields of information will further the goal of assisting 
customers in better understanding the circumstances and nature of a 
breach while retaining some flexibility for TRS providers to precisely 
tailor each notification, depending on the specific facts and details 
of each breach. The Commission agrees with Hamilton Relay that the 
Commission should give providers the flexibility to craft breach 
notifications that include relevant information in an accessible 
format, depending on the circumstances of each breach. While the 
Commission acknowledges arguments by AARO and EPIC supporting the 
imposition of minimum content requirements for customer breach 
notifications, the Commission is wary of imposing specific requirements 
that could conflict with many State regulations, and of attempting to 
impose a one-size-fits-all solution for all providers and all data 
breaches. Rather, the Commission finds that the seven categories of 
information recommended in this Order appropriately balance the goal of 
empowering consumers to take the necessary steps to protect themselves 
and their information in the wake of a data breach while simultaneously 
enabling TRS providers to respond flexibly to data breaches as they 
occur, and to issue customer notifications as swiftly as possible 
without the need to delay as they gather all of the information needed 
to satisfy a rigidly prescribed set of predetermined informational 
categories.
    104. Method of Customer Breach Notification. The Commission 
declines to specify the form that notifications to customers must take, 
instead leaving such a determination to the discretion of TRS 
providers, except to require that such notifications be provided in a 
format accessible to individuals with disabilities. In this proceeding, 
commenters were uniform in their insistence that the method of customer 
breach notification be left to the discretion of providers where it is 
not specified in State law. As CCA notes, the ``best means for reaching 
business customers and residential customers . . . can differ 
significantly, and carriers are best positioned based on their 
experience and contact with consumers to know customers' preferred way 
of receiving notifications.'' CTIA argues further that mandating the 
manner of customer CPNI incident notifications could ``reduc[e] carrier 
flexibility to provide the most up-to-date information to customers in 
fluid situations.'' As

[[Page 9989]]

Hamilton Relay points out, ``TRS providers do not have standard billing 
information for their customers because . . . most if not all TRS users 
do not pay for the service.'' Because this lack of standard billing 
information may complicate notifications to such users, the Commission 
agrees with Hamilton Relay that the Commission should grant TRS 
providers the discretion to take all reasonable steps necessary to 
provide the required information to their customers in a ``usable and 
readily understandable format'' whenever a breach occurs. The 
Commission thus declines to specify the manner that accessible 
notifications to customers must take, and leaves such a determination 
to the discretion of TRS providers where the manner of customer breach 
notifications is not specified by applicable State law.
    105. TRS User Registration Information. In their comments, Sorenson 
notes that ``TRS customers must undergo intrusive identity and address 
verification that other voice telephone customers do not,'' and that 
data retention requirements of TRS providers put customers who rely on 
these critical services at heightened risk. Sorenson thus recommends 
that the Commission's revised rules permit TRS providers to delete 
sensitive customer information, such as copies of users' driver's 
licenses/passports and other identity or address identifying 
information. Convo Communications take this recommendation a step 
further, advocating that the Commission not just permit but require 
providers to destroy identifying records regarding TRS users after a 
user is successfully registered in the TRS User Registration Database 
(TRS URD).
    106. The Commission declines to adopt these recommendations at this 
time. The requirements to collect and retain user registration 
information for registration in the TRS User Registration Database are 
outside the scope of this proceeding. The TRS User Registration 
Database is a centralized system of registration records established to 
protect the TRS Fund from waste, fraud, and abuse and to improve the 
Commission's ability to manage and oversee the TRS program. A necessary 
component of the administration and oversight of the TRS User 
Registration Database and the TRS program in general, is the ability of 
the Commission, the TRS User Registration Database administrator, and 
the TRS Fund administrator to review and audit the registration 
information of TRS users and the registration practices of TRS 
providers. Any consideration of changes to the rules concerning TRS 
providers retaining required registration information for TRS users 
must include an assessment of the impact of the ability of the 
Commission and relevant administrators to review the data upon which 
users were verified in the database. The record in this proceeding is 
incomplete as the Commission did not seek comment on this issue. The 
Commission therefore does not take action on this issue at this time.

E. Legal Authority

    107. The Commission finds that sections 201(b), 222, 225, and 
251(e) provide the Commission with authority to adopt the breach 
notification rules enumerated in this Order. The Commission concludes 
further that it has authority to apply these revised rules to 
interconnected VoIP providers. Lastly, the Commission finds that 
Congress' nullification of the Commission's revisions to its data 
breach rules in the 2016 Privacy Order pursuant to the Congressional 
Review Act (CRA) does not now preclude the Commission from adopting the 
rules set forth in this Order.
1. Section 222
    108. Section 222 of the Act provides authority for the requirements 
the Commission adopts and revises today. Section 222(a) imposes a duty 
on carriers to ``protect the confidentiality of proprietary information 
of, and relating to'' customers, fellow carriers, and equipment 
manufacturers. Section 222(c) imposes more specific requirements on 
carriers as to the protection and confidentiality of customer 
proprietary network information. Both subsections independently provide 
the Commission authority to adopt rules requiring telecommunications 
carriers and interconnected VoIP providers to address breaches of 
customer information, but the breadth of section 222(a) provides the 
additional clarity that the Commission's breach reporting rules can and 
must apply to all PII rather than just to CPNI.
    109. The Commission has long required carriers to report data 
breaches as part of their duty to protect the confidentiality of 
customers' information. The revisions to the Commission's data breach 
reporting rules adopted in this Order reinforce carriers' duty to 
protect the confidentiality of their customers' information, including 
information that may not fit the statutory definition of CPNI. Data 
breach reporting requirements also reinforce the Commission's other 
rules addressing the protection of customer information by meaningfully 
informing customer decisions regarding whether to give, withhold, or 
retract their approval for carriers to use or disclose their 
information. Moreover, requiring carriers to notify the Commission in 
the event of a data breach will better enable the Commission to 
identify and confront systemic network vulnerabilities and help 
investigate and advise carriers on how best to avoid future breaches, 
while simultaneously assisting carriers in fulfilling their duty 
pursuant to section 222(a) to protect the confidentiality of their 
customers' information.
    110. The Commission rejects Lincoln Network's argument that section 
222 does not grant the Commission authority to adopt rules requiring 
telecommunications carriers and interconnected VoIP providers to 
address breaches of covered data. Section 222 explicitly imposes a duty 
on telecommunications carriers to ``protect the confidentiality of 
proprietary information of, and relating to, other telecommunication 
carriers, equipment manufacturers, and customers.'' To argue, as 
Lincoln Network does, that section 222 does not grant the Commission 
``clear authority to protect the security of data'' contravenes the 
clear language and intent of section 222. Ever since it began 
implementation of the 1996 Act, the Commission has understood section 
222(a) as a source of carriers' duties and as a source of Commission 
rulemaking authority. To the extent that the Commission has described 
its section 222 authority as coextensive with the definition of CPNI, 
the Commission disavows such an interpretation. In those proceedings, 
the Commission was not examining the distinction between CPNI and other 
sensitive personal information, and it never explicitly decided that 
section 222(a) does not reach other forms of personal information. In 
fact, the Commission in 2007 described section 222(a)'s duty as 
extending to ``proprietary or personal customer information,'' and more 
recent enforcement actions have affirmed that carriers' duty to protect 
customer information extends beyond CPNI. As noted below, the general 
interpretation of section 222 in the TerraCom NAL also was confirmed by 
the Commission in a subsequent rulemaking order. And as noted above, in 
November 2021 and March 2022 orders revoking the operating authority of 
certain telecommunications carriers, the Commission further stated that 
all communications service providers have ``a statutory responsibility 
to ensure the protection of customer information,

[[Page 9990]]

including PII and CPNI.'' To find that carriers have no duty to protect 
the confidentiality of non-CPNI PII would be inconsistent with the 
plain language of section 222(a)'s use of the term ``proprietary 
information of, and relating to, . . . customers'' and is not the best 
interpretation of that provision. Instead, consistent with those recent 
Commission actions, the Commission finds that the phrase ``information 
of, and relating to, . . . customers'' in section 222(a) is naturally--
and indeed best--interpreted to have the same definition as PII, 
subject to the additional limitation that the information be 
``proprietary'' to the carrier--i.e., obtained in connection with 
establishing or maintaining a communications service. NCTA asserts that 
``most PII . . . is not `proprietary information,'' but does not 
justify why the Commission should adopt an understanding of that term 
different than the one here. Finally, given the larger context 
discussed below, to the extent that an obligation to take reasonable 
measures to protect all PII were not derived directly from section 
222(a), that would be because Congress understood it already to be 
based in section 201(b)'s prohibition on unjust or unreasonable 
practices.
    111. Some commenters contend that section 222(a) simply sets out 
high-level principles the substantive details of which are specified 
elsewhere. The Commission rejects NCTA's claim that ``legislative 
history supports an interpretation of Section 222 that does not impose 
an affirmative obligation under Section 222(a), which shows that 
Congress deliberately chose not to use `personally identifiable 
information' in Section 222.'' NCTA cites a statement from the 
conference report that `` `the new section 222 strives to balance both 
competitive and consumer privacy interests with respect to CPNI.''' But 
as even commenters opposed to the Commissin's interpretation of section 
222(a) recognize, section 222 applies to more than just CPNI, 
undercutting any understanding of that statement as reflecting the full 
scope and contours of section 222. NCTA also cites a House Report 
discussing earlier statutory language considered by the House, which 
would have specified a different scope of covered information. But that 
alternative definition also was part of a statutory provision that 
different in many other ways from section 222 as ultimately adopted, 
see July 24, 1995 House Rep., at 22-23, and section 222 as enacted 
ultimately was based on the Senate version. In sum, the Commission sees 
nothing in the legislative history that would persuade it to depart 
from what it sees as the best interpretation of section 222(a) based on 
the statutory text. But even beyond the foregoing analysis, that 
interpretation of section 222(a) is at odds with the fact that section 
222(a) lists ``equipment manufacturers'' among the classes of entities 
owed confidentiality protections as part of a carrier's ``general'' 
duty. Given that section 222 never otherwise mentions confidentiality 
protections owed to those entities, this reinforces the Commission's 
view that section 222(a) is best read as imposing enforceable 
obligations on telecommunications carriers separate and apart from the 
requirements of section 222(b) and (c). Admittedly, as CTIA points out, 
see CTIA Comments at 12, section 273(d)(2) separately prohibits ``[a]ny 
entity which establishes standards for telecommunications equipment or 
customer premises equipment, or generic network requirements for such 
equipment, or certifies telecommunications equipment or customer 
premises equipment . . . from releasing or otherwise using any 
proprietary information, designated as such by its owner, in its 
possession as a result of such activity, for any purpose other than 
purposes authorized in writing by the owner of such information.'' But 
CTIA fails to demonstrate that the entities that are the focus of 
section 222(a)--i.e., telecommunications carriers--are fully subsumed 
by (or even substantially overlap with) the entities that are the focus 
of section 273(d)(2)--e.g., entities that establish equipment standards 
or requirements or certify such equipment. The significant mismatch 
between sections 222(a) and 273(d)(2) thus gives the Commission no 
reason to question its understanding of section 222(a). Nor does 
section 222(a) otherwise include textual indicia at odds with the 
Commission's understanding. Section 222(a) employs regulatory 
terminology in imparting a general ``duty'' on telecommunications 
carriers. Section 222(a)'s heading of ``In General'' also is fully 
compatible with the Commission's understanding of that provision as 
imposing a general duty--in contrast to alternative headings such as 
``Purpose'' or ``Preamble'' that would indicate that the ``duty'' 
announced by such a provision is merely precatory or a ``statement of 
purpose'' with no legal force of its own.
    112. Contrary to some commenters' claims, the Commission's 
interpretation of section 222(a) also otherwise is compatible with the 
remainder of section 222. The Commission reads section 222(a) as 
imposing a broad duty that can and must be read in harmony with the 
more specific mandates set forth elsewhere in the statute. This 
understanding of section 222(a) also accords with the fact that the 
Commission generally has relied on a ``reasonableness'' standard when 
evaluating carriers' protection of information under section 222. 
Provisions such as sections 222(b) and (c) directly impose specific 
requirements on telecommunications carriers to address concerns that 
were particularly pressing at the time of section 222's enactment, 
which continue to control over the more general duty in section 222(a) 
to the extent of any overlap. The Commission's interpretation of 
section 222(a) thus preserves the role of each of these provisions 
within the section 222 framework. And given the more detailed statutory 
specification of carriers' requirements regarding CPNI in section 222, 
it is understandable the Congress made a point of establishing express 
exceptions from those requirements in section 222(d). Part of 
interpreting section 222(a) in harmony with section 222 as a whole 
includes interpreting it in harmony with section 222(d). Thus, the 
Commission does not interpret the grounds for disclosure authorized by 
section 222(d) as violating carriers' obligation to protect the 
confidentiality of proprietary information imposed by section 222(a). 
The Commission's analysis is the same regarding other provisions of 
section 222, such as the subscriber information disclosure requirements 
in section 222(e) and (g). Thus, the Commission does not interpret 
section 222(a) to impose obligations inconsistent with those disclosure 
requirements, either. Because the Commission reads section 222(a) in 
harmony with the remainder of section 222 there is no incompatibility 
in its approach. And the mere omission of section 222(a) from 
provisions like section 222(d), (e), and (g) would have been an oblique 
and indirect way of dictating an interpretation of section 222(a) that 
runs counter to its plain meaning: a reasonable person would not 
interpret ``a duty to protect the confidentiality'' of customer 
information as prohibiting its use for billing, for example, as is 
permitted by section 222(d)(1).
    113. Lincoln Network attempts to draw a distinction between 
security and confidentiality that is unavailing. Lincoln Network itself 
appears to recognize that something that could be characterized as a 
``security'' breach can

