Federal Register, Volume 88 Issue 73 (Monday, April 17, 2023)

[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 73 (Monday, April 17, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 23506-23553]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-07517]

[[Page 23505]]

Vol. 88

Monday,

No. 73

April 17, 2023

Part II

Department of Health and Human Services

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45 CFR Part 160 and 164

HIPAA Privacy Rule To Support Reproductive Health Care Privacy;
Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 73 / Monday, April 17, 2023 /
Proposed Rules

[[Page 23506]]

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Office of the Secretary

45 CFR Parts 160 and 164

RIN 0945-AA20

HIPAA Privacy Rule To Support Reproductive Health Care Privacy

AGENCY: Office for Civil Rights (OCR), Office of the Secretary,
Department of Health and Human Services.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; notice of Tribal consultation.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS or
``Department'') is issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to
solicit comment on its proposal to modify the Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information (``Privacy Rule'') under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
and the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Act of 2009 (HITECH Act). The proposal would modify existing standards
permitting uses and disclosures of protected health information (PHI)
by limiting uses and disclosures of PHI for certain purposes where the
use or disclosure of information is about reproductive health care that
is lawful under the circumstances in which such health care is
provided. The proposal would modify existing standards by prohibiting
uses and disclosures of PHI for criminal, civil, or administrative
investigations or proceedings against individuals, covered entities or
their business associates (collectively, ``regulated entities''), or
other persons for seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating
reproductive health care that is lawful under the circumstances in
which it is provided.

DATES:
Comments: Submit comments on or before June 16, 2023.
Meeting: Pursuant to Executive Order 13175, Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, the Department of Health
and Human Services' Tribal Consultation Policy, and the Department's
Plan for Implementing Executive Order 13175, the Office for Civil
Rights solicits input from Tribal officials as the Department develops
the modifications to the HIPAA Privacy Rule at 45 CFR parts 160 and
164, subparts A and E. The Tribal consultation meeting will be held on
May 17, 2023, at 2 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. EDT.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by RIN Number 0945-AA20,
by any of the following methods. Please do not submit duplicate
comments.
To participate in the Tribal consultation meeting, you must
register in advance at https://www.zoomgov.com/meeting/register/vJItf-2hqD8jHfdtmYaUoWidy9odBZMYQ4Q.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: You may submit electronic
comments at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for the Docket ID
number HHS-OCR-0945-AA20. Follow the instructions at http://www.regulations.gov for submitting electronic comments. Attachments
should be in Microsoft Word or Portable Document Format (PDF).
Regular, Express, or Overnight Mail: You may mail written
comments to the following address only: U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, Attention: HIPAA and
Reproductive Health Care Privacy NPRM, Hubert H. Humphrey Building,
Room 509F, 200 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20201. Please
allow sufficient time for mailed comments to be timely received in the
event of delivery or security delays.
Please note that comments submitted by fax or email and those
submitted after the comment period will not be accepted.
Inspection of Public Comments: All comments received by the
accepted methods and due date specified above may be posted without
change to content to https://www.regulations.gov, which may include
personal information provided about the commenter, and such posting may
occur after the closing of the comment period. However, the Department
may redact certain non-substantive content from comments or attachments
to comments before posting, including: threats, hate speech, profanity,
sensitive health information, graphic images, promotional materials,
copyrighted materials, or individually identifiable information about a
third-party individual other than the commenter. In addition, comments
or material designated as confidential or not to be disclosed to the
public will not be accepted. Comments may be redacted or rejected as
described above without notice to the commenter, and the Department
will not consider in rulemaking any redacted or rejected content that
would not be made available to the public as part of the administrative
record.
Docket: For complete access to background documents or posted
comments, go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID
number HHS-OCR-0945-AA20.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lester Coffer at (202) 240-3110 or
(800) 537-7697 (TDD).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The discussion below includes an Executive
Summary, a description of relevant statutory and regulatory authority
and history, the justification for this proposed regulation, a section-
by-section description of the proposed modifications, and a regulatory
impact analysis and other required regulatory analyses. The Department
solicits public comment on all aspects of the proposed rule. The
Department requests that persons commenting on the provisions of the
proposed rule label their discussion of any particular provision or
topic with a citation to the section of the proposed rule being
addressed and identify the particular request for comment being
addressed, if applicable.

I. Executive Summary
A. Overview
B. Applicability
C. Table of Abbreviations/Commonly Used Acronyms in This
Document
II. Statutory Authority and Regulatory History
A. Statutory Authority and History
1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA)
2. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act
B. Rulemaking Authority and Regulatory History
1. The Department's Rulemaking Authority Under HIPAA
2. Regulatory History
III. Justification for This Proposed Rulemaking
A. HIPAA Encourages Trust by Carefully Balancing Individuals'
Privacy Interests With Others' Interests in Using or Disclosing PHI
B. Developments in the Legal Environment are Eroding
Individuals' Trust in the Health Care System
C. To Protect the Trust Between Individuals and Health Care
Providers, the Department Proposes To Restrict Certain Uses and
Disclosures of PHI for Non-Health Care Purposes
IV. Section-by-Section Description of Proposed Amendments to the
Privacy Rule
A. Section 160.103--Definitions
1. Clarifying the Definition of ``Person''
2. Interpreting Terms Used in Section 1178(b) of the Social
Security Act
3. Adding a Definition of ``Reproductive Health Care''
4. Request for Comment
B. Section 164.502--Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health
Information: General Rules
1. Clarifying When PHI May Be Used or Disclosed by Regulated
Entities
2. Adding a New Category of Prohibited Uses and Disclosures

[[Page 23507]]

3. Clarifying Personal Representative Status in the Context of
Reproductive Health Care
4. Request for Comment
C. Section 164.509--Uses and Disclosures for Which an
Attestation Is Required (Proposed Heading)
1. Current Provision and Issues To Address
2. Proposal
3. Request for Comment
D. Section 164.512--Uses and Disclosures for Which an
Authorization or Opportunity To Agree or Object Is Not Required
1. Applying the Proposed Prohibition and Attestation Requirement
to Certain Permitted Uses and Disclosures
2. Making a Technical Correction to the Heading of 45 CFR
164.512(c) and Clarifying That Providing or Facilitating
Reproductive Health Care Is Not Abuse, Neglect, or Domestic Violence
3. Clarifying the Permission for Disclosures Based on
Administrative Processes
4. Request for Comment
E. Section 164.520--Notice of Privacy Practices for Protected
Health Information
1. Current Provision and Issues To Address
2. Proposal
3. Request for Comment
V. Executive Order 12866 and Related Executive Orders on Regulatory
Review
A. Regulatory Impact Analysis
1. Summary of Costs and Benefits
2. Baseline Conditions
3. Costs of the Proposed Rule
4. Request for Comment
B. Regulatory Alternatives to the Proposed Rule
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act--Small Entity Analysis
D. Executive Order 13132--Federalism
E. Assessment of Federal Regulation and Policies on Families
F. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
1. Explanation of Estimated Annualized Burden Hours
VI. Request for Comment
VII. Public Participation

I. Executive Summary

A. Overview

In this notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS or ``Department'') proposes
modifications to the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information (``Privacy Rule''), issued pursuant to section 264
of the Administrative Simplification provisions of title II, subtitle
F, of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA).\1\ The Privacy Rule \2\ is one of several rules, collectively
known as the HIPAA Rules,\3\ that protect the privacy and security of
individuals' protected health information \4\ (PHI), which is
individually identifiable health information \5\ (IIHI) transmitted by
or maintained in electronic media or any other form or medium, with
certain exceptions.\6\
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\1\ Subtitle F of title II of HIPAA (Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (Aug. 21, 1996)) added a new part C to title XI of the Social
Security Act (SSA), Public Law 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (Aug. 14, 1935),
(see sections 1171-1179 of the SSA (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1320d-
1320d-8)), as well as promulgating section 264 of HIPAA (codified at
42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 note), which authorizes the Secretary to
promulgate regulations with respect to the privacy of individually
identifiable health information. The Privacy Rule has subsequently
been amended pursuant to the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act of 2008 (GINA), title I, section 105, Public Law 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (May 21, 2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000ff), and the
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act of 2009, Public Law 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (Feb. 17,
2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 139w-4(0)(2)).
\2\ 45 CFR parts 160 and 164, subparts A and E. For a history of
the Privacy Rule, see Section II.B.2., ``Regulatory History,''
below.
\3\ See also the HIPAA Security Rule, 45 CFR parts 160 and 164,
subparts A and C; the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, 45 CFR part
164, subpart D; and the HIPAA Enforcement Rule, 45 CFR part 160,
subparts C, D, and E.
\4\ 45 CFR 160.103 (definition of ``Protected health
information'').
\5\ 42 U.S.C. 1320d. See also 45 CFR 160.103 (definition of
``Individually identifiable health information'').
\6\ At times throughout this NPRM, the Department uses the terms
``health information'' or ``individuals' health information'' to
refer generically to health information pertaining to an individual
or individuals. In contrast, the Department's use of the term
``IIHI'' refers to a category of health information defined in
HIPAA, and ``PHI'' is used to refer specifically to a category of
IIHI that is defined by and subject to the privacy and security
standards promulgated in the HIPAA Rules.
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Under its statutory authority to administer and enforce the HIPAA
Rules, the Department modifies the HIPAA Rules as needed, but not more
than once every 12 months.\7\ The Department makes the determination
that such modifications may be needed using information it receives on
an ongoing basis--from the public, regulated entities, media reports,
and its own analysis of the state of privacy for IIHI. Based on
information the Department has received in recent months, we believe it
may be necessary to modify the Privacy Rule to avoid the circumstance
where an existing provision of the Privacy Rule is used to request the
use or disclosure of an individual's PHI as a pretext for obtaining PHI
related to reproductive health care for a non-health care purpose where
such use or disclosure would be detrimental to any person. The
proposals in this NPRM would amend provisions of the Privacy Rule to
strengthen privacy protections for individuals' PHI related to
reproductive health care.
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\7\ 45 CFR 160.104.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health
Organization \8\ (Dobbs) makes it more likely than before that
individuals' PHI may be disclosed in ways that cause harm to the
interests that HIPAA seeks to protect but that are not adequately
addressed in this context,\9\ such as criminal, civil, or
administrative investigations or proceedings that chill access to
lawful health care and full communication between individuals and
health care providers. These developments in the legal environment
increase the potential for uses or disclosures about an individual's
reproductive health to undermine access to and the quality of health
care generally. Some states have already imposed criminal, civil, or
administrative liability for, or created private rights of action
against, individuals who obtain certain reproductive health care,
including pregnancy termination; the health care providers who furnish
such reproductive health care; or other persons who facilitate the
furnishing or receipt of certain reproductive health care.\10\ Other
states may follow suit in the future. And in yet other states, law
enforcement agencies may attempt to use general criminal laws to
prosecute individuals for seeking or obtaining such reproductive health
care.\11\
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\8\ 597 U.S. __, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) (No. 19-1392) (June 24,
2022).
\9\ See National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS
or ``Committee'') discussion below, section II.A.1., expressing
concern for harm caused by disclosing identifiable health
information for non-health care purposes.
\10\ See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. sec. 44-41-80(b), NRS 200.220,
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. sec. 171.208 (2021); 63 OK Stat sec.
1-745.34-35 (2022). See also Abortion Policy Tracker, Kaiser Family
Foundation (Jan. 20, 2023), https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/abortion-policy-tracker/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D.
\11\ See Laura Huss, Farah Diaz-Tello, Goleen Samari, ``Self-
Care, Criminalized: August 2022 Preliminary Findings,*'' If/When/
How: Lawyering for Reproductive Justice (2022), https://www.ifwhenhow.org/resources/self-care-criminalized-preliminary-findings/; Caroline Kitchener and Ellen Francis, ``Talk of
prosecuting women for abortion pills roils antiabortion movement,''
The Washington Post (Jan. 11. 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/01/11/alabama-abortion-pills-prosecution/.
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After Dobbs, the Department has heard concerns that civil,
criminal, or administrative investigations or proceedings have been
instituted or threatened on the basis of reproductive health care that
is lawful under the circumstances in which it is provided. The threat
that PHI will be obtained and used in such an investigation or
proceeding is likely to chill individuals' willingness to seek lawful
treatment or to provide full information to their

[[Page 23508]]

health care providers when obtaining that treatment.
A positive, trusting relationship between individuals and their
health care providers is essential to an individual's health and well-
being.\12\ The prospect of releasing highly sensitive PHI can result in
medical mistrust and the deterioration of the confidential, safe
environment that is necessary to quality health care, a functional
health care system, and the public's health generally.\13\ That is even
more true in the context of reproductive health care, given the
potential for stigmatization and other adverse consequences to
individuals resulting from disclosures they do not want or expect.\14\
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\12\ See Fallon E. Chipidza, Rachel S. Wallwork, Theodore A.
Stern, ``Impact of the Doctor-Patient Relationship,'' The Primary
Care Companion for CNS Disorders (Oct. 2015), https://www.psychiatrist.com/pcc/delivery/patient-physician-communication/impact-doctor-patient-relationship/.
\13\ See, e.g., Kim Bellware, ``Doctor says she shouldn't have
to turn over patients' abortion records,'' The Washington Post (Nov.
19, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/11/19/caitlin-bernard-rokita-lawsuit/ (citing the testimony of pediatric
bioethics expert Kyle Brothers about the potential negative effects
requests for this type of sensitive medical record could have on
individuals: ``This kind of disclosure, especially for a minor, is
just heartbreaking.''). See also Eric Boodman, ``In a doctor's
suspicion after a miscarriage, a glimpse of expanding medical
mistrust,'' STAT News (June 29, 2022), https://www.statnews.com/2022/06/29/doctor-suspicion-after-miscarriage-glimpse-of-expanding-medical-mistrust/ (Sarah Prager, professor of obstetrics and
gynecology at the University of Washington said that it's a bad
precedent if clinical spaces become unsafe for patients because,
``[a health care provider's] ability to take care of patients relies
on trust, and that will be impossible moving forward.'').
\14\ See Letter from NCVHS Chair Simon P. Cohn to HHS Secretary
Michael O. Leavitt (Feb. 20, 2008) (listing categories of health
information that are commonly considered to contain sensitive
information), p. 5, https://ncvhs.hhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/080220lt.pdf.
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Experience shows that medical mistrust--especially in vulnerable
communities that have been negatively affected by historical and
current health care disparities \15\--can create damaging and chilling
effects on individuals' willingness to seek appropriate and lawful care
for medical conditions that can worsen without treatment.\16\ If
individuals believe that their PHI may be disclosed without their
knowledge or consent to initiate criminal, civil, or administrative
investigations or proceedings against them or others based primarily
upon their receipt of lawful reproductive health care, they are likely
to be less open, honest, or forthcoming about their symptoms and
medical history. As a result, individuals may refrain from sharing
critical information with their health care providers, regardless of
whether they are seeking reproductive health care that is lawful under
the circumstances in which it is provided. For instance, an individual
who has obtained a lawful abortion in one state may fear receiving
emergency care in a state where abortion is unlawful because providing
information to a health care provider in such a state could place them
into legal jeopardy, even if that information is relevant to the
immediate health emergency. If an individual believes they cannot be
honest about their health history, the health care provider cannot
conduct an appropriate health assessment to reach a sound diagnosis and
recommend the best course of action for that individual. Heightened
confidentiality and privacy protections enable an individual to develop
a trust-based relationship with their health care provider and to be
open and honest with their health care provider. That health care
provider is then more likely to provide a correct diagnosis and aid the
individual in making informed treatment decisions.
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\15\ See Lisa P. Oakley, Marie Harvey, Daniel F. Lopez-Cevallos,
``Racial and Ethnic Discrimination, Medical Mistrust, and
Satisfaction with Birth Control Services among Young Adult
Latinas,'' Women's Health Issues (July-August 2018), p. 313, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1049386717305443;
and Cynthia Prather, Taleria R. Fuller, Khiya J. Marshall, et al.,
``The Impact of Racism on the Sexual and Reproductive Health of
African American Women,'' Journal of Women's Health (July 2016), p.
664, https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/jwh.2015.5637.
\16\ See Texas Maternal Mortality and Morbidity Review Committee
and Department of State Health Services Joint Biennial Report 2022,
Texas Department of State Health Services (Dec. 2022), p. 41,
https://www.dshs.texas.gov/sites/default/files/legislative/2022-Reports/Joint-Biennial-MMMRC-Report-2022.pdf.
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Similarly, if a health care provider believes that an individual's
highly sensitive PHI is likely to be disclosed without the individual's
or the health care provider's knowledge or consent in connection with a
criminal, civil, or administrative investigation or proceeding against
the individual, their health care provider, or others primarily because
of the type of health care the individual received or sought, the
health care provider is more likely to omit information about an
individual's medical history or condition, leave gaps, or include
inaccuracies when preparing the individual's medical records. And if an
individual's medical records lack complete information about the
individual's health history, a subsequent health care provider may not
be able to conduct an appropriate health assessment to reach a sound
diagnosis and recommend the best course of action for the individual.
Alternatively, a health care provider may even withhold from an
individual full and complete information about their treatment options
because of liability fears stemming from concerns about the level of
privacy afforded to PHI.\17\ Heightened confidentiality and privacy
protections enable a health care provider to feel confident maintaining
full and complete medical records. With complete medical records, an
individual is more likely to receive appropriate ongoing or future
health care, including correct diagnoses, and obtain appropriate
guidance, empowering the individual in making informed treatment
decisions. This further enables the individual to access lawful health
care--and health care providers to practice medicine--in an environment
that promotes social, environmental, mental, and physical wellness.
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\17\ See Brief for Zurawski at p. 10, Zurawski v. State of Texas
(No. D-1-GN-23-000968) (W.D. Tex. 2023) (stating that ``[i]n every
interaction with their medical team in Texas, Lauren M. and her
husband felt confused and frustrated and could not get direct
answers,'' and that ``[i]t was apparent that their doctors, nurses,
and counselors were all fearful of speaking directly and openly
about abortion for fear of liability under Texas's abortion
bans.'').
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Furthermore, an individual's lack of trust in their health care
provider to maintain the confidentiality of the individual's most
sensitive medical information and a lack of trust in the medical system
more generally may have significant repercussions for the public's
health more generally. Individuals who are not candid with their health
care providers about their reproductive health care may also withhold
information about other matters that have public health implications,
such as sexually transmitted infections or vaccinations.\18\
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\18\ See Letter from NCVHS Chair Simon P. Cohn to HHS Secretary
Michael O. Leavitt (June 22, 2006), p. 2 (with forwarded NCVHS
recommendations, ``Individual trust in the privacy and
confidentiality of their personal health information also promotes
public health, because individuals with potentially contagious or
communicable diseases are not inhibited from seeking treatment.''),
https://ncvhs.hhs.gov/rrp/june-22-2006-letter-to-the-secretary-recommendations-regarding-privacy-and-confidentiality-in-the-nationwide-health-information-network/.
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When proposing the initial Privacy Rule, the Department described
its policy choices as being motivated to develop and maintain a
relationship of trust between individuals and health care providers.
``A fundamental assumption of this regulation is that the greatest
benefits of improved privacy protection will be realized in the future
as patients gain increasing trust in health care practitioner's ability
to

