[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 223 (Tuesday, November 21, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 80997-81019]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-24936]


 ========================================================================
 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
 ________________________________________________________________________
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 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
 
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 

  Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 223 / Tuesday, November 21, 2023 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 80997]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 91, 135, and 136

[Docket No. FAA-2023-2250; Notice No. 24-02]
RIN 2120-AL37


Use of Supplemental Restraint Systems

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: This proposed rule would prohibit civil aircraft operations 
conducted with supplemental restraint systems (SRS) unless operators 
meet certain requirements for ensuring passenger safety during all 
phases of the operation. The FAA expects these proposed requirements 
would increase the safety of passengers during civil aircraft 
operations conducted with SRS. This proposal addresses recommendations 
from the National Transportation Safety Board and the Department of 
Transportation Office of Inspector General. Additionally, this proposed 
rule would codify, with updates, an Emergency Order currently in effect 
addressing safety concerns regarding the use of supplemental 
restraints. The proposed rule would apply to all civil aircraft 
operations conducted with use of SRS. The rule as proposed would not 
apply to parachute operations or rotorcraft external-load operations. 
Additionally, the proposed rule would not apply to operations conducted 
as public aircraft operations.

DATES: Send comments on or before January 22, 2024.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2023-2250 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at (202) 493-2251.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
https://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions 
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Raymond Plessinger, General Aviation 
and Commercial Division, Flight Standards Service, AFS-830, Federal 
Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 
20591; Telephone: (202) 267-1100; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Authority for This Proposed Rulemaking
III. Background
    A. Statement of the Problem
    B. History
IV. Discussion of the Proposed Rule
    A. Identified Safety Gaps
    B. How This Rule Enhances the Emergency Order of Prohibition
    C. Prohibitions Applicable to SRS and Doors Opened or Removed 
Flight Operations (Sec.  91.108(a) and (b))
    D. SRS Design Requirements (Sec.  91.108(c)(1) Through (4))
    E. Who May Provide the SRS (Sec.  91.108(d))
    F. SRS Operational Requirements (Sec.  91.108(e)(1) and (2))
    G. Pilot in Command (Sec.  91.108(f)(1) Through (5))
    H. Enhanced Passenger Briefing and Demonstration (Sec.  
91.108(g) and (h))
    I. Individuals Not Permitted To Use SRS (Sec.  91.108(i)(1) 
Through (4))
    J. Lap-Held Child (Sec.  91.108(j)(1) and (2))
    K. Excluded Operations (Sec.  91.108(k)(1) Through (3))
    L. Definition (Sec.  91.108(l))
    M. Additional Comments Invited
V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
    A. Summary of the Regulatory Evaluation
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
    C. International Trade Impact Assessment
    D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
    E. Paperwork Reduction Act
    F. International Compatibility and Cooperation
    G. Environmental Analysis
VI. Executive Order Determinations
    A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
    B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect 
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
    C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation
VII. Additional Information
    A. Comments Invited
    B. Electronic Access and Filing

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Frequently Used in This Document

AAIB--Danish Accident Investigation Board
FMVSS--Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
FOIA--Freedom of Information Act
FSOL--Fuel Shutoff Lever
ICR--Information Collection Request
InFO--Information for Operators
IRFA--Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
LOA--Letter of Authorization
NAICS--North American Industry Classification System
NPRM--Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NTSB--National Transportation Safety Board
OMB--Office of Management and Budget
PIC--Pilot in Command
RFA--Regulatory Flexibility Act
SBA--Small Business Administration
SOPs--Standard Operating Procedures
SPRS--Supplemental Passenger Restraint System(s)
SRS--Supplemental Restraint System(s)

I. Executive Summary

    This proposed rule addresses the use of supplemental restraint 
systems (SRS) in civil aircraft operations. On March 22, 2018, the FAA 
issued an Emergency Order of Prohibition titled ``Operators and Pilots 
of `Doors Off' Flights for Compensation or Hire'' \1\ to all operators 
and pilots of flights for compensation or hire with the doors open or 
removed in the United States or using aircraft registered in the United 
States for doors-off flights. The Emergency Order of Prohibition 
prohibits the use of supplemental passenger restraint systems (SPRS) 
that cannot be released quickly in an emergency.\2\ This was in

[[Page 80998]]

response to an open door helicopter accident on March 11, 2018, in 
which passengers were secured with SPRS and were unable to exit the 
aircraft before they drowned. At the time of the accident, no rules 
specifically addressed civil aircraft operations conducted with the use 
of SRS,\3\ including during operations with doors opened or removed. As 
a result of preliminary information discovered during the investigation 
of this accident, on March 19, 2018, the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) issued Urgent Safety Recommendation A-18-012, which 
recommended that the FAA prohibit all open-door aircraft operations 
using passenger harness systems, unless the harness system allows 
passengers to rapidly release the harness with minimal difficulty and 
without having to cut or forcefully remove the harness.\4\
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    \1\ Emergency Order of Prohibition, ``Operators and Pilots of 
``Doors Off'' Flights for Compensation or Hire'' available at 
https://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2018-0243-0001.
    \2\ The term ``supplemental passenger restraint system,'' as 
defined in the March 22, 2018, Emergency Order of Prohibition, means 
any passenger restraint that is not installed on the aircraft 
pursuant to an FAA approval, including (but not limited to) 
restraints approved through a Type Certificate, Supplemental Type 
Certificate, or as an approved major alteration using FAA Form 337.
    \3\ The FAA uses the term supplemental restraint system (SRS) to 
refer to the device in general, but, for the purposes of this 
rulemaking document, uses the term supplemental passenger restraint 
system (SPRS) when quoting or referring to documents that use the 
term ``SPRS'' (e.g., The Emergency Order of Prohibition). The FAA 
considers the two terms to be synonymous.
    \4\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-18-012, https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/A-18-012.
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    An SRS is a device used to secure an individual inside an aircraft 
when that person is not properly secured by an FAA-approved seat belt 
and, if installed, shoulder harness or an approved child restraint 
system. SRS are not installed on the aircraft pursuant to a Type 
Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, approved major alteration 
(FAA Form 337), or other FAA approval. An SRS consists of a harness 
secured around the torso of the individual using the SRS and a lanyard 
that connects the harness to an approved airframe attachment point 
inside the aircraft.
    To mitigate identified risks and ultimately prevent future 
fatalities, the FAA proposes to issue regulations regarding the use of 
SRS, including during operations with doors opened or removed. This 
proposed rule would establish requirements for use of SRS. This 
proposed rule would also prohibit flight operations with doors opened 
or removed except under two scenarios. The first scenario is when each 
individual \5\ occupies an FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety 
belt and, if installed, shoulder harness properly secured about them or 
an approved child restraint system properly secured to an approved seat 
or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness in 
accordance with Sec.  91.107(a)(3)(iii) or Sec.  135.128(a)(2), during 
the entire flight. The second scenario is if each individual occupies 
an FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, 
shoulder harness, properly secured about them during movement on the 
surface, takeoff, and landing; during other phases of flight, if 
permitted by the pilot in command (PIC),\6\ the passenger may use an 
SRS that meets all requirements proposed in this rule. The operator 
generally will provide the SRS to individuals who seek to use the SRS 
during the flight, but in some cases, an individual may opt to provide 
their own SRS as long as it meets the requirements proposed in this 
rule and the PIC approves the SRS.
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    \5\ The FAA uses two categories to define those who travel on 
airplanes: crewmember and passenger. In this proposal, the agency 
uses that distinction when referring specifically to a crewmember or 
passenger. When the distinction between a crewmember and a passenger 
is not applicable, the agency uses the word ``individual'' when 
referring to anyone who occupies an SRS.
    \6\ Under 14 CFR 91.3, the PIC is the final authority as to the 
operation of the aircraft. The PIC may determine it is unsafe to 
allow the use of SRS during a phase of flight that would otherwise 
be allowed.
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    This proposed rule would require the SRS to have a release 
mechanism that can be operated quickly by the passenger using the SRS 
with minimal difficulty. As proposed, the release mechanism must be 
located on the front or side of the harness in a place easily 
accessible to and visible by the passenger using the SRS and must 
prevent inadvertent release. Also, as proposed, the release mechanism 
cannot require the use of a knife to cut the restraint, the use of any 
other additional tool, or the assistance of any other individual to 
release the SRS.
    As explained in section IV.E.2 of this preamble, the FAA proposes 
that the SRS must be connected to an aircraft attaching point or points 
with a rated strength equal to or greater than the combined weight of 
all the passengers using an SRS attached to that same point, but it 
cannot be connected to any airframe attachment point located in the 
flightdeck. Additionally, as proposed, the rule requires the SRS to 
have a lanyard that ensures the torso of the passenger using the SRS 
remains inside the aircraft at all times.
    This proposed rule would also require operators conducting flight 
operations where passengers use an SRS to provide an enhanced passenger 
safety briefing. Further, this proposal would require passengers who 
seek to use an SRS during flight operations to demonstrate their 
ability to occupy, secure, and release the FAA-approved seat belts and, 
if installed, shoulder harnesses, as well as the ability to release 
quickly the SRS with no assistance, and with minimal difficulty. A 
passenger who could not meet the demonstration requirements of the 
enhanced safety briefing would be prohibited from using an SRS; 
however, they would be permitted to participate in the flight if they 
occupy an FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if 
installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about them during 
operations when the doors are opened or removed or when otherwise 
required by regulations. Only those passengers who have reached their 
fifteenth birthday could use an SRS during flight operations, and no 
individual using an SRS could occupy a seat in the flightdeck. In 
addition to prohibiting individuals who occupy a child restraint system 
from also using an SRS, this proposed rule would prohibit a child from 
being held by an adult who is using an SRS. This proposed rule would 
also prohibit a child from being held when the aircraft doors are 
opened or removed.
    This proposed rule would mitigate identified safety risks to 
passengers who use an SRS and would help ensure safety of the 
operation, including when the doors of the aircraft are opened or 
removed.

II. Authority for This Proposed Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in 
Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.). Subtitle I of 49 
U.S.C., specifically section 106, describes the authority of the FAA 
Administrator. Subtitle VII of 49 U.S.C., Aviation Programs, describes 
in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
    The FAA promulgates this rulemaking under the authority described 
in 49 U.S.C. 106(f), which establishes the authority of the 
Administrator to promulgate regulations and rules, and 49 U.S.C. 
44701(a)(5), which requires the Administrator to promote safe flight of 
civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and setting 
minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedures 
necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.

[[Page 80999]]

III. Background

A. Statement of the Problem

    The FAA operational regulations pertaining to passenger restraints 
currently address only FAA-approved seat belts and, if installed, 
shoulder harnesses and child restraint systems approved for use on 
aircraft. They require individuals to be secured during movement on the 
surface, takeoff, and landing, or as instructed by the flight crew. 
Current regulations do not address passenger safety in operations 
conducted with doors opened or removed, except for parachute operations 
and rotorcraft external-load operations.
    The proposed rule would mitigate the risk of harm to an individual 
using an SRS, including during operations with doors opened or removed. 
Specifically, the proposed rule is expected to mitigate the risk that 
an individual could fall out of the aircraft when the doors are opened 
or removed if they are not occupying an FAA-approved seat or berth with 
a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured 
about them during the entire flight. It also mitigates the risk that a 
passenger cannot quickly egress after an accident because the SRS they 
use is difficult to release. By limiting where the passenger can sit 
when using an SRS and where the attachment point to which the SRS is 
attached is located, this rule proposes to mitigate the risk that a 
component of the SRS may inadvertently move a flight control mechanism, 
which could impact the operation of the aircraft. The proposed rule 
would provide minimum requirements for all flight operations when an 
SRS is used, including those with doors opened or removed. If adopted, 
this proposed rule will result in safer flight operations and reduce 
the risk of harm to individuals, whether passengers or crewmembers.

B. History

1. Liberty Helicopters Accident
    On March 11, 2018, an Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2 lost engine power 
during cruise flight, and the pilot performed an autorotative descent 
and ditching on the East River in New York, New York. The pilot 
sustained minor injuries, the five passengers drowned, and the 
helicopter was substantially damaged. The FlyNYON-branded flight was 
operated by Liberty Helicopters Inc. (Liberty), per a contractual 
agreement with NYONair.\7\
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    \7\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and 
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON 
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019. 
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
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    Liberty operated the accident flight as a FlyNYON-branded, doors-
off helicopter flight that allowed the five passengers (one in the 
front seat, four in the rear seats) to take photographs of various 
landmarks while extending their legs outside the helicopter during 
portions of the flight. For the accident flight (and other FlyNYON 
flights that Liberty operated), Liberty configured its Airbus AS350 B2 
helicopter with the two right and the front left doors removed and the 
left sliding door locked open. Before departure, each passenger was 
fitted with a NYONair-provided harness/tether system that NYONair 
developed with the intent to prevent passengers from falling out of the 
helicopter. The harness/tether system used on the accident flight 
consisted of a full-body, workplace fall-protection harness that was 
secured (with a locking carabiner) to a tether, the other end of which 
was secured (with another locking carabiner) to an anchor point in the 
cabin. Each passenger also used the helicopter's installed, FAA-
approved restraints. The pilot (who was seated in the front right seat) 
used only an installed, FAA-approved restraint.\8\
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    \8\ Id. at ix.
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    Under normal circumstances, at the conclusion of each flight, 
operator personnel would unscrew a locking carabiner located on the 
back of each passenger's harness so that the passenger could exit the 
helicopter. The operator provided each individual secured by an SPRS 
with a cutting tool, stored in a pouch attached to the harness, for use 
in freeing themselves from the harness/tether system in case of an 
emergency.\9\ Prior to flight, each passenger viewed a passenger safety 
video that addressed general safety topics and emergency safety 
procedures, such as cutting-tool use.\10\ The video narrative for 
releasing from the harness/tether system in the event of an emergency 
stated that ``the harness can be released by opening the quick release 
clip in the back of the harness'' and the visual that accompanied the 
narrative showed one person releasing another person's carabiner. The 
video also instructed passengers that ``a cutter [cutting tool] is also 
secured to one of your chest straps and will allow you to quickly cut 
through the harness if you are unable to reach the quick release 
clip.'' \11\
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    \9\ Id. at 19.
    \10\ Id. at 44.
    \11\ Ibid.
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    Consistent with the standard operating procedures (SOPs) used for 
FlyNYON flights, the passengers were allowed (when instructed by the 
pilot) to position themselves to extend their legs outside the 
helicopter. The two passengers who had been seated in the rear inboard 
seats removed their installed, FAA-approved restraints and sat on the 
cabin floor, wearing their harness/tether systems. The passengers 
seated in the outboard seats were allowed to rotate outboard in their 
seats. To enable such freedom of movement, the SOPs allowed the 
passengers to wear their installed, FAA-approved restraint with the lap 
belt adjusted loosely and the shoulder harness routed under the 
arm.\12\
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    \12\ Id. at ix.
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    During the flight, the aircraft lost engine power and the pilot 
conducted an emergency landing on the East River. The helicopter's 
floats did not fully inflate, and the helicopter rolled right in the 
water and became fully inverted and submerged about 11 seconds after it 
touched down. Despite receiving a briefing on how to self-egress from 
the SPRS using the provided cutting tool, none of the passengers were 
able to egress. All five passengers drowned. The pilot was able to 
release his installed, FAA-approved restraint after he was under water 
and successfully egress from the helicopter.\13\
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    \13\ Id. at x.
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2. National Transportation Safety Board Reports and Recommendations
    The NTSB investigated the accident.\14\ On March 19, 2018, the NTSB 
issued an Urgent Safety Recommendation Report, Additional Harness 
Systems that Allow for Rapid Egress, ASR-18-02, to ``prohibit all open-
door commercial passenger-carrying aircraft flights that use passenger 
harness systems, unless the harness system allows passengers to rapidly 
release the harness with minimal difficulty, and without having to cut 
or forcefully remove the harness.'' \15\
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    \14\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and 
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON 
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019. 
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
    \15\ NTSB Urgent Recommendation, ASR-18-02, accessed at https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/A-18-012 on February 23, 
2021.
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    The NTSB published its final accident report, Inadvertent 
Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and Subsequent Ditching, Liberty 
Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight, following a 
board meeting held on

