[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 127 (Wednesday, July 5, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 43016-43047]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-13903]
[[Page 43015]]
Vol. 88
Wednesday,
No. 127
July 5, 2023
Part II
Department of Transportation
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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
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49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, et al.
Hazardous Materials: Modernizing Regulations To Improve Safety and
Efficiency; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 127 / Wednesday, July 5, 2023 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 43016]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, and 180
[Docket No. PHMSA-2019-0031 (HM-265A)]
RIN 2137-AF47
Hazardous Materials: Modernizing Regulations To Improve Safety
and Efficiency
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM).
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SUMMARY: PHMSA is publishing this ANPRM to solicit stakeholder feedback
on initiatives PHMSA is considering that may modernize the Hazardous
Materials Regulations and improve efficiencies while maintaining or
improving a current high level of safety. To fully engage with
stakeholders, this ANPRM solicits comments and input on questions
related to 46 distinct topics under consideration. Any comments, data,
and information received will be used to evaluate and potentially draft
proposed amendments.
DATES: Comments must be received by October 3, 2023. However, PHMSA
will consider late-filed comments to the extent possible.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number
PHMSA-2019-0031 (HM-265A) by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the online instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
Mail: Docket Management System, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Dockets Operations, M-30, Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, Ground Floor, Room W12-140 in the West Building, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except federal holidays.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number (PHMSA-2019-0031) or RIN 2137-AF47 for this ANPRM at the
beginning of the comment. Note that all comments received will be
posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov including any
personal information provided. If sent by mail, comments must be
submitted in duplicate. Persons wishing to receive confirmation of
receipt of their comments must include a self-addressed stamped
postcard.
Docket: For access to the dockets to read background documents or
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov or DOT's Docket
Operations Office; see ADDRESSES.
Confidential Business Information: Confidential Business
Information (CBI) is commercial or financial information that is both
customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from
public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this ANPRM contain
commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as
private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or
responsive to this ANPRM, it is important that you clearly designate
the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission
containing CBI as ``PROPRIETARY.'' Submissions containing CBI should be
sent to Eamonn Patrick, Standards and Rulemaking Division, Office of
Hazardous Materials Safety, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Ave.
SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001. Any commentary that PHMSA receives that
is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public
docket for this rulemaking.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eamonn Patrick, Standards and
Rulemaking Division, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, at
202-366-8553.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Abbreviations and Terms
A4A Airlines for America
AAR Association of American Railroads
ACA American Coating Association
ACC American Chemistry Council
AEI Automatic Equipment Identification
AFFTAC Analysis of Fire Effects on Tank Cars
AFPM American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers
AHS Association of Hazmat Shippers
ANPRM Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
ANSI American National Standards Institute
APA American Pyrotechnic Association
API American Petroleum Institute
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
ATA Air Transport Association
CA Competent Authority
CSC Convention for Safe Containers
COSTHA Council on the Safe Transportation of Hazardous Articles
CT-number Cargo tank registration number
DCE Design Certifying Engineer
DDR Damaged, Defective or Recalled
DGL Dangerous Goods List
DGTA Dangerous Goods Trainers Association
DOT Department of Transportation
EDI Electronic Data Interchange
E.O. Executive Order
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
ERG Emergency Response Guidebook
ERI Emergency Response Information
EX number Explosives approval number
FC number Consumer fireworks approval number
FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FMVSS Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
HHFT High Hazard Flammable Train
HMR Hazardous Materials Regulations
HMT Hazardous Materials Table
IBC Intermediate Bulk Container
IBR Incorporation by Reference
ICAO TI International Civil Aviation Organization Technical
Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air
IMDG Code International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code
IMO International Maritime Organization
IPANA Industrial Packaging Alliance of North America
ISO International Standards Organization
IT Information Technology
LTD QTY Limited Quantity
IVODGA International Vessel Operators Dangerous Goods Association
MAWP Maximum Authorized Working Pressure
NAAHAC North American Automotive Hazmat Action Committee
NBIC National Board Inspection Code
NEW Net Explosive Weight
NOPIC Notification of Pilot in Command
NOTOC Notification of the Captain
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NTTC National Tank Truck Carriers
OMB Office of Management and Budget
ORM-D Other Regulated Material-D
PG Packing Group
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration
PIH Poisonous by Inhalation
POP Performance Oriented Packagings
PRBA Rechargeable Battery Association
PRD Pressure Relief Device
RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RVP Reid Vapor Pressure
RI Registered Inspector
RIPA Reusable Industrial Packaging Association
RP Recommended Practice
RRTF Regulatory Reform Task Force
RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration
SAAMI Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute
[[Page 43017]]
TC TDG Transport Canada Transportation of Dangerous Goods
regulations
UN United Nations
USCG United States Coast Guard
USWAG Utilities Solid Waste Activities Group
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Objective
III. Topics Under Consideration
A. Evaluation of Carrier Maintenance of Emergency Response
Information
B. Non-Bulk Packaging, Intermediate Bulk Container, and Large
Packaging Periodic Retest Extension
C. Use of Non-Bulk Package Test Samples for Multiple Tests
D. Aerosol Classification Alignment
E. Residue IBC Exceptions
F. Requirements for Damaged, Defective, or Recalled Lithium
Cells and Batteries
G. Sampling and Testing Program for Unrefined Petroleum-Based
Products
H. Basic Oil Spill Response Plan Applicability
I. Standards Incorporated by Reference Update
J. EX-Number Display Requirements
K. Section 173.150 Ethyl Alcohol Exception
L. Limited Quantity Training Exception
M. Exceptions for Small Quantities of Division 4.3, PG I
Material
N. Recycling Safety Devices
O. Creation of Basic Description and Shipping Description
Definitions
P. Removal of the 60-Day Renewal Requirement for Approvals and
Special Permits
Q. Design Certifying Engineer Experience
R. Oxidizing Gases by Air
S. Part 176 Vessel Requirements Update
T. LTD QTY Shipping Paper Exception by Vessel
U. Convention for Safe Containers Data Plate and Inspection
Requirements
V. Identification of Freight Containers in Rail Transportation
W. Exceptions for Rail Transport of Lithium Batteries for
Purposes of Recycling and Disposal
X. Tank Car Manway Inspections
Y. Acid Resistant Manways for DOT 111A100W5 Tank Cars
Z. Tank Car Thermal Protection Standard
AA. Unoccupied Locomotive Train Placement
BB. Offering a Tank Car After Qualification Expiration
CC. Non-Destructive Examination
DD. Updating Requirements for Transporting Hazardous Materials
on Passenger Carrying Motor Vehicles
EE. EPA 27 Test Method for Cargo Tanks
FF. Mounting Pads for Cargo Tank Damage Protection Devices
GG. Cargo Tank Hydrostatic Test Medium
HH. Cargo Tank Thickness and Corrosion Inspection Requirements
II. Remove Exceptions for Cargo Tank Inspections
JJ. Segregation of Detonating Explosives for Highway
Transportation
KK. Cargo Tank Reflectivity
LL. Cargo Tank Registered Inspector Training and Qualification
MM. Cargo Tank Design Certifying Engineer Training and
Qualification
NN. Cargo Tank Registered Inspector Verification and
Documentation
OO. Cargo Tank Design Certifying Engineer Verification and
Documentation
PP. Cargo Tank Registered Inspector Revised Definition
QQ. Cargo Tank Design Certifying Engineer Revised Definition
RR. NTSB Safety Recommendations R-20-1 to R-20-4
SS. Placard Display on Intermediate Bulk Containers
TT. Emerging Technologies
I. Executive Summary
PHMSA, in consultation with its modal partners, is publishing this
ANPRM to solicit stakeholder input on initiatives PHMSA is considering
that may modernize its Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR
parts 171-180) in order to improve hazardous material transportation
efficiency, improve transparency and stakeholder engagement, and better
accommodate technological innovations--all while maintaining or
improving public safety and environmental impacts.
PHMSA regularly reviews HMR requirements to ensure that the
regulations continue to serve a useful safety purpose. In accordance
with executive order (E.O.) 12866,\1\ PHMSA periodically reviews the
HMR, and constantly seeks input from the public in the form of
regulatory petitions, to ensure that the regulations improve the
health, safety, and well-being of the American public without
unreasonable costs on society.
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\1\ 58 FR 51735.
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On October 2, 2017, the Office of the Secretary of Transportation,
consistent with E.O.s 12866, 13771, 13777, and 13783,\2\ published a
notice in the Federal Register \3\ titled ``Notice of Regulatory
Review'' inviting the public to provide input on existing rules and
other agency actions that are good candidates for repeal, replacement,
suspension, or modification. Many of the regulatory reform topics
discussed in this ANPRM were originally received as comments to the
October 2017 notice (hereinafter referred to as the ``2017 Regulatory
Reform Notice'').
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\2\ Please note that E.O.s 13771 (82 FR 9339), 13777 (82 FR
12285), and 13783 (82 FR 16093) were revoked by E.O. 13990 (86 FR
7037) on January 21, 2021.
\3\ 82 FR 45750, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069.
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PHMSA periodically revises the HMR based on changing economic,
technological, and safety conditions. Moreover, PHMSA addresses
requests to add, amend, or delete a regulation from diverse
stakeholders through our petition process (see Sec. Sec. 106.95-
106.105). PHMSA also regularly reviews special permits (documents that
permit activities not otherwise allowed under the HMR provided the
applicant is able to demonstrate it will maintain an equivalent level
of safety) and adopts the provisions of special permits with broad
potential applicability and satisfactory safety records into the HMR
for general use. Additionally, PHMSA participates in the development of
international standards for the transportation of hazardous materials,
including the International Civil Aviation Organization Technical
Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO
TI), the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code), and
the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods--Model
Regulations. PHMSA updates the HMR biennially to reflect the most
recent changes in these and other international regulations to maintain
harmonization with international requirements and facilitate
international commerce.
PHMSA has addressed many of the comments to the 2017 Regulatory
Reform Notice regarding the subject of hazardous materials
transportation regulation through completed and proposed rulemaking
efforts, including:
HM-219A, Hazardous Materials: Response to Petitions from
Industry to Modify, Clarify, or Eliminate Regulations, PHMSA-2015-
0102.\4\ In this final rule, PHMSA amended the HMR in response to 19
petitions for rulemaking submitted by the regulated community to
update, clarify, modernize, or provide relief from miscellaneous
regulatory requirements.
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\4\ 83 FR 55792 (Nov. 7, 2018). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-11-07/pdf/2018-23965.pdf.
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HM-219B, Hazardous Materials: Response to an Industry
Petition to Reduce Regulatory Burden for Cylinder Requalification
Requirements, PHMSA-2017-0083.\5\ In this final rule, PHMSA amended the
requalification periods for certain Department of Transportation (DOT)
4-series specification cylinders in non-corrosive gas service in
response to a petition for rulemaking submitted by the National Propane
Gas Association.
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\5\ 85 FR 68790 (Oct. 30, 2020). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-10-30/pdf/2020-22483.pdf.
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HM-219C, Hazardous Materials: Adoption of Miscellaneous
Petitions to Reduce Regulatory Burdens, PHMSA-2017-0120.\6\ In this
final rule, PHMSA
[[Page 43018]]
amended the HMR in response to 24 petitions for rulemaking submitted by
the regulated community between February 2015 and March 2018 to update,
clarify, or provide relief from various regulatory requirements without
adversely affecting safety.
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\6\ 85 FR 75680 (Nov. 25, 2020). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-25/pdf/2020-23712.pdf.
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HM-233G, Hazardous Materials: Continued Conversion of
Special Permits, PHMSA-2017-0121. In this NPRM, PHMSA will be proposing
to amend the HMR to adopt provisions contained in certain widely used
or longstanding special permits that have an established safety record.
The proposed revisions are intended to provide greater flexibility and
eliminate the need for numerous special permit renewal requests, thus
reducing paperwork burdens for the agency and the regulated community
and facilitating commerce while maintaining an equivalent level of
safety.
HM-215O, Hazardous Materials: Harmonization with
International Standards, PHMSA-2017-0108.\7\ In this final rule, PHMSA
amended the HMR to maintain alignment with international regulations
and standards by incorporating various amendments, including changes to
proper shipping names, hazard classes, packing groups, special
provisions, packaging authorizations, air transport quantity
limitations, and vessel stowage requirements. These revisions were
necessary to harmonize the HMR with recent changes made to the IMDG
Code, the ICAO TI, and the UN Model Regulations.
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\7\ 85 FR 27810 (May 11, 2020). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-11/pdf/2020-06205.pdf.
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HM-265, Hazardous Materials: Advancing Safety of Highway,
Rail, and Vessel Transportation, PHMSA-2018-0080. In this NPRM, PHMSA
will be proposing to amend the HMR to adopt a number of modal-specific
amendments that would enhance the safe transportation of hazardous
materials. PHMSA, in consultation with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and
the United States Coast Guard (USCG), will propose amendments
identified during Departmental review and from stakeholder petitions
for rulemaking.
The Department has received additional regulatory modernization
topics through petitions and internal review efforts. PHMSA believes
these additional topics reflect changing technologies, transportation
trends, and economic conditions and therefore deserve our
consideration. However, PHMSA understands there is value in obtaining
additional information on the potential safety and economic impacts for
these topics to inform specific changes to the HMR in the future. Thus,
the intent of this ANPRM is to raise awareness about these topics,
gather more information, and further evaluate the safety and
environmental benefits as well as the feasibility of proposing changes
to the HMR. PHMSA will review and evaluate all comments received and
late-filed comments to the extent practicable.
II. Objective
Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation law authorizes the
Secretary to ``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation,
including security, of hazardous materials in intrastate, interstate,
and foreign commerce'' (49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.). The Secretary has
delegated this authority to PHMSA (49 CFR 1.97(b)). The HMR are
designed to achieve three primary goals: (1) ensure that hazardous
materials are packaged and handled safely and securely during
transportation; (2) provide effective communication to transportation
workers, emergency responders, and the general public of the hazards of
the materials being transported; and (3) minimize the consequences of
an accident or incident should one occur. The hazardous materials
regulatory system is a risk management system that is prevention-
oriented and focused on identifying safety or security hazards and
reducing the probability and consequences of a hazardous material
release.
As new technologies are developed, understanding of the risks
inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials may change. New
technologies can potentially provide new opportunities to improve
packaging, hazard communication, and incident minimization. PHMSA
recognizes new technologies and techniques can potentially reduce costs
and burdens to society but remains focused on our primary mission to
protect people and the environment by advancing the safe transportation
of hazardous materials, including energy products, that are essential
to our daily lives. Any change to the existing safety system in the
HMR--e.g., containment, communication, and incident mitigation--must be
carefully evaluated when considering cost savings or cost burdens from
a regulation.
Therefore, we are publishing this ANPRM to solicit comments on the
safety, environmental, and economic impacts of regulatory modernization
initiatives suggested by the regulated community and other
stakeholders. To assist us in properly compiling information that we
receive, when responding to a specific question below, please note the
topic letter and question number in your comment. When providing
estimates of economic impact or other quantitative information, please
describe the basis for estimates, including data sources and
calculations. With respect to cost data, both granular (i.e., per unit
costs), aggregate, and programmatic (both one-time implementing and
recurring) cost data are particularly helpful in PHMSA's evaluation of
proposed changes to the HMR. When estimates are approximate or
uncertain, consider using a range or specifying the distribution in
other ways. For example:
B. Non-Bulk Packaging, Intermediate Bulk Container, and Large Packaging
Periodic Retest Extension
9. The total cost of each non-bulk drum design periodic
recertification is approximately $XXX. We estimate total spending on
package recertifications is $XXXXX for our company annually. If PHMSA
were to change those recertification requirements to allow a longer
interval between required recertification events as discussed in the
ANPRM, we believe this would result in a total additional cost savings
to our company of $XXX annually. We also anticipate one-time
implementation costs (pertaining to initial training and updating of
documentation) of $XXX and recurring costs of $XXX annually.
III. Topics Under Consideration
A. Evaluation of Carrier Maintenance of Emergency Response Information
Carriers that transport hazardous material must maintain emergency
response information (ERI) that meets the requirements of Sec. 172.602
onboard their motor vehicle, train, plane, or vessel. In accordance
with Sec. 172.602, ERI must be immediately accessible to train crew
personnel, drivers of motor vehicles, flight crew members, and bridge
personnel on vessels for use in the event of incidents involving
hazardous materials as well as emergency responders and representatives
of government agencies conducting an investigation.
PHMSA requests comment on the continued utility of this requirement
given advancements in technology and greater availability of resources,
such as the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG), to the emergency
responder community. Specifically, PHMSA requests comment on the
following questions:
[[Page 43019]]
1. Should ERI be required to accompany shipments of hazardous
materials? If no, what alternatives should be considered that maintain
existing levels of safety?
2. How does, if anything, the utility or value of ERI vary under
Sec. 172.602 in the different modes of transportation?
a. In highway and rail accidents, is emergency response generally
conducted by emergency responders rather than carrier personnel?
Explain.
b. How much do emergency responders rely on the ERI provided by the
highway or rail carrier, or do they rely on their own?
c. For air and marine vessel incidents, are carrier personnel
engaged in response actions? Explain.
d. Does air and vessel incident response depend to a larger degree
on ERI maintained by the carrier compared to highway and rail?
3. Provided an equivalent level of safety can be maintained, what
are the potential cost savings involved in revising the ERI
requirements under Sec. 172.602?
a. Would revisions to Sec. 172.602 in effect ``shift'' the costs
of maintaining ERI to entities other than the carrier, such as
emergency responders affiliated with tribes, states, counties, or
localities?
4. Are there differences in the reliance on the carrier's copy of
ERI between different types of emergency responders? Differences to
consider include urban and rural organizations, professional and
volunteer, and different response branches such as law enforcement
officers and firefighters.
B. Non-Bulk Packaging, Intermediate Bulk Container, and Large Packaging
Periodic Retest Extension
Packaging standards for UN Performance Oriented Packagings (POP),
also referred to as UN specification packagings, Intermediate Bulk
Containers (IBCs), and Large Packagings, are performance-based, rather
than highly prescriptive. The HMR provide general standards and
instructions for the construction of UN specification packagings and
IBCs in part 178, subparts L and N, respectively. However, in order to
be qualified to bear a UN specification packaging mark, each non-bulk
packaging or IBC design must pass qualification tests in part 178,
subparts M and O, respectively. After a design has been initially
qualified, the HMR require that each non-bulk single packaging design
and IBC design must undergo a periodic retest at least every 12 months
(see Sec. Sec. 178.601(e) and 178.801(e)). Each non-bulk combination
packaging design and Large Packaging design must undergo periodic
retest at least every 24 months (see Sec. Sec. 178.601(e) and
178.955(e)). These tests are intended to demonstrate that the
manufacturer's packagings continue to meet the standards required for
the safe transportation of hazardous materials.
The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)--PHMSA's
predecessor agency--adopted UN POP standards into the HMR on December
21, 1990, in a rulemaking known as HM-181 (55 FR 52402).\8\ The UN POP
system replaced the existing system of heavily prescriptive packaging
requirements.
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\8\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/standards-rulemaking/rulemakings/archived-rulemakings/72931/55-fr-52402-final-rulereducedsize.pdf.
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Those prescriptive requirements accommodated limited innovation in
package design and qualification and contributed to a sizable code of
regulations through unnecessary duplication of regulatory text. At the
time the UN POP standards were proposed, RSPA received comments stating
opposition to periodic packaging testing requirements after initial
qualification. Commenters specifically requested that no
``requalification'' testing be required unless a design change was made
to the packaging because of the time and expense involved in annually
testing packagings. In response to these comments, RSPA stated its
understanding that conducting periodic packaging testing every 12
months was not, by itself, sufficient to ensure each packaging produced
by a manufacturer would meet the required performance standards. RSPA
stated the expectation that manufacturers would need to take additional
measures, such as testing an increased number of samples or testing
samples to more stringent levels (e.g., higher drops or increased
hydrostatic test pressures) and implementing quality control programs
to ensure that each packaging they produced met the UN POP standards.
Additionally, RSPA noted that a 12-month periodic retesting
requirement was a relaxation of testing requirements for many packaging
types, compared to the previous packaging standards in the HMR.
However, RSPA acknowledged that this requirement would be particularly
onerous for manufacturers of non-bulk combination packagings because of
the large number of very similar designs in production, and therefore
allowed a number of variations in package design that would not require
retesting (see Sec. 178.601(g)) and extended the periodic retest
requirement to 24 months for non-bulk combination packagings. See pages
55 FR 52459-52460 of final rule HM-181 for further details on RSPA's
response to commenters regarding implementation of UN POP standards.
Several comments related to the periodic retest requirement for UN
specification non-bulk packagings and IBCs were submitted to the 2017
Regulatory Reform Notice docket. The Reusable Industrial Packaging
Association (RIPA),\9\ the Industrial Packaging Alliance of North
America (IPANA),\10\ and the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers
Institute (SAAMI) \11\ requested that PHMSA extend the periodic
retesting interval to up to five years for UN specification non-bulk
packagings and IBCs to align with international standards that permit
longer retest intervals and to reflect the higher quality manufacturing
practices now in place in the packaging industry. After the comment
period of the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice closed, IPANA submitted a
petition for rulemaking, P-1713,\12\ and SAAMI submitted a petition
designated P-1732 \13\ re-iterating their request.
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\9\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2634.
\10\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2667.
\11\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-1479.
\12\ https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=PHMSA-2018-0053.
\13\ https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=PHMSA-2019-0069.
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PHMSA notes that, unlike many other countries, when the UN POP
standards were adopted into the HMR, we did not require that packaging
manufacturers send their packagings to an independent third-party
laboratory for design qualification and periodic retesting. Rather, we
allowed, and continue to allow, non-bulk UN specification packaging and
IBC manufacturers to ``self-certify'' their own packagings by
conducting the required tests and recording the results. PHMSA is
requesting comment on the following questions to evaluate RIPA, IPANA,
and SAAMI's requests:
1. Can a package manufacturer or a UN Third-Party Packaging
Certification Agency demonstrate through data, modeling, or other
means, that a packaging design that is tested every 60 months performs
as well as a design tested every 12 to 24 months? Explain.
2. How have manufacturers' quality assurance procedures evolved and
improved since the implementation of UN POP system? Please provide
specific examples for all packaging types believed to warrant a longer
design qualification interval.
[[Page 43020]]
3. For trade associations who represent packaging manufacturers,
what percentage of packaging manufacturers in the United States have
implemented improved quality assurance procedures for UN POP (non-bulk,
Large Packagings, and IBCs) since the current system was adopted in the
HMR in 1990?
