[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 1 (Tuesday, January 2, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 101-105]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28813]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-255; NRC-2023-0200]
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades,
LLC; Palisades Nuclear Plant; Exemption
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC (HDI), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec
International, that would allow HDI and Holtec Palisades, LLC,
regarding certain emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemption
eliminates the requirements to maintain an offsite radiological
emergency preparedness plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP
activities at the Palisades Nuclear Plant, based on the reduced risks
of accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at a
decommissioning nuclear power reactor.
DATES: The exemption was issued on December 22, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2023-0200 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2023-0200. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tanya E. Hood, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-1387; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: December 27, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tanya E. Hood,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-255
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, and Holtec Palisades, LLC;
Palisades Nuclear Plant, Exemption
I. Background
By letter dated October 19, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML17292A032), Entergy Nuclear
Operations, Inc. (ENOI) certified to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC, or Commission) that it planned to permanently cease
power operations at the Palisades Nuclear Plant (Palisades) no later
than May 31, 2022. On May 20, 2022, ENOI permanently ceased power
operations at Palisades, and by letter dated June 13, 2022
(ML22164A067), ENOI certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently
removed from the Palisades reactor vessel and placed in the spent fuel
pool (SFP) on June 10, 2022.
By application dated December 23, 2020 (ML20358A075), as
supplemented
[[Page 102]]
by information provided in letters from Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC (HDI, the licensee) dated December 23, 2020, and
October 29, 2021 (ML20358A232, ML20358A239, and ML21302A064), ENOI,
Entergy Nuclear Palisades, LLC, Holtec International, and HDI submitted
an ``Application for Order Consenting to Transfers of Control of
Licenses and Approving Conforming License Amendments'' requesting
transfer of the Palisades license to HDI. By letter dated December 13,
2021 (ML21292A145), the NRC issued an order consenting to the license
transfer and draft conforming administrative license amendments. The
license transfer was executed on June 28, 2022 (ML22173A173),
coinciding with the transition of Palisades from an operational to a
decommissioning status.
Based on the docketing of the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel, as specified in section 50.82(a)(2) of title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed facility
operating license for Palisades no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessel. The
facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e.,
spent) nuclear fuel. Palisades spent fuel is currently stored in the
SFP and in dry cask storage at the independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI).
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports (USARs) for operating nuclear power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the
reactor core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would
involve the release of some fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at Palisades and the permanent removal of
fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible.
The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting systems are no
longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of the
spent fuel. Therefore, the emergency planning (EP) provisions for
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor,
reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
appendix E, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and
Utilization Facilities,'' to 10 CFR part 50 continue to apply to
nuclear power reactors that have provided certification that they have
permanently ceased operations and have permanently removed all fuel
from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions
distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is permanently
shut down and defueled from those for a reactor that is authorized to
operate. To reduce or eliminate EP requirements that are no longer
necessary due to the decommissioning status of the facility, the
licensee must obtain exemptions from those EP regulations. Only then
can HDI modify the Palisades emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk
associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of
Palisades.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated July 11, 2022 (ML22192A134), HDI requested
exemptions from specific portions of the EP requirements of 10 CFR
50.47 and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 for Palisades. More
specifically, HDI requested exemptions from certain planning standards
in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency
preparedness plans for nuclear power reactors; from certain
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) for establishment of plume exposure
pathway and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones (EPZs) for
nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, ``Content of Emergency Plans.''
The exemptions requested by HDI would eliminate the requirements to
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans, reviewed by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44
CFR, ``Emergency Management and Assistance,'' Part 350, ``Review and
Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and
Preparedness,'' and would reduce the scope of the onsite EP activities
at Palisades. HDI stated that application of all the standards and
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50,
appendix E is not needed for adequate emergency response capability,
based on the substantially lower onsite and offsite radiological
consequences of accidents still possible at the permanently shutdown
and defueled facility as compared to an operating facility.
If offsite protective actions were needed for a highly unlikely
beyond design-basis accidents (DBAs) that could challenge the safe
storage of spent fuel at Palisades, provisions exist for offsite
agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive emergency
management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System to
protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context,
also referred to as an emergency operations plan, is addressed in
FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans,'' which is publicly available
at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf.
