[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 162 (Wednesday, August 23, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57334-57348]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-17847]


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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement

30 CFR Part 250

[Docket ID: BSEE-2022-0009; EEEE500000 234E1700D2 ET1SF0000.EAQ000]
RIN 1014-AA52


Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf-
Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Revisions

AGENCY: Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Interior.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of the Interior (DOI or Department), through 
the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), is revising 
certain regulatory provisions published in the 2019 final well control 
rule for drilling, workover, completion, and decommissioning 
operations. BSEE is finalizing these revisions to clarify blowout 
preventer (BOP) system requirements and to modify certain specific BOP 
equipment capability requirements. This final rule will provide 
consistency and clarity to industry regarding the BOP equipment and 
associated operational requirements necessary for BSEE review and 
approval and will further ensure operations are conducted safely and in 
an environmentally responsible manner.

DATES: This final rule is effective on October 23, 2023. However, BSEE 
will defer the compliance date for the Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) 
intervention open functionality provision at 30 CFR 250.734(a)(4) until 
August 22, 2024. The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this final 
rule as of July 15, 2019.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions, contact Kirk Malstrom, 
Regulations and Standards Branch, (202) 258-1518, or by email: 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Executive Summary

    This final rule revises certain regulatory provisions that were 
published in the 2019 final rule entitled, ``Oil and Gas and Sulfur 
Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf-Blowout Preventer Systems and 
Well Control Revisions,'' 84 FR 21908 (May 15, 2019) (2019 WCR). On 
January 20, 2021, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13990 
(Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to 
Tackle the Climate Crisis). The accompanying ``President's Fact Sheet: 
List of Agency Actions for Review'' included the 2019 WCR on a list of 
rules the President instructed DOI to review for potential revisions to 
promote and protect public health and the environment, among other 
policy goals identified in the E.O. This review confirmed that the 2019 
WCR contains many provisions that help ensure that federally regulated 
outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas operations are conducted 
safely and in an environmentally responsible manner. Therefore, this 
final rule addresses only select provisions that, consistent with and 
as authorized by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), will 
further promote the objectives of E.O. 13990. At this time, BSEE is 
finalizing narrowly focused revisions to improve operations that use a 
BOP, certain BOP capabilities and functionalities, and BSEE oversight 
of such operations. The final rule:
     Clarifies the general BOP system expectations,
     Modifies the timeframes for commencing a failure analysis,
     Requires submission of independent third-party 
qualifications,
     Establishes dual shear ram requirements for surface BOPs 
on existing floating production facilities when an operator replaces an 
entire surface BOP stack,
     Requires Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) open functions on 
subsea BOPs, and
     Requires submittal of certain BOP test results if BSEE is 
unable to witness the testing.
    BSEE will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of the 2019 WCR 
and all BSEE regulations for any necessary and appropriate rulemakings 
in the future.

Table of Contents

I. Background
    A. BSEE Statutory and Regulatory Authority and Responsibilities
    B. Purpose and Summary of the Rulemaking
II. Discussion of Compliance Dates for the Final Rule
III. Discussion of Public Comments on the Proposed Rule
IV. Section-By-Section Summary and Responses to Comments on the 
Proposed Rule

[[Page 57335]]

V. Procedural Matters

I. Background

A. BSEE Statutory and Regulatory Authority and Responsibilities

    BSEE's authority for this rule flows from OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. 1331-
1356a. OCSLA, enacted in 1953 and substantially revised in 1978, 
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) to lease the OCS 
for mineral development and to regulate oil and gas exploration, 
development, and production operations on the OCS. The Secretary has 
delegated authority to perform certain of these functions to BSEE.
    To carry out its responsibilities, BSEE regulates offshore oil and 
gas operations to: enhance the safety of exploration for and 
development of oil and gas on the OCS, ensure that those operations 
protect the environment, and implement advancements in technology. BSEE 
also conducts onsite inspections to ensure compliance with regulations, 
lease terms, and approved plans and permits. Detailed information 
concerning BSEE's regulations and guidance to the offshore oil and gas 
industry may be found on BSEE's website at: https://www.bsee.gov/guidance-and-regulations.
    BSEE's regulatory program covers a wide range of OCS facilities and 
activities--including drilling, completion, workover, production, 
pipeline, and decommissioning operations--that offshore operators \1\ 
perform throughout the OCS. This rule is applicable to these listed 
operational activities (e.g., drilling, completion and workovers) that 
involve certain BOP operations, capabilities, or functionalities.
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    \1\ BSEE's regulations at 30 CFR part 250 generally apply to ``a 
lessee, the owner or holder of operating rights, a designated 
operator or agent of the lessee(s)'' (30 CFR 250.105 (definition of 
``you'') and ``the person actually performing the activity to which 
the requirement applies'' (30 CFR 250.146(c)). For convenience, this 
preamble will refer to these regulated entities as ``operators'' 
unless otherwise indicated.
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B. Purpose and Summary of the Rulemaking

    After the Deepwater Horizon incident in 2010, BSEE adopted several 
recommendations from multiple investigation teams to improve the safety 
of offshore operations. Subsequently, on April 29, 2016, BSEE published 
the 2016 Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Final Rule (81 FR 
25888) (2016 WCR). The 2016 WCR consolidated the equipment and 
operational requirements for well control into one part of BSEE's 
regulations; enhanced BOP and well design requirements; modified well-
control requirements; and incorporated certain industry technical 
standards. Most of the 2016 WCR provisions became effective on July 28, 
2016.
    Although the 2016 WCR addressed a significant number of issues that 
were identified during the analyses of the Deepwater Horizon incident, 
BSEE recognized that BOP equipment and systems continue to improve and 
that well control processes also evolve. Therefore, after the 2016 WCR 
took effect, BSEE continued to engage with the offshore oil and gas 
industry, Standards Development Organizations (SDOs), and other 
stakeholders. During these engagements, BSEE identified issues, and 
stakeholders expressed a variety of concerns regarding the 
implementation of the 2016 WCR. BSEE completed a review of the 2016 WCR 
and, on May 15, 2019, published the 2019 WCR in the Federal Register 
(84 FR 21908). The 2019 WCR left most of the 2016 WCR unchanged.
    Following publication of the 2019 WCR, BSEE continued to engage 
with stakeholders to gather information to ensure that industry was 
effectively implementing the governing regulatory requirements. On 
January 20, 2021, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13990 
(Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to 
Tackle the Climate Crisis). The accompanying ``President's Fact Sheet: 
List of Agency Actions for Review'' included the 2019 WCR on a list of 
rules the President instructed DOI to review for potential revisions to 
promote and protect public health and the environment, among other 
policy goals identified in the E.O. This review confirmed that the 2019 
WCR contains many provisions that help ensure that federally regulated 
outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas operations are conducted 
safely and in an environmentally responsible manner. Therefore, this 
final rule addresses only select provisions that, consistent with and 
as authorized by the OCSLA, will further promote the objectives of E.O. 
13990. At this time, BSEE is finalizing narrowly focused revisions to 
improve operations that use a BOP, certain BOP capabilities and 
functionalities, and BSEE oversight of such operations.

II. Discussion of Compliance Dates for the Final Rule

    BSEE considered the public comments on the proposed rule (87 FR 
56354, September 14, 2022), as well as relevant information gained 
during BSEE's interactions with stakeholders, involvement in 
development of industry standards, and evaluation of current 
technology. Based on its analysis, BSEE is setting an effective date of 
60 days following publication of the final rule, by which time 
operators will be required to comply with most of the final rule's 
provisions. BSEE determined, however, that it is appropriate to defer 
the compliance requirements in Sec.  250.734(a)(4) until one year after 
this rule is published. In this final rule, BSEE is requiring operators 
to equip subsea BOP stacks with the ROV intervention capability to both 
open and close each shear ram, ram locks, and one pipe ram. (Current 
regulations require only closure capability.) BSEE is allowing a 1-year 
deferred compliance date, from the date of publication of this final 
rule, to allow operators to make the required equipment modifications 
to enable the ROV intervention capability to open the specified 
components. Detailed explanations for the requirements associated with 
this compliance date are provided in section IV of this preamble.

III. Discussion of Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

    In response to the proposed rule, BSEE received 26 sets of 
submitted comments containing general statements, specific comments on 
the proposed provisions, and discussions of provisions not included in 
the proposed rule. Comments included submittals from the following 
entities: 13 companies, 2 industry organizations, 4 non-governmental 
organizations, 1 State government, 1 member of academia, 2 private 
citizens, and 3 anonymous submitters. All relevant comments are posted 
at the Federal eRulemaking portal: https://www.regulations.gov. To 
access the comments at that website, enter BSEE-2022-0009 in the Search 
box. BSEE reviewed all comments submitted, and this section of this 
preamble contains brief summaries of the relevant comments as well as 
BSEE's responses.
    BSEE received multiple comments expressing general support for the 
proposed rule. BSEE received supporting comments from, but not limited 
to, oil and gas companies, industry trade groups, private citizens, and 
non-governmental organizations. Some of the commenters expressing 
general support for the proposed rule also provided specific detailed 
comments, addressed further below. While these commenters voiced 
support broadly for certain proposed changes, some of them also 
disagreed with other specific proposals and provided suggested 
revisions. Many of the commenters who expressed general