4. For trade associations and packaging manufacturers, how
frequently are internal quality control tests conducted by
manufacturers?
a. What types of tests?
b. Does every U.S. IBC and non-bulk specification packaging
manufacturer follow the same internal quality control program? If not,
are there similarities among these manufacturers' quality control
programs? Are there best practices?
c. Is there a voluntary consensus standard (e.g., ISO, ASTM, etc.)
used to normalize these internal quality control tests such that the
standard could be incorporated by reference into the HMR?
5. Are there similar quality control methods used for all the
different types of packagings (e.g., steel drums, fiberboard boxes,
composite IBCs, etc.)? If not, how do the quality control methods
differ by packaging type?
6. For trade associations who represent packaging manufacturers, or
packaging manufacturers, how many how many non-bulk, Large Packaging,
and IBC packaging designs are currently in production in the U.S.?
Please provide information by type and whether the packagings are
single packagings or combination packagings (e.g., 5,000 combination
package 4G fiberboard box designs, 1,500 single package 1A1 non-
removable head steel drum designs, etc.).
7. Of the current UN POP designs in production in the U.S., what
percentage(s) are variations on tested designs produced without further
testing under Sec. 178.601(g)?
8. What is the cost of periodic retesting of a packaging for self-
certifiers (i.e., manufacturers who certify their own packagings)?
Please provide information by type (e.g., $1,000 for a 4G combination
package fiberboard box design, $3,500 for a composite IBC design,
etc.).
a. For a typical manufacturer, how much does periodic
recertification cost on an annual basis?
9. What is the total cost of a non-bulk, Large Packaging, and IBC
packaging periodic recertification for manufacturers who use UN Third-
Party Packaging Certification Agencies to certify their packagings?
Please provide information by type (e.g., $1,000 to recertify a 4G
combination packaging fiberboard box design, $3,500 to recertify a
composite IBC design, etc.).
a. For a typical manufacturer, how much does periodic
recertification cost on an annual basis?
10. Given the variability in packaging types encompassed by non-
bulk, Large Packaging, IBC POP standards and the differing capabilities
of manufacturers, would it be more effective to consider extension of
periodic retest periods on a case-by-case basis through issuance of
approvals, as provided by Sec. Sec. 178.601(e), 178.801(e) and
178.955(e)?
11. Would packaging manufacturers be willing to submit packagings
to UN Third-Party Packaging Certification Agencies for testing, in lieu
of self-certification, in order to have a longer interval between
periodic qualifications? Why or why not?
12. Do the users of non-bulk packagings, IBCs, or Large Packagings
support an extension of the periodic qualification interval? Why or why
not?
13. How would the extension of the periodic qualification interval
impact costs or savings for users of non-bulk packagings, IBCs, or
Large Packagings? Please quantify the impact on burden hours for
employees using Bureau of Labor Statistics labor categories, if
possible.
C. Use of Non-Bulk Package Test Samples for Multiple Tests
The HMR require that all non-bulk UN POP designs, also known as UN
specification packagings, be tested in accordance with the requirements
in part 178, subpart M. These testing requirements specify the types of
tests that must be conducted, and the number of samples of packages
that must be subjected to the tests. Generally, the HMR do not allow
sample packages to be reused for multiple tests, i.e., a drum that is
dropped as part of a drop test cannot be used for the stacking test
(see Sec. 178.601(k)(1)).
In 2017, PHMSA issued Letter of Interpretation Reference Number 16-
0154,\14\ which confirmed that package test samples may not be reused
for multiple tests, unless authorized by the terms of an approval (see
Sec. 178.601(k)(2)). PHMSA has issued approvals authorizing the reuse
of package test samples for different tests to approved UN Third-Party
Packaging Certification Agencies and other entities. IPANA submitted a
comment \15\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice requesting that PHMSA
rescind Letter of Interpretation 16-0154. PHMSA maintains the position
that this letter of interpretation is correct based on the current
requirements of the HMR. However, we are willing to consider revising
the HMR to permit the reuse of packages for different tests for all
package designs without approval from the Associate Administrator. To
evaluate this potential change to the HMR, PHMSA requests comment on
the following questions:
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\14\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretation%20Files/2017/160154.pdf.
\15\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2667.
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1. How many package designs would benefit from the option to re-use
a test sample for another test (i.e., use a sample package from the
drop test for the stack test)?
2. How much time would be saved for each design so tested? What
type of employee would save time? (Use Bureau of Labor employee
category codes, if possible.)
3. How many fewer test samples would be required for each design so
tested?
4. What are the cost savings, per design test or design
recertification test cycle, by reusing test samples for additional
tests?
5. Are there certain combinations of design tests that are most
suited for use of one sample across multiple tests? Are there certain
tests that should not be allowed to be performed with tests samples
subjected to other tests?
6. In practice, would sample reuse be limited to certain packaging
designs, types, and packaging materials? Please provide the packaging
types and materials.
7. Would permitting package sample reuse increase test failures and
associated costs with re-running certification tests? Please explain
your reasoning.
8. If sample reuse is permitted, what is the potential impact on
safety?
a. Would permitting sample reuse cause packaging designers to
create more robust packaging designs? If so, how?
b. Is there any possibility that allowing reuse would degrade
safety in packaging designs? If so, how?
c. Is there any concern that it will be more difficult to determine
the root cause of a packaging test failure if the sample has been
subjected to multiple tests?
D. Aerosol Classification Alignment
Section 171.8 of the HMR define an ``aerosol'' as:
an article consisting of any non-refillable receptacle containing a
gas compressed, liquefied or dissolved under pressure, the sole
purpose of which is to expel a nonpoisonous (other than a Division
6.1
[[Page 43021]]
Packing Group III material) liquid, paste, or powder and fitted with
a self-closing release device allowing the contents to be ejected by
the gas.
Aerosols are limited to 1 L in capacity and are eligible to be
shipped as a limited quantity in accordance with Sec. 173.306(a)(3),
(a)(5) and (b). These limited quantity exceptions allow for alternative
packaging, specifically: non-specification non-refillable containers;
DOT-specification DOT 2P, DOT 2P1, DOT 2Q, DOT 2Q1 or DOT 2Q2 non-
refillable metal receptacles; or DOT-specification DOT 2S non-
refillable plastic receptacles. Eligibility for the different
containers (non-specification, DOT 2P, 2Q or 2S) is dependent on the
pressure and flammability of the contents (i.e., Division 2.1 aerosols
are not permitted in DOT 2S plastic receptacles, and 2Q containers can
contain material at higher pressures than 2P containers; see Sec.
173.306(a)(3) for further details). The limited quantity exception also
provides hazard communication exceptions that facilitate commerce while
maintaining a level of safety corresponding to the level of hazard
present for the aerosols.
In the Sec. 172.101 Hazardous Materials Table (HMT), there are
five entries for UN1950 aerosols:
Aerosols, corrosive, Packing Group II or III, 2.2 (8)
Aerosols, flammable, 2.1
Aerosols, flammable, n.o.s. (engine starting fluid), 2.1
Aerosols, non-flammable, 2.2
Aerosols, poison, Packing Group III, 2.2 (6.1)
These entries do not address other possible combinations of
propellants and the liquid, paste, or powder contained in the aerosol
(i.e., a Division 2.1 flammable aerosol with a subsidiary hazard of
Class 8). The ICAO TI edition currently incorporated by reference in
the HMR (the 2021-2022 edition) lists 11 types of UN1950 aerosols
authorized for transportation by aircraft:
Aerosols, flammable, 2.1
Aerosols, flammable, containing substances in Division 6.1 PG
III and substances in Class 8, PG III, 2.1 (6.1, 8)
Aerosols, flammable, corrosive, containing substances in Class
8, PG III, 2.1 (8)
Aerosols, flammable (engine starting fluid), 2.1
Aerosols, flammable, toxic, containing substances in Division
6.1 PG III, 2.1 (6.1)
Aerosols, non-flammable, 2.2
Aerosols, non-flammable, containing substances in Division 6.1
PG III and substances in Class 8, PG III, 2.2 (6.1, 8)
Aerosols, non-flammable, containing substances in Class 8, PG
III, 2.2 (8)
Aerosols, non-flammable (tear gas devices), 2.2 (6.1)
Aerosols, non-flammable, toxic, containing substances in
Division 6.1, PG III, 2.2 (6.1)
Aerosols, oxidizing 2.2 (5.1)
The IMDG Code Dangerous Goods List (DGL) lists only one entry for
UN1950 aerosols, which is associated with Special Provision (SP) 63. SP
63 directs shippers to classify the primary hazard as Division 2.1
flammable gas or Division 2.2 non-flammable gas, based on the
flammability of the contents of the container, and then assign a Class
8 or Division 6.1 subsidiary hazard as necessary based on the nature of
the contents to be expelled. The IMDG Code also authorizes Division
6.1, PG II and Class 8, PG II subsidiary hazard materials in aerosols,
which the ICAO TI do not. The HMR currently allow Class 8, PG II
subsidiary hazard materials in aerosols, but not Division 6.1, PG II.
In practice, despite having only a single UN1950 entry for aerosols in
the DGL, the IMDG Code acknowledges an even broader list of possible
classifications for aerosols than the ICAO TI. The lack of alignment
between the HMR and international regulations for aerosol
classification creates confusion for shippers and carriers engaged in
international shipments.
Matson Navigation submitted petition P-1698 \16\ requesting that
PHMSA authorize Class 6.1 PG II material in aerosols for highway, rail,
and vessel transport, and that we amend the HMR to include additional
UN1950 aerosol entries in the HMT to account for Division 2.1 aerosols
with subsidiary Division 6.1. The petition also requests that we align
with the IMDG Code's 120 mL size restriction for aerosols with a 6.1
subsidiary hazard. PHMSA requests comment on the following questions to
evaluate Matson Navigation's petition to allow subsidiary 6.1, PG II
materials in aerosols for highway, vessel, and rail transportation, and
create new entries in the HMT:
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\16\ https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=PHMSA-2017-0021.
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1. How many shipments of Division 2.2 (6.1), PG II and Division 2.1
(6.1), PG II aerosols would move within the U.S. per year if
authorized? Please provide estimates for marine vessel, highway, and
rail separately, if possible.
2. Are there any known international incidents involving Division
6.1, PG II aerosols, including those shipments that have entered the
U.S.? Explain.
3. What would be the cost savings, per shipment, associated with
allowing Division 2.2 (6.1) PG II and Division 2.1 (6.1) PG II material
to be transported as an aerosol?
a. Would shippers be able to reduce costs by switching to less
expensive packaging authorized in Sec. 173.306(a)(3)? How much would
shippers save per packaging or shipment?
b. How much time would shippers save due to the reduced hazard
communication requirements associated with limited quantity shipments
by highway, rail, and vessel? What categories of employees would save
time? (Use Bureau of Labor Statistics labor categories, if possible.)
4. Do you support adoption of the IMDG Code 120-mL limit for
Division 2.2 and Division 2.1 (6.1) PG II aerosols transported by
highway, rail, and marine vessel? Marine vessel only? Why or why not?
a. Do you support adoption of the 120-mL limit for Division 2.2 and
Division 2.1 (6.1) PG III aerosols that currently do not have a 120-mL
limit when transported under the HMR? Why or why not?
5. How would the creation of additional entries on the Sec.
172.101 HMT for Division 2.1 aerosols with subsidiary hazards decrease
confusion and facilitate international commerce?
6. Should aerosols in Division 2.2 and Division 2.1 with a
subsidiary hazard of 6.1 PG II be required to bear markings indicating
the package is forbidden for transportation aboard aircraft?
a. Would such a marking reduce the risk that a forbidden aerosol
would be transported aboard an aircraft? Explain your reasoning.
7. How often are shipments frustrated by the current disharmony
between the HMR and international regulations? How many shipments are
frustrated on an annual basis?
a. What are the direct and indirect costs of a frustrated shipment?
For example, what amount of delay occurs and what are the costs of this
delay? Are ``demurrage''--i.e., delayed ship loading or unloading--fees
charged because of these delays? If so, how much are these fees on a
per-shipment basis?
b. What amount of revenue is forfeited when a shipper or carrier
declines to offer or transport a potentially non-compliant aerosol
shipment?
E. Residue IBC Exceptions
The HMR generally require that a package that contains a residue of
a hazardous material must be transported in the same manner as when it
contained a greater quantity of material (i.e., as if it was full, see
Sec. 173.29(a)).
[[Page 43022]]
However, Sec. 173.29(c) provides exceptions for non-bulk packages
containing the residue materials covered by Table 2 of the Sec.
172.504 placarding table. RIPA submitted petition P-1618 \17\ to PHMSA
a comment \18\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice, and a revised
petition in 2020 \19\ requesting that we also provide an exception for
IBCs containing the residue of hazardous material (residue IBCs),
similar to the existing exception for residue in a non-bulk package.
RIPA's request is summarized as follows:
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\17\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=PHMSA-2013-0100-0001.
\18\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2634.
\19\ https://www.regulations.gov/document/PHMSA-2013-0100-0004.
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Create an exception for IBCs containing a residue (not
more than 0.3 percent full) of Class 3, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1 PG III, 8, or 9
from subparts C-F (shipping papers, marking, labeling, and placarding,
respectively) and subpart G Emergency Response Information (ERI).
(Shipments not subject to shipping papers are not subject to ERI, see
Sec. 172.600(d)). Although not specifically requested by RIPA,
exception from the ERI requirements is implicit with a shipping paper
exception, and therefore, we mention it here.
Require a statement on a shipping document carried onboard
any vehicle transporting residue IBCs (e.g., a bill of lading or
waybill) reading:``This vehicle is carrying emptied intermediate bulk
containers (IBCs) that meet the RCRA empty container rule, 40 CFR
261.7, and may contain up to 0.3% of capacity of residues of hazardous
materials in Classes 3, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1 packing group III, 8, and 9.
These IBCs do not contain residues of any toxic inhalation hazard or
Packing Group I hazardous material.''
To support their petition, RIPA cites a bonfire test they conducted
on an IBC containing residue of acetone that demonstrated only fire
behavior, with no explosion, fragmentation, or fireballs.
Additionally, PHMSA is aware that Transport Canada has issued an
equivalency certificate, SU 11819,\20\ which grants a similar exception
to all RIPA member companies transporting residues of hazardous
materials in IBCs in Canada for all modes except air. The conditions of
SU 11819 are not identical to RIPA's request in P-1618, specifically in
that SU 11819 requires the display of a ``DANGER'' placard on a vehicle
transporting residue IBCs and requires that the shipment be accompanied
by a transport document identifying the shipment as residue IBCs, the
number of IBCs carried, and the primary hazard classes present. There
are some additional differences in that SU 11819 allows the IBCs to
remain up to 1 percent full and includes materials that P-1618 does not
request authorization to transport (Division 4.2, 5.2, and 6.1 other
than PIH material) under the exception.
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\20\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/standards-rulemaking/hazmat/transport-canada-su-11819.
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To evaluate creating an exception for residue IBCs, PHMSA requests
comment on the following questions:
1. Please provide supporting information describing how the
transportation of residue IBCs in accordance with P-1618 maintains an
equivalent level of safety compared to the HMR's current requirements
for IBCs that contain a residue of hazardous materials.
a. Does the P-1618 request account for the presence of vapors of
hazardous materials in the residue IBCs? Please describe.
b. If placarding the motor vehicle carrying residue IBCs is no
longer required--and therefore a hazmat endorsement on a Commercial
Driver's License is no longer required--how would a carrier ensure that
the driver is aware of the hazards of the material he or she is
transporting?
2. Do you support adoption of RIPA's request to have the vehicle
display no placards or ID number marks for a shipment of residue IBCs?
Why or why not? Alternatively, please propose an alternative form of
hazard communication for the vehicle.
3. Do you support adopting RIPA's request to have a statement for
all shipments paraphrased as follows: ``This vehicle is carrying
emptied intermediate bulk containers that may contain up to 0.3% of
capacity of residues of hazardous materials in Classes 3, 8, 9, and
Divisions 4.1, 5.1, 6.1 (packing group III). These IBCs do not contain
residues of any toxic inhalation hazard or Packing Group I hazardous
material.'' Why or why not? Should the statement be revised in any way?
How so?
4. Do you support a requirement that vehicles carry ERI for the
hazardous materials transported under this proposed exception?
5. Do you support RIPA's request to authorize this proposed
exception for Class 3, 8, and 9, and Division 4.1, 5.1, 6.1 (PG III
only) materials? Why or why not?
6. Do you support limiting the authorization to highway and rail
transport only, as requested in RIPA's petition, or include vessel
transport as authorized in SU 11819? Please explain your reasoning.
7. How much material should be allowed to remain in the IBC to take
this exception? How would the amount of material left in the IBC be
verified? Options to consider include alignment of the exception to
apply to containers emptied in accordance with:
a. The SU 11819 standard: The IBC has been emptied to the maximum
extent possible using the most effective method--e.g., can include
pouring, upending, pumping, aspirating, scraping, rinsing--for the type
of hazardous material and is less than 1 percent full;
b. RIPA's request: The residue does not exceed 0.3 percent of the
capacity of the packaging and is so certified by the emptier;
c. The U.S. EPA ``RCRA empty'' standard from 40 CFR 261.7: No more
than 0.3 percent by weight of the total capacity of the container
remains in the container or inner liner; or
d. An alternative quantity limit: If you support an alternative
quantity limit, please describe and support the limit with any
technical or scientific information available to you.
8. Are there any known incidents or accidents involving residue
IBCs shipped under Canadian SU 11819 or the European Agreements
Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR)
exception for residue IBCs? If so, please describe. For reference, ADR
regulations provide exceptions for emptied IBCs that are similar to the
exceptions provided in Canadian SU 11819.
9. Are there any known incidents or accidents involving residue
IBCs in the United States where improper emergency response protocols
were implemented, due to the lower hazard posed by the small amount of
hazardous material present on the vehicle? Please describe.
10. How would offerors of ``empty'' IBCs determine that they meet
the 0.3 percent residue requirement before offering?
a. P-1618 uses the term ``emptier,'' which is not a term defined or
generally used in the HMR. Please explain the difference between the
offeror of a hazardous material for transportation and the ``emptier.''
11. Do you support restricting the exception to transport for
purposes of testing/inspection or delivery to a disposal facility, as
provided in Canadian SU 11819? Why or why not?
12. Do you support limiting the exception to IBCs with a capacity
less than or equal to 550 gallons (2100 liters)--as RIPA requests--or
allowing the exception for IBCs of all sizes?
[[Page 43023]]
Please justify your response with technical data, if possible.
13. What cost savings would be achieved by shippers and carriers of
residue IBCs if this was adopted as proposed by RIPA? Please explain
your calculations including the amount of labor required and the rate
of compensation for that labor.
a. Please explain the current industry practice for determining the
shipping information for residue IBCs (i.e., explain how the material
is classified for transportation), and how RIPA's proposal will reduce
burdens on shippers and carriers.
b. What, if any, costs savings would be realized if placarding for
the vehicle carrying residue IBCs is no longer required, and a driver
without a hazmat endorsement is allowed to operate the vehicle?
14. What cost savings would be achieved by shippers and carriers of
residue IBCs if the HMR was modified to align with SU 11819? For
example, Transport Canada's SU 11819 requires the use of the
``DANGEROUS'' placard and updated shipping documents. Please explain
your calculations, including any additional costs accrued through the
additional shipping paper statement.
F. Requirements for Damaged, Defective, or Recalled Lithium Cells and
Batteries
The HMR permit the shipment of damaged, defective, or recalled
(DDR) lithium cells and batteries in accordance with Sec. 173.185(f).
These packaging instructions are more stringent than the normal lithium
cell and battery instructions found in Sec. 173.185(b), and do not
permit the transportation of DDR lithium batteries and cells aboard
aircraft. We received a comment \21\ from PRBA regarding two distinct
issues related to the requirements for transportation of DDR cells and
batteries. First, PRBA requested that PHMSA reconsider our limit of one
DDR cell or battery per outer packaging. Second, PRBA requested that
PHMSA remove the word ``recalled'' from Sec. 173.185(f).
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\21\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2826.
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PRBA explained that the use of the word ``recalled'' in Sec.
173.185(f) creates confusion for shippers and causes shippers to offer
batteries and devices containing batteries that have been recalled for
non-safety related reasons under the damaged, defective, or recalled
provisions in Sec. 173.185(f). It was never PHMSA's intent to subject
lithium batteries and lithium battery powered devices to the conditions
in Sec. 173.185(f) if they had been recalled for a non-safety related
purpose. When PHMSA created Sec. 173.185(f) in final rule HM-224F \22\
(79 FR 46011; Aug. 6, 2014), we stated:
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\22\ https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-06/pdf/2014-18146.pdf.
The HMR do not currently contain provisions for transporting
batteries subject to a manufacturer's recall or that are damaged and
potentially dangerous. Based on previously developed guidance
material and competent authority approvals, PHMSA will require
lithium batteries that have been damaged, identified as being
defective, or are otherwise being returned to the manufacturer for
safety reasons [emphasis added], to be packaged in combination
packages, surrounded by non-conductive cushioning material, and
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transported by highway or rail only.
While our intent may have been clear in the HM-224F preamble, we
acknowledge that the wording of Sec. 173.185(f) could mislead a
cautious shipper to ship lithium batteries and battery powered devices
that had been recalled for any reason under the more restrictive
requirements of this paragraph. Therefore, PHMSA requests comment on
the following questions to evaluate PRBA's comment:
Clarification of ``Defective''
1. PHMSA's concerns with DDR batteries include that damaged or
defective batteries have a higher chance of thermal runaway and
creating fire and explosion in transportation. PHMSA does not consider
devices and batteries recalled for non-safety related purposes to be
subject to the ``damaged, defective, or recalled'' packing instruction
in Sec. 173.185(f). How should PHMSA define ``damaged, defective, or
recalled'' for lithium batteries to clearly communicate this
distinction?
2. Given PHMSA's intended meaning of ``damaged, defective, or
recalled,'' how frequently do shippers prepare lithium battery
shipments under the restrictive requirements of Sec. 173.185(f) when
the shipment does not actually involve DDR batteries, but batteries
that are recalled for reasons other than safety? How many shipments are
involved on an annual basis?
a. How common are shipments of non-safety related recalled
batteries compared to those of safety related recalled batteries?
3. How much costlier are shipments of DDR batteries than non-DDR
battery shipments? What contributes to higher costs for DDR battery
shipments relative to non-DDR battery shipments?
a. Who mostly bears these costs of DDR or non-DDR battery
shipments? Shippers, manufacturers, or recyclers?
Packaging Requirements for DDR Batteries
4. What techniques, besides a visual examination of the battery,
are in use to identify DDR batteries prior to shipment? Please describe
any known to you.
