[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 249 (Friday, December 29, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 90202-90208]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-28776]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286; NRC-2023-0180]
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2,
LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC; Indian Point Energy Center;
Exemption
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an
exemption in response to a request from Holtec Decommissioning
International, LLC that would permit it, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC,
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC, to reduce the required level of primary
offsite liability insurance from $450 million to $100 million and to
eliminate the requirement to carry secondary financial protection for
the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3, collectively
referred to as the Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC).
DATES: The exemption was issued on November 16, 2023.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2023-0180 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2023-0180. Address
questions about Docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann;
telephone: 301-415-0624; email: [email protected]. For technical
questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, at 301-415-4737,
or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for
each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the
first time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: The PDR, where you may examine and order copies
of publicly available documents, is open by appointment. To make an
appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between 8
a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Sturzebecher, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: 301-415-8534, email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated: December 26, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Marlayna V. Doell,
Project Manager, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of
Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
Attachment--Exemption
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Docket Nos. 50-003, 50-247, and 50-286
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC, Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC,
and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit
Nos. 1, 2, and 3; Exemption
I. Background
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased
generation on October 31, 1974, and all fuel was removed from the IP1
reactor vessel by January 1976. In 1996, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC, the Commission) issued an order approving the safe-
storage condition of
[[Page 90203]]
IP1. In 2003, the NRC issued Amendment No. 52 to IP1's provisional
operating license, which changed the expiration date of the provisional
license to be consistent with that of the Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2) facility license at that time. Pursuant to
title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) section
50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer authorizes operation of the
reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel.
There is no IP1 spent fuel in wet storage at the Indian Point Energy
Center (IPEC) site; IP1 spent fuel is stored onsite in dry cask storage
at the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
By letter dated February 8, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System Accession No. ML17044A004), Entergy Nuclear Indian
Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC (the IPEC
licensees at that time, collectively, Entergy) certified to the NRC
that they planned to permanently cease power operations at IP2 and
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3) by April 30, 2020, and
April 30, 2021, respectively. By letters dated May 12, 2020, and May
11, 2021 (ML20113J902 and ML21131A157), Entergy certified to the NRC
that power operations permanently ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30,
2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. In the same letters, Entergy
certified to the NRC that the fuel was permanently removed from the IP2
and IP3 reactor vessels and placed in the IP2 and IP3 spent fuel pools
(SFPs) as of May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively.
Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessels, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the 10 CFR part 50 renewed
facility licenses for IP2 and IP3 (Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64,
respectively) no longer authorize operation of the reactors or
emplacement or retention of fuel in the reactor vessels. The facility
is still authorized to possess, and store irradiated (i.e., spent)
nuclear fuel. At the time of the exemption request described below,
spent fuel was stored onsite at the IP2 and IP3 facilities in the SFPs
and in a dry cask ISFSI.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated March 25, 2022 (ML22084A103), Holtec
Decommissioning International, LLC (HDI), one of the licensees of IPEC
and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec International
(Holtec), requested an exemption on behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2,
LLC (a licensee of IP1 and IP2, referred to as Holtec IP2) and Holtec
Indian Point 3, LLC (a licensee of IP3, referred to as Holtec IP3),
from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) concerning offsite primary
and secondary liability insurance.
HDI, Holtec IP2, and Holtec IP3 are hereafter collectively referred
to as the licensee. The exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) would permit
the licensee to reduce the required level of primary offsite liability
insurance from $450 million to $100 million and to eliminate the
requirement to carry secondary financial protection for IPEC.
The regulation at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires licensees to have
and maintain primary financial protection in an amount of $450 million.
In addition, licensees are required to participate in an industry
retrospective rating plan (secondary financial protection) that commits
licensees to pay into an insurance pool to be used for damages that may
exceed primary insurance coverage. Participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan will subject the licensee to deferred premium
charges up to a maximum total deferred premium of $131,056,000 with
respect to any nuclear incident at any operating nuclear power plant
and up to a maximum annual deferred premium of $20,496,000 per
incident.
Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety
analysis reports for operating power reactors involve failures or
malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor
core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the
release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent
cessation of power operations at IPEC and the permanent removal of the
fuel from the reactor vessel, many accidents are no longer possible.
Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability damages that would
require insurance or indemnification is commensurately lower for such
plants. Therefore, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) to permit a reduction in primary offsite liability
insurance and to withdraw from participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the
regulations in 10 CFR part 140 when the exemptions are authorized by
law and are otherwise in the public interest. The NRC staff has
reviewed the licensee's request for an exemption from 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) and has concluded that the requested exemption is
authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.
The Price Anderson Act of 1957 (PAA) requires that nuclear power
reactor licensees have insurance to compensate the public for damages
arising from a nuclear incident. Specifically, the PAA requires
licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity of 100,000 electrical
kilowatts or more'' to maintain the maximum amount of primary offsite
liability insurance commercially available (currently $450 million) and
a specified amount of secondary insurance coverage (currently up to
$131,056,000 per reactor). In the event of an accident causing offsite
damages in excess of $450 million, each licensee would be assessed a
prorated share of the excess damages, up to $131,056,000 per reactor,
for a total of approximately $13 billion per nuclear incident. The
NRC's regulations at 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) implement these PAA insurance
requirements and set forth the amount of primary and secondary
insurance each power reactor licensee must have.
As noted above, the PAA requirements with respect to primary and
secondary insurance and the implementing regulations at 10 CFR
140.11(a)(4) apply to licensees of facilities with a ``rated capacity
of 100,000 electrical kilowatts or more.'' In accordance with 10 CFR
50.82(a)(2), the license for a power reactor no longer authorizes
operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the
reactor vessel upon the docketing of the certifications for permanent
cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor
vessel. Therefore, the reactor cannot be used to generate power.
Accordingly, a reactor that is undergoing decommissioning has no
``rated capacity.'' Thus, the NRC may take the reactor licensee out of
the category of reactor licensees that are required to maintain the
maximum available insurance and to participate in the secondary
retrospective insurance pool.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were
established to require licensees to maintain sufficient insurance, as
specified under the PAA, to satisfy liability claims by members of the
public for personal injury, property damage, and the legal cost
associated with lawsuits as the result of a nuclear accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric
or greater. Thus, the insurance levels established by this regulation,
as required by the PAA, were associated
[[Page 90204]]
with the risks and potential consequences of an accident at an
operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric
or greater.
The legal and associated technical basis for granting exemptions
from 10 CFR part 140 is set forth in SECY-93-127, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993 (ML12257A628). The legal analysis
underlying SECY-93-127 concluded that, upon a technical finding that
lesser potential hazards exist after permanent cessation of power
operations (and the reactor having no ``rated capacity''), the
Commission has the discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of
insurance required of a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
As a technical matter, the fact that a reactor has permanently
ceased power operations is not itself determinative as to whether a
licensee may cease providing the offsite liability coverage required by
the PAA and 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4). In light of the presence of freshly
discharged irradiated fuel in the SFP at a recently shutdown reactor,
the potential for an offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire
with consequences comparable in some respects to an operating reactor
accident remains. That risk is very low at the time of reactor shutdown
because of design provisions that prevent a significant reduction in
coolant inventory in the SFP under normal and accident conditions and
becomes no longer credible once the continual reduction in decay heat
provides ample time to restore coolant inventory and permits air
cooling in a drained SFP. After that time, the probability of a large
offsite radiological release from a zirconium fire is negligible for
permanently shutdown reactors, but the SFP is still operational, and an
inventory of radioactive materials still exists onsite. Therefore, an
evaluation of the potential for offsite damage is necessary to
determine the appropriate level of offsite insurance post shutdown, in
accordance with the Commission's discretionary authority under the PAA
to establish an appropriate level of required financial protection for
such permanently shutdown facilities.
The NRC staff has conducted an evaluation and concluded that, aside
from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials for a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor,
no reasonably conceivable potential accident exists that could cause
significant offsite damage. During normal power reactor operations, the
forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes
heat generated by the reactor. The RCS transfers this heat away from
the reactor core by converting reactor feedwater to steam, which then
flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Most of the
accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors involve
failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the
reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents would
involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the
permanent cessation of reactor operations at IPEC and the permanent
removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are no longer
possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate
and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel.
Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. On a case-by-case
basis, licensees undergoing decommissioning have been granted
permission to reduce the required amount of primary offsite liability
insurance coverage from $450 million to $100 million and to withdraw
from the secondary insurance pool. One of the technical criteria for
granting the exemption is that the possibility of a design-basis event
that could cause significant offsite damage has been significantly
reduced.