[[Page 23509]]

maintain the confidentiality of their health information.'' \19\ The
Department also described the benefits of increasing individuals'
access to their own health care information in the development and
maintenance of that trust. Providing individuals with ``[o]pen access
to [their] health information can benefit both the individuals and the
covered entities. [ . . . ] It can increase communication, thereby
enhancing individuals' trust in their health care providers and
increasing compliance with the providers' instructions.'' \20\ The
Department reiterated this need for trust between individuals and
health care providers in the 2000 Privacy Rule, noting that ``[t]he
provision of high-quality health care requires the exchange of
personal, often-sensitive information between an individual and a
skilled practitioner. Vital to that interaction is the patient's
ability to trust that the information shared will be protected and kept
confidential.'' \21\ As the Department also stated, ``[h]ealth care
professionals who lose the trust of their patients cannot deliver high-
quality care.'' \22\
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\19\ See 64 FR 59918, 60006 (Nov. 3, 1999).
\20\ See 64 FR 59980.
\21\ See 65 FR 82462, 82463 (Dec. 28, 2000).
\22\ See 65 FR 82468.
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However, the Department also noted that the policy choices it made
when issuing the 2000 Privacy Rule were a result of balancing the
interests of the individual in the privacy of their PHI with the
interests of society in disclosures of PHI for non-health care
purposes. Thus, the 2000 Privacy Rule included permissions for
regulated entities to disclose PHI under certain conditions for
judicial and administrative proceedings and law enforcement purposes.
As the Department explained at that time, ``Individuals' right to
privacy in information about themselves is not absolute. It does not,
for instance, prevent reporting of public health information on
communicable diseases or stop law enforcement from getting information
when due process has been observed.'' \23\
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\23\ 65 FR 82464.
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The proposed modifications to the Privacy Rule in this NPRM
directly advance the purposes of HIPAA. From their inception, the
Department's regulations implementing the statute have sought to ensure
that individuals do not forgo lawful health care when needed--or
withhold important information from their health care providers that
may affect the quality of health care they receive--out of a fear that
their sensitive information would be revealed outside of their
relationships with their health care providers. In the past, the
Department generally has applied the same privacy standards to nearly
all PHI, regardless of the type of health care at issue. But the
Department has also recognized that some forms of PHI may be
particularly sensitive and thus may warrant heightened protections. For
example, the Department has accorded ``special protections'' to
psychotherapy notes under the Privacy Rule, owing in part to the
``particularly sensitive information'' those notes contain.\24\
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\24\ The special protections for psychotherapy notes and the
Department's rationale for them are discussed at greater length in
section III of this preamble.
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Many individuals regard information about their reproductive health
as highly private and personal. That information is likely to come up
in a wide variety of encounters between individuals and their health
care providers, including routine physicals, gynecological
examinations, and a range of other encounters that do not involve an
individual's effort to obtain health care, such as an abortion, that is
illegal under some post-Dobbs state laws. However, if individuals do
not trust that their health care providers will keep their sensitive
information private, they may withhold important health information
from their health care providers, leading to incomplete and inaccurate
medical records and potentially substandard health care. Some
individuals may refrain from or defer obtaining necessary health care,
which could lead to worse health outcomes and exacerbate health
disparities.\25\ Others may withhold aspects of their medical history
from their health care providers, which could impede the ability of
health care professionals to make fully informed medical judgments and
provide full and complete information about treatment options.
Similarly, health care providers may omit information about an
individual's medical history or condition, or leave gaps or include
inaccuracies, when preparing medical records, out of fear that the
individual's PHI is likely to be disclosed without the individual's or
the health care provider's knowledge or consent for use in criminal or
civil proceedings against the individual, their health care provider,
or others. In so doing, they increase the risk that the individual will
receive substandard ongoing or future health care. Regardless of how it
occurs, the result is substandard health care and worse health
outcomes.
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\25\ See Jessica Winter, ``The Dobbs Decision Has Unleashed
Legal Chaos for Doctors and Patients,'' The New Yorker (July 2,
2022) (Chloe Akers, a criminal defense attorney in Tennessee,
discussing agencies authorized to investigate offenses related to
abortion ``[t]hat leads to a serious concern about privacy at ob-gyn
offices and for other health-care providers.''), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-dobbs-decision-has-unleashed-legal-chaos-for-doctors-and-patients.
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Such deferrals or avoidance of lawful health care are not only
problematic for individuals' health, but they are also problematic for
public health. As discussed in greater detail below, the objective of
public health is to protect and improve the health of people and their
communities. Barriers that undermine the willingness of individuals to
seek lawful health care in a timely manner or to provide complete and
accurate health information to their health care providers undermine
the overall objective of public health. Thus, based on the longstanding
purposes of HIPAA, there is a compelling need to provide additional
protections to this especially sensitive category of information.
Following the Dobbs decision in 2022, laws enacted or effective in
a number of states \26\ raised the prospect that highly sensitive PHI
would be disclosed under circumstances that did not exist before the
Supreme Court's decision, generating significant confusion for
individuals, health care providers, family, friends, and caregivers
regarding their ability to privately seek, obtain, provide, or
facilitate health care. The Department has received questions from
regulated entities, Members of Congress, and others about the state of
privacy protections, particularly for information about an individual's
reproductive health or about reproductive health care an individual may
have received. While the Department has already taken steps to address
some of the confusion,\27\ we have received additional inquiries and
reports that indicate further clarification is needed to resolve this
confusion and strengthen privacy protections. In light of this
confusion, the Department believes that there is a need to reaffirm and
clarify that maintaining the privacy of an individual's PHI is
important to providing high-quality health care. To do so, the
Department believes it is

[[Page 23510]]

necessary to provide heightened protections for another especially
sensitive category of health information--PHI sought for the purposes
of conducting a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation into
or proceeding against any person in connection with seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that is lawful
under the circumstances in which it is provided. These proposed
modifications would provide heightened protections for individuals'
health information privacy under the defined circumstances; foster an
open and honest exchange of information between the individual and
health care provider, who--with that information--could employ
evidence-based clinical practice guidelines; and increase access to
high-quality, lawful health care.
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\26\ See ``After Roe Fell: Abortion Laws by State,'' Center for
Reproductive Rights (updated in real time) (describing actions taken
by states, including that ``some states and territories never
repealed their pre-Roe abortion bans'' that have now gone into
effect.), https://reproductiverights.org/maps/abortion-laws-by-state/.
\27\ See Press Release, ``HHS Issues Guidance to Protect Patient
Privacy in Wake of Supreme Court Decision on Roe,'' U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Servs. (June 29, 2022), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2022/06/29/hhs-issues-guidance-to-protect-patient-privacy-in-wake-of-supreme-court-decision-on-roe.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department has determined, in accordance with other Federal
agencies, that information about reproductive health care is
particularly sensitive and requires heighted protections. For example,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recognized that information
related to personal reproductive matters is ``particularly sensitive.''
\28\ In business guidance, FTC staff explained that ``[t]he exposure of
health information and medical conditions, especially data related to
sexual activity or reproductive health, may subject people to
discrimination, stigma, mental anguish, or other serious harms.'' \29\
As a result, the FTC has committed to using the full scope of its
authorities to protect consumers' privacy, including the privacy of
their health information and other sensitive data.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\28\ Kristin Cohen, ``Location, health, and other sensitive
information: FTC committed to fully enforcing the law against
illegal use and sharing of highly sensitive data,'' Federal Trade
Commission Business Blog (July 11, 2022), https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2022/07/location-health-and-other-sensitive-information-ftc-committed-fully-enforcing-law-against-illegal (last
accessed Nov. 15, 2022).
\29\ Id.
\30\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department of Defense (DOD) has also recognized such privacy
concerns. In a memorandum to DOD leaders, the Secretary of Defense
directed the DOD to ``[e]stablish additional privacy protections for
reproductive health care information'' for service members and
``[d]isseminate guidance that directs Department of Defense health care
providers that they may not notify or disclose reproductive health
information to commanders unless this presumption is overcome by
specific exceptions set forth in policy.'' \31\ The guidance repeatedly
emphasizes not only the importance of privacy for such highly sensitive
information but also the importance of privacy in making highly
sensitive reproductive health care decisions.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\31\ Memorandum Re: Ensuring Access to Reproductive Health Care,
Dep't of Defense (Oct. 20, 2022), p. 1, (emphasis in original),
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/20/2003099747/-1/-1/1/MEMORANDUM-ENSURING-ACCESS-TO-REPRODUCTIVE-HEALTH-CARE.PDF.
\32\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department recognizes that the need for heightened protections
for highly sensitive PHI is now more acute than it was before, given
the actions taken by states to regulate, and even criminalize,
reproductive health care.\33\ Before the Supreme Court's decision, the
range of circumstances in which persons attempted to seek or use highly
sensitive PHI in criminal, civil, and administrative investigations or
proceedings in connection with the provision of reproductive health
care was much narrower. The general HIPAA privacy protections provided
the necessary trust to promote access to and receipt of high-quality
and lawful health care in that environment. As states take steps to
more broadly regulate reproductive health care, some individuals and
their health care providers are at greater risk and have increased fear
that especially sensitive PHI detailing the individual's need for, or
receipt of, lawful reproductive health care will be used or disclosed
without their knowledge or consent.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\33\ See ``Talk of prosecuting women for abortion pills roils
antiabortion movement,'' supra note 11.
\34\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department carefully analyzed state prohibitions or
restrictions on an individual's ability to obtain health care and the
effects on health information privacy, access to high-quality health
care, and the relationships between individuals and their health care
providers after Dobbs; and conducted a thorough review of the history
and text of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule. The Department has also engaged
in extensive discussions with HHS agencies and other Federal
departments, including the Department of Justice; examined media
reports on state activity affecting privacy protections for
reproductive health information; held listening sessions with and
reviewed correspondence from stakeholders, including covered entities,
requesting technical assistance from the Department and urging the
Department to clarify and strengthen privacy protections for PHI; and
reviewed correspondence to HHS from Members of Congress who have urged
the same. The proposals contained within this NPRM are the result of
this work.

B. Applicability

The effective date of a final rule would be 60 days after
publication.\35\ Regulated entities would have until the ``compliance
date'' to establish and implement policies and practices to achieve
compliance with any new or modified standards. Except as otherwise
provided, 45 CFR 160.105 provides that regulated entities must comply
with the applicable new or modified standards or implementation
specifications no later than 180 days from the effective date of any
such change. The Department has previously noted that the 180-day
general compliance period for new or modified standards would not apply
where a different compliance period is provided in the regulation for
one or more provisions.\36\ However, the compliance period cannot be
less than the statutory minimum of 180 days.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\35\ See Office of the Federal Register, A Guide to the
Rulemaking Process (2011), p. 8, https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf.
\36\ See 78 FR 5566, 5569 (Jan. 25, 2013).
\37\ See 42 U.S.C. 1320d-4(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department does not believe that the proposed rule would pose
unique implementation challenges that would justify an extended
compliance period (i.e., a period longer than the standard 180 days
provided in 45 CFR 160.105). Further, the Department believes that
adherence to the standard compliance period is necessary to timely
address the circumstances described in this NPRM. Thus, the Department
proposes to apply the standard compliance date of 180 days after the
effective date of a final rule.\38\ The Department seeks comment on
this time frame for compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\38\ See 45 CFR 160.104(c)(1), which requires the Secretary to
provide at least a 180-day period for covered entities to comply
with modifications to standards and implementation specifications in
the HIPAA Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

If any provision in this rulemaking is held to be invalid or
unenforceable facially, or as applied to any person, plaintiff, or
circumstance, the provision shall be severable from the remainder of
this rulemaking, and shall not affect the remainder thereof, and the
invalidation of any specific application of a provision shall not
affect the application of the provision to other persons or
circumstances.

C. Table of Abbreviations/Commonly Used Acronyms in This Document

As used in this preamble, the following terms and abbreviations
have the meanings noted below.

[[Page 23511]]

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Term Meaning
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AMA.................................... American Medical Association.
BLS.................................... Bureau of Labor Statistics.
CDC.................................... Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention.
DOD.................................... Department of Defense.
HHS or Department...................... U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services.
EHR.................................... Electronic Health Record.
E.O.................................... Executive Order.
FTC.................................... Federal Trade Commission.
GINA................................... Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008.
Health IT.............................. Health Information Technology.
HITECH Act............................. Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical
Health Act of 2009.
HIPAA.................................. Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of
1996.
ICR.................................... Information Collection Request.
IIHI................................... Individually Identifiable
Health Information.
NCVHS or Committee..................... National Committee on Vital and
Health Statistics.
NPP.................................... Notice of Privacy Practices.
NPRM................................... Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
OCR.................................... Office for Civil Rights.
OMB.................................... Office of Management and
Budget.
PDF.................................... Portable Document Format.
PHI.................................... Protected Health Information.
PRA.................................... Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995.
PSAO................................... Pharmacy Services
Administration Organization.
RFA.................................... Regulatory Flexibility Act.
RIA.................................... Regulatory Impact Analysis.
SBA.................................... Small Business Administration.
SSA.................................... Social Security Act of 1935.
UMRA................................... Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995.
VA..................................... Department of Veterans Affairs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Statutory Authority and Regulatory History

A. Statutory Authority and History

1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
In 1996, Congress enacted HIPAA \39\ to reform the health care
delivery system. In so doing, Congress intended to make health
insurance more portable and accessible for consumers, to improve its
quality, and to simplify its administration.\40\ As noted by a leading
proponent of the bill during final debate leading up to passage of the
law, ``[o]ur objective, then, is to initiate fundamental reforms in
access to health care without doing irreversible harm to quality,
research and technology.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\39\ See HIPAA, supra note 1.
\40\ See H. Rept. 104-736, 104th Cong. (1996) at 177. See also
142 Cong. Rec. H3038 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 1996), (statement of Rep.
McDermott) (speaking about how privacy protection is essential to
improving health care quality, one of the purposes of the H.R. 3103,
Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996, the
precursor to HIPAA); 142 Cong. Rec. H9568 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Ganske).
\41\ See 142 Cong. Rec. S9505 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Roth).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

At the time, the health care system was moving from paper-based to
electronic medical records. Congress recognized the need to reduce the
burden of the transition on health care providers, encourage health
care provider adoption of technology by addressing concerns for
potential liability for use of new systems, and ensure patient
confidentiality of electronic data to foster trust in health care
providers and support patient access to health care.\42\ Congressional
statements leading up to HIPAA's enactment demonstrate Congress' desire
that the law enhance individuals' trust in health care providers: ``The
bill would also establish strict security standards for health
information because Americans clearly want to make sure that their
health care records can only be used by the medical professionals that
treat them. Often we assume that because doctors take an oath of
confidentiality that in fact all who touch their records operate by the
same standards. Clearly they do not.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\42\ See H.Rept. 104-736 at 177 and 264, supra note 40. See also
142 Cong. Rec. H9780 (daily ed., No. 116 Part II, Aug. 1, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Sawyer); 142 Cong. Rec. H9792 (daily ed. Aug. 1,
1996) (statement of Rep. McDermott); and 142 Cong. Rec. S9515-16
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simon).
\43\ 142 Cong. Rec. H9780 (statement of Rep. Sawyer), supra note
42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To address these needs, Congress enacted HIPAA's Administrative
Simplification provisions \44\ in subtitle F, sections 261 through 264,
which contained requirements for standards to support the electronic
exchange of health information. Section 261 states, in part, that
``[i]t is the purpose of this subtitle to improve [ . . . ] the
efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system, by encouraging
the development of a health information system through the
establishment of standards and requirements for the electronic
transmission of certain health information [ . . . ].'' \45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\44\ See HIPAA, supra note 1.
\45\ 42 U.S.C. 1320d note (Statutory Notes and Related
Subsidiaries: Purpose). Subtitle F also amended related provisions
of the SSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HIPAA protects individuals' health information in various ways.
Congress prohibited, among other things, the disclosure of
``individually identifiable health information to another person'' \46\
and provided for severe penalties for violations, including prison
sentences of up to 10 years and monetary fines of up to $250,000.\47\
Congress also put in place numerous protections for the privacy of
individuals' health information and directed HHS to promulgate rules,
recognizing the importance of standards for security and privacy in the
developing electronic environment, when Congress did not enact detailed
privacy requirements within a specified period.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\46\ 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6(a).
\47\ 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6(b).
\48\ See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7c(a)(3)(B)(ii) (creating a
fraud and abuse control program with measures to protect, among
other things, the confidentiality of the information and the privacy
of individuals receiving health care services and items.); H.Rept.
104-736 at 242, supra note 40 (explaining that such program ``would
ensure the confidentiality of information [ . . . ] as well as the
privacy of individuals receiving health care services''); 42 U.S.C.
1320a-7e(b)(3) (creating a health care fraud and abuse data
collection program with procedures to assure the protection of the
privacy of individuals receiving health care services.); H.Rept.
104-736 at 252, supra note 40 (explaining that such program would
``protect the privacy of individuals receiving health care
services''); section 264(a) of Public Law 104-191, (codified at 42
U.S.C. 1320d-2 note) (requiring the Secretary of HHS to submit
recommendations on privacy standards for individually identifiable
health information); section 264(c) of Public Law 104-191, (codified
at 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 note) (requiring the Secretary to issue
regulations containing such privacy standards if Congress does not);
H.Rept. 104-736 at 265, supra note 40 (recognizing that ``certain
uses of individually identifiable information are appropriate, and
do not compromise the privacy of an individual[,]'' such as ``the
transfer of information when making referrals from primary care to
specialty care'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HIPAA's preemption provisions reflect Congress' intent to protect
individuals' health care privacy. The statute provides a ``[g]eneral
rule'' that, with certain exceptions, HIPAA's provisions ``supersede
any contrary provision of State law.'' \49\ One exception to HIPAA's
preemption provisions is for ``state privacy laws that are contrary to
and more stringent than the corresponding federal standard,
requirement, or implementation specification.'' \50\ ``The effect of
these provisions is to let the law that is most protective of privacy
control.'' \51\ Thus, HIPAA created privacy standards that safeguard
the health information of all Americans, while respecting the ability