[[Page 81000]]

December 10, 2019, in which the Board issued additional safety 
recommendations.\16\ The accident docket includes a detailed summary of 
the pilot interview.\17\ The pilot reported that when he reached down 
for the emergency fuel shutoff lever, he realized that it was in the 
off position. He also noted that a portion of the front seat 
passenger's tether was underneath the lever.\18\ A review of radar data 
and onboard video showed that when the flight was proceeding northwest 
over Manhattan toward Central Park at an altitude of 1,900 feet mean 
sea level, the front passenger, who was facing outboard in his seat 
with his legs outside the helicopter, leaned back several times to take 
photographs using a smartphone. The onboard video showed that each time 
he leaned back, the tail of the tether attached to the back of his 
harness hung down loosely near the helicopter's floor-mounted controls. 
At one point, when he pulled himself up to adjust his seating position, 
the tail of his tether remained taut but appeared to pop upward. Two 
seconds later, the helicopter's engine sounds decreased, and the 
helicopter began to descend.\19\ The NTSB determined the probable cause 
of this accident was Liberty Helicopters Inc.'s use of a NYONair-
provided passenger harness/tether system, which caught on and activated 
the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff lever (FSOL) and resulted in the 
in-flight loss of engine power and the subsequent ditching.\20\ NTSB 
also stated that Liberty and NYONair's use of the harness and tether 
system hindered passenger egress and contributed to the severity of the 
accident.\21\
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    \16\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and 
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON 
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019. 
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
    \17\ Factual Report--Attachment 1, Interview Summaries, 
Operational Factors, accessed at https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=40476009&FileExtension=.PDF&FileName=Operations%20Attachment%201%20-%20Interview%20Summaries-Master.PDF on February 23, 2021.
    \18\ Id. at 6.
    \19\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and 
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON 
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019. 
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
    \20\ Id. at x.
    \21\ Id. at x, xii, 67, 83, 85.
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3. FAA Actions
    The FAA carefully considered the information and recommendations 
from the NTSB. Following the issuance of the NTSB Urgent Safety 
Recommendation Report ASR-18-02, the FAA concluded that the SPRS each 
passenger wore, while intended as a safety measure when the aircraft 
was in flight, might have prevented the passengers' quick egress from 
the aircraft. Although the fatalities that occurred on March 11, 2018, 
involved an aircraft ditching on the water, the FAA determined that 
other situations, such as smoke and fire emergencies, might also result 
in injuries and fatalities unless passengers can release quickly their 
SPRS. Under 49 U.S.C. 46105(c), the Acting Administrator of the FAA 
determined that an emergency existed related to safety in air commerce 
based on the threat to passenger safety presented by the use of SPRS 
not approved by the FAA, which may prevent a passenger from exiting the 
aircraft quickly in an emergency. To address this emergency, on March 
22, 2018, the FAA issued Emergency Order of Prohibition No. FAA-2018-
0243 to all operators and pilots of flights for compensation or hire 
with the doors open or removed in the United States or using aircraft 
registered in the United States for doors-off flights.\22\ The 
Emergency Order of Prohibition prohibits the use of SPRS that cannot be 
released quickly in an emergency in doors-off flight operation. The 
Emergency Order of Prohibition provides that persons may operate doors-
off flights for compensation or hire involving SPRS if the 
Administrator has determined that the restraints to be used can be 
quickly released by a passenger with minimal difficulty and without 
impeding egress from the aircraft in an emergency, and provides 
information for operators to apply to seek such approvals. The 
Emergency Order of Prohibition also prohibits passenger-carrying doors-
off flight operations unless the passengers are at all times properly 
secured using FAA-approved restraints.\23\
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    \22\ Emergency Order of Prohibition, ``Operators and Pilots of 
``Doors Off'' Flights for Compensation or Hire'' available at 
https://www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2018-0243-0001.
    \23\ Ibid.
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    The FAA also posted to its website FAA Notice N 8900.456, Emergency 
Order of Prohibition Pertaining to ``Doors Off'' Flight Operations for 
Compensation or Hire, which provides guidance to FAA Aviation Safety 
Inspectors (ASIs) and others regarding the Emergency Order of 
Prohibition and its implementation.\24\ Notice N 8900.456 directed ASIs 
to coordinate with the FAA's Aircraft Certification Service to ensure a 
restraint system, previously granted an approval by an FAA Form 337, is 
properly evaluated prior to use.\25\ That notice was subsequently 
revised to FAA Notice N 8900.457 \26\ and then FAA Notice N 
8900.506,\27\ before finally being established as FAA Order 8900.4.\28\ 
That order sets out the application process to request a Letter of 
Authorization (LOA) from the FAA's Flight Standards Service to conduct 
operations using an SPRS. As a part of that process, the applicant must 
demonstrate that the restraints can be released quickly by a passenger 
with minimal difficulty and without impeding egress from the aircraft 
in an emergency. In reviewing a request for an LOA, the FAA reviews the 
design, manufacture, installation, and operations.
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    \24\ https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/orders_notices/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/1032926.
    \25\ Id. at 2.
    \26\ http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N_8900.457.pdf.
    \27\ http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N_8900.506.pdf.
    \28\ Although FAA orders typically serve as guidance material 
for FAA personnel only, FAA Order 8900.4 provides information to 
individuals, pilots, and operators. http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8900.4.pdf.
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    In addition, the Agency published Information for Operators (InFO) 
18003, Supplemental Passenger Restraint Systems (SPRS) for ``Doors-
Off'' Flight Operations Conducted for Compensation or Hire, on May 9, 
2018, which informs operators of the procedure for obtaining an LOA for 
use of an SPRS for ``Doors-Off'' flight operations conducted for 
compensation or hire.\29\
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    \29\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/InFO18003.pdf.
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    In evaluating whether to authorize an operation with SPRS, the FAA 
requires the applicant to submit to the FAA the following items: a 
completed and signed FAA Form 7711-2, Certificate of Waiver or 
Authorization Application; a completed Attachment A, Request for FAA 
Letter of Authorization, Supplemental Passenger Restraint System--
Supporting Information; a link to a video that shows an occupant 
demonstrating the method of release from the device; and, if the 
operator has been issued a Motion Picture and Television Filming 
certificate of waiver, a signed FAA Form 7711-1. In reviewing the 
request, the FAA also evaluates the applicant's preflight

[[Page 81001]]

briefing procedures and/or step-by-step instructions, which must 
clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the SPRS can be released 
quickly by the SPRS user with minimal difficulty and without impeding 
egress from the aircraft in an emergency.
    Additionally, the evaluation includes confirmation that the 
components (harness and lanyard) were manufactured in accordance with 
credible certification standards.\30\ The FAA recognizes that 
acceptable and established minimum standards for supplemental 
restraints already exist and are in use in other FAA evaluation 
scenarios and in many occupations. The FAA accepts these standards 
since there is no single certification standard that is best for every 
SPRS, due to the unique activities in which the applicant seeks to 
engage during doors opened flight operations. The FAA considers these 
existing standards when reviewing submission packages. Credible 
certification standards include TSO-167 (for personnel carrying device 
systems), OSHA 1926.502 (fall protection), NFPA 1983-2017 (life safety 
rope and equipment), and EN 361:2002 (full body harness). Further 
discussion about credible certification standards can be found in 
section IV.D. of this proposal.
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    \30\ For the purposes of this evaluation, the FAA considers a 
certification standard to be credible when it ensures that 
materials, products, processes, and services are fit for their 
purpose.
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    Non-certificated individuals may also request authorization to use 
SPRS. For example, passengers seeking to use SPRS may seek FAA 
authorization of their own equipment. They may include but are not 
limited to net gunners or aerial photographers. The FAA issues an LOA 
specific to that individual, the identified components of the SPRS, and 
the submitted operational procedures when the individual is a passenger 
on a doors opened/removed flight operated for compensation or hire.
    The FAA reviews each submission to ensure the submitted 
documentation adequately demonstrates the ability of a user to release 
quickly the SPRS with minimal difficulty. Consistent with the Emergency 
Order of Prohibition, the ability for rapid release and egress must be 
inherent in the design of the SPRS. Additionally, each SPRS must not 
require the use of a cutting tool, or any other additional tool, or the 
assistance of any other person to release the restraint. The FAA also 
considers whether a user would have the ability to release the SPRS 
without any additional training beyond what would be provided in a 
preflight briefing, as discussed in the Emergency Order of Prohibition.
    Once issued, the pilot or operator must ensure the LOA is available 
on the aircraft whenever any SPRS is used on any flight operation with 
doors opened or removed for compensation or hire. If issued to a non-
certificated individual, the LOA requires that individual to provide a 
copy of the LOA to the pilot or operator prior to participating in a 
flight operation conducted with doors off for compensation or hire 
using an SPRS. The pilot or operator makes the final decision as to 
whether to accept the LOA and whether to permit the passenger to use 
the authorized SPRS on that flight.
    Between March 26, 2018, and October 15, 2019, the FAA issued 41 
LOAs to operators and 13 LOAs to non-certificated individuals. Through 
the application process, the FAA learned SPRS could be used on both 
fixed wing and rotorcraft aircraft.
    If this rule is finalized as proposed, it would supersede existing 
processes for authorizing SPRS.
4. Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General Report and 
Recommendations
    Following the fatal Liberty Helicopters crash, the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), in 
consultation with the NTSB, reviewed FAA's oversight of helicopter air 
tours and how FAA approved the supplemental passenger restraint systems 
used during the crash.\31\ The OIG objectives were to assess FAA's 
processes for (1) review and approval of supplemental restraints for 
open-door helicopter operations, and (2) oversight of company use of 
supplemental restraints.\32\ The OIG findings included that the FAA did 
not maintain effective and consistent oversight of open-door helicopter 
operations to maintain the safety of air tour passengers. The OIG 
issued recommendations to the FAA to improve the SPRS authorization 
process and oversight regarding SPRS use and to increase the safety of 
helicopter air tour passengers. Specifically, the OIG recommended the 
FAA issue a notice of proposed rulemaking and a final rule, if found to 
be in the public interest, that address operations using SPRS. This 
proposed rule addresses the OIG recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The FAA notes that both the NTSB and OIG used the term 
``supplemental passenger restraint system'' (SPRS).
    \32\ Weaknesses in FAA's Supplemental Passenger Restraint System 
Authorization Process Hinder Improvements to Open-Door Helicopter 
Operations, Audit Report AV2021010, issued December 8, 2020. 
Available at https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/38140.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Discussion of the Proposed Rule

A. Identified Safety Gaps

    Although the Emergency Order of Prohibition fills safety gaps that 
existed prior to the Liberty Helicopters accident, the FAA identified 
residual safety gaps that still exist and that this proposed rule seeks 
to address. Discussed below are the primary residual safety gaps the 
FAA identified.
1. Limited Regulatory Oversight
    Prior to March 11, 2018, no rules specifically addressed civil 
aircraft operations conducted with the use of SRS, including during 
operations with doors opened or removed. The Emergency Order of 
Prohibition sought to address this issue by imposing SPRS requirements; 
however, it only addresses doors-off operations for compensation or 
hire. This proposed rule would apply to all civil aircraft operations 
conducted in the U.S. with the use of SRS, including during operations 
with doors opened or removed and regardless of whether they are for 
compensation or hire. Moreover, the Emergency Order of Prohibition did 
not address operations where doors remain closed but where individuals 
use SRS. This proposed rule addresses those operations as well.
2. Ability To Release and Inadvertent Release of the Supplemental 
Restraint System
    As explained above, the NTSB stated that the passengers' inability 
to release from the SPRS hindered their egress from the aircraft and 
contributed to the severity of the accident.\33\ The Emergency Order of 
Prohibition sought to address this concern by imposing certain SPRS 
release mechanism design requirements; however, the FAA determined 
after the Emergency Order of Prohibition was put into place that there 
is no requirement to prevent inadvertent release of the mechanism. 
Although quick release is vital, it is equally important to ensure an 
SRS does not inadvertently release, particularly during operations 
where doors are opened or removed. This proposed rule addresses that 
concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See id. at x, xii, 67, 83, 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Lap-Held Children
    Current regulations permit a person to be held by an adult who is 
occupying an approved seat or berth, provided that the person being 
held has not reached his or her second birthday and does not occupy or 
use any restraining device.

[[Page 81002]]

See 14 CFR 91.107(a)(3)(i) and 135.128(a)(1). The Emergency Order of 
Prohibition does not address lap-held children, leaving an unacceptable 
risk of children falling out of an aircraft with doors opened or 
removed or otherwise being injured when an adult is holding a lap-held 
child while using only an SRS. This proposed rule seeks to eliminate 
that risk to lap-held children.

B. How This Rule Enhances the Emergency Order of Prohibition

    This proposed rule would enhance safety for individuals who use an 
SRS during all flight operations. As mentioned above, no regulations 
existed regarding the use of supplemental restraints prior to March 22, 
2018. After the Liberty Helicopters accident, the NTSB found ``that 
minimally trained passengers would have great difficulty extricating 
themselves from the harness/tether system, each of which was equipped 
with locking carabiners and an ineffective cutting tool, during an 
emergency requiring a rapid egress.'' \34\ The FAA issued Emergency 
Order of Prohibition No. FAA-2018-0243 to all operators and pilots of 
flights for compensation or hire with the doors open or removed in the 
United States or using aircraft registered in the United States for 
doors-off flights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and 
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON 
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 
York, March 11, 2018 at x. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 
2019. Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Emergency Order of Prohibition prohibits the use of SPRS that 
cannot be released quickly in an emergency in doors-off flight 
operations. The Emergency Order of Prohibition provides that persons 
may operate doors-off flights for compensation or hire involving SPRS 
if the Administrator has determined that the restraints to be used can 
be quickly released by a passenger with minimal difficulty and without 
impeding egress from the aircraft in an emergency, and provides 
information for operators to apply to seek such authorization. The 
Emergency Order of Prohibition also prohibits passenger-carrying doors-
off flight operations unless the passengers are at all times properly 
secured using FAA-approved restraints.
    The term ``supplemental passenger restraint system,'' as defined in 
the March 22, 2018, Emergency Order of Prohibition, means any passenger 
restraint that is not installed on the aircraft pursuant to an FAA 
approval, including (but not limited to) restraints approved through a 
Type Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, or as an approved 
major alteration using FAA Form 337. For this rulemaking, the FAA uses 
the term supplemental restraint system (SRS) instead of supplemental 
passenger restraint system (SPRS) used in the Emergency Order of 
Prohibition. The FAA finds the terms ``supplemental restraint system'' 
(SRS) and ``supplemental passenger restraint system'' (SPRS) to be 
synonymous, except ``supplemental restraint system'' is more precise as 
the restraint could be worn by either a passenger or a crew member. 
Therefore, for accuracy, the FAA uses the term ``supplemental restraint 
system'' (SRS) throughout this document, except when quoting or 
referring to documents that use the term ``SPRS.''
    Below is a table showing (1) the regulatory landscape after the FAA 
issued the Emergency Order of Prohibition, (2) identified safety gaps 
the Emergency Order did not address, and (3) a brief summary of the 
proposed Sec.  91.108 requirements, including the requirements that 
seek to close the gaps identified after the Emergency Order of 
Prohibition was issued.

