[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 118 (Wednesday, June 21, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 40096-40121]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-12142]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 0, 1, and 64

[WC Docket No. 17-97; FCC 23-18, FR ID 138840]


Call Authentication Trust Anchor

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission) takes further steps to combat illegally spoofed robocalls 
by strengthening and expanding caller ID authentication and robocall 
mitigation obligations and creating new mechanisms to hold providers 
accountable for violations of the Commission's rules.

DATES: Effective date: This rule is effective August 21, 2023, except 
for the amendments codified at 47 CFR 64.6303(c) (amendatory 
instruction 9) and 64.6305(d), (e), (f), and (g) (amendatory 
instruction 12) which are delayed. The Commission will publish a 
document in the Federal Register announcing the effective dates for the 
delayed amendments to 47 CFR 64.6303(c) and 64.6305(d), (e), (f), (g).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jonathan Lechter, Competition Policy 
Division, Wireline Competition Bureau, at (202) 418-0984, 
[email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Sixth 
Report and Order in WC Docket No. 17-97 adopted on March 16, 2023 and 
released on March 17, 2023. The document is available for download at 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-18A1.pdf. To request 
materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities (Braille, 
large print, electronic files, audio format), send an email to 
[email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 
202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).

Synopsis

I. Sixth Report and Order

    1. In this document, the Commission continues to strengthen and 
expand caller ID authentication requirements in the Secure Telephony 
Identity Revisited/Signature-based Handling of Asserted information 
using toKENs (STIR/SHAKEN) ecosystem by requiring non-gateway 
intermediate providers that receive unauthenticated calls directly from 
an originating provider to use STIR/SHAKEN to authenticate those calls. 
The STIR/SHAKEN framework is a set of technical standards and protocols 
that enable providers to authenticate and verify caller ID information 
transmitted with Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) calls. The STIR/
SHAKEN framework consists of two components: (1) the technical process 
of authenticating and verifying caller ID information; and (2) the 
certificate governance process that maintains trust in the caller ID 
authentication information transmitted along with a call.
    2. Further, with this document, the Commission expands robocall 
mitigation requirements for all providers, including those that have 
not yet implemented STIR/SHAKEN because they lack the necessary 
infrastructure or are subject to an implementation extension. The 
Commission empowers the Enforcement Bureau with new tools and penalties 
to hold providers accountable for failing to comply with its rules. The 
Commission also defines the STIR/SHAKEN obligations of satellite 
providers.
    3. The STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication framework protects 
consumers from illegally spoofed robocalls by enabling authenticated 
caller ID information to securely travel with the call itself 
throughout the entire call path. The Commission, consistent with 
Congress's direction in the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal 
Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act, adopted rules requiring voice 
service providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN in the internet Protocol 
(IP) portions of their voice networks by June 30, 2021, subject to 
certain exceptions.

[[Page 40097]]

Because the TRACED Act defines ``voice service'' in a manner that 
excludes intermediate providers, the Commission's authentication and 
Robocall Mitigation Database rules use ``voice service provider'' in 
this manner. The Commission's rules in 47 CFR 64.1200, many of which 
the Commission adopted prior to adoption of the TRACED Act, use a 
definition of ``voice service provider'' that includes intermediate 
providers. For purposes of this document, the Commission uses the term 
``voice service provider'' consistent with the TRACED Act definition 
and where discussing caller ID authentication or the Robocall 
Mitigation Database. In all other instances, the Commission uses 
``provider'' and specifies the type of provider as appropriate. Unless 
otherwise specified, the Commission means any provider, regardless of 
its position in the call path.

A. Strengthening the Intermediate Provider Authentication Obligation

1. Requiring the First Intermediate Provider To Authenticate 
Unauthenticated Calls
    4. Under the Commission's caller ID authentication rules, 
intermediate providers are required to authenticate any unauthenticated 
caller ID information for the SIP calls they receive or, alternatively, 
cooperate with the industry traceback consortium and timely and fully 
respond to all traceback requests received from the Commission, law 
enforcement, and the industry traceback consortium. In the Fourth Call 
Blocking Order, 86 FR 17726 (Apr. 6, 2021), however, the Commission 
required all providers in the path of a SIP call--including gateway 
providers and other intermediate providers--to respond fully and in a 
timely manner to traceback requests. The Commission later enhanced this 
obligation for gateway providers to require response within 24 hours in 
the Fifth Caller ID Authentication Report and Order, 87 FR 42916 (July 
18, 2022). As a result of that action, intermediate providers may 
decline to authenticate caller ID information given that compliance 
with the traceback alternative has been made mandatory. In the Fifth 
Caller ID Authentication Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM), 
87 FR 42670 (July 18, 2022), the Commission proposed closing this gap 
in the STIR/SHAKEN caller ID authentication regime by requiring all 
U.S. intermediate providers in the path of a SIP call carrying a U.S. 
number in the caller ID field to authenticate unauthenticated caller ID 
information, irrespective of their traceback obligations. Based on its 
review of the record, the Commission adopts its proposal to establish a 
mandatory caller ID authentication obligation for intermediate 
providers, but does so on an incremental basis. Specifically, the 
Commission amends its rules to require any non-gateway intermediate 
provider that receives an unauthenticated SIP call directly from an 
originating provider to authenticate the call. Stated differently, the 
first intermediate provider in the path of an unauthenticated SIP call 
will now be subject to a mandatory requirement to authenticate the 
call.
    5. The Commission has previously recognized that the STIR/SHAKEN 
framework has beneficial network effects and becomes more effective as 
more providers implement it. The record in this proceeding supports 
expanding STIR/SHAKEN implementation by requiring non-gateway 
intermediate providers to authenticate unauthenticated calls, 
regardless of their traceback obligations. Although originating 
providers are required to authenticate calls under the Commission's 
rules--with limited exceptions--some originating providers are not 
capable of implementing STIR/SHAKEN. In other cases, unscrupulous 
providers may deliberately fail to comply with the Commission's rules. 
The record shows that the failure of originating providers to sign 
calls is one of the key weaknesses in the STIR/SHAKEN regime. By 
requiring intermediate providers to authenticate unauthenticated SIP 
calls they receive directly from an originating provider, the 
Commission closes an important loophole in its caller ID authentication 
scheme, and incorporates calls that would otherwise go unauthenticated 
into the STIR/SHAKEN framework. Further, intermediate provider 
authentication will facilitate analytics, blocking, and traceback 
efforts by providing more information to downstream providers.
    6. The Commission recognizes, however, that a mandatory 
authentication obligation could subject intermediate providers to 
significant costs. The Commission believes that the goals of the STIR/
SHAKEN framework and the public interest are best served by taking a 
targeted approach to intermediate provider authentication that focuses 
on the first intermediate provider in the call path. The Commission 
therefore opts to take an incremental approach to imposing mandatory 
authentication obligations on intermediate providers, requiring only 
the first intermediate provider in the path of a SIP call to 
authenticate unauthenticated caller ID information, rather than 
requiring all intermediate providers in the path to do so at this time. 
Intermediate providers should know whether they receive calls directly 
from an originating provider pursuant to contracts that provide 
information to the intermediate provider about the originating 
provider's customers and expectations for handling their traffic. 
Further, as explained below, the Commission requires non-gateway 
intermediate providers to take ``reasonable steps'' to mitigate illegal 
robocall traffic. That duty, along with other requirements of the 
Commission's rules, may require an intermediate provider to perform the 
due diligence necessary to understand the sources of the traffic it 
receives. Accordingly, in the unlikely event that an intermediate 
provider does not know through its contracts whether it receives calls 
directly from an originating provider, it should obtain that 
information to comply with this and other aspects of the Commission's 
rules. The Commission finds that this approach, which focuses on the 
beginning of the call path, will directly address the problem of calls 
entering the call path without being authenticated by originating 
providers, as described above. The Commission agrees with YouMail that 
this targeted approach is likely to have the greatest impact on 
stopping illegally spoofed robocalls. As YouMail argues, apart from the 
originating provider, the ``best entity to identify and stop the 
sources of robocalls is the first `downstream' provider (i.e., the next 
provider in line that receives calls placed on the originating 
provider's network).'' While the Commission may consider expanding a 
call authentication requirement to all intermediate providers in the 
future, this targeted approach will provide the Commission with an 
opportunity to evaluate this first mandatory obligation for 
intermediate providers, together with other pending expansions of the 
caller ID authentication regime, and determine whether an 
authentication requirement for more downstream intermediate providers 
is warranted.
    7. The Commission is not persuaded by the arguments submitted by 
commenters favoring a mandatory authentication requirement for all 
intermediate providers. For instance, some commenters argue that the 
Commission's justifications for adopting a mandatory gateway provider 
authentication requirement apply with equal force to all non-gateway

[[Page 40098]]

intermediate providers in the call path. The Commission disagrees. The 
gateway provider caller ID authentication rules adopted by the 
Commission in May 2022 apply to the first domestic intermediate 
provider in the path of a foreign-originated call. The authentication 
requirement the Commission adopts in this document similarly applies to 
the first intermediate provider in the path of a U.S.-originated call. 
Further, there are fewer gateway providers than other domestic 
intermediate providers. Therefore, the overall industry cost of an 
authentication obligation imposed on all domestic intermediate 
providers is likely to be significantly higher than that of the gateway 
provider obligation. The record in this proceeding simply does not 
support requiring all intermediate providers to incur those costs at 
this time if imposing an authentication obligation on the first 
intermediate provider that receives an unauthenticated call directly 
from an originating provider can close significant gaps in the 
Commission's caller ID authentication regime. The Commission finds that 
the incremental approach it adopts in this document will target a 
critical gap in its call authentication regime while minimizing the 
impact of the requirements on industry, including new entrants to the 
market.
    8. The Commission also declines to impose an authentication 
obligation on all intermediate providers at this time to address 
instances in which authentication information is ``stripped out'' by 
the call transiting a non-IP network. The Commission has launched an 
inquiry into solutions to enable caller ID authentication over non-IP 
networks, the nexus between non-IP caller ID authentication and the IP 
transition generally, and on specific steps the Commission can take to 
encourage the industry's transition to IP. Widespread adoption of a 
non-IP authentication solution or IP interconnection would result in 
authenticated caller ID information being preserved and received by the 
terminating provider. The Commission therefore declines to impose an 
authentication obligation on all intermediate providers to address 
circumstances where a call traverses a non-IP network, but may revisit 
the subject after the Commission concludes its inquiry into whether 
non-IP authentication or IP interconnection solutions are feasible and 
can be timely implemented.
    9. The Commission notes that the requirement it adopts here for the 
first intermediate provider to authenticate a call will arise in 
limited circumstances, such as where the originating provider failed to 
comply with their own authentication obligation or where the call is 
sent directly to an intermediate provider from the limited subset of 
originating providers that lack an authentication obligation. If the 
originating provider complies with its authentication obligation, the 
first intermediate provider in the call chain need only meet its 
preexisting obligation to pass-on that authentication information to 
the next provider in the chain. Indeed, the first intermediate provider 
in the call path may completely avoid the need to authenticate calls if 
it implements contractual provisions with its upstream originating 
providers stating that it will only accept authenticated traffic. 
USTelecom requests that the Commission clarify that non-gateway 
intermediate providers be deemed in compliance with their 
authentication obligations if they enter into contractual provisions 
with originating providers and such providers represent and warrant 
that they do not originate any unsigned traffic and thereafter ``have 
no reason to know, and do not know, that their upstream provider is 
sending unsigned traffic it originated.'' The Commission declines to do 
so, finding that such a clarification is unnecessary. If a non-gateway 
intermediate provider were to claim that it has complied with the 
authentication obligation that the Commission adopts pursuant to terms 
of a contract with an originating provider, the Commission would 
evaluate such a claim on a case-by-case basis.
2. Applicable STIR/SHAKEN Standards for Compliance
    10. Voice service providers and gateway providers are obligated to 
comply with, at a minimum, the version of the STIR/SHAKEN standards 
ATIS-1000074, ATIS-1000080, and ATIS-1000084 and all of the documents 
referenced therein in effect at the time of their respective compliance 
deadlines, including any errata as of those dates or earlier. In the 
Fifth Caller ID Authentication FNPRM, the Commission proposed that non-
gateway intermediate providers comply with, at a minimum, the versions 
of these standards in effect at the time of their compliance deadline. 
The Commission also sought comment on whether all providers should be 
required to comply with the same versions of the standards as non-
gateway intermediate providers and whether it should establish a 
mechanism for updating the standard that providers must comply with 
going forward, including through delegation to the Wireline Competition 
Bureau.
    11. The Commission adopts its proposal that non-gateway 
intermediate providers subject to the authentication obligation 
described above must comply with, at a minimum, the versions of the 
standards in effect at the time of their authentication compliance 
deadline (which is addressed in the following section), along with any 
errata. Like other providers, non-gateway intermediate providers will 
have the flexibility to assign the level of attestation appropriate to 
the call based on the applicable level of the standards and the 
available call information. This approach is supported in the record.
    12. The Commission does not at this time require gateway and voice 
service providers to comply with versions of the standards that came 
into effect after their respective compliance deadlines. The Commission 
reiterates, however, that its requirement that providers must comply 
with a specific version of a standard ``at a minimum,'' means that 
while providers are required to comply with these standards, they are 
permitted to comply with any version of the standard that has been 
ratified by the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions 
(ATIS) subsequent to the standard in effect at the time their 
authentication implementation deadline. However, any later-adopted or 
improved version of the standards that a provider chooses to 
incorporate into its STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework must maintain 
the baseline call authentication functionality exemplified by the 
versions of ATIS-1000074, ATIS-1000080, and ATIS-1000084 in effect at 
the time of its respective compliance date.
    13. The Commission nevertheless concludes that there may be 
significant benefits for all providers to comply with standards as they 
are updated, particularly where updated versions contain critical new 
features or functions. Requiring all providers to comply with a single, 
updated standard would also facilitate enforcement of the Commission's 
rules and ensure that any new features and functions contained in 
revised standards spread throughout the STIR/SHAKEN ecosystem. 
Therefore, the Commission adopts a process to incorporate future 
standards into its rules where appropriate, similar to the process it 
has adopted to require compliance with updated technical standards in 
other contexts.
    14. Specifically, the Commission delegates to the Wireline 
Competition Bureau the authority to determine whether to seek comment 
on requiring compliance with revised versions of the three ATIS 
standards associated with the STIR/SHAKEN authentication

[[Page 40099]]

framework, and all documents referenced therein. The Commission also 
delegates to the Wireline Competition Bureau the authority to require 
providers subject to a STIR/SHAKEN authentication requirement to comply 
with those revised standards, and the authority to set appropriate 
compliance deadlines regarding such revised standards. Providers will 
only be required to implement new standards if the benefits to the 
STIR/SHAKEN ecosystem outweigh any compliance burdens. Additionally, a 
process based on delegated authority may allow the adoption of revised 
standards more quickly than would be the case through Commission-level 
notice and comment procedures.
    15. As with voice service and gateway providers, the Commission 
also requires any non-gateway intermediate provider subject to the 
authentication obligation described in this section to either upgrade 
its network to allow for the initiation, maintenance, and termination 
of SIP calls and fully implement the STIR/SHAKEN framework, or maintain 
and be ready to provide the Commission on request with documented proof 
that it is participating, either on its own or through a 
representative, including third party representatives, as a member of a 
working group, industry standards group, or consortium that is working 
to develop a non-internet Protocol caller identification authentication 
solution, or actively testing such a solution. The Commission finds 
that expanding the requirements of Sec.  64.6303 to non-gateway 
intermediate providers will ensure regulatory parity and promote the 
development of non-IP authentication solutions, while offering 
flexibility to providers that rely on non-IP infrastructure.
3. Compliance Deadlines
    16. The Commission sets a December 31, 2023, deadline for the new 
authentication obligations adopted in this section. By that date, the 
first non-gateway intermediate provider in the call chain must 
authenticate unauthenticated calls it receives. The Commission adopts a 
deadline longer than the six-month deadline it suggested in the Fifth 
Caller ID Authentication FNPRM because intermediate providers need time 
to deploy the technical capability to comply with the Commission's 
requirement to authenticate calls, and providers may wish to amend 
their contracts with upstream originating providers to meet this new 
requirement. While the record reflects disagreement as to an 
appropriate intermediate authentication provider deadline, the 
Commission concludes that a later deadline is not necessary. 
Implementation of call authentication technology has likely become 
faster and less costly for many providers than when the Commission 
first adopted caller ID authentication requirements, particularly for 
those that have already implemented STIR/SHAKEN in their other roles in 
the call stream. Moreover, a non-gateway intermediate provider can 
avoid the need to implement STIR/SHAKEN where it agrees to only accept 
authenticated traffic from originating providers. The Commission has 
previously found that six months is sufficient time for providers to 
evaluate and renegotiate contracts to address new regulatory 
requirements. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the approximate 
nine-month period afforded by the December 31, 2023, deadline provides 
sufficient time for intermediate providers to amend their contracts 
with originating providers, if necessary, to comply with the 
Commission's authentication requirement.

