[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 84 (Tuesday, May 2, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27570-27573]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-09239]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2023-03; Accident Mitigation and Train Length
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.
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SUMMARY: Freight train length has increased in recent years, and while
research is ongoing related to operational aspects of long trains,
including brake system performance, it is known that the in-train
forces longer trains experience are generally stronger and more complex
than those in shorter train consists. FRA is issuing this Safety
Advisory to ensure railroads and railroad employees are aware of the
potential complexities associated with operating longer trains and to
ensure they take appropriate measures to address those complexities to
ensure the safe operation of such trains. Among other things, this
Safety Advisory recommends that railroads review their operating rules
and existing locomotive engineer certification programs to address
operational complexities of train length, take appropriate action to
prevent the loss of communications between end-of-train devices, and
mitigate the impacts of long trains on blocked crossings.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christian Holt, Staff Director,
Operating Practices Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New
Jersey Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 366-0978.
Disclaimer: This Safety Advisory is considered guidance pursuant to
DOT Order 2100.6A (June 7, 2021). Except when referencing laws,
regulations, policies, or orders, the information in this Safety
Advisory does not have the force and effect of law and is not binding
in any way. This document does not review or replace any previously
issued guidance.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Freight-train length, particularly for Class I railroads, has
increased in recent years.\1\ The operation of longer trains presents
different, more complex, operational challenges, which can be
exacerbated by the weight and makeup of the trains.\2\ Accordingly,
FRA's Office of Research, Development, and Technology is currently
studying the air brake system performance and resulting train dynamics
of trains comprised of up to 200 cars.\3\ Additionally, in response to
the mandate of Section 22422 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
Act,\4\ the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine
(NAS) is conducting a study of the impacts of trains longer than 7,500
feet.\5\ The estimate to complete both FRA and NAS's studies is 2024.
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\1\ See GAO's May 2019 report titled RAIL SAFETY: Freight Trains
Are Getting Longer, and Additional Information is Needed to Assess
Their Impact, GAO-19-443 (available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-443.pdf).
\2\ See FRA Safety Advisory 2023-02, Train Makeup and
Operational Safety Concerns, for a discussion of how train makeup
affects safety. FRA Safety Advisory 2023-02 is available at: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/04/11/2023-07579/safety-advisory-2023-02-train-makeup-and-operational-safety-concerns.
\3\ See https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2022-12/2023_RDT_CurrentProjects_complete_FINAL.pdf.
\4\ Public Law 117-58 (Nov. 15, 2021).
\5\ See NAS https://www.nationalacademies.org/our-work/impacts-of-trains-longer-than-7500-feet.
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While this research is ongoing, FRA is issuing this Safety Advisory
to ensure railroads and railroad employees are aware of the potential
complexities involved in the operation of longer trains, and
appropriate actions are taken to address these complexities. This
Safety Advisory also makes clear that train length is a critical factor
to consider when building any train, just as consideration of a
consist's
[[Page 27571]]
configuration is critical, as outlined in FRA Safety Advisory 2023-
02.\6\
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\6\ https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/04/11/2023-07579/safety-advisory-2023-02-train-makeup-and-operational-safety-concerns.
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FRA has identified three significant incidents (discussed below)
that have occurred since 2022 involving trains with more than 200 cars,
where train handling and train makeup is believed to have caused, or
contributed to, the incidents. These incidents (which occurred in
Springfield, Ohio; Ravenna, Ohio; and Rockwell, Iowa) involved trains
that were 12,250 feet or longer and weighed over 17,000 trailing tons.
FRA believes these incidents demonstrate the need for railroads and
railroad employees to be particularly mindful of the complexities of
operating longer trains, which include, but are not limited to: (1)
train makeup and handling; (2) railroad braking and train handling
rules, policies, and procedures; (3) protecting against the loss of
end-of-train (EOT) device communications; and (4) where applicable,
protecting against the loss of radio communications among crew members.
