[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 167 (Wednesday, August 30, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 60056-60104]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-18582]



[[Page 60055]]

Vol. 88

Wednesday,

No. 167

August 30, 2023

Part III





Department of Homeland Security





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6 CFR Part 37





Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards 
Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes; Waiver for Mobile 
Driver's Licenses; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 167 / Wednesday, August 30, 2023 / 
Proposed Rules  

[[Page 60056]]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

6 CFR Part 37

[Docket No. TSA-2023-0002]
RIN 1652-AA76


Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification Cards 
Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes; Waiver for Mobile 
Driver's Licenses

AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration, Department of Homeland 
Security.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is proposing 
to amend the REAL ID regulations to waive, on a temporary and State-by-
State basis, the regulatory requirement that mobile or digital driver's 
licenses or identification cards (collectively ``mobile driver's 
licenses'' or ``mDLs'') must be compliant with REAL ID requirements to 
be accepted by Federal agencies for official purposes, as defined by 
the REAL ID Act, when full enforcement of the REAL ID Act and 
regulations begins on May 7, 2025.

DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments on or before 
October 16, 2023.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by the TSA docket number 
to this rulemaking, to the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS), a 
government-wide, electronic docket management system. To avoid 
duplication, please use only one of the following methods:
     Electronic Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility (M-30), U.S. Department 
of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, West Building Ground 
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001. The Department of 
Transportation (DOT), which maintains and processes TSA's official 
regulatory dockets, will scan the submission and post it to FDMS.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
    See the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section for format and other 
information about comment submissions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: George Petersen, Senior Program 
Manager, REAL ID Program, Enrollment Services and Vetting Programs, 
Transportation Security Administration; telephone: (571) 227-2215; 
email: [email protected].
    Please do not submit comments to these addresses.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Public Participation and Request for Comments

    TSA invites interested persons to participate in this NPRM by 
submitting written comments, including relevant data. Comments that 
will provide the most assistance to TSA will reference a specific 
portion of this proposed rule, explain the reason for any suggestion or 
recommended change, and include data, information, or authority that 
supports such suggestion or recommended change.

Submitting Comments

    With each comment, please identify the docket number at the 
beginning of your comments. You may submit comments and material 
electronically, by mail, or fax as provided under ADDRESSES, but please 
submit your comments and material by only one means. If you submit 
comments by mail or in person, submit them in an unbound format, no 
larger than 8.5 by 11 inches, suitable for copying and electronic 
filing.
    If you would like TSA to acknowledge receipt of comments submitted 
by mail, include with your comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard 
or envelope on which the docket number appears and we will mail it to 
you.
    All comments, except those that include confidential or SSI \1\ 
will be posted to https://www.regulations.gov, and will include any 
personal information you have provided. Should you wish your personally 
identifiable information redacted prior to filing in the docket, please 
clearly indicate this request in your submission. TSA will consider all 
comments that are in the docket on or before the closing date for 
comments and will consider comments filed late to the extent 
practicable. The docket is available for public inspection before and 
after the comment closing date.
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    \1\ ``Sensitive Security Information'' or ``SSI'' is information 
obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities, the 
disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
privacy, reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential 
information, or be detrimental to the security of transportation. 
The protection of SSI is governed by 49 CFR part 1520.
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Handling of Confidential or Proprietary Information and SSI Submitted 
in Public Comments

    Do not submit comments that include trade secrets, confidential 
commercial or financial information, or SSI to the public regulatory 
docket. Please submit such comments separately from other comments on 
the rulemaking. Comments containing this type of information should be 
appropriately marked as containing such information and submitted by 
mail to the address listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT 
section. TSA will take the following actions for all submissions 
containing SSI:
     TSA will not place comments containing SSI in the public 
docket and will handle them with applicable safeguards and restrictions 
on access.
     TSA will hold documents containing SSI, confidential 
business information, or trade secrets in a separate file to which the 
public does not have access, and place a note in the public docket 
explaining that commenters have submitted such documents.
     TSA may include a redacted version of the comment in the 
public docket.
     TSA will treat requests to examine or copy information 
that is not in the public docket as any other request under the Freedom 
of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) and the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) Freedom of Information Act regulation found in 6 CFR 
part 5.

Reviewing Comments in the Docket

    Please be aware that anyone is able to search the electronic form 
of all comments in any of our dockets by the name of the individual, 
association, business entity, labor union, etc., who submitted the 
comment. For more about privacy and the docket, review the Privacy and 
Security Notice for the FDMS at https://www.regulations.gov/privacy-notice, as well as the System of Records Notice DOT/ALL 14--Federal 
Docket Management System (73 FR 3316, January 17, 2008) and the System 
of Records Notice DHS/ALL 044--eRulemaking (85 FR 14226, March 11, 
2020).
    You may review TSA's electronic public docket at https://www.regulations.gov. In addition, DOT's Docket Management Facility 
provides a physical facility, staff, equipment, and assistance to the 
public. To obtain assistance or to review comments in TSA's public 
docket, you may visit this facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, excluding legal holidays, or call (202) 366-9826. This 
DOT facility is located in the West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140 
at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

[[Page 60057]]

Availability of Rulemaking Document

    You can find an electronic copy of this rulemaking using the 
internet by accessing the Government Publishing Office's web page at 
https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/FR/ to view the daily published 
Federal Register edition or accessing the Office of the Federal 
Register's web page at https://www.federalregister.gov. Copies are also 
available by contacting the individual identified for ``General 
Questions'' in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

Abbreviations and Terms Used in This Document

AAMVA--American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
CA/Browser Forum--Certification Authority Browser Forum
CISA--Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
DHS--U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DID--Decentralized Identifiers
FIPS--Federal Information Processing Standards
HSM--Hardware security module
IEC--International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO--International Organization for Standardization
mDL--mobile driver's licenses and mobile identification cards
NIST--National Institute for Standards and Technology
NPRM--Notice of proposed rulemaking
PUB--Publication
RFI--Request for Information
SP--Special Publication
TSA--Transportation Security Administration
VC--Verifiable Credentials
VCDM--Verifiable Credentials Data Model
W3C--World Wide Web Consortium

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
    A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action
    B. Overview of the Proposed Rule
    C. Need for a Multi-Phased Rulemaking
II. Background
    A. REAL ID Act, Regulations, and Applicability to mDLs
    B. Request for Information
    C. mDL Overview
    D. Current and Emerging Industry Standards and Government 
Guidelines for mDLs
    E. DHS Involvement in mDLs
III. Summary of the Proposed Rule
    A. Overview
    B. Specific Provisions
    C. Impacted Stakeholders
    D. Use Cases Affected by This Proposed Rule
IV. Discussion of Public Comments in the RFI
V. Consultation With States, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the 
Department of Transportation
VI. Regulatory Analyses
    A. Economic Impact Analyses
    B. Paperwork Reduction Act
    C. Federalism (E.O. 13132)
    D. Customer Service (E.O. 14058)
    E. Energy Impact Analysis (E.O. 13211)
    F. Environmental Analysis
VII. Specific Questions

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of the Regulatory Action

    This proposed rule is part of an incremental, multi-phased 
rulemaking that will culminate in the promulgation of comprehensive 
requirements for State issuance of REAL ID \2\-compliant mobile 
driver's licenses and mobile identification cards (collectively 
``mDLs''). In this first phase, TSA is proposing two changes to the 
current regulations in 6 CFR part 37, ``REAL ID Driver's Licenses and 
Identification Cards.'' First, TSA is proposing to add definitions for, 
among others, mobile driver's licenses and mobile identification cards. 
These definitions provide a precise explanation of those terms as 
referenced in the REAL ID Act, which applies to only State-issued 
driver's licenses and state-issued identification cards.\3\ Any other 
types of identification cards, such as those issued by a Federal 
agency, or commercial, educational, or non-profit entity, are beyond 
the scope of the Act and regulations. The definition of ``mDL'' as used 
in this rulemaking is limited to the REAL Act and regulations and 
should not be confused with ``mDLs'' as defined by other entities, or 
with State-issued mDLs that are not intended to comply with the REAL ID 
Act.
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    \2\ The REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of the FY05 Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, as amended, Public Law 109-13, 119 
Stat. 302. Effective May 22, 2023, authority to administer the REAL 
ID program was delegated from the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
the Adminstrator of TSA pursuant to DHS Delegation No. 7060.2.1.
    \3\ See id. section 201 (defining a ``driver's license'' to 
include ``driver's licenses stored or accessed via electronic means, 
such as mobile or digital driver's licenses, which have been issued 
in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary''; 
mirroring definition for ``identification card'').
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    Second, TSA is proposing to establish a temporary waiver process 
that would permit Federal agencies to accept mDLs for official 
purposes,\4\ as defined in the REAL ID Act and regulations, on an 
interim basis when enforcement begins on May 7, 2025,\5\ but only if 
all of the following conditions are met: (1) the mDL holder has been 
issued a valid and unexpired REAL ID-compliant physical driver's 
license or identification card from the same State that issued the mDL; 
(2) TSA has determined the issuing State to be REAL ID-compliant; and 
(3) TSA has issued a waiver to the State. To qualify for the waiver, 
this proposed rule would require States to submit an application 
demonstrating that they meet specified requirements, drawn from 19 
industry and government standards guidelines. The rulemaking proposes 
to incorporate by reference (IBR) those standards and guidelines, which 
cover technical areas such as mDL communication, digital identity, 
encryption, cybersecurity, and network/information system security and 
privacy.
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    \4\ The REAL ID Act defines official purposes as including but 
not limited to accessing Federal facilities, boarding federally 
regulated commercial aircraft, entering nuclear power plants, and 
any other purposes that the Secretary shall determine. See id. 
Notably, because the Secretary has not determined any other official 
purposes, the REAL ID Act and regulations do not apply to Federal 
acceptance of driver's licenses and identification cards for other 
purposes, such as applying for Federal benefits programs, submitting 
immigration documents, or other Federal programs.
    \5\ 88 FR 14473 (Mar. 9, 2023); DHS Press Release, DHS Announces 
Extension of REAL ID Full Enforcement Deadline (Dec. 5, 2022), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/12/05/dhs-announces-extension-real-id-full-enforcement-deadline.
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    As noted above, this proposed rule is part of an incremental 
rulemaking that would temporarily permit Federal agencies to accept 
mDLs for official purposes until TSA issues a subsequent rule that 
would set comprehensive requirements for mDLs. TSA believes it is 
premature to issue such requirements before the May 7, 2025, deadline 
due to the need for emerging industry standards and government 
guidelines to be finalized (discussed in more detail in Part II.D., 
below).
    The need for this rulemaking arises from TSA's desire to 
accommodate and foster the rapid pace of mDL innovation, while ensuring 
the intent of the REAL ID Act and regulations are met. Secure driver's 
licenses and identification cards are a vital component of our national 
security framework. The REAL ID Act of 2005 addressed the 9/11 
Commission's recommendation that the Federal Government ``set standards 
for the issuance of sources of identification, such as driver's 
licenses.'' Under the REAL ID Act and regulations, a Federal agency may 
not accept for any official purpose a State-issued driver's license or 
identification card, either physical or an mDL, that does not meet 
specified requirements, as detailed in the REAL ID regulations (see 
part II.A., below, for more discussion on these requirements).
    Although the current regulatory provisions do not include 
requirements that would enable States to issue REAL ID-compliant mDLs, 
several States are already investing significant resources to develop 
mDLs based on varying and often proprietary standards, many of which 
may lack the security, privacy,

[[Page 60058]]

and interoperability features necessary for Federal acceptance for 
official purposes. The rulemaking would encourage the development of 
mDLs with a higher level of security, privacy, and interoperability.
    Absent the proposed rule, individual States may choose insufficient 
mDL security and privacy safeguards that fail to meet the security 
purposes of REAL ID requirements and the privacy needs of users. The 
proposed rule would address these considerations by enabling TSA to 
grant a waiver to States whose mDLs TSA determines provide sufficient 
safeguards for security and privacy, pending completion of emerging 
standards. Without timely guidance from the Federal government 
regarding potential requirements for developing a REAL ID-compliant 
mDL, States risk investing in mDLs that are not aligned with emerging 
industry standards and government guidelines that may be IBR'd in a 
future rulemaking. States, therefore, may become locked-in to existing 
solutions and could face a substantial burden to redevelop products 
acceptable to Federal agencies under this future rulemaking.
    Many stakeholders have already expressed these concerns to TSA. In 
response to an April 2021 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Request 
for Information (RFI),\6\ issued to inform a future rulemaking that 
would set technical requirements and security standards for mDLs, one 
commenter cautioned that the absence of a common standard ``could lead 
to fragmentation of the market, a decrease in trust, non-interoperable 
solutions, and a global diminishing benefit of the mDL concept.'' \7\ 
Similarly, another commenter warned that ``[w]ithout clear, uniform, 
flexible standards that will encourage widespread public and private 
sector use of mDLs, mDLs will likely create confusion and struggle to 
gain a foothold in being accepted.'' \8\
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    \6\ See 86 FR 20320 (April 19, 2021).
    \7\ Comment by American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators.
    \8\ Comment by DocuSign.
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    Although this proposed rule would not set standards for the 
issuance of REAL ID-compliant mDLs, it does establish minimum 
requirements that States must meet to be granted a waiver. These 
proposed minimum standards and requirements would ensure that States' 
investments in mDLs provide minimum privacy and security safeguards 
consistent with information currently known to the TSA.

B. Overview of the Proposed Rule

    As further discussed in part II.A., below, mDLs cannot be accepted 
by Federal agencies for official purposes when REAL ID full enforcement 
begins on May 7, 2025, unless 6 CFR part 37 is amended to address mDLs. 
This proposed rule would establish a process for waiving, on a 
temporary and State-by-State basis, the current prohibition on Federal 
acceptance of mDLs for official purposes, and enable Federal agencies 
to accept mDLs on an interim basis while the industry matures to a 
point sufficient to enable TSA to develop more comprehensive mDL 
regulatory requirements.
    The current regulations prohibit Federal agencies from accepting 
non-compliant driver's licenses and identification cards, including 
both physical cards and mDLs, when REAL ID enforcement begins on May 7, 
2025. Any modification of this regulatory provision must occur through 
rulemaking (or legislation). Until and unless TSA promulgates 
comprehensive mDL regulations that enable States to develop and issue 
REAL ID-compliant mDLs, mDLs cannot be developed to comply with REAL 
ID, and Federal agencies therefore cannot accept mDLs for official 
purposes after REAL ID enforcement begins on May 7, 2025. The proposed 
rule would allow the Federal government to accept mDLs on an interim 
basis, but only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the mDL 
holder has been issued a valid and unexpired REAL ID-compliant physical 
driver's license or identification card, (2) TSA has determined the 
issuing State to be REAL ID-compliant, and (3) TSA has issued a waiver 
to such State based on that State's compliance with minimum privacy, 
safety, and interoperability requirements proposed in this rulemaking. 
Please see Part II.A., below, for an explanation of the REAL ID 
requirement that both cards and issuing States must be REAL ID 
compliant.

C. Need for a Multi-Phased Rulemaking

    TSA recognizes both that regulations can influence long-term 
industry research and investment decisions and that premature 
regulations can distort the choices of technologies adopted, which can 
be costly to undo. As noted above, there are clear reasons for TSA to 
issue requirements for mDLs. First, there is a growing demand for and 
interest in mDLs due to their potential benefits of increased 
convenience, security, and privacy. Second, to meet this demand, States 
are beginning to invest in the infrastructure and programs to issue 
mDLs. Third, in the absence of Federal regulations and guidelines as 
outlined in this rulemaking, States may make unsuitable investments and 
issue mDLs that Federal agencies cannot accept. Fourth, adoption and 
use of mDLs could be thwarted if current regulations are not amended to 
accommodate mDLs when REAL ID enforcement begins on May 7, 2025.
    At the same time, however, TSA believes it is premature to issue 
final, comprehensive requirements for mDLs given the rapid pace of 
innovation in this nascent market, and the multiple emerging industry 
and government standards and guidelines necessary to ensure mDL privacy 
and security that are still in development. From comments submitted in 
response to the RFI, TSA recognizes that technology and stakeholder 
positions in this industry are diverse and evolving. TSA also conducted 
a comprehensive analysis of industry and Government standards and 
guidance, and the types of technology currently available. Based on 
this analysis, a few international industry standards applicable to 
mDLs are available,\9\ while most are years away from publication. 
Accordingly, TSA has concluded that it is premature to promulgate 
comprehensive requirements for mDLs while those standards are emerging, 
because of the risk of unintended consequences, such as chilling 
innovation and competition in the marketplace, and ``locking-in'' 
stakeholders to certain technologies.
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    \9\ See Part II.D.
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    Although TSA believes it is premature to establish comprehensive 
requirements at this time, TSA believes it is appropriate to use its 
regulatory authority to establish a waiver process with clear standards 
and requirements to facilitate the acceptance of mDLs while the 
industry matures and moves to accepted standards. Therefore, TSA has 
decided to proceed with a multi-phased rulemaking approach. Initial 
efforts focused on research and gathering information from interested 
stakeholders, commencing with publication of the pre-rulemaking RFI 
that was intended to inform any subsequent rulemaking. ``Phase 1,'' the 
current phase, would establish a temporary waiver process. This waiver 
process would enable secure use of mDLs when REAL ID enforcement begins 
on May 7, 2025, while providing TSA additional operational experience 
and data from TSA, which will accept mDLs during the waiver period 
before eventually issuing comprehensive regulations. The proposed rule 
is

[[Page 60059]]

intended to serve as a regulatory bridge for this emerging technology.
    Following publication of industry standards currently under 
development, TSA anticipates conducting a ``Phase 2'' rulemaking that 
would repeal the temporary waiver provisions, including appendix A to 
subpart A of the part (discussed in Part III.B.4.iv., below) 
established in Phase 1 and establish more comprehensive requirements 
enabling States to issue mDLs that comply with REAL ID requirements. At 
this time, TSA anticipates the Phase 2 rulemaking would IBR pertinent 
parts of some emerging standards (pending review of those final, 
published documents) regarding specific requirements for security, 
privacy, and interoperability, and distinguish between existing 
regulatory requirements that apply only to mDLs versus physical cards. 
Comments received in Phase 1, experience and data gained from temporary 
Federal mDL acceptance under a waiver, TSA testing of mDL acceptance at 
TSA airport security checkpoints, and publication of emerging 
standards, will inform the Phase 2 rulemaking. As one commenter \10\ 
urged, DHS is taking ``a slow and careful approach'' to regulation in 
order to fully understand the implications of mDLs.
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    \10\ See comment from Electronic Privacy Information Center.
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    This iterative rulemaking approach supports Executive Order (E.O.) 
14058 of December 13, 2021 (Transforming Federal Customer Experience 
and Service Delivery to Rebuild Trust in Government), by using 
``technology to modernize Government and implement services that are 
simple to use, accessible, equitable, protective, transparent, and 
responsive for all people of the United States.'' \11\ As highlighted 
above and discussed in more detail below, allowing acceptance of mDLs 
issued by States that meet the waiver requirements would enable the 
public to more immediately realize potential benefits of mDLs, 
including greater convenience, security, and privacy. See Part II.C.4, 
below, for more discussion on these benefits.
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    \11\ Published at 86 FR 71357 (Dec. 16, 2021).
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II. Background