B. Mitigation and Robocall Mitigation Database Filing Obligations

    17. The Commission next takes action to strengthen the robocall 
mitigation requirements and Robocall Mitigation Database filing 
obligations of all providers. As the Commission proposed in the Fifth 
Caller ID Authentication FNPRM, it requires all providers--including 
intermediate providers and voice service providers without the 
facilities necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN--to: (1) take 
``reasonable steps'' to mitigate illegal robocall traffic; (2) submit a 
certification to the Robocall Mitigation Database regarding their STIR/
SHAKEN implementation status along with other identifying information; 
and (3) submit a robocall mitigation plan to the Robocall Mitigation 
Database. Consistent with its proposal, the Commission also requires 
downstream providers to block traffic received directly from all 
intermediate providers that are not in the Robocall Mitigation 
Database. These actions have significant support in the record. While 
the Commission does not require providers to take specific steps to 
meet their mitigation obligations, it does expand the subjects that 
providers must describe in their filed mitigation plans and the 
information that providers must submit to the Robocall Mitigation 
Database.
1. Applying the ``Reasonable Steps'' Mitigation Standard to All 
Providers
    18. The Commission adopts its proposal in the Fifth Caller ID 
Authentication FNPRM to expand to all providers the obligation to 
mitigate illegal robocalls under the general ``reasonable steps'' 
standard. Specifically, the Commission now requires all non-gateway 
intermediate providers, as well as voice service providers that have 
fully implemented STIR/SHAKEN, to meet the same ``reasonable steps'' 
general mitigation standard that is currently applied to gateway 
providers and voice service providers that have not fully implemented 
STIR/SHAKEN under the Commission's rules. The general mitigation 
standard the Commission adopts here for all providers is separate from 
and in addition to the new robocall mitigation program description 
obligations for all providers discussed below. The Commission also 
concludes that voice service providers without the facilities necessary 
to implement STIR/SHAKEN must mitigate illegal robocalls and meet this 
same mitigation standard.
    19. Requiring all providers to mitigate calls under the 
``reasonable steps'' standard will ensure that every provider in the 
call chain is subject to the same duty to mitigate illegal robocalls, 
promoting regulatory symmetry and administrability. There is 
significant support in the record for this approach. For providers with 
a STIR/SHAKEN authentication obligation, these mitigation duties will 
serve as an ``effective backstop'' to that authentication obligation 
and, for those without such an obligation, they will act as a key 
bulwark against illegal robocalls. As the Commission has noted, STIR/
SHAKEN is not a silver bullet and has a limited effect on illegal 
robocalls where the number was obtained lawfully and not spoofed. 
Requiring all providers to take reasonable steps to mitigate illegal 
robocalls will help address these limitations in the STIR/SHAKEN 
regime.
    20. As proposed, the Commission retains a general standard that 
requires providers to take ``reasonable steps'' to mitigate illegal 
robocall traffic, rather than mandate that providers include specific 
measures as part of their mitigation plans. The Commission notes, 
however, that what constitutes a ``reasonable step'' may depend upon 
the specific circumstances and the provider's role in the call path. 
While some commenters argue that the Commission should require 
providers to take specific measures under the ``reasonable steps'' 
standard, the Commission agrees that providers should retain ``the 
necessary flexibility in determining which measures to use to mitigate 
illegal calls on their networks.'' For this reason, the

[[Page 40100]]

Commission rejects ZipDX's request that it require providers to 
describe specific practices in their robocall mitigation plans, 
including specific know-your-upstream provider and analytics practices. 
That said, the Commission agrees that promptly investigating and 
mitigating illegal robocall traffic that is brought to the provider's 
attention through measures such as internal monitoring and tracebacks 
would constitute reasonable steps. Pursuant to this standard, a 
provider's program is ``sufficient if it includes detailed practices 
that can reasonably be expected to significantly reduce'' the carrying 
or processing (for intermediate providers) or origination (for voice 
service providers) of illegal robocalls. Each provider ``must comply 
with the practices'' that its program requires, and its program is 
insufficient if the provider ``knowingly or through negligence'' 
carries or processes calls (for intermediate providers) or originates 
(for voice service providers) unlawful robocall campaigns.
    21. The Commission declines to adopt Voice On The Net Coalition 
(VON)'s proposal for a safe harbor from contract breach for providers 
invoking contract termination provisions against providers originating 
illegal robocall traffic. VON does not explain why such a safe harbor 
is necessary or the legal authority for the Commission to adopt such a 
provision, and the Commission finds it outside the scope of this 
proceeding. Providers' programs must also commit to respond fully, 
within the time period required by the Commission's rules, to all 
traceback requests from the Commission, law enforcement, and the 
industry traceback consortium, and to cooperate with such entities in 
investigating and stopping illegal robocallers that use its service to 
originate, carry, or process illegal robocalls. The Commission declines 
to adopt Electronic Privacy Information Center and National Consumer 
Law Center (EPIC/NCLC)'s proposal to replace the ``reasonable steps'' 
general mitigation standard with the ``affirmative, effective 
measures'' standard found elsewhere in its rules. Under EPIC/NCLC's 
proposal, a provider would fail to meet this standard if they allow the 
origination of any illegal robocalls, even where the provider may have 
taken ``reasonable steps'' to mitigate such calls. The Commission 
disagrees with EPIC/NCLC's reading of its rules and conclude that these 
standards work hand-in-hand to prevent illegal robocalls. A key purpose 
of the ``reasonable steps'' standard is to ensure that providers enact 
a robocall mitigation program and describe that program in the Robocall 
Mitigation Database. If the program is not reasonable as described, or 
if it is not followed, the provider may be held liable. Further, if the 
steps described in a mitigation program are followed but are not 
actually effective in stopping illegal robocalls, the originating 
provider could be held liable for failing to put in place 
``affirmative, effective'' measures to stop robocalls if they do not 
take further action. Regardless of the mitigation standard the 
Commission adopts, the Commission disagrees with EPIC/NCLC that 
providers should be held strictly liable for allowing the origination 
of any illegal robocalls regardless of whether they have taken 
``reasonable steps'' to mitigate such calls, as explained in more 
detail below.
    22. The Commission also does not adopt VON's proposal of a ``gross 
negligence'' standard to evaluate whether a mitigation program is 
sufficient, rather than the Commission's existing standard, which 
assesses whether a provider ``knowingly or through negligence'' 
originates, carries, or processes illegal robocalls. The Commission 
disagrees that its existing standard ``essentially impose[s] strict 
liability on providers,'' as VON asserts. On the contrary, if a 
provider is taking sufficient ``reasonable steps'' to mitigate illegal 
robocall traffic pursuant to a robocall mitigation program that 
complies with the Commission's rules, the provider is likely not acting 
negligently.
    23. The Commission declines to adopt a heightened mitigation 
obligation solely for Voice over internet Protocol (VoIP) providers. 
The Commission acknowledges that there is evidence that VoIP providers 
are disproportionally involved in the facilitation of illegal 
robocalls. However, the Commission agrees with commenters opposing such 
a heightened standard, because the threat of illegal robocalls is an 
industry issue and impacts every type of provider. The Commission finds 
that applying its obligations to providers regardless of the technology 
used to transmit calls better aligns with the competitive neutrality of 
the TRACED Act.
    24. Deadlines. Consistent with the obligation placed on other 
providers and the limited comments filed in the record, the Commission 
requires providers newly covered by the general mitigation standard to 
meet that standard within 60 days following Federal Register 
publication of this document. No commenter argued that a greater length 
of time is needed to comply, and the Commission finds no reason to 
depart from the same compliance timeframe previously established for 
other providers.
2. Expanded Robocall Mitigation Database Filing Obligations
    25. The Commission next takes steps to strengthen its Robocall 
Mitigation Database filing obligations to increase transparency and 
ensure that all providers act to mitigate illegal robocalls. The 
Commission previously required voice service providers with a STIR/
SHAKEN implementation obligation and those subject to an extension to 
file certifications in the Robocall Mitigation Database regarding their 
efforts to mitigate illegal robocalls on their networks--specifically, 
whether their traffic is either signed with STIR/SHAKEN or subject to a 
robocall mitigation program. By ``STIR/SHAKEN implementation 
obligation,'' the Commission means the applicable requirement under its 
rules that a provider implement STIR/SHAKEN in the IP portions of their 
networks by a date certain, subject to certain exceptions. When 
referencing those providers ``without'' a STIR/SHAKEN implementation 
obligation, the Commission means those providers that are subject to an 
implementation extension, such as a provider with an entirely non-IP 
network or one that is unable to obtain the necessary Service Provider 
Code (SPC) token to authenticate caller ID information, or that lack 
control over the facilities necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN. Those 
voice service providers that certified that some or all of their 
traffic is ``subject to a robocall mitigation program'' were required 
to submit a robocall mitigation plan detailing the specific 
``reasonable steps'' that they have taken ``to avoid originating 
illegal robocall traffic.'' The Commission did not specifically require 
voice service providers without the facilities necessary to implement 
STIR/SHAKEN to file certifications in the database and had previously 
concluded that they were not subject to the Commission's implementation 
requirements.
    26. The Commission adopts its proposal to expand the obligation to 
file a robocall mitigation plan along with a certification in the 
Robocall Mitigation Database to all providers regardless of whether 
they are required to implement STIR/SHAKEN--including non-gateway 
intermediate providers and providers without the facilities necessary 
to implement STIR/SHAKEN--and expand the downstream blocking duty to 
providers receiving traffic directly from non-gateway intermediate 
providers not in the Robocall Mitigation Database. As

[[Page 40101]]

proposed, providers with a new Robocall Mitigation Database filing 
obligation must submit the same basic information as providers that had 
previously been required to file. The Commission also requires all 
providers to file additional information in certain circumstances, as 
explained below.
    27. Universal Robocall Mitigation Database Filing Obligation. There 
was overwhelming record support for broadening the Robocall Mitigation 
Database certification and mitigation plan filing obligation to cover 
all providers. Like the expanded mitigation obligation above, this 
approach will ensure that every provider in the call chain is covered 
by the same basic set of rules and will increase transparency and 
accountability. The Commission also agrees with USTelecom that 
requiring non-gateway intermediate providers to file a certification 
and mitigation plan in the Robocall Mitigation Database will facilitate 
the Commission's enforcement efforts for those providers, as it will 
for voice service providers newly obligated to file a mitigation plan.
    28. Consistent with its proposal and existing providers' 
obligations, all providers' robocall mitigation plans must describe the 
specific ``reasonable steps'' the provider has taken to avoid, as 
applicable, the origination, carrying, or processing of illegal 
robocall traffic as part of its robocall mitigation program. A provider 
that plays more than one ``role'' in the call chain should explain the 
mitigation steps it undertakes in each role, to the extent those 
mitigation steps are different.
    29. New Robocall Mitigation Program Description Obligations for All 
Providers. Under the Commission's current rules, voice service 
providers are required to describe the specific ``reasonable steps'' 
that they have taken ``to avoid originating illegal robocall traffic'' 
as part of their robocall mitigation programs. Gateway providers are 
required to address this topic and provide a description of how they 
have complied with the know-your-upstream provider requirement in Sec.  
64.1200(n)(4) of the Commission's rules. The Commission now imposes 
specific additional requirements for the contents of robocall 
mitigation plans filed in the Robocall Mitigation Database. 
Specifically, as part of their obligation to ``describe with 
particularity'' their robocall mitigation techniques, (1) voice service 
providers must describe how they are meeting their existing obligation 
to take affirmative, effective measures to prevent new and renewing 
customers from originating illegal calls; (2) non-gateway intermediate 
providers and voice service providers must, like gateway providers, 
describe any ``know-your-upstream provider'' procedures in place 
designed to mitigate illegal robocalls; and (3) all providers must 
describe any call analytics systems they use to identify and block 
illegal traffic, including whether they use a third-party vendor or 
vendors and the name of the vendor(s). To comply with the new 
requirements to describe their ``new and renewing customer'' and 
``know-your-upstream provider'' procedures, providers must describe any 
contractual provisions with end-users or upstream providers designed to 
mitigate illegal robocalls. The Commission does not expect providers to 
necessarily submit contractual provisions, but to describe them in 
general terms, including whether such provisions are typically included 
in their contracts. The Commission concludes that the obligation to 
describe these procedures is particularly important for voice service 
providers without a STIR/SHAKEN implementation obligation. While the 
Commission does not currently require intermediate providers other than 
gateway providers to engage in ``know-your-upstream provider'' 
procedures, if they have put such procedures in place, they must be 
documented in their robocall mitigation plan. While the Commission does 
not specifically require providers to use call analytics, doing so may 
be a ``reasonable step'' to mitigate illegal robocall traffic, 
depending on the circumstances. For example, if a provider is a 
reseller, it is likely to rely on any analytics software adopted by its 
wholesale provider to monitor call traffic. In that case, the reseller 
should describe this practice in its robocall mitigation plan.
    30. In the Fifth Caller ID Authentication Report and Order, the 
Commission required gateway providers to comply with a new requirement 
to ``know'' their upstream provider and required gateway providers to 
include in their Robocall Mitigation Database-filed mitigation plan a 
description of how they have complied with this obligation. In the 
Fifth Caller ID Authentication FNPRM, the Commission sought comment on 
expanding these two requirements to non-gateway intermediate providers. 
The Commission continues to study the record on whether to do so. 
Similarly, the Commission continues to consider whether to adopt its 
proposal to require all providers to respond to traceback requests 
within 24 hours as gateway providers are currently required to do.
    31. The Commission imposes these new requirements because it has 
become increasingly clear that provider due diligence and the use of 
call analytics are key ways to stop illegal robocalls. The public and 
the Commission's understanding of the steps providers take to 
scrutinize their relationships with other providers in the call path 
and analyze their traffic will facilitate compliance with and 
enforcement of the Commission's rules. Recent actions by the 
Enforcement Bureau demonstrating that some providers are not including 
meaningful descriptions in their mitigation plans warrants more 
prescriptive obligations. There is also specific record support for 
these new requirements.
    32. Baseline Information Submitted with Robocall Mitigation 
Database Certifications. Consistent with existing providers' filing 
obligations and the Commission's proposal in the Fifth Caller ID 
Authentication FNPRM, all providers newly obligated to submit a 
certification to the Robocall Mitigation Database pursuant to the 
requirements adopted herein must submit the following information: (1) 
whether it has fully, partially, or not implemented the STIR/SHAKEN 
authentication framework in the IP portions of its network; (2) the 
provider's business name(s) and primary address; (3) other business 
name(s) in use by the provider; (4) all business names previously used 
by the provider; (5) whether the provider is a foreign provider; and, 
(6) the name, title, department, business address, telephone number, 
and email address of one person within the company responsible for 
addressing robocall mitigation-related issues. The certification must 
be signed by an officer of the company. Consistent with the 
Commission's proposal and current rules, providers with a new filing 
obligation must update any information submitted within 10 business 
days of ``any change in the information'' submitted, ensuring that the 
information is kept up to date. Certifications and robocall mitigation 
plans must be submitted in English or with a certified English 
translation.
    33. Additional Information to be Submitted with Mitigation Plans. 
In order to effectively implement its new and modified authentication 
obligations, in addition to the baseline information currently required 
of all filers, the Commission also requires providers to submit 
additional information in their Robocall Mitigation Database 
certifications. The Commission requires all providers: (1) to submit 
additional information regarding their role(s) in the call chain; (2) 
asserting they do not have an obligation to implement STIR/SHAKEN to 
include more detail regarding the basis of that