5. Do the current requirements for DDR batteries in Sec.
173.185(f) provide an adequate level of safety during transportation
for these higher-risk batteries? If not, please describe the safety
deficiencies you are aware of and suggest a means to address the
deficiency.
6. Describe any technologies, practices, or procedures known to you
that could reduce the risks presented by these batteries in
transportation.
G. Sampling and Testing Program for Unrefined Petroleum-Based Products
Proper classification of a hazardous material is a cornerstone of
the packaging and hazard communication requirements in the HMR. The
person who offers a hazardous material for transportation (i.e., the
shipper) is responsible for properly classifying the material into one
of the nine hazard classes (see Sec. 173.22). In 2015, PHMSA published
HM-251,\23\ ``Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for
High-Hazard Flammable Trains'' (80 FR 26643; May 8, 2015) in response
to several rail incidents involving derailment of unit trains
transporting millions of gallons of crude oil within the United States
and Canada. As part of this rule, PHMSA created a specific requirement
in the HMR for the sampling and testing of unrefined petroleum-based
products to address the variability of the physical properties of these
materials (see 80 FR 26652-26653 for further discussion). These
sampling and testing plan requirements, which include a recordkeeping
component, are found in Sec. 173.41.
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\23\ https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2015-05-08/pdf/2015-10670.pdf.
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PHMSA received two comments in the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice
related to the sampling and testing plan for unrefined petroleum-based
products. American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM)
submitted a comment \24\ requesting that PHMSA repeal Sec. 173.41
because it is an unnecessary duplication of the shipper's
responsibility to classify (see Sec. 173.22(a)(1)). The American
Petroleum Institute (API) submitted a comment \25\ requesting that
PHMSA clarify and
[[Page 43024]]
revise the requirements of Sec. 173.41 to simplify the requirements
and encourage compliance.
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\24\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2785.
\25\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2766.
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PHMSA believes that the requirements in Sec. 173.41 serve an
important role in ensuring the proper classification of unrefined
petroleum-based products, which exhibit more variation than refined or
manufactured materials. Therefore, we do not anticipate removing this
section at this time. However, clarifications of the requirements in
Sec. 173.41 could encourage compliance and efficiency--and in turn
reduce environmental burdens. PHMSA requests comment on the following
questions:
1. Would the adoption in the HMR or incorporation by reference of
ANSI/API RP 3000 \26\ or parts of it in Sec. 173.41 help clarify
requirements and/or improve efficiency?
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\26\ https://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/wells-to-consumer/transporting-oil-natural-gas/rail-transportation/api-rp-3000.
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2. Are there any specific technical requirements or provisions in
ANSI/API RP 3000 or it's technical addendums that should be
incorporated into the HMR? If yes, please explain.
3. Should PHMSA adopt any of the DOT Special Permits that have been
issued in connection with Sec. 173.41 or the testing requirements of
Sec. 173.120 (e.g. DOT-SP 20861) \27\ into the HMR? Why or why not?
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\27\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/approvals-and-permits/hazmat/file-serve/offer/SP20861.pdf/offerserver/SP20861.
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4. What specific provisions of Sec. 173.41 for shippers and
carriers may improve compliance and efficiency?
a. Provide suggested regulatory text that would revise the
identified provisions.
b. Provide detailed estimated costs for the current requirement and
projected cost savings for the suggested revised requirements.
c. Provide detailed safety justifications that demonstrate how the
revised requirements will meet an equivalent or greater level of safety
to the current sampling and testing plan requirement.
H. Basic Oil Spill Response Plan Applicability
In accordance with Sec. 130.31, any person who transports liquid
petroleum oil in a packaging with a capacity of 3,500 gallons or
greater must have a basic written plan to respond to an oil spill. RSPA
instituted the 3,500-gallon threshold for basic oil spill response
plans in HM-214/PC-1 Interim Final Rule 2 (IFR-2) \28\ published on
June 16, 1993 (58 FR 33302). The 3,500-gallon threshold replaced a
requirement that would have imposed oil spill response planning
requirements on all bulk packages (capacity greater than 119 gallons),
which was deemed too burdensome. Rather than all bulk packagings,
packagings with a capacity of 3,500 gallons or more containing oil were
chosen as an appropriate threshold for basic oil spill planning. The
interim final rule noted that the 3,500-gallon capacity criterion is
the same as the HMR's bulk packaging registration requirement (see
Sec. 107.601(a)(4)), and the Federal Highway Administration's (now
FMCSA's) financial responsibility requirement found in 49 CFR part 387.
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\28\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/standards-rulemaking/rulemakings/archived-rulemakings/62066/58-fr-33302-interim-final-rule.pdf.
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The Utilities Solid Waste Activities Group (USWAG) submitted a
comment \29\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice requesting that PHMSA
change the applicability of the requirement to a packaging that
contains 3,500 gallons or more of liquid petroleum oil, rather than a
capacity of 3,500 gallons. USWAG described scenarios in which their
member utilities are required to develop basic oil spill response plans
for the transportation of large electrical transformers with liquid
capacities over 3,500 gallons that only contained a small residual
amount of oil. Since it is possible that releases of liquid petroleum
oils subject to part 130 requirements may not be subject to DOT 5800.1
Hazardous Material Incident Report Form requirements, PHMSA does not
have complete data on oil spills in transportation. Additionally, PHMSA
does not require that persons submit their basic oil spill response
plans for approval, therefore we are uncertain how many persons are
currently subject to this requirement. PHMSA requests comment on the
following questions:
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\29\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-1390.
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1. How many companies, utilities, or other entities transport
liquid petroleum oil in a packaging with a capacity of 3,500 gallons or
greater?
a. What percentage of these shipments result in spills and what
potential gaps exist in this data?
b. What are the likely consequences and damages, including worst-
case consequences?
c. How much higher would damages be for these spills without a
basic oil spill response plan?
2. If we were to change the criterion for applicability of the
basic oil spill response plan requirement to a packaging containing at
least 3,500 gallons of oil, rather than a capacity of 3,500 gallons,
how many companies, utilities, or other entities would be required to
create a basic oil spill response plan? Put another way, how many fewer
companies, utilities, or other entities would be required to create a
basic oil spill response plan? Should regulated entities be instead
responsible for a residual waste disposal plan?
3. If we were to change the criterion for applicability of the
basic oil spill response plan requirement to a packaging containing at
least 3,500 gallons of oil, rather than a capacity of 3,500 gallons,
how many fewer shipments of oil would be transported with a basic oil
spill response plan?
4. What is the cost to develop a basic (non-comprehensive) oil
spill response plan ``from scratch?'' While other estimation methods
are possible, consider describing the cost in terms of the amount of
labor required to develop the plan and the rate of compensation for
that labor.
5. Are there alternative thresholds for a basic (non-comprehensive)
oil spill response plan that PHMSA should consider; for example, a
quantity of oil that is between 0 gallons and 3,500 gallons? Please
provide experience or knowledge of oil spills from packages covered by
the basic oil spill response plan requirements in the United States.
6. Would exceptions for equipment such as electrical transformers
containing residue amounts of oil be a more suitable approach?
a. How would this be implemented?
b. What type of oil is found in electrical transformers?
c. Should all types of oil be eligible for this exception?
d. What quantity of oil is typically found in an electrical
transformer that is being transported via highway or rail?
7. If we changed the threshold for the requirement from packaging
capacity to actual quantity transported, what would be the appropriate
threshold for the quantity transported to require a basic oil spill
response plan? (i.e., would 3,500 gallons still be the appropriate
threshold or should the threshold be lowered?)
8. How would an offeror determine the amount of oil in the
packaging prior to offering it into transportation?
I. Standards Incorporated by Reference Update
The HMR incorporate by reference (IBR) approximately 200 technical
standards from industry groups, standard-setting organizations, and
international organizations as legally
[[Page 43025]]
binding and enforceable parts of the regulations (see Sec. 171.7). The
use of IBR materials provides several advantages for the regulated
community and PHMSA. It decreases the size and complexity of the HMR by
allowing the technical standards applicable to specific activities
(i.e., welding thin-walled steel cylinders) to be referenced and
incorporated into the regulations without including the actual standard
or its text in the HMR. Incorporation by reference encourages industry
groups to collaborate and share knowledge to develop consensus
documents reflecting best practices in the industry, with the knowledge
that PHMSA is willing to incorporate the standard into the HMR as a
binding requirement, when appropriate. IBR also allows PHMSA to focus
our research and development efforts more efficiently, with the
knowledge that industry groups and non-governmental organizations are
also constantly working to develop consensus standards in their
particular areas of expertise. IBR encourages standardization that
supports international commerce as well, through the use of
international standards such as ISO gas cylinder design, construction,
and testing standards, and international transportation standards,
including the ICAO TI and the IMDG Code.
While PHMSA reviews and updates IBR documents regularly, many IBR
standards currently in the HMR do not reflect the most current version
and may not reflect the state of the art for a particular area of the
transport industry. Please note it may also be purposeful on PHMSA's
part to not IBR a more recent version based on concerns with a
particular edition or IBR a standard in part. In accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act (see 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.) and the
requirements of the Office of the Federal Register (see 1 CFR part 51),
PHMSA must IBR a specific edition of a document as part of this
process. Therefore, whenever a new edition is developed and published,
the prior edition (i.e., the IBR edition) will remain the legally
binding standard until the new edition is incorporated through the
rulemaking process. This lag between publication of a new edition and
incorporation into the HMR can create confusion within industry and
create difficulties in enforcement as regulated entities acquire the
new standard through their memberships to industry groups or through a
desire to conform with newly identified best practices, but are legally
required by the HMR to follow the previous edition.
In other cases, some members of the regulated community may prefer
the older edition and find technical standards are being updated too
frequently, citing high costs to purchase new standards, training
costs, and other costs. Additionally, the incorporation of an older
industry standard may not necessarily create a conflict as an entity
conforming to the incorporated edition in the HMR can also at the same
time be conforming to the most current version for purposes of
satisfying condition(s) for a standard setting organization.
PHMSA recognizes that many IBR documents in the HMR are not the
most current version of the document available. To address this issue,
we request comment on the following questions:
1. Which documents incorporated by reference in Sec. 171.7 are
outdated and should be updated to reflect today's best practices in the
industry?
a. For each IBR document so identified, what is the most current
edition of the standard?
b. For each IBR document so identified, is the newest edition
readily available? What is the cost of purchasing the newest edition?
c. For each IBR document so identified, describe the relevant
changes from the currently incorporated edition to the newest edition.
d. For each identified change from the current IBR document to the
newest standard, please provide supporting rationale for the change
based on relevant technical and scientific data.
e. Please provide all available information on the:
i. costs imposed;
ii. cost savings created; and
iii. safety benefits of the changes identified from the current IBR
standard in the HMR to the most current industry standard.
f. Please indicate the costs, savings, and benefits to any
identifiable groups within society, such as specific companies,
industries, or the public.
2. Should PHMSA engage IBR organizations through a semi-annual
public meeting to discuss changes to the IBR standards, codes, or best
practices?
a. Should PHMSA consider individual, modal specific meetings to
address individual transportation modes, IBR standards, codes, or best
practices?
3. Please provide any comments related to the development of
consensus standards, including the ability of the public to participate
during the technical development process and barriers to accessing
standards (i.e., cost).
J. EX-Number Display Requirements
The HMR require all new explosives to be approved by PHMSA or other
authorized government agency before they can be transported to, from,
or within the United States (see Sec. 173.56 for further details). An
approved explosive is assigned an explosives approval number, commonly
referred to as an ``EX number.'' Consumer fireworks certified under the
provisions of Sec. 173.65 are assigned a fireworks certification
number, commonly referred to as an ``FC number,'' which is treated
equivalently to an EX number for hazard communication purposes. Any
interested party can search an EX or FC number using the PHMSA
website's approvals search tool \30\ and find the document that assigns
the explosive to a hazard class and division, as well as any potential
special packing instructions for the material.
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\30\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/approvals-and-permits/hazmat/approvals-search.
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PHMSA requires that the EX or FC number be displayed on the package
used to transport the explosive or on the hazardous material shipping
paper (see Sec. 172.320). PHMSA received a comment \31\ to the 2017
Regulatory Reform Notice from the American Pyrotechnic Association
(APA) requesting that PHMSA add another EX number display option and
allow the display of an EX number on a document, such as a ``packing
slip,'' that accompanies the shipping paper or on the explosive item
itself rather than the outer packaging. Many explosives approved in
accordance with the requirements in Sec. 173.56 are approved in
conjunction with their packaging, and the classification of the
material is dependent on the type, size, and strength of the package.
Therefore, PHMSA does not agree with APA that displaying the EX number
only on the device provides an equivalent level of information, because
it may create the incorrect impression that the device can be packaged
at the shipper's discretion, rather than in accordance with the EX
approval's instructions. The classification of fireworks certified by a
Fireworks Certification Agency (FCA) in accordance with the APA 87-1
standard (see Sec. Sec. 173.64 and 173.65), however, are not packaging
dependent. Therefore, PHMSA is willing to consider revising the HMR to
permit certain fireworks (UN0336, UN0335, and UN0431) when approved
under the provisions of APA 87-1 and certified by an FCA to be
transported with the UN ID number on a packing slip, or only displayed
on the devices themselves, rather than on the packaging or shipping
paper. Please note that UN0336, UN0335, and
[[Page 43026]]
UN0431 fireworks approved through the Sec. 173.56 EX approval process
are not under consideration for this topic because their classification
may be packaging dependent.
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\31\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2413.
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To evaluate this revision to the HMR, PHMSA requests comment on the
following questions:
1. From an emergency response perspective, how does allowing the
transportation of fireworks with FC numbers entered on a document other
than a hazmat shipping paper, or on the explosive item rather than the
outside packaging, impact the risks of hazardous materials in
transportation?
a. Would this change impact the ability to respond in accident
situations or create confusion during customs examination for import
shipments?
b. How will shippers and carriers ensure that the document remains
associated with the package at all times and available to inspectors
and emergency responders?
2. How much time would a fireworks shipper save per shipment if
these additional options were allowed?
3. What labor category (use Bureau of Labor Statistics labor
categories, if possible) of employee would save time per shipment?
Alternatively, please provide an hourly wage of the type of employee
responsible for complying.
4. How many UN0336, UN0335, and UN0431 fireworks shipments would
likely take advantage of this option per year? Approximations and
``ballpark'' estimates are acceptable.
a. Do manufacturers or shippers print/apply the packing slips or
display on the device at the same time as they print/apply the
packaging/shipping paper? Will these different processes/exceptions for
different firework categories be more costly?
5. What is the approximate breakdown of the modes of transportation
used for UN0336, UN0335, and UN0431 fireworks shipments (e.g., 50
percent highway and rail, 45 percent vessel, 5 percent air)?
a. Would adoption of the marking method discussed in this section
create harmonization issues with relevant international transport
regulations? Please explain your reasoning.
6. Should recordkeeping requirements apply to the accompanying
document displaying the FC numbers (i.e., packing slip) in the same
manner as for a shipping paper?
K. Section 173.150 Ethyl Alcohol Exception
Section 173.150(g) provides exceptions from the packaging and
shipment requirements of the HMR for limited quantities of beverages,
food, cosmetics and medicines, medical screening solutions, and
concentrates containing ethyl alcohol (commonly referred to as ethanol
or alcohol). Currently, the applicability of the exception in Sec.
173.150(g) is limited to these items when they are ``sold as retail
products.'' PHMSA received a comment \32\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform
Notice from the Association of Hazmat Shippers (AHS) requesting that
the applicability of the exception be modified to include materials
``suitable for retail sale.'' Section 173.150(g) was added to the HMR
based on special permit DOT SP-9275 in special permit conversion
rulemaking HM-233C \33\ (79 FR 15033; Mar. 18, 2014). However, DOT SP-
9275, as written at the time of adoption, did not use the phrases
``consumer commodity,'' ``sold as retail products,'' or ``suitable for
retail sale.'' When PHMSA adopted DOT SP-9275, the phrase, ``sold as
retail products,'' was added to limit the use of the exception to
packages that PHMSA was confident would pose minimal risk in
transportation.
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\32\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-1700.
\33\ https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-03-18/pdf/2014-05630.pdf.
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AHS believes that limiting applicability of Sec. 173.150(g) to
items ``sold as retail products'' unnecessarily limits the use of the
exception and creates undue burden on shippers of other consumer type
products that contain ethyl alcohol. To evaluate this request, PHMSA
requests comment on the following questions:
1. How many shipments are offered under the Sec. 173.150(g)
exception today on an annual basis? Approximation is acceptable.
a. What is the average volume of ethyl alcohol solution contained
in a completed package transported in accordance with Sec. 173.150(g)?
b. What is the average volume of ethyl alcohol solution per inner
package transported in accordance with Sec. 173.150(g)?
2. How many more shipments would be offered annually under the
provisions of Sec. 173.150(g) if the applicability language was
changed to state, ``suitable for retail sale'' rather than ``sold as
retail products?''
a. What amount of cost savings would shippers achieve if the
applicability of Sec. 173.150(g) was changed to products ``suitable
for retail sale?'' Describe this savings amount in any way you can,
whether that involves an individual shipper or a collection of shippers
that constitute the distribution channel.
b. What form would these savings take? Specifically, Sec.
173.150(g) is a broad exception from the HMR, so it may include
exceptions from specification packaging, labeling, marking, shipping
papers, and others. Which exceptions would provide the most savings and
be most valuable? How much do each of the exceptions contribute to
reducing costs for shippers? You may describe the cost reductions in
terms of an example shipment.
c. How many U.S. shippers use this ethyl alcohol exception? What
proportion are likely to be small businesses? Approximation is
acceptable.
3. Describe scenarios in which a material is not ``sold'' as a
retail product but is considered ``suitable for retail sale.'' In other
words, how does the change in wording from ``sold'' to ``suitable''
make an impact on the eligibility for the exception?
a. What types of shipments would now be eligible? Do these
shipments occur at different points in the supply chain? Do they
involve different clients or consumers that are not the end users
(i.e., consumers)?
b. Might cost savings be passed on generally to consumers (i.e.,
reduced prices)?
c. Are materials that are ``suitable for retail sale,'' but not
actually sold as retail products, packaged in packagings equivalent to
those sold as retail products?
d. Are there additional types of commodities or products that would
now be eligible? Would new products be introduced into the market due
to modifying this exception?
e. In these scenarios, what types of packages could be used when
these materials are not shipped ``suitable for retail sale?''
f. What are the costs, additional risks, and impacts associated
with adding ``suitable for retail sale'' to Sec. 173.150(g) to first
responders, shippers, and others in the transport chain?
4. Regardless of any change to the applicability of the Sec.
173.150(g) exception, have more shipments of consumer products
containing ethyl alcohol been offered based on Sec. 173.150(g) after
the ORM-D reclassification phase out on December 31, 2020?
5. Would shippers of different modes be differentially affected by
this exception? Are there different costs or benefits for shipments by
rail, air, highway, or vessel?
6. Have increased shipments of ethyl alcohol-based hand sanitizers
during the COVID-19 public health emergency changed the risk profile
and usage of this exception? If so, how?
[[Page 43027]]
L. Limited Quantity Training Exception
The HMR require hazmat employers to properly train and test all
hazmat employees (Sec. 172.702). Hazmat employees are those who
directly affect hazardous materials transportation safety by performing
hazmat functions, including those who prepare shipments, manufacture
packagings represented as qualified for use with hazardous materials,
and transport the material (see Sec. 171.8 for the full definition of
``hazmat employee''). The HMR training requirements are intended to
ensure that each hazmat employee has familiarity with the general
provisions of the HMR, can recognize and identify hazardous materials,
has knowledge of specific requirements of the HMR applicable to
functions performed by the employee, and has knowledge of emergency
response information, self-protection measures, and accident prevention
methods and procedures. The requirements for hazmat employee training
are found in part 172, subpart H (Sec. Sec. 172.700-172.704) and
include general awareness, function specific, safety, security, and in-
depth security training. Part 172 subpart H also requires that the
employer maintain records of the employee's hazmat training, including
the employee's training certificate, training materials, and instructor
information for at least three years (see Sec. 172.704(d)). Hazmat
employees must receive recurrent training at least once every three
years under Sec. 172.704(c).
While part 172, subpart H training is generally a basic requirement
for all hazmat employees, the HMR provide exceptions to Part 172's
training and recordkeeping requirements, including but not limited to
exceptions for small, excepted, and de minimis quantities (see
Sec. Sec. 173.4, 173.4a and 173.4b, respectively), materials of trade
(see Sec. 173.6), combustible liquids (see Sec. 173.150(f)), and
small lithium cells and batteries (see Sec. 173.185(c)).
The AHS submitted a comment \34\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform
Docket requesting that PHMSA create a training exception for limited
quantity (LTD QTY) shipments of hazardous materials by highway, rail,
and vessel, similar to the exception found in the Transport Canada
Transport of Dangerous Goods (TDG) regulations section 1.17. To
evaluate this proposal, PHMSA requests comment on the following
questions:
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\34\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-1700.
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1. How many hazmat shippers have employees who only are involved in
pre-transportation functions for LTD QTY material by highway, rail, and
vessel?
a. How many hazmat employees in the United States are only involved
in pre-transportation functions for LTD QTY material by highway, rail,
and vessel?
b. Approximately, what are employee turnover rates in the hazardous
materials shipping industry? Do the costs of training contribute to the
overall costs of turnover for these employees?
c. Is hazmat training typically included with other trainings or
conducted separately?
2. How many hazardous material carriers have employees who only
transport LTD QTY material?
a. How many hazmat employees in the United States are only involved
in transportation functions for LTD QTY material by highway, rail, and
vessel?
b. If these carrier employees, who only transport LTD QTY material,
were eligible for a training exception, would a carrier reduce the fees
that they charge to hazmat shippers? Our understanding is that some
carriers may charge a premium on hazmat shipments in the form of fees
or higher rates, which may--or may not--apply to LTD QTY shipments.
c. Is hazmat training typically included with other trainings or
conducted separately?
3. How would an LTD QTY-only shipper ensure that LTD QTY
requirements are met, including quantity limitations and restrictions
from air transportation, if part 172, subpart H training is not
required?
4. How would an LTD QTY-only carrier ensure that LTD QTY
requirements are met if part 172, subpart H training is not required?
5. For shippers, how much time would be saved annually per LTD QTY-
only employee if part 172, subpart H training was not required for
employees who solely prepare LTD QTY shipments?
a. What categories of employees would save time? (Use Bureau of
Labor Statistics labor categories, if possible.)
b. Specifically, how much time is devoted to recordkeeping for
hazmat training on a per employee basis? We assume this is a proportion
of the overall amount of training time specified in this question.
6. How much time would be saved annually for a carrier if part 172,
subpart H training was not required for drivers who only transport LTD
QTY material?
a. What categories of employees would save time? (Use Bureau of
Labor Statistics labor categories, if possible.)