A. REAL ID Act, Regulations, and Applicability to mDLs

    The REAL ID Act of 2005 sets minimum requirements for State-issued 
driver's licenses and identification cards accepted by Federal agencies 
for official purposes, including accessing Federal facilities, boarding 
federally regulated commercial aircraft, entering nuclear power plants, 
and any other purposes that the Secretary shall determine.\12\ The Act 
defines ``driver's licenses'' and ``identification cards'' strictly as 
State-issued documents,\13\ and the implementing regulations, 6 CFR 
part 37, further refine the definition of ``identification card'' as 
``a document made or issued by or under the authority of a State 
Department of Motor Vehicles or State office with equivalent 
function.'' \14\ Therefore, the REAL ID Act and regulations do not 
apply to identification cards that are not made or issued under a State 
authority, such as cards issued by a Federal agency or any commercial, 
educational, or non-profit entity.
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    \12\ The REAL ID Act of 2005--Division B of the FY05 Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, as amended, Public Law 109-13, 119 
Stat. 302.
    \13\ Id. at sec. 201.
    \14\ 6 CFR 37.3.
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    On January 29, 2008, DHS published a final rule implementing the 
Act's requirements.\15\ That rule included both a State compliance 
deadline \16\ and a schedule describing when individuals must obtain a 
compliant driver's license or identification card intended for use for 
official purposes.\17\ DHS refers to these two deadlines as ``State-
based'' and ``card-based'' enforcement, respectively (or ``full 
enforcement'' collectively). For State-based enforcement, 6 CFR 
37.65(a) prohibits Federal agencies from accepting cards issued by 
States and territories that are not compliant with the REAL ID 
standards.\18\ DHS incrementally enforced the State-based deadline in 
phases, with the last phase beginning January 22, 2018. Since this 
date, many Federal agencies have accepted all valid driver's licenses 
and identification cards issued by REAL ID-compliant States or States 
with an extension or under compliance review from DHS.
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    \15\ Minimum Standards for Driver's Licenses and Identification 
Cards Acceptable by Federal Agencies for Official Purposes; Final 
Rule, 73 FR 5272 (Jan. 29, 2008); codified at 6 CFR part 37 (2008 
final rule). DHS subsequently issued six other final rules and 
interim final rules amending the regulations, including changes to 
compliance deadlines and State extension submission dates. See 74 FR 
49308 (Sep. 28, 2009), 74 FR 68477 (Dec. 28, 2009) (final rule, 
stay), 76 FR 12269 (Mar. 7, 2011), 79 FR 77836 (Dec. 29, 2014); 84 
FR 55017 (Oct. 15, 2019); 86 FR 23237 (May 3, 2021). In addition to 
final rules, DHS also published two Information Collection Requests 
in the Federal Register in 2016 and 2022. See 81 FR 8736 (Feb. 22, 
2016) and 87 FR 23878 (Apr. 21, 2022).
    \16\ See 6 CFR 37.51(a).
    \17\ See 6 CFR 37.5(b).
    \18\ See 6 CFR 37.65(a).
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    Card-based enforcement begins on May 7, 2025.\19\ On this date, 
Federal agencies will be prohibited from accepting for official 
purposes a State- or territory-issued driver's license or 
identification card for official purposes unless the card is compliant 
with the REAL ID Act and regulations.\20\
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    \19\ See 6 CFR 37.5(b).
    \20\ See id.
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    On December 21, 2020, Congress passed the REAL ID Modernization Act 
\21\ to amend the REAL ID Act to reflect new technologies that did not 
exist when the law was enacted more than 15 years ago. Among other 
updates,\22\ the REAL ID Modernization Act clarified that mDLs are 
subject to REAL ID requirements by amending the definitions of 
``driver's license'' and ``identification card'' to specifically 
include mDLs that have been issued in accordance with regulations 
prescribed by the Secretary.\23\ The REAL ID regulations therefore must 
be updated to distinguish which existing requirements in 6 CFR 37 apply 
to mDLs versus physical cards, and to include additional requirements 
to ensure that mDLs meet equivalent levels of security currently 
imposed on REAL ID-compliant physical cards and are otherwise secure. 
An mDL cannot be REAL ID-compliant until TSA establishes REAL ID 
requirements in regulations and States issue mDLs compliant with those 
requirements. As a result of this requirement, mDLs must also be REAL 
ID-compliant to be accepted when card-based enforcement begins on May 
7, 2025.
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    \21\ REAL ID Modernization Act, Title X of Division U of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Public Law 116-260, 134 Stat. 
2304.
    \22\ TSA is conducting a separate rulemaking to implement other 
sections of the REAL ID Modernization Act.
    \23\ Sec. 1001 of the REAL ID Modernization Act, Title X of 
Division U of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Public Law 
116-260, 134 Stat. 2304.
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B. Request for Information

    In April 2021, DHS issued an RFI announcing DHS's intent to 
commence future rulemaking to set the minimum technical requirements 
and security standards for mDLs to enable Federal agencies to accept 
mDLs for official purposes. The RFI requested comments and information 
to inform DHS's rulemaking.\24\ In June 2021, DHS held a public meeting 
to provide an additional forum for comment.\25\ In response to comments 
at the public meeting concerning the importance of public access to an 
industry-developed standard referenced in the RFI, DHS subsequently 
published a notification in the Federal Register to facilitate access 
to the standard.\26\ DHS also conducted

[[Page 60060]]

extensive outreach and engagement with affected stakeholders, including 
States, industry, and individuals. DHS also conducted a roundtable 
discussion on privacy considerations with non-profit organizations 
representing varied interests.
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    \24\ 86 FR 20320 (April 19, 2021).
    \25\ 86 FR 31987 (June 16, 2021).
    \26\ 86 FR 51625 (Sept. 16, 2021).
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    The RFI requested comments on 13 specific topics, including: 
potential security risks arising from mDL usage and mitigating 
solutions, potential privacy concerns or benefits associated with mDL 
transactions, the maturity of certain industry standards and the 
appropriateness of DHS's adoption of them, costs to individuals to 
obtain mDLs, and various technical topics associated with mDL issuance 
and communications. In response, DHS received about 60 comments. Please 
see Part IV, below, for a detailed discussion of the comments received, 
which are also referenced throughout this preamble.

C. mDL Overview

1. mDLs Generally
    Driven by increasing public demand for more convenient, secure, and 
privacy-enhancing forms of identification, many States have invested 
significantly and rapidly in recent years to develop mDL technology. An 
mDL is generally recognized as the digital representation of an 
individual's identity information contained on a State-issued physical 
driver's license or identification card.\27\ An mDL may be stored on a 
diverse range of portable or mobile electronic devices, such as 
smartphones, smartwatches, and storage devices containing memory. Like 
a physical card, mDL data originates from identity information about an 
individual that is maintained in the database of a State driver's 
licensing agency.
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    \27\ A technical description of mDLs as envisioned by the 
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators may be found at 
https://www.aamva.org/Mobile-Drivers-License/.
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    Unlike physical driver's licenses that are read and verified 
visually through human inspection of physical security features, an mDL 
is read and verified electronically using a device known simply as a 
``reader'' (discussed in Part II.C.2., below). Physical cards employ 
physical security features to deter fraud and tampering, such as 
``easily identifiable visual or tactile [security] features'' on the 
surface of a card.\28\ An mDL, in contrast, combats fraud through the 
use of digital security features that are not recognizable through 
human inspection. For example, mDLs usually rely on digital security 
through use of asymmetric cryptography/public key infrastructure (PKI). 
As discussed in the RFI,\29\ Asymmetric cryptography generates a pair 
of encryption ``keys'' to encrypt and decrypt protected data. One key, 
a ``public key,'' is distributed publicly, while the other key, a 
``private key,'' is held by the State driver's licensing agency (i.e., 
a Department of Motor Vehicles, or ``DMV''). When a DMV issues an mDL 
to an individual (see Fig. 1, below, communication no. 1), the DMV uses 
its private key to digitally ``sign'' the mDL data. A Federal agency 
validates the integrity of the mDL data by obtaining the DMV's public 
key to verify the digital signature (see Fig. 1: mDL Secure 
Communications). Private keys and digital signatures are elements of 
data encryption that protect against unauthorized access, tampering, 
and fraud.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ 6 CFR 37.15(c) and 37.17(h).
    \29\ See 86 FR 20320, 20324 (April 19, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Generally, mDL-based identity verification under REAL ID would 
involve a triad of secure communications between a State driver's 
licensing agency, an mDL holder, and a Federal agency. Specifically, 
and as shown in Fig. 1, below, the following three communications would 
occur: (1) Issuance and Updates: the DMV would issue or ``provision'' 
an mDL onto a mobile device of the person requesting the mDL (who then 
becomes the mDL holder), (2) Data Transfer: the mDL holder would 
authorize release of relevant data from the device to a Federal agency, 
which would use a reader to retrieve data, and (3) Validation: the 
Federal agency would use a reader, to confirm that the data originated 
from the issuing DMV and is unchanged, by verifying the DMV's public 
key. Although not depicted in Fig. 1, the Federal agency would also 
validate (via human inspection or facial matching software) that the 
mDL belongs to the individual presenting it by comparing the 
individual's live appearance to the photo retrieved by the reader. 
Standardized communication interfaces are necessary to enable Federal 
agencies to exchange information with all 56 U.S. States and 
territories that issue mDLs.

[[Page 60061]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU23.005

2. mDL Readers
    Any Federal agency that chooses to accept mDLs for REAL ID official 
purposes would need to procure and use readers to validate an mDL 
holder's identity data from their mobile device and establish trust 
that the mDL is secure by using private-public key data encryption. 
Non-Federal agencies, such as State agencies, businesses, and other 
entities who choose to accept mDLs for uses beyond the scope of REAL ID 
are not governed by the REAL ID Act or regulations and therefore would 
make their own independent decisions concerning reading mDLs and reader 
procurement.\30\ The reader would confirm that the mDL holder's 
identity data is valid by performing the following steps: establishing 
a secure digital connection with an mDL holder's mobile device, 
receiving the required mDL information for identity verification, 
verifying its authenticity and integrity by validating the driver's 
licensing agency's digital signature of the mDL data, and confirming 
that the mobile device possesses the unique device key corresponding to 
the mDL at the time of issuance.
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    \30\ Non-Federal agencies and other entities who choose to 
accept mDLs for uses beyond the scope of REAL ID should also 
recognize the need for a reader to ensure the validity of the mDL. 
Any verifying entity can validate in the same manner as a Federal 
agency if they implement the standardized communication interface 
requirements specified in this proposed rule, which would require 
investment to develop the necessary IT infrastructure and related 
proceses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An mDL reader can take multiple forms, ranging from software to 
hardware. In its simplest form, an mDL reader can be an app installed 
on a smartphone or other mobile device. A reader could also be a 
dedicated device. This is expected to be a low-cost solution that could 
be added to existing smartphones carried by a verifying entity's 
employee. While reader development is ongoing in the industry, TSA 
understands that companies are already beginning to offer verification 
apps for free on their commercial app stores. As reader technology 
continues to evolve, there will likely be wide range of reader options 
with various capabilities and associated price points.\31\
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    \31\ Readers for mDLs have specific requirements and at this 
time are not interchangeable with readers for other types of Federal 
cards, such as the Transportation Worker Identification Credential 
(TWIC). Although TSA is evaluating some mDLs at select airport 
security checkpoints (see Part II.E.), cost estimates for readers 
used in the evaluations are not available because those readers are 
non-commercially available prototypes designed specifically for 
integration into TSA-specific IT infrastructure that few, if any, 
other Federal agencies use. In addition, mDL readers are evolving 
and entities who accept mDLs would participate voluntarily. 
Accordingly, associated reader costs are not quantified at this time 
but TSA intends to gain a greater understanding of any costs to 
procure reader equipment as the technology continues to evolve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. State mDL Issuance
    As noted above, mDL-issuance is proliferating rapidly among States, 
with nearly half of all States piloting, issuing, or considering mDLs. 
As of the date of this NPRM, at least eight States (Arizona, Colorado, 
Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Utah) are 
issuing mDLs, and three States (Florida, Iowa, and Virginia) are 
currently piloting or have piloted mDLs. Additionally, at least 17 
States (California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming) have 
indicated they are studying mDLs or considering enabling legislation.
    Based on its analysis of the current environment, TSA believes that 
States are issuing mDLs using widely varying technology solutions, 
resulting in a fragmented environment rather than a common standard for 
issuance and use. The various States issuing or piloting mDLs are 
believed to be using technology solutions provided by multiple vendors, 
and it is not clear whether such technological diversity provides the 
safeguards and interoperability necessary for Federal acceptance. For 
example, in September 2021 and March 2022, Apple announced \32\ that it 
was working with 13 States (Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Ohio,

[[Page 60062]]

Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, and Utah) to enable their mDLs to be provisioned 
into Apple's Wallet app. Google and GET Group North America have made 
similar announcements.\33\ States choosing a variety of technology 
solutions, which could result in non-standard, non-compatible 
technologies, which raises additional questions concerning the Federal 
government's ability to accept the mDLs for Federal purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2021/09/apple-announces-first-states-to-adopt-drivers-licenses-and-state-ids-in-wallet/; 
https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/03/apple-launches-the-first-drivers-license-and-state-id-in-wallet-with-arizona/.
    \33\ https://support.google.com/wallet/answer/12436402?hl=en; 
https://getgroupna.com/get-mobile-id-is-now-accepted-at-tsa-precheck/.
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    Although detailed mDL adoption statistics are unavailable, 
anecdotal information and fragmented reporting indicates that mDLs are 
rapidly gaining public acceptance. For example, Louisiana has recently 
reported that over one million residents (representing more than 20% of 
its population) have installed Louisiana's mDL app on their mobile 
devices.
4. Potential Benefits of mDLs
    An mDL has potential benefits for all stakeholders. For Federal 
agencies that require REAL ID-compliant IDs for official purposes, mDLs 
may provide efficiency and security enhancements. Compared to physical 
cards, which rely on manual inspection of physical security features on 
the surface of a card designed to deter tampering and fraud, mDLs rely 
on digital security features that are immune to many vulnerabilities of 
physical security features. For individuals, some commenters noted that 
mDLs may provide a more secure, convenient, privacy-enhancing, and 
``touchless'' method of identity verification compared to physical 
IDs.\34\ Among other privacy-enhancing features, the holder of an mDL 
could control what data fields are released. For example, if an mDL is 
used for identity purposes with a Federal agency, the holder could 
restrict the agency to receiving only the data necessary and required 
by the agency to verify the individual's identity. Potential hygiene 
benefits also derive from the contact-free method of ID verification 
enabled by mDLs. An mDL holder may transmit data to a verifying Federal 
agency's mDL reader by hovering their mDL above the reader, potentially 
eliminating any physical contact with the individual's mobile device 
thereby reducing germ transmission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See, e.g., comments submitted by: Applied Recognition, 
Bredemarket, Hiday, Mothershed, Muller, State of Connecticut, DHS of 
Motor Vehicles, Secure Technology Alliance, U.S. Travel Association.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Current and Emerging Industry Standards and Government Guidelines 
for mDLs

    The nascence of mDLs and absence of standardized mDL-specific 
requirements provide an opportunity for industry and government to 
develop standards and guidelines to close this void. TSA is aware of 
multiple such documents, both published and under development, from 
both Federal and non-government sources. This section discusses 
standards and guidelines that form the basis of many of the 
requirements proposed in this rulemaking, as well as additional 
documents that may inform the upcoming Phase 2 rulemaking. As discussed 
in Part III.B.8, below, this rulemaking proposes to amend Sec.  37.4 by 
incorporating by reference into part 37 nineteen standards and 
guidelines. All proposed incorporation by reference material is 
available for inspection at DHS Headquarters in Washington DC, please 
email [email protected]. The material may also be 
obtained from its publisher, as discussed below.
1. American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
    In September 2022, the American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators published mDL Implementation Guidelines (AAMVA 
Guidelines). Mobile Driver's License (mDL) Implementation Guidelines 
Version 1.2 (Jan. 2023), American Association of Motor Vehicle 
Administrators, 4401 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 700, Arlington, VA 22203, 
available at https://aamva.org/getmedia/b801da7b-5584-466c-8aeb-f230cef6dda5/mDL-Implementation-Guidelines-Version-1-2_final.pdf. The 
Guidelines are available to the public for free at the link provided 
above. The AAMVA Guidelines adapt industry standard ISO/IEC 18013-
5:2021 (discussed in Part II.D.4., below), for State driver's licensing 
agencies through the addition of more stringent and more specific 
recommendations, as the ISO/IEC standard has been developed for 
international purposes and may not meet all purposes and needs of 
States and the Federal Government. For example, Part 3.2 of the AAMVA 
Guidelines modify and expand the data elements specified in ISO/IEC 
18013-5:2021, in order to enable the mDL to indicate the REAL ID 
compliance status of the companion physical card, as well as to ensure 
interoperability necessary for Federal acceptance. AAMVA has added data 
fields for DHS Compliance and DHS Temporary Lawful Status. These 
additional fields provide the digital analog to the requirements for 
data fields for physical cards defined in 6 CFR 37.17(n) \35\ and 
37.21(e) \36\ respectively. As discussed generally in Part III.B, 
below, Sec.  37.10(a)(1) and (4) of this proposed rule would require a 
State to explain, as part of its application for a waiver, how the 
State issues mDLs that are compliant with specified requirements of the 
AAMVA Guidelines.
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    \35\ Section 37.17(n) provides, ``The card shall bear a DHS-
approved security marking on each driver's license or identification 
card that is issued reflecting the card's level of compliance as set 
forth in Sec.  37.51 of this Rule.''
    \36\ Section 37.21(e) provides, ``Temporary or limited-term 
driver's licenses and identification cards must clearly indicate on 
the face of the license and in the machine readable zone that the 
license or card is a temporary or limited-term driver's license or 
identification card.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Certification Authority Browser Forum
    The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is an 
organization of vendors of hardware and software used in the production 
and use of publicly trusted certificates. These certificates are used 
by forum members, non-member vendors, and governments to establish the 
security and trust mechanisms for public key infrastructure-enabled 
systems. The CA/Browser Forum has published two sets of requirements 
applicable for any implementers of PKI, including States that are 
seeking to deploy Certificate Systems that must be publicly trusted and 
used by third parties:
     Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of 
Publicly[hyphen]Trusted Certificates v. 1.8.6 (December 14, 2022), 
available at https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.8.6.pdf, and
     Network and Certificate System Security Requirements v. 
1.7 (April 5, 2021), available at https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-Network-Security-Guidelines-v1.7.pdf. CA/
Browser Forum, 815 Eddy St, San Francisco, CA 94109, (415) 436-9333.
    These documents are available to the public for free at the links 
provided above.
    To issue mDLs that can be trusted by Federal agencies, each issuing 
State must establish a certificate system, including a root 
certification authority that is under control of the issuing State. TSA 
believes the CA/Browser Forum requirements for publicly trusted 
certificates have been proven to be an effective model for securing 
online transactions. As discussed generally in Part III.B.4, below, 
appendix A to