[[Page 40102]]

assertion; (3) to certify that they have not been prohibited from 
filing in the Robocall Mitigation Database; and (4) to state whether 
they are subject to a Commission, law enforcement, or regulatory agency 
action or investigation due to suspected unlawful robocalling or 
spoofing and provide information concerning any such actions or 
investigations.
    34. First, to increase transparency for the industry and regulators 
and better facilitate its evaluation of the mitigation plans detailed 
in the Robocall Mitigation Database, the Commission requires providers 
to submit additional information to indicate the role or roles they are 
playing in the call chain. Specifically, providers must indicate 
whether they are: (1) a voice service provider with a STIR/SHAKEN 
implementation obligation serving end-users; (2) a voice service 
provider with a STIR/SHAKEN obligation acting as a wholesale provider 
originating calls; (3) a voice service provider without a STIR/SHAKEN 
obligation; (4) a non-gateway intermediate provider with a STIR/SHAKEN 
obligation; (5) a non-gateway intermediate provider without a STIR/
SHAKEN obligation; (6) a gateway provider with a STIR/SHAKEN 
obligation; (7) a gateway provider without a STIR/SHAKEN obligation; 
and/or (8) a foreign provider. This requirement expands upon the 
existing rule that providers indicate in their Robocall Mitigation 
Database filings whether they are a foreign provider, voice service 
provider, and/or gateway provider. The Commission notes that certain 
provider classes have different obligations under its rules and, as 
explained above, the ``reasonable steps'' necessary to meet the 
Commission's mitigation standard may differ based on the provider's 
role in the call path. The Commission concludes, therefore, that the 
collection of this information is necessary to allow the public and the 
Commission to determine whether a specific provider's mitigation steps 
are reasonable.
    35. Second, the Commission expands its requirement that providers 
with a current Robocall Mitigation Database filing obligation must 
state in their mitigation plan whether a STIR/SHAKEN extension applies, 
and apply that rule to all current and new Robocall Mitigation Database 
filers. Specifically, a filer asserting it does not have an obligation 
to implement STIR/SHAKEN because of an ongoing extension, or because it 
lacks the facilities necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN, must both 
explicitly state the rule that exempts it from compliance (for example, 
by explaining that it lacks the necessary facilities to implement STIR/
SHAKEN or it cannot obtain an SPC token) and explain in detail why that 
exemption applies to the filer (for example, by explaining that it is a 
pure reseller with some facilities, but that they are not sufficient to 
implement STIR/SHAKEN, or the steps it has taken to diligently pursue 
obtaining a token). The Commission concludes that this limited 
expansion of its existing rule is necessary to permit the public and 
Commission to evaluate why a provider believes it is not subject to all 
or a subset of the Commission's rules and whether that explanation is 
reasonable.
    36. Third, the Commission requires new and existing filers to 
certify that they have not been prohibited from filing in the Robocall 
Mitigation Database pursuant to a law enforcement action, including the 
new enforcement requirements adopted herein. Filers will be required to 
certify that they have not been barred from filing in the Robocall 
Mitigation Database by such an enforcement action. This includes, but 
is not limited to, instances in which a provider has been removed from 
the Robocall Mitigation Database and has been precluded from refiling 
unless and until certain deficiencies have been cured and those in 
which a provider's authorization to file has been revoked due to 
continued violations of the Commission's robocall mitigation rules. 
This information will enhance the effectiveness of the new enforcement 
measures the Commission adopts herein to impose consequences on repeat 
offenders of its robocall mitigation rules. The Commission disagrees 
with Cloud Communications Alliance (CCA) that the same purpose can be 
served by indicating whether a provider filed under a prior name. This 
is not sufficient information to facilitate the Commission's rule 
barring related entities of repeated bad actors from filing in the 
Robocall Mitigation Database. The Commission also adopts its proposal 
to require providers to submit information regarding their principals, 
affiliates, subsidiaries, and parent companies in sufficient detail to 
facilitate the Commission's ability to determine whether the provider 
has been prohibited from filing in the Robocall Mitigation Database. 
The Commission delegates to the Wireline Competition Bureau to 
determine the form and format of such data.
    37. Fourth, the Commission requires all providers to: (1) state 
whether, at any time in the prior two years, the filing entity (and/or 
any entity for which the filing entity shares common ownership, 
management, directors, or control) has been the subject of a formal 
Commission, law enforcement, or regulatory agency action or 
investigation with accompanying findings of actual or suspected 
wrongdoing due to the filing entity transmitting, encouraging, 
assisting, or otherwise facilitating illegal robocalls or spoofing, or 
a deficient Robocall Mitigation Database certification or mitigation 
program description; and, if so (2) provide a description of any such 
action or investigation, including all law enforcement or regulatory 
agencies involved, the date that any action or investigation was 
commenced, the current status of the action or investigation, a summary 
of the findings of wrongdoing made in connection with the action or 
investigation, and whether any final determinations have been issued. 
The Commission limits this reporting requirement to formal actions and 
investigations that have been commenced or issued pursuant to a written 
notice or other instrument containing findings by the law enforcement 
or regulatory agency that the filing entity has been or is suspected of 
the illegal activities itemized above, including, but not limited to, 
notices of apparent liability, forfeiture orders, state or federal 
civil lawsuits or criminal indictments, and cease-and-desist notices. 
Providers that must include confidential information to accurately and 
fully comply with this reporting requirement, as explained below, may 
seek confidential treatment of that information pursuant to Sec.  0.459 
of the Commission's rules. This information will help the Commission 
evaluate claims made by providers in their mitigation program 
descriptions and identify potential violations of its rules. The 
Commission does not adopt USTelecom's request that the reporting 
requirement the Commission adopts be limited to public actions and 
investigations. The Commission finds that limiting the reporting 
requirement to formal actions and investigations that are public would 
simply reduce the scope of the reporting requirement and is not 
necessary to clarify it. The Commission agrees with commenters, 
however, that providers should not be required to submit information 
concerning mere inquiries from law enforcement or regulatory agencies 
or investigations that do not include findings of actual or suspected 
wrongdoing. Thus, for example, traceback requests, Enforcement Bureau 
letters of inquiry or subpoenas, or investigative demand letters or 
subpoenas issued by regulatory agencies or law enforcement would not 
trigger this obligation because they are not

[[Page 40103]]

accompanied by findings of actual or suspected wrongdoing. The 
Commission does not adopt INCOMPAS's proposal that it exempt formal 
actions and investigations accompanied by findings of actual or 
suspected wrongdoing that rely ``solely'' on tracebacks from the 
disclosure requirement the Commission adopts in this document. As 
stated above, the Commission excludes traceback requests from the 
disclosure requirement when they are not accompanied by findings of 
actual or suspected wrongdoing. When a formal action or investigation 
based solely on traceback requests is accompanied by findings of actual 
or suspected wrongdoing made by the Commission, law enforcement, or a 
regulatory agency, disclosure of that information may be useful in 
evaluating claims made by providers in their mitigation program 
descriptions and identifying potential violations of the Commission's 
rules. The Commission finds that inquiries or investigations that do 
not contain findings of actual or suspected wrongdoing by the law 
enforcement or regulatory agency would be of limited value to the 
Commission in evaluating the certifications and robocall mitigation 
plans submitted to the Robocall Mitigation Database.
    38. Finally, the Commission requires filers to submit their 
Operating Company Number (OCN) if they have one. An OCN is a 
prerequisite to obtaining an SPC token, and the Commission concludes 
that filing the OCN or indicating that they do not have one will allow 
the Commission to more easily determine whether a provider is meeting 
its requirement to diligently pursue obtaining a token in order to 
authenticate their own calls and provides an additional way to 
determine relationships among providers. The Commission does not 
require filers to include additional identifying information discussed 
in the Fourth Caller ID Authentication FNPRM, 86 FR 59084 (Oct. 26, 
2021). There was no support for doing so, and the Commission finds the 
incremental benefits of providing additional information beyond the OCN 
are unclear.
    39. Robocall Mitigation Database Filing Deadlines. Providers newly 
subject to the Commission's Robocall Mitigation Database filing 
obligations must submit a certification and mitigation plan to the 
Robocall Mitigation Database by the later of: (1) 30 days following 
publication in the Federal Register of notice of approval by the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) of any associated Paperwork Reduction 
Act (PRA) obligations; or (2) any deadline set by the Wireline 
Competition Bureau through Public Notice. This approach provides 
additional flexibility to the Wireline Competition Bureau to provide an 
extended filing window where circumstances warrant. Existing filers 
subject to new or modified requirements adopted in this document must 
amend their filings with the newly required information by the same 
deadline. If a provider is required to fully implement STIR/SHAKEN but 
has not done so by the Robocall Mitigation Database filing deadline, it 
must so indicate in its filing. It must then later update the filing 
within 10 business days of completing STIR/SHAKEN implementation. The 
Commission recognizes that some of this information may be considered 
confidential. Providers may make confidential submissions consistent 
with the Commission's existing confidentiality rules. Providers may 
only redact filings to the extent appropriate under the Commission's 
confidentiality rules.
    40. Refusing Traffic From Unlisted Providers. As proposed, the 
Commission extends the prohibition on accepting traffic from unlisted 
(including de-listed) providers to non-gateway intermediate providers. 
This proposal is well supported in the record and will close the final 
gap in the Commission's Robocall Mitigation Database call blocking 
regime. Under this rule, downstream providers will be prohibited from 
accepting any traffic from a non-gateway intermediate provider not 
listed in the Robocall Mitigation Database, either because the provider 
did not file or their certification was removed as part of an 
enforcement action. The Commission concludes that a non-gateway 
intermediate provider Robocall Mitigation Database filing requirement 
and an associated prohibition against accepting traffic from non-
gateway intermediate providers not in the Robocall Mitigation Database 
will ensure regulatory symmetry. By extending this prohibition to non-
gateway intermediate providers, the Commission ensures that downstream 
providers will no longer be required to determine the ``role'' of the 
upstream provider on a call-by-call basis to determine whether the call 
should be blocked. Consistent with the Commission's proposal, and the 
parallel requirements adopted for accepting traffic from gateway 
providers and voice service providers, compliance will be required no 
sooner than 90 days following the deadline for non-gateway intermediate 
providers to submit a certification to the Robocall Mitigation 
Database.
    41. As a result of non-gateway intermediate providers' affirmative 
obligation to submit a certification in the Robocall Mitigation 
Database, downstream providers may not rely upon any non-gateway 
intermediate provider database registration imported from the 
intermediate provider registry. Any imported Robocall Mitigation 
Database entry is not sufficient to meet a non-gateway intermediate 
provider's Robocall Mitigation Database filing obligation or to prevent 
downstream providers from blocking traffic upon the effective date of 
the obligation for downstream providers to block traffic from non-
gateway intermediate providers.
    42. Bureau Guidance. Consistent with its prior delegations of 
authority concerning the Robocall Mitigation Database submission 
process, the Commission directs the Wireline Competition Bureau to make 
the necessary changes to the Robocall Mitigation Database and to 
provide appropriate Robocall Mitigation Database filing instructions 
and training materials as necessary and consistent with this document. 
The Commission delegates to the Wireline Competition Bureau the 
authority to specify the form and format of any submissions as well as 
necessary changes to the Robocall Mitigation Database submission 
interface. The Commission also delegates to the Wireline Competition 
Bureau the authority to make the necessary changes to the Robocall 
Mitigation Database to indicate whether a non-gateway intermediate 
provider has made an affirmative filing (as opposed to being imported 
as an intermediate provider) and whether any provider's filing has been 
de-listed as part of an enforcement action, and to announce its 
determination as part of its guidance. The Commission also directs the 
Wireline Competition Bureau to release a public notice upon Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) approval of any information collection 
associated with the Commission's Robocall Mitigation Database filing 
requirements, announcing OMB approval of its rules, effective dates, 
and deadlines for filing and for providers to block traffic from non-
gateway intermediate providers that have not filed.

C. Enforcement

    43. In order to further strengthen its efforts to hold illegal 
robocallers accountable for their actions, the Commission adopts 
several enforcement proposals described in the Fifth Caller

[[Page 40104]]

ID Authentication FNPRM. Specifically, the Commission: (1) adopts a 
per-call forfeiture penalty for failure to block traffic in accordance 
with its rules and sets maximum forfeitures for such violations; (2) 
requires the removal of non-gateway intermediate providers from the 
Robocall Mitigation Database for violations of its rules, consistent 
with the standard applied to other filers; (3) establishes an expedited 
process for provider removal for facially deficient certifications; and 
(4) establishes rules that would impose consequences on repeat 
offenders of its robocall mitigation rules. The adoption of more robust 
enforcement tools is supported in the record.
1. Per Call Maximum Forfeitures
    44. The Commission first adopts its proposal to establish a 
forfeiture penalty on a per-call basis for violations of its robocall 
blocking rules in 47 CFR 64.1200 through 64.1204 and 47 CFR 64.6300 
through 64.6308. Commenters generally agreed that aggressive penalties 
are appropriate. Mandatory blocking is an important tool for protecting 
American consumers from illegal robocalls. As the Commission has found 
in its previous robocalling orders and enforcement actions, illegal 
robocalls cause significant consumer harm. Penalties for failure to 
comply with mandatory blocking requirements must deter noncompliance 
and be sufficient to ensure that entities subject to these requirements 
are unwilling to risk suffering serious economic harm.
    45. Consistent with its proposal, the Commission authorizes the 
maximum forfeiture amount for each violation of the mandatory blocking 
requirements of $23,727 per call. This is the maximum forfeiture amount 
the Commission's rules permit it to impose on non-common carriers. 
Although common carriers may be assessed a maximum forfeiture of 
$237,268 for each violation, the Commission finds that it should not 
impose a greater penalty on one class of providers than another for 
purposes of the mandatory blocking requirements. The Commission also 
sets a base forfeiture amount of $2,500 per call because it concludes 
that the failure to block results in a similar consumer harm as the 
robocall itself (e.g., the consumer receives the robocall itself). The 
Commission finds that a $2,500 base forfeiture is reasonable in 
comparison to the $4,500 base forfeiture for violations of the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA). While the failure to 
block produces significant consumer harm, the harm is not as great and 
does not carry the same degree of culpability as the initiator of an 
illegal robocall campaign who may have committed a TCPA violation. 
While the Commission sought comment on whether it should consider 
specific additional mitigating or aggravating factors, it did not 
receive sufficient comment to provide a basis for doing so. As with 
other violations of its rules, however, existing upward and downward 
adjustment criteria in Sec.  1.80 of the Commission's rules may apply. 
Additionally, there may be pragmatic factors in its prosecutorial 
discretion in calculating the total forfeiture amount--particularly 
when there is a very large number of calls at issue--as the Commission 
has done in its enforcement actions pursuant to the TCPA and those 
actions taken against spoofing.
2. Provider Removal From the Robocall Mitigation Database
    46. The Commission also adopts its proposal to provide for the 
removal of non-gateway intermediate providers from the database for 
violations of its rules. In the Second Caller ID Authentication Report 
and Order, 85 FR 73360 (Nov. 17, 2020), the Commission set forth 
consequences for voice service providers that file a deficient robocall 
mitigation plan or that ``knowingly or negligently'' originate illegal 
robocall campaigns, including removal from the Robocall Mitigation 
Database. Gateway providers are now subject to the same rules for calls 
that they carry or process. To promote regulatory symmetry, the 
Commission concludes that non-gateway intermediate providers should 
face similar consequences.
    47. Specifically, the Commission finds that a non-gateway 
intermediate provider with a deficient certification--such as when the 
certification describes a program that is unreasonable, or if it 
determines that a provider knowingly or negligently carries or 
processes illegal robocalls--the Commission will take appropriate 
enforcement action. This may include, among other actions, removing a 
certification from the database after providing notice to the 
intermediate provider and an opportunity to cure the filing, requiring 
the intermediate provider to submit to more specific robocall 
mitigation requirements, and/or proposing the imposition of a 
forfeiture. The Commission declines, however, to adopt other reasons to 
remove providers from the database. The Commission concludes that the 
existing basis for removal is appropriately tailored to the underlying 
purpose of the Robocall Mitigation Database--to facilitate detection 
and elimination of illegal robocall traffic. As proposed, the 
Commission explicitly expands its delegation of authority to the 
Enforcement Bureau to de-list or exclude a provider from the Robocall 
Mitigation Database to include the removal of non-gateway intermediate 
providers.
    48. Downstream providers must refuse traffic sent by a non-gateway 
intermediate provider that is not listed in the Robocall Mitigation 
Database, as described above and consistent with the existing 
safeguards applicable to the Commission's existing rules for refusing 
traffic for calls to 911, public safety answering points, and 
government emergency numbers. The Commission agrees with VON that any 
sanctions for failure to block calls from a provider removed from the 
database should not occur without sufficient notice to the industry. 
The Commission concludes, however, that the existing Enforcement Bureau 
process, where providers are given two business days to block calls 
following Commission notice of removal from the database, is 
sufficient, as it appropriately balances the public's interest in 
blocking unwanted robocalls against the need to allow providers 
sufficient time to take the necessary steps to block traffic.
3. Expedited Removal Procedure for Facially Deficient Filings
    49. The Commission agrees with commenters that there are certain 
instances in which a provider should be removed from the Robocall 
Mitigation Database on an expedited basis. Specifically, the Commission 
finds that where the Enforcement Bureau determines that a provider's 
filing is facially deficient, the Enforcement Bureau may remove a 
provider from the Robocall Mitigation Database using an expedited two-
step procedure, which entails providing notice and an opportunity to 
cure the deficiency. This streamlined process will allow the 
Enforcement Bureau to move more quickly against providers whose filings 
clearly fail to meet the Commission's requirements.
    50. In the Second Caller ID Authentication Report and Order, the 
Commission required that providers be given notice of any deficiencies 
in their certification and an opportunity to cure prior to removal from 
the Robocall Mitigation Database, but did not prescribe a specific 
removal procedure. Pursuant to that requirement and the Commission's 
prior delegation, the Wireline Competition Bureau and Enforcement 
Bureau have implemented the following three-step removal procedure: (1) 
the Wireline Competition Bureau contacts the provider, notifying