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation for State,
territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It promotes a
common understanding of the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and
decision-making and helps planners at all levels of government in their
efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats
emergency plans. An emergency operations plan is flexible enough for
use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards
planning.''
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part
50 when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an
undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule.
As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has
permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the
reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible
accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor.
However, current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power
[[Page 103]]
reactor permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological
release from a credible emergency accident scenario is reduced. Due to
the permanently defueled status of the reactor, no new spent fuel will
be added to the Palisades SFP and the radionuclides in the current
spent fuel will continue to decay as the spent fuel ages. The spent
fuel will produce less heat due to radioactive decay, increasing the
available time to mitigate a loss of water inventory from the SFP. The
NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic
BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor]
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 1997
(ML082260098), and the NRC's NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of Spent
Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,''
dated February 2001 (ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactors that are bounded by the
assumptions and conditions in the report, the risk of offsite
radiological release is significantly less than for an operating
nuclear power reactor.
In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by HDI, have
been granted to licensees of permanently shutdown and defueled power
reactors. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled
status. Specifically, the NRC's approval of these prior exemptions from
certain EP requirements was based on the licensee's demonstration that:
(1) the radiological consequences of DBAs would not exceed the limits
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Protective Action
Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary, and (2) in the highly
unlikely event of a beyond DBA resulting in a loss of all modes of
cooling for the spent fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time
to initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite
authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP
approach to protect the health and safety of the public. In prior
exemptions, sufficient time was demonstrated if the time exceeded 10
hours from the loss of coolant until the fuel temperature would be
expected to reach 900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C), assuming no air
cooling. In this exemption request, the licensee provided an analysis
demonstrating that after the spent fuel has decayed for 12 months, for
beyond-design-basis events where the SFP is drained and air cooling is
not possible, at least 10 hours would be available from the time spent
fuel cooling is lost until the hottest fuel assembly reaches a
temperature of 900 [deg]C. This 10-hour minimum threshold provides
sufficient time for the licensee to take mitigative actions, or if
government officials deem warranted, for offsite protective actions to
be initiated using a CEMP or ``all-hazards'' approach.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a)
are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment of
the HDI EP exemptions is described in SECY-23-0043, ``Request by Holtec
Decommissioning International, LLC for Exemptions from Certain
Emergency Planning Requirements for Palisades Nuclear Plant,'' dated
May 30, 2023 (ML23054A179). The Commission approved the NRC staff's
recommendation to grant the exemptions in the staff requirements
memorandum to SECY-23-0043, dated December 7, 2023 (ML23341A181). The
exemptions are conditioned to make it clear that the exemptions will
terminate if the status of the Palisades reactor changes such that the
certifications of permanent cessation of operations and permanent
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel are no longer applicable.
Descriptions of the specific exemptions requested by HDI and the NRC
staff's basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY-23-0043.
The staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the
specific EP exemptions, requested by HDI, are provided in the NRC
staff's safety evaluation dated December 22, 2023 (ML23263A977).
A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV, which would allow HDI to revise the Palisades Emergency
Plan to reflect the submittal of the certification of the permanently
shutdown and defueled condition of the facility. As stated above, in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined that
granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will not result in a
violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's
regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents no Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, HDI provided analyses that show the
radiological consequences of DBA will not exceed the limits of the EPA
PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, formal offsite
radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR part 50 are no
longer needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area
boundary, based on the radiological consequences of DBAs still possible
at Palisades.
Although highly unlikely, there is one postulated beyond DBA that
might result in significant offsite radiological releases. However,
NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond DBAs is greatly reduced at
permanently shutdown and defueled reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in
NUREG-1738 concludes that the event sequences important to risk at
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors are limited to large
earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP assessments, this is an
important difference relative to the operating power reactors, where
typically a large number of different sequences make significant
contributions to risk. As described in NUREG-1738, relaxation of
offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 a few months after shutdown
resulted in only a small change in risk. The report further concludes
that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP requirements is
small because the overall risk is low, and because even under current
EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was judged to have
marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the severe earthquake
event that dominates SFP risk. All other sequences including cask drops
(for which offsite radiological emergency plans are expected to be more
effective) are too low in likelihood to have a significant impact on
risk. Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of
10 CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present
an undue risk to the public health and safety.