These technical complexities make it critical that employees assigned
to operate longer trains are adequately trained and qualified for the
most demanding service for which they can be called. Additionally,
these technical complexities make it necessary to ensure that a
railroad's operational testing program adequately assesses and
evaluates whether employees are appropriately equipped and demonstrate
the capability to fully address those complexities in real world
operating scenarios.
Springfield, Ohio--March 4, 2023
On March 4, 2023, at approximately 4:54 p.m. a Norfolk Southern
Railway (NS) 210-car, mixed-freight train totaling 13,470 feet and
17,966 trailing tons with distributed power units (DPUs) experienced a
derailment involving 28 cars, including 21 empty and 7 loaded cars in
Springfield, Ohio. The train had 82 cars equipped with end-of-car
cushioning devices, and 18 of those derailed. The train consisted of
three head-end locomotives and two mid-train DPUs, with one head-end
locomotive offline. The train was traveling on an ascending 0.6% grade
with the heavier part of the consist (the back end) on a 0.7% downhill
grade. The weight was mostly concentrated at the head and rear ends of
the train. During the incident, dynamic braking was applied only to the
head-end locomotive consist, while the DPUs were idle, making the train
function like a conventional train. The derailment happened at the sag
between ascending and descending grades, with short, empty rail cars
designed to ship coiled steel being the first to derail. Buff forces
peaked as the downhill portion of the train ran-in, causing the
derailment of cars 70 through 72 (the short coil cars) and the
subsequent pile-up. The train was classified as a key train,\7\ with 28
loaded hazardous materials (hazmat) cars distributed throughout. No
hazmat cars derailed. FRA's investigation into this incident is
currently ongoing, but preliminary indications show excessive buff
force due to train makeup and train handling are the primary causes of
the incident.
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\7\ As defined by Association of American Railroads (AAR)
Circular OT-55, available at https://public.railinc.com/sites/default/files/documents/OT-55.pdf, a ``Key Train'' is any train
with: (1) One tank car load of Poison or Toxic Inhalation Hazard
(PIH or TIH) (Hazard Zone A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia
(UN1005), or ammonia solutions (UN3318); (2) 20 car loads or
intermodal portable tank loads of any combination of hazardous
material; or (3) One or more car loads of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF),
High Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW).
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Ravenna, Ohio--November 1, 2022
On November 1, 2022, at approximately 7:04 p.m., a NS 238-car,
mixed-freight train totaling 15,657 feet and 24,538 trailing tons with
DPUs experienced a derailment involving 22 cars, in Ravenna, Ohio. The
train included 188 loads and 50 empties, and was powered by two head-
end locomotives and two mid-train DPUs. The incident occurred on the NS
Keystone Subdivision main track. The derailment happened during an
undesired emergency air brake application, the cause of which is still
under investigation. The train was designated as a key train, and 2 of
the 63 hazmat cars derailed, in addition to 20 other cars. In the
consist, 56 cars were equipped with end-of-car cushioning devices. The
train was initially operating with the energy management system
engaged, but reverted to manual operation prior to the derailment. The
railroad reported the cause of the incident as buffing or excessive
slack action due to train makeup, but FRA's investigation is ongoing.
Rockwell, Iowa--March 24, 2022
On March 24, 2022, at approximately 1:59 a.m., a southbound Union
Pacific Railroad (UP) train totaling 12,250 feet long and 23,315
trailing tons experienced a derailment of 37 cars in Rockwell, Iowa.
The train was traveling at a speed of 46 miles per hour at the time of
the incident. The train consisted of two head-end locomotives, one mid-
train DPU, one rear DPU, and a total of 204 cars consisting of 169
loads and 35 empties. At the time of the incident, the energy
management system was engaged, the train's head-end was ascending with
the rear portion descending, causing the slack to run in, leading to
compression at the middle of the train. This incident is still under
investigation and the analysis of in-train forces is ongoing, but
preliminary indications are that the primary cause of the incident was
buffing or excessive slack action due to train makeup.
