[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 164 (Friday, August 25, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58238-58242]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-18311]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security


Ilya Balakaev,

    Sharikopodshipnikovkaya 20-68,
    Moscow, Russian Federation;
    Radiotester OOO,
    a/k/a Radiotester LLC,
    Sharikopodshipnikovskaya 11, Building 1,
    Moscow, 115088, Russian Federation
    and
    Volgograd Prospect, House 2,
    Moscow, 109316, Russian Federation;
    Order Renewing Temporary Denial of Export Privileges
    Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations 
(the ``Regulations'' or ``EAR''),\1\ I hereby grant the request of the 
Bureau of Industry and Security (``BIS''), U.S. Department of Commerce, 
through its Office of Export Enforcement (``OEE''), to renew the 
temporary denial order (``TDO'') issued in this matter on February 24, 
2023. I find that renewal of this order is necessary in the public 
interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-774 
(2020), originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act 
(50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (``EAA''), which lapsed on 
August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of 
August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by 
successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in effect 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the President 
signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform 
Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While section 1766 of 
ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections 
which are inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in 
pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms 
of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, 
including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in 
effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall 
continue in effect according to their terms until modified, 
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant 
to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5) 
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Procedural History

    On February 24, 2023, I signed an order denying the export 
privileges of Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC 
(collectively, ``the Respondents'') for a period of 180 days on the 
ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest 
to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The order was 
issued ex parte pursuant to Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations and 
was effective upon issuance.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The TDO was published in the Federal Register on March 1, 
2023 (88 FR 12912).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 31, 2023, BIS, through OEE, submitted a written request for 
renewal of the TDO that was issued on February 24, 2023. The written 
request was made more than 20 days before the TDO's scheduled 
expiration. A copy of the renewal request was sent to Respondents in 
accordance with Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the Regulations. No 
opposition to the renewal of the TDO has been received.

II. Renewal of the TDO

A. Legal Standard

    Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily 
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order 
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent 
violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ``A 
violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.'' 
15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to 
occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under 
investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges 
demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the 
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under 
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]'' Id. A 
``[l]ack of information establishing the precise time a violation may 
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long 
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a 
violation.'' Id.
    Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and 766.24, TDO may also be made 
applicable to other persons if BIS has reason to believe that they are 
related to a respondent and that applying the order to them is 
necessary to prevent its evasion. 15 CFR 766.23(a)-(b) and 766.24(c). A 
``related person'' is a person, either at the time of the TDO's 
issuance or thereafter, who is related to a respondent ``by ownership, 
control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection 
in the conduct of trade or business.'' 15 CFR 766.23(a). Related 
persons may be added to a TDO on an

[[Page 58239]]

ex-parte basis in accordance with Section 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 
15 CFR 766.23(b).

