[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 249 (Friday, December 29, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 90202-90208]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28776]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286; NRC-2023-0180]


Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, 
LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Energy Center; 
Exemption

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an 
exemption in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning 
International, LLC that would permit it, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, 
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC, to reduce the required level of primary 
offsite liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million and to 
eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial protection for 
the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, collectively 
referred to as the Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC).

DATES: The exemption was issued on November 16, 2023.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2023-0180 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2023-0180. Address 
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical 
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS 
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public 
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737, 
or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for 
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the 
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
     NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies 
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an 
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to 
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8 
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except 
Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-8534, email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.

    Dated: December 26, 2023.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of 
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards.

Attachment--Exemption

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, 
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 
Nos. 1, 2, and 3; Exemption

I. Background

    Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased 
generation on October 31, 1974, and all fuel was removed from the IP1 
reactor vessel by January 1976. In 1996, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC, the Commission) issued an order approving the safe-
storage condition of

[[Page 90203]]

IP1. In 2003, the NRC issued Amendment No. 52 to IP1's provisional 
operating license, which changed the expiration date of the provisional 
license to be consistent with that of the Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2) facility license at that time. Pursuant to 
title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section 
50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer authorizes operation of the 
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel. 
There is no IP1 spent fuel in wet storage at the Indian Point Energy 
Center (IPEC) site; IP1 spent fuel is stored onsite in dry cask storage 
at the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
    By letter dated February 8, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System Accession No. ML17044A004), Entergy Nuclear Indian 
Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC (the IPEC 
licensees at that time, collectively, Entergy) certified to the NRC 
that they planned to permanently cease power operations at IP2 and 
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3) by April 30, 2020, and 
April 30, 2021, respectively. By letters dated May 12, 2020, and May 
11, 2021 (ML20113J902 and ML21131A157), Entergy certified to the NRC 
that power operations permanently ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30, 
2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. In the same letters, Entergy 
certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently removed from the IP2 
and IP3 reactor vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 spent fuel pools 
(SFPs) as of May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively.
    Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent 
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor 
vessels, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed 
facility licenses for IP2 and IP3 (Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64, 
respectively) no longer authorize operation of the reactors or 
emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessels. The facility 
is still authorized to possess, and store irradiated (i.e., spent) 
nuclear fuel. At the time of the exemption request described below, 
spent fuel was stored onsite at the IP2 and IP3 facilities in the SFPs 
and in a dry cask ISFSI.

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated March 25, 2022 (ML22084A103), Holtec 
Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI), one of the licensees of IPEC 
and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec International 
(Holtec), requested an exemption on behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2, 
LLC (a licensee of IP1 and IP2, referred to as Holtec IP2) and Holtec 
Indian Point 3, LLC (a licensee of IP3, referred to as Holtec IP3), 
from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) concerning offsite primary 
and secondary liability insurance.
    HDI, Holtec IP2, and Holtec IP3 are hereafter collectively referred 
to as the licensee. The exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) would permit 
the licensee to reduce the required level of primary offsite liability 
insurance from $450 million to $100 million and to eliminate the 
requirement to carry secondary financial protection for IPEC.
    The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires licensees to have 
and maintain primary financial protection in an amount of $450 million. 
In addition, licensees are required to participate in an industry 
retrospective rating plan (secondary financial protection) that commits 
licensees to pay into an insurance pool to be used for damages that may 
exceed primary insurance coverage. Participation in the industry 
retrospective rating plan will subject the licensee to deferred premium 
charges up to a maximum total deferred premium of $131,056,000 with 
respect to any nuclear incident at any operating nuclear power plant 
and up to a maximum annual deferred premium of $20,496,000 per 
incident.
    Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety 
analysis reports for operating power reactors involve failures or 
malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor 
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the 
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent 
cessation of power operations at IPEC and the permanent removal of the 
fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible. 
Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability damages that would 
require insurance or indemnification is commensurately lower for such 
plants. Therefore, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 
140.11(a)(4) to permit a reduction in primary offsite liability 
insurance and to withdraw from participation in the industry 
retrospective rating plan.

III. Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own 
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the 
regulations in 10 CFR part 140 when the exemptions are authorized by 
law and are otherwise in the public interest. The NRC staff has 
reviewed the licensee's request for an exemption from 10 CFR 
140.11(a)(4) and has concluded that the requested exemption is 
authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.
    The Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) requires that nuclear power 
reactor licensees have insurance to compensate the public for damages 
arising from a nuclear incident. Specifically, the PAA requires 
licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity of 100,000 electrical 
kilowatts or more'' to maintain the maximum amount of primary offsite 
liability insurance commercially available (currently $450 million) and 
a specified amount of secondary insurance coverage (currently up to 
$131,056,000 per reactor). In the event of an accident causing offsite 
damages in excess of $450 million, each licensee would be assessed a 
prorated share of the excess damages, up to $131,056,000 per reactor, 
for a total of approximately $13 billion per nuclear incident. The 
NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA insurance 
requirements and set forth the amount of primary and secondary 
insurance each power reactor licensee must have.
    As noted above, the PAA requirements with respect to primary and 
secondary insurance and the implementing regulations at 10 CFR 
140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity 
of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.'' In accordance with 10 CFR 
50.82(a)(2), the license for a power reactor no longer authorizes 
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the 
reactor vessel upon the docketing of the certifications for permanent 
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor 
vessel. Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to generate power.
    Accordingly, a reactor that is undergoing decommissioning has no 
``rated capacity.'' Thus, the NRC may take the reactor licensee out of 
the category of reactor licensees that are required to maintain the 
maximum available insurance and to participate in the secondary 
retrospective insurance pool.
    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were 
established to require licensees to maintain sufficient insurance, as 
specified under the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by members of the 
public for personal injury, property damage, and the legal cost 
associated with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear accident at an 
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric 
or greater. Thus, the insurance levels established by this regulation, 
as required by the PAA, were associated

[[Page 90204]]

with the risks and potential consequences of an accident at an 
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric 
or greater.
    The legal and associated technical basis for granting exemptions 
from 10 CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY-93-127, ``Financial 
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During 
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993 (ML12257A628). The legal analysis 
underlying SECY-93-127 concluded that, upon a technical finding that 
lesser potential hazards exist after permanent cessation of power 
operations (and the reactor having no ``rated capacity''), the 
Commission has the discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of 
insurance required of a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
    As a technical matter, the fact that a reactor has permanently 
ceased power operations is not itself determinative as to whether a 
licensee may cease providing the offsite liability coverage required by 
the PAA and 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of freshly 
discharged irradiated fuel in the SFP at a recently shutdown reactor, 
the potential for an offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire 
with consequences comparable in some respects to an operating reactor 
accident remains. That risk is very low at the time of reactor shutdown 
because of design provisions that prevent a significant reduction in 
coolant inventory in the SFP under normal and accident conditions and 
becomes no longer credible once the continual reduction in decay heat 
provides ample time to restore coolant inventory and permits air 
cooling in a drained SFP. After that time, the probability of a large 
offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire is negligible for 
permanently shutdown reactors, but the SFP is still operational, and an 
inventory of radioactive materials still exists onsite. Therefore, an 
evaluation of the potential for offsite damage is necessary to 
determine the appropriate level of offsite insurance post shutdown, in 
accordance with the Commission's discretionary authority under the PAA 
to establish an appropriate level of required financial protection for 
such permanently shutdown facilities.
    The NRC staff has conducted an evaluation and concluded that, aside 
from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and 
