[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 139 (Friday, July 21, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 47029-47054]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-15067]


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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Parts 70 and 71

[EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0186; FRL-8961-02-OAR]
RIN 2060-AV39


Removal of Title V Emergency Affirmative Defense Provisions From 
State Operating Permit Programs and Federal Operating Permit Program

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is removing the 
``emergency'' affirmative defense provisions from the EPA's title V 
operating permit program regulations. These provisions established an 
affirmative defense that sources could have asserted in enforcement 
cases brought for noncompliance with technology-based emission 
limitations in operating permits, provided that the exceedances 
occurred due to qualifying emergency circumstances. These provisions, 
which have never been required elements of state operating permit 
programs, are being removed because they are inconsistent with the 
EPA's interpretation of the enforcement structure of the Clean Air Act 
(CAA or the Act) in light of prior court decisions from the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The removal of these provisions is 
also consistent with other recent EPA actions involving affirmative 
defenses and would harmonize the EPA's treatment of affirmative 
defenses across different CAA programs. Through this document, the EPA 
is also providing guidance on the implementation process resulting from

[[Page 47030]]

the removal of the emergency affirmative defense provisions from the 
EPA's regulations, including the need for some state, local, and tribal 
permitting authorities to submit program revisions to the EPA to remove 
similar title V affirmative defense provisions from their EPA-approved 
title V programs, and to remove similar provisions from individual 
operating permits.

DATES: This final rule is effective on August 21, 2023.

ADDRESSES: The EPA has established a docket for this action under 
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0186. All documents in the docket are 
listed on the http://www.regulations.gov website. Although listed in 
the index, some information is not publicly available, e.g., CBI or 
other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Certain 
other material, such as copyrighted material, is not placed on the 
internet and will be publicly available only in hard copy form. 
Publicly available docket materials are available electronically 
through http://www.regulations.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Corey Sugerik, Office of Air Quality 
Planning and Standards, Air Quality Policy Division (C504-05), 
Environmental Protection Agency, Research Triangle Park, NC; telephone 
number: (919) 541-3223; email address: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. General Information

A. How is this Federal Register document organized?

    The information presented in this preamble is organized as follows:

I. General Information
    A. How is this Federal Register document organized?
    B. Does this action apply to me?
    C. Where can I get a copy of this document and other related 
information?
II. Background and Overview of the Final Action
III. Response to Significant Comments
    A. Affirmative Defenses and the NRDC Decision
    B. Exemptions and the Sierra Club Decision
    C. Other Legal and Policy Considerations
    D. Potential Impacts
    E. Response to Comments Outside the Scope of This Action
IV. Implementation Considerations
    A. Program Revisions
    B. Permit Revisions
V. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
    A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and 
Executive Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review
    B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
    C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
    D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
    E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
    F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With 
Indian Tribal Governments
    G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From 
Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks
    H. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
    I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
    J. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 
Populations
    K. Congressional Review Act (CRA)
VI. Statutory Authority
VII. Judicial Review

B. Does this action apply to me?

    Entities potentially directly affected by this rulemaking include 
federal, state, local, and tribal air pollution control agencies that 
administer title V operating permit programs.\1\ Entities potentially 
indirectly affected by this rulemaking include owners and operators of 
emissions sources in all industry groups who hold or apply for title V 
operating permits.
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    \1\ This preamble makes frequent use of the term ``state,'' 
usually meaning the state air pollution control agency that serves 
as the permitting authority. The use of the term ``state'' also 
applies to local, tribal, and U.S. territorial air pollution control 
agencies, where applicable.
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C. Where can I get a copy of this document and other related 
information?

    In addition to being available in the docket, an electronic copy of 
this Federal Register document will be posted at https://www.epa.gov/title-v-operating-permits/current-regulations-and-regulatory-actions.

II. Background and Overview of the Final Action

    The EPA has promulgated permitting regulations applicable to the 
operation of major and certain other sources of air pollutants under 
title V of the CAA. These regulations are codified in 40 CFR parts 70 
and 71, which contain the requirements for state operating permit 
programs and the federal operating permit program, respectively. These 
regulations contained identical provisions establishing an affirmative 
defense that sources could assert in enforcement actions brought for 
noncompliance with technology-based emission limitations caused by 
specific emergency circumstances. These ``emergency'' provisions were 
located at 40 CFR 70.6(g) and 71.6(g).
    In this action, the EPA is removing the emergency affirmative 
defense provisions in 40 CFR 70.6(g) and 71.6(g) because they are 
inconsistent with the EPA's current interpretation of the enforcement 
structure of the CAA, in light of prior court decisions from the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit--primarily the court's 2014 
decision in NRDC v. EPA, 749 F.3d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The removal of 
these provisions is also consistent with other recent EPA actions 
involving affirmative defenses \2\ and will harmonize the EPA's 
treatment of affirmative defenses across different CAA programs. The 
EPA previously provided background on the title V emergency provisions 
and articulated its justification for this action in the preamble to 
the 2016 and 2022 proposed rules preceding this final 
rule.3 4 Section III. of this document responds to 
significant comments we received on those proposals and provides 
additional information in support of this final rule.
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    \2\ In newly issued and revised New Source Performance Standards 
(NSPS), emission guidelines for existing sources, and NESHAP 
regulations, the EPA has either omitted new affirmative defense 
provisions or removed existing affirmative defense provisions. See, 
e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
the Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry and Standards of 
Performance for Portland Cement Plants; Final Rule, 80 FR 44771 
(July 27, 2015); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for Major Sources: Industrial, Commercial, and 
Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters; Final Rule, 80 FR 72789 
(November 20, 2015); Standards of Performance for New Stationary 
Sources and Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources: Commercial and 
Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units; Final Rule, 81 FR 40956 
(June 23, 2016).
    \3\ See Removal of Title V Emergency Affirmative Defense 
Provisions From State Operating Permit Programs and Federal 
Operating Permit Program, Proposed Rule, 81 FR 38645 (June 14, 
2016); Removal of Title V Emergency Affirmative Defense Provisions 
From State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating 
Permit Program, Proposed Rule, 87 FR 19042 (April 1, 2022).
    \4\ Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0186 comprises all supporting 
documents and public comments for both the 2016 and 2022 proposals.
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    As a consequence of the EPA's action to remove these provisions 
from 40 CFR 70.6(g), it will be necessary for any states that have 
adopted similar affirmative defense provisions in their part 70 
operating permit programs to revise their part 70 programs to remove 
these provisions. In addition, individual operating permits that 
contain title V affirmative defenses based on 40 CFR 70.6(g) or similar 
state regulations will eventually need to be revised. The EPA discussed 
its expectations concerning how states will implement this rule in 
section V. of the preamble to the 2016 proposed rule and also requested

[[Page 47031]]

comments on some of the aspects discussed. Additional information 
regarding these implementation considerations and the EPA's response to 
relevant comments received on these issues are included in section IV. 
of this document.
    EPA expects that program revisions to remove the title V emergency 
defense provisions from state operating permit programs will include, 
at minimum: (1) a redline document identifying the state's proposed 
revision to its part 70 program rules; (2) a brief statement of the 
legal authority authorizing the revision; and (3) a schedule and 
description of the state's plans to remove affirmative defense 
provisions from individual operating permits. The EPA encourages states 
to consult with their respective EPA regional offices on the specific 
contents of their revision submittal packages.
    In general, any impermissible affirmative defense provisions within 
individual operating permits that are based on a title V authority and 
that apply to federally-enforceable requirements will need to be 
removed. As explained in the 2016 proposal, the EPA expects that any 
necessary permit changes should occur in the ordinary course of 
business, such as during periodic permit renewals or revisions. At the 
latest, states would be expected to remove affirmative defense 
provisions from individual permits by the next periodic permit renewal 
that occurs following either (1) the effective date of this rule (for 
permit terms based on 40 CFR 70.6(g) or 71.6(g)) or (2) the EPA's 
approval of state program revisions (for permit terms based on a state 
affirmative defense provision).

III. Response to Significant Comments

    This section contains the EPA's response to significant comments 
regarding the EPA's proposed action to remove 40 CFR 70.6(g) and 
71.6(g) and provides the EPA's justification for this final action. 
Comments and the EPA's responses are divided into four general topic 
areas: section III.A. of this document discusses the legal basis for 
this action in light of the NRDC decision; section III.B. discusses 
issues related to exemptions from emission limitations and the D.C. 
Circuit's 2008 decision in Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 
2008); section III.C. discusses other legal and policy considerations; 
and section III.D. discusses various issues involving the consequences 
of removing the title V emergency affirmative defense provisions from 
operating permit programs, focusing primarily on the impact on sources.

A. Affirmative Defenses and the NRDC Decision

    The following subsections address comments received concerning the 
NRDC decision and the EPA's legal basis for this action. Subsections 
III.A.1. and III.A.2. of this document address general comments either 
supporting or opposing the EPA's interpretation of the NRDC decision. 
Subsection III.A.3. addresses specific comments concerning the extent 
to which the NRDC decision should apply beyond the context of citizen-
suit enforcement under CAA section 304, and how the decision should 
inform the EPA's treatment of affirmative defenses in the context of 
EPA-initiated judicial enforcement and administrative penalty actions 
under CAA sections 113(b) and (d). Specific comments that discuss the 
relationship between the NRDC decision and prior case law are presented 
in section III.C.2. of this document.
1. Support for the EPA's Interpretation of the CAA's Enforcement 
Structure in Light of the NRDC Decision
    Comment: Multiple environmental and state commenters supported the 
EPA's view that, in light of NRDC, the title V emergency affirmative 
defense provisions should be removed because they impermissibly limit 
the authority of courts to decide appropriate penalties in private 
civil suits. Some commenters claimed that the EPA lacks the authority 
to create such provisions. Other state and industry commenters 
acknowledged that the NRDC decision limits the EPA's discretion to 
retain affirmative defense provisions, either altogether or in certain 
contexts. Commenters argued that when Congress wanted to limit the 
authority of courts, to allow an affirmative defense or to permit an 
extrajudicial entity to modify penalties, it did so expressly, citing 
CAA sections 113(e)(1), 113(c)(5)(C)-(D), and 113(d)(2)(B).
    Some commenters asserted that the NRDC decision applies beyond the 
specific context of CAA section 112 standards because the court's 
rationale was based on CAA sections 113 and 304, not CAA section 112. 
Therefore, commenters concluded that the prohibition on affirmative 
defenses applies to any citizen-enforceable emission standards or 
limitations under the Act. Commenters claimed that NRDC is applicable 
to the title V emergency affirmative defense provisions because, like 
the hazardous air pollution standards at issue in NRDC, all other 
emission standards contained in title V operating permits are 
enforceable under CAA section 304. Some commenters further asserted 
that the fundamental principles underlying the NRDC decision with 
respect to affirmative defenses were reinforced by the D.C. Circuit's 
2016 decision in U.S. Sugar v. EPA.\5\
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    \5\ U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
amended on rehearing on unrelated grounds, U.S. Sugar Corp v. EPA, 
844 F.3d 268 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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    Response: The EPA generally agrees with commenters supporting the 
legal basis for this action to remove the emergency affirmative defense 
provisions from the EPA's title V regulations. The EPA previously 
explained its legal rationale for this action in the 2016 and 2022 
proposed rules.\6\ Here, the EPA reiterates some of the primary legal 
principles guiding this current action.
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    \6\ See 81 FR 38649. As noted in the 2016 and 2022 proposals, 
the EPA has also previously explained its interpretation of the CAA 
in light of the NRDC decision at great length in multiple other 
documents, including documents supporting the EPA's 2015 SSM SIP 
Action. See State Implementation Plans: Response to Petition for 
Rulemaking; Findings of Substantial Inadequacy; and SIP Calls To 
Amend Provisions Applying to Excess Emissions During Periods of 
Startup, Shutdown and Malfunction; Supplemental Proposal To Address 
Affirmative Defense Provisions in States Included in the Petition 
for Rulemaking and in Additional States, Supplemental Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 79 FR 55919, 55929 (September 17, 2014) (SSM 
SIP Action Supplemental Proposal); State Implementation Plans: 
Response to Petition for Rulemaking; Restatement and Update of EPA's 
SSM Policy Applicable to SIPs; Findings of Substantial Inadequacy; 
SIP Calls To Amend Provisions Applying to Excess Emissions During 
Periods of Startup, Shutdown and Malfunction, Final Action, 80 FR 
33839, 33851 (June 12, 2015) (SSM SIP Action); and Memorandum, 
Withdrawal of the October 9, 2020, Memorandum Addressing Startup, 
Shutdown, and Malfunctions in State Implementation Plans and 
Implementation of the Prior Policy, 3-4 (September 30, 2021), 
available at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-09/oar-21-000-6324.pdf (September 2021 SSM SIP Memo).
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    The EPA's current interpretation of the CAA with respect to 
affirmative defenses is informed by the D.C. Circuit's NRDC decision. 
In NRDC, the D.C. Circuit vacated affirmative defense provisions 
contained in the EPA's National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants (NESHAP) for the portland cement industry, promulgated under 
CAA section 112. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the EPA lacked the 
authority to create these affirmative defense provisions because they 
contradicted fundamental requirements of the Act concerning the 
authority of courts to decide whether to assess civil penalties in CAA 
enforcement suits. Importantly, the court's decision did not turn upon 
any specific provisions of CAA section 112, but rather on the 
provisions of CAA sections 113 and 304. These provisions

[[Page 47032]]

pertain to enforcement of a wide variety of CAA requirements beyond 
section 112 standards, including enforcement of emission limits 
contained in title V permits. Thus, the mere fact that the court 
addressed the legality of an affirmative defense provision in the 
context of a section 112 NESHAP does not mean that the court's 
interpretation of sections 113 and 304 does not also apply more 
broadly. To the contrary, the EPA sees no reason why the logic of the 
court concerning sections 113 and 304 would not apply to the title V 
emergency affirmative defense provisions, as well.
    Notably, in 2016, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its NRDC opinion 
concerning affirmative defenses. In U.S. Sugar, the D.C. Circuit 
addressed various challenges to rules promulgated in 2011, including 
challenges urging that--in the absence of affirmative defenses--the EPA 
was required to address periods of malfunction in setting the 
applicable standards. Discussing NRDC, the U.S. Sugar opinion stated 
that the affirmative defense provision at issue in the NRDC case was 
``an impermissible intrusion on the judiciary's role.'' \7\ The fact 
that the title V emergency affirmative defenses arguably apply more 
broadly (i.e., to potentially numerous technology-based emission limits 
developed under multiple CAA program areas) than the affirmative 
defense at issue in NRDC potentially makes it even more intrusive on 
the judiciary's role.
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    \7\ See U.S. Sugar, 830 F.3d at 607.
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    In light of the NRDC decision and the EPA's reevaluation of the 
CAA, the EPA interprets the enforcement provisions in sections 113 and 
304 of the CAA to preclude affirmative defense provisions that would 
operate to limit a court's authority or discretion to determine the 
appropriate remedy in an enforcement action. Section 304(a) grants the 
federal district courts jurisdiction to determine liability and to 
impose penalties in enforcement suits brought by citizens. Similarly, 
section 113(b) grants the federal district courts jurisdiction, in 
enforcement actions brought by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on 
behalf of the EPA, to determine liability and to impose remedies of 
various kinds, including injunctive relief and monetary penalties. 
These grants of jurisdiction come directly from Congress, and the EPA 
is not authorized to alter or eliminate this authority. With respect to 
monetary penalties, CAA section 113(e) lists various factors that 
courts and the EPA shall consider in the event of judicial or 
administrative enforcement for violations of CAA requirements, 
including title V permit conditions. Because Congress has already given 
federal courts the authority to determine what penalties are 
appropriate in the event of judicial enforcement for a violation of a 
title V permit provision, neither the EPA nor states should be able to 
alter or eliminate that authority by superimposing restrictions on the 
authority and discretion granted by Congress to the courts. Affirmative 
defense provisions by their nature limit or eliminate the authority of 
federal courts to determine liability or to impose remedies through 
considerations that differ from the explicit grants of authority in 
section 113(b) and section 113(e). Therefore, these provisions are not 
appropriate under the CAA, no matter what type of event they apply to, 
what criteria they contain, or what forms of remedy they purport to 
limit or eliminate. The emergency affirmative defense provisions that 
the EPA is removing from 40 CFR 70.6(g) and 71.6(g) purported to 
interfere with the authority of the courts to determine whether and to 
what extent penalties or other remedies were appropriate in judicial 
enforcement actions, conflicted with the holding of NRDC, and were 
contrary to the enforcement structure of the CAA. Thus, the EPA has 
determined that these provisions should be removed from the EPA's 
regulations.
    Section IV.A. of this document contains additional information 
concerning the need for states to submit program revisions to remove 
similar title V affirmative defense provisions from EPA-approved state 
operating permit programs, and to remove similar provisions from 
individual operating permits.
2. Comments Suggesting That the NRDC Case Is a Narrow Decision That the 
EPA Is Incorrectly Extending or Misapplying
    Comment: Some commenters stated that the D.C. Circuit's decision in 
NRDC v. EPA was limited to the particular facts or circumstances of 
that case and that the EPA's reliance on the decision to support 
removal of the title V emergency affirmative defense provisions is an 
incorrect extension or misapplication of the decision. Commenters 
generally claimed that the EPA should not apply the NRDC court's ruling 
to every corner of the CAA, including to the title V affirmative 
defense provisions within the EPA's regulations and state operating 
permit programs. Some commenters stated that the NRDC decision only 
invalidated an affirmative defense associated with a NESHAP issued in 
accordance with CAA section 112, and that the decision should be 
limited to those standards (or, even, to the specific standards for 
portland cement plants subject to that litigation). Commenters alleged 
that the D.C. Circuit provided no language to broaden its ruling. Some 
commenters focused on the specific statutory mandates involved in 
establishing section 112 standards. One commenter alleged that the D.C. 
Circuit held that once a section 112 standard is promulgated and 
established for all operating modes, no ``gap'' remains for the EPA to 
create an affirmative defense.
    Other commenters focused on the differences between title V permits 
and the section 112 standards that the NRDC court considered. These 
commenters explained that title V permits contain numerous different 
underlying standards applicable to a source (such as standards 
developed under a State Implementation Plan (SIP) or under New Source 
Review Programs), as well as additional procedural and monitoring, 
reporting, and recordkeeping requirements. Thus, one commenter asserted 
that enforcement of title V permit requirements differs from 
enforcement of specific section 112 emission limits, and that the D.C. 
Circuit's logic prohibiting affirmative defenses does not apply to 
other types of applicable requirements in a title V permit, including 
substantive standards as well as administrative or procedural 
requirements.
    Some commenters attempted to distinguish the title V emergency 
affirmative defense, which at least one commenter characterized as a 
defense to ``liability'' or ``noncompliance,'' from the affirmative 
defense to ``civil penalties'' at issue in the NRDC case. One commenter 
claimed that the NRDC decision was based on the assumption that excess 
emissions automatically result in a violation of a section 112 
standard, and therefore that the D.C. Circuit only addressed how 
affirmative defense provisions affect a court's authority to determine 
appropriate remedies after an actionable violation has been identified. 
Multiple commenters asserted that neither CAA section 113 nor the NRDC 
case speak to provisions that define when a violation has occurred. 
Some commenters also asserted that the NRDC decision involved an 
affirmative defense for malfunctions, not emergencies, and concluded 
that the EPA should not apply the decision to the title V emergency 
affirmative defense because malfunctions are not similar in nature to 
emergencies.
    Some commenters also claimed more generally that the title V 
affirmative defense provisions do not impair a court's ability to 
decide whether a source has met its burden of