[[Page 23512]]

of states to provide individuals with additional privacy protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\49\ 42 U.S.C. 1320d-7(a)(1) (providing the general rule that,
with limited exceptions, a provision or requirement under HIPAA
supersedes any contrary provision of state law.) See also section
264(c)(2) of Public Law 104-191 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2
note).
\50\ 65 FR 82580 (the exception applies under section
1178(a)(2)(B) of the SSA and section 264(c)(2) of HIPAA).
\51\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Conference Report resolving differences in House and Senate
bill language provides further evidence that Congress gave great weight
to the need for privacy standards that adequately protect individual
health information privacy at a Federal level but allow for greater
health information privacy protection by states. Congressional
references to ``rapidly'' progressing technological innovation \52\ and
the need to balance the privacy interests of individuals and the
benefits of sharing data in certain circumstances (e.g., sharing IIHI
for treatment or aggregated data for research \53\) demonstrate that
Congress considered that health care reform would require a carefully
calibrated and appropriate method for exchanging data. Similarly,
congressional deliberations demonstrate that Congress viewed individual
privacy, confidentiality, and data security as critical for orderly
administrative simplification.\54\ As noted by one Member of Congress,
privacy standards would add an additional layer of protection beyond
the oath pledged by health care providers to keep information secure
and, as described by another Member, would further protect information
from being used in a ``malicious or discriminatory manner.'' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\52\ See H.Rept. 104-736 at 270, supra note 40. See also South
Carolina Med. Ass'n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346, 354 (4th Cir. 2003)
(``Recognizing the importance of protecting the privacy of health
information in the midst of the rapid evolution of health
information systems, Congress passed HIPAA in August 1996.''), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 981 (2003).
\53\ See H.Rept. 104-736 at 265, supra note 40.
\54\ On a resolution waiving points of order against the
Conference Report to H.R. 3103, members debated an ``erosion of
privacy'' balanced against the administrative simplification
provisions. See 142 Cong. Rec. H9777 and H9780, supra note 42.
\55\ See comment from Rep. Sawyer, supra note 42. See also
statement of Sen. Simon, supra note 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Congress applied the Administrative Simplification provisions
directly to three types of entities known as ``covered entities''--
health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who
transmit information electronically in connection with a transaction
for which HHS has adopted a standard.\56\ Congress also required the
Secretary, no later than 12 months from the date of enactment, to
identify ``detailed'' recommendations for Federal standards to protect
the privacy and security of IIHI nationwide addressing, at least, (1)
the rights that an individual who is a subject of IIHI should have; (2)
the procedures that should be established for the exercise of such
rights; and (3) the uses and disclosures of such information that
should be authorized or required. Congress further directed the
Secretary to promulgate standards to govern the privacy of information
no later than 42 months after HIPAA's enactment if Congress itself had
not done so via additional legislation.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\56\ See section 262 of Public Law 104-191, adding section 1172
to the SSA (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1320d-1). See also section 13404
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Public Law
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (Feb. 17, 2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 17934)
(applying privacy provisions and penalties to business associates of
covered entities).
\57\ See section 264 of Public Law 104-191 (codified at 42
U.S.C. 1320d-2 note). Although the original regulations were enacted
in 2001, more than 42 months from HIPAA's enactment, ``HHS's delay
in promulgating the final Privacy Rule did not deprive the agency of
the power to act.'' Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. HHS,
224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (S.D. Tex. 2002), aff'd, 67 F. App'x 253
(5th Cir. 2003) (noting that HHS's delay, ``particularly in the face
of huge administrative burdens . . . do[es] not result in the
invalidation of HHS's authority to promulgate the Privacy Rule'')
(citing Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 459 n.2 (1998);
Brock v. Pierce Cnty., 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HIPAA section 264(d) required the Secretary to consult with the
Department's National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS)
\58\ in carrying out the requirements of section 264.\59\ Like
Congress, NCVHS considered the appropriateness of permitting
identifiable health information to be used for certain purposes and not
others and requiring ``substantive and procedural barriers'' for still
others. For example, NCVHS recommended that ``strong substantive and
procedural protections'' be imposed if health information were to be
disclosed to law enforcement, and, where identifiable health
information would be made available for non-health purposes,
individuals should be afforded assurances that their data would not be
used against them.\60\ Ultimately, NCVHS ``unanimously'' believed, ``[
. . . ] the Secretary and the Administration [should] assign the
highest priority to the development of a strong position on health
privacy that provides the highest possible level of protection for the
privacy rights of patients.'' \61\ NCVHS further noted that failure to
do so would ``undermine public confidence in the health care system,
expose patients to continuing invasions of privacy, subject record
keepers to potentially significant legal liability, and interfere with
the ability of health care providers and others to operate the health
care delivery and payment system in an effective and efficient
manner,'' which would undermine what Congress intended when it enacted
HIPAA.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\58\ See section 264(a) and (d) of Public Law 104-191 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 note). The law also required the Secretary to
consult with the U.S. Attorney General.
\59\ 42 U.S.C. 242k(k) established the NCVHS as an 18-member
committee within the Office of the Secretary. The statute requires
the committee to include persons with expertise in the following
fields: health statistics, electronic interchange of health care
information, privacy and security of electronic information,
population-based public health, purchasing or financing health care
services, integrated computerized health information systems, health
services research, consumer interests in health information, health
data standards, epidemiology, and the provision of health services.
NCVHS committee members are appointed to serve four-year terms.
NCVHS serves as the statutory public advisory body to the Secretary
``for health data, statistics, privacy, and national health
information policy and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.'' In addition, the Committee advises the
Secretary, ``reports regularly to Congress on HIPAA implementation,
and serves as a forum for interaction between HHS and interested
private sector groups on a range of health data issues.'' National
Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics, About NCVHS, https://ncvhs.hhs.gov/.
\60\ Letter from NCVHS Chair Don E. Detmer to HHS Secretary
Donna E. Shalala (June 27, 1997) (forwarding NCVHS recommendations),
https://ncvhs.hhs.gov/rrp/june-27-1997-letter-to-the-secretary-with-recommendations-on-health-privacy-and-confidentiality/.
\61\ Id. at Principal Findings and Recommendations.
\62\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The NCVHS explicitly stated that:

The Committee strongly supports limiting use and disclosure of
identifiable information to the minimum amount necessary to
accomplish the purpose. The Committee also strongly believes that
when identifiable health information is made available for non-
health uses, patients deserve a strong assurance that the data will
not be used to harm them.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\63\ Id. at Executive Summary.

NCVHS acknowledged that secondary uses of individuals' health
information could provide benefits to society but recognized that these
uses posed the potential for harm to individuals in certain
circumstances. As NCVHS described it, ``[a] restriction prohibiting
secondary use against the record subject is an essential part of the
`bargain' that allows use of the data for socially beneficial purposes
while protecting individual patients.'' \64\ Thus, NCVHS strongly
recommended restrictions of the ability of third parties to use
information against the individual for purposes unrelated to health,
particularly for law enforcement and other governmental purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\64\ Id. at E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In its recommendations, NCVHS acknowledged that there might be
difficulty in distinguishing between categories of users, but it also
recognized the importance of doing so.\65\ NCVHS recommended that ``any
rules

[[Page 23513]]

regulating disclosures of identifiable health information be as clear
and as narrow as possible. Each group of users must be required to
justify their need for health information and must accept reasonable
substantive and procedural limitations on access.'' \66\ This would
allow for the disclosures that society deemed necessary and appropriate
while providing individuals with clear expectations regarding their
health information privacy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\65\ Id. at F.
\66\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act
On February 17, 2009, Congress enacted the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (HITECH Act)
\67\ to promote the widespread adoption and standardization of health
information technology (health IT). In passing the law, Congress
instructed that any new health IT standards take into account the
privacy and security requirements of the HIPAA Rules.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\67\ Title XIII of Division A and Title IV of Division B of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Public Law 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (Feb. 17, 2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 201 note).
\68\ Section 3009(a)(1)(B) of the HITECH Act (codified at 42
U.S.C. 300jj-19(a)(1)) requires that the health IT standards and
implementation specifications adopted under section 3004 take into
account the requirements of HIPAA privacy and security law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Within the HITECH Act, Congress enacted new HIPAA privacy and
security requirements for covered entities and business associates and
expanded certain rights of individuals with respect to their PHI. The
HITECH Act affirmed that ``[t]he standards governing the privacy and
security of individually identifiable health information promulgated by
the Secretary under sections 262(a) and 264'' of HIPAA ``shall remain
in effect to the extent that they are consistent with this subtitle''
and directed the Secretary to ``amend such Federal regulations as
required to make such regulations consistent with this subtitle.'' \69\
The HITECH Act further provided that ``[t]his title may not be
construed as having any effect on the authorities of the Secretary
under HIPAA privacy and security law,'' defined to include ``section
264 of the [HIPAA]'' and ``regulations under [that] provision[ ].''
\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\69\ Section 13421(b) of the HITECH Act (codified at 42 U.S.C.
17951).
\70\ Section 3009(a) of the HITECH Act (codified at 42 U.S.C.
300jj-19(a)), which, as stated above, preserves the Secretary's
authority to modify the privacy regulations under 45 CFR 160.104(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Congress understood the relationship between a connected health IT
landscape, a necessary and vital component of health care reform,\71\
and privacy and security standards when it enacted the HITECH Act. The
Purpose statement of an accompanying House of Representatives report
\72\ on the Energy and Commerce Recovery and Reinvestment Act \73\
recognizes that ``[i]n addition to costs, concerns about the security
and privacy of health information have also been regarded as an
obstacle to the adoption of [health IT].'' The Senate Report for S. 336
\74\ similarly acknowledges that ``[i]nformation technology systems
linked securely and with strong privacy protections can improve the
quality and efficiency of health care while producing significant cost
savings.'' \75\ As the Department explained in the 2013 regulation
referred to as the ``Omnibus Rule'' \76\ and discussed in greater
detail below, the HITECH Act's new HIPAA privacy and security
requirements \77\ supported Congress' goal to promote widespread
adoption and interoperability of health IT by ``strengthen[ing] the
privacy and security protections for health information established by
HIPAA.'' \78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\71\ C. Stephen Redhead, ``The Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act,'' Congressional Research
Service (updated Apr. 27, 2009), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40161/9 (``[Health IT], which generally refers to the
use of computer applications in medical practice, is widely viewed
as a necessary and vital component of health care reform.'').
\72\ H.Rept. 111-7, accompanying H.R. 629, 111th Cong., at 74
(2009).
\73\ H.R. 629, Energy and Commerce Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009, introduced in the House on January 22, 2009, contained
nearly identical provisions to subtitle D of the HITECH Act.
\74\ Congress enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009, which included the HITECH Act, on February 17, 2009. While
it was the House version of the bill, H.R. 1, that was enacted, the
Senate version, S. 336, contained nearly identical provisions to
subtitle D of the HITECH Act.
\75\ S.Rept. 111-3, 111th Cong. accompanying S. 336, 111th
Cong., at 59 (2009).
\76\ 78 FR 5566.
\77\ Subtitle D of title XIII of the HITECH Act (codified at 42
U.S.C. 17921, 42 U.S.C. 17931-17941, and 42 U.S.C. 17951-17953).
\78\ 78 FR 5568.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Rulemaking Authority and Regulatory History

1. The Department's Rulemaking Authority Under HIPAA
In passing HIPAA, Congress recognized the importance of privacy for
IIHI by requiring the Secretary to issue regulations on privacy in the
event that Congress itself did not enact specific privacy
legislation.\79\ That statutory directive complemented the Secretary's
general rulemaking authority to ``make and publish such rules and
regulations, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary to
the efficient administration of the functions with which each is
charged under this chapter.'' \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\79\ See Section 264(c)(1) of Public Law 104-191 (codified at 42
U.S.C. 1320d-2 note).
\80\ Section 1102 of the SSA (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1302).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Congress further contemplated that related rulemaking authorities
would not be static. Indeed, in a closely analogous section of the
HIPAA Administrative Simplification provisions--related to enabling the
electronic exchange of health information--Congress built in a
mechanism to adapt such regulations as technology and health care
evolve, directing that the Secretary review and modify the
Administrative Simplification standards as determined appropriate, but
not more frequently than once every 12 months.\81\ The Department
recognized how intertwined these particular Administrative
Simplification standards would be with the standards for the privacy of
individually identifiable health information, and thus promulgated a
regulatory standard that limits modifications to all of the rules
promulgated under the Administrative Simplification provisions to no
more frequently than once every 12 months.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\81\ See Section 1174(b)(1) of Public Law 104-191 (codified at
42 U.S.C. 1320d-3).
\82\ 45 CFR 160.104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Secretary exercised each of these rulemaking authorities in
2000 to adopt 45 CFR 160.104(a), which reserves the Secretary's power
to modify any ``standard or implementation specification adopted under
this subchapter'' of these regulations, including the Administrative
Simplification provisions. The Secretary invoked this modification
authority to amend the Privacy Rule in 2002.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\83\ See 67 FR 53182 (Aug. 14, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Subsequently, as discussed above, Congress affirmed that the HIPAA
Rules--including 45 CFR 160.104(a)--are to remain in effect to the
extent that they are consistent with the HITECH Act and directed the
Secretary to revise the HIPAA Rules as necessary for consistency with
the HITECH Act.\84\ At the same time, Congress also confirmed that the
new law was not intended to have any effect on authorities already
granted under HIPAA to the Department, including section 264 of that
statute and the regulations issued under that provision. Congress'
affirmation of the Secretary's rulemaking power, including the

[[Page 23514]]

authority to modify the Secretary's own regulations, thus confirms that
the Secretary retains the authority to modify the Privacy Rule as often
as every 12 months when appropriate, including to strengthen privacy
and security protections for IIHI. In fact, after the enactment of the
HITECH Act, the Secretary exercised this authority to modify the
Privacy Rule again in 2013.\85\
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\84\ Section 13421(b) of the HITECH Act (codified at 42 U.S.C.
17951).
\85\ See 78 FR 5566.
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To properly execute the HIPAA statutory mandate, and in accordance
with the regulatory authority granted to it by Congress, the Department
regularly evaluates the interaction of the Privacy Rule and state
statutes and regulations governing the privacy of health information.
In keeping with the Department's practice, this NPRM attempts to
accommodate state autonomy to the extent consistent with the need to
maintain rules for health information privacy that serve HIPAA's
objectives. The proposed regulation, if finalized, would thus preempt
state law only to the extent necessary to achieve the national
objectives of HIPAA.
The Secretary has delegated authority to administer the HIPAA Rules
and to make decisions regarding their implementation, interpretation,
and enforcement to the HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR).\86\
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\86\ See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Office of the
Secretary, Office for Civil Rights; Statement of Delegation of
Authority, 65 FR 82381 (Dec. 28, 2000); U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., Office of the Secretary, Office for Civil Rights;
Delegation of Authority, 74 FR 38630 (Aug. 4, 2009); U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Servs., Office of the Secretary, Statement of
Organization, Functions and Delegations of Authority, 81 FR 95622
(Dec. 28, 2016).
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2. Regulatory History
The 2000 Privacy Rule
As directed by HIPAA, the Department provided a series of
recommendations to Congress for a potential new law that would address
the confidentiality of individually identifiable health
information.\87\ Congress did not act within its three-year self-
imposed deadline. As a result, the Department published a proposed rule
setting forth the required standards on November 3, 1999,\88\ and
issued the first final rule establishing ``Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information'' (``2000 Privacy Rule'')
on December 28, 2000.\89\
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\87\ See Confidentiality of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Section I.A.
(Sept. 1997), https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/confidentiality-individually-identifiable-health-information.
\88\ 64 FR 59918.
\89\ 65 FR 82462.
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The final rule announced ``standards to protect the privacy of
individually identifiable health information'' to ``begin to address
growing public concerns that advances in electronic technology and
evolution in the health care industry are resulting, or may result, in
a substantial erosion of the privacy surrounding'' health
information.\90\ On the eve of that rule's issuance, the President
issued an Executive order recognizing the importance of protecting
patient privacy, explaining that ``[p]rotecting the privacy of
patients' protected health information promotes trust in the health
care system. It improves the quality of health care by fostering an
environment in which patients can feel more comfortable in providing
health care professionals with accurate and detailed information about
their personal health.'' \91\ Thus, the primary goal of the Privacy
Rule was to provide greater protections to individuals' privacy and to
engender a trusting relationship between individuals and health care
providers.\92\
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\90\ 65 FR 82462.
\91\ Executive Order 13181 (Dec. 20, 2000), 65 FR 81321.
\92\ Id.
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\93\ 65 FR 82462.
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Since promulgation, the Privacy Rule has protected PHI \94\ by
limiting the circumstances under which covered entities and their
business associates (collectively, ``regulated entities'') are
permitted or required to use or disclose PHI and by requiring covered
entities to have safeguards in place to protect the privacy of PHI. In
adopting these regulations, the Department acknowledged the need to
balance several competing factors, including existing legal
expectations, individuals' privacy expectations, and societal
expectations.\95\ The Department noted ``the large number of comments
from individuals and groups representing individuals demonstrate the
deep public concern about the need to protect the privacy of
individually identifiable health information'' and ``evidence about the
importance of protecting privacy and the potential adverse consequences
to individuals and their health if such protections are not extended.''
\96\ The Department struck a balance between the ``competing
interests--the necessity of protecting privacy and the public interest
in using identifiable health information for vital public and private
purposes--in a way that is also workable for the varied
stakeholders[.]'' \97\
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\94\ PHI includes individuals' IIHI transmitted by or maintained
in electronic media or any other form or medium, with certain
exceptions. See 45 CFR 160.103 (definition of ``Protected health
information'').
\95\ See 65 FR 82471.
\96\ 65 FR 82472.
\97\ Id.
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The Department established ``general rules'' for uses and
disclosures of PHI, codified at 45 CFR 164.502, in the 2000 Privacy
Rule.\98\ The 2000 Privacy Rule also specified the circumstances in
which a covered entity was required to obtain an individual's
consent,\99\ authorization,\100\ or the opportunity for the individual
to agree or object.\101\ Additionally, it established rules for when a
covered entity is permitted to use or disclose PHI without an
individual's consent, authorization, or opportunity to agree or
object.\102\ In particular, the Privacy Rule permits certain uses and
disclosures of PHI, without the individual's authorization, for
identified activities that benefit the community, such as public health
activities, law enforcement purposes, judicial and administrative
proceedings, and research.
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\98\ 65 FR 82462.
\99\ 45 CFR 164.506 was originally titled ``Consent for uses or
disclosures to carry out treatment, payment, or health care
operations.''
\100\ 45 CFR 164.508.
\101\ 45 CFR 164.510.
\102\ 45 CFR 164.512.
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The Privacy Rule also established the rights of individuals with
respect to their PHI, including the right to receive adequate notice of
a covered entity's privacy practices, the right to request restrictions
of uses and disclosures, the right to access (i.e., to inspect and
obtain a copy of) their PHI, the right to request an amendment of their
PHI, and the right to receive an accounting of disclosures.\103\
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\103\ See 45 CFR 164.520, 164.522, 164.524, 164.526, and
164.528.
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As part of the final rule, the Department provided that covered
entities were to comply with the 2000 Privacy Rule no later than 24
months following its effective date.\104\
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\104\ The effective date of the Privacy Rule was updated to
April 14, 2001. A covered entity meeting the definition of a small
health plan was given 36 months to comply with the Privacy Rule. The
compliance date for most covered entities was April 14, 2003. See 66
FR 12434 (Feb. 26, 2001).
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The 2002 Privacy Rule
After publication of the 2000 Privacy Rule, the Department received
many