[[Page 57336]]

support for the rule also recommended that BSEE continue to evaluate 
other provisions of the 2019 WCR and provide stakeholders with further 
opportunities to continue discussions on the topics covered in the 
previous WCRs.
    Multiple commenters provided statements or comments that were not 
relevant to the scope of the proposed rule, and therefore BSEE is not 
addressing them in this final rule.
Comments on the Initial Regulatory Impact Analysis (IRIA)
    Summary of comments: A commenter suggested that BSEE should 
quantitatively and/or qualitatively describe the full range of harms 
that the Bureau expects to avoid by decreasing the risk of well 
blowouts, which include fatalities, negative health impacts on coastal 
populations, and the destruction of fragile ecosystems.
    Response: BSEE appreciates the comment that BSEE should account for 
the full range of benefits associated with decreasing the risk of well 
blowouts. In the Final RIA, BSEE has added a qualitative summary of the 
types of benefits the rule will provide; however, BSEE has elected not 
to provide a quantitative accounting of the benefits as this rule is 
not a significant regulatory action as defined under Executive Order 
12866, as amended by Executive Order 14094 (``Modernizing Regulatory 
Review,'' 88 FR 21879 (April 6, 2023)).
    Summary of comments: A commenter suggested that BSEE should also 
conduct a break-even analysis to support its finding that the proposed 
rule's benefits justify its costs.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter. Executive Orders 12866 
and 14094 require agencies to conduct such analyses only for 
significant regulatory actions, and this rule is not a significant 
regulatory action, as demonstrated in the cost section of the RIA.
Miscellaneous Comments
    Summary of comments: One commenter suggested that BSEE hold 
periodic workshops and smaller WCR updates to encourage ongoing 
discussions on this topic.
    Response: BSEE agrees in part with the commenter and will continue 
to look for ways to engage with all stakeholders on the provisions 
associated with the WCRs and WCR-related topics.
Summary of Comments: Source Control and Containment Equipment (SCCE) 
Mandatory Equipment--30 CFR 250.462(b)
    A commenter stated that the 2019 WCR changed a ``must'' to a 
``may'' in 30 CFR 250.462(b), thereby eliminating the requirement that 
an operator have access to all the identified SCCE. The commenter 
suggested that the regulations should establish a default ``must'' 
requirement for all equipment, and clearly articulate the specific 
conditions under which BSEE would allow an operator an exemption for 
one or more pieces of equipment. The commenter suggested that BSEE 
should make access to all the listed equipment a requirement for all 
operators under all conditions unless provided for under a clearly 
articulated exception.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter. Under both the 2016 
WCR and the 2019 WCR, the regulations make it mandatory for operators 
to have access to and the ability to deploy appropriate SCCE necessary 
for regaining control of the well at issue. In the 2019 WCR, BSEE 
clarified that there are different categories of SCCE (e.g., supporting 
equipment, co-located equipment) that warrant distinct treatment. 
Accordingly, BSEE revised the list of SCCE found in 30 CFR 250.462(b) 
and clarified that the SCCE required for any given situation ``may 
include, but is not limited to'' the items on that list. The intent of 
this revision was to clarify that the analysis required in 30 CFR 
250.462(a) should be used to determine which SCCE an operator must have 
access to for its operations, and that the list in 30 CFR 250.462(b) 
provides examples of SCCE types that may be deemed appropriate, and 
thus required, based on the analysis of the particular well scenario. 
The SCCE that is necessary and appropriate to regain well control may 
vary based on the circumstances of the drilling operations (e.g., well 
design and integrity, nature and structure of facility and associated 
infrastructure), even across distinct wells within one region (e.g., 
Gulf of Mexico). BSEE intends to ensure the use of a consistent, 
objective review of the operator's ability to respond to a blowout 
based on actual conditions, as opposed to rote application of a fixed 
checklist of equipment, some of which may be inappropriate or 
incompatible depending on the specific circumstances. The 2019 WCR 
removed the potential suggestion that every possible type of SCCE--
regardless of relevance, necessity, or compatibility under the 
circumstances--must be maintained for every well (which was never the 
intent) and replaced that suggestion with the more streamlined 
requirement that operators must have available SCCE appropriate for the 
specific operations. The requested changes are not necessary, as the 
regulations continue to require that operators ``must have access to 
and the ability to deploy'' the SCCE necessary to regain control of the 
well.
Summary of Comments: Cement Evaluation Logs for Complex Wells
    A commenter requested that BSEE provide studies that show all well 
blowouts with failed cement and include a comparison of a pressure test 
versus the use of cement evaluation tools, the number of wells that 
require a pressure test and evaluation logs, and the number of wells 
that have remedial cement repairs as a result of cement evaluation 
logs. The commenter requested that BSEE revise its regulations to make 
cement evaluation logs mandatory for all offshore wells, and, in 
particular, for complex wells or wells in environmentally sensitive 
locations, to determine cement placement and quality and to verify 
cement repairs.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the suggestion that it would be 
necessary or appropriate to require cement evaluation logs for every 
well, as there are other viable indicators of successful cement 
placement and well integrity. These include tests required under 
existing regulations, such as pressure integrity testing required under 
30 CFR 250.427 and the requirement to locate the top of cement 
(including through use of cement logs) and take remedial actions (per 
30 CFR 250.428(c), (d)) where those tests provide indications of an 
inadequate cement job. BSEE has the discretion to require additional 
analysis, including cement logs, if warranted.
Summary of Comments: Mechanical Integrity Assessment (MIA) Report--30 
CFR 250.732(d)
    A commenter suggested that BSEE should restore the MIA Report 
requirements from the 2016 WCR that were eliminated in the 2019 WCR. 
The commenter asserted that BSEE now allows for industry self-
regulation instead of independent third-party review that was required 
with the MIA Report.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter that it is necessary or 
appropriate to restore the MIA Report requirements from the 2016 WCR. 
The regulations, taken as a whole, ensure proper mechanical integrity 
of equipment (e.g., specific BOP requirements of 30 CFR part 250,

[[Page 57337]]

subparts G through S). All of the material informational requirements 
in the former MIA Reports continue to be captured in the regulations 
following the 2019 WCR. While those requirements are more dispersed 
throughout the regulations, BSEE has experienced no informational 
disadvantage or reduction based on the elimination of the cumulative 
MIA Report requirement.
Summary of Comments: BOP 5-Year Complete Breakdown--30 CFR 250.739
    A commenter suggested that BSEE should issue guidance to explain 
how far the BOP must be broken down to meet an acceptable BOP ``major, 
detailed'' 5-year inspection. The commenter also suggested that BSEE 
restore the requirement for the independent third-party expert to be 
present at the 5-year BOP inspection.
    Response: As BSEE explained in response to questions surrounding 
implementation of the 2016 WCR, BOP equipment must be broken down to 
allow for an appropriately detailed physical inspection. BSEE did not 
intend for this requirement to mean that each component must be 
dismantled to its smallest possible part. (See 2019 WCR, 84 FR 21961) 
Operators may use original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-approved 
methods (e.g., x-ray or ultrasonic) to assist in the detailed 
inspection. BSEE disagrees with the commenter's suggestion that the 
independent third party must be present at the 5-year BOP inspection, 
as there are other means for independent third-party verifications and 
certifications that help ensure that the BOP is fit for service at a 
specific location for its intended use. For example, the regulations 
require that an independent third party review the inspection 
documentation and compile a detailed inspection report, which allows 
the independent third party to compare the design data with the current 
status of the equipment and accomplishes BSEE's goal of verifying that 
the well control system components are fit for service and within 
design tolerances to be utilized for specific well conditions. BSEE's 
experience reviewing these inspection reports since 2019 has indicated 
no material change or reduction in the comprehensiveness or 
effectiveness of its oversight.
Summary of Comments: BOP Testing Frequency--30 CFR 250.737(b)
    Multiple commenters recommended that BSEE remove the 21-day BOP 
testing interval option (even if supported by a BOP health monitoring 
plan required under Sec.  250.737(a)(4)) and instead retain the 14-day 
test interval requirement for all BOPs and also require the BOP health 
monitoring plan for all BOPs.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenters' recommendations to 
remove the 21-day BOP testing frequency alternative. Since promulgation 
of the 2016 WCR, BSEE has obtained and considered additional data 
relevant to the effects of different BOP testing intervals, including 
from the 2017 SafeOCS report \2\ regarding BOP equipment failure, 
operator-submitted BOP health monitoring plan information (as required 
by 30 CFR 250.737(a)(4)(i) through (iv)), the 2019 Argonne National 
Laboratory research report,\3\ international experience with 21-day 
testing cycles, and the results of a two-year pilot program examining 
BOP testing frequency and associated BOP health monitoring data. BSEE 
has found that the BOP health monitoring plans provide relevant data on 
BOP equipment operation throughout the equipment's lifecycle and 
provide sufficient additional assurance of successful functioning and 
oversight of BOP equipment to support a 21-day testing interval. Based 
on this data, BSEE has concluded that BOP reliability is not reduced by 
permitting a 21-day testing frequency that includes BOP health 
monitoring. BSEE continues to evaluate the BOP testing frequency to 
ensure proper equipment functionality. BSEE will also continue to 
evaluate the information gathered under the BOP health monitoring plans 
to determine if it would be appropriate to apply the health monitoring 
plan requirement to all BOPs.
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    \2\ https://safeocs.gov/file/2017_WCR_Annual_Report_v4.pdf.
    \3\ https://www.bsee.gov/sites/bsee.gov/files/examination-of-blowout-preventer-pressure-test-frequency.pdf.
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Summary of Comments: Real-Time Monitoring (RTM) Transmission--30 CFR 
250.724
    A commenter suggested that BSEE should make clear in the regulation 
that transmission from one computer to another on the same rig or 
platform or having ``qualified personnel'' on the same rig or platform 
would not satisfy the 2019 WCR.
    Response: BSEE does not permit RTM under Sec.  250.724 to be 
conducted by personnel located on the same rig or facility where the 
activities being monitored are taking place. Offsite personnel must 
conduct the monitoring. BSEE does not believe that a regulatory 
revision is necessary, as the commenter's suggestion reflects BSEE's 
position under existing regulations.
Summary of Comments: Use of API Bulletin 92L Related to Drilling 
Margin--30 CFR 250.427(b)
    A commenter expressed concerns about operators relying on API 
Bulletin 92L in situations where the Bulletin does not provide adequate 
methods to address lost circulation events. The commenter also 
requested that BSEE issue guidance to address what those situations are 
and how they should be handled.
    Response: Since 2019, BSEE's experience with application of API 
Bulletin 92L relative to ongoing operations has confirmed its 
successful use for lost circulation events. BSEE believes the Bulletin 
adequately addresses how to proceed in the event of lost circulation 
and how to diagnose associated well stability issues safely and 
appropriately. The Bulletin provides operators with flow charts to use 
for evaluating what is happening in the well during lost circulation 
events and determining how to respond accordingly (e.g., stopping 
drilling to run casing or drilling ahead a short distance to a safe 
stopping point). There are circumstances where limited drilling forward 
is safer than immediately halting operations in response to a lost 
circulation or drilling margin event. However, BSEE and API Bulletin 
92L recognize that there are situations where it is not appropriate to 
continue operations when there are indications of lost circulation, and 
the Bulletin does not contemplate drilling ahead under those 
circumstances. For example, an operator may not continue operations 
with inadequate mud volume on location if the mud weight is 
insufficient to control expected pore pressure or when the open hole 
formation integrity test is below predicted equivalent circulating 
density. Accordingly, the Bulletin adequately identifies those 
circumstances where continued operations are not appropriate and, in 
those circumstances, the regulation requires the operator to obtain 
BSEE's approval before it may proceed. Regulatory changes are not 
needed. BSEE will continue to consider the extent to which guidance may 
be appropriate to provide additional clarity around these subjects.
Summary of Comments: Ensuring Adequate Cement Job--30 CFR 250.423(a) 
and (b)
    A commenter recommended that this regulation should be revised to 
clarify that latching mechanisms need to be engaged upon successful 
installation and cementing of casing strings or liners for the purpose 
of ensuring that casing