[[Page 47033]]

demonstrating that an emergency has occurred and whether civil 
penalties are appropriate. Other commenters discussed the breadth of 
the NRDC case with respect to SIP provisions. Commenters asserted that 
the D.C. Circuit did not opine on the authority of the EPA or states to 
provide relief from noncompliance with technology-based SIP standards 
that are incorporated into title V operating permits. Commenters also 
claimed that the D.C. Circuit expressly reserved judgment concerning 
the validity of such defenses in SIPs,\8\ and that states have 
discretion under the CAA to include affirmative defense provisions in 
their SIPs. These commenters attempted to distinguish SIPs from the 
section 112 standards at issue in the NRDC case. Multiple commenters 
also incorporated in their comment submissions various attachments 
related to the Startup, Shutdown, and Malfunction (SSM) SIP Action,\9\ 
including comments submitted on the initial and supplemental SSM SIP 
Call proposals \10\ as well as briefs filed in the ongoing SSM SIP 
Action litigation.\11\ Portions of these attachments addressed the 
EPA's interpretation of the NRDC case.
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    \8\ Commenters cited NRDC, 749 F.3d at 1064 n.2.
    \9\ SSM SIP Action, 80 FR 33840.
    \10\ State Implementation Plans: Response to Petition for 
Rulemaking; Findings of Substantial Inadequacy; and SIP Calls To 
Amend Provisions Applying to Excess Emissions During Periods of 
Startup, Shutdown, and Malfunction; Proposed Rule, 78 FR 12460 
(February 22, 2013); SSM SIP Action Supplemental Proposal, 79 FR 
55919.
    \11\ Environmental Committee of the Florida Electric Power 
Coordinating Group, Inc. v. EPA, No. 15-1239 (D.C. Cir.) (SSM SIP 
Action litigation).
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    Response: The EPA disagrees with commenters' assertions that the 
logic of the NRDC case was restricted to the context of section 112 
standards, or to a single NESHAP standard. Most of these comments do 
not address the fundamental legal principles upon which the D.C. 
Circuit based its decision, or the EPA's explanation of these 
principles. Contrary to what some commenters suggest, the NRDC decision 
was not based on any statutory mandates specific to promulgating CAA 
section 112 standards. Instead, the decision was based on CAA sections 
113 and 304, which apply broadly to the enforcement of a wide range of 
CAA requirements, including SIP requirements. Thus, any differences 
between section 112 standards and other standards contained in title V 
permits (or, for example, the difference between malfunctions and 
emergencies) are irrelevant to the legal principles upon which the NRDC 
decision was based, and which apply equally well to the EPA's title V 
regulations in 40 CFR 70.6(g) and 71.6(g), as discussed in the 
preceding subsection.
    The EPA also disagrees that NRDC is distinguishable from the 
current action due to any functional differences between the 
affirmative defense at issue in NRDC, which some commenters 
characterized as a defense to a claim for civil penalties for 
violations, and the title V emergency affirmative defense, which 
commenters characterized as a defense to an action brought for 
noncompliance. Both the title V affirmative defense and the portland 
cement NESHAP malfunction affirmative defense (originally located at 40 
CFR 63.1344) established an affirmative defense that a source could 
assert in actions brought under CAA sections 113 and 304, after an 
enforcement action had been initiated for an alleged violation.\12\ 
Both affirmative defense provisions functioned in the same manner. The 
fact that the portland cement defense was confined to enforcement 
actions for penalties, whereas the title V provisions do not on their 
face contain such an explicit restriction and could potentially be read 
more broadly, is irrelevant to the fact that both provisions purported 
to interfere with the authority of courts to determine whether and to 
what extent relief is appropriate in a given case, including relief 
from penalties. Moreover, CAA section 304(a), upon which the D.C. 
Circuit relied, is not restricted to monetary penalties. The EPA has 
previously explained its position that affirmative defenses are 
inappropriate regardless of what type of event they apply to, what 
criteria they contain, or what forms of remedy they purport to limit or 
eliminate. The EPA also notes that the title V emergency affirmative 
defense provisions were explicitly restricted to noncompliance with 
technology-based emission limits (such as emission limits derived from 
a NESHAP similar to the ones the D.C. Circuit invalidated) and were 
never available as a defense in an enforcement case for violations of 
other types of title V permit requirements, contrary to some 
commenters' assertions.
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    \12\ To the extent that commenters argue that the title V 
affirmative defenses function to define when a violation has 
occurred, these comments are addressed further in section III.B.1. 
of this document.
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    Finally, the EPA disagrees with commenters' claims that the title V 
affirmative defense provisions would not impair a court's ability to 
decide whether civil penalties are appropriate because a source 
attempting to invoke the title V emergency affirmative defense would 
have the burden to prove that an emergency occurred and other 
demonstration requirements had been met. The affirmative defense 
provision formerly in the portland cement NESHAP was similarly 
structured, and the D.C. Circuit nonetheless found that those 
provisions impermissibly intruded into the judiciary's role to 
determine whether penalties are appropriate. Any comments challenging 
the holding of the D.C. Circuit in NRDC are beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking. To the extent that commenters suggested that a title V 
affirmative defense provision could be appropriate with respect to 
certain technology-based SIP requirements contained in a title V 
permit, the EPA disagrees. For the reasons previously discussed, 
affirmative defense provisions in title V permits are not appropriate 
with respect to any federally-enforceable requirements. To the extent 
that commenters discussed the relationship between the NRDC and Sierra 
Club cases and affirmative defense provisions contained within SIPs, 
and to the extent that commenters incorporated comments or briefs 
relevant to the SSM SIP Action but did not specifically explain how 
those comments were pertinent to the EPA's proposal to eliminate the 
title V emergency affirmative defense provisions, such comments are 
beyond the scope of this current rulemaking. Moreover, the EPA has 
previously responded to those comments and legal briefs in the 
appropriate venues.\13\ To the extent that comments addressed issues 
relevant to this action, the EPA is responding to these comments in 
this document.
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    \13\ See SSM SIP Action, 80 FR 33840, 33852 (noting that 
``[s]tates have great discretion in how to devise SIP provisions, 
but they do not have discretion to create provisions that contradict 
fundamental legal requirements of the CAA'' and that ``[t]he 
jurisdiction of federal courts to determine liability and to impose 
statutory remedies for violations of SIP emission limitations is one 
such fundamental requirement''); Initial Brief of Respondent EPA, 
SSM SIP Action Litigation (filed July 26, 2016).
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3. The NRDC Case As It Applies Beyond Citizen-Suit Enforcement Under 
CAA Section 304(a)
    Comment: Many commenters argued that the NRDC decision only 
invalidated affirmative defenses that could be asserted in citizen 
suits brought under CAA section 304 in federal court. These commenters 
asserted that the NRDC case does not require the EPA to remove 
affirmative defenses with respect to either: (1) EPA-initiated civil 
judicial enforcement actions under section 113(b); or (2) 
administrative penalty actions brought under section 113(d). Many of 
these commenters recommended that instead of entirely

[[Page 47034]]

removing the title V emergency affirmative defense provisions, the EPA 
should amend the provisions to clarify that they do not apply to any 
enforcement actions based on section 304, but only to actions based on 
sections 113(b) and (d).
    First, regarding EPA-initiated enforcement under section 113(b), 
some commenters acknowledged the EPA's position (as explained in the 
2016 proposed rule) that, because both sections 304 and 113(b) vest 
federal district courts with the ability to determine liability and 
assess penalties, the EPA's hands are tied with respect to its own 
civil enforcement. One commenter noted that the NRDC case did not 
directly speak to enforcement actions brought by the EPA under section 
113(b). Other commenters claimed that section 113(b) does nothing to 
impede the EPA's ability to define the circumstances under which it is 
``appropriate'' to initiate an enforcement action, and that this would 
not interfere with the authority of a court to determine liability and 
assess penalties in an eventual enforcement action. Some commenters 
suggested that the EPA could use the affirmative defense to define by 
rule when it would be appropriate to commence an enforcement action, 
and others noted that the practical effect of the defense is to define 
when the EPA will exercise its enforcement discretion to initiate an 
enforcement action in the courts.
    Second, regarding the EPA's authority to assess administrative 
penalties under section 113(d), commenters cited language from the NRDC 
decision, wherein the D.C. Circuit noted that, although the EPA did not 
have discretion to determine whether civil penalties should be imposed 
by a court, the agency had discretion to determine whether to assess 
administrative penalties under section 113(d).\14\ Various commenters 
similarly alleged that because CAA section 113(d) explicitly gives the 
EPA the authority to modify penalties, it therefore allows the EPA to 
establish an affirmative defense in the context of administrative 
enforcement. Some commenters claimed that retaining the title V 
affirmative defense for administrative enforcement is especially 
important because most penalties related to emission exceedances are 
imposed through administrative penalties sought by the agency, not as a 
result of citizen suits in federal court. Finally, some commenters 
suggested that the EPA could define when it would be appropriate to 
assess administrative penalties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See NRDC, 749 F.3d at 1063.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also made similar arguments with respect to the ability 
of states to determine when it would be appropriate to pursue 
enforcement action, whether through the courts or with respect to 
administrative penalties.
    Response: The EPA disagrees with the claim that it would be 
appropriate to retain the title V affirmative defense provisions for 
use in EPA-initiated judicial enforcement or administrative penalty 
actions. First, as explained previously and as acknowledged by 
commenters, the logic of the NRDC case applies not only to citizen-suit 
actions under section 304(a), but also to judicial enforcement actions 
initiated by DOJ on behalf of the EPA pursuant to section 113(b). Like 
section 304(a), section 113(b) involves enforcement actions that are 
ultimately brought before federal courts. Therefore, any affirmative 
defense that could be asserted in an enforcement proceeding brought 
under section 113(b) would similarly infringe on the authority of 
courts to determine appropriate penalties. Regarding suggestions that 
the EPA could treat the affirmative defense as establishing criteria 
defining whether the EPA considers it ``appropriate'' to commence an 
enforcement action under section 113(b), the EPA finds that this is not 
necessary or appropriate. For the reasons provided in section III.D.2. 
of this document, the EPA has decided not to explicitly codify such an 
``enforcement discretion'' type provision.
    Second, the EPA acknowledges that NRDC does not address the EPA's 
authority to establish an affirmative defense to CAA section 113(d) 
administrative actions. However, such an affirmative defense is not 
necessary. As discussed further in section III.D.2., if a source 
believes it is unable to comply with emissions standards as a result of 
an emergency, the EPA may use its case-by-case enforcement discretion 
to determine whether to initiate enforcement, as appropriate. Further, 
as the D.C. Circuit recognized, in an EPA or citizen enforcement 
action, the court has the discretion to consider any defense raised and 
determine whether penalties are appropriate.\15\ The same is true for 
EPA administrative actions. Moreover, assessment of penalties for 
violations in administrative proceedings and judicial proceedings 
should generally be consistent. Cf. CAA section 113(e), 42 U.S.C. 
7413(e) (requiring both the Administrator of the EPA and the court to 
take specified criteria into account when assessing penalties). The EPA 
has previously explained this approach in various rules developed under 
CAA sections 111, 112, and 129.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ See NRDC, 749 F.3d at 1064; see also U.S. Sugar, 830 F.3d 
at 609. (``[Sources] can argue that penalties should not be assessed 
because of an unavoidable malfunction'' and courts ``should not 
hesitate to exercise their judicial authority to craft appropriate 
civil remedies in the case of emissions exceedances caused by 
unavoidable malfunctions.'').
    \16\ See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants Residual Risk and Technology Review for Flexible 
Polyurethane Foam Production; Final Rule, 79 FR 48073, 48082 n.3 
(August 15, 2014); Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Reconsideration of 
Additional Provisions of New Source Performance Standards; Final 
Rule, 79 FR 79017, 79024 n.3 (December 31, 2014); National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Polyvinyl Chloride and 
Copolymers Production Reconsideration; Proposed Rule, 85 FR 71490 
n.16 (November 9, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section IV.A.3. of this document discusses similar issues regarding 
how states may be able to implement this rule by retaining or 
developing similar provisions that apply in the limited context of 
state-initiated administrative enforcement actions or judicial 
enforcement in state courts.

B. Exemptions and the Sierra Club Decision

    In the 2016 proposed rule, the EPA noted that the D.C. Circuit in 
Sierra Club vacated an EPA rule that exempted sources from otherwise 
applicable emissions standards during periods of SSM because the SSM 
exemption violated the CAA requirement that such standards apply 
continuously. The EPA stated that, although the title V emergency 
affirmative defenses were not exemptions, if they were to be construed 
or treated as exemptions, they would run afoul of Sierra Club and also 
should be removed for that reason. The EPA received various comments 
relating to these issues.
1. Comments Suggesting That the Title V Emergency Provisions Create an 
Exemption to Emission Limits or Define Whether a Violation Has Occurred
    Comment: Commenters presented differing perspectives on how the 
title V emergency affirmative defense provisions function. The majority 
of commenters addressing this topic supported the EPA's position that 
the title V affirmative defense provisions, by their terms, clearly 
function as an affirmative defense, rather than as exemptions or 
provisions that define when a violation occurs. Commenters supporting 
this perspective explained that applicable emission limits would still 
apply during an emergency, and exceedances would still constitute a

[[Page 47035]]

violation, but sources could later assert the affirmative defense in an 
effort to demonstrate to either the agency or a judge that, despite a 
violation of the applicable requirement, there are valid reasons to 
excuse the source from some or all penalties associated with the 
violation. Another commenter noted the very strict conditions that a 
source attempting to claim the affirmative defense for an emergency 
would have to comply with and document in order to be eligible for the 
affirmative defense. Similarly, commenters acknowledged that asserting 
this defense would not automatically mean it was granted.
    However, other commenters suggested that the affirmative defense 
provisions functionally serve as exemptions to applicable emission 
limits or define when a violation of an emission limit has occurred. 
For example, one commenter claimed that the title V affirmative defense 
provisions operate as an exemption, whereby no restriction or emission 
limit would exist in specific emergency circumstances. One commenter 
suggested that the affirmative defenses found in 40 CFR 70.6(g) are an 
affirmative defense to liability rather than an affirmative defense for 
the reduction of penalties, which the commenter claims was considered 
in NRDC. Other commenters claimed that the title V affirmative defense 
essentially provides criteria for the EPA, the state, or a court to 
consider when deciding whether excess emissions trigger a violation in 
the first instance, and these commenters attempted to distinguish the 
title V affirmative defense from the section 112 affirmative defense at 
issue in the NRDC decision. Environmental commenters stated that the 
emergency provisions could be interpreted to mean that, when their 
terms are met, a source did not violate the relevant emission 
limitation, thereby effectively providing an exemption. Environmental 
commenters also argued that this type of functional exemption would be 
illegal.
    Finally, one commenter suggested that the EPA convert the emergency 
affirmative defense provisions into a narrowly tailored exemption from 
technology-based standards. The commenter asserted that this approach 
would be within the EPA's authority, and that an exemption would 
provide more consistency than the use of enforcement discretion alone.
    Response: The EPA agrees with the majority of commenters that 
acknowledged that the title V emergency affirmative defense provisions 
did not create exemptions or otherwise define whether a violation has 
occurred, as stated in the proposal.\17\ The provisions being removed 
through this action, found at 40 CFR 70.6(g)(2) and 71.6(g)(3) state, 
in part, ``An emergency constitutes an affirmative defense to an action 
brought for noncompliance with . . . technology-based emission 
limitations.'' By their terms, these provisions explicitly purported to 
establish an affirmative defense to an enforcement action, not an 
exemption. Moreover, these provisions purported to establish an 
affirmative defense to an action brought for noncompliance with certain 
emission limits. So, before the defense would apply, alleged 
noncompliance with an emissions limitation would have already occurred, 
and an enforcement action (administrative or judicial) would have been 
brought because of such noncompliance. The title V affirmative 
defenses, like the affirmative defense provisions at issue in the NRDC 
case, were thus based on the establishment of an alleged violation of 
permitted emission limits in the first instance. Moreover, it would not 
have been the burden of the party bringing an action for noncompliance 
to negate any claimed emergency ``exemption'' to an otherwise 
applicable emission limit. Rather, it would clearly have been the 
source's burden in defending against such an action to properly assert 
and prove all the elements of the emergency affirmative defense.\18\ 
The result of a successfully pled affirmative defense would be to 
provide the decision maker in an enforcement case with reasons why, 
despite violations of an emission limit, the source should not be held 
liable and assessed penalties (or potentially other forms of relief) 
for such noncompliance. Therefore, the EPA believes that the title V 
emergency affirmative defense provisions were not intended and should 
not be interpreted to function as an exemption or to otherwise define 
when a violation has occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ See 81 FR 38645, 38651.
    \18\ See 40 CFR 70.6(g)(4) (the ``permittee . . . has the burden 
of proof'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that the affirmative defense provisions could have 
been interpreted to provide an exemption or define whether a violation 
has occurred, the EPA reiterates that such an exemption would be 
impermissible under the EPA's interpretation of the CAA and in light of 
Sierra Club. Some commenters suggested that the EPA should interpret 
the affirmative defense to function as an affirmative defense to 
liability or to define whether the emission limitation applies and thus 
whether there is a ``violation.'' But, if there is no ``violation'' 
when certain criteria or conditions for an affirmative defense are met, 
then there is, in effect, no emission limitation that applies when the 
criteria or conditions are met, and the affirmative defense would 
operate to create an exemption from the emission limitation. As 
discussed in the following subsection, and based on the EPA's 
interpretation of the Sierra Club decision, this would violate the 
basic CAA principle that emission limitations must apply continuously 
and cannot contain exemptions, conditional or otherwise. For the same 
reasons, it is not appropriate to convert the title V emergency 
affirmative defense provisions into an exemption, as suggested by a 
commenter.
2. Comments Interpreting the Sierra Club Case With Respect to 
Exemptions From Emission Limitations
    Comment: Commenters presented differing views on the EPA's 
interpretation of Sierra Club. Environmental commenters supported the 
EPA's conclusion that exemptions from emission limitations are 
unlawful, and that, to the extent that the title V emergency 
affirmative defense provisions could be interpreted as providing for an 
exemption, those provisions would be unlawful. Commenters noted that in 
the Sierra Club case, the D.C. Circuit held that sections 112 and 
302(k), read together, require that there must be continuous section 
112-compliant standards. Commenters claimed that the statutory terms 
``emission standard'' and ``emission limitation'' mean the same thing, 
citing CAA section 302(k). Therefore, commenters asserted the court's 
holding in Sierra Club also applies to the emission limitations 
affected by the title V affirmative defenses. Environmental commenters 
further asserted that the fundamental principles underlying the Sierra 
Club decision with respect to exemptions were reinforced by the D.C. 
Circuit's U.S. Sugar decision.
    However, a number of industry commenters challenged the EPA's 
interpretation of the Sierra Club case, arguing generally that the case 
has limited applicability beyond the context of section 112 standards. 
Some commenters asserted that Sierra Club is not relevant to the 
current rulemaking because the case was anchored to the unique language 
of CAA section 112 and only addressed exemptions under CAA section 112, 
rather than regulations in operating permit programs, SIP requirements, 
or New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) regulations. One commenter 
argued that because the Sierra Club decision was