[[Page 23515]]

inquiries and unsolicited comments about the Rule's impact and
operation. As a result, the Department opened the 2000 Privacy Rule for
further comment in March 2001, less than one month before the effective
date and 25 months before the compliance date, for most covered
entities and issued clarifying guidance on the Rule's
implementation.\105\ NCVHS' Subcommittee on Privacy, Confidentiality
and Security held public hearings about the 2000 Privacy Rule. From
those hearings, the Department learned more about concerns related to
key provisions and their potential unintended consequences on health
care quality and access.\106\ In March 2002, the Department proposed
modifications to the 2000 Privacy Rule to clarify the requirements and
correct potential problems that could threaten access to, or quality
of, health care.\107\
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\105\ 66 FR 12738 (Feb. 28, 2001).
\106\ 67 FR 53183.
\107\ 67 FR 14775 (Mar. 27, 2002).
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In response to the comments on the proposed rule, the Department
finalized modifications on August 14, 2002 (``2002 Privacy
Rule'').\108\ This final rule clarified HIPAA's requirements while
``maintain[ing] strong protections for the privacy of individually
identifiable health information.'' \109\ These modifications addressed
certain workability issues, including but not limited to clarifying
distinctions between health care operations and marketing; modifying
the minimum necessary standard to exclude disclosures authorized by
individuals and clarify its operation; clarifying that consent is not
required for treatment, payment, or health care operations, and to
otherwise clarify the role of consent in the Privacy Rule; and making
other modifications and conforming amendments consistent with the
proposed rule. The Department also included modifications to the
provisions permitting the use or disclosure of PHI for public health
activities and for research activities without consent, authorization,
or an opportunity to agree or object.
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\108\ 67 FR 53182. See the final rule for changes in the
entirety. The 2002 Privacy Rule was issued before the compliance
date for the 2000 Privacy Rule. Thus, covered entities never
implemented the 2000 Privacy Rule. Instead, they implemented the
2000 Privacy Rule as modified by the 2002 Privacy Rule.
\109\ 67 FR 53182.
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2013 Omnibus Final Rule
Following the enactment of the HITECH Act, the Department issued an
NPRM, entitled ``Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and
Enforcement Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health [HITECH] Act'' (``2010 NPRM''),\110\ to propose
implementation of certain HITECH Act requirements. In 2013, the
Department issued the Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security,
Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health [HITECH] Act and the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, and Other Modifications to
the HIPAA Rules--Final Rule (``2013 Omnibus Rule''),\111\ which
implemented many of the new HITECH Act requirements, including
strengthening individuals' privacy rights as related to their PHI.
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\110\ 75 FR 40867 (July 14, 2010).
\111\ 78 FR 5565. In addition to finalizing requirements of the
HITECH Act that were proposed in the NPRM, the Department adopted
modifications to the Enforcement Rule not previously adopted in an
earlier interim final rule, 74 FR 56123 (Oct. 30, 2009), and to the
Breach Notification Rule not previously adopted in an interim final
rule, 74 FR 42739 (Aug. 24, 2009). The Department also finalized
previously proposed Privacy Rule modifications as required by GINA,
74 FR 51698 (Oct. 7, 2009).
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The Department also finalized regulatory provisions not required by
the HITECH Act, but necessary to address the ``workability and
effectiveness'' of the HIPAA Rules and ``to increase flexibility for
and decrease burden on regulated entities.'' \112\ In the 2010 NPRM,
the Department noted that it had not amended the HIPAA Privacy and
Security Rules since 2002 and 2003, respectively, other than to amend
the Enforcement Rule through a 2009 interim final rule.\113\ It further
explained that information gleaned from contact with the public since
that time, enforcement experience, and technical corrections required
to eliminate ambiguity provided the impetus for the Department's
actions to make certain regulatory changes.\114\
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\112\ 78 FR 5566. The Department's general rulemaking authority
is codified in HIPAA section 264(c), and OCR conducts rulemaking
under HIPAA based on authority granted by the Secretary.
\113\ See 75 FR 40871. See also 74 FR 56123. The Department
issued an interim final rule on October 30, 2009, to implement
HITECH Act statutory changes to the HIPAA Enforcement Rule.
\114\ 75 FR 40871.
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For example, the Department modified its prior interpretation of
the Privacy Rule requirement at 45 CFR 164.508(c)(1)(iv) that a
description of a research purpose must be ``study specific.'' The
Department explained that, under its new interpretation, the research
purposes need only be described adequately so that it would be
``reasonable for the individual to expect that his or her protected
health information could be used or disclosed for such future
research.'' \115\ The Department attributed its changed interpretation
to the expressed concerns from covered entities, researchers, and other
commenters to the 2010 NPRM that the former requirement did not
represent current research practices. The Department expressed a
similar rationale for the Privacy Rule modifications permitting certain
disclosures of student immunization records to schools without an
authorization,\116\ and another provision redefining the definition of
PHI to exclude information regarding an individual who has been
deceased for more than 50 years.\117\ For the latter, the Department
noted that it was balancing the privacy interests of decedents' living
relatives and other affected individuals against the legitimate needs
of public archivists to obtain records.
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\115\ 78 FR 5612.
\116\ Id. at 5616-17. See also 45 CFR 164.512(b)(1).
\117\ 78 FR 5614. See also 45 CFR 164.502(f) and the definition
of ``Protected health information'' at 45 CFR 160.103, excluding
IIHI regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50
years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

None of the above-described changes were expressly required by the
HITECH Act. Rather, the Department determined them to be necessary
pursuant to its ongoing general rulemaking authority.\118\
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\118\ In addition to the rulemakings discussed here, the
Department has modified the HIPAA Privacy Rule for workability
purposes and in response to changes in circumstances on two other
occasions, and it issued another notice of proposed rulemaking in
2021 for the same reasons. See 79 FR 7289 (Feb. 6, 2014), 81 FR 382
(Jan. 6, 2016), and 86 FR 6446 (Jan. 21, 2021).
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III. Justification for This Proposed Rulemaking

HIPAA and the HIPAA Rules promote access to health care by
establishing standards for the privacy of PHI in order to protect the
confidentiality of individuals' health information. These protections
promote the development and maintenance of confidence and trust between
individuals and their health care providers and health plans, and help
improve the completeness and accuracy of patient records.\119\ The
Privacy Rule, as it has been amended over time, carefully balances the
interests of individuals and society in identifiable health information
by establishing conditions for when and how such information may be
used and

[[Page 23516]]

disclosed--with and without the individual's permission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\119\ See 65 FR 82463. See also H. Rept. 104-736 at 177 and 264,
supra note 40. See also 142 Cong. Rec. H9780 (statement of Rep.
Sawyer), supra note 42; 142 Cong. Rec. H9792 (statement of Rep.
McDermott), supra note 42; and 142 Cong. Rec. S9515-16 (statement of
Sen. Simon), supra note 42.
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The Privacy Rule is balanced to protect an individual's privacy
while allowing the use or disclosure of PHI for certain non-health care
purposes, including in certain criminal, civil, and administrative
investigations and proceedings. The Privacy Rule permits, but does not
require, covered entities to disclose PHI to law enforcement officials,
without the individual's written authorization, under specific
circumstances.\120\ For example, a covered entity is permitted to
disclose PHI to law enforcement in compliance with, and as limited by,
the relevant requirements of a court order. A covered entity is also
permitted to disclose certain limited types of PHI in response to a law
enforcement official's request for such information for the limited
purpose of identifying or locating a suspect, fugitive, material
witness, or missing person. Such disclosures are also currently
permitted, under certain circumstances, for health oversight
purposes,\121\ judicial and administrative proceedings,\122\ or to
coroners and medical examiners.\123\ Except when required by law, the
disclosures summarized above are subject to a minimum necessary
determination by the covered entity.\124\ When reasonable to do so, the
covered entity may rely upon the representations of the public health
authority, law enforcement official, or other public official as to
what information is the minimum necessary for their lawful
purpose.\125\ Moreover, if the law enforcement official making the
request for information is not known to the covered entity, the covered
entity must verify the identity and authority of such person prior to
disclosing the information.\126\
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\120\ See 45 CFR 164.152(f).
\121\ 45 CFR 164.512(d).
\122\ 45 CFR 164.512(e).
\123\ 45 CFR 164.512(g)(1).
\124\ 45 CFR 164.502(b) and 164.514(d).
\125\ 45 CFR 164.514(d)(3)(iii)(A).
\126\ 45 CFR 164.514(h).
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However, the Department believes that developments in the legal
environment have disrupted the balance. On one hand, there is the
individual's interest in the privacy of their health information and
that of society in fostering trust between individuals and health care
providers to promote public health. On the other hand, there is the
interest of others in using or disclosing that information to achieve
certain public policy goals, in this case, for purposes of criminal,
civil, and administrative investigations or proceedings. Those
developments have made information related to reproductive health care,
which has long been considered highly sensitive,\127\ more likely to be
of interest for punitive non-health care purposes, and thus more likely
to be disclosed if sought for a purpose permitted under the Privacy
Rule today. The interest in this sensitive health information is likely
to remain high, even where the reproductive health care has been
provided under circumstances in which it was lawful to do so. The
Department believes PHI will be increasingly targeted by those seeking
evidence for criminal, civil, or administrative investigations into or
proceedings against persons in connection with seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care--or identifying
persons for such purposes, thereby jeopardizing the relationships
between individuals and their health care providers, even when such
health care is lawfully obtained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\127\ See Letter from NCVHS, supra note 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To address these developments, the Department is proposing to
protect this sensitive PHI and preserve that balance by establishing a
new purpose for which disclosures are prohibited in certain
circumstances--that is, the use or disclosure of PHI for the criminal,
civil, or administrative investigation of or proceeding against an
individual, regulated entity, or other person for seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care, as well as the
identification of any person for the purpose of initiating such an
investigation or proceeding. Such disclosures of PHI would be
prohibited when the reproductive health care: (1) is provided outside
of the state where the investigation or proceeding is authorized and
where such health care is lawfully provided; (2) is protected,
required, or authorized by Federal law, regardless of the state in
which such health care is provided; or (3) is provided in the state in
which the investigation or proceeding is authorized and that is
permitted by the law of that state. In these circumstances, the state
lacks any substantial interest in seeking the disclosure. Protecting
against disclosures of PHI in these circumstances thus directly
advances the long-understood purpose of the HIPAA privacy protections
without unduly interfering with legitimate state prerogatives.
To assist in effectuating this prohibition, the Department proposes
to require covered entities in certain circumstances to obtain an
attestation from the person requesting the use or disclosure that the
use or disclosure is not for a prohibited purpose. Additionally, the
Department proposes to clarify the definition of ``person'' and certain
other terms that distinguish between state laws that are contrary to
the Privacy Rule and are therefore preempted by it and those that are
excepted from preemption. The Department also discusses its view of
``child abuse'' for the purposes of the Privacy Rule and which persons
a covered entity may decline to recognize as an individual's personal
representative under particular circumstances. This NPRM contains
proposals for minor technical corrections that reflect the Department's
long-standing interpretation of the Privacy Rule. Lastly, the
Department proposes to require modifications to the Notice of Privacy
Practices (NPP) to ensure that individuals are aware of and understand
the proposed prohibition.

A. HIPAA Encourages Trust by Carefully Balancing Individuals' Privacy
Interests With Others' Interests in Using or Disclosing PHI

It is well established that a functioning health care system
depends in part on patients trusting their health care providers and
health care systems.\128\ According to the American Medical Association
(AMA), a key element of patient trust is privacy protection, ``a
crucial element for honest health discussions.'' \129\ Privacy is the
core foundation of the relationship between individuals and their
health care providers.\130\ The original Hippocratic Oath required
physicians to pledge to maintain the confidentiality of information
they learn about their patients.\131\ Individuals' health privacy
concerns affect their trust in health care providers, and thus, their
willingness to provide complete and accurate information to health care
providers.\132\

[[Page 23517]]

Individuals must disclose sensitive information to their health care
providers to obtain appropriate health care.\133\ If individuals do not
trust that the sensitive information they disclose to their health care
providers will be kept private, they may be deterred from seeking or
obtaining needed health care or withhold information from their health
care providers, compromising the quality of the health care they
receive.\134\ Similarly, if a health care provider does not trust that
the information they include in an individual's medical records will
not be kept private, the health care provider might leave gaps or
include inaccuracies when preparing medical records, creating a risk
that ongoing or future health care would be compromised. Thus, the
Privacy Rule promotes access to higher quality health care by
protecting the privacy of individuals' health information in order to
engender trust between individuals and health care providers and to
help improve the completeness and accuracy of individuals' medical
records. The Federal Government has a strong interest in ensuring that
individuals have access to high-quality health care,\135\ and from its
inception, the Privacy Rule has recognized the importance of trust to
health care quality.
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\128\ See Jennifer Richmond, Marcella H. Boynton, Sachiko Ozawa,
et al., ``Development and Validation of the Trust in My Doctor,
Trust in Doctors in General, and Trust in the Health Care Team
Scales,'' Social Science & Medicine (Apr. 2022), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953622001332?via%3Dihub.
\129\ See ``Patient Perspectives Around Data Privacy,'' American
Medical Association (2022), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/ama-patient-data-privacy-survey-results.pdf.
\130\ Id.
\131\ Warren T. Reich, editor. Vol. 5. Macmillan; New York, NY:
1995. Oath of Hippocrates; p. 2632. (Encyclopedia of Bioethics).
\132\ See ``Development and Validation of the Trust in My
Doctor, Trust in Doctors in General, and Trust in the Health Care
Team Scales,'' supra note 128; Bradley E. Iott, Celeste Campos-
Castillo, Denise L. Anthony, ``Trust and Privacy: How Patient Trust
in Providers is Related to Privacy Behaviors and Attitudes,'' AMIA
Annual Symposium Proceedings (Mar. 2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7153104/; Pamela Sankar, Susan
Mora, Jon F. Merz, et al., ``Patient perspectives of medical
confidentiality: a review of the literature,'' Journal of General
Internal Medicine (Aug. 2003), p. 659-69, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12911650/.
\133\ See ``Recommendations on Privacy and Confidentiality,
2006-2008,'' Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Stats. (May 2009), p.
4, https://ncvhs.hhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/privacyreport0608.pdf; See also Letter from NCVHS (forwarding NCVHS
recommendations) (``As a practical matter, it is often essential for
individuals to disclose sensitive, even potentially embarrassing,
information to a health care provider to obtain appropriate care''),
supra note 18.
\134\ See 64 FR 60019 (In the 1999 Privacy Rule NPRM, the
Department discussed confidentiality as an important component of
trust between individuals and health care providers and cited a 1994
consumer privacy survey that indicated that a lack of privacy may
deter patients from obtaining preventive care and treatment.);
``Trust and Privacy: How Patient Trust in Providers is Related to
Privacy Behaviors and Attitudes,'' supra note 132.
\135\ See Testimony (transcribed) of Peter R. Orszag, Director,
Congressional Budget Office, Hearing on Comparative Clinical
Effectiveness before House of Representatives Committee on Ways and
Means, Subcommittee on Health, 2007 WL 1686358 (June 12, 2007)
(``because federal health insurance programs play a large role in
financing medical care and represent a significant expenditure, the
federal government itself has an interest in evaluations of the
effectiveness of different health care approaches''); Statement of
Sen. Durenberger introducing S.1836, American Health Quality Act of
1991 and reading bill text, 137 Cong. Rec. S26720 (Oct. 17, 1991)
(``[T]he Federal Government has a demonstrated interest in assessing
the quality of care, access to care, and the costs of care through
the evaluative activities of several Federal agencies.'').
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Of course, health information--and PHI in particular--can be useful
for purposes other than an individual's own health care. Indeed,
society also benefits when individuals trust their health care
providers to keep highly sensitive information private for the same
reasons that individuals benefit. After all, it is to society's benefit
that individuals seek out necessary medical care, and that when they
do, they receive high-quality health care based on information that is
more likely to be complete and accurate when individuals trust their
health care providers. Individuals' lack of trust in health care
providers and the health care system can have serious consequences for
society.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\136\ See Letter from NCVHS, supra note 18.
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There is also significant interest in using PHI to address non-
health care concerns, such as for research, law enforcement purposes,
judicial and administrative proceedings, health oversight activities,
and others. As the Department explained in the 1999 Privacy Rule NPRM,
``The information may be sought well before a trial or hearing, to
permit the party to discover the existence or nature of testimony or
physical evidence, or in conjunction with the trial or hearing, in
order to obtain the presentation of testimony or other evidence. These
uses of health information are clearly necessary to allow the smooth
functioning of the legal system.'' \137\ For example, in the absence of
a permission to use or disclose PHI for judicial and administrative
proceedings, a regulated entity would be dependent upon an individual's
authorization to use or disclose PHI to defend itself against a medical
malpractice claim brought by the individual, rendering the regulated
entity dependent upon the very person bringing the claim against them.
The Department believes that there is societal benefit to permitting
such uses and disclosures where such uses and disclosures do not
undermine the public policy goals set by Congress when it passed
HIPAA--that is, where they do not undermine the trust of individuals in
the health care system and the ability of individuals to receive high-
quality health care.\138\ The Department has long permitted uses and
disclosures of PHI for non-health care purposes in such circumstances,
subject to certain limitations because of the potential harm they could
cause to individuals.
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\137\ 64 FR 59959.
\138\ See Letter from NCVHS, at Executive Summary, supra note 60
(with forwarded NCVHS recommendations, ``The importance of trust in
the provider-patient relationship must be preserved. Health records
are used to improve the quality of health care [ . . . ] protect the
public health, and assure public accountability of the health care
system.'').
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As discussed in section II of this preamble, the Privacy Rule
represents the Department's careful balancing of individuals' interests
and the interests of others in a way that engenders individuals' trust
and enables high-quality health care, while also allowing others to use
individuals' PHI for certain public policy purposes. The Department
recognized the need for trust between patients and health care
providers in the 2000 Privacy Rule, noting that ``[t]he provision of
high-quality health care requires the exchange of personal, often-
sensitive information between an individual and a skilled practitioner.
Vital to that interaction is the patient's ability to trust that the
information shared will be protected and kept confidential.'' \139\
Further, if individuals do not trust that the sensitive information
they give their health care providers will be kept private, they may be
deterred from seeking needed health care.\140\ And when individuals do
seek health care, they may be reluctant to be completely forthcoming
with their health care providers, thus compromising the quality of the
health care they receive. As the Department also stated, ``[h]ealth
care professionals who lose the trust of their patients cannot deliver
high-quality care.'' \141\ And when the trust of individuals is lost,
the public's health as a whole is jeopardized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\139\ 65 FR 82463.
\140\ See 64 FR 60019 (In the 1999 Privacy Rule NPRM, the
Department discussed confidentiality as an important component of
trust between individuals and health care providers and cited a 1994
consumer privacy survey that indicated that a lack of privacy may
deter patients from obtaining preventive care and treatment.).
\141\ 65 FR 82468.
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Throughout the preamble to the 2000 Privacy Rule and the preambles
to the rules revising the Privacy Rule, the Department described and
explained its efforts to balance those interests. In the 2002 Privacy
Rule, the Department discussed its re-evaluation of the balance
established by the 2000 Privacy Rule and revised certain provisions
because of concerns that arose as regulated entities prepared to
implement its requirements. The Department made certain revisions to
protect the privacy interests of individuals by strengthening the
requirements for covered entities to inform individuals of their
privacy practices through an NPP. These revisions afforded individuals
the opportunity to engage in discussions