[[Page 57338]]

and liners are properly secured for wellbore integrity, or 
alternatively the latching or lock down mechanism must engage 
automatically upon installing the string or casing, prior to cementing.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter that clarification is 
needed for this associated regulation. BSEE requires the latching or 
lock down mechanisms to be engaged upon successfully installing the 
casing or liner.
Summary of Comments: Effective Seal--30 CFR 250.731(a)(5)
    A commenter asserted that the 2019 WCR's revisions to the language 
of this provision from ``achieve an effective seal'' to ``close'' 
imposes a lesser standard, as closing does not necessarily mean there 
is an effective seal. The commenter recommended that the regulations 
should be revised to clearly specify which ram types must meet an 
``effective seal'' standard.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter. As previously stated 
in the 2019 WCR, the requirements of paragraph (a)(5) relate only to 
the regulator set points used to activate the rams and do not alter any 
of the ram operational requirements contained in Sec. Sec.  250.733 and 
250.734 for surface and subsea BOPs, respectively. Those provisions 
continue to require that BOP systems contain rams that, when activated, 
are capable of ``sealing the wellbore after shearing,'' and other rams 
``capable of closing and sealing'' on downhole equipment. Some rams are 
not designed or intended to seal, such as the casing shear ram. BSEE 
uses the data obtained through this provision in the permit application 
to evaluate ram closing and sealing capabilities. The word 
``effective'' in this context is not necessary and does not provide any 
supplemental regulatory standard.
Summary of Comments: Test Demonstration Time--30 CFR 250.732(a)(2)(ii)
    A commenter expressed concerns that the 5-minute testing time is 
insufficient. This commenter suggested that BSEE should not abandon the 
30-minute test protocol and that BSEE must provide supporting rationale 
for adopting anything other than the recommended pressure time.
    Response: BSEE is unaware of any data indicating BOP pressure 
testing failures between 5 and 30 minutes, such that extending test 
length would capture additional relevant data. In developing the 2019 
WCR, BSEE considered and reevaluated the 2016 WCR requirements 
regarding BOP testing done in laboratories or test facilities against 
historical data and the past application of that data. Based on the 
historical data, BSEE found that the 5-minute pressure integrity 
testing timeframe was well established and adequate to demonstrate 
effective sealing. This conclusion was bolstered through increased and 
ongoing interactions with testing facilities, through which BSEE was 
kept apprised of new test protocols and test data and what they 
indicated regarding appropriate test period length. In reviews of 
historical lab testing data as well as permits issued since 2010, BSEE 
found no indications of failures between the 5-minute and 30-minute 
marks. BSEE also reviewed publicly available incident data and did not 
identify any past incidents involving failure of equipment after 
successfully sealing a well. Accordingly, BSEE views the 5-minute 
pressure integrity test hold time to provide sufficient confirmation of 
the required capabilities, and more prolonged tests do not provide 
material safety gains.
Summary of Comments: Shear Ram Capability--30 CFR 250.734(a)(6)(vi)
    A commenter expressed concerns that the 2019 WCR removed the 2016 
WCR ``fail safe'' requirement that the control systems for certain 
emergency functions be a failsafe design once activated, and 
recommended that BSEE restore that language in the regulations.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter's recommendation, as 
the relevant systems already function as fail-safe designs once 
activated, and adding that language would not alter the required 
emergency functionality. BSEE removed this language in the 2019 WCR 
because certain required emergency functions, such as the autoshear/
deadman systems, are already considered fail-safe systems (i.e., they 
will fail in the mode that results in activation of the emergency 
function). They are designed to function automatically in emergency 
situations and do not require intervention by surface personnel to 
function. Existing regulatory requirements maintain these inherently 
fail-safe emergency functions (e.g., autoshear/deadman systems) 
adequately and ensure that the required emergency systems function in a 
fail-safe manner, without the commenter's proposed language change.

IV. Section-by-Section Summary and Responses to Comments on the 
Proposed Rule

    BSEE is finalizing revisions to the following regulations:

Subpart G--Well Operations and Equipment

What are the general requirements for BOP systems and system 
components? (Sec.  250.730)
    This section of the existing regulations includes requirements for 
the design, installation, maintenance, inspection, repair, testing, and 
use of BOP systems and system components. This section also requires 
compliance with certain provisions of API Standard 53 and several 
related industry standards, and requires operators to use failure 
reporting procedures.
    Summary of proposed rule revisions to paragraph (a):
    BSEE proposed to revise paragraph (a) by modifying the current 
requirement that the ``BOP system must be capable of closing and 
sealing the wellbore in the event of flow due to a kick, including 
under anticipated flowing conditions for the specific well 
conditions,'' to a requirement that the ``BOP system must be capable of 
closing and sealing the wellbore at all times to the well's maximum 
kick tolerance design limits.'' Additional minor, non-substantive 
wording and grammatical changes were proposed for readability to 
accommodate this proposed revision.
    Summary of final rule revisions to paragraph (a):
    Based upon comments received, BSEE is revising paragraph (a) to 
state that the ``BOP system must be capable of closing and sealing the 
wellbore to the well's [maximum anticipated surface pressure] at all 
times, except as otherwise specified in the BOP system requirements of 
this subpart.'' These revisions will help ensure there is a consistent 
and proven approach for BOP system design criteria and will also 
provide clarity for operators to ensure the BOP system meets the 
requirements of the regulations at all times.
    Summary of comments to proposed paragraph (a):
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed concerns with 
the inclusion of the well's maximum kick tolerance design limit and 
suggested that the use of the maximum anticipated surface pressure 
(MASP) is a more appropriate and conservative design criteria.
    Response: BSEE agrees that the maximum anticipated surface 
pressure, in this case, is a better design criterion than the maximum 
kick tolerance design limit. MASP is used extensively in the 
requirements for design and operation of multiple pieces of equipment 
across BSEE regulations. Industry has substantial experience in 
calculating MASP, while experience

[[Page 57339]]

