[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 169 (Friday, September 1, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 60385-60402]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-16896]


 ========================================================================
 Proposed Rules
                                                 Federal Register
 ________________________________________________________________________
 
 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
 the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
 notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
 the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
 
 ========================================================================
 

  Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 169 / Friday, September 1, 2023 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 60385]]



FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 217

[Regulation Q; Docket No. R-1814]
RIN 7100-AG65


Regulatory Capital Rule: Risk-Based Capital Surcharges for Global 
Systemically Important Bank Holding Companies; Systemic Risk Report (FR 
Y-15)

AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) 
is inviting public comment on a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend 
the Board's rule that identifies and establishes risk-based capital 
surcharges for global systemically important bank holding companies 
(GSIBs). The proposal would also amend the Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-
15), which is the source of inputs to the implementation of the GSIB 
framework under the capital rule. The changes set forth in the proposal 
would improve the precision of the GSIB surcharge and better measure 
systemic risk under the framework. For certain systemic indicators 
currently measured only as of a single date, the proposal would change 
to reporting of the average of daily or monthly values to reduce the 
effects of temporary changes to indicator values around measurement 
dates. To improve risk capture, the proposal would also make 
improvements to the measurement of some systemic indicators used in the 
GSIB surcharge framework and the framework for determining prudential 
standards for large banking organizations. In addition, the proposal 
would reduce cliff effects and enhance the sensitivity of the surcharge 
to changes in the method 2 score by calculating surcharges based on 
narrower score band ranges. Finally, the proposal would make several 
amendments to the FR Y-15 to improve the consistency of data reporting 
and systemic indicator measurement.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before November 30, 2023.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. R-1814 and 
RIN 7100-AG65, by any of the following methods:
     Agency Website: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the 
instructions for submitting comments at http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Email: [email protected]. Include docket 
number and RIN in the subject line of the message.
     Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
     Mail: Ann Misback, Secretary, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW, 
Washington, DC 20551.
    In general, all public comments will be made available on the 
Board's website at www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as submitted, and will not be modified to remove 
confidential, contact or any identifiable information. Public comments 
may also be viewed electronically or in paper in Room M-4365A, 2001 C 
St. NW, Washington, DC 20551, between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. during 
Federal business weekdays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Anna Lee Hewko, Associate Director, 
(202) 250-1577; Brian Chernoff, Manager, (202) 452-2952; Jennifer 
McClean, Senior Financial Institution Policy Analyst II, (202) 785-
6033, Policy Development, Division of Supervision and Regulation; or 
Jay Schwarz, Assistant General Counsel, (202) 452-2970; Mark Buresh, 
Special Counsel, (202) 452-5270, Jonah Kind, Senior Counsel, (202) 452-
2045, David Imhoff, Attorney, (202) 452-2249, Legal Division, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets NW, 
Washington, DC 20551. For users of TDD-TYY, (202) 263-4869 or dial 711 
from any telephone anywhere in the United States.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
    A. Background
    B. Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15)
II. Summary of the Proposal
    A. Data Averaging of Certain Systemic Indicators
    B. Reducing Cliff Effects in the Calculation of Method 2 GSIB 
Surcharges
    C. Effective Date of Changes to a Firm's GSIB Surcharge 
Requirement
    D. Clarification for Reduction in GSIB Surcharge Calculated 
During the Intervening Year Between Calculation and Effective Date 
of a GSIB Surcharge Increase
    E. Amendments to Systemic Indicators
    i. Interconnectedness and Complexity
    ii. Substitutability
    iii. Cross-Jurisdictional Activity
    iv. Short-Term Wholesale Funding
    F. Foreign Banking Organization Reporting Requirements
    G. Implementation and Timing
    H. Interaction With Other Proposals
III. Impact
    A. Benefits of the Proposed Changes
    B. Costs of the Proposed Changes
    C. Interaction With Other Rules and Proposals
IV. Administrative Law Matters
    A. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
    C. Plain Language
    D. Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act of 2023

I. Introduction

    The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) 
adopted a final rule in 2015 that established a methodology for 
identifying U.S. global systemically important bank holding companies 
(GSIBs) and assigning a risk-based capital surcharge for the largest, 
most interconnected U.S.-based bank holding companies.\1\ The GSIB 
surcharge framework requires a GSIB to maintain additional capital to 
strengthen the firm's resiliency, thereby reducing the probability of 
its failure and the risks that the firm's failure or distress could 
pose to the U.S. financial system.
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    \1\ Regulatory Capital Rules: Implementation of Risk-Based 
Capital Surcharges for Global Systemically Important Bank Holding 
Companies, 80 FR 49082 (Aug. 14, 2015). See 12 CFR Pt. 217, Subpart 
H.
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    The Board is inviting public comment on a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (proposal) that would improve the measurement of systemic 
indicators under the GSIB surcharge framework and enhance the 
sensitivity of the surcharge to changes in a bank holding company's 
risk profile. By improving the calculation of surcharges, the

[[Page 60386]]

proposal would better ensure that each GSIB maintains capital levels 
commensurate with its systemic footprint. The proposed changes include 
revisions to the Board's capital rule and amendments to the measurement 
and reporting of certain systemic indicators used in the GSIB surcharge 
framework. Certain of the indicators that the proposal would modify are 
also used for purposes of the Board's framework for determining 
prudential standards for large banking organizations (regulatory 
tiering framework).\2\ The proposed changes include revisions 
consistent with the framework used by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Basel Committee) to identify GSIBs and assess their 
systemic importance.\3\
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    \2\ See 12 CFR 252.5 and 238.10; see also ``Prudential Standards 
for Large Bank Holding Companies, Savings and Loan Holding 
Companies, and Foreign Banking Organizations,'' 84 FR 59032 
(November 1, 2019); and ``Changes to Applicability Thresholds for 
Regulatory Capital and Liquidity Requirements,'' 84 FR 59230 
(November 1, 2019). As used in this Supplementary Information 
section, the term ``banking organizations'' refers to U.S. GSIBs for 
purposes of the GSIB surcharge framework and to FR Y-15 reporters 
(bank holding companies, savings and loan holding companies, foreign 
banking organizations, and U.S. intermediate holding companies of 
foreign banking organizations meeting certain criteria) for purposes 
of the FR Y-15. There are also certain circumstances under which a 
depository institution that is not required to report the FR Y-15 
would be subject to standards based on calculation methodologies 
contained in the FR Y-15. See, e.g., 12 CFR 217.2, ``Category III 
Board-regulated institution.''
    \3\ The Basel Committee is a committee comprised of central 
banks and banking supervisory authorities, which was established by 
the central bank governors of the G-10 countries in 1975. It is the 
primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of 
banking organizations. The Basel Committee developed a methodology, 
available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/gsib/, that uses an indicator-
based measurement approach for assessing the systemic importance of 
global systemically important banks. In July 2018, the Basel 
Committee made revisions to its methodology, which are available at 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d445.htm.
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A. Background

    The methodology to identify a GSIB (method 1) uses five equally 
weighted categories that are correlated with systemic importance--(1) 
size, (2) interconnectedness, (3) substitutability, (4) complexity, and 
(5) cross-jurisdictional activity--and subdivides certain categories 
into systemic indicators. Generally, a bank holding company subject to 
Category I, II, or III capital standards must calculate its method 1 
score annually.\4\ A bank holding company calculates each systemic 
indicator by dividing its own measure of the indicator by an aggregate 
global measure for that indicator.\5\ The resulting value for each 
systemic indicator is then multiplied by the prescribed weighting in 
the capital rule and by 10,000 to reflect the result in basis points. A 
bank holding company then sums the weighted values for the twelve 
systemic indicators to determine its method 1 score.\6\ A bank holding 
company is identified as a GSIB if its method 1 score equals or exceeds 
130 basis points.\7\
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    \4\ 12 CFR 217.400 and 217.402. In 2019, the Board, with the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), adopted rules establishing 
four categories of capital standards for U.S. banking organizations 
with $100 billion or more in total assets and foreign banking 
organizations with $100 billion or more in combined U.S. assets. 
Under this framework, Category I capital standards apply to U.S. 
global systemically important bank holding companies and their 
depository institution subsidiaries. Category II standards apply to 
banking organizations with at least $700 billion in total 
consolidated assets or at least $75 billion in cross-jurisdictional 
activity and their depository institution subsidiaries. Category III 
standards apply to banking organizations with total consolidated 
assets of at least $250 billion or at least $75 billion in weighted 
short-term wholesale funding, nonbank assets, or off-balance sheet 
exposure and their depository institution subsidiaries. Category IV 
standards apply to banking organizations with total consolidated 
assets of at least $100 billion that do not meet the thresholds for 
a higher category and their depository institution subsidiaries. See 
12 CFR 252.5 and 238.10; see also ``Prudential Standards for Large 
Bank Holding Companies, Savings and Loan Holding Companies, and 
Foreign Banking Organizations,'' 84 FR 59032 (November 1, 2019); and 
``Changes to Applicability Thresholds for Regulatory Capital and 
Liquidity Requirements,'' 84 FR 59230 (November 1, 2019).
    \5\ 12 CFR 217.404. The Board annually publishes the aggregate 
global measures.
    \6\ 12 CFR 217.404. Scores are rounded to the nearest basis 
point according to standard rounding rules for the purposes of 
assigning levels. That is, fractional amounts between zero and one-
half are rounded down to zero, while fractional amounts at or above 
one-half are rounded to one. A bank's substitutability category 
score is capped at 100 basis points. See also 80 FR at 49088 (Aug. 
14, 2015).
    \7\ 12 CFR 217.402.
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    If a bank holding company is identified as a GSIB, it must also 
calculate its method 2 score.\8\ Method 2 measures a bank holding 
company's systemic risk profile using the same systemic indicators as 
method 1, except that the substitutability category is replaced with a 
measurement of reliance on short-term wholesale funding.\9\ Method 2 
also uses fixed coefficient values for each of the systemic indicators, 
rather than multiplying indicators by a measure that changes each year 
based on the aggregate global measure for that indicator.\10\ A firm 
multiplies its indicator values by the respective fixed coefficients 
and aggregates the amount together to compute the firm's method 2 
score.
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    \8\ 12 CFR 217.403.
    \9\ 12 CFR 217.405 and 406. The short-term wholesale funding 
score is calculated by dividing the firm's average weighted short-
term wholesale funding by the firm's average risk-weighted assets 
and multiplying the result by a fixed factor of 350.
    \10\ 12 CFR 217.405. See also 80 FR at 49087-88 (Aug 14, 2015).
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    A GSIB is subject to the larger GSIB surcharge that applies based 
on its method 1 score and method 2 score. A GSIB is subject to a 
minimum surcharge of 1.0 percent, and surcharges increase with GSIB 
score under both method 1 and method 2. Method 1 surcharges increase in 
increments of 0.5 percentage points for each 100-basis point method 1 
score band, up to a method 1 surcharge of 2.5 percent, which is 
associated with a method 1 score ranging from 430 to 529 basis points. 
If a GSIB's method 1 score exceeds 529, the GSIB's method 1 surcharge 
equals 3.5 percent, plus 1.0 percentage point for every further 100-
basis point increase in score. Like the method 1 surcharge, the method 
2 surcharge uses score band ranges of 100 basis points, with the lowest 
score band ranging from 130 to 229 basis points. The method 2 surcharge 
increases in increments of 0.5 percentage points per score band.

B. Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15)

    The Systemic Risk Report form (FR Y-15) collects systemic risk data 
from U.S. bank holding companies and covered savings and loan holding 
companies \11\ with total consolidated assets of $100 billion or more, 
any U.S.-based bank holding company designated as a GSIB that does not 
meet that consolidated assets threshold, and foreign banking 
organizations with combined U.S. assets of $100 billion or more.\12\ 
The FR Y-15 collects data on a firm's structure, activities, and 
funding that is consistent and comparable among firms and is often 
unavailable from other sources. In addition, the data collected on the 
FR Y-15 is used to identify other firms that may present significant 
systemic risk, to analyze the systemic risk implications of proposed 
mergers and acquisitions, and to determine the application of 
prudential standards to large banking organizations. Respondents must 
submit the FR Y-15 quarterly.
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    \11\ Covered savings and loan holding companies are those that 
are not substantially engaged in insurance or commercial activities. 
For more information, see the definition of ``covered savings and 
loan holding company'' provided in 12 CFR 217.2.
    \12\ The mandatory FR Y-15 is authorized by sections 163 and 165 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act) (12 U.S.C. 5463 and 5365), the International 
Banking Act (12 U.S.C. 3106 and 3108), the Bank Holding Company Act 
(12 U.S.C. 1844), and Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) (12 U.S.C. 
1467a).
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    Under the GSIB surcharge framework, any U.S.-based top-tier bank 
holding company that qualifies as a Category I,

[[Page 60387]]

II, or III Board-regulated institution must compute annually its method 
1 score using the values for the systemic indicators (in each of the 
size, interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity, and cross-
jurisdictional activity categories) that it reported on its FR Y-15 as 
of December 31 of the prior year. A GSIB must also determine its GSIB 
surcharge based on the data reported on its FR Y-15 as of the same 
date.
    Data reported on the FR Y-15 is also used to determine the 
applicable category of prudential standards for U.S. banking 
organizations with total consolidated assets of $100 billion or more 
and foreign banking organizations with combined U.S. assets of $100 
billion or more, under the framework adopted by the Board in 2019.\13\ 
Specifically, measures for cross-jurisdictional activity, weighted 
short-term wholesale funding, and off-balance sheet exposure, which are 
used to determine whether a banking organization is subject to Category 
II or III standards, use or include data reported on the FR Y-15.\14\
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    \13\ See 12 CFR part 252, subpart A, and 12 CFR 238.10.
    \14\ See id.
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II. Summary of the Proposal

A. Data Averaging of Certain Systemic Indicators

    Under the current framework, FR Y-15 filers report many of the data 
values used to calculate a firm's method 1 or method 2 score on a 
point-in-time basis, reflecting the firm's amount for the indicators as 
of end of the reporting quarter. Indicators calculated on a point-in-
time basis include intra-financial system assets, intra-financial 
system liabilities, securities outstanding, assets under custody, 
notional amount of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, trading and 
available-for-sales securities, Level 3 assets, cross-jurisdictional 
claims, and cross-jurisdictional liabilities. A firm's GSIB method 1 
and 2 score calculations use as inputs the value of these indicators as 
of December 31 of the previous calendar year.
    The value of a firm's indicator on December 31 may not, however, be 
accurately representative of a firm's actual systemic footprint if the 
value of the indicator on December 31 differs materially from the value 
on other dates. For example, the seasonality of market dynamics could 
cause December 31 to be an anomalous day for any given firm. 
Additionally, measurement based only on a single point in time may 
create incentives for a firm to manage the values of its systemic 
indicators on December 31 to reduce the amount of its GSIB surcharge in 
a manner that would not be commensurate with the firm's actual systemic 
footprint, based on the values of its systemic indicators on other days 
of the year.
    The proposal would require a GSIB to report intra-financial system 
assets, intra-financial system liabilities, securities outstanding, 
assets under custody, OTC derivatives, trading and available for sale 
securities, Level 3 assets, cross-jurisdictional claims, and cross-
jurisdictional liabilities on the FR Y-15 as the average of daily 
values of the indicator over the reporting quarter, instead of quarter-
end point-in-time values.\15\ For certain off-balance sheet items, a 
GSIB would report the average of month-end values over the reporting 
quarter, rather than an average of daily values. (See Table 1.) For 
example, for the December 31 reporting date, a GSIB would report for 
most items the average of the values of that item for each business day 
from October 1 through December 31, and for specified off-balance sheet 
items, the average of the month-end values for October, November, and 
December. This methodology would be similar to how GSIBs currently 
report the on- and off-balance-sheet components of the total exposures 
systemic indicator.\16\ In addition, the proposal would base a GSIB's 
method 1 and method 2 score calculation for these indicators on the 
average of reported values over all four quarters of a calendar year, 
rather than only the reported values for the fourth quarter.
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    \15\ Unless otherwise noted, references to averaging of 
``daily'' values in this Supplementary Information section refer to 
averaging of values for each business day. A firm that newly becomes 
a GSIB would be required to begin reporting the average of daily 
values as of the first quarter following its identification as a 
GSIB.
    \16\ Currently, for the purposes of calculating a Category I-III 
banking organization's GSIB surcharge score, the total exposures 
systemic indicator reflects the average of daily values for on-
balance sheet items within the fourth quarter and the average of 
month-end values for off-balance sheet items within the fourth 
quarter.
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    The proposal would not change the current reporting methodology for 
indicators that measure flows (payments activity, underwritten 
transactions, and trading volume) and short-term wholesale funding.\17\
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    \17\ For these indicators, where firms currently report items as 
12-month sums or averages, the proposal would require reporting of 
values for the reporting quarter only, with a separate line item to 
include the 12-month sum or averages, to align with the proposed 
reporting of other indicators.
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    The proposed changes to require reporting of average data for 
previously point-in-time indicators would only apply to GSIBs. For 
these firms, the averaging requirement will better reflect a firm's 
systemic risk profile in the calculation of its GSIB surcharge 
requirements and reduce opportunities to manage the values of systemic 
indicators in a manner that would result in a surcharge requirement 
that is not commensurate with the firm's systemic risk profile.
    The proposal would require a firm subject to Category II or III 
standards to calculate its method 1 and method 2 GSIB scores by using 
the average of its four quarterly reported values for the year. Except 
as noted below regarding the total exposures systemic indicator, the 
proposal would not require firms that are subject to Category II, III, 
or IV standards to newly report FR Y-15 data as averages of daily or 
monthly values, in order to limit operational burdens for firms that 
are not yet identified as GSIBs.
    Table 1 displays the systemic indicator by categories and the 
proposed reporting requirements for GSIBs relative to the current 
requirements.

                             Table 1--Measurement of GSIB Surcharge Inputs for GSIBs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Category                   Systemic indicator     Current U.S. reporting          Proposal
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Size.................................  Total exposures........  For on-balance sheet     No changes in
                                                                 items, average of        reporting.
                                                                 daily values over the
                                                                 fourth quarter.
                                                                For off-balance sheet    No changes in
                                                                 items, average of the    reporting.
                                                                 three month-end
                                                                 balances over the
                                                                 fourth quarter.

[[Page 60388]]

 
Interconnectedness...................  Intra-financial system   For on-balance sheet     For on-balance sheet
                                        assets.                  items, as of December    items, report average
                                                                 31.                      of daily values over
                                                                                          the reporting quarter.
                                                                For off-balance sheet    For off-balance sheet
                                                                 items, as of December    items, report average
                                                                 31.                      of month-end exposure
                                                                                          amounts over the
                                                                                          reporting quarter.
                                       Intra-financial system   For on-balance sheet     For on-balance sheet
                                        liabilities.             items, as of December    items, report average
                                                                 31.                      of daily values over
                                                                                          the reporting quarter.
                                                                For off-balance sheet    For off-balance sheet
                                                                 items, as of December    items, report average
                                                                 31.                      of month-end exposure
                                                                                          amounts over the
                                                                                          reporting quarter.
                                       Securities outstanding.  As of December 31......  Report average daily
                                                                                          balances over the
                                                                                          reporting quarter.
Substitutability (Method 1 Only).....  Payments activity......  Total gross value of     No change.
                                                                 all cash payments sent
                                                                 via large-value
                                                                 payment systems over
                                                                 the last year.
                                       Assets under custody...  As of December 31......  Report average daily
                                                                                          balances over the
                                                                                          reporting quarter.
                                       Underwritten             Total underwriting over  No change.
                                        transactions in debt     the last year.
                                        and equity markets.
Short-Term Wholesale Funding (Method   Short-term wholesale     Average of daily values  No change.
 2 Only).                               funding metric (ratio).  for weighted short-
                                                                 term wholesale funding
                                                                 over the preceding
                                                                 four quarters in the
                                                                 numerator. Four-
                                                                 quarter average of
                                                                 total risk-weighted
                                                                 assets in the
                                                                 denominator.
Complexity...........................  Notional amount of over- As of December 31......  For off-balance sheet
                                        the-counter (OTC)                                 items, report average
                                        derivatives.                                      of month-end exposure
                                                                                          amounts over the
                                                                                          reporting quarter.
                                       Trading and available-   As of December 31......  Report average daily
                                        for-sale securities.                              balances over the
                                                                                          reporting quarter.
                                       Level 3 assets.........  As of December 31......  Report average daily
                                                                                          balances over the
                                                                                          reporting quarter.
Cross-Jurisdictional Activity........  Cross-jurisdictional     As of December 31......  Report average daily
                                        claims.                                           balances over the
                                                                                          reporting quarter.
                                       Cross-jurisdictional     As of December 31......  Report average daily
                                        liabilities.                                      balances over the
                                                                                          reporting quarter.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Interaction With Other Proposals
    Currently, the FR Y-15 requires banking organizations subject to 
Category I, II, or III standards to report data for the total exposures 
indicator as the average of daily values for on-balance sheet items and 
the average of month-end values for off-balance sheet items. This 
reporting methodology aligns with the calculation of total leverage 
exposure for purposes of the supplementary leverage ratio 
requirement.\18\ Other banking organizations must elect to report this 
data using averages or point-in-time data.
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    \18\ See 12 CFR 217.10(c).
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    The Board, with the OCC and FDIC (together with the Board, the 
agencies), is separately issuing a proposal that would revise the 
agencies' risk-based capital framework applicable to banking 
organizations with at least $100 billion in total assets and their 
depository institution subsidiaries and to banking organizations with 
significant trading activities. In addition to revising risk-based 
capital requirements, this separate proposal would also revise the 
applicability of the supplementary leverage ratio requirement to 
include all banking organizations subject to the capital rule with at 
least $100 billion in total assets and their depository institution 
subsidiaries.
    In connection with this separately proposed change to broaden the 
scope of application of the supplementary leverage ratio requirement, 
the proposal would require all banking organizations that file the FR 
Y-15 to report data for the total exposures systemic indicator as the 
average of daily values for on-balance sheet items and the average of 
month-end values for off-balance sheet items, to align with the 
calculation of total leverage exposure for purposes of the 
supplementary leverage ratio requirement.
    Question 1: What would be the advantages and disadvantages of 
requiring firms subject to the GSIB surcharge framework or all firms 
that report the FR Y-15 to report indicators that they currently report 
as of a single point in time instead as averages of daily, weekly, or 
monthly values?
    Question 2: What operational burdens would be required, relative to 
what banking organizations already do to track this information? To 
what extent would the operational burdens of reporting averages of 
daily, weekly, monthly values differ for the different indicators?
    Question 3: For off-balance sheet items, what would be the 
advantages or disadvantages of requiring reporting based on an average 
of more frequent data than month-end values, such as an average of 
daily or weekly values?

[[Page 60389]]

    Question 4: What would be the advantages and disadvantages of 
requiring calculation of GSIB surcharges based on indicators averaged 
over the fourth quarter only, rather than based on average values over 
all four quarters of the calendar year? For which indicators and why?

B. Reducing Cliff Effects in the Calculation of Method 2 GSIB 
Surcharges

    As described in the 2015 rulemaking, the Board chose to assign GSIB 
surcharges using 100-basis point score band sizes so that modest 
changes in a firm's systemic indicators would generally not cause a 
change in its surcharge and surcharges would be reasonably sensitive to 
changes in a firm's systemic footprint. In practice, the Board has 
observed that firms' method 2 scores tend to cluster close to the upper 
limit of a score band range, especially at year-end.
    In order to increase the sensitivity of a firm's surcharge to its 
systemic risk profile and reduce cliff effects around changing score 
bands, the Board is proposing to make the method 2 score band ranges 
narrower.\19\ Instead of 100-basis point score band ranges 
corresponding to 0.5-percentage point increments in the surcharge 
(1.0%, 1.5%, 2.0%, etc.), the proposal would modify the ranges in 
method 2 to 20-basis point ranges that would correspond to 0.1-
percentage point increments (1.0%, 1.1%, 1.2%, etc.).
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    \19\ The proposal would not amend the score band ranges for 
method 1, as discussed further below.
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    Under this approach, the lowest score band range would be method 2 
scores of 189 basis points or less, corresponding to a 1.0 percent 
surcharge, the lowest applicable surcharge for a GSIB. If the method 2 
score of a GSIB equaled or exceeded 190 basis points, the method 2 
surcharge would equal the sum of 1.1 percent and an additional 0.1 
percent for each additional 20 basis points by which the GSIB's method 
2 score exceeded 190 basis points. Expressed mathematically, this is 
equivalent to:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01SE23.000

Where ceiling means to round the fraction to the nearest integer above 
or equal to it.\20\ Table 2 illustrates the application of this formula 
up to a score of 1129.
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    \20\ For example, 2.1 rounds up to 3; 4.7 rounds up to 5; 6 does 
not require rounding.