[[Page 47036]]

limited to section 112 standards, the decision could at most be read to 
prohibit title V provisions excusing noncompliance with an underlying 
NESHAP provision.
    Other commenters asserted that requirements that limit emissions on 
a continuous basis do not have to impose the same limitation at all 
times, and that the form of the limitation does not always have to be 
the same. For example, commenters noted that CAA section 302(k) 
includes design, equipment, work practice, and operational standards, 
which could apply during periods of operation not covered by a 
numerical emissions limitation. These commenters claim that the Sierra 
Club case did not approach the question of whether these different 
types of standards would be acceptable. One commenter also asserted 
that the emergency affirmative defense is not an exemption from 
continuously applicable emission limits.
    Response: As discussed in the preceding subsection, the title V 
emergency affirmative defense provisions should not be interpreted to 
provide an exemption to emission limits or otherwise define when a 
violation of an emission limitation has occurred. However, as noted in 
the proposal, to the extent that the title V provisions could be 
interpreted as providing such an exemption, this would run afoul of the 
CAA requirement that emission limitations be continuous. See CAA 
section 302(k), 42 U.S.C. 7602(k). The EPA disagrees with commenters' 
assertions that the Sierra Club court's reasoning does not apply beyond 
section 112 standards. As the EPA has explained in depth in other 
documents, the same logic prohibiting exemptions from NESHAP emission 
limits applies to other emission limitations subject to the definition 
of ``emission limitation'' within section 302(k), including emission 
limits contained within a source's title V permit.\19\ Finally, 
comments on whether it is appropriate to impose different types of 
emission limitations during different modes of operation may be 
relevant to standard-setting or other proceedings where such 
limitations are established, but these comments are not material to 
this rulemaking to remove the title V emergency affirmative defense 
provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See, e.g., SSM SIP Action, 80 FR 33892 (``Since the 2008 
D.C. Circuit decision in Sierra Club v. Johnson, however, it has 
been clear that NSPS and NESHAP standards themselves cannot contain 
such exemptions. The reasoning of the court was that exemptions for 
SSM events are impermissible because they contradict the requirement 
that emission limitations be `continuous' in accordance with the 
definition of that term in section 302(k). Although the court 
evaluated this issue in the context of EPA regulations under section 
112, the EPA believes that this same logic extends to SIP provisions 
under section 110, which similarly must contain emission limitations 
as defined in the CAA. Section 110(a)(2)(A) requires states to have 
emission limitations in their SIPs to meet other CAA requirements, 
and any such emission limitations would similarly be subject to the 
definition of that term in section 302(k).''); see also id. at 
33862.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Other Legal and Policy Considerations

    This section addresses comments involving other legal and policy 
considerations related to the EPA's removal of the title V emergency 
affirmative defense provisions.
1. Ongoing SSM SIP Action Litigation
    Comment: Some state and industry commenters urged the EPA to delay 
finalizing this action until the ongoing SSM SIP Action litigation 
concludes. These commenters claimed that the EPA's rationale underlying 
this title V action depends on the same core legal issues involving the 
EPA's interpretation of the NRDC and Sierra Club cases, which the 
commenters claimed is currently under judicial review in the SSM SIP 
Action litigation. One commenter further asserted that an adverse 
ruling in the SSM SIP Action litigation would be dispositive of the 
issues involved here.
    Response: The EPA disagrees with the commenters' suggestion to 
delay this final action. The EPA has no reason to delay moving forward 
with the removal of affirmative defense provisions from various CAA 
program areas, including title V, solely because litigants have 
challenged the SSM SIP Action. The EPA is confident of the strong legal 
and policy bases for this current action, as well as prior actions in 
the SSM SIP Action and numerous regulations promulgated under CAA 
sections 111, 112, and 129 that also address affirmative defense 
provisions. In fact, the EPA's interpretation of the CAA and its 
application of relevant court decisions was upheld by the D.C. 
Circuit.\20\ The EPA also disagrees with commenters' assertions that an 
adverse decision with respect to the SSM SIP Action would necessarily 
undermine the legal justification for this rule, because the SSM SIP 
Action litigation could be decided on procedural or substantive grounds 
that would not be determinative for this action. For example, the 
ongoing SSM SIP Action litigation involves many issues that are 
unrelated to this current rulemaking.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Specifically, the EPA's approach to addressing malfunction 
emissions in section 112 rules for major boilers and area boilers 
and section 111 and 129 rules for commercial and industrial solid 
waste incinerators was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in U.S. Sugar.
    \21\ For example, briefs filed in the SSM SIP Action litigation 
allege, among other things, that the EPA failed to make the showing 
required to issue a SIP call, which is a procedure specific to CAA 
section 110. See Brief of Industry Petitioners, SSM SIP Action 
Litigation (filed March 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Consideration of Prior Case Law
    Comment: Multiple state and industry commenters discussed court 
decisions involving SSM issues and affirmative defenses predating the 
NRDC cases. These commenters generally asserted that the EPA relied too 
heavily on the NRDC case in justifying the current action, and that the 
EPA failed to address the importance of prior case law and the 
relationship between these prior cases and the NRDC case.
    Many of these commenters cited to the Fifth Circuit's Luminant \22\ 
decision, where commenters asserted the court determined that 
affirmative defense provisions do not interfere with a court's 
jurisdiction to assess civil penalties or enforce the CAA, contrary to 
the D.C. Circuit's decision in NRDC. One commenter, acknowledging the 
differing outcomes of the Luminant and NRDC cases, asked the EPA to 
discuss this dissonance and claimed that the EPA should have sought en 
banc review of the NRDC decision before the full D.C. Circuit, or 
alternatively sought review by the Supreme Court. Another commenter 
suggested that the EPA should delay finalizing this rule because of the 
confusion in the courts resulting from the differing NRDC and Luminant 
decisions. Some commenters claimed that the Luminant case is more 
directly relevant to the current action than the NRDC case. One 
commenter asserted that the Luminant case would be controlling over the 
NRDC case in states within the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction, including 
Texas. Some commenters noted that the NRDC case explicitly 
distinguished its holding from that of Luminant and avoided confronting 
the SIP issues discussed in Luminant. Similarly, some commenters cited 
the Eleventh Circuit's Georgia Power \23\ case, which also involved 
affirmative defense provisions contained within a SIP. Some commenters 
also cited two cases where circuit courts upheld the EPA's ability to 
use affirmative defense provisions in Federal Implementation Plans 
(FIPs), including the Ninth Circuit's Montana Sulphur \24\ decision and 
the Tenth Circuit's Arizona Public

[[Page 47037]]

Service \25\ case. Other commenters cited to prior cases decided in the 
context of Clean Water Act regulations, including Marathon Oil \26\ and 
Essex Chemical,\27\ and claimed that these cases support the creation 
of mechanisms like affirmative defenses to account for the 
unforeseeable and uncontrollable failure of even the best technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Luminant Generation Co. v. EPA, 714 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 
2013).
    \23\ Sierra Club v. Georgia Power, 443 F.3d 1346, 1357 (11th 
Cir. 2006).
    \24\ Montana Sulphur & Chemical Co. v. EPA, 666 F.3d 1174 (9th 
Cir. 2012).
    \25\ Arizona Public Service v. EPA, 562 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 
2009).
    \26\ Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977).
    \27\ Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters also addressed the D.C. Circuit's U.S. Sugar 
decision. One commenter claimed generally that the case did not 
undercut the EPA's basis for providing the title V emergency 
affirmative defense. Other commenters, however, claimed that U.S. Sugar 
reinforced the EPA's view that affirmative defense provisions that 
constrain or interfere with a court's authority under CAA sections 113 
and 304 are inimical to the Act.
    Response: The EPA acknowledges that various circuit court cases 
preceding the D.C. Circuit's NRDC decision, including the Fifth 
Circuit's Luminant decision, upheld the agency's prior interpretation 
of affirmative defense provisions in various contexts, including the 
authority of the EPA to approve affirmative defense provisions 
contained in SIPs and the authority of the EPA to create affirmative 
defense provisions in FIPs. In these decisions, the courts deferred to 
the EPA's prior interpretation of the CAA with respect to affirmative 
defense provisions.\28\ While some courts found the EPA's former 
interpretation permissible, those courts did not determine that the 
EPA's former interpretation was the only or even the best permissible 
interpretation. As previously noted, it is well within the EPA's legal 
authority to now revise its interpretation to a different 
interpretation of the CAA.\29\ Those prior decisions were based upon an 
interpretation of the CAA that the agency no longer holds, and 
therefore those prior decisions do not speak to the validity of the 
EPA's current policy with respect to affirmative defenses. The EPA 
further notes that the affirmative defense provisions at issue in the 
other court decisions cited by the commenters, including affirmative 
defenses in SIPs and FIPs, are not affected by this action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ For example, the Fifth Circuit in Luminant held that the 
EPA's interpretation of the CAA at that time was a ``permissible 
interpretation of section [113], warranting deference.'' 714 F.3d at 
853.
    \29\ FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 
(2009); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In NRDC, however, the D.C. Circuit conclusively determined that the 
EPA's former interpretation of the CAA concerning affirmative defenses 
was not permissible with respect to section 112 standards promulgated 
by the EPA. The NRDC court vacated the affirmative defense provisions 
in that case, finding them without legal basis because they 
contradicted fundamental requirements of the Act concerning the 
authority of courts to decide whether to assess civil penalties in CAA 
enforcement suits. Because the NRDC decision interprets CAA sections 
113 and 304 and addresses the legal basis for affirmative defense 
provisions, the EPA has reevaluated its interpretation of the CAA with 
respect to affirmative defense provisions in title V programs as well. 
Based on this reevaluation and the reasoning of the NRDC decision, the 
EPA has determined that it is appropriate to remove the emergency 
affirmative defense provisions in 40 CFR 70.6(g) and 71.6(g), and to 
require removal of similar affirmative defense provisions from state 
operating permit programs and individual operating permits, because 
these provisions are not authorized by the CAA.
    Finally, the EPA notes that the D.C. Circuit's U.S. Sugar decision 
further reinforced the principles underlying the NRDC decision. In U.S. 
Sugar, the D.C. Circuit, acknowledging that the EPA could not create an 
exemption or affirmative defense provision, deferred to the EPA's 
decision to rely on case-by-case enforcement discretion as the 
mechanism to handle excess emissions during malfunctions.\30\ Arguments 
suggesting that prior cases, including Marathon Oil and Essex Chemical, 
require the EPA to provide affirmative defenses in such situations are 
contrary to the U.S. Sugar decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ U.S. Sugar, 830 F.3d at 607-09.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. EPA's Historical Policies Concerning Affirmative Defense Provisions
    Comment: A number of commenters addressed the EPA's historical 
policies concerning affirmative defenses,\31\ including the title V 
emergency provisions and the policy considerations underlying this type 
of mechanism to address emissions in unusual situations. Many 
commenters discussed the EPA's initial decision to create the title V 
affirmative defense in the 1992 part 70 rule and 1996 part 71 rule. One 
commenter claimed that the EPA initially included the title V 
provisions to do what was right, even if the EPA did not concede that 
it was required. Commenters focused on the initial purpose of the 
emergency provisions, asserting that the affirmative defense provisions 
were a very limited, appropriate recognition that even properly 
designed and maintained technology is not infallible and can fail due 
to emergencies beyond the control of a source. Other commenters noted 
the EPA's prior approach that acknowledged that enforcement and the 
imposition of penalties might not be appropriate in certain situations 
beyond the control of the source. Commenters asserted that the NRDC 
decision does not undermine the policy reasons that initially informed 
the promulgation of affirmative defense provisions, and that these same 
policy reasons support the title V emergency affirmative defense 
provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ Some commenters also discussed the EPA's historical policy 
on exemptions prior to the Sierra Club case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also claimed that the title V emergency provisions are 
consistent with decades of EPA policy, citing various rulemakings and 
guidance documents. Commenters also stated that these types of 
affirmative defense provisions were recognized by states long before 
the 1990 CAA Amendments and the title V operating permits program, and 
that the title V affirmative defense provisions have existed for over 
25 years. Commenters also pointed to other EPA actions justifying 
affirmative defenses, including FIPs for Montana and New Mexico, EPA's 
briefs prepared for litigation in the Luminant case, and EPA's 
withdrawal of Texas' SIP Call. Commenters also noted that affirmative 
defense provisions are still contained in other regulations promulgated 
by the EPA, including NSPS and NESHAP standards.
    Some commenters addressed the EPA's legal authority to change its 
policy on affirmative defenses. Commenters asserted that agencies are 
only permitted to change their existing interpretations when they offer 
a reasoned explanation for the change, citing various Supreme Court 
cases including Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro \32\ and FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations.\33\ These commenters alleged that the EPA's action 
is arbitrary and capricious because the EPA has failed to provide an 
adequate justification for the agency's revised policy with respect to 
the title V affirmative defenses. However, other commenters 
acknowledged that the EPA may change its interpretation so long as the 
agency provides a reasoned explanation, and

[[Page 47038]]

agreed that the justifications provided by the EPA in the 2016 and 2022 
proposed rules are sufficient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016).
    \33\ 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, some commenters discussed the perceived inequity or 
unfairness of the EPA's change in policy and removal of affirmative 
defense provisions, based in part on the supposition that sources have 
come to rely on these provisions. Specific comments addressing how the 
removal of the title V affirmative defense provisions could impact 
sources are discussed further in section III.D.2. of this document.
    Response: The EPA acknowledges the underlying considerations 
supporting the EPA's past policies--especially the agency's recognition 
that even well-designed and appropriately operated equipment may 
sometimes fail due to circumstances beyond the control of the source 
(such as during emergencies) and that, in certain situations, 
enforcement for violations of technology-based standards may not be 
appropriate. This rule does not change that general recognition. As 
discussed in section III.D.2. of this document, the EPA continues to 
believe that enforcement may not be warranted under certain specific 
circumstances, such as during an emergency, as determined on a case-by-
case basis by enforcement authorities. The EPA, states, citizens, and 
the courts retain the discretion and authority to consider such 
circumstances in evaluating how to respond to exceedances or 
violations. However, an affirmative defense provision that interferes 
with the authority of courts to assess penalties is no longer an 
appropriate or legally sound mechanism to address these situations.
    The EPA also acknowledges its past policies regarding different 
mechanisms to account for excess emissions during periods of SSM and 
emergencies. Based on these former policies, the EPA previously 
established affirmative defense provisions in various other CAA program 
areas, including within previously promulgated FIPs and various NSPS 
and NESHAP regulations. However, since that time, decisions from the 
D.C. Circuit, including Sierra Club and NRDC, have established 
parameters under the CAA regarding legally permissible approaches for 
addressing excess emissions during periods of SSM or emergency events. 
In light of these decisions--particularly the 2014 NRDC decision--the 
EPA has concluded that certain aspects of its prior interpretation of 
the CAA were not legally permissible under the CAA. Thus, the EPA has 
revised its interpretation of the CAA with respect to affirmative 
defense provisions, and this revised interpretation provides the basis 
for the current action (and similar actions in other CAA program 
areas).
    Following the 2016 proposal, the EPA continued to evaluate SSM 
provisions, including affirmative defenses, in SIPs. In October 2020, 
the EPA issued a guidance memorandum that, among other things, 
expressly superseded a portion of the EPA's interpretation of 
affirmative defenses presented in the 2015 SSM SIP Policy.\34\ However, 
on September 30, 2021, the EPA issued a guidance memorandum that 
withdrew the October 2020 memorandum in its entirety and reinstated the 
legal and policy positions expressed in the 2015 SSM SIP Policy in 
their entirety.\35\ Thus, the EPA's current interpretation of 
affirmative defenses in the context of SIPs is the interpretation set 
out in the 2015 SSM SIP Policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Memorandum, Inclusion of Provisions Governing Periods of 
Startup, Shutdown, and Malfunctions in State Implementation Plans, 6 
(October 9, 2020), available at https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-09/2020-ssm-in-sipsguidance-memo.pdf. In 2020, EPA 
also took action relating to an SSM-related affirmative defense in a 
SIP for Texas, withdrawing a SSM ``SIP call'' in part because the 
SIP-based affirmative defense was deemed to not be inconsistent with 
the CAA. See 85 FR 7232 (February 7, 2020); see also 85 FR 23700 
(April 28, 2020) (SIP call withdrawal relating to North Carolina) 
and 85 FR 73218 (November 17, 2020) (SIP call withdrawal relating to 
Iowa). Petitions for review of these withdrawal actions were filed 
in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See 
Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 20-1115.
    \35\ September 2021 SSM SIP Memo, supra note 5. This memorandum 
also announced an intent to revisit, among other things, the 2020 
action withdrawing the SSM affirmative defense-related SIP call for 
Texas. Id. at 5. On December 17, 2021, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted the EPA's request for a 
voluntary remand of that 2020 Texas SIP call withdrawal action, as 
well as the similar SIP call withdrawal actions relating to North 
Carolina and Iowa, in light of EPA's stated intent to reconsider 
those actions. Sierra Club v. EPA, No. 20-1115.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The EPA's revised interpretation following the NRDC decision was, 
and continues to be, well within the EPA's legal authority, and the EPA 
has properly exercised its authority to revise its interpretation of 
the CAA through the appropriate processes. The authority of an agency 
to change its interpretation of a statute is well-established, provided 
that it gives a reasoned explanation for the change.\36\ The EPA 
disagrees with commenters that suggest that the EPA has not provided an 
adequate rationale for this shift in policy, either generally with 
respect to affirmative defenses or specifically with respect to the 
title V emergency affirmative defense provisions. The EPA has clearly 
articulated its revised interpretation of the CAA with respect to 
affirmative defenses, here and in other documents, including the 2016 
proposed rule (as referenced in the 2022 proposed rule), based on the 
EPA's analysis of the NRDC decision.\37\ Commenters have not 
substantiated their claim that the EPA's rationale is inadequate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125-26; FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009); see also Nat'l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
981-82 (2005) (agency must adequately explain the reasons for a 
reversal of policy).
    \37\ The EPA has clearly explained its general shift in policy 
with respect to affirmative defense provisions in other documents. 
See, e.g., 81 FR 36849; SSM SIP Action Supplemental Proposal, 79 FR 
55934; SSM SIP Action, 80 FR 33851.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Consistency With Other CAA Program Areas
    Comment: A number of commenters acknowledged and addressed the 
EPA's desire to ensure consistent agency policy with respect to 
affirmative defense provisions across different CAA program areas. 
However, some commenters asserted that consistency between the EPA's 
title V regulations and other CAA programs is not a rationale for 
taking this action. Other commenters disagreed that the title V 
provisions should be removed for consistency with actions like the 2015 
SSM SIP Action, arguing that the two actions are distinguishable. 
Finally, some commenters claimed that removal of the title V 
affirmative defense would actually undermine the goal of consistency 
across CAA program areas, because title V permits incorporate emission 
limits developed under numerous CAA regulatory authorities, and because 
various NSPS, NESHAP, and SIP regulations currently still contain 
affirmative defense provisions.
    One commenter also suggested that the EPA could resolve any 
inconsistency between the title V affirmative defense provisions and 
underlying standards that do not allow an affirmative defense by 
clarifying through an interpretive rule or rule revision that 
nationwide standards outweigh affirmative defense provisions under 
title V.
    Response: The EPA is not removing the title V emergency affirmative 
defense provisions solely for the sake of consistency. Rather, as 
discussed in the proposal and in section III.A. of this document, these 
provisions present legal issues substantially similar to those that 
called for the removal of affirmative defense provisions from other 
regulations. In addition to the legal considerations supporting the 
current action, and as previously explained in the preamble to the 2016 
proposed rule (as referenced in the 2022 proposal), the EPA believes 
that it is important to apply, as much as