B. The TDO and BIS's Request for Renewal

    The U.S. Commerce Department, through BIS, responded to the Russian 
Federation's (``Russia's) further invasion of Ukraine by implementing a 
sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely restrict 
Russia's access to technologies and other items that it needs to 
sustain its aggressive military capabilities. These controls primarily 
target Russia's defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors and are 
intended to cut off Russia's access to vital technological inputs, 
atrophy key sectors of its industrial base, and undercut Russia's 
strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage.
    As of February 24, 2022, any item classified under any Export 
Classification Control Number (``ECCN'') in Categories 3 through 9 of 
the Commerce Control List (``CCL'') required a license to be exported 
or reexported to Russia. See 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). As of April 8, 
2022, the license requirements for Russia were expanded to cover all 
items on the CCL. See 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). These rules were 
codified in Title 15 CFR 746.8, which state, ``a license is required, 
excluding deemed exports and deemed reexports, to export, reexport, or 
transfer (in-country) to or within Russia or Belarus any item subject 
to the EAR and specified in any Export Control Classification Number 
(``ECCN'') on the CCL.''
    OEE's request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the 
issuance of the initial TDO and the evidence developed over the course 
of this investigation, which demonstrate the existence of an illicit 
procurement network conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws by 
unlawfully procuring and shipping controlled counterintelligence items 
to Russia and North Korea. As detailed in its July 31, 2023 request for 
renewal of the TDO, OEE's investigation, which remains ongoing, has 
revealed evidence that this illicit network and its reach remain 
ongoing. As a result, the renewal of this order is necessary.
1. The Basis for the Initial TDO
    As detailed in the initial TDO issued on February 24, 2023, 
Balakaev engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations by unlawfully 
procuring and exporting from the United States electronic devices 
subject to the EAR to the Federal Security Service of the Russian 
Federation (``FSB''), a BIS-listed entity located in the Russian 
Federation (``Russia''), and to the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (``North Korea'' or ``DPRK'') without the required U.S. 
government authorization. ``Export'' is defined in the EAR as an 
``actual shipment or transmission out of the United States, including 
the sending or taking of an item out of the United States, in any 
manner.'' 15 CFR 734.13(a)(1).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ ``Item'' means ``commodities, software, and technology.'' 15 
CFR 772.1. Further, ``technology'' may be in any tangible or 
intangible form, such as written or oral communications, blueprints, 
drawings, photographs, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, 
engineering designs and specifications, computer-aided design files, 
manuals or documentation, electronic media or information revealed 
through visual inspection. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FSB is listed on the Commerce Department's Entity List \4\ with 
a policy of denial for all items subject to the EAR with certain 
exceptions for transactions authorized by the Department of the 
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (``OFAC'') pursuant to 
General License No. 1B of March 2, 2021.\5\ As a result of this 
listing, no item subject to the Regulations may be exported, 
reexported, or transferred (in-country) to the FSB without prior 
authorization from BIS, and BIS will review any license applications 
for the FSB pursuant to a policy of denial.\6\ The FSB was originally 
listed on the Entity List on January 4, 2017,\7\ with a license review 
policy of presumption of denial for all items subject to the EAR.\8\ As 
such, as of January 4, 2017, a license was required to export, 
reexport, or transfer (in-country) all items subject to the EAR to the 
FSB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ The Entity List (supplement no. 4 to part 744 of the EAR) 
