[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 117 (Tuesday, June 20, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 39783-39793]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-12803]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 25

[IB Docket No. 21-456; FCC 23-29; FR ID 147653]


Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for Non-Geostationary Orbit, 
Fixed-Satellite Service Systems

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission or we) revises its rules governing spectrum sharing among a 
new generation of broadband satellite constellations to promote market 
entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency. The Commission 
adopts rules clarifying protection obligations between non-
geostationary satellite orbit, fixed-satellite service (NGSO FSS) 
systems authorized through different processing rounds, subjects those 
protections to a sunset period, and requires all NGSO FSS operators 
licensed or granted market access in the United States to coordinate 
with each other in good faith.

DATES: Effective July 20, 2023, except for the amendment to Sec.  
25.261 in

[[Page 39784]]

amendatory instruction 4, which is delayed indefinitely. The Commission 
will publish a document in the Federal Register announcing the 
effective date of Sec.  25.261 in instruction 4.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Clay DeCell, 202-418-0803.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report 
and Order, FCC 23-29, adopted April 20, 2023, and released April 21, 
2023. The full text is available online at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-29A1.pdf. The document is also available for 
inspection and copying during business hours in the FCC Reference 
Center, 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. To request materials in 
accessible formats for people with disabilities, send an email to 
[email protected] or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 
202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).

Procedural Matters

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), requires 
that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and 
comment rulemakings, unless the agency certifies that ``the rule will 
not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.'' Accordingly, we have prepared a 
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the possible 
impact of the rule changes contained in this document on small 
entities. The FRFA is set forth in Section IV below.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    This document contains new or modified information collection 
requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), 
Public Law 104-13. It will be submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for review under Section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, other 
Federal agencies, and the general public will be invited to comment on 
the modified information collection requirements contained in this 
document.
    In this document, we have assessed the effects of requiring later-
round NGSO FSS grantees to submit compatibility showings with respect 
to earlier-round grantees with whom coordination has not yet been 
reached. We find that doing so will serve the public interest and is 
unlikely to directly affect businesses with fewer than 25 employees.

Congressional Review Act

    The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 
concurs that this rule is ``non-major'' under the Congressional Review 
Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of the Report and 
Order to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 
5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

Synopsis

I. Introduction

    1. In this document, we revise Commission rules governing spectrum 
sharing among a new generation of broadband satellite constellations to 
promote market entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency 
through good-faith coordination. Specifically, we adopt rules 
clarifying protection obligations between non-geostationary satellite 
orbit, fixed-satellite service (NGSO FSS) systems authorized through 
different processing rounds by using a degraded throughput methodology, 
and subject those protections to a sunset period. After the sunset 
period, new entrants authorized in later processing rounds will share 
spectrum on an equal basis with earlier-round incumbents. We also 
clarify that all NGSO FSS operators licensed or granted market access 
in the United States must coordinate with each other in good faith, 
regardless of their processing round status, and we explain our 
expectations for information sharing during this good-faith 
coordination. This document will continue the Commission's efforts to 
promote development and competition in broadband NGSO satellite 
services made possible by the new space age.

II. Background

    2. This proceeding continues the Commission's recent efforts to 
update and refine its rules governing NGSO FSS systems. Constellations 
of NGSO FSS satellites traveling in low- and medium-Earth orbit may 
provide broadband services to industry, enterprise, and residential 
customers with lower latency and wider coverage than has previously 
been available via satellite. The number of applications filed in 
recent years for NGSO FSS system authorizations, and the number of 
satellites launched, are unprecedented.
    3. Processing Round Procedure Overview. Applications for NGSO FSS 
system licenses and petitions for declaratory ruling seeking U.S. 
market access for non-U.S.-licensed NGSO FSS systems are considered in 
groups based on filing date, under a processing round procedure. 
Pursuant to the Commission's rules, a license application for ``NGSO-
like'' satellite operation, including operation of an NGSO FSS system, 
that satisfies the acceptability for filing requirements is reviewed to 
determine whether it is a ``competing application'' or a ``lead 
application.'' A competing application is one filed in response to a 
public notice initiating a processing round. Any other application is a 
lead application. Competing applications are placed on public notice to 
provide interested parties an opportunity to file pleadings in response 
to the application. Lead applications are also placed on public notice. 
The public notice for a lead application initiates a processing round, 
establishes a cut-off date for competing NGSO-like satellite system 
applications, and provides interested parties an opportunity to file 
pleadings in response to the application.
    4. The Commission reviews each application in the processing round 
and all the pleadings filed in response to each application. Based upon 
this review and consideration of such other matters as it may 
officially notice, the Commission will grant all the applications for 
which the Commission finds that the applicant is legally, technically, 
and otherwise qualified, that the proposed facilities and operations 
comply with all applicable rules, regulations, and policies, and that 
grant of the application will serve the public interest, convenience 
and necessity. The Commission will deny the other applications.
    5. NGSO FSS System Spectrum Sharing Overview. The Commission has 
adopted rules for spectrum sharing among NGSO FSS systems. NGSO FSS 
space station applications granted with a condition to abide by these 
sharing rules are exempt from frequency band segmentation procedures 
that otherwise apply to applications for NGSO-like satellite operation. 
Instead, NGSO FSS operators must coordinate with one another in good 
faith the use of commonly authorized frequencies. If two or more NGSO 
FSS satellite systems fail to complete coordination, a default 
spectrum-splitting procedure applies.
    6. Under the default spectrum-splitting procedure, whenever the 
percentage increase in system noise temperature of an earth station 
receiver, or a space station receiver for a satellite with on-board 
processing, of either system, [Delta]T/T, exceeds 6% due to 
interference from emissions originating in the other system in a 
commonly authorized frequency band, such