II. The Complexities of Operating Longer Trains
As noted above, the operation of longer trains involves technical
challenges pertaining to (1) train makeup and handling; (2) railroad
braking and train handling rules, policies, and procedures; (3)
protecting against the loss of EOT device communications; and (4) where
applicable, protecting against the loss of radio communication among
crew members.
Train Makeup and Handling
FRA notes that recently issued Safety Advisory 2023-02 addresses
train makeup and accompanying operational safety concerns. FRA
reiterates the recommendations in that Safety Advisory as applied to
longer trains.
Railroad Braking and Train Handling Rules, Policies, and Procedures
Air brake and train handling (ABTH) rules are the basis for the
safe operation of any train, but as noted above, longer trains may pose
unique challenges that must be comprehensively addressed in railroads'
ABTH rules. ABTH rules are developed from experience and are based on
factors such as the designs and types of rolling equipment in a
consist, whether the equipment is loaded or empty, and the placement of
that equipment in a train's consist. FRA recognizes that railroads
regularly update their ABTH rules, but FRA is concerned that some
railroads' ABTH rules do not sufficiently address issues related to
train length such as, but not limited to:
The maximum number of powered axles in stretch (powered)
and dynamic braking;
Train consist comprised of long-short car combinations;
The placement of loaded and empty cars within a train
consist;
End-of-car cushioning devices;
Air brakes;
The use of distributed power, if equipped;
[[Page 27572]]
Operating over grades and through curves;
Cold weather operations; and
Train automatic operation (energy management systems),
including transfer from automatic to manual operating scenarios.
Accordingly, this Safety Advisory recommends that railroads review
their existing ABTH rules and update those rules as necessary to ensure
they comprehensively address the complexities associated with train
length in the railroad's operations.
Protecting Against the Loss of EOT Device Communications
Railroads have used EOT devices for years to monitor brake pipe
pressure at the rear of the train. More recently, the functionality of
these devices has expanded to assist in emergency braking. Two-way EOT
device systems are comprised of a rear-of-train unit (rear unit)
located on the last car of a train and a front-of-train unit (front
unit) located in the cab of the locomotive controlling the train. An
EOT system is linked by radio signals that will automatically transmit
an emergency brake signal from the controlling locomotive to the rear
of the train when an emergency brake application is initiated. The
system additionally allows for the engineer in the controlling
locomotive to manually activate a switch which sends a radio signal to
the rear unit EOT device that is tied into the air brake system, opens
an internal valve, and initiates an emergency brake application.
Due to the distance EOT device signals must travel on longer
trains, the greater the risk that signal communications may be lost
between the front and rear units. Thus, longer trains are more prone to
experience EOT device loss of signal communications than shorter train
consists. Other factors, such as the local topography and weather
conditions, can present further challenges to EOT devices maintaining
communications. A loss of communication between EOT devices can be
temporary or permanent, and can result in an emergency air brake signal
from the controlling locomotive taking longer to propagate through the
entire train (effectively slowing down braking of the entire consist),
or in the event of a train air brake line blockage, a loss of
communication between the EOT devices will result in the emergency
signal not being transmitted to the rear EOT device, as evidenced by
the fatal UP Granite Canyon accident that occurred on October 4, 2018.
Accordingly, this Safety Advisory recommends that railroads
implement technologies, policies, procedures, and any necessary
hardware enhancements to ensure two-way EOT devices maintain continuous
and undisrupted communications to and from the front and rear units.
Additionally, this Safety Advisory recommends that railroads develop,
implement, and maintain clear rules to follow in the event of a loss of
communication between EOT devices.