                         Table 2--Proposed Revised Method 2 Surcharge Score Band Ranges
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Method 2 surcharge                              Method 2 surcharge
                                 -------------------------------- Method 2 score -------------------------------
      Method 2 score range            Current        Proposed          range          Current        Proposed
                                     (percent)       (percent)                       (percent)       (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than 189...................             1.0             1.0         630-649             3.5             3.3
190-209.........................                             1.1         650-669                             3.4
210-229.........................                             1.2         670-689                             3.5
230-249.........................             1.5             1.3         690-709                             3.6
250-269.........................                             1.4         710-729                             3.7
270-289.........................                             1.5         730-749             4.0             3.8
290-309.........................                             1.6         750-769                             3.9
310-329.........................                             1.7         770-789                             4.0
330-349.........................             2.0             1.8         790-809                             4.1
350-369.........................                             1.9         810-829                             4.2
370-389.........................                             2.0         830-849             4.5             4.3
390-409.........................                             2.1         850-869                             4.4
410-429.........................                             2.2         870-889                             4.5
430-449.........................             2.5             2.3         890-909                             4.6
450-469.........................                             2.4         910-929                             4.7
470-489.........................                             2.5         930-949             5.0             4.8
490-509.........................                             2.6         950-969                             4.9
510-529.........................                             2.7         970-989                             5.0
530-549.........................             3.0             2.8        990-1009                             5.1
550-569.........................                             2.9       1010-1029                             5.2
570-589.........................                             3.0       1030-1049             5.5             5.3
590-609.........................                             3.1       1050-1069                             5.4
610-629.........................                             3.2       1070-1089                             5.5
                                                                       1090-1109                             5.6
                                                                       1110-1129                             5.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 60390]]

    The proposed method 2 score band range structure would result in a 
surcharge equivalent to that under the current method 2 surcharge score 
band range structure when a method 2 score is in the middle quintile of 
the current score band range, as displayed in Table 2. For example, a 
method 2 score of 280 basis points is near the center of the current 
2.5 percent surcharge score band range and would likewise receive a 2.5 
percent surcharge under the proposal. Under the proposal, method 2 
scores at the lower end of a current method 2 score band range would 
receive a modest GSIB surcharge reduction. Method 2 scores at the 
higher end of a current method 2 score band range would receive a 
modest GSIB surcharge increase under the proposal.
    The proposed revision is not meant to alter the overall calibration 
of the method 2 surcharge, as reflected by the fact that the surcharge 
for a proposed score band range that is at the center of a current 
score band range would remain unchanged. Rather, the proposal would 
apply a more continuous approach to determining a firm's GSIB surcharge 
that would reduce cliff-effects in the framework and increase its risk 
sensitivity.
    The proposal would not amend the score band ranges for method 1. 
Because method 1 is structured to be generally consistent with the 
methodology used by other major jurisdictions to calculate GSIB 
surcharges and with the GSIB surcharge standard published by the Basel 
Committee, the proposal would keep the existing score band ranges for 
method 1 in the interest of continuing to promote international 
consistency.
    Question 5: What are the advantages and disadvantages of the 
proposed approach to method 2 surcharges, including for firms' capital 
planning? What alternative approaches, if any, should the Board 
consider for reducing cliff effects and better reflecting a firm's 
systemic risk profile in its GSIB surcharge?
    Question 6: What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a 
wider or narrower score band structure than the proposed approach of 20 
basis points of method 2 score per 0.1 percentage point increase in 
method 2 surcharge?

C. Effective Date of Changes to a Firm's GSIB Surcharge Requirement

    Under the current framework, an increase in the GSIB surcharge of a 
global systemically important bank holding company takes effect on 
January 1 of the year that is one full calendar year after the 
increased GSIB surcharge was calculated.\21\ This approach facilitates 
GSIBs' capital planning and allows time for a GSIB to shrink its 
systemic risk profile such that it would be subject to a lower GSIB 
surcharge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ A firm typically calculates its method 2 score for a given 
year after it files its FR Y-15 for the fourth quarter, which 
typically occurs around April of the following year. For method 1, a 
firm typically calculates its score later that same year, after the 
Board publishes the aggregate global measures for that year, which 
typically occurs around November or December.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board is seeking comment on whether it would be appropriate to 
modify the effective date of changes to a firm's GSIB surcharge 
requirement following a change in its GSIB score. Under the proposed 
change to measure certain indicators based on average values over a 
four-quarter period, rather than year-end point-in-time values, it is 
possible that a GSIB may have greater ability to predict its applicable 
GSIB surcharge further in advance than under the current framework. In 
addition, under the proposed change to a narrower score band structure 
for determining method 2 surcharges, it is possible that incremental 
changes in GSIB surcharge requirements may be smaller than under the 
current approach.
    Given these dynamics, the Board requests comment regarding possible 
changes to the timing for an increase in a firm's GSIB surcharge to 
take effect following the calculation date. One potential approach 
could be for the effective date of the GSIB surcharge under both method 
1 and 2 to occur with a shorter lag, such that increases would take 
effect on April 1 of the year that immediately follows the calculation 
of the increased GSIB surcharge. This approach would have the benefit 
of providing a closer matching in time between the measurement of a 
firm's systemic indicators and the application of a GSIB surcharge 
based on that data.
    An alternative approach could be for the effective date of the GSIB 
surcharge under method 2, if binding, to coincide with the effective 
date of the stress capital buffer, October 1, of the year in which the 
increased GSIB surcharge was calculated. The effective date under 
method 1, if binding, could be April 1 or October 1 of the year that 
immediately follows the year in which the increased GSIB surcharge was 
calculated. This approach would have a similar benefit to the first 
approach, but also account for the consideration that the calculation 
of method 1 scores typically occurs later in the calendar year, based 
on the Board's publication date of the aggregate global measures used 
in the method 1 calculation.
    Question 7: What would be the advantages and disadvantages of 
adjusting the timing for a firm's GSIB surcharge to take effect 
following the calculation date of its GSIB score? To what extent would 
other elements of the proposal, such as averaging of indicators and a 
narrower method 2 score band structure, reduce the amount of time 
needed for a GSIB to meet a higher GSIB surcharge? How would such a 
change affect a GSIB's capital planning?
    Question 8: What would be the advantages and disadvantages of 
changing the effective date of a change to a firm's GSIB surcharge 
requirement to coincide with the effective date of the stress capital 
buffer requirement?
    Question 9: What other approaches to the effective date of the GSIB 
surcharge should the Board consider, and why?

D. Clarification for Reduction in GSIB Surcharge Calculated During the 
Intervening Year Between Calculation and Effective Date of a GSIB 
Surcharge Increase

    The proposal would amend section 217.403 of the capital rule to 
clarify ambiguity regarding the GSIB surcharge for a GSIB that 
calculates a GSIB score that would result in a higher GSIB surcharge 
taking effect on January 1 of the year that is one full calendar year 
after a calculation date, but then in the year after that calculation 
date calculates a GSIB score that would result in a lower GSIB score 
than the one scheduled to take effect. The proposal would clarify that 
in that situation, the lower, more recently calculated score would 
apply. The proposed clarification would specify that a firm's GSIB 
surcharge in effect for a calendar year is the surcharge calculated in 
the immediately prior calendar year, unless the surcharge calculated in 
the calendar year two years prior was lower, in which case the GSIB 
surcharge calculated in the calendar year two years prior shall be in 
effect. For example, a GSIB may calculate a GSIB score in 2024 that 
results in an increased GSIB surcharge from 2.0 to 2.2 percent to take 
effect on January 1, 2026. If, in 2025, that GSIB calculates a GSIB 
surcharge of 2.1 percent, the GSIB's effective surcharge on January 1, 
2026, would be the 2.1 percent calculated in 2025, instead of the 2.2 
percent calculated in 2024. If, in 2025, the GSIB calculates a GSIB 
surcharge of 2.3 percent, its effective surcharge on January 1, 2026, 
would be the 2.2 percent calculated in 2024.

[[Page 60391]]

E. Amendments to Systemic Indicators

    The Board is proposing to revise various aspects of the systemic 
indicators, as implemented in certain cases through the data collected 
on the FR Y-15. This section discusses these revisions, grouped by 
systemic indicator category. Unless otherwise noted, each proposed 
modification in this section would apply to all filers of the FR Y-15. 
Table 3 summarizes the proposed modifications to the GSIB framework and 
the FR Y-15 reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ The capital rule currently requires banking organizations 
subject to Category I and II standards to use SA-CCR to calculate 
standardized total risk-weighted assets and total leverage exposure 
and to use SA-CCR or the internal models methodology to calculate 
their advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets. Firms subject 
to Category III or IV standards may, but are not required to, use 
SA-CCR. The Board, with the OCC and the FDIC, is separately 
proposing changes to the capital rule that would remove the advanced 
approaches capital requirements and require firms subject to 
Category I, II, III, and IV standards to use SA-CCR to calculate 
total risk-weighted assets and total leverage exposure.

           Table 3--Proposed Amendments to Systemic Indicators
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Proposed amendments              Affected systemic indicators
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Revise definition of ``financial         Intra-financial system assets;
 institutions'' for interconnectedness    intra-financial system
 category and treatment of holdings of    liabilities; securities
 securities issued by an exchange-        outstanding.
 traded fund.
Clarify treatment of certain exposures   Intra-financial system assets;
 of a banking organization that arise     intra-financial system
 in connection with client cleared        liabilities; notional amount
 derivatives positions.                   of OTC derivatives.
Incorporate the standardized approach    Intra-financial system assets;
 for counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR)    intra-financial system
 to measure derivative exposures \22\.    liabilities.
Update treatment of non-cash collateral  Intra-financial system assets;
 in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives    intra-financial system
 transactions.                            liabilities.
Update treatment of certificates of      Securities outstanding.
 deposit.
Clarify scope for reporting of           Securities outstanding.
 preferred shares.
Introduce two trading volume indicators  Trading volume.
Update list of currencies..............  Payments activity.
Add derivatives exposures..............  Cross-jurisdictional claims;
                                          cross-jurisdictional
                                          liabilities.
Streamline reporting of the cross-       Cross-jurisdictional
 jurisdictional liabilities systemic      liabilities.
 indicator.
Technical edits to align the FR Y-15     Short-term wholesale funding.
 instructions for reporting short-term
 wholesale funding with the capital
 rule.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Interconnectedness and Complexity
a. Definition of ``Financial Institution'' and Treatment of Exchange-
Traded Funds
    Banking organizations often enter into transactions with other 
financial sector entities, giving rise to a range of obligations. These 
transactions can serve many purposes and can also serve as transmission 
channels for stress. Financial distress at a banking organization can 
materially raise the likelihood of distress at other firms given the 
network of obligations throughout the financial system. Accordingly, 
the GSIB framework includes as a measure of a banking organization's 
systemic risk profile indicators of its interconnectedness with other 
financial institutions and the financial sector as a whole.
    The GSIB surcharge framework measures interconnectedness using 
three systemic indicators: intra-financial system assets, intra-
financial system liabilities, and securities outstanding. For purpose 
of these indicators, the FR Y-15 instructions currently define 
``financial institutions'' as depository institutions, bank holding 
companies, securities brokers, securities dealers, insurance companies, 
mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, investment banks, and central 
counterparties. The definition excludes central banks and other public 
sector bodies, such as multilateral development banks and the Federal 
Home Loan Banks, but includes state-owned commercial banks. The 
definition also excludes stock exchanges, though stock exchanges may 
have subsidiaries that are included, such as securities dealers or 
central counterparties.
    This proposal would expand the definition of ``financial 
institution'' to include savings and loan holding companies, private 
equity funds, asset management companies, and exchange-traded funds. 
The proposed inclusion of savings and loan holding companies would 
clarify that a reporting firm should include positions with these firms 
in the same manner as other depository institution holding companies, 
since a banking organization's positions with these firms can act as a 
similar channel for transmission of distress that can undermine 
financial stability.
    The proposed inclusion of private equity funds in the 
interconnectedness indicators would be consistent with the purpose of 
the interconnectedness category to holistically assess a banking 
organization's exposures to and from other financial sector 
entities.\23\ Private equity funds are engaged in asset management 
activities, which are a financial activity, and they typically have 
transactions or relationships with a broad set of other financial 
market participants. Like with other asset management entities, 
perceptions of distress at a private equity fund could affect market 
perceptions of the soundness of other financial market participants. As 
such, they can present a similar channel for transmission of distress 
and financial instability as other asset management entities and other 
types of entities included in the definition of ``financial 
institution.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ The proposed change would not include the portfolio 
companies of a private equity fund unless a portfolio company itself 
meets the definition of ``financial institution.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed change regarding asset management companies would 
similarly reflect that positions with asset management companies, in 
addition to positions with the underlying funds managed by the 
companies, represent sources of financial sector interconnectedness.
    To improve clarity, the proposal would modify the FR Y-15 
instructions to specify that exchange-traded funds are included in the 
definition of ``financial institution,'' and would include in the line 
items for holdings of securities issued by other financial institutions 
(within the intra-financial system assets indicator) holdings of 
securities of an exchange-traded fund.