[[Page 39785]]

frequency band will be divided among the affected satellite networks 
(i.e., individual links) in accordance with the following: (1) Each of 
n (number of) satellite networks involved must select 1/n of the 
assigned spectrum available in each of these frequency bands; (2) the 
affected station(s) of the respective satellite systems may operate in 
only the selected (1/n) spectrum associated with its satellite system 
while the [Delta]T/T of 6% threshold is exceeded; and (3) all affected 
station(s) may resume operations throughout the assigned frequency 
bands once the [Delta]T/T of 6% threshold is no longer exceeded. The 
spectrum selection order for each satellite network is determined by 
the date that the first space station in each satellite system is 
launched and capable of operating in the frequency band under 
consideration.
    7. In the NGSO FSS Report and Order, the Commission stated that it 
will ``initially limit'' sharing under the [Delta]T/T of 6% threshold 
to qualified applicants in a processing round. The Commission explained 
that treatment of later applicants would be case-by-case based on the 
situation at the time and considering both the need to protect existing 
expectations and investments and provide for additional entry, as well 
as any comments filed by incumbent operators and reasoning presented by 
the new applicant.
    8. NPRM. The NPRM sought comment on rule changes that would clarify 
the relative obligations between NGSO FSS systems approved in different 
processing rounds. Specifically, the Commission proposed to limit the 
existing NGSO FSS spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261 to 
those systems approved in the same processing round, and to require 
systems approved in a later processing round to coordinate with, or 
demonstrate they will protect, earlier-round systems. The Commission 
invited comment on how to quantify inter-round protection and whether 
it should sunset after a period of time. The Commission also proposed 
to require all NGSO FSS grantees, regardless of their processing round 
status, to coordinate with each other in good faith and sought comment 
on specific information sharing obligations that could facilitate 
operator-to-operator coordination. In response to the NPRM, seventeen 
comments, fifteen reply comments, and numerous ex partes were filed.

III. Discussion

    9. After review of the record, we adopt rule changes that will 
promote market entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency 
among a new generation of broadband NGSO satellite constellations. 
Specifically, we adopt three proposals in the NPRM that received broad 
support: (1) limiting the default spectrum-splitting procedure in 
section 25.261 to NGSO FSS systems approved in the same processing 
round, before sunsetting; (2) requiring NGSO FSS systems approved in a 
later processing round to coordinate with, or demonstrate they will 
protect, earlier-round systems; and (3) requiring all NGSO FSS grantees 
to coordinate with each other in good faith. We also address three 
issues that produced a diverse record. After reviewing the proposed 
options for inter-round protection, we conclude that an interference 
analysis based on a degraded throughput methodology offers the most 
technically promising path for NGSO FSS inter-round sharing and require 
later-round systems to use such a methodology when demonstrating that 
they will protect earlier-round systems. On information sharing 
requirements, we clarify our expectations as to the necessary exchanges 
of information that will take place as part of the universal NGSO FSS 
good-faith coordination requirement we are adopting in this Order. We 
also conclude that protection of earlier-round NGSO FSS systems must 
ensure a stable environment for continued service and investment but 
should not hinder later-round systems indefinitely. Accordingly, we 
adopt a sunsetting provision. NGSO FSS systems will be entitled to 
protection from systems approved in a subsequent processing round until 
ten years after the first authorization or market access grant in that 
subsequent processing round. After that date, all systems in both 
processing rounds will be treated on an equal basis with respect to 
spectrum sharing in the absence of a coordination agreement, and the 
default spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261 will also apply 
between systems in the two rounds. Finally, we apply the rule changes 
adopted in this final rule to all current NGSO FSS licensees and market 
access grantees as well as pending and future applicants and 
petitioners.

A. Limiting the Default Spectrum-Splitting Procedure to Systems 
Approved Through the Same Processing Round, Before Sunsetting

    10. In the NPRM, the Commission noted that, while it stated in the 
2017 NGSO FSS Report and Order that it would ``initially limit'' the 
default spectrum-splitting procedure in section 25.261 to qualified 
NGSO FSS applicants in the same processing round, there is no such 
limitation in the current rule text. Nonetheless, recent NGSO FSS 
system licenses and grants of market access have included a requirement 
to apply the spectrum-splitting procedure only among NGSO FSS systems 
approved within the same processing round. To provide greater 
regulatory certainty, the Commission proposed to codify this 
limitation. Doing so would eliminate general ``case-by-case'' 
consideration of how to treat later NGSO FSS applicants relative to 
approved systems, except when considering waiver requests.
    11. Commenters broadly welcome the Commission's proposal, which we 
adopt to provide greater regulatory stability and predictability to 
NGSO FSS operators as they deploy their initial constellations, subject 
to the sunsetting provision described below. The purpose of the 
Commission's recent NGSO FSS processing rounds has been to establish a 
sharing environment among authorized systems to provide a measure of 
certainty in lieu of adopting an open-ended requirement to accommodate 
all future applicants. NGSO FSS operators have planned, invested, and 
begun deploying thousands of satellites in their initial constellations 
based in part on their assessment of the specific characteristics of 
other participants in their processing round, which allows them to 
estimate the amount of spectrum likely to be available during a 
situation governed by the spectrum-splitting procedure. Limiting the 
spectrum-splitting procedure to systems approved within the same 
processing round is therefore an important element of regulatory 
stability for NGSO FSS grantees as they deploy their initial 
constellations, reflected in the licensing decisions taken under the 
current, case-by-case approach. Over time, this anticipated NGSO FSS 
sharing environment will change as system authorizations granted in the 
same processing round are surrendered or not ultimately built out, new 
entrants are approved in later processing rounds and coordinate with 
existing systems, and operators' own system designs are updated for 
later-generation constellations. Therefore, while we do expect that the 
need for the stability and predictability offered by limiting the 
default spectrum-splitting procedure to systems approved through the 
same processing round will diminish over time and should be 
counterbalanced with the benefits of promoting new entry, as addressed 
through the sunsetting provision discussed below, we conclude that the 
establishment of an initial sharing environment will

[[Page 39786]]

promote the development of NGSO FSS systems.
    12. While no commenter suggests the Commission grant every new NGSO 
FSS application filed after a processing round cut-off date on an equal 
basis with applications filed within the processing round, some parties 
nonetheless encourage the Commission to retain discretion when 
considering later-filed NGSO FSS applications. We always retain such 
discretion in the context of a rule waiver upon a finding of good 
cause, although we expect such circumstances to be rare. We believe the 
waiver standard is the appropriate threshold for considering whether an 
NGSO FSS application submitted after a relevant processing round cut-
off date should be treated as if it had been filed within the 
processing round window and therefore given equal access to spectrum, 
through the default spectrum-splitting procedure, with timely filed 
applications.