[[Page 47039]]

reasonably possible, the EPA's policy concerning affirmative defense 
provisions consistently across CAA program areas. As previously 
explained, the EPA has removed affirmative defense provisions from 
numerous other CAA standards since the 2014 NRDC decision.\38\ Based on 
the relationship between title V and these underlying standards, it is 
particularly important to remove the affirmative defense provisions 
from the title V program regulations. Title V permits include a wide 
range of substantive CAA requirements that apply to a source, including 
SIP provisions and standards developed under CAA sections 111, 112, and 
129. Because the title V affirmative defense provisions applied 
independent of these underlying standards, the title V emergency 
affirmative defense might be asserted in civil actions or other 
proceedings involving noncompliance with title V permit terms 
reflecting standards from which the EPA has recently eliminated 
affirmative defenses. In this way, the continued presence of the title 
V affirmative defense provisions could effectively undermine the EPA's 
efforts to remove affirmative defenses from the underlying standards, 
as well as the efforts of states to revise SIPs to comply with the 2015 
SSM SIP Action. The EPA acknowledges that not all affirmative defense 
provisions in the EPA's regulations have been removed as of the date of 
this rule. However, the fact that this is an ongoing process does not 
provide a basis for retaining or delaying removal of the title V 
affirmative defense provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ 87 FR 19042, 19044, n. 3 (citing recent EPA rulemakings 
removing affirmative defense provisions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, the EPA does not believe that it would be appropriate to 
simply clarify in some manner--whether by revising the emergency 
affirmative defense rules or issuing guidance--that the title V 
affirmative defense would not apply where the underlying standards do 
not allow or provide for an affirmative defense. Although this approach 
could potentially reduce inconsistency between title V provisions and 
the underlying standards from which affirmative defenses have been 
removed, it would nonetheless fail to address the more fundamental 
problem that the title V affirmative defense provisions are, in and of 
themselves, inconsistent with the enforcement structure of the CAA and 
thus legally impermissible.
5. Relationship to Other CAA Standards
    Comment: Commenters raised a number of concerns involving the 
relationship between the title V emergency affirmative defense and 
other CAA standards, including section 112 NESHAP, section 111 NSPS, 
and SIPs. Comments specifically relating to SIPs are discussed in the 
following subsection.
    Commenters claimed generally that the EPA has failed to consider 
how the CAA requirements related to enforcement must be harmonized with 
the CAA requirements relating to standard setting and permitting. One 
commenter claimed that the title V affirmative defense provisions avoid 
the need to address emergencies in each individual underlying standard, 
which the commenter characterized as an impractical approach. Another 
commenter asserted that the title V affirmative defense provisions have 
effectively become part of the underlying applicable standards, and 
other commenters suggested that the title V affirmative defense 
provisions are necessary to ensure that underlying technology-based 
standards are achievable and adequately demonstrated, taking into 
account costs. These commenters asserted that removing the affirmative 
defense would have the effect of making the underlying standards in a 
permit more stringent than those authorized by the governing standards, 
in that sources would be subject to a level of control technology that 
is technologically and economically infeasible. Other commenters 
suggested that if affirmative defenses are removed, either title V 
permits or underlying standards would need to provide some other way to 
account for malfunctions, such as through alternative emission 
limitations, work practice standards, or malfunction abatement plans.
    Some commenters also claimed that the overlap between the title V 
emergency provisions and various malfunction provisions in NSPS and 
NESHAP regulations could cause confusion. However, other commenters 
recognized that the removal of the title V affirmative defense 
provisions should not have any impact on independent malfunction or 
emergency provisions contained in underlying technology-based 
standards.
    Lastly, several environmental commenters asserted that EPA must go 
further and quickly remove ``SSM loopholes'' from other CAA programs, 
including section 111 NSPS, section 112 NESHAP, and SIPs.
    Response: Many of the comments relating to malfunction emissions 
and the development of technology-based standards are either not 
directly related to the current rule to remove the title V emergency 
affirmative defense provisions or reflect a misunderstanding about the 
relationship between the title V affirmative defense provisions and 
underlying standards included within operating permits. As an initial 
matter, title V of the CAA does not generally impose new substantive 
requirements on a source. Rather, title V permits provide a vehicle to 
clarify in a single document the various CAA requirements applicable to 
a source. Although title V permits must contain conditions (such as 
monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting provisions) necessary to 
assure compliance with all CAA requirements already applicable to a 
source, title V of the CAA does not provide the basis for making 
substantive changes to underlying applicable standards.\39\ Therefore, 
title V permits are not an appropriate mechanism for addressing 
commenters' concerns related to the development of, for example, 
alternative emission limits, work practice standards, or malfunction 
abatement plans. These considerations may be more relevant in the 
context of developing specific SIP provisions or section 111, 112 or 
129 standards.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ 40 CFR 70.1(b) (requiring all title V sources to have a 
permit to operate that ``assures compliance by the source with all 
applicable requirements'' and stating that ``title V does not impose 
substantive new requirements,'' although it does require imposition 
of fees and certain compliance measures).
    \40\ The D.C. Circuit's U.S. Sugar decision addressed arguments, 
raised in the context of challenges to NESHAPs issued under CAA 
section 112 that did not provide for an affirmative defense for 
unavoidable malfunctions, that such malfunctions must be accounted 
for either by an affirmative defense or by appropriate adjustments 
in the standard-setting itself. The D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA's 
decision to neither include an affirmative defense nor adjust the 
underlying standard, as requested by Petitioners, to account for 
malfunction periods. Instead, the court upheld the EPA's decision to 
use enforcement discretion to address exceedances that occur during 
malfunction periods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, the underlying standards, not the title V affirmative 
defense provisions, establish the appropriate level of emission 
controls, accounting for technological, economic, and other 
considerations, as appropriate. The title V emergency affirmative 
defense provisions are not, as some commenters suggested, part of the 
underlying applicable requirements themselves. The title V affirmative 
defense provisions operated independently from the specific standards 
and/or emission limits, as well as any emergency, malfunction, or upset 
provisions contained within underlying applicable

[[Page 47040]]

requirements. Although the title V provisions provided for an 
affirmative defense in emergencies, removal of the affirmative defenses 
would not make underlying technology-based standards more stringent or 
otherwise have any effect on standards applicable to a source. The 
title V provisions merely provided an affirmative defense that a 
source, after having allegedly violated a technology-based emission 
limitation contained in its title V permit, could assert in an 
enforcement proceeding brought for alleged violations of the title V 
permit term reflecting the requirements of the underlying standard. 
Because the title V affirmative defense did not provide an exemption to 
any standard or define when a violation of a standard has occurred, a 
source's compliance status with the underlying standard itself--as well 
as the source's compliance status with the title V permit term--would 
not be affected by the presence or absence of an affirmative defense.
    Finally, comments discussing the purported need to provide for or 
address excess emissions associated with malfunctions are immaterial 
because this action addresses the title V affirmative defense 
provisions for emergencies, which--although there may be some 
similarities--are significantly different, and narrower, than 
malfunction events. For further discussion, see section III.D.3. of 
this document.
6. Relationship to the 2015 SSM SIP Action
    Comment: Multiple commenters addressed the relationship between 
this action and the 2015 SSM SIP Action. Some commenters asserted that 
the EPA's current action is based on the 2015 SSM SIP Action, or 
claimed that the two actions are related for various reasons. Other 
commenters claimed that the 2015 SSM SIP Action is not at issue in this 
rulemaking, disagreed with the EPA's statements that certain aspects of 
the 2015 SSM SIP Action are especially relevant, and attempted to 
distinguish the types of provisions at issue in the 2015 SSM SIP Action 
from those at issue here.
    Some commenters also specifically discussed the need for states to 
develop SIP provisions that account for SSM situations (including work 
practice standards) and claimed that states should not be prohibited 
from including approved state SSM plans in title V permits. One 
commenter suggested that removing the title V affirmative defense 
provisions before SIP issues are resolved could prevent states from 
incorporating all applicable requirements, including SIP requirements, 
into title V permits, and another commenter asserted that this title V 
rule should be withdrawn while states modify their rules to address the 
2015 SSM SIP Action. On the other hand, other commenters suggested that 
by promptly finalizing this title V rule, the EPA can better facilitate 
the coordination of SSM SIP revisions with title V program revisions 
and individual operating permit revisions.
    Response: This current title V rule is related to the 2015 SSM SIP 
Action to the extent that each rule is based at least in part on the 
EPA's view that, in light of the NRDC decision, affirmative defense 
provisions are contrary to the enforcement structure of the CAA.\41\ 
However, this title V action is not ``based on'' the 2015 SSM SIP 
Action, and the two actions are functionally independent rulemakings, 
each operating within distinct areas of the CAA's regulatory structure. 
Therefore, and for the reasons discussed in the preceding subsection 
discussing the relationship between title V and other CAA standards, 
this current action involving the title V affirmative defense 
provisions will not have any effect on states' ability to develop 
appropriate SIP provisions in response to the 2015 SSM SIP Action, and 
it will not affect states' ability to ensure that title V permits 
appropriately reflect all requirements applicable to a source, 
including revised SIP provisions. In fact, as some commenters 
indicated, it may be convenient for states to coordinate implementation 
of any title V permit changes related to the 2015 SSM SIP Action with 
permit changes related to this rulemaking. Issues regarding 
implementation of this rule are discussed further in section IV. of 
this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ This legal rationale is not affected by any differences 
between affirmative defense provisions implicated by the 2015 SSM 
SIP Action and those implicated by this action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Title V of the CAA
    Comment: Some commenters noted that while title V of the CAA does 
not establish or mandate affirmative defense provisions, neither does 
title V of the CAA prohibit the EPA from establishing affirmative 
defenses.
    Response: The EPA acknowledges that title V of the CAA is silent 
with respect to affirmative defense provisions; it neither provides for 
such provisions nor explicitly prohibits them. However, the EPA 
interprets other provisions of the CAA that apply to enforcement of the 
title V operating permits program--including sections 113 and 304--to 
effectively prohibit the creation of affirmative defense provisions, as 
discussed in section III.A.1. of this document.
8. Constitutional Issues
    Comment: Some commenters raised constitutional issues with the 
removal of the title V emergency affirmative defense provisions. 
Commenters argued that the imposition of penalties for any conduct that 
is unavoidable violates basic constitutional protections guaranteed by 
the Eighth Amendment and due process requirements. Commenters further 
asserted that explicit affirmative defense provisions are necessary to 
satisfy minimum constitutional standards, and that alternative 
approaches, such as the exercise of enforcement discretion, are not 
sufficient.
    Response: The EPA disagrees with commenters with respect to these 
constitutional arguments. The comments suggest that without the title V 
affirmative defense, any penalty assessed for violation of a title V 
permit term during an emergency would be per se ``excessive'' or 
``arbitrary'' and that the existing CAA enforcement provisions would be 
facially unconstitutional. The EPA disagrees. It should be reiterated, 
first, that the title V emergency affirmative defense has never been a 
required permit term and it has not universally been adopted by all 
permitting authorities for all permits. Even where the defense may be 
available, it is, by its own terms, very limited and narrowly 
circumscribed. Commenters have provided no information indicating that 
the defense has been asserted with any frequency or, indeed, at all. It 
is difficult to see how the removal from the EPA's regulations of a 
narrowly circumscribed, discretionary defense that apparently is 
infrequently asserted could render the CAA unconstitutional.
    Moreover, the CAA does not mandate that EPA automatically initiate 
an enforcement action, let alone automatically assess a penalty, for a 
violation of a CAA requirement. EPA has absolute discretion on whether 
to initiate an enforcement action in any circumstance, including during 
an emergency.\42\ If EPA chooses to initiate an enforcement action in a 
circumstance involving a violation during an emergency, and chooses to 
seek a penalty for that violation, the CAA establishes a maximum civil 
penalty in

[[Page 47041]]

section 113(b) \43\ but then expressly provides in section 113(e) that 
the EPA or the courts ``shall take into consideration various 
criteria--including specifically, ``good faith efforts to comply,'' 
and, more generally, ``other factors as justice may require.'' Thus, 
the CAA on its face does not mandate the imposition of any penalty 
automatically, much less one that is per se excessive. The commenters 
fail to provide any specific support for their claim that the statutory 
penalty provisions of the CAA are facially unconstitutional, instead 
making only generalized claims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (holding that 
decisions of agency not to undertake enforcement action are presumed 
unreviewable).
    \43\ The maximum statutory civil monetary penalty amounts are 
adjusted annually for inflation in 40 CFR part 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell,\44\ 
a case cited by some commenters, provides no support for any claim that 
removal of the title V affirmative defense would somehow be 
unconstitutional. State Farm involved a claim that a jury award of $145 
million in punitive damages was excessive and, accordingly, contrary to 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Reaffirming that the Fourteenth Amendment ``prohibits the 
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments,'' the Supreme 
Court held that, under the particular circumstances of the case, the 
punitive damages award was excessive and ``an irrational and arbitrary 
deprivation of property.'' \45\ Here, no penalties have been assessed 
at all, and State Farm provides no support for the conclusion that--
absent the title V emergency affirmative defenses--the CAA's 
authorization, in accordance with various identified criteria, of 
possible penalties is necessarily unconstitutional.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
    \45\ Id. at 429.
    \46\ Additionally, State Farm involved a claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which imposes limitations on the states, not 
the federal government. This discussion assumes, for the sake of 
argument, that the principles expressed in State Farm would also 
apply to claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The EPA also disagrees with the claims that--absent the title V 
affirmative defenses--the penalty provisions of the CAA would be 
facially contrary to the Eighth Amendment. Again, if a party believes 
that the penalties assessed in a particular enforcement action violate 
the Eighth Amendment, it can raise that claim at the appropriate time. 
As with the commenters' due process arguments, Congress has addressed 
the potential for unfair--or unconstitutional--penalties by setting out 
various criteria to be considered in determining civil penalties. The 
penalty criteria in section 113(e) provide an opportunity to raise 
concerns about imposition of penalties in the event of an emergency 
similar to that afforded by the title V affirmative defenses, albeit 
directed at the courts' discretion. The commenters do not explain why 
they believe these explicit statutory factors do not provide sufficient 
protection against the imposition of an allegedly unconstitutionally 
excessive penalty.