[[Page 40105]]

it that its filing is deficient, explaining the nature of the 
deficiency, and providing 14 days for the provider to cure the 
deficiency; (2) if the provider fails to rectify the deficiency, the 
Enforcement Bureau releases an order concluding that a provider's 
filing is deficient based on the available evidence and directing the 
provider to explain, within 14 days, why the Enforcement Bureau should 
not remove the Company's certification from the Robocall Mitigation 
Database and giving the provider a further opportunity to cure the 
deficiencies in its filing; and (3) if the provider fails to rectify 
the deficiency or provide a sufficient explanation why its filing is 
not deficient within that 14-day period, the Enforcement Bureau 
releases an order removing the provider from the Robocall Mitigation 
Database.
    51. While this procedure is appropriate in cases where there may be 
questions about the sufficiency of the steps described in a mitigation 
plan, the Commission concludes that an expedited approach is warranted 
where the certification is facially deficient. A certification is 
``facially deficient'' where the provider fails to submit a robocall 
mitigation plan within the meaning of the Commission's rules. That is, 
it fails to submit any information regarding the ``specific reasonable 
steps'' it is taking to mitigate illegal robocalls. While it is not 
practical to provide an exhaustive list of reasons why a filing would 
be considered ``facially deficient,'' examples include, without 
limitation, instances where the provider only submits: (1) a request 
for confidentiality with no underlying substantive filing; (2) only 
non-responsive data or documents (e.g., a screenshot from the 
Commission's website of a provider's FCC Registration Number data or 
other document that does not describe robocall mitigation efforts); (3) 
information that merely states how STIR/SHAKEN generally works, with no 
specific information about the provider's own robocall mitigation 
efforts; or (4) a certification that is not in English and lacks a 
certified English translation. In these and similar cases, the 
Commission need not reach the question of whether the steps the 
provider is taking to mitigate robocalls are reasonable because the 
provider has failed to submit even the most basic information required 
to do so.
    52. The Commission concludes that where a provider's filing is 
facially deficient, it has ``willfully'' violated its Robocall 
Mitigation Database filing obligation within the meaning of that term 
in section 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 
558(c), which applies to revocations of licenses. Although the 
Commission does not reach a definitive conclusion here, the removal of 
a provider's certification from the Robocall Mitigation Database--which 
will lead to the mandatory blocking of the provider's traffic by 
downstream providers--is arguably equivalent to the revocation of a 
license. This finding is consistent with precedent concluding that a 
party acts ``willfully'' within the meaning of section 558(c) where it 
acts with ``careless disregard.'' As such, where a ``willful'' 
violation has occurred, the provider's Robocall Mitigation Database 
certification may be removed without a separate notice prior to the 
initiation of an ``agency proceeding'' to remove the certification. 
While the Commission does not specifically conclude that a Robocall 
Mitigation Database certification is a license within the meaning of 
that section, the Commission's expedited procedure would be compliant 
with section 558 if it reached such a conclusion. The Commission does 
not adopt Professional Association for Customer Engagement (PACE)'s 
proposal to provide a complete list of reasons for why a provider's 
filing might be facially deficient, and the specific steps it must take 
in response to avoid removal. It is not practical to provide an 
exhaustive list of all potential examples of facially deficient filings 
and methods to cure such deficiencies. Further, attempting to do so 
would limit the Commission's flexibility to respond to changing tactics 
by bad actors and could provide a roadmap for bad actors to avoid 
expedited removal. Moreover, the Commission concludes that PACE's due 
process concerns are addressed under the expedited removal process it 
adopts: The Enforcement Bureau's notice to the provider in the first 
step will explain the basis for its conclusion that the filing is 
facially deficient, while the second step offers providers an 
opportunity to cure that deficiency prior to removal. Therefore, the 
Commission adopts the following two-step expedited procedure for 
removing a facially deficient certification: (1) issuance of a notice 
by the Enforcement Bureau to the provider explaining the basis for its 
conclusion that the certification is facially deficient and providing 
an opportunity for the provider to cure the deficiency or explain why 
its certification is not deficient within 10 days; and (2) if the 
deficiency is not cured or the provider fails to establish that there 
is no deficiency within that 10-day period, the Enforcement Bureau will 
issue an order removing the provider from the database. The Commission 
notes that a number of providers have responded within 14 days to 
Enforcement Bureau requests to correct their deficient filings and 
concludes that employing a marginally shorter time period for this 
expedited process will further the Commission's interest in swiftly 
resolving these willful violations without materially affecting a 
providers' ability to respond to the Enforcement Bureau's notice.
    53. The Commission finds that this expedited two-step procedure is 
also consistent with providers' Fifth Amendment due process rights 
under the Supreme Court's three factor test. While providers have a 
significant ``private interest'' under the first factor of the test 
that would be affected by removal from the Robocall Mitigation 
Database, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards under the second factor is exceedingly 
low, given that (1) the filings in question are facially deficient, and 
(2) providers would have a reasonable opportunity to cure the deficient 
filings by submitting a valid robocall mitigation plan. Given the 
extremely low risk of erroneous deprivation of a private interest in 
these situations, the Commission finds that these first two factors do 
not outweigh the third factor--the ``Government's interest''--which is 
very weighty here: The Government has a strong interest in ensuring 
that providers adopt valid robocall mitigation plans as soon as 
possible to further its continuing efforts to reduce the number of 
illegal robocalls and harm to consumers, and in blocking traffic of 
providers that are unable or unwilling to implement or document 
effective mitigation measures.
    54. The Commission concludes that this expedited approach is 
preferable to EPIC/NCLC's proposal to automatically remove certain 
``high-risk'' VoIP providers from the Robocall Mitigation Database or 
impose forfeitures through a bespoke, expedited process. As explained 
above, the Commission does not believe that a separate set of rules for 
VoIP providers is appropriate and the expedited procedure the 
Commission adopts in this document complies with the APA and due 
process. EPIC/NCLC do not explain how removal from the database prior 
to any opportunity to respond is consistent with the APA or due 
process.

[[Page 40106]]

4. Consequences for Continued Violations
    55. In order to address continued violations of its robocall 
mitigation rules, the Commission proposed in the Fifth Caller ID 
Authentication FNPRM to subject repeat offenders to proceedings to 
revoke their section 214 operating authority and to ban offending 
companies and/or their individual company owners, directors, officers, 
and principals from future significant association with entities 
regulated by the Commission. The Commission further proposed to find 
that providers that are not common carriers operating pursuant to 
blanket section 214 authority hold other Commission authorizations 
sufficient to subject them to the Commission's jurisdiction for 
purposes of enforcing its rules pertaining to preventing illegal 
robocalls. The Commission also proposed to find that providers not 
classified as common carriers but that are registered in the Robocall 
Mitigation Database hold a Commission certification such that they are 
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. The Commission adopts its 
proposal to revoke the section 214 operating authority of entities that 
engage in continued violations of its robocall mitigation rules. The 
Commission also finds that non-common carriers holding Commission 
authorizations and/or certifications are similarly subject to 
revocation of their authorizations and/or certifications. The 
Commission further finds that it will consider whether it is in the 
public interest for individual company owners, directors, officers, and 
principals of entities for which the Commission has revoked an 
authority or a certification, or for other entities with which those 
individuals are affiliated, to obtain future Commission authorizations, 
licenses, or certifications at the time that they apply for them.
    56. Revocation of Section 214 Authority and Other Commission 
Authorizations. In the Fifth Caller ID Authentication FNPRM, the 
Commission proposed to find that entities engaging in continued 
violations of its robocall mitigation rules, be subject to revocation 
of their section 214 operating authority, where applicable. The 
Commission concludes that the ``robocall mitigation rules'' within the 
scope of this requirement means the specific obligations to: (1) 
implement a robocall mitigation program that includes specific 
``reasonable steps'' to mitigate illegal robocalls and comply with the 
steps outlined in the plan; (2) submit a plan describing the mitigation 
program to the Robocall Mitigation database; and (3) not accept traffic 
from providers not in the Robocall Mitigation database. This includes 
obligations that the Commission previously adopted as well as those 
that it adopts in this document.
    57. The Commission concludes that this requirement also pertains to 
continued violation of providers' authentication obligations. While in 
certain instances the Commission has referred to provider mitigation 
obligations as separate from authentication, the Commission has also 
concluded that they work hand in hand to stop illegal robocalls. 
Indeed, analytics providers often use authentication information to 
determine whether to block or label a call. The Commission therefore 
concludes that call authentication serves to mitigate illegal 
robocalls, and failure to follow the Commission's authentication rules 
falls within the scope of the enforcement authority it adopts in this 
document.
    58. The Commission did not receive comments regarding the scope of 
the specific rules covered by the consequences proposed in the Fifth 
Caller ID Authentication FNPRM. The Commission finds, however, that it 
is reasonable to fully enforce the foregoing robocall mitigation rules 
by holding accountable those who engage in continued violations of 
those rules. The Commission will exercise its ability to revoke the 
section 214 authorizations for providers engaging in continued 
violations of those rules, consistent with its long-standing authority 
to revoke the section 214 authority of any provider for serious 
misconduct.
    59. The Commission's authority to revoke section 214 authority in 
order to protect the public interest is well established. The 
Commission intends to apply that authority as necessary to address 
entities engaging in continued violations of its rules. Specifically, 
an entity engaging in continued violations of the Commission's robocall 
mitigation rules as defined in this section will be required to explain 
to the Enforcement Bureau why the Commission should not initiate 
proceedings to revoke its domestic and/or international section 214 
authorizations. Consistent with established Commission procedures, the 
Commission may then adopt an order to institute a proceeding to revoke 
domestic and/or international section 214 authority. Should the entity 
fail to address concerns regarding its retention of section 214 
authority, the Commission would then issue an Order on Revocation 
consistent with its authority to revoke section 214 authority when 
warranted to protect the public interest.
    60. The Commission also adopts its proposals that providers not 
classified as common carriers but that hold other types of Commission 
authorizations, including a certification as a result of being 
registered in the Robocall Mitigation Database, are subject to the 
Commission's jurisdiction for the purpose of the consequences the 
Commission adopts in this section. Interconnected VoIP providers are 
subject to Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended 
(Communications Act or Act) through their requirement to file 
applications to discontinue service under section 214 and Sec.  63.71 
of the Commission's rules. As explained below, this approach does not 
constitute an improper exercise of jurisdiction over domestic non-
common carriers or foreign providers. The Fifth Caller ID 
Authentication FNPRM listed the providers that the Commission 
contemplated would be subject to its enforcement authority. These 
providers have domestic and international section 214 authorizations, 
have applied for and received authorization for direct access to 
numbering resources, are designated as eligible telecommunications 
carriers under section 214(e) of the Communications Act in order to 
receive federal universal service support, or are registered in the 
Robocall Mitigation Database. Where the Commission grants a right or 
privilege, it unquestionably has the right to revoke or deny that right 
or privilege in appropriate circumstances. In addition, holders of 
these and all Commission authorizations have a clear and demonstrable 
duty to operate in the public interest. Continued violations of the 
Commission's robocall mitigation rules are wholly inconsistent with the 
public interest, and the Commission finds it necessary to exercise its 
authority to institute a proceeding and, if warranted, revoke the 
authorizations, licenses, and/or certifications of all repeat 
offenders. Indeed, there is no opposition in the record to the 
Commission instituting revocation proceedings when warranted, and the 
Commission agrees with VON that when providers, including those without 
section 214 authority, have clearly and repeatedly been responsible for 
originating or transporting illegal robocalls and have had a sufficient 
opportunity to be heard through the enforcement process, there may be 
grounds for termination of Commission authorizations. The Commission's 
established section 214 revocation

[[Page 40107]]

process described above satisfies due process requirements, and the 
Commission intends to apply it to all entities that it finds to be 
continually violating its robocall mitigation rules.
    61. Future Review of Entities, Individual Company Owners, 
Directors, Officers, and Principals Applying for Commission 
Authorizations, Licenses, or Certifications. Once the Commission has 
revoked the section 214 or other Commission authorization, license, or 
certification of an entity that has engaged in continued violations of 
its robocall mitigation rules, the Commission will consider the public 
interest impact of granting other future Commission authorizations, 
licenses, or certifications to the entity that was subject to the 
revocation, as well as individual company owners, directors, officers, 
and principals (either individuals or entities) of such entities. The 
Commission expects that owners, directors, officers, and principals, 
whether or not they have control of the entity, have influence, 
management, or supervisory responsibilities for the entity subject to 
the revocation. The Commission will consider the public interest impact 
as part of its established review processes for Commission applications 
at the time that they are filed. For example, a principal of a provider 
that had its section 214 authority revoked or that was removed from the 
Robocall Mitigation Database as a result of an enforcement action may 
be subject to a denial of other Commission authorizations, licenses, or 
certifications, including for international section 214 authority, or 
for approval to acquire an entity that holds blanket domestic section 
214 authority or international section 214 authority. This is 
consistent with the Commission's current process in which it reviews 
many public interest factors in determining whether to grant an 
application, including whether an applicant for a license has the 
requisite citizenship, character, financial, technical, and other 
qualifications. To ensure that the Commission can accurately identify 
individual company owners, directors, officers, and principals of an 
entity for which it revoked authority, the Commission intends to rely 
on information contained in providers' registrations filed in the 
Robocall Mitigation Database. Where that information is insufficient 
for this purpose, the Commission will require entities undergoing 
revocation proceedings to identify their individual company owners, 
directors, officers, and principals as part of the revocation process.
    62. The Commission proposed in the Fifth Caller ID Authentication 
FNPRM that principals and others associated with entities subject to 
revocation would be banned from holding a 5% or greater ownership 
interest in any entity that applies for or already holds any FCC 
license or instrument of authorization for the provision of a regulated 
service subject to Title II of the Act or of any entity otherwise 
engaged in the provision of voice service for a period of time to be 
determined. The record contains no information on how the Commission 
would undertake the complex process of identifying the providers or 
applicants that would be impacted by the 5% ownership trigger 
threshold, or whether it would risk negatively impacting the operations 
and customers of providers associated with the targeted principal, but 
which were not involved in the robocall offenses. Should the Commission 
see an increased volume of repeat offenses of the robocall mitigation 
rules, it will consider whether to adopt rules permanently barring 
principals and others associated with entities subject to revocation 
from holding both existing and future Commission authorizations. Going 
forward now, the Commission will generally consider whether it is in 
the public interest for individual company owners, directors, officers, 
and principals associated with an entity for which it has revoked a 
Commission authorization to obtain new Commission authorizations or 
licenses at the time that they, or an entity with which they are 
affiliated, apply for them. This is consistent with the Commission's 
stated intent in the Fifth Caller ID Authentication FNPRM to consider 
the impact these principals and others may have on ``future'' 
significant association with entities regulated by the Commission.
    63. The Commission concludes that these new enforcement tools, 
acting in tandem with its new requirement for providers to submit their 
related entities and principals in their robocall mitigation plans, 
will ensure that bad actor providers and their principals will face 
potentially serious consequences for their repeated violation of the 
Commission's robocall mitigation rules. These potential consequences 
reach beyond a forfeiture and appropriately subject these entities and 
principals to specified consequences and a thorough public interest 
review as required. The Commission makes clear that revoking a 
Commission authorization or license does not transform entities that 
have not been classified as common carriers into common carriers or 
extend its general jurisdiction over foreign providers. Rather, this 
consequence merely allows the Commission discretion to revoke a 
Commission authorization or license that a provider, person, or entity 
would otherwise be eligible for or to deny an application for a 
Commission license or authorization by a principal of an entity subject 
to revocation. For this reason, the Commission need not exempt foreign 
providers from this rule, as some commenters argue.
5. Other Enforcement Matters
    64. The Commission does not adopt EPIC/NCLC's proposal to base 
enforcement actions, including removal from the Robocall Mitigation 
Database, solely on the number of tracebacks a provider receives. In 
enforcement actions, the Commission has considered a high volume of 
tracebacks as a factor in determining whether a provider engaged in 
egregious and intentional misconduct. While receiving a high number of 
traceback requests may be evidence of malfeasance in certain instances, 
this is not always the case. The Commission's rules independently 
require providers to commit to respond to traceback requests--and to 
actually respond to such requests--in a certain time period, and they 
may be subject to forfeiture or removal for failure to do so. The 
Commission also declines to adopt licensing or bonding requirements for 
certain VoIP providers as EPIC/NCLC proposes.
    65. The Commission declines to adopt EPIC/NCLC's strict liability 
standard for forfeiture or removal from the Robocall Mitigation 
Database for failure to block any illegal calls regardless of the 
circumstances, or their suggestion of an ``interim'' standard of 
assessing liability for transmitting illegal robocall traffic based on 
whether a provider ``knew or should have known that [a] call was 
illegal.'' The Commission concludes that expectations to stop all 
illegal calls are not realistic and that a strict liability standard 
could lead to significant market disruptions. Similarly, the Commission 
declines to adopt NCTA or ACA Connect's proposed ``good faith'' or 
CCA's proposed ``reasonableness'' standards.