Protecting Against the Loss of Radio Communications Among Crew Members
Effective radio voice communications are crucial for ensuring the
safety of railroad employees and train operations. A longer train can
present a radio voice communication problem for an operating employee
traveling a long distance away from the lead locomotive. Portable radio
handsets generally used might not have sufficient radio signal strength
to provide clear communication over great distances or undulating
topography. This problem is particularly concerning during emergency
situations, where clear communication is critical. For instance, if an
operating employee is injured and unable to contact the locomotive
engineer, delays in getting timely aid to the operating employee may
occur.
As a result, this Safety Advisory recommends that railroads adopt
enhanced technologies and, as necessary, procedures for maintaining
radio voice communications with a contingency plan if voice
communications are lost between operating employees.
III. Employee Training and Qualification Considerations
Training Generally
The potential complexities involved with the operation of longer
trains make it particularly critical that locomotive engineers (and all
other crew members) are adequately trained and qualified to safely
perform their duties. FRA is concerned that certified locomotive
engineers may receive basic train handling training that was typically
satisfactory for historical operations over particular territories, but
given railroads' current increased operation of longer trains, such
training may no longer be adequate. FRA reminds railroads of the
regulatory requirement at 49 CFR 240.211(a) for railroads to, prior to
initially certifying or recertifying any person as a locomotive
engineer, determine that the person has demonstrated the skills
necessary to safely operate locomotives or trains in the most demanding
class or type of service that the person will be permitted to perform.
In the context of longer trains, the engineer must be adequately
trained in their operation and demonstrate an ability to safely do so
prior to being called for such operation. For example, an engineer who
has safely operated a 100-car consist over a particular territory for
the past five years, but has never been trained and qualified on a
longer consist, should not be called to operate a 200-car train without
additional training on the operational complexities involved.
A locomotive engineer cannot be expected to safely operate in a
more demanding service without proper additional training that covers
the unique challenges and complexities those trains present. This
training concern extends to the designated supervisors of locomotive
engineers, who are responsible for understanding these territories,
operations, and associated risks, and are expected to be involved in
the training, testing, and qualifying of locomotive engineers.
Part 240 Locomotive Engineer Certification Programs
Appendix B to 49 CFR part 240 outlines the procedures that
railroads must describe in their locomotive engineer certification
programs, and the level of detail required for the training,
qualification, and certification of locomotive engineers. Accordingly,
FRA expects each railroad to design its program to address that
railroad's specific operations and FRA expects railroads to adjust
their programs as the nature or circumstances of operations change.
Specifically, if a railroad creates a more demanding operating
environment through the operation of longer trains, that railroad's
locomotive engineer certification program must be updated to reflect
that more demanding environment. For this reason, FRA recommends that
each railroad with a submitted program, review whether updates to their
programs are necessary to ensure: (1) the complexities of that
railroad's operations are adequately addressed in the program, and (2)
its employees are adequately trained and qualified to operate in the
most demanding service. FRA notes that the use of distributed power and
energy management systems typically involved in longer train operations
place new demands on locomotive engineers and, as such, those employees
must be trained and qualified on these additional complexities.
Part 217 Operational Testing
Under 49 CFR part 217, railroads are required to conduct
operational tests. These operational tests are vital for determining
that employees are
[[Page 27573]]
properly trained and fully aware of the rules and regulations governing
safe operations. By identifying and addressing any potential training
and compliance issues revealed by effective operational testing of
longer trains, railroads can mitigate the potential risk of accidents
and incidents. As new operations and technology are introduced,
operational testing must be adjusted accordingly.
IV. Blocked Public Highway-Rail Grade Crossings
Blocked crossings occur when trains occupy highway-rail grade
crossings and impede the flow of motor vehicle or pedestrian traffic
over railroad tracks for extended periods of time. Blocked crossings
pose numerous potential safety risks--frustrated individuals may be
tempted to crawl, on, over, under, or between stopped railcars and
blocked crossings can hinder emergency services' access to individuals
in need of fire, police, or EMS assistance. Residents of communities
through which railroads operate often rely on specific highway-rail
grade crossings for daily commutes and other essential activities.