             Table 1--Comparison of Requirements for Operations Using Supplemental Restraint Systems
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Emergency order of prohibition
   (current) Letter of authorization     Identified safety gaps     Performance-based requirements (proposed)
                process                                           91.108--Use of supplemental restraint systems
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency Order of Prohibition No. FAA-  Emergency Order of      The SRS proposed rule applies to:
 2018-0243, issued March 22, 2018,        Prohibition did not     All operations where the doors are
 applies to operations for compensation   address:                opened or removed, regardless of whether they
 or hire with doors open or removed.      Flight          are for compensation or hire;
It prohibits the use of SPRS that         operations not          All operations, regardless of whether
 cannot be released quickly and           conducted for           the doors are opened or removed, where
 prohibits doors-off operations unless    compensation or hire;   passengers use an SRS; and
 passengers are at all times secured      or                      Passengers and crew members.
 using FAA-approved restraints or         Operations     Proposed Requirement: Flight operations with
 restrained by an authorized SPRS.        where the doors         doors opened or removed are prohibited unless
                                          remain closed, but      each individual either occupies:
                                          passengers use an       An FAA-approved seat or berth with a
                                          SRS.                    safety belt/shoulder harness or an approved
                                         In addition, the         child restraint system during all phases of
                                          Emergency Order of      flight; or
                                          Prohibition only        An approved seat or berth with a
                                          applies to passengers   safety belt/shoulder harness during critical
                                          and does not address    phases of flight and is secured during the
                                          crew members.           cruise portion of flight with an SRS.
The supplemental restraint must have a   Emergency Order of      The SRS proposed rule includes the same design
 release mechanism that:                  Prohibition did not     requirements for the SRS release mechanism as
 Can be released quickly by the   address inadvertent     the Emergency Order of Prohibition but adds a
 person using the SPRS with minimal       release of the SRS.     requirement about inadvertent release.
 difficulty, without excessive force                             Proposed Requirement: The supplemental
 and without impeding egress from the                             restraint must have a release mechanism that:
 aircraft;                                                        Can be quickly operated with minimal
 Is located on the front or                               difficulty;
 side of the harness, easily accessible                           Is attached to the front or side of
 to and visible by the person using the                           the harness in a location easily accessible to
 SPRS;                                                            and visible by the individual using the SRS;
 Does not require the use of a                            Prevents inadvertent release; and
 knife to cut the restraint, any other                            Does not require the use of a knife to
 additional tool, or the assistance of                            cut the restraint, any other additional tool,
 any other person to release the SPRS.                            or the assistance of any other individual to
                                                                  release the SRS.

[[Page 81003]]

 
Operators, pilots, or individuals        Other than addressing   The SRS proposed rule adds more detailed design
 desiring authorization to use an SPRS    the release             and operational requirements and other
 must submit the following items for      mechanism, the          requirements/prohibitions not addressed in the
 evaluation:                              Emergency Order of      Emergency Order of Prohibition:
 Completed FAA Form 7711-2,       Prohibition did not    Proposed Design Requirements: The supplemental
 Certificate of Waiver or Authorization   address detailed        restraint system must:
 Application;                             design or operational   Have a harness that secures around the
 Completed ATTACHMENT A,          requirements.           individual's torso;
 Request for FAA Letter of                                        Have a lanyard that connects the
 Authorization; and                                               harness to the airframe attachment point and
 A link to at least one video                             that ensures the individual's torso remains
 that shows an occupant demonstrating                             inside the aircraft;
 the method of release from the SPRS.                             Not impede egress from the aircraft in
If the submitter seeks to use                                     an emergency after being released; and
 authorized SPRS for Motion Picture and                           Identify the sizing criteria for which
 Television Filming (MP/TF) operations,                           the SRS is rated.
 the submission must also include a                              Proposed Operational Requirements:
 scanned copy of the operators or                                 A qualified person must:
 pilot's issued FAA Form 7711-1,                                 [cir] Connect the SRS to an attachment point
 Certificate of Waiver or                                         with rated strength for the individual using
 Authorization.                                                   the SRS; and
                                                                 [cir] Not connect the SRS to an attachment
                                                                  located in the flightdeck.
                                         The Emergency Order of  Additional Proposed Requirements: The proposed
                                          Prohibition did not     rule adds requirements for:
                                          address other           Individuals providing their own SRS;
                                          requirements outlined   Pilot in Command's responsibilities
                                          in the right-hand       and authority;
                                          column, ``additional    Passenger briefings;
                                          proposed                Passengers demonstrating their ability
                                          requirements.''         to occupy FAA-approved safety belt/shoulder
                                                                  harness and accomplish actions required for
                                                                  SRS quick release without assistance.
                                         The Emergency Order of  Proposed Prohibitions:
                                          Prohibition did not     The proposed rule prohibits the
                                          address individuals     following individuals from using an SRS:
                                          who are prohibited     [cir] Passengers who cannot demonstrate their
                                          from using an SRS or    ability to occupy a safety belt/shoulder
                                          lap-held children       harness or to release quickly their SRS;
                                          during certain         [cir] Individuals under 15 years of age;
                                          operations.            [cir] Individuals seated in flightdeck;
                                                                 [cir] Passengers occupying a CRS;
                                                                  The proposed rule also prohibits lap-
                                                                  held children from being held by an adult
                                                                  using an SRS or during doors-open or -removed
                                                                  operations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Prohibitions Applicable to SRS and Doors Opened or Removed Flight 
Operations (Sec.  91.108(a) and (b))

    The FAA is proposing to add a new Sec.  91.108 to address the use 
of supplemental restraint systems. Proposed Sec.  91.108(a) establishes 
the general prohibition against using SRS. Specifically, paragraph (a) 
would prohibit any operations in a registered civil aircraft if any 
individual is secured with an SRS except as described in Sec.  91.108. 
This is a change from the status quo. The FAA determined that, even 
after the issuance of the Emergency Order of Prohibition following the 
Liberty Helicopters accident, safety gaps continue to exist. This 
proposal intends to eliminate these safety gaps for all individuals who 
use an SRS. For example, the Emergency Order of Prohibition prohibits 
operations with passengers using an SPRS unless certain conditions 
exist, including authorization from the FAA. Proposed paragraph (a) 
would apply the prohibition to everyone on board, including crew 
members. In addition, currently, an individual can use an SRS without 
FAA authorization both during operations conducted with doors closed 
and operations conducted not for compensation or hire. Proposed 
paragraph (a) would extend the prohibition to these additional types of 
operations as well. Proposed Sec.  91.108(b) builds on the prohibition 
in paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) would prohibit operations with doors 
opened or removed with two exceptions. The first exception, under Sec.  
91.108(b)(1)(i), is when each individual on board is properly secured 
in an approved seat or berth or in an approved child restraint system 
during all phases of flight. The second exception, under Sec.  
91.108(b)(1)(ii), is when an individual is properly secured in an 
approved seat or berth during movement on the surface, takeoff, and 
landing, and is secured during other phases of flight using an SRS in 
accordance with, and that meets the requirements of, Sec.  91.108.
    The FAA proposes these requirements to ensure that during 
operations with doors opened or removed, all individuals are at all 
times properly secured using restraints that meet the requirements of 
the proposed rule and at no time are unrestrained during operations. As 
proposed, all SRS would be required to be properly secured on each 
individual and properly secured to an FAA-approved airframe attaching 
point prior to the removal of the FAA-approved seat belt and, if 
installed, shoulder harness. The proposed rule requires the attachment 
point(s) to be rated at a strength equal to or greater than the total 
combined weight of the occupants secured to the attachment point to 
ensure that the attachment point has adequate strength.
    To ensure each individual is properly secured at all times during 
flight operations in which doors are opened or removed, operators may 
choose to require compliance with procedures that ensure both the FAA-
approved aircraft seat belt and, if installed, shoulder harness and the 
SRS are secured prior to ground movement or that the SRS is secured 
after takeoff. In either case, the proposed rule requires each person 
to be properly secured by the SRS before releasing the FAA-approved 
seat belt and, if installed, shoulder harness. The FAA reiterates that 
an individual must be secured by an FAA-approved seat belt and, if 
installed, shoulder harness during movement on the surface, takeoff, 
and landing. Moreover, the FAA proposes

[[Page 81004]]

that an individual cannot release their safety belt and shoulder 
harness until the PIC authorizes them to do so. As discussed in more 
detail in Section IV.G., the PIC is the final authority on whether SRS 
may be used during flight operations. In addition, the PIC is in the 
best position to know when flight conditions are appropriate to 
authorize SRS use.
    Finally, the FAA notes that proposed Sec.  91.108 compliments the 
safety belt provisions in Sec. Sec.  91.107 and 135.128. Each of these 
regulations requires individuals to be properly secured in FAA-approved 
safety belts and, if installed, shoulder harnesses during critical 
phases of flight (i.e., movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing). 
Section 91.108 simply allows individuals to release their safety belts 
and shoulder harnesses during the cruise portion of flight if they are 
appropriately harnessed by an SRS and as authorized by the PIC.

D. SRS Design Requirements (Sec.  91.108(c)(1) Through (4))

    As the FAA determined the possible scope of this rulemaking, the 
FAA considered developing certification requirements for SRS. 
Specifically, the FAA considered a requirement that the SRS be 
installed pursuant to an FAA approval or that the SRS be separately 
approved by the FAA. However, the FAA's development of the current LOA 
review process based on the safety concerns identified by the NTSB 
following the Liberty Helicopters' accident has not indicated that a 
physical review of the SRS itself is necessary. In the minutes before 
the Liberty Helicopters accident, the passengers disconnected their 
FAA-approved lap belts and shoulder harnesses and moved about the 
helicopter's interior, secured only by their SRS, which kept them 
secured within the opened door cabin. The SRS does not need to meet 
restraint crashworthiness standards because it is intended as a fall 
protective device, and the proposed rule requires the use of restraints 
installed pursuant to an FAA approval during critical phases of flight 
only. For these reasons, the FAA determined that requiring that the SRS 
be installed pursuant to an FAA approval based on a new set of 
certification standards would create an unnecessary burden when the 
approach in this proposed rule would achieve the safety objectives.
    The SRS is intended as a fall protective device and not as a 
crashworthy restraint as mentioned previously. The FAA is aware that 
standards currently exist that ensure SRS component materials will 
maintain their integrity and efficacy when used during cruise phases of 
flight. For instance, the FAA determined that components that meet 
National Fire Protection Association, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, or American Society for Testing and Materials standards 
are adequate to prevent an individual using the SRS from falling out of 
an aircraft being operated with doors opened or removed. Although these 
standards help ensure an SRS provides adequate fall protection, they do 
not address whether a particular SRS is designed and operated in a way 
that ensures the ability to rapidly egress from an aircraft during an 
emergency. Therefore, this proposed rule does not recommend or require 
one standard over another.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Design characteristics of some manufactured devices might 
not meet the rigorous and necessary safety requirements that would 
allow for rapid egress in an aircraft emergency. For example, a fall 
arrest harness which meets its appropriate standard would be able to 
safely bear the occupant's weight and prevent a fall. However, it 
still could entangle the occupant and would not be permissible under 
this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule would establish minimum requirements for the 
utilization of an SRS to ensure that each SRS has an appropriately 
designed harness and lanyard, as well as an appropriately designed 
release mechanism that can be released quickly, and will not impede 
egress in an emergency. Specifically, these minimum requirements 
include a quick release mechanism that must be operated without the use 
of a cutting tool, any other tool, or the assistance of another person, 
and require that the device, when released, does not impede egress from 
the aircraft as described in section IV, D, 2 below.
    This proposed rule would also allow operators flexibility in 
determining which make or model of SRS to permit for their operations, 
as long as the SRS meets the requirements in the proposed rule. 
Moreover, the proposed performance-based design requirements would 
allow innovation in design and manufacturing for manufacturers to 
develop new SRS components to meet aviation-specific needs. Each SRS 
design requirement is discussed in more detail below.
1. Harness and Lanyard (Sec.  91.108(c)(1) and (2))
    The FAA proposes that each SRS have a harness that secures around 
the individual's torso and a lanyard that connects the harness to an 
airframe attachment point or points, ensuring that the individual's 
torso remains inside the aircraft. An SRS consists of two components: a 
body harness secured around a person's torso; and a lanyard that 
connects to the harness and to an airframe attachment point in the 
aircraft that is not within the flightdeck. The harness is attached to 
a lanyard through the use of a quick release mechanism. As proposed, an 
SRS lanyard would be required to meet specific criteria to ensure the 
safety of the occupant using the SRS. This proposed rule would require 
the lanyard's length ensures the person's torso remains inside the 
aircraft at all times to prevent the person from becoming human 
external cargo and, thus, an external load. Pursuant to the definition 
in 14 CFR 1.1, an external load means a load that is carried, or 
extends, outside of the aircraft fuselage. The pertinent regulations 
for human and nonhuman external cargo, which pertain to any load that 
is carried, or extends outside a rotorcraft, are found in part 133.
    An SRS must comply with the provisions of proposed Sec.  91.108 and 
is distinct from child restraints approved for use on aircraft, as 
described in Sec. Sec.  91.107 and 135.128. A child restraint system 
does not have a body harness secured around a person's torso, and it is 
not connected to an airframe attachment point in the aircraft by a 
lanyard. In the United States, federal regulations for child restraint 
systems use on aircraft are governed by Federal Motor Vehicles Safety 
Standard (FMVSS) No. 213, which ensures that child restraint systems 
for aircraft use not only are crashworthy in a typical motor vehicle 
frontal crash scenario, but also must pass an inversion test to ensure 
the occupant is contained in the event an aircraft encounters 
turbulence.\36\ In contrast to an SRS, the characteristics of a child 
restraint system meeting the criteria of FMVSS No. 213 include that the 
child restraint system should have a solid back and seat, internal 
restraint straps installed to securely hold the child in the device, 
and a label showing approval for aviation use.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ 49 CFR 571.213 S8.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Impede Egress in an Emergency After Being Released (Sec.  
91.108(c)(3))
    The FAA proposes that an SRS must not impede egress from the 
aircraft during an emergency after being released. The use of an SRS 
may complicate the emergency egress of passengers. This could occur if 
an SRS is used in conjunction with a corded headset, for instance, or 
when multiple SRS users' lanyards are attached to