D. STIR/SHAKEN Obligations of Satellite Providers

    66. The Commission concludes that satellite providers that do not 
use North American Numbering Plan (NANP) numbers to originate calls or 
only use such numbers to forward calls to non-NANP numbers are not 
``voice service providers'' under the TRACED Act and therefore do not 
have a STIR/SHAKEN

[[Page 40108]]

implementation obligation. The Commission also provides an ongoing 
extension from TRACED Act obligations to satellite providers that are 
small voice service providers and use NANP numbers to originate calls 
on the basis of a finding of undue hardship.
    67. The Commission previously provided small voice services 
providers, including satellite providers, an extension from STIR/SHAKEN 
implementation until June 30, 2023. In the Fifth Caller ID 
Authentication FNPRM, the Commission sought comment on whether the 
TRACED Act requirements apply to some or all satellite providers and, 
if so, whether the Commission should grant certain satellite providers 
a STIR/SHAKEN extension. In addition to the questions raised in the 
Fifth Caller ID Authentication FNPRM, the Wireline Competition Bureau 
in August 2022 sought comment on the small provider extension generally 
and its applicability to satellite providers.
    68. Satellite Providers Originating Calls Using Non-NANP Numbers. 
The Commission concludes that, where satellite providers originate 
calls using non-NANP numbers, they are not acting as ``voice service 
providers'' within the meaning of the TRACED Act. This conclusion is 
consistent with the TRACED Act's definition of voice service which 
requires that voice communications must use resources from the NANP. 
The Commission also concludes that where satellite providers utilize 
NANP resources for call forwarding to non-NANP numbers, such calls also 
fall outside of the definition of voice service. This finding is 
consistent with the underlying purpose of the STIR/SHAKEN regime. One 
of the key aims of the TRACED Act, STIR/SHAKEN, and the Commission's 
implementing rules, is to prevent call spoofing. Where a phone number 
is not displayed to the end user, as is the case in the satellite call 
forwarding scenario, call spoofing is not a concern.
    69. Satellite Providers Originating Calls Using NANP Numbers. The 
Commission next permits an indefinite extension of time for small voice 
providers that are satellite providers originating calls using NANP 
numbers. There are de minimis instances where satellite providers may 
assign NANP resources to their subscribers for caller ID purposes. 
While the Commission finds that, in these cases, satellite providers 
are acting as voice service providers, the Commission believes it is 
also appropriate to provide an indefinite extension for STIR/SHAKEN 
implementation to these providers by applying the TRACED Act's ``undue 
hardship'' standard.
    70. The TRACED Act directed the Commission to assess burdens or 
barriers to the implementation of STIR/SHAKEN, and granted the 
Commission discretion to extend the implementation deadline for a 
``reasonable period of time'' based upon a ``public finding of undue 
hardship.'' In considering whether the hardship is ``undue'' under the 
TRACED Act--as well as whether an extension is for a ``reasonable 
period of time''--it is appropriate to balance the hardship of 
compliance due to the ``the burdens and barriers to implementation'' 
faced by a voice service provider or class of voice service providers 
with the benefit to the public of implementing STIR/SHAKEN 
expeditiously.
    71. The Commission concludes that an indefinite extension is 
appropriate under this standard for small voice providers that are 
satellite providers originating calls using NANP numbers. The number of 
satellite subscribers using NANP resources is miniscule. There is 
little evidence that satellite providers or their users are responsible 
for illegal robocalls and satellite service costs make the high-volume 
calling necessary for robocallers uneconomical. The balancing of the 
benefits and burdens, therefore, counsels against requiring such 
providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN.
    72. The Commission notes that it must annually reevaluate TRACED 
Act extensions granted, ensuring that the Commission will be able to 
act quickly to prevent any unforeseen abuses. While the Commission 
provides small voice service satellite providers an extension from 
STIR/SHAKEN implementation, the Commission makes clear that they must, 
like other voice service providers with an extension, submit a 
certification to the Robocall Mitigation Database pursuant to its 
existing rules and the new obligations the Commission adopts in this 
document.

E. Differential Treatment of International Roaming Traffic

    73. The Commission next declines to adopt rules in this document 
concerning the differential treatment of international roaming traffic. 
The Commission also declines to adopt rules concerning differential 
treatment of non-conversational traffic in this document. The 
Commission continues to consider the record on this issue. In the Fifth 
Caller ID Authentication FNPRM, the Commission sought comment on 
stakeholders' assertions that international cellular roaming traffic 
involving NANP numbers (i.e., traffic originated abroad from U.S. 
mobile subscribers carrying U.S. NANP numbers and terminated in the 
U.S.) is unlikely to carry illegal robocalls and therefore should be 
treated with a ``lighter'' regulatory touch. As part of that inquiry, 
the Commission also asked whether any separate regulatory regime for 
such traffic could be ``gamed'' by illegal robocallers by disguising 
their traffic as cellular roaming traffic.
    74. Given the limited record on this issue, particularly with 
respect to whether and how providers could readily identify or 
segregate such traffic for differential treatment, the Commission 
directs the Wireline Competition Bureau to refer the issue to the North 
American Numbering Council for further investigation.

F. Summary of Cost Benefit Analysis

    75. The Commission finds that the benefits of the rules it adopts 
in this document will greatly outweigh the costs imposed on providers. 
As it explained in the First Caller ID Authentication Report and Order, 
85 FR 22029 (Apr. 21, 2020), the Commission concluded that its STIR/
SHAKEN rules are likely to result in, at a minimum, $13.5 billion in 
annual benefits. In the Fifth Caller ID Authentication FNPRM, the 
Commission sought comment on its belief that its proposed rules and 
actions would achieve a large share of the annual $13.5 billion benefit 
and that the benefits will far exceed the costs imposed on providers. 
After reviewing the record in this proceeding, the Commission confirms 
this conclusion.
    76. Limiting the ability of illegal robocallers to evade existing 
rules will preserve and extend the benefits of STIR/SHAKEN. The new 
enforcement tools the Commission adopts, as well as expanded call 
authentication and robocall mitigation obligations, will increase the 
effectiveness of its authentication regime, thereby allowing more 
illegal robocalls to be readily identified and stopped. As the 
Commission found previously, it again concludes that an overall 
reduction in illegal robocalls from new rules will lower network costs 
by eliminating both unwanted traffic congestion and the labor costs of 
handling numerous customer complaints. This reduction in robocalls will 
also help restore confidence in the U.S. telephone network and 
facilitate reliable access to emergency and healthcare services.
    77. In this document the Commission adopts a targeted obligation 
applicable to the first intermediate provider in the call path. By 
limiting the authentication obligation to the intermediate provider at 
the beginning of the call chain, the

[[Page 40109]]

Commission maximizes the benefits of the requirement while minimizing 
its costs. Indeed, intermediate providers can avoid any authentication 
burden if they require their upstream providers to only send them 
authenticated traffic.
    78. The Commission acknowledges that the revised and expanded 
mitigation and Robocall Mitigation Database filing obligations it 
adopts in this document will impose limited short-term implementation 
costs. Nevertheless, the Commission concludes that the benefits of 
bringing all providers within the mitigation and Robocall Mitigation 
Database regime will produce significant benefits to the Commission and 
the public by increasing transparency and accountability, and by 
facilitating the enforcement of the Commission's rules.

G. Legal Authority

    79. Consistent with its proposals, the Commission adopts the 
foregoing obligations pursuant to the legal authority it relied on in 
prior caller ID authentication and call blocking orders.
    80. Caller ID Authentication. The Commission concludes that the 
same authority through which it imposed caller ID authentication 
obligations on gateway providers--a subset of intermediate providers--
applies equally to its rules that impose caller ID authentication 
obligations on non-gateway intermediate providers. Specifically, the 
Commission finds authority to impose caller ID authentication 
obligations on the first intermediate providers in the call chain under 
section 251(e) of the Act and the Truth in Caller ID Act. In the Second 
Caller ID Authentication Report and Order, the Commission found it had 
the authority to impose caller ID authentication obligations on 
intermediate providers under these provisions. It reasoned that calls 
that transit the networks of intermediate providers with illegally 
spoofed caller ID are exploiting numbering resources and so found 
authority under section 251(e). The Commission found additional, 
independent authority under the Truth in Caller ID Act on the basis 
that such rules were necessary to prevent unlawful acts and to protect 
voice service subscribers from scammers and bad actors, stressing that 
intermediate providers play an integral role in the success of STIR/
SHAKEN across the voice network. The Commission relied on this 
reasoning in adopting authentication obligations on gateway providers 
and it therefore relies on this same legal authority to impose an 
authentication obligation on the first intermediate providers in the 
call chain.
    81. Robocall Mitigation. The Commission adopts its robocall 
mitigation provisions for non-gateway intermediate providers and voice 
service providers, including those without the facilities necessary to 
implement STIR/SHAKEN, pursuant to sections 201(b), 202(a), and 251(e) 
of the Communications Act; the Truth in Caller ID Act; and the 
Commission's ancillary authority, consistent with the authority the 
Commission invoked to adopt analogous rules in the Fifth Caller ID 
Authentication Report and Order and Second Caller ID Authentication 
Report and Order. The Commission sought comment on whether it should 
impose a mitigation duty on voice providers without the facilities 
necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN on the basis of an ongoing extension 
from the TRACED Act. The Commission concludes that because such 
providers were not granted an initial extension as a class under the 
TRACED Act, the clearest basis of authority for imposing a mitigation 
obligation is found in sections 201(b), 202(a), and 251(e) of the 
Communications Act; the Truth in Caller ID Act; and the Commission's 
ancillary authority. The Commission concludes that section 251(e) of 
the Act and the Truth in Caller ID Act authorize it to prohibit 
domestic intermediate providers and voice service providers from 
accepting traffic from non-gateway intermediate providers that have not 
filed in the Robocall Mitigation Database. In the Second Caller ID 
Authentication Report and Order, the Commission concluded that section 
251(e) gives it authority to prohibit intermediate providers and voice 
service providers from accepting traffic from both domestic and foreign 
voice service providers that do not appear in the Robocall Mitigation 
Database, noting that its exclusive jurisdiction over numbering policy 
provides authority to take action to prevent the fraudulent abuse of 
NANP resources. The Commission observed that illegally spoofed calls 
exploit numbering resources whenever they transit any portion of the 
voice network--including the networks of intermediate providers and 
that preventing such calls from entering an intermediate provider's or 
terminating voice service provider's network is designed to protect 
consumers from illegally spoofed calls. The Commission found that the 
Truth in Caller ID Act provided additional authority for its actions to 
protect voice service subscribers from illegally spoofed calls.
    82. The Commission concluded that it had the authority to adopt 
these requirements pursuant to sections 201(b), 202(a), and 251(e) of 
the Act, as well as the Truth in Caller ID Act, and its ancillary 
authority. Sections 201(b) and 202(a) provide the Commission with broad 
authority to adopt rules governing just and reasonable practices of 
common carriers. Accordingly, the Commission found that the new 
blocking rules were clearly within the scope of its sections 201(b) and 
202(a) authority and that it is essential that the rules apply to all 
voice service providers, applying its ancillary authority in section 
4(i). The Commission also found that section 251(e) and the Truth in 
Caller ID Act provided the basis to prescribe rules to prevent the 
unlawful spoofing of caller ID and abuse of NANP resources by all voice 
service providers, a category that includes VoIP providers and, in the 
context of its call blocking orders, intermediate providers. The 
Commission concludes that the same authority provides a basis to adopt 
the mitigation obligations it adopts in this document to the extent 
that providers are acting as common carriers.
    83. While the Commission concludes that its direct sources of 
authority provide an ample basis to adopt its proposed rules on all 
providers, its ancillary authority in section 4(i) provides an 
independent basis to do so with respect to providers that have not been 
classified as common carriers. The Commission may exercise ancillary 
jurisdiction when two conditions are satisfied: (1) the Commission's 
general jurisdictional grant under Title I of the Communications Act 
covers the regulated subject; and (2) the regulations are reasonably 
ancillary to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily 
mandated responsibilities. The Commission concludes that the 
regulations adopted in this document satisfy the first prong because 
providers that interconnect with the public switched telephone network 
and exchange IP traffic clearly offer ``communication by wire and 
radio.''
    84. With regard to the second prong, requiring providers to comply 
with its proposed rules is reasonably ancillary to the Commission's 
effective performance of its statutory responsibilities under sections 
201(b), 202(a), and 251(e) of the Communications Act and the Truth in 
Caller ID Act as described above. With respect to sections 201(b) and 
202(a), absent application of its proposed rules to providers that are 
not classified as common carriers, originators of robocalls could 
circumvent the Commission's proposed scheme by sending calls only via 
providers that

[[Page 40110]]

have not yet been classified as common carriers.
    85. Enforcement. The Commission adopts its additional enforcement 
rules above pursuant to sections 501, 502, and 503 of the Act. These 
provisions allow the Commission to take enforcement action against 
common carriers as well as providers not classified as common carriers 
following a citation. The Commission relies on this same authority to 
revise Sec.  1.80 of its rules by adding new maximum and base 
forfeiture amounts.

II. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    86. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), as 
amended, an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was 
incorporated into the FNPRM adopted in May 2022 (Fifth Caller ID 
Authentication FNPRM). The Commission sought written public comment on 
the proposals in the Fifth Caller ID Authentication FNPRM, including 
comment on the IRFA. The comments received are discussed below. This 
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the RFA.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Order

    87. This document takes important steps in the fight against 
illegal robocalls by strengthening caller ID authentication 
obligations, expanding robocall mitigation rules, and granting an 
indefinite extension for small voice service providers that are also 
satellite providers originating calls using NANP numbers on the basis 
of undue hardship. The decisions the Commission makes here protect 
consumers from unwanted and illegal calls while balancing the 
legitimate interests of callers placing lawful calls.
    88. First, this document requires any non-gateway intermediate 
provider that receives an unauthenticated SIP call directly from an 
originating provider to authenticate the call. Second, it requires non-
gateway intermediate providers subject to the authentication obligation 
to comply with, at a minimum, the version of the standards in effect on 
December 31, 2023, along with any errata. Third, it requires all 
providers--including intermediate providers and voice service providers 
without the facilities necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN--to: (1) take 
``reasonable steps'' to mitigate illegal robocall traffic; (2) submit a 
certification to the Robocall Mitigation Database regarding their STIR/
SHAKEN implementation status along with other identifying information; 
and (3) submit a robocall mitigation plan to the Robocall Mitigation 
Database. Fourth, it requires all providers to commit to fully respond 
to traceback requests from the Commission, law enforcement, and the 
industry traceback consortium, and to cooperate with such entities in 
investigating and stopping illegal robocallers that use its services to 
originate, carry, or process illegal robocalls. Fifth, it requires 
downstream providers to block traffic received directly from non-
gateway intermediate providers that have not submitted a certification 
in the Robocall Mitigation Database or have been removed through 
enforcement actions. Finally, this document grants an ongoing STIR/
SHAKEN implementation extension on the basis of undue hardship for 
satellite providers that are small service providers using NANP numbers 
to originate calls.

B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response 
to the IRFA

    89. There were no comments raised that specifically addressed the 
proposed rules and policies presented in the Fifth Caller ID 
Authentication FNPRM IRFA. Nonetheless, the Commission considered the 
potential impact of the rules proposed in the IRFA on small entities 
and took steps where appropriate and feasible to reduce the compliance 
burden for small entities in order to reduce the economic impact of the 
rules enacted herein on such entities.

C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration

    90. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended 
the RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the 
proposed rules as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not 
file any comments in response to the proposed rules in this proceeding.

D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which 
Rules Will Apply

    91. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where 
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be 
affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the 
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small 
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``mall governmental 
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same 
meaning as the term ``small-business concern'' under the Small Business 
Act. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 601(3), the statutory definition of a small 
business applies unless an agency, after consultation with the Office 
of Advocacy of the SBA and after opportunity for public comment, 
establishes one or more definitions of such term which are appropriate 
to the activities of the agency and publishes such definition(s) in the 
Federal Register. A ``small-business concern'' is one which: (1) is 
independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of 
operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the 
SBA.
    92. Small Businesses, Small Organizations, Small Governmental 
Jurisdictions. The Commission's actions, over time, may affect small 
entities that are not easily categorized at present. The Commission 
therefore describes, at the outset, three broad groups of small 
entities that could be directly affected herein. First, while there are 
industry specific size standards for small businesses that are used in 
the regulatory flexibility analysis, according to data from the SBA 
Office of Advocacy, in general a small business is an independent 
business having fewer than 500 employees. These types of small 
businesses represent 99.9% of all businesses in the United States, 
which translates to 32.5 million businesses.
    93. Next, the type of small entity described as a ``small 
organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is 
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.'' 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a revenue benchmark of $50,000 
or less to delineate its annual electronic filing requirements for 
small exempt organizations. The IRS benchmark is similar to the 
population of less than 50,000 benchmark in 5 U.S.C. 601(5) that is 
used to define a small governmental jurisdiction. Therefore, the IRS 
benchmark has been used to estimate the number small organizations in 
this small entity description. Nationwide, for tax year 2020, there 
were approximately 447,689 small exempt organizations in the U.S. 
reporting revenues of $50,000 or less according to the registration and 
tax data for exempt organizations available from the IRS. The IRS 
Exempt Organization Business Master File (E.O. BMF) Extract provides 
information on all registered tax-exempt/non-profit organizations. The 
data utilized for purposes of this description was extracted from the 
IRS E.O. BMF data for businesses for the tax year 2020 with revenue 
less than or equal to $50,000,