[[Page 9991]]

result in loss of confidentiality for data or information. Thus, even 
assuming arguendo that breaches of security and breaches of 
confidentiality are not coextensive, that would matter only if the 
Commission were attempting to act beyond the scope of section 222's 
statutory grant of authority with respect to confidentiality--which is 
not the case here. Based on relevant textual indicia, the Commission 
concludes that ``confidentiality'' within the meaning of section 222 
encompasses impermissible access to, use of, and/or disclosure of 
covered information. Section 222(a) establishes carriers' ``duty to 
protect the confidentiality of proprietary information . . . .'' 
Section 222(b), in turn, is entitled ``[c]onfidentiality of carrier 
information,'' and limits carriers' ``use'' of proprietary information. 
Section 222(c) is entitled ``[c]onfidentiality of customer proprietary 
network information'' and limits how carriers ``use, disclose, or 
permit access to'' individually identifiable CPNI. ``Although section 
headings cannot limit the plain meaning of a statutory text, `they 
supply cues' as to what Congress intended.'' Against that backdrop the 
Commission rejects Lincoln Network's attempts to rely on isolated 
examples of terminology uses from recent industry reports or the like. 
The Commission's data breach reporting requirements focus on 
``breaches,'' which occur when ``a person, without authorization or 
exceeding authorization, gains access to, uses, or discloses covered 
data.'' The ``covered data'' is defined in terms of the statutory 
categories of proprietary information and customer proprietary network 
information, and the focus on access, use, and disclosure of those data 
fits comfortably within the Commission's section 222 authority.
2. Section 201(b)
    114. Section 201(b) of the Act requires practices of common 
carriers to be just and reasonable and declares any unjust or unlawful 
practices to be unlawful. The Commission concluded in the TerraCom NAL 
that section 201(b) was violated when carriers failed to notify 
customers whose personal information had been breached by the carriers' 
inadequate data-security policies. The TerraCom NAL explicitly put 
carriers ``on notice that in the future [the Commission] fully 
intend[s] to assess forfeitures for such violations'' under section 
201(b). As NCTA points out, the Commission did not propose a forfeiture 
under section 201(b), NCTA Reply at 10-11, but that was because it was 
the first time the Commission had declared a carrier's practices 
related to its failure to notify consumers of a data breach to be a 
violation of section 201(b). The Commission made explicit that, in the 
future, such violations would be penalized under section 201(b). The 
Commission now makes that clear again here. The Commission therefore 
concludes that its authority to prohibit unjust and unreasonable 
practices and to ``prescribe such rules and regulations as may be 
necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of'' the 
Act pursuant to section 201(b) provides independent authority for the 
Commission to consider PII as protected consumer information and to 
require carriers to notify customers, law enforcement, and the 
Commission about breaches as discussed throughout this Report and 
Order.
    115. CTIA provides no explanation for its conclusory assertion that 
carriers' data privacy and security practices are not practices ``in 
connection with'' communications services. The Commission is no more 
persuaded by arguments that take a different tack and contend that the 
carrier actions at issue in this proceeding are not ``charges,'' 
``practices,'' ``classifications,'' or ``regulations'' within the 
meaning of section 201(b). This argument relies on the theory that the 
Supreme Court has held ``that activity is not covered by Section 201(b) 
unless it `resembles activity that . . . transportation and 
communications agencies have long regulated.' '' But in that decision, 
the Supreme Court did not so hold; it merely considered that factor in 
support of its threshold determination that the activity at issue there 
``easily fits within the language of the statutory phrase'' as 
understood ``in ordinary English.'' The Commission sees no reason why a 
carrier's privacy and data breach notification practices with respect 
to customer PII that it has by virtue of its service relationship with 
them would not easily fit within the ordinary understanding of that 
statutory phrase, as well. Independently, the Commission also observes 
that the Commission has, in fact, historically regulated carriers' 
privacy practices under its section 201(b) authority. Certainly any 
information collected from a customer or prospective customer related 
to establishing or maintaining the provision of a communications 
service would qualify. As discussed above, it is well established that 
carriers have come into possession of, and sometimes suffered breaches 
of, sensitive personal information that may not be CPNI. Nor does the 
canon of statutory construction about specific provisions governing 
general ones apply here. Section 222, adopted as part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), was not intended to narrow 
carriers' privacy duties or the Commission's authority to oversee 
carriers' privacy practices. The Commission rejects contrary arguments 
premised on the fact that section 222 does not itself include a savings 
clause expressly preserving the Commission's authority under section 
201, in contrast to section 251 of the Act. The 1996 Act made clear 
that ``the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to 
modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless 
expressly so provided in such Act or amendments.'' Nothing in section 
222 expressly modifies, impairs, or supersedes the Commission's 
authority under section 201(b) to act to ensure that carriers' 
practices are just and reasonable. While it is not entirely clear why 
Congress felt the need for an additional savings clause in section 
251(i), it might simply have done so ``to be doubly sure,'' Barton v. 
Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1453 (2020), particularly given the 
responsibilities assigned to the States in the implementation of 
sections 251 and 252 of the Act. Nor is the Commission persuaded by 
contrary claims based on high-level statements in legislative history 
about the balancing various interests underlying various legislative 
alternatives that eventually led to section 222 of the Act. See, e.g., 
CTIA Dec. 6, 2023 Ex Parte at 5-6. Such high-level statements in 
legislative history do not persuade the Commission to depart from what 
it sees as the best interpretation of the statutory text. Nor is it 
even clear that the relevant balancing of interests in the cited 
legislative history necessarily is relevant to the particular exercise 
of section 201(b) authority at issue here. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 
103-559, at 60 (June 24, 1994) (discussing the ``careful balance of 
competing, often conflicting, considerations'' of consumers' need ``to 
be sure that information about them that carriers can collect is not 
misused'' with consumers' expectation that ``the carrier's employee 
will have available all relevant information about their service,'' 
which ``argues for looser restrictions on internal use of customer 
information''). The Commission regulated carriers' privacy practices 
under its general Title II authority even before enactment of the 1996 
Act, and the 1996 Act codified the privacy duty and enacted specific 
restrictions for the new competitive environment that the Act was 
intended to promote. In the course of rejecting a request that carriers 
be compelled to share customer