The NRC staff performed an evaluation of the design-basis accidents
for IPEC when permanently defueled as part of SECY-22-0102, ``Request
by Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC For Exemptions from
Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3,'' dated November 18, 2022
(ML22231A155). Based on its configuration and licensing basis, with no
spent fuel stored in the IP1 SFP and a prohibition against storing any
fuel in the pool in the future, there are no postulated Design Basis
Accidents (DBAs) that remain applicable to IP1. The IP1 SFP is no
longer in use because all spent fuel and other material has been
removed, and the IP1 SFP has been drained. At the time of the exemption
request, spent fuel was stored onsite in the IP2 and IP3 SFPs, with
plans to move all spent fuel to dry cask storage at the onsite ISFSI in
accordance with the licensee's Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities
Report dated December 19, 2019 (ML19354A698).
HDI has stated, and the NRC staff agrees, that while spent fuel
remains in the SFPs, the only postulated design-basis accidents that
would remain applicable to IPEC in the permanently defueled condition
that could contribute a significant dose would be: (1) a fuel handling
accident (FHA) in the fuel storage buildings; (2) an accidental release
of waste gas; and (3) an accidental release-recycle of waste liquid.
For completeness, the NRC staff also evaluated the applicability of
other design-basis accidents documented in the IPEC Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for IP2 and IP3 (ML20259A199 and
ML19282B159), respectively to ensure that these accidents would not
have consequences that could potentially exceed the 10 CFR 50.67 dose
limits and Regulatory Guide 1.183, ``Alternative Radiological Source
Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors''
(ML003716792), dose acceptance criteria or approach the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) early phase protective action
guides (PAGs) (ML17044A073).
In the IPEC UFSAR, the licensee determined that after a decay time
of at least 720 hours (30 days) following permanent cessation of power
operations of each unit, the FHA doses would decrease to a level that
would not warrant protective actions under the EPA early phase PAG
framework, notwithstanding meeting the dose limit requirements under 10
CFR 50.67 and dose acceptance criteria under Regulatory Guide 1.183.
The NRC staff notes that the doses from an FHA are dominated by
relatively short-lived isotopes such as Iodine-131. Based on the
permanent shutdown of IP3 on April 30, 2021, after over two years of
decay, the thyroid dose from an FHA would be negligible. The only
isotope remaining in significant amounts, among those postulated to be
released in a DBA FHA, would be Krypton-85. Because Krypton-85
primarily decays by beta emission, the calculated skin dose from an FHA
release would make an insignificant contribution to the total effective
dose equivalent, which is the parameter of interest in the
determination of the EPA early phase PAGs for sheltering or evacuation.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the dose consequence from an
FHA for the permanently shutdown IPEC facility would not approach the
EPA early phase PAGs.
As part of the supporting documentation for an application for
exemptions from various emergency planning requirements, HDI performed
an analysis that includes the determination of the dose consequences
[[Page 90205]]
for a waste gas decay tank rupture accident. In that analysis, HDI
reevaluated the dose from an accidental release of waste gas to reflect
the removal of the waste gas decay tank(s) from operation and to
reevaluate the dose at 15 months after the shutdown of IP3. Based on
the revised analysis, the radiological consequences of a postulated
waste gas decay tank rupture were determined to be negligible because
the tanks are removed from operation, and depressurized and vented to
atmosphere.
Section 6.4, ``Accidental Release-Recycle of Waste Liquid,'' of the
IP2 and IP3 Defueled Safety Analysis Reports (DSARs) (ML20259A199 and
ML21270A059, respectively) addresses the accidental release of waste
liquid and states that the hazard from these releases is derived only
from any volatized components. The volatilized components are what
comprise the waste gas accident. Thus, the accidental release of liquid
waste is evaluated in the analysis for an accidental release of waste
gas.
The NRC staff reviewed the consequences of an FHA, waste gas
release accident, and liquid tank failure accident in detail during the
review of previously approved license amendment requests and exemptions
for IPEC and found them to be acceptable. Since this technical
information has not changed in relation to this exemption request, the
NRC staff relied on these previous conclusions to conduct portions of
the review for this exemption request. The NRC staff notes that while
HDI continues to rely on the information from previously approved
licensing actions, the calculated doses would be expected to be lower
when this exemption is implemented due to additional decay time beyond
the time assumed in the previously approved actions. Any offsite
consequence from a design-basis radiological release is highly unlikely
and, thus, a significant amount of offsite liability insurance coverage
is not required.