with the methods for determining the maximum kick tolerance is less 
extensive and consistent. BSEE also recognizes that there may be 
circumstances where the use of MASP as a design parameter for 
identifying and sizing appropriate well control equipment would require 
more equipment capabilities than use of the maximum kick tolerance. 
Therefore, BSEE is revising the proposed provision to replace the 
reference to maximum kick tolerance design limit as the capability 
threshold with a reference to MASP to ensure consistency for 
calculating the design criteria and utilization of the most 
conservative design parameter.
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed general support 
for the use of the maximum kick tolerance design limit. However, the 
commenters also expressed concerns that the maximum kick tolerance 
design limit is unclear and suggested that BSEE define and clarify the 
term.
    Response: BSEE agrees with the commenters' concerns about the 
clarity of using the maximum kick tolerance design limit as a standard. 
The maximum kick tolerance design limit concept is not referenced in 
the current BSEE regulations, so there is no clear experience from 
which a general consistent approach for calculating the maximum kick 
tolerance design limit can be developed. In response to comments, BSEE 
will not finalize the use of the maximum kick tolerance design limit as 
the applicable threshold and will instead require the use of a well-
established design parameter: the well's MASP. The MASP is a commonly 
used design criterion referenced throughout the BSEE regulations. It is 
thoroughly understood and provides a comparable, and often more 
conservative, standard to ensure adequate BOP capability.
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters recommended that BSEE 
clarify that BOP systems must close and seal the wellbore at all times 
to the requirements of the regulations.
    Response: BSEE agrees with the commenters' assertion that BOP 
systems must properly function at all times to the requirements of the 
regulations. Therefore, BSEE is revising the proposed provision to 
state that the BOP system must be capable of closing and sealing the 
wellbore to MASP at all times, except as otherwise specified in the 
regulations (such as in Sec. Sec.  250.730(a)(3); 250.732(a)(1)(i), 
(iii), and (v); and 250.733(a)(1)). BSEE's regulations include 
requirements related to BOP system design, fabrication, operation, 
maintenance, and testing, as well as independent validation and 
certification for ensuring the BOP was designed, tested, and maintained 
to perform under the maximum environmental and operational conditions 
anticipated to occur at the well. As a whole, the BOP system regulatory 
requirements help ensure that the BOP systems are appropriate for their 
intended use at all times and provide regulatory certainty to 
stakeholders for compliance and, if necessary, BSEE enforcement.
    Summary of comments: A commenter expressed concerns that this 
paragraph does not go far enough to ensure that the BOP system is 
capable of closing and sealing the wellbore at all times based on 
existing exclusions in the current regulations. The commenter suggested 
revising the paragraph to specify that the BOP system must be capable 
of closing and sealing on all tubulars, including tool joints, drill 
collars, slip-proof sections, bottom hole assemblies, heavy casing, and 
pipe under compression, and under the maximum flowing conditions. The 
commenter also asserted that their trademarked technology is the only 
system able to meet the standard reflected in their suggested 
revisions.
    Response: BSEE agrees in part with the commenter's assertion that 
technology can help drive improvements to existing BOP system 
capabilities. However, at this time and based on existing knowledge, 
data, and experience, there is not adequate data demonstrating that the 
referenced equipment is necessary or proven for general adoption or 
implementation. In the context of existing proven and available 
technologies, imposition of an ``at all times'' mandate without further 
context would not accurately recognize prevailing operational 
realities. A BOP functions as a mitigation device, designed to backstop 
other prevention mechanisms to keep a well from progressing to a full 
blowout; its purpose is not to halt a full blowout once it has 
commenced. Operators must ensure ram closure time and sealing integrity 
within the operational and mechanical design limits of proven and 
available equipment that are reflected in the equipment capability 
requirements of the regulations. The changes in the final rule further 
support and reflect the totality of improved BOP equipment, procedures, 
and testing, while acknowledging the safe and appropriate purpose and 
function of the BOP, clarifying these requirements from the 2016 and 
2019 WCRs. BSEE regulations accommodate use of new or unusual 
technology to demonstrate improvements that can influence development 
of regulatory requirements. BSEE will continue to evaluate, and, if 
appropriate, allow the use of new technology, including the commenter's 
cited technology, while responsibly overseeing developments in the 
field through regulations designed to ensure safety and environmental 
protection. BSEE will also continue to evaluate the BOP system 
regulations to ensure they are appropriate and effective, and, if 
necessary, revise the regulations based on proven improved technology. 
BSEE believes that the existing cited regulatory standards are 
consistent with the capabilities of currently proven technologies and 
the purpose and intended functions of BOPs.
    Summary of comments: A commenter expressed concerns that industry 
is not currently using BOP systems properly to ensure well control. The 
commenter stated that, during certain stripping operations, industry is 
using subsea BOP elastomeric elements in a manner that may not 
constitute ``proper use'' of the equipment under Sec.  250.730(a). The 
commenter asserted that their company-specific technology would 
eliminate the concerns related to stripping operations.
    Response: BSEE agrees in part with the commenter's assertion that 
BOP systems need to be properly used. However, the commenter's 
discussion of stripping operations does not pertain to any of the 
proposals promulgated through the proposed rule and is therefore 
outside the scope of this final rule. Further, BSEE would not codify a 
requirement to use a specific company's product. BSEE will continue to 
review and evaluate existing stripping operations and their effects on 
the associated equipment.
    Summary of proposed rule revisions to paragraph (c):
    BSEE proposed to revise paragraph (c) by removing, throughout the 
paragraph, the option to submit failure reports to a designated third 
party. BSEE also proposed to revise paragraph (c)(2) to ensure that the 
operator starts a failure investigation and analysis within 90 days of 
the failure instead of within 120 days.
    Summary of final rule revisions to paragraph (c):
    Based on comments received, BSEE is requiring throughout paragraph 
(c) that the failure reporting must be sent to BSEE's Office of 
Offshore Regulatory Programs Chief, any BSEE-designated third party to 
collect failure data, and the manufacturer of the equipment. BSEE also 
received and considered comments on the proposed provisions in 
paragraph (c)(2) that would require the investigation and failure 
analysis to

[[Page 57340]]

be started within 90 days of the failure, and BSEE includes the 
proposed language in the final rule without change.
    Summary of Comments on paragraph (c)--Submission of Failure 
Reporting to a Designated Third Party:
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters strongly opposed the 
removal of BSEE's ability to use a third party to collect failure data. 
The commenters expressed their concerns that the proposed revisions may 
discourage the same level of details currently submitted to the third 
party, which includes confidential data, commercially sensitive 
information, and operators' internal processes. The commenters also 
cited the value of utilizing the third party, including the prevention 
of disclosure of proprietary and confidential data under the 
Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act 
(CIPSEA). The commenters suggested that BSEE retain the language in the 
current regulations and continue to allow the use of a designated third 
party. The commenters also suggested that BSEE work with the designated 
third party to establish increased reporting protocols to facilitate 
BSEE's timely review of failure data, identify trends, and respond 
appropriately.
    Response: BSEE agrees in part with the commenters' suggestion to 
retain the use of a designated third party to collect failure data. 
However, this final rule also requires submittal of the failure data to 
BSEE. BSEE continues to find value in using the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (BTS) for monitoring failure analysis and 
compiling and analyzing trend data, but this reporting arrangement 
limits BSEE's ability to efficiently and effectively address all of the 
issues associated with certain failures. Receiving failure reports 
directly will facilitate BSEE's timely review of the failure data to 
help more quickly identify trends and respond to systemic issues 
falling within BSEE's regulatory authority. BSEE also agrees with the 
commenters' suggestion to establish an increased reporting protocol 
from the third party (or parties) to BSEE. BSEE is in discussions with 
the currently designated third party to establish a monthly dashboard, 
as well as additional tools that would enhance BSEE's ability to review 
data and take appropriate action if necessary. BSEE does not want to 
disrupt the reporting process and the detailed data collected under 
CIPSEA. Furthermore, BSEE will protect confidential, proprietary, or 
sensitive information to the extent permitted by law, similar to its 
treatment of similar information submitted regularly to BSEE through 
the permitting process and other regulatory processes.
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters support the proposed 
revision to remove the option to use a third party for failure data 
collection and explained that the revisions would enable BSEE to review 
and respond to the failure information quickly and efficiently.
    Response: BSEE agrees in part with the commenters that BSEE's 
timely review and response to the failure data is important. 
Accordingly, BSEE is now requiring the failure data to be submitted to 
BSEE in addition to the designated third party. Furthermore, BSEE is in 
discussions with the current designated third party to establish a 
monthly dashboard as well as additional tools that would enhance BSEE's 
ability to review data and to take additional action if necessary. 
These revisions will allow BSEE to continue to use BTS for monitoring 
failure analysis and trend data while also facilitating BSEE's access 
to and timely review of the relevant failure data for the purposes 
discussed in the prior response.
    Summary of Comments on paragraph (c)(2)--Timeframe to Start a 
Failure Analysis:
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed concerns about 
shortening the timeframe for starting the failure analysis due to the 
time it takes to transport the equipment from remote offshore locations 
to various onshore equipment manufacturers' locations. The commenters 
recommended that BSEE keep the timeframe as in the existing 
regulations.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the recommendation to keep the 
timeframe in the existing regulations. BSEE understands the need to 
allow for transportation of the equipment, but experience indicates 
that 90 days is enough time to ensure proper transport, if necessary, 
under most circumstances, as discussed in the proposed rule. The 
regulations allow for BSEE approval of alternate procedures if 
necessary and justified under the regulatory standards.
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed concerns that 
BSEE did not provide adequate justification to support the change of 
the failure analysis paradigm from the 2016 WCR to the 2019 WCR and 
that shortening the timeframe in this rule is still inadequate. The 
commenters suggested that the timeframe should revert to the 2016 WCR 
standard of 120 days to start and complete the failure analysis.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenters' request to revert to 
the 2016 WCR timeframe and is finalizing the timeframe as proposed. The 
commenters did not proffer new data that would call into question the 
justifications provided for the changes made in the 2019 WCR, including 
the operational safety and practical issues implicated by the prior 
timelines. As discussed in the proposed rule, based in part on 
experience gathered through implementation of the 2019 WCR, the 
selected timeframe allows for sufficient time to commence the analysis 
without jeopardizing safety or compromising investigation resources, 
while acknowledging that certain timeframes established in the 2016 WCR 
were inconsistent with some operational realities.
    Summary of comments: A commenter expressed concerns that, in 
certain circumstances, operations are allowed to continue during an 
investigation. The commenter requested that BSEE provide a list of 
planned exemptions and rationale for each exemption and expressed 
concern with using a BOP with known failures.
    Response: Other BSEE regulations specify the required actions to be 
taken when there are certain failures, including suspending operations 
as appropriate (e.g., Sec.  250.738), and establish the substantive 
requirements for BOP capabilities during operations (e.g., Sec. Sec.  
250.730, 250.733, 250.734). Paragraph (c)(2) refers to the failure 
investigation and reporting requirements, not the equipment operational 
or functional requirements. Regulatory revisions are not required to 
address this concern.
What are the independent third party requirements for BOP systems and 
system components? (Sec.  250.732)
    This section of the existing regulations describes the required 
qualifications of an independent third party. It also identifies the 
circumstances in which an operator must use an independent third party 
to satisfy certification, verification, or reporting requirements.
    Summary of proposed revisions to paragraph (b):
    BSEE proposed to revise paragraph (b) by adding that an independent 
third party must be accredited by a qualified standards development 
organization and that BSEE may review the independent third party 
accreditation and qualifications to ensure that it has sufficient 
capabilities to perform the required functions.
    Summary of final rule revisions to paragraph (b):

[[Page 57341]]