[[Page 9992]]

information with certain other carriers to protect against 
discrimination against competitors under sections 201(b) and 202(a) of 
the Act, the Commission stated that ``the specific consumer privacy and 
consumer choice protections established in section 222 supersede the 
general protections identified in sections 201(b) and 202(a).” 
Understood in context, that simply stands for the proposition that 
where consumer privacy issues addressed specifically in section 222 are 
implicated, the requirements of section 222 are controlling over more 
general protections in section 201(b) and 202(a) that are unrelated to 
privacy--such as advancing competitive neutrality. The Commission 
similarly rejects attempts to rely on statements about section 222 that 
the Commission made in analogous statutory contexts where it rejected 
pro-competition requirements under statutory provisions like sections 
272 or 274 in light of the privacy requirements of section 222. More 
generally, to the extent that the Commission has made statements that 
its section 222 authority supersedes its authority under section 
201(b), the Commission disavows such an interpretation for the reasons 
stated in this section. Independently, with particular respect to data 
breach notification requirements, the Commission does not find either 
section 201(b) or section 222 to be a more specific provision. And even 
assuming arguendo that section 222 were controlling within its self-
described scope, the Commission's rules are fully consistent with that 
authority as well. As the Commission stated in 1998, ``Congress . . . 
enacted section 222 to prevent consumer privacy protections from being 
inadvertently swept away along with the prior limits on competition.'' 
For the reasons discussed throughout this Report and Order, 
notification to customers, law enforcement, and the Commission are 
essential to the Commission's oversight of carriers' privacy practices.
    116. The structure of the Communications Act and its relationship 
with the Federal Trade Commission Act also demonstrate that this 
Commission has authority to make rules governing common carriers' 
protection of PII. The FTC has broad statutory authority to protect 
against ``unfair or deceptive'' acts or practices, but that authority 
is limited by carving out several exceptions for categories of entities 
subject to oversight by other regulatory agencies, one of which is 
common carriers subject to the Communications Act. The clear intent is 
that the expert agencies in those areas will act based on the 
authorities provided by those agencies' statutes. It is implausible 
that Congress would have exempted common carriers from any obligation 
to protect their customers' private information that is not CPNI. 
Insofar as some parties contend that section 222 establishes a 
comprehensive scheme of privacy regulation for carriers to the 
exclusion of section 201(b), yet also contest the Commission's 
interpretation of section 222(a), they effectively ask the Commission 
to accept that the supposedly comprehensive privacy scheme that 
Congress enacted intentionally left the non-CPNI PII of carriers' 
customers unprotected by Federal law. As discussed, the Commission not 
only finds that view contrary to the statutory text, but find it 
implausible more generally.
3. Interconnected VoIP
    117. The Commission finds that section 222 and the Commission's 
ancillary jurisdiction grant the Commission authority to apply the 
rules it adopts here to interconnected VoIP providers. Interconnected 
VoIP providers have been explicitly subject to the Commission's data 
breach rules since 2007, when the Commission first adopted the data 
breach notification rule. In the 2007 CPNI Order, the Commission 
recognized that if interconnected VoIP services were telecommunications 
services, they self-evidently would be covered by section 222 and the 
Commission's implementing rules. Although the Commission has not 
broadly addressed the statutory classification of interconnected VoIP 
as a general matter, it has consistently recognized that a provider may 
offer VoIP on a Title II basis if it voluntarily ``holds itself out as 
a telecommunications carrier and complies with appropriate Federal and 
State requirements.'' But because the Commission generally had not 
classified interconnected VoIP, the Commission also exercised its Title 
I ancillary jurisdiction to extend its CPNI rules to interconnected 
VoIP services, finding that ``interconnected VoIP services fall within 
the subject matter jurisdiction granted to [the Commission] in the 
Act,'' and that ``imposing CPNI obligations is reasonably ancillary to 
the effective performance of the Commission's various 
responsibilities.''
    118. The Commission proceeds under the same alternative bases here, 
and concludes that legal and factual bases for the findings relied on 
in the 2007 CPNI Order have only grown more persuasive since then. The 
Commission observed at the time that ``interconnected VoIP service `is 
increasingly used to replace analog voice service.' '' This trend has 
continued. Interconnected VoIP now accounts for a far larger share of 
the residential fixed voice services market than legacy switched access 
services, and ``fixed switched access continues to decline while 
interconnected VoIP services continue to increase.'' Therefore, as the 
Commission found in 2007, today's consumers should reasonably expect 
``that their telephone calls are private irrespective of whether the 
call is made using the services of a wireline carrier, a wireless 
carrier, or an interconnected VoIP provider, given that these services, 
from the perspective of a customer making an ordinary telephone call, 
are virtually indistinguishable.'' The Commission likewise thinks 
interconnected VoIP subscribers should reasonably expect their other 
information to also be protected and treated confidentially consistent 
with the other protections that apply under section 222. Furthermore, 
extending section 222's protections to interconnected VoIP service 
customers remains ``necessary to protect the privacy of wireline or 
wireless customers that place calls to or receive calls from 
interconnected VoIP customers.'' Indeed, following the 2007 CPNI Order, 
Congress ratified the Commission's decision to apply section 222's 
requirements to interconnected VoIP services, adding language to 
section 222 that applied provisions of section 222 to users of ``IP-
enabled voice service.'' These revisions to section 222 would not make 
sense if the privacy-related duties of subsections (a) and (c) did not 
apply to interconnected VoIP providers. The Commission notes that no 
commenter chose to address this issue in the course of this proceeding.
    119. In the case of interconnected VoIP providers that have 
obtained direct access to telephone numbers, the Commission concludes 
that section 251(e) also gives the Commission authority to condition 
that access on those providers' compliance with privacy requirements 
equivalent to those that apply to telecommunications carriers. The 
Commission previously exercised its authority under section 251(e) to 
ensure, for example, that an interconnected VoIP provider receiving 
direct access to numbers ``possesses the financial, managerial, and 
technical expertise to provide reliable service.'' Ensuring that 
interconnected VoIP providers remain on the same regulatory footing as 
telecommunications carriers with respect to customer privacy--as was 
the case when direct access to numbers for interconnected VoIP 
providers began--will ensure a level

[[Page 9993]]

competitive playing field and ensure that consumers' expectations are 
met regarding the privacy of their information when using the telephone 
network.
4. Legal Authority To Adopt Rules for TRS
    120. The Commission finds that it has separate and independent 
authority under sections 225 and 222 to amend its data breach rule for 
TRS to ensure that TRS users receive privacy protections equivalent to 
those enjoyed by users of telecommunications and VoIP services. Section 
225 of the Act directs the Commission to ensure that TRS are available 
to enable communication in a manner that is functionally equivalent to 
voice telephone services. In the 2013 VRS Reform Order, the Commission 
found that applying the privacy protections of the Commission's 
regulations to TRS users advances the functional equivalency of TRS. 
The Commission concluded further that the specific mandate of section 
225 to establish ``functional requirements, guidelines, and operations 
procedures for TRS'' authorizes the Commission to make the privacy 
protections included in the Commission's data breach regulations 
applicable to TRS users.
    121. The Commission also found that extending its privacy--
including data breach--regulations to TRS users was ancillary to its 
responsibilities under section 222 of the Act to telecommunications 
service subscribers that place calls to or receive calls from TRS 
users, because TRS call records include call detail information 
concerning all calling and called parties. The Commission moreover 
determined that applying data breach requirements to point-to-point 
video services provided by VRS providers (such point-to-point services, 
while provided in association with VRS, are not themselves a form of 
TRS) is ancillary to its responsibilities under sections 222 and 225, 
including the need to protect information that VRS providers had by 
virtue of being a given customer's registered VRS provider--even in the 
context of point-to-point video service--and to guard against the risk 
to consumers who are likely to expect the same privacy protections when 
dealing with VRS providers, whether they are using VRS or point-to-
point video services.
    122. The Commission concludes that, for the same reasons cited in 
the 2013 VRS Reform Order, these sources of authority for establishing 
the current data breach rule for TRS now authorize the Commission to 
amend this rule to ensure that TRS users continue to receive privacy 
protections equivalent to those enjoyed by users of telecommunications 
and VoIP services. The record in this proceeding supports this 
conclusion. As AARO states, the Commission has ``ample legal 
authority'' to amend its data breach rule for TRS under sections 222 
and 225.
5. Impact of the Congressional Disapproval of the 2016 Privacy Order
    123. In 2016, the Commission attempted to revise its breach 
notification rules as part of a larger proceeding addressing privacy 
requirements for broadband internet service providers (ISPs). In 2015, 
the Commission classified broadband internet access service as a 
telecommunications service subject to Title II of the Act, a decision 
that the D.C. Circuit upheld in U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 
(D.C. Cir. 2016). As a result of classifying broadband internet access 
service as a telecommunications service, such services were subject to 
sections 201 and 222 of the Act. The rules the Commission adopted in 
the 2016 Privacy Order applied to telecommunications carriers and 
interconnected VoIP providers in addition to ISPs, which had been 
classified as providers of telecommunications services in 2015. In 
2017, however, Congress nullified those 2016 revisions to the 
Commission's privacy rules under the CRA. Pursuant to the language of 
the Resolution of Disapproval, the 2016 Privacy Order was rendered ``of 
no force or effect.'' That resolution conformed to the procedure set 
out in the CRA, which requires agencies to submit most rules to 
Congress before they can take effect and provides a mechanism for 
Congress to disapprove of such rules. Pursuant to the operation of the 
CRA, the 2016 Privacy Order ``may not be reissued in substantially the 
same form, and a new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule 
may not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule is specifically 
authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution 
disapproving the original rule.''
    124. In analyzing the impact of the Resolution of Disapproval of 
the 2016 Privacy Order, the Commission first explains its understanding 
of the CRA's prohibition on reissuance. The Commission also shows that, 
in any event, the revisions made here to the breach notification rule 
are different in substantial ways from those that were included in the 
2016 Privacy Order.
    125. First, the Commission concludes that the CRA is best 
interpreted as prohibiting the Commission from reissuing the 2016 
Privacy Order in whole, or in substantially the same form, or from 
adopting another item that is substantially the same as the 2016 
Privacy Order. It does not prohibit the Commission from revising its 
breach notification rules in ways that are similar to, or even the same 
as, some of the revisions that were adopted in the 2016 Privacy Order, 
unless the revisions adopted are the same, in substance, as the 2016 
Privacy Order as a whole. To be clear, although the CRA would permit 
the Commission to adopt a breach notification rule that is the same as 
the breach notification rule that was adopted by the 2016 Privacy 
Order, the rule that the Commission adopts here has substantial 
differences. The Commission rejects arguments that there was 
insufficient notice for the Commission to adopt this interpretation of 
the effect of the CRA resolution of disapproval. In pertinent part, 
notice under the APA requires ``reference to the legal authority under 
which the rule is proposed'' and ``either the terms or substance of the 
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.'' 
The Data Breach Notice described the proposal to adopt expanded data 
breach notification requirements pursuant to its statutory authority 
under sections 222, 225, and other possible sources of authority. In 
the course of this request for comment, the Commission sought specific 
comment regarding ``the effect and scope of the Congressional 
disapproval of the 2016 Privacy Order.'' This satisfies the 
requirements of the APA. Even beyond that, however, the Commission's 
interpretation flows from ordinary tools of statutory interpretation, 
first and foremost by focusing on the relevant statutory text and 
context. Contrary to the suggestion of some, the Commission finds 
nothing ``novel'' about this interpretive approach, providing 
additional grounds to conclude that the notice and comment requirements 
of the APA were satisfied here.
    126. Congress's Resolution of Disapproval, by its terms, 
disapproved ``the rule submitted by the Federal Communications 
Commission relating to `Protecting the Privacy of Customers of 
Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services' (81 FR 87274 (December 
2, 2016)).'' This referred to the 2016 Privacy Order in its entirety, 
which was summarized in the cited Federal Register document. The 
statutory term ``rule,'' as used in the CRA, refers to ``the whole or a 
part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and 
future effect

