[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 160 (Monday, August 21, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 56756-56760]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-17774]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2022-1483; Project Identifier MCAI-2022-00435-T; 
Amendment 39-22522; AD 2023-16-03]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type 
Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership 
(CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-
1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report from the supplier of a 
manufacturing quality escape in which some sensing elements were 
manufactured with insufficient salt fill. This could result in an 
inability to detect hot bleed air leaks. This AD requires, depending on 
airplane serial number, reviewing the airplane maintenance records for 
affected bleed leak detection system sensing elements, testing the 
sensing elements, replacing those that fail, and witness marking those 
that pass, as specified in a Transport Canada AD, which is incorporated 
by reference. This AD also prohibits the installation of affected parts 
under certain conditions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the 
unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective September 25, 2023.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of September 25, 
2023.

ADDRESSES: 
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2022-1483; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 
docket contains this final rule, the mandatory continuing airworthiness 
information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The 
address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
    Material Incorporated by Reference:
     For Transport Canada material incorporated by reference in 
this AD, contact Transport Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft 
Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario K1A 0N5, Canada; 
telephone 888-663-3639; email [email protected] You may find this material on the 
Transport Canada website at tc.canada.ca/en/aviation.
     For Kidde Aerospace & Defense service information 
incorporated by reference in this AD, contact Kidde Aerospace & 
Defense, 4200 Airport Drive NW, Building B, Wilson, NC 27896; 
telephone: 319-295-5000; website: kiddetechnologies.com/aviation.com.
     You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness 
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des 
Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the 
FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available in the AD docket at 
regulations.gov under Docket No. MCAI-2022-00435-T.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Niczky, Aviation Safety 
Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; 
telephone: 516-228-7347; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus Canada 
Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. The 
NPRM published in the Federal Register on November 25, 2022 (87 FR 
72416). The NPRM was prompted by CF-2022-13, dated March 28, 2022, 
issued by Transport Canada, which is the aviation authority for Canada 
(Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13). The MCAI states that Airbus Canada 
Limited Partnership received disclosure letters from the supplier that 
reported a manufacturing quality escape in which some of the overheat 
detection sensing elements were manufactured with insufficient salt 
fill. These sensing elements are used by the bleed air leak detection 
system for temperature detection in the event of a hot bleed air leak. 
Insufficient salt fill can result in an inability to detect hot bleed 
air leaks, which can cause damage to surrounding structures and systems 
that could prevent continued safe flight and landing.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require, depending on airplane 
serial number, reviewing the airplane maintenance records for affected 
bleed leak detection system sensing elements, testing the sensing 
elements, replacing those that fail, and witness marking those that 
pass, as specified in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13. The NPRM also 
proposed to prohibit the installation of affected parts under certain 
conditions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition 
on these products.
    Since the NPRM was issued, Transport Canada revised AD CF-2022-13 
and issued Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1, dated April 18, 2023 
(Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1) (also referred to as the MCAI). 
Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 clarifies the definition of the 
affected part. Also, Airbus Canada Limited Partnership issued updated 
Service Bulletins BD500-362002 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, and 
BD500-362003 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023. These updated service 
bulletins removed redundant steps and corrected that only failed 
sensing elements and not a failed loop needs to be replaced.
    You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2022-1483.

Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive

Comments

    The FAA received comments from Air Line Pilots Association, 
International (ALPA), who supported the NPRM without change.
    The FAA received additional comments from Delta Air Lines (Delta). 
The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's 
response to each comment.

Request To Delay Final Rule

    Delta requested that the FAA delay the final rule until a revised 
Transport Canada AD is issued. Delta stated the current definition of 
an ``Affected Part'' in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 does not provide 
a clear and concise method for compliance for operators to comply with 
the proposed AD. Delta stated that it wants to review the new Transport 
Canada AD and submit comments on a new NPRM.
    The FAA agrees that the definition for ``Affected Part'' should be 
revised for

[[Page 56757]]

clarity. As stated previously, Transport Canada has revised Transport 
Canada AD CF-2022-13 to update the definition for ``Affected Part.'' 
The FAA has revised this AD to refer to Transport Canada AD CF-2022-
13R1. However, the FAA disagrees with the request to issue a 
supplemental NPRM. The FAA notes that the updated definition does not 
result in new requirements and therefore a supplemental NPRM is not 
necessary. In addition, the FAA has added paragraph (i) to this AD to 
provide credit for actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD, if 
those actions were performed before the effective date of this AD using 
Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13.

