[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 121 (Monday, June 26, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 41295-41308]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-13071]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 25 and 121

[Docket No.: FAA-2022-0772; Amdt. Nos. 25-150 and 121-389]
RIN 2120-AL59


Installation and Operation of Flightdeck Installed Physical 
Secondary Barriers on Transport Category Airplanes in Part 121 Service

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule implements a mandate in the FAA 
Reauthorization Act of 2018 by requiring that certain airplanes used to 
conduct domestic, flag, or supplemental passenger-carrying operations 
have installed a physical secondary barrier that protects the 
flightdeck from unauthorized intrusion when the flightdeck door is 
opened.

[[Page 41296]]


DATES: Effective August 25, 2023.

ADDRESSES: For information on where to obtain copies of rulemaking 
documents and other information related to this final rule, see 
``Additional Information'' in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 
this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning 
this action, contact Dan Jacquet, AIR-626, Human-Machine Interface 
Section, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, 
Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 2200 
South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198; telephone (206) 231-3208; 
email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Executive Summary

    This final rule implements \1\ section 336 of the FAA 
Reauthorization Act of 2018 by requiring the installation and use of an 
installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) that will be deployed 
(closed and locked) whenever the flightdeck door is opened while the 
airplane is in flight. This final rule affects operators conducting 
passenger-carrying operations under title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (14 CFR), part 121, with transport category airplanes 
operating in the United States by requiring the operators to use the 
IPSB, when installed, as part of their procedures for opening the 
flightdeck door. Affected operators must comply with this rule when 
operating transport category airplanes manufactured two years after the 
effective date of this final rule.
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    \1\ The FAA determined that an informal rulemaking proceeding 
under section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act is appropriate 
to prospectively apply these requirements on certain newly-
manufactured airplanes.
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    In this final rule, the FAA estimates costs of $35,000 for the 
purchase and installation of an IPSB. After the addition of training 
and other costs, the present value costs for this rule are $236.5 
million ($20.3 million annualized) at a 7 percent discount rate and 
$505 million ($29 million annualized) at a 3 percent discount rate. 
When the flightdeck door must be opened for lavatory breaks, meal 
service, or crew changes, the flightdeck could be vulnerable to attack. 
The benefit of this rule, requiring installation and use of IPSBs on 
airplanes in part 121 service, is to slow such an attack long enough so 
that an open flightdeck door can be closed and locked before an 
attacker could reach the flightdeck.

II. Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in 
Title 49 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). Subtitle I, section 106, 
describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's 
authority.
    This rulemaking is issued under the authority described in Subtitle 
VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General Requirements.'' 
Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations and 
minimum standards for the design and performance of aircraft that the 
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This 
regulation is within the scope of that authority.
    In addition, section 336, ``Secondary Cockpit Barriers,'' of the 
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Public Law 115-254 (Oct. 5, 2018), 
directs the Administrator of the FAA to issue an order requiring 
installation of a secondary flightdeck barrier on ``each new aircraft 
that is manufactured for delivery to a passenger air carrier in the 
United States operating under the provisions of part 121 of title 14, 
Code of Federal Regulations.''

III. Background

A. History

    Following the events of September 11, 2001, the FAA adopted 
standards for flightdeck security in January 2002 by adding 14 CFR 
25.795 and amending 14 CFR 121.313.\2\ Those amendments were intended 
to make the flightdeck resistant to forcible intrusion and small 
firearms, and prevent unauthorized entry into the flightdeck. These 
requirements were based on International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) standards,\3\ and the recommendations of the Aviation Rulemaking 
Advisory Committee (ARAC) \4\ Design for Security Harmonization Working 
Group. ARAC included representatives of aircraft owners and operators, 
airmen and flight crewmembers, airports, aircraft maintenance 
providers, aircraft manufacturers, public citizen and passenger groups, 
training providers, and labor organizations.
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    \2\ Security Considerations in the Design of the Flightdeck on 
Transport Category Airplanes, 67 FR 2117 (January 15, 2002).
    \3\ Adopted by Amendment 97 to Annex 8 to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation on March 12, 1997.
    \4\ See ARAC-ICAO Amendment 97 to Annex 8 and Resistance to 
Intrusion Complete File (Design for Security HWG, TAE), www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/342.
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    Even a strong and secure flightdeck door, however, must 
occasionally open to accommodate necessary activities such as lavatory 
breaks and meal service. Between the time of opening and closing the 
flightdeck door (door transition), the open flightdeck has some degree 
of vulnerability to attack. Such an attack could happen quickly, and 
leave insufficient time for the cabin crew to react.
    Therefore, in 2007, the FAA promulgated requirements \5\ to address 
the security of the flightdeck when the flightdeck door was opened, 
however briefly. Specifically, the FAA adopted Sec. Sec.  121.584, 
``Requirement to view the area outside the flightdeck door,'' and 
121.587, ``Closing and locking of flightcrew compartment door,'' to 
require that the flightdeck door be locked when the airplane is in 
operation, unless it is necessary to open it to permit access by 
authorized persons, and require compliance with FAA-approved procedures 
for opening the door.
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    \5\ Flightdeck Door Monitoring and Crew Discreet Alerting 
Systems (72 FR 45629; August 15, 2007).
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    As a result of these new requirements, air carriers and type design 
holders developed various methods and designs, including the use of 
crewmembers and equipment and, in limited cases, IPSBs,\6\ to help 
secure the flightdeck during the period when the flightdeck door was 
open during flight. To provide guidance and recommendations for these 
different methods and designs, RTCA, Inc. (RTCA),\7\ formed a committee 
to develop recommended procedures and standards for airplane secondary 
barriers. In 2011, RTCA produced DO-329, ``Aircraft Secondary Barriers 
and Alternative Flight Deck Security Procedures.'' DO-329 describes 
various means of addressing the times when the flightdeck door must be 
opened. In this context, these means can be combinations of people, 
procedures and/or equipment. The document does not recommend one of 
these means over another, but provides advice on the use of each one to 
meet the objective of a secure flightdeck. Subsequently and based on 
the RTCA's report, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 120-110, 
``Aircraft Secondary Barriers and

[[Page 41297]]

Alternate Flight Deck Security Procedures,'' in 2015. That AC 
references various means of compliance with Sec.  121.584(a)(1), which 
prohibits the flightdeck door from being unlocked during flight unless 
the operator has an approved procedure and visual device to verify that 
the area outside the flightdeck door is secure.
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    \6\ Relatively few such IPSBs were installed, relative to the 
total number of airplanes in scheduled service, and most have since 
been removed. The FAA is not aware of the reasons for removal. In 
addition, the FAA has no data regarding whether those varying 
installations would have met the requirements of this proposal.
    \7\ RTCA was formerly the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics and an Advisory Committee to the FAA.
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B. Congressional Mandate

    On October 5, 2018, Congress enacted the FAA Reauthorization Act of 
2018 (the ``Act''). Section 336 of the Act required the FAA to issue an 
order requiring installation of a secondary flightdeck barrier on each 
new aircraft that is manufactured for delivery to a passenger air 
carrier in the United States operating under provisions of part 121.

C. ARAC Report

    On June 20, 2019, to facilitate the implementation of the mandate 
in section 336 to require secondary barriers on certain aircraft, the 
FAA tasked ARAC \8\ to recommend standards for IPSB. The ARAC formed 
the Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Working Group (the ``Working Group''), 
under the Transport Airplane and Engine Subcommittee, to carry out the 
tasks. The Working Group included representatives from manufacturers, 
air carriers, and pilot and flight attendant unions. On February 27, 
2020, the Working Group submitted its ``Recommendation Report to 
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee for Implementation of Section 
336 of Public Law 115-254'' (the ``Report'') \9\ to ARAC. ARAC accepted 
the Report in March of 2020 and forwarded it to the FAA.\10\ The Report 
contained 21 recommendations, most of which were by consensus.\11\ This 
final rule incorporates those consensus recommendations.
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    \8\ See Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Tasking Notice (June 20, 
2019), www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information?documentID=3943.
    \9\ See Flightdeck Secondary Barriers Working Group Report, 
available in the docket for this rulemaking and at www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information?documentID=4342.
    \10\ See Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Meeting 
(June 18, 2020), www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/ARAC%20June%202020%20Meeting%20Packet.pdf.
    \11\ As discussed in section II.C of the NPRM for this 
rulemaking (87 FR 46892).
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D. Summary of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and Final Rule

    This rulemaking finalizes the NPRM published August 1, 2022, which 
proposed to implement section 336 of the Act by requiring that certain 
airplanes used to conduct passenger-carrying operations under 14 CFR 
part 121 (i.e., domestic, flag, or supplemental) have an IPSB that 
protects the flightdeck from unauthorized intrusion when the flightdeck 
door is opened (87 FR 46892).
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that the IPSB must resist intrusion, 
provide line-of-sight visibility to allow crewmember situational 
awareness of the area between the passenger cabin and the entry to the 
flightdeck, and meet certain physical standards (i.e., design standards 
in new Sec.  25.795(a)(4)), but still allow for necessary crewmember 
activities.
    The proposed rulemaking would affect operators conducting 
passenger-carrying operations under part 121 with transport category 
airplanes. The NPRM proposed that operators would be required to 
incorporate the use of an installed IPSB into their flightdeck door 
opening procedures and require crewmembers to deploy the IPSB before 
opening the flightdeck door. The FAA proposed that the rule would apply 
to operation of transport category airplanes manufactured two years 
after the effective date of a final rule.
    This rule adopts the proposal with limited changes to clarify the 
applicability of the part 25 design requirements for IPSBs to airplanes 
required by operating rules to have IPSBs, and to clarify that the 
requirement for part 121 operators' airplanes to be equipped with IPSB 
applies only to passenger-carrying transport category airplanes. The 
final rule also includes the ``line of sight'' design requirement as a 
part 25 design requirement, rather than an operating rule.