[[Page 60063]]

subpart A of the part, sections 1, 2, and 4-8, require compliance with 
specified requirements of the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements 
and/or Network and Certificate System Requirements. Section 37.4 of 
this proposed rule would IBR these CA/Browser Forum references.
3. Cybersecurity Guidelines
    DHS and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 
have published two guidelines which are relevant to the operations of 
States' mDL issuance systems:
     National Cyber Incident Response Plan (Dec. 2016), 
available at https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/ncirp/National_Cyber_Incident_Response_Plan.pdf, and
     CISA Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response 
Playbooks (Nov. 2021), available at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Federal_Government_Cybersecurity_Incident_and_Vulnerability_Response_Playbooks_508C.pdf.
    Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Mail Stop 0380, 
245 Murray Lane, Washington, DC 20528-0380, (888) 282-0870. These 
guidelines, available for free at the links provided above, provide 
details on best practices for management of systems during a 
cybersecurity incident, providing recommendations on incident and 
vulnerability response. Management of cybersecurity incidents and 
vulnerabilities are critical to maintenance of a State's mDL issuance 
information technology (IT) infrastructure. As discussed generally in 
Part III.B.4, below, appendix A to subpart A of the part, section 8, 
requires compliance with specified requirements of the DHS National 
Cyber Incident Response Plan and the CISA Cybersecurity Incident & 
Vulnerability Response Playbooks. Section 37.4 of this proposed rule 
would IBR these DHS and CISA standards.
4. ISO/IEC Standards and Technical Specifications
    Two international standards-setting organizations, the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC),\37\ are jointly 
drafting two series of multi-part International Standards and Technical 
Specifications.\38\ Series ISO/IEC 18013, Personal identification--ISO-
compliant driving licence Parts 5-7, are specific to mDLs, and series 
ISO/IEC 23220 Cards and security devices for personal identification--
Building blocks for identity management via mobile devices, Parts 1-6, 
concern digital identity (of which mDLs are a subset). DHS TSA has 
participated in the development of both Series as a non-voting member 
of the United States national body member of the Joint Technical 
Committee.\39\ Together, both Series would establish standardized 
interfaces that would enable the mDL communications triad (see Part 
II.C.1., above) as follows: (1) State driver's licensing agency and the 
mDL holder (Series 23220), (2) mDL Holder and a verifying entity 
(Series 18013), and (3) verifying entity and State licensing agency 
(Series 18013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ ISO is an independent, non-governmental international 
organization with a membership of 164 national standards bodies. ISO 
creates documents that provide requirements, specifications, 
guidelines or characteristics that can be used consistently to 
ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for 
their purpose. The IEC publishes consensus-based international 
standards and manages conformity assessment systems for electric and 
electronic products, systems and services, collectively known as 
``electrotechnology.'' ISO and IEC standards are voluntary and do 
not include contractual, legal or statutory obligations. ISO and IEC 
standards contain both mandatory requirements and optional 
recommendations, and those who choose to implement the standards 
must adopt the mandatory requirements.
    \38\ ISO defines an International Standard as ``provid[ing] 
rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or for their 
results, aimed at achieving the optimum degree of order in a given 
context. It can take many forms. Apart from product standards, other 
examples include: test methods, codes of practice, guideline 
standards and management systems standards.'' www.iso.org/deliverables-all.html. In contrast, ISO defines a ``Technical 
Specification'' as ``address[ing] work still under technical 
development, or where it is believed that there will be a future, 
but not immediate, possibility of agreement on an International 
Standard. A Technical Specification is published for immediate use, 
but it also provides a means to obtain feedback. The aim is that it 
will eventually be transformed and republished as an International 
Standard.'' www.iso.org/deliverables-all.html.
    \39\ A member of the TSA serves as DHS's representative to the 
Working Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In September 2021, ISO and IEC published international standard 
ISO/IEC 18013, Part 5, entitled, ``Personal identification--ISO-
compliant driving licence.'' ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021, Personal 
identification--ISO-compliant driving licence--Part 5: Mobile driving 
licence (mDL) application (Sept. 2021), International Organization for 
Standardization, Chemin de Blandonnet 8, CP 401, 1214 Vernier, Geneva, 
Switzerland, +41 22 749 01 11, www.iso.org/contact-iso.html.\40\ 
Section 37.4 of this rulemaking proposes to IBR this standard, which is 
available from DHS as discussed above. In addition, the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), a private organization not 
affiliated with DHS, will provide public access \41\ to ISO/IEC 18013-
5:2021 until October 16, 2023. Standard ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 
standardizes the interface between an mDL and an entity seeking to read 
an individual's mDL for identify verification purposes, and sets full 
operational and communication requirements for both mDLs and mDL 
readers. This standard applies to ``attended'' mode verification, in 
which both the mDL holder and an officer or agent of a verifying entity 
are physically present together during the time of identity 
verification.\42\ DHS received numerous comments in response to the RFI 
concerning the appropriateness of this standard as a starting point for 
future regulatory requirements.\43\ Many comments received in response 
to the RFI noted that standard ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021, which published in 
Sept. 2021, provides a sufficient baseline for secure Federal 
acceptance.\44\ After carefully

[[Page 60064]]

considering all comments received, TSA believes ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 is 
critical to enabling the interoperability, security, and privacy 
necessary for wide acceptance of mDLs by Federal agencies for official 
purposes. As discussed in Part III.B, below, this NPRM proposes to IBR 
this standard into part 37. Specifically, Sec.  37.8 of the proposed 
rule would require Federal agencies to validate an mDL as required by 
standard ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021, and Sec.  37.10(a)(4) would require a 
State to explain, as part of its application for a waiver, how the 
State issues mDLs that are interoperable with this standard to provide 
the security necessary for Federal acceptance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ Forthcoming Part 6 of Series ISO/IEC 18013, ``mDL test 
methods,'' is a technical specification that will enable testing of 
mDLs and readers to certify conformance with ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021. 
TSA anticipates a draft of this standard may be completed by the end 
of 2023, and the final document may publish at the end of 2024.
    \41\ ANSI advises interested persons to visit the following 
website to obtain access: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/DQVJYMK. 
This link will direct interested persons to a nongovernment website 
that is not within the Federal government's control and may not 
follow the same privacy, security, or accessibility policies as 
Federal government websites. ANSI requires individuals to complete 
an online license agreement form, which will ask for name, 
professional affiliation, and email address, before it grants access 
to any standards. ANSI will provide access on a view-only basis, 
meaning copies of the document cannot be downloaded or modified. 
Individuals who access non-governmental sites to view available 
standards are subject to the policies of the owner of the website. 
For access to non-final draft standards, please contact ISO/IEC 
using the information provided earlier.
    \42\ Part 7 of Series ISO/IEC 18013, entitled ``mDL add-on 
function,'' is an upcoming technical specification that will 
standardize interfaces for ``unattended'' mode verification, in 
which the mDL holder and officer/agent of the verifying agency are 
not physically present together, and the identity verification is 
conducted remotely. Unattended identity verification is not 
currently considered a REAL ID use case.
    \43\ See, e.g., comments submitted by: American Association of 
Motor Vehicle Administrators; American Civil Liberties Union, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy Information 
Center; Apple; Association for Convenience & Fuel Retailing; CBN 
Secure Technologies; FaceTec; Florida DHS of Highway Safety and 
Motor Vehicles; IDEMIA; Maryland DHS of Transportation, Motor 
Vehicle Administration; National Immigration Law Center and 
Undersigned Organizations; Secure Technology Alliance; State of 
Connecticut, DHS of Motor Vehicles; Underwriters Laboratories; 
Verifiable Credentials Policy Committee, Blockchain Advocacy 
Coalition. All comments are available at https://www.regulations.gov/docket/DHS-2020-0028.
    \44\ See comments submitted by American Association of Motor 
Vehicle Administrators; Florida DHS of Highway Safety and Motor 
Vehicles; Maryland DHS of Transportation, Motor Vehicle 
Administration; State of Connecticut, DHS of Motor Vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ISO/IEC 23220 Series of Technical Specifications, ``Cards and 
security devices for personal identification--Building blocks for 
identity management via mobile devices,'' cover international digital 
IDs broadly and are applicable to mDLs. ISO/IEC 23220: Cards and 
security devices for personal identification--Building blocks for 
identity management via mobile devices, International Organization for 
Standardization, Chemin de Blandonnet 8, CP 401, 1214 Vernier, Geneva, 
Switzerland, +41 22 749 01 11, www.iso.org/contact-iso.html. This 
Series consists of six Parts, with Parts 3, 5, and 6 being relevant to 
mDLs and the forthcoming Phase 2 rulemaking. More specifically, Series 
23220 would establish the following critical requirements for 
``provisioning'' \45\ an mDL, which refers to the various steps 
required for a State driver's licensing agency to securely place an mDL 
onto a mobile device:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ The initial step of provisioning requires proving that an 
mDL applicant owns the mobile device onto which the mDL will be 
stored. Next, a trusted connection would be established between the 
licensing agency and the target device. Finally, the licensing 
agency would use this connection to securely transmit and update mDL 
data on the device.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Part 3, ``Protocols and services for installation and 
issuing phase,'' covers data function calls and formatting that States 
will use to communicate (e.g., provision, refresh, revoke) with a 
mobile device.
     Part 5, ``Trust models and confidence level assessment,'' 
covers trust framework and provisioning, including confidence levels, 
identity proofing, binding, identity resolution, evidence validation, 
evidence verification, and holder authentication.
     Part 6, ``Mechanism for use of certification on 
trustworthiness of secure area,'' primarily covers device security 
requirements and trust of the secure areas in mobile devices.
    TSA anticipates that Series ISO/IEC 23220 will define critical 
requirements for the interface between a State driver's licensing 
agency and mobile device. However, none of Parts 3, 5, and 6 of Series 
23220 have published. TSA understands that drafts of Parts 3 and 5 may 
publish in late 2023, and final publication is possible by the end of 
2024; publication dates for Part 6 are unknown, but a draft is 
anticipated in 2024. DHS received many comments in response to the RFI 
cautioning, however, that standard ISO/IEC 23220, Parts 3, 5, and 6, 
are not sufficiently mature to inform regulatory requirements.\46\ 
Given the evolving stage of Series ISO/IEC 23220 and comments to the 
RFI, TSA believes it is premature to rely on this Series to inform this 
proposed rulemaking and thus is not proposing to IBR them in this NPRM. 
TSA may consider adopting requirements of pertinent Parts of this 
standard in the upcoming Phase 2 rulemaking, pending review of the 
final published documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See comments submitted by American Civil Liberties Union, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy Information 
Center; IDEMIA; Maryland DHS of Transportation, Motor Vehicle 
Administration; Underwriters Laboratories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. National Institute for Standards and Technology
i. Digital Identity Guidelines
    The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has 
published Digital Identity Guidelines, NIST SP 800-63-3, that cover 
technical requirements for Federal agencies implementing digital 
identity. NIST Special Publication 800-63-3, Digital Identity 
Guidelines (June 2017), National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
U.S. Department of Commerce, 100 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, 
available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-3.pdf. The Digital Identity Guidelines, available for 
free at the link provided above, define technical requirements in each 
of the areas of identity proofing, registration, user authentication, 
and related issues. Because TSA is not aware of a common industry 
standard for mDL provisioning that is appropriate for official REAL ID 
purposes today, TSA views the current NIST Digital Guidelines as 
critical to informing waiver application requirements for States 
regarding provisioning (discussed in detail in Part III.B.4., below). 
As discussed generally in Part III.B.4, below, under proposed rule text 
Sec.  37.10(a)(2), which requires compliance with appendix A to subpart 
A of the part, a State must explain, as part of its application for a 
waiver, how the State issues mDLs that are compliant with NIST SP 800-
63-3 to provide the security for mDL IT infrastructure necessary for 
Federal acceptance. Section 37.4 of this proposed rule would IBR NIST 
SP 800-63-3.
    NIST has also published Digital Identity Guidelines Authentication 
and Lifecycle Management, NIST SP 800-63B, as a part of NIST SP 800-63-
3. NIST Special Publication 800-63B, Digital Identity Guidelines: 
Authentication and Lifecycle Management (June 2017), National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, 100 Bureau 
Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, available at
    https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/specialpublications/nist.sp.800-63b.pdf. This document provides technical requirements for Federal 
agencies implementing digital identity services. The standard focuses 
on the authentication of subjects interacting with government systems 
over open networks, establishing that a given claimant is a subscriber 
who has been previously authenticated and establishes three 
authenticator assurance levels. As discussed generally in Part III.B.4, 
below, proposed rule text Sec.  37.10(a)(2) requires compliance with 
appendix A to subpart A of the part, which would require a State to 
explain, as part of its application for a waiver, how the State manages 
its mDL issuance infrastructure using authenticators at assurance 
levels provided in NIST SP 800-63B. Section 37.4 of this proposed rule 
would incorporate by reference NIST SP 800-63B.
    NIST is developing a revision to the Digital Identity Guidelines, 
SP 800-63-4, which is expected to impact key issues related to mDL 
processes. This publication and its companion volumes NIST SP 800-63A 
Rev. 4, SP 800-63B Rev. 4, and SP 800-63C Rev. 4, provide technical 
guidelines for the implementation of digital identity services. Initial 
public drafts of this suite published in December 2022, and final 
drafts may publish in early 2024. The full suite of draft NIST Digital 
Identity Guidelines, NIST SP 800-63-4, are available for free as 
follows:
     NIST SP 800-63-4, Digital Identity Guidelines, Initial 
Public Draft (December 2022), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-4.ipd.pdf.
     NIST SP 800-63A Rev. 4 Digital Identity Guidelines: 
Enrollment and

[[Page 60065]]

Identity Proofing, Initial Public Draft (December 2022), available at 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63A-4.ipd.pdf;
     NIST SP 800-63B Rev. 4 Digital Identity Guidelines: 
Authentication and Lifecycle Management, Initial Public Draft (December 
2022), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63B-4.ipd.pdf;
     NIST SP 800-63C Rev. 4 Digital Identity Guidelines: 
Federation and Assertions, Initial Public Draft (December 2022), 
available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63C-4.ipd.pdf.

National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 100 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899. The final versions 
of these publications may be candidates for incorporation by reference 
(pending review of the final published documents) in the forthcoming 
Phase 2 rulemaking.
ii. Federal Information Processing Standards
    NIST also maintains the Federal Information Processing Standards 
(FIPS) which relate to the specific protocols and algorithms necessary 
to securely process data. This suite of standards includes:
     NIST FIPS PUB 140-3, Security Requirements for 
Cryptographic Modules (March 22, 2019), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf,
     NIST FIPS PUB 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (August 4, 
2015), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf,
     NIST FIPS PUB 186-5, Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 
(February 3, 2023), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf,
     NIST FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
(November 26, 2001) available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf,
     NIST FIPS PUB 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication 
Code (HMAC) (July 16, 2008) available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.198-1.pdf, and
     NIST FIPS PUB 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash 
and Extendable-Output Functions (August 4, 2015) available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf.

National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 100 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899. This suite of FIPS 
standards, available for free at the links provided above, are critical 
to the transactions required for mDLs, and any Federal systems which 
interact with or are used to verify a mDL for REAL ID official purposes 
will be required to use the algorithms and protocols defined. As 
discussed generally in Part III.B, below, Sec.  37.10(a)(4) requires 
compliance with specified requirements of NIST FIPS PUB 180-4, 186-5, 
197, 198-1, and 202, and appendix A to subpart A of the part, section 
5, requires compliance with FIPS PUB 140-3. Section 37.4 of this 
proposed rule would incorporate by reference the suite of FIPS 
standards discussed above.
iii. Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and 
Organizations; Key Management
    NIST has published several guidelines to protect the security and 
privacy of information systems:
     NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, Security and Privacy Controls for 
Information Systems and Organizations (September 2020), available at 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf.
     NIST SP 800-57 Part 1, Rev. 5, Recommendation for Key 
Management: Part 1--General (May 2020), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf.
     NIST SP 800-57 Part 2, Rev. 1, Recommendation for Key 
Management: Part 2--Best Practices for Key Management Organizations 
(May 2019), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt2r1.pdf.
     NIST SP 800-57 Part 3, Rev. 1, Recommendation for Key 
Management, Part 3: Application-Specific Key Management Guidance 
(January 2015) available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57Pt3r1.pdf.

National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 100 Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899. All of these 
documents are available for free at the links provided above.
    Collectively, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 and NIST SP 800-57 provide 
relevant controls for States regarding mDL security and privacy 
covering a broad range of topics related to the administration of a 
certificate system including: access management; certificate life-cycle 
policies; operational controls for facilities and personnel; technical 
security controls; and vulnerability management such as threat 
detection, incident response, and recovery planning. Due to the 
sensitive nature of State Certificate System processes and the 
potential for significant harms to security if confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of the certificate systems is compromised, 
the minimum risk controls specified in appendix A to subpart A of the 
part require compliance with the NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 ``high 
baseline'' as set forth in that document, as well as compliance with 
the specific risk controls described in the appendix. In addition, and 
as discussed generally in Part III.B, below: appendix A to subpart A of 
the part, secs. 1-8, require compliance with NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5; 
secs. 1 and 5 require compliance with NIST SP 800-57 Part 1, Rev. 5; 
sec. 1 requires compliance with NIST SP 800-57 Part 2 Rev. 1; and sec. 
1 requires compliance with NIST SP 800-57 Part 3, Rev. 1. Section 37.4 
of this proposed rule would incorporate by reference NIST SP 800-53 
Rev. 5 and the full suite of NIST SP 800-57 references discussed above.
iv. Cybersecurity Framework
    NIST has published the Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity v. 1.1 (April 16, 2018), National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, 100 
Bureau Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf. This document, 
available for free at the link provided above, provides relevant 
information for cybersecurity for States issuing mDLs. As discussed 
generally in Part III.B., below, certain requirements from the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework have been adopted in appendix A to subpart A of 
the part, secs. 1,2, 5-8. Section 37.4 of this proposed rule would 
incorporate by reference the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
6. W3C Standards
    In its RFI, DHS specifically sought comments on industry standards 
that could inform future regulatory requirements.\47\ DHS received 
multiple comments \48\ concerning standards being developed by the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), which is a