D. Potential Impacts

    This section discusses various issues involving the effects of 
removing the title V emergency affirmative defense provisions, focusing 
primarily on the impact on sources. Overall, the EPA does not believe 
that removing the emergency affirmative defense provisions will 
substantially affect the legal rights of title V sources or the 
decisions sources make when confronted with emergency situations. It is 
also important to reiterate that the EPA is basing the current action 
on its interpretation of the CAA in light of relevant caselaw 
indicating that these affirmative defense provisions must be removed 
because they are inconsistent with the enforcement structure of the 
CAA.
1. Scope and Use of Title V Affirmative Defense Provisions
    Comment: Multiple state and industry commenters acknowledged the 
limited scope of the title V affirmative defense provisions, which 
apply only to emergency situations. Commenters also addressed the 
relationship between emergencies and malfunctions. While some 
commenters provided examples of situations that would constitute an 
emergency but not a malfunction, other commenters asserted that the 
terms ``emergency'' and ``malfunction'' are closely related in that 
they both relate to unexpected and unforeseen events.
    A number of commenters further acknowledged the limited historical 
and potential use of the title V emergency affirmative defense 
provisions. However, commenters suggested that the rule could have 
greater impacts than might be apparent.
    Environmental commenters, on the other hand, characterized large 
SSM exceedances as routine and claimed that large polluters have used 
affirmative defense provisions in many citizen enforcement actions. 
Additionally, these commenters asserted that excess emissions are often 
the result of operator errors, poor plant design, and a lack of 
preventive maintenance. Thus, commenters claimed that sources using SSM 
affirmative defense provisions have lacked an incentive to make 
investments in accident prevention. Finally, these commenters claimed 
that emissions during SSM and emergency events can be controlled.
    Response: The EPA agrees with commenters that emphasized the 
limited scope of the title V emergency affirmative defense provisions. 
Unlike more general affirmative defense provisions addressing excess 
emissions during equipment malfunctions (which some commenters appear 
to address), the title V provisions being removed were specific to 
situations that qualify as an ``emergency,'' defined as ``any situation 
arising from sudden and reasonably unforeseeable events beyond the 
control of the source, including acts of God, which situation requires 
immediate corrective action to restore normal operation, and that 
causes the source to exceed a technology-based emission limitation 
under the permit, due to unavoidable increases in emissions 
attributable to the emergency.'' 40 CFR 70.6(g)(1). Thus, while the 
title V emergency affirmative defenses, like affirmative defenses for 
malfunctions, relate to events that are beyond the control of a source, 
the title V defenses would only have been available in a more extreme, 
limited set of circumstances. While it is possible for some overlap in 
malfunction and emergency situations to exist (e.g., certain emergency 
events could potentially cause equipment malfunctions), the EPA 
believes that the majority of exceedances during malfunction events 
would not be attributable to ``emergencies'' as defined in the title V 
affirmative defense provisions. In addition, the title V affirmative 
defense provisions being removed contain various procedural 
requirements that must be met to assert the defense. See 40 CFR 
70.6(g)(3). Moreover, as some commenters acknowledged and based on the 
best information available to the EPA, the title V emergency 
affirmative defense provisions have rarely, if ever, been asserted in 
enforcement proceedings. Comments contending that sources frequently or 
routinely have asserted affirmative defenses appear to relate to SSM 
affirmative defenses, rather than the narrower title V affirmative 
defense for emergencies. It is unlikely that the criteria for the title 
V emergency affirmative defense would have been met in such 
circumstances, as the title V provisions could not be asserted for 
(among other things) noncompliance caused by improperly designed 
equipment, lack of preventative

[[Page 47042]]

maintenance, careless or improper operation, or operator error.
    For these reasons, the EPA does not believe that the removal of the 
narrowly drawn and apparently infrequently used title V emergency 
affirmative defense provisions will have a significant impact on 
sources. Further, as discussed in the following subsection, the EPA, 
state authorities, and other entities likely would consider the 
relevant circumstances--especially the relatively unusual, extreme, and 
unavoidable circumstances that would have qualified under the narrow 
definition of ``emergency''--in deciding whether to pursue enforcement 
action or seek penalties, and sources remain free to argue to the 
court, in the event of an enforcement action, that penalties should not 
be assessed for these same reasons.
2. Alternatives to an Affirmative Defense: Discretion To Initiate 
Enforcement and the Discretion of Decision Makers To Determine 
Appropriate Remedies
    Comment: Many commenters expressed concerns that removing the title 
V emergency affirmative defense provisions would result in less 
certainty or greater risk of liability to sources confronted with 
emergency situations. One commenter asserted that even if the EPA is 
not legally required to provide an affirmative defense in title V 
permits, the EPA should, to the maximum extent consistent with law, 
continue to provide and allow states to provide sources relief from the 
threat of enforcement for exceedances caused by emergencies. Another 
commenter claimed more generally that the EPA must find other ways to 
assure sources that they will not be subject to penalties if they 
operate to provide vital services in an emergency. Commenters generally 
requested additional guidance from the EPA to provide more certainty to 
sources in the absence of an explicitly codified affirmative defense.
    Most commenters acknowledged the fact that even in the absence of 
an affirmative defense, the EPA, state, and citizens all retain the 
discretion to determine whether to bring an enforcement action, based 
on the unique circumstances of each case. Thus, most commenters 
acknowledged that not all exceedances of emission limits will 
automatically result in enforcement actions. One commenter asserted 
that the EPA routinely uses enforcement discretion to decide which 
alleged violations to pursue, and that such decisions are often made on 
the same principles codified in an affirmative defense. Other 
commenters asserted that the EPA does not intend for true emergencies 
to result in increased enforcement, and that the EPA's suggested 
enforcement discretion approach avoids forcing every violation to 
judicial resolution. Finally, one commenter asserted that the exercise 
of enforcement discretion by state permitting authorities is 
appropriate and consistent with CAA sections 113 and 304 and separation 
of power principles.
    However, a number of commenters challenged the sufficiency of 
relying on enforcement discretion alone to handle excess emissions 
caused by emergencies. Commenters noted that explicitly codified 
affirmative defense provisions have the benefit of providing certainty 
to permittees, promoting consistency to agency actions, and promoting 
the creation and retention of records necessary to justify agency 
actions. Commenters claimed that relying on enforcement discretion 
alone would result in more uncertainty and jeopardy and less harmony 
among different CAA programs, because enforcement discretion policies 
may be unwritten and unavailable to the public. Other commenters noted, 
citing the U.S. Sugar decision, that federal and state policies 
regarding enforcement discretion do nothing to prevent citizens from 
pursuing enforcement. Some commenters also asserted that an enforcement 
discretion approach still leaves sources in the difficult position of 
choosing between proper emergency response and compliance with emission 
limits. Other commenters claimed that relying on enforcement discretion 
puts all power in the hands of the EPA, without any checks and 
balances, and asserted that this contradicts principles of cooperative 
federalism and exceeds the authority intended in the passage of the 
CAA.
    Some commenters discussed how prior court decisions have treated 
enforcement discretion. One commenter claimed that the D.C. Circuit in 
U.S. Sugar acknowledged, but did not evaluate, the EPA's reliance on 
enforcement discretion, and the commenter alleged that the court 
appeared to have doubts that enforcement discretion alone is 
sufficient. Another commenter claimed that the U.S. Sugar decision did 
not validate the enforcement discretion approach beyond the context of 
section 112 standards. Other commenters cited to the 1973 D.C. Circuit 
opinion in Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus \47\ in support of 
their position that reliance on enforcement discretion is not a 
sufficient response to addressing excess emissions from malfunctions, 
and another commenter claimed that the 9th Circuit rejected the EPA's 
use of enforcement discretion in the 1977 Marathon Oil \48\ Clean Water 
Act case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ 486 F.2d 375, 399 n.91 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
    \48\ Marathon Oil Co v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 
1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters requested that the EPA provide additional guidance 
to clarify the circumstances under which permitting authorities 
(including the EPA) should exercise their discretion not to bring 
enforcement actions. Many commenters encouraged the use of the criteria 
contained in 40 CFR 70.6(g) in guiding permitting authorities' exercise 
of enforcement discretion. Some commenters asserted that states should 
be able to rely on those criteria when exercising their enforcement 
discretion. Other commenters urged the EPA: to make clear that the EPA 
would not expect to bring an enforcement action under circumstances 
meeting those criteria; to make clear that the EPA would continue to 
use its enforcement discretion in the case of emergency situations; and 
to create a strong policy statement that the EPA does not support civil 
penalties in situations meeting those criteria. Commenters, with one 
quoting a passage from the EPA's brief in the U.S. Sugar case, urged 
the EPA to more fully articulate certain standards for determining 
whether the EPA would pursue enforcement in a given situation, 
including consideration of the good faith efforts of a source to 
minimize emissions, which types of preventative and corrective actions 
would be considered, and the nature and extent of the root cause 
analysis that should be employed by sources to ascertain and rectify 
excess emissions. Another commenter claimed that it is appropriate for 
permitting authorities to take into account circumstances involving how 
a source mitigated damage to people and the environment in responding 
to an emergency.
    Relatedly, one commenter suggested that instead of removing the 
affirmative defense provisions, the EPA should amend them to provide 
that the affirmative defense may be allowed, if specified conditions 
are met, at the discretion of the enforcement entity.
    Commenters also acknowledged that even when an enforcement action 
is commenced, the ultimate decision makers also have the discretion to 
determine whether and to what extent penalties are appropriate in a 
given situation. Environmental commenters asserted that both the EPA 
and the NRDC court recognized that even

[[Page 47043]]

without an affirmative defense, sources are still free to argue to a 
court that they should be subject to lesser (or no) civil penalties for 
any number of reasons, including practical considerations or 
emergencies. Another commenter noted that the D.C. Circuit in U.S. 
Sugar confirmed that sources may still argue to a court that penalties 
should not be assessed in a given situation, and that sources may 
support these arguments with relevant facts, such as the source's 
compliance history and good faith efforts to comply with emission 
limits.
    However, while some commenters acknowledged that the absence of an 
affirmative defense would not automatically result in the imposition of 
particular remedies, other commenters asserted that without an 
affirmative defense, sources would lack a legal defense in enforcement 
actions and would be liable for unforeseeable events outside of their 
control. One commenter claimed that this would be unjust, and that 
imposing an unjust system would foster disrespect for the law.
    Finally, some commenters requested further guidance on how sources 
could make similar defenses in enforcement proceedings. Commenters 
requested that the EPA retain or narrow the definition of ``emergency'' 
in its regulations, as this definition could help guide a court's 
review of circumstances that are unlikely to warrant punishment, and 
could provide more certainty to sources.
    Response: As discussed in detail in the 2016 proposal,\49\ the EPA 
reiterates that the legal rights and obligations of individual sources 
potentially subject to enforcement proceedings will not be 
significantly affected by the removal of emergency affirmative defense 
provisions from their title V permits. The absence of an affirmative 
defense provision in a source's title V permit does not mean that all 
exceedances of emission limitations in a title V permit, including 
those resulting from an emergency, will automatically be subject to 
enforcement or automatically be subject to imposition of penalties or 
other remedies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See 81 FR 38653.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, any entity that may bring an action to enforce title V 
permit provisions has enforcement discretion that they may exercise as 
they deem appropriate in any given circumstance. For example, if the 
excess emissions caused by an emergency occurred despite proper 
operation of the facility, and despite the permittee taking all 
reasonable steps to minimize such emissions, EPA or other relevant 
entities may well decide that no enforcement action is warranted in a 
specific case. In the event that an entity decides to bring an 
enforcement action, it may, nonetheless, take into account the 
emergency circumstances in deciding what remedies to seek.
    The EPA appreciates that relying on enforcement discretion might 
afford less certainty to sources than an affirmative defense provision. 
However, as the EPA has explained, the latter approach is not legally 
consistent with the enforcement structure of the CAA, which among other 
things imposes a duty on the source to continually comply with emission 
limits and standards. Moreover, the EPA believes the exercise of 
enforcement discretion in lieu of a codified affirmative defense 
provision is both appropriate and sufficient to carry out the mandates 
established by Congress in the CAA in a fair and equitable fashion, a 
position that the D.C. Circuit upheld in its U.S. Sugar decision.\50\ 
The EPA believes that it is unlikely that entities would initiate an 
enforcement action for emissions exceedances resulting solely from a 
true emergency situation that would have qualified under the narrow 
definition and particular requirements of the title V emergency 
affirmative defense provisions. The EPA also generally agrees with 
commenters that the conditions contained in the title V emergency 
provisions, including but not limited to the nature of the emergency 
event and the source's efforts to take all reasonable steps to minimize 
emissions during an emergency, would likely be important considerations 
to take into account when deciding whether to pursue enforcement, among 
all other relevant factors. Enforcement discretion decisions 
necessarily involve case-specific considerations, which should not be 
confined to the specific conditions contained in the title V emergency 
affirmative defense provisions.\51\ Thus, the EPA will not, in the 
course of this rulemaking, provide explicit criteria that the EPA, 
states, or other entities should apply in determining whether to 
commence an enforcement action. Nothing in this action precludes the 
EPA from issuing such guidance in other appropriate proceedings or 
formats if the agency should subsequently determine that to be 
appropriate.
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    \50\ In its U.S. Sugar decision, the D.C. Circuit upheld the 
EPA's reliance on case-by-case enforcement discretion as a 
permissible and reasonable substitute for affirmative defense 
provisions in accounting for malfunctions within section 112 
standards. U.S. Sugar, 830 F.3d at 607-09. The EPA believes that the 
D.C. Circuit's statements in NRDC and U.S. Sugar are more reflective 
of the court's current views concerning affirmative defenses and 
enforcement discretion than the much earlier decisions cited by 
commenters, including Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus. 
Arguments suggesting that prior cases, including Marathon Oil and 
Essex Chemical, require the EPA to provide affirmative defenses in 
such situations are contrary to the D.C. Circuit's holdings.
    \51\ These considerations could potentially be much broader than 
the title V emergency affirmative defense provisions, and encompass 
situations where a source would never have been eligible for the 
emergency affirmative defense.
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    Second, even if an enforcement action is commenced for exceedances 
caused by an emergency, the absence of an explicitly defined 
affirmative defense provision does not affect a source's ability to 
demonstrate to the court (or to the EPA in an administrative 
enforcement action) that penalties or other kinds of relief are not 
warranted. Under section 113(e), courts (and the EPA in an 
administrative enforcement action) must consider various factors when 
assessing monetary penalties, including the source's compliance 
history, good faith efforts to comply for the duration of the 
violation, and ``such other factors as justice may require.'' Thus, 
with or without an explicit affirmative defense, a source retains the 
ability to defend itself in an enforcement action and to oppose the 
imposition of particular remedies or to seek the reduction or 
elimination of monetary penalties, based on the specific facts and 
circumstances of the emergency event. The D.C. Circuit has noted that 
such justifications would be a ``good argument . . . to make to the 
courts.'' \52\ Thus, overall, elimination of the title V emergency 
affirmative defense provisions will not deprive sources of these 
defenses in potential enforcement actions. Sources retain all of the 
arguments they previously could have made. Congress vested the courts 
with the authority to judge how best to weigh the evidence in an 
enforcement action and to determine appropriate remedies. The EPA may 
not, through the title V affirmative defenses, restrict a court's 
ability to do so, and the EPA does not believe that it would be 
appropriate, in this action, to provide guidance to the courts with 
respect to what factors a court should or must consider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ NRDC, 749 F.3d at 1064.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For similar reasons, the EPA does not believe it would be 
appropriate or necessary to retain the definition of ``emergency'' or 
any of the other provisions formerly contained in 40 CFR 70.6(g) and 
71.6(g) that were associated with the title V affirmative defense. 
These additional provisions, which were created solely for the purpose 
of supporting the title V affirmative defense and ensuring that it was 
narrowly tailored, no longer serve

[[Page 47044]]

a purpose in the EPA's part 70 and part 71 regulations. For example, 
the EPA does not believe that retaining a standalone definition of 
``emergency'' without any context or application would be helpful to 
relevant entities determining whether to initiate enforcement or to the 
courts or an agency determining the appropriate remedies.
    As explained in section III.A., affirmative defense provisions by 
their nature limit or eliminate the authority of federal courts to 
determine liability or to impose remedies through considerations that 
differ from the explicit grants of authority in section 113(b) and 
section 113(e). Therefore, these provisions are not appropriate under 
the CAA, no matter what type of event they apply to, what criteria they 
contain, or what forms of remedy they purport to limit or eliminate. 
Thus, it would not be appropriate to amend the title V affirmative 
defense provisions to provide that the affirmative defense may be 
allowed if specified conditions are met, at the discretion of the 
enforcement entity.
3. Impacts on the Decision Making and Planning of Sources Confronted 
With Emergency Situations
    Comment: Industry commenters raised concerns involving how the 
removal of the title V affirmative defense provisions will affect how 
sources plan for and react to emergency situations. Many of these 
comments asserted that without an affirmative defense provision in 
their title V permits, sources confronted with an emergency situation 
would be forced to decide whether to (1) comply with operating permit 
requirements or (2) deal with the emergency situation in a manner 
protective of human safety or other public interests, at the risk of 
being held liable for violating permit terms. Specifically, some 
commenters asserted that facilities faced with the threat of liability 
may be less willing to shut down systems in an emergency, creating the 
risk of more catastrophic accidents. Other commenters suggested that 
sources might shut down earlier than would normally be the case, which 
could result in resource shortages that could impede emergency response 
efforts or area recovery. Commenters asserted that the affirmative 
defense provisions serve the important purpose of allowing sources the 
flexibility to continue or resume operations to provide vital services 
in times of emergency.
    One industry commenter, citing discussion in the EPA's 2014 SSM SIP 
Action Supplemental Proposal, asserted that removing the affirmative 
defense provisions could result in an additional resource burden for 
sources, who could be forced to invest in facility improvements in 
order to protect the source from emergency situations.
    Other commenters asserted similar arguments specifically concerning 
electric grid reliability, asserting that sources would have to weigh 
compliance obligations against the need to continue generating 
electricity to avert grid reliability problems. Some commenters 
generally claimed, without describing specific instances, that the 
title V emergency affirmative defense provisions, in addition to other 
available mechanisms for relief from penalties, have helped ensure 
reliable electric grid operation in emergency situations. Several 
commenters provided specific examples of these situations.
    Commenters presented differing views of whether the definition of 
``emergency'' in the title V affirmative defense provisions would 
encompass reliability or electric system emergencies. One commenter 
asserted that the definition of ``emergency'' should cover an extreme 
situation involving critical reliability concerns because the EPA has 
recognized that CAA rules need to account for the unique interconnected 
and interdependent operations of power plants. However, another 
commenter acknowledged that the definition may not be broad enough to 
cover this situation, but suggested that the EPA recognize that 
enforcement may be unwarranted not only for unit-specific emergencies, 
but also for situations where facilities are called upon to support 
reliability in the context of a larger electric system emergency.
    Some commenters claimed that certain electric system operators 
cannot force a source to continue generating electricity in order to 
ensure system reliability if doing so would cause the source to violate 
an environmental requirement, such as a permit condition. Thus, these 
commenters expressed concern that without the title V affirmative 
defense--characterized by the commenters as an ``exemption''--electric 
system operators would not be able to force a source to generate 
electricity in order to ensure system reliability. Other commenters 
discussed emergency generation orders issued by the Department of 
Energy (DOE) under section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 
U.S.C. 824a(c), by which the DOE may require power plant owners to 
operate and generate electricity in certain emergency situations. While 
some commenters expressed concern that a source could face the risk of 
significant penalties for emissions exceedances resulting from 
complying with such an order, other commenters discussed an amendment 
to the FPA that excuses sources from compliance with environmental 
regulations when necessary to comply with DOE emergency orders. One 
commenter concluded that this FPA provision should be viewed as 
complementary to, rather than a substitute for, the title V emergency 
defense, and another asserted that this legislation indicates 
congressional support for an emergency defense when electric system 
reliability is at issue.
    Commenters urged the EPA to consult with other agencies with 
expertise in reliability. Commenters also suggested that the EPA direct 
federal and state enforcement offices to engage in close consultation 
with relevant grid operators or reliability authorities prior to 
initiating enforcement actions where exceedances were caused by a 
demonstrated reliability need. Commenters also proposed that system 
operators should be able to submit a reliability analysis in the record 
of any enforcement proceeding and suggested that courts should not 
independently assess previously established reliability-related 
determinations.
    Response: The EPA does not believe that the removal of the title V 
emergency affirmative defense provisions will significantly affect the 
decision making of sources confronted with emergency situations. 
Sources confronted with an emergency situation will always have to 
assess the risk of liability involved with courses of action that would 
result in exceedances of emission limits contained in title V permits 
as well as the underlying standards. The EPA does not believe that 
removing the title V affirmative defense provisions will affect this 
risk assessment. First, the title V emergency provisions did not 
provide guaranteed protection from liability. They simply created an 
affirmative defense that a source, having allegedly violated a 
technology-based emissions limit, could assert in narrowly defined 
circumstances after an enforcement action was initiated. Moreover, 
permittees seeking to assert the defense bore the burden of 
establishing that a number of required conditions were met.
    Second, the incentives that exist for sources to behave in a 
prudent manner during emergencies remain largely unchanged, even 
without an explicit affirmative defense. As discussed in section 
III.D.2. of this document, sources can still argue all available