[[Page 104]]
C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by HDI only involve EP requirements under
10 CFR part 50 and will allow HDI to revise the Palisades Emergency
Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. Physical security measures at Palisades are not affected by
the requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite
radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in scope of
the onsite EP activities at Palisades will not adversely affect the
licensee's ability to physically secure the site or protect special
nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent
with common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2),
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants,
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and
requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the
risks associated with operation of a nuclear power reactor at its
licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a
reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously in Section III, because Palisades is
permanently shut down and defueled, there is no longer a risk of
offsite radiological release from a DBA and the risk of a significant
offsite radiological release from a beyond DBA is greatly reduced when
compared to the risk at an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has
confirmed the reduced risks at Palisades by comparing the generic risk
assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site-specific conditions
at Palisades and determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound
the risks presented for Palisades. As indicated by the results of the
research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more recently for NUREG-2161,
``Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the
Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,'' dated
September 2014 (ML14255A365), while other consequences can be
extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have little
potential to cause offsite early fatalities, even if the formal offsite
radiological EP requirements were relaxed. HDI's analysis of a beyond
DBA involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an
adiabatic heatup analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat,
shows that 12 months after permanent cessation of power operations at
Palisades, the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 [deg]C
is at least 10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming
a loss of all cooling means.
The NRC staff has verified the licensee's analyses and its
calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in
granting the requested exemptions to HDI, there is no DBA that will
result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. In the highly unlikely event of a beyond DBA
affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via
all modes of heat transfer, there will be a minimum of 10 hours
available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at
least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a
means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were
projected to occur under this highly unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10
hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to
implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the
health and safety of the public.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP
coolant inventory with no air cooling (or other methods of removing
decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the
rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously
granted exemptions, as it does with the licensee's requested EP
exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions or, if needed, for
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP
approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness
plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently
shutdown and defueled facilities.
Additionally, in its letter to the NRC dated July 11, 2022, HDI
described the SFP makeup strategies that could be used in the event of
a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. The multiple strategies for
providing makeup water to the SFP include: using various existing plant
systems for inventory makeup and an internal strategy that relies on
the portable FLEX pump manifold, and having available two installed
diesel-driven fire pumps and one motor-driven fire pump that can
provide 1,500 gallons per minute makeup water from the facility intake
via hard pipe or hose stations. In addition, HDI states that two onsite
FLEX pumper units with a capacity of 1,000 gallons per minute each can
provide makeup water from the facility intake or from Lake Michigan
directly. Further, Palisades procedures specify that the installation
of the SFP spray monitor nozzles and direct fill should be given
priority over the hard pipe fill connection due to expected SFP area
high radiation levels if the SFP water level cannot be maintained.
These strategies will continue to be required as License Condition 6.b
of Renewed Facility License No. DPR-20 for Palisades. Considering the
very low probability of beyond DBAs affecting the SFP, these diverse
strategies provide multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or
spray to the SFP before the onset of any postulated offsite
radiological release.
For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the
licensee's requested exemptions meet the underlying purpose of all of
the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as well as the requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, and satisfy the special
circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the
greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated
with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the Palisades
facility 12 months after the facility permanently ceases operation.
The NRC staff further concludes that the exemptions granted by this
action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at
Palisades and provide reasonable assurance that adequate offsite
protective measures, if needed, can and will be taken by State and
local government agencies using a CEMP approach, in the highly unlikely
event of a radiological emergency at Palisades. Since the underlying
purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even
with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and the reduction
in the scope of the onsite EP activities at Palisades, the special
[[Page 105]]
circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's
Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact published
in the Federal Register (FR) on December 21, 2023 (88 FR 88664).
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12, the licensee's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part
50, appendix E, section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY-
23-0043, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants HDI exemptions from certain EP requirements in
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E,
section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's
safety evaluation dated December 22, 2023. The exemptions are effective
12 months after permanent cessation of power operations, which was May
20, 2023. Because this period had already elapsed, the exemption is
effective upon issuance. These exemptions will terminate if the status
of the Palisades reactor changes such that the certifications of
permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from
the reactor vessel are no longer applicable.
Dated: this 22nd day of December 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jane Marshall,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2023-28813 Filed 12-29-23; 8:45 am]
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