[[Page 60066]]

standards-development organization that develops open standards for the 
World Wide Web. Similar to its involvement with ISO, DHS has 
participated in the development of these standards as a non-voting 
member in the W3C Credential Community Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ 86 FR 20320 at 20325-26.
    \48\ See comments submitted by American Civil Liberties Union, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy Information 
Center; Association for Convenience & Fuel Retailing; CBN Secure 
Technologies; Indico.tech and Lorica Identity; Mastercard; Muller; 
OpenID Foundation; UL; Verifiable Credentials Policy Committee, 
Blockchain Advocacy Coalition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While TSA is not proposing to IBR these W3C standards in this NPRM, 
TSA understands that W3C is developing two standards concerning digital 
identification that, like the ISO/IEC Series of standards discussed 
above, may be relevant to the Phase 2 rulemaking. The W3C standards are 
``Verifiable Credentials Data Model v1.1'' (VCDM v1.1) and 
``Decentralized Identifiers v1.0'' (DID v1.0). Verifiable Credentials 
Data Model v1.1 (March 3, 2022), W3C/MIT, 105 Broadway, Room 7-134, 
Cambridge, MA 02142, available at www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model/; 
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0 (July 19, 2022), W3C/MIT, 105 
Broadway, Room 7-134, Cambridge, MA 02142, available at www.w3.org/TR/did-core/. These documents are available to the public for free at the 
links provided above. DHS has participated in the development of these 
standards as a non-voting member in the W3C Credential Community Group.
    In March 2022, the W3C published VCDM v1.1. A ``Verifiable 
Credential'' (VC) is a form of digital identification, developed under 
this standard, with features that enable a verifying entity to confirm 
its authenticity.\49\ This standard defines elements of a data model 
that enables using a digital identity in online transactions. The 
standard appears to provide broad requirements that enable issuance of 
diverse types of secure digital identification using varying data 
fields (e.g., name, date of birth), data types (e.g., text, numeric 
values, length of data string), and methods of digital security. 
Although the standard sets forth specifications for the data model 
generally, TSA understands the standard does not provide specific 
requirements to implement security and privacy protections for the data 
model. Instead, references to these topics appear to be largely non-
binding, informative guidance. For example, the standard requires that 
the VC contain at least one encryption mechanism to detect tampering 
(such as a digital signature), but does not set forth any specific 
mechanisms that are acceptable.\50\ Similarly, although the standard 
encourages the use of mechanisms to enable a VC holder to selectively 
release only certain data to a verifying entity, it does not specify 
acceptable implementation mechanisms.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See VCDM sections 1 and 2.
    \50\ See VCDM sections 4.7 and 8.1.
    \51\ See VCDM sections 5.8 and 7.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In July 2022, W3C published complementary standard DID v1.0, which 
specifies the essential requirements to enable the use of diverse types 
of digital identification in online transactions. A ``DID,'' is a 
unique identifier used in online transactions that, for example, 
enables VC holders to authenticate themselves. A DID can be used in a 
blockchain system. Like the VCDM standard, DHS understands that the 
DIDs standard includes non-binding guidance, but no prescriptive 
specifications, concerning security and privacy.
    In their current forms, TSA understands that the W3C VCDM standard 
and DID standard focus on the use of digital identification in 
unattended mode internet transactions, which is different from the 
attended, in-person REAL ID transactions contemplated for mDLs under 
this rulemaking. In addition, the current versions of the W3C standards 
do not set forth specific requirements concerning security and privacy 
or an mDL-specific data model, which may impede States from developing 
standardized, interoperable mDLs. Several commenters also expressed 
similar concerns.\52\ TSA is not aware of any State pursuing an mDL 
with the VCDM model as the sole data model. However, TSA understands 
that W3C's work is ongoing, and future revisions may set forth 
security, privacy requirements, interoperability requirements, and a 
standardized data model needed for in-person REAL ID identity 
verification. In addition, given the breadth of the VCDM and DID, it 
may be possible in the future to develop a VCDM-based mDL that conforms 
to both W3C recommendations and the ISO/IEC standards simultaneously, 
providing full ecosystem interoperability. As stated above, TSA is not 
proposing to IBR these W3C Standards in this NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See comments submitted by Muller and UL.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TSA understands that the standards and guidelines discussed above 
in this Part II.D. are the most comprehensive and relevant references 
governing mDLs today. TSA also acknowledges that many additional 
standards and guidelines are in development covering diverse types of 
digital identification that can be issued and verified by different 
entities, both government and commercial. These emerging documents are 
expected to concisely synthesize the large body of existing work from 
NIST and standards-development organizations, and will provide 
standardized mechanisms for mDLs. After carefully evaluating comments 
concerning emerging industry standards and closely observing ongoing 
development, TSA does not endorse any emerging standards at this time. 
TSA will continue to monitor development, and the future Phase 2 
rulemaking may incorporate by reference pertinent parts of emerging 
standards (pending review of final published documents) that TSA 
believes are appropriate for Federal acceptance of mDLs for REAL ID 
official purposes.

E. DHS and TSA Involvement in mDLs

    DHS and TSA have been actively participating in the mDL and digital 
identity space for many years to keep pace with industry developments. 
DHS has been participating in industry standards-development activities 
by serving as a non-voting member on working groups of the ISO/IEC and 
the W3C that are developing mDL/digital identity standards and 
technical specifications. Concurrently, DHS and TSA have been 
collaborating with industry to test the use of mDLs at various TSA 
security checkpoints. In 2022, TSA, under its collaboration with Apple 
(see Part II.C.3., above), launched a limited initiative that enables 
Arizona, Maryland, and Colorado residents to test the use of mDLs 
provisioned into the Apple Wallet app at select airport security 
checkpoints.\53\ On May 18, 2023, TSA announced acceptance of Georgia 
mDLs provisioned into the Apple Wallet app at select airport security 
checkpoints.\54\ Similarly, on March 1, 2023 and June 1, 2023, TSA 
announced acceptance of Utah-issued mDLs provisioned into the GET 
Mobile ID app, and Maryland-issued mDLs provisioned into the Google 
Wallet app, respectively, at select airports.\55\ Utah

[[Page 60067]]

utilizes a third-party mDL app produced by GET Group North America. DHS 
and TSA anticipate additional collaborations with other States and 
vendors in the future. These programs enable States, industry, and the 
Federal government to evaluate mDLs and ensure that they provide the 
security, privacy, and interoperability necessary for future, full-
scale acceptance at Federal agencies for official purposes as defined 
in the REAL ID Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ See TSA Biometrics Technology website, https://www.tsa.gov/biometrics-technology; Press Release, TSA, TSA enables Arizona 
residents to use mobile driver's license or state ID for 
verification at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (Mar. 23, 
2022), available at https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2022/03/23/tsa-enables-arizona-residents-use-mobile-drivers-license-or-state-id; Press Release, TSA, TSA enables Maryland residents to use 
mobile driver's license or state ID for verification at Baltimore/
Washington International and Reagan National Airports (May 25, 
2022), available at https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2022/05/25/tsa-enables-maryland-residents-use-mobile-drivers-license-or-state.
    \54\ Press release, TSA, TSA enables Georgia residents to use 
mobile driver's license or state ID for verification at ATL (May 18, 
2023), available at https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2023/05/18/tsa-enables-georgia-residents-use-mobile-drivers-license-or-state-id
    \55\ Press Release, TSA, TSA using state-of-the art identity 
verification technology, accepting mobile driver licenses at SLC 
security checkpoint (Mar. 9, 2023), available at https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2023/03/09/tsa-using-state-art-identity-verification-technology-accepting; Press Release, TSA, TSA 
now accepts mobile IDs in Google Wallet on Android mobile devices, 
starting with the State of Maryland (June 1, 2023), available at 
https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2023/06/01/tsa-now-accepts-mobile-ids-google-wallet-android-mobile-devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Summary of the Proposed Rule

A. Overview

    In addition to revising definitions applicable to the REAL ID Act 
to incorporate mDLs, this rule proposes changes to 6 CFR part 37 that 
would enable TSA to grant a temporary waiver to States that TSA 
determines issue mDLs consistent with specified TSA requirements 
concerning security, privacy, and interoperability. This rule would 
enable Federal agencies, at their discretion, to accept for REAL ID 
official purposes, mDLs issued by a State that has been granted a 
waiver. The proposed rule would apply only to Federal agency acceptance 
of State-issued mDLs as defined in this proposed rule for REAL ID 
official purposes, but not other forms of digital identification, 
physical driver's licenses or physical identification cards, or non-
REAL ID purposes. Any temporary waiver issued by TSA would be valid for 
a period of 3 years from the date of issuance. The waiver enabled by 
this rulemaking would be repealed when TSA publishes a Phase 2 rule 
that would set forth comprehensive requirements for mDLs.
    To obtain a waiver, a State would be required to submit an 
application, supporting data, and other documentation to establish that 
their mDLs meet TSA-specified criteria (discussed in Part III.B.4., 
below) concerning security, privacy, and interoperability. If the 
Secretary determines, upon evaluation of a State's application and 
supporting documents, that a State's mDL could be securely accepted 
under the terms of a waiver, the Secretary may issue such State a 
certificate of waiver. TSA intends to work with each State applying for 
a waiver on a case-by-case basis to ensure that its mDLs meet the 
minimum requirements necessary to obtain a waiver. This rulemaking 
would establish the full process for a State to apply for a waiver, 
including instructions for submitting the application and responding to 
subsequent communications from TSA as necessary, specific information 
and documents that a State must provide with its application, and 
requirements concerning timing, issuance of decisions, requests for 
reconsideration, and terms, conditions, and limitations related to 
waivers. To assist States that are considering applying for a waiver, 
TSA has developed guidelines, entitled, ``Mobile Driver's License 
Waiver Application Guidance,'' which provide non-binding 
recommendations of some ways that States can meet the application 
requirements set forth in this rulemaking.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ The specific measures and practices discussed in the DHS 
Waiver Application Guidance are neither mandatory nor necessarily 
the ``preferred solution'' for complying with the requirements 
proposed in the rule. Rather, they are examples of measures and 
practices that a State issuer of mDLs may choose to consider as part 
of its overall strategy to issue mDLs. States have the ability to 
choose and implement other measures to meet these requirements based 
on factors appropriate to that State, so long as DHS determines that 
the measures implemented provide the levels of security and data 
integrity necessary for Federal acceptance of mDLs for official 
purposes as defined in the REAL ID Act and 6 CFR part 37. As 
provided in proposed Sec.  37.10(c) of 6 CFR part 37, DHS may 
periodically update the Guidance as necessary to recommend 
mitigations of evolving threats to security, privacy, or data 
integrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TSA cautions, however, that the waiver enabled by this rulemaking 
is not a commitment by Federal agencies to accept mDLs issued by a 
State to whom TSA has granted a waiver. Federal agencies exercise full 
discretion over their identity verification policies, which may be 
subject to change. A Federal agency that accepts mDLs may suddenly halt 
acceptance for reasons beyond the agency's control, such as suspension 
or termination of a waiver, technical issues with IT systems, or a loss 
of resources to support mDLs. In such instances, an mDL holder seeking 
to use an mDL for REAL ID official purposes (including boarding 
commercially regulated aircraft or access to Federal facilities) may be 
denied such uses. To avoid this issue, TSA strongly urges all mDL 
holders to carry their physical REAL ID cards in addition to their 
mDLs. This will ensure that mDL holders are not disenfranchised from 
REAL ID uses if a Federal agency does not accept mDLs. Indeed, TSA has 
long advised that passengers who choose to present mDLs in TSA 
checkpoint testing must continue to have their physical cards readily 
available in the event that a TSA officer requires such 
identification.\57\ TSA also recommends to Federal agencies that they 
regularly inform the public, in a form and manner of their choosing, of 
their mDL acceptance policies. TSA urges the public to view mDLs not as 
a replacement of physical REAL ID cards, but as a complement to them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ See, e.g., https://www.tsa.gov/real-id (see FAQ for ``Does 
TSA accept mobile driver's licenses?'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Specific Provisions

1. Definitions
    TSA proposes adding new definitions to subpart A, Sec.  37.3. In 
particular, new definitions for ``mobile driver's license'' and 
``mobile identification card'' are necessary because the current 
regulations predated the emergence of mDL technology and, therefore, 
does not define these terms. Additionally, the definitions reflect 
changes made by the REAL ID Modernization Act, which amended the 
definitions of ``driver's license'' and ``identification card'' to 
specifically include ``mobile or digital driver's licenses'' and 
``mobile or digital identification cards.'' The proposed definitions in 
this rule would provide a more precise definition of ``mobile driver's 
license'' and ``mobile identification card'' by clarifying that those 
forms of identification require a mobile electronic device to store the 
identification information, as well as an electronic device to read 
that information. TSA also proposes adding a new definition of ``mDL'' 
that collectively refers to mobile versions of both State-issued 
driver's licenses and State-issued identification cards as defined in 
the REAL ID Act. TSA also proposes adding additional definitions to 
explain terms used in Sec.  37.10(a) and appendix A to subpart A to the 
part. For example, the proposed rule would add new defintions for 
``digital certificates'' and ``certificate systems,'' which are 
necessary elements of risk controls for the IT systems that States use 
to issue mDLs. In addition, the rulemaking proposes adding a definition 
for ``certificate policy,'' which forms the governance framework for 
the State's certificate systems. A State must develop, maintain, and 
execute a certificate policy to comply with the requirements set forth 
in appendix A to subpart A of the part.
2. TSA Issuance of Temporary Waiver From Sec.  37.5(b) and State 
Eligibility Criteria
    TSA proposes adding to subpart A new Sec.  37.7, entitled 
``Temporary waiver for mDLs; State eligibility,'' to establish the 
availability of a temporary waiver

[[Page 60068]]

for a State to exempt its mDLs from meeting the card-based compliance 
requirement of Sec.  37.5(b). Section 37.7(a) authorizes TSA to issue a 
temporary certificate of waiver to States that submit an application 
for a waiver that demonstrates compliance with application criteria set 
forth in Sec.  37.10(a) and (b). This waiver would only apply to mDLs, 
not physical cards, and would not waive the requirement in Sec.  
37.5(b) regarding State-based compliance or any other requirements in 
the regulations. Issuance of a certificate of waiver to a State would 
permit Federal agencies to continue accepting for official purposes 
mDLs issued by those States when REAL ID enforcement begins on May 7, 
2025. The mere issuance of a waiver to a State, however, does not 
obligate any Federal agency to accept an mDL issued by such State; each 
Federal agency retains discretion to determine its own policies 
regarding identification, including whether to accept mDLs.
    To be eligible for consideration for a waiver, a State must meet 
the criteria set forth in proposed Sec.  37.7(b). These criteria 
require that the issuing State: is in full compliance with REAL ID 
requirements; has submitted an application demonstrating that the State 
issues mDLs that provide security, privacy, and interoperability 
necessary for Federal acceptance; and issues mDLs only to individuals 
who have been issued a valid and unexpired REAL ID-compliant physical 
driver's license or identification card. TSA's determination of whether 
a State satisfies the eligibility criteria would be based on TSA's 
evaluation of the information provided by the State in its application 
(see Part III.B.4., below), as well as other information available to 
TSA.
3. Requirements for Federal Agencies That Accept mDLs
    TSA proposes adding to subpart A new Sec.  37.8, entitled 
``Requirements for Federal agencies accepting mDLs issued by States 
with temporary waiver.'' This section proposes that any Federal agency 
that elects to accept mDLs for REAL ID official purposes must meet 
three requirements in proposed new Sec.  37.8. First, a Federal agency 
must confirm that the State holds a valid certificate of waiver. 
Agencies would make this confirmation by verifying that the State's 
name appears in a list of States to whom TSA has granted a waiver. TSA 
would publish this list on the REAL ID website at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL (as provided in Sec.  37.9(b)(1)). Second, Federal agencies must 
use an mDL reader to retrieve mDL data from an individual's mobile 
device, and validate that the data is authentic and unchanged. To 
retrieve and validate mDL data, Federal agencies must follow the 
processes required by industry standard ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021. Finally, 
if a State discovers that acceptance of a State's mDL is likely to 
cause imminent or serious threats to the security, privacy, or data 
integrity, the State must notify TSA at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL within 
72 hours of such discovery. Examples of such triggering events include 
cyber-attacks and other events that cause serious harm to a State's mDL 
issuance system. TSA would consider whether such information warrants 
suspension of that State's waiver under Sec.  37.9(e)(4)(i)(B) (see 
discussion in Part III.B.6., below). If TSA elects not to issue a 
suspension, Federal agencies would continue to exercise their own 
discretion regarding continuing acceptance of mDLs.
4. Requirements for States Seeking to Apply for a Waiver
    TSA proposes adding to subpart A new Sec.  37.9, which would set 
forth a process for a State to request a temporary certificate of 
waiver established in new Sec.  37.7. As provided in Sec.  37.9(a), a 
State seeking a waiver must file a complete application as set forth in 
Sec.  37.10(a) and (b), following instructions that would be available 
at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL. Section 37.10(a) and (b) would set forth 
all information, documents, and data that a State must include in its 
application for a waiver. TSA is proposing that if TSA determines that 
the means that a State implements to comply with the requirements in 
Sec.  37.10(a) and (b) provide the requisite levels of security, 
privacy, and data integrity for Federal acceptance of mDLs for official 
purposes, TSA would grant such State a waiver. TSA does not, however, 
propose prescribing specific means (other than the requirements 
specified in appendix A to subpart A of the part, which is discussed 
further in Part III.B.4.iv, below) that a State must implement. 
Instead, States would retain broad discretion to choose and implement 
measures to meet these requirements based on factors appropriate to 
that State.
(i) Application Requirements
    As set forth in Sec.  37.10(a)(1) through (4), a State would be 
required to establish in its application how it issues mDL under the 
specified criteria for security, privacy, and interoperability suitable 
for acceptance by Federal agencies, as follows:
     Paragraph (a)(1) would set forth requirements for mDL 
provisioning.
     Paragraph (a)(2) would specify requirements for managing 
State Certificate Systems, which are set forth in appendix A to subpart 
A of the part.
     Paragraph (a)(3) would require a State to demonstrate how 
it protects personally identifiable information of individuals during 
the mDL provisioning process.
     Paragraph (a)(4) would require a State to establish: how 
it issues mDLs that are interoperable with requirements set forth in 
standard ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021; that the State uses only those 
algorithms for encryption,\58\ secure hash function,\59\ and digital 
signatures that are specified in ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021, and in NIST FIPS 
PUB 180-4, 186-5, 197, 198-1, and 202; and how the State complies with 
the ``AAMVA mDL data element set'' as defined in the AAMVA mDL 
Guidelines v. 1.2, Section 3.2 (see Part II.D., above, for a detailed 
discussion of those references).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Encryption refers to the process of cryptographically 
transforming data into a form in a manner that conceals the data's 
original meaning to prevent it from being read. Decryption is the 
process of restoring encrypted data to its original state. [IETF RFC 
4949, Internet Security Glossary, Version 2, August 2007]
    \59\ A function that processes an input value creating a fixed-
length output value using a method that is not reversible (i.e., 
given the output value of a function it is computationally 
impractical to find the function's corresponding input value).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Audit Requirements
    Section 37.10(b) would require a State to submit an audit report 
prepared by an independent auditor verifying the accuracy of the 
information provided by the State in response to Sec.  37.10(a), as 
follows:
     Paragraph (1) would set forth specific experience, 
qualifications, and accreditations that an auditor must meet.
     Paragraph (2) would require a State to provide information 
demonstrating the absence of a potential conflict of interest of the 
auditing entity.
(iii) Waiver Application Guidance
    As set forth in Sec.  37.10(c), TSA proposes to publish ``Mobile 
Driver's License Waiver Application Guidance,'' in the Federal Register 
and on the REAL ID website at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL to assist States 
in completing their applications. The proposed guidance document is 
available for review at www.regulations.gov/docket/TSA-2023-0002. TSA 
is accepting comments on the guidance along with this proposed rule. 
This guidance would provide TSA's recommendations for some ways that 
States can meet the requirements in Sec.  37.10(a)(1). The guidance 
would not establish legally enforceable