[[Page 9994]]

designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or 
describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an 
agency.'' Thus, ``rule'' can and does refer to an entire decision that 
adopts rules. In implementing Congress's resolution of disapproval, the 
Commission treated the 2016 Privacy Order as a single rule. In a 
ministerial order, the Commission ``simply recogniz[ed] the effect of 
the resolution of disapproval'' should be that ``the 2016 Privacy Order 
`shall be treated as though [it] had never taken effect.' '' As a 
result, all of the changes that the 2016 Privacy Order made to the 
Commission rules codified in the Code of Federal Regulations were 
reversed, with the result that all of the Commission rules in part 64, 
subpart U, were restored to how they read prior to their amendment by 
the 2016 Privacy Order. The term ``rule'' can also refer to parts of 
such a decision, or to various requirements as adopted or amended by 
such a decision. In the context of the CRA's bar on reissuance, the 
Commission must consider which rule is specified by that bar. The 
reissuance bar, 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2), provides that ``a new rule that is 
substantially the same as such a rule may not be issued''--where ``such 
a rule'' refers to the rule specified in the joint resolution of 
disapproval as described in section 802. As shown above, the joint 
resolution referred to the entirety of the 2016 Privacy Order. 
Therefore, the Commission concludes that the ``rule'' to which the 
reissuance bar applies is the entire 2016 Privacy Order with all of the 
rule revisions adopted therein.
    127. The Commission concludes that it would be erroneous to 
construe the resolution of disapproval as applying to anything other 
than all of the rule revisions, as a whole, adopted as part of the 2016 
Privacy Order. That resolution had the effect of nullifying each and 
every provision of the 2016 Privacy Order--each of those parts being 
rules under the APA--but not ``the rule'' specified in the resolution 
of disapproval. By its terms, the CRA does not prohibit the adoption of 
a rule that is merely substantially similar to a limited portion of the 
disapproved rule or one that is the same as individual pieces of the 
disapproved rule. The Commission rejects arguments that because the CRA 
borrows from the APA's definition of ``rule'' as referring to the whole 
or a part of certain agency statements of general applicability and 
future effect, an agency cannot adopt a rule substantially similar to 
any part of an agency rulemaking decision that does not take effect due 
to a resolution of disapproval under the CRA. The key issue is not the 
definition of ``rule'' in the abstract, but the wording of 5 U.S.C. 
801(b)(2) (along with the wording of the resolution of disapproval 
itself). And 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2) is worded in singular terms--referring 
to ``A rule that does not take effect (or does not continue) under 
paragraph (1) . . . '' as opposed to saying ``Any rule that does not 
take effect (or does not continue) under paragraph (1) . . . '' or 
``Rules that do not take effect (or do not continue) under paragraph 
(1) . . . .'' So even if there might be multiple APA rules that do not 
take effect as a result of a resolution of disapproval, the CRA's focus 
is on a singular ``rule'' that does not take effect. Since the whole 
2016 Privacy Order was the subject of the resolution of disapproval, 
and the whole 2016 Privacy Order did not take effect as a result, the 
Commission concludes that the whole 2016 Privacy Order is the relevant 
``rule'' for purposes of 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2). And although some 
commenters claim that the Commission's approach to interpreting the CRA 
could lead to uncertainty about what is subject to 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2), 
they do not identify any actual ambiguity as the Commission's approach 
is applied here--instead, they seemingly just dislike the outcome. Nor 
is the Commission persuaded that Congress lacks the tools to address 
any concerns about the scope of a resolution of disapproval if any were 
to arise. For example, the record does not reveal why Congress could 
not specify the ``relating to'' criterion in the resolution of 
disapproval language required by 5 U.S.C. 802(a) in more granular or 
detailed ways. Independently, Congress also always remains free to 
enact laws outside the CRA process that reject agency rules with as 
much detail and precision as they wish should ambiguity concerns become 
a practical problem.
    128. To prohibit an agency from making any of the individual 
decisions made in an entire disapproved rulemaking action would not 
only be contrary to the text of the resolution of disapproval, 
interpreted consistently with the CRA, but also would be contrary to 
the apparent intent of the CRA. When Congress adopted the CRA, it 
recognized that it would be necessary for agencies to interpret the 
scope of the bar on reissuance in the future. According to a floor 
statement that its authors intended to be authoritative,

[t]he authors [of the CRA] intend the debate on any resolution of 
disapproval to focus on the law that authorized the rule and make the 
congressional intent clear regarding the agency's options or lack 
thereof after enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. It will 
be the agency's responsibility in the first instance when promulgating 
the rule to determine the range of discretion afforded under the 
original law and whether the law authorizes the agency to issue a 
substantially different rule. Then, the agency must give effect to the 
resolution of disapproval.

    129. Accordingly, the Commission observes that, in the floor debate 
on the resolution of disapproval in 2017, supporters of the resolution 
did not mention the breach notification provision apart from a brief 
reference. Senators who spoke in favor of the resolution cited the 2016 
Privacy Order's treatment of broadband providers and the information 
they hold as different from providers of other services on the 
internet. The debate gives no reason to believe that the breach 
notification rule motivated those members of Congress who supported the 
resolution. Although the Commission's conclusion that the whole 2016 
Privacy Order is the relevant ``rule'' for purposes of 5 U.S.C. 
801(b)(2) is fully justified even without considering the legislative 
history of the resolution of disapproval, the Commission rejects 
arguments that it is inappropriate to also look at that history and 
contentions that the Commission is misinterpreting that history. In 
addition to legislative history of the CRA that indicates that the 
legislative history of each resolution of disapproval should be 
relevant, out of an abundance of caution given the lack of an 
authoritative determination specifying the details of how to evaluate 
whether a rule is substantially the same under 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2), the 
Commission considers whether there are indicia from the legislative 
history of the resolution of disapproval here to inform that analysis. 
For instance, if the legislative history indicated that the resolution 
of disapproval of the 2016 Privacy Order somehow hinged entirely or 
significantly on concern about some or all of the 2016 data breach 
reporting requirements, the Commission then could consider whether and 
how to account for that in the 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2) analysis 
notwithstanding the fact that there is little practical overlap between 
this order and the entirety of the 2016 Privacy Order. Although data 
breach notification issues occasionally appear to have been raised by 
opponents of the resolution of disapproval, high-level statements by 
supporters of the resolution about ``FCC overreach'' or the like do 
not, without more, persuade the Commission that the 2016 data breach 
notification requirements played a

[[Page 9995]]

significant role in motivating the resolution of disapproval. Thus, the 
Commission sees nothing in the legislative history of the resolution of 
disapproval that would cause the Commission to question its conclusion 
that its action here does not adopt substantially the same rule for CRA 
purposes.
    130. As EPIC notes in its comments, Congressional disapproval of 
the 2016 Privacy Order under the CRA was largely predicated on claims 
that the Order would create duplicative privacy authority with the 
Federal Trade Commission as relates to broadband internet service 
providers. A review of the Congressional record from 2017 reveals that 
this indeed appears to have been the animating justification for 
Congressional disapproval of the 2016 Privacy Order. Whatever the 
merits of such an argument, the Commission finds that it does not now 
preclude the Commission from adopting the rules set forth in this 
Order. As EPIC notes, the rules the Commission adopts here are not 
privacy measures directed at broadband internet service providers, but 
rather, data security measures directed at providers of 
telecommunications, interconnected VoIP services, and TRS, and which 
build upon rules that have existed since 2007. Thus, the primary 
animating justification behind Congressional disapproval of the 2016 
Privacy Order is irrelevant to the present case.
    131. In addition, the revisions that the Commission makes here to 
the breach notification rule are different in substantial ways from 
those that Congress disapproved in 2017. The 2016 Privacy Order was 
focused in large part on adopting privacy rules for broadband internet 
access service, and also made a number of changes to the Commission's 
privacy rules more generally that, among other things, required 
carriers to disclose their privacy practices, revised the framework for 
customer choice regarding carriers' access, use, and disclosure of the 
customers' information, and imposed data security requirements in 
addition to data breach notification requirements. When the 2016 
Privacy Order is viewed as a whole, it is clear that there is at most a 
small conceptual overlap between the adoption of data breach 
notification requirements at issue here and the many actions taken in 
that Order of which data breach notification requirements represented 
only a small fraction.
    132. Independently, even assuming arguendo that the CRA were 
interpreted to require an evaluation on a more granular basis here, the 
Commission is not persuaded that the requirements it adopts here are 
substantially the same as analogous requirements in the 2016 Privacy 
Order. For example, the customer notification requirement the 
Commission adopts here is materially less prescriptive regarding the 
content and manner of customer notice than what the Commission adopted 
in 2016. Further, the 2016 data breach notification rules for customer 
notifications and government agency notifications did not incorporate 
the good-faith exception from the definition of covered breaches that 
the Commission adopts here. With respect to the Federal agency 
notification requirements, as compared to the 2016 rules, the rules the 
Commission adopts here in that regard provide for the Commission and 
other law enforcement agencies to gain a much more complete picture of 
data breaches, including trends and emerging activities, consistent 
with the demonstrated need for such oversight. Consequently, even 
assuming arguendo that one were to conduct the 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2) 
evaluation on a more granular basis, the Commission is not persuaded 
that the data breach notification requirements the Commission adopts 
here would be substantially the same as breach notification 
requirements adopted in the 2016 Privacy Order. Even assuming one were 
to conduct the 5 U.S.C. 801(b)(2) evaluation at a more granular basis, 
the Commission is not persuaded that the breach notification rule from 
the 2016 Privacy Order is the right level of granularity, nor that the 
evaluation of whether rules are substantially the same should be 
conducted based on high-level policy similarities, as some commenters 
contend. For example, the customer notification requirement is itself a 
``rule'' within the meaning of the APA, as is the Federal agency 
notification requirement. Ultimately, however viewed, the Commission is 
persuaded that the rules it adopts here are not substantially the same 
as a disapproved rule for purposes of the CRA.
    133. Nor is the Commission adopting something substantially the 
same as the 2016 Privacy Order as a whole through the aggregate effect 
of individual Commission actions. For one, the theory that 
classification of broadband internet access service as a 
telecommunications service will automatically subject those services to 
the Commission's privacy rules, including the data breach notification 
requirements adopted here, is belied by multiple considerations: (1) 
the Commission has simply sought comment on those classification issues 
in its Open internet Notice and has not yet acted in that regard; (2) 
the 2015 Open internet Order shows that the Commission is willing and 
able to decline to apply rules that might be triggered by a 
classification decision, having done so there, for example, by 
forbearing from all rules implementing section 222 pending 
consideration in a subsequent proceeding; and (3) the Open internet 
Notice sought comment on following the same approach to privacy that 
the Commission took in the 2015 Open internet Order and specifically 
noted the resolution of disapproval of the 2016 Privacy Order as a 
relevant consideration bearing on how it proceeds there. The 
Commission's analysis also is not materially altered by arguments that 
the Commission otherwise has adopted ``data security, customer 
authentication, employee training, and other requirements.'' In 
addition to being unpersuaded that such requirements substantially 
``mirror provisions of the 2016 order,'' the Commission independently 
is not persuaded that the aggregation of such requirements and the data 
breach notification requirements adopted here lead to such a 
significant overlap with the 2016 Privacy Order as to render the 
Commission's collective actions substantially the same as the 2016 
Privacy Order as a whole. For example, in the recent SIM Swap Order, 
the Commission adopted certain privacy requirements focused on wireless 
carriers' practices in the specific context of account transfers (or 
``swaps'') from a device associated with one subscriber identity module 
(SIM) to a device associated with a different SIM on in connection with 
a wireless number being ported out. That is a vastly different focus 
than the 2016 Privacy Order, which focused on the general privacy 
practices of all carriers. Thus, even assuming arguendo some high-level 
conceptual similarities, the operation and practical effect is 
significantly different than even arguably analogous requirements that 
were part of the 2016 Privacy Order. As discussed above, the primary 
focus of the 2016 Privacy Order was privacy rules for broadband 
internet access service, along with a number of changes to the 
Commission's privacy rules more generally that, among other things, 
required carriers to disclose their privacy practices, and revised the 
framework for customer choice regarding carriers' access, use, and 
disclosure of the customers' information. Given the other significant 
issues central to that decision, even assuming arguendo that there were 
some conceptual overlap between the