7. What is the estimated cost for a shipper to provide LTD QTY-only
training for an employee?
8. What is the estimated cost for a carrier to provide LTD QTY-only
training for an employee? Is hazmat training typically included with
other trainings or conducted separately?
9. Would the creation of a training exception for LTD QTY material
increase the number of hazmat incidents and accidents involving LTD QTY
material?
a. Would a training exception for LTD QTY material increase the
probability that a shipment fails to use the LTD QTY mark/marking?
Explain.
b. Please provide the risk analysis conducted to support answers to
these questions.
10. The IMDG Code does not provide a training exception for LTD QTY
material.
a. Would creating an exception from part 172, subpart H training
requirements for LTD QTY shippers and carriers conflict with the IMDG
Code and create barriers to international vessel commerce?
b. How will shippers and carriers ensure that employees who prepare
LTD QTY shipments transported in accordance with the IMDG Code for
vessel transportation meet IMDG Code training requirements?
11. Do hazmat shippers and carriers tend to use consultants or
contractors to deliver hazmat training for hazmat employees? Or
alternatively, do they tend to conduct their own training ``in-house?''
What is the difference in cost between hiring an outside trainer and
conducting in-house training? Are there ways to reduce the cost of
training when the required training is limited to LTD QTY shipments?
12. Rather than a training exception for all LTD QTY, should PHMSA
limit a training exception to only certain LTD QTY materials, e.g.,
Class 3, Division 4.1 and Class 9? Explain.
13. For shippers and carriers who operate in Canada, please provide
any information available to you relevant to your experiences utilizing
this exception in Canada.
M. Exceptions for Small Quantities of Division 4.3, PG I Material
Division 4.3 dangerous when wet materials react, sometimes
violently, with water. Communication of a material's dangerous when wet
characteristics is therefore crucial to preventing inappropriate
emergency response (e.g., attempting to suppress a fire involving
Division 4.3 materials with water). Due to the hazard these materials
present, Division 4.3 materials
[[Page 43028]]
are listed in Table 1 for placarding in Sec. 172.504, meaning that
placards are required on a vehicle transporting of any amount of a
Division 4.3 material, unless the material is being transported in
accordance with an exception, such as small quantity (Sec. 173.4),
excepted quantity (Sec. 173.4a), de minimis (Sec. 173.4b), limited
quantity (Sec. 173.151) or materials of trade (Sec. 173.6). Division
4.3, PG I materials present an especially significant hazard in
transportation and are generally not eligible for limited quantity,
small quantity, excepted quantity, de minimis, or material of trade
exceptions.
However, PHMSA recognizes that some Division 4.3, PG I materials
are packaged in such a way and transported in such small quantities
that they present limited risk in transportation. Accordingly, PHMSA
issued a Competent Authority (CA) approval CA1996100010 \35\ to the
Dexsil Corporation, in accordance with Sec. 173.4(c), to allow the
transportation of test kits containing very small quantities of
Division 4.3, PG I material under the provisions of the Sec. 173.4
small quantity exception. This exception provides users of the test
kits in unopened packages relief from many HMR requirements, including
training, placarding, and security plans. The USWAG submitted a comment
\36\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice requesting that PHMSA adopt
the provisions of CA1996100010 into the HMR for general use or expand
the small quantity exception to include Division 4.3, PG I material.
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\35\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/approvals-and-permits/hazmat/file-serve/approval/0_CA1996100010_2016100114.pdf/4197059.
\36\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-1390.
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USWAG additionally requested that PHMSA modify the security plan
requirements for Division 4.3 materials. Currently, the HMR security
plan requirements found in part 172, subpart I (Sec. Sec. 172.800-
172.822) require that a shipper or carrier who offers or transports an
amount of Division 4.3 material that requires placarding must develop a
security plan. As discussed above, any quantity of a Division 4.3, PG I
material requires placarding and therefore a security plan (see Sec.
172.800(b)(9)). USWAG describes this as unduly burdensome for
electrical utilities who may transport very small quantities of
Division 4.3, PG I material in test kits that no longer fall under
CA1996100010 due to re-packaging. USWAG requests that PHMSA create a
threshold amount of Division 4.3 offered or transported at one time for
the security plan requirements to apply and suggests one (1) pound as a
starting point for discussion. To evaluate USWAG's requests, PHMSA
requests comment on the following questions:
Authorization To Transport Division 4.3, PG I Materials in Accordance
With Sec. 173.4
1. How many shipments of Division 4.3, PG I material are
transported under the provisions of CA1996100010 annually?
2. How many companies transport Division 4.3, PG I material under
the provisions of CA1996100010 annually?
3. Do you support adoption of the provisions of CA1996100010 into
the HMR? Explain.
a. What specific provisions in CA1996 (inner package quantity,
completed package quantity, packaging type, etc.) are appropriate for
inclusion in the HMR? What specific provisions are not?
b. What specific safety concerns exist for transporting Division
4.3 PG I material in accordance with the small quantity exception?
4. Do you support a modification of the HMR to transport Division
4.3 PG I material in accordance with the Sec. 173.4 small quantity
exception without a Competent Authority Approval?
a. If yes, please provide justification based on relevant technical
and scientific data known to you.
b. If yes, please provide any available information related to the
costs and benefits of your proposed action in general, and identifiable
groups that are impacted in particular.
c. If yes, please describe the effect of your proposed action on
the quality of the natural and social environments.
d. If no, please tell us why you are against expanding this small
quantity exception.
Creation of a New Threshold for Security Plans for Division 4.3
Materials
5. In general, how much does it cost to create a security plan for
highway carriers of Division 4.3 materials? What would be a low-end
estimate and a high-end estimate?
a. We understand the cost may depend on a variety of factors--what
are the factors that drive the cost?
b. If your knowledge is limited to your company's experience,
provide a general estimate relevant to your company's experience.
c. What type of recurring costs do firms incur to maintain, store,
or update security plans?
d. Do security plan costs differ by transport mode or by individual
material?
6. How many companies are required to create security plans solely
to offer or transport Division 4.3 materials?
a. Of these companies, how many only transport Division 4.3
material in quantities less than 1 lb. per vehicle?
i. Of these companies, how much time is spent developing and
updating a security plan for the <1 lb. of Division 4.3 material?
ii. What type of employees spend time developing and updating
security plans? (Use Bureau of Labor Statistics labor categories, if
possible.)
iii. Do these companies generally contract for a security plan
developed by third party consultants? Is the decision to contract for
the security plan due to limited security expertise within these
companies?
7. Is 1 lb. a reasonable threshold for security concerns that
should be addressed through a security plan for Division 4.3 material?
a. Please provide justification for your support or opposition to a
1 lb. threshold, including a risk analysis that describes the relative
hazards presented by 1 lb. of different Division 4.3 materials,
including those that generate a flammable gas and those that generate a
poisonous gas.
b. If you oppose the creation of a 1 lb. threshold for security
plans for Division 4.3 material, provide an alternative and
justification for the alternative threshold.
8. How many kits are typically transported in a utility vehicle
during day-to-day operations? Rather than a weight threshold, would it
be reasonable for PHMSA to develop a security plan threshold based on a
specific number of kits?
a. Please provide justification for your support or opposition to a
threshold based on number of kits, including a risk analysis that
describes the relative hazards presented by your suggested number of
kits that would trigger a security plan, including those that generate
a flammable gas and those that generate a poisonous gas.
N. Recycling Safety Devices
Section 173.166(c) requires that the EX-number assigned to a
Division 1.4G safety device (e.g., air bag inflators and seat belt
pretensioners--see definition in Sec. 173.166 for further details)
must be entered on the hazmat shipping paper. Section 173.166(d)(4)
provides an exception to this requirement when the safety devices are
shipped to a recycling or waste disposal facility.
[[Page 43029]]
In 2014, PHMSA published Letter of Interpretation 13-0189 \37\ that
states safety devices shipped for reuse can use the Sec. 173.166(d)(4)
exception and may be shipped without the EX-number on the shipping
paper. On October 9, 2017, COSTHA and North American Automotive Hazmat
Action Committee (NAAHAC) submitted petition P-1708 \38\ requesting
that PHMSA revise Sec. 173.166(d)(4) by inserting the word ``metal''
in front of the word ``recycling.'' COSTHA and NAAHAC believe that
PHMSA's interpretation of the scope of the exception in Sec.
173.166(d)(4), as discussed in Letter of Interpretation 13-0189, is
incorrect. Additionally, COSTHA and NAAHAC believe this interpretation
indirectly supports reuse of safety devices, which they do not support.
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\37\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretation%20Files/2013/130189.pdf.
\38\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=PHMSA-2017-0139-0001.
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The intent of the change requested by P-1708 would be to limit the
exception provided in Sec. 173.166(d)(4) to shipments related to reuse
of the metal components, rather than reuse or refurbishment of the
entire safety device. COSTHA and NAAHAC believe that allowing
transportation of safety devices for reuse without EX numbers entered
on the shipping paper will cause several issues. These include
breakdowns in automotive manufacturer's traceability databases used
during automotive recalls, increase in consumer safety risks, and
violations of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) if
inappropriate or counterfeit safety devices are installed in a vehicle.
Additionally, COSTHA submitted a comment \39\ to the 2017
Regulatory Reform Notice requesting that PHMSA act on P-1708. To
evaluate this change, PHMSA requests comment on the following
questions:
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1. Are materials other than metal recovered from safety devices
through the recycling process? If so, would the insertion of the word
``metal'' into Sec. 173.166(d)(4) limit the ability to recover non-
metal materials and the economic value they may have? Would it result
in curtailing or even stopping the recovery of non-metal materials? If
so, to what extent?
2. How many salvaged, serviceable 1.4G safety devices are shipped
each year? How many are for metal recycling, and how many are for
reuse?
3. Is it possible to determine the hazard classification (Class 9
vs Division 1.4G) and EX number, if applicable, of a serviceable safety
device pulled out of a vehicle?
a. Are there identifying markings on the safety device or module
itself (e.g., stock number, product code)?
b. How much time does it take to determine the hazard
classification and EX number, if applicable, of serviceable safety
device removed of a vehicle? Qualitatively, is this process of
determining the hazard classification and EX number, if applicable,
burdensome or is it relatively easy?
4. Would a salvage yard or other such business stop transporting or
shipping serviceable 1.4G safety devices to consumers for reuse if they
were required to determine and enter the EX number on a shipping paper?
What percentage of such businesses would continue selling reused
serviceable safety devices despite the additional expense of
determining and entering the EX number?
5. The FMVSS generally permit serviceable safety devices to be (re-
)installed into a motor vehicle, provided the safety device is (re-
)installed into a vehicle of the correct make/model and is not subject
to any recalls. How will requiring entry of the EX number on a shipping
paper for serviceable airbags being shipped for reuse address concerns
related to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's FMVSS?
6. Are there any technical standards describing best practices or
requirements that ensure the safety of reused safety devices?
7. How will consumers be affected by the proposed change to add the
word ``metal?'' Is there the potential for higher costs to consumers
(i.e., through reduced consumer surplus) if salvaged safety devices are
rendered unavailable for reuse? Put another way, are there economic
impacts to consumers if replacement safety devices must be purchased as
newly manufactured rather than salvaged?
8. What is the extent of possible impacts on consumer safety? For
example, to what extent are consumers currently exposed to purchasing
incompatible, damaged, or counterfeit safety devices?
9. Are you aware of any academic or other research that approaches
these issues from a cost/benefit perspective? Avoided damages from car
accidents are accounted for as ``benefits,'' whereas ``costs'' would
include the differential between newly manufactured safety devices and
salvaged safety devices. Is it possible to quantify and/or monetize
these potential impacts?
10. Are there alternative ways to address the issues raised in P-
1708 and associated comment? What additional agencies or organizations
should be involved in decision-making? What efforts must be
coordinated?
11. What impacts would adoption of the COSTHA proposal have on
other federal regulation, or state or local regulations?
12. Are EX-numbers used for tracking and tracing these devices
through the supply chain?
O. Creation of Basic Description and Shipping Description Definitions
The HMR contain detailed instructions for the information required
to appear on a hazardous material shipping paper in part 172, subpart C
(Sec. Sec. 172.200-205). The core requirement of a hazardous material
shipping paper is the information referred to as the ``basic
description'' (see Sec. Sec. 172.202(a)(1)-(4) and 172.202(b)). The
four elements of the basic description are the UN identification number
(UN ID number), proper shipping name, hazard class, and packing group.
This information must be entered in this specific order, and no
additional information is permitted to be interspersed in between these
four elements unless specifically authorized. Although Sec. 172.202(b)
describes the information required by Sec. 172.202(a)(1)-(4) as the
``basic description,'' there is no definition for the term ``basic
description'' in Sec. 171.8, the main definition section of the HMR.
Beyond the basic description, additional information is required to
complete the full shipping paper entry for a hazardous material. This
additional information includes the number and type of packages,
quantity of material, and special information required by Sec.
172.203, including the ``RQ'' notation for hazardous substances, and
identity of radionuclides for Class 7 material, among others.
In 2015, the Dangerous Goods Trainers Association (DGTA) submitted
a petition \40\ (P-1655) to PHMSA to create definitions in Sec. 171.8
for the ``basic description'' (information required by Sec.
172.202(a)(1)-(4)) and the ``shipping description'' (basic description
and all other information required to appear on the hazmat shipping
paper). DGTA stated their belief that the creation of these definitions
and accompanying editorial revisions to the shipping paper language in
Sec. Sec. 172.201 and 172.202 would
[[Page 43030]]
increase clarity of the HMR and decrease confusion for shipping paper
preparers. Please note that PHMSA is not contemplating changing the
requirements for what information appears on a shipping paper; rather,
we are evaluating the creation of definitions to clarify the existing
requirements. To evaluate this petition, PHMSA requests comment on the
following questions:
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1. Would the creation of definitions for ``basic description'' and
``shipping description'' in Sec. 171.8 as described above increase the
clarity of the HMR? Why or why not?
a. Is there uncertainty or confusion among regulated entities or
enforcement officials related to the information required to appear on
a hazardous material shipping paper?
b. To what degree would the creation of definitions for these terms
increase compliance with shipping paper requirements?
c. Should the definitions of ``basic description'' and ``shipping
description'' be different that those presented above?
d. Would the creation of the definitions as discussed improve the
international harmonization process?
2. Does any identified uncertainty or confusion related to the
information required to appear on a hazardous material shipping paper
result in ``frustrated'' shipments and delay?
a. Is there an estimate of the costs of delay to the shipper,
carrier, freight forwarder, or customer? This may include estimates of
the freight value of time, as well as any fees or surcharges related to
resolving alleged non-compliance.
3. Should these definitions be added to Sec. 171.8? If not, what
section should they be added to?
P. Removal of the 60-Day Renewal Requirement for Approvals and Special
Permits
PHMSA issues renewals of special permits and approvals in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. Sec. 107.109 and 107.705,
respectively. Sections 107.109(b) and 107.705(c) authorize the
continued use of the special permit or approval until final
administrative action is taken on the renewal application, provided
that the applicant requests renewal at least 60 days before the special
permit or approval expires. PHMSA understands that some stakeholders
believe that the requirement to apply for renewal at least 60 days
before expiration may be too burdensome on the regulated community.
PHMSA is considering changing the requirement to authorize continued
use of the special permit or approval until final administrative action
is taken on the renewal application, provided the applicant applies for
renewal before the special permit or approval expires.
1. Do you support authorizing continued use of special permits and
approvals until final administrative action is taken on the renewal
application, provided the applicant requests renewal prior to the
expiration date? Explain.
2. Would this regulatory flexibility provide any quantifiable
monetary or other benefits for a holder of a special permit or
approval? If so, please provide information related to any known
benefits or decreased costs.
3. What safety concerns are there for allowing continued use of a
special permit or approval beyond its expiration while a renewal
application is being processed?
4. Would such continued use of a special permit or approval cause
any potential complications for the enforcement of HMR requirements by
state and local partners?
Q. Design Certifying Engineer Experience
Design Certifying Engineers (DCEs) are required to review and
approve the design of specification cargo tanks and PHMSA is
considering whether to require that a DCE perform a similar role for
tank cars. DCEs, as defined in Sec. 171.8, are required to register
with the Department and meet education and experience requirements.
Specifically, for cargo tanks, a DCE is required to meet one of the
following conditions:
(1) Has an engineering degree and one year of work experience in
cargo tank structural or mechanical design;
(2) Is currently registered as a professional engineer by
appropriate authority of a state of the United States or a province of
Canada; or
(3) Has at least three years' experience in performing the duties
of a DCE prior to September 1, 1991.
PHMSA would consider an alternate definition for tank car DCEs that
mirrors the existing cargo tank definition, except we would not include
the clause in (3) that permits individuals who do not meet the criteria
in (1) and (2) to work as DCEs based on their historical status.
The current definition of DCE allows professional engineers with no
experience in structural or mechanical design to register as a DCE and
certify the design of a cargo tank, and PHMSA is considering the same
for tank cars to maintain consistency for the definition. PHMSA, FMCSA,
and FRA request comment on the following questions to evaluate the
current state of the DCE community:
1. Are there any professional engineers who had no previous
experience in cargo tank structural or mechanical design currently
registered with the Department as a DCE for cargo tanks? Explain.
2. Is a professional engineer with no experience in cargo tank
structural or mechanical design capable of adequately reviewing and
certifying a cargo tank design?
3. Is a professional engineer with no experience in tank car
structural or mechanical design capable of adequately reviewing and
certifying a tank car design?
4. Do you support adding a one-year experience requirement for
professional engineers seeking to become DCEs? Explain. For example,
``Is currently registered as a professional engineer by appropriate
authority of a state of the United States or a province of Canada and
has at least one year of work experience in cargo tank/tank car
structural or mechanical design.'' Why or why not?
R. Oxidizing Gases by Air
In 2007, PHMSA modified the requirements for the transportation of
compressed oxygen and other oxidizing gases by aircraft in rulemaking
HM-224B \41\ (72 FR 4442; Jan. 31, 2007). This final rule created a
requirement to transport oxidizing gas cylinders in a flame-proof,
thermally resistant outer packaging, known as a DOT31FP packaging (see
Sec. Sec. 173.302(f)(5) and 173.304(f)(5). When a package containing a
compressed gas cylinder is exposed to fire on board an aircraft, the
high temperatures cause the pressure inside the cylinder to increase.
Eventually, the pressure reaches the ``set-to-discharge'' pressure for
the cylinder's pressure relief device (PRD), causing the PRD to
activate in order to vent the contents of the cylinder to prevent a
catastrophic failure of the cylinder. In an aircraft fire, activation
of a PRD for an oxidizing gas cylinder can be counter-productive,
because the oxidizing gas released from the cylinder will feed the fire
and further endanger the aircraft. Many aircraft cargo compartments do
not have an active fire suppression systems installed. The DOT31FP
packaging is designed to thermally insulate and protect the oxidizing
gas cylinder from the high temperatures and flame impingement of a
cargo fire for up to three hours, thereby preventing release of the
[[Page 43031]]
oxidizing gas. This three-hour window is intended to allow the plane to
land safely, even on a long, over-water flight with no airfields
available to divert to nearby. Please refer to HM-224B for additional
information on the development of the DOT31FP thermal protection
standard.
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A4A submitted a comment \42\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice
requesting that PHMSA remove the requirement for the DOT31FP packaging
and allow the transportation of oxidizing gases on aircraft in the ATA
300 outer packaging commonly used for the transportation of oxidizing
gas cylinders prior to 1999, and then required for oxygen cylinders
from 1999-2007 (see HM-224A; \43\ 64 FR 45388, published Aug. 19,
1999). As discussed in HM-224A (see 64 FR 45392), testing conducted on
the ATA 300 outer packaging demonstrated the packaging's ability to
prevent a cylinder from reaching a temperature that would activate the
PRD for approximately one hour when tested in the 400 [deg]F oven used
to simulate aircraft fire conditions.
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A4A requests that PHMSA either remove the requirement to use
DOT31FP packaging for shipments of oxidizing gas and replace it with an
option to use either the DOT31FP package or the ATA 300 packaging for
domestic flights within the United States, or flights that are always
within one hour of a divert airfield; or remove the requirement to use
DOT31FP packaging and replace it with an option to use the DOT31FP
package for ATA 300 packaging for all flights. A4A states that the ATA
300 packaging provides an acceptable level of safety while
significantly reducing the cost of transporting oxidizing gases on
aircraft. PHMSA requests comment on the following questions to evaluate
A4A's request:
1. If PHMSA adopted A4A's request to remove the DOT31FP packaging
requirements as the only packaging for transporting oxidizing gases on
domestic flights or flights with short diversion times, how would
airlines prevent oxidizing gas packages from being placed on
international/long diversion time flights?
a. What is the likelihood that an ATA 300 packaging would be used
unintentionally on international/long division time flights?
b. What actions would an operator take if ATA 300 packaging were
used unintentionally on international/long diversion time flights?
2. If PHMSA adopted A4A's request to remove the DOT31FP packaging
requirements as the only packaging on transporting oxidizing gases for
domestic flights or flights with short diversion times, how many ATA
300 packages containing oxidizing gases would be shipped per year?
3. How many packages containing oxidizing gases have been shipped
on aircraft per year since the use of DOT 31FP packaging was required?
4. How many packages containing oxidizing gas were shipped on
aircraft from 1996 to 2007?
5. Are commenters aware of any incidents, in the United States or
elsewhere in the world, where DOT31FP packages containing cylinders of
oxidizing gases were exposed to fire conditions?
6. If PHMSA adopted A4A's request to remove the DOT31FP packaging
requirements as the only packaging for transporting oxidizing gases on
domestic flights or flights with short diversion times, please provide
quantified economic savings and identify which parties would benefit.
This estimation should detail the differential in costs between DOT31FP
and ATA 300 packaging, as well as the number of packagings that
currently are in use and expected to be used in the future.
7. Based on the hour-long resistance of the ATA 300 packaging to
fire, how long of a diversion time would be acceptable to ensure a safe
landing in event of a cargo fire?
8. PHMSA and FAA are aware that checked passenger baggage often
contains hazardous materials for personal use authorized in Sec.
175.10, and potentially may contain hazardous material not authorized
for transportation in passenger baggage (e.g., spare lithium
batteries).
a. If PHMSA adopted A4A's request to remove the DOT31FP packaging
requirements as the only packaging for transporting oxidizing gases on
domestic flights or flights with short diversion times, should these
packages be segregated from passenger baggage?
b. Should there be other segregation requirements?
c. Would a requirement to segregate an ATA 300 package containing
an oxidizing gas from passenger baggage significantly impact the
projected economic benefit gained by authorizing ATA 300 packages?