[[Page 60069]]

requirements for a States applying for a waiver. Instead, the guidance 
would provide non-binding examples of measures and practices that a 
State may choose to consider as part of its overall strategy to issue 
mDLs. States continue to exercise discretion to select processes not 
included in the Guidance. Given the rapidly-evolving cyber threat 
landscape, however, TSA may periodically update its guidance to provide 
additional information regarding newly-published standards or other 
sources, or recommend mitigations of newly discovered risks to the mDL 
ecosystem. TSA would publish updated guidance in the Federal Register 
and on the REAL ID website at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL, and would 
provide a copy to all States that have applied for or been issued a 
certificate of waiver. Updates to guidance will not impact issued 
waivers or pending applications.
(iv) Appendix A to Subpart A: Requirements for State mDL Issuance 
Systems
    Appendix A to subpart A of the part sets forth fundamental 
requirements to ensure the security and integrity of State mDL issuance 
processes. More specifically, these requirements concern the creation, 
issuance, use, revocation, and destruction of the State's certificate 
systems and cryptographic keys. The appendix consists of requirements 
in eight categories: (1) Certificate Authority Certificate Life Cycle 
Policy, (2) Certificate Authority Access Management, (3) Facility, 
Management, and Operational Controls, (4) Personnel Security Controls, 
(5) Technical Security Controls, (6) Threat Detection, (7) Logging, and 
(8) Incident Response and Recovery Plan. Adherence to these 
requirements ensures that States issue mDLs in a standardized manner 
with security and integrity to establish the trust necessary for 
Federal acceptance for official purposes.
     Certificate Authority Certificate Life Cycle Policy 
requirements (appendix A, sec. 1) ensure that a State issuing an mDL 
creates and manages a formal process which follows standardized 
management and protections of digital certificates. These requirements 
must be implemented in full compliance with the references cited in the 
appendix: the CA Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance 
and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates, CA Browser Forum 
Network and Certificate System Security Requirement, NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, NIST SP 800-57, and NIST SP 800-53B.
     Certificate Authority Access Management requirements 
(appendix A, sec. 2) set forth policies and processes for States 
concerning, for example, restricting access to mDL issuance systems, 
policies for multi-factor authentication, defining the scope and role 
of personnel, and Certificate System architecture which separates and 
isolates Certificate System functions to defined security zones. These 
requirements must be implemented in full compliance with the references 
cited in the appendix: CA Browser Forum Network and Certificate System 
Security Requirements, NIST Cybersecurity Framework, NIST 800-53 Rev. 
5, NIST SP 800-63-3, and NIST SP 800-63B.
     Under the requirements concerning Facility, Management, 
and Operational Controls (appendix A, sec. 3), States must provide 
specified controls protecting facilities where Certificate Systems 
reside from unauthorized access, environmental damage, physical 
breaches, and risks from foreign ownership, control, or influence. 
These requirements must be implemented in full compliance with the 
references cited in the appendix: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.
     Personnel security controls (appendix A, sec. 4) require 
States to establish policies to control insider threat risks to 
Certificate Systems and facilities. Such policies must include 
establish screening criteria for personnel who access Certificate 
Systems, post-employment access termination, updates to personnel 
security policy, training, records retention schedules, among other 
policies. These requirements must be implemented in full compliance 
with the references cited in the appendix: NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 and CA 
Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of 
Publicly-Trusted Certificates.
     Technical security controls (appendix A, sec. 5) specify 
requirements to protect Certificate System networks. In addition, 
States are required to protect private cryptographic keys of Issuing 
Authority Root Certificates using hardware security modules of Level 3 
or higher and Document Signer private cryptographic keys in hardware 
security modules of Level 2 and higher. Other controls are specified 
regarding Certificate System architecture and cryptographic key 
generation processes. These requirements must be implemented in full 
compliance with the references cited in the appendix: CA Browser Forum 
Network and Certificate System Security Requirements, CA Browser Forum 
Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-
Trusted Certificates, NIST Cybersecurity Framework, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 
5, NIST SP 800-57, and NIST FIPS 140-3.
     Under requirements for threat detection (appendix A, sec. 
6), States must implement controls to monitor and log evolving threats 
to various mDL issuance infrastructure, including digital certificate, 
issuance, and support systems. These requirements must be implemented 
in full compliance with the references cited in the appendix: CA 
Browser Forum Network and Certificate System Security Requirements, 
CISA Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response Playbooks, NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework, NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.
     Logging controls (appendix A, sec. 7) require States to 
record various events concerning Certificate Systems, including the 
management of cryptographic keys, digital certificate lifecycle events. 
The controls set forth detailed requirements concerning specific types 
of events that must be logged, as well as timeframes for maintaining 
such logs. These requirements must be implemented in full compliance 
with the references cited in the appendix: CA Browser Forum Baseline 
Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted 
Certificates, NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.
     Finally, section 8 of appendix A requires States to 
implement policies to respond to and recover from security incidents. 
States must act on logged events, issue alerts to relevant personnel, 
respond to alerts within a specified time period, perform vulnerability 
scans, among other things. In particular, States must provide written 
notice to TSA at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL within 72 hours of discovery 
of a significant cyber incident or breach that could compromise the 
integrity of a Certificate System. These requirements must be 
implemented in full compliance with the references cited in the 
appendix: CA Browser Forum Network and Certificate System Security 
Requirements, CISA Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response 
Playbooks, CISA National Cyber Incident Response Plan; NIST SP 800-53 
Rev. 5, NIST Cybersecurity Framework. TSA invites comment on all 
aspects of the waiver application requirements and costs of compliance, 
including the Waiver Application Guidance, appendix A to subpart A to 
the part, the appropriateness of requiring compliance with the 
specified standards and guidelines and any alternate standards that 
should be considered, and other recommendations

[[Page 60070]]

that commenters believe TSA should consider.
5. Decisions on Applications for Waiver
    Section 37.9(b) would establish a timeline and process for TSA to 
issue decisions on a waiver application. Under this paragraph, TSA 
would endeavor to provide States a decision on initial applications 
within 60 days, but not longer than 90 days. TSA would provide three 
types of written notice via email: approved, insufficient, or denied.
    If TSA approves a State's application for a waiver, TSA would 
memorialize that decision by issuing a certificate of waiver to that 
State, and including the State in a list of State-mDLs approved for 
Federal use, published by TSA on the REAL ID website at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL. A certificate of waiver would specify the date that the 
waiver becomes effective, the expiration date, and any other terms and 
conditions with which a State must comply, as provided under proposed 
Sec.  37.9(d). A State seeking to renew its certificate beyond the 
expiration date must reapply for a waiver, as provided in Sec.  
37.9(e)(6).
    If TSA determines that an application is insufficient, did not 
respond to certain information required in Sec.  37.10(a) or (b), or 
contains other deficiencies, TSA would provide an explanation of such 
deficiencies and allow the State an opportunity address the 
deficiencies within the timeframe specified in Sec.  37.9(b)(2). TSA 
would permit States to submit multiple amended applications if 
necessary, with the intent of working with States individually to 
enable their mDLs to comply with the requirements of Sec.  37.10(a) and 
(b).
    If TSA denies an application, TSA would provide the specific 
grounds for the basis of the denial and afford the State an opportunity 
to submit a new application. As stated in Sec.  37.9(c), TSA would also 
provide a State an opportunity to seek reconsideration of a denied 
application. Instructions for seeking reconsideration would be provided 
by TSA on the REAL ID website at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL. An adverse 
decision upon reconsideration would be considered a final agency 
action. As provided in Sec.  37.9(c), however, a State whose request 
for reconsideration has been denied may submit a new application for a 
waiver.
6. Limitations, Suspension, and Termination of Certificate of Waiver
    Section 37.9(e) would set forth various restrictions on a 
certificate of waiver. Specifically, in paragraph (e)(1) of this 
section, TSA proposes that a certificate of waiver would be valid for a 
period of three years from the date of issuance. Paragraph (e)(2) 
proposes that a State must report to TSA if, after it receives a 
waiver, it makes significant modifications to its mDL issuance 
processes that differ in a material way from information that the State 
provided in its application. If the State makes such modifications, it 
would be required to report such changes 60 days before implementing 
the changes. This requirement is intended to apply to changes that may 
undermine the bases on which TSA granted a waiver. The reporting 
requirement is not intended to apply to routine, low-level changes, 
such as systems maintenance and software updates and patches. Paragraph 
(e)(3) would require a State that is issued a waiver to comply with all 
requirements specified in Sec. Sec.  37.51(a) and 37.9(d)(3).
    Section 37.9(e)(4) sets forth processes for suspension of 
certificates of waiver. As provided in proposed Sec.  37.9(e)(4)(i)(A), 
TSA may suspend the validity of a certificate of waiver if TSA 
determines that a State:
     fails to comply with any terms and conditions (see Sec.  
37.9(d)(3)) specified in the certificate of waiver;
     fails to comply with reporting requirements (see Sec.  
37.9(e)(2)); or
     issues mDLs in a manner that is not consistent with the 
information the State provided in its application for a waiver under 
Sec.  37.10(a) and (b).
    Before suspending a waiver for these reasons, TSA will provide such 
State written notice via email that it intends to suspend its waiver, 
along with an explanation of the reasons, information on how the State 
may address the deficiencies, and a timeline for the State to respond 
and for TSA to reply to the State, as set forth in Sec.  
37.9(e)(4)(ii). DHS may withdraw the notice of suspension, request 
additional information, or issue a final suspension. If TSA issues a 
final suspension of a State's certificate of waiver, DHS will remove 
the name of that State from the list of mDLs approved for Federal 
acceptance for official purposes.
    TSA additionally may suspend a State's waiver at any time upon 
discovery that Federal acceptance of a State's mDL is likely to cause 
imminent or serious threats to the security, privacy, or data integrity 
of any Federal agency, as proposed by Sec.  37.9(e)(4)(i)(B). 
Suspension would apply to all Federal agencies and would not be agency-
specific. Examples of such triggering events include cyber-attacks and 
other events that cause serious harm to a State's mDL issuance systems. 
If a State discovers a significant cyber incident that it believes 
could compromise the integrity of its mDL issuance systems, sec. 8.6 of 
appendix A to subpart A of the part would require States to provide 
written notice to TSA, at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL, of such incident 
within 72 hours of discovery. If TSA determines such suspension is 
necessary, TSA will provide written notice via email to each State 
whose certificate of waiver is affected, as soon as practicable after 
discovery of the triggering event, providing an explanation for the 
suspension, as well as an estimated timeframe for resumption of the 
validity of the certificate of waiver.
    It is TSA's intent to work with States to resolve the conditions 
that could lead to suspension and avoid issuing a final suspension. If 
TSA issues a final suspension of any State's certificate of waiver, TSA 
will temporarily remove the name of that State from the list of mDLs 
approved for Federal acceptance for official purposes. A State 
receiving a final suspension may apply for a new certificate of waiver 
by submitting a new application. Under Sec.  37.9(e)(5), TSA may 
terminate a certificate of waiver for serious or egregious violations. 
More specifically, TSA may terminate a waiver if TSA determines that a 
State:
     does not comply with REAL ID requirements in Sec.  
37.51(a);
     is committing an egregious violation of any terms and 
conditions (see Sec.  37.9(d)(3)) specified in the certificate of 
waiver and is unwilling to cure such violation;
     is committing an egregious violation of reporting 
requirements (see Sec.  37.9(e)(2)) and is unwilling to cure such 
violation; or
     provided false information in its waiver application.
    Before terminating a certificate of waiver, TSA would provide 
written notice via email of intent to terminate, including findings 
supporting the termination and an opportunity to present information. 
As specified, a State would have 7 days to respond to the notice, and 
TSA would respond via email within 30 days. TSA may withdraw the notice 
of termination, request additional information, or issue a final 
termination. If TSA issues a final termination of a State's certificate 
of waiver, TSA will remove the name of that State from the list of mDLs 
approved for Federal acceptance for official purposes. A State whose 
certificate of waiver has been terminated may apply for a new 
certificate of waiver by submitting a new application.

[[Page 60071]]

7. Effect of a Status of Waiver on REAL ID Compliance
    Section 37.9(f) clarifies that the status of a State's certificate 
of waiver, including the status of an application for a waiver, has no 
bearing on TSA's determination of that State's compliance or non-
compliance with any other section of this part. A certificate of waiver 
that TSA has issued to a State is not a determination that the State is 
in compliance with any other section in this part. Similarly, an 
application for a waiver that TSA has deemed insufficient or denied, or 
a certificate of waiver TSA has suspended, terminated, or expired, is 
not a determination that the State is not in compliance with any other 
section in this part.
8. Incorporation by Reference
    TSA proposes adding to subpart A, Sec.  37.4, the following 
industry standards and government guidelines that this rulemaking 
proposes to incorporate by reference (discussed in detail in Part 
II.D., above):

 AAMVA
    [cir] Mobile Driver's License (mDL) Implementation Guidelines, 
Version 1.2 (Jan. 2023);
 CA/Browser Forum
    [cir] Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of 
Publicly-Trusted Certificates, Version 1.8.6 (Dec. 14, 2022),
    [cir] Network and Certificate System Security Requirements, Version 
1.7 (Apr. 5, 2021);
 CISA
    [cir] Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response Playbooks 
(Nov. 2021),
    [cir] National Cyber Incident Response Plan (Dec. 2016);
 ISO/IEC
    [cir] ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021, Personal identification--ISO-compliant 
driving licence--Part 5: Mobile driving licence (mDL) application, 
Edition 1 (Sept. 2021);
 NIST
    [cir] FIPS PUB 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic 
Modules (Mar. 22, 2019),
    [cir] FIPS PUB 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (Aug. 2015),
    [cir] FIPS PUB 186-5, Digital Signature Standard (DSS) (Feb. 2023),
    [cir] FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Nov. 26, 
2001),
    [cir] FIPS PUB 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC) (July 2008),
    [cir] FIPS PUB 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and 
Extendable-Output Functions (Aug. 2015),
    [cir] SP 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls for Information 
Systems and Organizations, Rev. 5 (Sept. 2020),
    [cir] SP 800-57 Part 1, Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1--
General, Rev. 5 (May 2020),
    [cir] SP 800-57 Part 2, Recommendation for Key Management: Part 2--
Best Practices for Key Management Organization, Rev. 1 (May 2019),
    [cir] SP 800-57 Part 3, Recommendation for Key Management: Part 3: 
Application-Specific Key Management Guidance, Rev. 1 (Jan. 2015),
    [cir] SP 800-63-3, Digital Identity Guidelines, (June 2017),
    [cir] SP 800-63B, Digital Identity Guidelines Authentication and 
Lifecycle Management (June 2017), and
    [cir] Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
Version 1.1 (Apr. 16, 2018).

C. Impacted Stakeholders

    The proposed changes would apply to State driver's licensing 
agencies issuing mDLs that seek a temporary waiver from TSA for its 
mDLs. The waiver would enable Federal agencies to accept such mDLs for 
official purposes, defined in the REAL ID Act as accessing Federal 
facilities, entering nuclear power plants, boarding federally regulated 
commercial aircraft, and any other purposes that the Secretary shall 
determine. Any Federal agency that chooses to accept mDLs for official 
purposes must procure a reader in order to receive an individual's 
identity data.
    This proposed rule does not impose any requirements on:
     States that do not seek a waiver for mDLs;
     Non-State issuers of other forms of digital 
identification; or
     Federal agencies to accept mDLs.
    A State seeking a waiver for Federal acceptance of its mDLs for 
official purposes would be required to file with TSA a complete 
application and supporting documents. An application form and 
instructions would be published by TSA in a form and manner prescribed 
by TSA, such as a TSA-specified website. Through the application, the 
State would be required to demonstrate how its mDLs meet the 
requirements for a waiver set forth in Sec.  37.10(a) and (b).

D. Use Cases Affected by This Proposed Rule

    The scope of this proposed rule is confined strictly to Federal 
acceptance of mDLs for official purposes, defined by the REAL ID 
regulations as accessing Federal facilities, entering nuclear power 
plants, and boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft. Any other 
purpose is beyond the scope of this rulemaking. For example, a waiver 
issued under this proposed rule would not apply to any of the 
following:
     mDL acceptance by Federal agencies for non-REAL ID 
official uses (e.g., applying for Federal benefits);
     mDL acceptance by non-Federal agencies (e.g., State 
agencies, businesses, private persons);
     Commercial transactions; or
     Physical driver's licenses or identification cards.
    Nothing in this proposed rule would require Federal agencies to 
accept mDLs; each Federal agency retains the discretion to determine 
its identification policies. Additionally, nothing in this proposed 
rule would require a State to seek a waiver or issue mDLs.

IV. Discussion of Public Comments in the RFI

    As discussed in Part II.B., above, DHS issued an RFI \60\ on April 
19, 2021, and requested comments from the public to be submitted by 
June 18, 2021. In addition, DHS and TSA held a virtual public meeting 
on June 30, 2021, to provide an additional forum for public comments, 
and extended the RFI comment period until July 30, 2021, to permit 
additional comments following the public meeting.\61\ Approximately 100 
persons attended the public meeting. In response to discussion at the 
public meeting and comments to the RFI concerning the importance of 
access to the primary industry standard referenced in the RFI, ISO/IEC 
18013-5:2021, DHS facilitated public access to the standard by 
publishing a notification \62\ in the Federal Register on September 16, 
2021, providing instructions to the public to gain access to the 
standard without cost. Approximately 30 persons requested and received 
access. Additionally, DHS reopened the comment period until October 18, 
2021. With the comment period extension and reopening, DHS provided a 
total RFI comment period of 180 days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ 86 FR 20320.
    \61\ 86 FR 31987.
    \62\ 86 FR 51625.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DHS received roughly 60 comments to the RFI from a diverse group of 
stakeholders, including advocacy groups representing varied interests, 
individuals, State government agencies, trade associations, and 
industry. An analysis of comments received showed that topics of 
interest to stakeholders

[[Page 60072]]

concerned: the need for standardization and/or Federal guidance,\63\ 
potential benefits to the public from mDLs generally,\64\ and the 
appropriateness of ISO/IEC standards as a starting point for regulatory 
requirements.\65\ Input received from these stakeholders, as it relates 
to the focus of this NPRM, is included and referenced throughout this 
proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ See, e.g., comments submitted by: American Association of 
Motor Vehicles Administrators; CBN Secure Technologies; DocuSign; 
FaceTec; IDmachines; Maryland DHS of Transportation, Motor Vehicle 
Administration; National Conference of State Legislatures; State of 
Connecticut, DHS of Motor Vehicles; U.S. Travel Association.
    \64\ See, e.g., comments submitted by: Applied Recognition; 
Bredemarket; Hiday; IDmachines; Mothershed; Muller; State of 
Connecticut, DHS of Motor Vehicles; U.S. Travel Association.
    \65\ See, e.g., comments submitted by: American Association of 
Motor Vehicle Administrators; American Civil Liberties Union, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy Information 
Center; Apple; Association for Convenience & Fuel Retailing; CBN 
Secure Technologies; FaceTec; Florida DHS of Highway Safety and 
Motor Vehicles; IDEMIA; Maryland DHS of Transportation, Motor 
Vehicle Administration; National Immigration Law Center and 
Undersigned Organizations; Secure Technology Alliance; State of 
Connecticut, DHS of Motor Vehicles; Underwriters Laboratories; 
Verifiable Credentials Policy Committee, Blockchain Advocacy 
Coalition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the issues already discussed, many commenters raised 
concerns about potential privacy risks depending on the mode of data 
transfer. For background, an mDL reader can retrieve an individual's 
data under two different modes of operation: a ``device retrieval'' 
mode (also known as ``offline'') in which data is retrieved directly 
from an mDL holder's mobile device, and a ``server retrieval'' mode 
(also known as ``online'') in which the data is retrieved from a State 
driver's licensing agency.\66\ In its RFI, DHS noted that it was 
considering both modes of operation for Federal acceptance for official 
purposes, and specifically sought comments on the security and privacy 
risks, and mitigating solutions for both modes.\67\ DHS received 
numerous comments from advocacy groups, industry, and States concerning 
potential privacy risks posed specifically by server retrieval 
mode.\68\ Chief among these concerns was the potential for mDL usage to 
be tracked. TSA has observed that security and privacy protections to 
mitigate such concerns are evolving and unsettled, and after careful 
consideration of commenters' concerns, TSA does not believe server 
retrieval mode is appropriate for Federal acceptance for official 
purposes at this time. TSA will continue monitoring industry 
developments and may update its conclusions in the Phase 2 rulemaking, 
if warranted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ 86 FR 20323-24.
    \67\ 86 FR 20326.
    \68\ See, e.g., comments submitted by American Association of 
Motor Vehicle Administrators; American Civil Liberties Union, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy Information 
Center; Association for Convenience and Fuel Retailing; Better 
Identity Coalition; Electronic Privacy Information Center; IDEMIA; 
National Immigration Law Center, and Undersigned Organizations; and 
Verifiable Credentials Policy Committee--Blockchain Advocacy 
Coalition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DHS also received comments on other topics, including non-REAL ID 
use cases such as commercial transactions and technical information on 
various topics. As noted above, a waiver issued under the proposed rule 
would not address use of an mDL for commercial transactions or any 
other non-Federal purposes not covered by the REAL ID Act or 
regulations. In general, mDL acceptance by Federal agencies for non-
REAL ID official purposes, mDL acceptance by non-Federal agencies, and 
mDL use in commercial transactions go beyond the scope of the REAL ID 
Act's official purposes. Although not the focus of this proposal, TSA 
may examine some of these issues through its on-going mDL efforts, such 
as mDL collaborations with industry, which could inform future 
regulatory proposals. To support this interest, TSA appreciates 
stakeholders' perspectives on these topics.