radioactive materials for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor, 
no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists that could cause 
significant offsite damage. During normal power reactor operations, the 
forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes 
heat generated by the reactor. The RCS transfers this heat away from 
the reactor core by converting reactor feedwater to steam, which then 
flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Most of the 
accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors involve 
failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the 
reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents would 
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the 
permanent cessation of reactor operations at IPEC and the permanent 
removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are no longer 
possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate 
and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. 
Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the 
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks 
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. On a case-by-case 
basis, licensees undergoing decommissioning have been granted 
permission to reduce the required amount of primary offsite liability 
insurance coverage from $450 million to $100 million and to withdraw 
from the secondary insurance pool. One of the technical criteria for 
granting the exemption is that the possibility of a design-basis event 
that could cause significant offsite damage has been significantly 
reduced.
    The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents 
for IPEC when permanently defueled as part of SECY-22-0102, ``Request 
by Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC For Exemptions from 
Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for Indian Point Nuclear 
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3,'' dated November 18, 2022 
(ML22231A155). Based on its configuration and licensing basis, with no 
spent fuel stored in the IP1 SFP and a prohibition against storing any 
fuel in the pool in the future, there are no postulated Design Basis 
Accidents (DBAs) that remain applicable to IP1. The IP1 SFP is no 
longer in use because all spent fuel and other material has been 
removed, and the IP1 SFP has been drained. At the time of the exemption 
request, spent fuel was stored onsite in the IP2 and IP3 SFPs, with 
plans to move all spent fuel to dry cask storage at the onsite ISFSI in 
accordance with the licensee's Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities 
Report dated December 19, 2019 (ML19354A698).
    HDI has stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that while spent fuel 
remains in the SFPs, the only postulated design-basis accidents that 
would remain applicable to IPEC in the permanently defueled condition 
that could contribute a significant dose would be: (1) a fuel handling 
accident (FHA) in the fuel storage buildings; (2) an accidental release 
of waste gas; and (3) an accidental release-recycle of waste liquid. 
For completeness, the NRC staff also evaluated the applicability of 
other design-basis accidents documented in the IPEC Updated Final 
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for IP2 and IP3 (ML20259A199 and 
ML19282B159), respectively to ensure that these accidents would not 
have consequences that could potentially exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose 
limits and Regulatory Guide 1.183, ``Alternative Radiological Source 
Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors'' 
(ML003716792), dose acceptance criteria or approach the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase protective action 
guides (PAGs) (ML17044A073).
    In the IPEC UFSAR, the licensee determined that after a decay time 
of at least 720 hours (30 days) following permanent cessation of power 
operations of each unit, the FHA doses would decrease to a level that 
would not warrant protective actions under the EPA early phase PAG 
framework, notwithstanding meeting the dose limit requirements under 10 
CFR 50.67 and dose acceptance criteria under Regulatory Guide 1.183. 
The NRC staff notes that the doses from an FHA are dominated by 
relatively short-lived isotopes such as Iodine-131. Based on the 
permanent shutdown of IP3 on April 30, 2021, after over two years of 
decay, the thyroid dose from an FHA would be negligible. The only 
isotope remaining in significant amounts, among those postulated to be 
released in a DBA FHA, would be Krypton-85. Because Krypton-85 
primarily decays by beta emission, the calculated skin dose from an FHA 
release would make an insignificant contribution to the total effective 
dose equivalent, which is the parameter of interest in the 
determination of the EPA early phase PAGs for sheltering or evacuation. 
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the dose consequence from an 
FHA for the permanently shutdown IPEC facility would not approach the 
EPA early phase PAGs.
    As part of the supporting documentation for an application for 
exemptions from various emergency planning requirements, HDI performed 
an analysis that includes the determination of the dose consequences