[[Page 23518]]

regarding the use and disclosure of their PHI, while protecting the
interests of covered entities by allowing activities that are essential
to the provision of high-quality health care to occur unimpeded,
reducing the burden on such entities.\142\ The Department made other
revisions to ``balance an individual's privacy expectations with a
covered entity's need for information for reimbursement and quality
purposes.'' \143\ In that same rulemaking, in addressing comments on
still other revisions, the Department clearly stated, ``Patient privacy
must be balanced against other public goods, such as research and the
risk of compromising such research projects if researchers could not
continue to use such data.'' \144\
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\142\ 67 FR 53209.
\143\ 67 FR 53216.
\144\ 67 FR 53226.
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In more recent rulemakings, the Department has continued its
efforts to build and maintain individuals' trust in the health care
system by balancing the interests of individuals with those of others
as it further revised the Privacy Rule. For example, in explaining
revisions made as part of the 2013 Omnibus Rule, the Department stated,
``The Privacy Rule, at Sec. 164.512(b), recognizes that covered
entities must balance protecting the privacy of health information with
sharing health information with those responsible for ensuring public
health and safety.'' \145\ As another example from that same rule, the
Department revised the requirements for the distribution of the NPP
because ``[w]e believe these distribution requirements best balance the
right of individuals to be informed of their privacy rights with the
burden on health plans to provide the revised [Notice of Privacy
Practices].'' \146\ In the 2014 CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule;
Patients' Access to Test Reports Final Rule, the Department further
balanced the interests of individuals and those of others by providing
individuals (or their personal representatives) with the right to
access test reports directly from laboratories subject to HIPAA.\147\
This rulemaking afforded the Department with the opportunity to
demonstrate the supremacy of the individual's right of access over the
potential burden imposed on others, in this case, the laboratory. And
still more recently, the primary focus of the 2016 HIPAA Privacy Rule
and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Final
Rule was to issue a narrowly tailored rule that appropriately balanced
public safety goals with individuals' privacy interests to ensure that
individuals are not discouraged from seeking voluntary treatment for
mental health needs.\148\
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\145\ 78 FR 5616.
\146\ 78 FR 5625.
\147\ 79 FR 7290 (Feb. 6, 2014).
\148\ 81 FR 382, 386 (Jan. 6, 2016).
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As part of balancing individuals' interests with those of society,
the Department has recognized that it may be necessary to provide
certain types of health information with special protection because
they are particularly sensitive. For example, while the Department
usually applies the same privacy standards to all PHI regardless of the
type of health care at issue, it affords ``special protections'' to
psychotherapy notes. These protections are afforded in part because of
the ``particularly sensitive information'' those notes contain and in
part because of the unique function of these records, which are by
definition maintained separately from an individual's medical
record.\149\ As the Department explained when it proposed these
protections, ``[p]sychotherapy notes are of primary value to the
specific provider and the promise of strict confidentiality helps to
ensure that the patient will feel comfortable freely and completely
disclosing very personal information essential to successful
treatment.'' \150\ The Department elaborated that, ``[b]ecause of the
sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult
psychotherapists,'' and the ``embarrassment or disgrace'' engendered by
``disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling
sessions,'' even ``the mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful
treatment.'' \151\ To support the development and maintenance of an
individual's trust and protect the relationship between an individual
and their therapist, psychotherapy notes may be disclosed without an
individual's authorization only in limited circumstances, such as to
avert a serious and imminent threat to health or safety. Those limited
circumstances do not include judicial and administrative proceedings or
law enforcement purposes unless the disclosure is ``necessary to
prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety
of a person or the public.'' \152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\149\ See 45 CFR 164.501 (definition of ``Psychotherapy notes'')
(explicitly providing that psychotherapy notes are separated from
the individual's medical record).
\150\ 64 FR 59941.
\151\ Id.
\152\ 45 CFR 164.508(a)(2).
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Information related to an individual's reproductive health and
associated health care is also especially sensitive and has long been
recognized as such. As stated in the AMA's Principles of Medical
Ethics, the ``decision to terminate a pregnancy should be made
privately within the relationship of trust between patient and
physician in keeping with the patient's unique values and needs and the
physician's best professional judgment.\153\ NCVHS first noted it as an
example of a category of health information commonly considered to
contain sensitive information in 2008.\154\ From 2005-2010, NCVHS held
nine hearings that addressed questions about sensitive information in
medical records and identified additional categories of sensitive
information beyond those addressed in Federal and state law, including
``sexuality and reproductive health information,'' which NCVHS
elaborated on in a 2010 letter to the Secretary:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\153\ Amendment to Opinion 4.2.7, Abortion H-140.823, American
Medical Association (2022), https://policysearch.amaassn.org/policyfinder/detail/%224.2.7%20Abortion%22?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-H-140.823.xml.
\154\ See Letter from NCVHS, supra note 14.

Some reproductive issues may expose people to political
controversy [ . . . ], and public knowledge of an individual's
reproductive history may place [them] at risk of stigmatization.
Additionally, individuals may wish to have their reproductive
history segmented so that it is not viewed by family members who
otherwise have access to their records. Parents may wish to delay
telling their offspring about adoption, gamete donation, or the use
of other forms of assisted reproduction technology in their
conception, and, thus, it may be important to have the capacity to
segment these records.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\155\ See Letter from NCVHS Chair Justine M. Carr to HHS
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Nov. 10, 2010) (forwarding NCVHS
recommendations).

At that time, the general privacy standards promulgated under HIPAA
adequately protected information related to reproductive health care.
Based on settled Federal constitutional law in 2000, the Department did
not see a need to treat uses or disclosures of PHI related to
reproductive health care, such as information about a pregnancy
termination, differently from other uses or disclosures of PHI related
to other categories of health care when establishing the Federal
standards for privacy as mandated by HIPAA.\156\ HHS knew that
individuals generally could legally access reproductive health care
nationwide. And because such health care generally was legal and
constitutionally protected, HHS was confident that law enforcement or
other

[[Page 23519]]

third parties typically would not seek individuals' health information
for purposes of investigating violations of criminal or civil laws
related to highly sensitive types of health care, such as the provision
of or access to reproductive health care, except in certain limited
circumstances aimed at ensuring the quality and safety of such health
care. Therefore, until states' recent efforts to regulate and
criminalize the provision of or access to reproductive health care,
effectuating the purposes of HIPAA did not require regulatory
provisions that restricted uses and disclosures of PHI related to those
activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\156\ See 65 FR 82464-70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Developments in the Legal Environment Are Eroding Individuals' Trust
in the Health Care System

The Supreme Court's decision in Dobbs on June 24, 2022, created new
concerns about the privacy of PHI related to reproductive health care.
In that decision, the Court overruled Roe v. Wade \157\ and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey \158\ and held that
constitutional challenges to state abortion regulations are subject to
rational-basis review.\159\ But the Court's decision did not disturb
other longstanding constitutional principles, such as those protecting
the right of interstate travel or the right to use contraception.\160\
Nor did it displace Federal statutes, such as Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act \161\ (EMTALA), that protect access to
reproductive health care in particular circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\157\ 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
\158\ 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
\159\ Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2283-2284.
\160\ See id. at 2309 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
\161\ Public Law 99-272, 100 Stat. 164 (Apr. 7, 1986) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. 1395dd). For further discussion of a health care
provider's obligations under the EMTALA statute, see https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/emergency-medical-care-letter-to-health-care-providers.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Following the Supreme Court's decision, states have taken actions,
some tacitly and some explicitly, that could interfere with
individuals' longstanding expectations created by HIPAA and the Privacy
Rule with respect to the privacy of their PHI.\162\ The Department is
aware of reports that persons or authorities have reached or intend to
reach beyond their own states' borders to investigate reproductive
health care that has been performed in other states where that health
care is legal.\163\ These actions present new concerns nationwide for
the protection of health information privacy mandated by HIPAA. Because
the Privacy Rule currently permits uses and disclosures of PHI for
certain purposes,\164\ including when another law requires a regulated
entity to make the use or disclosure,\165\ regulated entities after
Dobbs might be compelled to use or disclose PHI to law enforcement or
other persons who may use that health information against an
individual, a regulated entity, or another person who has sought,
obtained, provided, or facilitated reproductive health care, even when
such health care is lawful in the circumstances in which the health
care is obtained.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\162\ See, e.g., Kayte Spector-Bagdady, Michelle M. Mello,
``Protecting the Privacy of Reproductive Health Information After
the Fall of Roe v Wade,'' JAMA Network (June 30, 2022), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2794032; Lisa
G. Gill, ``What does the overturn of Roe v. Wade mean for you?,''
Consumer Reports (June 24, 2022), https://www.consumerreports.org/health-privacy/what-does-the-overturn-of-roe-v-wade-mean-for-you-a1957506408/.
\163\ See, e.g., Giulia Carbonaro, ``Texas bill targeting
internet abortion access `attacks individual liberty','' Newsweek
(Mar. 3, 2023), https://www.newsweek.com/texas-bill-targeting-internet-abortion-access-attacks-individual-liberty-1785254; Alice
Miranda Ollstein and Megan Messerly, ``Missouri wants to stop out-
of-state abortions. Other states could follow,'' Politico (Mar. 19,
2022), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/19/travel-abortion-law-missouri-00018539. For pending bills that would impose limitations
on the ability of individuals to travel to obtain reproductive
health care, see, e.g., H.B. 2012, Missouri 101st General Assembly
(2022) (would have permitted a private citizen to sue a person who
provides or facilitates an abortion for a Missouri resident,
including an out-of-state physician or person who transports an
individual across state lines to a health care provider); H.B. No.
787, Texas State Legislature (2023) (prohibiting the receipt of tax
incentives by a business entity that assists an employee in
obtaining an abortion, including through funding out-of-state travel
for the procedure); and H.B. 90 and S.B. 600, Tennessee General
Assembly (2023) (prohibiting local governments from spending money
to assist ``a person in obtaining an abortion,'' including through
funding out-of-state travel for the procedure).
\164\ 45 CFR 164.502(a)(1).
\165\ 45 CFR 164.512(a).
\166\ See Eleanor Klibanoff, ``Lawyers preparing for abortion
prosecutions warn about health care, data privacy,'' The Texas
Tribune (July 25, 2022), https://www.texastribune.org/2022/07/25/abortion-prosecution-data-health-care/(discussing the fact that the
most common way PHI is obtained by law enforcement is through health
care provider disclosures).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One significant consequence of the developments in Federal and
state law is the erosion of individuals' trust in health care providers
to protect their health information privacy, creating barriers or
disincentives for individuals to obtain health care, including legal
reproductive health care, and increasing the potential for health care
providers to possess incomplete or inaccurate medical records. A 2023
qualitative study of individuals who obtained abortions after the
passage of a law significantly restricting abortion access in Texas
highlighted the concerns of such individuals with respect to the
privacy of PHI related to reproductive health care they received.\167\
In fact, a recently filed complaint details the decision made by the
plaintiff's out-of-state health care provider to describe the
plaintiff's condition as something other than an abortion, even though
the abortion was lawful in the state in which it was provided because
the health care provider was concerned about the ramifications of
documenting the health care provided as an abortion.\168\ Another
significant consequence is the risk that individual medical records
will not be maintained with completeness and accuracy, including as
they relate to legal reproductive health care. The developments
discussed above have increased uncertainty nationwide for individuals,
regulated entities, and other persons about the privacy of an
individual's PHI. Recent state actions now place individuals and health
care providers in potential civil or criminal jeopardy when PHI related
to an individual's reproductive health is used and disclosed,
regardless of whether the health care services are obtained or
performed legally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\167\ Courtney C. Baker, Emma Smith, Mitchell D. Creinin, et
al., ``Texas Senate Bill 8 and Abortion Experiences in Patients with
Fetal Diagnoses: A Qualitative Analysis,'' Obstetrics & Gynecology
(Mar. 2023), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/36735418 (citing a
representative statement made by a study participant, `` `I would
joke around and say, well don't sue me, but halfway mean it.' '').
\168\ See Brief for Zurawski at p. 2 (One plaintiff had to
travel out of state for an abortion to save the life of one of her
twins, and afterwards, fearful of documenting her abortion, her
health care provider instead described her condition as ``vanishing
twin syndrome.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the past, some law enforcement officials exercised their
authority under general criminal statutes to obtain PHI for use against
pregnant individuals on the basis of their pregnancy status or
pregnancy outcomes.\169\ But more recent developments in law have
created an environment in which law enforcement and others are
increasingly likely to request PHI from regulated entities for use
against individuals,\170\ health care

[[Page 23520]]

providers, and others, solely because such persons sought, obtained,
provided, or facilitated lawful reproductive health care.\171\ This
environment of increased demand for PHI for these purposes is not
limited to states in which those legal developments have occurred.
Rather, these legal developments have nationwide implications because
of the overall effects on the relationship between health care
providers and individuals and the flow of health information across
state lines. Examples of such cross-state health information flows
include disclosures from health care providers to health plans with a
multi-state presence or between health care providers in different
states to treat individuals as they travel across the country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\169\ See ``Self-Care, Criminalized: August 2022 Preliminary
Findings,*'' supra note 11; ``Confronting Pregnancy Criminalization:
A Practical Guide for Healthcare Providers, Lawyers, Medical
Examiners, Child Welfare Workers, and Policymakers,'' Pregnancy
Justice (June 2022), https://www.pregnancyjusticeus.org/confronting-pregnancy-criminalization/.
\170\ See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. sec. 44-41-80(b) and NRS
200.220. See also ``Self-Care, Criminalized: August 2022 Preliminary
Findings,*'' supra note 11, p. 2-3 (From 2000 to 2020, out of 54
cases, 74% of the adult cases involved the criminalization of the
person for self-managing their own abortion, and 39% of the cases
reported to law enforcement were by health care providers.); ``Talk
of prosecuting women for abortion pills roils antiabortion
movement,'' supra note 11.
\171\ The Department believes that those investigating or
bringing proceedings against individuals, health care providers, or
other persons for seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating
reproductive health care will increasingly seek to access PHI as
part of their investigation or proceeding. See, e.g., Karen Brooks
Harper, ``Texas abortion foes use legal threats and propose more
laws to increase pressure on providers and their allies,'' The Texas
Tribune (July 18, 2022), https://www.texastribune.org/2022/07/18/texas-abortion-laws-pressure-campaign/; Timothy Bella, ``Doctor in
10-year-old rape victim's abortion faces AG inquiry, threats,'' The
Washington Post (July 27, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/07/27/abortion-doctor-girl-rape-caitlin-bernard-investigation/; ``Doctor says she shouldn't have to turn over
patients' abortion records,'' supra note 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This reality is in tension with many individuals' expectation that
they have or should have the right to health information privacy,
including the right to determine who has access to that information. In
fact, in its most recent annual survey on patient privacy, the AMA
found that, of 1,000 patients surveyed: (1) nearly 75% are concerned
about protecting the privacy of their own health information; and (2)
59% of patients worry about health data being used by companies to
discriminate against them or their loved ones.\172\ In its report on
the survey, the AMA opines that a lack of health information privacy
raises many questions about circumstances that could put patients and
physicians in legal peril, and that the ``primary purpose of increasing
[health information] privacy is to build public trust, not inhibit data
exchange.'' \173\ The mismatch between privacy expectations and current
legal protections for health information privacy undermines trust
between individuals and health care providers nationwide, thereby
decreasing access to, and effectiveness of, health care for
individuals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\172\ See ``Patient Perspectives Around Data Privacy,'' supra
note 129.
\173\ Id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The present situation also has resulted in ambiguity and confusion
for individuals and health care providers, many of whom are uncertain
about when health information is protected under the HIPAA Rules given
recent legal developments.\174\ This confusion undermines access to
health care and individual privacy--including for individuals seeking
or obtaining health care that is lawful nationwide. For example, the
Department is aware that some health care providers, both clinicians
and pharmacies, are hesitant to prescribe or fill prescriptions for
medications that can result in pregnancy loss, even when those
prescriptions are intended to treat individuals for other health
matters, because of fear of law enforcement action.\175\ As a result,
these health care providers are either denying access to prescriptions
that affect an individual's quality of life or requiring additional PHI
to justify an individual's need for such prescriptions for purposes
that are permissible under state law.\176\ Although most health care
providers, including pharmacies, are subject to the HIPAA Rules, and
thus, limited in the purposes for which they are permitted to use or
disclose such PHI, an individual's privacy is necessarily reduced as an
increasing number of persons have access to an increasing amount of
their PHI. Additionally, individuals face an increasing risk to the
security of their PHI as the number of information technology systems
in which the PHI is stored increases. As the number of persons and
information technology systems with access to this PHI increases, this
expands the number and types of regulated entities from which law
enforcement and others may try to seek disclosure of this highly
sensitive information. Individual trust in regulated entities is eroded
when individuals' access to health care is questioned and their PHI is
subject to disclosures that previously were unnecessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\174\ See Press Release, American Medical Association, American
Pharmacists Association, American Society of Health-System
Pharmacists, and National Community Pharmacists Association,
``Statement on state laws impacting patient access to necessary
medicine'' (Sept. 8, 2022), https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/statement-state-laws-impacting-patient-access-necessary-medicine. See also Abigail Higgins, ``Abortion rights
advocates fear access to birth control could be curtailed,'' The
Washington Post (June 24, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/06/24/birth-control-access-supreme-court-abortion-ruling/.
\175\ See Interview with Donald Miller, PharmD, ``Methotrexate
access becomes challenging for some patients following Supreme Court
decision on abortion,'' Pharmacy Times (July 20, 2022), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/view/methotrexate-access-becomes-challenging-for-patients-following-supreme-court-decision-on-abortion; Jamie
Ducharme, ``Abortion restrictions may be making it harder for
patients to get a cancer and arthritis drug,'' Time (July 6, 2022),
https://time.com/6194179/abortion-restrictions-methotrexate-cancer-arthritis/; Katie Shepherd and Frances Stead Sellers, ``Abortion
bans complicate access to drugs for cancer, arthritis, even
ulcers,'' The Washington Post (Aug. 8, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2022/08/08/abortion-bans-methotrexate-mifepristone-rheumatoid-arthritis/.
\176\ See, e.g., Jen Christensen, ``Women with chronic
conditions struggle to find medications after abortion laws limit
access,'' CNN Health (July 22, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/22/health/abortion-law-medications-methotrexate/index.html; Brittni
Frederiksen, Matthew Rae, Tatyana Roberts, et al., ``Abortion Bans
May Limit Essential Medications for Women with Chronic Conditions,''
Kaiser Family Foundation (Nov. 17, 2022), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/abortion-bans-may-limit-essential-medications-for-women-with-chronic-conditions/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Impingements on health information privacy related to reproductive
health care are likely to have a disproportionately greater effect on
women, individuals of reproductive age, and individuals from
communities that have been historically underserved, marginalized, or
subject to discrimination or systemic disadvantage by virtue of their
race, disability, social or economic status, geographic location, or
environment.\177\ Historically underserved and marginalized individuals
are also more likely to be the subjects of investigations and
proceedings about any suspected interest in, or obtaining of,
reproductive health care, even where such health care is lawful under
the circumstances in which it is provided.\178\ They are also less
likely to have adequate access to legal counsel to defend themselves
from