[[Page 81005]]

multiple securement points in the cabin. It could also occur if an SRS 
requires the user to exit the aircraft while using the harness with the 
lanyard attached to it, which could cause a tripping hazard or 
interfere with the ability of any other person on the aircraft to 
evacuate in an emergency. Even though the user may be able to 
disconnect themselves from the aircraft while still using the harness 
with the lanyard attached, this configuration would not meet the 
regulation since the lanyard could become entangled and impede egress 
from the aircraft. A retractable lanyard, however, that would not 
become entangled or impede egress would comply with the proposed 
requirement.
3. Quick Release Requirements (Sec.  91.108(c)(4))
    The FAA proposes to require that each SRS have a release mechanism 
that the individual using the SRS can operate quickly with minimal 
difficulty and without impeding egress from the aircraft in an 
emergency. This is important because emergency evacuation conditions 
may include an environment where egress is already difficult due to 
smoke, fire, or water.
    This proposed rule would require the quick release mechanism to be 
located on the front or side of the harness, in a location easily 
accessible to, and visible by, the individual using the SRS. This 
release could work in several ways. A mechanism located on the front or 
side of the harness that releases the harness from the lanyard, 
allowing the individual to egress from the aircraft while continuing to 
wear the harness, would fulfill this proposed requirement. Similarly, a 
mechanism located on the front or side of the harness that releases the 
harness from the individual's torso, allowing the individual to egress 
the aircraft while leaving the entire SRS behind, would also comply 
with the proposed requirement.
    Although the release mechanism of the SRS must be able to be 
operated quickly with minimal difficulty, it must also prevent 
inadvertent release while in use. The proposed term ``inadvertent 
release'' means unintentional activation of the quick release system. 
Complying with this standard could consist of having a dual actuation 
device, which is a sequential control that requires two distinct 
actions in series for actuation. For example, an operator may use 
protective covers or flaps that a person must open or remove prior to 
operating the release mechanism. Another example would be a release 
mechanism of the SRS that could include a press-gate carabiner that 
requires two distinct actions.
    Additionally, the FAA is aware of certain buckles that cannot be 
opened when under load, such as could occur when the user is upside 
down or sideways following an accident. Although this feature would 
prevent inadvertent release, this feature would not meet the 
requirement to allow the release mechanism to be operated quickly with 
minimal difficulty if rapid egress from the aircraft were required.
    Additionally, this proposed rule would require that the quick 
release mechanism be capable of release without the use of a knife, any 
additional tool, or the assistance of any other individual to cut or 
release the SRS. In the Liberty Helicopters accident, passengers used 
harnesses that included interconnected shoulder straps and leg straps, 
a chest strap that spanned the two front shoulder straps, and a dorsal 
D-ring (used on the accident flight for attaching a tether) between the 
wearer's upper shoulder blades. NYONair attached a pouch containing an 
emergency cutting tool on either the right or left upper shoulder strap 
of each harness.\37\ The dorsal D-ring on each passenger's harness was 
secured with a locking carabiner to a tether, which consisted of 
several loops of 11 mm webbing of varying lengths (manufactured by a 
climbing-gear supplier). The other end of each tether was secured to a 
cabin anchor point with a second locking carabiner.\38\ First 
responders reported that they found the passengers strapped in the 
cabin, and they had to cut various straps to free them. Part of one 
passenger's harness was found in the helicopter with the D-ring secured 
to the tether (and the tether secured to the cabin floor fitting) with 
locking carabiners. The NTSB inspected portions of two harnesses and 
found that one had a pouch attached that contained a cutting tool; the 
other had a pouch attached, but no cutting tool was present. Post-
accident examination of a harness removed from another passenger 
revealed a cutting tool contained inside a pouch attached to the front 
of the left shoulder strap.\39\ A ceiling-mounted camera in the 
helicopter captured video and audio information of emergency egress-
related events. It showed that, despite receiving instruction on how to 
remove or cut their harnesses, the passengers were unable to release 
themselves.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and 
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON 
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019. 
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf at page 18.
    \38\ Id. at 19.
    \39\ Id. at 21.
    \40\ See id. at 28-29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NTSB found that minimally trained passengers would have great 
difficulty extricating themselves from the harness/tether system, each 
of which was equipped with locking carabiners and an ineffective 
cutting tool, during an emergency requiring a rapid egress. 
Additionally, the NTSB concluded that Liberty's ``. . . decision to use 
locking carabiners and ineffective cutting tools as the primary means 
for passengers to rapidly release from the harness/tether system was 
inappropriate and unsafe.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ Id. at xii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In an emergency, rapid egress from the aircraft is essential. 
Passengers who have never used a cutting tool, or who don't pay 
attention to a safety briefing or take it seriously, could have 
difficulty using a tool to cut themselves from an SRS, especially in an 
environment that may include smoke, fire, or water. They could forget 
where the tool is located on the harness or have difficulty in removing 
the tool from the storage pouch. Also, they could drop the tool, 
rendering it useless. Relying on another person to assist in detachment 
could also be ineffectual if that person becomes injured or 
unresponsive in an emergency and cannot help.

E. Who May Provide the SRS (Sec.  91.108(d))

    The FAA proposes to allow an operator or an individual to provide 
an SRS for use during a flight. In some cases, an individual (e.g., 
professional photographer, fire suppression technician, wildlife net 
gunner) may own their own SRS and want to use it on different 
operators' aircraft. In other cases, the operator or PIC will provide 
the SRS to individuals who seek to use SRS during the flight. For an 
individual providing their own SRS, the FAA proposes that they must 
confirm with the PIC, either verbally or in writing, as determined by 
the PIC, the system's continued serviceability and readiness for its 
intended purposes. One way an individual providing their own SRS can 
meet this requirement is by ensuring the SRS is inspected and 
maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions.
    In addition, the proposed rule would require that each individual 
providing their own SRS comply with the sizing criteria for which the 
SRS is rated. This requirement would ensure that the SRS is properly 
sized for the individual using the SRS. The manufacturer's sizing 
criteria may include different

[[Page 81006]]

measurements such as height, weight, chest circumference, or other 
specified sizing criteria. Requiring that the SRS be used within the 
limitations for which the SRS is rated will help ensure safe and 
appropriate use of the system.\42\ This requirement supplements an SRS 
operational requirement in section IV.F.3., below, stating that the SRS 
must fit the individual using it based on the sizing criteria for which 
the SRS is rated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ For similar requirements imposed on the PIC regarding the 
SRS's continued serviceability and sizing criteria, see section IV.G 
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. SRS Operational Requirements (Sec.  91.108(e)(1) and (2))

    As discussed in more detail below, the FAA proposes specific SRS 
operational requirements to help ensure individuals are using the SRS 
safely and appropriately.
1. Airframe Attachment Points (Sec.  91.108(e)(1)(i))
    This proposed rule would require a qualified person designated by 
the operator to connect each SRS lanyard to an airframe attachment 
point or points with a rated strength equal to or greater than the 
total weight of the occupant (or the combined weight if there is more 
than one occupant attached to an attachment point).\43\ There is no 
requirement for a specific number of attachment points. The number and 
location vary by each aircraft type design. Attachment points in the 
cabin may be existing hard points, with weight capabilities documented 
on existing placards or in appropriate aircraft flight manuals. If 
multiple harnesses are attached to a single location, the proposed rule 
requires the attachment point to be rated at a strength equal to or 
greater than the total combined weight of the occupants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ The weight limits for aircraft attachment points are 
placarded within the aircraft, and the aircraft weight and center of 
gravity limitations are outlined in the aircraft flight manual. 
Under Sec.  91.103 (Preflight action), prior to flight, each pilot 
is responsible for being familiar with pertinent information 
concerning the flight--that typically includes information outlined 
in the aircraft flight manual. In addition, Sec.  91.9 (Civil 
aircraft flight manual, marking, and placard requirements) requires 
persons to comply with the operating limitations specified in the 
approved aircraft flight manual. Consequently, it is the PIC's 
responsibility to ensure that all occupants on board meet the 
attachment point limitations outlined for that aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All aircraft are designed for both emergency landing conditions and 
all flight loads. The FAA is not proposing that an SRS be designed or 
intended for restraining an occupant in an emergency landing condition 
because the FAA expects occupants to be in an FAA-approved seat with 
the seat belt fastened prior to an emergency landing. Therefore, the 
FAA is not proposing that SRS be subject to the emergency landing load 
factors applicable to the FAA-approved seats and seatbelts. SRS are 
designed to keep an individual inside the aircraft, while approved 
seats and seatbelts are designed for emergency landing conditions. The 
proposed rule would require each airframe attachment point used for the 
attachment of SRS to have a rated strength equal to or greater than the 
total weight of each occupant (or the combined weight if there is more 
than one occupant attached to an attachment point). This proposed 
requirement regarding airframe attachment point(s) would ensure that 
the attachment point has adequate strength under all flight conditions.
2. SRS Attachment Location (Sec.  91.108(e)(1)(ii))
    The FAA proposes that no SRS may be connected to any airframe 
attachment point located in the flightdeck. During the Liberty 
Helicopters accident flight, the front passenger, who was facing 
outboard in his seat with his legs outside the helicopter, leaned back 
several times to take photographs using a smartphone. The onboard video 
showed that, each time he leaned back, the tail of the tether attached 
to the back of his harness hung down loosely near the helicopter's 
floor-mounted controls. At one point, when he pulled himself up to 
adjust his seating position, the tail of his tether remained taut but 
appeared to pop upward. Two seconds later, the helicopter's engine 
sounds decreased, and the helicopter began to descend. The pilot 
reported that when he reached down for the emergency fuel shutoff 
lever, he realized that it was in the off position. He also noted that 
a portion of the front seat passenger's tether was underneath the 
lever.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During its investigation of the Liberty Helicopters accident, the 
NTSB evaluated the certification basis for the accident helicopter's 
fuel shutoff lever, which did not require protection from inadvertent 
activation due to external influences, such as interference from a 
passenger.\45\ The NTSB found that the tail of the front passenger's 
tether caught on the fuel shutoff lever during the flight, which 
resulted in the inadvertent activation of the fuel shutoff lever, 
interruption of fuel flow to the engine, and loss of engine power.\46\ 
The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident was Liberty 
Helicopters' use of a NYONair-provided passenger harness/tether system, 
which caught on and activated the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff 
lever and resulted in the in-flight loss of engine power and the 
subsequent ditching.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Id. at ix.
    \46\ Id. at xii.
    \47\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the FAA developed this NPRM, it considered previous accidents 
and incidents in addition to the Liberty Helicopters accident that 
involved inadvertent operation of flight controls. Reports from these 
incidents indicate in each that a passenger inadvertently manipulated 
controls (e.g., fuel flow control lever) in the flightdeck. For 
example, on April 4, 1994, an A[eacute]rospatiale AS 350B Ecureuil air 
ambulance crashed in Alberta, Canada, following loss of engine power. 
After an investigation, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada 
issued its final report, Engine Failure, Hard Landing, Turbowest 
Helicopters Limited, Aerospatiale AS350B Astar (Helicopter) C=FHBG, 
High Prairie, Alberta, 62nm NE, 04 April 1994.\48\ The report stated 
that a strap from a knapsack got caught on the fuel control lever and 
moved it out of the ``flight'' position resulting in fuel starvation to 
the engine, a total loss of engine power, and low rotor revolutions per 
minute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Engine Failure, Hard Landing, Turbowest Helicopters 
Limited, Aerospatiale AS350B Astar (Helicopter) C=FHBG, High 
Prairie, Alberta, 62nm NE, 04 April 1994, Report Number A94W0037 
(Gatineau, Quebec, Canada: Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 
1994) accessed at http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1994/a94w0037/a94w0037.pdf on June 24, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 13, 1996, an A[eacute]rospatiale AS 350B1 Ecureuil, 
under contract to carry out a number of flights in connection with the 
filming of scenes for a feature film, crashed in Greenland following 
loss of engine power, killing the single passenger/photographer and 
seriously injuring the pilot. Following completion of its 
investigation, the Danish Accident Investigation Board (AAIB) opined 
that during movements in and around the lefthand seat, while 
troubleshooting problems with his photographic equipment, the 
photographer may unintentionally have pushed the fuel control lever 
toward idle/shut down. During its investigation, the Danish AAIB became 
aware of an almost identical incident that happened in 1993. The 
mission was also photography, and the straps of the photography 
equipment became caught in the fuel control lever and moved it toward 
the idle position, resulting in the loss of engine power. The pilot was 
able to restart the engine and landed the helicopter normally.

[[Page 81007]]

    On April 15, 2008, a Eurocopter AS350B2 helicopter crashed 34 miles 
east of Chickaloon, Alaska, killing the pilot and three passengers and 
seriously injuring one passenger. The NTSB determined that the probable 
cause of the accident was the loss of engine power due to an overspeed 
of the helicopter's turbine engine, precipitated by the inadvertent 
movement of the fuel flow control lever by a passenger in the front 
seat. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to properly 
secure or stow the passenger's backpack. During its investigation, the 
NTSB interviewed two large helicopter operators, Era and Eurocopter, 
about incidents of passengers interfering with floor-mounted engine 
controls on helicopters--specifically, the fuel flow control lever. 
Both operators informed the NTSB that they had anecdotal information 
about passengers placing items such as purses and camera bags on the 
floor-mounted engine controls. The operators also mentioned incidents 
of bag straps snagging on the fuel and other control levers.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ NTSB Accident Number ANC08FA053, released 2/17/2010, 
available at: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=67841.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The airworthiness standards for 14 CFR 23.2600, 25.1143(e), 
27.1143(d), and 29.1143(e) \50\ require that flight and engine controls 
not be subject to inadvertent operation. This requirement is based on 
the assumption that only crewmembers and/or pilots will interact with 
the aircraft controls. When the FAA codified these airworthiness 
standards, the FAA did not anticipate crewmembers or passengers in the 
flightdeck would be attached to or carry equipment that is not part of 
the approved type design that could snag on controls. Generally, flight 
manual procedures \51\ require that all items be secured prior to 
flight. These procedures reinforce the assumptions made when the 
airworthiness standards were codified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ The airworthiness standards in parts 23, 25, 27, and 29 are 
organized by aircraft category. Part 23 applies to normal category 
airplanes; part 25 applies to transport category airplanes; part 27 
applies to normal category rotorcraft; and part 29 applies to 
transport category rotorcraft.
    \51\ See Sec.  91.9 (Civil aircraft flight manual, marking, and 
placard requirements) requiring persons to comply with the operating 
limitations specified in the approved aircraft flight manual; see 
also Sec.  21.5 (Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual) requiring the 
aircraft flight manual to contain the operating limitations and 
other information required by applicable regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule would prohibit any person who occupies a seat in 
the flightdeck from using an SRS. In addition, this proposed rule would 
require an SRS to be connected to an aircraft attaching point or points 
that are not in the flightdeck. These proposed limitations would 
prevent inadvertent operation of the flight controls, as was 
experienced by the crew and passengers of the Liberty Helicopters 
accident flight. The operator would be responsible for ensuring that 
both of these requirements are met.
3. Sizing Criteria (Sec.  91.108(e)(2))
    This proposed rule would also require that the SRS fit the 
individual using it based on the sizing criteria for which the SRS is 
rated. As discussed above in section IV.E (``Who May Provide the 
SRS''), sizing criteria may include different measurements such as 
height, weight, chest circumference, or other specified sizing 
criteria. For example, SRS size requirements may be listed as small, 
medium, and large; however, the size may actually be based on a 
combination of height and weight. To illustrate, a ``small'' SRS may 
have minimum criteria of 4 feet 10 inches in height and a weight of 100 
pounds and a maximum of 6 feet in height and 170 pounds. Requiring that 
the SRS fit the individual using it will help ensure safe and 
appropriate use of the system. This requirement is supplemented by the 
additional requirements under Sec.  91.108(d)(2) and (f)(3) found in 
Sections IV.E. and IV.G, respectively.