[[Page 47045]]

defenses to an alleged violation and/or assert that penalties should 
not be imposed, based on the particular circumstances. The ability to 
assert relevant considerations in this manner is not limited to the 
particular conditions associated with the title V emergency affirmative 
defense provisions. The EPA agrees that the need to avert catastrophic 
accidents, or to avert an electric reliability crisis, or any number of 
other public interest-related considerations, could be especially 
relevant to the decision whether to pursue enforcement or impose 
penalties. The EPA cannot, however, restrict or define--through the 
operation of an affirmative defense or otherwise--the evidence or 
considerations that a court may take into account when determining 
whether penalties should be assessed in a given situation.
    Additionally, the EPA does not believe that removing the title V 
emergency affirmative defense provisions will have a significant effect 
on how sources plan for emergencies or invest in facility improvements 
in order to prepare for emergencies. The EPA notes that the comments 
received on this point, and the EPA's statements in the 2014 SSM 
Supplemental Proposal cited by commenters, are more relevant to 
preparing for excess emissions from equipment malfunctions than to 
preparing for emergencies. Moreover, as discussed previously, removing 
the affirmative defense provisions should not change the incentives 
that sources have to prepare for emergencies. Prudent behavior with 
respect to planning for emergency situations and minimizing emissions 
during an emergency to the maximum extent possible would be just as 
advantageous to a source seeking to reduce the possibility that 
enforcement will be initiated (or seeking to establish that penalties 
are not appropriate) as it would be to a source attempting to meet the 
criteria of a codified affirmative defense provision. The EPA believes 
that such prudent behavior is a matter of good business practice that 
most, if not all, sources would normally pursue irrespective of an 
affirmative defense.\53\
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    \53\ Additionally, as discussed in section III.D.3., the title V 
emergency affirmative defense provisions have rarely, if ever, been 
asserted in enforcement proceedings. Thus, the EPA does not believe 
that the removal of the narrowly drawn and apparently infrequently 
used title V emergency affirmative defense provisions will have a 
significant impact on sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding specific comments concerning electric grid reliability, 
the EPA does not believe that the current action will have a measurable 
impact on electric grid reliability, and the EPA does not believe that 
it is necessary to consult with other agencies with expertise in 
reliability with respect to the limited actions being taken in this 
rule. As an initial matter, even if the EPA were to retain the existing 
title V emergency affirmative defense, the availability of that defense 
in different types of situations involving issues of grid reliability 
is uncertain. The EPA generally agrees with the commenters suggesting 
that most electric grid reliability situations would not have qualified 
as emergencies eligible for the title V affirmative defense, based on 
the narrow definition of ``emergency'' in the title V regulations being 
removed through this action.\54\ However, again, nothing would prevent 
the consideration of reliability-related circumstances in determining 
whether to initiate enforcement or in deciding whether penalties are 
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Again, the title V emergency provisions were only available 
for ``sudden and reasonably unforeseeable events beyond the control 
of the source'' requiring ``immediate corrective action to restore 
normal operation, and that causes the source to exceed a technology-
based emission limitation under the permit, due to unavoidable 
increases in emissions attributable to the emergency.'' 40 CFR 
70.6(g)(1). This definition of ``emergency'' generally contemplated 
emergencies directly affecting the operations of a single source. In 
contrast, the need for one source to continue operating in response 
to reliability concerns would generally not involve any sort of 
emergency at that particular source, but rather would likely be 
motivated by circumstances occurring at a different source. For 
example, one source might be required to generate electricity to 
make up for power that another source was unable to generate due to 
an emergency at the other source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, contrary to the assertion of commenters, the removal 
of the affirmative defense provisions should not affect the ability of 
electric grid operators to request that sources generate electricity in 
order to avert grid reliability problems. Some of these comments were 
based on the mistaken premise that the title V affirmative defense 
provisions functioned as an exemption to emission limits.\55\ Moreover, 
as other commenters note, Congress has provided various forms of relief 
in these situations, including the amendment to FPA section 202(c) 
(exempting sources from compliance with environmental regulations when 
necessary to comply with a DOE emergency order), as well as provisions 
such as CAA section 110(f) (authorizing state governors to temporarily 
suspend certain requirements where the President determines a national 
or regional energy emergency exists). The EPA cannot here provide any 
further guarantees in this regard in the form of an affirmative 
defense, exemption, or other mechanism that would run contrary to the 
CAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ A source faced with demands to continue generating 
electricity would always have to decide whether doing so could cause 
it to exceed emission limits in its title V operating permit; the 
presence or absence of an affirmative defense that could later be 
asserted in an enforcement proceeding does not change this fact. For 
further discussion, see section III.B.1. of this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Perceived Benefits of the Requirements Associated With the Title V 
Affirmative Defense Provisions
    Comment: Some commenters discussed perceived benefits of retaining 
affirmative defense provisions as written, in addition to the increased 
certainty and consistency that commenters believe the provisions 
provided. One commenter claimed that the various demonstration and 
reporting requirements in the title V emergency affirmative defense 
provisions serve as incentives for sources to prevent and minimize 
excess emissions during emergencies, an incentive that the commenter 
claimed would be lost if the affirmative defense was removed.
    Response: The components of the title V emergency affirmative 
defense involving recordkeeping and reporting requirements and the 
obligation for a source to properly operate its facility and take all 
reasonable steps to minimize excess emissions (40 CFR 70.6(g)(3) and 
71.6(g)(3)) were important to limit the scope of the defense and any 
potential for abuse. However, the EPA does not agree that removing the 
affirmative defense will eliminate the incentives for sources to 
appropriately prepare for and respond to emergency situations, to 
minimize excess emissions, to maintain proper records of such events, 
or to notify relevant authorities in a timely manner. Because the CAA 
requires continuous compliance with applicable emission limitations and 
emission standards, sources should properly operate and take steps to 
minimize excess emissions at all times. Sources still have an incentive 
to do all of these things in the event of an emergency, because doing 
so would continue to be in their best interests both for compliance 
purposes and for purposes of defending against an enforcement action. 
Again, the EPA believes that such prudent behavior is a matter of good 
business practice that most, if not all, sources would normally pursue 
irrespective of an affirmative defense.
5. Environmental and Public Health Impacts
    Comment: A number of commenters discussed the potential air quality 
and public health impacts of removing the title V affirmative defense 
provision. Industry commenters asserted that

[[Page 47046]]

removing the affirmative defense provisions would not reduce emissions 
or provide any air quality benefits. Moreover, industry and state 
commenters claimed that the EPA has not made any demonstration that 
emissions during emergencies endanger public health or safety or have 
resulted in problems with attainment of the NAAQS. One commenter 
claimed that EPA action to remove the title V affirmative defense 
provisions would be arbitrary and capricious because the action would 
impose regulatory burdens without any significant benefit, and because 
the EPA failed to consider the costs and benefits of its proposed 
action.
    On the other hand, environmental commenters claimed that 
affirmative defense provisions impermissibly allow large facilities to 
emit massive amounts of pollution in violation of applicable emission 
limits without consequence. These commenters provided extensive 
discussion of the health impacts of different pollutants and cited to 
numerical data and case studies involving the emissions of a number of 
large industrial facilities. The commenters asserted that this is an 
environmental justice issue, as these emissions impact surrounding 
communities, which the commenters claimed are often low-income 
communities or communities of color. Environmental commenters asserted 
that the impacts of climate change may increase the incidence of 
malfunctions due to extreme weather events.
    Response: As previously explained, the EPA is removing the 
affirmative defense provisions from the title V program regulations 
because these provisions are inconsistent with the EPA's interpretation 
of the enforcement structure of the CAA. The EPA is not basing this 
current action on potential air quality benefits, or a weighing of 
costs and benefits, associated with the removal of these provisions. 
While the EPA acknowledges that there are benefits to reducing 
emissions, including reducing impacts to communities with environmental 
justice concerns, as previously explained, the purpose of this 
rulemaking is to eliminate the affirmative defense provisions that EPA 
finds to be inconsistent with the enforcement structure of the Clean 
Air Act. This action also does not take into account the impact of 
climate change on the incidence of malfunctions and, as previously 
explained, emergencies, which--although there may be some 
similarities--are significantly different, and narrower, than 
malfunction events.

E. Response to Comments Outside the Scope of This Action

    Comment: Several industry commenters requested that EPA should 
consider removing hospital, medical, and infectious waste incinerators 
(HMIWI) as a title V source category or consider reducing program 
requirements applicable to HMIWIs. Separately, one commenter expressed 
disagreement with the EPA's return to its 2015 SSM SIP Policy.
    Response: These comments are not relevant to the current rulemaking 
action and are outside the scope of this final rule.

IV. Implementation Considerations

    This section provides guidance and addresses comments on various 
aspects related to implementing this final rule. First, as indicated in 
the 2016 and 2022 proposed rules, as a result of the EPA's removal of 
40 CFR 70.6(g), state, local and tribal permitting authorities \56\ 
whose part 70 programs contain impermissible affirmative defense 
provisions \57\ must submit program revisions to the EPA to remove such 
impermissible provisions from their EPA-approved part 70 programs. The 
part 70 program revision process should follow the procedures in 40 CFR 
70.4(a) and (i), as specified in the guidance provided in the following 
subsections. In summary, the EPA expects that states with part 70 
programs containing impermissible affirmative defense provisions will 
submit to the EPA either a program revision, or a request for an 
extension of time, within 12 months of the effective date of this final 
rule--i.e., by August 21, 2024. Other considerations associated with 
program revisions are discussed further in section IV.A. of this 
document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ As noted previously, the term ``state'' is used generically 
throughout this section to refer to all state, local, U.S. 
territorial, and tribal permitting authorities that administer EPA-
approved part 70 (title V) programs. See 40 CFR 70.2 and 71.2.
    \57\ As specified further in section IV.A.1. of this document, 
the term ``impermissible affirmative defense provisions'' is 
intended to refer to all affirmative defense provisions that, for 
the same reasons necessitating the EPA's removal of CFR 70.6(g) and 
71.6(g), are inconsistent with the enforcement structure of the CAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    States must also remove title V-based affirmative defense 
provisions contained in individual operating permits. The EPA 
encourages states to remove these provisions at their earliest 
convenience. The EPA expects that any necessary permit changes should 
occur in the ordinary course of business as states process periodic 
permit renewals or other unrelated permit modifications. At the latest, 
states must remove affirmative defense provisions from individual 
permits during the next permit revision or periodic permit renewal for 
the source that occurs following either (1) the effective date of this 
rule (for permit terms based on 40 CFR 70.6(g) or 71.6(g)) or (2) the 
EPA's approval of state program revisions (for permit terms based on an 
affirmative defense provision in an EPA-approved title V program). 
Additional considerations associated with permit revisions are 
discussed further in section IV.B. of this document.

A. Program Revisions

    This section clarifies the EPA's expectations for how the final 
action to remove 40 CFR 70.6(g) will affect state programs and responds 
to comments involving these considerations. Specifically, this section 
describes the actions that some states will need to take in order to 
submit program revisions to remove impermissible affirmative defense 
provisions.
1. Necessity for State Program Revisions
    As indicated in the 2016 and 2022 proposed rules, as a result of 
the removal of 40 CFR 70.6(g), the EPA has determined that it is 
necessary for states whose part 70 programs contain impermissible 
affirmative defense provisions to submit program revisions to the EPA 
to remove such provisions from their EPA-approved part 70 programs.\58\ 
This determination is based on the EPA's interpretation of the 
enforcement structure of the CAA, as informed by the NRDC decision. The 
EPA's rationale concerning affirmative defenses, presented in section 
III.A. of this document, applies equally to affirmative defense 
provisions within state part 70 operating permit programs, which the 
EPA now considers to be impermissible. The term ``impermissible 
affirmative defense provisions'' as used throughout this section is 
intended to refer to all affirmative defense provisions that, for the 
same reasons necessitating the EPA's removal of CFR 70.6(g) and 
71.6(g), are inconsistent with the CAA. This includes, but is not 
limited to, any provisions within EPA-approved part 70 programs that 
are similar to, based on, or function in similar ways to the provisions 
being removed from 40 CFR 70.6(g). For example, any title V provisions 
that establish an affirmative defense that could be asserted in a civil 
enforcement

[[Page 47047]]

action involving alleged noncompliance with any federally-enforceable 
standards would be inconsistent with the enforcement structure of the 
CAA. Such provisions are impermissible regardless of whether the 
affirmative defense provisions are specific to emergency situations, 
and regardless of other criteria contained within such provisions. Any 
provisions in an EPA-approved part 70 program that establish an 
exemption to emission limitations as described in this document will 
similarly need to be removed. This action will not have any direct 
effect on affirmative defense provisions established under other CAA 
programs, such as the SIP or section 111, 112, or 129 programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ To the extent that this document refers to the need to 
remove affirmative defense provisions from part 70 programs, the EPA 
is referring to the need for states to submit program revisions to 
the EPA to remove such provisions from states' EPA-approved part 70 
(title V) operating permit programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. EPA's Authority To Require State Program Revisions
    Comment: Multiple commenters objected to the EPA's indication that, 
if the EPA finalized the removal of 70.6(g), it may be necessary for 
states with similar affirmative defense provisions to remove those 
provisions and submit program revisions.
    A number of commenters discussed the legal authority by which the 
EPA could require state program revisions. Environmental commenters 
suggested that CAA section 502(b), read together with sections 502(d) 
and (i) and with 40 CFR 70.4, plainly authorizes the EPA to revise the 
minimum elements of operating permit program regulations when the 
Administrator determines that revisions are necessary to meet the 
requirements of the CAA. Other commenters argued that the EPA has no 
legal basis for imposing its policy preference on states, and some 
industry commenters claimed that nothing in the CAA authorizes the EPA 
to withdraw its final approval of a state title V permit program 
because the EPA prefers a particular improvement to what was already 
approved, claiming that this would be contrary to Congressional intent 
and the purpose of title V. One state commenter similarly claimed that 
requiring program revisions would fundamentally shift the careful 
balance between the state and the federal governments' regulatory 
partnership. Some commenters also claimed that requiring states to make 
title V program changes would constitute a challenge to the legality of 
state programs and would require a finding that there is no situation 
where the state program provisions can be applied in a way that is 
consistent with the Act. One commenter characterized state program 
revisions as an unfunded mandate, which the commenter asserted should 
not be imposed on states without a clear and compelling need. One 
commenter claimed that the EPA has impermissibly extended its 
interpretation of the NRDC case to state operating permit programs.
    State commenters discussed the authority of states to tailor the 
details of their own title V program regulations and potential limits 
on the EPA's authority to dictate the fine particulars of state 
programs. One state commenter claimed that by removing the title V 
emergency affirmative defense provisions, the EPA would substantially 
raise the minimum elements required by the Act for state operating 
permit programs, citing 40 CFR 70.1(a). Other state commenters claimed 
that under title V, similar to CAA section 110 for SIPs, after the EPA 
sets minimum program requirements, states must meet these minimum 
requirements but have the authority and discretion to otherwise tailor 
their program to their specific state requirements, such as by 
providing for affirmative defenses. State commenters further asserted 
that the EPA's implementing regulations do not require a state's 
enforcement program to be set out in any particular manner, while 
acknowledging that states must have adequate authority to carry out all 
aspects of the program and submit a description of their enforcement 
program to the EPA, citing 40 CFR 70.4(b)(3) and (5). One state 
commenter noted that an acceptable enforcement program should include 
the ability to account for emissions during distinct periods of 
operation, including SSM.
    Both state and industry commenters also highlighted the fact that 
the title V emergency provisions have always been discretionary, not 
required, elements of state programs. One commenter argued that because 
the affirmative defense provisions were initially discretionary, it 
should now be up to states to decide whether to retain them. The 
commenter claimed that this is a logical extension of a state's 
constitutional authority and that the EPA should not disturb state 
authorities by disapproving existing state permit programs that contain 
these provisions.
    Response: The EPA agrees with those commenters who asserted that 
the CAA authorizes the EPA to revise its part 70 implementing 
regulations when necessary to conform to the CAA, including provisions 
of the CAA that apply to the enforcement of title V permit 
requirements. As the CAA and the EPA's implementing regulations are 
periodically updated to address evolving legal, policy, technical, and 
scientific information, so must state operating programs be updated. 
State part 70 program revisions, while infrequent, are a natural and 
necessary part of a complex regulatory program, and this process is 
entirely consistent with the principles of cooperative federalism 
established in title V of the CAA. As various commenters acknowledged, 
the EPA has the authority to establish the minimum elements for state 
title V programs. See CAA section 502. The EPA's part 70 regulations 
implement this authority. When the EPA must remove an element from its 
implementing regulations in order to maintain consistency with CAA 
requirements, it follows that it would also generally be necessary to 
revise EPA-approved state part 70 programs to meet the same minimum 
legal requirements required by the CAA. The EPA acknowledges that 
states may establish additional permitting requirements, but only to 
the extent they are not inconsistent with the CAA. See CAA section 
506(a). States do not have discretion to implement provisions that are 
inconsistent with the enforcement structure of the CAA or the EPA's 
part 70 regulations.
    As some commenters acknowledged, the EPA's existing part 70 
implementing regulations clearly establish a framework by which state 
part 70 programs may need to occasionally be revised, including when 
the part 70 regulations are revised or modified. See, e.g., 40 CFR 
70.4(a) (if part 70 is revised and the Administrator determines that 
changes to approved state programs are necessary, states must submit 
program revisions); 70.4(i) (program revisions may be necessary when 
relevant federal or state statutes or regulations are modified). The 
EPA has the authority to approve or disapprove program revisions based 
on the requirements of the part 70 regulations and the CAA. See 40 CFR 
70.4(i)(1), (2). Thus, the EPA has authority to require state title V 
program revisions.
    To be clear, the final action being taken in this rule is the 
removal of the affirmative defense provisions from the EPA's 
regulations at 40 CFR 70.6(g) and 71.6(g). As a consequence of this 
regulatory action, it will be necessary for states with part 70 
programs containing impermissible affirmative defense provisions to 
make conforming revisions to their part 70 programs. However, contrary 
to the assertions of some commenters, the EPA is not, at this time, 
disapproving or making any finding of deficiency or inadequacy with 
respect to any particular state program (such as a finding under 40 CFR 
70.10), although this type of determination may be appropriate at a 
later time. This document clarifies the EPA's expectations for how the 
program revision process will unfold, based on