B. Protection of Earlier-Round Systems From Later-Round Systems

    13. Another important element of regulatory stability for NGSO FSS 
grantees is the knowledge that they will be protected from harmful 
interference that might be caused by later-authorized systems. In the 
NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify an inter-round protection 
requirement consistent with licensing decisions. The rule would require 
that, prior to commencing operations, an NGSO FSS licensee or market 
access recipient must either certify that it has completed a 
coordination agreement with any operational NGSO FSS system licensed or 
granted U.S. market access in an earlier processing round, or 
demonstrate that it will not cause harmful interference to any such 
system with which coordination has not been completed.
    14. Commenters broadly support, and none oppose, a requirement for 
later-round NGSO FSS grantees to protect earlier-round grantees, which 
we adopt herein. As explained in the NPRM, the protection of an NGSO 
FSS system from systems approved through a subsequent processing round 
goes to the heart of the stability of interference environment the 
Commission intended to create through use of the processing round 
procedure. Accordingly, to clarify the obligations of later-round 
grantees and to provide greater regulatory certainty, we codify a 
requirement that, prior to commencing operations, an NGSO FSS licensee 
or market access recipient must either submit in the International 
Communications Filing System (ICFS) a certification that it has 
completed a coordination agreement with any operational NGSO FSS system 
licensed or granted U.S. market access in an earlier processing round, 
or submit for Commission approval a showing that it will not cause 
harmful interference to any such system with which coordination has not 
been completed. If an earlier-round system becomes operational after a 
later-round system has commenced operations, the later-round licensee 
or market access recipient must submit a certification of coordination 
or a compatibility showing with respect to the earlier-round system no 
later than 60 days after the earlier-round system commences operations 
as notified under section 25.121(b) or otherwise. Notices of 
commencement of operations for NGSO FSS systems subject to section 
25.261 will be placed on public notice as informative to facilitate the 
filing of these certifications and showings. Compatibility showings 
will be placed on public notice for comment by interested parties 
before action by the Commission. Further, to address the possibility 
that a later-round system may need to significantly limit its 
operations to protect a large, planned, earlier-round system of which 
only one or a few satellites have been launched and are operating, we 
will allow later-round systems to operate on an unprotected, non-
interference basis with respect to an earlier-round system after they 
have submitted a required compatibility showing for the earlier-round 
system and while it remains pending with the Commission. By requiring 
this technical showing before operations on a non-interference basis 
may begin, we will allow the affected earlier-round operator, and any 
other interested parties, to provide the Commission with their views on 
the sufficiency of the showing. At the same time, we guard against an 
incentive for earlier-round grantees to use Commission processes to 
delay service by the later-round system by vigorously opposing all 
compatibility showings by grantees that have not yet completed 
coordination with them.

C. Level of Protection for Earlier-Round Systems

    15. The NPRM identified three principal methods, suggested by 
satellite operators, by which the Commission could quantify a required 
level of protection for earlier-round NGSO FSS systems from later-round 
systems or otherwise ensure their compatible operations. First, the 
Commission could develop and adopt an interference-to-noise (I/N) 
limit. The I/N limit could incorporate a standard reference antenna 
mask and standard noise temperature and specify a percentage of time 
during which the limit may be exceeded. Applicants in a later 
processing round could be required to demonstrate that their proposed 
systems would comply with the I/N limit based on a probabilistic 
analysis. Second, the Commission could adopt interference protection 
criteria based upon the percentage of degraded throughput experienced 
by the earlier-round NGSO FSS system. A degraded throughput method 
would recognize that most, if not all, modern NGSO systems will use 
adaptive coding and modulation (ACM) and may be designed to meet 
performance objectives stated as either the packet error ratio or the 
spectral efficiency (bit/s/Hz) as a function of carrier-to-noise ratio 
(C/N). Satellite systems using ACM can maintain a satellite connection 
despite signal degradation, but at lower throughput rates. Third, the 
Commission could adopt a modified spectrum-splitting procedure for 
inter-round sharing. Under this option, when a 6% [Delta]T/T threshold 
is passed, the earlier-round system would be entitled to use 75% of the 
commonly authorized spectrum and the later-round system 25% of the 
available spectrum, instead of the 50%/50% split applicable to NGSO FSS 
systems approved through the same processing round.
    16. Commenters are divided on their preference for an I/N limit, a 
degraded throughput methodology, or a modified band-splitting option. 
Supporters of an I/N limit argue that it is easily administrable, 
familiar to operational NGSO systems engaged in coordination, and less 
susceptible to misapplication based on subjective carrier 
characteristics. Commenters that favor a degraded throughput 
methodology note that it takes into account the design and objectives 
of modern NGSO systems, including the use of ACM. Proponents of a 
modified band-splitting option argue that it would encourage both 
parties to coordinate because both would have to reduce their spectrum 
use when the interference trigger is reached. Several commenters 
request the Commission seek further comment on the development of an 
inter-round protection criteria before it is adopted, and specifically 
argue that no reference values currently exist for quantifying proposed 
new criteria.
    17. After review of the record in response to the NPRM, we believe 
that pursuing a degraded throughput approach to quantify the level of 
protection for earlier-round systems from later-round systems is the 
most technically promising option as it would account for the realities 
of

[[Page 39787]]