[[Page 60392]]

Currently, the instructions for this line item state not to include 
bond exchange-traded funds. Although the redemption structures for 
shares of exchange-traded funds generally differ from the structure of 
an open-ended mutual fund, asset management entities can have a variety 
of redemption structures and still act a source of financial sector 
interconnectedness. This change would improve the clarity of reporting 
instructions and the consistency of treatment of asset management 
entities and provide a more complete measure of a banking 
organization's interconnectedness.
    The proposal would implement these changes through revisions to the 
instructions of the FR Y-15 that would apply to all filers.
    Question 10: What other types of entities should the definition of 
``financial institution'' include, and why?
    Question 11: In what ways could the Board further improve clarity 
regarding the types of entities included in the term ``financial 
institution'' for purposes of the interconnectedness indicators?
b. Derivatives
    The proposal would revise the FR Y-15 instructions for the 
interconnectedness and complexity indicators--specifically, intra-
financial system assets and liabilities in the interconnectedness 
category and notional amount of OTC derivatives in the complexity 
category--to clarify the treatment of certain exposures of a banking 
organization that arise in connection with client cleared derivatives 
positions.
    When a banking organization acts as a derivatives clearing 
intermediary for a client, it generally does so under one of two 
structures: the principal model or the agent model. Under the principal 
model, the banking organization facilitates the clearing of derivatives 
for a client by becoming a direct counterparty to both the client and 
the central counterparty (CCP). Under the agency model, the clearing 
member client and the CCP face each other directly, and the banking 
organization provides to the CCP a guarantee of the client's 
performance.
    Under current reporting, all three indicators include client 
cleared derivative positions under the principal model. For the 
complexity indicator, filers must report the notional amounts 
associated with each of its positions with the CCP and the clearing 
member client. For the interconnectedness indicators, filers must 
report net exposures to the CCP and the net exposures to clients that 
fit the definition of a financial institution.
    To promote consistent treatment of the two clearing models and 
better capture sources of interconnectedness and complexity, the 
proposal would include in all three indicators (intra-financial system 
assets and intra-financial system liabilities in the interconnectedness 
category and notional amount of OTC derivatives in the complexity 
category) a firm's guarantees of client performance to a CCP with 
respect to client cleared derivative positions.
    For the interconnectedness indicators, inclusion of guarantees by a 
banking organization of a client's performance would provide a more 
accurate measurement of the firm's interconnectedness. While the 
banking organization is not the primary obligor under these positions, 
these positions could become transmission channels for distress if the 
banking organization experienced material distress or failure.
    For the complexity indicator, inclusion of guarantees by a banking 
organization of a client's performance on derivative contracts would 
provide a more accurate assessment of the firm's complexity, because it 
would provide a more complete picture of the firm's derivative 
exposures. As OTC derivatives contribute to complexity, whether the 
banking organization is a primary or secondary obligor, a more accurate 
representation of the notional amount of OTC derivatives exposures 
would improve the Board's ability to assess systemic risk.
    Question 12: What are the advantages and disadvantages of including 
in the interconnectedness and complexity indicators guarantees of 
client performance to a CCP with respect to client cleared derivative 
positions?
    The proposal would also update the reporting of derivative 
positions in the interconnectedness indicators to align with amendments 
to the capital rule in 2019 that adopted the standardized approach for 
counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR). The indicators for intra-financial 
system assets and intra-financial system liabilities include the net 
fair value and potential future exposure of OTC derivatives with other 
financial institutions, as calculated under the capital rule. The 
current instructions specify that firms should use the current exposure 
method to calculate the potential future exposure of these positions. 
The proposal would update the instructions for the relevant line items, 
5(b) and 11(b) in the interconnectedness category, to provide instead 
for calculation using SA-CCR for a banking organization that uses SA-
CCR. Specifically, the proposal would state that a firm should report 
the exposure amount of derivatives in accordance with the capital rule, 
12 CFR 217.34(a). This change would align with the measurement of 
derivatives in the interconnectedness category with that used in the 
size category, as well as in the calculation of standardized total 
risk-weighted assets and total leverage exposure in the capital rule.
    In addition, the proposal would allow a banking organization to 
recognize, for purposes of the intra-financial system assets and intra-
financial system liabilities indicators, the value of non-cash 
collateral to offset the net fair value of derivatives if such 
collateral is financial collateral (as defined in the capital rule, 12 
CFR 217.2) and if adjusted for the applicable haircuts under SA-CCR or 
the current exposure method, depending on which the banking 
organization uses in accordance with the capital rule, 12 CFR 
217.34(a). Specifically, this proposal would revise line items 5(a) and 
11(a) in the interconnectedness category of the FR Y-15. This change 
would provide recognition of risk mitigants that reduce the impact to 
other financial institutions from a firm's failure.
c. Securities Outstanding
    The proposal would revise the scope of certain exposures measured 
under the securities outstanding systemic indicator in the 
interconnectedness category. First, the proposal would revise the FR Y-
15 instructions to indicate that filers should not report a certificate 
of deposit in the securities outstanding indicator if the certificate 
of deposit is not due to or held by a financial institution and is non-
transferable. This modification would exclude such certificates of 
deposit from the interconnectedness category because they are not, and 
cannot become, exposures due to or held by a financial institution.
    Consistent with the purpose of the interconnectedness indicators, 
filers would continue to include in the securities outstanding 
indicator a certificate of deposit that is issued to a financial 
institution and a certificate of deposit that is transferable.
    The proposal would also modify the instructions for other items 
included in the securities outstanding systemic indicator in order to 
provide greater clarity to filers. Specifically, the proposal would 
require banking organizations to include preferred shares that have a 
determinable fair value in the securities outstanding systemic 
indicator, even if the preferred shares are not registered with the

[[Page 60393]]

Securities and Exchange Commission or listed on a securities exchange. 
The proposed change would clarify the FR Y-15 instructions, which state 
that publicly traded instruments must be reported. The proposed change 
is intended to include instruments for which banking organizations can 
easily determine a fair value, which can be done for securities for 
which there is an active market. The proposed change would be 
consistent with the intent of the securities outstanding category to 
accurately measure issued and outstanding debt and equity instruments 
of a banking organization.
    Question 13: What further modifications or clarifications to the 
securities outstanding systemic indicator should the Board consider, 
and why?
    Question 14: What are the advantages and disadvantages of the 
proposed revisions to the interconnectedness and complexity categories? 
What other changes should the Board consider, and why?
ii. Substitutability
a. Trading Volume
    The substitutability category used in method 1 measures the extent 
to which a banking organization provides critical financial services 
and infrastructure to third parties and the broader financial system 
that would be difficult to substitute in a period of financial stress 
or failure. Currently, there are three substitutability indicators: (1) 
payments activity; (2) assets under custody; and (3) underwritten 
transactions in debt and equity markets.
    The proposal would revise the substitutability category to 
introduce two new systemic indicators, ``trading volume--fixed income'' 
and ``trading volume--equity and other,'' as a complement to the 
existing systemic indicator for underwritten transactions in debt and 
equity markets.
    The proposed inclusion in the substitutability category of trading 
volume in addition to underwriting activity would provide a broader 
measure of the extent to which a banking organization's activities 
contribute to liquidity in the primary market (underwriting) and 
secondary market (trading). The permitted trading activity of banking 
organizations, such as market making, can promote market liquidity, 
thereby enhancing price discovery and permitting market participants to 
manage financial risk more holistically. The provision of market-making 
services can require substantial investments in information technology 
and infrastructure, making it difficult to substitute in a period of 
financial stress or firm default. The proposal would include separate 
systemic indicators for trading volume in fixed income and in equities 
and other securities to avoid disproportionate impact due to 
differences in overall trading volumes in the two markets.
    The FR Y-15 sections for the substitutability indicators (Schedules 
C and J) currently include these measures as memoranda line items. The 
proposal would move these line items into the main section of Schedule 
C to reflect their inclusion as new systemic indicators.\24\ The 
indicator for trading volume in fixed income securities includes money 
market instruments, certificates of deposit, bills, bonds, and other 
fixed income securities, such as commercial paper, corporate bonds, 
syndicated corporate loans, covered bonds, convertible debt, and 
securitized products.\25\ This indicator includes securities issued by 
public sector entities (as defined in 12 CFR 217.2) as well as 
securities issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored agencies, 
multilateral development banks, and state and local governments, but 
does not include securities issued by a sovereign, as defined in 12 CFR 
217.2. The indicator for trading volume of equities and other 
securities includes all publicly traded equities (as defined in 12 CFR 
217.2), including American depositary receipts (ADRs) and global 
depositary receipts (GDRs), unlisted equity securities, preferred 
stock, trust preferred securities, and securities issued by investment 
funds, as defined in 12 CFR 217.2.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ As discussed in section II.F of this Supplementary 
Information section below, the proposal would remove Schedule J to 
streamline reporting by foreign banking organizations.
    \25\ See FR Y-15 Instructions, Schedule C, line items M5, M5(a), 
M5(b), and M6.
    \26\ See FR Y-15 Instructions, Schedule C, line items M5, M5(c), 
M5(d), and M7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal would also modify the weighting of the indicators for 
substitutability in a firm's method 1 GSIB score calculation to reflect 
the addition of the two new indicators. Currently, the indicator for 
underwritten transactions in debt and equity markets receives a 6.67 
percent weighting. The proposal would reallocate a portion of this 
weighting to the two new indicators: the indicator for underwritten 
transactions in debt and equity markets would receive a 3.33 percent 
weighting, and the trading volume--fixed income and trading volume--
equity and other systemic indicators would each receive a 1.67 percent 
weight. The remaining systemic indicators in the substitutability 
category would retain their current weighting of 6.67 percent each. The 
inclusion of the proposed systemic indicators for trading volume would 
not affect a GSIB's method 2 score calculation, as method 2 does not 
include the substitutability category of indicators.
    Question 15: What are the advantages and disadvantages of the 
proposed trading volume systemic indicators as measures of a banking 
organization's substitutability, based on its contributions to 
efficient market functioning? What alternative indicators, if any, 
should the Board consider?
    Question 16: What, if any, other trading instruments and exposures 
besides those mentioned above should the proposed systemic indicators 
for trading volume include, and why?
b. Currencies Included in the Payments Activity Systemic Indicator and 
Associated Memoranda Items
    The payments activity indicator includes the value of all cash 
payments sent via large-value payment systems, along with the value of 
all cash payments sent through an agent (for example, using a 
correspondent or nostro account), over the calendar year in major 
global currencies. To determine which currencies to include in this 
indicator, the Board considers factors such as the extent to which a 
currency represents a material share of global foreign exchange market 
turnover, among other factors.\27\ In identifying major currencies, the 
Board takes into account the list of major currencies announced by the 
Basel Committee for purposes of the international GSIB surcharge 
standard, including updates typically announced by the Basel Committee 
every three years.\28\ The FR Y-15 also collects payments activity for 
certain other currencies (memorandum item currencies) that are not used 
at sufficient volumes to be included in the payments activity metric, 
in order to help inform the selection of major currencies in the future 
and monitor activity more consistently over time in currencies that may 
become major currencies in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ For example, a currency may also be considered a major 
currency if it represents a material share of global nominal gross 
domestic product (GDP).
    \28\ See, e.g., Instructions for the end-2022 G-SIB assessment 
exercise, January 2023, available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/gsib/instr_end22_gsib.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal would update the list of currencies that are included 
in the payments activity systemic indicator to reflect changes in the 
materiality of