9. Have any air carriers conducted safety management system (SMS)
risk assessments related to accepting oxidizing gases in ATA 300
packagings rather than DOT31FP packagings? If so, please provide the
completed SMS risk assessment to PHMSA for review.
10. Do airframe manufacturers support A4A's contention that
replacing DOT31FP packaging with ATA 300 packaging is equivalent when
considering a cargo fire involving a compressed oxygen cylinder?
11. Have any interested parties conducted a package performance
technical analysis that compares the ATA 300 packaging design type with
the DOT31FP packaging design type in an operations environment? If so,
please provide this analysis to PHMSA for review.
a. Would authorization of ATA 300 packaging increase safety risks?
b. Would it increase the probability of a catastrophic event?
c. Can this change in risk be quantified?
d. Are there limitations or operational safeguards that can be
implemented to achieve an equivalent level of safety when compared to
the DOT31FP standard?
12. What percent of cargo compartments in domestic flights or
flights with short diversion times have active fire suppression systems
installed?
S. Part 176 Vessel Requirements Update
Part 176 of the HMR contain instructions and requirements for the
safe transportation of hazardous materials by vessel. PHMSA received a
comment \44\ from the SAAMI requesting that PHMSA update part 176.
Specifically, SAAMI asserts its belief that part 176 does not
sufficiently differentiate between different vessel types, containers
versus break bulk, and local offshore work versus long distance
voyages. PHMSA requests comment on the following questions related to
updating part 176 requirements:
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1. What specific changes should be made to part 176? Include
suggested revised regulatory text and a detailed explanation for each
requested change.
a. Include information and arguments that support your proposed
action, including relevant technical and scientific data.
b. Include any specific cases that support or demonstrate the need
for your proposed action.
2. Please provide information about the following:
a. The costs, savings, and safety or environmental benefits of your
proposed action to society in general
[[Page 43032]]
and to identifiable groups such as specific companies or industries
affected by your proposal.
b. The regulatory burden of your proposed action on small
businesses, small organizations, small governmental jurisdictions, and
Indian tribes.
c. The recordkeeping and reporting burdens of your proposed action
and whom they would affect.
d. The direct effects, including preemption effects under 49 U.S.C.
5125 of Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation law, of your
proposed action on states, on the relationship between the Federal
Government and the states, and on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. (See 49 CFR
part 107, subpart C, regarding preemption.)
e. The effect of your proposed action on the quality of the natural
and social environments.
T. LTD QTY Shipping Paper Exception by Vessel
Limited quantity (LTD QTY) materials are subject to hazardous
material shipping paper requirements when transported by vessel. In
2011, PHMSA issued final rule HM-215K (76 FR 3307) that initiated a
phase-out of the ORM-D exception in order to harmonize the HMR with
international transport standards. The ORM-D classification and
exceptions are not accepted internationally. The ORM-D exception has
been phased out and after December 31, 2020, is no longer valid for
transportation (see Sec. 172.316). ``ORM-D material'' meant a material
such as a consumer commodity; cartridges, small arms; cartridges, power
devices (used to project fastening devices); cartridges for tools,
blank; and cases; and cartridge, empty with primer, which, although
otherwise subject to the regulations of the HMR, presented a limited
hazard during transportation due to its form, quantity and packaging.
The ORM-D exception had very similar quantity limits and
applicability to the LTD QTY exception, except that LTD QTY can
encompass materials not in a form intended or suitable for sale through
retail sales agencies or instrumentalities for consumption by
individuals for purposes of personal care or household use (i.e., the
LTD QTY exception is based on the classification and quantity of the
material, not the end use of the product like ORM-D). One significant
difference between the ORM-D exception and LTD QTY is that the ORM-D
exception does not require shipping papers for vessel transportation.
The Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturer's Institute (SAAMI)
submitted a comment \45\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice
requesting that PHMSA remove the requirement for shipping papers for
LTD QTY materials transported by vessel. SAAMI states that this would
reduce the burden of compliance with the HMR for domestic vessel
transportation. In order to evaluate this request, PHMSA requests
comment on the following questions:
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1. How many ORM-D shipments are offered for domestic vessel
transportation annually?
2. How many LTD QTY shipments are offered for domestic vessel
transportation annually?
3. How much time would be saved by offerors and carriers per
shipment if the HMR no longer required shipping papers for domestic
vessel transportation of LTD QTY material? What categories of employees
would save time? (Use Bureau of Labor Statistics labor categories, if
possible.)
4. The IMDG Code does not offer a shipping paper exception for LTD
QTY material. Would the creation of a shipping paper exception in the
HMR for LTD QTY shipments via vessel create additional confusion and
frustration because of a lack of alignment with international
standards?
5. Please describe the number of packages, hazardous materials
involved, number of shipments per year, and origin/destination pairs
for domestic vessel shipments projected to use this exception.
6. Do LTD QTY shipments that are offered for domestic vessel
transportation differ significantly by vessel type? Is this relevant
for the transmission of shipping papers?
7. Do the recipients of LTD QTY shipments rely on shipping papers
for tracking and tracing purposes?
U. Convention for Safe Containers Data Plate and Inspection
Requirements
The USCG requires safety approvals, periodic inspections, and
markings for shipping containers used in international commerce (see 49
CFR parts 450-453). Compliance with these requirements is indicated by
the presence of a Convention for Safe Containers (CSC) safety approval
data plate on the freight container.
Shipping containers used exclusively in domestic commerce are not
subject to this requirement. USCG has identified this as a potential
safety issue for hazardous materials transported domestically.
Hazardous materials carried in structurally deficient shipping
containers increase the risk of unintentional release of the material
to the environment during all modes of transportation. The HMR
currently require that all shipping containers used to transport Class
1 (except Division 1.4) explosive material by vessel must be
structurally serviceable and bear a current CSC safety approval data
plate (see Sec. 176.172). To address USCG's concern regarding
structurally deficient shipping containers used in domestic commerce,
PHMSA is considering expanding the requirement in Sec. 176.172 to all
hazardous materials transported by vessel. Although this requirement is
applicable specifically to vessel transportation, freight containers
are commonly transported by highway and rail as well, so an improvement
in container integrity will benefit multiple modes of transportation.
In order to evaluate this potential revision to the HMR, PHMSA requests
comment on the following questions:
1. How many shipping containers are in use in domestic-only
transportation?
2. How many domestic-only shipping containers do not have a current
CSC safety approval data plate?
3. Do you support requiring all domestic-only shipping containers
used to transport hazardous materials to maintain a current CSC safety
approval data plate? Explain. If this should not apply to all hazardous
materials, which materials should be covered by expanded applicability
of the data plate requirement for shipping containers?
4. What is the annual cost for an inspection and certification of a
container for safety approval and display of a CSC data plate?
5. What are the most frequented domestic-only commerce routes where
shipping containers without current CSC safety data plates are used to
transport hazardous materials? Are any of these routes in close
proximity to vulnerable communities where release or incidents would
have potentially disproportionate impacts?
6. Are shipping containers swapped between domestic-only and
international shipping? If so, how do shippers prepare these containers
for inspection and marking differently than containers used only for
international shipping?
7. Is the shipper or transporter responsible for affixing the CSC
safety approval data plate on the container?
V. Identification of Freight Containers in Rail Transportation
Proper emergency response to a hazardous materials incident begins
with identification of the types and quantities of the hazardous
material
[[Page 43033]]
involved in the incident. The HMR require several types of hazard
communication intended to communicate the hazards present in a
shipment, including hazard class labels and placards that communicate
the general type of hazard present, and UN identification number (UN
ID) markings that communicate the specific material in the packaging,
vehicle, or freight container. A shipping document that identifies the
materials carried onboard must also be available for use in emergencies
or inspection scenarios.
Rail transportation presents unique challenges for emergency
response based on the length of a train and the potential for chaotic
accident scenes after a derailment or collision. Emergency response
efforts for rail incidents typically involve the Notice to Train Crew,
also known as a train consist, a document carried by the train crew
(see Sec. 174.26). This document identifies the current position in
the train of each rail car containing a hazardous material and provides
the hazardous material shipping paper information and emergency
response information required under part 172 of the HMR. Emergency
responders can use this train consist information to identify the
contents of a rail car based on its position in the train and unique
identifier markings on the rail car, even if the placards and UN ID
markings are obscured or destroyed during the accident.
Use of train consist information in this way depends on the ability
of the emergency responder to accurately identify rail cars after an
accident, which may involve the scattering of the rail cars and the
freight containers carried by flatcars over a wide geographical area.
It is PHMSA and FRA's understanding that current industry practice is
to mark each freight container with a unique identification number to
track the freight container through the shipping process. The HMR
require that this unique identification number be entered on the hazmat
shipping paper when such a mark is present on a freight container (see
Sec. 172.203(g)(1)). However, the HMR do not require that this marking
appear on the freight container in a specific location, nor does the
HMR prescribe any requirements for the durability, legibility, or size
of this freight car identification marking. This can hinder emergency
response efforts in an accident, as emergency responders lack a
consistent way to identify freight containers that have been thrown
free of the rail cars that carried them. PHMSA requests comment on the
following questions related to marking a unique identifier on freight
containers transported by rail:
1. Do you support creating requirements for the specific location,
size, durability, and legibility of a freight container's unique
identifier markings in rail transportation? Why or why not?
a. In what location(s) should freight container identification
marks be required to appear to maximize visibility and awareness in
accident and inspection scenarios?
b. What minimum size should the markings be?
c. Are the durability requirements in Sec. 172.304 adequate for
this marking?
d. Should there be requirements for a specific background color for
the marking or a requirement to have the marking clearly contrast from
the background?
2. Do you support adoption of the IMO Convention on Safe Containers
(CSC) marking requirements for freight containers transported by rail?
a. Would these IMO requirements, if applied to rail transport,
allow adequate visibility and consistency in accident and inspection
scenarios?
3. Would adoption of requirements for location, size, durability,
and legibility for unique identifier markings on freight containers
impose costs on the regulated community?
a. Please identify any costs and additional time burdens that would
be created by such a requirement. If this requirement creates
additional time burdens on employees, please identify the labor
category (use Bureau of Labor Statistics labor categories, if possible)
of the employees involved and the amount of time spent complying with
the new requirement would take.
4. Would this adoption produce quantifiable or monetizable safety
benefits for communities? Would it produce quantifiable or monetizable
environmental benefits? Explain.
5. Would this adoption reduce the number of needed ``response
hours'' and the associated public burden and costs of response for
local police, firefighters, or hazmat response units? Explain.
6. What is the paperwork burden to include unique identifiers for
freight containers on shipping papers? To what degree are freight
containers used in rail transportation already marked with these unique
identifiers?
7. How consistent are existing marking standards? How significant
of a change in marking standards would it be for all offerors and
carriers to adopt more rigorous identification marking requirements?
8. Describe the record-keeping technology and protocols rail
carriers use currently to track and trace the identifier markings they
currently use and place on rail cars.
W. Exceptions for Rail Transport of Lithium Batteries for Purposes of
Recycling and Disposal
The HMR provide exceptions for the transportation of lithium cells
and batteries to recycling and disposal facilities in Sec. 173.185(d).
To date, the exceptions for transport of lithium cells and batteries
for purposes of recycling or disposal have been limited to motor
vehicle transport. The exceptions in Sec. 173.185(d) provide relief
from the testing and recordkeeping requirements in Sec. 173.185(a),
and the UN POP packaging requirements in Sec. 173.185(b). Cells and
batteries transported in accordance with Sec. 173.185(d) must be
placed in packages meeting the general packaging requirements of
Sec. Sec. 173.24 and 173.24a, and the cells and batteries must be
protected from shifting, damage, and short circuits in accordance with
Sec. Sec. 173.185(b)(2) and 173.185(b)(3)(i). Damaged, defective, or
recalled (DDR) cells and batteries are not eligible for this exception.
Currently, lithium batteries shipped for the purposes of recycling or
disposal may be transported by any mode when fully regulated; however,
exceptions found in Sec. 173.185(d) are only allowed for highway
transportation.
The Rechargeable Battery Association (PRBA) submitted a comment
\46\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice requesting that PHMSA review
this requirement and expand the applicability of the exception to rail
transportation to accommodate larger shipments of batteries destined
for recycling and disposal facilities. PHMSA also recognizes that it is
possible for damaged or defective batteries to enter the transportation
stream through a manufacturer's recall or recycling program that might
not be directly related to a battery safety issue (e.g., a consumer
electronic device has a flawed screen and is recalled, but some of the
recalled devices also have a damaged battery due to exposure to heat,
water, impacts, or an inherent flaw in the battery). PHMSA is
requesting comments on the following questions to evaluate PRBA's
comment and additional concerns related to the transportation of
lithium batteries for disposal and recycling:
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[[Page 43034]]
Rail Transportation of Used Lithium Batteries
1. How many shipments of lithium batteries destined for recycling
or disposal are made by rail annually?
2. How many shipments of lithium batteries for recycling or
disposal would be made by rail annually if we expanded the exception in
Sec. 173.185(d) to include rail transportation?
3. Would more lithium batteries be shipped by rail if the exception
was expanded to include rail transportation? Or would modifying the
exception mainly result in existing rail shipments of lithium batteries
for recycling or disposal shifting to non-UN POP packaging?
4. What are the cost savings, if any, of a rail shipment of lithium
batteries for recycling or disposal compared to a motor vehicle
shipment?
5. Do existing lithium battery hazard communication requirements
(including for batteries granted exceptions in Sec. 173.185(c))
adequately convey the risk inherent to the transportation of container
loads of used lithium batteries?
6. Should a packaging size limit or shipment weight limit be
implemented for transportation of lithium batteries in accordance with
Sec. 173.185(d)? If so, what should the limit be?
7. Are safety risks to the public and railroad employees elevated
when shipping large volumes of used lithium batteries in containers by
rail in accordance with this exception? If so, to what extent/
magnitude?
8. Are there unique risks associated with shipping large volumes of
lithium batteries by rail, including in containers that are not well
ventilated? If so, should PHMSA consider additional safety measures and
hazard communication requirements to reflect those risks, even when
moving under packaging exceptions in Sec. 173.185?
9. Would an exception to the provision on specification packaging
requirements--but not testing and recordkeeping requirements--in Sec.
173.185(a) enhance the transportation of larger volumes of lithium
batteries for disposal and recycling while maintaining safety
protocols? Please explain.
10. What are the safety benefits, if any, of shipping damaged,
defective, and recalled (DDR) batteries by rail rather than by motor
vehicle? Would there be a material impact on the number of incidents or
the severity of incidents?
General Damaged, Defective, and Recalled Issues
11. What steps do shippers take to screen devices and batteries
collected at a retail store or other collection point for DDR
batteries?
12. What steps are retailers and device/battery manufacturers
taking to inform customers about the dangers of DDR batteries?
X. Tank Car Manway Inspections
Tank cars designed for the transportation of hazardous liquids are
constructed with an opening large enough to permit the access of a
person to the inside of the tank, known as a manway. Such openings are
necessary to permit the entry of a person inside the tank car to
conduct periodic inspections, repairs, and other operations requiring
access to the inside of the tank. The manway opening is closed with a
manway cover, and a gasket is placed between the manway nozzle and the
manway cover to create a seal that prevents the release of the
hazardous contents of the tank either in liquid or gaseous form and
prevents the entry of air or moisture into the tank during
transportation. Manways are often used (i.e., opened) during the
loading and unloading of tank cars either to relieve vacuum during
unloading, or to permit the placement of a hose through which product
is pumped into the tank during loading.
The HMR require the person who offers the tank car into
transportation (i.e., the offeror) to externally visually inspect the
tank car's gasket(s) to detect any damage or other condition (e.g.,
deterioration) that could make the tank car unsafe for transportation
(see Sec. 173.31(d)(1)(ii)) as part of the broader process of
examining the tank car to make sure it is in proper condition and safe
for transportation prior to shipment (i.e., pre-trip inspection). PHMSA
understands Sec. 173.31(d)(1)(ii) to require that the manway gasket
must be visually inspected whenever the tank car is offered into
transportation regardless of whether the manway was opened or not
during a loading or unloading operation. On November 14, 2016, PHMSA,
in consultation with FRA, issued revised Letter of Interpretation
Reference Number (Ref. No.) 15-0031R,\47\ which states, in part,
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\47\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretation%20Files/2016/150031R.pdf.
. . . without opening a hinged and bolted manway and observing
the condition of the manway's gasket, there is no way an offeror can
reasonably perform a visual inspection of the gasket to meet the
minimum inspection requirement of Sec. 173.31(d)(1)(ii) or know
that the gasket meets the performance requirements of either
Sec. Sec. 173.31(d)(2) or 173.24. This rationale applies generally
to other tank car fittings designed to be opened/removed for the
purposes of loading or unloading and serve as primary or secondary
closures (including, for example, plugs or caps on top valves,
etc.). In order to ensure compliance with these requirements, an
offeror must remove the bottom outlet cap and open the manway cover
and inspect the condition of the gasket, regardless of whether the
offeror used the fitting during a particular loading/unloading
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event.
Dow Chemical \48\ and the American Chemistry Council \49\ (ACC)
both submitted public comments to the Department of Transportation
requesting that PHMSA rescind this letter. Dow Chemical and ACC state
that requiring visual inspection of manway gaskets at the time the tank
car is offered for transportation may create unanticipated negative
consequences, including degradation of product purity, formation of a
flammable atmosphere, increased wear on the manway structure, and
increased opportunity for human error during closure after inspection.
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\48\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2701.
\49\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2706.
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PHMSA, in consultation with FRA, does not plan to rescind Letter of
Interpretation Ref. No. 15-0031R at this time. Our position remains
that a direct external visual inspection of the gasket is the only way
for an offeror to meet the inspection requirements as written in Sec.
173.31(d)(1)(ii) to ensure the tank car is safe for transportation.
However, we also recognize that new technologies and development of new
practices may allow for more passive means of inspection such that
opening of the manway to allow for visual inspection of the gasket may
not be necessary to ensure that the tank car is safe for
transportation. Since 2017, PHMSA has issued several special permits
related to the issue of a tank manway gasket inspection to several
entities, specifically, Phillips 66, Dow Chemical, and Kraton.\50\ A
special permit is a document issued by the Associate Administrator
permitting a person to perform a function that is not otherwise
permitted under the HMR. These special permits authorize replacement of
the external visual inspection of the manway gasket by periodic
external inspections (Phillips 66) or by a pressure test and leak
detection equipment (Dow Chemical and Kraton). For the benefit of the
reader, copies of
[[Page 43035]]
the special permits have been posted to the docket for this notice.
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\50\ See DOT-SP 11771, DOT-SP 21098, and DOT-SP 21007,
respectively.
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PHMSA believes that it is likely that additional companies besides
Phillips 66, Dow Chemical, and Kraton are capable of loading and
unloading tank cars without opening the manway, and therefore may be
interested in seeking similar special permits or party status to
existing special permits. PHMSA anticipates evaluating future special
permit requests and potential regulatory changes to Sec. 173.31(d)(1)
that would authorize pre-trip inspections of manway gaskets via a
method other than external visual inspection. We seek a greater
understanding of the state of the art tank car loading and unloading to
evaluate options to replace visual tank car manway gasket inspections.
Based on data collected by FRA, from 2018-2020, 29 percent \51\ of
non-accident releases (NARs) occur at the manway. The root cause for a
significant number of these NARs is traced to human error during manway
closure, improper tool use, or another issue that could be avoided if
the manway was not opened during loading or unloading. Therefore, PHMSA
recognizes that it may be in the interest of safety as well as
reduction of regulatory burden to encourage tank car shippers to keep
manways closed during loading and unloading, and accordingly allow for
an alternate method of inspecting the integrity of the manway gasket.
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\51\ FRA NAR data indicates 338 out of 1164 total NARs in 2018,
2019, and 2020 occurred at the manway.
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PHMSA requests comment on the following questions to assist our
evaluation of special permit requests and potential regulatory
revisions. PHMSA plans to use this information to better inform its
evaluation of requests for Special Permits on this topic and, as
appropriate and in keeping with its standard procedures, in its future
review of special permits for suitability of their potential inclusion
in the HMR:
1. Please present specific alternative methods for verifying the
manway gasket condition, besides an external visual examination of the
manway gasket during the pre-trip inspection.
a. For each method provided, how much does it cost to implement per
shipment relative to the current method of visual inspection?
b. Provide any information available to you indicating how this
method for verifying the manway gasket condition would maintain a level
of safety at least equivalent to a visual inspection of the gasket
during the pre-trip inspection.
c. Are there gasket materials known to remain leak tight over
multiple trips for specific ladings? If so, describe the gasket
material/hazardous material lading combination, and the method by which
multi-trip leak tightness has been validated.
d. Are there gasket materials known not to remain leak tight over
multiple trips with specific ladings? If so, describe the gasket
material/hazardous material lading combination and how usage of such
gaskets could be eliminated from service in tank cars used in an
alternate leak tight inspection program.
2. Are you aware of any accidents or near-miss incidents that could
have led to fire, explosion, or other hazardous incidents related to
opening the manway cover as part of the pre-trip inspection? If so,
please provide all available information relating to the incidents to
PHMSA.
3. Please quantify the cost burden associated with product
degradation caused by introduction of ambient air or moisture into the
tank during the manway gasket inspection.
4. How many tank car shipments are made annually that require
opening the manway solely for the purpose of inspecting the manway
gasket (i.e., the manway is not involved in any other inspection,
loading, or unloading purpose)?
5. How much time is spent, per shipment, opening a manway and
visually inspecting the gasket? What labor category of employee
conducts this inspection? (Use Bureau of Labor Statistics labor
categories, if possible.)
6. What additional costs are associated with a visual inspection of
a manway gasket besides the employee's time (e.g., tools, equipment,
replenishing of inert atmosphere)?
a. For example, does the manway gasket inspection requirement
contribute to wear and tear on the tank car components? If yes, please
describe to what extent this has a material impact.
b. Does the manway gasket inspection requirement adversely affect
the quality of the hazardous material commodity (e.g., purity,
concentrations)? If yes, please elaborate with specific examples.
7. Given the reliability issues that arise with hinged and bolted
manway covers, should PHMSA consider phasing out hinged and bolted
manway covers altogether?
a. If hinged and bolted manways were no longer authorized on
general purpose tank cars, how would loading operations need to be
altered? What would be the costs of altering those loading operations?
b. Several hazardous materials authorized in general purpose tank
cars are loaded through the hinged and bolted manway cover. Are there
materials that can only be loaded using the hinged and bolted manway
cover?
c. A fittings plate is an option for loading a tank car without
operating the hinged and bolted manway cover. Is there other technology
that would be utilized in place of hinged and bolted manway covers? If
yes, please describe.
d. What would be the associated costs of replacing hinged and
bolted manway covers with a fittings plate or an alternative closure?
e. What length of transition time would be needed to completely
remove all hinged and bolted manway covers from tank cars?