E. General Overview of Public Comments

    The FAA received comments from 31 commenters, including Airlines 
for America (A4A); Association of Flight Attendants-Communications 
Workers of America, AFL-CIO (AFA-CWA); Aerospace Industries Association 
(AIA); Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA); Airbus 
Commercial Aircraft (Airbus); National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil 
(ANAC); Allied Pilots Association (APA); The Boeing Company (Boeing); 
Coalition of Airline Pilots Association (CAPA); Cabin Ops Safety Risk 
Management, LLC (Cabin Ops); Embraer S. A. (Embraer); International 
Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations-Cabin Safety 
Working Group (ICCAIA-CSWG); Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB); 
Regional Airline Association (RAA); Southwest Airlines Pilots 
Association (SWAPA); Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA); the 
Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO (TTD); United Airlines, Inc. 
(United); and several individuals.
    Commenters generally supported the implementation of an IPSB in 
transport category airplanes but submitted requests for additional 
modifications. These requests generally address the following: 
compliance time; international harmonization; applicability; retrofit 
of IPSBs onto the existing fleet; part 129 airplanes; crew staffing and 
training concerns; changes to the ``reach through'' requirement; 
requests that the FAA clarify whether a malfunctioning IPSB would 
prevent the airplane's operation; questions regarding whether operators 
need to upgrade equipment and procedures that provide information to 
the flightdeck; and the cost and benefit evaluation.
    In addition, the commenters addressed the draft ACs that 
accompanied the NPRM, as well as requests for specific details 
pertaining to compliance. The FAA's responses to these comments can be 
found at the Dynamic Regulatory System (drs.faa.gov), along with the 
finalized ACs.

IV. Discussion of Comments and the Final Rule

A. Compliance Time

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to amend Sec.  121.313 by requiring 
part 121 operators to have an IPSB on transport category airplanes 
manufactured two years after the effective date of the final rule.
    ALPA, APA, CAPA, SWAPA, and TTD recommended that the compliance 
period should be reduced, so that the rule applies to airplanes 
manufactured one year (12 months) after the effective date of this 
final rule. They stated that doing so would align with the intent of 
Congress, and the text of the legislation, which mandated the FAA to 
issue an order by October 5, 2019. These commenters reasoned that a 
one-year compliance period would be enough, because manufacturers and 
airlines were provided with sufficient notice of the substance and 
urgency of the requirement when the legislation mandated in 2018 that 
the FAA issue an order within a year, and when ARAC issued the Report 
in 2020. These commenters further stated that aircraft manufacturers 
should already have preparations substantially underway to facilitate 
the installation of IPSB on newly-manufactured aircraft. There has

[[Page 41298]]

been voluntary industry movement toward designing and implementing IPSB 
since 2003 (two major airlines \12\ voluntarily installed IPSB on more 
than a hundred of their aircraft, and two aircraft manufacturers \13\ 
had previously offered IPSB as standard equipment on newly-manufactured 
aircraft), so some manufacturers already possess procedures to 
implement IPSB installation. Additionally, a consensus-based technical 
standard exists in an RTCA document; \14\ the industry has had access 
to the ARAC recommendations addressing implementation of the 
legislation for more than two years; and the FAA also published draft 
ACs that provided recommended standards and procedures.
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    \12\ Delta Air Lines and United.
    \13\ Airbus and Boeing.
    \14\ DO-329, ``Aircraft Secondary Barriers and Alternative 
Flight Deck Security Procedures,'' discussed in the NPRM.
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    In contrast, A4A, AIA, Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, the ICCAIA-CSWG, 
and RAA recommended that the FAA increase the compliance period to 
three years (36 months) after the effective date of the final rule. 
Airbus stated that, because the requirements would impact many aircraft 
types and cabin interior configurations, the industry would be required 
to develop many IPSBs, each with unique type design criteria in 
parallel, resulting in the need for significant resources from original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), the supplier community, and the FAA to 
review and certify these unique designs. These commenters pointed out 
that, because the proposed requirements and the draft ACs provided 
performance-based requirements, additional time would be needed to 
derive specific design criteria to comply with the requirements. These 
commenters then provided general overviews of the steps required to 
develop, certify, test, manufacture, and install a new IPSB; to train 
crew and maintenance staff; and, to establish the necessary supply 
chain--the completion of which would necessitate more than two years. 
A4A stated that a 2-year implementation timeframe could only be 
possible if IPSBs are ``plug-and-play'' installations with already-
existing parts. Boeing further pointed out that the industry is 
experiencing additional manufacturing delays due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. In addition, these commenters reiterated a study \15\ cited 
in the Report that predicted three years would be required to fully 
design and implement IPSB on newly-manufactured aircraft. Embraer and 
the ICCAIA-CSWG also stated that design holders and applicants would 
not be able to begin their compliance efforts until the FAA publishes 
its final rule.
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    \15\ ``Secondary Cockpit Barriers OEM Working Group--Position on 
Proposed Secondary Barriers Installation for 14 CFR part 121 
Aircrafts'' (June 13, 2019).
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    Embraer also pointed to a DOT NPRM, published in January 2020, as 
support for a three-year compliance time. This NPRM \16\ would require 
carriers flying single-aisle aircraft to make changes to their lavatory 
on new aircraft to better accommodate the needs of disabled passengers. 
Embraer stated this NPRM proposed changes similar in complexity to the 
installation of an IPSB, yet DOT had proposed a three-year compliance 
date after the publication of the final rule to provide the time 
necessary for equipment and airplane manufacturers to make required 
changes to the interiors of their airplane and obtain the appropriate 
regulatory approvals for those changes. TCCA commented that two years 
seems optimistic to design, certify, and implement IPSB installation.
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    \16\ Accessible Lavatories on Single-Aisle Aircraft: Part 1 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 85 FR 27 (2020). The changes proposed 
in the NPRM included such additions as grab bars, lavatory faucets 
with tactile information on temperature, attendant call buttons, and 
a modification to the lavatory door.
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    In summary, arguments for shortening the compliance time are mainly 
based on the mandate in the legislation, and the amount of time that 
has passed since then. Arguments for extending the compliance time 
point to the engineering challenges for different aircraft types, and 
to the fact that, until a final rule is enacted, manufacturers do not 
have criteria on which to base designs.
    The FAA notes that two years is more time than was given for the 
mandatory retrofit of reinforced flightdeck doors. Also, equipment and 
airplane manufacturers are starting from a position of greater 
experience and design understanding, than existed when the flightdeck 
door requirements were enacted. Conversely, it is true that final 
design and manufacturing is not feasible until the final standards are 
adopted. This makes a one-year compliance time unrealistic. As was 
discussed in the NPRM, the FAA also considered--in proposing the two-
year compliance time the variety of competing concerns and arguments 
that were presented during the ARAC activity, and the resulting 
recommendations for either 18- or 36-month compliance times, all as 
memorialized in the Report. Given the foregoing, the FAA continues to 
determine that a two-year compliance time, as proposed by the NPRM, is 
appropriate.
    In a related comment, United stated that, because the FAA proposed 
to place the compliance deadline in part 121, the burden to comply with 
proposed Sec.  121.313 would fall upon air carriers, when air carriers 
do not control the timeline for design and approval of new IPSB 
designs. United recommended the compliance deadline be placed in 14 CFR 
part 25, which would create incentives for part 25 applicants to 
complete their designs and demonstrate compliance in a timely manner.
    The FAA's regulatory approach in this rulemaking is consistent with 
other, similar rulemakings requiring updates to the existing fleet.\17\ 
In addition, since the requirement only applies to certain operations, 
i.e., part 121, a generalized requirement in part 25 would not be 
appropriate. Ensuring that operators change their procedures to comply 
with Sec.  121.584 require changes to part 121, and so adding the 
requirement to part 25 would not relieve operators from the burden of 
compliance. Therefore, consistent with the proposal, the applicability 
of the requirement for IPSB is provided in part 121.
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    \17\ See, e.g., Amendment 121-289, Improved Flammability 
Standards for Materials Used in the Interiors of Transport Category 
Airplane Cabins (52 FR 5422); Amendment 121-301, Improved 
Flammability Standards for Thermal/Acoustic Insulation Materials 
Used in Transport Category Airplanes (68 FR 45045); and Amendment 
121-306, Miscellaneous Cabin Safety Changes (69 FR 62777). All of 
these regulations required physical design changes to newly-
manufactured airplanes, using a two-year compliance time.
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B. International Harmonization

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to amend Sec.  121.313 by adding 
paragraph (l) that would require the installation of an IPSB ``that 
provides line-of-sight visibility between the flight door and the 
cabin'' for aircraft under part 121 operations.
    ANAC submitted regulatory text that would move this line-of-sight 
specification from proposed Sec.  121.313(l) to a new Sec.  
25.795(a)(4)(vi). ANAC cited section III.A.4 of the NPRM preamble, 
which stated that the visibility requirement would be evaluated during 
certification. ANAC reasoned that part 25 design standards would be a 
more appropriate part for the visibility requirement, and would also 
allow foreign countries to comply even if they do not have an 
equivalent operating rule requiring the installation of an IPSB.
    The FAA agrees that the line-of-sight provision is more appropriate 
as a part 25 design standard in Sec.  25.795 for the reasons the 
commenter provided.