[[Page 60394]]

certain currencies' share of global foreign exchange market turnover. 
The proposal would also update the list of currencies that are not 
included in the payments activity systemic indicator but that are 
collected as memorandum item currencies.
    The proposal would revise the payments activity systemic indicator 
to include the Singapore dollar based on its use in global foreign 
exchange markets, and to remove the Brazilian real and the Mexican peso 
from the systemic indicator based on their reduced relative use in 
global foreign exchange markets. Based on the 2022 Triennial Central 
Bank Survey published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
the Singapore dollar accounted for over 2 percent of foreign exchange 
market turnover in April 2022.\29\ The Mexican peso, which the FR Y-15 
currently includes in the payments systemic indicator, accounted for 
slightly less than 2 percent of foreign exchange market turnover, and 
the Brazilian real, which the FR Y-15 also currently includes in the 
payments systemic indicator, accounted for significantly less than 2 
percent of foreign exchange market turnover.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ The BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey is a comprehensive 
source of information on the size and structure of global over-the-
counter markets in foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives. 
The BIS coordinates the Triennial Survey every three years. The 
foreign exchange turnover part of the 2022 Triennial Survey took 
place in April 2022 and involved central banks and other authorities 
in 52 jurisdictions. These authorities collected data from more than 
1,200 banks and other dealers and reported national aggregates to 
the BIS for inclusion in global aggregates. See Triennial Central 
Bank Survey, October 2022, available at https://www.bis.org/statistics/rpfx22_fx.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposal, the Board would continue to collect data on 
payments in the Mexican peso on the FR Y-15 as a memorandum item 
currency, based on its share of foreign exchange market turnover. In 
addition, the proposal would add payments activity in Norwegian krone 
and South Korean won as memoranda item currencies on the FR Y-15. These 
currencies each accounted for slightly less than 2 percent of foreign 
exchange market turnover, based on the Triennial Central Bank Survey. 
Like other memoranda item currencies, the Norwegian krone and South 
Korean won would not be included in the payments activity systemic 
indicator under the proposal.
    The proposal would amend the FR Y-15 to no longer collect data on 
payments activity in Russian rubles and the Brazilian real, which are 
currently included as memoranda item currencies, as the foreign 
exchange market turnover for these currencies is significantly less 
than the other currencies for which the report collects information.
    Question 17: Which, if any, other currencies should the Board 
include in the payments activity systemic indicator or as memorandum 
item currencies, and why?
    Question 18: Which, if any, of the currencies that would be 
included in the payments activity systemic indicator or as memorandum 
item currencies should the Board not include, and why?
c. Clarifications for the Payments Activity Indicator
    The proposal would make additional changes to the FR Y-15 
instructions for the payments activity indicator to improve clarity for 
filers. First, the proposal would modify the instructions for payments 
made in the last four quarters to more clearly state the current 
requirement that filers should include in their reported values the 
quarter including the as-of date of the report. This clarification 
would make no substantive change to the current instructions. 
Additionally, the proposal would update a footnote in the instructions 
for line item 1, which cites a report published by the Bank for 
International Settlements' Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, 
to reflect a change in the name of this body to the Committee on 
Payments and Market Infrastructures and to provide an updated 
hyperlink.
iii. Cross-Jurisdictional Activity
a. Cross-Jurisdictional Derivatives Activity
    Banking organizations with large cross-border activities and 
exposures may be more difficult and costly to resolve than domestically 
focused banking organizations in the event of a failure. The greater a 
banking organization's exposures across borders and to non-domestic 
counterparties, the more difficult it can be to coordinate its 
resolution were it to fail. In addition, cross-jurisdictional activity 
can add complexity and present channels for transmission of distress 
with parties in different jurisdictions. The two systemic indicators 
included in this category--cross-jurisdictional claims and cross-
jurisdictional liabilities--measure a depository institution holding 
company's global profile by considering its activity and exposures 
outside of the United States.
    Under the current FR Y-15 instructions, neither of these indicators 
for cross-jurisdictional activity include derivative exposures. 
Derivatives, however, can give rise to cross-jurisdictional claims and 
liabilities, present sources of cross-border complexity, and act as 
channels for transmission of distress in the same manner as other 
assets and liabilities or even to a greater extent to amplify the 
effect of a banking organization's failure. (The failure of Lehman 
Brothers during the 2007-09 financial crisis presents a notable 
example.) Omission of derivatives from the systemic indicators for 
cross-jurisdictional activity can materially understate this measure 
for a banking organization, and also present opportunities for a 
banking organization to use derivatives to structure its exposures in a 
manner that reduces the value of its systemic indicators without 
reducing the risks the indicator is intended to measure.
    Accordingly, the proposal would revise the systemic indicators for 
cross-jurisdictional claims and cross-jurisdictional liabilities to 
include derivative exposures. As a result of this change, these 
indicators would provide a more accurate and comprehensive measure of a 
banking organization's cross-jurisdictional activity and the associated 
risks intended to be captured. Under the proposal, cross-jurisdictional 
derivative claims and cross-jurisdictional derivative liabilities would 
be calculated gross of collateral in order to measure the underlying 
scale of a banking organization's cross-jurisdictional derivatives 
activity. A banking organization may be engaged in significant cross-
jurisdictional derivatives business even if its cross-jurisdictional 
claims and liabilities are relatively small net of collateral. The 
proposal would implement the modification to include derivative 
exposures to the cross-jurisdictional activity category systemic 
indicators through revisions to the FR Y-15, which currently collects 
such cross-jurisdictional derivative exposures as memoranda items.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Currently, the cross-jurisdictional derivative claims 
memorandum item is reported net of cash collateral. Under the 
proposal, a banking organization would report cross-jurisdictional 
derivative claims gross of cash and other collateral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to its usage under the GSIB surcharge framework, cross-
jurisdictional activity as reported on the FR Y-15 also serves as a 
risk-based indicator in the Board's framework for determining the 
applicable category of prudential standards for large banking 
organizations. Specifically, a banking organization that has cross-
jurisdictional activity of $75 billion or more is subject to Category 
II standards.\31\ The proposed change would therefore also have the 
effect of

[[Page 60395]]

improving the measurement of cross-jurisdictional activity for the 
purposes of determining the application of prudential standards for 
large banking organizations, for the same reasons described above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ See 12 CFR 252.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 19: What other modifications, if any, would improve 
measurement of the cross-jurisdictional activity indicators?
b. Other Changes to Measurement of Cross-Jurisdictional Activity 
Indicators
    Currently, the FR Y-15 instructions direct filers to measure cross-
jurisdictional liabilities by referencing instructions for the Treasury 
International Capital reports and the Country Exposure Report (FFIEC 
009). To streamline the reporting instructions for cross-jurisdictional 
liabilities, the proposal would remove references to the Treasury 
International Capital reports, consolidate line items related to cross-
jurisdictional liabilities, and apply consistent definitions with the 
FFIEC 009 for the measurement of cross-jurisdictional liabilities. This 
approach would result in a consistent methodology for measuring the 
consolidated cross-jurisdictional liabilities of firms while 
simplifying the reporting instructions.
    As part of this change, the proposal would revise the scope of the 
cross-jurisdictional liabilities indicator to include total liabilities 
booked at foreign offices regardless of whether payment is guaranteed 
at locations outside the country of the office. Foreign office 
liabilities may present complexity or increase the difficulty and cost 
of resolving a banking organization in the event of a failure 
regardless of whether payments are guaranteed at locations outside the 
country of the office. Therefore, this revision would better reflect a 
banking organization's cross-jurisdictional activities and exposures.
    The proposal would also make other revisions to the FR Y-15 
instructions for cross-jurisdictional activity to provide greater 
clarity to filers.
iv. Short-Term Wholesale Funding
    The proposal would make amendments to the short-term wholesale 
funding indicator and its associated FR Y-15 instructions to improve 
the consistency of data measurement and reporting, reduce operational 
burden, and improve the clarity of reporting instructions. For purposes 
of the method 2 surcharge, short-term wholesale funding measures the 
ratio of weighted daily average wholesale funding with a remaining 
maturity of one year or less to average risk weighted assets. In 
addition to the method 2 surcharge, short-term wholesale funding is 
also used to determine the applicable category of prudential standards 
under the regulatory tiering framework adopted by the Board in 2019. 
Specifically, a firm with weighted short-term wholesale funding of $75 
billion or more is subject to Category III standards.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See 12 CFR part 252, subpart A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Alignment With Other Requirements
    To improve consistency of data measurement and reporting and reduce 
operational burden for filers, the proposal would align the maturity 
categories used to calculate a firm's short-term wholesale funding 
score under the GSIB surcharge framework and reported on the FR Y-15 
with the maturity categories used for liquidity data reporting on the 
Complex Institution Liquidity Monitoring Report (FR 2052a) and for 
purposes of the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) rule,\33\ by moving the 
start and end dates for certain categories by one day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See 12 CFR part 249; see also Net Stable Funding Ratio: 
Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards and Disclosure Requirements, 86 
FR 9120 (Feb. 11, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Due to recent amendments to the FR 2052a to align the report with 
the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) rule,\34\ there is currently a one-
day difference between the start and end dates for certain maturity 
categories for reporting data items on the FR Y-15 and the FR 2052a. 
Specifically, one of the maturity categories in the FR 2052a and under 
the NSFR rule includes a lower bound of 180 days. The short-term 
wholesale funding indicator under the GSIB surcharge framework and the 
FR Y-15 reporting form, however, include a category for remaining 
maturity of 181 to 365 days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal would modify the maturity category of 91 to 180 days 
under the GSIB surcharge framework and FR Y-15 to a remaining maturity 
of 91 to 179 days, and the maturity category of 181 to 365 days to a 
maturity of 180 to 364 days, to align with the FR 2052a. This change 
would improve consistency and reduce operational burdens, for example, 
by allowing banking organizations to pull data from the FR 2052a to 
complete FR Y-15 reporting.
b. Sweep Deposits
    The GSIB surcharge framework's method 2 score calculation of short-
term wholesale funding requires banking organizations to include 
brokered deposits, as defined in the Board's liquidity coverage ratio 
and NSFR rules.\35\ The proposal would make a conforming amendment to 
the GSIB surcharge framework's reference to brokered deposits to align 
with a 2021 change to the defined term under the Board's liquidity 
rules. In the 2021 NSFR final rule, the Board amended the definition of 
``brokered deposit'' to create a separate defined term, ``sweep 
deposits,'' for a category of funding that had previously been included 
in the scope of the term ``brokered deposits.'' \36\
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    \35\ 12 CFR part 249.
    \36\ ``Net Stable Funding Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement 
Standards and Disclosure Requirements,'' 86 FR 9120 (February 11, 
2021). A sweep deposit is a deposit held at a banking organization 
by a customer or counterparty through a contractual feature that 
automatically transfers to the banking organization from another 
regulated financial company at the close of business each day 
amounts identified under the agreement governing the account from 
which the amount is being transferred. See 12 CFR 249.3. The 2021 
change was also consistent with amendments adopted by the FDIC to 
its regulations regarding brokered deposits. See ``Unsafe and 
Unsound Banking Practices: Brokered Deposits and Interest Rate 
Restrictions,'' 86 FR 6742 (January 22, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal would clarify that the change to create a separate 
defined term for this class of funding was not intended to scope sweep 
deposits out of the short-term wholesale funding indicator in the GSIB 
surcharge framework. Specifically, the proposal would amend the GSIB 
surcharge framework to add ``sweep deposits'' to the scope of the 
short-term wholesale funding indicator and add a definition of ``sweep 
deposits.'' The Board made similar conforming terminology changes to 
the FR Y-15 and its instructions for Schedules G and N, ``Short-Term 
Wholesale Funding Indicator,'' line item 1.b, ``Retail brokered 
deposits and sweeps,'' as well as the glossary entry for ``sweep 
deposit,'' as of the June 30, 2021, reporting period.
c. Short-Term Wholesale Funding Calculation
    The proposal would revise the General Instructions for the short-
term wholesale funding indicator in the FR Y-15 to more closely align 
with the GSIB surcharge framework. The revised instructions would 
clarify that firms should report short-term wholesale funding 
consistent with the definition in the capital rule.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See 12 CFR 217.406(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 20: In addition to the proposed changes, what additional 
changes, if any, should the Board consider making to the FR Y-15, and 
why--for example, to improve the measurement of indicators and systemic 
risk or to reduce operational reporting burdens?