V. Consultation With States, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the 
Department of Transportation

    Under section 205 of the REAL ID Act, issuance of REAL ID 
regulations must be conducted in consultation with the Secretary of 
Transportation and the States. During the development of this NPRM, DHS 
and TSA consulted with the Department of Transportation and other 
Federal agencies with an interest in this rulemaking. DHS and TSA also 
consulted with State officials via AAMVA. In addition, DHS and TSA met 
with various non-governmental organizations, including civil rights and 
privacy advocacy groups. Stakeholder input, informed by extensive 
outreach, was critical to informing this NPRM.

VI. Regulatory Analyses

A. Economic Impact Analyses

1. Regulatory Impact Analysis Summary
    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, E.O. 12866 of September 30, 1993 (Regulatory Planning 
and Review),\69\ as supplemented by E.O. 13563 of January 18, 2011 
(Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review),\70\ and amended by E.O. 
14094 of April 6, 2023 (Modernizing Regulatory Review) \71\ directs 
Federal agencies to propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \72\ 
requires agencies to consider the economic impact of regulatory changes 
on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreement Act of 1979 \73\ 
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Fourth, the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 \74\ (UMRA) requires agencies to 
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects 
of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to 
result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in 
the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more 
(adjusted for inflation) in any one year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ Published at 58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
    \70\ Published at 76 FR 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
    \71\ Published at 88 FR 21879 (April 6, 2023).
    \72\ Public Law 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (Sept. 19, 1980) (codified 
at 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA)).
    \73\ Public Law 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (July 26, 1979) (codified at 
19 U.S.C. 2531-2533).
    \74\ Public Law 104-4, 109 Stat. 66 (Mar. 22, 1995) (codified at 
2 U.S.C. 1181-1538).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Assessments Required by E.O. 12866 and E.O. 13563
    E.O. 12866 and E.O. 13563 direct agencies to assess the costs and 
benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is 
necessary, select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits 
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety 
effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Under E.O. 12866, as 
amended by E.O. 14094, agencies must also determine whether a 
regulatory action is significant.\75\ These requirements were 
supplemented by E.O. 13563, which emphasizes the importance of 
quantifying both costs

[[Page 60073]]

and benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting 
flexibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ See section 1(b) of E.O. 14094, revising section 3(f) of 
E.O. 12866. Section 3(f) of E.O. 12866 defines a ``significant 
regulatory action'' as any regulatory action that is likely to 
result in a rule that: (1) has an annual effect on the economy of 
$200 million or more or adversely affects in a material way the 
economy; a sector of the economy; productivity; competition; jobs; 
the environment; public health or safety; or State, local, 
territorial, or tribal governments or communities (also referred to 
as economically significant); (2) creates serious inconsistency or 
otherwise interferes with an action taken or planned by another 
agency; (3) materially alters the budgetary impacts of entitlements, 
grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of 
recipients thereof; or (4) raises novel legal or policy issues 
arising out of legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the 
principles set forth in the E.O.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In conducting these analyses, TSA has made the following 
determinations:
    (a) While TSA attempts to quantify costs where available, TSA 
primarily discusses the costs and benefits of this rulemaking in 
qualitative terms. At present, mDLs are part of an emerging and 
evolving industry with an elevated level of uncertainty surrounding 
costs and benefits. Nonetheless, TSA anticipates the rulemaking would 
not result in an effect on the economy of $200 million or more in any 
year of the analysis. The rulemaking would not adversely affect the 
economy, interfere with actions taken or planned by other agencies, or 
generally alter the budgetary impact of any entitlements.
    (b) TSA has not prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
(IRFA) and, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Secretary certifies that 
the proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. The proposed rule would only 
directly regulate the fifty States, the District of Columbia, and the 
five U.S. territories who voluntarily participate in the mDL waiver 
process, who under the RFA are not considered small entities.
    (c) TSA has determined that the NPRM imposes no significant 
barriers to international trade as defined by the Trade Agreement Act 
of 1979; and
    (d) TSA has determined that the NPRM does not impose an unfunded 
mandate on State, local, or tribal governments, such that a written 
statement would be required under the UMRA, as its annual effect on the 
economy does not exceed the $100 million threshold (adjusted for 
inflation) in any year of the analysis.
    TSA has prepared an analysis of its estimated costs and benefits, 
summarized in the following paragraphs, and in the OMB Circular A-4 
Accounting Statement. When estimating the cost of a rulemaking, 
agencies typically estimate future expected costs imposed by a 
regulation over a period of analysis. For this proposed rule's period 
of analysis, TSA uses a 10-year period of analysis to estimate costs.
    This proposed rule would establish a temporary waiver process that 
would permit Federal agencies to accept mDLs for official purposes, as 
defined in the REAL ID Act, when full enforcement of the REAL ID Act 
and regulations begins on May 7, 2025. Federal agencies would be able 
to accept mDLs for official purposes on an interim basis, provided 
that: (1) the mDL holder has been issued a valid and unexpired REAL ID-
compliant physical driver's license or identification card from the 
same State that issued the mDL; (2) TSA has determined the issuing 
State to be REAL ID-compliant; and (3) TSA has issued a waiver to the 
State. Federal agencies that opt to accept mDLs for official purposes 
must also procure a mDL reader in order to validate the identity of the 
mDL holder. As part of the application process for the mDL waiver, 
States would be required to submit to TSA an application, including 
supporting data, and other documentation necessary to establish that 
their mDLs meet specified criteria concerning security, privacy, and 
interoperability. The criteria concerning security, privacy, and 
interoperability would not change absent a subsequent rulemaking. When 
REAL ID Act and regulations enforcement begins on May 7, 2025, Federal 
agencies will be prohibited from accepting non-compliant driver's 
licenses and identification cards, including both physical cards and 
mDLs, for official purposes.
    In the following paragraph TSA summarizes the estimated costs of 
the proposed rule on the affected parties: States, TSA, mDL users, and 
relying parties (Federal agencies that voluntarily choose to accept 
mDLs for official purposes). TSA has also identified other non-
quantified impacts to affected parties. As Table 1 displays, TSA 
estimates the 10-year total cost of the proposed rule to be $826.8 
million undiscounted, $695.6 million discounted at 3 percent, and 
$562.0 million discounted at 7 percent. The total cost to States 
comprises approximately 98 percent of the total quantified costs of the 
proposed rule.

[[Page 60074]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU23.006

    States incur costs to familiarize themselves with the requirements 
of the proposed rule, purchase access to an industry standard, submit 
their mDL waiver application, submit an mDL waiver reapplication, and 
comply with mDL application criteria requirements. As displayed in 
Table 2, the 10-year cost to States is $813.7 million undiscounted, 
$684.2 million discounted at 3 percent, and $552.4 million discounted 
at 7 percent.

[[Page 60075]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU23.007

    TSA incurs costs associated with reviewing mDL waiver applications 
and mDL waiver renewals, purchasing access to industry standards, 
procuring mDL readers, and mDL training. As displayed in Table 3, the 
10-year cost to TSA is $9.84 million undiscounted, $8.62 million 
discounted at 3 percent, and $7.35 million discounted at 7 percent.

[[Page 60076]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU23.008

    Relying parties represent Federal agencies that elect to accept a 
mDLs for official purposes. Per the proposed rule, relying parties 
would be required to use a mDL reader to retrieve and validate mDL 
data. As a result, relying parties would incur costs to procure mDL 
readers should they voluntarily choose to accept mDLs for official 
purposes. TSA is also considered a relying party, but due to the 
particular impact to TSA related to the requirement for REAL ID related 
to boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft, those impacts are 
discussed separately. As displayed in Table 4, the 10-year cost to 
relying parties is $3.29 million undiscounted, $2.74 million discounted 
at 3 percent, and $2.19 million discounted at 7 percent.

[[Page 60077]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU23.009

    TSA has also identified other non-quantified impacts to the 
affected entities. States may incur costs to: monitor and study mDL 
technology as it evolves; resolve the underlying issues that could lead 
to a suspension or termination of a mDL waiver; report serious threats 
to security, privacy, or data integrity; report material changes to mDL 
issuance processes; remove conflicts of interest with a third-party 
auditor; and request reconsideration of a denied mDL waiver 
application. TSA may incur costs to: investigate circumstances that 
could lead to suspension or termination of a State's mDL waiver; 
provide notice to States, relying parties, and the public related to 
mDL waiver suspensions or terminations; develop an IT solution that 
maintains an up-to-date list of States with valid mDL waivers; and 
resolve a request for reconsideration of a denied mDL waiver 
application. mDL users may incur costs with additional application 
requirements to obtain a mDL. Relying parties may incur costs to 
resolve any security or privacy issue with the mDL reader; report 
serious threats to security, privacy, or data integrity; verifying the 
list of States with valid mDL waivers; train personnel to verify mDLs; 
and update the public on identification policies.
    TSA believes that States implementing a mDL, absent the rulemaking, 
would still comply with the AAMVA mDL Implementation Guidelines 
(hereafter referred to as the ``AAMVA Guidelines''). Many of the 
requirements of the mDL application criteria are already contained 
within the AAMVA Guidelines. This includes mDL application criteria 
concerning: data encryption; authentication; device identification 
keys; user identity verification; applicant presentation; REAL ID 
compliant physical card; data record; records retention; privacy; and 
interoperability. Only the mDL application criteria related to 
escalated review and infrastructure security/issuance are not contained 
with the AAMVA Guidelines. Operating under the assumption that States 
interested in mDLs would comply with the AAMVA Guidelines, TSA assumes 
the application criteria that overlap with the AAMVA Guidelines would 
otherwise be incurred and thus not included as a cost of the proposed 
rule. However, TSA requests comment on this assumption and any cost 
information associated with the mDL application criteria.
    This proposed rule would establish mDL application criteria that 
would serve as an interim mDL standard for those States choosing to 
issue mDLs that can be accepted for official purposes. TSA's 
application criteria may help guide States in their development of mDL 
technologies which would provide a shared standard that could 
potentially improve efficiency while also promoting higher security, 
privacy, and interoperability safeguards.
    The application criteria set requirements establishing security and 
privacy protections to safeguard an mDL holder's identity data. They 
also set interoperability requirements to ensure secure transactions 
with Federal agencies. States, via their mDL waiver application, must 
establish that their mDLs meet the application criteria thus helping to 
ensure adequate security and privacy protections are in place. Absent 
the proposed rule, individual States may choose insufficient security 
and privacy safeguards for mDL technologies that fail to meet the 
intended security purposes of REAL ID and the privacy needs of users.

[[Page 60078]]

    mDLs themselves may provide additional security benefits by 
offering a more secure verification of an individual's identity and 
authentication of an individual's credential compared to physical 
cards. In general, mDLs use a cryptographic protocol that ensures the 
mDL was obtained through a trusted authority, such as a State's 
Department of Motor Vehicles.\76\ This same protocol may prevent the 
alteration of mDLs and reduce the threat of counterfeit 
credentials.\77\ mDLs also offer increased protection of personal 
identifiers by preventing over-collection of information. mDLs may 
possess the ability to share only those attributes necessary to 
validate the user identity with the relying party.\78\ When using a 
physical card, the user has no ability to limit the information that is 
shared, regardless of the amount of information required for 
verification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ Secure Technology Alliance's Mobile Driver's License 
Workshop Showcases mDLs Role in the Future of Identification. 
December 14, 2021. https://www.securetechalliance.org/secure-technology-alliances-mobile-drivers-license-workshop-showcases-mdls-role-in-the-future-of-identification/.
    \77\ Ibid.
    \78\ Mobile ID can bring both convenience and citizen privacy. 
July 15, 2021. https://www.biometricupdate.com/202107/mobile-id-can-bring-both-convenience-and-citizen-privacy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TSA's mDL application criteria can help guide State development and 
investment in mDLs. The mDL application criteria would foster a level 
of standardization that would potentially reduce complexity by limiting 
individual State nuances while also ensuring interoperability across 
States and with the Federal Government. This increased interoperability 
reduces implementation costs by limiting the need for different 
protocols or mechanisms to accept mDLs from individual States.
    Identification of mDL application criteria that can be used across 
States would result in efficiency gains through multiple States 
pursuing similar objectives, goals, and solutions. Establishing 
application criteria early in the technology development process has 
the potential to align development activities across disparate efforts. 
Early guidance might also reduce re-work or modifications required in 
future regulations thus saving time and resources redesigning systems 
and functionality to adhere to subsequent Federal guidelines.
    Furthermore, the mDL application criteria may potentially encourage 
investment in mDLs and the pooling of resources to develop mDL 
technology capabilities across States and address common concerns or 
issues. Such collaboration, or unity of effort, can help spread 
research and development risk and reduce inefficiencies that may arise 
from States working independently. Greater clarity over mDL 
regulations, with the proposed rule part of an incremental, multi-
phased rulemaking approach, may spur new entrants (States and 
technology companies) into the mDL ecosystem.
    The proposed rule, would allow Federal agencies to continue to 
accept mDLs for official purposes when REAL ID enforcement begins. This 
would avoid the sudden halting of mDL acceptance when REAL ID 
enforcement begins which would reverse trends in providing for a more 
customer-friendly screening experience. The experience and insight 
learned through the mDL waiver process could also be used to inform 
future standards and rulemaking.
3. OMB A-4 Statement
    The OMB A-4 Accounting Statement presents annualized costs and 
qualitative benefits of the proposed rule.
BILLING CODE 9110-05-P

[[Page 60079]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU23.010

BILLING CODE 9110-05-C
4. Alternatives Considered
    In addition to the proposed rule, or the ``preferred alternative'', 
TSA also considered four alternative regulatory options.
    The first alternative (Alternative 1) represents the status quo, or 
no change relative to the proposed creation of a mDL waiver. This 
represents a scenario without a rulemaking or a waiver process to 
enable mDL acceptance for official Federal purposes. Under this 
alternative, States would continue to

[[Page 60080]]

develop mDLs in a less structured manner while waiting for relevant 
guiding standards to be published which would likely result in 
dissimilar mDL implementation and technology characteristics. This 
alternative was not selected because it does not address the market 
failures associated with a lack of common standards, such as increased 
complexity of mDL use across States, and may result in larger costs in 
the long run when formal mDL standards are finalized.
    The second alternative (Alternative 2) features the same 
requirements of the proposed rule, including an mDL waiver process, but 
allows for an auto acceptance of certain State waivers that are ``low-
risk.'' TSA would identify mDLs from States who have fulfilled the 
proposed rule's minimum requirements prior to applying for the waiver 
and have sufficiently demonstrated (e.g., via TSA initiative or recent 
evaluation by a trusted party) to TSA that their mDL systems present 
adequate interoperability and low security and privacy risk. The auto 
acceptance provision would allow Federal agencies to immediately (or 
conditionally) accept those ``low-risk'' mDLs for official purposes 
pending final approval of the respective State mDL waiver applications. 
However, TSA rejects this alternative because TSA believes the emerging 
technology underlying mDLs is insufficiently established to accept the 
security, privacy, and interoperability of States' mDL systems without 
an evaluation by TSA or another trusted party. In addition, a similar 
presumptive eligibility process is not available for other aspects of 
REAL ID and such an action would not reduce the burden on States or TSA 
to comply with any framework DHS develops.
    Under the third alternative (Alternative 3), TSA would establish 
more comprehensive requirements than those in the proposed rule to 
ensure mDLs comply with the REAL ID Act. States would be required to 
adopt the more comprehensive requirement to issue valid mDLs that can 
be accepted for official purposes. These technical requirements could 
include specific standards related to mDL issuance, provisioning, 
verification, readers, privacy, and other security measures. TSA 
rejects this alternative because promulgating more comprehensive 
requirements for mDLs is premature, as both industry standards and 
technology used by States are still evolving. Restrictive requirements 
could stifle innovation by forcing all stakeholders to pivot toward 
compliance. This could impede TSA from identifying and implementing a 
more efficient regulatory approach in the future.
    Finally, under the fourth alternative (Alternative 4), instead of a 
waiver process, TSA would first establish minimum requirements for 
issuing REAL ID compliant mDLs before TSA later sets more comprehensive 
requirements as additional guidance and standards become available in 
the mid- and long-term. The interim minimum requirements would consist 
of the same requirements for security, privacy, and interoperability, 
based on nineteen industry and government standards and guidelines, 
described in the proposed rule to guide waiver applications. 
Alternative 4 effectively would codify standards that may become 
obsolete in the near future, as existing standards are revised, 
emerging standards publish, and new cyber threats proliferate. TSA 
rejects this alternative because establishing minimum requirements that 
may become obsolete in the near future may limit the ability for TSA to 
revise standards quickly and would increase the security and privacy 
risks of accepting mDLs. In addition, costs under Alternative 4 would 
roughly be similar to costs under the proposed rule, as both options 
would require audits and other compliance costs. TSA requests comments 
as to whether finalizing these minimum requirements for REAL ID 
compliance would be preferable to the temporary waiver process 
described in this proposal. Specifically, TSA seeks comment on whether 
Alternative 4 would realize higher benefits, either quantitative or 
qualitative, for States and the public, than the waiver process 
described in this proposal. TSA also seeks comment on costs to the 
affected entities to comply with the minimum requirements.
5. Regulatory Flexibility Act Assessment
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980, as amended,\79\ was 
enacted by Congress to ensure that small entities (small businesses, 
small not-for-profit organizations, and small governmental 
jurisdictions) would not be unnecessarily or disproportionately 
burdened by Federal regulations. Section 605 of the RFA allows an 
agency to certify a rule in lieu of preparing an analysis if the 
regulations are not expected to have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ Public Law 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (Sept. 19, 1980) (codified 
at 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In accordance with the RFA, TSA has not prepared a Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis and pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Secretary 
certifies that the proposed rule would not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities. The proposed rule 
would directly impact States that voluntarily choose to apply for a 
waiver that would permit mDLs issued by those States to be accepted for 
official Federal purposes.
6. International Trade Impact Assessment
    The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
establishing any standards or engaging in related activities that 
create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. The Trade Agreement Act does not consider legitimate domestic 
objectives, such as essential security, as unnecessary obstacles. The 
statute also requires that international standards be considered and, 
where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards. TSA has 
assessed the potential effect of this proposed rule and has determined 
this rule would not have an adverse impact on international trade.
7. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment
    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Public 
Law 104-4, establishes requirements for Federal agencies to assess the 
effects of their regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal 
governments and the private sector. Under sec. 202 of the UMRA, TSA 
generally must prepare a written Statement, including a cost-benefit 
analysis, for proposed and final rules with ``Federal mandates'' that 
may result in expenditures by State, local, and tribal governments in 
the aggregate or by the private sector of $100 million or more 
(adjusted for inflation) in any one year.
    Before TSA promulgates a rule for which a written statement is 
required, sec. 205 of the UMRA generally requires TSA to identify and 
consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and adopt the 
least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that 
achieves the objectives of the rulemaking. The provisions of sec. 205 
do not apply when they are inconsistent with applicable law. Moreover, 
sec. 205 allows TSA to adopt an alternative other than the least 
costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative if the 
final rule provides an explanation why that alternative was not 
adopted. Before TSA establishes any regulatory requirements that may