[[Page 9996]]

issues addressed in the 2016 Privacy Order and data security, customer 
authentication, and employee training requirements recently adopted by 
the Commission--and even considered in conjunction with the data breach 
notification rules the Commission adopts here--the Commission is not 
persuaded that the Commission has adopted substantially the same rule 
as the 2016 Privacy Order. Separately, insofar as the Commission 
considers the legislative history of the 2017 resolution of 
disapproval, data security, customer authentication, and employee 
training requirements likewise received only isolated mention, and then 
primarily with respect to broadband internet access service. 
Consequently, that legislative history does not reveal that the 
resolution of disapproval hinged entirely or significantly on concerns 
about such issues, even considered collectively. Thus, whether viewed 
alone or in the aggregate, the Commission is not persuaded that it has 
adopted substantially the same rule as the 2016 Privacy Order as a 
whole. And the Commission notes, of course, that Congressional 
disapproval of a particular rule implementing a statute does not 
nullify an agency's general authority under that statute.

II. Effective Dates

    134. The revised recordkeeping and reporting requirements adopted 
in this Report and Order, including the revisions to 47 CFR 64.2011 and 
64.5111 set forth in Appendix A, are subject to approval by the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB). Unless and until such time as OMB 
approves these new or modified requirements, the current, unmodified 
versions of 47 CFR 64.2011 and 64.5111 shall continue to apply.
    135. The Commission directs the Wireline Competition Bureau to 
announce OMB approval and effective dates for the modified rules 
contained within this Order by subsequent public notice. Pursuant to 
this process, the Commission anticipates that carriers of all sizes 
will have ample time to come into compliance with these requirements, 
and therefore rejects CCA's request for a 12-month implementation 
timeline.

III. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    1. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended (RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was 
incorporated into the Data Breach Reporting Requirements (Data Breach 
Notice), released in January 2023. The Commission sought written public 
comment on the proposals in the Data Breach Notice, including comment 
on the IRFA. No comments were filed addressing the IRFA. This Final 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the RFA.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Report and Order

    2. The Report and Order takes several important steps aimed at 
updating the Commission's rules regarding data breach notifications, 
both to Federal agencies and to customers, to better protect consumers 
from the dangers associated with data security breaches of customer 
information and to ensure that the Commission's rules keep pace with 
modern challenges.
    3. First, the Commission expands the scope of the data breach 
notification rules to cover various categories of personally 
identifiable information (PII) that carriers hold with respect to their 
customers. Second, the Commission expands the definition of ``breach'' 
for telecommunications carriers to include inadvertent access, use, or 
disclosure of customer information, except in those cases where such 
information is acquired in good faith by an employee or agent of a 
carrier, and such information is not used improperly or futher 
disclosed. Third, the Commission requires carriers to notify the 
Commission, in addition to the United States Secret Service (Secret 
Service) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as soon as 
practicable, and in no event later than seven business days after 
reasonable determination of a breach. Fourth, the Commission eliminates 
the requirement that carriers notify customers of a breach in cases 
where a carrier can reasonably determine that no harm to customers is 
reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach, or where a breach 
solely involves encrypted data and the carrier has definitive evidence 
that the encryption key was not also accessed, used, or disclosed. 
Fifth, the Commission eliminates the mandatory waiting period for 
carriers to notify customers, and instead requires carriers to notify 
customers of breaches of covered data without unreasonable delay after 
notification to Federal agencies, and in no case more than 30 days 
following reasonable determination of a breach, unless a delay is 
requested by law enforcement. Sixth, and finally, to ensure that 
telecommunications relay service (TRS) customers enjoy the same level 
of protections as customers of telecommunications carriers, the 
Commission adopts equivalent requirements for TRS providers. By 
adopting these requirements the Commission increases the the protection 
of consumers from improper use and/or disclosure of their information 
consistent with approaches to protect the public adopted by the 
Commission's Federal and State government partners.

B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response 
to the IRFA

    4. There were no comments raised that specifically addressed the 
proposed rules and policies presented in the IRFA. Nonetheless, the 
Commission considered the general comments received about the potential 
impact of the rules proposed in the IRFA on small entities and took 
steps where appropriate and feasible, as discussed below, to reduce the 
compliance burden and the economic impact of the rules adopted in the 
Report and Order on small entities.

C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration

    5. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended 
the RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the 
proposed rules as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not 
file any comments in response to the proposed rules in this proceeding.

D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which 
the Rules Will Apply

    6. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where 
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be 
affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the 
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small 
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental 
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same 
meaning as the term ``small-business concern'' under the Small Business 
Act. A ``small-business concern'' is one which: (1) is independently 
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and 
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
    7. Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental 
Jurisdictions. The Commission's actions, over time, may affect small 
entities that are not easily categorized at present. The Commission 
therefore describes, at

[[Page 9997]]

the outset, three broad groups of small entities that could be directly 
affected herein. First, while there are industry specific size 
standards for small businesses that are used in the regulatory 
flexibility analysis, according to data from the Small Business 
Administration's (SBA) Office of Advocacy, in general a small business 
is an independent business having fewer than 500 employees. These types 
of small businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United 
States, which translates to 32.5 million businesses.
    8. Next, the type of small entity described as a ``small 
organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is 
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.'' 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a revenue benchmark of $50,000 
or less to delineate its annual electronic filing requirements for 
small exempt organizations. Nationwide, for tax year 2020, there were 
approximately 447,689 small exempt organizations in the U.S. reporting 
revenues of $50,000 or less according to the registration and tax data 
for exempt organizations available from the IRS.
    9. Finally, the small entity described as a ``small governmental 
jurisdiction'' is defined generally as ``governments of cities, 
counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special 
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' U.S. Census 
Bureau data from the 2017 Census of Governments indicate there were 
90,075 local governmental jurisdictions consisting of general purpose 
governments and special purpose governments in the United States. Of 
this number there were 36,931 general purpose governments (county, 
municipal and town or township) with populations of less than 50,000 
and 12,040 special purpose governments--independent school districts 
with enrollment populations of less than 50,000. Accordingly, based on 
the 2017 U.S. Census of Governments data, the Commission estimates that 
at least 48,971 entities fall into the category of ``small governmental 
jurisdictions.''
1. Wireline Carriers
    10. Wired Telecommunications Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau 
defines this industry as establishments primarily engaged in operating 
and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure 
that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, 
sound, and video using wired communications networks. Transmission 
facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of 
technologies. Establishments in this industry use the wired 
telecommunications network facilities that they operate to provide a 
variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP 
services, wired (cable) audio and video programming distribution, and 
wired broadband internet services. By exception, establishments 
providing satellite television distribution services using facilities 
and infrastructure that they operate are included in this industry. 
Wired Telecommunications Carriers are also referred to as wireline 
carriers or fixed local service providers.
    11. The SBA small business size standard for Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer 
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there 
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of 
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. 
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service 
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 4,590 providers 
that reported they were engaged in the provision of fixed local 
services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,146 
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's 
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered 
small entities.
    12. Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the Commission nor the 
SBA has developed a size standard for small businesses specifically 
applicable to local exchange services. Providers of these services 
include both incumbent and competitive local exchange service 
providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry 
with an SBA small business size standard. Wired Telecommunications 
Carriers are also referred to as wireline carriers or fixed local 
service providers. The SBA small business size standard for Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer 
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there 
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of 
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. 
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service 
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 4,590 providers 
that reported they were fixed local exchange service providers. Of 
these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,146 providers have 
1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business 
size standard, most of these providers can be considered small 
entities.
    13. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the 
Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard 
specifically for incumbent local exchange carriers. Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry with an SBA small 
business size standard. The SBA small business size standard for Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer 
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there 
were 3,054 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of 
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. 
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service 
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 1,212 providers 
that reported they were incumbent local exchange service providers. Of 
these providers, the Commission estimates that 916 providers have 1,500 
or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size 
standard, the Commission estimates that the majority of incumbent local 
exchange carriers can be considered small entities.
    14. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the 
Commission nor the SBA has developed a size standard for small 
businesses specifically applicable to local exchange services. 
Providers of these services include several types of competitive local 
exchange service providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the 
closest industry with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small 
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies 
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data 
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this 
industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with 
fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 
2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, 
there were 3,378 providers that reported they were competitive local 
exchange service providers. Of these providers, the Commission 
estimates that 3,230 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. 
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of 
these providers can be considered small entities.
    15. Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). Neither the Commission nor the 
SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for 
Interexchange

[[Page 9998]]