    Based on comments received, BSEE is not finalizing the proposed 
revision to paragraph (b) that would have stated that the independent 
third party must be accredited by a qualified standards development 
organization (SDO). BSEE will instead require the operator to submit 
the independent third party's qualifications to BSEE with the 
associated permit application. This final rule will also add 
clarification that BSEE will evaluate the submitted qualifications to 
ensure they meet the regulatory requirements for permit approval. This 
revision will ensure that BSEE receives the third party qualifications 
and has the ability to evaluate the qualifications in connection with 
the permit review and approval process. This revision will also provide 
BSEE with an additional tool to increase oversight of the independent 
third party qualifications and ensure properly qualified entities 
perform the required verifications and certifications.
    Summary of Comments:
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed concerns that it 
was unclear who or what SDO would provide the proposed accreditation, 
and that no accreditation process currently exists to satisfy the 
proposed requirement. The commenters asserted that the regulatory 
framework has successfully incorporated use of independent third 
parties for many years and that the proposed accreditation requirements 
would disrupt those established systems without contributing materially 
to independent third party accountability. These commenters suggested 
keeping the existing regulations unchanged.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenters' suggestion to keep 
the existing requirements unchanged, which would not achieve the 
desired improvement for BSEE's oversight of the independent third party 
qualifications. BSEE does agree in part with the commenters' assertion 
that the proposed SDO process and the expectations for the 
accreditation of the independent third parties through that process 
were unclear. BSEE understands that there are many SDOs that provide 
many different types of accreditations. BSEE also understands that 
there is no regulated entity in a position to provide consistency with 
an accreditation process under these circumstances. Therefore, BSEE is 
not finalizing the proposed requirement for SDO accreditation and is 
instead requiring operators to submit the independent third party's 
qualifications directly to BSEE with the associated permit application. 
In considering whether to approve the permit application, BSEE will 
evaluate whether the identified qualifications satisfy the regulatory 
requirement to use an independent third party with the mandated 
credentials and ``capable of providing the required certifications and 
verifications.'' This will achieve the appropriate enhancement of 
oversight for the qualifications of independent third parties providing 
the required verifications, while avoiding the ambiguity and 
uncertainty surrounding the proposed SDO accreditation requirement.
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters suggested that BSEE should 
restore the BSEE approved verification organizations (BAVO) process 
established in the 2016 WCR.
    Response: BSEE disagrees that the BAVO process is necessary. As 
discussed, BSEE is taking alternative steps to review and ensure 
independent third party qualifications to perform the necessary 
verification functions by requiring submission of their qualification 
for review with the associated permit application (e.g., Application 
for Permit to Drill (APD) and Application for Permit to Modify (APM)). 
These qualifications would be fully considered as part of the permit 
review and associated permit approval process. BSEE would identify any 
gaps in the potential qualifications of the independent third parties 
and address any issues related to adequate oversight. This is similar 
to the functions BSEE anticipated performing through its BAVO approval 
process. The Department does not perceive meaningful gains in 
accountability or vetting from implementing the additional layer of 
administrative certification of the former BAVO framework, which never 
went into effect and was replaced based on BSEE's positive experiences 
interacting and attending inspections and testing with independent 
third parties in its stead.
    Summary of comments: A commenter asserted that BSEE should take a 
larger role in oversight of the independent third party qualifications 
and should require review of the qualifications in the regulations.
    Response: BSEE agrees with the commenter and is requiring in this 
final rule the submission of the independent third party's 
qualifications with the associated permit application (e.g., APD and 
APM). BSEE will fully review these qualifications during the permit 
review and associated permit approval process to ensure that the 
regulatory requirement to use independent third parties with the 
identified credentials and necessary capabilities has been met. BSEE 
will use those reviews to identify any gaps in the potential 
qualifications and address any issues related to the validity or 
reliability of the associated verifications. If BSEE determines that 
the submitted third party qualifications do not meet the regulatory 
requirements, then BSEE would not approve the associated permit 
application.
    Summary of comments: A commenter disagreed with the third party 
review concept and suggested that BSEE use an auditing process similar 
to that applied in the Safety and Environmental Management Systems 
Program. The commenter also suggested that BSEE study the effects of 
accreditation and third party review.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the suggested use of an auditing 
process to review the third party qualifications or in lieu of using 
independent third parties. Similar to the issues identified above 
regarding the proposed imposition of an SDO accreditation requirement, 
BSEE is not aware of existing organizations or systems with the 
frameworks currently in place to implement an audit process that would 
adequately replace the important functions currently served by 
independent third party verifications and certifications or that would 
be materially superior to the enhanced BSEE oversight of those 
functions facilitated by this final rule. BSEE will continue to 
evaluate the appropriateness of an auditing process for future 
potential rulemaking.
What are the requirements for a surface BOP stack? (Sec.  250.733)
    This section of the existing regulations describes the capability, 
type, and number of BOPs required when an operator uses a surface BOP 
stack for drilling or for conducting operations.
    This section also describes the requirements for the risers and BOP 
stack when a surface BOP is used on a floating production facility.
    Summary of proposed rule revisions to paragraph (b)(1):
    BSEE proposed to revise paragraph (b)(1) by adding that an operator 
must also follow the BOP requirements of Sec.  250.734(a)(1) when 
replacing an entire surface BOP stack on an existing floating 
production facility. That provision requires dual shear rams for 
applicable BOP stacks.
    Summary of final rule revisions:
    BSEE received and considered comments on the proposed revisions and 
includes the proposed revisions in the final rule without change.
    Summary of Comments:

[[Page 57342]]

    Summary of comments: A commenter asserted that consideration should 
be given to the extent to which this revision might create a 
disincentive for replacing old BOP stacks.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the assertion that the provision 
might create a disincentive for replacing old BOP stacks. BSEE is aware 
of every facility and BOP stack that does not have dual shear rams and 
the potential constraints on a complete BOP stack replacement. If a BOP 
stack reaches the point of needing immediate replacement, the operator 
would not realistically have the option to neglect that action to avoid 
meeting the dual shear ram requirements. If a stack needs to be 
entirely replaced, the operator would likely have no choice but to 
replace the BOP stack to remain in compliance with the general 
regulatory requirements of part 250, subpart G. BSEE has identified 
only seven facilities potentially implicated by this provision and will 
work with the operators on a case-by-case basis to ensure appropriate 
action is taken without creating a disincentive to make the upgrades.
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed concerns that 
the proposed rule is unclear and could require significant (and perhaps 
infeasible) modifications to be made to existing facilities on the OCS, 
and that this rulemaking does not fully account for these impacts. The 
commenters suggested that BSEE engage with industry to determine how to 
achieve the intent of the proposed provision and then repropose a 
modified provision in a later rulemaking. The commenters suggested that 
BSEE should keep the existing regulations unchanged.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenters' suggestion to keep 
the existing regulations unchanged. BSEE is working to ensure that all 
BOPs have dual shear rams. However, BSEE recognizes that the existing 
facilities without the dual shear rams must complete the upgrades at an 
appropriate time. BSEE is aware of every facility and BOP stack that 
does not have dual shear rams and the potential constraints on a 
complete BOP stack replacement. If there is an immediate need to 
replace the entire BOP stack, beyond routine maintenance, those 
circumstances are serious enough to warrant the upgrade of the BOP 
stack to meet the dual shear ram requirements. BSEE has identified only 
seven facilities potentially implicated by this provision and will work 
with the operators on a case-by-case basis to ensure appropriate action 
is taken without creating unnecessary and potentially hazardous 
modifications to the associated facility to ensure regulatory 
compliance.
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed support for 
requiring dual shear rams to be installed whenever the BOP stack is 
replaced, not merely on new facilities.
    Response: BSEE agrees with these commenters in part and is 
finalizing the proposed provisions to require that certain facilities 
upgrade their BOP stacks to include dual shear rams at an appropriate 
time.
    Summary of comments: A commenter asserted that all existing 
facilities should have dual shear rams and opined on the importance of 
redundancy.
    Response: BSEE generally agrees and is working to ensure that all 
BOPs have dual shear rams, within operational, practical, and safety 
constraints. The provisions of the final rule advance those efforts.
    Summary of comments: A commenter expressed concerns that the 
financial impact is grossly underestimated, as requiring operators to 
raise the substructure of existing platform rigs to accommodate a 
taller BOP system after adding another BOP cavity would result in 
massive structural impacts. The commenter asserts this could have the 
effect of rendering some leases and projects uneconomic.
    Response: BSEE disagrees with the commenter that it has 
underestimated the economic impacts of this provision. BSEE has 
identified only seven existing facilities using BOP stacks that would 
potentially be subject to the requirements of this revision, most of 
which are located in depleted fields and only one of which is projected 
to replace its entire BOP stack over the next ten years. If an operator 
of such a facility has determined an immediate need to replace the 
entire BOP stack, beyond routine maintenance, those circumstances are 
serious enough that the operation would be necessary for the operator 
to comply with the general regulatory requirements of part 250, subpart 
G. Irrespective of this change, replacement of an entire BOP stack 
would entail rig downtime and require such facilities to take a number 
of actions to accommodate the new BOP stack, i.e., such replacement 
would be an appropriate time to accommodate the dual shear rams. 
Furthermore, potential facility modifications can be conducted 
simultaneously with anticipated rig down time for replacement of the 
entire BOP stack to help minimize overall rig down time. BSEE 
anticipates that any facility modifications and burdens associated with 
that replacement would be incurred because of the otherwise-required 
stack replacement itself, and that this particular element of that 
substantial undertaking is unlikely to contribute significantly to the 
overall costs. See the accompanying Regulatory Impact Analysis for more 
detailed discussion of estimated costs. BSEE is not requiring all 
remaining surface BOP stacks to be immediately upgraded and is allowing 
completion of the upgrades at an appropriate time when other facility 
modifications would be necessary. BSEE will work with the operators on 
a case-by-case basis to ensure that they take appropriate actions for 
regulatory compliance without creating unnecessary and potentially 
hazardous modifications to the associated facility.
What are the requirements for a subsea BOP system? (Sec.  250.734)
    This section of the existing regulations identifies the 
requirements for a subsea BOP system used for drilling or conducting 
operations. The section describes the requirements for subsea BOP 
system capabilities, as well as the functionality, type, and quantity 
of required equipment (e.g., BOPs, pod control systems, accumulator 
capacity, ROVs, autoshear and deadman, acoustic control system, and 
management and operating protocols).
    Summary of proposed rule revisions to paragraph (a)(4):
    BSEE proposed to revise paragraph (a)(4) by adding that the 
operator must have the ROV intervention capability to both open and 
close each shear ram, ram locks, and one pipe ram. (Current regulations 
require only closure capability.)
    Summary of final rule revisions:
    BSEE received comments in general support of the proposed revisions 
to this section and is including the proposed language in the final 
rule without change. However, based on comments, BSEE is also adding a 
deferred compliance date--one year after publication of the final 
rule--to allow operators to make the required equipment modifications.
    Summary of Comments:
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed support for the 
proposal to require the ROV intervention capability to both open and 
close certain components. However, multiple commenters also requested a 
one-year deferred compliance date to allow sufficient time to make the 
required modifications to the existing equipment and ensure compliance 
with the regulations.
    Response: BSEE agrees with the commenters' request to allow a one-
year deferred compliance date in order to allow sufficient time for 
operators to