modern NGSO systems and be based on a key design consideration for such 
systems. As they transit through the view of an earth station, NGSO 
satellites operate across a range of path distances, elevation angles, 
and antenna scan angles. Atmospheric conditions, such as rain 
attenuation, can also cause link degradations and outages, especially 
in higher frequency bands and modern NGSO systems use ACM, uplink and 
downlink power control, and network protocols to provide continuous 
data services in the face of these varying environmental effects. A 
degraded throughput methodology would recognize that the mechanisms 
NGSO FSS systems use to tolerate signal degradation due to path-loss 
changes and link outages due to weather effects, and would also provide 
resilience to certain interference from other NGSO FSS systems. 
Further, degraded throughput analyses submitted on the record 
demonstrate that the analysis can be performed using widely available 
satellite system operational information, such as contained in an ITU 
filing or Commission space station application, and is not unduly 
difficult to perform. With respect to the issues of potential 
synchronization loss and taking into account GSO interference and 
aggregate interference from multiple NGSO FSS constellations, these 
will be explored through the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and 
can be addressed within the framework of a degraded throughput 
methodology. Accordingly, we will require an NGSO FSS licensee or 
market access recipient that has not yet reached a coordination 
agreement with an earlier-round system to use a degraded throughput 
methodology in its demonstration that it will protect earlier-round 
systems.
    18. In contrast, we are concerned that adopting an I/N limit for 
the protection of earlier-round systems, rather than as a band-
splitting trigger for systems in the same processing round, may 
overprotect earlier-round systems by not taking into account ACM and 
other methods used by modern NGSO systems to tolerate certain amounts 
of interference while continuing to provide reliable service to 
consumers, and therefore weaken their incentives to complete 
coordination with new entrants. In addition, while a 75%/25% band-
splitting procedure between earlier- and later-round systems would 
provide some incentive to both parties to coordinate, this option may 
not ensure the continuity of earlier-round operations with existing 
customer bases if the earlier-round operator were required to reduce 
its spectrum usage by 25% during an event surpassing the [Delta]T/T 
threshold with a later-round system with which it has not yet found an 
appropriate accommodation.
    19. While we adopt a requirement to use a degraded throughput 
methodology in demonstrations of compatibility with earlier-round 
systems because it accounts for ACM and other techniques used by modern 
NGSO systems and holds the best potential proposed on the record to 
protect earlier-round systems without unduly burdening later-round 
systems, we recognize that certain details of its implementation may 
benefit from further comment, such as the final percentage criteria to 
be used. The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is dedicated to 
finalizing these issues. However until the particular issues in the 
Further Notice are resolved, we conclude that using the degraded 
throughput methodology as a basis for inter-round protection is more 
promising than an I/N protection criteria or modified spectrum-
splitting option proposed on the record for the reasons discussed 
above.

D. Good-Faith Coordination

    20. Although the Commission has adopted default rules for spectrum 
sharing among NGSO FSS systems, it has consistently affirmed that 
coordination among NGSO FSS operators in the first instance offers the 
best opportunity for efficient spectrum sharing. Accordingly, the NPRM 
proposed to adopt a rule providing that the good-faith coordination 
requirement applies among all NGSO FSS grantees, including those 
approved through different processing rounds.
    21. All commenters on this issue support the Commission's proposal 
to require good-faith coordination among all NGSO FSS grantees, which 
we adopt. With this requirement, we make clear that all NGSO FSS 
operators approved by the Commission must engage in good faith when 
discussing and accommodating the shared use of spectrum with other NGSO 
FSS operators. We will review any allegations that an NGSO FSS operator 
has not met the good-faith coordination requirement and may take 
enforcement actions, including monetary forfeitures, modification, or 
termination of the NGSO FSS authorization. We discuss expectations for 
information sharing in the context of good-faith coordination below.

E. Information Sharing During Good-Faith Coordination

    22. In addition to the overall need for good-faith coordination, 
the Commission has emphasized that information sharing among NGSO FSS 
operators is essential to their efficient use of spectrum. In the NPRM, 
the Commission invited comment on whether to require sharing of certain 
types of information, such as beam-pointing information, that may be 
necessary for the implementation of any spectrum-sharing solution or 
protection criteria between NGSO FSS systems. The NPRM also sought 
comment on any practical concerns associated with such information 
sharing, and how best to address any associated, potential, competitive 
harms. More broadly, the Commission inquired as to whether it should 
add a definition of ``good faith'' coordination in our rules and how it 
may better encourage efficiency among NGSO FSS systems.
    23. The record produced a variety of views regarding information 
sharing requirements. Commenters generally recognize that more detailed 
technical discussions may assist parties in reaching an operator-to-
operator coordination agreement, but diverge on whether the types of 
information to be shared should be agreed to by the coordinating 
parties, or whether the Commission should specify types of information 
that must be shared in all coordination discussions. Some commenters 
recommend the development of a third-party clearinghouse or industry-
run database to facilitate sharing of NGSO FSS operational information. 
Commenters raise particular concern that a requirement to share real-
time beam-pointing information may be impracticable for systems that 
use dynamic beam pointing and reveal confidential and proprietary 
traffic trends whose competitive harm may be difficult to address by 
means such as non-disclosure agreements. Some commenters argue that 
information sharing requirements should be limited to operational NGSO 
FSS systems, or make other proposals.
    24. We decline to codify specific information sharing requirements 
as part of good-faith NGSO FSS coordination at this time. As an initial 
matter, we are encouraged that some first-round and second-round NGSO 
FSS systems have already completed coordination agreements under the 
Commission's existing regulatory framework, and this demonstrates that 
systems can effectively coordinate, even absent a third-party 
clearinghouse or other database to facilitate information sharing. We 
expect that number will grow as systems proceed in development and 
deployment. For systems approved in the same processing round, we 
believe the

[[Page 39788]]

prospect of splitting spectrum under the default sharing mechanism 
provides significant incentive for both parties to share the necessary 
technical information to conclude an agreement that ensures beneficial 
and stable access to spectrum. For systems approved in different 
processing rounds, the prospect of a later-round system operating on a 
non-interference basis after submitting a compatibility showing, which 
can be made using publicly available information, also may provide an 
incentive to the earlier-round operator to share additional technical 
information to ensure its ongoing operations are in fact protected. 
Beyond these incentives, we expect that certain essential NGSO 
operating parameters and other information that is typically publicly 
available, such as the maximum number of satellites that can provide 
service simultaneously at the same location (Nco), exclusion angle to 
the GSO arc, minimum earth station elevation angle, and location of 
gateway earth stations, will not be withheld during good-faith 
coordination. We also recognize that satellite selection information, 
revealing which satellites will be transmitting in a given situation, 
can be especially important to efficient spectrum sharing between 
larger and smaller constellations to ensure the smaller constellation 
is not unnecessarily restricted. When evaluating whether an NGSO FSS 
operator has acted in good faith in refusing to provide information in 
coordination, we will consider the relative benefit of the information 
to the other party, which may increase if the other party is already 
operational, as well as the relative competitive or other risks to 
providing the information. However, coordination discussions typically 
do not begin only once the two systems are operational. With respect to 
sharing of real-time beam information, we note the practical 
difficulties raised in the record for advanced systems with dynamically 
repointable beams which, in addition to competitive concerns, may not 
be overcome by use of a third-party clearinghouse or industry-run 
database because introducing a third-party database between the 
operator that has changed its beam pointing plans in real time could 
only further delay the time until other operators receive the updated 
beam pointing data, adjust their own operations to reflect these 
changes, and then further de-conflict any interference issues that may 
arise from the other operators having adjusted their operations which 
must also be circulated via the third-party database. However, we will 
monitor the progress of NGSO FSS systems as they proceed in 
coordination and deployment and may revisit this issue in the future if 
ongoing coordination difficulties among operational systems suggest 
that more information sharing requirements are required. We note that 
the potential benefits for spectrum efficiency of dynamic beam pointing 
would appear to require some level of information sharing in order to 
be realized by more than one system so that other operators are not 
required to protect links that could be used, but are not used at a 
given time. When earlier round systems do not share certain non-public 
information, later round systems may have to make assumptions regarding 
the operations of earlier round systems in order to plan operations and 
submit a compatibility showing.
    25. Beyond a general good-faith coordination requirement, and any 
related information sharing requirements, OneWeb argues the Commission 
should adopt a definition of ``good faith'' that mandates, inter alia, 
``that both parties to the coordination agree to utilize all inherent 
flexibility and capabilities in the operation of their respective 
systems to avoid interference between the two systems.'' We believe 
good-faith coordination places obligations on both parties to promote 
spectral efficiency. OneWeb's proposed definition, however, could 
disincentivize investments in more advanced, spectrally efficient 
systems by requiring all those efficiencies to be used to accommodate 
systems that have been built with more limited sharing capabilities. We 
decline to require such a sharing outcome in all cases and therefore do 
not adopt the proposed definition. As noted above, we intend to monitor 
compliance with the foregoing requirements and will address the need 
for further steps in light of our experience.