[[Page 40111]]

for Region 1--Northeast Area (58,577), Region 2--Mid-Atlantic and Great 
Lakes Areas (175,272), and Region 3--Gulf Coast and Pacific Coast Areas 
(213,840) that includes the continental U.S., Alaska, and Hawaii. This 
data does not include information for Puerto Rico.
    94. Finally, the small entity described as a ``small governmental 
jurisdiction'' is defined generally as ``governments of cities, 
counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special 
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' U.S. Census 
Bureau data from the 2017 Census of Governments indicate there were 
90,075 local governmental jurisdictions consisting of general purpose 
governments and special purpose governments in the United States. The 
Census of Governments survey is conducted every five (5) years 
compiling data for years ending with ``2'' and ``7''. Local 
governmental jurisdictions are made up of general purpose governments 
(county, municipal, and town or township) and special purpose 
governments (special districts and independent school districts). Of 
this number there were 36,931 general purpose governments (county, 
municipal and town or township) with populations of less than 50,000 
and 12,040 special purpose governments--independent school districts 
with enrollment populations of less than 50,000. There were 2,105 
county governments with populations less than 50,000. This category 
does not include subcounty (municipal and township) governments. There 
were 18,729 municipal and 16,097 town and township governments with 
populations less than 50,000. There were 12,040 independent school 
districts with enrollment populations less than 50,000. While the 
special purpose governments category also includes local special 
district governments, the 2017 Census of Governments data does not 
provide data aggregated based on population size for the special 
purpose governments category. Therefore, only data from independent 
school districts is included in the special purpose governments 
category. Accordingly, based on the 2017 U.S. Census of Governments 
data, the Commission estimates that at least 48,971 entities fall into 
the category of ``small governmental jurisdictions.'' This total is 
derived from the sum of the number of general purpose governments 
(county, municipal. and town or township) with populations of less than 
50,000 (36,931) and the number of special purpose governments--
independent school districts with enrollment populations of less than 
50,000 (12,040), from the 2017 Census of Governments--Organizations 
tbls. 5, 6 & 10.
    95. Wired Telecommunications Carriers. The U.S. Census Bureau 
defines this industry as establishments primarily engaged in operating 
and/or providing access to transmission facilities and infrastructure 
that they own and/or lease for the transmission of voice, data, text, 
sound, and video using wired communications networks. Transmission 
facilities may be based on a single technology or a combination of 
technologies. Establishments in this industry use the wired 
telecommunications network facilities that they operate to provide a 
variety of services, such as wired telephony services, including VoIP 
services, wired (cable) audio and video programming distribution, and 
wired broadband internet services. By exception, establishments 
providing satellite television distribution services using facilities 
and infrastructure that they operate are included in this industry. 
Wired Telecommunications Carriers are also referred to as wireline 
carriers or fixed local service providers. Fixed Local Service 
Providers include the following types of providers: Incumbent Local 
Exchange Carriers (ILECs), Competitive Access Providers (CAPs) and 
Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs), Cable/Coax CLECs, 
Interconnected VOIP Providers, Non-Interconnected VOIP Providers, 
Shared-Tenant Service Providers, Audio Bridge Service Providers, and 
Other Local Service Providers. Local Resellers fall into another U.S. 
Census Bureau industry group and therefore data for these providers is 
not included in this industry.
    96. The SBA small business size standard for Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer 
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there 
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of 
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. The 
available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise 
estimate of the number of firms that meet the SBA size standard. 
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service 
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 5,183 providers 
that reported they were engaged in the provision of fixed local 
services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,737 
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's 
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered 
small entities.
    97. Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the Commission nor the 
SBA has developed a size standard for small businesses specifically 
applicable to local exchange services. Providers of these services 
include both incumbent and competitive local exchange service 
providers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry 
with an SBA small business size standard. Wired Telecommunications 
Carriers are also referred to as wireline carriers or fixed local 
service providers. Fixed Local Exchange Service Providers include the 
following types of providers: Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers 
(ILECs), Competitive Access Providers (CAPs) and Competitive Local 
Exchange Carriers (CLECs), Cable/Coax CLECs, Interconnected VOIP 
Providers, Non-Interconnected VOIP Providers, Shared-Tenant Service 
Providers, Audio Bridge Service Providers, Local Resellers, and Other 
Local Service Providers. The SBA small business size standard for Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer 
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there 
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of 
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. The 
available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise 
estimate of the number of firms that meet the SBA size standard. 
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service 
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 5,183 providers 
that reported they were fixed local exchange service providers. Of 
these providers, the Commission estimates that 4,737 providers have 
1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business 
size standard, most of these providers can be considered small 
entities.
    98. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the 
Commission nor the SBA have developed a small business size standard 
specifically for incumbent local exchange carriers. Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry with an SBA small 
business size standard. The SBA small business size standard for Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer 
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there 
were 3,054 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of 
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. The 
available U.S. Census

[[Page 40112]]

Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of 
firms that meet the SBA size standard. Additionally, based on 
Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of 
December 31, 2020, there were 1,227 providers that reported they were 
incumbent local exchange service providers. Of these providers, the 
Commission estimates that 929 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. 
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, the 
Commission estimates that the majority of incumbent local exchange 
carriers can be considered small entities.
    99. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (LECs). Neither the 
Commission nor the SBA has developed a size standard for small 
businesses specifically applicable to local exchange services. 
Providers of these services include several types of competitive local 
exchange service providers. Competitive Local Exchange Service 
Providers include the following types of providers: Competitive Access 
Providers (CAPs) and Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs), 
Cable/Coax CLECs, Interconnected VOIP Providers, Non-Interconnected 
VOIP Providers, Shared-Tenant Service Providers, Audio Bridge Service 
Providers, Local Resellers, and Other Local Service Providers. Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers is the closest industry with a SBA small 
business size standard. The SBA small business size standard for Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers classifies firms having 1,500 or fewer 
employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there 
were 3,054 firms that operated in this industry for the entire year. Of 
this number, 2,964 firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. The 
available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a more precise 
estimate of the number of firms that meet the SBA size standard. 
Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service 
Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 3,956 providers 
that reported they were competitive local exchange service providers. 
Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 3,808 providers have 
1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small business 
size standard, most of these providers can be considered small 
entities.
    100. Interexchange Carriers (IXCs). Neither the Commission nor the 
SBA have developed a small business size standard specifically for 
Interexchange Carriers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the 
closest industry with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small 
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies 
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data 
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms that operated in this 
industry for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with 
fewer than 250 employees. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does 
not provide a more precise estimate of the number of firms that meet 
the SBA size standard. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 
2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, 
there were 151 providers that reported they were engaged in the 
provision of interexchange services. Of these providers, the Commission 
estimates that 131 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. 
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, the 
Commission estimates that the majority of providers in this industry 
can be considered small entities.
    101. Cable System Operators (Telecom Act Standard). The 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, contains a size standard for a 
``small cable operator,'' which is a cable operator that, directly or 
through an affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than one percent of 
all subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with any 
entity or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate exceed 
$250,000,000. For purposes of the Telecom Act Standard, the Commission 
determined that a cable system operator that serves fewer than 677,000 
subscribers, either directly or through affiliates, will meet the 
definition of a small cable operator based on the cable subscriber 
count established in a 2001 Public Notice. Based on industry data, only 
six cable system operators have more than 677, 000 subscribers. 
Accordingly, the Commission estimates that the majority of cable system 
operators are small under this size standard. The Commission notes 
however, that it neither requests nor collects information on whether 
cable system operators are affiliated with entities whose gross annual 
revenues exceed $250 million. The Commission does receive such 
information on a case-by-case basis if a cable operator appeals a local 
franchise authority's finding that the operator does not qualify as a 
small cable operator pursuant to Sec.  76.901(e) of the Commission's 
rules. Therefore, the Commission is unable at this time to estimate 
with greater precision the number of cable system operators that would 
qualify as small cable operators under the definition in the 
Communications Act.
    102. Other Toll Carriers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has 
developed a definition for small businesses specifically applicable to 
Other Toll Carriers. This category includes toll carriers that do not 
fall within the categories of interexchange carriers, operator service 
providers, prepaid calling card providers, satellite service carriers, 
or toll resellers. Wired Telecommunications Carriers is the closest 
industry with a SBA small business size standard. The SBA small 
business size standard for Wired Telecommunications Carriers classifies 
firms having 1,500 or fewer employees as small. U.S. Census Bureau data 
for 2017 show that there were 3,054 firms in this industry that 
operated for the entire year. Of this number, 2,964 firms operated with 
fewer than 250 employees. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does 
not provide a more precise estimate of the number of firms that meet 
the SBA size standard. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 
2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, 
there were 115 providers that reported they were engaged in the 
provision of other toll services. Of these providers, the Commission 
estimates that 113 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. 
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of 
these providers can be considered small entities.
    103. Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite). This 
industry comprises establishments engaged in operating and maintaining 
switching and transmission facilities to provide communications via the 
airwaves. Establishments in this industry have spectrum licenses and 
provide services using that spectrum, such as cellular services, paging 
services, wireless internet access, and wireless video services. The 
SBA size standard for this industry classifies a business as small if 
it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show 
that there were 2,893 firms in this industry that operated for the 
entire year. Of that number, 2,837 firms employed fewer than 250 
employees. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a 
more precise estimate of the number of firms that meet the SBA size 
standard. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal 
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 797 
providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of wireless 
services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 715 
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the

[[Page 40113]]

SBA's small business size standard, most of these providers can be 
considered small entities.
    104. Satellite Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms 
primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other 
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by 
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of 
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications. Satellite 
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth 
station operators. The SBA small business size standard for this 
industry classifies a business with $35 million or less in annual 
receipts as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 firms 
in this industry operated for the entire year. Of this number, 242 
firms had revenue of less than $25 million. The available U.S. Census 
Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of 
firms that meet the SBA size standard. The Commission also notes that 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau glossary, the terms receipts and 
revenues are used interchangeably. Additionally, based on Commission 
data in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of December 
31, 2020, there were 71 providers that reported they were engaged in 
the provision of satellite telecommunications services. Of these 
providers, the Commission estimates that approximately 48 providers 
have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's small 
business size standard, a little more than of these providers can be 
considered small entities.
    105. Local Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA have 
developed a small business size standard specifically for Local 
Resellers. Telecommunications Resellers is the closest industry with a 
SBA small business size standard. The Telecommunications Resellers 
industry comprises establishments engaged in purchasing access and 
network capacity from owners and operators of telecommunications 
networks and reselling wired and wireless telecommunications services 
(except satellite) to businesses and households. Establishments in this 
industry resell telecommunications; they do not operate transmission 
facilities and infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) 
are included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard for 
Telecommunications Resellers classifies a business as small if it has 
1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 
1,386 firms in this industry provided resale services for the entire 
year. Of that number, 1,375 firms operated with fewer than 250 
employees. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a 
more precise estimate of the number of firms that meet the SBA size 
standard. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal 
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 293 
providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of local 
resale services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 289 
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's 
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered 
small entities.
    106. Toll Resellers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA have 
developed a small business size standard specifically for Toll 
Resellers. Telecommunications Resellers is the closest industry with an 
SBA small business size standard. The Telecommunications Resellers 
industry comprises establishments engaged in purchasing access and 
network capacity from owners and operators of telecommunications 
networks and reselling wired and wireless telecommunications services 
(except satellite) to businesses and households. Establishments in this 
industry resell telecommunications; they do not operate transmission 
facilities and infrastructure. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) 
are included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard for 
Telecommunications Resellers classifies a business as small if it has 
1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 
1,386 firms in this industry provided resale services for the entire 
year. Of that number, 1,375 firms operated with fewer than 250 
employees. The available U.S. Census Bureau data does not provide a 
more precise estimate of the number of firms that meet the SBA size 
standard. Additionally, based on Commission data in the 2021 Universal 
Service Monitoring Report, as of December 31, 2020, there were 518 
providers that reported they were engaged in the provision of toll 
services. Of these providers, the Commission estimates that 495 
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently, using the SBA's 
small business size standard, most of these providers can be considered 
small entities.
    107. Prepaid Calling Card Providers. Neither the Commission nor the 
SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically for 
prepaid calling card providers. Telecommunications Resellers is the 
closest industry with a SBA small business size standard. The 
Telecommunications Resellers industry comprises establishments engaged 
in purchasing access and network capacity from owners and operators of 
telecommunications networks and reselling wired and wireless 
telecommunications services (except satellite) to businesses and 
households. Establishments in this industry resell telecommunications; 
they do not operate transmission facilities and infrastructure. Mobile 
virtual network operators (MVNOs) are included in this industry. The 
SBA small business size standard for Telecommunications Resellers 
classifies a business as small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. U.S. 
Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 1,386 firms in this industry 
provided resale services for the entire year. Of that number, 1,375 
firms operated with fewer than 250 employees. The available U.S. Census 
Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of 
firms that meet the SBA size standard. Additionally, based on 
Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of 
December 31, 2020, there were 58 providers that reported they were 
engaged in the provision of payphone services. Of these providers, the 
Commission estimates that 57 providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. 
Consequently, using the SBA's small business size standard, most of 
these providers can be considered small entities.
    108. All Other Telecommunications. This industry is comprised of 
establishments primarily engaged in providing specialized 
telecommunications services, such as satellite tracking, communications 
telemetry, and radar station operation. This industry also includes 
establishments primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal 
stations and associated facilities connected with one or more 
terrestrial systems and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, 
and receiving telecommunications from, satellite systems. Providers of 
internet services (e.g., dial-up internet Service Providers) or VoIP 
services, via client-supplied telecommunications connections are also 
included in this industry. The SBA small business size standard for 
this industry classifies firms with annual receipts of $35 million or 
less as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 
1,079 firms in this industry that operated for the entire year. Of 
those firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than $25 million. The available 
U.S. Census

[[Page 40114]]

Bureau data does not provide a more precise estimate of the number of 
firms that meet the SBA size standard. The Commission also notes that 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau glossary, the terms receipts and 
revenues are used interchangeably. Based on this data, the Commission 
estimates that the majority of ``All Other Telecommunications'' firms 
can be considered small.

E. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities

    109. This document requires providers to meet certain obligations. 
These changes affect small and large companies equally and apply 
equally to all the classes of regulated entities identified above. 
Specifically, this document adopts a limited intermediate provider 
authentication requirement. It requires a non-gateway intermediate 
provider that receives an unauthenticated SIP call directly from an 
originating provider to authenticate the call. The requirement will 
arise in limited circumstances--where the originating provider failed 
to comply with their own authentication obligation, or where the call 
is sent directly to an intermediate provider from the limited subset of 
originating providers that lack an authentication obligation. Indeed, 
if the first intermediate provider in the call path implements 
contractual provisions with its upstream originating providers stating 
that it will only accept authenticated traffic, it will completely 
avoid the need to authenticate calls. Non-gateway intermediate 
providers that are subject to the authentication obligation have the 
flexibility to assign the level of attestation appropriate to the call 
based on the current version of the standards and the call information 
available. A non-gateway intermediate provider using non-IP network 
technology in its network has the flexibility to either upgrade its 
network to allow for the initiation, maintenance, and termination of 
SIP calls and fully implement the STIR/SHAKEN framework, or provide the 
Commission, upon request, with documented proof that it is 
participating, either on its own or through a representative, as a 
member of a working group, industry standards group, or consortium that 
is working to develop a non-IP solution, or actively testing such a 
solution. Under this rule, a non-gateway intermediate provider 
satisfies its obligation if it participates through a third-party 
representative, such as a trade association of which it is a member or 
vendor.
    110. This document also requires all providers to take ``reasonable 
steps'' to mitigate illegal robocalls. The new classes of providers 
subject to the ``reasonable steps'' standard are not required to 
implement specific measures to meet that standard, but providers' 
programs must include detailed practices that can reasonably be 
expected to significantly reduce the carrying, processing, or 
origination of illegal robocalls. In addition, all providers must 
implement a robocall mitigation program and comply with the practices 
that its program requires. The providers must also commit to respond 
fully to all traceback requests from the Commission, law enforcement, 
and the industry traceback consortium, and to cooperate with such 
entities in investigating and stopping illegal robocalls.
    111. All providers must submit a certification and robocall 
mitigation plan to the Robocall Mitigation Database regardless of 
whether they are required to implement STIR/SHAKEN, including providers 
without the facilities necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN. The robocall 
mitigation plan must describe the specific ``reasonable steps'' that 
the provider has taken to avoid, as applicable, the origination, 
carrying, or processing of illegal robocall traffic. This document also 
requires providers to ``describe with particularity'' certain 
mitigation techniques in their robocall mitigation plans. Specifically, 
(1) voice service providers must describe how they are complying with 
their existing obligation to take affirmative effective measures to 
prevent new and renewing customers from originating illegal calls; (2) 
non-gateway intermediate providers and voice service providers must 
describe any ``know-your-upstream provider'' procedures; and (3) all 
providers must describe any call analytics systems used to identify and 
block illegal traffic. To comply with the new requirements to describe 
their ``new and renewing customer'' and ``know-your-upstream provider'' 
procedures, providers must describe any contractual provisions with 
end-users or upstream providers designed to mitigate illegal robocalls.
    112. All providers with new filing obligations must submit a 
certification to the Robocall Mitigation Database that includes the 
following baseline information:
    (1) whether the provider has fully, partially, or not implemented 
the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework in the IP portions of its 
network;
    (2) the provider's business name(s) and primary address;
    (3) other business name(s) in use by the provider;
    (4) all business names previously used by the provider;
    (5) whether the provider is a foreign service provider;
    (6) the name, title, department, business address, telephone 
number, and email address of one person within the company responsible 
for addressing robocall mitigation-related issues.
    113. Certifications and robocall mitigations plans must be 
submitted in English or with certified English translation, and 
providers with new filing obligations must update any submitted 
information within 10 business days.
    114. This document also adopts rules requiring providers to submit 
additional information in their Robocall Mitigation certifications. 
Specifically, (1) all providers must submit additional information 
regarding their role(s) in the call chain; (2) all providers asserting 
they do not have an obligation to implement STIR/SHAKEN must include 
more detail regarding the basis of that assertion; (3) all providers 
must certify that they have not been prohibited from filing in the 
Robocall Mitigation Database pursuant to a law enforcement action; (4) 
all providers must state whether they have been subject to a formal 
Commission, law enforcement, or regulatory agency action or 
investigation with accompanying findings of actual or suspected 
wrongdoing due to unlawful robocalling or spoofing and provide 
information concerning any such actions or investigations; and (5) all 
filers must submit their OCN if they have one. Submissions may be made 
confidentially, consistent with the Commission's existing 
confidentiality rules.
    115. This document requires downstream providers to block traffic 
received from a non-gateway intermediate provider that is not listed in 
the Robocall Mitigation Database, either because the provider did not 
file or their certification was removed as part of an enforcement 
action. After receiving notice from the Commission that a provider has 
been removed from the Robocall Mitigation Database, downstream 
providers must block all traffic from the identified provider within 
two business days.

F. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    116. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant 
alternatives that it has considered in reaching its approach, which may 
include the following four alternatives, among

[[Page 40115]]

others: (1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting 
requirements or timetables that take into account the resources 
available to small entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or 
simplification of compliance or reporting requirements under the rule 
for small entities; (3) the use of performance, rather than design, 
standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part 
thereof, for small entities.
    117. Generally, the decisions the Commission made in this document 
apply to all providers, and do not impose unique burdens or benefits on 
small providers. The Commission took several steps to minimize the 
economic impact of the rules adopted in this document on small 
entities.
    118. This document imposes a limited intermediate provider 
authentication obligation that requires the first non-gateway 
intermediate provider in the call chain to authenticate unauthenticated 
calls received directly from an originating provider. Limiting the 
application of the authentication obligation to first non-gateway 
intermediate providers helps reduce the burden on intermediate 
providers, including small providers, and minimizes the potential costs 
associated with a broader authentication requirement for all 
intermediate providers that were identified in the record.
    119. The Commission also allowed flexibility where appropriate to 
ensure that providers, including small providers, can determine the 
best approach for compliance based on the needs of their networks. For 
example, non-gateway intermediate providers have the flexibility to 
assign the level of attestation appropriate to the call based on the 
applicable level of the standards and the available call information. 
Additionally, the new classes of providers subject to the ``reasonable 
steps'' standard have the flexibility to determine which measures to 
use to mitigate illegal robocall traffic on their networks. In reaching 
this approach, the Commission considered and declined to adopt a 
``gross negligence'' standard for evaluating whether a mitigation 
program is sufficient. The Commission also declined to adopt a 
heightened mitigation obligation solely for VoIP providers in order to 
ensure that the obligation applies to providers regardless of the 
technology used to transmit calls. Likewise, the Commission allowed 
non-gateway intermediate providers subject to its call authentication 
requirements that rely on non-IP infrastructure the flexibility to 
either upgrade their networks to implement STIR/SHAKEN or participate 
as a member of a working group, industry standards group, or consortium 
that is working to develop a non-IP caller ID authentication solution. 
This flexibility will reduce compliance costs for non-gateway 
intermediate providers, including small providers. The Commission also 
declined to require providers to submit information concerning 
inquiries from law enforcement or regulatory agencies or investigations 
that do not include findings of actual or suspected wrongdoing. And the 
Commission declined to require Robocall Mitigation Database filers to 
include certain additional identifying information discussed in the 
Fourth Caller ID Authentication FNPRM beyond their OCN.
    120. This document also grants an indefinite STIR/SHAKEN 
implementation extension to satellite providers that are small voice 
service providers and use NANP numbers to originate calls.

G. Report to Congress

    121. The Commission will send a copy of the Sixth Report and Order, 
including this FRFA, in a report to be sent to Congress and the 
Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review 
Act. In addition, the Commission will send a copy of the Sixth Report 
and Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of 
the Small Business Administration. A copy of the Sixth Report and Order 
(or summaries thereof) will also be published in the Federal Register.

III. Procedural Matters

    122. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. As required by the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), an Initial Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated into the Fifth Caller ID 
Authentication FNPRM. The Commission sought written public comment on 
the possible significant economic impact on small entities regarding 
the proposals addressed in the Fifth Caller ID Authentication FNPRM, 
including comments on the IRFA. Pursuant to the RFA, a Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) is set forth in Section II, above. The 
Commission's Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference 
Information Center, will send a copy of the Sixth Report and Order, 
including the FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration (SBA).
    123. Paperwork Reduction Act. This document may contain new or 
modified information collection requirements subject to the PRA, Public 
Law 104-13. Specifically, the rules adopted in 47 CFR 64.6303(c) and 
64.6305(d), (e), and (f) may require new or modified information 
collections. All such new or modified information collection 
requirements will be submitted to OMB for review under section 3507(d) 
of the PRA. OMB, the general public, and other Federal agencies will be 
invited to comment on the new or modified information collection 
requirements contained in this proceeding. In addition, the Commission 
notes that pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 
Public Law 107-198, it previously sought specific comment on how the 
Commission might further reduce the information collection burden for 
small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. In this document, 
the Commission describes several steps it has taken to minimize the 
information collection burdens on small entities.
    124. Congressional Review Act. The Commission has determined, and 
the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 
OMB, concurs, that this rule is ``major'' under the Congressional 
Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of the 
Sixth Report and Order to Congress and the Government Accountability 
Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

IV. Ordering Clauses

    125. Accordingly, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), 201, 202, 214, 
217, 227, 227b, 251(e), 303(r), 501, 502, and 503 of the Communications 
Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 154(j), 201, 202, 214, 217, 
227, 227b, 251(e), 303(r), 501, 502, and 503, it is ordered that the 
Sixth Report and Order is adopted.
    126. It is further ordered that parts 0, 1, and 64 of the 
Commission's rules are amended as set forth in the Final Rules.
    127. It is further ordered that, pursuant to Sec. Sec.  1.4(b)(1) 
and 1.103(a) of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.4(b)(1), 1.103(a), the 
Sixth Report and Order, including the rule revisions and redesignations 
described in the Final Rules, shall be effective 60 days after 
publication in the Federal Register, except that: (1) the additions of 
47 CFR 64.6303(c) and 64.6305(f) and the revisions to redesignated 47 
CFR 64.6305(d) and (e) as described in the Final Rules will not be 
effective until OMB completes any review that the Wireline Competition 
Bureau determines is required under the Paperwork Reduction Act; and 
(2) the revisions to redesignated 47 CFR 64.6305(g) as described in the 
Final

[[Page 40116]]

Rules will not be effective until an effective date is announced by the 
Wireline Competition Bureau. The Commission directs the Wireline 
Competition Bureau to announce effective dates for the additions of and 
revisions to 47 CFR 64.6303(c) and 64.6305(d) through (g), as 
redesignated by the Sixth Report and Order, by subsequent notification.
    128. It is further ordered that the Office of the Managing 
Director, Performance Evaluation and Records Management, shall send a 
copy of the Sixth Report and Order in a report to be sent to Congress 
and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional 
Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
    129. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a 
copy of the Sixth Report and Order, including the Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration.

List of Subjects

47 CFR Part 0

    Authority delegations (Government agencies), Communications, 
Communications common carriers, Classified information, Freedom of 
information, Government publications, Infants and children, 
Organization and functions (Government agencies), Postal Service, 
Privacy, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Sunshine Act, 
Telecommunications.

47 CFR Part 1

    Administrative practice and procedure, Civil rights, Claims, 
Communications, Communications common carriers, Communications 
equipment, Cuba, Drug abuse, Environmental impact statements, Equal 
access to justice, Equal employment opportunity, Federal buildings and 
facilities, Government employees, Historic preservation, Income taxes, 
Indemnity payments, Individuals with disabilities, internet, 
Investigations, Lawyers, Metric system, Penalties, Radio, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Satellites, Security measures, 
Telecommunications, Telephone, Television, Wages.

47 CFR Part 64

    Carrier equipment, Communications common carriers, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Telecommunications, Telephone.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.

Final Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR parts 0, 1, and 64 as follows:

PART 0--COMMISSION ORGANIZATION

0
1. The authority citation for part 0 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 155, 225, and 409, 
unless otherwise noted.

Subpart A--Organization

0
2. Amend Sec.  0.111 by revising paragraph (a)(28)(i) and (ii) and 
adding paragraph (a)(29) to read as follows:


Sec.  0.111   Functions of the Bureau.

    (a) * * *
    (28) * * *
    (i) Whose certification required by Sec.  64.6305 of this chapter 
is deficient after giving that provider notice and an opportunity to 
cure the deficiency; or
    (ii) Who accepts calls directly from a provider not listed in the 
Robocall Mitigation Database in violation of Sec.  64.6305(g) of this 
chapter.
    (29) Take enforcement action, including revoking an existing 
section 214 authorization, license, or instrument for any entity that 
has repeatedly violated Sec.  64.6301, Sec.  64.6302, or Sec.  64.6305 
of this chapter. The Commission or the Enforcement Bureau under 
delegated authority will provide prior notice of its intent to revoke 
an existing license or instrument of authorization and follow 
applicable revocation procedures, including providing the authorization 
holder with a written opportunity to demonstrate why revocation is not 
warranted.
* * * * *

PART 1--PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

0
3. The authority citation for part 1 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  47 U.S.C. chs. 2, 5, 9, 13; 28 U.S.C. 2461 note, 
unless otherwise noted.

Subpart A--General Rules of Practice and Procedure

0
4. Amend Sec.  1.80 by:
0
a. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(9) through (11) as paragraphs (b)(10) 
through (12);
0
b. Adding new paragraph (b)(9);
0
c. Revising newly redesignated paragraph (b)(10);
0
d. In newly redesignated paragraph (b)(11):
0
i. Revising table 1;
0
ii. Revising the headings for tables 2 and 3;
0
iii. Revising the heading and footnote 1 for table 4; and
0
iv. Revising note 2 following table 4;
0
e. In newly redesignated paragraph (b)(12)(ii), revising the heading 
for table 5; and
0
f. Revising note 3 following table 5 to newly redesignated paragraph 
(b)(12)(ii).
    The addition and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  1.80   Forfeiture proceedings.

* * * * *
    (9) Forfeiture penalty for a failure to block. Any person 
determined to have failed to block illegal robocalls pursuant to 
Sec. Sec.  64.6305(g) and 64.1200(n) of this chapter shall be liable to 
the United States for a forfeiture penalty of no more than $23,727 for 
each violation, to be assessed on a per-call basis.
    (10) Maximum forfeiture penalty for any case not previously 
covered. In any case not covered in paragraphs (b)(1) through (9) of 
this section, the amount of any forfeiture penalty determined under 
this section shall not exceed $23,727 for each violation or each day of 
a continuing violation, except that the amount assessed for any 
continuing violation shall not exceed a total of $177,951 for any 
single act or failure to act described in paragraph (a) of this 
section.
    (11) * * *

 Table 1 to Paragraph (b)(11)--Base Amounts for Section 503 Forfeitures
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Violation
                         Forfeitures                            amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Misrepresentation/lack of candor............................       (\1\)
Failure to file required DODC required forms, and/or filing      $15,000
 materially inaccurate or incomplete DODC information.......
Construction and/or operation without an instrument of            10,000
 authorization for the service..............................
Failure to comply with prescribed lighting and/or marking...      10,000

[[Page 40117]]

 
Violation of public file rules..............................      10,000
Violation of political rules: Reasonable access, lowest unit       9,000
 charge, equal opportunity, and discrimination..............
Unauthorized substantial transfer of control................       8,000
Violation of children's television commercialization or            8,000
 programming requirements...................................
Violations of rules relating to distress and safety                8,000
 frequencies................................................
False distress communications...............................       8,000
EAS equipment not installed or operational..................       8,000
Alien ownership violation...................................       8,000
Failure to permit inspection................................       7,000
Transmission of indecent/obscene materials..................       7,000
Interference................................................       7,000
Importation or marketing of unauthorized equipment..........       7,000
Exceeding of authorized antenna height......................       5,000
Fraud by wire, radio or television..........................       5,000
Unauthorized discontinuance of service......................       5,000
Use of unauthorized equipment...............................       5,000
Exceeding power limits......................................       4,000
Failure to Respond to Commission communications.............       4,000
Violation of sponsorship ID requirements....................       4,000
Unauthorized emissions......................................       4,000
Using unauthorized frequency................................       4,000
Failure to engage in required frequency coordination........       4,000
Construction or operation at unauthorized location..........       4,000
Violation of requirements pertaining to broadcasting of            4,000
 lotteries or contests......................................
Violation of transmitter control and metering requirements..       3,000
Failure to file required forms or information...............       3,000
Per call violations of the robocall blocking rules..........       2,500
Failure to make required measurements or conduct required          2,000
 monitoring.................................................
Failure to provide station ID...............................       1,000
Unauthorized pro forma transfer of control..................       1,000
Failure to maintain required records........................       1,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 2 to Paragraph (b)(11)--Violations Unique to the Service

* * * * *

Table 3 to Paragraph (b)(11)--Adjustment Criteria for Section 503 
Forfeitures

* * * * *

Table 4 to Paragraph (b)(11)--Non-Section 503 Forfeitures That Are 
Affected by the Downward Adjustment Factors \1\

* * * * *
    \1\ Unlike section 503 of the Act, which establishes maximum 
forfeiture amounts, other sections of the Act, with two exceptions, 
state prescribed amounts of forfeitures for violations of the 
relevant section. These amounts are then subject to mitigation or 
remission under section 504 of the Act. One exception is section 223 
of the Act, which provides a maximum forfeiture per day. For 
convenience, the Commission will treat this amount as if it were a 
prescribed base amount, subject to downward adjustments. The other 
exception is section 227(e) of the Act, which provides maximum 
forfeitures per violation, and for continuing violations. The 
Commission will apply the factors set forth in section 503(b)(2)(E) 
of the Act and this table 4 to determine the amount of the penalty 
to assess in any particular situation. The amounts in this table 4 
are adjusted for inflation pursuant to the Debt Collection 
Improvement Act of 1996 (DCIA), 28 U.S.C. 2461. These non-section 
503 forfeitures may be adjusted downward using the ``Downward 
Adjustment Criteria'' shown for section 503 forfeitures in table 3 
to this paragraph (b)(11).


    Note 2 to paragraph (b)(11):  Guidelines for Assessing 
Forfeitures. The Commission and its staff may use the guidelines in 
tables 1 through 4 of this paragraph (b)(11) in particular cases. 
The Commission and its staff retain the discretion to issue a higher 
or lower forfeiture than provided in the guidelines, to issue no 
forfeiture at all, or to apply alternative or additional sanctions 
as permitted by the statute. The forfeiture ceilings per violation 
or per day for a continuing violation stated in section 503 of the 
Communications Act and the Commission's rules are described in 
paragraph (b)(12) of this section. These statutory maxima became 
effective September 13, 2013. Forfeitures issued under other 
sections of the Act are dealt with separately in table 4 to this 
paragraph (b)(11).

    (12) * * *
    (ii) * * *

Table 5 to Paragraph (b)(12)(ii)

* * * * *

    Note 3 to paragraph (b)(12): Pursuant to Public Law 104-134, the 
first inflation adjustment cannot exceed 10 percent of the statutory 
maximum amount.

* * * * *

PART 64--MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS

0
5. The authority citation for part 64 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154, 201, 202, 217, 218, 220, 
222, 225, 226, 227, 227b, 228, 251(a), 251(e), 254(k), 255, 262, 
276, 403(b)(2)(B), (c), 616, 617, 620, 1401-1473, unless otherwise 
noted; Pub. L. 115-141, Div. P, sec. 503, 132 Stat. 348, 1091.

Subpart HH--Caller ID Authentication

0
6. Amend Sec.  64.6300 by redesignating paragraphs (i) through (n) as 
paragraphs (j) through (o) and adding new paragraph (i) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  64.6300   Definitions.

* * * * *
    (i) Non-gateway intermediate provider. The term ``non-gateway 
intermediate provider'' means any entity that is an intermediate 
provider as that term is defined by paragraph (g) of this section that 
is not a gateway provider as that term is defined by paragraph (d) of 
this section.
* * * * *

[[Page 40118]]


0
7. Amend Sec.  64.6302 by adding paragraph (d) to read as follows:


Sec.  64.6302  Caller ID authentication by intermediate providers.

* * * * *
    (d) Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of this section, a non-gateway 
intermediate provider must, not later than December 31, 2023, 
authenticate caller identification information for all calls it 
receives directly from an originating provider and for which the caller 
identification information has not been authenticated and which it will 
exchange with another provider as a SIP call, unless that non-gateway 
intermediate provider is subject to an applicable extension in Sec.  
64.6304.


Sec.  64.6303  [Amended]

0
8. Amend Sec.  63.6303 by adding reserved paragraph (c).

0
9. Delayed indefinitely, further amend Sec.  63.6303 by adding 
paragraph (c) to read as follows:


Sec.  64.6303  Caller ID authentication in non-IP networks.