[[Page 23521]]

such actions.\179\ Such individuals are thus especially likely to be
concerned that information they give to their health care providers
regarding their reproductive health care will not remain private. This
is particularly true in light of the historic lack of trust that
members of marginalized communities have for the health care system;
\180\ such individuals are more likely to be deterred from seeking or
obtaining health care--or from giving their health care providers full
information when they do obtain it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\177\ See Christine Dehlendorf, Lisa H. Harris, Tracy A. Weitz,
``Disparities in Abortion Rates: A Public Health Approach,''
American Journal of Public Health. (Oct. 2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3780732/. See also Kiara
Alfonseca, ``Why Abortion Restrictions Disproportionately Impact
People of Color, ABC News (June 24, 2022), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/abortion-restrictions-disproportionately-impact-people-color/story?id=84467809; Susan A. Cohen, ``Abortion and Women of Color:
The Bigger Picture,'' Guttmacher Institute (Aug. 6, 2008), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2008/08/abortion-and-women-color-bigger-picture; ``The Disproportionate Harm of Abortion Bans: Spotlight on
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health,'' Center for Reproductive Rights
(Nov. 29, 2021), https://reproductiverights.org/supreme-court-case-mississippi-abortion-ban-disproportionate-harm/.
\178\ See Brief of Amici Curiae for Organizations Dedicated to
the Fight for Reproductive Justice--Mississippi in Action, et al. at
*59-60, Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. (discussing the likelihood that those who
terminate their pregnancies and anyone who assists them may face
criminal investigation or arrest, exacerbating the mass
incarceration of marginalized people in Mississippi and Louisiana,
particularly in light of the states' disproportionate rates of
incarceration for people of color).
\179\ See ``Equal access to justice: ensuring meaningful access
to counsel in civil cases, including immigration proceedings,''
Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute and Northeastern
University School of Law Program on Human Rights and the Global
Economy (July 2014), https://hri.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/publications/equal_access_to_justice_-_cerd_shadow_report.pdf.
See also ``Report: State Abortion Bans Will Harm Women and Families'
Economic Security Across the U.S.'' (Aug. 25, 2022), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/state-abortion-bans-will-harm-women-and-families-economic-security-across-the-us/.
\180\ See Leslie Read, Heather Nelson, Leslie Korenda, The
Deloitte Ctr. for Health Solutions, ``Rebuilding Trust in Health
Care: What Do Consumers Want--and Need--Organizations to Do?'' (Aug.
5, 2021), p. 3 (With focus groups of 525 individuals in the United
States who identify as Black, Hispanic, Asian, or Native American,
``Fifty-five percent reported a negative experience where they lost
trust in a health care provider.''), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/health-care/trust-in-health-care-system.html;
Liz Hamel, Lunna Lopes, Cailey Mu[ntilde]ana, et al., Kaiser Family
Foundation, The Undefeated Survey on Race and Health (Oct. 2020), p.
23, (Percent who say they can trust the health care system to do
what is right for them or their community almost all of the time or
most of the time: Black adults: 44%; Hispanic adults: 50%; White
adults: 55%), https://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Race-Health-and-COVID-19-The-Views-and-Experiences-of-Black-Americans.pdf;
``Issue Brief: Health Insurance Coverage and Access to Care for
LGBTQ+ Individuals: Current Trends and Key Challenges,'' U.S. Dep't
of Health and Human Servs., Assistant Sec'y for Policy & Evaluation,
Office of Health Policy (June 2021), p. 9 (``According to a recent
survey, 18 percent of LGBTQ+ individuals reported avoiding going to
a doctor or seeking healthcare out of concern that they would face
discrimination or be treated poorly because of their sexual
orientation or gender identity.''), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/lgbt-health-ib.pdf; Abigail A. Sewell,
``Disaggregating Ethnoracial Disparities in Physician Trust,''
Social Science Research. (Nov. 2015), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26463531/; Irena Stepanikova, Stefanie
Mollborn, Karen S. Cook, et al., ``Patients' Race, Ethnicity,
Language, and Trust in a Physician,'' Journal of Health and Social
Behavior (Dec. 2006), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17240927/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The recent legal landscape that increases the potential for
disclosures of PHI to impose liability for seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care risks eroding
health information privacy and trust in health care providers that has
long been supported and advanced by the Privacy Rule. The Department
issued guidance in 2022 to clarify its longstanding interpretation of
the Privacy Rule's law enforcement provisions.\181\ In the guidance,
the Department explained that disclosures for non-health care purposes,
such as disclosures to law enforcement officials, are permitted only in
narrow circumstances tailored to protect the individual's privacy and
support their access to health care, including abortion care. The
guidance specifically reminded regulated entities that they can use and
disclose PHI, without an individual's signed authorization, only as
expressly permitted or required by the Privacy Rule. Additionally, the
guidance explained the Privacy Rule's restrictions on disclosures of
PHI when required by law, for law enforcement purposes, and to avert a
serious threat to health or safety. For example, where state law does
not expressly require reporting of suspicions of self-managed
reproductive health care, the Privacy Rule would not permit a
disclosure by a hospital workforce member of such suspicions to law
enforcement under the ``required by law'' permission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\181\ See ``HIPAA Privacy Rule and Disclosures of Information
Relating to Reproductive Health Care,'' U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs. (June 29, 2022), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/phi-reproductive-health/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

However, many questions remain with respect to the potential for
this sensitive PHI to be disclosed and the effects of such disclosure
on the individual. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Department to
consider whether it should revise the Privacy Rule to ensure the
privacy of health information related to an individual's use of lawful
reproductive health care, consistent with Congress' intent to create
standards for the privacy of IIHI that promote trust and support access
to high-quality health care.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\182\ See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,
515 (2009) (holding ``[ . . . ] the agency must show that there are
good reasons for the new policy. [ . . . ][I]t suffices that the new
policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons
for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the
conscious change of course adequately indicates.'' (emphasis in
original)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. To Protect the Trust Between Individuals and Health Care Providers,
the Department Proposes To Restrict Certain Uses and Disclosures of PHI
for Non-Health Care Purposes

The Federal Government seeks to ensure that individuals have access
to high-quality health care.\183\ This proposed rule would further that
goal by restricting the use and disclosure of certain PHI for non-
health care purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\183\ See Testimony (transcribed) of Peter R. Orszag and
statement of Sen. Durenberger, supra note 135.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department acknowledges that the Privacy Rule has not
previously conditioned uses and disclosures for certain purposes on the
specific type of health care about which the disclosure relates, as it
does herein with reproductive health care. However, the primary reasons
behind this rulemaking are the risks to privacy, patient trust, and
health care quality that occur when it is the very act of obtaining
health care that subjects an individual to an investigation or
proceeding, potentially disincentivizing the individual from obtaining
medically necessary health care.
As discussed above, the Department has long provided special
protections for psychotherapy notes when they are not included as part
of the medical record because of the sensitivity around this
information. Given the particularly sensitive nature of information
related to an individual's reproductive health, the Department is
proposing to create new, special safeguards for this information.
However, unlike psychotherapy notes, which by their very nature are
easily defined and segregated, reproductive health information is not
easily defined or segregated. This is in part because many types of PHI
may not initially appear to be related to an individual's reproductive
health but may in fact reveal information about an individual's
reproductive health or reproductive health care an individual has
received. For example, in a pregnant individual, a high blood pressure
reading may be a sign of preeclampsia, and glucose found in a urine
test may indicate gestational diabetes. Additionally, it is the
Department's understanding that today's clinical documentation and
health IT do not provide regulated entities with the ability to segment
certain PHI such that regulated entities could afford specific
categories of PHI special protections, or at least do so in a manner
that is not overly burdensome and cost prohibitive.\184\ Instead, as is
consistent

[[Page 23522]]

with the Privacy Rule's overall approach,\185\ the Department proposes
a purpose-based prohibition on certain uses and disclosures to protect
individuals' privacy interests in their PHI. The Department believes
that this proposed purpose-based prohibition, in concert with the
proposed attestation, will restrict the use and disclosure of PHI that
could harm HIPAA's overall goals of increasing trust in the health care
system, improving health care quality, and protecting individual
privacy, while continuing to allow PHI uses and disclosures that either
provide support for those goals or do not interfere with their
achievement.
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\184\ See, e.g., 87 FR 74216, 74221 (Dec. 2, 2022) (noting that
42 CFR part 2 previously resulted in the separation of substance use
disorder (SUD) treatment records previous from other health records,
which led to the creation of data ``silos'' that hampered the
integration of SUD treatment records into covered entities'
electronic record systems and billing processes. When considering
amendments to the relevant statute, some lawmakers argued that the
silos perpetuated negative stereotypes about persons with SUD and
inhibited coordination of care during the opioid epidemic. See also
``Health Information Technology Advisory Committee (HITAC) Annual
Report for Fiscal Year 2019,'' Health Information Technology
Advisory Committee (Feb. 19, 2020), p. 37, https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/page/2020-03/HITAC%20Annual%20Report%20for%20FY19_508.pdf (``The new
certification criteria that support the sharing of data via third-
party apps will help advance the use of data segmentation, but
adoption of this capability by the industry is not yet
widespread.'').
\185\ See 64 FR 59924, 59939, and 59955.
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Also, consistent with the Privacy Rule's approach, the Department
proposes a Rule of Applicability for the purpose-based prohibition that
recognizes the interests of the Federal Government and states in
protecting the privacy of persons who seek, obtain, provide, or
facilitate lawful reproductive health care. This Rule of Applicability
would limit the new prohibition to certain categories of instances in
which the state lacks any substantial interest in seeking the
disclosure. The Department believes that the proposals described in
greater detail later in this NPRM could benefit health care providers
and individuals. Although many benefits are not quantifiable, the
Department believes the proposals would increase the likelihood that
individuals would seek lawful health care by improving their confidence
in the confidentiality of their PHI; improve access to high quality and
continuous health care by increasing the accuracy and completeness of
individuals' medical records; improve population health by encouraging
individuals to receive disease screenings; safeguard the mental health
of pregnant individuals; prevent increases in maternal mortality and
morbidity; enhance support for victims of rape, incest, and sex
trafficking; and maintain family economic stability. Similarly, the
proposals are expected to increase certainty for, and therefore reduce
the burden on, regulated entities implementing the Privacy Rule.
The Department's proposed modifications are consistent with its
existing authority to modify the Privacy Rule. As discussed above,
Congress expressly authorized the Department to develop standards for
the privacy of IIHI. The Department has consistently exercised its
rulemaking authority to establish, implement, and modify the HIPAA
Rules pursuant to this statutory authority, including when necessary to
maintain their effectiveness, address workability issues for regulated
entities including clarifying amendments, and respond to changed
circumstances.\186\ The proposed changes would effectuate HIPAA's goals
of setting standards with respect to the privacy of IIHI, thereby
increasing the quality of and access to health care by fostering trust
in the health care system and buttressing continuity of health
care.\187\ Moreover, Congress expressly provided in HIPAA that the
Department's regulations in this area ``shall supersede any contrary
provision of State law,'' absent an explicit exception.\188\ As
discussed below, various state laws that might conflict with the rules
proposed herein, such as those that require disclosure of PHI for
purposes of criminal, civil, or administrative investigations or
proceedings based on seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating
lawful reproductive health care, are not excepted from this general
rule of preemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\186\ See, e.g., 67 FR 53182 (modifying the 2000 Privacy Rule in
response to stakeholder implementation concerns and to clarify key
provisions), 78 FR 5566 (modifying the HIPAA Rules to address HITECH
requirements and improve workability and flexibility for covered
entities), 79 FR 7289 (modifying the Privacy Rule to address
requirements in the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of
1988 and to improve patient access), and 81 FR 382 (modifying the
Privacy Rule to permit certain disclosures to the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System).
\187\ See section III of this rulemaking for a full discussion
of HIPAA and congressional intent.
\188\ 42 U.S.C. 1320d-7 and section 264(c)(2) of Public Law 104-
191 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 note).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In accordance with section 264(d) of HIPAA, the Department has
consulted with the Attorney General in the formulation of this proposed
rule and intends to continue to engage in these consultations before
finalizing the rule. The Department invites NCVHS to review this
proposed rule and to provide comments to the Department.

IV. Section-by-Section Description of Proposed Amendments to the
Privacy Rule

The Department proposes to modify the Privacy Rule to strengthen
privacy protections for individuals' PHI by adding a new category of
prohibited uses and disclosures. This modification would prohibit a
regulated entity from using or disclosing an individual's PHI for the
purpose of conducting a criminal, civil, or administrative
investigation into or proceeding against the individual, a health care
provider, or other person in connection with seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that: (1) is
provided outside of the state where the investigation or proceeding is
authorized and such health care is lawful in the state in which it is
provided; (2) is protected, required, or authorized by Federal law,
regardless of the state in which such health care is provided; or (3)
is provided in the state in which the investigation or proceeding is
authorized and that is permitted by the law of that state. In these
three circumstances, the state lacks any substantial interest in
seeking the disclosure. To operationalize this proposed modification,
the Department also proposes to revise or clarify certain definitions
and terms that apply to the Privacy Rule, as well as other HIPAA Rules.
The NPRM would also prohibit a regulated entity from using or
disclosing an individual's PHI for the purpose of identifying \189\ an
individual, health care provider, or other person for the purpose of
initiating such an investigation or proceeding against the individual,
a health care provider, or other person in connection with seeking,
obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that is
lawful under the circumstances in which it is provided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\189\ Section 164.514(h) of 45 CFR requires a covered entity, in
most cases, to take reasonable steps to verify the identify and
authority of a person requesting PHI before disclosing the PHI,
including in the case of public officials. The proposed restriction
against using or disclosing PHI in connection with the proposals in
this NPRM would not modify 45 CFR 164.514(h) but would address only
those circumstances in which a regulated entity would use or
disclose PHI to identify an individual for a purpose that would be
restricted herein. Further, the Department believes the attestation
requirement proposed in this NPRM would provide a regulated entity
the assurance it needs to make disclosures for identity purposes
that are consistent with the Privacy Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To effectuate these proposals, the Department proposes conforming
and clarifying changes to the HIPAA Rules. These proposed changes
include, but are not limited to, clarifying the definition of
``person'' to reflect long-standing statutory language defining the
term; adopting new definitions of ``public health'' surveillance,
investigation, or intervention, and ``reproductive health care'';
clarifying that a regulated entity may not decline to recognize a
person as a personal representative for the purposes of the Privacy
Rule solely because they provide or facilitate reproductive health care
for an individual; a new requirement that, in certain

[[Page 23523]]

circumstances, regulated entities must first obtain an attestation that
a requested use or disclosure is not for a prohibited purpose; and
modifications to the NPP for PHI to inform individuals that their PHI
may not be used or disclosed for a prohibited purpose.
The Department's proposals are discussed in greater detail below.

A. Section 160.103--Definitions

1. Clarifying the Definition of ``Person''
Current Provision and Issues To Address
HIPAA does not define the term ``person.'' \190\ By regulation, the
Department has long defined ``person'' for purposes of the HIPAA Rules
to mean ``a natural person, trust or estate, partnership, corporation,
professional association or corporation, or other entity, public or
private.'' \191\ This definition was based on the meaning of ``person''
that Congress adopted in the original Social Security Act of 1935
(SSA), defined as an ``individual, a trust or estate, a partnership, or
a corporation.'' \192\
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\190\ See 42 U.S.C. 1320d-1320d-8.
\191\ 45 CFR 160.103.
\192\ See section 1101(3) of Public Law 74-271, 49 Stat. 620
(Aug. 14, 1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1301(3)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In 2002, Congress enacted 1 U.S.C. 8, which defines ``person,''
``human being,'' ``child,'' and ``individual.'' \193\ The statute
specifies that this definition shall apply when ``determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of
the United States.'' \194\ The Department understands 1 U.S.C. 8 to
provide a definition of ``person'' and ``child'' that is consistent
with the Department's understanding of that term, as it is used in the
SSA, HIPAA, and the HIPAA Rules and does not include a fertilized egg,
embryo, or fetus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\193\ 1 U.S.C. 8(a). The Department is not opining on whether
any state law confers a particular legal status upon a fetus. The
Department instead cites to this statute to define the scope of the
right of privacy that attaches pursuant to HIPAA.
\194\ Id.
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Proposal
Thus, the Department proposes to clarify the definition of
``natural person'' in a manner consistent with 1 U.S.C. 8. In so doing,
the Department would make clear that all terms subsumed within the
definition of ``natural person,'' such as ``individual,'' \195\ which
refers to a ``person'' who is the subject of PHI under the HIPAA Rules,
is limited to the confines of the term ``person.'' \196\ The Department
would also make clear that ``natural person,'' as used in the
definition of ``person'' under the HIPAA Rules, is limited to the
definition at 1 U.S.C. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\195\ 45 CFR 160.103 (definition of ``Individual'').
\196\ See The Prenatal Record and the Initial Prenatal Visit,
The Global Library of Women's Medicine (last updated Jan. 2008) (PHI
about the fetus is included in the mother's PHI), https://www.glowm.com/section-view/heading/The%20Prenatal%20Record%20and%20the%20Initial%20Prenatal%20Visit/item/107#.Y7WRKofMKUl.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department believes it would be beneficial to clarify the
definition of ``person'' to ensure that there is an understanding among
stakeholders as to its meaning for Privacy Rule purposes. As such, the
Department believes the proposed clarification of the definition of
person better explains to regulated entities and other stakeholders the
parameters of who is an ``individual'' whose PHI is protected by the
HIPAA Rules.
2. Interpreting Terms Used in Section 1178(b) of the Social Security
Act \197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\197\ 42 U.S.C. 1320d-7(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HIPAA includes a rule of construction for certain laws generally
concerning ``[p]ublic health.'' \198\ Specifically, section 1178(b) of
the SSA provides that nothing in HIPAA ``shall be construed to
invalidate or limit'' laws ``providing for the reporting of disease or
injury, child abuse, birth, or death, public health surveillance, or
public health investigation or intervention.'' \199\ Accordingly, the
Privacy Rule permits a regulated entity to use and disclose PHI for
certain public health purposes, treating the uses and disclosures
covered by section 1178(b) as permitted uses and disclosures to public
health authorities or other appropriate government authorities for the
listed activities.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\198\ Id.
\199\ Id. The Department incorporated this limitation on Federal
preemption of state laws in the HIPAA Rules at 45 CFR 160.203(c).
\200\ 45 CFR 164.512(b). The Privacy Rule addresses its
interactions with laws governing excepted public health activities
in two sections: 45 CFR 164.512(a), Standard: Uses and disclosures
required by law, and 45 CFR 164.512(b), Standard: Uses and
disclosures for public health activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A regulated entity may use or disclose PHI to public health
authorities for the full range of activities described above, including
reporting of diseases and injuries, reporting of birth and death to
vital statistics agencies, and activities covered by the terms public
health surveillance, public health investigation, and public health
intervention. A ``public health authority'' means an agency or
authority of the United States, a State, a territory, a political
subdivision of a State or territory, or an Indian tribe, or a person or
entity acting under a grant of authority from, or contract with, such
public agency, including the employees or agents of such public agency
or its contractors or persons or entities to whom it has granted
authority, that is responsible for public health matters as part of its
official mandate.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\201\ See 45 CFR 164.501 (definition of ``Public health
authority'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HIPAA does not define the terms in section 1178(b) that govern the
scope of the ``public health'' exceptions to preemption and the
Department declines to do so here. The Department believes it necessary
to define only ``public health'' surveillance, investigation, or
intervention and to make clear the Department's interpretation of key
terms used in section 1178(b) to clarify when HIPAA preempts contrary
state laws. The Department believes that state laws that require the
use or disclosure of highly sensitive PHI for non-public health
purposes, such as criminal, civil, or administrative investigations or
proceedings based on whether a person sought, obtained, provided, or
facilitated reproductive health care, are not exempt from HIPAA's
general rule of preemption.
Reporting of Disease or Injury, Birth, or Death
The Privacy Rule permits regulated entities to use or disclose PHI
without authorization for the public health purposes of reporting
``disease or injury,'' ``birth,'' or ``death.'' \202\ Similarly,
section 1178(b) exempts state laws requiring such reporting from
HIPAA's general preemption provision. The Department recognizes that
such public health reporting activities are an important means of
identifying threats to the health and safety of the public. The
Department does not propose to define ``disease or injury,'' ``birth,''
or ``death,'' because the Department believes that these terms, when
read with the definition of ``person'' as discussed above and in the
broader context of HIPAA as discussed in greater detail below, exclude
information about abortion or other reproductive health care. But the
Department invites comment on whether it would be beneficial to clarify
that these terms exclude information about reproductive health care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\202\ See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Office for
Civil Rights, Public Health (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/public-health/index.html.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 23524]]