The licensee also analyzed the bounding radiological consequences
of a postulated complete loss of SFP water from either the IP2 and IP3
SFPs (i.e., a pool draindown event), which NUREG-0586, ``Final Generic
Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear
Facilities,'' Supplement 1 (ML023470327 and ML023500228), section
4.3.9, identifies is a beyond design-basis event. The HDI analysis
considered the distances from both SFPs to both control rooms and the
site boundary, as well as a combination of IP3 fuel in the IP2 SFP, to
bound the analysis for both units. The analysis considered that the SFP
water and the concrete SFP structures serve as radiation shielding.
Therefore, a loss of water shielding above the fuel could increase the
offsite radiation levels because of the gamma rays streaming out of the
SFP and being scattered back to a receptor at the site boundary. The
analysis determined that the limiting dose rate in the IP2 and IP3
control rooms at one year after permanent shutdown are less than 0.0259
millirem per hour (mrem/hr) and the dose rate to a receptor at the site
boundary is less than 11.55 mrem/hr. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes
that the dose consequence from a SFP draindown for the permanently
shutdown IPEC facility would not approach the EPA early phase PAGs.
The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to lead
to a significant radiological release at a permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor is a zirconium fire in the SFP. The zirconium fire
scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely, accident scenario that
involves the loss of water inventory from the SFP resulting in a
significant heatup of the spent fuel and culminating in substantial
zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a
zirconium fire scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated
fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire
scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time that IPEC has
been permanently shut down.
In SECY-93-127 the NRC staff concluded that there was a low
likelihood and reduced short-term public health consequences of a
zirconium fire once a decommissioning plant's spent fuel has
sufficiently decayed. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants during
Decommissioning,'' dated July 13, 1993 (ML003760936), the Commission
approved a policy that authorized, through the exemption process,
withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance layer and a
reduction in commercial liability insurance coverage to $100 million
when a licensee is able to demonstrate that the spent fuel could be
air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Duane Arnold Energy
Center, published in the Federal Register on May 18, 2021 (86 FR
26961)). Additional discussions of other decommissioning reactor
licensees that have received exemptions to reduce their primary
insurance level to $100 million are provided in SECY-96-256, ``Changes
to the Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown
Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated
December 17, 1996 (ML15062A483). These prior exemptions were based on
the licensee demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled consistent
with the technical criterion discussed above.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ML003721626 and
ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff discussed additional
information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at decommissioning
reactors and associated implications for offsite insurance. Analyzing
when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable of adequate air-
cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the probability of a
zirconium fire would be exceedingly low.
The NRC staff evaluated the issue of zirconium fires and presented
independent evaluations of SFP accident risk in NUREG-1738, ``Technical
Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power
Plants'' (ML010430066); NUREG/CR- 6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory
Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized
Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants''
(ML082260098); and NUREG/CR-6441, ``Analysis of Spent Fuel Heatup
Following Loss of Water in a Spent Fuel Pool'' (ML021050336). These
documents describe the considerations surrounding a seismic event with
the potential to result in a loss of SFP coolant that uncovers fuel and
discuss the parameters under which the fuel is able to be air cooled in
such a scenario.
The NRC staff compared the IPEC facility with the reference plant
in NUREG- 6451 and confirmed that the fuel assembly and spent fuel rack
parameters for IP2 and IP3 are consistent with those assumed in NUREG-
6451, or are conservative when compared to the generic values.
Therefore, the NRC staff has high confidence that the stored fuel in
the IPEC SFPs will remain in a coolable configuration following a
beyond design basis seismic event. Additionally, the NRC staff compared
the site-specific conditions at IPEC with the generic risk assumptions
in NUREG-1738 and determined that the risk values in
[[Page 90206]]
NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented by IPEC. Based on IPEC's
conformance with the analysis in NUREG-6451 and NUREG-1738, the NRC
finds there is reasonable assurance that the fuel stored in IPEC SFPs
is air coolable 15 months after permanent shutdown of the reactor.