Carriers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry 
with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small business size 
standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 
1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 
show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the 
entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 
employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal 
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 127 
providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of 
interexchange services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates 
that 109 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using 
the SBA's small business size standard, the Commission estimates that 
the majority of providers in this industry can be considered small 
entities.
    16. Cable System Operators (Telecom Act Standard). The 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, contains a size standard for a 
``small cable operator,'' which is ``a cable operator that, directly or 
through an affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than one percent of 
all subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with any 
entity or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate exceed 
$250,000,000.'' For purposes of the Telecom Act Standard, the 
Commission determined that a cable system operator that serves fewer 
than 498,000 subscribers, either directly or through affiliates, will 
meet the definition of a small cable operator. Based on industry data, 
only six cable system operators have more than 498,000 subscribers. 
Accordingly, the Commission estimates that the majority of cable system 
operators are small under this size standard. The Commission notes 
however, that the Commission neither requests nor collects information 
on whether cable system operators are affiliated with entities whose 
gross annual revenues exceed $250 million. Therefore, the Commission is 
unable at this time to estimate with greater precision the number of 
cable system operators that would qualify as small cable operators 
under the definition in the Communications Act.
    17. Other Toll Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has 
developed a definition for small businesses specifically applicable to 
Other Toll Carriers. This category includes toll carriers that do not 
fall within the categories of interexchange carriers, operator service 
providers, prepaid calling card providers, satellite service carriers, 
or toll resellers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest 
industry with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small 
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies 
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data 
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms in this industry that 
operated for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with 
fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 
2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, 
there were 90 providers that reported they were engaged in the 
provision of other toll services. Of these providers, the Commission 
estimates that 87 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. 
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of 
these providers can be considered small entities.
2. Wireless Carriers
    18. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). This 
industry comprises establishments engaged in operating and maintaining 
switching and transmission facilities to provide communications via the 
airwaves. Establishments in this industry have spectrum licenses and 
provide services using that spectrum, such as cellular services, paging 
services, wireless internet access, and wireless video services. The 
SBA size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if 
it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show 
that there were 2,893 firms in this industry that operated for the 
entire year. Of that number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 
employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal 
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 594 
providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of wireless 
services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 511 
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's 
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered 
small entities.
    19. Satellite Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms 
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other 
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by 
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of 
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' Satellite 
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth 
station operators. The SBA small business size standard for this 
industry classifies a business with $38.5 million or less in annual 
receipts as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 firms 
in this industry operated for the entire year. Of this number, 242 
firms had revenue of less than $25 million. Additionally, based on 
Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of 
December 31, 2021, there were 65 providers that reported they were 
engaged in the provision of satellite telecommunications services. Of 
these providers, the Commission estimates that approximately 42 
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's 
small business size standard, a little more than half of these 
providers can be considered small entities.
3. Resellers
    20. Local Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA have 
developed a small business size standard specifically for Local 
Resellers. Telecommunications Resellers is the closest industry with a 
SBA small business size standard. The Telecommunications Resellers 
industry comprises establishments engaged in purchasing access and 
network capacity from owners and operators of telecommunications 
networks and reselling wired and wireless telecommunications services 
(except satellite) to businesses and households. Establishments in this 
industry resell telecommunications; they do not operate transmission 
facilities and infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) 
are included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard for 
Telecommunications Resellers classifies a business as small if it has 
1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 
1,386 firms in this industry provided resale services for the entire 
year. Of that number, 1,375 firms operated with fewer than 250 
employees. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2022 Universal 
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2021, there were 207 
providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of local 
resale services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 202 
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's 
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered 
small entities.
    21. Toll Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA have 
developed a small business size

[[Page 9999]]

standard specifically for Toll Resellers. Telecommunications Resellers 
is the closest industry with a SBA small business size standard. The 
Telecommunications Resellers industry comprises establishments engaged 
in purchasing access and network capacity from owners and operators of 
telecommunications networks and reselling wired and wireless 
telecommunications services (except satellite) to businesses and 
households. Establishments in this industry resell telecommunications; 
they do not operate transmission facilities and infrastructure. Mobile 
virtual network operators (MVNOs) are included in this industry. The 
SBA small business size standard for Telecommunications Resellers 
classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. 
Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 1,386 firms in this industry 
provided resale services for the entire year. Of that number, 1,375 
firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on 
Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of 
December 31, 2021, there were 457 providers that reported they were 
engaged in the provision of toll services. Of these providers, the 
Commission estimates that 438 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. 
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of 
these providers can be considered small entities.
    22. Prepaid Calling Card Providers. Neither the Commission nor the 
SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for 
prepaid calling card providers. Telecommunications Resellers is the 
closest industry with a SBA small business size standard. The 
Telecommunications Resellers industry comprises establishments engaged 
in purchasing access and network capacity from owners and operators of 
telecommunications networks and reselling wired and wireless 
telecommunications services (except satellite) to businesses and 
households. Establishments in this industry resell telecommunications; 
they do not operate transmission facilities and infrastructure. Mobile 
virtual network operators (MVNOs) are included in this industry. The 
SBA small business size standard for Telecommunications Resellers 
classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. 
Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 1,386 firms in this industry 
provided resale services for the entire year. Of that number, 1,375 
firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. Additionally, based on 
Commission data in the 2022 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of 
December 31, 2021, there were 62 providers that reported they were 
engaged in the provision of prepaid card services. Of these providers, 
the Commission estimates that 61 providers have 1,500 or fewer 
employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, 
most of these providers can be considered small entities.
4. Other Entities
    23. All Other Telecommunications. This industry is comprised of 
establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized 
telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications 
telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes 
establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal 
stations and associated facilities connected with one or more 
terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, 
and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems. Providers of 
internet services (e.g. dial-up ISPs) or Voice over internet Protocol 
(VoIP) services, via client-supplied telecommunications connections are 
also included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard 
for this industry classifies firms with annual receipts of $35 million 
or less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 
1,079 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of 
those firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than $25 million. Based on this 
data, the Commission estimates that the majority of ``All Other 
Telecommunications'' firms can be considered small.
E. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities
    24. In the Report and Order, the Commission expanded the scope of 
the Commission's breach notification rules to cover various categories 
of customer PII held by telecommunications carriers. The Commission 
also adopted a requirement that all telecommunications carriers notify 
the Commission, in addition to the Secret Service and the FBI, as soon 
as practicable, and in no event later than seven business days after 
reasonable determination of a breach of covered data. The Commission 
exempted from this notification requirement breaches that affect fewer 
than 500 customers and for which the carrier reasonably determines that 
no harm to customers is reasonably likely to occur as a result of the 
breach. Instead, the Commission required carriers to sign and file with 
the Commission and other law enforcement an annual summary regarding 
all such breaches occurring in the previous calendar year. Carriers 
must also notify affected customers of breaches, with the exception of 
instances where a carrier can reasonably determine that no harm to such 
customers is reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach. 
Additionally, the Commission applied similar rules to TRS providers.
    25. The Commission's review of the record included comments about 
unique burdens for small businesses that may be impacted by the 
notification requirements adopted in the Report and Order. Accordingly, 
the Commission considered, and adopted provisions to mitigate, some of 
those concerns. For example, the Commission decided to utilize the 
existing reporting portal, which small and other carriers and TRS 
providers are already accustomed to using to notify the Commission 
along with the Secret Service and FBI of breaches rather than creating 
a centralized reporting facility operated by the Commission to report 
breaches to the Commission and these agencies as proposed in the Data 
Breach Notice. As such, the Commission anticipates that the requirement 
to notify it of data breaches will have de minimis cost implications 
because small and other carriers and TRS providers are already 
obligated to notify the Secret Service and FBI of such breaches, and 
will use the existing portal to do so. The Commission delegated 
authority to the Wireline Competition Bureau to coordinate with the 
Secret Service, the current administrator of the reporting facility, 
and the FBI, to the extent necessary, to ensure that the Commission 
will be notified when data breaches are reported, thereby ensuring that 
no additional burden would be imposed on small and other carriers and 
TRS providers. The Commission also adopted a threshold trigger that 
permits carriers and TRS providers to forgo notifying Federal agencies 
of breaches that are limited in scope and unlikely to pose harm to 
customers, instead requiring small and other carriers and TRS providers 
to maintain the information, and file an annual summary of such 
breaches. Additionally, with the support of several small carriers, the 
Commission adopted a harm-based notification trigger for reporting 
breaches to customers, which allows small and rural providers to focus 
their resources on data security and mitigation measures rather than 
generating notifications where harm to the consumer is unlikely.

[[Page 10000]]

    26. In the Report and Order the Commission also adopted a ``without 
unreasonable delay, but no later than 30 days after reasonable 
determination of the breach'' timeframe for notifying customers of 
covered data breaches. Consistent with the comments in support of small 
carriers interests, the Commission recognizes that this reporting 
standard can take into account factors such as the provider's size, as 
a small carrier may have limited resources and could require additional 
time to investigate a data breach than a large carrier. The Commission 
notes that many State laws similarly require breach notifications which 
are in line with the requirements that the Commission adopts today. 
Therefore, although the Commission cannot quantify the compliance 
costs, it does not expect the adopted rules to impose any significant 
cost burdens for small entities, or require these entities to hire 
professionals to meet their compliance obligations.

F. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    27. The RFA requires an agency to provide ``a description of the 
steps the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact 
on small entities . . . including a statement of the factual, policy, 
and legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final 
rule and why each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule 
considered by the agency which affect the impact on small entities was 
rejected.''
    28. The Commission took steps and considered alternatives in this 
proceeding that may reduce the impact of the adopted rule changes on 
small entities. For example, the Commission's expansion of the 
definition of ``breach'' included consideration of whether to include 
situations where a telecommunications carrier, or a third party 
discovers conduct that could have reasonably led to exposure of 
customer CPNI, even if it has not yet determined if such exposure 
occurred. Small and other commenters generally opposed such an 
expansion, and the Commission ultimately declined to expand ``breach'' 
to include these situations. Conversely, although some commenters on 
behalf of small entities opposed requiring breach notification to the 
Commission, the Commission was not persuaded by their arguments. The 
Commission disagreed that the existing requirement to notify the Secret 
Service and the FBI is sufficient and that adding the Commission to the 
list of recipients of the same breach notifications Commission rules 
already require carriers to submit would impose any additional burden 
on carriers. Several actions the Commission takes in the Report and 
Order will avoid imposing additional burdens on small and other 
carriers who have to file breach notifications with the Commission.
    29. As an initial matter the Commission considered, and included a 
good-faith exception that excluded from the definition of ``breach'' a 
good-faith acquisition of covered data by an employee or agent of a 
carrier where such information is not used improperly or further 
disclosed. The Commission believes this exception will help avoid 
excessive notifications to consumers, and reduce reporting burdens on 
small and other carriers. Furthermore, in the Data Breach Notice, the 
Commission proposed to create a new portal for reporting breaches to 
the Commission. However, in the Report and Order the Commission decided 
instead to make use of the existing portal which small and other 
carriers and TRS providers are already accustomed to using for data 
breach reporting requirements to Federal law enforcement agencies. The 
Commission's decision to continue using a portal that small and other 
carriers and providers are already familiar and comfortable working 
with reduces the administrative burdens on small entities of learning a 
new mechanism and creating new reporting processes. Additionally, the 
contents of the notification to the Commission are the same fields that 
carriers and providers already report to the Secret Service and the 
FBI. The Commission agreed with commenters on behalf of small entities 
that the breach notification information small and other carriers and 
providers are required to submit to the FBI and Secret Service is 
largely sufficient, and the Commission should generally require 
reporting of the same information. As such, the impact of also 
reporting the breach to the Commission should be de minimis on small 
carriers and providers. The Commission considered adopting a lower 
reporting threshold for the affected-customer notification of no-harm-
risk breaches to the Federal agencies but ultimately decided to adopt a 
500-customer threshold because that is consistent with many other State 
laws, and would therefore promote consistency and efficiency in 
compliance. A lower threshold could impose higher burdens on small and 
other carriers and providers, so the Commission declined to adopt such 
a rule. Likewise for consistency and efficiency, the Commission 
similarly declined to adopt a threshold of 5000 affected customers to 
trigger notification to Federal agencies. The Commission also 
considered ways to reduce the burden of the annual reporting 
requirement for breaches affecting fewer than 500 individuals and where 
the carrier or TRS provider could reasonably determine that no harm to 
customers was reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach. In 
determining the content and format requirements of the annual report, 
the Commission instructed the Bureau to minimize the burdens on 
carriers and TRS providers by, for example, limiting the content 
required for each reported breach to that absolutely necessary to 
identify patterns or gaps that require further Commission inquiry. At a 
minimum, the Commission directed the Bureau to develop requirements 
that are less burdensome than what is required for individual breach 
submissions to the reporting facility, and to consider streamlined ways 
for filers to report this summary information.
    30. The Commission also considered adopting minimum requirements 
for the contents of customer notifications for telecommunications 
carriers and TRS providers. However, the Commission declined to impose 
such minimum requirements on carriers and TRS providers because doing 
so may create unnecessary burdens on carriers and TRS providers, 
particularly small ones. Specifically, the Commission considered but 
declined to adopt minimum reporting requirements harmonizing content 
requirements for carriers with the information required under the Cyber 
Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) as 
part of their notifications to Federal agencies. In the absence of 
final rules, and a potential for imposing duplicative or inconsistent 
fields, by declining to adopt such a requirement the Commission 
minimizes the economic impact for small entities. Relatedly, the 
Commission declined to adopt a specific method of notification for 
customers, instead deciding that carriers and TRS providers have pre-
established methods of reaching their customers, each carrier or TRS 
provider is in the best position to know how best to reach their 
customers, and imposing a specific method would add unnecessary burdens 
to the industry. The Commission also considered requiring notification 
to all customers whenever a breach occurred. Such a requirement would 
lead to increased obligations to notify customers of every instance 
which qualified as a ``breach''