[[Page 47048]]

the EPA's existing implementing regulations and the EPA's longstanding 
experience in overseeing title V operating permit programs. The EPA 
intends that this guidance will be useful to permitting authorities and 
permit holders interested in understanding how removal of the 
affirmative defense provisions from the EPA's regulations will affect 
their programs and individual permits, respectively.
    The EPA also reiterates, as multiple commenters acknowledged, that 
the title V affirmative defense provisions have always been 
discretionary elements of state permitting programs, and the EPA has 
never required states to adopt these provisions. In fact, a number of 
state part 70 programs do not appear to contain any such title V 
affirmative defense provisions. However, contrary to one commenter's 
assertion, the fact that these provisions were never required elements 
of state programs does not mean that they now must be deemed 
appropriate program elements or that states must be allowed to continue 
implementing them.
    Finally, as explained in section V.D. below, this action does not 
contain an unfunded mandate of $100 million or more as described in 
UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531-1538, and does not significantly or uniquely affect 
small governments. The action imposes no new enforceable duty on any 
state, local or tribal governments or the private sector. As a result 
of this rule, some states with EPA-approved part 70 programs that 
contain impermissible affirmative defense provisions will be required 
to submit program revisions to the EPA, according to the framework 
established by the EPA's existing regulations. To the extent that such 
affected states allow local air districts or planning organizations to 
implement portions of the state's obligation under the CAA, the 
regulatory requirements of this action do not significantly or uniquely 
affect small governments because those governments have already 
undertaken the obligation to comply with the CAA.
3. Scope of Necessary Program Revisions
    Comment: Commenters addressed various aspects of the scope of state 
program revisions that would be necessary following the removal of 40 
CFR 70.6(g). First, some commenters claimed that part 70 program 
regulations that incorporate by reference 40 CFR 70.6(g) or any state 
affirmative defense provisions effectively function the same as 
regulations that expressly include an affirmative defense. Commenters 
claimed that if these provisions were not removed from state programs, 
they would create ambiguity and would undermine CAA enforcement. 
Therefore, these commenters asserted that part 70 program regulations 
that incorporate by reference any other affirmative defense provisions 
must also be removed from state programs.
    Next, multiple commenters expressed support for the view that 
states may retain affirmative defense provisions that could be used for 
alleged noncompliance with permit requirements arising solely from 
state law. Some commenters asserted that the EPA has no authority to 
limit the ability of states to provide this type of state-only 
affirmative defense provision. Another commenter suggested that state-
only affirmative defense provisions should be available not only for 
enforcement actions brought by state agencies, but also for enforcement 
actions brought by citizens or the EPA. However, other commenters 
indicated concern that sources could attempt to invoke state-only 
affirmative defense provisions in enforcement proceedings involving 
noncompliance with federal requirements, thereby undermining the 
enforcement of the CAA. These commenters suggested that the EPA provide 
guidance to clarify that if a state wishes to retain an affirmative 
defense for noncompliance with state-only requirements, the state must 
also include clarifying language in their regulations expressly 
limiting the applicability of such remaining affirmative defense 
provisions. Commenters also suggested that states identify these state-
only program provisions in their title V program revisions.
    Additionally, some commenters asserted that states should be able 
to circumscribe their own authority to enforce even federally 
enforceable requirements. Commenters suggested that states should be 
able to provide an affirmative defense to state-initiated enforcement 
(such as for administrative penalty proceedings) or otherwise restrict 
their ability to enforce alleged violations of federally-enforceable 
applicable requirements.
    Finally, some commenters disagreed with the EPA's suggestion that 
states may retain portions of the emergency provisions, such as the 
definition of ``emergency'' or certain reporting requirements, for 
purposes of supporting other regulations that do not involve an 
affirmative defense. The commenters expressed concern that the presence 
of a definition of ``emergency'' or other recordkeeping, reporting, or 
work practice requirements could be interpreted as providing for an 
affirmative defense or otherwise excusing a source from compliance 
during these periods. However, these commenters also asserted that the 
EPA should encourage more readily accessible information about excess 
emission events, in order to better inform surrounding communities of 
air quality issues.
    Response: As previously noted, all impermissible affirmative 
defense provisions, as specified in section IV.A.1. of this document, 
will need to be removed from EPA-approved part 70 programs. To 
reiterate, this encompasses provisions that are similar to, based on, 
or function in similar ways to the provisions in 40 CFR 70.6(g) that 
the EPA is removing in this action, including all provisions that 
effectively establish an affirmative defense that could be asserted in 
an enforcement action involving alleged noncompliance with any 
federally-enforceable standards. In light of comments received, the EPA 
is also providing clarification on various other topics related to the 
scope of necessary program revisions.
    Regarding state part 70 provisions that incorporate other 
affirmative defense provisions by reference, as a general matter, the 
EPA agrees with commenters' assertions that incorporating a provision 
by reference may have the same legal effect as explicitly including the 
provision within a regulation. Thus, where a state part 70 program 
incorporates by reference another independently applicable affirmative 
defense that suffers the same infirmities as those provisions being 
removed from 40 CFR 70.6(g) and 71.6(g), the state provision 
incorporating the affirmative defense provision would generally need to 
be removed.\59\
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    \59\ It may be possible that some state programs could 
incorporate 40 CFR 70.6(g) (or a similar state provision) by 
reference in such a manner as to leave it free from doubt that the 
incorporating provision would have no legal effect following the 
removal of 40 CFR 70.6(g) from the EPA's regulations (or following 
the removal of the state affirmative defense). However, the EPA 
believes that removal of the incorporating provision would 
nonetheless be the best practice to avoid the potential for 
confusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Concerning the comments supporting the option for states to retain 
an affirmative defense as a ``state-only'' provision--which would apply 
solely to rights and responsibilities created by state law and would 
not apply to, interfere with, or otherwise affect any requirements or 
remedies under the CAA or federally-enforceable regulations--the EPA 
agrees that states have the discretion to develop such state-only 
provisions, as allowed under

[[Page 47049]]

state law. However, any such provisions would only be available in 
enforcement actions brought solely under state law, and they would not 
be available in enforcement actions brought for alleged violations of 
any federally-enforceable requirements in a source's title V permit. 
This rulemaking would have no effect on, and does not preclude states 
from retaining or creating, such regulations unrelated to the state's 
EPA-approved part 70 program. State-only affirmative defense provisions 
that are included within individual operating permits would need to be 
clearly labeled to indicate their limited applicability. 40 CFR 
70.6(b)(2).
    However, notwithstanding the ability of states to create state-only 
affirmative defense provisions within their state regulations, any 
impermissible affirmative defense provisions contained within any EPA-
approved part 70 programs will nonetheless need to be removed from the 
state's EPA-approved part 70 program. In such instances, the state 
would need to transmit to the EPA a program revision submittal to 
remove the affirmative defense provision from the body of regulations 
that comprise the state's official EPA-approved part 70 program. The 
EPA believes that the best practice for states would be to conduct a 
rulemaking to remove the affirmative defense provision from the state's 
current regulations (or to revise the state regulations to clarify the 
limited applicability of a state-only affirmative defense) and/or a 
legislative process to remove such provisions from a state statute, in 
addition to submitting the part 70 program revision to the EPA to 
formally remove the provision from the state's EPA-approved part 70 
program. This would provide clarity for sources and the public and 
avoid any inconsistency between the state's EPA-approved part 70 
program and the state's current regulations and/or statutes.
    Regarding comments suggesting that states should be able to limit 
their own authority to enforce even federally enforceable requirements, 
as noted in section III.D.2. of this document, permitting authorities 
always retain the discretion to determine whether to initiate an 
enforcement action based on the circumstances of a given case. To the 
extent that a state develops an ``enforcement discretion''-type 
provision that applied only in its own administrative enforcement 
actions or only with respect to enforcement actions brought by the 
state in state courts, such a provision may be appropriate under state 
rules.\60\ However, among the minimum required elements of a title V 
permit program is the requirement that, consistent with EPA 
regulations, the permitting authority have adequate authority to assure 
compliance with applicable standards, requirements, and regulations, 
and to enforce permits, including the ability to recover civil 
penalties for each violation. See CAA section 502(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. 
7661a(b)(5). EPA regulations further provide that approved title V 
programs must have appropriate enforcement authority, including the 
authority to seek injunctive relief and to assess or recover civil 
penalties for violations of any applicable requirement or permit 
condition. See 40 CFR 70.11. Thus, to the extent that states wish to 
describe certain aspects of their enforcement discretion policy within 
their part 70 program regulations, this could only be permissible 
provided that the provision does not effectively undermine or eliminate 
the state's ability to enforce its title V program, even under the 
circumstances previously covered by the affirmative defense. For 
example, it would likely not be permissible for a state to establish 
criteria that, when met, would effectively preclude the state from 
enforcing, even in part, a federally-enforceable standard. Nor would it 
be permissible for any such provision to limit the ability of the EPA 
or citizens to enforce any federally-enforceable permit terms or to 
interfere with the authority of the federal courts to determine whether 
and to what extent certain remedies are appropriate in a given case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ The EPA has previously discussed an analogous issue in the 
context of SIPs. See SSM SIP Action, 80 FR 33855.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, although states may not retain title V provisions 
establishing an affirmative defense to noncompliance with federal 
requirements, the EPA reiterates its position that states may choose to 
retain certain aspects of their existing program regulations--such as 
the definition of ``emergency'' and associated reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements--to support functions unrelated to an 
affirmative defense, such as prompt reporting requirements. The EPA 
disagrees with commenters' assertions that the presence of definitions 
or reporting and recordkeeping requirements associated with emergencies 
would necessarily imply that an affirmative defense exists or that 
exceedances of emission limits during emergencies are excused. To the 
contrary, and although the EPA is not retaining such provisions within 
its own regulations, states may decide that some of these provisions 
could potentially serve a useful function for state permitting 
authorities considering whether to pursue enforcement, for sources 
faced with the possibility of a state enforcement action, and for the 
public.
4. Timing Associated With Program Revisions
    Comment: Multiple state and industry commenters requested that the 
EPA allow states additional time to submit any required part 70 program 
revisions. These commenters all asserted that 12 months is not 
sufficient time to conduct the administrative processes required to 
change part 70 program regulations, and suggested that anywhere between 
18 and 36 months should be allowed, for various reasons. Some state 
commenters provided specific examples of the administrative actions 
associated with rulemakings that would necessitate additional time, 
including outreach, public hearings and comment periods, rule 
development, gubernatorial approval, legislative committee review, and 
legislative approval. One state commenter noted that many states face 
program and staff resource constraints based on other rulemaking 
obligations. Another state commenter predicted that necessary rule 
changes may take longer to promulgate because they will be 
controversial. Some commenters recommended providing additional time 
for state program revisions because these affirmative defense 
provisions are not currently causing any pressing problems with 
enforcement and there is no urgent need to change the provisions. 
Finally, one commenter suggested that additional time for state program 
revisions would be necessary to allow time for sources to implement 
measures to address the loss of the affirmative defense.
    Other commenters, on the other hand, recommended a more limited 
time frame, while acknowledging the discretion that the EPA has under 
40 CFR 70.4(a) to extend program revision deadlines. These commenters 
supported the EPA's default 12-month submission deadline with the 
possibility of an extended deadline of up to 24 months, on the grounds 
that states should be able to easily amend their operating permit rules 
within months, and that prompt action would facilitate the coordination 
of SIP revisions and title V revisions (and associated permit 
revisions). Environmental commenters urged the EPA to require states 
seeking an extension to specifically request additional time and to 
demonstrate good cause for the extension, and urged that

[[Page 47050]]

such requests be granted only under compelling circumstances. These 
commenters also suggested additional details concerning the required 
form, content, and timing of such an extension request.
    Response: As discussed in the proposal, the necessary changes to 
part 70 programs arising from this rule should generally be relatively 
minor and straightforward, involving the removal of affirmative defense 
provisions from the state's part 70 program.\61\ Because of the nature 
of the required revisions, the EPA continues to believe that most or 
many states should be able to complete the necessary program revisions 
within 12 months. However, the EPA again appreciates that some states 
may require more time to complete program revisions, based on a number 
of different factors associated with their administrative process, 
including the potential need for legislative approval. Therefore, the 
EPA is allowing states to submit a request to the appropriate EPA 
Regional office requesting an extension to this 12-month deadline and 
demonstrating why such an extension is necessary. Such extension 
requests should include detailed information concerning the steps that 
the state will take to revise its part 70 program, as well as the 
specific timing associated with each of these steps. The EPA 
understands that many states have lengthy rulemaking processes and 
expects that requests for extension that include the information 
identified here in sufficient detail would generally be approved. 
Nonetheless, the EPA will consider each program revision submission and 
extension request on a case-by-case basis. The EPA expects that each 
state with a part 70 program containing impermissible affirmative 
defense provisions will submit a program revision or request for an 
extension of time to the EPA by August 21, 2024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ As discussed in section IV.A.3. of this document, this 
particular revision to remove affirmative defense provisions from a 
state's EPA-approved part 70 program might not necessarily also 
involve a notice-and-comment rulemaking to revise the state's 
current administrative code, although the EPA believes this would be 
a best practice to ensure clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Program Revision Submittal Details
    Comment: Two state commenters discussed the details of any required 
program revision submittals. One state suggested requiring the 
following four components: (1) legal authorization to revise the state 
rules and part 70 program; (2) redlined changes to state rules; (3) 
timeline for planned removal of affirmative defense from each permit; 
and (4) a plan to make these changes to individual permits. Another 
state commenter requested additional clarity on what form of legal 
authority demonstration would be required for program revision 
submittals, and suggested that a rulemaking certification (certifying 
that the rules have been reviewed by legal counsel and have been found 
to be within the legal authority of the agency) would be sufficient and 
less burdensome than a formal opinion by the state Attorney General. 
One state commenter further expressed concern with the additional 
burden that would be associated with preparing and submitting a revised 
program plan. Finally, one commenter requested clarification of the 
EPA's intention to publish proposed program revisions in the Federal 
Register and provide a 30-day public comment period. They requested 
further clarification on whether the EPA intended to publish notice of 
approval in the Federal Register or issue a letter to state governors 
or their designees.
    Response: As stated in the introduction to this section regarding 
program revisions, the part 70 program revision process should follow 
the procedures in 40 CFR 70.4(a) and (i). The EPA's part 70 regulations 
provide that for state program revisions, the state should submit such 
documents as the EPA determines to be necessary. See 40 CFR 
70.4(i)(2)(i). As noted in the 2016 proposal, the EPA expects that 
program revisions to remove the title V emergency defense provisions 
will include, at minimum: (1) a redline document identifying the 
state's proposed revision to its part 70 program rules; (2) a brief 
statement of the legal authority authorizing the revision; and (3) a 
schedule and description of the state's plans to remove affirmative 
defense provisions from individual operating permits. The EPA 
encourages states to consult with their respective EPA regional offices 
on the specific contents of their revision submittal packages.
    Regarding one commenter's statements concerning the legal authority 
demonstration component, the EPA reiterates that this component could 
take various forms depending on the specific circumstances of each 
state, and a formal opinion by an Attorney General should not be 
required for the narrow program revisions implicated by this particular 
rule. For a revision involving only the removal of affirmative defense 
provisions, a certification indicating that the revisions are within 
the legal authority of the agency and followed all required 
administrative (including public participation) requirements should be 
sufficient. For other program revisions related to the removal of 
affirmative defense provisions, such as the inclusion of a narrowly 
tailored enforcement discretion provision, as discussed in section 
IV.A.3. of this document, the legal authority demonstration should also 
contain assurances that the state has adequate authority to enforce its 
part 70 program.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ For example, the state should demonstrate that any such 
alternative provisions: do not interfere with the authority of 
courts to determine whether and to what extent certain remedies are 
appropriate in a given case; do not limit the ability of citizens or 
the EPA to pursue enforcement; and do not limit the state's ability 
to enforce its part 70 program, for example by establishing criteria 
that, when met, would effectively preclude the state from assessing 
or recovering penalties consistent with 40 CFR 70.11(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is unclear what the comments discussing a ``revised program 
plan'' refer to. The EPA believes that the plan described in this 
document, involving narrow program revision submittals to remove 
affirmative defense provisions, is appropriate. As noted in the 2016 
proposal, states may, but need not, also include as part of their 
program revision submittals any other unrelated revisions to state 
program regulations.
6. Consequences of Failure To Submit Program Revisions
    Comment: Some commenters requested that the EPA clarify the 
consequences for states that refuse to revise their operating permit 
regulations. Specifically, commenters cited to CAA sections 502(d) and 
(i) and discussed the possibility of notices of deficiency (NOD), 
sanctions, and the eventual withdrawal of permitting authority.
    Response: Commenters are correct that the EPA has the authority 
under CAA sections 502(d) and (i), and as specified in the EPA's 
implementing regulations at 40 CFR 70.10, to issue NODs, issue 
sanctions, and potentially withdraw approval of part 70 programs under 
appropriate circumstances, potentially including the failure of a 
permitting authority to submit required program revisions to the EPA. 
The EPA would exercise this authority on a case-by-case basis for this 
element of the program, as it would with any other.
7. Discussion of State-Specific Program Provisions
    Comment: In response to requests from the EPA for information about 
part 70 programs that contain affirmative defense provisions, various 
commenters discussed certain provisions in specifically identified 
state part 70

[[Page 47051]]

programs that could be impacted by the final rule.\63\ Several 
commenters also requested an update to the document titled ``Title V 
Affirmative Defense Provisions in State, Local, and Tribal Part 70 
Programs'' that was included in the docket during the 2016 rulemaking 
process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ In the proposed rule, the EPA solicited comment on a 
document titled, ``Title V Affirmative Defense Provisions in State, 
Local, and tribal Part 70 Programs'' that was included in in the 
docket associated with this rulemaking (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-
2016-0186). This document contains a tentative list of part 70 
programs that appear to contain affirmative defense provisions that 
could be affected by this action. The document was intended for 
informational purposes only and does not reflect any type of 
determination as to the adequacy or inadequacy of any specific 
program provisions. The EPA received comments involving provisions 
within the Texas and Georgia part 70 programs that purportedly 
incorporate by reference affirmative defense provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Response: The EPA appreciates this additional information. As noted 
previously, the EPA is not taking any action in this final rule with 
respect to the adequacy or inadequacy of individual state programs, 
including specific programs identified in the 2016 document referenced 
by commenters. The EPA expects that permitting authorities with part 70 
programs that have impermissible affirmative defense provisions will 
follow the process provided in section IV. of this document. EPA 
Regional offices will work closely with permitting authorities to 
provide support during this process. States with additional questions 
about the impact of this rule on their operating permit programs should 
contact the appropriate EPA Regional office for further assistance.