In addition, the licensee performed a bounding analysis for the IP2
and IP3 SFPs demonstrating that after the spent fuel has decayed for 15
months, with a complete loss of SFP water inventory with no heat loss
or credit for air-cooling (i.e., adiabatic heat-up), a minimum of 10
hours would be available before any fuel cladding temperature reaches
900 degrees Celsius ([deg]C) from the time all cooling is lost. The 10-
hour criterion, conservatively, does not consider the time to uncover
the fuel and assumes instantaneous loss of cooling to the fuel. The 10-
hour time period is also not intended to represent the time that it
would take to repair all key safety systems or to repair a large SFP
breach. The 10-hour criterion is a conservative period of time in which
pre-planned mitigation measures to provide makeup water or spray to the
SFP can be reliably implemented before the onset of a zirconium
cladding ignition. In addition, in the unlikely event that a release is
projected to occur, 10 hours would provide sufficient time for offsite
agencies, if deemed warranted, to take appropriate action to protect
the health and safety of the public.
Given the permanent shutdown date of IP3 of April 30, 2021, the
period in which the spent fuel could heat up to clad ignition
temperature within 10 hours under adiabatic conditions ended on August
1, 2022, after 15 months of fuel decay time. This analysis, ``Holtec
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up Calculation Methodology Topical Report,
Revision 2,'' dated December 22, 2021 (ML21357A005 [non-public]), was
submitted by HDI in support of a request for exemptions from certain
emergency planning requirements, dated December 22, 2021 (ML21356B693).
HDI provided further information in Enclosure 1, ``Indian Point Unit
Nos. 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up Calculations,'' to HDI's
supplemental letter dated February 1, 2022 (ML22032A117).
In the NRC staff's evaluation contained in SECY-22-0102, the NRC
staff assessed the HDI accident analyses associated with the
radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a permanently shutdown and
defueled IPEC after 15 months of fuel decay. For the highly unlikely
beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory
is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal from the
spent fuel are no longer available, the NRC staff found that there will
be a minimum of 10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the
cladding reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might
occur. The NRC staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support
deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions,
to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid
oxidation. As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would
progress to a zirconium fire is deemed not credible.
Based on the above considerations, the NRC staff has determined
that the licensee's proposed reduction in primary offsite liability
coverage to a level of $100 million and the licensee's proposed
withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance pool for
offsite financial protection are consistent with the policy established
in SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance considerations resulting from
zirconium fire risks, as discussed in SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100.
The NRC has previously determined in SECY-00-0145 that the minimum
offsite financial protection requirement may be reduced to $100 million
and that secondary insurance is not required once it is determined that
the spent fuel in the SFP is no longer thermal-hydraulically capable of
sustaining a zirconium fire based on a plant-specific analysis. In
addition, the NRC staff notes that similar exemptions from these
insurance requirements have been granted to other permanently shutdown
and defueled power reactors upon satisfactory demonstration that the
zirconium fire risk from the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of
negligible concern.
A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law
The PAA and its implementing regulations in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4)
require licensees of nuclear reactors that have a rated capacity of
100,000 kilowatts electric or more to have and maintain $450 million in
primary financial protection and to participate in a secondary
retrospective insurance pool. In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the
Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140
as the Commission determines are authorized by law. The legal and
associated technical basis for granting exemptions from 10 CFR part 140
are set forth in SECY-93-127. The legal analysis underlying SECY-93-127
concluded that, upon a technical finding that lesser potential hazards
exist after permanent cessation of operations, the Commission has the
discretion under the PAA to reduce the amount of insurance required of
a licensee undergoing decommissioning.
Based on its review of the exemption request, the NRC staff
concludes that the technical criteria for relieving the licensee from
its existing primary and secondary insurance obligations have been met.
As explained above, the NRC staff found that no reasonably conceivable
design-basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release
greater than the EPA PAGs and, therefore, that any offsite consequence
from a design- basis radiological release is highly unlikely and the
need for a significant amount of offsite liability insurance coverage
is unwarranted. Additionally, the NRC staff determined that, after 15
months decay, the fuel stored in the IPEC SFPs will be capable of being
adequately cooled by air in the highly unlikely event of pool drainage.
Moreover, in the highly unlikely beyond design-basis accident scenario
where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a manner that all
methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no longer available,
the NRC staff has determined that at least 10 hours would be available
and is sufficient time to support deployment of mitigation equipment,
consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the zirconium cladding
from reaching a point of rapid oxidation. Thus, the NRC staff concludes
that the fuel stored in the IPEC SFP will have decayed sufficiently by
the requested effective date for the exemption of 15 months after
permanent cessation of power operations to support a reduction in the
required offsite insurance consistent with SECY-00-0145.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, section 170, or other laws, as amended, which require licensees
to maintain adequate financial protection.