At the time of HIPAA's enactment, state laws provided for the
reporting of disease or injury, birth, or death by covered health care
providers and other persons.\203\ These state public health reporting
systems were well established and involved close collaboration between
the state, local, or territorial jurisdiction and the Federal
Government.\204\ Reports generally were made to public health
authorities or, in some specific cases, law enforcement (e.g.,
reporting of gunshot wounds).\205\ Similar public health reporting
systems continue to exist today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\203\ The 1996-98 Report of the NCVHS to the Secretary describes
various types of activities considered to be public health during
the era in which HIPAA was enacted, such as the collection of public
health surveillance data on health status and health outcomes and
vital statistics information. See Report of ``The National Committee
on Vital and Health Statistics, 1996-98,'' Nat'l Comm. on Vital and
Health Stats. (Dec. 1999), https://ncvhs.hhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/90727nv-508.pdf.
\204\ Id.
\205\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reporting of ``disease or injury'' commonly refers to diagnosable
health conditions reported for limited purposes such as workers'
compensation, tort claims, or health tracking efforts. All states,
territories, and Tribal governments require covered health care
providers (e.g., physicians and laboratories) and others to report
cases of certain diseases or conditions that affect public health, such
as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), malaria, and foodborne
illnesses.\206\ Such reporting enables public health practitioners to
study and explain diseases and their spread, along with determining
appropriate actions to prevent and respond to outbreaks.\207\ States
also require health care providers to report incidents of certain types
of injuries, such as those caused by gunshots, knives, or burns.\208\
Various Federal statutes use the phrase ``disease or injury'' similarly
to refer to events such as workplace injuries for purposes of
compensation.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\206\ See ``Reportable diseases,'' in National Institutes of
Health, National Library of Medicine, MedlinePlus, https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/001929.htm (accessed Oct. 19, 2022).
See also ``What is Case Surveillance?'' Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance Sys. (July
20, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/nndss/about/index.html.
\207\ See ``Reportable diseases,'' supra note 206. Such
reporting is a type of public health surveillance activity.
\208\ See Victims Rights Law Center, ``Mandatory Reporting of
Non-Accidental Injuries: A State-by-State Guide'' (May 2014), http://4e5ae7d17e.nxcli.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Mandatory-Reporting-of-Non-Accidental-Injury-Statutes-by-State.pdf.
\209\ See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. 1110 (referring to an ``injury
suffered or disease contracted''); 10 U.S.C. 972 (discussing time
lost as a result of ``disease or injury''); 38 U.S.C. 3500
(providing education for certain children whose parent suffered ``a
disease or injury'' incurred or aggravated in the Armed Forces); see
also 5 U.S.C. 8707 (insurance provision discussing compensation as a
result of ``disease or injury''); 33 U.S.C. 765 (discussing
retirement for disability as a result of ``disease or injury''); 15
U.S.C. 2607(c) (requiring chemical manufacturers to maintain records
of ``occupational disease or injury'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The limited meaning given to the terms ``disease'' and ``injury''
is clear from HIPAA's broader context. For instance, interpreting
``injury'' to include reporting of any criminal abuse would render the
specific exception for ``child abuse'' superfluous. And interpreting
``disease'' to include reporting of any disease for any purpose would
eviscerate HIPAA's general provisions protecting PHI. ``[D]isease
management activities'' constitute ``health care'' under the Privacy
Rule, and a broad interpretation of ``disease or injury'' would make
even information about cancer treatment disclosable.\210\ Consequently,
the Department has long understood ``disease or injury'' to narrowly
refer to diagnosable health conditions reported for limited purposes
such as workers' compensation, tort claims, or health tracking
efforts.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\210\ See 65 FR 82571 (recognizing that ``disease management
activities'' often constitute ``health care'' under HIPAA); 65 FR
82777 (discussing the importance of privacy for information about
cancer, a ``disease'' that causes an ``indisputable'' ``societal
burden''); 65 FR 82778 (discussing the importance of privacy for
information about sexually transmitted diseases, including Human
Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/
AIDS)); 65 FR 82463-64 (noting that numerous states adopted laws
protecting health information relating to certain health conditions
such as communicable diseases, cancer, HIV/AIDS, and other
stigmatized conditions.); 65 FR 82731 (finding that there are no
persuasive reasons to provide information contained within disease
registries with special treatment as compared with other information
that may be used to make decisions about an individual).
\211\ See, e.g., 65 FR 82517 (discussing tort litigation as
information that could implicate IIHI); 65 FR 82542 (discussing
workers' compensation); 65 FR 82527 (separately addressing
disclosures about ``abuse, neglect or domestic violence'' and
limiting such disclosures to only two circumstances, even if
expressly authorized by state statute or regulation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With respect to reporting of ``births'' and ``deaths,'' such vital
statistics are reported by covered health care providers to the vital
registration systems operated in various jurisdictions \212\ legally
responsible for the registration of vital events.\213\ State laws
require birth certificates to be completed for all births, and Federal
law mandates the national collection and publication of births and
other vital statistics data.\214\ Tracking and reporting death is a
complex and decentralized process with a variety of systems used by
more than 6,000 local vital registrars.\215\ When HIPAA was enacted,
the Model State Vital Statistics Act and Regulations, which is followed
by most states,\216\ included distinct categories for ``live births,''
``fetal deaths,'' and ``induced terminations of pregnancy,'' with
instructions that abortions ``shall not be reported as fetal deaths.''
\217\ In light of that common understanding at the time of HIPAA's
enactment, it is clear that the reporting of abortions is not included
in the category of reporting of deaths for the purposes of HIPAA and
does not fall within the scope of state activities Congress
specifically designated as excepted from preemption by HIPAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\212\ See ``Health Department Governance,'' Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Public Health Professionals Gateway (Nov.
25, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/publichealthgateway/sitesgovernance/index.html.
\213\ See the list of events included in vital events ``vital
events--births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and fetal deaths,''
National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, About the National Vital Statistics System (Jan. 4,
2016), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/about_nvss.htm.
\214\ See ``Birth Data,'' National Center for Health Statistics,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Vital
Statistics (Dec. 6, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/births.htm.
\215\ See ``How Tracking Deaths Protects Health,'' Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health and Surveillance Data
(July 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/surveillance/pdfs/Tracking-Deaths-protects-healthh.pdf.
\216\ See ``State Definitions and Reporting Requirements: For
Live Births, Fetal Deaths, and Induced Terminations of Pregnancy,''
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for
Health Statistics (1997), p. 5, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/itop97.pdf.
\217\ ``Model State Vital Statistics Act and Regulations,''
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for
Health Statistics (1992), p. 8, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/misc/mvsact92b.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

More generally, while Congress exempted certain ``[p]ublic health''
laws from preemption,\218\ Congress chose not to create a general
exception for criminal laws or other laws that address the disclosure
of information about similar types of activities outside of the public
health context. Thus, the Privacy Rule's exceptions for reporting of
disease or injury, birth, or death do not allow the use or disclosure
of PHI for investigating or punishing a person for seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care. Similarly, state
laws requiring disclosure for such purposes are not exempt under
section 1178(b) from HIPAA's general preemption provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\218\ 42 U.S.C. 1178(b) (codified in HIPAA at 42 U.S.C. 1320d-
7).

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[[Page 23525]]

Public Health Surveillance, Investigation, or Intervention
The Privacy Rule also permits a regulated entity to use or disclose
PHI to conduct ``public health'' surveillance, investigation, or
intervention.\219\ Section 1178(b) similarly exempts state laws
providing for ``public health'' surveillance, investigation, or
intervention from HIPAA's general preemption rule. Neither HIPAA nor
the Privacy Rule currently defines these terms. To clarify their
meaning, the Department proposes to define public health \220\
surveillance, investigation, or intervention to mean population-based
activities to prevent disease and promote health of populations.\221\
The Department also proposes to clarify that such public health
activities do not include uses and disclosures for the criminal, civil,
or administrative investigation into or proceeding against any person
in connection with seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating
reproductive health care, or to identify any person for the purpose of
initiating such an investigation or proceeding.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\219\ See 45 CFR 164.512(b)(1)(i); U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights, Disclosures for Public Health
Activities, (accessed Oct. 19, 2022), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/disclosures-public-health-activities/index.html.
\220\ See ``Ten Essential Public Health Services,'' Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Professionals Gateway
(Dec. 1, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/publichealthgateway/publichealthservices/essentialhealthservices.html and ``What is
Public Health?'' in CDC Foundation, Public Health in Action (2023),
https://www.cdcfoundation.org/what-public-health?gclid=Cj0KCQjw_viWBhD8ARIsAH1mCd7ME0r94gapt8Qh48LjdQO3Sto101snekpI94auuahRs7LizEkh7OwaAiKxEALw_wcB. See also ``HIPAA Privacy Rule
and Public Health,'' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
MMWR (Apr. 11, 2003), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/m2e411a1.htm.
\221\ See Report of ``The National Committee on Vital and Health
Statistics, 1996-98,'' supra note 203. These activities are
consistent with the definition proposed herein.
\222\ See Report of ``The National Committee on Vital and Health
Statistics, 1996-98,'' supra note 203, for descriptions of public
health activities in 1996-98.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Since the time of HIPAA's enactment, public health activities
related to surveillance, investigation, or intervention have been
widely understood to refer to activities aimed at improving the health
of a population. For example, legal dictionaries define ``public
health'' as ``[t]he health of the community at large,'' or ``[t]he
healthful or sanitary condition of the general body of people or the
community en masse; esp., the methods of maintaining the health of the
community, as by preventive medicine or organized care for the sick.''
\223\ Stedman's Medical Dictionary defines ``public health'' as ``the
art and science of community health, concerned with statistics,
epidemiology, hygiene, and the prevention and eradication of epidemic
diseases; an effort organized by society to promote, protect, and
restore the people's health; public health is a social institution, a
service, and a practice.'' \224\ The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention's (CDC) Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
commonly defines ``public health surveillance'' as ``the ongoing
systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of outcome-specific
data for use in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of public
health practice.'' \225\ And many states similarly define ``public
health'' to mean population-level activities.\226\ The Department
likewise has used public health in this way since it first adopted the
Privacy Rule.\227\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\223\ ``Health,'' ``public health,'' Black's Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019).
\224\ ``Public health,'' Stedman's Medical Dictionary 394520.
\225\ Jonathan Weinstein, ``In Re Miguel M.,'' 55 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 389, 390 (2010) (citing Stephen B. Thacker, ``Historical
Development,'' in Principles and Practice of Public Health
Surveillance 1 (Steven M. Teutsch & R. Elliott Churchill eds., 2d
ed., 2000)), https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1599&context=nyls_law_review.
\226\ See, e.g., Richard A. Goodman, Judith W. Munson, Kim
Dammers, et al., ``Forensic Epidemiology: Law at the Intersection of
Public Health and Criminal Investigations,'' 31 The Journal of Law,
Medicine & Ethics 684, 689-90 (2003); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec.
40:3.1 (2011) (defining threats to public health as nuisances
``including but not limited to communicable, contagious, and
infectious diseases, as well as illnesses, diseases, and genetic
disorders or abnormalities''); N.C. Gen. Stat. sec. 130A-141.1(a)
(2010) (defining public health investigations as the ``surveillance
of an illness, condition, or symptoms that may indicate the
existence of a communicable disease or condition'').
\227\ See, e.g., 65 FR 82464 (noting that reporting of public
health information on communicable diseases is not prevented by
individuals' right to information privacy); id. at 82467 (discussing
the importance of accurate medical records in recognizing troubling
public health trends and in assessing the effectiveness of public
health efforts); id. at 82473 (discussing disclosure to ``a
department of public health''); id. at 82525 (recognizing that it
may be necessary to disclose PHI about communicable diseases when
conducting a public health intervention or investigation); id. at
82526 (recognizing that an entity acts as a ``public health
authority'' when, in its role as a component of the public health
department, it conducts infectious disease surveillance); ``HIPAA
Privacy Rule and Public Health,'' supra note 220 (describing what
traditionally are considered to be ``public health activities'' that
require PHI).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

There is also a widely recognized distinction between public health
activities, which primarily focus on improving the health of
populations, and criminal investigations, which primarily focus on
identifying and imposing liability on persons who have violated the
law. States and other local governing authorities maintain criminal
codes that are distinct and separate from public health reporting
laws,\228\ although some jurisdictions enforce required reporting
through criminal statutes. Different governmental bodies are
responsible for enforcing these separate codes, and public health
officials do not typically investigate criminal activity.\229\ When
states intend for public health information to be shared with law
enforcement for criminal investigation purposes, they typically pass
specific laws to permit that sharing.\230\ Other Federal laws also
treat public health investigations as distinct from criminal
investigations.\231\ Maintaining a clear distinction between public
health investigations and criminal investigations serves HIPAA's
broader purposes, as well, by safeguarding privacy to ensure quality
health care.\232\
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\228\ For example, traditional public health reporting laws grew
from colonial requirements that physicians report disease. These
requirements transitioned to state regulatory requirements imposed
by public health departments on authority granted to them by states.
See Public Health Law 101, Disease Reporting and Public Health
Surveillance, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, p. 12 and
14, https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/phl101/PHL101-Unit-5-16Jan09-Secure.pdf. See also, e.g., Code of Georgia 31-12-2 (2021),
authority to require disease reporting.
\229\ See ``Public Health,'' supra note 223 (``Many cities have
a `public health department' or other agency responsible for
maintaining the public health; Federal laws dealing with health are
administered by the Department of Health and Human Services.''); See
also ``Forensic Epidemiology: Law at the Intersection of Public
Health and Criminal Investigations,'' supra note 226, at 689.
\230\ See ``Forensic Epidemiology: Law at the Intersection of
Public Health and Criminal Investigations,'' supra note 226, at 687
(discussing South Dakota Statutes sec. 22-18-31, a law allowing HIV
test results to be released to a prosecutor for criminal
investigation purposes); id. at 693 (discussing North Carolina
General Statute (N.C.G.S.) sec. 130A-476, a law allowing
confidential medical information to be shared with law enforcement
in certain circumstances related to communicable diseases or
terrorism).
\231\ See Camara v. Municipal Ct. of City & Cty. of S.F., 387
U.S. 523, 535-37 (1967) (discussing administrative inspections under
the Fourth Amendment, such as those aimed at addressing ``conditions
which are hazardous to public health and safety,'' and not ``aimed
at the discovery of evidence of crime''); 42 U.S.C. 241(d)(D)
(prohibiting disclosure of private information from research
subjects in ``criminal'' and other proceedings); 42 U.S.C. 290dd-
2(c) (prohibiting substance abuse records from being used in
criminal proceedings).
\232\ See ``Forensic Epidemiology: Law at the Intersection of
Public Health and Criminal Investigations,'' supra note 226, at 687
(discussing reasons why ``an association of public health with law
enforcement'' may be ``to the detriment of routine public health
practice''). See also 45 CFR 164.512(b)(1)(i) (including ``public
health investigations'' as an activity carried out by a public
health authority that is authorized by law to carry out public
health activities).