[[Page 60396]]

F. Foreign Banking Organization Reporting Requirements

    In 2019, in connection with the final rule establishing categories 
and thresholds for determining prudential standards for large banking 
organizations, the Board added new Schedules H through N to the FR Y-
15, which apply solely to foreign banking organizations and their U.S. 
intermediate holding companies. The new schedules were intended to 
simplify reporting for foreign banking organizations and their 
intermediate holding companies. However, based on experience since this 
change, the Board is proposing to consolidate FR Y-15 reporting for 
U.S. and foreign banking organizations on a single set of schedules to 
reduce technical challenges and operational burden and improve 
administration and consistency of reporting.
    To simplify and streamline the reporting form and its instructions, 
the proposal would remove Schedules H through N and make adjustments to 
accommodate reporting by foreign banking organizations using the same 
schedules as domestic firms, Schedules A through G. Under the proposal, 
a foreign banking organization would file Schedules A through G for its 
combined U.S. operations and separately for any applicable U.S. 
intermediate holding company. This change would only reorganize the way 
that foreign banking organizations report the FR Y-15 and would not 
change the actual information collected. The proposal would make 
corresponding updates to the FR Y-15 instructions to reflect this 
change.

G. Implementation and Timing

    The proposal's amendments to the capital rule, FR Y-15, and FR Y-15 
instructions would take effect two calendar quarters after the date of 
adoption of a final rule. This effective date timing would give firms a 
minimum of two quarters to make the required changes to their systems 
and processes. During the initial three quarters following the 
effective date, items that require a four-quarter average or sum would 
include data from quarters for which the underlying reporting 
instructions differ. Banking organizations would not be required to 
adjust data reported in previous quarters when calculating these four-
quarter averages or sums. A banking organization that does not have 
data for an indicator for a previous quarter would be required to use a 
pro-rata approach.
    Question 21: What alternative implementation timing should the 
Board consider and why?
    Question 22: To the extent that the Board decides to adopt any 
particular element of this proposal and not to adopt other elements of 
this proposal, how should the Board account for that for those elements 
of the proposal that are adopted? Which elements of the proposal, if 
any, would require adjustment if another element is not adopted and 
what adjustments should the Board consider?

H. Interaction With Other Proposals

    The Board, with the OCC and FDIC, is separately issuing a proposal 
that would revise the agencies' risk-based capital framework applicable 
to banking organizations with at least $100 billion in total assets and 
their depository institution subsidiaries and to banking organizations 
with significant trading activities (the capital proposal).\38\ The 
capital proposal would require these banking organizations to use more 
risk-sensitive standardized approaches and reduce the use of internal 
models to enhance consistency in capital requirements across these 
banking organizations and better reflect the risks of these banking 
organizations' exposures.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ In addition to revising risk-based capital requirements, 
the capital proposal would also revise the applicability of the 
supplementary leverage ratio and countercyclical capital buffer 
requirements to include all banking organizations with at least $100 
billion in total assets and their depository institution 
subsidiaries.
    \39\ The capital proposal also includes certain proposed 
amendments to the FR Y-15 form and instructions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 23: What modifications, if any, should the Board consider 
to this proposal due to the capital proposal?

III. Impact

    This section assesses the impact of the proposed changes, using 
supervisory data for 2021 and 2022. The impact analysis focuses on 
domestic GSIBs, which would see small changes to their GSIB scores and 
capital surcharges as a result of the proposal.\40\ Additionally, some 
proposed changes, such as the amendments to the FR Y-15 reporting 
requirements, would affect all FR Y-15 filers, as well as, potentially, 
their categorizations and requirements under the regulatory tiering 
framework for large banking organizations.\41\ Overall, the Board 
expects that the systemic stability and operational benefits of the 
proposed changes would outweigh their relatively small costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ Where not explicitly noted, the impact analysis considers 
the proposal's impact on both method 1 and method 2 GSIB scores, 
although method 2 GSIB scores determine the applicable capital 
surcharges of GSIBs at the time of this proposal. Currently, there 
are eight GSIBs in the United States: Bank of America Corporation, 
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, Citigroup Inc., The Goldman 
Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street 
Corporation, and Wells Fargo & Company.
    \41\ See 12 CFR part 252, subpart A; see also 84 FR 59230.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board analyzed the combined benefits and costs of the proposal. 
Where feasible and relevant, the Board assessed the effects of 
measuring systemic indicators by using averages of daily or monthly 
values (henceforth: ``averaging'') and using narrow GSIB score bands 
separately from the rest of the proposed changes. The analysis also 
considered potential interactions between the proposal and other 
elements of the regulatory framework for banking organizations, such as 
the regulatory tiering framework, and with proposed changes by the 
Board, OCC, and FDIC to make amendments to their capital rule for large 
banking organizations and banking organizations with significant 
trading activity (the capital proposal, as described above in section 
II.H of this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section).

A. Benefits of the Proposed Changes

    The proposed changes would increase the stability of the financial 
system by better aligning firms' applicable GSIB capital surcharges 
with the intended functioning of the GSIB framework. The proposal would 
achieve this by enhancing the risk sensitivity of method 1 and method 2 
GSIB scores as well as implementing a more continuous correspondence 
between the method 2 GSIB scores and the applicable capital surcharges.
    The reporting of systemic indicators on an average, rather than 
point-in-time, basis would improve the measurement of firms' systemic 
footprints and reduce opportunities for firms to lower their systemic 
indicators at year end so that they receive lower GSIB capital 
surcharges than warranted by their actual systemic footprints, as 
measured by the value of their systemic indicators at other times of 
the year. Both internal staff analysis and empirical evidence in Berry, 
Khan, and Rezende (2020) show that some domestic GSIBs have reported 
reduced systemic indicators at year end relative to amounts reported on 
other dates, especially reporting reduced ``complexity'' systemic 
indicators before year end.\42\ Averaging would both

[[Page 60397]]

reduce the incentive and the associated social costs of this practice, 
such as the potential reduction of market depth and willingness to 
participate in related market segments at year end, which is an 
important consideration given the supply of liquidity that GSIBs 
provide in financial markets.\43\ Additionally, averaging would also 
have the benefit of making the measurement of systemic indicators more 
robust to seasonal (intra-year) fluctuations and thus yielding a more 
accurate measure of firms' systemic footprints for the determination of 
GSIB capital surcharges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ For more details, see Berry, J., Khan, A., and Rezende, M., 
``How Do U.S. Global Systemically Important Banks Lower Their 
Capital Surcharges?,'' FEDS Notes (2020) and working paper (2021, 
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3764965).
    \43\ For the role of domestic GSIBs as liquidity providers and 
``lenders of second-to-last resort'' in U.S. Treasury repurchase 
agreement and foreign exchange swap markets, see Correa, R., Du, W., 
and Liao, G.Y., ``U.S. Banks and Global Liquidity,'' National Bureau 
of Economic Research working paper 27491 (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments to FR Y-15 reporting requirements would 
further enhance the risk sensitivity of GSIB scores by improving the 
measurement of firms' systemic footprints. Most of the amendments would 
entail small refinements to the cross-jurisdictional activity, 
interconnectedness, and short-term wholesale funding systemic 
indicators. Additionally, many of the amendments would improve 
measurement and reporting consistency across jurisdictions, by aligning 
with changes to the international GSIB surcharge standard published by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
    The benefits of implementing more narrow method 2 GSIB score bands 
would include reducing cliff effects and improving the alignment 
between firms' systemic footprints and their capital surcharges. Cliff 
effects occur when firms cross the boundary between two score bands and 
thus experience a relatively large change in their applicable capital 
surcharges, which could affect their marginal lending, investment, and 
capital distribution decisions. Narrow score bands would substantially 
reduce the size of these changes in the capital surcharge (from 50 
basis points to 10 basis points), thereby making the transition between 
score bands and the related changes in firms' cost of capital smoother. 
Narrow score bands would also have the benefit of tying the applicable 
capital surcharges more closely to firms' systemic footprints, as 
measured by method 2 GSIB scores. Specifically, the proposal would 
ensure that firms with similar systemic footprints are assigned similar 
capital surcharges by reducing score differences across GSIBs that fall 
in the same band.
    Crucially, under the proposal, the rate of change in the GSIB 
capital surcharge per score change (that is, the steepness of the 
surcharge schedule) would be unchanged, and firms would retain their 
ability to determine their capital surcharges in the long run by 
adjusting their systemic risk profiles.

B. Costs of the Proposed Changes

    The proposal would modestly increase the GSIB scores and capital 
surcharges of GSIBs, with minimal effect on their cost of capital and 
real economic activity. The Board estimates that most of the method 2 
score increase would be driven by the addition of cross-jurisdictional 
derivative exposures to the cross-jurisdictional activity systemic 
indicators, which would increase method 2 GSIB scores by about 11 
points on average across firms. The averaging of systemic indicators 
would have a somewhat smaller effect, increasing method 2 GSIB scores 
by about 9 points on average across firms. This effect would primarily 
affect the scores of those GSIBs that have recently reported lower 
systemic indicators at year end such that they received lower GSIB 
capital surcharges than would be warranted based on typical systemic 
indicator values at other times of the year. Notably, the 
implementation of narrow score bands would not affect GSIB scores, and 
the proposed score bands would not have a material effect on firms' 
GSIB capital surcharges.
    Considering all proposed changes, the Board estimates that their 
combined effect would increase method 2 GSIB scores by about 27 points 
on average across firms, which corresponds to an about 13-basis-point 
increase in the average method 2 GSIB capital surcharge. At the end of 
2022, the combined effect of the proposed changes would correspond to 
an about $13 billion aggregate increase in the risk-based capital 
requirements of domestic GSIBs.
    Finally, the Board anticipates that the proposal may increase the 
costs of regulatory compliance, as detailed below in the Paperwork 
Reduction Act section of the preamble.

C. Interaction With Other Rules and Proposals

    The last part of this impact analysis considers the interactions of 
the proposal with other elements of the regulatory framework for 
banking organizations. Specifically, the Board examined the interaction 
of the proposal with the regulatory tiering framework, capital 
proposal, and long-term debt and total loss-absorbing capacity 
requirements.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See 12 CFR part 252, subpart G; see also 85 FR 17003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board estimates that the proposed revisions to the cross-
jurisdictional activity systemic indicator would not have a material 
impact on the category of prudential standards applicable to any 
domestic banking organization. The Board estimates that the proposed 
revisions would substantially increase the reported value of cross-
jurisdictional activity of the combined U.S. operations and U.S. 
intermediate holding companies of most foreign banking organizations 
that have combined U.S. assets of $100 billion or more. For some of 
these firms, this change could result in the application of more 
stringent capital and liquidity standards.
    For the combined U.S. operations of most foreign banking 
organizations that have combined U.S. assets of $100 billion or more, 
the reported value of cross-jurisdictional activity would increase 
above $75 billion as a result of the proposal. This change would result 
in seven foreign banking organizations that are currently subject to 
Category III or IV standards becoming subject to Category II standards, 
which include requirements for daily liquidity reporting (rather than 
monthly or no liquidity reporting); monthly (rather than quarterly) 
internal liquidity stress testing; and full (rather than reduced) 
liquidity risk management. This change would have the benefit of 
enhancing the liquidity positions and liquidity risk management of 
these foreign banking organizations' U.S. operations at the cost of 
somewhat higher administrative expenses.
    For the U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign banking 
organizations, the Board estimates that the increase in the reported 
value of cross-jurisdictional activity would move two firms that are 
currently subject to Category III standards to Category II, making them 
subject to more stringent capital and liquidity requirements. 
Consequently, these two firms would have to conduct annual company-run 
stress testing (rather than every two years); recognize accumulated 
other comprehensive income (AOCI) in their regulatory capital; and meet 
the full (rather than 85 percent reduced) standardized liquidity 
requirements. The Board expects that the two affected U.S. intermediate 
holding companies would not incur significant costs to meet the 
increased liquidity requirements because they had sufficiently large 
liquidity buffers throughout 2022 and in the first quarter