Request To Add Exception To Refer to Affected Parts

    Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of 
the proposed AD to specify that where paragraphs a. and b. of Part III. 
of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 specify to ``test the sensing 
elements,'' replace that text with ``test affected parts.'' Delta 
stated that the safety concern is only applicable to an ``Affected 
Part'' as identified in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 and not all 
sensing elements on an airplane. Delta explained that as currently 
written, Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 requires operators to test all 
sensing elements, regardless of if they are an ``affected part'' or 
not. Delta stated that specifying ``affected part'' will allow 
operators to initially inspect each sensing element, determine if it is 
an ``affected part'', and test (apply corrective actions) only those 
affected parts; thereby minimizing labor hours.
    The FAA agrees the language in paragraphs a. and b. of Part III of 
Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 should be revised to specify the 
``affected part'' as defined in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13. 
Transport Canada has updated paragraphs a. and b. of Part III of 
Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 to refer to the affected parts. As 
stated previously, this AD now refers to Transport Canada AD CF-2022-
13R1. Paragraphs a. and b. of Part III of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-
13R1 now narrow the scope to testing of only affected parts. Therefore, 
an exception to Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 is not needed in this 
AD.

Request To Add an Exception for Replacing Parts

    Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of 
the proposed AD to change the replacement parts. Delta stated that 
where Appendix A through Appendix J of Airbus Canada Limited 
Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 
2022; and Appendix A through Appendix C of Airbus Canada Limited 
Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated February 18, 
2022, specify ``remove and replace any failed loop,'' replace with 
``remove and replace any failed sensing element.'' Delta stated that, 
as written, the appendices specifies that if a sensing element fails, 
then the entire loop is to be removed and replaced under the Required 
for Compliance (RC) procedure. Delta stated Airbus Canada specified 
that more than one sensing element can be within a single loop and that 
only sensing elements that fail the test need to be replaced. Delta 
concluded that the recommended exception will provide more clarity on 
what parts need to be removed and replaced to address the safety 
concern.
    The FAA agrees that the affected parts are sensing elements and if 
a sensing element fails, only that sensing element must be replaced as 
specified in paragraphs a. and b. of Part III, Transport Canada AD CF-
2022-13R1. The FAA has added an exception in paragraph (h)(5) of this 
AD to state that where the appendixes of Issue 001 of the service 
information referenced in ``First SB'' and ``Second SB'' of Transport 
Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 specify steps to remove and replace any failed 
loop, this AD requires replacing only any failed sensing element. In 
addition, Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletins BD500-
362002 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, and BD500-362003 Issue 002, 
dated July 26, 2023, removed the statements ``remove and replace any 
failed loop'' and now specify only replacing a failed sensing element. 
As defined in ``First SB'' and ``Second SB'' of Transport Canada AD CF-
2022-13R1, later revisions of the service information are allowed for 
compliance, which includes Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service 
Bulletins BD500-362002 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, and BD500-362003 
Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023.

Request To Add Exception To Exclude Redundant Marking

    Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of 
the proposed AD to exclude redundant steps for adding ``witness 
marks.'' Delta listed multiple steps for adding ``witness marks'' 
within the parts in the procedures of Airbus Canada Limited Partnership 
Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022; and 
Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue 
001, dated February 18, 2022. Delta stated those steps are redundant to 
a step for adding ``witness marks'' in the appendixes of Airbus Canada 
Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated 
February 18, 2022; and Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service 
Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022. Delta stated 
that following completion of an appendix, the associated part procedure 
is done. Delta stated both steps cannot be deviated from because both 
are within the RC procedure section of the service information. Delta 
stated that Airbus Canada confirmed that the marking of sensing 
elements only needs to be done once.
    The FAA agrees that the steps for adding ``witness marks'' within 
the procedures parts in the Accomplishment Instructions are redundant 
with the steps in the appendices of Airbus Canada Limited Partnership 
Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022; and 
Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue 
001, dated February 18, 2022. The FAA agrees that redundant steps are 
not required to be performed. Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service 
Bulletins BD500-362002 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, and BD500-362003 
Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, removed the redundant marking steps 
from the appendices. The FAA has added an exception to paragraph (h)(6) 
of this AD to clarify that adding ``witness marks'' is only done once 
when using Issue 001 of the service information referenced in ``First 
SB'' and ``Second SB'' of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1. Paragraph 
(h)(6) of this AD also clarifies that replacing an affected part if a 
test is unsatisfactory is only done once, which addresses the following 
comment about additional redundant steps.