[[Page 10001]]

under the expanded definition and scope of the rules described in the 
Report and Order. However, by adopting the harm-based trigger, the 
Commission limits the applicability of the customer-notification 
obligations to breaches which are likely to cause harm to customers, 
thereby reducing burdens on small and other telecommunications carriers 
and TRS providers. In addition, the Commission also adopted a safe 
harbor under which customer notification is not required where a breach 
solely involves encrypted data and the carrier has definitive evidence 
that the encryption key was not also accessed, used, or disclosed, 
further reducing burdens on small and other carriers from the 
Commission's customer notification requirements.
    31. The Commission's actions and the considerations discussed above 
lead the Commission to believe that the new requirements adopted in the 
Report and Order are minimally burdensome, and small carriers and TRS 
providers should not have any increased regulatory burdens, or 
significant compliance issues with including these new breach 
notification requirements in their existing processes. Nevertheless, 
the importance of the breach notification requirements adopted in the 
Report and Order to safeguard the public against improper use or 
disclosure of their customer data, to hold telecommunications carriers 
and TRS providers accountable, and to ensure customers are provided 
with the necessary resources to protect themselves in the event their 
data through their association with a telecommunications carrier or TRS 
provider is compromised, outweighs any minimal burdens that 
telecommunications carriers and TRS providers may experience in 
providing information to the Commission, and Federal law enforcement 
agencies.

G. Report to Congress

    32. The Commission will send a copy of the Report and Order, 
including this FRFA, in a report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the 
Congressional Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send a copy 
of the Report and Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the Small Business Administration. A copy of the Report and 
Order (or summaries thereof) will also be published in the Federal 
Register.

IV. Procedural Matters

    33. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. Pursuant to the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), as amended, the Commission's 
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is set forth in Appendix B. The 
Commission's Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference 
Information Center, will send a copy of this Report and Order, 
including the FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration (SBA).
    34. Paperwork Reduction Act. This document contains new or modified 
information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. All such new or modified 
requirements will be submitted to OMB for review under section 3507(d) 
of the PRA. OMB, the general public, and other Federal agencies will be 
invited to comment on any new or modified information collection 
requirements contained in this proceeding. In addition, the Commission 
notes that pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 
Public Law 107-198, see 47 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), the Commission previously 
sought specific comment on how the Commission might further reduce the 
information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer 
than 25 employees.
    35. In this Report and Order, the Commission has assessed the 
effects of (1) expanding the scope of the data breach notification 
rules to cover specific categories of PII that carriers hold with 
respect to their customers; (2) expanding the definition of ``breach'' 
to include inadvertent access, use, or disclosure of customer 
information, except in those cases where such information is acquired 
in good faith by an employee or agent of a carrier, and such 
information is not used improperly or further disclosed; (3) requiring 
carriers to notify the Commission, in addition to Secret Service and 
FBI, as soon as practicable, and in no event later than seven business 
days after reasonable determination of a breach; (4) eliminating the 
requirement that carriers notify customers of a breach in cases where a 
carrier can reasonably determine that no harm to customers is 
reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach, or where the 
breach solely involved encrypted data and the carrier had definitive 
evidence that the encryption key was not also accessed, used, or 
disclosed; and (5) applying similar rules to TRS providers, and the 
Commission finds that the impact on small businesses with fewer than 25 
employees will be minimal. While the Commission expanded the scope of 
the data breach notification rules, the Commission also adopted a good-
faith exception from the definition of breach which limits the 
reportable instances. Additionally, the Commission decided to utilize 
the existing reporting portal, which small carriers and TRS providers 
are already accustomed to using, for Federal agency breach 
notifications rather than creating a new centralized portal. The 
Commission delegated authority to the Wireline Competition Bureau to 
coordinate with the Secret Service, the current administrator of the 
reporting facility, and the FBI, to the extent necessary, to ensure 
that the Commission will be notified when data breaches are reported, 
thereby ensuring that no additional burden would be imposed on small 
and other carriers and TRS providers from separate reporting 
requirements. The Commission also exempted from the Federal agency 
reporting requirement breaches that affect fewer than 500 customers and 
for which the carrier reasonably determines that no harm to customers 
is reasonably likely to occur, and instead require carriers to file 
with Federal agencies an annual summary regarding all such breaches 
occurring in the previous calendar year. This annual reporting 
requirement is intended to minimize the burden of reporting such 
breaches to Federal law enforcement and the Commission. In determining 
the content and format requirements of the annual report, the 
Commission instructed the Bureau to minimize the burdens on carriers 
and TRS providers by, for example, limiting the content required for 
each reported breach to that absolutely necessary to identify patterns 
or gaps that require further Commission inquiry. Additionally, with the 
support of several small carriers, the Commission adopted a harm-based 
notification trigger for reporting breaches to customers, which allows 
small providers to focus their resources on data security and 
mitigation measures rather than generating notifications where harm to 
the consumer is unlikely.
    36. Congressional Review Act. The Commission has determined, and 
the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
Office of Management and Budget, concurs, that this rule is non-major 
under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission 
will send a copy of this Report and Order to Congress and the 
Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
    37. OPEN Government Data Act. The OPEN Government Data Act, 
requires agencies to make ``public data assets'' available under an 
open license and as ``open Government data assets,'' i.e., in machine-
readable, open format, unencumbered by use restrictions other than 
intellectual property rights, and

[[Page 10002]]

based on an open standard that is maintained by a standards 
organization. This requirement is to be implemented ``in accordance 
with guidance by the Director'' of the OMB. The term ``public data 
asset'' means ``a data asset, or part thereof, maintained by the 
Federal Government that has been, or may be, released to the public, 
including any data asset, or part thereof, subject to disclosure under 
[the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)].'' A ``data asset'' is ``a 
collection of data elements or data sets that may be grouped 
together,'' and ``data'' is ``recorded information, regardless of form 
or the media on which the data is recorded.'' The Commission delegates 
authority, including the authority to adopt rules, to the Wireline 
Competition Bureau, in consultation with the agency's Chief Data 
Officer and after seeking public comment to the extent it deems 
appropriate, to determine whether to make publicly available any data 
assets maintained or created by the Commission pursuant to the rules 
adopted herein, and if so, to determine when and to what extent such 
information should be made publicly available. In doing so, the Bureau 
shall take into account the extent to which such data assets should not 
be made publicly available because they are not subject to disclosure 
under the FOIA.
    38. People with Disabilities. To request materials in accessible 
formats for people with disabilities (Braille, large print, electronic 
files, audio format), send an email to [email protected] or call the 
Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice).
    39. Contact Person. For further information, please contact Mason 
Shefa, Competition Policy Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at 
(202) 418-2494 or [email protected].

V. Ordering Clauses

    40. Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to sections 1, 2, 
4(i), 4(j), 201, 202, 222, 225, 251, 303(b), 303(r), 332, and 705 of 
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154(i), 
154(j), 201, 202, 222, 225, 251, 303(b), 303(r), 332, 605, this Report 
and Order is adopted.
    41. It is further ordered that part 64 of the Commission's rules is 
amended as set forth in Appendix A of the Report and Order.
    42. It is further ordered that this Report and Order shall be 
effective thirty (30) days after publication of the text or a summary 
thereof in the Federal Register, except that the amendments to 47 CFR 
64.2011 and 64.5111, which contain new or modified information 
collection requirements that require approval by the Office of 
Management and Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act, will not be 
effective until the Office of Management and Budget completes any 
required review under the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Commission 
directs the Wireline Competition Bureau to publish a notice in the 
Federal Register announcing completion of such review and the relevant 
effective date. It is the Commission's intention in adopting the 
foregoing Report and Order that, if any provision of the Report and 
Order or the rules, or the application thereof to any person or 
circumstance, is held to be unlawful, the remaining portions of such 
Report and Order and the rules not deemed unlawful, and the application 
of such Report and Order and the rules to other person or 
circumstances, shall remain in effect to the fullest extent permitted 
by law.
    43. It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of the 
Secretary, Reference Information Center, shall send a copy of this 
Report and Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office 
pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
    44. It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of the 
Secretary, Reference Information Center, shall send a copy of this 
Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, 
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 64

    Carrier equipment, Communications common carriers, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Telecommunications, Telephone.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.

Final Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 64 as follows:

PART 64--MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS

0
1. The authority citation for part 64 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154, 201, 202, 217, 218, 220, 
222, 225, 226, 227, 227b, 228, 251(a), 251(e), 254(k), 255, 262, 
276, 403(b)(2)(B), (c), 616, 620, 716, 1401-1473, unless otherwise 
noted; Pub. L. 115-141, Div. P, sec. 503, 132 Stat. 348, 1091.


0
2. Effective March 13, 2024, the heading for subpart U is revised to 
read as follows:

Subpart U--Privacy of Customer Information

0
3. Delayed indefinitely, amend Sec.  64.2011 by revising the section 
heading and paragraphs (a) through (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  64.2011  Notification of security breaches.