[[Page 60398]]

of 2023. The impact of AOCI inclusion in regulatory capital would be 
small, while the cost of increasing the frequency of company-run stress 
tests would likely be modest for these firms.\45\ A notable benefit of 
the proposed change would be to make the categorization and regulatory 
treatment of banking organizations more consistent within the tiering 
framework through the enhanced measurement of the cross-jurisdictional 
activities of banking organizations, which would ensure the application 
of more stringent requirements for firms with significant cross-
jurisdictional activity.
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    \45\ Under the capital proposal, the Board, OCC, and FDIC are 
separately proposing to require banking organizations subject to 
Category III and IV standards to recognize AOCI in their regulatory 
capital, in addition to banking organizations subject to Category I 
and II standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The capital proposal, which the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC are 
concurrently proposing, would also interact with the effects of this 
proposal on the scores and surcharges of GSIBs through changes to the 
calculation of risk-weighted assets of these firms under the capital 
rule. The capital proposal would increase the risk-weighted assets of 
most GSIBs, affecting their GSIB capital surcharge in two ways. First, 
the risk-weighted asset change would reduce the short-term wholesale 
funding systemic indicators of most GSIBs (by mechanically increasing 
the denominator of the indicator), which in turn would reduce their 
capital surcharges. Second, the dollar amounts of the capital surcharge 
changes under the proposal would be proportionally larger due to the 
change in risk-weighted assets.
    Finally, the Board considered how the small increase in method 1 
and method 2 GSIB scores would affect the long-term debt and total 
loss-absorbing capacity requirements of GSIBs. The increase in GSIB 
scores would have no immediate impact on long-term debt requirements 
because it only affects the risk-based long-term debt requirement, 
which was not binding at the end of 2021 for any of the domestic GSIBs. 
Meanwhile, the Board estimates that the total loss-absorbing capacity 
requirement would increase by a small amount for one GSIB as a result 
of increases to method 1 GSIB scores under the proposal.

IV. Administrative Law Matters

A. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

    Certain provisions of the proposed rule contain ``collections of 
information'' within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521). The Board may not conduct or sponsor, and 
a respondent is not required to respond to, an information collection 
unless it displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) control number. The Board reviewed the proposed rule under the 
authority delegated to the Board by OMB.
    The proposed rule contains reporting requirements subject to the 
PRA. To implement these requirements, the Board proposes to revise the 
Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15; OMB No. 7100-0352).
    Comments are invited on the following:
    (a) Whether the proposed collections of information are necessary 
for the proper performance of the Board's functions, including whether 
the information has practical utility;
    (b) The accuracy of the estimates of the burden of the proposed 
information collections, including the validity of the methodology and 
assumptions used;
    (c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected;
    (d) Ways to minimize the burden of the information collections on 
respondents, including using automated collection techniques or other 
forms of information technology; and
    (e) Estimates of capital or startup costs and costs of operation, 
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
    Comments on aspects of this proposed rule that may affect reporting 
or recordkeeping requirements and burden estimates should be sent to 
the addresses listed in the ADDRESSES section of the Supplementary 
Information. A copy of the comments may also be submitted to the OMB 
desk officer for the Agencies: By mail to U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget, 725 17th Street NW, #10235, Washington, DC 20503 or by 
facsimile to (202) 395-5806, Attention, Federal Banking Agency Desk 
Officer.
Proposed Revision, With Extension, of the Following Information 
Collection
    Collection title: Systemic Risk Report.
    Collection identifier: FR Y-15.
    OMB control number: 7100-0352.
    General description of report: The FR Y-15 quarterly report 
collects systemic risk data from U.S. bank holding companies and 
covered savings and loan holding companies with total consolidated 
assets of $100 billion or more, any U.S.-based bank holding company 
designated as a GSIB that does not meet the consolidated assets 
threshold, and foreign banking organizations with $100 billion or more 
in combined U.S. assets. The Board uses the FR Y-15 data to monitor, on 
an ongoing basis, the systemic risk profile of subject institutions. In 
addition, the FR Y-15 is used to (1) facilitate the implementation of 
the GSIB surcharge rule, (2) identify other institutions that may 
present significant systemic risk, and (3) analyze the systemic risk 
implications of proposed mergers and acquisitions.
    Proposed effective date: Two full quarters after the adoption of 
the final rule.
    Frequency: Quarterly.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
    Respondents: Top-tier U.S. bank holding companies and covered 
savings and loan holding companies with $100 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets, any U.S.-based bank holding company designated as 
a GSIB that does not meet that consolidated assets threshold, and 
foreign banking organizations with combined U.S. assets of $100 billion 
or more.
    Estimated number of respondents: 53.
    Estimated average hours per response: Reporting--56 hours for 
GSIBs, 49 hours for Category II and Category III firms, and 50 hours 
for Category IV Firms. Recordkeeping--0.25 hours.
    Estimated annual burden hours: Reporting--10,528 hours; \46\ 
Recordkeeping--53 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ This estimated total annual burden reflects adjustments 
that have been made to the Board's burden methodology for the FR Y-
15 that provide a more consistent estimate of respondent burden 
across different regulatory reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimated change in total burden: 256 hours.
    Legal authorization and confidentiality:
    Sections 163 and 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as amended by the 
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 
authorize the Board to consider risk to U.S. financial stability in 
regulating and examining bank holding companies with $100 billion or 
more in consolidated assets and nonbank financial companies who are 
under the Board's supervision.\47\ The Board is further authorized to 
impose prudential standards for such entities and to differentiate 
among companies on an individual basis or by category, taking into 
consideration their capital structure, riskiness, complexity, financial 
activities, size, and any other risk-related factors that the Board 
deems appropriate.\48\ This authorization also

[[Page 60399]]

covers certain foreign banks with U.S. operations under the 
International Banking Act (``IBA'').\49\ Sections 165(b)(1)(B) and 
165(f) of the Dodd-Frank Act authorize the Board to establish enhanced 
public disclosures for companies subject to prudential standards under 
section 165.\50\
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    \47\ 12 U.S.C. 5363; 5365.
    \48\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(2)(C). The Board is required to establish 
prudential standards for bank holding companies with assets equal to 
or greater than $250 billion and nonbank financial companies 
supervised by the Board that (A) are more stringent than the 
standards and requirements applicable to nonbank financial companies 
and bank holding companies that do not present similar risks to the 
financial stability of the United States; and (B) increase in 
stringency based on the considerations enumerated in section 
165(b)(3). 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(1).
    \49\ 12 U.S.C. 3106(a). Section 8(a) provides that certain 
foreign banks with U.S. operations will be treated as bank holding 
companies for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act (``BHC 
Act''), and sections 163 and 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act amend the BHC 
Act.
    \50\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(b)(1)(B) and (f).
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    In addition, the reporting requirements associated with the FR Y-15 
are authorized for bank holding companies pursuant to section 5 of the 
BHC Act; \51\ for savings and loan holding companies pursuant to 
sections 10(b)(2) and 10(g) of the Home Owners' Loan Act; \52\ and for 
U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations 
pursuant to section 5 of the BHC Act and sections 8(a) and 13(a) of the 
IBA.\53\
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    \51\ 12 U.S.C. 1844.
    \52\ 12 U.S.C. 1467a(b)(2); 1467a(g).
    \53\ 12 U.S.C. 3106(a); 3108(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FR Y-15 report is mandatory.
    The data collected on the FR Y-15 is made public unless a specific 
request for confidentiality is submitted by the reporting entity, 
either on the FR Y-15 or on the form from which the data item is 
obtained. Determinations regarding confidential treatment will be made 
on a case-by-case basis based on exemption 4 of the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), which protects from disclosure trade secrets 
and commercial or financial information (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4)). A number 
of the items in the FR Y-15 are retrieved from the FR Y-9C and other 
items may be retrieved from the FFIEC 009 and FFIEC 101. Confidential 
treatment will also extend to any automatically calculated items on the 
FR Y-15 that have been derived from confidential data items and that, 
if released, would reveal the underlying confidential data. To the 
extent confidential data collected under the FR Y-15 will be used for 
supervisory purposes, it may be exempt from disclosure under exemption 
8 of FOIA (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(8)).
    The Board proposes to modify the confidentiality treatment of items 
1 through 4 in Schedule G. Currently, the FR Y-15 instructions indicate 
that these items will be kept confidential until the first reporting 
date after the final liquidity coverage ratio standard has been 
implemented. Because the Board has implemented that standard,\54\ this 
language is no longer appropriate, and would be deleted under the 
proposal. Under the amended instructions, requests for confidential 
treatment with respect to these items would be considered on a case-by-
case basis based on exemption 4 of FOIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ See ``Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Public Disclosure 
Requirements; Extension of Compliance Period for Certain Companies 
To Meet the Liquidity Coverage Ratio Requirements,'' 81 FR 94922 
(December 27, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Current Actions: The Board is proposing to amend the FR Y-15 form 
and instructions to align with the proposed rulemaking which would 
amend the Board's GSIB surcharge requirement under the Board's capital 
rule. See section II of the proposal for a description of the changes 
to the FR Y-15.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    The Board is providing an initial regulatory flexibility analysis 
with respect to this proposed rule. The Regulatory Flexibility Act \55\ 
(RFA), requires an agency to consider whether the rule it proposes will 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.\56\ In connection with a proposed rule, the RFA requires an 
agency to prepare and invite public comment on an initial regulatory 
flexibility analysis describing the impact of the rule on small 
entities, unless the agency certifies that the proposed rule, if 
promulgated, would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. An initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis must contain (1) a description of the reasons why action by 
the agency is being considered; (2) a succinct statement of the 
objectives of, and legal basis for, the proposed rule; (3) a 
description of, and, where feasible, an estimate of the number of small 
entities to which the proposed rule will apply; (4) a description of 
the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance 
requirements of the proposed rule, including an estimate of the classes 
of small entities that will be subject to the requirement and the type 
of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or 
record; (5) an identification, to the extent practicable, of all 
relevant Federal rules which may duplicate, overlap with, or conflict 
with the proposed rule; and (6) a description of any significant 
alternatives to the proposed rule which accomplish the stated 
objectives of applicable statutes and minimize any significant economic 
impact of the proposed rule on small entities.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \56\ Under regulations issued by the Small Business 
Administration, a small entity includes a bank holding company with 
total assets of $850 million or less. Consistent with the General 
Principles of Affiliation in 13 CFR 121.103(a), the assets of all 
domestic and foreign affiliates are counted toward the size 
threshold when determining whether to classify a Board-regulated 
institution as a small entity. As of December 31, 2022, there were 
approximately 2,081 small bank holding companies and approximately 
88 small savings and loan holding companies.
    \57\ 5 U.S.C. 603(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board has considered the potential impact of the proposed rule 
on small entities in accordance with the RFA. Based on its analysis and 
for the reasons stated below, the Board believes that this proposed 
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. Nevertheless, the Board is publishing and 
inviting comment on this initial regulatory flexibility analysis. The 
proposal would also make corresponding changes to the Board's reporting 
forms.
    As discussed in detail above, the proposed rule would amend the 
Board's rule that identifies and establishes risk-based capital 
surcharges for GSIBs, as well as related regulatory reports. The 
proposed rule would improve the precision of the GSIB surcharge and 
better measure systemic risk under the GSIB framework, including by 
changing the reporting of certain values from point-in-time indicators 
to longer-term averages, making additional improvements to certain 
systemic risk indicators, and reducing cliff effects by implementing 
narrower score band ranges.
    The Board has broad authority to establish regulatory capital 
standards for bank holding companies and U.S. intermediate holding 
companies of foreign banking organizations under the Bank Holding 
Company Act and the Dodd-Frank Act.\58\ Sections 163 and 165 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, as amended by the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, 
and Consumer Protection Act, authorize the Board to consider risk to 
U.S. financial stability in regulating and examining bank holding 
companies with $100 billion or more in consolidated assets and nonbank 
financial companies under the Board's supervision.\59\ The Board is 
further authorized to impose prudential standards for such entities and 
to differentiate among companies on an individual basis or by category, 
taking into consideration their capital