Request To Add Exception To Exclude Redundant Replacements

    Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of 
the proposed AD to exclude redundant replacement steps. Delta listed 
multiple steps to remove the sensing element if the test is 
unsatisfactory and install a new sensing element within the procedures 
of the parts of Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletin 
BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022; and Airbus Canada 
Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated 
February 18, 2022. Delta stated those steps are redundant to steps to 
``replace a failed sensing element'' as well as steps to ``replace a 
failed loop'' (which

[[Page 56758]]

Delta noted it has asked to be revised to ``replace any failed sensing 
element'' in its previous comment) in the appendixes of Airbus Canada 
Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated 
February 18, 2022; and Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service 
Bulletin BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022. Delta stated 
that following completion of an appendix, the associated part procedure 
is done. Delta stated both steps cannot be deviated from because both 
are within the RC procedure section of the service information. Delta 
stated that Airbus Canada confirmed that the replacement of failed 
sensing elements only needs to be done once.
    The FAA agrees that the steps to remove the sensing element if the 
test is unsatisfactory and install a new sensing element that are 
within the procedures of the parts of the Accomplishment Instructions 
are redundant with the steps in the appendices of Airbus Canada Limited 
Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 
2022; and Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Service Bulletin BD500-
362003 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022. The FAA agrees that 
redundant steps are not required to be performed. Airbus Canada Limited 
Partnership Service Bulletins BD500-362002 Issue 002, dated July 26, 
2023, and BD500-362003 Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023, removed the 
redundant replacement steps from the appendices. As stated previously, 
the FAA has added an exception to paragraph (h)(6) of this AD to 
clarify that replacing affected parts is only done once when using 
Issue 001 of the service information referenced in ``First SB'' and 
``Second SB'' of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1.

Change to Paragraph (h)(4) of the Proposed AD

    The exception in paragraph (h)(4) of the proposed AD to the parts 
installation prohibition specified in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13 
referred to ``ACLP SB BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022'' 
and ``ACLP SB BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022'' for the 
prohibited sensing elements. The FAA has revised paragraph (h)(4) of 
this AD to specify prohibited sensing elements are identified in either 
Issue 001 or Issue 002 of the service information, i.e., ``ACLP SB 
BD500-362002 Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022, or Issue 002, dated 
July 26, 2023'' and ``ACLP SB BD500-362003 Issue 001, dated February 
18, 2022, or Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023.''

Conclusion

    This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another 
country and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to 
the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, it 
has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI 
referenced above. The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered the 
comments received, and determined that air safety requires adopting 
this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address 
the unsafe condition on this product. Except for minor editorial 
changes, and any other changes described previously, this AD is adopted 
as proposed in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic 
burden on any operator.

Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51

    Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 specifies procedures for, 
depending on airplane serial number, reviewing the airplane maintenance 
records for affected bleed leak detection system sensing elements, 
testing the sensing elements, replacing those that fail, and witness 
marking those that pass. Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 also 
prohibits the installation of any affected parts unless it is a 
serviceable part.
    Kidde Aerospace & Defense Service Bulletin CFD-26-1, Revision 6, 
dated February 28, 2022, specifies affected continuous fire detector 
(CFD) part numbers and testing procedures.
    This material is reasonably available because the interested 
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by 
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD affects 69 airplanes of U.S. 
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                      Estimated Costs for Required Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Labor cost               Parts cost          Cost per product             Cost on U.S. operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Up to 125 work-hours x $85 per                $0  Up to $10,625..............  Up to $552,500.
 hour = $10,625 (for Group A, 52
 airplanes).
Up to 1 work-hour x $85 per hour              $0  Up to $85..................  Up to $1,445.
 = $85 (for Group B, 17
 airplanes).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary on-
condition actions that would be required based on the results of any 
required actions. The FAA has no way of determining the number of 
aircraft that might need these on-condition actions:

                                     Estimated Costs of On-Condition Actions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Labor cost                             Parts cost                       Cost per product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Up to 58 work-hours x $85 per hour =      Up to $101,045...................  Up to $105,975.
 $4,930 (for Group A airplanes).
Up to 183 work-hours x $85 per hour =     Up to $101,045...................  Up to $116,600.
 $15,555 (for Group B airplanes).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA has included all known costs in its cost estimate. 
According to the manufacturer, however, some or all of the costs of 
this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact 
on affected operators.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA

[[Page 56759]]

with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by 
prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the 
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This 
regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses 
an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products 
identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive:

2023-16-03 Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate 
Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); 
Bombardier, Inc.): Amendment 39-22522; Docket No. FAA-2022-1483; 
Project Identifier MCAI-2022-00435-T.

(a) Effective Date

    This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective September 25, 
2023.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-
500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes, certificated in any category, as 
identified in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1, dated April 18, 2023 
(Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1).