* * * * *
    (c) Except as provided in Sec.  64.6304, not later than December 
31, 2023, a non-gateway intermediate provider receiving a call directly 
from an originating provider shall either:
    (1) Upgrade its entire network to allow for the processing and 
carrying of SIP calls and fully implement the STIR/SHAKEN framework as 
required in Sec.  64.6302(d) throughout its network; or
    (2) Maintain and be ready to provide the Commission on request with 
documented proof that it is participating, either on its own or through 
a representative, including third party representatives, as a member of 
a working group, industry standards group, or consortium that is 
working to develop a non-internet Protocol caller identification 
authentication solution, or actively testing such a solution.

0
10. Amend Sec.  64.6304 by:
0
a. Removing the word ``and'' at the end of paragraph (a)(1)(i);
0
b. Revising paragraph (a)(1)(ii);
0
c. Adding paragraph (a)(1)(iii); and
0
d. Revising paragraphs (b) and (d).
    The revisions and addition read as follows:


Sec.  64.6304  Extension of implementation deadline.

    (a) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (ii) A small voice service provider notified by the Enforcement 
Bureau pursuant to Sec.  0.111(a)(27) of this chapter that fails to 
respond in a timely manner, fails to respond with the information 
requested by the Enforcement Bureau, including credible evidence that 
the robocall traffic identified in the notification is not illegal, 
fails to demonstrate that it taken steps to effectively mitigate the 
traffic, or if the Enforcement Bureau determines the provider violates 
Sec.  64.1200(n)(2), will no longer be exempt from the requirements of 
Sec.  64.6301 beginning 90 days following the date of the Enforcement 
Bureau's determination, unless the extension would otherwise terminate 
earlier pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) introductory text or (a)(1)(i), in 
which case the earlier deadline applies; and
    (iii) Small voice service providers that originate calls via 
satellite using North American Numbering Plan numbers are deemed 
subject to a continuing extension of Sec.  64.6301.
* * * * *
    (b) Voice service providers, gateway providers, and non-gateway 
intermediate providers that cannot obtain an SPC token. Voice service 
providers that are incapable of obtaining an SPC token due to 
Governance Authority policy are exempt from the requirements of Sec.  
64.6301 until they are capable of obtaining an SPC token. Gateway 
providers that are incapable of obtaining an SPC token due to 
Governance Authority policy are exempt from the requirements of Sec.  
64.6302(c) regarding call authentication. Non-gateway intermediate 
providers that are incapable of obtaining an SPC token due to 
Governance Authority policy are exempt from the requirements of Sec.  
64.6302(d) regarding call authentication.
* * * * *
    (d) Non-IP networks. Those portions of a voice service provider, 
gateway provider, or non-gateway intermediate provider's network that 
rely on technology that cannot initiate, maintain, carry, process, and 
terminate SIP calls are deemed subject to a continuing extension. A 
voice service provider subject to the foregoing extension shall comply 
with the requirements of Sec.  64.6303(a) as to the portion of its 
network subject to the extension, a gateway provider subject to the 
foregoing extension shall comply with the requirements of Sec.  
64.6303(b) as to the portion of its network subject to the extension, 
and a non-gateway intermediate provider receiving calls directly from 
an originating provider subject to the foregoing extension shall comply 
with the requirements of Sec.  64.6303(c) as to the portion of its 
network subject to the extension.
* * * * *

0
11. Amend Sec.  64.6305 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a)(1);
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) as paragraphs (d), (e), 
and (g) and adding new paragraph (c);
0
c. Revising newly redesignated paragraphs (d)(3) introductory text, 
(d)(5) introductory text, (e)(2) introductory text, (e)(3) introductory 
text, and (e)(5);
0
d. Adding reserved paragraph (f);
0
e. Revising newly redesignated paragraphs (g)(1) through (3);
0
f. Redesignating paragraph (g)(4) as paragraph (g)(5) and adding new 
reserved paragraph (g)(4); and
0
g. Revising newly redesignated paragraph (g)(5) introductory text.
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  64.6305  Robocall mitigation and certification.

    (a) * * *
    (1) Each voice service provider shall implement an appropriate 
robocall mitigation program.
* * * * *
    (c) Robocall mitigation program requirements for non-gateway 
intermediate providers. (1) Each non-gateway intermediate provider 
shall implement an appropriate robocall mitigation program.
    (2) Any robocall mitigation program implemented pursuant to 
paragraph (c)(1) of this section shall include reasonable steps to 
avoid carrying or processing illegal robocall traffic and shall include 
a commitment to respond fully and in a timely manner to all traceback 
requests from the Commission, law enforcement, and the industry 
traceback consortium, and to cooperate with such entities in 
investigating and stopping any illegal robocallers that use its service 
to carry or process calls.
    (d) * * *
    (3) All certifications made pursuant to paragraphs (d)(1) and (2) 
of this section shall:
* * * * *
    (5) A voice service provider shall update its filings within 10 
business days of any change to the information it must provide pursuant 
to paragraphs (d)(1) through (4) of this section.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (2) A gateway provider shall include the following information in 
its certification made pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section, in

[[Page 40119]]

English or with a certified English translation:
* * * * *
    (3) All certifications made pursuant to paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) 
of this section shall:
* * * * *
    (5) A gateway provider shall update its filings within 10 business 
days to the information it must provide pursuant to paragraphs (e)(1) 
through (4) of this section, subject to the conditions set forth in 
paragraphs (d)(5)(i) and (ii) of this section.
* * * * *
    (f) [Reserved]
    (g) * * *
    (1) Accepting traffic from domestic voice service providers. 
Intermediate providers and voice service providers shall accept calls 
directly from a domestic voice service provider only if that voice 
service provider's filing appears in the Robocall Mitigation Database 
in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section and that filing has 
not been de-listed pursuant to an enforcement action.
    (2) Accepting traffic from foreign providers. Beginning April 11, 
2023, intermediate providers and voice service providers shall accept 
calls directly from a foreign voice service provider or foreign 
intermediate provider that uses North American Numbering Plan resources 
that pertain to the United States in the caller ID field to send voice 
traffic to residential or business subscribers in the United States, 
only if that foreign provider's filing appears in the Robocall 
Mitigation Database in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section 
and that filing has not been de-listed pursuant to an enforcement 
action.
    (3) Accepting traffic from gateway providers. Beginning April 11, 
2023, intermediate providers and voice service providers shall accept 
calls directly from a gateway provider only if that gateway provider's 
filing appears in the Robocall Mitigation Database in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this section, showing that the gateway provider has 
affirmatively submitted the filing, and that filing has not been de-
listed pursuant to an enforcement action.
    (4) [Reserved]
    (5) Public safety safeguards. Notwithstanding paragraphs (g)(1) 
through (4) of this section:
* * * * *

0
12. Delayed indefinitely, further amend Sec.  64.6305 by:
0
a. Revising paragraphs (d)(1) introductory text, (d)(1)(ii) and (iii), 
(d)(2), and (d)(4)(iv) and (v) and adding paragraphs (d)(4)(vi) and 
(vii);
0
b. Revising paragraphs (e)(1) introductory text and (e)(2)(i) through 
(iii);
0
c. Adding paragraph (e)(2)(iv);
0
d. Revising paragraphs (e)(4)(iv) and (v) and adding paragraphs 
(e)(4)(vi) and (vii); and
0
e. Adding paragraphs (f) and (g)(4).
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  64.6305  Robocall mitigation and certification.

* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (1) A voice service provider shall certify that all of the calls 
that it originates on its network are subject to a robocall mitigation 
program consistent with paragraph (a) of this section, that any prior 
certification has not been removed by Commission action and it has not 
been prohibited from filing in the Robocall Mitigation Database by the 
Commission, and to one of the following:
* * * * *
    (ii) It has implemented the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework on 
a portion of its network and all calls it originates on that portion of 
its network are compliant with Sec.  64.6301(a)(1) and (2); or
    (iii) It has not implemented the STIR/SHAKEN authentication 
framework on any portion of its network.
    (2) A voice service provider shall include the following 
information in its certification in English or with a certified English 
translation:
    (i) Identification of the type of extension or extensions the voice 
service provider received under Sec.  64.6304, if the voice service 
provider is not a foreign voice service provider, and the basis for the 
extension or extensions, or an explanation of why it is unable to 
implement STIR/SHAKEN due to a lack of control over the network 
infrastructure necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN;
    (ii) The specific reasonable steps the voice service provider has 
taken to avoid originating illegal robocall traffic as part of its 
robocall mitigation program, including a description of how it complies 
with its obligation to know its customers pursuant to Sec.  
64.1200(n)(3), any procedures in place to know its upstream providers, 
and the analytics system(s) it uses to identify and block illegal 
traffic, including whether it uses any third-party analytics vendor(s) 
and the name(s) of such vendor(s);
    (iii) A statement of the voice service provider's commitment to 
respond fully and in a timely manner to all traceback requests from the 
Commission, law enforcement, and the industry traceback consortium, and 
to cooperate with such entities in investigating and stopping any 
illegal robocallers that use its service to originate calls; and
    (iv) State whether, at any time in the prior two years, the filing 
entity (and/or any entity for which the filing entity shares common 
ownership, management, directors, or control) has been the subject of a 
formal Commission, law enforcement, or regulatory agency action or 
investigation with accompanying findings of actual or suspected 
wrongdoing due to the filing entity transmitting, encouraging, 
assisting, or otherwise facilitating illegal robocalls or spoofing, or 
a deficient Robocall Mitigation Database certification or mitigation 
program description; and, if so, provide a description of any such 
action or investigation, including all law enforcement or regulatory 
agencies involved, the date that any action or investigation was 
commenced, the current status of the action or investigation, a summary 
of the findings of wrongdoing made in connection with the action or 
investigation, and whether any final determinations have been issued.
* * * * *
    (4) * * *
    (iv) Whether the voice service provider is a foreign voice service 
provider;
    (v) The name, title, department, business address, telephone 
number, and email address of one person within the company responsible 
for addressing robocall mitigation-related issues;
    (vi) Whether the voice service provider is:
    (A) A voice service provider with a STIR/SHAKEN implementation 
obligation directly serving end users;
    (B) A voice service provider with a STIR/SHAKEN implementation 
obligation acting as a wholesale provider originating calls on behalf 
of another provider or providers; or
    (C) A voice service provider without a STIR/SHAKEN implementation 
obligation; and
    (vii) The voice service provider's OCN, if it has one.
* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (1) A gateway provider shall certify that all of the calls that it 
carries or processes on its network are subject to a robocall 
mitigation program consistent with paragraph (b)(1) of this section, 
that any prior certification has not been removed by Commission action 
and it

[[Page 40120]]

has not been prohibited from filing in the Robocall Mitigation Database 
by the Commission, and to one of the following:
* * * * *
    (2) * * *
    (i) Identification of the type of extension or extensions the 
gateway provider received under Sec.  64.6304 and the basis for the 
extension or extensions, or an explanation of why it is unable to 
implement STIR/SHAKEN due to a lack of control over the network 
infrastructure necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN;
    (ii) The specific reasonable steps the gateway provider has taken 
to avoid carrying or processing illegal robocall traffic as part of its 
robocall mitigation program, including a description of how it complies 
with its obligation to know its upstream providers pursuant to Sec.  
64.1200(n)(4), the analytics system(s) it uses to identify and block 
illegal traffic, and whether it uses any third-party analytics 
vendor(s) and the name(s) of such vendor(s);
    (iii) A statement of the gateway provider's commitment to respond 
fully and within 24 hours to all traceback requests from the 
Commission, law enforcement, and the industry traceback consortium, and 
to cooperate with such entities in investigating and stopping any 
illegal robocallers that use its service to carry or process calls; and
    (iv) State whether, at any time in the prior two years, the filing 
entity (and/or any entity for which the filing entity shares common 
ownership, management, directors, or control) has been the subject of a 
formal Commission, law enforcement, or regulatory agency action or 
investigation with accompanying findings of actual or suspected 
wrongdoing due to the filing entity transmitting, encouraging, 
assisting, or otherwise facilitating illegal robocalls or spoofing, or 
a deficient Robocall Mitigation Database certification or mitigation 
program description; and, if so, provide a description of any such 
action or investigation, including all law enforcement or regulatory 
agencies involved, the date that any action or investigation was 
commenced, the current status of the action or investigation, a summary 
of the findings of wrongdoing made in connection with the action or 
investigation, and whether any final determinations have been issued.
* * * * *
    (4) * * *
    (iv) Whether the gateway provider or any affiliate is also foreign 
voice service provider;
    (v) The name, title, department, business address, telephone 
number, and email address of one person within the company responsible 
for addressing robocall mitigation-related issues;
    (vi) Whether the gateway provider is:
    (A) A gateway provider with a STIR/SHAKEN implementation 
obligation; or
    (B) A gateway provider without a STIR/SHAKEN implementation 
obligation; and
    (vii) The gateway provider's OCN, if it has one.
* * * * *
    (f) Certification by non-gateway intermediate providers in the 
Robocall Mitigation Database. (1) A non-gateway intermediate provider 
shall certify that all of the calls that it carries or processes on its 
network are subject to a robocall mitigation program consistent with 
paragraph (c) of this section, that any prior certification has not 
been removed by Commission action and it has not been prohibited from 
filing in the Robocall Mitigation Database by the Commission, and to 
one of the following:
    (i) It has fully implemented the STIR/SHAKEN authentication 
framework across its entire network and all calls it carries or 
processes are compliant with Sec.  64.6302(b);
    (ii) It has implemented the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework on 
a portion of its network and calls it carries or processes on that 
portion of its network are compliant with Sec.  64.6302(b); or
    (iii) It has not implemented the STIR/SHAKEN authentication 
framework on any portion of its network for carrying or processing 
calls.
    (2) A non-gateway intermediate provider shall include the following 
information in its certification made pursuant to paragraph (f)(1) of 
this section in English or with a certified English translation:
    (i) Identification of the type of extension or extensions the non-
gateway intermediate provider received under Sec.  64.6304, if the non-
gateway intermediate provider is not a foreign provider, and the basis 
for the extension or extensions, or an explanation of why it is unable 
to implement STIR/SHAKEN due to a lack of control over the network 
infrastructure necessary to implement STIR/SHAKEN;
    (ii) The specific reasonable steps the non-gateway intermediate 
provider has taken to avoid carrying or processing illegal robocall 
traffic as part of its robocall mitigation program, including a 
description of any procedures in place to know its upstream providers 
and the analytics system(s) it uses to identify and block illegal 
traffic, including whether it uses any third-party analytics vendor(s) 
and the name of such vendor(s);
    (iii) A statement of the non-gateway intermediate provider's 
commitment to respond fully and in a timely manner to all traceback 
requests from the Commission, law enforcement, and the industry 
traceback consortium, and to cooperate with such entities in 
investigating and stopping any illegal robocallers that use its service 
to carry or process calls; and
    (iv) State whether, at any time in the prior two years, the filing 
entity (and/or any entity for which the filing entity shares common 
ownership, management, directors, or control) has been the subject of a 
formal Commission, law enforcement, or regulatory agency action or 
investigation with accompanying findings of actual or suspected 
wrongdoing due to the filing entity transmitting, encouraging, 
assisting, or otherwise facilitating illegal robocalls or spoofing, or 
a deficient Robocall Mitigation Database certification or mitigation 
program description; and, if so, provide a description of any such 
action or investigation, including all law enforcement or regulatory 
agencies involved, the date that any action or investigation was 
commenced, the current status of the action or investigation, a summary 
of the findings of wrongdoing made in connection with the action or 
investigation, and whether any final determinations have been issued.
    (3) All certifications made pursuant to paragraphs (f)(1) and (2) 
of this section shall:
    (i) Be filed in the appropriate portal on the Commission's website; 
and
    (ii) Be signed by an officer in conformity with 47 CFR 1.16.
    (4) A non-gateway intermediate provider filing a certification 
shall submit the following information in the appropriate portal on the 
Commission's website:
    (i) The non-gateway intermediate provider's business name(s) and 
primary address;
    (ii) Other business names in use by the non-gateway intermediate 
provider;
    (iii) All business names previously used by the non-gateway 
intermediate provider;
    (iv) Whether the non-gateway intermediate provider or any affiliate 
is also foreign voice service provider;
    (v) The name, title, department, business address, telephone 
number, and email address of one person within the company responsible 
for addressing robocall mitigation-related issues;

[[Page 40121]]

    (vi) Whether the non-gateway intermediate provider is:
    (A) A non-gateway intermediate provider with a STIR/SHAKEN 
implementation obligation; or
    (B) A non-gateway intermediate provider without a STIR/SHAKEN 
implementation obligation; and
    (vii) The non-gateway intermediate service provider's OCN, if it 
has one.
    (5) A non-gateway intermediate provider shall update its filings 
within 10 business days of any change to the information it must 
provide pursuant to this paragraph (f) subject to the conditions set 
forth in paragraphs (d)(5)(i) and (ii) of this section.
    (g) * * *
    (4) Accepting traffic from non-gateway intermediate providers. 
Intermediate providers and voice service providers shall accept calls 
directly from a non-gateway intermediate provider only if that non-
gateway intermediate provider's filing appears in the Robocall 
Mitigation Database in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section, 
showing that the non-gateway intermediate provider affirmatively 
submitted the filing, and that filing has not been de-listed pursuant 
to an enforcement action.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2023-12142 Filed 6-20-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P