[[Page 90205]]

for a waste gas decay tank rupture accident. In that analysis, HDI 
reevaluated the dose from an accidental release of waste gas to reflect 
the removal of the waste gas decay tank(s) from operation and to 
reevaluate the dose at 15 months after the shutdown of IP3. Based on 
the revised analysis, the radiological consequences of a postulated 
waste gas decay tank rupture were determined to be negligible because 
the tanks are removed from operation, and depressurized and vented to 
atmosphere.
    Section 6.4, ``Accidental Release-Recycle of Waste Liquid,'' of the 
IP2 and IP3 Defueled Safety Analysis Reports (DSARs) (ML20259A199 and 
ML21270A059, respectively) addresses the accidental release of waste 
liquid and states that the hazard from these releases is derived only 
from any volatized components. The volatilized components are what 
comprise the waste gas accident. Thus, the accidental release of liquid 
waste is evaluated in the analysis for an accidental release of waste 
gas.
    The NRC staff reviewed the consequences of an FHA, waste gas 
release accident, and liquid tank failure accident in detail during the 
review of previously approved license amendment requests and exemptions 
for IPEC and found them to be acceptable. Since this technical 
information has not changed in relation to this exemption request, the 
NRC staff relied on these previous conclusions to conduct portions of 
the review for this exemption request. The NRC staff notes that while 
HDI continues to rely on the information from previously approved 
licensing actions, the calculated doses would be expected to be lower 
when this exemption is implemented due to additional decay time beyond 
the time assumed in the previously approved actions. Any offsite 
consequence from a design-basis radiological release is highly unlikely 
and, thus, a significant amount of offsite liability insurance coverage 
is not required.
    The licensee also analyzed the bounding radiological consequences 
of a postulated complete loss of SFP water from either the IP2 and IP3 
SFPs (i.e., a pool draindown event), which NUREG-0586, ``Final Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear 
Facilities,'' Supplement 1 (ML023470327 and ML023500228), section 
4.3.9, identifies is a beyond design-basis event. The HDI analysis 
considered the distances from both SFPs to both control rooms and the 
site boundary, as well as a combination of IP3 fuel in the IP2 SFP, to 
bound the analysis for both units. The analysis considered that the SFP 
water and the concrete SFP structures serve as radiation shielding. 
Therefore, a loss of water shielding above the fuel could increase the 
offsite radiation levels because of the gamma rays streaming out of the 
SFP and being scattered back to a receptor at the site boundary. The 
analysis determined that the limiting dose rate in the IP2 and IP3 
control rooms at one year after permanent shutdown are less than 0.0259 
millirem per hour (mrem/hr) and the dose rate to a receptor at the site 
boundary is less than 11.55 mrem/hr. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes 
that the dose consequence from a SFP draindown for the permanently 
shutdown IPEC facility would not approach the EPA early phase PAGs.
    The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to lead 
to a significant radiological release at a permanently shutdown and 
defueled reactor is a zirconium fire in the SFP. The zirconium fire 
scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, accident scenario that 
involves the loss of water inventory from the SFP resulting in a 
significant heatup of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial 
zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a 
zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated 
fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire 
scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time that IPEC has 
been permanently shut down.
    In SECY-93-127 the NRC staff concluded that there was a low 
likelihood and reduced short-term public health consequences of a 
zirconium fire once a decommissioning plant's spent fuel has 
sufficiently decayed. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum, ``Financial 
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants during 
Decommissioning,'' dated July 13, 1993 (ML003760936), the Commission 
approved a policy that authorized, through the exemption process, 
withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance layer and a 
reduction in commercial liability insurance coverage to $100 million 
when a licensee is able to demonstrate that the spent fuel could be 
air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
    The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar 
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Duane Arnold Energy 
Center, published in the Federal Register on May 18, 2021 (86 FR 
26961)). Additional discussions of other decommissioning reactor 
licensees that have received exemptions to reduce their primary 
insurance level to $100 million are provided in SECY-96-256, ``Changes 
to the Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown 
Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated 
December 17, 1996 (ML15062A483). These prior exemptions were based on 
the licensee demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled consistent 
with the technical criterion discussed above.
    In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100, 
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency 
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants 
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ML003721626 and 
ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff discussed additional 
information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at decommissioning 
reactors and associated implications for offsite insurance. Analyzing 
when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable of adequate air-
cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the probability of a 
zirconium fire would be exceedingly low.
    The NRC staff evaluated the issue of zirconium fires and presented 
independent evaluations of SFP accident risk in NUREG-1738, ``Technical 
Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power 
Plants'' (ML010430066); NUREG/CR- 6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory 
Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized 
Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants'' 
(ML082260098); and NUREG/CR-6441, ``Analysis of Spent Fuel Heatup 
Following Loss of Water in a Spent Fuel Pool'' (ML021050336). These 
documents describe the considerations surrounding a seismic event with 
the potential to result in a loss of SFP coolant that uncovers fuel and 
discuss the parameters under which the fuel is able to be air cooled in 
such a scenario.
    The NRC staff compared the IPEC facility with the reference plant 
in NUREG- 6451 and confirmed that the fuel assembly and spent fuel rack 
parameters for IP2 and IP3 are consistent with those assumed in NUREG-
6451, or are conservative when compared to the generic values. 
Therefore, the NRC staff has high confidence that the stored fuel in 
the IPEC SFPs will remain in a coolable configuration following a 
beyond design basis seismic event. Additionally, the NRC staff compared 
the site-specific conditions at IPEC with the generic risk assumptions 
in NUREG-1738 and determined that the risk values in

[[Page 90206]]

NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented by IPEC. Based on IPEC's 
conformance with the analysis in NUREG-6451 and NUREG-1738, the NRC 
finds there is reasonable assurance that the fuel stored in IPEC SFPs 
is air coolable 15 months after permanent shutdown of the reactor.
    In addition, the licensee performed a bounding analysis for the IP2 
and IP3 SFPs demonstrating that after the spent fuel has decayed for 15 
months, with a complete loss of SFP water inventory with no heat loss 
or credit for air-cooling (i.e., adiabatic heat-up), a minimum of 10 
hours would be available before any fuel cladding temperature reaches 
900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C) from the time all cooling is lost. The 10-
hour criterion, conservatively, does not consider the time to uncover 
the fuel and assumes instantaneous loss of cooling to the fuel. The 10-
hour time period is also not intended to represent the time that it 
would take to repair all key safety systems or to repair a large SFP 
breach. The 10-hour criterion is a conservative period of time in which 
pre-planned mitigation measures to provide makeup water or spray to the 
SFP can be reliably implemented before the onset of a zirconium 
cladding ignition. In addition, in the unlikely event that a release is 
projected to occur, 10 hours would provide sufficient time for offsite 
agencies, if deemed warranted, to take appropriate action to protect 
the health and safety of the public.
    Given the permanent shutdown date of IP3 of April 30, 2021, the 
period in which the spent fuel could heat up to clad ignition 
temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic conditions ended on August 
1, 2022, after 15 months of fuel decay time. This analysis, ``Holtec 
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up Calculation Methodology Topical Report, 
Revision 2,'' dated December 22, 2021 (ML21357A005 [non-public]), was 
submitted by HDI in support of a request for exemptions from certain 
emergency planning requirements, dated December 22, 2021 (ML21356B693). 
HDI provided further information in Enclosure 1, ``Indian Point Unit 
Nos. 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up Calculations,'' to HDI's 
supplemental letter dated February 1, 2022 (ML22032A117).
    In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-22-0102, the NRC 
staff assessed the HDI accident analyses associated with the 
radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a permanently shutdown and 
defueled IPEC after 15 months of fuel decay. For the highly unlikely 
beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory 
is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal from the 
spent fuel are no longer available, the NRC staff found that there will 
be a minimum of 10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the 
cladding reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might 
occur. The NRC staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support 
deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, 
to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid 
oxidation. As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would 
progress to a zirconium fire is deemed not credible.
    Based on the above considerations, the NRC staff has determined 
that the licensee's proposed reduction in primary offsite liability 
coverage to a level of $100 million and the licensee's proposed 
withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance pool for 
offsite financial protection are consistent with the policy established 
in SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance considerations resulting from 
zirconium fire risks, as discussed in SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100. 
The NRC has previously determined in SECY-00-0145 that the minimum 
offsite financial protection requirement may be reduced to $100 million 
and that secondary insurance is not required once it is determined that 
the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer thermal-hydraulically capable of 
sustaining a zirconium fire based on a plant-specific analysis. In 
addition, the NRC staff notes that similar exemptions from these 
insurance requirements have been granted to other permanently shutdown 
and defueled power reactors upon satisfactory demonstration that the 
zirconium fire risk from the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of 
negligible concern.

A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law

    The PAA and its implementing regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 
require licensees of nuclear reactors that have a rated capacity of 
100,000 kilowatts electric or more to have and maintain $450 million in 
primary financial protection and to participate in a secondary 
retrospective insurance pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the 
Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140 
as the Commission determines are authorized by law. The legal and 
associated technical basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part 140 
are set forth in SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127 
concluded that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards 
exist after permanent cessation of operations, the Commission has the 
discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of insurance required of 
a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
    Based on its review of the exemption request, the NRC staff 
concludes that the technical criteria for relieving the licensee from 
its existing primary and secondary insurance obligations have been met. 
As explained above, the NRC staff found that no reasonably conceivable 
design-basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release 
greater than the EPA PAGs and, therefore, that any offsite consequence 
from a design- basis radiological release is highly unlikely and the 
need for a significant amount of offsite liability insurance coverage 
is unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC staff determined that, after 15 
months decay, the fuel stored in the IPEC SFPs will be capable of being 
adequately cooled by air in the highly unlikely event of pool drainage. 
Moreover, in the highly unlikely beyond design-basis accident scenario 
where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a manner that all 
methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no longer available, 
the NRC staff has determined that at least 10 hours would be available 
and is sufficient time to support deployment of mitigation equipment, 
consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the zirconium cladding 
from reaching a point of rapid oxidation. Thus, the NRC staff concludes 
that the fuel stored in the IPEC SFP will have decayed sufficiently by 
the requested effective date for the exemption of 15 months after 
permanent cessation of power operations to support a reduction in the 
required offsite insurance consistent with SECY-00-0145.
    The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed 
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, section 170, or other laws, as amended, which require licensees 
to maintain adequate financial protection.
    Accordingly, consistent with the legal standard presented in SECY-
93-127, under which decommissioning reactor licensees may be relieved 
of the requirements to carry the maximum amount of insurance available 
and to participate in the secondary retrospective premium pool where 
there is sufficient technical justification, the NRC staff concludes 
that the requested exemption is authorized by law.