identifies entities for which there is reasonable cause to believe, 
based on specific and articulable facts, that the entities have been 
involved, are involved, or pose a significant risk of being or 
becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or 
foreign policy interests of the United States.
    \5\ See 87 FR 34131 (Jun. 6, 2022). See also Sec. Sec.  
734.9(g), 746.8(a)(3), and 744.21(b) of the EAR.
    \6\ Id.
    \7\ See 82 FR 722 (Jan. 4, 2017). See also 82 FR 18219 (Apr. 18, 
2017), 86 FR 37903 (Jul. 19, 2021), 87 FR 12240 (Mar. 3, 2022), and 
87 FR 34136 (Jun. 6, 2022) for additional listings of FSB-related 
entities on the Entity List.
    \8\ On March 2, 2021, the Department of State designated the FSB 
pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for its contributions to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, exports to the 
FSB were also prohibited under 15 CFR 744.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As of January 26, 2007, a license is required for the export or 
reexport to North Korea of all items subject to the EAR other than food 
or medicine designated as EAR99.\9\ This rule was codified in Title 15 
CFR 746.4, which states ``consistent with United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1718, a license is required to export or reexport 
any item subject to the EAR (see part 734 of the EAR) to the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), except food and medicines 
classified as EAR99 (definitions in part 772 of the EAR).'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ See 52 FR 3722 (Jan. 26, 2007).
    \10\ Additionally, BIS implemented broad based controls for 
items and activities subject to the EAR in support of U.S. national 
security and foreign policy. 50 U.S.C. 481 l(l)-(2). These controls 
included restrictions on exports and reexports to the DPRK for 
United Nations (``UN'') and anti-terrorism reasons. 15 CFR 746.4, 
742.19. Consistent with ECRA and UN Security Council Resolutions, 
with limited exceptions, a license was required to export or 
reexport any item subject to the EAR to North Korea. 15 CFR 746.4. 
The DPRK was also subject to a UN Security Council arms embargo, and 
thus, militarily sensitive items were also restricted. 15 
CFR746.1(b)(2). Furthermore, the Secretary of State designated the 
DPRK a state sponsor of terrorism and implemented additional 
restrictions on it. 15 CFR 742.19(a)(2)-(3). For example, additional 
prohibitions applied to certain items destined for military, police, 
intelligence or other sensitive end users or if an item would make a 
significant contribution to the military potential of the DPRK. 15 
CFR 742.19(a)(3); Supplement No. 2 to part 742.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As referenced in the initial TDO, on February 21, 2023, Balakaev 
was indicted on multiple counts in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York. The charges included, but were not 
limited to, conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws in 
connection with the unlicensed export of electronic spectrum analyzers, 
signal generators, and gas detection equipment, among other items, to 
Balakaev's company Radiotester, located in Moscow, Russia, for ultimate 
end use by officials of the FSB and the DPRK. As described in the 
indictment and initial TDO, Radiotester is owned or controlled by 
Balakaev. The company is described on its website as ``helping to 
quickly resolve issues of supply and repair of foreign-made measuring 
equipment'' and as having ``experience of working with large federal, 
city-forming, manufacturing enterprises''.
    As further detailed in the initial TDO, Balakaev heads an illicit 
procurement network consisting of an individual in the United States, 
referred to herein as ``Individual 3'', who would assist Balakaev in 
purchasing the electronic equipment, as well as two members of the FSB 
in Russia, referred to as FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator 
2, who worked in FSB Center 8's Military Unit 43753 and who would 
publish a request for proposal (``RFP'') to repair a device on publicly 
available Russian websites (collectively, the ``Balakaev Network''). In 
particular, Balakaev would purchase the electronic devices on the 
internet or directly through the United States-based