8. A tank car requires a qualification and maintenance program per
part 180, subpart F. With respect to questions presented in item #7,
what would be the impact on the tank car's qualification and
maintenance program if implemented?
9. How many hazardous material non-accident releases would likely
be prevented if hinged and bolted manway covers were replaced by a more
permanent closure?
10. Could eliminating hinged and bolted manway cover designs remove
the need to open manways and inspect the gaskets? What are the cost
savings in terms of time and equipment reliability that might be
recognized by tank car offerors?
Y. Acid Resistant Manways for DOT 111A100W5 Tank Cars
Section 179.201-6(b) requires that the top, bottom, and edge of a
manway cover for a DOT-111A100W5 tank car must be covered by an acid
resistant material, unless the metal manway cover is made from material
that is not affected by the lading. In the time since this requirement
was created, DOT-111A100W5 tank cars have entered service for non-
acidic materials, including sodium hypochlorite. PHMSA received a
comment \52\ from the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice from the Olin
Corporation requesting that PHMSA revise Sec. 179.201-6(b) to require
that DOT-111A100W5 tank car manway covers instead be covered with a
material appropriate for the commodity or product, which could include
non-acidic materials. PHMSA requests comment on the following questions
to evaluate this comment:
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\52\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-1444.
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1. Do companies besides Olin Corporation use DOT-111A100W5 tank
cars to transport materials other than acids? How many other companies?
[[Page 43036]]
2. How many DOT-111A100W5 tank cars are impacted by this issue?
3. If this proposal is adopted, what methods could the owner of a
DOT-111A100W5 tank car use to inform potential future owners and users
that the manway lining is not resistant to acids as outlined in Sec.
179.201-6(b)? Should a new marking or delimiter be adopted to account
for tank cars with manways that are not made of acid resistant
material?
4. What benefits would adopting this proposal provide to DOT-
111A100W5 owners and users? Would this provide a safety benefit by
requiring the manway lining be resistant to the lading carried in the
tank car?
5. Would there be cost savings for manufacturers or purchasers of
these tank cars due to using less expensive materials for the manway
covers?
6. Would it be best to specify the requirements for non-acidic DOT-
111A100W5 tank cars in a special permit rather than the HMR? Explain.
7. Should a new specification delimiter be created to segregate
these tank cars from original DOT-111A100W5?
8. How frequently are these tank cars used for acidic materials?
For non-acidic materials?
9. Are these tank cars used for both? Do the manway covers need to
be re-covered prior to each use, appropriate for the commodity or
product?
Z. Tank Car Thermal Protection Standard
DOT-117 tank cars used to transport flammable liquids, including
crude oil and ethanol, must be constructed with thermal protection
systems designed to protect the tank car from fire and heat (see
Sec. Sec. 179.18 and 179.202-6). The thermal protection standard
establishes the performance requirement of a tank car and thermal
protection system when exposed to a 1,600 [deg]F pool fire for 100
minutes, and a 2,200 [deg]F torch fire for 30 minutes (see Appendix B
to part 179--Procedures for Simulated Pool and Torch-Fire Testing). To
pass the Part 179, Appendix B tests, the thermal protection systems
must prevent a rise in temperature above 800 [deg]F on the non-exposed
side of the test plate. This standard is designed to reduce the
potential harm to human health and the environment caused from exposure
to a fire resulting from an accident.
Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk Southern) submitted a
comment \53\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice, requesting
modifications to this thermal protection testing. Specifically, Norfolk
Southern describes research conducted by the Association of American
Railroads Thermal Blanket Task Force that suggests that doubling the
pool fire survivability standard is possible using currently available
thermal protection systems. Norfolk Southern also states that the
majority of ``DOT-11[7]'' tank cars are being equipped with thermal
protection systems that do not meet the new Thermal Blanket Task Force
proposed standard. Norfolk Southern requests that PHMSA adopt a new,
more stringent thermal protection standard for DOT-117 tank cars that
would replace the long-standing performance requirements. To evaluate
this request, PHMSA requests comment on the following questions:
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\53\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2689.
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1. What specific change to the HMR is requested to address the
issue identified by Norfolk Southern?
2. Task Force Activities
a. Has the Thermal Blanket Task Force developed a new consensus
standard for thermal protection? If so, please provide a copy of the
standard if possible.
b. Has the Task Force addressed DOT-113 tank cars carrying
flammable cryogenic material (i.e., Liquified Natural Gas)?
c. What is the status of any proposed standard currently? What is
the timeline for finalization?
3. In general, should PHMSA consider increasing the minimum 100-
minute pool fire standard to 200-minutes or longer in Sec. 179.18(a)?
Explain.
a. Should the new standard apply only to new manufacture? Explain.
If yes, what would be the appropriate timeframe to mandate compliance
with the 200-minute standard for new manufacture?
b. Should it apply retroactively? Explain. If yes, what would be
the appropriate timeframe to retrofit existing tank cars that do not
meet 200-minute standard?
c. How does the implementation of the HM-251C ``FAST Act
Requirements for Flammable Liquids and Rail Tank Cars'' final rule (81
FR 53935, August 15, 2016) \54\ factor into whether the 200-minute
standard should be reserved for new manufacture or apply retroactively
to include retrofitting existing tank cars?
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\54\ https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-08-15/pdf/2016-19406.pdf.
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4. Should PHMSA consider reducing the part 179, Appendix B back-
plate temperature acceptance criteria from 800 [deg]F to a new lower
temperature? Explain.
a. If so, what should the temperature be? What scientific data
supports the new acceptance criteria? Please provide the data
supporting any new acceptance criteria.
5. Newly constructed DOT-117 tank cars require a \1/2\ inch thermal
protection blanket per Sec. 179.202-6(b). Norfolk Southern claims new
DOT-117 tank cars are being equipped with thermal protection material
that would not achieve their new minimum safety standard. Please
provide detailed information and justification of this claim.
a. How many DOT-117 tank cars have been or are being equipped with
this allegedly insufficient thermal protection material?
b. What is the insufficient thermal protection material and what
makes it insufficient or underperform relative to the 200-minute
standard?
6. If Norfolk Southern is proposing a new performance standard of
200 minutes for all tank cars carrying flammable liquid commodities
that require a Sec. 179.18-compliant thermal protection system, are
all existing thermally-protected tank cars (e.g., DOT-105s, DOT-112s
and DOT-117s with approved \1/2\ inch thermal blankets) capable of
achieving the new standard?
a. Should the new thermal protection performance standard apply to
all tank cars requiring thermal protection? Explain.
b. Is there a subset of higher-risk flammable liquid tank cars for
which the 200-minute standard would be most appropriate?
7. Norfolk Southern references a ``recently published AFFTAC''
model showing the thermal protection performance can be doubled with
currently available materials. PHMSA requests the AFFTAC study
referenced in this comment as well as a summary of the underlying
assumptions/inputs to those models. PHMSA also requests any additional
information that will support the Norfolk Southern proposal and the
AFFTAC study.
a. Does the thermal model address every currently authorized
thermal protection material?
b. Does the thermal model address the various types of steel/
thickness that is authorized by the HMR?
c. Were Class 2 flammable gases modeled in addition to Class 3
flammable liquids?
8. How many tank cars would need to be retrofitted if PHMSA and FRA
implemented a new thermal protection standard that applied
retroactively? Please provide separate estimates for flammable liquids
and other commodities.
a. How many existing DOT-105, DOT-112, and DOT-117 tank cars
[[Page 43037]]
would be affected by the proposed change?
9. What is the cost of a thermal blanket that meets the proposed
standard, compared to thermal blankets that meet the current standard?
In other words, please express the unit cost of each technology and the
resulting cost differential.
10. How much would it cost to manufacture a new tank car to the new
standard? How much would it cost to retrofit a tank car to meet the new
standard? Please consider additional labor costs in the case of new
manufacture vs. retrofit. Please also describe other categories of
costs and the amount that may be relevant.
11. If the new 200-minute standard were adopted, what additional
amount of incident damages could be avoided relative to the current
100-minute standard? If possible, please express this in qualitative as
well as quantitative terms, including estimates of the monetary value
of avoided damages. Please note, avoided damages may include avoided
damages to property (both public and private), the environment, and
human health and safety. Related, it could include avoided costs to
society on the basis that incidents may be more severe, and the
emergency response more difficult or dangerous, with the baseline
standard (100 minutes) versus the proposed standard (200 minutes).
12. Are there specific rail incidents that would have been less
severe if the 200-minute proposed standard were already achieved? Is
there a documentation of challenges and impacts to the emergency
response that resulted from the current 100-minute standard?
13. Is the proposed 200-minute standard appropriate for all
hazardous materials that require thermal protection systems, or is
there a specific reason to apply this standard only to flammable
liquids?
AA. Unoccupied Locomotive Train Placement
The HMR require separation between locomotives, occupied cabooses,
and placarded rail cars (including tank cars) containing hazardous
materials (see Sec. 174.85) in rail transportation. This separation is
accomplished by placing non-placarded rail cars, known as ``buffer
cars,'' between the placarded rail car and the locomotive (also known
as the engine or power unit) or occupied caboose. The intent of this
requirement is used to protect the train crew in the engine or caboose
from hazardous materials released during an accident.
On January 29, 2020, PHMSA received a petition for rulemaking from
the Association of American Railroads (AAR), requesting that PHMSA
amend the requirements in Sec. 174.85.\55\ PHMSA accepted this
petition for rulemaking and assigned it the identifier P-1741.
Specifically, AAR requests that PHMSA amend Sec. 174.85 to no longer
require the use of buffer cars to separate placarded rail cars from
unoccupied locomotives, also known as unoccupied head end locomotives,
distributed power units or dead in tow locomotives.
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\55\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=PHMSA-2020-0023-0001.
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In order to evaluate AAR's request, PHMSA seeks comment on the
following questions:
1. Do railroads use distributed power units to transport employees?
If so, how will railroads ensure that an occupied distributed power
unit is provided the required buffer cars?
2. Do you support the creation of operational controls beyond the
requested revision in P-1741? Why or why not?
a. Should a distinction for buffer car requirements be drawn
between unoccupied head-end locomotives, distributed power units, and
dead-in-tow locomotives?
b. What operational controls (e.g., locked doors, door tags with a
message prohibiting entry), if any, are appropriate to identify a
locomotive as an unoccupied distributed power unit?
c. Are there any hazard class or divisions that should still
require compliance with buffer car requirements, even from unoccupied
distributed power units? If so, how many buffer cars?
d. If operational controls (e.g., locked doors, door tags), and
maintenance of buffer car requirements for unoccupied distributed power
units for certain high hazard materials are proposed, would that impact
the estimated cost savings projected in the petition? To what extent?
3. Does removing the requirement for buffer cars around distributed
power units create any additional risks to railroad employees or the
general public? Explain.
4. Across all railroads, how many switching moves occur annually?
a. If unoccupied locomotives are no longer required to be separated
from placarded rail cars, how many fewer switching moves would be
required across all railroads?
b. If unoccupied locomotives are no longer required to be separated
from placarded rail cars, how many fewer switching moves would be
required for Class I, II, and III railroads?
5. Would other benefits (i.e., increased number of cars in revenue
service) accrue to railroads if buffer cars are no longer required
around distributed power units?
6. Is the estimate of annual savings of $180,000-$450,000 per
railroad accurate for Class I railroads? Explain.
a. What are the estimated savings for Class II and Class III
railroads?
b. What other costs, if any, are associated with this requirement,
or is the only quantifiable financial impact the cost savings described
above? Please describe all other sources of cost savings or costs.
7. How do railroads acquire buffer cars?
a. What commodities or materials do buffer cars typically contain?
Would eliminating the buffer car requirement disproportionally affect
customers/related entities?
b. How can the market for buffer cars be described? Who would be
most affected by eliminating the demand for buffer cars?
BB. Offering a Tank Car After Qualification Expiration
The HMR require that tank cars used to transport hazardous material
by rail must be qualified to remain in hazardous material in accordance
with part 180, subpart F. The maximum intervals for the required
inspections and tests are listed in Sec. 180.509(c)(3); however, a
tank car owner may specify shorter test and inspection intervals in
their tank car test and inspection plan. FRA, based on a high volume of
requests for guidance, is aware of confusion among the tank car
community about whether a tank car filled with a hazardous material
before the expiration of a test or inspection can be offered into
transportation after the test or inspection's expiration date.
Section 173.31(a)(3) states: ``No person may fill a tank car
overdue for periodic inspection with a hazardous material and then
offer it for transportation.'' This language is similar to that used
for other packages that require periodic requalification, including
cylinders (see Sec. 180.205(c)), cargo tanks (see Sec. Sec.
173.33(a)(3) and 180.407(a)(1)), portable tanks (see Sec.
173.32(a)(2)), and IBCs (see Sec. 173.35(a)).
Based on Sec. 173.31(a)(3), PHMSA and FRA have provided the
guidance that a tank car may be filled prior to expiration of its
qualification and offered after the qualification interval has expired.
Historically, FRA has only cited violations of the HMR if an offeror
loaded a car after its test date has passed and then offered that car
into
[[Page 43038]]
transportation. However, FRA still receives numerous calls and emails
seeking guidance on moving a tank car that is loaded prior to the
requalification date and offered after, which indicates that the
current language does not adequately address this particular scenario.
Additionally, PHMSA and FRA are aware that our historical guidance on
this issue conflicts with current industry practice, which does not
permit the transportation of a car offered to the railroad after the
expiration of qualification without a One Time Movement Approval.
We are seeking comments on whether the language in this paragraph
should be amended to further clarify how it applies to the scenario
where tank cars are loaded prior to their requalification date and
offered after the requalification date has expired. Therefore, PHMSA,
in consultation with FRA, seeks comment on the following questions:
1. Is the current language in Sec. 173.31(a)(3) sufficient to
address the scenario of loading a tank car prior to the next required
requalification date and offering it after it is overdue for
requalification?
2. Should Sec. 173.31(a)(3) be clarified so that it more clearly
permits the movement of a car that was loaded prior to its required
requalification date but is now overdue for requalification?
3. Permitting cars to be loaded prior to expiration of the
requalification interval and offered after could allow an indefinite
period of time to pass before the expired car is actually offered into
transportation, particularly if it was stored on private track for
months or years. Does this create a potential safety issue?
4. Should PHMSA consider placing a deadline on the amount of time
an offeror has to transport a loaded hazmat tank car that is overdue
for qualification? If so, what should that time limit be? Potential
time limits to consider are three months, six months, one year, or two
years. Please provide any safety data or reliability information to
support the proposed deadline.
5. Should PHMSA forbid the offering of any loaded tank car that is
overdue for requalification, regardless of when it was loaded?
6. Is the practice of filling tank cars prior to expiration of the
qualification date and then offering the tank car after expiration of
the qualification date more prevalent in certain industries? If so,
please describe.
CC. Non-Destructive Examination
Non-destructive examination (NDE), also known as non-destructive
testing (NDT), of hazardous materials packaging is a core requirement
of the HMR for the manufacture and continuing qualification of many
hazmat packagings, including non-bulk Performance Oriented Packagings,
compressed gas cylinders, IBCs, cargo tanks, tank cars, and portable
tanks. However, the HMR does not define the term ``non-destructive
examination'' and does not have consistent standards for the
development of NDE plans or qualification for NDE practitioners across
all packaging types. For example, PHMSA and FRA are aware of confusion
related to NDE plan development, training, and certification
requirements for NDE conducted in accordance with the tank car
qualification requirements found in Sec. 180.509. In order to evaluate
the creation of a standardized definition and requirements for NDE,
PHMSA requests comment on the following questions:
1. Should PHMSA create a definition for non-destructive
examination? Explain why you support or oppose the creation of a
definition for NDE.
2. If you support the creation of a definition for NDE, please
provide a suggested definition.
a. What tests should be included in the definition?
b. Are there commonly accepted definitions for NDE contained in
widely recognized industry standards? Are there differences between NDE
definitions in different industries?
c. Should the definition be package or mode-specific, i.e., should
the definition apply to all packagings, or only cargo tanks, or tank
cars, or compressed gas cylinders? Explain your reasoning.
3. Do you support the creation of a standardized system of NDE plan
development, employee training, and qualification that would apply to
all NDE conducted in accordance with the HMR? Why or why not?
a. Are there existing industry standards and publications that
could be incorporated by reference into the HMR to create a
standardized NDE system?
b. Do you support the incorporation of a particular industry
standard over others? If so, why?
DD. Updating Requirements for Transporting Hazardous Materials on
Passenger Carrying Motor Vehicles
PHMSA is considering updating the requirements of the HMR related
to transportation of hazardous materials on board commercial passenger-
carrying motor vehicles (e.g., buses, taxis, ride-sharing vehicles) to
account for new challenges and opportunities in modern transportation.
Examples of the types of issues PHMSA and FMCSA are aware of in this
space include the transportation of fireworks and patient medical
samples in ridesharing vehicles, and transportation of medical oxygen
cylinders on buses. To begin the process of addressing and updating the
provisions in Sec. 177.870, PHMSA requests comment on the following
questions:
1. What provisions in Sec. 177.870 should be updated or revised
for clarity? What provisions need to be added? What provisions can be
removed?
2. In some cases, transport of hazardous material on passenger-
carrying motor vehicles may be prohibited or regulated by state or
local governments, or as a matter of corporate policy. Is there a need
for additional regulation in this area specifically at the federal
level? Why or why not?
3. What types and quantities of hazardous materials should be
authorized for transportation on board passenger-carrying motor
vehicles?
4. What types and quantities of hazardous materials should not be
authorized for transportation on board passenger-carrying vehicles?
Should PHMSA develop restrictions based on types of packaging, in
addition to or instead of classification-based restrictions?
5. Do current hazard communication requirements (marking, labeling,
placarding, etc.) meet the needs of emergency responders and carriers
in scenarios where hazardous materials are transported on board
passenger-carrying vehicles?
6. What locations on the vehicles should the hazardous material be
stowed? Options for consideration are on one's person; carried on and
placed on or near a seat; on the floor; and/or in a storage bin or
area. Other options for consideration include the distinction between
the stowage of hazardous materials being transported as cargo and
hazardous materials being brought on board by passengers or carrier
employees.
7. Incidents involving hazardous material on board passenger-
carrying motor vehicles may be underreported. Please share examples of
incidents fitting this description.
a. What sort of requirement or regulation would have most likely
prevented these incidents?
8. What are appropriate training requirements for drivers of
passenger-carrying vehicles that transport hazardous materials? What
would this training cost to implement? How many drivers are likely to
be affected and need training? In what manner are drivers already being
trained on awareness and
[[Page 43039]]
handling of hazardous materials carried by passengers or offered as
cargo?
9. Are hazardous materials, other than those carried by passengers
for their personal (non-commercial) use, currently transported on board
passenger-carrying vehicles?
a. If so, what are some common scenarios? What types and quantities
of hazmat?
10. Should there be exceptions applicable to certain types and
quantities of hazardous materials being carried by passengers or
carrier employees (i.e., medical devices) and if so, what should those
exceptions include?
11. Do you support adoption of provisions similar to the air
transportation requirements in Sec. 175.10 to address hazardous
materials carried on board by passengers for their personal use
separate from those carried as cargo on board passenger-carrying
vehicles?
12. What are the appropriate training requirements for employees,
other than the driver, of passenger-carrying vehicles that transport
hazardous materials?
13. Are passenger-carrying motor vehicle drivers and/or other
employees trained to recognize hazardous materials that may be
transported by passengers?
14. Should the number of people transported on board a motor
vehicle be considered when determining the types and quantities of
hazardous materials that are allowed to be carried on board? Explain.
EE. EPA 27 Test Method for Cargo Tanks
The HMR require annual leakage tests for all MC and DOT
specification cargo tanks (see Sec. 180.407(c)). The leakage test is
generally conducted at 80 percent of the tank's maximum authorized
working pressure (MAWP) (see Sec. 180.407(h)). Section 180.407(h)(2)
provides an exception to this normal leak test regime for cargo tanks
used to transport petroleum distillate fuels that are equipped with
vapor collection equipment. These cargo tanks may be tested in
accordance with the Environmental Protection Agency's Test Method 27--
Determination of Vapor Tightness of Gasoline Delivery Tank Using
Pressure-Vacuum Test (EPA Test Method 27). EPA Test Method 27 is
conducted at a significantly lower pressure (0.6 psig) than would
normally be required to leak test a DOT 406 cargo tank (2.1-3.2 psig),
the type of cargo tank most commonly used in gasoline service.
In 2016, PHMSA issued Letter of Interpretation 16-0048 \56\ on the
applicability of the exception in Sec. 180.407(h)(2). In this letter,
PHMSA clarified that the test was restricted to cargo tanks exclusively
used to transport petroleum distillate fuels (defined in EPA Test
Method 27 as a petroleum distillate or petroleum distillate/alcohol
blend having a Reid vapor pressure (RVP) of 27.6 kilopascals or
greater, which is used as a fuel for internal combustion engines).
Concurrently, the FMCSA issued a safety bulletin \57\ to raise
awareness of the applicability of EPA Test Method 27, rather than the
normal leakage test. Some common petroleum distillate fuels have an RVP
significantly below 27.6 kilopascals, including diesel fuel.
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\56\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretation%20Files/2016/160048.pdf.
\57\ https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/Use%20of%20EPA%20Method%2027%20Test_Final_11302016.pdf.
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National Tank Truck Carriers (NTTC) submitted a comment to the 2017
Regulatory Reform Notice requesting that PHMSA and FMCSA rescind this
guidance and allow cargo tanks equipped with vapor collection equipment
and transporting any petroleum distillate fuel, regardless of the
fuel's RVP, to utilize EPA Test Method 27. PHMSA believes the
interpretation provided in 2016 is correct based on the requirements in
the HMR; however, we are willing to consider revisions to the
applicability of EPA Test Method 27. To evaluate this topic, PHMSA
requests comment on the following questions:
1. Is a test pressure of 0.6 psig, when conducted in accordance
with EPA Test Method 27, sufficient to detect any leak(s) in a cargo
tank? Please provide all information available to you that supports
your position.
2. Prior to the publication of PHMSA's 2016 interpretation and
related FMCSA safety advisory, what commodities other than gasoline
were carried in DOT or MC specification cargo tanks that were tested
via the EPA Test Method 27, rather than the standard Sec. 180.407(h)
leak test? What percentage of cargo tanks in petroleum distillate fuel
service are not utilizing Sec. 180.407(h)(2) based on the PHMSA
interpretation and FMCSA guidance?