F. Sunsetting of Inter-Round Protection Requirement

    26. In conjunction with the proposal in the NPRM to require later-
round NGSO FSS systems to protect earlier-round systems absent a 
coordination agreement, the Commission also inquired as to whether this 
inter-round protection requirement should sunset after a period of 
time, and what protection should apply to an NGSO FSS system after any 
sunsetting. We sought specific comment on how any sunset provision may 
affect investment in NGSO FSS systems and ongoing operations of 
earlier-round systems as well as competition and new market entry.
    27. Commenters suggest a variety of sunset periods. Several oppose 
any sunsetting. Some commenters also encourage a further notice of 
proposed rulemaking on this issue. Proponents of sunsetting argue that 
it would encourage innovation and new entry, promote coordination by 
time limiting the advantages of incumbency, and is consistent with the 
iterative and dynamic approach of NGSO FSS operators upgrading and 
modifying their own systems. Opponents argue that any sunsetting 
provision would jeopardize quality and continuity of service by 
operational earlier-round systems, incentivize coordination delays by 
later-round systems until after an earlier round system's priority 
expires, and discourage investment by introducing regulatory 
uncertainty.
    28. The proposed sunset periods are: 6 years after the application 
cut-off date in a processing round; 6 years after grant of the earlier-
round system; at the 6-year, 50% deployment milestone of an earlier-
round system if the milestone is not met, otherwise at the 9-year, full 
deployment milestone; less than 10 years after grant of the earlier-
round system; less than the 15-year license term of the earlier-round 
system; at the expiration of the 15-year license term of the earlier-
round system; 10 or 12 years after grant of the first application in a 
subsequent processing round; or 15 years commencing from release of 
this Order for the current Ku-/Ka-band processing rounds, and 15 years 
from the first authorization or market access grant in a subsequent 
processing round for future processing rounds. Commenters propose that 
after the sunset period has run, both earlier- and later-round systems 
would share spectrum on an equal basis under the spectrum-splitting 
procedure in section 25.261.
    29. After review of the record and consideration of furthering 
development and competition in NGSO FSS systems, we adopt a sunset 
provision of 10 years after the first grant in a subsequent processing 
round. As the Commission has repeatedly stated, the purpose of the 
recent NGSO FSS processing rounds has been to establish a stable 
sharing environment among authorized systems. But earlier-round 
advantages should not continue indefinitely.
    30. We believe that the protection afforded to an earlier-round 
system by a later-round system should work in concert with our 
deployment milestones for NGSO systems to relieve earlier-round 
grantees of the uncertainty of near-term, equal sharing with new 
entrants while also giving later-round systems an equal opportunity 
after they

[[Page 39789]]

have demonstrated their commitment to provide service and completed 
their final deployment milestone. To accomplish these goals, the sunset 
date should be tied to the date of authorization of systems in a 
subsequent processing round, and define the period during which they 
will be required to protect any earlier-round systems. With each new 
processing round, therefore, incumbents will be ensured of a period of 
time during which they will be protected by systems approved in that 
processing round, and may plan to accommodate those systems as they 
proceed through deployment, before the time that they will be required 
to share spectrum on an equal basis in the absence of a coordination 
agreement. Fixing a sunset date dependent on the authorization date of 
the earlier-round system could mean that after the sunset date, any 
approved later-round system would automatically be afforded equal 
spectrum sharing with existing, earlier-round systems, without the same 
lead time that would enable earlier-round systems to assess their 
likely sharing requirements with the systems that will actually proceed 
to deployment, and adjust accordingly. In addition, fixing a single 
date to sunset the protection between systems in two processing rounds 
simplifies the sharing expectations for all operators in both rounds. 
By fixing the sunset date at 10 years after the first grant in a 
subsequent processing round, many later-round systems will be near, or 
have already passed, their 9-year full deployment milestone depending 
on their grant date. Thus, later-round systems will be afforded equal 
spectrum sharing opportunities under the spectrum-splitting procedure 
once their full service constellations are operational, while earlier-
round systems will have had time to adjust to the constellations 
ultimately deployed by later-round grantees. We believe this period 
appropriately balances the need for stability for incumbent operations 
and the possibility for new entrants to compete on an equal footing 
once they have built out their systems.
    31. The length of this sunset period also addresses several 
concerns on the record. First, we do not expect the sunset period to 
introduce significant coordination delays because the period is long 
enough that a later-round grantee would not wish to operate for years, 
including at near its full constellation size, without an agreement 
with earlier-round grantees. Second, the iterative nature of NGSO FSS 
systems, and relatively shorter lifetime of NGSO satellites when 
compared to GSO satellites, undermines arguments that sunsetting would 
jeopardize existing services. Rather than maintaining a fixed system 
design, our experience has been that NGSO FSS operators have proposed 
to modify and expand their NGSO FSS systems. As earlier-round grantees 
propose to expand and update their constellations, including through 
participation in subsequent processing rounds, any burden imposed by 
sunsetting their inter-round protection rights should be offset by 
benefits to the later-generations of their systems. Sunsetting also 
will not upset existing expectations of interference protection 
because, under Commission policy in effect prior to this Order, later-
round applicants were considered on a case-by-case basis as to whether 
they will be entitled to share spectrum on an equal basis with earlier-
round systems--as such there was never a guarantee that earlier-round 
grantees would be entitled to protection from all later-round systems. 
Nor do we believe that sunsetting will discourage overall investment in 
NGSO FSS systems or hamper efforts to promote broadband in underserved 
areas--on the contrary, we expect that increased competition 
facilitated by sunsetting inter-round protections will spur investment 
and development of new systems while providing appropriate returns for 
earlier-round systems initial constellations. Finally, the iterative 
development of NGSO FSS systems and evolving spectrum sharing 
requirements counsels in particular in favor of a sunsetting provision 
in this instance, as compared to other instances where the Commission 
has preferred to maintain incumbent protections indefinitely. As noted, 
many earlier-round grantees have proposed updated, second-generation 
systems filed in a later processing round that will enhance the 
services these grantees intend to provide. Therefore, incumbents 
themselves will benefit from sunsetting for their second-generation 
systems. The nature of NGSO FSS systems, which must be designed to 
endure changing environmental effects, also renders them more capable 
of sharing spectrum than other system designs. After sunsetting, 
incumbents will be subject to co-equal spectrum sharing with the new 
entrants; but they will have had a significant period of time during 
which to reach a coordination agreement through good faith discussions 
that improves both operators' spectrum usage possibilities. Given the 
dynamic nature of NGSO FSS systems and the benefits of competition and 
new entry, we conclude that a 10-year sunset period beginning on the 
date of the first grant in a subsequent processing round appropriately 
balances the interests involved.