[[Page 58240]]

manufacturers and ship them to Individual 3's home in Richmond, 
Virginia. Then, often traveling through the Eastern District of New 
York, Balakaev flew to the United States to pick up the devices and 
bring them back to Russia or had Individual 3 and others ship the 
electronic devices from the United States to Russia. On occasion, 
Balakaev directed others to travel with the electronic devices from the 
United States to Russia. Balakaev subsequently used parts from the 
electronic devices to repair FSB equipment or provided the equipment 
directly to a DPRK official. The electronic devices Balakaev purchased, 
repaired, and sold to the FSB and DPRK are subject to the EAR and are 
items commonly used as part of sensitive foreign counterintelligence 
and military operations, including the transmission of encrypted 
communications, the ability to scan a room to determine if it was 
bugged, and the detection of hazardous gases.
    As stated in the initial TDO, OEE has presented evidence indicating 
that Balakaev and the other above-captioned parties were engaged in 
unlawfully purchasing and shipping dual-use items from U.S. 
manufacturers to the FSB and DPRK. These items included advanced 
electronics and sophisticated testing equipment, some of which can be 
used in sensitive foreign counterintelligence and military operations.
    The February 2023 indictment charged Balakaev, owner of 
Radiotester, with conspiring to defraud, conspiring to violate IEEPA, 
conspiring to violate ECRA, and smuggling goods from the United States. 
The violations charged in the indictment cover conduct occurring 
between at least January 2017 through February 2022, and it alleges 
that Balakaev was not only aware of U.S. export control laws but also 
took active steps to evade U.S. export controls by illicitly procuring 
items subject to the EAR without the required BIS export licenses.
i. Unlicensed Exports of U.S.-Origin Electronic Devices to the FSB in 
Russia
    As stated in the indictment and in the initial TDO issued on 
February 24, 2023, Balakaev and his co-conspirators in the Balakaev 
Network unlawfully sourced, purchased, shipped and transported spectrum 
analyzers and signal generators from vendors and manufacturers in the 
United States for the benefit of the FSB in Russia. Spectrum analyzers 
are generally used to detect the frequency of radio signals to identify 
surveillance devices. The spectrum analyzers that were exported by 
Balakaev are classified under ECCN 3A992.a and are controlled for Anti-
Terrorism (AT) reasons. Signal generators are generally used to 
securely transmit information, often as part of counterintelligence or 
other covert operations. The signal generators that were exported by 
Balakaev are classified under ECCN 3A992.a and are controlled for AT 
reasons. A license was required to export these items to the FSB in 
Russia.
    As described in the indictment and in the initial TDO, because many 
of the spectrum analyzers and signal generators used by the FSB were 
manufactured in the United States, it is difficult for the FSB to 
obtain parts to repair these items. Pursuant to the scheme involving 
the Balakaev Network, Balakaev conspired with FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and 
FSB Co-Conspirator 2, who worked in FSB Center 8's Military Unit 43753. 
In particular, FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator 2 would 
publish a RFP to repair certain devices on publicly available Russian 
websites. Balakaev, FSB Co-Conspirator 1, and FSB Co-Conspirator 2 then 
negotiated a contract price to repair the devices before Balakaev 
submitted a bid in response to the RFP. To ensure that Balakaev won the 
bid, FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator 2 instructed Balakaev 
to submit two higher bids under fictious company names, in addition to 
the agreed-upon bid through Balakaev's company, Radiotester.
    Once the FSB accepted Radiotester's bid and the contract was 
signed, Balakaev traveled to FSB Center 8 in Russia to pick up the 
broken device(s). Either FSB Co-Conspirator 1 or FSB Co-Conspirator 2 
would meet Balakaev outside the secure gate of FSB Center 8 to provide 
Balakaev with the broken device(s).
    As described in the indictment and the initial TDO, Balakaev then 
sourced the necessary repair parts from the United States. Balakaev 
either purchased the devices over the internet or directly from the 
U.S. manufacturers, and had the devices shipped to Individual 3's home 
in Richmond, Virginia. Once purchased, Balakaev brought or shipped the 
devices to Russia where he then mined the devices for component parts 
to use to repair the FSB devices. After Balakaev repaired the devices, 
he returned to FSB Center 8, where he met with either FSB Co-
Conspirator 1 or FSB Co-Conspirator 2 outside the FSB Center 8 gate to 
provide the repaired devices. The FSB Military Unit 43753 then wired 
payment to Balakaev's Sberbank account.
    As also referenced in the indictment and initial TDO, in total, 
between approximately 2017 and February 2022, Balakaev entered into 
approximately ten (10) contracts with FSB Military Unit 43753 to repair 
approximately forty (40) spectrum analyzers and signal generators. In 
furtherance of those contracts, Balakaev purchased approximately forty-
three (43) devices in the United States. Balakaev frequently traveled 
between Russia and the United States during this time to obtain the 
devices, often through John F. Kennedy International Airport (``JFK 
Airport'') in the Eastern District of New York. In furtherance of the 
scheme to unlawfully export controlled items from the United States to 
the FSB, on or about and between February 2017 and March 2021, Balakaev 
traveled from Russia to the United States approximately fourteen (14) 
times, typically staying in the United States anywhere from two (2) to 
fourteen (14) days on each trip. Included below is one example of the 
multiple unlawful exports to the FSB which are described in further 
detail in the indictment.
    By way of example, on or about December 19, 2019, Balakaev, acting 
through Radiotester, entered into a contract with the FSB Military Unit 
43753. As described in the indictment, the contract was to repair an 
Agilent HP 8562EC and two Agilent HP 8560EC spectrum analyzers. 
According to purchase records and shipment notifications, Balakaev 
purchased two Agilent HP 8560E spectrum analyzers that were delivered 
to Individual 3's home in Richmond, Virginia on or about January 14, 
2020 and January 15, 2020. Approximately one month later, on or about 
February 10, 2020, Balakaev flew from Russia to the United States, 
where he stayed for approximately one week, in order to obtain the two 
Agilent HP 8560E spectrum analyzers that he purchased. While in the 
United States, on or about February 17, 2020, Balakaev emailed FSB Co-
Conspirator 1 with the subject of the email ``Repair Contracts 43753'' 
and attached a PDF about spectrum analyzers. The following month, in or 
about March 2020, Balakaev purchased an Agilent HP 8562EC spectrum 
analyzer to fulfill the FSB contract. On or about March 21, 2020, the 
device was delivered to Individual 3's home in Richmond, Virginia.
    In addition to the example described above, between approximately 
April 16, 2020 and March 6, 2021, Balakaev purchased approximately 
thirty (30) additional spectrum analyzers, spectrum analyzer parts, and 
other radio parts which were shipped to Individual 3's home in 
Richmond, Virginia. Balakaev also traveled to the United