B. Permit Revisions

    This section clarifies the EPA's expectations for the eventual 
removal of impermissible affirmative defense provisions from individual 
title V operating permits.
1. Scope of Permit Revisions
    Comment: One commenter claimed that title V permits containing 
affirmative defenses derived from sources of authority other than 40 
CFR 70.6(g) would not need to be revised.
    Response: In general, any impermissible affirmative defense 
provisions within individual operating permits that are based on a 
title V authority and that apply to federally-enforceable requirements 
will need to be removed. For example, permit conditions that directly 
rely on 40 CFR 70.6(g) or 71.6(g) would need to be removed following 
the removal of these provisions from the EPA's regulations. 
Importantly, however, permit revisions would not be limited to permit 
conditions based on 40 CFR 70.6(g) and 71.6(g); any permit conditions 
that rely on a similarly impermissible title V affirmative defense 
provision contained in (or incorporated by reference into) a state's 
part 70 program would also have to be removed following state program 
revisions. On the other hand, and as the EPA explained in the 2016 
proposal, this rule will not directly affect affirmative defense 
provisions contained in title V permits that are derived from 
independent applicable requirements, such as SIP, NSPS or NESHAP 
provisions. Finally, should a state decide to retain a ``state-only'' 
affirmative defense or enforcement discretion-type provision, it may 
need to eventually amend title V operating permits to explicitly state 
the limited applicability of the state-only provision. See 40 CFR 
70.6(b)(2). The discussion provided in the following subsections 
applies to both the removal of affirmative defense provisions from 
permits and to the amendment or modification of such permit terms.
2. Burden, Mechanism, and Timing of Permit Revisions
    Comment: State commenters and one tribal commenter claimed that the 
EPA underestimates the burden of removing affirmative defense 
provisions from individual permits, and challenged the EPA's statement 
in the proposal that ``removal of affirmative defense provisions from 
permits should generally occur in the ordinary course of business and 
should require essentially no additional burden on states and 
sources.'' State commenters explained that thousands of existing 
operating permits would require some form of revision action to be 
processed by the state, and that revising certain general permits that 
apply to multiple sources would require an administrative process 
similar to a rulemaking.
    Numerous state and industry commenters supported the EPA's 
suggestion that states may utilize a number of existing permit 
mechanisms to remove affirmative defense provisions from title V 
permits in the ordinary course of business, such as when the permitting 
authority next processes a permit renewal or significant permit 
modification for a source. One state commenter noted that this would be 
the most sensible and least disruptive and burdensome mechanism to 
complete permit revisions.
    Commenters agreed with the EPA's initial suggestion that the 
removal of affirmative defense provisions from operating permits could 
be accomplished through the minor permit revision process and would not 
constitute a significant permit modification. Further, one state 
suggested that the EPA adopt a policy interpretation that removal of 
affirmative defense provisions could be accomplished through the 
administrative amendment process.
    Some commenters also asserted that permit revisions should not be 
based on any other independent deadline or timeline, and that there is 
no urgency to remove the provisions. Other commenters, though, urged 
the EPA to encourage permitting authorities to exercise their 
discretion to remove the provisions as expeditiously as possible, on 
the earliest possible occasion.
    Commenters also addressed the sequence of program revisions and 
permit revisions. One commenter expressed concern that potential 
ambiguity may arise if a source invokes an affirmative defense 
provision found in the permit, after the program revisions have been 
approved but the permit has not been amended. Lastly, one tribal 
commenter expressed its concern that making conforming revisions to 
permits before programmatic revisions would create inconsistencies that 
could undermine enforcement.
    Response: The EPA acknowledges commenters' general assertions that 
a large number of existing title V permits across the nation will 
eventually need to be revised to remove title V affirmative defense 
provisions. However, the EPA disagrees that this will involve any 
extraordinary burden on states or sources. The need to occasionally 
revise individual title V permits is a natural, common, and required 
feature of the title V operating permits program. Title V operating 
permits, by their nature, include a wide variety of requirements 
applicable to a source, and permit changes are periodically necessary 
to incorporate new or modified applicable requirements, and to reflect 
physical or operational changes that occur at a source. The EPA's 
regulations, and all EPA-approved state part 70 programs, contain well-
established mechanisms to account for various types of necessary 
revisions to title V permits. See, e.g., 40 CFR 70.7(d)-(h). The permit 
revisions that will need to occur as a result of this rulemaking fit 
well within this existing regulatory framework for occasional permit 
revisions.
    Moreover, the EPA expects permit changes to remove discretionary 
title V affirmative defense provisions to be a potentially less 
burdensome process than, for example, the process required to 
incorporate new applicable

[[Page 47052]]

requirements in a permit via permit reopening. See, e.g., 40 CFR 
70.7(f)(1)(i). As explained in the 2016 proposal, the EPA expects that 
any necessary permit changes should occur in the ordinary course of 
business. For example, these revisions could be made when a state 
processes periodic permit renewals or other permit revisions. 
Additionally, states may utilize other existing mechanisms to 
effectuate these permit changes, consistent with each state's approved 
part 70 program regulations. For example, the EPA does not believe that 
a permit revision to simply remove a discretionary affirmative defense 
provision would require significant modification procedures, and 
permitting authorities may be able to process these changes as minor 
modifications. Also, in certain circumstances, it may be possible for 
some permit changes to be made using administrative permit amendment 
procedures, provided that the removal of the title V emergency 
provisions would satisfy one of the specific circumstances contemplated 
within each state's approved part 70 program regulations governing 
administrative amendments.\64\ States may also be able to utilize other 
streamlined mechanisms for processing multiple permit revisions at 
once.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ In addition to specifying various types of permit changes 
for which the administrative amendment process would be appropriate, 
the EPA's regulations in 40 CFR 70.7(d) also provide states with the 
opportunity to specify additional criteria as part of their part 70 
programs, if the EPA Administrator determines that those situations 
are similar to those specified in 40 CFR 70.7(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the timing of such permit changes, for state or tribal 
permitting agencies implementing the federal title V program or part 70 
programs that directly rely on 40 CFR 70.6(g), any permit revisions 
necessary to remove impermissible affirmative defense provisions from 
individual permits should occur promptly after the effective date of 
this final rule. For states implementing part 70 programs that contain 
state affirmative defense provisions, any permit revisions necessary to 
remove impermissible affirmative defense provisions from individual 
permits should similarly occur promptly after the EPA's approval of the 
necessary part 70 program revisions.\65\ Generally, states would be 
expected to remove title V affirmative defense provisions from permits 
(or clearly label remaining provisions as state-only) at the earliest 
possible occasion when each permit is next reviewed by the permitting 
authority, such as the next permit renewal or unrelated permit 
revision. Thus, at the latest, states would be expected to remove 
affirmative defense provisions from individual permits by the next 
periodic permit renewal that occurs following either (1) the effective 
date of this rule (for permit terms based on 40 CFR 70.6(g) or 71.6(g)) 
or (2) the EPA's approval of state program revisions (for permit terms 
based on a state affirmative defense provision).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ 81 FR 38645, 38653, n. 35 (June 14, 2016) (acknowledging 
limits on state discretion where currently-approved state program 
regulations require inclusion of emergency affirmative defense 
provisions in state-issued title V permits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is important to note that while the EPA is not currently 
establishing any independent timeline for states to remove these 
provisions from individual permits, the EPA encourages states to begin 
removing these provisions from permits prior to the completion of any 
necessary part 70 program revisions. States may also find it convenient 
to remove these provisions in the course of completing revisions to 
permits related to the implementation of the 2015 SSM SIP Action.
3. EPA Objections to Permits
    Comment: Some commenters urged the EPA to make clear that the 
agency will object to title V permits issued after the effective date 
of the final rule that incorporate or refer to title V affirmative 
defense provisions.
    Response: As previously noted, the EPA expects that any necessary 
permit revisions will generally occur following program revisions to 
remove the underlying affirmative defense provisions from each 
permitting authority's part 70 program regulations. Therefore, although 
the EPA encourages states to remove title V emergency affirmative 
defense provisions from operating permits at the earliest possible 
opportunity (including during permit renewals that occur before program 
revisions take place), the EPA generally does not anticipate objecting 
to title V permits that contain emergency affirmative defense 
provisions during the Agency's 45-day review period until after the 
relevant permitting authority has made necessary corrections to its 
approved part 70 program. The Administrator will evaluate any petitions 
to object to proposed title V operating permits on a case-by-case 
basis. Statements in this document are not intended to prejudge such 
petition responses.
    As noted in section IV.B.2. of this document, in those state or 
tribal areas that implement the federal title V program (in 40 CFR part 
71) or where the operating permit program directly relies on or 
incorporates by reference 40 CFR 70.6(g), the EPA expects states to 
begin the process of removing impermissible affirmative defense 
provisions from operating permits promptly after the effective date of 
this final rule, as such permit revisions would not need to await state 
program revisions.

V. Statutory and Executive Orders Reviews

A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review and Executive 
Order 13563: Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review

    This action is not a significant regulatory action and was 
therefore not submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
for review.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    This action does not impose any new information collection burden 
under the PRA. OMB has previously approved the information collection 
activities contained in the existing regulations and has assigned OMB 
control numbers 2060-0243 (for part 70 state operating permit programs) 
and 2060-0336 (for part 71 federal operating permit program). In this 
action, the EPA is removing certain provisions from the EPA's 
regulations, which should ultimately result in the removal of similar 
provisions from state, local, and tribal operating permit programs and 
individual permits. Consequently, some states will be required to 
submit program revisions to the EPA in order to remove affirmative 
defense provisions from their EPA-approved part 70 programs, and will 
eventually be required to remove provisions from individual permits. 
However, this action does not involve any requests for information, 
recordkeeping or reporting requirements, or other requirements that 
would constitute an information collection under the PRA.

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)

    I certify that this action will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities under the RFA. This 
action will not impose any requirements on small entities. Entities 
potentially affected directly by this proposal include state, local, 
and tribal governments, and none of these governments would qualify as 
a small entity. Other types of small entities, including stationary 
sources of air pollution, are not directly subject to the requirements 
of this action.

D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)

    This action does not contain an unfunded mandate of $100 million or 
more as described in UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1531-1538, and does not 
significantly or

[[Page 47053]]

uniquely affect small governments. The action imposes no new 
enforceable duty on any state, local or tribal governments or the 
private sector. As a result of this rule, some states with EPA-approved 
part 70 programs that contain impermissible affirmative defense 
provisions will be required to submit program revisions to the EPA, 
according to the framework established by the EPA's existing 
regulations. To the extent that such affected states allow local air 
districts or planning organizations to implement portions of the 
state's obligation under the CAA, the regulatory requirements of this 
action do not significantly or uniquely affect small governments 
because those governments have already undertaken the obligation to 
comply with the CAA.

E. Executive Order 13132: Federalism

    This action does not have federalism implications. It will not have 
substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between 
the national government and the states, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

F. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian 
Tribal Governments

    This action has tribal implications. However, it will neither 
impose substantial direct compliance costs on federally recognized 
tribal governments, nor preempt tribal law. One tribal government (the 
Southern Ute Indian Tribe) currently administers an approved part 70 
operating permit program, and one tribal government (the Navajo Nation) 
currently administers a part 71 operating permit program pursuant to a 
delegation agreement with the EPA. These tribal governments may be 
required to take certain actions, including a program revision (for the 
part 70 program) and eventual permit revisions, but these actions will 
not require substantial compliance costs. The EPA conducted outreach 
with tribal officials early in the process of developing this 
regulation to permit them to have meaningful and timely input into its 
development. A summary of that outreach is provided in the rulemaking 
docket, Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0186, available at http://www.regulations.gov.

G. Executive Order 13045: Protection of Children From Environmental 
Health Risks and Safety Risks

    The EPA interprets Executive Order 13045 as applying to those 
regulatory actions that concern environmental health or safety risks 
that the EPA has reason to believe may disproportionately affect 
children, per the definition of ``covered regulatory action'' in 
section 2-202 of the Executive Order. This action is not subject to 
Executive Order 13045 because it does not concern an environmental 
health risk or safety risk.

H. Executive Order 13211: Actions Concerning Regulations That 
Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use

    This action is not subject to Executive Order 13211 because it is 
not a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866.

I. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act

    This rulemaking does not involve technical standards.

J. Executive Order 12898: Federal Actions To Address Environmental 
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations

    Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994) directs 
federal agencies, to the greatest extent practicable and permitted by 
law, to make environmental justice part of their mission by identifying 
and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse 
human health or environmental effects of their programs, policies, and 
activities on minority populations (people of color) and low-income 
populations.
    The EPA believes that it is not practicable to assess whether the 
human health or environmental conditions that exist prior to this 
action result in disproportionate and adverse effects on people of 
color, low-income populations and/or Indigenous peoples. This action 
simply removes the emergency affirmative defense provisions from the 
EPA's operating permit program regulations. As a result of this action, 
it will also be necessary for some state, local, and tribal permitting 
authorities to remove similar affirmative defense provisions from their 
EPA-approved part 70 programs and from individual title V operating 
permits. These title V provisions existed independently from any 
specific environmental health standards, and their removal should not 
affect the establishment of, or compliance with, environmental health 
or safety standards. It is not practicable to predict whether the 
removal of these affirmative defense provisions will result in any 
significant difference in emissions and subsequently whether this 
action will have any positive or negative effect on people of color, 
low-income populations and/or Indigenous peoples. Information 
supporting this Executive Order review is contained in section III.D.5. 
of this document.
    The EPA provided meaningful participation opportunities for people 
of color, low-income populations and/or Indigenous peoples or tribes in 
the development of the action through tribal outreach outlined in 
section V.F. of this document and summarized in the rulemaking docket, 
Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2016-0186, as well as the standard opportunity 
to provide public comment on each proposal (2016 and 2022).

K. Congressional Review Act (CRA)

    This action is subject to the CRA, and the EPA will submit a rule 
report to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of 
the United States. This action is not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 
U.S.C. 804(2).

VI. Statutory Authority

    The statutory authority for this action is provided in CAA sections 
502(b) and 502(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. 7661a(b) & (d)(3), which direct the 
Administrator of the EPA to promulgate regulations establishing state 
operating permit programs and give the Administrator the authority to 
establish a federal operating permit program. Additionally, the 
Administrator determines that this action is subject to the provisions 
of CAA section 307(d), which establish procedural requirements specific 
to rulemaking under the CAA. CAA section 307(d)(1)(V) provides that the 
provisions of CAA section 307(d) apply to ``such other actions as the 
Administrator may determine.'' 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(1)(V).

VII. Judicial Review

    Section 307(b)(1) of the CAA governs judicial review of final 
actions by the EPA. This section provides, in part, that petitions for 
review must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit: (i) when the agency action consists of 
``nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final actions 
taken, by the Administrator,'' or (ii) when such action is locally or 
regionally applicable, but ``such action is based on a determination of 
nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the 
Administrator finds and publishes that such action is based on such a 
determination.'' For locally or regionally applicable final actions, 
the CAA reserves to the EPA complete discretion whether to invoke the 
exception in (ii).
    This final action is ``nationally applicable'' within the meaning 
of CAA section 307(b)(1). In the alternative, to

[[Page 47054]]

the extent a court finds this final action to be locally or regionally 
applicable, the Administrator is exercising the complete discretion 
afforded to him under the CAA to make and publish a finding that this 
action is based on a determination of ``nationwide scope or effect'' 
within the meaning of CAA section 307(b)(1).\66\ This final action 
revises both the regulatory requirements in 40 CFR part 70 that govern 
state, local, tribal, and U.S. territorial operating permit programs 
nationwide and the regulatory requirements in 40 CFR part 71 that 
govern federal operating permits nationwide.\67\ Accordingly, this 
final action is a nationally applicable regulation or, alternatively, 
the Administrator is exercising the complete discretion afforded to him 
by the CAA and hereby finds that this final action is based on a 
determination of nationwide scope or effect for purposes of CAA section 
307(b)(1) and is hereby publishing that finding in the Federal 
Register.
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    \66\ In deciding whether to invoke the exception by making and 
publishing a finding that this final action is based on a 
determination of nationwide scope or effect, the Administrator has 
also taken into account a number of policy considerations, including 
his judgment balancing the benefit of obtaining the D.C. Circuit's 
authoritative centralized review versus allowing development of the 
issue in other contexts and the best use of Agency resources.
    \67\ In the report on the 1977 Amendments that revised section 
307(b)(1) of the CAA, Congress noted that the Administrator's 
determination that the ``nationwide scope or effect'' exception 
applies would be appropriate for any action that has a scope or 
effect beyond a single judicial circuit. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 at 
323, 324, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1402-03.
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    Under section 307(b)(1) of the CAA, petitions for judicial review 
of this action must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit within 60 days from the date this 
final action is published in the Federal Register. Filing a petition 
for reconsideration by the Administrator of this final action does not 
affect the finality of the action for the purposes of judicial review, 
nor does it extend the time within which a petition for judicial review 
must be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or 
action.

List of Subjects

40 CFR Part 70

    Environmental protection, Administrative practice and procedure, 
Air pollution control, Intergovernmental relations, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

40 CFR Part 71

    Environmental protection, Administrative practice and procedure, 
Air pollution control, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Michael S. Regan,
Administrator.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, title 40, chapter I of the 
Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

PART 70--STATE OPERATING PERMIT PROGRAMS

0
1. The authority citation for part 70 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  42 U.S.C. 7401, et seq.


Sec.  70.6  [Amended]

0
2. In Sec.  70.6, remove paragraph (g).

PART 71--FEDERAL OPERATING PERMIT PROGRAMS

0
3. The authority citation for part 71 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7401, et seq.


Sec.  71.6  [Amended]

0
4. In Sec.  71.6, remove paragraph (g).

[FR Doc. 2023-15067 Filed 7-20-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6560-50-P