[[Page 41299]]

Therefore, the final rule regulatory text reflects this approach.
    In the NPRM, proposed Sec.  25.795(a)(4) stated that an IPSB must 
be installed to resist intrusion into the flightdeck whenever the 
flightdeck door is opened. ANAC recommended that the FAA rewrite this 
requirement as, ``[i]f an installed physical secondary barrier is 
installed, it shall resist intrusion into the flightdeck whenever the 
flightdeck is opened.'' ANAC stated that, because Brazil and several 
other countries adopt part 25 for harmonization purposes, the proposed 
rule would make the IPSB mandatory for these countries when neither 
ANAC, nor ICAO, has identified IPSB as a security problem. ANAC 
recommended that the IPSB mandate be better fitted in the operating 
regulations of each country.
    The FAA agrees with the commenter's reasoning and has clarified the 
final rule by including the clause, ``if required by the operating 
rules'' to Sec.  25.795(a)(4) in the final rule.

C. Exclusion of All-Cargo and Private-Use Airplanes

    Consistent with section 336 of the Act, the FAA intended for the 
proposed requirements for IPSB to apply only to transport-category 
airplanes used in passenger-carrying operations under part 121.
    A4A and Embraer recommended revising the regulatory text to specify 
that the requirements exclude all-cargo airplanes, such as by 
explicitly stating that airplanes used solely to transport cargo would 
not be required to comply with the proposed mandate for IPSB in Sec.  
121.313 by adding the words ``of passenger air carriers'' in proposed 
Sec.  121.313(l). These commenters believed Congress, and ARAC, clearly 
intended to exclude all-cargo air carriers.
    The FAA agrees with the commenters' rationale regarding the 
potential confusion in the proposed regulatory text regarding all-cargo 
airplanes, and adds the term ``passenger-carrying'' in Sec.  121.313(l) 
to specify the requirements will apply to passenger-carrying transport 
category airplanes only, excluding all-cargo airplanes. This change 
aligns with the text of section 336, which specified ``passenger air 
carriers.''
    Airbus also requested that the rule except ``private use 
transportation'' from compliance with proposed Sec.  25.795(a)(4), 
because private use aircraft are usually configured with a cabin that 
cannot accommodate IPSB installation, and usually contain a low number 
of occupants who will be familiar with the aircraft. Airbus recommended 
that Sec.  25.795(e), ``Exceptions,'' be amended accordingly.
    The FAA does not agree with Airbus' request. As previously 
discussed, in the final rule, Sec.  25.795(a)(4) references only those 
airplanes required by operating rules to have a flightdeck door. The 
only operating rule that requires an IPSB falls under part 121, and 
part 121 does not apply to private-use operations. Therefore, no change 
to proposed Sec.  25.795(e) is needed and Sec.  25.795(e) is finalized 
as proposed.

D. Requests That the FAA Mandate Retrofit

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to apply the requirement for an IPSB 
only to new airplanes that are manufactured two years after the 
effective date of the final rule. The NPRM did not include a proposed 
retrofit requirement for those airplanes manufactured prior to that 
effective date.
    ALPA, CAPA, APA, SWAPA, TTD, and an individual requested that the 
FAA extend the requirement for an IPSB to all aircraft conducting 
operations under part 121, including older airplanes, rather than to 
just newly-manufactured airplanes operating under part 121 as proposed. 
These commenters stated that not requiring an IPSB in existing aircraft 
under part 121 operations would become a known security vulnerability. 
These commenters stated that extending the requirements to the existing 
part 121 fleet would align with the intent of Congress in mandating an 
IPSB order be published by October 2019, because doing so would account 
for the many airplanes that have been manufactured without IPSB 
installation since that date. Additionally, JCAB, recognizing that the 
proposed regulations did not have a retrofit requirement, requested 
that the FAA provide how it evaluated the risks to already-manufactured 
aircraft.
    A4A and United supported the implementation of the IPSB 
requirements to newly-manufactured aircraft only, as proposed in the 
NPRM, and stated that a retrofit requirement would not be warranted 
because current measures remain effective in addressing safety and 
security concerns. However, rather than being applicable to newly-
manufactured aircraft operating under part 121, these commenters 
recommended that these requirements instead be applicable to newly 
type-certificated aircraft operating under part 121. A4A stated that 
application to all newly type-certificated aircraft would be supported 
by relevant data and the current multi-layered security environment for 
commercial aviation, including on-board security procedures. A4A and 
United further cited concerns that application to all newly-
manufactured aircraft would result in non-commonality issues within 
their fleets, as well as increased cost burdens in training and 
maintenance.
    Section 336 was explicit in mandating the FAA to require 
installation of IPSB on each newly manufactured aircraft. The purpose 
of this rulemaking is to implement the congressional mandate of IPSB on 
such aircraft.
    In addition, a mandated retrofit is outside the scope of this final 
rule and would require an independent rulemaking action to implement. 
The FAA continues to monitor threats to aviation security in 
conjunction with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and 
other agencies. Should additional flightdeck security measures be 
deemed necessary, the FAA may propose additional rulemaking.
    Similarly, the FAA also does not agree with the suggestion to make 
the requirements of this rule applicable only to newly-type 
certificated airplanes, because doing so would not meet the mandate 
from Congress. The legislation was explicit in that it mandates the FAA 
to require installation of IPSB on each new aircraft.
    The FAA notes that it, and other U.S. Government agencies, use a 
variety of tools to continuously assess potential risks to aviation 
safety and security.

E. Requests To Include Airplanes Operating Under Part 129

    In the NPRM, the FAA did not propose to apply the requirement for 
IPSB to airplanes operating under part 129.
    ALPA, APA, CAPA, SWAPA, and TTD requested that the requirements be 
extended to any aircraft operating under part 129 within the United 
States, and to part 129 air carriers who operate solely outside the 
United States but with aircraft registered in the United States. These 
commenters stated that this extension would follow the same rationale 
that resulted in the FAA extending the requirement to install hardened 
flightdeck doors from part 121 to part 129. They reasoned that, while 
the FAA is bound by the minimum requirements of the legislation in 
publishing an IPSB requirement, the FAA is not constrained by the 
legislation when exercising its general Title 49 statutory powers to 
regulate aviation safety in the public interest, and therefore could 
establish additional IPSB requirements beyond those expressly required 
by Congress.

[[Page 41300]]

    As previously noted, the purpose of this final rule is to implement 
section 336 of the Act, which limited the applicability of the mandate 
for IPSB to airplanes manufactured for delivery to passenger air 
carriers operating under part 121. Moreover, as noted in the NPRM, 
there currently is no international standards organization, such as 
ICAO, proposing an IPSB; nor are other civil aviation authorities 
mandating, or proposing to mandate, an IPSB.
    Moreover, extending these requirements to part 129 was not proposed 
in the NPRM, and is therefore out of scope for this final rule. 
Accordingly, here is no change and the rule is adopted as proposed in 
this matter.

F. Crewmember Staffing and Training Concerns

    Several commenters sought changes to the proposal to address 
crewmember staffing and training. In the NPRM, the FAA did not propose 
any requirements regarding crewmember staffing or training.
    AFA-CWA and Cabin Ops recommended the FAA add a crew staffing 
requirement to this rule, by increasing the required number of flight 
attendants from one to two, for airplanes with 19 to 50 passenger 
seats. Currently, for airplanes with a passenger capacity from 19 to 
50, only one flight attendant is required.\18\ These commenters stated 
that when the flightdeck door is opened to allow a flightcrew member to 
leave the flightdeck--for example, to use the lavatory--no crewmember 
is in the cabin for the period of time that the flightcrew member is 
away, because the lone flight attendant must enter the flightdeck. They 
suggest that having a second, required cabin crewmember would maintain 
at least one crewmember in the cabin.
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    \18\ See Sec.  121.391, ``Flight attendants.''
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    Cabin Ops also questioned whether the FAA should still require two 
persons to be on the flightdeck during times where a pilot leaves the 
flightdeck. The commenter stated that this was not realistic, and 
suggested that the FAA state in regulations and policy that each 
passenger air carrier should be required to conduct a safety risk 
assessment when applying the operational procedures to small regional 
aircraft.
    In contrast, RAA stated that implementation of IPSB would provide 
an additional layer of security, whereas requiring two flight attendant 
represents increased long-term costs for certain small air carriers.
    The FAA does not agree with the recommendation to increase flight 
attendant staffing, nor with Cabin Ops' suggestion that an IPSB is 
incompatible with the requirement for two persons on the flightdeck at 
all times.\19\ Historically, aircraft with a seating capacity of 20 to 
50 passengers have successfully and safely operated with one flight 
attendant. The FAA currently has no data to support mandating two 
flight attendants on these aircraft. In addition, the installation of 
an IPSB will isolate the flightdeck door from the cabin in times when 
it must open. Finally, adding a new crew requirement is outside the 
scope of the NPRM. The FAA expects that each air carrier, in accordance 
with part 5, will use its approved processes within its Safety 
Management System (SMS) \20\ to identify and control risks identified 
in its operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See, e.g., 14 CFR 121.313(g), 121.547, and 121.587.
    \20\ See AC 120-92, ``Safety Management System for Aviation 
Service Providers.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TTD requested the rule require training on IPSBs for flight 
attendants.
    The FAA does not agree that a specific training requirement is 
necessary for this rule. When new equipment is installed on an 
aircraft, Sec.  121.421, ``Flight attendants: Initial and transition 
ground training,'' requires flight attendants to be trained on that 
equipment.
    Finally, JCAB, noting the importance of the IPSB only being 
deployed for a short length of time, asked that such be specified in 
the operating manual.
    Given that the purpose of an IPSB is to slow a security threat so 
that the flightdeck door can be closed, the FAA does not agree that 
specifying a maximum duration that the IPSB can be deployed is 
necessary.