G. Pilot in Command (Sec.  91.108(f)(1) Through (5))

    In accordance with Sec.  91.3(a), the PIC of an aircraft is 
directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the 
operation of that aircraft. As a result, this proposed rule imposes 
several responsibilities on the PIC.
    First, the FAA proposes that regardless of who provides the SRS, 
the PIC has the overall responsibility to ensure that the SRS meets the 
requirements of proposed Sec.  91.108. As the final authority of the 
aircraft operation, the PIC is best suited to make this determination. 
In addition, the FAA proposes that if the SRS does not meet the 
requirements outlined in Sec.  91.108, the PIC must not permit the 
individual to use the SRS. For example, if the PIC determines that an 
SRS is not safe for continued use or that an individual does not meet 
the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated (if the operator or PIC 
provided the SRS), the PIC must not permit the individual to use that 
SRS.
    Second, for any SRS provided by either the operator or the PIC, the 
FAA proposes that the PIC must ensure the SRS's continued 
serviceability and readiness for its intended purpose. As discussed in 
the section pertaining to individuals providing their own SRS, this 
requirement may be met by inspecting and maintaining the SRS in 
accordance with the SRS manufacturer's instructions. Ensuring the SRS 
is serviceable and ready for its intended purpose will help ensure the 
SRS is safe for continued use.
    Third, the FAA proposes that the PIC may only permit an individual 
to use an SRS that is provided by either the operator or the PIC if 
that individual complies with the sizing criteria for which the SRS is 
rated. As discussed in sections IV.E (``Who May Provide the SRS'') and 
IV.F.3 (``Sizing Criteria''), a manufacturer's sizing criteria may 
include different measurements such as height, weight, chest 
circumference, or other specified sizing criteria. This requirement 
would ensure safe and appropriate use of the system and that the SRS is 
properly sized for the individual using the SRS.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ For similar requirements imposed on individuals providing 
their own SRS, regarding the SRS's continued serviceability and use 
limitations, see section IV.E above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, the FAA proposes that the PIC has final authority regarding 
whether the SRS may be used during flight operations. If the PIC 
determines an individual should not use an SRS during an operation, the 
PIC may prohibit use of the SRS. This stipulation is in addition to the 
PIC's obligation to prohibit the use of an SRS if it does not meet the 
requirements in Sec.  91.108. For example, the PIC may determine that 
aircraft operations, outside the requirements of Sec.  91.108, render 
conditions unsafe to use an SRS. In that case, the PIC may prohibit 
individuals from using the SRS during the flight.
    Finally, the FAA proposes that the PIC has final authority to 
authorize an individual to release the FAA-approved safety belt and, if 
installed, shoulder harness and remain secured only by the supplemental 
restraint system. The PIC is in the best position to determine when 
appropriate flight conditions exist so as to allow individuals to move 
about the aircraft using only an SRS.

H. Enhanced Passenger Briefing and Demonstration (Sec.  91.108 (g) and 
(h))

1. Passenger Briefing (Sec.  91.108(g)(1) and (2))
    The FAA proposes to require a passenger briefing on how to use SRS 
during a flight. Existing regulations require operators to provide all 
passengers a safety briefing prior to departure. When a passenger 
onboard an aircraft will use an SRS, the rule as proposed requires that 
passenger to receive additional information in an enhanced safety 
briefing. In addition, any passenger using an SRS provided by

[[Page 81008]]

either the operator or PIC would have to demonstrate the ability to 
occupy, secure, and release the FAA-approved seat belts and, if 
installed, shoulder harnesses, as well as the ability to release 
quickly the SRS with no assistance and with minimal difficulty. 
Individuals providing their own SRS do not have to meet this specific 
requirement, but they must still meet the other briefing requirements, 
and they must meet the demonstration requirements under Sec.  
91.108(h), as discussed in Section IV.H.2, below. Therefore, under the 
proposed requirements, in addition to the standard briefing 
requirements codified at Sec. Sec.  91.107, 91.519, 91.1035, and 
135.117, an operator or PIC conducting operations that involve the use 
of SRS would provide an enhanced briefing prior to the flight to all 
passengers using an SRS during the flight.
    This proposed rule would require the enhanced safety briefing to 
include information about the proper use, securing, and releasing of 
the SRS and the means of direct communication among crewmembers and 
passengers during normal and emergency operating procedures. This 
proposed rule would require the provision of information about use of 
any headset and intercom systems, how a passenger will be notified of 
an event requiring action, including emergencies, egress procedures, 
and other unforeseen circumstances, and how crewmembers would notify 
the passenger that they can release the FAA-approved seat belt and, if 
installed, shoulder harness and move within the aircraft using the SRS. 
The briefing would also describe how a passenger will be notified when 
to return to their seat and secure the FAA-approved seat belt and, if 
installed, shoulder harness, and when to notify the pilot of safety 
concerns. Each such aspect of this proposed briefing requirement is 
important because it provides the individual with additional 
information specific to the unique characteristics of using an SRS 
during normal and emergency flight operations that would enhance the 
individual's safety. The proposed briefing helps inform the individual 
SRS user of the behavioral expectations during the flight and may 
provoke clarifying dialogue, if necessary, that ensures the individual 
understands these expectations. These elements are critical to ensuring 
the safety of the operation.
    Finally, to ensure clarity between the existing passenger briefing 
requirements outlined under Sec. Sec.  135.117 and 136.7 and the 
passenger briefing requirements in this proposed rule, the FAA proposes 
to add a cross-reference to Sec.  91.108 in those sections. Adding this 
cross-reference will help ensure that the proposed briefing 
requirements in Sec.  91.108 are not overlooked when considering the 
other passenger briefing requirements in Sec. Sec.  135.117 and 136.7.
2. Passenger Demonstration (Sec.  91.108(h)(1) and (2))
    After receiving this enhanced briefing, prior to ground movement of 
the aircraft, this proposed rule would require all passengers using an 
SRS to demonstrate their comprehension of the information presented in 
the briefing. To this end, the proposed rule requires all passengers 
using an SRS to demonstrate to the operator their ability to occupy, 
secure, and release the FAA-approved seat belts and, if installed, 
shoulder harnesses, as well as their ability to release the SRS quickly 
without assistance and with minimal difficulty. As noted in the 
proposed regulatory requirements, the passenger must demonstrate their 
ability to accomplish all actions required for quick release of the SRS 
with no assistance, regardless of whether the individual will use the 
individual's own SRS or will use an SRS the operator provides.
    The proposed requirement for the user of the SRS to demonstrate the 
ability to occupy, secure, and release the FAA-approved seat belts and, 
if installed, shoulder harnesses would ensure that, in an inflight 
emergency while using SRS at low altitude, the individual can quickly 
re-secure themself with the FAA-approved seat belt and, if installed, 
shoulder harness. It would also establish that the individual can 
accomplish all actions required for quick release of the SRS without 
assistance to egress the aircraft in case of an emergency.

I. Individuals Not Permitted To Use SRS (Sec.  91.108(i)(1) Through 
(4))

    During operations when SRS are in use, there might be instances 
when not all individuals are using an SRS, either by choice or because 
they do not meet the requirements of the proposed rule. This would 
include, but is not limited to, any passenger who is unable to 
demonstrate that the individual is able to occupy, secure, and release 
the FAA-approved seat belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, or 
release quickly the SRS with no assistance and with minimal difficulty. 
Passengers under the age of 15, individuals occupying a seat in the 
flightdeck, and passengers occupying or using an approved child 
restraint system are not permitted to use an SRS.
1. Individuals Unable To Meet the Demonstration Requirements of the 
Enhanced Safety Briefing (Sec.  91.108(i)(1))
    If an individual cannot demonstrate that they are able to occupy, 
secure, and release the FAA-approved seat belt and, if installed, 
shoulder harness, and able to release quickly the SRS with no 
assistance and with minimal difficulty, this proposed rule would 
prohibit the individual from occupying or using an SRS during the 
flight. The individual must remain secured in their FAA-approved seat 
belt and, if installed, shoulder harness for the entire flight.
2. Individuals Under the Age of 15 (Sec.  91.108(i)(2))
    The FAA is proposing that an individual may not use an SRS during 
operations unless the individual has reached their fifteenth birthday. 
In determining this proposal, the FAA referred to the ``Exit Row 
Seating'' final rule,\53\ which evaluated various criteria to determine 
individuals who are capable of performing certain functions during an 
emergency. As explained below, limiting the age to 15 or older for 
those who use an SRS helps maximize the chances of survival for the 
user should an emergency evacuation occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ See Exit Row Seating, Final Rule, 55 FR 8054, 8066 (Mar. 6, 
1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the ``Exit Row Seating'' final rule, many children 
do not have the skills or capabilities necessary to perform the 
required functions of an emergency evacuation from an aircraft and 
would likely require the assistance of an adult during an 
emergency.\54\ The same is true for children using SRS. It is likely a 
child would need assistance in releasing from the SRS in order to 
egress the aircraft safely and quickly during an emergency. Similarly, 
it is likely that some children, due to their age and/or size, would 
not have the cognitive or physical ability to safely release from an 
SRS during an emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has stated that it is difficult to establish a clear cut-
off point between childhood and adolescence when individuals may be 
more capable of handling emergency situations.\55\ Notwithstanding, a 
number of existing laws, regulations, and practices point to the age of 
15 as a turning point into adulthood. For example, in many states it is 
the age when driver's licenses and

[[Page 81009]]

work permits become available.\56\ After considering several options 
for an age requirement to use an SRS, the FAA determined that the 
reasoning in the ``Exit Row Seating'' final rule applies in this 
proposed rule. Fifteen is an objective criterion that will enable 
operators to comply with clear SRS requirements. Moreover, most 
children at that age can accomplish the functions required to release 
from an SRS safely and quickly during an emergency. The FAA has 
determined that individuals who have reached this age are less likely 
to need assistance from an adult during an emergency. Consequently, the 
FAA proposes that passengers under the age of 15 are prohibited from 
using an SRS and must occupy either an approved seat or berth with a 
safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, or an approved child 
restraint system that complies with Sec.  91.107(a)(3)(iii) or Sec.  
135.128(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Id. (discussing various dictionary definitions of 
``child.'') In the Exit Row Seating NPRM, the FAA did not propose a 
specific age limit, but one commenter requested a defined age to 
facilitate the operators' abilities to establish objective criteria. 
Exit Row Seating, NPRM, 54 FR 10484 (Mar. 13, 1989).
    \56\ 55 FR 8066.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Individuals Seated in the Flightdeck (Sec.  91.108(i)(3))
    This proposed rule would prohibit individuals using an SRS from 
sitting in the flightdeck. As discussed in section IV.F.3 of this 
preamble, this proposed prohibition is based on a review of past 
accidents and incidents where unsecured items, including those with 
straps and lanyards, have a history of interfering with flight and 
engine controls. In the Liberty Helicopters accident, a tether caught 
on and activated the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff lever, resulting 
in the in-flight loss of engine power and subsequent ditching.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and 
Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON 
Doors-Off Flight, Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 
York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, December 10, 2019. 
Available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described above, airworthiness standards codified at 14 CFR 
parts 23, 25, 27 and 29 require that flight and engine controls not be 
subject to inadvertent operation. These standards do not address 
circumstances when carry-on objects, tethers, or straps would 
inadvertently move a control. Consequently, crewmembers or passengers 
in the flightdeck should not be attached to or carry equipment that 
could snag on controls.
4. Passengers Who Occupy or Use an Approved Child Restraint System 
(Sec.  91.108(i)(4))
    The FAA proposes to prohibit anyone occupying or using a child 
restraint system from also using an SRS. Current regulations under 14 
CFR parts 91, 121, 125, and 135 allow a child, who by definition is any 
individual under 18 years of age, to occupy or use an FAA-approved 
child restraint system, provided certain conditions exist, including 
that the child is accompanied by a parent, guardian, or attendant 
designated by the child's parent or guardian to attend to the safety of 
the child during the flight.\58\ As a result, there may be 
circumstances where an individual occupying an approved child restraint 
system is 15 years old or older and is otherwise eligible to use an 
SRS. As explained in more detail below, an SRS may not be used by an 
individual occupying a child restraint system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See Sec.  91.107 Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, 
and child restraint systems, Sec.  135.128 Use of safety belts and 
child restraint systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The use of a child restraint system is incompatible with the use of 
an SRS. As described above, this proposed rule would require each SRS 
to consist of a body harness secured around the torso of the individual 
using the SRS and a lanyard that connects the body harness to an 
airframe attachment point inside the aircraft. The SRS would have a 
release mechanism that the individual can quickly operate with minimal 
difficulty and without impeding egress from the aircraft in an 
emergency. Additionally, the release mechanism cannot require the 
assistance of any other individual to release the SRS. It is illogical 
to permit a child who occupies a child restraint system, and who must 
be accompanied by a parent, guardian, or attendant tasked to attend to 
the safety of the child during the flight, to be permitted to also use 
an SRS. Therefore, this proposed rule would prohibit all individuals 
occupying or using a child restraint system from also using an SRS. The 
FAA notes that this proposed rule permits the use of an approved child 
restraint system on a flight where the doors are opened or removed as 
long as the child restraint system is properly secured to an approved 
seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, 
and complies with Sec.  91.107(a)(3)(iii) (for part 91 operations) or 
Sec.  135.128(a)(2) (for part 135 operations).

J. Lap-Held Child (Sec.  91.108(j)(1) and (2))

    The proposed rule would prohibit a child who has not reached their 
second birthday from being held by an adult during civil aircraft 
operations when the adult uses an SRS or during any operation in which 
the doors are opened or removed. Specifically, the proposed rule would 
prohibit a child from being held by an adult using an SRS during civil 
aircraft operations even when the aircraft doors are not opened or 
removed. The intent of using an SRS is to provide support to the user 
when they are out of their required safety belt and, if installed, 
shoulder harness. Unexpected turbulence can cause an airplane to 
suddenly jolt, possibly injuring passengers who are not restrained. If 
turbulence occurs when the SRS user is not secured by a safety belt, 
they would require the use of their hands to steady themselves or to 
hold onto an aircraft seat or structure to prevent themselves from 
falling, particularly if they are out of their seat. Holding a lap 
child would prevent the SRS user from being able to use their hands to 
steady themselves or to grasp onto something if necessary. Further, in 
the event of an emergency, time is critical. Using an SRS requires 
additional steps to release. Holding a lap child while trying to 
quickly release the SRS and the required safety belt and, if installed, 
shoulder harness, could cause the SRS user additional time to evacuate 
the aircraft.
    In addition, this rule would prohibit a lap-held child during 
operations where the aircraft doors are opened or removed. As currently 
permitted by Sec. Sec.  91.107 and 135.128, a child who has not reached 
their second birthday may be held by an adult who occupies an approved 
seat or berth. However, it is contrary to this proposed rule, the 
intent of which is to mitigate risks to all occupants during operations 
conducted anytime an SRS is in use, to permit a child to remain 
unrestrained during all phases of flight, including during movement on 
the surface, takeoff, and landing, when the aircraft doors are opened 
or removed. During an operation with doors opened or removed, a lap-
held child would be at high risk of falling out of the aircraft--an 
unacceptable risk this rule seeks to prevent.
    For the above reasons, the FAA proposes that lap-held children may 
not be held by anyone using an SRS, regardless of whether the doors are 
opened or removed, and they are not permitted on flights where the 
doors are opened or removed.
    Finally, to ensure clarity between the lap-held child permissions 
outlined under Sec. Sec.  91.107 and 135.128 and the lap-held child 
restrictions in this proposed rule, the FAA proposes to add a cross-
reference to Sec.  91.108 in those sections. Adding this cross-
reference will help ensure that proposed Sec.  91.108 is not overlooked 
when considering whether lap-held children are permitted on a flight.