[[Page 57343]]

make the necessary equipment modifications to comply with this 
provision. This is a reasonable amount of time for executing the 
modifications to the impacted subsea BOP systems that currently lack 
these functionalities, which must be removed from subsea service at a 
safe operational time and undergo necessary equipment modifications 
before being returned to subsea service. One year is a reasonable 
period of time for responsibly accomplishing these steps, particularly 
given that the critical function of ram closure will continue to be 
required in the interim. BSEE does not want to inadvertently increase 
the risk during any of the ongoing BOP operations and the one-year 
deferred compliance date allows enough time for the operators to 
conduct the necessary equipment modifications during routine 
maintenance and other opportunities when the well is placed in a safe 
condition.
What are the BOP system testing requirements? (Sec.  250.737)
    This section of the existing regulations details the pressure test 
frequency, procedures, and duration for BOP systems. This section also 
contains additional testing requirements, including compliance with API 
Standard 53, and specifies documentation required for certain BOP 
testing.
    Summary of proposed rule revisions to paragraphs (d)(2)(ii) and 
(d)(3)(iii):
    BSEE proposed to revise paragraphs (d)(2)(ii) and (d)(3)(iii) by 
adding the requirement that, if a BSEE representative is unable to 
witness the testing, the operator must provide the initial test results 
to the appropriate District Manager within 72 hours after completion of 
the tests.
    Summary of final rule revisions:
    BSEE received comments in general support of the proposed revisions 
to this section and is including the proposed language in the final 
rule without change.
    Summary of Comments:
    Summary of comments: Multiple commenters expressed support for the 
proposed return to the 2016 WCR requirement that, if BSEE is unable to 
witness testing, the operator must provide initial test results within 
72 hours.
    Response: BSEE agrees with the commenters' support for these 
provisions and is including the proposed language in the final rule 
without change.

V. Procedural Matters

Regulatory Planning and Review (Executive Orders (E.O.) 12866 and 
13563)

    E.O. 12866 provides that the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will review 
all significant rules. To determine if this rulemaking is a significant 
rule, a BSEE contractor prepared an economic analysis that assessed the 
anticipated costs and potential benefits of the rulemaking. The 
following discussion summarizes the economic analysis; a complete copy 
of the economic analysis can be viewed at www.Regulations.gov (use the 
keyword/ID ``BSEE-2022-0009'').
    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several types of 
economic analyses. First, E.O.s 12866, 14094, and 13563 direct agencies 
to assess the costs and benefits of regulatory alternatives and, if 
regulation is necessary, to select a regulatory approach that maximizes 
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public 
health, and safety effects; distributive impacts; and equity), unless a 
statute requires another regulatory approach. Under E.O.s 12866 and 
14094, an agency must determine whether a regulatory action is 
significant and, therefore, subject to review by OMB. Section 3(f) of 
E.O. 12866, as amended by E.O. 14094, defines a ``significant 
regulatory action'' as any regulatory action that is likely to result 
in a rule that:

--Has an annual effect on the economy of $200 million or more, or 
adversely affects in a material way the economy, a sector of the 
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public 
health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities 
(also referred to as ``economically significant'');
--Creates serious inconsistency or otherwise interferes with an action 
taken or planned by another agency;
--Materially alters the budgetary impacts of entitlement grants, user 
fees, loan programs, or the rights and obligations of recipients 
thereof; or
--Raises novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, 
the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in E.O. 12866.

    OIRA has determined that this final rule is not significant within 
the definition of E.O. 12866 because the estimated annual costs or 
benefits would not exceed $200 million in any year of the 10-year 
analysis period and the rule will not meet any of the other 
significance triggers. Accordingly, OMB has not reviewed this final 
rule.
(1) Need for Regulatory Action
    BSEE has identified a need to amend the existing well control 
regulations to ensure that oil and gas operations on the OCS are 
conducted in a safe and environmentally responsible manner. In 
particular, BSEE considers the rule necessary to reduce the likelihood 
of an oil or gas blowout, which can lead to the loss of life, serious 
injuries, and harm to the environment. As the Deepwater Horizon 
incident demonstrated, blowouts can result in catastrophic 
consequences.
    After the Deepwater Horizon incident in 2010, BSEE adopted several 
recommendations from multiple investigation teams to improve the safety 
of offshore operations. Subsequently, on April 29, 2016, BSEE published 
the 2016 Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control Final Rule (81 FR 
25888) (2016 WCR). The 2016 WCR consolidated the equipment and 
operational requirements for well control into one part of BSEE's 
regulations; enhanced BOP and well design requirements; modified well-
control requirements; and incorporated certain industry technical 
standards. Most of the 2016 WCR provisions became effective on July 28, 
2016.
    Although the 2016 WCR addressed a significant number of issues that 
were identified during the analyses of the Deepwater Horizon incident, 
BSEE recognized that BOP equipment and systems continue to improve and 
that well control processes also evolve. Therefore, after the 2016 WCR 
took effect, BSEE continued to engage with the offshore oil and gas 
industry, Standards Development Organizations (SDOs), and other 
stakeholders. During these engagements, BSEE identified issues, and 
stakeholders expressed a variety of concerns regarding the 
implementation of the 2016 WCR. BSEE completed a review of the 2016 WCR 
and, on May 15, 2019, published the 2019 WCR in the Federal Register 
(84 FR 21908). The 2019 WCR left most of the 2016 WCR unchanged.
    Following publication of the 2019 WCR, BSEE continued to engage 
with stakeholders to gather information to ensure that industry was 
effectively implementing the governing regulatory requirements. On 
January 20, 2021, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13990 
(Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to 
Tackle the Climate Crisis). The accompanying ``President's Fact Sheet: 
List of Agency Actions for Review'' included the 2019 WCR on a list of 
rules the President instructed DOI to review for potential revisions to 
promote and

[[Page 57344]]

protect public health and the environment, among other policy goals 
identified in the E.O. This review confirmed that the 2019 WCR contains 
many provisions that help ensure that federally regulated outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas operations are conducted safely and 
in an environmentally responsible manner. Therefore, this final rule 
addresses only select provisions that, consistent with and as 
authorized by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), will 
further promote the objectives of E.O. 13990. At this time, BSEE is 
finalizing narrowly focused revisions to improve operations that use a 
BOP, certain BOP capabilities and functionalities, and BSEE oversight 
of such operations. The final rule will:
    (A) Clarify the general BOP system expectations,
    (B) Require failure notifications to be sent to BSEE and modify the 
timeframes for commencing a failure analysis,
    (C) Require submission of the independent third party 
qualifications with the associated permit application,
    (D) Establish dual shear ram requirements for surface BOPs on 
existing floating production facilities when an operator replaces an 
entire surface BOP stack,
    (E) Require ROV open functions for subsea BOPs, and
    (F) Require submittal of certain BOP test results if BSEE is unable 
to witness the testing.
(2) Alternatives
    BSEE has considered two regulatory alternatives:
    (A) Promulgate the requirements contained within the final rule.
    (B) Take no regulatory action and continue to rely on existing well 
control regulations in combination with permit conditions, deepwater 
operations plans (DWOPs), operator prudence, and industry standards.
    Alternative 1--the final rule--would incorporate recommendations 
provided by government, industry, academia, and other stakeholders. In 
addition to addressing concerns and aligning with industry standards, 
this final rule would prudently improve efficiency and consistency of 
the regulations.
(3) Economic Analysis
    BSEE's economic analysis evaluated the expected impacts of the 
final rule compared with the baseline. The baseline refers to current 
industry practice in accordance with existing regulations, industry 
permits, DWOPs, and industry standards with which operators already 
comply. Impacts that exist as part of the baseline were not considered 
costs or benefits of the final rule. Thus, the cost analysis evaluates 
only activities, expenditures, and capital investments representing a 
change from the baseline that would result when the rule is finalized. 
BSEE quantified and monetized the costs, in year 2022 dollars, of all 
the provisions in the final rule determined to result in a change 
compared to the baseline. These estimated compliance costs are 
discussed more specifically in the associated final regulatory impact 
analysis, which can be viewed at www.regulations.gov (use the keyword/
ID ``BSEE-2022-0009'').
    BSEE qualitatively assessed the benefits of the final rule. The 
rulemaking will allow BSEE to address stakeholder concerns related to 
the BOP and well control provisions in 30 CFR part 250 and provide 
clarification about regulations in this section. The amendments will 
have a positive net impact on worker safety and the environment. The 
benefits include clarification, more timely review of data to 
facilitate faster response to systemic risks, increased accountability 
of verification entities to ensure that risks are accurately assessed 
and verified, improved protection from a blowout, improved ability to 
manage a blowout, and the assurance that BSEE receives and is able to 
review BOP testing data to help identify risks.
    BSEE's economic analysis covers 10 years (2023 through 2032) to 
ensure it encompasses any significant costs and benefits likely to 
result from this final rule. A 10-year period was used for this 
analysis because of the uncertainty associated with predicting 
industry's activities and the advancement of technical capabilities 
beyond 10 years. It is very difficult to predict, plan, or project 
costs associated with technological innovation due to unknown 
technological or business constraints that could drive a product into 
mainstream adoption or into obsolescence. The regulated community 
itself has difficulty conducting business modeling beyond a 10-year 
time frame. Over time, the costs associated with a particular new 
technology may drop because of various supply and demand factors, 
causing the technology to be more broadly adopted. In other cases, an 
existing technology may be replaced by a lower-cost alternative as 
business needs may drive technological innovation. Extrapolating costs 
and benefits beyond this 10-year time frame would produce more 
speculative results and therefore be disadvantageous in determining 
actual costs and benefits likely to result from this final rule. BSEE 
concluded that this 10-year analysis period provides the best overall 
ability to forecast reliable costs and benefits likely to result from 
this final rule. When summarizing the costs and benefits, we present 
the estimated annual effects, as well as the 10-year discounted totals 
using discount rates of 3 and 7 percent, per OMB Circular A-4, 
``Regulatory Analysis.''
    Table 1 presents the total costs per year of the final rule. As 
seen in the table, the estimated costs over the ten-year period are 
$2.8 million undiscounted, $2.6 million discounted at 3%, and $2.4 
million discounted at 7%.