G. Requests To Exclude Smaller Transport Category Airplanes

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to apply the IPSB requirement to all 
transport-category airplanes that are required to have a flightdeck 
door, regardless of the airplane's size. The FAA also asked for 
comment, including supporting data, regarding whether aircraft used for 
flights of shorter distance or duration should be excluded from the 
requirement, due to the decreased likelihood of the flightdeck door 
being opened during such flights.
    In response, Embraer, the ICCAIA-CSWG, and RAA asked the FAA to 
consider excluding from the final rule smaller transport category 
airplanes with flights of shorter duration. APA, Embraer, and RAA also 
supported excluding smaller transport category airplanes from this 
final rule, regardless of the flight duration.
    The ICCAIA-CSWG and Embraer, stated that, although short duration 
flights can be associated with any size of airplane, short flights are 
to be expected with smaller transport category airplanes, which have a 
more limited maximum flight duration. These commenters also stated that 
smaller transport category airplanes have confined interior spaces, 
with lavatories, galleys, and wardrobes located close to the 
flightdeck, leaving a very small space for changes to aircraft design. 
Finally, these commenters stated the design challenges created by the 
proposed IPSB requirement due to increases in cost and weight, would be 
more significant for smaller transport category airplanes as compared 
to the larger airplanes.
    A4A, Embraer, and the ICCAIA-CSWG stated that on smaller transport 
category airplanes, the combination of an Improvised Non-Installed 
Secondary Barrier (INSB) with procedures and crewmembers training would 
provide appropriate protection during flightdeck door transition.
    In contrast, ALPA, APA, CAPA, and AFA-CWA agreed with the FAA that 
there was no obvious design parameter, such as passenger capacity or 
airplane gross weight, which correlated with short flights.
    Prior to publication of the NPRM, the FAA tasked ARAC to provide 
information that could be applied to determine if a certain size of 
aircraft could be exempted from the requirement to have an IPSB. ARAC 
did not provide a recommendation on that topic. The NPRM included a 
similar request for information; however, no specific data or proposed 
criteria were submitted. Accordingly, while commenters made a number of 
assertions regarding design challenges, neither the commenters nor ARAC 
provided data to support a change to the proposal to account for 
aircraft size or flight duration.

H. Reach-Through Requirement

    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in Sec.  25.795(a)(4)(iv) that the 
IPSB must prevent a person from reaching through it and touching the 
flightdeck door.
    Airbus, Boeing, and the ICCAIA-CSWG recommended that the FAA change 
the phrase ``touching the flightdeck door'' to incorporate different 
words, including ``grasping,'' ``blocking,'' and ``grabbing'' the 
flightdeck door. They argued that such changes would be more inclusive 
of the

[[Page 41301]]

ways a person can touch a flightdeck door.
    The FAA does not agree that the suggested words are more inclusive. 
Any of the proposed words would need to be defined, whereas the word 
``touch'' is well-understood and more conservative than the recommended 
words. As such, Sec.  25.795(a)(4)(iv) will remain as proposed in the 
final rule.
    TCCA asked the FAA if it will mandate be a minimum distance between 
the IPSB and the flightdeck door.
    The FAA declines to impose a specified minimum distance between the 
IPSB and the flightdeck door, because the requirements of this rule are 
performance-based.

I. Master Minimum Equipment List

    In the NPRM, the FAA did not propose any requirements regarding the 
IPSB and the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL).\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ See Sec.  121.628, ``Inoperable instruments and 
equipment.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A4A, Boeing, TCCA, and United commented that the FAA should allow 
operators Minimum Equipment List (MEL) relief should the IPSB 
malfunction or become inoperable. They suggested that passenger air 
carriers should be allowed to temporarily operate aircraft with an 
inoperable IPSB. These commenters also suggested that the final rule 
ensure that operators be able to obtain MEL relief for inoperable 
IPSBs. A4A and United also suggested that in addition to providing MEL 
relief in the final rule, that the FAA should issue an MMEL Policy 
Letter that allows for aircraft operation with an inoperative IPSB.
    For purposes of the airplane's potential deferral under its MEL or 
MMEL, and its continued compliance with Sec.  121.584(a), the FAA does 
not consider an IPSB to be ``essential for safe operations under all 
operating conditions,'' in accordance with Sec.  121.628(b)(1). 
Therefore, the IPSB may be included in an operator's MEL. Finally, in 
accordance with existing processes, the FAA will evaluate whether an 
MMEL Policy Letter is necessary.

J. Adequacy of Current Devices and Procedures

    In the NPRM, the FAA intended proposed Sec.  121.584(a)(3) to 
prohibit an operator from unlocking or opening the flightdeck door 
during flight unless there was an approved audio procedure and an 
approved visual device to verify that the IPSB, if an IPSB is required 
to be installed, has been deployed.
    Embraer and the ICCAIA-CSWG raised concerns that this requirement 
could be interpreted as requiring the flightcrew to see--from the 
flightdeck--that the IPSB is installed, whereas some aircraft 
configurations may render it impossible to see from the flightdeck that 
the IPSB is deployed.\22\ These commenters stated that, if proposed 
Sec.  121.584(a)(3) were interpreted too strictly, it would require 
operators to install a system inside the flightdeck to inform the 
flightcrew that the IPSB is deployed, thus creating an unnecessary 
burden for those aircraft configurations. These commenters stated that 
this was not recommended in the Report, nor were the costs of a new 
visual system accounted for in the NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Embraer and the ICCAIA-CSWG used the word ``installed,'' 
but the FAA infers that they meant ``deployed.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing commented that the FAA should have emphasized in the NPRM 
that compliance with proposed Sec.  121.584(a)(3) can be satisfied with 
audio and visual devices present in current airplanes and associated 
crew procedures, without the need for additional flightdeck indications 
such as an electronic flightdeck indication that the IPSB is deployed.
    As explained in the NPRM, the FAA proposed Sec.  121.584(a)(3) to 
make sure that, if an IPSB is installed, it is deployed any time the 
flightdeck door is opened during flight. However, this rule does not 
require the installation of any specific system inside the flightdeck 
to inform the flight crew that the IPSB is deployed and secured. 
Operators will work with their FAA oversight office to develop 
procedures for opening the flightdeck door for different aircraft 
configurations. The FAA anticipates that operators will continue to 
utilize various methods similar to their current approved procedures 
regarding the opening of the flightdeck door (e.g., audio and visual 
devices present in current airplanes and associated procedures).

K. Cost and Benefit Evaluation

    The FAA provided a Preliminary Regulatory Impact Assessment for the 
proposed requirements in the NPRM. A4A stated that the FAA should have 
considered, in its cost-benefit analysis, the technical difficulties 
and the on-going cost implications for the requirement to maintain and 
operate aircraft with functional IPSB. A4A cited the challenges of 
redesigning interiors on smaller aircraft with space, monument \23\ 
limitations, and potential maintenance issues for IPSB due to their 
moving parts, and significant training costs for crewmembers who must 
work across a fleet with mixed IPSB equipage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Functional units such as galleys, lavatories, are called 
``monuments.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA recognizes the technical difficulties of installing IPSBs 
on some smaller airplanes, which might increase costs. The FAA relied 
on the ARAC's $35,000 per airplane estimate, which included the entire 
range of affected airplane models, so the FAA's estimate of the overall 
fleet remains valid. The FAA also estimates that training costs per 
employee for a simple device such as an IPSB is very low (training time 
of approximately 30 minutes). Once an employee is trained on a 
particular IPSB model, the FAA does not believe there will be 
significant training costs for training on additional models, due to 
their similarity of function.
    RAA suggested that the FAA consider excluding operators of short 
duration flights from the final rule as a means to reduce economic 
burdens on small entities. The commenter cited the Report which 
recognized that, for short flights, the flightdeck door may be less 
likely to be opened, in which case the IPSB would not provide the 
intended benefit. The commenter also referenced a DOT NPRM \24\ 
regarding accessible lavatories on single-aisle aircraft applicable to 
single-aisle aircraft with 125 or more passenger seats, because DOT 
tentatively recognized that aircraft with fewer than 125 seats tend to 
be shorter-haul aircraft, with shorter flight times, where it may not 
be cost-beneficial to require interior improvements to lavatories, and 
the commenter extended this rationale to the flightdeck door. The FAA 
addresses this comment in the section titled ``Regulatory Flexibility 
Act,'' under the subsection titled ``Significant Issues Raised in 
Public Comments.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Ibid, 85 FR 27 (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM preamble section titled ``Proposed Exception from 
Incompatible Regulations,'' the FAA proposed that, during its 
certification of the IPSB installation, the requirements of Sec.  
25.365 would not apply to IPSBs in the deployed configuration.
    TCCA stated that the proposed regulation was not incompatible with 
the provisions of Sec.  25.365, ``Pressurized compartment loads.'' TCCA 
questioned the utility of the expense of building a decompression-
resistant IPSB when the Report estimated the probability of 
decompression to be 10-\9\ when the IPSB is deployed. If the 
FAA's intention was to grant exemption from Sec.  25.365 when an IPSB 
is deployed, then TCCA recommended that the FAA justify that intention 
based on a cost-benefit argument instead of incompatibility,