    (a) Commission and Federal Law Enforcement Notification. Except as 
provided in paragraph (a)(3) of this section, as soon as practicable, 
but no later than seven business days, after reasonable determination 
of a breach, a telecommunications carrier shall electronically notify 
the Commission, the United States Secret Service (Secret Service), and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) through a central reporting 
facility. The Commission will maintain a link to the reporting facility 
on its website.
    (1) A telecommunications carrier shall, at a minimum, include in 
its notification to the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI:
    (i) The carrier's address and contact information;
    (ii) A description of the breach incident;
    (iii) The method of compromise;
    (iv) The date range of the incident;
    (v) The approximate number of customers affected;
    (vi) An estimate of financial loss to the carrier and customers, if 
any; and
    (vii) The types of data breached.
    (2) If the Commission, or a law enforcement or national security 
agency, notifies the carrier that public disclosure or notice to 
customers would impede or compromise an ongoing or potential criminal 
investigation or national security, such agency may direct the carrier 
not to so disclose or notify for an initial period of up to 30 days. 
Such period may be extended by the agency as reasonably necessary in 
the judgment of the agency. If such direction is given, the agency 
shall notify the carrier when it appears that public disclosure or 
notice to affected customers will no longer impede or compromise a 
criminal investigation or national security. The agency shall provide 
in writing its initial direction to the carrier, any subsequent 
extension, and any notification that notice will no longer impede or 
compromise a criminal investigation or national security.
    (3) A telecommunications carrier is exempt from the requirement to 
provide notification to the Commission and law enforcement pursuant to 
paragraph (a) of this section of a breach that affects fewer than 500 
customers and the

[[Page 10003]]

carrier reasonably determines that no harm to customers is reasonably 
likely to occur as a result of the breach. In circumstances where a 
carrier initially determined that it qualified for an exemption under 
this paragraph (a)(3), but later discovers information such that this 
exemption no longer applies, the carrier must report the breach to 
Federal agencies as soon as practicable, but no later than within seven 
business days of this discovery, as required in this paragraph (a).
    (b) Customer notification. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) 
of this section, a telecommunications carrier shall notify affected 
customers of a breach of covered data without unreasonable delay after 
notification to the Commission and law enforcement pursuant to 
paragraph (a) of this section, and no later than 30 days after 
reasonable determination of a breach. This notification shall include 
sufficient information so as to make a reasonable customer aware that a 
breach occurred on a certain date, or within a certain estimated 
timeframe, and that such a breach affected or may have affected that 
customer's data. Notwithstanding the foregoing, customer notification 
shall not be required where a carrier reasonably determines that no 
harm to customers is reasonably likely to occur as a result of the 
breach, or where the breach solely involves encrypted data and the 
carrier has definitive evidence that the encryption key was not also 
accessed, used, or disclosed.
    (c) Recordkeeping. All carriers shall maintain a record, 
electronically or in some other manner, of any breaches discovered, 
notifications made to the Commission, Secret Service, and the FBI 
pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, and notifications made to 
customers pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section. The record shall 
include, if available, dates of discovery and notification, a detailed 
description of the covered data that was the subject of the breach, the 
circumstances of the breach, and the bases of any determinations 
regarding the number of affected customers or likelihood of harm as a 
result of the breach. Carriers shall retain the record for a minimum of 
2 years.
    (d) Annual Reporting of Certain Small Breaches. A 
telecommunications carrier shall have an officer, as an agent of the 
carrier, sign and file with the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI, a 
summary of all breaches occurring in the previous calendar year 
affecting fewer than 500 individuals and where the carrier could 
reasonably determine that no harm to customers was reasonably likely to 
occur as a result of the breach. This filing shall be made annually, on 
or before February 1 of each year, through the central reporting 
facility, for data pertaining to the previous calendar year.
    (e) Definitions. (1) As used in this section, a ``breach'' occurs 
when a person, without authorization or exceeding authorization, gains 
access to, uses, or discloses covered data. A ``breach'' shall not 
include a good-faith acquisition of covered data by an employee or 
agent of a telecommunications carrier where such information is not 
used improperly or further disclosed.
    (2) As used in this section, ``covered data'' includes both a 
customer's CPNI, as defined by Sec.  64.2003, and personally 
identifiable information.
    (3) As used in this section, ``encrypted data'' means covered data 
that has been transformed through the use of an algorithmic process 
into a form that is unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable through a 
security technology or methodology generally accepted in the field of 
information security.
    (4) As used in this section, ``encryption key'' means the 
confidential key or process designed to render encrypted data useable, 
readable, or decipherable.
    (5) Except as provided in paragraph (e)(6) of this section, as used 
in this section, ``personally identifiable information'' means:
    (i) An individual's first name or first initial, and last name, in 
combination with any government-issued identification numbers or 
information issued on a government document used to verify the identity 
of a specific individual, or other unique identification number used 
for authentication purposes;
    (ii) An individual's username or email address, in combination with 
a password or security question and answer, or any other authentication 
method or information necessary to permit access to an account; or
    (iii) Unique biometric, genetic, or medical data.
    (iv) Notwithstanding the above:
    (A) Dissociated data that, if linked, would constitute personally 
identifiable information is to be considered personally identifiable if 
the means to link the dissociated data were accessed in connection with 
access to the dissociated data; and
    (B) Any one of the discrete data elements listed in paragraphs 
(e)(5)(i) through (iii) of this section, or any combination of the 
discrete data elements listed above is personally identifiable 
information if the data element or combination of data elements would 
enable a person to commit identity theft or fraud against the 
individual to whom the data element or elements pertain.
    (6) As used in this section, ``personally identifiable 
information'' does not include information about an individual that is 
lawfully made available to the general public from Federal, State, or 
local government records or widely distributed media.
* * * * *

0
4. Delayed indefinitely, amend Sec.  64.5111 by revising the section 
heading and paragraphs (a) through (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  64.5111  Notification of security breaches.

    (a) Commission and Federal law enforcement notification. Except as 
provided in paragraph (a)(3) of this section, as soon as practicable, 
but not later than seven business days, after reasonable determination 
of a breach, a TRS provider shall electronically notify the Disability 
Rights Office of the Federal Communications Commission's (Commission) 
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, the United States Secret 
Service (Secret Service), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
through a central reporting facility. The Commission will maintain a 
link to the reporting facility on its website.
    (1) A TRS provider shall, at a minimum, include in its notification 
to the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI:
    (i) The TRS provider's address and contact information;
    (ii) A description of the breach incident;
    (iii) A description of the customer information that was used, 
disclosed, or accessed;
    (iv) The method of compromise;
    (v) The date range of the incident;
    (vi) The approximate number of customers affected;
    (vii) An estimate of financial loss to the provider and customers, 
if any; and
    (viii) The types of data breached.
    (2) If the Commission, or a law enforcement or national security 
agency notifies the TRS provider that public disclosure or notice to 
customers would impede or compromise an ongoing or potential criminal 
investigation or national security, such agency may direct the TRS 
provider not to so disclose or notify for an initial period of up to 30 
days. Such period may be extended by the agency as reasonably necessary 
in the judgment of the agency. If such direction is given, the agency 
shall notify the TRS provider when it appears that public disclosure or 
notice to affected customers will no longer

[[Page 10004]]

impede or compromise a criminal investigation or national security. The 
agency shall provide in writing its initial direction to the TRS 
provider, any subsequent extension, and any notification that notice 
will no longer impede or compromise a criminal investigation or 
national security and such writings shall be contemporaneously logged 
on the same reporting facility that contains records of notifications 
filed by TRS providers.
    (3) A TRS provider is exempt from the requirement to provide 
notification to the Commission and law enforcement pursuant to 
paragraph (a) of this section of a breach that affects fewer than 500 
customers and the carrier reasonably determines that no harm to 
customers is reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach. In 
circumstances where a carrier initially determined that it qualified 
for an exemption under this paragraph (a)(3), but later discovers 
information such that this exemption no longer applies, the carrier 
must report the breach to Federal agencies as soon as practicable, but 
not later than within seven business days of this discovery, as 
required in this paragraph (a).
    (b) Customer Notification. Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) 
of this section, a TRS provider shall notify affected customers of 
breaches of covered data without unreasonable delay after notification 
to the Commission and law enforcement as described in paragraph (a) of 
this section, and no later than 30 days after reasonable determination 
of a breach. This notification shall include sufficient information so 
as to make a reasonable customer aware that a breach occurred on a 
certain date, or within a certain estimated timeframe, and that such a 
breach affected or may have affected that customer's data. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, customer notification shall not be 
required where a TRS provider reasonably determines that no harm to 
customers is reasonably likely to occur as a result of the breach, or 
where the breach solely involves encrypted data and the provider has 
definitive evidence that the encryption key was not also accessed, 
used, or disclosed.
    (c) Recordkeeping. A TRS provider shall maintain a record, 
electronically or in some other manner, of any breaches discovered, 
notifications made to the Commission, Secret Service, and the FBI 
pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, and notifications made to 
customers pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section. The record shall 
include, if available, the dates of discovery and notification, a 
detailed description of the covered data that was the subject of the 
breach, the circumstances of the breach, and the bases of any 
determinations regarding the number of affected customers or likelihood 
of harm as a result of the breach. TRS providers shall retain the 
record for a minimum of 2 years.
    (d) Annual reporting of certain small breaches. A TRS provider 
shall have an officer, as an agent of the provider, sign and file with 
the Commission, Secret Service, and FBI, a summary of all breaches 
occurring in the previous calendar year affecting fewer than 500 
individuals and where the provider could reasonably determine that no 
harm to customers was reasonably likely to occur as a result of the 
breach. This filing shall be made annually, on or before February 1 of 
each year, through the central reporting facility, for data pertaining 
to the previous calendar year.
    (e) Definitions. (1) As used in this section, a ``breach'' occurs 
when a person, without authorization or exceeding authorization, gains 
access to, uses, or discloses covered data. A ``breach'' shall not 
include a good-faith acquisition of covered data by an employee or 
agent of a TRS provider where such information is not used improperly 
or further disclosed.
    (2) As used in this section, ``covered data'' includes:
    (i) A customer's CPNI, as defined by section 64.5103;
    (ii) Personally identifiable information, as defined by section 
64.2011(e)(5); and
    (iii) The content of any relayed conversation within the meaning of 
Sec.  64.604(a)(2)(i).
    (3) As used in this section, ``encrypted data'' means covered data 
that has been transformed through the use of an algorithmic process 
into a form that is unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable through a 
security technology or methodology generally accepted in the field of 
information security.
    (4) As used in this section, ``encryption key'' means the 
confidential key or process designed to render encrypted data useable, 
readable, or decipherable.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2024-01667 Filed 2-9-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P