G. Application of Rule Changes

    32. The NPRM invited comment on whether to apply all, or some, of 
the rule changes adopted in this proceeding to existing grantees and 
pending applicants or only to new license applications, license 
modification applications, application amendments, and market access 
petitions filed after the new rules go into effect.
    33. Most commenters on this issue support the general applicability 
of rule changes in this proceeding to existing grantees and applicants 
as well as future applicants. Some argue that applying certain rule 
changes to already approved systems would be onerous, as it may require 
reconsideration of the design and operation of the systems.
    34. We will apply all rule changes adopted in this final rule to 
current NGSO FSS licensees and market access grantees, pending 
applicants and petitioners, as well as future applicants and 
petitioners. With respect to pending applications, applicants do not 
gain any vested right merely by filing an application, and the simple 
act of filing an application is not considered a ``transaction already 
completed'' for purposes of this analysis. Applying our new rules and 
procedures to pending space station applications will not impair the 
rights any applicant had at the time it filed its application. Nor will 
doing so increase an applicant's liability for past conduct. Similarly, 
with respect to current NGSO FSS licensees and market access grantees, 
none of the actions we take here (that is, limiting the default 
spectrum-splitting procedure to NGSO FSS systems approved in the same 
processing round (subject to a sunset), requiring later-round systems 
to coordinate with or protect earlier-round systems, and requiring all 
NGSO FSS grantees to coordinate with each other in good faith), 
increase liability for past conduct, impair rights a party possessed 
when he acted, or impose new duties with respect to transactions 
already completed. Rather, all of these actions take effect in the 
future, after the rules become effective. While some commenters claim 
that some of the rule changes here, such as the sunsetting of 
interference protections, upset their expectations, NGSO FSS grants 
have been conditioned upon the outcome of future rulemakings and thus 
licensees and grantees have been on notice that the regulatory 
environment in which they are operate was subject to change. Moreover, 
even under the rules in effect prior to this Order, first round systems

[[Page 39790]]

were not guaranteed protection from later round systems; rather, this 
issue was to be considered on a ``case-by-case'' basis. Accordingly, 
applying these rule changes to existing licenses and grants of market 
access will not upset any grantee's reasonable expectations. Further, 
we have crafted the sunset provision to provide incumbent NGSO FSS 
grantees sufficient time to evaluate and adapt to the eventual, equal 
sharing environment with systems ultimately deployed in each subsequent 
processing round. Not applying the sunset provision to existing 
grantees, while applying the other rule changes to them, would 
substantially frustrate the purpose of sunsetting by locking in 
incumbent protections that are not assured under the current, case-by-
case regime. Sunsetting the inter-round protection requirement, and 
allowing later-round systems an opportunity to share spectrum on an 
equal basis with earlier-round systems after the sunset period, removes 
a barrier to entry and therefore promotes competition and will favor 
technological innovation among earlier-round systems that facilitates 
their sharing with new entrants. Whereas exempting first-round systems 
from sunsetting, which includes some large constellations, would 
destroy these benefits for all new entrants in second and later 
processing rounds for as long as the first-round systems remain active.

H. Digital Equity and Inclusion

    35. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to advance 
digital equity for all, including people of color, persons with 
disabilities, persons who live in rural or Tribal areas, and others who 
are or have been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely 
affected by persistent poverty or inequality, invited comment on any 
equity-related considerations and benefits (if any) that may be 
associated with the proposals and issues discussed in the NPRM.
    36. Commenters support the Commission's ongoing efforts to bridge 
the digital divide and highlight the role of satellite services in 
providing broadband access to underserved communities. They support 
technology inclusive policies that ensure regulatory certainty and 
spectrum access for satellite operators. We believe that the rule 
amendments in this Report and Order will encourage a more stable and 
competitive environment for the development of NGSO FSS systems well 
suited to reaching underserved areas with new broadband capacity, and 
therefore that this rulemaking will enhance digital equity and 
inclusion.

I. Other Issues Raised in Comments

    37. Some commenters also suggest the Commission pursue broader rule 
changes regarding NGSO FSS systems to tackle a variety of issues, 
including addressing orbital debris concerns, verifying NGSO compliance 
with equivalent power-flux density limits for the protection of GSO 
networks, revisiting the spectrum-splitting procedure in section 
25.261, updated in 2017, or the NGSO milestone requirements, revised in 
2015 and 2017, or taking up other suggestions not treated in the NPRM. 
Other commenters caution against expanding the scope of the current 
proceeding. Given the complexity and diversity of issues raised and 
their differing procedural statuses, some reiterating arguments in 
petitions for reconsideration or petitions for rulemaking, we decline 
to create an ``omnibus'' NGSO rulemaking at this time and instead move 
immediately in a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to propose to 
finalize the remaining key issue raised in the NPRM.