[[Page 41302]]

and also specify the estimated cost differential of a decompression-
resistant IPSB.
    The FAA agrees that ``compatibility'' may not be the most accurate 
term to describe how the FAA makes compliance findings with Sec.  
25.365 when the IPSB is deployed. A better term is ``applicability.'' 
As noted in the NPRM, the FAA has long considered that Sec.  25.365 
does not apply to interior features that have transient configurations 
(such as a lavatory door) when a door is open. Because deployment of 
the IPSB is also transient, the FAA has determined that Sec.  25.365 is 
not applicable to the IPSB when deployed. However, should IPSB designs 
be proposed that are intended to remain in place, Sec.  25.365 would be 
applicable.
    Airbus recommended that the FAA increase its estimated cost for 
each IPSB unit from $35,000 to $50,000, because if the cost included 
recurrent and non-recurrent costs, then it should cover development 
expenses (i.e., engineering costs, stress and analysis, certification 
testing and witnessing, different prototypes for different aircraft 
configurations) and supplier development costs.
    The FAA does not agree with this recommendation. The cost analysis 
in the regulatory evaluation for the proposed rule included the $9 
million nonrecurring engineering costs estimated by ARAC. That estimate 
would have included all costs that Airbus characterizes as development 
costs, and includes assumed up-front costs for initial aircraft design, 
partial design reuse for remaining models, and unique installations for 
each aircraft model.
    In the NPRM, the FAA divided total losses ($35.7 billion) by 50-
year cumulative present value costs ($236.5 million) to derive an 
annual probability of an attempted attack of 0.66 percent. An 
individual commenter stated that this calculation was not correct, that 
dividing a loss by a 50-year cost did not yield an annual probability, 
but 0.66 percent spread over many years. The commenter suggested that 
the correct calculation to assess the break-even annual probability of 
an attempted attack would be to divide total losses ($35.7 billion) by 
annualized costs ($20.3 million), leading to a probability of an 
attempted attack of 0.057 percent per year.
    The FAA does not agree with the suggestion that the break-even 
analysis is incorrect. An annual probability of 0.66 percent translates 
to one successful attack every 151 years (1/151 = 0.0066 or 0.66 
percent). The commenter, in his own comment, stated that ``even if 
there were only one terrorist hijacking attack in one hundred and fifty 
years (annual attack probability of 0.7 percent) . . ., secondary 
barriers are cost effective.'' The FAA points out that this 0.7 percent 
estimate is effectively identical to the FAA's estimate of 0.66 
percent.
    In addition, the individual commenter took exception to the FAA 
characterization, in the Regulatory Impact Analysis section of the 
NPRM, of the commenter's quantification of benefits in the Briefing 
Note (Stewart and Mueller, 2019) \25\ as ``problematic.'' The commenter 
stated that any quantifiable risk involves some subjectivity and 
uncertainty in predicting rates of disruption for security measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Mark G. Stewart & John Mueller, ``Security Risk and Cost-
Benefit Assessment of Secondary Flight Deck Barriers,'' Centre for 
Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, The University of 
Newcastle, Australia (2019), nova.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/
manager/Repository/uon:35881.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The statement may be true, but that does not preclude the FAA from 
determining that the subjectivity and uncertainty is so great as to 
make accurate estimates problematic; for example, the airport 
disruption rate for airport checkpoint screening of 15 percent 
estimated in the Briefing Note compared to a disruption rate of 50 
percent estimated by other researchers.
    Another individual also stated this rule would have no possible 
break-even benefit, given the finding of the RIA that the annual 
probability of an attempted breach of the flight compartment door is 
0.66 percent while costing travelers $236.5 million per year. Using 
worldwide data for commercial flights, the commenter suggested that the 
annual probability of a 9/11-type terrorist attack implied by the 
break-even analysis was orders of magnitude too high.
    The FAA notes that $236.5 million is not the yearly cost of the 
rule; rather, it is the total present value cost of the rule over the 
49-year estimation period, from 2023 to 2072. Table 1 of the regulatory 
evaluation shows this, and also shows that the corresponding annualized 
cost is $20.7 million (at a 7 percent discount rate). In addition, the 
FAA does not agree with the use of all commercial flights worldwide as 
basis for consideration. A 9/11-type attack would likely require 
hijacking of a large transport category airplane. Moreover, the focus 
of the proposed rule and the regulatory analysis is necessarily on 
transport category airplanes taking off and landing in the United 
States. Accordingly, the commenter's use of all commercial flights 
worldwide, including flights with non-transport category aircraft, 
leads to estimates of excessively low probabilities.

L. Miscellaneous

    TCCA and an individual expressed concern that deployment of the 
IPSB would signal that the flightdeck door was about to be opened, 
which might have a negative impact on security. TCCA noted that 
providing some visual obscuration might address this concern, but could 
conflict with the line-of-sight requirement.
    The FAA notes that current procedures for opening the flightdeck 
door could also provide a similar signal. In that vein, the IPSB 
enhances flightdeck security, since this rule mandates that the 
flightdeck door will not be unlocked or opened until after the IPSB is 
deployed.
    In the NPRM, the FAA proposed static load requirements in Sec.  
25.795(a)(4) for the IPSB when it is deployed. Airbus requested more 
details on how and where to apply the requested load on the IPSB.
    The FAA notes that the load must be applied at ``the most critical 
location,'' and that this requirement is performance-based. The 
applicant for a design approval of an IPSB will have to define the 
critical locations for the load. However, the FAA provided draft 
guidance for applicants on this topic in AC 25.795-10, ``Installation 
of Physical Secondary Barriers for Transport Category Airplanes,'' 
which is in the docket for this rulemaking. This AC states that 
critical locations should include the IPSB center and the IPSB latch 
area. This AC will be finalized with the publication of this rule.
    TCCA asked whether the aircraft size and weight criteria from Sec.  
25.795(b) would be applicable to the proposed Sec.  25.795(b)(4).
    The aircraft size and weight criteria in paragraph (b) of Sec.  
25.795 are not relevant to the flight deck door requirements of 
paragraph (a); and, as this rule adds design requirements for IPSB to 
paragraph (a), the aircraft size and weight criteria in paragraph (b) 
continue to be inapplicable.
    Embraer recommended an edit to the NPRM preamble, under the section 
titled ``Proposed exception from incompatible regulations,'' regarding 
a sentence which stated that, because the proposed rule would not 
require that the IPSB be deployed during taxi, takeoff, and landing, 
the amount of time that the IPSB is deployed should be ``very brief in 
comparison to the duration of the flight.'' Embraer recommended that 
the sentence should

[[Page 41303]]

end at ``very brief'' to give flexibility for the operator to define, 
according to its operating procedures, the amount of time that the IPSB 
is deployed.
    The FAA confirms that it was the agency's intent to convey that 
operators have flexibility to define the amount of time that the IPSB 
is deployed.
    Three individuals commented that a modular, lightweight, non-porous 
device would be the fastest and most cost-effective way to install a 
barrier on existing airplanes.
    The FAA notes that the requirements in this final rule are 
performance-based standards, allowing for various designs.
    An individual commenter recommended the FAA require that both the 
main flightdeck door and the IPSB not be able to be opened at the same 
time.
    This recommendation would likely involve significant design 
complexity, and cause delay while the FAA conducts additional risk 
analysis. The FAA has not included this recommendation in the final 
rule.

V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    Federal agencies consider impacts of regulatory actions under a 
variety of executive orders and other requirements. First, Executive 
Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563, as amended by Executive Order 
14094 (``Modernizing Regulatory Review''), direct that each Federal 
agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) 
requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes 
on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) 
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing 
U.S. standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider 
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis 
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of 
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that 
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, 
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with 
base year of 1995). The current threshold after adjustment for 
inflation is $177,000,000 using the most current (2022) Implicit Price 
Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product. This portion of the preamble 
summarizes the FAA's analysis of the impacts of the final rule. The FAA 
provides a detailed Regulatory Impact Analysis in the docket of this 
rulemaking.
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA determined that this final 
rule (1) has benefits that justify its costs; (2) is an economically 
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866; (3) will not have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities; (4) will not create 
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States; and 
(5) will not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local, or tribal 
governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the threshold 
identified above. These analyses are summarized below.