[[Page 58241]]

States twice in 2021 to obtain the devices and fulfill his FSB 
contracts. Further, in approximately January 2022, Balakaev, through 
Radiotester, entered into a new contract with FSB Military Unit 43753 
to repair six spectrum analyzers and signal generators, including the 
following make and models: HP8648D; Agilent HP 8562E; Agilent HP 
8562EC; Rohde & Schwarz FS300; and Rohde & Schwarz SM300. In 
approximately February 2022, Balakaev picked up the devices from FSB 
Co-Conspirator 1 at FSB Center 8 to begin the process of procuring 
spectrum analyzers for use in repairing the devices.
ii. Unlicensed Exports of U.S.-Origin Gas Detection Equipment to the 
DPRK
    Between approximately 2019 and 2020, Balakaev conspired with DPRK 
Government Official 1, the First Secretary of the Embassy of the DPRK 
to the Russian Federation, to provide the DPRK with U.S.-origin 
technology that can detect hazardous gases, in violation of United 
States laws.
    As described in the indictment and in the initial TDO, in 
approximately 2019, DPRK Government Official 1 contacted Balakaev to 
discuss business they could engage in together. DPRK Government 
Official 1 contacted Balakaev specifically due to connections that 
Balakaev had made while working at the Russian Ministry of Culture and 
in his travel to North Korea. Balakaev subsequently met DPRK Government 
Official 1 multiple times at the North Korean embassy in Moscow, 
Russia. On one of those occasions, DPRK Government Official 1 asked 
Balakaev to purchase an Altair 4X gas detector for the DPRK. The Altair 
4X gas detector is a device manufactured by a company in the United 
States that can be used to detect deadly gases such as combustible 
gases, oxygen-deficient atmospheres, and toxic gases. The Altair 4X gas 
detector is subject to the EAR and designated as EAR99.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ The Altair 4X gas detector would not fall within the 
exception set forth in Sec.  746.4 as it is not EAR99 food or 
medicine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On approximately December 28, 2019, Balakaev purchased the Altair 
4X gas detector on the internet in the United States and had it shipped 
to Individual 3's home in Richmond, Virginia. On January 2, 2020, the 
shipment arrived at Individual 3's home. Approximately two months 
later, on or about February 9, 2020, DPRK Government Official 1 sent 
Balakaev a photograph of a broken CD labeled ``Altair 4XR Multigas 
Detector.'' Balakaev responded, in sum and substance, that he would 
send a link for the gas detector software. As further described in the 
indictment and initial TDO, on or about February 10, 2020, Balakaev 
traveled from Russia to the United States to obtain the gas detector 
that was previously shipped to Individual 3's home. Approximately one 
week later, on or about February 17, 2020, Balakaev returned to Russia 
with the gas detector.
    As the indictment and initial TDO further demonstrate, Balakaev was 
aware of the applicable U.S. export control laws which prohibited him 
from purchasing the electronic devices in the United States for 
ultimate end use by the FSB and DPRK. As described in the indictment, 
on or about November 5, 2019, Individual 3 emailed Balakaev a hyperlink 
to a BIS document titled ``Don't Let This Happen To You!: Actual 
Investigations of Export Control and Antiboycott Violations.'' In the 
email, Individual 3 wrote to Balakaev to ``Take a look just in case.'' 
The BIS document provided ``an introduction to the consequences of 
violating U.S. export control law.'' In addition to explaining U.S. 
export control laws, the document noted specific examples of 
individuals who violated U.S. sanctions regulations by exporting items 
to Russia without a BIS license. Balakaev subsequently downloaded the 
document and saved the document to his computer.
2. Basis for Renewal of TDO
i. Recent Procurement Attempts
    As noted in OEE's request for renewal, OEE's investigation, which 
remains ongoing, has identified evidence of multiple transactions 
involving Balakaev and the Balakaev Network dating back to 2017. As 
described in the indictment, Balakaev has demonstrated a pattern of 
conduct involving the illicit procurement and unauthorized exports of 
EAR-controlled items for end use by the FSB and DPRK. Further, on 
October 18, 2022, Balakaev made statements to law enforcement that he 
intended to continue to procure EAR-controlled items through other 
means and is still obtaining contracts through the FSB.
    In addition, Balakaev informed agents that he had fulfilled FSB 
contracts he had obtained in January 2022 for the repair of six 
devices, and that he was currently negotiating with FSB Co-Conspirators 
for new contracts in January or February 2023. According to Balakaev, 
the new contracts were not public yet and the FSB Co-Conspirators would 
advise Balakaev to review the contracts. Accordingly, OEE has reason to 
believe that Balakaev and the other above-captioned parties continue to 
engage in unlawfully purchasing and shipping dual-use items from U.S. 
manufacturers to the FSB and DPRK. These items include advanced 
electronics and sophisticated testing equipment, some of which can be 
used in sensitive foreign counterintelligence and military operations.
ii. Risk of Continued Evasion
    Since the issuance of the TDO on February 24, 2023, an arrest 
warrant has been issued for Ilya Balakaev. Ilya Balakaev is presently a 
fugitive from U.S. law enforcement and resides in the Russian 
Federation. Because he has not yet been apprehended, OEE has reason to 
believe that his illicit procurement efforts will remain ongoing, given 
the length and nature of the conduct identified to date. Moreover, 
because Balakaev is familiar with methods of concealment, he is likely 
to use increasingly sophisticated methods to avoid detection by law 
enforcement, absent the renewal of the TDO.