Accordingly, consistent with the legal standard presented in SECY-
93-127, under which decommissioning reactor licensees may be relieved
of the requirements to carry the maximum amount of insurance available
and to participate in the secondary retrospective premium pool where
there is sufficient technical justification, the NRC staff concludes
that the requested exemption is authorized by law.
B. The Exemption is Otherwise in the Public Interest
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established
to require
[[Page 90207]]
licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance to ensure
adequate funding for offsite liability claims following an accident at
an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not consider the
reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents at
permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
The basis provided in SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100
allows licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary
offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from participation in the
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges. As discussed in
these documents, once the zirconium fire concern is determined to be
negligible, possible accident scenario risks at permanently shutdown
and defueled reactors are greatly reduced when compared to the risks at
operating reactors, and the associated potential for offsite financial
liabilities from an accident are commensurately less. The licensee
analyzed and the NRC staff confirmed that the risks of accidents that
could result in an offsite radiological release are minimal, thereby
justifying the proposed reductions in offsite primary liability
insurance and withdrawal from participation in the secondary
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges.
Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating
pool could potentially have adverse consequences on the safe and timely
completion of decommissioning. If a nuclear incident sufficient to
trigger the secondary insurance layer occurred at another nuclear power
plant, the licensee could incur financial liability of up to
$131,056,000. However, because IPEC is permanently shut down, it cannot
produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover such a
liability. Therefore, such liability if subsequently incurred could
significantly affect the ability of the facility to conduct and
complete timely radiological decontamination and decommissioning
activities. In addition, as SECY-93-127 concluded, the shared financial
risk exposure to the licensee is greatly disproportionate to the
radiological risk posed by IPEC when compared to operating reactors.
The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning power
plants does not warrant that the licensee be required to carry full
operating reactor insurance coverage after the requisite spent fuel
cooling period has elapsed following final reactor shutdown. The
licensee's proposed financial protection limits will maintain a level
of liability insurance coverage commensurate with the risk to the
public. These changes are consistent with previous NRC policy as
discussed in SECY-00-0145 and exemptions approved for other
decommissioning reactors. Thus, the underlying purpose of the
regulations will not be adversely affected by the reductions in
insurance coverage. Accordingly, an exemption from participation in the
secondary insurance pool and a reduction in the primary insurance to
$100 million, a value more in line with the potential consequences of
accidents, would be in the public interest in that this ensures that
there will be adequate funds to address any of those consequences and
helps to ensure the safe and timely decommissioning of the reactors.
Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that an exemption from 10
CFR 140.11(a)(4), which would permit the licensee to lower the IPEC
primary insurance levels and to withdraw from the secondary
retrospective premium pool at the requested effective date of 15 months
after the permanent cessation of power operations, is in the public
interest.
C. Environmental Considerations
The NRC's approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion after
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from the
requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental
impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (i) there is no significant hazards
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (iv) there is
no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant
increase in the potential for or consequences from radiological
accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought
involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director of the Division of Decommissioning, Uranium
Recovery, and Waste Programs in the NRC's Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, I have determined that approval of the exemption
request involves no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10
CFR 50.92, because reducing the licensee's offsite liability
requirements for IPEC does not: (1) involve a significant increase in
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated;
(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from
any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted financial protection
regulation is unrelated to the operation of IPEC or site activities.
Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite
and no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not
associated with construction so there is no significant construction
impact. The exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e.,
potential amount of radiation in an accident) or any activities
conducted at the site. Therefore, there is no significant increase in
the potential for, or consequences of, a radiological accident. In
addition, there would be no significant impacts to biota, water
resources, historic properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic
conditions in the region resulting from issuance of the requested
exemption. The requirement for offsite liability insurance involves
surety, insurance, or indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee
an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) for IPEC.
IPEC permanently ceased power operations on October 31, 1974, April 30,
2020, and April 30, 2021, for IP1, IP2 and IP3, respectively. The
exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) permits IPEC to reduce the required
level of primary financial protection from $450 million to $100 million
and to withdraw from participation in the secondary layer of financial
protection 15 months after permanent cessation of power
[[Page 90208]]
operations, which was August 1, 2022. Because this period has already
elapsed, the exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated: November 16, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jane Marshall,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2023-28776 Filed 12-28-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P