A. Regulatory Impact Analysis

1. Benefits
    During many flights, the flightdeck door must be opened for 
lavatory breaks, meal service, rest periods, crew changes, etc. During 
the time of door transition, the open flightdeck has some degree of 
vulnerability to attack. During these openings, an attack on the 
flightdeck could happen quickly; this could leave insufficient time for 
passengers and cabin crew to react. However, there have been no 
breaches of a flightdeck since the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks.
    The purpose and functional benefit of IPSBs, which Congress 
directed the FAA to require by mandate, is to enhance the flightdeck 
security procedures of Sec.  121.584 by slowing the time by which an 
unauthorized person could reach the flightdeck by at least the time 
required to open and reclose the flightdeck door.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ Report, pp. 33-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A Briefing Note \27\ (Stewart and Mueller, 2019) provided to the 
ARAC Flightdeck Secondary Barrier Working Group by one of the members, 
applied an engineering technique--reliability analysis--to the TSA's 
``Layers of Security'' \28\ to estimate the benefits of secondary 
barriers in reducing the vulnerability of the U.S. commercial fleet to 
a 9/11-like terrorist attack. This approach requires estimates of 
``disruption rates'' for the various TSA layers of security and also 
requires an estimate of the probability of a 9/11-like terrorist 
attack. Estimates of security layer disruption rates are very difficult 
to make and, accordingly, are highly uncertain. For example, Stewart 
and Mueller estimate a disruption rate of 15% for the TSA Airport 
Checkpoint Screening security layer, whereas Martonosi and Barrett \29\ 
estimate the disruption rate to be 50%. Estimating the probability of a 
9/11-like terrorist attack is also difficult since there has been only 
one such event. Consequently, estimating quantified benefits of the 
IPSB requirements is problematic. Accordingly, the FAA does not endorse 
the analysis or conclusions of this Briefing Note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Mark G. Stewart & John Mueller, ``Security Risk and Cost-
Benefit Assessment of Secondary Flight Deck Barriers,'' Centre for 
Infrastructure Performance and Reliability, The University of 
Newcastle, Australia (2019), nova.newcastle.edu.au/vital/access/
manager/Repository/uon:35881.
    \28\ ``Inside Look: TSA Layers of Security,'' www.tsa.gov/blog/2017/08/01/inside-look-tsa-layers-security.
    \29\ Susan E. Martonosi & Arnold Barnett. 2006. ``How Effective 
is Security Screening of Airline passengers?,'' Interfaces 36(6): 
545, 550.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, based on estimates of costs of the 9/11 attacks, the FAA 
has conducted a break-even analysis. An authoritative study \30\ of the 
costs to New York City of the 9/11 attacks provides an estimate of 
$26.6 billion in physical capital and short-term earnings losses,\31\ 
which amounts to $38.86 billion in 2021 dollars.\32\ What remains is to 
estimate the cost of the 2,763 lives lost in the 9/11 attacks. Using 
DOT's $11.8 million dollar estimate of the Value of Statistical Life 
(VSL),\33\ that loss is $32.60 billion, which added to the physical 
capital and earnings losses, makes the total New York City costs to be 
$71.46 billion. The FAA estimates the cost of a single-airplane 9/11-
type attack (and the value of an averted attack) to be half that at 
$35.73 billion. The break-even analysis estimates what the annual 
probability of a single-airplane 9/11-type attack must be in order for 
the final rule to break even, i.e., for the benefits of the final rule 
to be equal to its costs. Dividing the $236.5 million cost \34\ of the 
proposed rule by the $35.7 billion averted attack value yields the 
breakeven annual probability of an attack to be 0.66%. Multiplying

[[Page 41304]]

this calculated breakeven probability of attack times the $35.7 billion 
averted attack value necessarily returns the $236.5 million break-even 
expected value of averting an attack. Such a breakeven analysis 
implicitly assumes that the proposed rule is completely effective. 
Thus, here the final rule breaks even, under the assumptions that the 
probability of an attempted attack is 0.66% per year and that the rule 
will be 100% effective in thwarting any such attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Jason Bram, James Orr, and Carol Rapaport. 2002. 
``Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York 
City,'' Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 8:2 
(November).
    \31\ $21.6 bn in physical capital losses plus the $5 bn average 
of $3.6-$6.4 bn in short-term earnings losses.
    \32\ $26.6 bn inflated by ratio of 2021 and 2002 GDP Price 
Deflators. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, ``Table 1.1.4 
Price Indexes for GDP.'' Click ``Modify'' icon and refresh table 
with first and last years of period.
    \33\ U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Transportation 
Policy. ``Departmental Guidance on the Value of a Statistical 
Life,'' www.dot.gov/policy/transportation-policy/economy. Effective 
Date: March 24, 2022.
    \34\ Assumes 7% discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Costs
    The FAA uses the cost estimate of $35,000 provided by the Report 
for the purchase and installation of an IPSB. Training costs for pilots 
and flight attendants are estimated using training hours from the 
Report and the opportunity costs of pilots and flight attendants 
estimated from annual hourly wages from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Costs are estimated in two stages. First-stage costs are calculated for 
the 25-year period, 2023-2047, during which the fleet operating under 
part 121 gradually becomes fully equipped with IPSBs. Second-stage 
costs are calculated to include in the analysis a full 25-year airplane 
life cycle (2048-2072) for which the entire part 121 fleet is equipped 
with IPSBs.
(a) Stage One Costs
    The FAA estimates the rule will begin to apply to new airplanes 
operating under part 121 by the end of 2023. The FAA uses its Aerospace 
Forecast 2020-2040 to estimate the annual increase in the passenger 
fleet operating under part 121.\35\ The sum of the forecast increase in 
the fleet and the number of retirements determines the annual increase 
in new airplanes operating under part 121 and therefore the annual 
number of IPSBs that will be installed in airplanes destined for part 
121 operations. Annual retirements are estimated assuming a retirement 
rate (3.57%) that is consistent with the 2020-2040 forecast of the 
number of airplanes in part 121 operations. A similar analysis is done 
to determine the IPSB training costs of pilots and flight attendants, 
except that training costs apply to current as well as future pilots 
and flight attendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ FAA Forecast FY 2020-2040, Table 21: ``US Mainline Air 
Carriers--Passenger Jet Aircraft,'' & Table 25: ``Regional Air 
Carriers--Passenger Aircraft.'' Since some regional air carriers 
operate under part 135 as well as part 121, the estimate of 
airplanes operating under part 121 is improved by excluding 
airplanes with less than 20 passenger seats. Estimates for the 
period 2040-2047 are made assuming the growth rate (1.74%) implied 
by the FAA part 121 airplane numbers for 2030 and 2040.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(b) Stage Two Costs
    As previously noted, second-stage costs are calculated in order to 
include a full 25-year airplane life cycle (2048-2072) for which the 
entire part 121 fleet is equipped with IPSBs. For this second stage, 
the FAA is well beyond the terminal date of the FAA forecast and, 
accordingly, assumes a constant growth rate for the part 121 fleet. The 
constant growth rates for pilots and flight attendants are as before.
(c) Other Potential Costs
    Stewart and Mueller also discuss potential added risks associated 
with IPSBs, including, for example, that crew vigilance and 
responsiveness might be reduced in the presence of an IPSB. The FAA 
notes that it does not find significant downsides to the installation 
of the ISPBs if all other relevant regulations are complied with.
(d) Total Costs of the Rule
    Table 1 summarizes the total costs of the rule by combining stage 
one and stage two costs. At a 7 percent discount rate, the present 
value total costs of this rule are $236.5 million with annualized costs 
at $20.3 million. At a 3 percent discount rate, the present value total 
costs of this rule are $505.0 million with annualized costs at $ 29.0 
million.

                                 Table 1--Total Costs of Secondary Barriers Rule
                                                  [$ millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Present value     Annualized     Present value     Annualized
                                                   costs (7%)      costs (7%)       costs (3%)      costs (3%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2023-2047.....................................           $186.0           $16.0           $296.5           $17.0
2048-2072.....................................             50.4             4.3            208.6            12.0
2023-2072.....................................            236.5            20.3            505.0            29.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Present values discounted to 2021 at 7% and 3% discount rates.
\2\ Columns may not sum to totals due to rounding.