III. Findings

    I find that the evidence presented by BIS demonstrates that a 
violation of the Regulations by the above-captioned parties is imminent 
in both time and degree of likelihood. As such, a TDO is needed to give 
notice to persons and companies in the United States and abroad that 
they should cease dealing with Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a 
Radiotester LLC in export or reexport transactions involving items 
subject to the EAR. Such a TDO is consistent with the public interest 
to preclude future violations of the Regulations given the deliberate, 
covert, and determined nature of the misconduct and clear disregard for 
complying with U.S. export control laws.
    This Order is being issued on an ex parte basis without a hearing 
based upon BIS's showing of an imminent violation in accordance with 
Section 766.24 and 766.23(b) of the Regulations.
    It Is Therefore Ordered:
    First, that ILYA BALAKAEV, with an address at 
Sharikopodshipnikovkaya 20-68 Moscow, Russian Federation; RADIOTESTER 
OOO A/K/A RADIOTESTER LLC, with an address at Sharikopodshipnikovskaya 
11, Building 1, Moscow, 115088, Russian Federation, and Volgograd 
Prospect, House 2, Moscow, 109316, Russian Federation; and when acting 
for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees 
(each a ``Denied Person'' and collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may 
not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction 
involving any commodity, software or technology

[[Page 58242]]

(hereinafter collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be 
exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any 
other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License 
Exception, or export control document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity 
subject to the EAR; or
    C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
    Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the 
following:
    A. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of a 
Denied Person any item subject to the EAR;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control 
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from 
the United States, including financing or other support activities 
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts 
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to 
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
    D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item 
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will 
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is 
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item, 
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied 
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes 
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, 
modification or testing.
    Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided 
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or 
business organization related to Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/
a Radiotester LLC by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of 
responsibility in the conduct of trade or related services may also be 
made subject to the provisions of this Order.
    In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(e) of the EAR, 
Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC may, at any 
time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in support 
of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. 
Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, 
Maryland 21202-4022.
    In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(d) of the EAR, 
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not 
later than 20 days before the expiration date. Respondents Ilya 
Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC may oppose a request 
to renew this Order by filing a written submission with the Assistant 
Secretary for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than 
seven days before the expiration date of the Order.
    A copy of this Order shall be served on each denied person and 
shall be published in the Federal Register.
    This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for 
180 days.

Matthew S. Axelrod,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023-18311 Filed 8-24-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DT-P