IV. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    38. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), as 
amended, an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was 
incorporated in the Revising Spectrum Sharing Rules for Non-
Geostationary Orbit, Fixed-Satellite Service Systems, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in December 2021 in this proceeding. The 
Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in the NPRM, 
including comment on the IRFA. No comments were filed addressing the 
IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to the 
RFA.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Final Rule

    39. In recent years, the Commission has received an unprecedented 
number of applications for non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO) 
space station licenses, including for NGSO fixed-satellite service 
(FSS) systems. Traveling closer to the Earth than a traditional GSO 
satellite, low- and medium-orbit NGSO FSS satellite constellations are 
capable of providing broadband services to industry, enterprise, and 
residential customers with lower latency and wider coverage than was 
previously available via satellite. This final rule continues to 
facilitate the deployment of NGSO FSS systems capable of providing 
broadband and other services on a global basis, and will promote 
competition among NGSO FSS system proponents, including the market 
entry of new competitors.
    40. The Order amends the Commission's rules governing the treatment 
of NGSO FSS systems filed in different processing rounds. In 
particular, the Order adopts rules specifying that the Commission's 
existing spectrum sharing mechanism for NGSO FSS systems will be 
limited to those systems approved in the same processing round. The 
Order also adopts a rule providing that later-round NGSO FSS systems 
will have to protect earlier-round systems by using a degraded 
throughput methodology. In addition, the Order adopts a sunset 
provision after which earlier-round grantees and later-round grantees 
will share spectrum on an equal basis under the existing spectrum 
sharing mechanism for NGSO FSS systems.

B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response 
to the IRFA

    41. There were no comments filed that specifically addressed the 
proposed rules and policies presented in the IRFA.

C. Legal Basis

    42. The proposed action is authorized under sections 4(i), 7(a), 
303, 308(b), and 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 
U.S.C. 154(i), 157(a), 303, 308(b), 316.

D. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business

    43. Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended 
the RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the 
proposed rules as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not 
file any comments in response to the proposed rules in this proceeding.

E. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which 
the Rules Will Apply

    44. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, 
where feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may 
be affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the 
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small 
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental 
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same 
meaning as the term ``small business concern''

[[Page 39791]]

under the Small Business Act. A ``small business concern'' is one 
which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in 
its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 
established by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Below, we 
describe and estimate the number of small entities that may be affected 
by the adoption of the final rules.
    45. Satellite Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms 
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other 
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by 
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of 
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' Satellite 
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth 
station operators. The SBA small business size standard for this 
industry classifies a business with $38 million or less in annual 
receipts as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 firms 
in this industry operated for the entire year. Of this number, 242 
firms had revenue of less than $25 million. Additionally, based on 
Commission data in the 2021 Universal Service Monitoring Report, as of 
December 31, 2020, there were 71 providers that reported they were 
engaged in the provision of satellite telecommunications services. Of 
these providers, the Commission estimates that approximately 48 
providers have 1,500 or fewer employees. Consequently using the SBA's 
small business size standard, a little more than half of these 
providers can be considered small entities.
    46. All Other Telecommunications. The ``All Other 
Telecommunications'' category is comprised of establishments primarily 
engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as 
satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and radar station 
operation. This industry also includes establishments primarily engaged 
in providing satellite terminal stations and associated facilities 
connected with one or more terrestrial systems and capable of 
transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving telecommunications 
from, satellite systems. Establishments providing internet services or 
voice over internet protocol (VoIP) services via client-supplied 
telecommunications connections are also included in this industry. The 
SBA has developed a small business size standard for ``All Other 
Telecommunications,'' which consists of all such firms with annual 
receipts of $35 million or less. For this category, U.S. Census Bureau 
data for 2012 show that there were 1,442 firms that operated for the 
entire year. Of those firms, a total of 1,400 had annual receipts of 
less than $25 million and 15 firms had annual receipts of $25 million 
to $49,999,999. Thus, the Commission estimates that the majority of 
``All Other Telecommunications'' firms potentially affected by our 
action can be considered small.

F. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities

    47. The final rule amends rules that are applicable to space 
station operators requesting a license or authorization from the 
Commission, or entities requesting that the Commission grant a request 
for U.S. market access. Specifically, the final rule adopts changes to 
the spectrum sharing requirements among NGSO FSS satellite systems and 
requires space station licensees and market access grantees that were 
authorized through a later processing round to submit a technical 
demonstration that they will not cause harmful interference to space 
station licensees and market access grantees that were authorized 
through an earlier processing round, prior to the sunsetting period, if 
the later-round grantees have not certified that they have reached a 
coordination agreement with the earlier-round grantees. The technical 
demonstration of compatibility between the later-round system and the 
earlier-round system is based on a degraded throughput methodology that 
consists of three steps. The first step is to establish a baseline of 
performance. To do this, an operator models the earlier-round NGSO 
system's performance without any additional interference by computing 
the earlier-round NGSO system's probabilistic carrier-to-noise (C/N) 
level using its published system parameters and a rain-attenuation 
model. This provides the baseline: (1) the earlier-round system's time-
weighted average throughput (derived by computing the spectral 
efficiency from the C/N results), and (2) the earlier-round system's 
link unavailability time percentage (i.e., the percentage of time when 
the earlier-round system's expected C/N will fall below its minimum 
usable level). The second step is to repeat the analysis above, adding 
in the effect of the later-round system's interference into the 
earlier-round system. This produces a second measurement of time-
weighted average throughput and link unavailability time-percentage. 
The third step is to compare these two sets of figures to measure the 
effect of any additional interference. If the resulting performance 
impact exceeds the permissible limits, then the later-round system must 
adjust its operations to mitigate interference to a permissible level.
    48. Because of the costs involved in developing and deploying an 
NGSO FSS satellite constellation, we anticipate that few NGSO FSS 
operators affected by this rulemaking would qualify under the 
definition of ``small entity.''

G. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities

    49. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant 
alternatives that it has considered in developing its approach, which 
may include the following four alternatives (among others): ``(1) the 
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small 
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and 
(4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for 
such small entities.''
    50. The final rule adopts a requirement for NGSO FSS systems 
authorized through a later processing round to either complete a 
coordination agreement with, or submit a technical demonstration using 
a degraded throughput methodology that they will not interfere with, 
NGSO FSS systems authorized through an earlier processing round. The 
Commission adopted this requirement to ensure that earlier-round NGSO 
FSS systems will continue to have their services protected as new 
entrants deploy their systems. The Commission selected a degraded 
throughput methodology as the basis for the technical demonstration 
because it offers the most promising technical path for protection of 
earlier-round systems without unduly burdening the operations of later-
round systems. The Commission also considered use of an interference-
to-noise ratio (I/N) as a protection criteria for earlier-round 
systems, or use of a modified band-splitting approach in which earlier-
round systems and later-round systems would have to operate in 
different spectrum bands, with the earlier-round system entitled to 
more spectrum than the later-round system, in the event that an 
interference threshold is surpassed. The Commission did not adopt an I/
N protection criteria because it may unduly burden the operations of 
later-round systems, and did not adopt a modified band-splitting 
approach

[[Page 39792]]

because the Commission preferred a technically grounded inter-round 
sharing solution. While a technical demonstration using a degraded 
throughput methodology might be more burdensome to produce than a 
demonstration using an I/N level, the record demonstrated the 
feasibility of degraded throughput analyses and their superior ability 
to model contemporary NGSO FSS systems and more precisely account for 
the likelihood of harmful interference.
    51. As noted above, because of the high costs typically involved in 
the development of NGSO FSS constellations, we anticipate that few 
small entities will be required to submit such technical 
demonstrations. However, for small entities seeking to operate NGSO FSS 
systems, adoption of a sunset provision combined with use of a degraded 
throughput methodology will provide operators incentive to innovate and 
to coordinate with other systems, which will increase spectral 
efficiency and permit entities to implement newer socially-valuable 
technologies.

H. Report to Congress

    52. The Commission will send a copy of the Report and Order, 
including the FRFA, in a report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the 
Congressional Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send a copy 
of the Report and Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for 
Advocacy of the SBA. A copy of the Second Report and Order and FRFA (or 
summaries thereof) will also be published in the Federal Register.

V. Ordering Clauses

    53. It is ordered, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 7(a), 10, 303, 
308(b), and 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 
U.S.C. 154(i), 157(a), 160, 303, 308(b), 316, that the Report and Order 
is adopted, the policies, rules, and requirements discussed herein are 
adopted, and Part 25 of the Commission's rules is amended as set forth 
below.
    54. It is further ordered that the Report and Order shall be 
effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register, except 
Sec.  25.261(d) which contains new or modified information collection 
requirements and will be submitted for approval by the Office of 
Management and Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act and shall 
become effective after the Commission publishes a notice in the Federal 
Register announcing such approval and the relevant effective date.
    55. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center will send a 
copy of the Report and Order to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 
Small Business Administration, in accordance with Section 603(a) of the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    56. It is further ordered that the Commission shall send a copy of 
the Report and Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the 
Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review 
Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 25

    Administrative practice and procedure, Satellites.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.

Final Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 25 as follows:

PART 25--SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 307, 309, 310, 319, 
332, 605, and 721, unless otherwise noted.


0
2. Effective July 20, 2023, amend Sec.  25.151 by revising paragraphs 
(a)(10) through (12) and adding paragraph (a)(13) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.151  Public notice.

    (a) * * *
    (10) The receipt of space station application information filed 
pursuant to Sec.  25.110(b)(3)(iii);
    (11) The receipt of notifications of non-routine transmission filed 
pursuant to Sec.  25.140(d);
    (12) The receipt of EPFD input data files from an NGSO FSS licensee 
or market access recipient, submitted pursuant to Sec.  25.111(b) or 
Sec.  25.146(c)(2); and
    (13) The receipt of NGSO FSS compatibility showings filed pursuant 
to Sec.  25.261(d).
* * * * *

0
3. Effective July 20, 2023, amend Sec.  25.261 by revising paragraph 
(b) and the first sentence in paragraph (c)(1), adding reserved 
paragraph (d), and adding paragraph (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.261  Sharing among NGSO FSS space stations.

* * * * *
    (b) Coordination. NGSO FSS licensees and market access recipients 
must coordinate in good faith the use of commonly authorized 
frequencies regardless of their processing round status.
    (c) * * *
    (1) Each of n (number of) satellite networks involved that were 
licensed or granted market access through the same processing round, 
except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, must select 1/n of 
the assigned spectrum available in each of these frequency bands. * * *
* * * * *
    (d) [Reserved]
    (e) Sunsetting. Ten years after the first authorization or grant of 
market access in a processing round, the systems approved in that 
processing round will no longer be required to protect earlier-rounds 
systems, and instead will be required to share spectrum with earlier-
round systems under paragraph (c) of this section.

0
4. Delayed indefinitely, further amend Sec.  25.261 by adding paragraph 
(d) and revising paragraph (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  25.261  Sharing among NGSO FSS space stations.

* * * * *
    (d) Protection of earlier-round systems. Prior to commencing 
operations, an NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient must either 
certify that it has completed a coordination agreement with any 
operational NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access in 
an earlier processing round, or submit for Commission approval a 
compatibility showing which demonstrates by use of a degraded 
throughput methodology that it will not cause harmful interference to 
any such system with which coordination has not been completed. If an 
earlier-round system becomes operational after a later-round system has 
commenced operations, the later-round licensee or market access 
recipient must submit a certification of coordination or a 
compatibility showing with respect to the earlier-round system no later 
than 60 days after the earlier-round system commences operations as 
notified pursuant to Sec.  25.121(b) or otherwise.
    (1) Compatibility showings will be placed on public notice pursuant 
to Sec.  25.151(a)(13).
    (2) While a compatibility showing remains pending before the 
Commission, the submitting NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient 
may commence operations on an unprotected, non-interference basis with 
respect to the operations of the system that is the subject of the 
showing.

[[Page 39793]]

    (e) Sunsetting. Ten years after the first authorization or grant of 
market access in a processing round, the systems approved in that 
processing round will no longer be required to protect earlier-rounds 
systems under paragraph (d) of this section, and instead will be 
required to share spectrum with earlier-round systems under paragraph 
(c) of this section.

[FR Doc. 2023-12803 Filed 6-16-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P