3. Discussion of Alternatives
(a) Alternative 1--Extending the Rule To Include Foreign Carriers 
Operating Under Part 129 \36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Part 129 governs foreign operators who operate either 
within the United States, or who operate solely outside the United 
States, but with airplanes registered in the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At this time, neither other civil aviation authorities nor ICAO 
have identified secondary barriers as a security priority. Therefore, 
extending the IPSB requirement to foreign air carriers would be without 
the agreement of other civil aviation authorities. After the events of 
September 11, 2001, the FAA did apply the hardened flightdeck door 
requirement to foreign air carriers, but the need for hardened 
flightdeck doors was recognized internationally and the FAA's standards 
were reflected in the requirements of most other countries. The FAA 
estimates that by the time IPSBs are fully adopted by part 121 
operators, 35% of part 121 and part 129 operating commercial passenger 
aircraft will not have an IPSB.
(b) Alternative 2--Exempting the Rule for Short Duration Flights
    ARAC recognized that, for short flights, the flightdeck door may 
not need to be opened, in which case the IPSB would not provide the 
intended benefit. However, ARAC was unable to identify any airplane 
design parameter, such as passenger capacity or airplane gross weight 
that correlates with short flights. Also, the range of all the airplane 
models that will be affected by this rule exceeds the maximum flight 
length at which opening the flightdeck door is unlikely. Therefore, 
this rule does not address an airplane's size or range, or duration of 
flight.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980, Public Law 96-354, 94 
Stat. 1164 (5 U.S.C. 601-612), as amended by the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 
857, Mar. 29, 1996) and the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 
111-240, 124 Stat. 2504, Sept. 27, 2010), requires Federal agencies to 
consider the effects of the

[[Page 41305]]

regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to 
minimize any significant economic impact. The term ``small entities'' 
comprises small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are 
independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, 
and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000.
    The FAA published an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) 
in the proposed rule to aid the public in commenting on the potential 
impacts to small entities. The FAA considered the public comments in 
developing the final rule and this Final Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (FRFA). An FRFA must contain the following:
    (1) A statement of the need for, and objectives of, the rule;
    (2) A statement of the significant issues raised by the public 
comments in response to the IRFA, a statement of the assessment of the 
agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes made in the 
proposed rule as a result of such comments;
    (3) The response of the agency to any comments filed by the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA) in 
response to the proposed rule, and a detailed statement of any change 
made to the proposed rule in the final rule as a result of the 
comments;
    (4) A description of and an estimate of the number of small 
entities to which the rule will apply or an explanation of why no such 
estimate is available;
    (5) A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and 
other compliance requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the 
classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement and 
the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report 
or record; and
    (6) A description of the steps the agency has taken to minimize the 
significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the 
stated objectives of applicable statues, including a statement of the 
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative 
adopted in the final rule and why each of the other significant 
alternatives to the rule considered by the agency which affect the 
impact on small entities was rejected.
1. Need for and Objectives of the Rule
    This rule is needed to satisfy the requirements of section 336 of 
the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. This law requires that the FAA 
issue an order for the installation of Secondary Cockpit Barriers on 
each new airplane that is manufactured for delivery to a passenger air 
carrier in the United States operating under part 121.
2. Significant Issues Raised in Public Comments
    No issues were raised in direct response to the IRFA. However, in 
comments to the NPRM, some commenters suggested that the FAA consider 
excluding smaller transport category airplanes from the IPSB 
requirement as small transports typically have a limited flight 
duration. As recognized by the ARAC, for short flights the flightdeck 
door may not need to be opened, in which case the IPSB would not 
provide the intended benefit. Two commenters stated that on smaller 
airplanes, a combination of an Improvised Non-Installed Secondary 
Barrier (INSB) and establishment of procedures and crewmembers training 
would provide appropriate protection during flightdeck door transition. 
Some commenters also stated that smaller transport category aircraft 
have confined interior spaces with lavatories, galleys, and wardrobes 
close to the flightdeck, leaving a very small space for changes to 
aircraft design. These commenters also stated that the design 
challenges created by the IPSB rule, due to increases in cost and 
weight, are more significant for smaller transport category airplanes 
as compared to larger transports. RAA specifically suggested that the 
FAA consider excluding operators of short duration flights from the 
final rule as a means to reduce economic burdens on small entities.
    References to cost impacts on small transport airplanes are 
relevant here to the extent that they are operated by small operators. 
Excluding small operators from the rule is infeasible because no 
operator would designate airplanes for short flights only and even if 
they did, the FAA could not be assured that they would not be used for 
longer flights where an IPSB could be safety-enhancing. The magnitude 
of the economic impact on small entities is estimated in section 5 
below. Even though the FAA makes a very conservative estimate there by 
assuming immediate installation of IPSBs, at $35,000 apiece, on a 2% 
revenue criterion, the FAA shows the economic impact to be 
insignificant, ranging from 0.06% to 1.13% of revenues for small 
operators. If $35,000 is deemed too low because confined space 
significantly raises the IPSB cost for small operators, that estimate 
can be stress tested by doubling the IPSB cost estimate to $70,000. 
This test increases the range of economic impact from 0.12% to 2.26%. 
With just 2 of the 11 operators for which the FAA has data showing an 
impact just over 2%, the FAA still finds an insignificant impact on a 
substantial number of operators.
3. Responses to SBA Comments
    The Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA has not filed any 
comments in response to the proposed rule.
4. Small Entities to Which the Rule Will Apply
    The RFA defines small entities as small businesses, small 
governmental jurisdictions, or small organizations. In 5 U.S.C. 601(3), 
the RFA defines ``small business'' to have the same meaning as ``small 
business concern'' under section 3 of the Small Business Act. The Small 
Business Act authorizes the Small Business Administration (SBA) to 
define ``small business'' by issuing regulations.
    SBA has established size standards for various types of economic 
activities, or industries, under the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS).\37\ These size standards generally 
define small businesses based on the number of employees or annual 
receipts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Small Business Administration, Table of Size Standards 
(2019). www.sba.gov/document/support-table-size-standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NAICS has classified certificate holders operating under part 121 
in either NAICS 481111, Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation or NAICS 
481211, Nonscheduled Chartered Passenger Air Transportation, or both. 
Since the size standard for either industry is the same at 1,500 
employees, it is of no concern in which of the two industries they are 
classified.
    In the regulatory impact analysis for this rulemaking, a total of 
43 operators operating under part 121 were identified in the FAA's 
National Vital Information Subsystem (NVIS) data base. Table 2 lists 23 
of these operators identified in this study as having less than 1,500 
employees and therefore potentially subject to consideration under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act. Twelve of these operators were identified 
as small based on airline employment data (Table 2, col. 3) from the 
DOT Bureau of Transportation Statistics.\38\ The remaining eleven 
operators were identified as having less than 1,500 total employees on 
the basis of their numbers of operations and maintenance employees 
(also from the NVIS database). One of the small operators, Piedmont 
Airlines, was excluded from the regulatory flexibility analysis as it 
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Airlines. Since the remaining 
22 small

[[Page 41306]]

operators are more than 50% of the part 21 operator population, the FAA 
estimates that a substantial number of small firms are affected by this 
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Transtats.bts.gov.

                                                          Table 2--Data for Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of Secondary Barriers Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                All ops                                                                                                 IPSB
                                                  emp    No. emp      Flt                 No.     2015   2016   2017   2018   2019  Avg rev    IPSB    cost/
            Part 121 operator name               (NVIS     (BTS    attendants  Pilots  aircraft   $ mn   $ mn   $ mn   $ mn   $ mn   2015 -  cost ($  avg rev                Notes
                                                 data)    data)                                                                       2019     000)     (%)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AERODYNAMICS INC..............................       37  .......           10      15         2  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......       70  .......  Operation certificate terminated
                                                                                                                                                                Oct. 2020.
AIR WISCONSIN AIRLINES LLC....................    1,120  .......          289     571        67    536    443    248  .....  .....      409    2,345     0.57  .................................
CARIBBEAN SUN AIRLINES INC....................      104      158           51      20         7  .....  .....     34     37     38       27      245     0.90  Doing business as World Atlantic
                                                                                                                                                                Airlines.
CHAMPLAIN ENTERPRISES INC.....................      713  .......          170     330        37  .....    115    135  .....  .....      122    1,295     1.06  Operates mainly through
                                                                                                                                                                subsidiary CommutAir, which
                                                                                                                                                                operates as United Express.
COMPASS AIRLINES LLC..........................    1,299    1,438          469     531        48    177    235    236    241    228      223    1,680     0.75  Shut down due to Covid.
CORVUS AIRLINES INC...........................      156  .......           29      61        10  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......      350  .......  Bankrupt July 2020.
EASTERN AIRLINES LLC..........................      146      196           88      30         8  .....     56     28  .....  .....       42      280     0.67  .................................
ELITE AIRWAYS LLC.............................      139      130           40      43        13  .....  .....  .....    134    117      126      455     0.36  .................................
EMPIRE AIRLINES INC...........................      332  .......           14     134        60  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......    2,100  .......  .................................
GOJET AIRLINES LLC............................      918      977          292     487        43    204    227    238    257    265      238    1,505     0.63  Trans States Holding WOS.
GULF AND CARIBBEAN CARGO INC..................       79      122            0      41        19  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......      665  .......  .................................
HILLWOOD AIRWAYS, LLC.........................       49       35           14       9         2  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......       70  .......  .................................
KAISERAIR INC.................................       94       68           15      38         7  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......      245  .......  .................................
KEY LIME AIR CORPORATION......................      123  .......            9      38        35  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......    1,225  .......  .................................
MIAMI AIR INTERNATIONAL INC...................      249      351          131      67         6    108    105    119    118    112      112      210     0.19  Liquidated May 2020.
OMNI AIR INTERNATIONAL LLC....................      758    1,045          302     246        14    360    336    358    493    541      418      490     0.12  .................................
PENINSULA AVIATION SERVICES INC...............       80  .......           18      17         6  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......      210  .......  Saudi Arabian A/C refueling.
PIEDMONT AIRLINES INC.........................    1,096  .......          231     530        60  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......    2,100  .......  WOS of American Airlines.
SEABORNE VIRGIN ISLAND INC....................       96  .......           17      29         7  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......      245  .......  Subsidiary of Silver Airways.
SIERRA PACIFIC AIRLINES INC...................       43       35           12      11         2  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......       70  .......  .................................
SILVER AIRWAYS LLC............................      355  .......           56     142        26    119  .....  .....  .....     42       80      910     1.13  .................................
TEM ENTERPRISES...............................       21       25            5       5         1     55     97     81  .....      2       59       35     0.06  Doing business as Xtra Airways.
TRANS STATES AIRLINES LLC.....................    1,116  .......          244     464        48  .....  .....  .....  .....  .....  .......    1,680  .......  Planned shutdown accelerated due
                                                                                                                                                                to Covid.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements
    Since the IPSB rule applies to only new airplanes entering the 
fleet, the analysis assumes that each operator's current fleet is 
replaced immediately even though the fleet airplanes generally will be 
replaced only when they are retired. Though airplanes could be retired 
any time over the next 25 years depending on the age of the airplane, 
the analysis assumes immediate replacement to ensure that the economic 
impact is not underestimated. The regulatory impact analysis assumes 
that the average retirement age of transport category airplanes is 25 
years.
    The economic impact is assessed using 11 of the 22 small operators 
for which revenue data is available from Cirium's (formerly 
FlightGlobal) FlightFleets Analyzer. The analysis uses average revenue 
for the five-year period 2015-2019. Revenue figures for the 11 
operators are available for an average of 3.45 years. For an operator, 
the economic impact is measured as the estimated $35,000 cost of an 
FAA-certified IPSB times number of airplanes, as a percentage of the 
average revenue. The number of airplanes is from the SPAS database as 
of January 9, 2020. The regulatory impact analysis also considers 
training costs for flight attendants and pilots, but these costs are 
not included here as they have a trivial effect on the results.
    As Table 2 shows, the economic impact ranges from 0.06% and 1.13% 
of