B. The Exemption is Otherwise in the Public Interest

    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established 
to require

[[Page 90207]]

licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance to ensure 
adequate funding for offsite liability claims following an accident at 
an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not consider the 
reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents at 
permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
    The basis provided in SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100 
allows licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary 
offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from participation in the 
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges. As discussed in 
these documents, once the zirconium fire concern is determined to be 
negligible, possible accident scenario risks at permanently shutdown 
and defueled reactors are greatly reduced when compared to the risks at 
operating reactors, and the associated potential for offsite financial 
liabilities from an accident are commensurately less. The licensee 
analyzed and the NRC staff confirmed that the risks of accidents that 
could result in an offsite radiological release are minimal, thereby 
justifying the proposed reductions in offsite primary liability 
insurance and withdrawal from participation in the secondary 
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges.
    Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating 
pool could potentially have adverse consequences on the safe and timely 
completion of decommissioning. If a nuclear incident sufficient to 
trigger the secondary insurance layer occurred at another nuclear power 
plant, the licensee could incur financial liability of up to 
$131,056,000. However, because IPEC is permanently shut down, it cannot 
produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover such a 
liability. Therefore, such liability if subsequently incurred could 
significantly affect the ability of the facility to conduct and 
complete timely radiological decontamination and decommissioning 
activities. In addition, as SECY-93-127 concluded, the shared financial 
risk exposure to the licensee is greatly disproportionate to the 
radiological risk posed by IPEC when compared to operating reactors.
    The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning power 
plants does not warrant that the licensee be required to carry full 
operating reactor insurance coverage after the requisite spent fuel 
cooling period has elapsed following final reactor shutdown. The 
licensee's proposed financial protection limits will maintain a level 
of liability insurance coverage commensurate with the risk to the 
public. These changes are consistent with previous NRC policy as 
discussed in SECY-00-0145 and exemptions approved for other 
decommissioning reactors. Thus, the underlying purpose of the 
regulations will not be adversely affected by the reductions in 
insurance coverage. Accordingly, an exemption from participation in the 
secondary insurance pool and a reduction in the primary insurance to 
$100 million, a value more in line with the potential consequences of 
accidents, would be in the public interest in that this ensures that 
there will be adequate funds to address any of those consequences and 
helps to ensure the safe and timely decommissioning of the reactors.
    Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that an exemption from 10 
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit the licensee to lower the IPEC 
primary insurance levels and to withdraw from the secondary 
retrospective premium pool at the requested effective date of 15 months 
after the permanent cessation of power operations, is in the public 
interest.

C. Environmental Considerations

    The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity 
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by 
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after 
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. 
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the 
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental 
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical 
exclusion provided that: (i) there is no significant hazards 
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or 
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is 
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant 
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological 
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought 
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
    As the Director of the Division of Decommissioning, Uranium 
Recovery, and Waste Programs in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Material 
Safety and Safeguards, I have determined that approval of the exemption 
request involves no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 
CFR 50.92, because reducing the licensee's offsite liability 
requirements for IPEC does not: (1) involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; 
(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from 
any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted financial protection 
regulation is unrelated to the operation of IPEC or site activities. 
Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or significant 
increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite 
and no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or 
occupational radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not 
associated with construction so there is no significant construction 
impact. The exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., 
potential amount of radiation in an accident) or any activities 
conducted at the site. Therefore, there is no significant increase in 
the potential for, or consequences of, a radiological accident. In 
addition, there would be no significant impacts to biota, water 
resources, historic properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic 
conditions in the region resulting from issuance of the requested 
exemption. The requirement for offsite liability insurance involves 
surety, insurance, or indemnity matters only.
    Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the 
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee 
an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for IPEC. 
IPEC permanently ceased power operations on October 31, 1974, April 30, 
2020, and April 30, 2021, for IP1, IP2 and IP3, respectively. The 
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) permits IPEC to reduce the required 
level of primary financial protection from $450 million to $100 million 
and to withdraw from participation in the secondary layer of financial 
protection 15 months after permanent cessation of power

[[Page 90208]]

operations, which was August 1, 2022. Because this period has already 
elapsed, the exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated: November 16, 2023.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Jane Marshall,

Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste 
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2023-28776 Filed 12-28-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P