3. What are the cost savings for a cargo tank operator in
conducting the EPA Test Method 27 instead of a standard Sec.
180.407(h) leakage test? Please describe all sources of cost savings
(time savings, tank wear, etc.).
4. How many DOT or MC specification cargo tanks equipped with vapor
collection equipment are in use?
a. Are these tanks used in any service other than dedicated
gasoline transportation? If yes, what materials are commonly
transported in these low-pressure cargo tanks?
b. How many cargo tanks in dedicated gasoline service are in use?
5. Based on your experience as a Registered Inspector and the
number of cargo tanks that have undergone the EPA Test Method 27 test
per calendar year, what is the failure rate for EPA Test Method 27?
a. What, if any, problems have you observed with the EPA Test
Method 27? Please explain.
b. Should a leakage test be performed in accordance with 49 CFR
180.407(h) in conjunction with EPA Test Method 27? Explain why or why
not. Please provide information related to increased cost and employee
time burdens created if a Sec. 180.407(h)(1) leakage test was required
in addition to the EPA Test Method 27 test.
c. Does your facility experience any issues of temperature
stabilization when performing EPA Test Method 27? If yes, please
explain the nature of the problems observed.
6. Should the U.S. Department of Transportation formally define
``petroleum distillate fuels'' for the purpose of determining the
applicability of the exception in Sec. 180.407(h)? If so, what
definition should be used?
FF. Mounting Pads for Cargo Tank Damage Protection Devices
DOT and MC specification cargo tank motor vehicles are required to
be manufactured with accident damage protection devices that are
intended to protect valves, piping, and other vulnerable areas of the
tank from damage in accidents (see Sec. Sec. 178.337-10, 178.338-10
and 178.345-8). Accident damage protection devices meet the definition
of ``appurtenance'' (see Sec. 178.320) when applied directly to the
cargo tank wall because when attached to the cargo tank wall, they have
no lading retention or containment function and provide no structural
support to the cargo tank. Appurtenances are required to be attached to
the cargo tank wall in a specific manner to protect the integrity of
the tank.
In 2015, PHMSA issued Letter of Interpretation 15-0049 \58\ to
Thompson Tank, Inc., in which we confirmed that
[[Page 43040]]
accident damage protection devices are considered appurtenances for the
purposes of cargo tank construction. In 2016, the Truck Trailer
Manufacturer's Association (TTMA) submitted an interpretation request,
asking that PHMSA re-evaluate our response in 15-0049. Specifically,
TTMA noted that virtually none of the cargo tanks currently in service
utilize mounting pads for damage protection devices that meet the 2-
inch setback required for appurtenances. PHMSA issued Letter of
Interpretation 16-0042 \59\ to TTMA, in which we re-affirmed our
interpretation that accident damage protection devices attached to the
cargo tank wall are considered appurtenances.
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\58\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretation%20Files/2015/150049.pdf.
\59\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/standards-rulemaking/hazmat/interpretations/58476/160042.pdf.
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TTMA submitted a comment \60\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform Notice
requesting that PHMSA rescind 15-0049 and 16-0042. TTMA again noted
that many cargo tanks currently in service do not have mounting pads
that meet appurtenance mounting requirements.
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\60\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-1398.
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PHMSA received a related comment \61\ on cargo tank attachment pads
from Container Technology Inc. Container Technology states that
requiring the attachment pad to extend two inches beyond the attached
structural support or appurtenance is arbitrary and overly
conservative, especially in scenarios where the weight of the
attachment is less than the weight of the pad itself. To evaluate TTMA
and Container Technology Inc.'s comments, PHMSA requests comment on the
following questions:
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\61\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2698 (see attachment 5).
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Accident Damage Protection
1. If accident damage protection devices should not be considered
under the definition of ``appurtenance'' (see Sec. 178.320), how
should they be characterized? Please provide justification for your
response.
2. How would the cargo tank manufacturing and design industry
account for the stresses imposed on the cargo tank wall if the accident
damage protection devices are allowed to be mounted directly to the
cargo tank wall?
3. What data is available in support of the practice of attaching
accident damage protection devices to the cargo tank wall without the
use of pads? Does this data show that it offers an equivalent level of
safety to using pads?
4. What performance standard should apply to the size of attachment
pads for appurtenances and structural support members for cargo tank
motor vehicles?
a. Please supply all structural analysis and scientific data
available to support a new performance standard.
Mounting Pad 2-Inch Setback Requirement
5. For a single cargo tank, what is the cost of ensuring that the
cargo tank attachment pads meet the 2-inch setback requirement? You may
describe these costs in terms of the needed labor and equipment.
6. Aggregated to all affected cargo tanks, what is the cost to the
industry to comply with the 2-inch setback requirement?
7. Does complying with the 2-inch setback requirement require any
other design or manufacturing changes to the cargo tanks or mounting
pads?
8. What data is available in support of the practice of attaching
appurtenances, including accident damage protection devices to the
cargo tank wall without a 2-inch setback? Does this data show that it
offers an equivalent level of safety to using 2-inch setback?
GG. Cargo Tank Hydrostatic Test Medium
When hydrostatic pressure tests for cargo tanks are required in
part 180, subpart H, the HMR require that water or other similar
viscosity liquid be used as the test medium (see Sec.
180.407(g)(viii)). PHMSA understands that some stakeholders believe
that the requirement to use water--or other similar viscosity liquid--
may be unduly restrictive. PHMSA has authorized the use of alternate
test mediums for portable tank testing (e.g., DOT SP-20294, 20308, and
16163),\62\ but has not authorized this for cargo tanks. PHMSA requests
comment on the following questions to evaluate authorizing additional
liquids for hydrostatic testing cargo tanks:
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\62\ https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/approvals-and-permits/hazmat/file-serve/offer/SP20294.pdf/2018115089/SP20294;https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/approvals-and-permits/hazmat/file-serve/offer/SP20308.pdf/2019044410/SP20308;https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/approvals-and-permits/hazmat/file-serve/offer/SP16163.pdf/2016086118/SP16163.
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1. Are there other liquids that may be safely and effectively used
to hydrostatically test cargo tanks? Explain.
2. For any liquid(s) identified, what advantages does the material
provide compared to water or a similar viscosity liquid? Discuss at
least the economic, environmental, and safety advantages of the
alternative material.
3. Do you support authorization to use a material other than water
or a similar viscosity liquid for cargo tank hydrostatic tests?
Explain.
4. Are there situations where the use of water was not suitable for
a CTMV pressure test? If so, why?
5. Is it cost effective or beneficial to authorize alternative
liquids to be used in limited applications for testing and inspecting
of DOT specification cargo tanks used to transport specific types of
hazardous material?
HH. Cargo Tank Thickness and Corrosion Inspection Requirements
Section 180.407(d)(2)(viii) requires all major appurtenances and
structural attachments on a cargo tank motor vehicle--and those
elements of the upper coupler assembly that can be inspected without
dismantling the upper coupler--must be inspected for any corrosion or
damage that might prevent safe operation. There are currently no
standards in the HMR to guide this determination for evaluating
corrosion or damage to major appurtenances, structural attachments, and
visible upper coupler elements.
PHMSA and FMCSA request comment on the following questions to
evaluate the requirements in Sec. 180.407(d)(2)(viii):
1. Do you support the creation of corrosion standards for visual
examination, for example: ``The thickness in the corroded areas must
not be less than 10 percent below the calculated thickness, if
available, or 10 percent of the nominal thickness of the structural
attachment, whichever is less, but in no case less than 0.177 inches.
In addition, the corroded area can be no greater than 10 percent of the
area of the item being evaluated. King pin wear must be inspected in
accordance with the manufacturer's inspection procedures.'' Explain.
a. How frequently would a deficiency or failure be found at the 10
percent standard mentioned above?
b. Are the above criteria stricter or less strict than common
visual inspection practices today? Explain.
2. When repair is necessary, how long is the cargo tank motor
vehicle out of use?
3. How much time does a visual inspection take?
a. If an inspection is done to a quantified standard, what would be
the difference in time needed to perform it?
b. Would additional diagnostic tools or methods be necessary?
Please describe.
II. Remove Exceptions for Cargo Tank Inspections
Sections 180.409(b)-(d) provide exceptions from the Registered
[[Page 43041]]
Inspector qualification requirements for cargo tank motor vehicles. It
is PHMSA and FMCSA's understanding that very few cargo tank motor
vehicle inspections are conducted under the provisions of Sec.
180.409(b), (c), and (d). We are concerned these provisions do not
enhance public safety and may allow unqualified persons to perform
tests and inspections. We request comment on the following questions to
evaluate the continued inclusion of the exceptions provided in Sec.
180.409(b)-(d) in the HMR:
1. How many cargo tank inspections are conducted annually by
persons not registered with the Department or not meeting the education
and/or experience requirements of a ``Registered Inspector'' under the
provisions of Sec. 180.409(b)-(d)?
2. Would the removal of the exceptions in Sec. 180.409(b)-(d) from
the HMR impose any additional costs on cargo tank motor vehicle users?
Please identify any costs and additional time burdens that would be
created by such a requirement. If this requirement creates additional
time burdens on employees, please identify the labor category (use
Bureau of Labor Statistics labor categories, if possible) of the
employees involved and the amount of time spent complying with the new
requirement would take.
3. Are inspections conducted by those not registered more common
for cargo tank users/owners in particular geographic or rural areas?
More common for smaller carriers or firms? If so, please explain.
JJ. Segregation of Detonating Explosives for Highway Transportation
In the HMR, explosives are required to be segregated from each
other based on the hazards and likelihood of initiation of different
explosive types. The intention of these segregation requirements is to
reduce the overall risk in transportation. The risk factors are encoded
in the hazard classification of each explosive in the hazard division
(Division 1.1, 1.2, etc.), and compatibility group (A, B, C, etc.),
which are assigned to each explosive in its EX-approval. See Sec. Sec.
173.50 and 173.52 for the definition of each explosive hazard class and
compatibility group.
While the HMR's segregation requirements for explosives are usually
based on hazard class and compatibility group, initiating or primary
explosives present a particular hazard in transportation due to the
risk of unintended initiation and must be further segregated from less
sensitive explosives to avoid accidental explosive propagation in
transportation. The general segregation requirements for explosives in
highway transportation are found in the Compatibility Table for Class 1
(Explosive) Materials under Sec. 177.848(f), and additional
segregation requirements specific for detonator assemblies, boosters
with detonators, and detonators are found in Sec. 177.835(g). In Sec.
177.835(g), the HMR has more conservative, separate requirements for
detonator assemblies and boosters with detonators compared to the
requirements for detonators.
Prior to harmonization with the UN Model Regulations in final rule
HM-181 \63\ (Dec. 20, 1990, 55 FR 52402), the HMR used non-performance-
based definitions to differentiate between article types. Prior to the
publication of HM-181, the HMR defined blasting initiators with <10g
Net Explosive Weight (NEW) (excluding delay and ignition charges) as
``detonators'' and those with >10g NEW (excluding delay and ignition
charges) as ``Detonating Primers.'' The term ``Detonating primers'' was
editorially updated to ``detonating assemblies'' in final rule HM-189M
(October 1, 1996; 61 FR 51334). Further revisions of section Sec.
177.835(g) to change energetic classifications from Class A/B/C to
Divisions 1.1-1.4S, along with other editorial changes, have led to
confusion about the intent of the section. With the loss of the 10g NEW
delineation between detonators and detonating primers (now detonator
assemblies) after the publication of HM-181, and the shift toward
performance-based classifications, the original regulatory intent has
been lost and has led to confusion in the regulated community.
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\63\ https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1990-12-21/pdf/FR-1990-12-21.pdf#page=138.
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Detonator assemblies and boosters with detonators are prohibited
from transportation in the same motor vehicle with Division 1.1, 1.2,
or 1.3 explosive material (except other detonator assemblies, boosters
with detonators or detonators), Division 1.4 detonating cord material,
or Division 1.5 material. Detonators are prohibited from transportation
in the same motor vehicle with Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 material
(except other detonators, detonator assemblies or boosters with
detonators), and Division 1.4 detonating cord material, or Division 1.5
material, unless the detonators are packed in accordance with one of
the exceptions in Sec. 177.835(g)(1)-(3).
PHMSA is considering revising the segregation requirements for
detonator assemblies to bring them in line with the additional
flexibility offered to detonators in Sec. 177.835(g)(1)-(3).
Additionally, PHMSA is considering amending segregation requirements
for Division 1.4S detonators and developing segregation requirements
commensurate with the risk presented by articles similar to detonators,
including ``fuzes, detonating.'' As stated in Letter of Interpretation
10-0107,\64\ PHMSA currently requires that ``fuzes, detonating'' be
segregated in the same manner as detonators, due to the similar risks
of the materials. PHMSA is considering research to develop the
necessary data to make these revisions, as well as seeking comments
from stakeholders.
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\64\ https://www7.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/legacy/interpretations/Interpretations/2010/100107.pdf.
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PHMSA requests comment on the following questions to gather
information related to potential amendments of segregation requirements
for primary initiating explosives:
1. Should detonator assemblies be eligible for the same segregation
relief as detonators when transported by highway (i.e., the exceptions
in Sec. 177.835(g)(1)-(3))?
a. Why or why not?
b. Should distinctions be drawn between detonator assemblies based
upon the hazard division (e.g., should we allow Division 1.4 detonator
assemblies to be eligible for the same segregation relief available to
detonators, but not Division 1.1 detonator assemblies)? Please explain
your reasoning.
c. Do you have any specific safety concerns with allowing detonator
assemblies to be transported on the same motor vehicle with Division
1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 material detonating cord Division 1.4 material or
Division 1.5 material if they are packaged in accordance with the
requirements in Sec. 177.835(g)(1)-(3)?
2. Are the packaging options in Sec. 177.835(g)(1)-(3) appropriate
for detonator assemblies? Explain.
3. If detonator assemblies were eligible for the same segregation
relief as detonators, how many shipments of detonator assemblies per
year would be conducted in motor vehicles containing Division 1.1, 1.2,
or 1.3 explosive material (except other detonator assemblies, boosters
with detonators, or detonators), detonating cord Division 1.4 material,
or Division 1.5 material?
4. If detonator assemblies were eligible for the same segregation
relief as detonators, would this create quantifiable cost savings or
other benefits? If yes, please describe the cost savings or other
benefits in detail.
[[Page 43042]]
5. Should PHMSA develop specific segregation requirements for
articles that are similar to detonators, such as ``fuzes, detonating,''
including both those that do and do not incorporate protective features
(e.g., ``fuzes, detonating'' of compatibility group B vs. D)? Explain.
a. Approximately how many shipments of ``fuzes, detonating'' are
transported by highway annually in the United States?
b. If PHMSA developed a less restrictive segregation requirement
for ``fuzes, detonating,'' would it create cost savings or other
benefits to explosives shippers or carriers? If so, please describe the
cost savings or benefits in detail.
6. PHMSA is considering whether the risks associated with primary
detonating explosives, when meeting UN 6(d) unconfined single package
test criteria and classed as Division 1.4S, justifies further relief
from segregation requirements.
a. Do you support creating segregation exceptions for primary
detonating explosives classified as Division 1.4S? Explain.
b. If PHMSA developed a less restrictive segregation requirement
for Division 1.4S detonating explosives, would it create cost savings
or other benefits to explosives shippers or carriers? If so, please
describe the cost savings or benefits in detail.
7. Are the manufacturers and shippers of both non-detonating/
initiating explosives and detonators/initiating explosives typically
the same firms?
KK. Cargo Tank Reflectivity
MC-331 cargo tank motor vehicles, typically used to transport
compressed gases, are required to be painted a white, aluminum, or
similar reflecting color on the upper two-thirds of the area of the
cargo tank, unless insulated or covered by a jacket made of aluminum,
stainless steel, or other bright non-tarnishing metal (see Sec.
178.337-1(d)). This requirement has been in place since the creation of
the MC-331 specification in final rule Order 59-B \65\ (Jan 16, 1965,
30 FR 579). Cargo tank coating technology has progressed significantly
over the years, and now includes alternatives such as vinyl wraps and
paint. PHMSA has issued several Letters of Interpretation on this
issue, (see Letters of Interpretation Ref. Nos. 11-0067, 14-0180, 15-
0242, and 19-0107) in which we stated that wraps or covers that met the
reflectivity requirements of the section would be acceptable for use on
MC-331 cargo tank motor vehicles.
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\65\ https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1965-01-16/pdf/FR-1965-01-16.pdf#page=19.
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PHMSA is considering revising the requirement that the tank must be
``painted,'' and also whether a reflective covering could be used
instead of paint. PHMSA and FMCSA are also aware, based on the volume
of requests for letters of interpretations on this topic received in
recent years, that there is significant confusion in the industry
related to determining whether a particular color of wrap or paint
meets the reflectivity requirement of this section. However, PHMSA and
FMCSA have not received enough data to propose a specific reflectivity
requirement to replace the current ``white, aluminum, or similar
reflecting color'' standard. To address this issue, PHMSA seeks comment
on the following questions:
1. Do you support the creation of a reflectivity performance
standard for wrapped or painted MC-331 cargo tank motor vehicles to
replace or in addition to the current requirement for the tank to be a
``white, aluminum, or similar reflecting color?'' Explain.
2. Please provide any relevant technical and scientific data or
other information available to you to support the creation of a
reflectivity performance standard for wraps or paint other than the
existing regulatory requirement.
a. How often do cargo tank owner/operators repaint or recoat the
tank motor vehicles to meet the specification requirements? Would this
performance standard require re-painting or re-coating more or less
often?
LL. Cargo Tank Registered Inspector Training and Qualification
DOT and MC specification cargo tanks must be tested and inspected
in accordance with the requirements of part 180, subpart E. Unless
excepted in Sec. 180.409, tests and inspections required to continue
to operate a specification cargo tank in hazardous materials service
must be conducted by an inspector who meets the following requirements:
Is registered with the FMCSA in accordance with part 107,
subpart F of the HMR;
Is familiar with DOT-specification cargo tanks, and
trained and experienced in use of the inspection and testing equipment
needed; and
Has the training and experience required to meet the
definition of ``Registered Inspector'' in Sec. 171.8 of the HMR.
PHMSA received a comment \66\ to the 2017 Regulatory Reform Docket
from Container Technology requesting that we develop a checklist of
best practices for cargo tank Registered Inspectors. As described by
Container Technology, this would allow cargo tank owners to more
accurately determine whether the Registered Inspector was performing
high quality inspections and tests. FMCSA, who administers the cargo
tank registration program, and PHMSA acknowledge that there are
challenges associated with ensuring cargo tank Registered Inspectors
have the proper training, education, and experience to properly inspect
cargo tanks in accordance with all the test and inspection requirements
in part 180, subpart E.
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\66\ https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2017-0069-2698.
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PHMSA and FMCSA have received several safety recommendations from
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) related to the training
and qualification of cargo tank Registered Inspectors. The NTSB issued
Recommendations H-18-001 through H-18-006 \67\ to FMCSA, PHMSA, and a
private company as a result of findings from an investigation \68\
conducted into a cargo tank motor vehicle accident that occurred in
Stroud, Alabama on March 11, 2016. PHMSA is uncertain whether the
development of a voluntary checklist for use by cargo tank owners will
address the issues that have been identified in the NTSB report and
recommendations. Further, PHMSA is concerned that developing such a
checklist may set an untenable precedent for other situations.
Alternatively, PHMSA believes that incorporation by reference of an
industry standard for cargo tank inspection (e.g., National Boiler
Inspection Code [NBIC], ASME, Truck Trailer Manufacturer's Association)
may help address these issues. PHMSA requests comment on the following
questions:
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\67\ https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/H-18-001-006.pdf.
\68\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HAR1801SUM.pdf.
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1. The NTSB has recommended that PHMSA and FMCSA incorporate by
reference the training and qualification requirements of the NBIC into
the HMR for cargo tank inspectors (see Accident Summary Report NTSB/
HAR-18/01/SUM PB2018-100361 and NTSB Safety Recommendation H-18-004).
Do you support the incorporation of these training and qualification
requirements for cargo tank Registered Inspectors into the HMR?
Explain.
[[Page 43043]]
a. Will incorporation of the NBIC impose any additional costs on
the cargo tank inspection community? If so, please identify specific
provisions in the NBIC that will create additional cost burdens.
2. Are there other generally accepted industry standards that
describe training requirements, recommendations, and best practices for
cargo tank Registered Inspectors?
a. If yes, what are the alternative standards?
i. What is their cost to purchase (if any)?
ii. Are they available in electronic format?
iii. Are they primarily used in an international or domestic
context?
b. How would you describe the equivalency of these alternative
standards to the existing Registered Inspector requirements? Explain
why you believe the alternative standards are equivalent to or superior
to the existing Registered Inspector requirements.
3. Will the IBR of the NBIC or similar industry publications for
the training and qualification of cargo tank Registered Inspectors
ensure that all persons certified to inspect cargo tanks have the
necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to adequately perform
inspections of cargo tanks to verify their safety?
a. If you support methods other than IBR of the NBIC to ensure that
all persons certified to inspect cargo tanks have the necessary
knowledge, skills, and abilities to adequately perform, please describe
them, along with detailed justifications and descriptions of any
additional cost burdens for the industry.
4. Should PHMSA revise the current education and experience
requirements in the definition of ``Registered Inspector'' in Sec.
171.8? Why or why not? If a new qualification or experience is
suggested, please explain the reasoning behind your proposal. Current
qualifications are listed below:
(1) Has an engineering degree and one year of work experience
relating to the testing and inspection of cargo tanks;
(2) Has an associate degree in engineering and two years of work
experience relating to the testing and inspection of cargo tanks;
(3) Has a high school diploma (or General Equivalency Diploma) and
three years of work experience relating to the testing and inspection
of cargo tanks; or
(4) Has at least three years' experience performing the duties of a
Registered Inspector prior to September 1, 1991.
5. Do you support the creation of an additional option to meet the
Sec. 171.8 definition of ``Registered Inspector'' based on attending a
training course on the test and inspection or assembly of cargo tank
motor vehicles? Why or why not? For example, the proposed language
would be as follows:
``Registered Inspector means a person registered with the
Department in accordance with subpart F of part 107 of this chapter who
has the knowledge and ability to determine whether a cargo tank motor
vehicle conforms to the applicable observable and verifiable DOT
specification and to perform the tests and inspections and/or perform
assembly as prescribed in part 180, subpart E. A Registered Inspector
meets the knowledge and ability requirements of this section by meeting
any one of the following requirements:
(1-4) * * *; or
(5) Has successfully completed a course in the testing and
inspection or assembly of cargo tank motor vehicles specific to part
180, subpart E, and the applicable sections of parts 171, 172, 173, and
178, including:
(A) The course must include written and performance evaluations,
including actual inspection and testing or assembly of cargo tank motor
vehicles specific to the person's certification;
(B) The training certification must document the specific tests and
inspections; the cargo tank motor vehicle specifications; non-
specification cargo tank motor vehicles requiring testing; and/or cargo
tank motor vehicle special permits the person has been certified to
inspect and test; and
(C) The certificate, a copy of the course training materials, and
inspection documentation must be retained as long as the person
performs Registered Inspector functions, and for one year thereafter.''