Local knowledge of these crossings has developed over time, allowing
community members to navigate through those crossings safely and
efficiently. However, longer trains may, in certain instances, mean
that trains are occupying these crossings for longer periods,
potentially blocking access to homes, hospitals, schools, or
businesses, and causing unexpected disruptions. Local emergency
responders, such as police, fire, and ambulance services, can be
severely impacted if emergency responders must find an alternate route
when a train is blocking a crossing or if there is no alternative
route.
Longer trains may also present challenges for pedestrians as the
trains occupy pedestrian crossings for longer periods of time. Blocked
crossings near schools are especially critical safety hazards due to
the potential for children to cut through the idling trains.
Depending on the length of time that a crossing is blocked, the
type of vehicles at a blocked crossing, and the configuration of the
highway, motor vehicle drivers could be expected to take greater risks
and commit dangerous maneuvers in an attempt to seek an alternate
route. Motor vehicle drivers may also be more tempted to ``outrun the
train'' by speeding to cross the tracks before the oncoming train
reaches the crossing, particularly at locations that are frequently
blocked by trains. Although trains of any length may block highway-rail
grade crossings for a variety of reasons, the operation of longer
trains may, in certain instances, exacerbate the impact of blocked
crossings on communities. Accordingly, FRA recommends that railroads
identify geographic areas with highway-rail grade crossings that could
be impacted by longer trains, and work with local communities and
emergency responders to identify and implement methods of preventing,
or at least mitigating, the impacts of such blockages. These actions
could include: identifying alternative routes for critical emergency
response needs, establishing and maintaining clear lines of
communication between the railroad and local authorities, or developing
protocols for resolving concerns surrounding emergency response and
blocked crossings.
V. Recommended Actions
Due to the complexities involved in the operation of longer trains,
and to ensure the safety of the Nation's railroads, their employees,
and the general public, FRA recommends that freight railroads take the
following actions:
1. Review ABTH rules, or supplements, to ensure those rules
adequately address the complexities associated with the railroad's
operation of longer trains.
2. Implement technologies, policies, procedures, and/or any
necessary hardware enhancements to ensure two-way EOT devices maintain
undisrupted communications to and from the head-end and rear-end units.
Develop, implement, and maintain clear policies, procedures, and rules
that address instances of the loss of communications between EOT
devices.
3. Adopt enhanced technologies and/or procedures for maintaining
radio voice communications with a contingency plan if voice
communications are lost between operating employees.
4. Identify changes to crew training, train handling procedures,
train makeup, DPU requirements, limitations to length or tonnage, speed
restrictions, track, mechanical, and brake inspection and maintenance
requirements necessary to ensure safe operations of longer trains.
5. Review, and update as necessary, each railroad's current 49 CFR
part 240 locomotive engineer certification program to ensure the
program addresses all levels of operations, including the operation of
longer trains.
6. Review and evaluate existing operational testing data as
required by 49 CFR 217.9(e) relevant to the operation of longer trains.
If longer train operations are conducted, or if any potential training
or compliance issues are identified, consider increasing the frequency
of operational testing and/or modifying the types of operational
testing performed to address those deficiencies.
7. Identify geographic areas that could be impacted by longer
trains at highway-rail grade crossings, take action to minimize blocked
crossings by considering train length when taking any action that
causes any part of a train to occupy a crossing, and work with local
communities and emergency responders to prevent or at least mitigate
the impacts of blocked crossings should they occur.
8. Conduct post-accident simulator evaluations and assign accurate
primary and contributing cause codes for reportable and accountable
accidents and incidents. A detailed narrative is basic to an
understanding of the factors leading to, and the consequences arising
from, an accident.
FRA encourages freight railroads to take actions consistent with
the preceding recommendations. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory
2023-03, issue additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate
action necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's
railroads, including pursing other corrective measures under its rail
safety authority.
Issued in Washington, DC.
Amitabha Bose,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2023-09239 Filed 5-1-23; 8:45 am]
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