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 36, Pneumatic.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by a report from the supplier of overheat 
detection sensing elements that there was a manufacturing quality 
escape in which some sensing elements were manufactured with 
insufficient salt fill. The FAA is issuing this AD to address 
insufficient salt fill of the overheat detection sensing elements. 
The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in an inability 
to detect hot bleed air leaks, which can cause damage to surrounding 
structures and systems that could prevent continued safe flight and 
landing.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Requirements

    Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all 
required actions and compliance times specified in, and in 
accordance with Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1.

(h) Exception to Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1

    (1) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 refers to April 11, 
2022 (the effective date of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13, dated 
March 28, 2022), or to its effective date, this AD requires using 
the effective date of this AD.
    (2) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 refers to hours air 
time, this AD requires using flight hours.
    (3) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 defines ``Affected 
part'' and refers to part numbers in a certain service bulletin, for 
this AD, operators must use Kidde Aerospace & Defense Service 
Bulletin CFD-26-1, Revision 6, dated February 28, 2022, to determine 
the part number.
    (4) Where ``Part I'' of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 
specifies the parts installation prohibition for certain airplanes, 
replace the text ``associated with Part A through Part J of the 
first SB or Part A through Part C of the second SB'' with 
``associated with Part A through Part J of ACLP SB BD500-362002 
Issue 001, dated February 18, 2022, or Issue 002, dated July 26, 
2023; or Part A through Part C of ACLP SB BD500-362003 Issue 001, 
dated February 18, 2022, or Issue 002, dated July 26, 2023.''
    (5) Where the appendixes of Issue 001 of the service information 
referenced in ``First SB'' and ``Second SB'' of Transport Canada AD 
CF-2022-13R1 specify steps to ``remove and replace any failed 
loop,'' this AD requires replacing only any failed sensing element 
as specified in Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1.
    (6) Where the appendixes and the procedure sections of Issue 001 
of the service information referenced in ``First SB'' and ``Second 
SB'' of Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1 specify redundant steps to 
remove and replace any failed loops or any failed sensing elements 
and steps to add ``witness marks (dots),'' this AD requires those 
steps be performed only once. Also, as stated in paragraph (h)(5) of 
this AD only the failed sensing element must be replaced and not a 
failed loop.

(i) Credit for Previous Actions

    This paragraph provides credit for actions required by paragraph 
(g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the effective 
date of this AD using Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13, dated March 
28, 2022.

(j) Additional AD Provisions

    The following provisions also apply to this AD:
    (1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, 
International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve 
AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 
39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 
principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as 
appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the 
International Validation Branch, send it to ATTN: Program Manager, 
Continuing Operational Safety, FAA, International Validation Branch, 
1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone 516-
228-7300. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
    (2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD 
to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be 
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, International 
Validation Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada; or Airbus Canada 
Limited Partnership's Transport Canada Design Approval Organization 
(DAO). If approved by the DAO, the approval must include the DAO-
authorized signature.
    (3) Required for Compliance (RC): Except as required by 
paragraph (j)(2) of this AD, if any service information contains 
procedures or tests that are identified as RC, those procedures and 
tests must be done to comply with this AD; any procedures or tests 
that are not identified as RC are recommended. Those procedures and 
tests that are not identified as RC may be deviated from using 
accepted methods in accordance with the operator's maintenance or 
inspection program without obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided 
the procedures and tests identified as RC can be done and the 
airplane can be put back in an airworthy condition. Any 
substitutions or changes to procedures or tests identified as RC 
require approval of an AMOC.

(k) Additional Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Thomas Niczky, 
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite

[[Page 56760]]

410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone: 516-228-7347; email: [email protected].

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed 
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do 
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1, dated April 18, 2023.
    (ii) Kidde Aerospace & Defense Service Bulletin CFD-26-1, 
Revision 6, dated February 28, 2022.
    (3) For Transport Canada AD CF-2022-13R1, contact Transport 
Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 159 
Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario K1A 0N5, Canada; telephone 888-663-
3639; email [email protected]. You may find this Transport 
Canada AD on the Transport Canada website at tc.canada.ca/en/
aviation.
    (4) For Kidde Aerospace & Defense service information, contact 
Kidde Aerospace & Defense, 4200 Airport Drive NW, Building B, 
Wilson, NC 27896; telephone: 319-295-5000; website: 
kiddetechnologies.com/aviation.com.
    (5) You may view this service information at the FAA, 
Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 
South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability 
of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.
    (6) You may view this material that is incorporated by reference 
at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For 
information on the availability of this material at NARA, email 
[email protected], or go to: www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued on August 3, 2023.
Victor Wicklund,
Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2023-17774 Filed 8-18-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P