[[Page 81010]]

K. Excluded Operations (Sec.  91.108(k)(1) Through (3))

    The FAA determined that this proposed rule should not apply to 
certain other regulations if the rule would otherwise conflict with the 
intent of those regulations. As a result, this proposed rule would not 
apply to operations conducted under part 105, Parachute Operations, nor 
would it apply to the persons described in Sec.  91.107(a)(3)(ii), 
which allows person(s) on board an aircraft for the purpose of engaging 
in sport parachuting to use the floor of the aircraft as a seat.
    Additionally, this proposed rule would not apply to rotorcraft 
external-load operations conducted under part 133. Title 14 CFR 1.1 
defines external load as a load that is carried, or extends, outside of 
the aircraft fuselage. Section 133.11(a) states that no person subject 
to part 133 may conduct rotorcraft external-load operations within the 
United States without, or in violation of the terms of, a Rotorcraft 
External-Load Operator Certificate issued by the Administrator under 
Sec.  133.17.
    This proposed rule also would not interfere with or contradict the 
requirements of Sec.  91.105, Flight crewmembers at stations, or Sec.  
135.171, Shoulder harness installation at flight crewmember stations. 
As proposed, the regulation would allow an operator to conduct a flight 
with doors opened or removed under Sec.  91.108(b)(1) even if there are 
flight crewmembers on board who are subject to the requirements of 
Sec. Sec.  91.105 or 135.171 and to the extent that the flight 
crewmembers must unfasten their shoulder harnesses in accordance with 
those sections. Similarly, the FAA proposes that Sec.  91.108(b)(2) not 
apply to any flight crewmembers subject to Sec. Sec.  91.105 or 135.171 
to the extent they need to unfasten their shoulder harnesses in 
accordance with those sections. Sections 91.105 and 135.171 allow a 
flight crewmember to unfasten or not use the installed shoulder harness 
if the crewmember cannot perform the required duties with the shoulder 
harness fastened.
    The proposed SRS rule could inhibit, or otherwise conflict with, 
the aforementioned operations; therefore, the FAA proposes the 
aforementioned exclusions under Sec.  91.108.

L. Definition (Sec.  91.108(l))

    This proposed rule would define an SRS as a device that is not 
installed on the aircraft pursuant to an FAA approval used to secure an 
individual inside an aircraft when that person is not properly secured 
by an FAA-approved seat belt and, if installed, shoulder harness or an 
approved child restraint system.\59\ An SRS consists of a harness 
secured around the torso of the individual using the supplemental 
restraint system and a lanyard that connects the harness to an approved 
airframe attachment point inside the aircraft. Examples of FAA-approved 
devices include (but are not limited to) restraints approved through a 
Type Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, or as an approved 
major alteration using FAA Form 337.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ As explained previously, there may be circumstances where 
an individual occupying an approved child restraint system is 15 
years old or older and is otherwise eligible to use an SRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

M. Additional Comments Invited

    This proposed rule would apply to operations conducted under parts 
91 and 135 and does not include an option for waiving the proposed 
requirements of Sec.  91.108 in accordance with Sec.  91.905, List of 
rules subject to waivers. The FAA cannot envision a scenario in which 
operations conducted with doors opened or removed could occur safely 
without complying with the proposed requirements of Sec.  91.108. The 
FAA seeks input, however, on its proposal that Sec.  91.108 not be 
listed in the rules subject to waivers under Sec.  91.905.

V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    Federal agencies consider impacts of regulatory actions under a 
variety of executive orders and other requirements. First, Executive 
Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563, as amended by Executive Order 
14094 (``Modernizing Regulatory Review''), direct that each federal 
agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) 
requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes 
on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) 
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing 
U.S. standards, this Act requires agencies to consider international 
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of U.S. 
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 
104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs, 
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a 
federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by state, local, or 
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. The 
current threshold after adjustment for inflation is $177 million using 
the most current (2022) Implicit Price Deflator for the Gross Domestic 
Product. The FAA has provided a detailed Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA) in the docket for this rulemaking. This portion of the preamble 
summarizes the FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this proposed 
rule.
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined that this 
proposed rule: (1) has benefits that justify its costs. This rule is 
not a significant regulatory action, as defined in section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866. The proposed rule, if adopted, would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, 
would not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade, and 
would not impose an unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal 
governments, or on the private sector.

A. Summary of the Regulatory Evaluation

    The FAA estimates that for safety benefits to equal or exceed the 
costs of the proposed rule, based on a 20-year analysis, two accidents 
of the same severity as the Liberty Helicopters accident would need to 
be mitigated. The estimated safety benefit in present value, from 
mitigating one part 91 and one part 135 helicopter accident (i.e., an 
accident in year 10 and an accident in year 20 of the analysis period), 
would range from $26.8 million to $40.2 million, at a 7 percent 
discount rate, and $45.4 million to $68.0 million at a 3 percent 
discount rate.
    The cost of the proposed rule to operators, pilots, and passengers 
comes from purchasing harnesses and lanyards that meet specific 
requirements as set forth in this rule, conducting a pre-flight safety 
briefing on the use of the SRS, and requiring passengers to demonstrate 
their ability to remove the SRS in the event of an emergency. The FAA 
would also incur costs for periodic surveillance of parts 91 and 135 
SRS operations. The estimated present value cost to the FAA, over 20 
years, is $1,240 at a 7 percent discount rate and $1,263 at a 3 percent 
discount rate. The estimated present value total cost to industry and 
the FAA, for these requirements, over 20 years, is $22.3 million at a 7 
percent discount rate and $31.7 million at a 3 percent discount rate. 
Estimated safety

[[Page 81011]]

benefits and costs are shown in the table below.

                                                     Table 2--Total Benefits and Costs Over 20 Years
                                                                   [Millions of USD] *
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                 Safety benefits                        Safety benefits
             Provisions                       Affected population          --------------------------    Costs    --------------------------    Costs
                                                                                Low          High                      Low          High
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     .....................................         7 Percent present value
                                                         3 Percent present value
                                                                           -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
91.108--Use of supplemental          Part 91 Operations...................        $17.8        $26.7        $19.4        $26.0        $39.0        $27.5
 restraint systems \60\.             Part 135 Operations..................          9.0         13.6          2.9         19.4         29.0          4.1
                                                                           -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..........................  .....................................         26.8         40.2         22.3         45.4         68.0         31.7
    Annualized.....................  .....................................          2.5          3.8          2.1          3.0          4.6          2.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding.

    In 2018, in response to the Liberty Helicopters accident, the FAA 
issued an Emergency Order of Prohibition, which prohibited the use of 
supplemental passenger restraint systems (SPRS) that cannot be released 
quickly in an emergency in doors-off flight operations. The FAA also 
estimates the cost and benefit of the proposed rule using the Emergency 
Order of Prohibition as the baseline. The FAA estimates that the 
undiscounted cost of the rule, above the Emergency Order of 
Prohibition, is $22.9 million ($11.8 million at 7 percent present 
value, or $16.8 million at 3 percent present value). When annualized, 
at either a 7 percent or 3 percent discount rate, the cost is 
approximately $1.1 million. The costs come entirely from the 
demonstration by passengers of the ability to release the device. The 
FAA considers that a passenger demonstrating the ability to release 
themselves from the device adds to the efficacy of the rule above the 
Emergency Order of Prohibition. However, the FAA is unable to quantify 
the incremental safety benefits gained by the passenger demonstration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ Assumes a part 91 accident occurs in year 10 and a part 135 
accident occurs in year 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Who is potentially affected by this rule?
    This proposed rule would affect all flights with doors opened or 
removed and all operations with individuals on board who choose to use 
an SRS, except for operations conducted under part 105, Parachute 
Operations, or conducted under part 133, Rotorcraft External-Load 
Operations, and public aircraft operations. The FAA identified the 
following, from Flight Standards' Web-based Operations Safety System 
(June 2021), as the population that could be affected:

                                      Table 3--Potential Affected Operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Number of       Number of       Number of       Number of
                       CFR                           operators      rotorcraft       operators       aircraft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Rotorcraft
                                                            Fixed wing
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
91..............................................             405           1,051             716           1,894
135.............................................             472           2,917           1,728           8,411
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, based on the number of requests for SRS LOAs, the FAA 
narrowed the population to 26 part 91 operators and 40 part 135 
operators over the next 20 years.
    General Assumptions:
     The present value discount rate of three and seven percent 
is used as required by the Office of Management and Budget.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-4 (2003), 
guidance for the development of regulatory analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Period of Analysis: 20 years to capture replacement of an 
SRS occurring every 10 years.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ A sample of harnesses provided for consideration of an SRS 
LOA, such as Yates 363 and 338, have a maximum life span of 10 
years. See Product manuals. available at http://yatesgear.com/en/special-forces-full-body-spie-harness and http://yatesgear.com/en/ars-heli-ops-harness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The estimated average number of passengers per flight is 
between 3 to 5 passengers. The FAA used 4 passengers in the analysis.
     Estimated time to create and update content for enhanced 
passenger safety briefing: \63\ 2 hours per operator. Assume updates 
occur every 10 years to align with the replacement cycle of harnesses 
and lanyards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Part 135--Operating Requirements: Commuter and on-Demand 
Operations and Rules Governing Persons on Board such Aircraft, 
Paperwork Reduction Act Supporting Statement, (OMB No. 2120-0039): 
Sec.  at 8 (Apr. 9, 2019) (estimate of time and volume of operators 
and passenger briefings pursuant to Sec.  135.117, Briefing of 
passengers before flight), available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=86383102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Estimated pilot time to complete enhanced safety briefing: 
\64\ 0.03 hours (2 minutes)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Estimated time for passenger competency demonstration: 
\65\ 0.02 hours (1 minute)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ This estimate is a combination of the time identified in 
the Emergency Order and the FAA's assertion that a passenger will 
need to release the SRS in under a minute to be able to evacuate a 
helicopter in an emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Baseline: There were no requirements for an SRS prior to 2018 when 
the FAA issued Emergency Order of Prohibition No. FAA-2018-0243. Since 
the Emergency Order of Prohibition is temporary, the baseline used in 
this analysis is pre-Emergency Order. However, the Emergency Order 
requires harnesses and lanyards that fulfill the same requirements 
required in the

[[Page 81012]]

proposed rule; therefore, operators already incur the cost of the 
harness and lanyard. Operators would primarily incur the additional 
cost of the passenger demonstration briefing under the proposed rule. 
This is analyzed as a second baseline. The extension of the Emergency 
Order of Prohibition was considered as an alternative, and cost and 
benefits are estimated in the alternative section below.
2. Benefits of This Rule
    Benefits of this rule include preventing future accidents similar 
to the Liberty Helicopters accident. The NTSB final safety report 
identified the probable cause of this accident as Liberty Helicopters' 
use of an SRS system. The SRS caught on and activated the engine fuel 
shutoff lever, located in the flightdeck, and resulted in the loss of 
engine power and the subsequent ditching. That same SRS, worn by 
passengers on that flight, also contributed to the severity of the 
accident by hindering the passengers' quick egress from the aircraft. 
This proposed rule would prohibit use of an SRS in the flightdeck, 
address the inadvertent activation of the fuel shutoff lever, and 
propose SRS requirements that would reduce the likelihood of passengers 
being unable to remove an SRS when needed in an emergency.
    The Liberty Helicopters accident resulted in five fatalities, one 
minor injury, and a substantially damaged aircraft. The analysis 
assumes that another accident of similar magnitude would occur in the 
20-year time horizon. While the SRS operation requirements, passenger 
briefing, and passenger demonstration set forth in the proposed rule 
would have lessened the severity of the accident, the NTSB determined 
the probable cause of the accident to be the inadvertent activation of 
the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff lever by the passenger harness/
tether system.\66\ Prohibiting the use of an SRS in the flightdeck 
would help mitigate the risk factor that initiated the accident. The 
benefits include avoided casualties and aircraft damage. Multiplying 
the five casualties by a value of statistical life (VSL) of $11.6 
million yields a total of $58.0 million as the social cost of these 
fatalities.\67\ The pilot also sustained minor injuries at an avoided 
minor injury rate of $34,800, and the helicopter, an Airbus AS350 B2, 
suffered substantial damage valued at $210,243.\68\ Adding the value of 
avoided casualties, including the pilot's injuries, to aircraft damage 
gives a total potential loss of $58.2 million that enhanced safety 
measures could avert.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ National Transportation Safety Board. (March 11, 2018) 
Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever and Subsequent 
Ditching Liberty Helicopters Inc., Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off 
Flight Airbus Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH (Report No. NTSB/AAR-19/
04 or PB2020-100100). Retrieved from https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf.
    \67\ Departmental Guidance on Valuation of a Statistical Life in 
Economic Analysis, Issued Date: 3/23/2021 https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/revised-departmental-guidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-in-economic-analysis.
    \68\ Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory 
Decisions, A Guide: 2021 Update, Section 5, Table 5-10: General 
Aviation Restoration Costs ($2018). These numbers are adjusted to 
reflect 2020 dollars. https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/benefit_cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention evaluated 
how effective the proposed requirements would be at addressing the NTSB 
urgent safety recommendation and any other factors that may have 
contributed to the Liberty Helicopters accident, previously described 
in section III. of this proposed rule. Based on that assessment, the 
FAA used a range for the effectiveness rate of 0.6 to 0.9.\69\ 
Multiplying the effectiveness rates by the estimated potential loss of 
$58.2 million, mentioned above, yields an estimated range of $34.9 to 
$52.4 million for one averted accident. Assuming an accident occurs 
every 10 years over a 20-year time horizon (i.e., an accident in year 
10 and year 20 of the analysis period), the present value of benefits 
would range from $26.8 million to $40.2 million, at a 7 percent 
discount rate, and $45.4 million to $68.0 million at 3 percent discount 
rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Id. at Appendix A at 61 (stating, High effectiveness--The 
JIMDAT-assigned values in which enhancements that are judged to have 
a ``low'' probability of preventing an accident receive a numerical 
value ranging from 0.1 to 0.4, reflecting a one in ten chance of 
preventing the accident to a 40% chance. Similarly, ``medium'' may 
receive numerical ratings of 0.4 to 0.6 and ``high'' may receive up 
to 0.95).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Costs Relative to Pre-Emergency Order of Prohibition
    This proposed rule would prohibit flight operations with an SRS 
unless the SRS meets specific requirements. Although these requirements 
are being proposed under part 91, they would affect any operation with 
an SRS except for operations conducted under part 105, parachute 
operations, and operations conducted under part 133, Rotorcraft 
External-Load Operations. This subsection examines the costs relative 
to the regulatory environment before the Emergency Order of 
Prohibition, when no rules specifically addressed civil aircraft 
operations conducted with the use of SRS.
    This proposed rule would require the SRS (which would consist of a 
harness and lanyard, at a minimum) to have an accessible front or side 
release mechanism that can be quickly operated with minimal difficulty 
during an emergency. The rule would require the lanyard be connected to 
an aircraft attaching point or points that are not in the flightdeck, 
with a rated strength equal to or greater than the weight of the 
occupant (or the combined weight if there is more than one occupant 
attached to an attachment point), and ensures the torso of the person 
using the SRS remains inside the aircraft at all times. Additionally, 
for operations with doors opened or removed, each person would need to 
occupy an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if installed, 
shoulder harness, properly secured about the individual during all 
phases of flight; or occupy an approved seat or berth with a safety 
belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about the 
individual during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing, in 
accordance with Sec.  91.107 and during other phases of flight, the 
individual would use an SRS.
    This proposed rule would also require operators to provide 
passengers with an enhanced safety briefing that includes a passenger's 
satisfactory demonstration of competency to release quickly the SRS 
with no assistance. The rule also proposes certain requirements 
regarding persons who may seek to participate in such flights. 
Passengers unable to release quickly from an SRS, passengers under 15 
years of age, individuals seated in the flightdeck, and passengers 
occupying an approved child restraint system would be prohibited from 
using the SRS. Furthermore, children may not be held in an adult's lap 
if the adult uses an SRS or the aircraft doors are opened or removed. 
The FAA intends these proposed requirements to ensure the safety of all 
aircraft occupants on such flights.
    The cost of the proposed rule to operators, passengers, and pilots 
would arise out of purchasing harnesses and lanyards that meet specific 
requirements as set forth in this rule, a pre-flight safety briefing on 
the use of the SRS, and passengers demonstrating their ability to 
remove the SRS in the event of an emergency. The cost to the FAA comes 
from approving the addition of SRS to part 135 passenger safety 
briefing cards and for periodic surveillance of parts 91 and 135 SRS 
operations. The estimated cost of these requirements is $22.3 million 
at 7 percent present value

[[Page 81013]]

and $31.6 million at 3 percent present value, as shown in the table 
below.