[[Page 41307]]

sales, which averages to 0.60%. On a 2% criterion that the economic 
impact is significant only if cost is at least 2% of a small firm's 
annual revenues, there is no significant economic impact for any small 
firm. On a 1% criterion, the economic impact is barely significant for 
just 2 of the 11 firms for which data is available. Bearing in mind 
that these estimates are very conservative, the FAA concludes that 
there is not a significant impact on a substantial number of small 
firms.
6. Significant Alternatives Considered
    The FAA evaluated alternatives to this rulemaking that could 
minimize impacts on small entities. The FAA identified only alternative 
2 of its regulatory impact analysis as potentially minimizing such 
impacts. Specifically, the FAA considered exempting short duration 
flights from the rule as a means of reducing economic impacts on small 
entities. ARAC recognized that, for short flights, the flightdeck door 
may not need to be opened, in which case the IPSB would not provide the 
intended benefit. However, ARAC was unable to identify any airplane 
design parameter, such as passenger capacity or airplane gross weight 
that sufficiently correlates with short flights. Also, the range of all 
the airplane models that will be affected by the rule exceeds the 
maximum flight length at which opening the flightdeck door is unlikely.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as amended by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465), prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities 
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Pursuant to these Acts, the establishment of standards is not 
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic 
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a 
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and 
has determined that it will have a legitimate domestic objective, in 
that it will increase the safety of the United States from terrorist 
attacks on U.S.-operated airplanes. This rule would not operate in a 
manner as to directly affect foreign trade and, therefore, would have 
little or no effect on foreign trade.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $177.0 million in lieu of $100 
million.
    This rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act do not 
apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that 
there will be no new requirement for information collection associated 
with this rule.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. 
The FAA has determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended 
Practices that correspond to these regulations.

G. Environmental Analysis

    In accordance with the provisions of regulations issued by the 
Council on Environmental Quality (40 CFR parts 1500 through 1508), FAA 
Order 1050.1F identifies FAA actions that are categorically excluded 
from preparation of an Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact 
Statement under the National Environmental Policy Act in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has determined this final rule 
action qualifies for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 
5-6.6(d) because no significant impacts to the environment are expected 
from publication of this final rule and it involves no extraordinary 
circumstances.

VI. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order (E.O.) 13132, Federalism. The FAA has 
determined that this action will not have a substantial direct effect 
on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and 
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among 
the various levels of government, and, therefore, will not have 
federalism implications.

B. Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination With Indian 
Tribal Governments

    Consistent with Executive Order 13175, Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments,\39\ and FAA Order 1210.20, 
American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Consultation Policy and 
Procedures,\40\ the FAA ensures that Federally Recognized Tribes 
(Tribes) are given the opportunity to provide meaningful and timely 
input regarding proposed Federal actions that have the potential to 
have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the 
relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on 
the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal 
Government and Indian tribes; or to affect uniquely or significantly 
their respective Tribes. At this point, the FAA has not identified any 
unique or significant effects, environmental or otherwise, on tribes 
resulting from this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ 65 FR 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000).
    \40\ FAA Order No. 1210.20 (Jan. 28, 2004), available at 
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/1210.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this final rule under E.O. 13211, Actions 
Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The FAA has determined that it is 
not a ``significant energy action'' under the Executive order and is 
not be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, 
distribution, or use of energy.

D. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation

    Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation, promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet 
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, 
environmental, and other issues and to

[[Page 41308]]

reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory 
requirements. The FAA has analyzed this action under the policies and 
agency responsibilities of Executive Order 13609, and has determined 
that this action will have no effect on international regulatory 
cooperation.

VII. Additional Information

A. Electronic Access and Filing

    A copy of the NPRM, all comments received, this final rule, and all 
background material may be viewed online at www.regulations.gov using 
the docket number listed above. Electronic retrieval help and 
guidelines are available on the website. It is available 24 hours each 
day, 365 days each year. An electronic copy of this document may also 
be downloaded from the Office of the Federal Register's website at 
www.federalregister.gov and the Government Publishing Office's website 
at www.govinfo.gov. A copy may also be found at the FAA's Regulations 
and Policies website at www.faa.gov/regulations_policies.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677. 
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this 
rulemaking.
    All documents the FAA considered in developing this final rule, 
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed in 
the electronic docket for this rulemaking.

B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires the FAA to comply with small entity requests for 
information or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations 
within its jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this 
document may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under 
the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the 
preamble. To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit 
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

List of Subjects

14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

14 CFR Part 121

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Alcohol abuse, Aviation safety, 
Charter flights, Drug abuse, Drug testing, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Safety, Transportation.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations as follows:

PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES

0
1. The authority citation for part 25 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and 
44704; Pub. L. 115-254, 132 Stat 3281 (49 U.S.C. 44903 note).


0
2. In Sec.  25.795, add paragraph (a)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.795  Security considerations.

    (a) * * *
    (4) If required by the operating rules of this chapter, an 
installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) must be installed to resist 
intrusion into the flightdeck whenever the flightdeck door is opened. 
When deployed, the IPSB must:
    (i) Resist a 250 pound (1113 Newtons) static load in the direction 
of the passenger cabin applied at the most critical locations on the 
IPSB;
    (ii) Resist a 600 pound (2669 Newtons) static load in the direction 
of the flightdeck applied at the most critical locations on the IPSB;
    (iii) Delay a person attempting to access the flightdeck by at 
least the time required for a crewmember to open and reclose the 
flightdeck door, but no less than 5 seconds;
    (iv) Prevent a person from reaching through and touching the 
flightdeck door;
    (v) Allow for necessary crewmember activities; and
    (vi) Provide line-of-sight visibility between the flightdeck door 
and the cabin.
* * * * *

PART 121--OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
OPERATIONS

0
3. The authority citation for part 121 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40103, 40113, 40119, 
41706, 42301 preceding note added by Pub. L. 112-95, sec. 412, 126 
Stat. 89, 44101, 44701-44702, 44705, 44709-44711, 44713, 44716-
44717, 44722, 44729, 44732; 46105; Pub. L. 111-216, 124 Stat. 2348 
(49 U.S.C. 44701 note); Pub. L. 112-95, 126 Stat. 62 (49 U.S.C. 
44732 note); Pub. L. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186 (49 U.S.C. 44701 note).

0
4. In Sec.  121.313, add paragraph (l) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.313  Miscellaneous equipment.

* * * * *
    (l) For airplanes required by paragraph (f) of this section to have 
a door between the passenger and pilot or crew rest compartments, and 
for passenger-carrying transport category airplanes that have a door 
installed between the pilot compartment and any other occupied 
compartment, that were manufactured after August 25, 2025, an installed 
physical secondary barrier (IPSB) that meets the requirements of Sec.  
25.795(a)(4) of this chapter in effect on August 25, 2023.

0
5. In Sec.  121.584, add paragraph (a)(3) to read as follows:


Sec.  121.584  Requirement to view the area outside the flightdeck 
door.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (3) If the airplane is in flight, any installed physical secondary 
barrier (IPSB) required by Sec.  121.313(l) has been deployed; and
* * * * *

    Issued under authority provided by Public Law 115-254, 49 U.S.C. 
106(f) and 44701(a) in Washington, DC, on June 14, 2023.
Polly Trottenberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2023-13071 Filed 6-23-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P