  Table 1--Total Costs Associated With Final Amendments to BOP and Well
                           Control Regulations
                                 [2022$]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Discounted   Discounted
              Year                Undiscounted     at 3%        at 7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023............................       $38,046      $38,046      $38,046
2024............................     1,898,190    1,842,903    1,774,009
2025............................        38,046       35,862       33,231
2026............................        38,046       34,817       31,057
2027............................       595,852      529,407      454,573
2028............................        38,046       32,819       27,126
2029............................        38,046       31,863       25,352
2030............................        38,046       30,935       23,693
2031............................        38,046       30,034       22,143
2032............................        38,046       29,159       20,694
                                 ---------------------------------------

[[Page 57345]]

 
    Total.......................     2,798,410    2,635,845    2,449,924
                                 ---------------------------------------
    Annualized..................       279,841      309,001      348,814
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Annualized costs are calculated by the annuity method.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, and the Congressional Review Act

    The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals 
Management, certifies that this final rule will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities as defined 
under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (RFA).
    The RFA, at 5 U.S.C. 603, requires agencies to prepare a regulatory 
flexibility analysis to determine whether a regulation would have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
Further, under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., an 
agency is required to produce compliance guidance for small entities if 
the rule would have a significant economic impact. For the reasons 
explained in this section, BSEE believes that this final rule likely 
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities. BSEE provides this Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis 
to demonstrate the relatively minor impact of this final rule on small 
entities and to support DOI's certification.

(1) Description of the Reasons That Action by the Agency Is Being 
Considered

    Following publication of the 2019 WCR, BSEE continued to engage 
with stakeholders to gather information to ensure that industry was 
effectively implementing the governing regulatory requirements. On 
January 20, 2021, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13990 
(Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to 
Tackle the Climate Crisis). The accompanying ``President's Fact Sheet: 
List of Agency Actions for Review'' included the 2019 WCR on a list of 
rules the President instructed DOI to review for potential revisions to 
promote and protect public health and the environment, among other 
policy goals identified in the E.O.

(2) Description and Estimated Number of Small Entities Regulated

    Small entities, as defined by the RFA, consist of small businesses, 
small organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions. 5 U.S.C. 
601(6). We have not identified any small organizations or small 
government jurisdictions that the rule would impact, so this analysis 
focuses on impacts to small businesses. A small business is one that is 
independently owned and operated and that is not dominant in its field 
of operation. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 601(3); 15 U.S.C. 632(a)(1). The 
definition of small business varies from industry to industry to 
properly reflect differing industry characteristics. 15 U.S.C. 
632(a)(3).
    The final rule will affect all well drilling operators and Federal 
oil and gas lease holders on the OCS, primarily those working in the 
Gulf of Mexico. BSEE's analysis shows that this will include 48 
companies that drilled at least one offshore well during the period 
2015 to 2021. Of these drilling operators, approximately 20 are likely 
to be active in each given year. Entities that will operate under the 
final rule are classified primarily under North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) codes 211120 (Crude Petroleum 
Extraction), 211130 (Natural Gas Extraction), and 213111 (Drilling Oil 
and Gas Wells). For NAICS classifications 211120 and 211130, the Small 
Business Administration defines a small business as one with fewer than 
1,251 employees; the rest are considered large businesses (the 
threshold for 213111 is lower, and thus less inclusive). BSEE estimates 
that approximately 83 percent of offshore operators drilling on the OCS 
are small under this standard.

(3) Description and Estimate of Compliance Requirements

    BSEE has estimated the incremental costs for small operators and 
lease holders in the offshore oil and natural gas production industry. 
BSEE did not consider costs already incurred as a result of current 
industry practice in accordance with existing regulations, industry 
permits, DWOPs, and API industry standards with which operators already 
comply because they are part of the baseline.
    Three provisions of the final rule will have cost impacts on a 
substantial number of small businesses. For the amendments to Sec.  
250.730(c), BSEE estimates that the annual cost of adding an additional 
recipient to failure notification submissions is $101 per company. For 
the amendments to Sec.  250.732(b), BSEE estimates that the annual cost 
of adding independent third-party qualifications to associated permit 
application (e.g., APDs and APMs) is $682 per company. For the new 
requirements under Sec.  250.737(d)(2)(ii) and (d)(3)(iii) to submit 
BOP testing data to BSEE when it does not witness the testing, BSEE 
estimates that the annual cost per company to comply with these 
requirements will be $58.03. The combined cost of these provisions 
constitutes less than 1 percent of revenues for the smallest operators 
and therefore is not a significant economic impact.

(4) Identification of All Relevant Federal Rules That May Duplicate, 
Overlap, or Conflict With the Final Rule

    The final rule will not conflict with any relevant Federal rules or 
duplicate or overlap with any Federal rules in any way that will 
unnecessarily add cumulative regulatory burdens on small entities 
without any gain in regulatory benefits.

(5) Description of Significant Alternatives to the Final Rule

    BSEE has considered two regulatory alternatives:
    (A) Promulgate the requirements contained within the final rule.
    (B) Take no regulatory action and continue to rely on existing well 
control regulations in combination with permit conditions, DWOPs, 
operator prudence, and industry standards.
    Alternative 1--the final rule--would incorporate recommendations 
provided by government, industry, academia, and

[[Page 57346]]

other stakeholders. In addition to addressing concerns and aligning 
with industry standards, this final rule will prudently improve 
efficiency and consistency of the regulations.
    The potential costs to small entities are believed to be small; 
however, the risk of safety or environmental accidents for small 
companies is not necessarily lower than it is for larger companies. 
Offshore operations are highly technical and can be hazardous. Adverse 
consequences in the event of incidents are similar regardless of the 
operator's size. The final rule will reduce risk for entities of all 
sizes.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    This final rule will not impose an unfunded mandate on State, 
local, or Tribal governments or the private sector of more than $189 
million per year. The final rule will not have a significant or unique 
effect on State, local, or Tribal governments or the private sector. A 
statement containing the information required by Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act (2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.) is not required.

Takings Implication Assessment (E.O. 12630)

    Under the criteria in E.O. 12630, this final rule does not have 
significant takings implications. The rule is not a governmental action 
capable of interference with constitutionally protected property 
rights. A Takings Implication Assessment is not required.

Federalism (E.O. 13132)

    Under the criteria in E.O. 13132, this final rule does not have 
federalism implications. This final rule does not substantially and 
directly affect the relationship between the Federal and State 
governments. To the extent that State and local governments have a role 
in OCS activities, this final rule does not affect that role. A 
federalism assessment is not required.

Civil Justice Reform (E.O. 12988)

    This final rule complies with the requirements of E.O. 12988. 
Specifically, this rule:
    (1) Meets the criteria of section 3(a) requiring that all 
regulations be reviewed to eliminate errors and ambiguity and be 
written to minimize litigation; and
    (2) Meets the criteria of section 3(b)(2) requiring that all 
regulations be written in clear language and contain clear legal 
standards.

Consultation With Indian Tribes (E.O. 13175)

    BSEE strives to strengthen its government-to-government 
relationships with Tribal Nations and Alaska Natives through a 
commitment to consultation with the Tribes and recognition of their 
right to self-governance and Tribal sovereignty. We are also respectful 
of our responsibilities for consultation with Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA) Corporations. BSEE evaluated the subject matter 
of this rulemaking under the criteria in E.O. 13175, Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments (dated November 6, 2000), 
DOI's Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes and Policy on 
Consultation with Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Corporations (512 
Departmental Manual 4, dated November 30, 2022 and 512 Departmental 
Manual 6, dated November 30, 2022, respectively), and DOI's Procedures 
for Consultation with Indian Tribes and Procedures for Consultation 
with Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Corporations (512 Departmental 
Manual 5, dated November 30, 2022, and 512 Departmental Manual 7, dated 
November 30, 2022, respectively) and determined that it has no 
substantial direct effects on Tribal Nations or Alaska Natives. 
Therefore, consultation under E.O. 13175 and DOI's Procedures for 
Consultation with Tribal Nations and ANCSA Corporations is not 
required.

Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995

    This final rule does not contain any new collection of information 
that requires approval by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). OMB 
has previously approved the information collection requirements 
associated with 30 CFR part 250, subpart G, Well Operations and 
Equipment, and assigned OMB Control Number 1014-0028. That approval is 
currently with OMB under the renewal process, and in accordance with 5 
CFR 1320.10, an agency may continue to conduct or sponsor this 
collection of information while the submission is pending at OMB. The 
currently approved annual burden associated with this information 
collection is 160,842 hours. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and 
a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information 
unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.
    During the proposed rule stage, BSEE suggested changing the 
requirements in subpart G, Well Operations and Equipment, by revising 
regulatory provisions published in the 2019 WCR for drilling, workover, 
completion, and decommissioning operations. These changes provide 
clarity to BOP system requirements and revise a few specific BOP 
equipment capabilities. These proposed changes were estimated to add 10 
burden hours to the 1014-0028 collection.
    The following provides a breakdown of the paperwork hour burdens 
and non-hour cost burdens for this final rule.
    Section 250.730--This section will add text requiring that BSEE and 
the designated third party receive failure reports. This will result in 
no burden changes in the currently approved failure reporting burden 
because adding BSEE to already-required transmissions to third parties 
would impose minimal to no additional burden.
    Section 250.732(b)--This section will add to the current paragraph 
that the independent third party qualifications must be sent to BSEE 
with the associated permit application (hour burden and any associated 
fees are covered under 1014-0025 or 1014-0026); furthermore, there are 
no changes in hour burden. Any anticipated burdens are miniscule and 
won't add any additional burdens to the permitting process.
    Section 250.737(d)(2) and (3)--This section will add the 
requirement that if BSEE is unable to witness BOP testing, the operator 
must provide the initial test results to the appropriate District 
Manager within 72 hours after completion of the tests. The 2019 WCR 
provisions removed this requirement from the regulations. Yet, BSEE 
inadvertently never removed the IC burden associated with this 
requirement; therefore, no burden changes are needed.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)

    BSEE analyzed the provisions of the rule in compliance with the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et 
seq.) to determine whether they could have a significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment. The DOI implementing regulations for 
NEPA encourage the use of existing NEPA analyses when a bureau 
determines those analyses ``adequately assess[ ] the environmental 
effects of the proposed action and reasonable alternatives,'' and the 
supporting record for that determination evaluates ``whether new 
circumstances, new information[,] or

[[Page 57347]]

changes in the action or its impacts not previously analyzed may result 
in significantly different environmental effects.'' (43 CFR 46.120)
    BSEE prepared Environmental Assessments (EAs) for both the 2016 WCR 
and the 2019 WCR. Those EAs analyzed the environmental effects of 
regulatory revisions the same as or similar to those contained in this 
final rule, because the majority of this rule reverts to the regulatory 
standards established in the 2016 WCR (and revised through the 2019 
WCR). Both EAs resulted in a Finding of No Significant Impact. BSEE 
evaluated this rulemaking through a Determination of NEPA Adequacy 
(DNA) and found that the previous EAs adequately assessed the 
environmental effects of the potentially impact-producing portions of 
this rulemaking and that no new circumstances, new information, or 
changes in the action or its impacts exist that could result in 
significantly different environmental effects than those analyzed in 
the previous EAs. The balance of the changes in the final rule are 
purely administrative in nature with no potential for environmental 
impacts. Consequently, no additional NEPA analysis is required.

Data Quality Act

    In developing this rule, we did not conduct or use a study, 
experiment, or survey requiring peer review under the Data Quality Act 
(Pub. L. 106-554, app. C, sec. 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-154).

Effects on the Nation's Energy Supply (E.O. 13211)

    This rule is not a significant energy action under the definition 
in E.O. 13211. The rule is not a significant regulatory action under 
E.O. 12866, as amended by Executive Order 14094, and it is not likely 
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or 
use of energy. A Statement of Energy Effects is not required.

List of Subjects in 30 CFR Part 250

    Administrative practice and procedure, Continental shelf, 
Environmental impact statements, Environmental protection, Government 
contracts, Incorporation by reference, Investigations, Oil and gas 
exploration, Outer Continental Shelf--mineral resources, Outer 
Continental Shelf--rights-of-way, Penalties, Pipelines, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Sulfur.

Laura Daniel-Davis,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Land and Minerals Management.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Department of the 
Interior amends 30 CFR part 250 as follows:

PART 250--OIL AND GAS AND SULFUR OPERATIONS IN THE OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF

0
1. The authority citation for part 250 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 30 U.S.C. 1751, 31 U.S.C. 9701, 33 U.S.C. 
1321(j)(1)(C), 43 U.S.C. 1334.


0
2. Amend Sec.  250.730 by revising paragraphs (a) introductory text and 
(c) to read as follows:


Sec.  250.730  What are the general requirements for BOP systems and 
system components?

    (a) You must ensure that the BOP system and system components are 
designed, installed, maintained, inspected, tested, and used properly 
to ensure well control. The working-pressure rating of each BOP 
component (excluding annular(s)) must exceed MASP as defined for the 
operation. For a subsea BOP, the MASP must be determined at the 
mudline. The BOP system includes the BOP stack, control system, and any 
other associated system(s) and equipment. The BOP system and individual 
components must be able to perform their expected functions and be 
compatible with each other. Your BOP system must be capable of closing 
and sealing the wellbore to the well's MASP at all times, except as 
otherwise specified in the BOP system requirements of this subpart. The 
BOP system must be capable of closing and sealing without losing ram 
closure time and sealing integrity due to the corrosiveness, volume, 
and abrasiveness of any fluids in the wellbore that the BOP system may 
encounter. Your BOP system must meet the following requirements:
* * * * *
    (c) You must follow the failure reporting procedures contained in 
API Standard 53 (incorporated by reference in Sec.  250.198) and:
    (1) You must provide a written notice of equipment failure to the 
Office of Offshore Regulatory Programs (OORP) Chief, any third party 
designated by BSEE pursuant to paragraph (c)(4) of this section, and 
the manufacturer of such equipment within 30 days after the discovery 
and identification of the failure. A failure is any condition that 
prevents the equipment from meeting the functional specification.
    (2) You must start an investigation and a failure analysis within 
90 days of the failure to determine the cause of the failure and 
complete the investigation and the failure analysis within 120 days 
after initiation. You also must document the results and any corrective 
action. You must submit the analysis report to the OORP Chief, any 
third party designated by BSEE pursuant to paragraph (c)(4) of this 
section, and the manufacturer. If you cannot complete the investigation 
and analysis within the specified time, you must submit an extension 
request detailing when and how you will complete the investigation and 
analysis to BSEE for approval. You must submit the extension request to 
the OORP Chief.
    (3) If the equipment manufacturer notifies you that it has changed 
the design of the equipment that failed or if you have changed 
operating or repair procedures as a result of a failure, then you must, 
within 30 days of such changes, report the design change or modified 
procedures in writing to the OORP Chief, and any third party designated 
by BSEE pursuant to paragraph (c)(4) of this section.
    (4) Submit notices and reports to the Chief, Office of Offshore 
Regulatory Programs; Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement; 
45600 Woodland Road, Sterling, Virginia 20166. BSEE may designate a 
third party to also receive the data and reports. If BSEE designates a 
third party, you must submit the data and reports to the designated 
third party as well.
* * * * *

0
3. Amend Sec.  250.732 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  250.732  What are the independent third party requirements for 
BOP systems and system components?

* * * * *
    (b) The independent third party must be a technical classification 
society, a licensed professional engineering firm, or a registered 
professional engineer capable of providing the required certifications 
and verifications. You must submit the independent third party 
qualifications to BSEE with the associated permit application (e.g., 
APD and APM). BSEE will evaluate the submitted qualifications to ensure 
they meet the regulatory requirements for permit approval.
* * * * *

0
4. Amend Sec.  250.733 by revising paragraph (b)(1) to read as follows:

[[Page 57348]]

Sec.  250.733  What are the requirements for a surface BOP stack?

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (1) On new floating production facilities installed after April 29, 
2021, that include a surface BOP, or when you replace an entire surface 
BOP stack on an existing floating production facility, follow the BOP 
requirements in Sec.  250.734(a)(1).
* * * * *

0
5. Amend Sec.  250.734 by revising paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  250.734  What are the requirements for a subsea BOP system?

    (a) * * *

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 When operating with a subsea BOP
         system, you must:                 Additional requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                              * * * * * * *
(4) Have a subsea BOP stack         You must have the ROV intervention
 equipped with remotely operated     capability to open and close each
 vehicle (ROV) intervention          shear ram, ram locks, one pipe ram,
 capability.                         and disconnect the lower marine
                                     riser package (LMRP) under MASP
                                     conditions as defined for the
                                     operation. You must be capable of
                                     performing these functions in the
                                     response times outlined in API
                                     Standard 53 (as incorporated by
                                     reference in Sec.   250.198). The
                                     ROV panels on the BOP and LMRP must
                                     be compliant with API RP 17H (as
                                     incorporated by reference in Sec.
                                     250.198).
 
                              * * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *

0
6. Amend Sec.  250.737 by revising paragraphs (d)(2)(ii) and 
(d)(3)(iii) to read as follows:


Sec.  250.737  What are the BOP system testing requirements?

* * * * *
    (d) * * *

------------------------------------------------------------------------
          You must . . .                Additional requirements . . .
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                              * * * * * * *
(2) * * *.........................  (ii) Contact the District Manager at
                                     least 72 hours prior to beginning
                                     the initial test to allow BSEE
                                     representative(s) to witness the
                                     testing. If BSEE representative(s)
                                     are unable to witness the testing,
                                     you must provide the initial test
                                     results to the appropriate District
                                     Manager within 72 hours after
                                     completion of the tests.
 
                              * * * * * * *
(3) * * *.........................  (iii) Contact the District Manager
                                     at least 72 hours prior to
                                     beginning the stump test to allow
                                     BSEE representative(s) to witness
                                     the testing. If BSEE
                                     representative(s) are unable to
                                     witness the testing, you must
                                     provide the test results to the
                                     appropriate District Manager within
                                     72 hours after completion of the
                                     tests.
 
                              * * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2023-17847 Filed 8-22-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-VH-P