[[Page 60400]]

structure, riskiness, complexity, financial activities, size, and any 
other risk-related factors that the Board deems appropriate.\60\ This 
authorization also covers certain foreign banks with U.S. operations 
under the International Banking Act.\61\ The Board also has broad 
authority under the International Lending Supervision Act (ILSA) \62\ 
to establish regulatory capital requirements for the institutions it 
regulates. For example, ILSA directs each Federal banking agency to 
cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by 
establishing minimum capital requirements as well as by other means 
that the agency deems appropriate.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See 12 U.S.C. 1844, 5365, and 5371.
    \59\ 12 U.S.C. 5363 and 5365.
    \60\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(a).
    \61\ 12 U.S.C. 3106(a).
    \62\ 12 U.S.C. 3901-3911.
    \63\ 12 U.S.C. 3907(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section, the Board is 
proposing to revise its GSIB surcharge framework under its capital rule 
and related regulatory reports. The only companies subject to these 
rules and reports, and thus potentially impacted by the proposal, are 
GSIBs; holding companies subject to Category II, III, and IV standards; 
and foreign banking organizations with combined U.S. assets of $100 
billion or more. Companies that would be impacted by the proposal 
therefore substantially exceed the $850 million asset threshold at 
which a banking entity is considered a ``small entity'' under SBA 
regulations.\64\ The proposed rule therefore would not impose mandatory 
requirements on any small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ 13 CFR 121.201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed previously in the Paperwork Reduction Act section, the 
proposed rule includes proposed changes to the Systemic Risk Report (FR 
Y-15). The Board is aware of no other Federal rules that duplicate, 
overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule. Because the proposed rule 
generally would not apply to any small entities supervised by the 
Board, the Board believes that the proposed rule would not have a 
significant economic impact on small banking organizations supervised 
by the Board. Therefore, the Board believes that there are no 
significant alternatives to the proposed rule that would reduce the 
economic impact on small banking organizations supervised by the Board.
    The Board welcomes comment on all aspects of its analysis. In 
particular, the Board requests that commenters describe the nature of 
any impact on small entities and provide empirical data to illustrate 
and support the extent of the impact.

C. Plain Language

    Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Pub. L. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338, 1471, 12 U.S.C. 4809) requires the Federal banking agencies 
to use plain language in all proposed and final rules published after 
January 1, 2000. The Board has sought to present the proposed rule in a 
simple and straightforward manner and invites comment on the use of 
plain language. For example:
     Is the material organized to suit your needs? If not, how 
could the Board present the proposed rule more clearly?
     Are the requirements in the proposed rule clearly stated? 
If not, how could the proposed rule be more clearly stated?
     Does the proposal contain technical language or jargon 
that is not clear? If so, which language requires clarification?
     Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, 
use of headings, paragraphing) make the proposed rule easier to 
understand? If so, what changes would achieve that?
     Is this section format adequate? If not, which of the 
sections should be changed and how?
     What other changes can the Board incorporate to make the 
proposed rule easier to understand?

D. Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act of 2023

    The Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act of 2023 (12 
U.S.C. 553(b)(4)) requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking include 
the internet address of a summary of not more than 100 words in length 
of the proposed rule, in plain language, that shall be posted on the 
internet website under section 206(d) of the E-Government Act of 2002 
(44 U.S.C. 3501 note).
    In summary, in the proposal the Federal Reserve Board requests 
comment on a proposal that would make certain adjustments to the 
calculation of the capital surcharge for the largest and most complex 
banks. The changes would better align the surcharge to each bank's 
systemic risk profile, in particular by measuring a bank's systemic 
importance averaged over the entire year, instead of only at the year-
end value.
    The proposal and such a summary can be found at https://www.regulations.gov and https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/reglisting.htm.

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 217

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital, 
Federal Reserve System, Holding companies.

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System proposes to amend chapter II of title 12 
of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 217--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, SAVINGS AND 
LOAN HOLDING COMPANIES, AND STATE MEMBER BANKS (REGULATION Q)

0
1. The authority citation for Part 217 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 248(a), 321-338a, 481-486, 1462a, 1467a, 
1818, 1828, 1831n, 1831o, 1831p-l, 1831w, 1835, 1844(b), 1851, 3904, 
3906-3909, 4808, 5365, 5368, 5371, and 5371 note.

0
2. In Sec.  217.401:
0
a. Revise paragraphs (b), (j) through (m), (q), (r), (t), (w), (y), 
(z), (aa) through (dd); and
0
b. Add new paragraph (ee).
    The revisions and addition read as follows:


Sec.  217.401   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (b) Assets under custody means the value reported as ``Assets under 
custody--systemic indicator amount'' on Schedule C of the FR Y-15.
* * * * *
    (j) Cross-jurisdictional claims means the value reported as ``Total 
cross-jurisdictional claims--systemic indicator amount'' on Schedule E 
of the FR Y-15.
    (k) Cross-jurisdictional liabilities means the value reported as 
``Total cross-jurisdictional liabilities--systemic indicator amount'' 
on Schedule E of the FR Y-15.
    (l) Intra-financial system assets means the value reported as 
``Total intra-financial system assets--systemic indicator amount'' on 
Schedule B of the FR Y-15.
    (m) Intra-financial system liabilities means the value reported as 
``Total intra-financial system liabilities--systemic indicator amount'' 
on Schedule B of the FR Y-15.
* * * * *
    (q) Level 3 assets means the value reported as ``Total Level 3 
assets--systemic indicator amount'' on Schedule D of the FR Y-15.
    (r) Notional amount of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives means the 
value reported as ``Total notional amount of over-the-counter (OTC)

[[Page 60401]]

derivative contracts--systemic indicator amount'' on Schedule D of the 
FR Y-15.
* * * * *
    (t) Payments activity means the value reported as ``Payments 
activity--systemic indicator amount'' on Schedule C of the FR Y-15.
* * * * *
    (w) Securities outstanding means the value reported as ``Total 
securities outstanding--systemic indicator amount'' on Schedule B of 
the FR Y-15.
* * * * *
    (y) Sweep deposit has the meaning set forth in 12 CFR 249.3.
    (z) Systemic indicator includes the following indicators included 
on the FR Y-15:
    (1) Total exposures;
    (2) Intra-financial system assets;
    (3) Intra-financial system liabilities;
    (4) Securities outstanding;
    (5) Payments activity;
    (6) Assets under custody;
    (7) Underwritten transactions in debt and equity markets;
    (8) Trading volume--equity and other;
    (9) Trading volume--fixed income;
    (10) Notional amount of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives;
    (11) Trading and available-for-sale (AFS) securities;
    (12) Level 3 assets;
    (13) Cross-jurisdictional claims; or
    (14) Cross-jurisdictional liabilities.
    (aa) Total exposures means the value reported as ``Total 
exposures--systemic indicator amount'' on Schedule A of the FR Y-15.
    (bb) Trading and AFS securities means the value reported as ``Total 
trading and available-for-sale (AFS) securities--systemic indicator 
amount'' on Schedule D of the FR Y-15.
    (cc) Trading volume--equity and other means the value reported as 
``Trading volume--equities and other securities--systemic indicator 
amount'' on Schedule C of the FR Y-15.
    (dd) Trading volume--fixed income means the value reported as 
``Trading volume--fixed income--systemic indicator amount'' on Schedule 
C of the FR Y-15.
    (ee) Underwritten transactions in debt and equity markets means the 
value reported as ``Underwriting activity--systemic indicator amount'' 
on Schedule C of the FR Y-15.
0
3. In Sec.  217.403:
0
a. Remove Table 2 to Sec.  217.403; and
0
b. Revise paragraphs (c) and (d).
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  217.403  GSIB Surcharge.

* * * * *
    (c) Method 2 surcharge--
    (1) General. The method 2 surcharge of a global systemically 
important BHC is 1.0 percent if the method 2 score of the global 
systemically important BHC is 189 basis points or less.
    (2) Higher method 2 surcharges. To the extent that the method 2 
score of a global systemically important BHC equals or exceeds 190 
basis points, the method 2 surcharge equals the sum of:
    (i) 1.1 percent; and
    (ii) An additional 0.1 percent for each 20 basis points that the 
global systemically important BHC's score exceeds 190 basis points.
    (d) Effective date of an adjusted GSIB surcharge. As of January 1 
of a calendar year, the GSIB surcharge in effect (i.e., incorporated 
into the maximum payout ratio under Sec.  217.11) for a global 
systemically important BHC for that year is the GSIB surcharge 
calculated by the global systemically important BHC in the immediately 
prior calendar year, unless the GSIB surcharge calculated by the global 
systemically important BHC in the calendar year two years prior was 
lower, in which case the GSIB surcharge calculated in the calendar year 
two years prior shall be in effect.
0
4. In Sec.  217.404, revise Table 1 to Sec.  217.404 to read as 
follows:


Sec.  217.404  Method 1 Score.

* * * * *

          Table 1 to Sec.   217.404--Systemic Indicator Weights
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Indicator
             Category                Systemic indicator       weight
                                                             (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Size..............................  Total exposures.....              20
Interconnectedness................  Intra-financial                 6.67
                                     system assets.
                                    Intra-financial                 6.67
                                     system liabilities.
                                    Securities                      6.67
                                     outstanding.
Substitutability..................  Payments activity...            6.67
                                    Assets under custody            6.67
                                    Underwritten                    3.33
                                     transactions in
                                     debt and equity
                                     markets.
                                    Trading volume--                1.67
                                     fixed income.
                                    Trading volume--                1.67
                                     equity and other.
Complexity........................  Notional amount of              6.67
                                     over-the-counter
                                     (OTC) derivatives.
                                    Trading and                     6.67
                                     available-for-sale
                                     (AFS) securities.
                                    Level 3 assets......            6.67
Cross-jurisdictional activity.....  Cross-jurisdictional              10
                                     claims.
                                    Cross-jurisdictional              10
                                     liabilities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

0
5. In Sec.  217.406:
0
a. Revise paragraph (b)(2); and
0
b. Revise Table 1 to Sec.  217.406.
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  217.406   Short-term wholesale funding score.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) Short-term wholesale funding includes the following components:
    (i) All funds that the bank holding company must pay under each 
secured funding transaction, other than an operational deposit, with a 
remaining maturity of 1 year or less;
    (ii) All funds that the bank holding company must pay under all 
unsecured wholesale funding, other than an operational deposit, with a 
remaining maturity of 1 year or less;
    (iii) The fair value of an asset as determined under GAAP that a 
bank holding company must return under a covered asset exchange with a 
remaining maturity of 1 year or less;
    (iv) The fair value of an asset as determined under GAAP that the 
bank holding company must return under a short position to the extent 
that the borrowed asset does not qualify as a Level 1 liquid asset or a 
Level 2A liquid asset;
    (v) All brokered deposits held at the bank holding company provided 
by a retail customer or counterparty; and
    (vi) All sweep deposits held at the bank holding company.
* * * * *

[[Page 60402]]



                 Table 1 to Sec.   217.406--Short-Term Wholesale Funding Components and Weights
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Remaining
                                        maturity of 30       Remaining          Remaining          Remaining
  Component of short-term wholesale    days of less or   maturity of 31 to  maturity of 91 to   maturity of 180
               funding                   no maturity     90 days (percent)       179 days         to 364 days
                                          (percent)                             (percent)          (percent)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category 1..........................                 25                 10                  0                  0
    (1) Secured funding transaction
     secured by a level 1 liquid
     asset;
    (2) Unsecured wholesale funding
     where the customer or
     counterparty is not a financial
     sector entity or a consolidated
     subsidiary thereof;
    (3) Brokered deposits and sweep
     deposits provided by a retail
     customer or counterparty; and
    (4) Short positions where the
     borrowed asset does not qualify
     as either a level 1 liquid
     asset or level 2A liquid asset.
Category 2..........................                 50                 25                 10                  0
    (1) Secured funding transaction
     secured by a level 2A liquid
     asset; and
    (2) Covered asset exchanges
     involving the future exchange
     of a Level 1 liquid asset for a
     Level 2A liquid asset.
Category 3..........................                 75                 50                 25                 10
    (1) Secured funding transaction
     secured by a level 2B liquid
     asset;
    (2) Covered asset exchanges
     (other than those described in
     Category 2); and
    (3) Unsecured wholesale funding
     (other than unsecured wholesale
     funding described in Category
     1).
Category 4..........................                100                 75                 50                 25
    Any other component of short-
     term wholesale funding.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.
Ann E. Misback,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2023-16896 Filed 8-31-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-P