[[Page 60081]]

significantly or uniquely affect small governments, including tribal 
governments, it must develop under sec. 203 of the UMRA a small 
government agency plan. The plan must provide for notifying potentially 
affected small governments, enabling officials of affected small 
governments to have meaningful and timely input in the development of 
TSA regulatory proposals with significant Federal intergovernmental 
mandates, and informing, educating, and advising small governments on 
compliance with the regulatory requirements.
    When adjusted for inflation, the threshold for expenditures becomes 
$177.1 million in 2022 dollars. TSA has determined that this proposed 
rule does not contain a Federal mandate that may result in expenditures 
that exceed that amount either for State, local, and tribal governments 
in the aggregate in any one year. TSA will publish a final analysis, 
including its response to public comments, when it publishes a final 
rule.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) 
requires that TSA consider the impact of paperwork and other 
information collection burdens imposed on the public. Under the 
provisions of PRA section 3507(d), DHS must obtain approval from the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for each collection of 
information it conducts, sponsors, or requires through regulations. 
This proposed rule would call for a collection of information under the 
PRA. Accordingly, TSA has submitted to OMB the proposed rule and this 
analysis, including the sections relating to collections of 
information. See 5 CFR 1320.11(a). As defined in 5 CFR 1320.3(c), 
``collection of information'' includes reporting, recordkeeping, 
monitoring, posting, labeling, and other similar actions. This section 
provides the description of the information collection and of those who 
must collect the information as well as an estimate of the total annual 
time burden.
    The proposed rule establishes a process for States to apply to TSA 
for a temporary waiver. Such a request is voluntary but would require 
the submission of an mDL waiver application, resubmission of an mDL 
waiver application deemed insufficient or denied, and reapplication for 
a mDL waiver when the term of the mDL waiver expires. All of these 
items would be considered new information collections.
    TSA uses the current State of mDL implementation to inform its 
estimate on how many State entities would request a mDL waiver during 
the period of analysis.\80\ All 50 States, the District of Columbia, 
and five territories (collectively referred to as States hereafter) are 
eligible to apply for a mDL waiver as discussed in the proposed rule. 
However, DHS assumes that not all States would apply for the mDL 
waiver. TSA assumes 15 States would apply for a mDL waiver in Year 1 of 
the analysis, 10 States in Year 2, and five States in Year 3.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Eight States currently provide mDLs. Roughly 20 States have 
taken steps towards mDL implementation, including seven States 
participating in the TSA mobile ID evaluation program without a 
current mDL solution.
    \81\ Each State would submit one mDL waiver application.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Following the State submission of its mDL waiver application, TSA 
determines if the application is approved, insufficient, or denied. 
States are allowed to amend an insufficient or denied mDL waiver 
application and resubmit to TSA review.
    TSA assumes that all submissions would initially be deemed 
insufficient due to the mDL waiver criteria being new and with mDLs an 
emerging technology. Nonetheless, TSA intends to work individually with 
interested States to meet the mDL criteria to maximize the likelihood 
of receiving a waiver. Based on these assumptions, TSA estimates all 
initial mDL waiver applications would be deemed insufficient and that 
90 percent of States would resubmit their mDL waiver applications.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ DHS assumes that 10 percent of applications deemed 
insufficient would no longer pursue a mDL waiver due to the level of 
effort involved to become sufficient and wait until the mDL 
environment is more fully developed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A State's mDL waivers would be valid for three years. Therefore, 
States granted a mDL waiver in Year 1 would need to reapply in Year 4 
which is beyond the scope of this particular information collection.
    TSA technology subject matter experts estimate that the mDL waiver 
application would take, on average, 20 hours to complete. TSA also 
estimates that mDL waiver resubmissions would take 25 percent of the 
initial mDL waiver application time which equates to 5 hours.\83\ 
Finally, TSA estimates that mDL waiver reapplications would take 75 
percent of the initial mDL waiver application time which equates to 15 
hours.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ mDL Waiver Resubmission burden = 20 hours [initial mDL 
waiver application burden] x 0.25 = 5 hours.
    \84\ mDL Waiver Renewal burden = 20 hours [initial mDL waiver 
application burden] x (1 - 0.25) = 15 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These hour burden estimates are combined with the number of 
collection activities to calculate the total and average time burden 
associated with the proposed rule. TSA estimates the proposed rule's 
total three-year burden for mDL waiver applications, mDL waiver 
resubmissions, and mDL waiver reapplications is 57 responses and 735 
hours. TSA estimates an average yearly burden of 19 responses and 245 
hours. Details of the calculation can be found in Table 6.

[[Page 60082]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP30AU23.011

    In addition, States TSA incur costs associated with independent 
entity audits of their mDL infrastructure. DHS estimates this cost at 
$32,500 per submission.\85\ States would incur this cost for the 
initial mDL waiver application and mDL waiver reapplication. As there 
are no reapplications anticipated for this information collection 
request, TSA multiplies the annual average number of mDL waiver 
applications from Table 6 above (10) and the independent entity audit 
cost of $32,500 for a total mDL waiver application cost of $325,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ TSA technology subject matter experts assume estimate a 
range of audit costs between $5,000 and $60,000. DHS uses the 
midpoint of this range as the point estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Federalism (E.O. 13132)

    A rule has implications for federalism under E.O. 13132 of August 
6, 1999 (Federalism) if it has a substantial direct effect on State or 
local governments and would either preempt State law or impose a 
substantial direct cost of compliance on them. TSA analyzed this 
proposed rule under this order and determined it does not have these 
implications for federalism.

D. Customer Service (E.O. 14058)

    E.O. 14058 of December 13, 2021 (Transforming Federal Customer 
Experience and Service Delivery to Rebuild Trust in Government), is 
focused on enhancing the of technology ``to modernize Government and 
implement services that are simple to use, accessible, equitable, 
protective, transparent, and responsive for all people of the United 
States.'' The Secretary of Homeland Security has specifically committed 
to testing the use of innovative technologies at airport security 
checkpoints to reduce passenger wait times. This proposed rule supports 
this commitment. Using mDLs to establish identity at airport security 
checkpoints is intended to provide the public with increased 
convenience, security, privacy, and health benefits from ``contact-
free'' identity verification. In 2022, DHS began a limited initiative 
to evaluate some mDLs to determine the viability of using an mDLs as a 
form of identification at an airport security checkpoint.

E. Energy Impact Analysis (E.O. 13211)

    TSA analyzed this proposed rule under E.O. 13211 of May 18, 2001 
(Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affected Energy 
Supply, Distribution or Use), and determined that it is not a 
``significant energy action'' under that E.O. and is not likely to have 
a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of 
energy. Therefore, this rulemaking does not require a Statement of 
Energy Effects.

F. Environmental Analysis

    TSA reviews proposed actions to determine whether the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) applies to them and, if so, what degree 
of analysis is required. DHS Directive 023-01 Rev. 01 (Directive) and 
Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01 Rev. 01 (Instruction Manual) establish 
the procedures that DHS and its components use to comply with NEPA and 
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations for implementing 
NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500 through 1508. The CEQ regulations allow Federal 
agencies to establish, with CEQ review and concurrence, categories of 
actions (``categorical exclusions'') which experience has shown do not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human 
environment and, therefore, do not require an Environmental Assessment 
(EA) or Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). See 40 CFR 
1507.3(b)(2)(ii), 1508.4. DHS has determined that this action will not 
have a significant effect on the human environment. This action is 
covered by categorical exclusion number A3(d) in DHS Management 
Directive 023-01 Rev. 01.

VII. Specific Questions

    While commenters are asked to comment on this proposal in its 
entirety, TSA specifically requests comments in response to the 
following questions. Commenters are encouraged to address issues that 
may not be discussed below based upon their knowledge of the issues and 
implications. In providing your comments, please follow the 
instructions in the Commenter Instructions section above.
    1. Applications for waivers. Provide comments on:
    a. The estimated cost and time required for States to complete and 
submit applications for waivers, including the initial mDL waiver 
application, resubmission, and reapplication;
    b. The estimated number of States and territories that would submit 
a waiver application, and when those States and territories would 
submit a waiver application;
    c. The percentage of States that would receive a decision of 
approved, insufficient, or denied;
    d. The percentage of States receiving a decision of insufficient 
that would resubmit an amended application; and
    e. The assumption that TSA would approve all resubmitted 
applications.
    2. Application Criteria. Provide comments on:
    a. The costs States may incur to demonstrate compliance with the 
criteria to apply for a waiver as required by proposed Sec.  37.10(a) 
and appendix A

[[Page 60083]]

to subpart A of the part, including the costs and availability of any 
professional services required;
    b. The appropriateness of the application requirements set forth in 
proposed Sec.  37.10(a) and appendix A to subpart A of the part;
    c. The impact that the Initial Public Versions of Revision 4 of 
NIST SP 800-63, NIST SP 800-63A, NIST SP 800-63B, and NIST SP 800-63C 
may have on the requirements set forth in proposed Sec.  37.10(a) and 
appendix A to subpart A of the part, including States' ability to 
demonstrate compliance with the criteria to apply for a waiver as 
required by proposed Sec.  37.10(a) and appendix A to subpart A of the 
part.
    3. Audit report. Provide comments on requiring States to submit a 
report of an audit as required in proposed Sec.  37.10(b), which report 
would require verifying the materials that a State would provide in its 
application for a waiver as required by proposed Sec.  37.10(a), 
including:
    a. The appropriateness of requiring an audit to be conducted by a 
recognized independent entity;
    b. The appropriateness of requiring an auditor to hold an active 
Certified Public Accountant license in the State that is seeking a 
waiver;
    c. The appropriateness of requiring an auditor to be experienced 
with information systems security audits, including whether such 
auditors should have different or additional experience;
    d. The appropriateness of requiring the auditor to be accredited by 
the State seeking a waiver;
    e. The appropriateness of requiring an auditor to hold a current 
and active American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
Certified Information Technology Professional (CITP) credential or 
ISACA (F/K/A Information Systems Audit and Control Association) 
Certified Information System Auditor certification;
    f. The availability of auditors who meet the criteria specified in 
proposed Sec.  37.10(b)(1);
    g. The estimated cost and time incurred by States to obtain a 
report by the auditor; and
    h. Any other considerations relating to auditing.
    4. DHS Mobile Driver's License Waiver Application Guidance. Provide 
comments on the ``Mobile Driver's License Waiver Application 
Guidance,'' available at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL.
    5. Waiver validity period. DHS is considering a three-year validity 
period for waivers. Provide comments on the appropriateness of a three-
year validity period for waivers and on alternate validity periods.
    6. Mobile driver's license readers. Provide comment on the costs to 
procure mDL reader equipment, estimated reader usage by Federal 
agencies, States, and businesses, and the functional form of such 
reader equipment.
    7. mDL acceptance. Provide comment on the number of Federal 
agencies other than TSA DHS and DHS component agencies that voluntarily 
choose to accept mDLs for official purposes for identity verification, 
including:
    a. The number and types of locations where mDLs will be accepted; 
and
    b. The number of individuals that are expected to obtain mDLs.
    8. Costs to individuals. Provide comment on costs incurred by mDL 
users, including costs associated with obtaining an mDL.
    9. TSA invites public comments on Alternative 4, including, but not 
limited to, costs to the affected entities to comply with the minimum 
standards, benefits of the alternative compared to the preferred 
alternative, and risks to security and privacy of accepting mDLs based 
on the minimum requirements.

List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 37

    Document security, Driver's licenses, Identification cards, 
Incorporation by reference, Licensing and registration, Motor vehicle 
administrations, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles, Personally 
identifiable information, Physical security, Privacy, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

The Proposed Amendments

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Transportation 
Security Administration is proposing to amend part 37 of title 6, Code 
of Federal Regulations, to read as follows:

PART 37--REAL ID DRIVER'S LICENSES AND IDENTIFICATION CARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 37 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 30301 note; 6 U.S.C. 111, 112.

Subpart A--General

0
2. Amend Sec.  37.3 by adding the definitions for ``A Root Certificate 
Authority,'' ``Administration,'' ``Certificate Authority,'' 
``Certificate Management System,'' ``Certificate Policy,'' 
``Certificate System,'' ``Critical Security Event,'' ``Delegated Third 
Party,'' ``Delegated Third Party System,'' ``Denial of Service,'' 
``Digital Certificates,'' ``Digital Signatures,'' ``Distributed Denial 
of Service,'' ``Execution Environment,'' ``Front End System,'' 
``Hardware security module,'' ``High Security Zone,'' ``Identity 
Proofing,'' ``Identity verification,'' ``Internal Support System,'' 
``Issuing Authority,'' ``Issuing Authority Certificate Authority,'' 
``Issuing System,'' ``mDL,'' ``Mobile driver's license,'' ``Mobile 
identification card,'' ``Multi-Factor Authentication,'' ``Online 
Certificate Status Protocol,'' ``Penetration Test,'' ``Public Key 
Infrastructure,'' ``Rich Execution Environment,'' ``Root Certificate 
Authority System,'' ``Secure Element,'' ``Secure hardware,'' ``Secure 
Key Storage Device,'' ``Secure Zone,'' ``Security Support System,'' 
``Sole Control,'' ``State Root Certificate,'' ``System,'' ``Trusted 
Execution Environment,'' ``Trusted Role,'' ``Virtual Local Area 
Network,'' ``Vulnerability,'' ``Vulnerability scanning,'' and ``Zone'' 
in alphabetical order to read as follows:


Sec.  37.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    A Root Certificate Authority is the State Certificate Authority 
whose public encryption key establishes the basis of trust for all 
other Digital Certificates issued by a State.
    Administration means management actions performed on Certificate 
Systems by a person in a Trusted Role.
* * * * *
    Certificate Authority means an issuer of Digital Certificates that 
are used to certify the identity of parties in a digital transaction.
    Certificate Management System means a system used by a State or 
Delegated Third Party to process, approve issuance of, or store Digital 
Certificates or Digital Certificate status information, including the 
database, database server, and storage.
    Certificate Policy means the set of rules and documents that forms 
a State's governance framework in which Digital Certificates, 
Certificate Systems, and cryptographic keys are created, issued, 
managed, and used.
    Certificate System means the system used by a State or Delegated 
Third Party to provide services related to Public Key Infrastructure 
for digital identities.
* * * * *
    Critical Security Event means detection of an event, a set of 
circumstances, or anomalous activity that could lead to a circumvention 
of a Zone's security controls or a compromise of a Certificate System's 
integrity, including excessive login attempts, attempts to access 
prohibited resources, Denial of Service or Distributed Denial of 
Service attacks,

[[Page 60084]]

attacker reconnaissance, excessive traffic at unusual hours, signs of 
unauthorized access, system intrusion, or an actual compromise of 
component integrity.
* * * * *
    Delegated Third Party means a natural person or legal entity that 
is not the State and that operates any part of a Certificate System 
under the State's legal authority.
    Delegated Third Party System means any part of a Certificate System 
used by a Delegated Third Party while performing the functions 
delegated to it by the State.
    Denial of Service means the prevention of authorized access to 
resources or the delaying of time-critical operations.
* * * * *
    Digital Certificates identify the parties involved in an electronic 
transaction, and contain information necessary to validate Digital 
Signatures.
    Digital Signatures are mathematical algorithms used to validate the 
authenticity and integrity of a message.
    Distributed Denial of Service means a Denial of Service attack 
where numerous hosts perform the attack.
* * * * *
    Execution Environment means a place within a device processer where 
active application's code is processed.
* * * * *
    Front End System means a system with a public IP address, including 
a web server, mail server, DNS server, jump host, or authentication 
server.
* * * * *
    Hardware security module means a physical computing device that 
safeguards and manages cryptographic keys and provides cryptographic 
processing.
    High Security Zone means a physical location where a State's or 
Delegated Third Party's private key or cryptographic hardware is 
located.
* * * * *
    Identity Proofing refers to a series of steps that the State 
executes to prove the identity of a person.
    Identity verification is the confirmation that identity data 
belongs to its purported holder.
* * * * *
    Internal Support System means a system which operates on a State's 
internal network and communicates with the Certificate System to 
provide business services related to mDL management.
    Issuing Authority means the State that issues a mobile driver's 
license or mobile identification card.
    Issuing Authority Certificate Authority means a Certificate 
Authority operated by or on behalf of an Issuing Authority or a State's 
Root Certificate Authority.
    Issuing System means a system used to sign mDLs, digital 
certificates, mobile security objects, or validity status information.
* * * * *
    mDL means mobile driver's licenses and mobile identification cards, 
collectively.
    Mobile driver's license means a driver's license that is stored on 
a mobile electronic device and read electronically.
    Mobile identification card means an identification card, issued by 
a State, that is stored on a mobile electronic device and read 
electronically.
    Multi-Factor Authentication means an authentication mechanism 
consisting of two or more of the following independent categories of 
credentials (i.e., factors) to verify the user's identity for a login 
or other transaction means something you know (knowledge factor), 
something you have (possession factor), and something you are 
(inherence factor).
* * * * *
    Online Certificate Status Protocol means an online protocol used to 
determine the status of a Digital Certificate.
* * * * *
    Penetration Test means a process that identifies and attempts to 
exploit vulnerabilities in systems through the active use of known 
attack techniques, including the combination of different types of 
exploits, with a goal of breaking through layers of defenses and 
reporting on unpatched vulnerabilities and system weaknesses.
* * * * *
    Public Key Infrastructure means a structure where a Certificate 
Authority uses Digital Certificates for issuing, renewing, and revoking 
digital credentials.
* * * * *
    Rich Execution Environment, also known as a ``normal execution 
environment,'' means the area inside a device processor that runs an 
operating system.
    Root Certificate Authority System means a system used to create a 
State's Root Certificate or to generate, store, or sign with the 
private key associated with a State Root Certificate.
* * * * *
    Secure Element means a tamper-resistant secure hardware component 
which is used in a device to provide the security, confidentiality, and 
multiple application environment required to support various business 
models.
    Secure hardware means hardware provided on a mobile device for key 
management and trusted computation such as a Secure Element (SE) or 
Trusted Execution Environment.
    Secure Key Storage Device means a device certified as meeting the 
specified FIPS 140-3 Level 2 overall, Level 3 physical, or Common 
Criteria (EAL 4+).
    Secure Zone means an area (physical or logical) protected by 
physical and logical controls that appropriately protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of Certificate Systems.
    Security Support System means a system used to provide security 
support functions, which may include authentication, network boundary 
control, audit logging, audit log reduction and analysis, vulnerability 
scanning, and intrusion detection (host-based intrusion detection, 
network-based intrusion detection).
* * * * *
    Sole Control means a condition in which logical and physical 
controls are in place to ensure the Administration of a Certificate 
System can only be performed by a State or Delegated Third Party.
* * * * *
    State Root Certificate means a public Digital Certificate of a Root 
Certificate Authority operated by or on behalf of a State.
    System means one or more pieces of equipment or software that 
stores, transforms, or communicates data.
* * * * *
    Trusted Execution Environment means an Execution Environment that 
runs alongside but isolated from a Rich Execution Environment and has 
the security capabilities necessary to protect designated applications.
    Trusted Role means an employee or contractor of a State or 
Delegated Third Party who has authorized access to or control over a 
Secure Zone or High Security Zone.
* * * * *
    Virtual Local Area Network means a broadcast domain that is 
partitioned and isolated within a network.
    Vulnerability means a weakness in an information system, system 
security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be 
exploited or triggered by a threat source.
    Vulnerability scanning means a technique used to identify host 
attributes and associated Vulnerabilities.
    Zone means a subset of Certificate Systems created by the logical 
or physical partitioning of systems from other Certificate Systems.