                                Table 4--Proposed Rule Total Cost Over 20 Years *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          Requirements                                Part 91        Part 135          Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harness + Replacement...........................................        $172,608        $623,616        $796,224
Lanyard + Replacement...........................................          43,152         155,904         199,056
Create Briefing.................................................          14,572          19,774          34,346
Passenger Briefing (Pilot + Passenger)..........................      16,840,356       2,139,920      18,980,276
Passenger Demonstration (Pilot + Passenger).....................      20,342,887       2,584,989      22,927,876
FAA costs.......................................................             583             898           1,481
Total Cost......................................................      37,414,159       5,525,101      42,939,259
Total Cost at 7 Percent Present Value...........................      19,361,893       2,933,645      22,295,537
Total Cost at 3 Percent Present Value...........................      27,541,440       4,109,635      31,651,075
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding.

4. Costs Relative to Post-Emergency Order of Prohibition
    After the FAA published the Emergency Order of Prohibition, 
operators were required to comply with many of the requirements of this 
proposed rule. This subsection measures the costs which are above and 
beyond the costs of complying with the Emergency Order of Prohibition.
    There are three main differences between this rule and the 
Emergency Order of Prohibition. First, the Emergency Order of 
Prohibition does not prohibit passengers using an SRS from being seated 
in the flightdeck, while the proposed rule would prohibit this. The FAA 
estimates minimal cost from this proposed prohibition.
    Second, the Emergency Order of Prohibition applies only to 
operations conducted for compensation or hire. The proposed rule would 
extend this to all civil operations. The FAA does not have precise data 
on operations using an SRS that are not for compensation or hire, and 
so assumes there would be a negligible number.
    Finally, the Emergency Order of Prohibition does not require a 
passenger demonstration of the passenger's ability to release the SRS. 
The FAA estimates the undiscounted costs, beyond the Emergency Order of 
Prohibition, to be $22.9 million ($11.8 million at 7 percent present 
value, or $16.8 million at 3 percent present value). At either discount 
rate, the annualized cost is approximately $1.1 million. These costs 
come entirely from the value of passenger and pilot time spent on the 
demonstration.
5. Alternatives Considered
    The FAA considered proposing the Emergency Order of Prohibition as 
the proposed rule but applying it to all civil operations. The 
Emergency Order of Prohibition prohibits the use of an SRS that cannot 
be released quickly in an emergency during flight operations for 
compensation or hire with the doors opened or removed. The Emergency 
Order of Prohibition requires: a supplemental harness that meets 
specific safety requirements, an application for an LOA to include a 
link to a video (roughly 8 seconds long) demonstrating the user's 
ability to release themselves from the supplemental harness without 
assistance, a preflight briefing on the release of the SRS, and FAA 
review and approval of the application. The table below summarizes the 
costs of each of these requirements.

   Table 5--Emergency Order of Prohibition Total Cost Over 20 Years *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Requirements              Part 91      Part 135        Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost of Harness + Application     $4,747,142    $1,225,615    $5,972,757
 + Video + Safety Briefing....
FAA Cost......................         2,399         4,107         6,506
Total Cost....................     4,749,541     1,229,722     5,979,263
Total Cost at 7 Percent            4,394,485       986,054     5,380,539
 Present Value................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding.

    The FAA considered proposing the above requirements in this 
proposed rule, but after careful review of the NTSB final accident 
report and the information gathered through the Emergency Order of 
Prohibition, the FAA determined that it could tailor the requirements 
to increase the likelihood that passengers would be able to quickly 
release the supplemental restraint in the event of an emergency. For 
example, the Emergency Order of Prohibition does not address the use of 
an SRS in the flightdeck. Additionally, the proposed rule would require 
operators to conduct an enhanced safety briefing and passengers to 
complete a demonstration. Passengers in the Liberty Helicopters 
accident received a briefing on how to release their supplemental 
restraints but were unable to release them during the accident. 
Requiring passengers to demonstrate successfully their ability to 
release the SRS would ensure passengers not only understand how to 
release themselves from the SRS during an emergency but also increase 
the likelihood that they would be able to release themselves from the 
SRS during an emergency. The proposed passenger demonstration 
requirement would be necessary to achieve the effectiveness estimate of 
0.6 to 0.9 as discussed in the main analysis of the proposed rule. 
However, uncertainty exists regarding the incremental reduction in the 
effectiveness of a regulatory alternative that would not require 
passengers to demonstrate proficiency in using the SRS. The FAA 
requests comments and data to help quantify the benefits of this 
alternative relative to the proposed rule.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354), as 
amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996 (Pub.

[[Page 81014]]

L. 104-121) and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-240), 
requires federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory 
action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any 
significant economic impact. The term ``small entities'' comprises 
small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are 
independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, 
and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000.
    The FAA is publishing this Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
(IRFA) to aid the public in commenting on the potential impacts to 
small entities from this proposal. The FAA invites interested parties 
to submit data and information regarding the potential economic impact 
that would result from the proposal. The FAA will consider comments 
when making a determination or when completing a Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Assessment.
    An IRFA must contain the following:
    (1) A description of the reasons why the action by the agency is 
being considered;
    (2) A succinct statement of the objective of, and legal basis for, 
the proposed rule;
    (3) A description of and, where feasible, an estimate of the number 
of small entities to which the proposed rule will apply;
    (4) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and 
other compliance requirements of the proposed rule, including an 
estimate of the classes of small entities that will be subject to the 
requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for 
preparation of the report or record;
    (5) An identification, to the extent practicable, of all relevant 
federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the 
proposed rule; and
    (6) A description of any significant alternatives to the proposed 
rule that accomplish the stated objectives of applicable statutes and 
that minimize any significant economic impact of the proposed rule on 
small entities.
1. Reasons the Action Is Being Considered
    This proposed rule addresses safety issues that contributed to the 
Liberty Helicopters accident to ensure the safety of similar 
operations. The operator-provided harness/tether system the passengers 
used on that flight, while intended as a safety measure when the 
aircraft was in flight, hindered the passengers' egress from the 
aircraft. This proposed rule would address the safety issue by 
proposing specific requirements for individuals using an SRS or 
participating in flights with doors opened or removed.
2. Objectives of the Proposed Rule
    For flights with doors opened or removed, each person would be 
required to either occupy an approved seat or berth with a safety belt 
and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about the 
individual during all phases of flight; or occupy an approved seat or 
berth with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly 
secured about the individual during movement on the surface, takeoff, 
and landing, and during other phases of flight, the individual uses an 
SRS.
    For flights using an SRS, this proposed rule would require the 
harness and lanyard, at a minimum, to have an accessible front or side 
release mechanism that can be operated quickly with minimal difficulty 
during an emergency. As proposed, the lanyard must be connected to an 
aircraft attaching point or points, not in the flightdeck, with a rated 
strength equal to or greater than the weight of the occupant (or the 
combined weight if there is more than one occupant attached to an 
attachment point). This proposed rule would require the lanyard to 
ensure the torso of the person using the SRS remains inside the 
aircraft. Additionally, operators would be required to provide 
passengers with an enhanced safety briefing, and passengers would 
demonstrate the capability to release quickly the SRS with no 
assistance. Passengers under 15 years of age, individuals seated in the 
flightdeck, passengers occupying an approved child restraint system, or 
passengers unable to release quickly from the SRS would be prohibited 
from using the SRS.
3. All Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict
    This proposed rule does not duplicate, overlap, or conflict with 
any other rule.
4. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities
    This proposed rule would affect flights with doors opened or 
removed and all operations with individuals on board who choose to use 
an SRS. A search of the Web Based Operations Safety System (WebOPSS) 
database, as of June 2021, indicates that the rule could affect 1,121 
part 91 operators and 2,200 part 135 operators. These flights include 
sightseeing, motion picture and television filming, electronic news 
gathering, power line inspection, game management, and fire 
suppression, for example. The Small Business Administration (SBA) 
defines charter nonscheduled passenger air transport (NAICS 481211) 
with less than 1,500 employees or scenic and sightseeing transportation 
(NAICS 487990) with less than $8.0 million in revenue as small 
businesses.\70\ Census data indicates that revenue for the scenic and 
sightseeing transportation industry (NAICS 4879), which includes 
airplane and helicopter operations, was roughly $502.5 million for 220 
establishments, and for nonscheduled chartered passenger air 
transportation (NAICS 481211), there are 28,261 employees for 1,604 
firms.\71\ Based on census data and the SBA definition of a small 
business, a substantial number of operators affected by this proposed 
rule would be considered small businesses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ United States Small Business Administration, Table of Size 
Standards (2019), available at https://www.sba.gov/document/support--table-size-standards.
    \71\ United States Census Bureau, Transportation and 
Warehousing: Geographic Area Series: Summary Statistics for the 
U.S., States, Metro Areas, Counties, and Places (2012), available at 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements
    The cost of the proposed rule would include purchasing harnesses 
and lanyards that meet specific requirements as set forth in this rule, 
a preflight safety briefing on the use of the SRS, and passengers' 
satisfactory demonstration of their ability to remove the SRS in the 
event of an emergency. The estimated cost for these requirements per 
year for a part 91 operator is $71,949 and $6,905 for a part 135 
operator, as shown in the table below.

                 Table 6--Estimated Cost per Operator *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Provisions                  Part 91 \72\    Part 135 \73\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Harness + Replacement...................          $6,639         $15,590

[[Page 81015]]

 
Lanyard + Replacement...................           1,660           3,898
Create + Update Briefing................             560             494
Passenger Briefing (Pilot + Passenger)..         647,706          53,498
Passenger Demonstration (Pilot +                 782,419          64,625
 Passenger).............................
Total Over 20 Years.....................       1,438,984         138,105
Estimated Yearly Cost Per Operator......          71,949           6,905
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding.

6. Significant Alternatives Considered
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ Total cost per requirement is divided by 26 part 91 
operators.
    \73\ Total cost per requirement is divided by 40 part 135 
operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA considered proposing to codify the requirements of the 
Emergency Order of Prohibition applied to all civil operations, but 
determined to propose adding the requirement for operators to brief 
passengers on the SRS and verify that passengers could release the SRS 
in an emergency.
    The Emergency Order currently prohibits the use of an SRS during 
flights with doors opened or removed unless it complies with the 
process referenced in FAA Order 8900.4. FAA Order 8900.4 requires 
harnesses and lanyards that fulfill the same requirements this proposed 
rule would require; therefore, operators already incur the cost of the 
harness and lanyard. Under this proposed rule, operators would 
primarily incur the additional cost of the enhanced safety briefing. 
However, the majority of the cost comes from the pilot safety briefing 
and the passenger demonstration and is directly tied to the passenger 
count. Based on the foregoing, this proposed rule would not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The FAA solicits comments regarding this proposed determination.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits federal 
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities 
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not 
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic 
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a 
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has 
assessed the potential effect of this proposed rule and determined that 
it would have only a domestic impact and, therefore, no effect on 
international trade.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) 
governs the issuance of federal regulations that require unfunded 
mandates. An unfunded mandate is a regulation that requires a state, 
local, or tribal government or the private sector to incur direct costs 
without the federal government having first provided the funds to pay 
those costs. The FAA determined that the proposed rule will not result 
in the expenditure of $177 million or more by state, local, or tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or the private sector, in any one year.
    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by state, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $177.0 million in lieu of $100 
million.
    This proposed rule would not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
the FAA to consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. According to the 1995 
amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an 
agency may not collect or sponsor the collection of information, nor 
may it impose an information collection requirement, unless it displays 
a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. 
As required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)), 
the FAA has submitted a new information collection to OMB for its 
review.
     Summary: The FAA is proposing to require operators 
conducting operations using SRS, including during operations with doors 
opened or removed, to present updated safety information to passengers.
     Use: Part 91 and 135 operators would create and brief an 
enhanced passenger safety briefing.
     Respondents: As of June 2021, the FAA estimates that 26 
part 91 operators (based on the number of approved Letter of 
Authorization holders and the A049 \74\ population) and 40 part 135 
operators would choose to offer flights with use of an SRS over the 
next 20 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ An A049 is a Letter of Authorization for Commercial Air 
Tour Operations Authorization and Drug and Alcohol Testing Program 
Registration. This allows a Part 91 operator to operate commercially 
and allows the FAA to estimate the affected population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Frequency: Operators who choose to offer flights using an 
SRS would initially develop and periodically update an enhanced 
passenger safety briefing pertaining to the SRS. The FAA assumes 
updates would occur every ten years, based on a typical SRS replacement 
period.
     Annual Burden Estimated: The total burden hours are 
calculated by multiplying the number of enhanced passenger safety 
briefings and subsequent updates by 2 hours per briefing. As shown in 
the table below, this sums to 90 hours for part 91 operators and 134 
hours for part 135 operators over 3 years. The FAA is updating existing 
Information Collection Request (ICR) 2120-0005 (General Operating and 
Flight Rules--FAR 91 and FAR 107).