6. Do you support a provision that would indicate that a person may
only gain the requisite experience to operate as a Registered Inspector
by working under the direct supervision of another qualified Registered
Inspector? Why or why not?
7. Do you support adding a specific requirement that Registered
Inspectors must receive and document additional function-specific
training (see Sec. 172.704) prior to testing a different tank
specification (e.g., a DOT 406 vs a DOT 407) or conducting a different
type of test (e.g., leakage pressure test vs. hydrostatic pressure
test)? Why or why not?
8. Should PHMSA create a requirement for initial certification of
Registered Inspectors by a separate, 3rd party organization?
a. Who should assume the responsibility of ensuring that a
Registered Inspectors has mastered the ability to perform the tasks
outlined in the HM regulations?
b. What training/experience/qualifications/credentials would be
needed for the person(s) who assume(s) the responsibility of ensuring
that a Registered Inspectors is fully trained and qualified?
c. What should be the qualification standards for the 3rd party
organization to create an initial certification of Registered
Inspectors?
d. Please estimate any costs likely to be created by the adoption
of a 3rd party certification system for Registered Inspectors.
MM. Cargo Tank Design Certifying Engineer Training and Qualification
PHMSA and FMCSA believe that the training and qualification of
persons meeting the definition of a ``Design Certifying Engineer'' in
Sec. 171.8 needs to be updated to address issues that have been
identified by FMCSA among DCE personnel. An individual must meet the
definition of a DCE, and be registered with FMCSA (see part 107,
subpart F), in order to approve the design of a DOT or MC specification
cargo tank as specified in part 178, subpart J. Generally, a
combination of work experience and education is necessary to ensure the
person performing the function of the DCE can perform the tasks
outlined in the HMR. PHMSA and FMCSA request comment on the following
questions to evaluate the training and qualification of cargo tank
DCEs:
1. Should PHMSA revise the current education and experience
requirements in the definition of DCE in Sec. 171.8 (current
qualifications are listed below):
(1) Has an engineering degree and one year of work experience in
cargo tank structural or mechanical design;
(2) Is currently registered as a professional engineer by
appropriate authority of a state of the United States or a province of
Canada; or
(3) Has at least three years' experience in performing the duties
of a Design Certifying Engineer prior to September 1, 1991.
Why or why not? If a new qualification or experience is suggested,
please explain the reasoning behind your proposal.
2. Should PHMSA create a requirement for initial certification of
DCEs by a separate, 3rd party organization?
a. Who should assume the responsibility of ensuring that a DCE has
mastered the ability to perform the tasks outlined in the HMR?
b. What training/experience/qualifications/credentials would be
[[Page 43044]]
needed for the person(s) who assume(s) the responsibility of ensuring
that a DCE is fully trained/qualified?
c. What should be the qualification standards for the 3rd party
organization to create an initial certification of DCEs?
NN. Cargo Tank Registered Inspector Verification and Documentation
PHMSA and FMCSA have encountered issues in verifying that cargo
tank Registered Inspectors meet the required education and experience
requirements, as defined in Sec. 171.8. Lack of, or improper,
documentation can indicate that the Registered Inspector lacks the
experience and education to properly perform the functions of a
Registered Inspector. PHMSA, in conjunction with FMCSA, request comment
on the following questions to evaluate creating record retention
requirements for Registered Inspectors:
1. Do you support requiring that Registered Inspectors and their
employers be required to maintain documentation proving that the
Registered Inspector meets the education and experience requirements of
the Sec. 171.8 definition for as long as they are employed as a
Registered Inspector and for one year thereafter? Why or why not?
2. What additional burdens would the creation of this requirement
impose on Registered Inspectors and their employers?
a. Please estimate the number of records (physical or digital) that
would be created and maintained by Registered Inspectors and their
employers, and the number of hours required to generate and maintain
each record.
b. What categories of employees would be responsible for creating
and maintaining these records? (Use Bureau of Labor Statistics labor
categories, if possible.)
3. Who are the typical employers of Registered Inspectors? Self-
employed or inspection firms?
OO. Cargo Tank Design Certifying Engineer Verification and
Documentation
PHMSA and FMCSA have encountered difficulties in verifying that
cargo tank Design Certifying Engineers meet the required education and
experience requirements, as defined in Sec. 171.8. Lack of or improper
documentation can indicate that the DCE lacks the experience and
education to properly perform the functions that are required of a DCE.
PHMSA, in conjunction with FMCSA, requests comment on the following
questions to evaluate creating record retention requirements for DCEs:
1. Do you support requiring that DCEs and their employers be
required to maintain documentation proving that the DCE meets the
education and experience requirements of the Sec. 171.8 definition for
as long as they are employed as a DCE and for one year thereafter? Why
or why not?
2. What additional burdens would the creation of this requirement
impose on DCEs and their employers?
a. Please estimate the type and number of records (physical or
digital) that would be created and maintained by DCEs and their
employers, and the number of hours required to generate and maintain
each record.
b. What categories of employees would be responsible for creating
and maintaining these records? (Use Bureau of Labor Statistics labor
categories, if possible.)
3. Who are the typical employers of Design Certifying Engineers?
Self-employed or engineering firms?
PP. Cargo Tank Registered Inspector Revised Definition
PHMSA and FMCSA believe that the definition of ``Registered
Inspector'' in Sec. 171.8 needs to be updated to address issues that
have been identified by FMCSA. An individual must meet the definition
of Registered Inspector, with some exceptions provided in Sec.
180.409, in order to conduct the tests and inspections required for
continued service of cargo tank motor vehicles in part 180, subpart E.
PHMSA and FMCSA are concerned that the current definition of
``Registered Inspector'' is insufficiently clear, creates confusion for
new inspectors entering the field related to the type of experience
required before beginning work as a Registered Inspector, and can also
allow unqualified inspectors to continue to test and inspect cargo
tanks. In particular, the phrase, ``work experience relating to the
testing and inspection of cargo tanks'' has generated numerous
questions and is insufficiently clear.
PHMSA, in conjunction with FMCSA, request comment on the following
questions to evaluate potential modifications to the definition of
``Registered Inspector:''
1. Should the phrase ``relating to the testing and inspection of
cargo tanks'' be replaced with a phrase that more clearly communicates
our expectation that the Registered Inspector's work experience
directly relates to the continuing qualification of cargo tanks? Why or
why not?
a. For example, ``A Registered Inspector meets the knowledge and
ability requirements of this section by meeting any one of the
following requirements: (1) Has an engineering degree and at least one
year of work experience engaging in the continuing qualification,
maintenance, or periodic testing and inspecting of DOT specification
cargo tanks, cargo tank motor vehicles and/or cargo tank equipment used
in hazardous materials transportation, and is responsible, qualified,
and competent to demonstrate the skills and abilities to ensure
compliance, qualification, and maintenance of cargo tanks?''
b. If you do not agree with the above example, please provide a
suggested definition and explain the intended application of your
revised definition.
2. Would this proposed revised definition have any impact on third-
party groups that offer training courses for Registered Inspectors?
3. Does this proposed revised definition align with any industry
standard definitions?
QQ. Cargo Tank Design Certifying Engineer Revised Definition
PHMSA and FMCSA believe that the definition of ``Design Certifying
Engineer'' in Sec. 171.8 needs to be updated to address issues that
have been identified by FMCSA in cargo tank DCE personnel. An
individual must meet the definition of DCE in order to approve the
design of a DOT or MC specification cargo tank as specified in part
178, subpart J. PHMSA and FMCSA are concerned that the current
definition of ``Design Certifying Engineer'' is insufficiently clear,
creates unnecessary confusion for new engineers entering the field
related to the type of experience required before beginning work as a
DCE, and can also allow unqualified engineers to approve the design of
cargo tanks. In particular, the phrase, ``work experience in cargo tank
structural or mechanical design'' has generated numerous questions and
is insufficiently clear.
PHMSA, in conjunction with FMCSA, request comment on the following
questions to evaluate potential modifications to the definition of
``Design Certifying Engineer:''
1. Should the phrase ``in cargo tank structural or mechanical
design'' be replaced with a phrase that more clearly communicates our
expectation that the DCE's work experience directly relates to the
design of cargo tanks?
a. For example, ``A Design Certifying Engineer meets the knowledge
and ability requirements of this section by meeting any one of the
following requirements: (1) Has an engineering degree and at least one
year of work
[[Page 43045]]
experience engaging in performance of the stress analysis of pressure
vessels and certification of cargo tank or cargo tank motor vehicle
designs, including its required accident damage protection devices, in
conformance to the specification requirements of this subchapter.''
b. If you do not agree with the above example, please provide a
suggested definition and explain the intended application of your
revised definition.
2. Would this proposed revised definition have any impact on 3rd
party groups that offer training courses for Design Certifying
Engineers?
3. Does this proposed revised definition align with any industry
standard definitions?
RR. NTSB Safety Recommendations R-20-1 to R-20-4
On February 14, 2020, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) issued four related safety recommendations to PHMSA and FRA.\69\
Safety Recommendations R-20-1 to R-20-4 were issued after the
investigation of a release of ethanol from a DOT-111A100W1 tank car in
Fredericksburg, VA on November 2, 2016. The NTSB determined that the
probable cause of the ethanol release was undetected cracks that
resulted from overspeed high-energy coupling events, which caused tank
shell deformation that led to the initiation of two fatigue cracks at
the terminations of the cradle pad fillet welds. Based on the findings
of the investigation, NTSB issued the following safety recommendations
to PHMSA and FRA:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/HZM2001.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
R-20-1--Work together to develop maximum coupling speed
thresholds and impact mass limits for hazardous materials railcars.
R-20-2--Require that tank cars involved in high-energy
coupling-force events undergo a structural integrity inspection by a
qualified technician before returning to service.
R-20-3--Develop methods to identify tank cars that have
sustained overspeed and high-energy coupling force events.
R-20-4--After the successful development of methods to
identify tank cars that have sustained overspeed and high-energy
coupling force events, require that rail carriers have monitoring
processes in place to promptly remove damaged tank cars from hazardous
materials service.
The intent of this collection of safety recommendations is to
prevent releases of hazardous materials from occurring due to damage to
cars from overspeed or high-energy coupling events by: (1) minimizing
the opportunity for these events; and (2) discovering damage in a
timely manner so that corrective measures can be taken. PHMSA and FRA
concur with the NTSB's conclusion that reducing overspeed and high-
energy coupling-force events, inspecting the structural integrity of
tank cars that have experienced these events, and identifying and
removing tank cars damaged by these events is in the interest of
improving tank car safety. In this ANPRM, we describe existing
regulatory standards designed to address overspeed coupling, and seek
comment from railroads, tank car shippers, tank car manufacturers, tank
car owners, and any other interested parties on the best means to
address this issue.
The HMR address tank car coupling speed in Sec. 174.83(b) for
certain materials:
Division 1.1 and 1.2 explosives;
Division 2.3 Hazard Zone A gas;
Division 6.1 PG I Hazard Zone A material;
Class DOT 113 tank car displaying a Division 2.1
(flammable gas) placard, including a Class DOT 113 tank car containing
only a residue of a Division 2.1 material.
Section 174.83(b) requires that tank cars containing these
materials may not be cut off while in motion, coupled into with more
force than is necessary to complete the coupling, or struck by any car
moving under its own momentum. Section 174.83(e) addresses flatcar
coupling as follows: ``No placarded flatcar or any flatcar carrying a
placarded transport vehicle, freight container, or bulk packaging may
be coupled into with more force than is necessary to complete the
coupling.''
Voluntary rail industry standards also address tank car coupling
speeds. AAR Circular OT-55-Q states, ``Maximum reasonable efforts will
be made to achieve coupling of loaded placarded tank cars at speeds not
to exceed 4 mph.'' \70\ The United States Hazardous Materials
Instructions for Rail (US-1) states, ``When rail cars are cut off in
motion, the coupling speed must not exceed 4 mph.'' \71\ As noted in
the NTSB report, the existing regulatory requirements and voluntary
industry standards did not prevent the hard-coupling event that led to
the ethanol release in Fredericksburg, VA on November 2, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Recommended Railroad Operating Practices for Transportation
of Hazardous Materials. Circular No. OT 55-Q. (CPC-1337). https://www.aar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CPC-1337-OT-55-Q-w-AskRail-9-6-18.pdf.
\71\ United States Hazardous Materials Instructions for Rail.
https://www.aar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/US-HMI-for-Rail-2015-FINAL.pdf.
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Transport Canada has implemented coupling speed standards and
inspection requirements for tank cars that experience overspeed
coupling events in Section 10.7 of the Transportation of Dangerous
Goods (TDG) Regulations.\72\ The TDG Regulations' coupling speed
standards consist of a general limit of 6 mph for coupling, with
allowance for 7.5 mph for a single railway vehicle moving under its own
momentum at temperatures above -25 [deg]C. Additionally, the TDG
Regulations require a visual inspection of the underframe, and coupling
and cushioning components of the tank car before the tank car travels 2
kilometers after one of the following overspeed coupling events occurs,
as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations. ``Coupling
of Railway Vehicles,'' Section 10.7. SOR/2019-101. https://tc.canada.ca/en/dangerous-goods/part-10.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combined coupling
mass: tank car and
Item other railway Ambient temperature Relative coupling speed
vehicle, and their
contents
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1................................ >150,000 kg (330,700 <=-25 [deg]C (-13 >9.6 kph (6.0 mph).
lb). [deg]F).
2................................ >150,000 kg (330,700 <=-25 [deg]C (-13 >12 kph (7.5 mph).
lb). [deg]F).
3................................ <=150,000 kg <=-25 [deg]C (-13 >12.9 kph (8.0 mph).
(330,700 lb). [deg]F).
4................................ <=150,000 kg >-25 [deg]C (-13 >15.3 kph (9.5 mph).
(330,700 lb). [deg]F).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the person in possession of the tank car when the
overspeed coupling event occurs must submit a written report to the
tank car's owner within 10 days, informing the owner of the overspeed
coupling event. The tank car owner must then ensure the tank car is not
used in hazardous materials service, other than the lading
[[Page 43046]]
contained in the tank car at time of coupling, until a detailed
structural integrity inspection can be conducted by a tank car
facility.
FRA and PHMSA note that the standards adopted by Transport Canada
in the TDG Regulations align with the intent of NTSB Safety
Recommendations R-20-1 and R-20-2, in that they address coupling speed
thresholds and impact mass limits, as well as require a detailed
structural integrity inspection for tank cars that experience coupling
events beyond the coupling speed and mass thresholds. However, Safety
Recommendations R-20-3 and R-20-4, for identification of cars that
experience overspeed coupling events, and rail carrier monitoring
procedures to remove a tank car damaged in an overspeed coupling event
from service, do not currently have a direct precedent in American,
Canadian, or voluntary industry standards. While there are technologies
in use to monitor coupling speeds, neither PHMSA nor FRA believe that a
systematic, industry-wide process has been implemented to monitor
overspeed coupling. Since no systematic overspeed coupling monitoring
system exists, a system for carrier identification of tank cars that
have experienced overspeed coupling events would also need to be
developed. With consideration of the existing coupling speed standards,
and recognition of the need to gather more information to develop
monitoring system standards, PHMSA and FRA request comment on the
following questions:
1. Do you support adoption of the Transport Canada coupling speed
and impact mass standards, described above, into the HMR? Why or why
not? Please support your position with any data or information
available to you.
2. Do you support requiring a visual inspection of the tank car
underframe, and coupling and cushioning components immediately (within
2 km, or 1.25 miles) after an overspeed coupling event that exceeds
certain speed and impact mass standards? Why or why not? Please support
your position with any data or information available to you.
a. Is requiring an immediate visual inspection of the tank car
before the train moves 2 km (1.25 miles) miles a reasonable standard?
What alternatives should be considered? Explain.
b. If this requirement was adopted, who would/should conduct the
inspection? Are railroad personnel trained/qualified to perform the
inspection?
c. How much time would each visual inspection require?
d. What costs would be associated with the adoption of this
requirement? Provide a quantified estimate, if possible.
3. Do you support requiring a detailed structural integrity
inspection, conducted at a certified tank car facility, for a tank car
subjected to a coupling that exceeds certain speed and impact mass
standards? Why or why not? Please support your position with any data
or information available to you.
a. If this requirement was adopted, how much would inspection
services cost a tank car owner? Please include estimates for time out
of service, inspection labor, recordkeeping, and all other costs
associated with a structural integrity inspection.
4. What methods or procedures are currently in use to measure tank
car coupling speeds and avoid high-energy, overspeed coupling events?
5. What methods or procedures are currently in use to identify tank
cars that have experienced high-energy, overspeed coupling events?
6. Describe a system that could be used to measure all tank car
coupling events and identify tank cars that have experienced a high-
energy, overspeed coupling event. The system should use existing
methods, procedures, and available technologies to the extent
practical.
a. How much would it cost to develop and implement such a system?
Estimates are acceptable. Please provide as detailed a cost breakdown
as possible addressing research and development (if required), capital
expenditures, employee wages, etc. associated with your estimate.
b. How much would it cost to maintain such a system? Estimates are
acceptable. Please provide as detailed a cost breakdown as possible
addressing capital expenditures, employee wages, etc. associated with
your estimate.
c. Who would bear the costs for the development, implementation,
and maintenance of the system you describe?
d. If such a system was implemented, would you support a
requirement that the person in possession of a tank car that
experiences a high-energy, overspeed coupling event must report all
such events to the tank car owner and/or the Department of
Transportation, regardless of whether the event results in the release
of hazardous materials? Why or why not? In your estimation, how many
such reports would be filed nationwide annually, if such a requirement
was adopted?
7. Please provide any information available to you on the rate of
high-energy or overspeed coupling events that occur without causing an
immediate release of hazardous materials. How often do high-energy or
overspeed coupling events occur with no immediate release of hazardous
materials?
8. In consideration of the intent of the safety recommendations,
rather than imposing a speed or impact mass standard and associated
procedures, what alternative measures could be implemented to arrive at
the same goal of preventing incidents that result in the release of a
hazardous material because of damage to a tank car from overspeed and
high energy coupling events?
SS. Placard Display on Intermediate Bulk Containers
Section 172.516 details the visibility and display of placards.
Paragraph (a) specifies that each placard on a motor vehicle or rail
car must be ``clearly visible from the direction it faces, except from
the direction of another transport vehicle or rail car to which the
motor vehicle or rail car is coupled.'' Furthermore, this paragraph
indicates that placards displayed on a freight container or portable
tank can be used to meet this visibility requirement.
PHMSA has received several requests for letters of interpretation
on whether placards displayed on IBCs or shrink-wrapped pallets
containing multiple non-bulk packages of hazardous materials may be
used to meet the Sec. 172.516 visibility requirement, in addition to
those placards displayed on a freight container or portable tank.
Examples of these letters include 20-0025 \73\ and 10-0075.\74\ PHMSA
has provided the guidance that such placard display is permissible, and
would meet the requirements of Sec. 172.516, provided the placards are
clearly visible from the direction the placard faces. To encourage a
uniform understanding of placard display requirements, PHMSA is
considering a revision to Sec. 172.516 to clearly authorize motor
vehicle placard display on IBCs, shrink-wrapped pallets containing non-
bulk packages, or other arrangements that permit adequate visibility of
placards for each direction they face.
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\73\ https://www7.phmsa.dot.gov/regulations/title49/interp/20-0025.
\74\ https://www7.phmsa.dot.gov/regulations/title49/interp/10-0075.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To evaluate the feasibility revising the placard visibility
requirements in the HMR to allow motor vehicle placard display to be
accomplished by displaying placards on IBCs, shrink-wrapped pallets, or
other arrangements besides freight containers or portable
[[Page 43047]]
tanks, PHSMA seeks comments on the following questions:
1. In your opinion, should PHMSA revise Sec. 172.516 to clearly
authorize motor vehicle placard display on IBCs, shrink-wrapped pallets
containing non-bulk packages, or other arrangements that permit
adequate visibility of placards for each direction they face? Why or
why not?
2. Would placards displayed on IBCs or shrink-wrapped pallets
containing non-bulk packages be as visible and recognizable in normal
transportation scenarios and accident scenarios compared to placards
displayed on a freight container or portable tank?
3. Would a revision to Sec. 172.516 to clearly authorize motor
vehicle placard display on IBCs, shrink-wrapped pallets containing non-
bulk packages, or other arrangements that permit adequate visibility of
placards for each direction they face create any cost savings for
hazardous material shippers or transporters? Please provide a cost-
savings estimate per shipment, including time savings, if applicable.
TT. Emerging Technologies
Emerging energy storage, transportation, and carbon sequestration
technologies are at the forefront of efforts to meet Executive Order
14008 (``Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad'').\75\ These
technologies include new battery chemistries, increased transportation
of clean energy products including hydrogen, and the capture,
purification, and sequestration of carbon dioxide. PHMSA is committed
to ensuring that the HMR do not become a barrier to the development,
use, and prevalence of such technologies, and facilitates the
integration of these new technologies in the economy, by adding,
revising, or deleting certain provisions as necessary. Accordingly,
PHMSA requests comment on the following questions:
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\75\ https://www.federalregister.gov/citation/86-FR-7619.
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1. Please identify any revisions in the HMR required to facilitate
the adoption of new and emerging technologies.
a. Include information and arguments that support your proposed
action, including relevant technical and scientific data.
b. Include any specific cases that support or demonstrate the need
for your proposed action.
2. Please provide information about the following:
a. The costs, savings, and safety or environmental benefits of your
proposed action to society in general and to identifiable groups such
as specific companies or industries affected by your proposal.
b. The regulatory burden of your proposed action on small
businesses, small organizations, small governmental jurisdictions, and
Indian tribes.
c. The recordkeeping and reporting burdens of your proposed action
and whom they would affect.
d. The direct effects, including preemption effects under 49 U.S.C.
5125 of federal hazardous materials transportation law, of your
proposed action on states, on the relationship between the Federal
Government and the states, and on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government. (See 49 CFR
part 107, subpart C, regarding preemption.)
e. The effect of your proposed action on the quality of the natural
and social environments.
Issued in Washington, DC, on June 26, 2023, under the authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
William S. Schoonover,
Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety, Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.
[FR Doc. 2023-13903 Filed 7-3-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P