[[Page 60085]]

0
3. Amend Sec.  37.4 by adding paragraphs (a)(2), (b)(2), and (d) 
through (f) to read as follows:


Sec.  37.4  Incorporation by reference.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (2) ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021, Personal identification--ISO-compliant 
driving license--Part 5: Mobile driving license (mDL) application, 
Edition 1 (September 2021); IBR approved for Sec. Sec.  37.8; 37.10(a); 
appendix A to this subpart.
    (b) * * *
    (2) Mobile Driver's License (mDL) Implementation Guidelines, 
Version 1.2 (January 2023); IBR approved for Sec.  37.10(a); appendix A 
to this subpart.
* * * * *
    (d) Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum), 815 
Eddy St, San Francisco, CA 94109, (415) 436-9333, 
[email protected], www.cabforum.org.
    (1) Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of 
Publicly[hyphen]Trusted Certificates, Version 1.8.6 (December 14, 
2022), https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.8.6.pdf; IBR approved for appendix A to this subpart.
    (2) Network and Certificate System Security Requirements, Version 
1.7 (April 5, 2021), https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-Network-Security-Guidelines-v1.7.pdf; IBR approved for 
appendix A to this subpart A.
    (e) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Mail Stop 
0380, Department of Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane, Washington, DC 
20528-0380, [email protected], (888) 282-0870, www.cisa.gov.
    (1) Cybersecurity Incident & Vulnerability Response Playbooks 
(November 2021), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Federal_Government_Cybersecurity_Incident_and_Vulnerability_Response_Playbooks_508C.pdf; IBR approved for appendix A to this subpart.
    (2) National Cyber Incident Response Plan (December 2016), 
Department of Homeland Security, https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/ncirp/National_Cyber_Incident_Response_Plan.pdf; IBR 
approved for appendix A to this subpart.
    (f) National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau 
Drive, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, (301) 975-2000, www.nist.gov.
    (1) Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 
(PUB) 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (March 22, 
2019), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-3.pdf; IBR 
approved for appendix A to this subpart.
    (2) FIPS PUB 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (August 2015), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf; IBR 
approved for Sec.  37.10(a).
    (3) FIPS PUB 186-5, Digital Signature Standard (DSS) (Feb. 2023), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-5.pdf; IBR 
approved for Sec.  37.10(a).
    (4) FIPS PUB 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Nov. 26, 
2001), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf; IBR 
approved for Sec.  37.10(a).
    (5) FIPS PUB 198-1, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC) (July 2008), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.198-1.pdf; IBR approved for Sec.  37.10(a).
    (6) FIPS PUB 202, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and 
Extendable-Output Functions (August 2015), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf; IBR approved for Sec.  37.10(a).
    (7) Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Security and Privacy Controls 
for Information Systems and Organizations, Rev. 5 (September 2020), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53 
Rev. 5.pdf; IBR approved for appendix A to this subpart.
    (8) SP 800-57 Part 1, Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1--
General, Rev. 5, Elaine Barker (May 2020), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf; IBR approved for 
appendix A to this subpart.
    (9) SP 800-57 Part 2, Recommendation for Key Management: Part 2--
Best Practices for Key Management Organization, Rev. 1, Elaine and 
William C. Barker (May 2019), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt2r1.pdf; IBR approved for appendix 
A to this subpart A.
    (10) SP 800-57 Part 3, Recommendation for Key Management: Part 3: 
Application-Specific Key Management Guidance, Rev. 1, Elaine Barker and 
Quynh Dang (January 2015), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57Pt3r1.pdf; IBR approved for appendix 
A to this subpart.
    (11) SP 800-63-3, Digital Identity Guidelines, Paul A. Grassi et 
al. (June 2017), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-3.pdf; IBR approved for appendix A to this subpart.
    (12) SP 800-63B, Digital Identity Guidelines Authentication and 
Lifecycle Management, Paul A. Grassi et al. (June 2017), https://
nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf; IBR 
approved for appendix A to this subpart.
    (13) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
Version 1.1 (April 16, 2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf; IBR approved for appendix A to this subpart.
0
4. Add Sec.  37.7 to read as follows:


Sec.  37.7  Temporary waiver for mDLs; State eligibility.

    (a) Generally. TSA may issue a temporary certificate of waiver that 
exempts mDLs issued by a State from meeting the requirements in Sec.  
37.5(b), when the State meets the requirements of Sec.  37.10(a) and 
(b).
    (b) State eligibility. A State may be eligible for a waiver only 
if, after considering all information provided by a State under Sec.  
37.10(a) and (b), TSA determines that--
    (1) The State is in full compliance with all applicable REAL ID 
requirements as defined in subpart E of this part;
    (2) Information provided by the State under Sec.  37.10(a) and (b) 
sufficiently demonstrates that the State's mDL provides the security, 
privacy, and interoperability necessary for acceptance by Federal 
agencies; and
    (3) The State issues mDLs only to individuals who have been issued 
a valid and unexpired REAL ID-compliant physical driver's license or 
identification card issued by that State.
0
5. Add Sec.  37.8 to read as follows:


Sec.  37.8  Requirements for Federal agencies accepting mDLs issued by 
States with temporary waiver.

    Notwithstanding Sec.  37.5(b), Federal agencies may accept an mDL 
for REAL ID official purposes issued by a State that has a valid 
certificate of waiver issued by TSA under Sec.  37.7(a). A Federal 
agency that elects to accept mDLs under this section must--
    (a) Confirm the State holds a valid certificate of waiver 
consistent with Sec.  37.7(a) by verifying that the State appears in a 
list of mDLs approved for Federal use, available as provided in Sec.  
37.9(b)(1);
    (b) Use an mDL reader to retrieve and validate mDL data as required 
by standard ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 (incorporated by reference; see Sec.  
37.4); and
    (c) Upon discovery that acceptance of a State's mDL is likely to 
cause

[[Page 60086]]

imminent or serious threats to the security, privacy, or data 
integrity, the agency's senior official responsible for REAL ID 
compliance, or equivalent function, must report such discovery to DHS 
at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL within 72 hours of such discovery.
0
6. Add Sec.  37.9 to read as follows:


Sec.  37.9  Applications for temporary waiver for mDLs.

    (a) Application process. Each State requesting a temporary waiver 
must file with TSA a complete application as set forth in Sec.  
37.10(a) and (b). Application filing instructions, may be obtained from 
DHS at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL.
    (b) Decisions. TSA will provide written notice via email to States 
within 60 days, to the extent practicable, but in no event longer than 
90 days, indicating that TSA has made one of the following decisions:
    (1) Approved. Upon approval of an application for a temporary 
waiver, TSA will issue a certificate of waiver to the State, and 
publish the State's name in a list of mDLs approved for Federal use at 
www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL.
    (2) Insufficient. Upon determination that an application for a 
temporary waiver is incomplete or otherwise deficient, TSA will provide 
the State an explanation of deficiencies, and an opportunity to address 
any deficiencies and submit an amended application. States will have 60 
days to respond to the notice, and TSA will respond via email within 30 
days.
    (3) Denied. Upon determination that an application for a waiver 
fails to meet criteria specified in Sec.  37.10(a) and (b), TSA will 
provide the State specific grounds on which the denial is based, and 
provide the State an opportunity to seek reconsideration as provided in 
paragraph (c) of this section.
    (c) Reconsideration. (1) States will have 90 days to file a request 
for reconsideration of a denied application. The State must explain 
what corrective action it intends to implement to correct any defects 
cited in the denial or, alternatively, explain why the denial is 
incorrect. Instructions on how to file a request for reconsideration 
for denied applications may be obtained from TSA at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL. TSA will notify States of its final determination within 60 
days of receipt of a State's request for reconsideration.
    (2) An adverse decision upon reconsideration is a final agency 
action. A State whose request for reconsideration has been denied may 
submit a new application at any time following the process set forth in 
paragraph (a) of this section.
    (d) Terms and conditions. A certificate of waiver will specify--
    (1) The effective date of the waiver;
    (2) The expiration date of the waiver; and
    (3) Any additional terms or conditions as necessary.
    (e) Limitations; suspension; termination--(1) Validity period. A 
certificate of waiver is valid for a period of 3 years from the date of 
issuance.
    (2) Reporting requirements. If a State, after it has been granted a 
certificate of waiver, makes any significant additions, deletions, or 
modifications to its mDL issuance processes, other than routine systems 
maintenance and software updates, that differ materially from the 
information the State provided in response to Sec.  37.10(a) and (b) 
under which the waiver was granted, the State must provide written 
notice of such changes to TSA at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL 60 days before 
implementing such additions, deletions, or modifications.
    (3) Compliance. A State that is issued a certificate of waiver 
under this section must comply with all applicable REAL ID requirements 
in Sec.  37.51(a), and with all terms and conditions specified in 
paragraph (d)(3) of this section.
    (4) Suspension. (i) TSA may suspend the validity of a certificate 
of waiver for any of the following reasons:
    (A) Failure to comply. TSA determines that a State has failed to 
comply with paragraph (d)(3) or (e)(2) of this section, or has issued 
mDLs in a manner not consistent with the information provided under 
Sec.  37.10(a) or (b); or
    (B) Threats to security, privacy, and data integrity. TSA reserves 
the right to suspend a certificate of waiver at any time upon discovery 
that Federal acceptance of a State's mDL is likely to cause imminent or 
serious threats to the security, privacy, or data integrity of any 
Federal agency. In such instances, TSA will provide written notice via 
email to each affected State as soon as practicable after discovery of 
the triggering event, including reasons for suspension, an explanation 
of any corrective actions a State must take to resume validity of its 
certificate of waiver.
    (ii) Before suspending a certificate of waiver under paragraph 
(e)(4)(i)(A) of this section, TSA will provide to such State written 
notice via email of intent to suspend, including an explanation of 
deficiencies and instructions on how the State may cure such 
deficiencies. States will have 30 days to respond to the notice, and 
TSA will respond via email within 30 days. TSA's response would include 
one of the following: withdrawal of the notice, a request for 
additional information, or a final suspension.
    (iii) If TSA issues a final suspension, TSA will temporarily remove 
the State from the list of mDLs approved for Federal acceptance for 
official purposes. TSA will continue to work with a State to whom TSA 
has issued a final suspension to resume validity of its existing 
certificate of waiver. A State that has been issued a final suspension 
may seek a new certificate of waiver by submitting a new application 
following the process set forth in paragraph (a) of this section.
    (5) Termination. (i) DHS may terminate a certificate of waiver at 
an earlier date than specified in paragraph (d)(2) of this section if 
TSA determines that a State--
    (A) Does not comply with applicable REAL ID requirements in Sec.  
37.51(a);
    (B) Is committing an egregious violation of requirements specified 
under paragraph (d)(3) or (e)(2) of this section that the State is 
unwilling to cure; or
    (C) Provided false information in support of its waiver 
application.
    (ii) Before terminating a certificate of waiver, TSA will provide 
the State written notice via email of intent to terminate, including 
findings on which the intended termination is based, together with a 
notice of opportunity to present additional information. States must 
respond to the notice within 7 days, and TSA will reply via email 
within 30 days. TSA's response would include one of the following: 
withdrawal of the notice, a request for additional information, or a 
final termination.
    (iii) If TSA issues a final termination, TSA will remove the State 
from the list of mDLs approved for Federal acceptance for official 
purposes. A State whose certificate of waiver has been terminated may 
seek a new waiver by submitting a new application following the process 
set forth in paragraph (a) of this section.
    (6) Reapplication. A State seeking extension of a certificate of 
waiver after expiration of its validity period must file a new 
application under paragraph (a) of this section.
    (f) Effect of status of certificate of waiver. (1) Issuance of a 
certificate of waiver is not a determination of compliance with any 
other section in this part.
    (2) An application for certificate of waiver that TSA has deemed 
insufficient or denied, or a certificate of waiver that TSA has deemed 
suspended, terminated, or expired, is not a determination of non-
compliance with any other section in this part.

[[Page 60087]]

0
7. Add Sec.  37.10 to read as follows:


Sec.  37.10  Application criteria for issuance of temporary waiver for 
mDLs; audit report; waiver application guidance.

    (a) Application criteria. A State requesting a certificate of 
waiver must establish in its application that the mDLs for which the 
State seeks a waiver are issued with controls sufficient to resist 
compromise and fraud attempts, provide privacy protections sufficient 
to safeguard an mDL holder's identity data, and provide 
interoperability for secure acceptance by Federal agencies under the 
terms of a certificate of waiver. To demonstrate compliance with such 
requirements, a State must provide information, documents, and/or data 
sufficient to explain the means, which includes processes, 
methodologies, or policies, that the State has implemented to comply 
with requirements in this paragraph (a).
    (1) Provisioning. For both remote and in-person provisioning, a 
State must explain the means it uses to address or perform the 
following--
    (i) Data encryption. Securely encrypt mDL data and an mDL holder's 
Personally Identifiable Information when such data is transferred 
during provisioning, and when stored on the State's system(s) and on 
mDL holders' mobile devices.
    (ii) Escalated review. Review repeated failed attempts at 
provisioning, resolve such failures, and establish criteria to 
determine when the State will deny provisioning an mDL to a particular 
mDL applicant.
    (iii) Authentication. Confirm that an mDL applicant has control 
over the mobile device to which an mDL is being provisioned at the time 
of provisioning.
    (iv) Device identification keys. Confirm that the mDL applicant 
possesses the mDL device private key bound to the mDL during 
provisioning.
    (v) User identity verification. Prevent an individual from falsely 
matching with the licensing agency's records, including portrait 
images, of other individuals.
    (vi) Applicant presentation. Prevent physical and digital 
presentation attacks by detecting the liveness of an individual and any 
alterations to the individual's appearance during remote and in-person 
provisioning.
    (vii) REAL ID compliant physical card. Issue mDLs only to residents 
who have been issued by that State a valid and unexpired REAL ID 
compliant physical driver's license or physical identification card.
    (viii) Data record. Issue mDLs using data, including portrait 
image, of an individual that matches corresponding data in the database 
of the issuing State's driver's licensing agency for that individual.
    (ix) Records retention. Manage mDL records and related records, 
consistent with requirements set forth in the American Association of 
Motor Vehicle Administrator (AAMVA) Mobile Driver's License (mDL) 
Implementation Guidelines (incorporated by reference; see Sec.  37.4).
    (2) Issuance. A State must explain the means it uses to manage the 
creation, issuance, use, revocation, and destruction of the State's 
certificate systems and keys in full compliance with the requirements 
set forth in appendix A to this subpart.
    (3) Privacy. A State must explain the means it uses to protect 
Personally Identifiable Information during processing, storage, and 
destruction of mDL records and provisioning records.
    (4) Interoperability. A State must explain the means it uses to 
issue mDLs that are interoperable with standard ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 
and the ``AAMVA mDL data element set'' defined in the American 
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrator (AAMVA) Mobile Driver's 
License (mDL) Implementation Guidelines v. 1.1 (incorporated by 
reference; see Sec.  37.4) as follows:
    (i) A State must issue mDLs using the data model defined in ISO/IEC 
18103-5:2021 section 7 (incorporated by reference; see Sec.  37.4), 
using the document type ``org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL,'' and using the name 
space ``org.iso.18013.5.1''. States must include the following mDL data 
elements defined as mandatory in Table 5: ``family_name'', 
``given_name'', ``birth_date'', ``issue_date'', ``expiry_date'', 
``issuing_authority'', ``document_number'', ``portrait'', and must 
include the following mDL data elements defined as optional in Table 5: 
``sex'', ``resident_address'', ``portrait_capture_date'', 
``signature_usual_mark''.
    (ii) States must use the AAMVA mDL data element set defined in 
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrator (AAMVA) Mobile 
Driver's License (mDL) Implementation Guidelines v. 1.2, Section 3.2 
(incorporated by reference; see Sec.  37.4), using the namespace 
``org.iso.18013.5.1.aamva'' and must include the following data 
elements in accordance with the AAMVA mDL Implementation Guidelines 
v1.2 (incorporated by reference; see Sec.  37.4): ``DHS_compliance'', 
and ``DHS_temporary_lawful_status''.
    (iii) States must use only encryption algorithms, secure hashing 
algorithms, and digital signing algorithms as defined by ISO/IEC 18103-
5:2021, Section 9 and Annex B (incorporated by reference; see Sec.  
37.4), and which are included in the following NIST Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS): NIST FIPS PUB 180-4, NIST FIPS PUB 186-5, 
NIST FIPS PUB 197, NIST FIPS PUB 198-1, and NIST FIPS PUB 202 
(incorporated by reference; see Sec.  37.4).
    (b) Audit report. States must include with their applications a 
report of an audit that verifies the information provided under 
paragraph (a) of this section.
    (1) The audit must be conducted by a recognized independent 
entity--
    (i) Holding an active Certified Public Accountant license in the 
issuing State;
    (ii) Experienced with information systems security audits;
    (iii) Accredited by the issuing State; and
    (iv) Holding a current and active American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) Certified Information Technology 
Professional (CITP) credential or ISACA (F/K/A Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association) Certified Information System Auditor 
(CISA) certification.
    (2) States must include information about the entity conducting the 
audit that identifies--
    (i) Any potential conflicts of interest; and
    (ii) Mitigation measures or other divestiture actions taken to 
avoid conflicts of interest.
    (c) Waiver application guidance--(1) Generally. TSA will publish 
``Mobile Driver's License Waiver Application Guidance'' to facilitate 
States' understanding of the requirements set forth in paragraph (a) of 
this section. The non-binding Guidance will include recommendations and 
examples of possible implementations for illustrative purposes only. 
TSA will publish the Guidance on the REAL website at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL.
    (2) Updates. TSA may periodically update its Waiver Application 
Guidance as necessary to provide additional information or 
recommendations to mitigate evolving threats to security, privacy, or 
data integrity. TSA will publish updated Guidance in the Federal 
Register and at www.dhs.gov/real-id/mDL, and provide a copy to all 
States that have applied for or been issued a certificate or waiver.
0
8. Add appendix A to subpart A to read as follows:

[[Page 60088]]

Appendix A to Subpart A of Part 37--Mobile Driver's License Issuance 
Infrastructure Requirements

    A State that issues mDLs for acceptance by Federal agencies for 
official purposes as specified in the REAL ID Act must implement the 
requirements set forth in this appendix in full compliance with the 
cited references as set forth in the following table. All the 
standards identified in the following table are incorporated by 
reference, see Sec.  37.4. If a State utilizes the services of a 
Delegated Third Party, the State must ensure the Delegated Third 
Party complies with all applicable requirements of this appendix for 
the services provided.
BILLING CODE 9110-05-P

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    Dated: August 17, 2023.
David P. Pekoske,
Administrator.

[FR Doc. 2023-18582 Filed 8-28-23; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 9110-05-C