[[Page 81016]]



                                     Table 7--Information Collection Burdens
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Number of operators       Time to develop or         Total hour burden
               Year                --------------------------  update briefing (hours  -------------------------
                                      Part 91      Part 135         per briefing)         Part 91      Part 135
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.................................           21           31                        2            42           62
2.................................            0            0                        2             0            0
3.................................            0            1                        2             0            2
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.........................  ...........  ...........  ........................           42           64
    Average Over 3 Years..........  ...........  ...........  ........................           14           21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For part 91 operators, the FAA assumes that a pilot, with an hourly 
wage of $75.90, would be the person developing and updating the content 
of the briefing. At $75.90 the total cost burden is $3,188 ($2,602 at 7 
percent present value) over a 3-year period. For part 135 operators, 
the Director of Operations, at an hourly wage of $68.66, could be the 
person responsible for developing the briefing. Total cost burden for 
part 135 operators over a 3-year period is $4,394 ($3,578 at 7 percent 
present value) for developing the content of the briefing.
    Pilots would also brief passengers on the content of the enhanced 
passenger briefing prior to each flight. The estimated number of 
flights per year is multiplied by 2 minutes per briefing for parts 91 
and 135 annual burden hours to brief passengers. Total burden hours, 
over 3 years, as shown in the table below, sums to 8,177 hours for part 
91 operators and 962 hours for part 135 operators.

                             Table 8--Total Hour Burden for Enhanced Safety Briefing
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Number of flights        Time to present the        Total hour burden
               Year                -------------------------- enhanced safety briefing -------------------------
                                      Part 91      Part 135     (hours per briefing)      Part 91      Part 135
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.................................       89,935       10,475                     0.03         2,698          314
2.................................       90,845       10,684                     0.03         2,725          321
3.................................       91,780       10,897                     0.03         2,753          327
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.........................  ...........  ...........  ........................        8,177          962
    Average Over 3 Years..........  ...........  ...........  ........................        2,726          321
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A pilot would be presenting the briefing at an hourly wage of 
$75.90. At $75.90 the total cost burden over a 3-year period, for part 
91 operators, is $620,598 ($506,593 at 7 percent present value) and 
$72,989 ($59,581 at 7 percent present value) for part 135 operators.
    The agency is soliciting comments to--
    (1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
    (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to 
be collected; and
    (4) Minimize the burden of collecting information on those who are 
to respond, including by using appropriate automated, electronic, 
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms 
of information technology.
    Individuals and organizations may send comments on the information 
collection requirement to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section 
at the beginning of this preamble by January 22, 2024. Comments also 
should be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget, Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk Officer for FAA, 
New Executive Office Building, Room 10202, 725 17th Street NW, 
Washington, DC 20053.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to 
International Civil Aviation Organization Standards and Recommended 
Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has reviewed the 
ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices and has not identified any 
conflicts with these proposed regulations.

G. Environmental Analysis

    FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA actions that are categorically 
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy 
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has 
determined this rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical 
exclusion identified in paragraph 5-6.6f for regulations and involves 
no extraordinary circumstances.
    This rulemaking action provides a framework for civil aircraft 
operations conducted with SRS, including during operations with doors 
opened or removed. It does not affect the frequency of aircraft 
operations in the airspace of the United States. The FAA has reviewed 
the implementation of the rulemaking action and determined it is 
categorically excluded from further environmental review. Possible 
extraordinary circumstances that would preclude the use of a 
categorical exclusion have been examined, and the FAA has determined 
that no such circumstances exist. After careful and thorough 
consideration of the rulemaking action, the FAA finds that it does not 
require preparation of an Environmental Assessment or Environmental 
Impact Statement in accordance with the requirements of NEPA, Council 
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations, and FAA Order 1050.1F.

[[Page 81017]]

VI. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The agency has 
determined that this action would not have a substantial direct effect 
on the states, or the relationship between the federal government and 
the states, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among 
the various levels of government, and, therefore, would not have 
federalism implications.

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211, 
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use. The agency has determined that it would not be a 
``significant energy action'' under the executive order and would not 
be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy.

C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation

    Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet 
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, 
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent 
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has 
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of 
Executive Order 13609 and has determined that this action would have no 
effect on international regulatory cooperation.

VII. Additional Information

A. Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The agency 
also invites comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, 
or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in 
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion 
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain 
duplicate comments, commenters should submit only one time if comments 
are filed electronically, or commenters should send only one copy of 
written comments if comments are filed in writing.
    The FAA will file in the docket all comments it receives, as well 
as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA 
personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this 
proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before 
the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed 
after the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without 
incurring expense or delay. The agency may change this proposal in 
light of the comments it receives.
    Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments 
from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts 
these comments, without edit, including any personal information the 
commenter provides, to https://www.regulations.gov, as described in the 
system of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at 
https://www.dot.gov/privacy.
    Confidential Business Information: Confidential Business 
Information (CBI) is commercial or financial information that is both 
customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from 
public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain 
commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as 
private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or 
responsive to this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the 
submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission 
containing CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked 
submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed 
in the public docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be 
sent to the person in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document. Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not 
specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for 
this rulemaking.

B. Electronic Access and Filing

    A copy of the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), all comments 
received, any final rule, and all background material may be viewed 
online at https://www.regulations.gov using the docket number listed 
above. A copy of this rule will be placed in the docket. Electronic 
retrieval help and guidelines are available on the website. It is 
available 24 hours each day, 365 days each year. An electronic copy of 
this document may also be downloaded from the Office of the Federal 
Register's website at https://www.federalregister.gov and the 
Government Publishing Office's website at https://www.govinfo.gov. A 
copy may also be found at the FAA's Regulations and Policies website at 
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677. 
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this 
rulemaking.
    All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule, 
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed in 
the electronic docket for this rulemaking.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 91

    Air carrier, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Charter flights, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

14 CFR Part 135

    Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

14 CFR Part 136

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, National parks, 
Recreation and recreation areas, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations as follows:

PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES

0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101, 40103, 40105, 40113, 
40120, 44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 
44716, 44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 
47508, 47528-47531, 47534, Pub. L. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (49 U.S.C. 
44703 note); articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11).

0
2. Amend Sec.  91.107 by revising paragraph (a)(3)(i) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  91.107  Use of safety belts, shoulder harnesses, and child 
restraint systems.

    (a) * * *
    (3) * * *
    (i) Be held by an adult, except as outlined in Sec.  91.108(j), who 
is occupying an approved seat or berth, provided that the person being 
held has

[[Page 81018]]

not reached his or her second birthday and does not occupy or use any 
restraining device;
* * * * *
0
3. Add Sec.  91.108 to read as follows:


Sec.  91.108  Use of supplemental restraint systems.

    (a) Use of supplemental restraint systems. Except as provided in 
this section, no person may conduct an operation in a registered civil 
aircraft in which any individual on board is secured with a 
supplemental restraint system.
    (b) Doors opened or removed flight operations. Except as provided 
under paragraph (k) of this section:
    (1) No person may operate a registered civil aircraft with the 
doors opened or removed unless--
    (i) Each individual on board occupies an approved seat or berth 
with a safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, properly 
secured about the individual or an approved child restraint system 
properly secured to an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, 
if installed, shoulder harness in accordance with Sec.  
91.107(a)(3)(iii) or Sec.  135.128(a)(2) of this chapter, during all 
phases of flight; or
    (ii) Each individual on board--
    (A) Occupies an approved seat or berth with a safety belt and, if 
installed, shoulder harness, properly secured about the individual 
during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing; and
    (B) Is secured during the remainder of the flight using a 
supplemental restraint system in accordance with, and that meets the 
requirements of, this section.
    (2) Prior to releasing an FAA-approved safety belt and, if 
installed, shoulder harness during an operation with the doors opened 
or removed, an individual must be properly secured by a supplemental 
restraint system that is connected to an airframe attachment point. An 
individual cannot release their safety belt and, if installed, shoulder 
harness until the pilot in command authorizes them to do so.
    (c) Supplemental restraint system design requirements. Each 
supplemental restraint system must:
    (1) Have a harness that secures around the torso of the individual 
using the supplemental restraint system;
    (2) Have a lanyard that connects the harness to an airframe 
attachment point or points inside the aircraft and that ensures the 
torso of the individual using the supplemental restraint system remains 
inside the aircraft at all times;
    (3) Not impede egress from the aircraft in an emergency after being 
released; and
    (4) Have a release mechanism that--
    (i) Can be quickly operated by the individual using the 
supplemental restraint system with minimal difficulty;
    (ii) Is attached to the front or side of the harness in a location 
easily accessible to and visible by the individual using the 
supplemental restraint system;
    (iii) Prevents inadvertent release; and
    (iv) Does not require the use of a knife to cut the restraint, any 
other additional tool, or the assistance of any other individual to 
release the supplemental restraint system.
    (d) Who may provide the supplemental restraint system. The 
supplemental restraint system may be provided by the operator or by the 
individual using the supplemental restraint system. An individual 
providing their own supplemental restraint system must:
    (1) Confirm with the pilot in command, either verbally or in 
writing, as determined by the pilot in command, the system's continued 
serviceability and readiness for its intended purposes; and
    (2) Ensure they are complying with the sizing criteria for which 
the supplemental restraint system is rated.
    (e) Supplemental restraint system operational requirements. The 
following are supplemental restraint system operational requirements:
    (1) A qualified person designated by the operator must--
    (i) Connect the supplemental restraint system to an airframe 
attachment point or points with a rated strength equal to or greater 
than the weight of the individual using the supplemental restraint 
system (or the combined weight if there is more than one supplemental 
restraint system attached to an attachment point); and
    (ii) Not connect the supplemental restraint system to any airframe 
attachment point located in the flightdeck.
    (2) A supplemental restraint system must fit the individual using 
it based on the sizing criteria for which the supplemental restraint 
system is rated.
    (f) Pilot in command. The pilot in command--
    (1) Has the overall responsibility to ensure that the supplemental 
restraint system meets the requirements of this section and must not 
permit an individual to use a supplemental restraint system that does 
not meet the requirements of this section;
    (2) Must ensure, for any supplemental restraint system provided by 
either the operator or the pilot in command, the supplemental restraint 
system's continued serviceability and readiness for its intended 
purpose;
    (3) May only permit an individual to use a supplemental restraint 
system provided by the operator or the pilot in command if that 
individual complies with the sizing criteria for which the supplemental 
restraint system is rated;
    (4) Has final authority regarding whether the supplemental 
restraint system may be used during flight operations; and
    (5) Has final authority to authorize an individual to release the 
FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed, shoulder harness and remain 
secured only by the supplemental restraint system.
    (g) Passenger briefing. Before each takeoff, the pilot in command 
must ensure that each passenger who intends to use a supplemental 
restraint system has been briefed on:
    (1) How to use, secure, and release the supplemental restraint 
system properly. This requirement is not necessary for an individual 
providing their own supplemental restraint system, but that individual 
must meet the passenger demonstration requirements in paragraph (h) of 
this section.
    (2) Means of direct communication between crewmembers and 
passengers during normal and emergency operating procedures regarding--
    (i) The use of headset and intercom systems, if installed;
    (ii) How passengers will be notified of an event requiring action, 
including emergencies, egress procedures, and other unforeseen 
circumstances;
    (iii) How each passenger will be notified when the passenger is 
permitted to release the FAA-approved safety belt and, if installed, 
shoulder harness, and move within the aircraft using the supplemental 
restraint system;
    (iv) How each passenger will be notified when the passenger must 
return to their seat and secure the FAA-approved safety belt and, if 
installed, shoulder harness; and
    (v) When and how to notify a crewmember of safety concerns.
    (h) Passenger demonstration. After the briefing required by 
paragraph (g) of this section, prior to ground movement, any passenger 
intending to use a supplemental restraint system must demonstrate to 
the pilot in command, a crewmember, or other qualified person 
designated by the operator, the following:
    (1) The ability to use, secure, and release the FAA-approved safety 
belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, and
    (2) The ability to accomplish all actions required for quick 
release of the supplemental restraint system, without assistance and 
with minimal difficulty.
    (i) Individuals not permitted to use supplemental restraint 
systems. The

[[Page 81019]]

following individuals are not permitted to use a supplemental restraint 
system, as defined in paragraph (l) of this section:
    (1) Any passenger who cannot demonstrate--
    (i) That they are able to occupy, secure, and release the FAA-
approved seat belt and, if installed, shoulder harness; and
    (ii) That they are able to release quickly the supplemental 
restraint system with no assistance and with minimal difficulty.
    (2) Any individual who is less than 15 years of age.
    (3) Any individual seated in the flightdeck.
    (4) Any passenger who occupies or uses an approved child restraint 
system.
    (j) Lap-held child. Notwithstanding any other requirement of this 
chapter, a child who has not reached their second birthday may not be 
held by an adult during civil aircraft operations when:
    (1) The adult uses a supplemental restraint system; or
    (2) The aircraft doors are opened or removed.
    (k) Excluded operations. Unless otherwise stated:
    (1) This section does not apply to operations conducted under part 
105 or 133 of this chapter and does not apply to the persons described 
in Sec.  91.107(a)(3)(ii) of this chapter.
    (2) Operators subject to the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of 
this section may operate an aircraft with doors opened or removed 
notwithstanding any flight crewmembers on board who are subject to the 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  91.105 and 135.171 of this chapter and who 
need to unfasten their shoulder harnesses in accordance with those 
sections.
    (3) Paragraph (b)(2) of this section does not apply to any flight 
crewmembers subject to Sec. Sec.  91.105 and 135.171 of this chapter to 
the extent that the flight crewmembers need to unfasten their shoulder 
harnesses in accordance with those sections.
    (l) Definition. For purposes of this section, a supplemental 
restraint system means any device that is not installed on the aircraft 
pursuant to an FAA approval, used to secure an individual inside an 
aircraft when that person is not properly secured by an FAA-approved 
seat belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, or an approved child 
restraint system. It consists of a harness secured around the torso of 
the individual using the supplemental restraint system and a lanyard 
that connects the harness to an approved airframe attachment point 
inside the aircraft.

PART 135--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND ON DEMAND OPERATIONS 
AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT

0
4. The authority citation for part 135 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 41706, 44701-44702, 
44705, 44709, 44711-44713, 44715-44717, 44722, 44730, 45101-45105; 
Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 58 (49 U.S.C. 44730).

0
5. Amend Sec.  135.117 by adding paragraph (g) to read as follows:


Sec.  135.117  Briefing of passengers before flight.

* * * * *
    (g) If any passengers on board a flight conducted under this part 
are secured with a supplemental restraint system, the pilot in command 
of that flight must ensure those passengers are briefed in accordance 
with Sec.  91.108(g) of this chapter.
0
6. Amend Sec.  135.128 by revising paragraph (a)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  135.128  Use of safety belts and child restraint systems.

    (a) * * *
    (1) Be held by an adult, except as outlined in Sec.  91.108(j) of 
this chapter, who is occupying an approved seat or berth, provided the 
child has not reached his or her second birthday and the child does not 
occupy or use any restraining device; or
* * * * *

PART 136--COMMERCIAL AIR TOURS AND NATIONAL PARKS AIR TOUR 
MANAGEMENT

0
7. The authority citation for part 136 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 40119, 44101, 
44701-44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722, 44901, 
44903-44904, 44912, 46105.

0
8. Amend Sec.  136.7 by adding paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  136.7  Passenger briefings.

* * * * *
    (c) If any passengers on board a flight conducted under this part 
are secured with a supplemental restraint system, the pilot in command 
of that flight must ensure those passengers are briefed in accordance 
with Sec.  91.108(g) of this chapter.

    Issued in Washington, DC, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 
106(f) and 44701(a)(5).
Wesley L. Mooty,
Acting Deputy Executive Director, Flight Standards Service.
[FR Doc. 2023-24936 Filed 11-20-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P