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[[Page 23526]]

The Department concludes that the Privacy Rule's permissions to use
and disclose PHI for the ``public health'' activities of surveillance,
investigation, or intervention do not include criminal, civil, or
administrative investigations into, or proceedings against, any person
in connection with seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating
reproductive health care, nor do they include identifying any person
for the purpose of initiating such investigations or proceedings. Such
actions are not public health activities. Public health surveillance,
investigations, or interventions ensure the health of the community as
a whole by addressing population-level issues such as the spread of
communicable diseases, even where they involve individual-level
interventions. Such surveillance systems provide data necessary to
examine and potentially develop interventions to improve the public's
health, such as providing education or resources to support
individuals' access to health care and improve health outcomes.\233\
U.S. states, territories, and Tribal governments participate in
bilateral agreements with the Federal Government to share data on
conditions that affect public health.\234\ The CDC's Division of
Reproductive Health presently collects reproductive health data in
support of national and state-based population surveillance systems to
assess maternal complications, mortality and pregnancy-related
disparities, and the numbers and characteristics of individuals who
obtain legal induced abortions.\235\ Importantly, disclosures to public
health authorities permitted by the Privacy Rule are limited to the
``minimum necessary'' to accomplish the public health purpose.\236\ In
many cases, regulated entities need disclose only de-identified data
\237\ to meet the public health purpose. By contrast, criminal, civil,
and administrative investigations and proceedings generally target
specific persons; they are not designed to address population-level
health concerns and are not limited to information authorized to be
collected by a public health or similar government authority for a
public health activity. Thus, the exceptions in section 1178(b) for
``public health'' investigations, interventions, or surveillance do not
limit the Department's ability to prohibit uses or disclosures of PHI
for other purposes, such as judicial and administrative proceedings or
law enforcement purposes. While the Department has chosen as a policy
matter to permit uses or disclosures of PHI for law enforcement and
other purposes in other contexts, it believes, as discussed above, that
a different balance is appropriate in the context of highly sensitive
information related to reproductive health care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\233\ See ``Improving the Role of Health Departments in
Activities Related to Abortion,'' American Public Health Association
(Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.apha.org/Policies-and-Advocacy/Public-Health-Policy-Statements/Policy-Database/2022/01/07/Improving-Health-Department-Role-in-Activities-Related-to-Abortion.
\234\ See ``Reportable diseases,'' supra note 206. See also
``What is Case Surveillance?'' supra note 206.
\235\ See ``Reproductive Health,'' Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (Apr. 20, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/drh/about-us/index.htm; and ``Reproductive
Health--CDCs Abortion Surveillance System FAQs,'' Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Reproductive Health (Nov. 17, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/abortion.htm.
\236\ See 45 CFR 164.502(b).
\237\ See 45 CFR 164.514(a).
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In light of the proposed definition of ``public health'' in this
context, the Department does not propose to additionally define the
terms ``investigation,'' ``intervention,'' or ``surveillance,'' because
it believes these terms are commonly understood. Specifically, the
Department believes public health investigation or intervention
includes monitoring real-time health status and identifying patterns to
develop strategies to address chronic diseases and injuries, as well as
using real-time data to identify and respond to acute outbreaks,
emergencies, and other health hazards.\238\ The Department also
believes public health surveillance refers to the ongoing, systematic
collection, analysis, and interpretation of health-related data
essential to planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health
practice.\239\ Nevertheless, the Department invites comment on whether
it would be beneficial to specifically define these terms.
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\238\ See ``Ten Essential Public Health Services,'' supra note
220.
\239\ See ``Introduction to Public Health Surveillance,''
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/training/publichealth101/surveillance.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Child Abuse Reporting
In accordance with section 1178(b) of HIPAA, the Privacy Rule
permits a regulated entity to use or disclose PHI to report known or
suspected child abuse or neglect if the report is made to a public
health authority or other appropriate government authority that is
authorized by law to receive such reports,\240\ which primarily are
state or local child protective services agencies.\241\ This Privacy
Rule provision does not include permission for the covered entity to
disclose PHI in response to a request for PHI for a criminal, civil, or
administrative investigation into or proceeding against a person based
on suspected child abuse. Rather, the Privacy Rule only permits the
disclosure of information for the purpose of making a report. We also
note that the permission limits such disclosures to the minimum
necessary to make the report.\242\ Any disclosure of PHI in response to
a request from an investigator, whether in follow up to the report made
by the covered entity (other than to clarify the PHI provided on the
report) or as part of an investigation initiated based on an allegation
or report made by a person other than the covered entity, would be
required to meet the conditions of disclosures to law enforcement or
for other investigations or legal proceedings.\243\
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\240\ See 45 CFR 164.512(b)(1)(ii).
\241\ State laws require certain persons, such as health care
providers, to report known or suspected child abuse or neglect; such
persons are often called ``mandatory reporters.'' See ``Mandatory
Reporters of Child Abuse and Neglect,'' U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., Administration for Children and Families, Children's
Bureau, Child Welfare Information Gateway (Apr. 2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf. See also ``Factsheet: How
the Child Welfare System Works,'' U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., Administration for Children and Families, Children's Bureau,
Child Welfare Information Gateway (Oct. 2020), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cpswork.pdf.
\242\ See 45 CFR 164.502(b) and 164.514(d).
\243\ See 45 CFR 164.512(e) and (f).
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As discussed above, the Department understands the term ``person''
as it is used in the SSA, HIPAA, and the HIPAA Rules to be consistent
with 1 U.S.C. 8. Congress also defined the term ``child'' in 1 U.S.C.
8, and the Department similarly understands the term ``child'' in the
Privacy Rule to be consistent with that definition. Further, at the
time HIPAA was enacted, ``most, if not all, states had laws that
mandated reporting of child abuse or neglect to the appropriate
authorities.'' \244\ As such, the Department believes that to the
extent its proposal would prohibit a regulated entity from disclosing
PHI in order to report ``child abuse'' where the alleged victim does
not meet the definition of ``person,'' the proposal is consistent with
both 1 U.S.C. 8 and 1178(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\244\ 65 FR 82527.
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At the time HIPAA was enacted, ``most, if not all, states had laws
that mandated reporting of child abuse or neglect to the appropriate

[[Page 23527]]

authorities.'' \245\ Additionally, when Congress enacted HIPAA, it had
already addressed child abuse reporting in other laws, such as the
Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990 \246\ and the Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act.\247\ For example, 34 U.S.C. 20341(a)(1), a provision
of the original Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990 still in place
today, requires certain professionals to report suspected abuse when
working on Federal land or in a federally operated (or contracted)
facility.\248\ As used in these statutes, the term ``child abuse'' does
not include activities related to reproductive health care, such as
abortion.
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\245\ Id.
\246\ Public Law 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
3509).
\247\ Public Law 93-247, 88 Stat. (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5101
note).
\248\ See 34 U.S.C. 20341(a)(1), originally enacted as part of
the Victims of Child Abuse Act of 1990 and codified at 42 U.S.C.
13031, which was editorially reclassified as 34 U.S.C. 20341, Crime
Control and Law Enforcement. For the purposes of such mandated
reporting, see 34 U.S.C. 20341(c)(1) for definition of ``child
abuse.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

For the reasons just stated, the Department believes that ``child
abuse'' as used in the Privacy Rule and section 1178(b) is best
interpreted to exclude conduct based solely on seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care. This
interpretation is consistent with the public health aims of improving
access to health care, including reproductive health care, for
individuals and with congressional intent when HIPAA was enacted.
Additionally, as the Department has stated in previous rulemakings, we
do not intend to disrupt longstanding state or Federal child abuse
reporting requirements that apply to regulated entities.\249\ Thus, the
Department believes this interpretation of ``child abuse'' supports the
protection of children while also serving HIPAA's objectives of
protecting the privacy of PHI to promote individuals' trust in the
health care system and preserving the relationship between individuals
and their health care providers. The Department requests comment on its
interpretation of ``child abuse'' as that term is used in the Privacy
Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\249\ 65 FR 82527.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Adding a Definition of ``Reproductive Health Care''
The HIPAA Rules define ``health care'' as ``care, services, or
supplies related to the health of an individual.'' \250\ The definition
clarifies that the term specifically ``includes but is not limited'' to
certain types of care, services, or supplies related to the health of
the individual. These groupings are ``[p]reventive, diagnostic,
therapeutic, rehabilitative, maintenance, or palliative care, and
counseling, service, assessment, or procedure with respect to the
physical or mental condition, or functional status, of an individual or
that affects the structure or function of the body'' \251\ and ``[the
s]ale or dispensing of a drug, device, equipment, or other item in
accordance with a prescription.'' \252\ As indicated by ``includes, but
is not limited to,'' this is not an exclusive list of the types of
services or supplies that constitute health care for the purposes of
the HIPAA Rules. Indeed, ``health care'' also includes supplies
purchased over the counter or furnished to the individual by a person
that does not meet the definition of a health care provider under the
HIPAA Rules.\253\
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\250\ 45 CFR 160.103 (definition of ``Health care'').
\251\ Id.
\252\ Id.
\253\ 45 CFR 164.103 (definition of ``Health care provider'').
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The Department proposes to add and define a new term,
``reproductive health care,'' that is a subcategory of the existing
term ``health care.'' Specifically, the Department proposes to define
``reproductive health care'' as ``care, services, or supplies related
to the reproductive health of the individual.'' As with ``health
care,'' ``reproductive health care'' applies broadly and includes not
only reproductive health care and services furnished by a health care
provider and supplies furnished in accordance with a prescription, but
also care, services, or supplies furnished by other persons and non-
prescription supplies purchased in connection with an individual's
reproductive health. The Department proposes defining reproductive
health care based on the underlying activities, consistent with its
approach to defining ``health care'' in the 2000 Privacy Rule.\254\
Under this proposal, such care, services, or supplies would be
considered ``reproductive health care'' to the extent that they meet
this functional definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\254\ 65 FR 82571.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Elsewhere, Congress and the Department have defined similar terms
like ``reproductive health services'' and ``reproductive health care
services'' to mean ``reproductive health services provided in a
hospital, clinic, physician's office, or other facility, and includes
medical, surgical, counselling or referral services relating to the
human reproductive system, including services relating to pregnancy or
the termination of a pregnancy.'' \255\ The Department proposes to use
the term ``reproductive health care'' rather than ``reproductive health
services'' to ensure that the term is interpreted broadly to capture
all health care that could be furnished to address reproductive health,
including the provision of supplies such as medications and devices,
whether prescription or over-the-counter. The Department also proposes
to define ``reproductive health care'' to include all specified
services regardless of where they are provided, rather than only when
provided in particular locations, and all types of reproductive health
care services, rather than only certain types of services listed within
the definition. The Department believes that services meeting the
definition of these similar terms would generally be included within
the proposed definition of ``reproductive health care.'' Additionally,
the Department believes that basing the proposed term and definition of
``reproductive health care'' on the existing HIPAA term and definition
of ``health care'' would be easier and less burdensome for regulated
entities and other stakeholders to understand and implement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\255\ 18 U.S.C. 248(e)(5) uses the term ``reproductive health
services,'' while E.O. 14076, 87 FR 42053 (July 8, 2022), and 14079,
87 FR 49505 (Aug. 3, 2022), use the term ``reproductive healthcare
services.'' The definitions are essentially the same, with the only
difference being ``health'' as opposed to ``healthcare.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In keeping with the Department's intention for ``reproductive
health care'' to be interpreted broadly and inclusive of all types of
health care related to an individual's reproductive system, the
Department would interpret ``reproductive health care'' to include, but
not be limited to: contraception, including emergency contraception;
pregnancy-related health care; fertility or infertility-related health
care; and other types of care, services, or supplies used for the
diagnosis and treatment of conditions related to the reproductive
system. Pregnancy-related health care includes, but is not limited to,
miscarriage management, molar or ectopic pregnancy treatment, pregnancy
termination, pregnancy screening, products related to pregnancy,
prenatal care, and similar or related care. Other types of care,
services, or supplies used for the diagnosis and treatment of
conditions related to the reproductive system includes health care
related to reproductive organs, regardless of whether the health care
is related to an individual's pregnancy or whether the individual is of
reproductive age. The Department would interpret fertility or
infertility-related health care to include services such as assisted
reproductive

[[Page 23528]]

technology and its components,\256\ as well as other care, services, or
supplies used for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\256\ See ``What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?'' Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (Oct. 8, 2019), https://
www.cdc.gov/art/
whatis.html#:~:text=According%20to%20this%20definition%2C%20ART,donat
ing%20them%20to%20another%20woman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department is not proposing a specific definition of
``reproductive health'' at this time. Various definitions of the term
have been included in literature. The Department recognizes that it may
be helpful to stakeholders if ``reproductive health'' were to be
defined in the final rule and invites comment on whether including a
particular definition of ``reproductive health'' would be beneficial.
4. Request for Comment
The Department requests comment on the forgoing definitions and
proposals, including any benefits, drawbacks, or unintended
consequences. The Department also requests comment on the following
considerations in particular:
a. Whether the definitions the Department proposes to adopt are
appropriate. If not, please provide an alternative definition(s) and
support for the definition(s).
b. Whether it is necessary for the Department to define
``reproductive health.'' If so, please provide a definition and support
for the definition.
c. Whether the Department should provide examples of ``reproductive
health care'' in regulatory text, or it is sufficient to provide
extensive discussion of the examples in preamble?
d. Whether it would be helpful for the Department to define any
additional terms. If so, please propose a definition and support for
the definition and rationale.

B. Section 164.502--Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health
Information: General Rules

1. Clarifying When PHI May Be Used or Disclosed by Regulated Entities
Section 164.502 of the Privacy Rule contains the general rules
governing uses and disclosures of PHI, including that a covered entity
or business associate may use or disclose PHI only as permitted or
required by the Privacy Rule.\257\ Section 164.502(a)(1) lists
permitted uses and disclosures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\257\ 45 CFR 164.502(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In this NPRM, the Department proposes several modifications to the
Privacy Rule to prohibit regulated entities from using or disclosing an
individual's PHI for use against any individual, regulated entity, or
other person for the purpose of a criminal, civil, or administrative
investigation into or proceeding against such person in connection with
seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care
that is lawful under the circumstances in which it is provided. The
Department also proposes to prohibit regulated entities from using or
disclosing PHI for identifying an individual, a regulated entity, or
other person for the purpose of initiating such an investigation or
proceeding. These changes are proposed to continue safeguarding the
privacy of PHI to ensure trust in the health care system and to enable
individuals' access to high-quality health care. The proposed
prohibition in 45 CFR 164.502 is three-fold: paragraph (a)(5)(iii)
outlines the activity the Department proposes to prohibit; paragraph
(a)(1)(iv) specifies that an authorization cannot be used to bypass the
proposed prohibition in paragraph (a)(5)(iii); and paragraph (a)(1)(vi)
clarifies that the permissions at 45 CFR 164.512 cannot be used to
circumvent the proposed prohibition.
The Department proposes to modify the general rules in 45 CFR
164.502 by adding a clause to paragraph (a)(1)(iv) and adding a new
requirement in paragraph (a)(1)(vi). Existing paragraph (a)(1)(iv)
permits disclosures based on a valid authorization and, in a prefatory
clause, provides an exception to that general permission such that a
health plan cannot use or disclose PHI that is genetic information for
underwriting purposes, even with an individual's authorization. Thus,
an authorization that purports to allow a use or disclosure of PHI for
that prohibited purpose is not valid under the Privacy Rule. Similarly,
the Department proposes to add the new prohibition proposed in 45 CFR
164.502(a)(5)(iii) to the types of uses and disclosures that would not
be permitted even with an authorization. By adding an exception to
paragraph (a)(1)(iv) for uses and disclosures prohibited by paragraph
(a)(5)(iii), the Department seeks to fully protect individuals' privacy
by precluding any possibility that a third party, such as a law
enforcement official, could obtain an individual's PHI for a prohibited
purpose by coercing the individual to sign an authorization.
In addition, the new proposed requirement in paragraph (a)(5)(iii)
would expressly permit certain uses and disclosures made under 45 CFR
164.512 only when an applicable attestation has been obtained pursuant
to proposed 45 CFR 164.509, discussed below in section IV.D. For
clarity, this proposal would also revise paragraph (a)(5)(vi) to
replace the sentence containing the conditions for certain permitted
uses and disclosures with a lettered list.
2. Adding a New Category of Prohibited Uses and Disclosures
Issues To Address
Generally, the Privacy Rule prohibits uses or disclosures of PHI
except as permitted or required by the Rule. The Privacy Rule
explicitly prohibits uses and disclosures of PHI in two circumstances:
(1) a health plan generally is prohibited from using or disclosing PHI
that is genetic health information for underwriting purposes; \258\ and
(2) a regulated entity is prohibited from selling PHI except when they
have obtained a valid authorization from the individual who is the
subject of the PHI.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\258\ 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(i).
\259\ 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed in section III of this preamble, the Department issued
its prior iterations of the Privacy Rule at a time when individuals, as
a practical matter, generally would not have expected their highly
sensitive health care information to be used or disclosed for criminal,
civil, or administrative investigations into or proceedings about that
health care. The current regulatory and legal environment is in tension
with that expectation and threatens to erode the trust that is
essential to access to and quality of health care. The Department has
received letters from the public, indicating confusion and concern as
to the ability of regulated entities to use or disclose PHI for the
purposes described above. These sentiments have been echoed by
stakeholders in listening sessions and in media reports. Letters sent
to the Department by Members of Congress further reinforce that
confusion and concern exist about the privacy of individuals' PHI, in
addition to supporting the Department's position that it has the
ongoing authority under HIPAA and the HITECH Act to modify the Privacy
Rule to ensure the privacy of PHI.\260\ These developments and
communications bolster the

[[Page 23529]]

Department's decision to propose certain regulatory changes and
technical corrections that are necessary to eliminate ambiguity and
promote trust in the health care system. Therefore, the Department
proposes to modify 45 CFR 164.502 by adding a new paragraph (a)(5)(iii)
that will protect the privacy of individuals who obtain reproductive
health care that is lawful under the circumstances in which it is
provided, as well as their health care providers, and others who assist
them in obtaining such health care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\260\ See, e.g., Letter from United States Congress Senators
Tammy Baldwin, Elizabeth Warren, and Ron Wyden, et al., to HHS
Secretary Xavier Becerra (March 7, 2023); Letter from United States
Congress Senators Patty Murray, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Martin
Heinrich, et al., to HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra (Sept. 13, 2022);
Letter from United States Congress House Representatives Earl
Blumenauer, Diana DeGette, Barbara Lee, et al., to HHS Secretary
Xavier Becerra (Aug. 30, 2022); and Letter from United States
Congress Senators Michael F. Bennet and Catherine Cortez Masto to
HHS Secretary Xavier Becerra (July 1, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proposed Prohibition
In keeping with the Privacy Rule's purpose-based approach to
specifying uses or disclosures that are required, permitted, or
prohibited, proposed 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii) would prohibit a
regulated entity from using or disclosing PHI where the PHI would be
used for a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation into or
proceeding against any person in connection with seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating lawful reproductive health care, or
identifying any person for the purpose of initiating such an
investigation or proceeding, subject to the Rule of Applicability and
Rule of Construction set forth in 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii)(C) and (D).
Furthermore, the Department proposes that ``seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating'' would include, but not be limited to,
expressing interest in, inducing, using, performing, furnishing, paying
for, disseminating information about, arranging, insuring, assisting,
or otherwise taking action to engage in reproductive health care, as
well as attempting to engage in any of the same.
This proposed prohibition addresses efforts to investigate or bring
proceedings against any person in connection with seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that is lawful
under the circumstances in which it is provided, or to identify any
person for the purpose of initiating such investigation or proceeding.
As discussed above, it would be contrary to the Congressional intent of
protecting the privacy of an individual's PHI and access to health care
if the Privacy Rule were to permit a regulated entity to use or
disclose PHI to investigate and bring proceedings against persons for
seeking, obtaining, providing or facilitating reproductive health care,
or to identify any person for such purposes, where such health care is
lawful under state or Federal law. Permitting such uses and disclosures
would also be inconsistent with longstanding individual privacy
expectations and could especially chill access to lawful health care,
including by high-risk individuals who may have already experienced a
miscarriage, ectopic pregnancy, stillbirth, or infertility. If such
uses and disclosures are permitted, individuals may delay obtaining
lawful health care or withhold information about their condition or
medical history because they may not trust their health care providers
to use the information only to provide appropriate health care, rather
than report them to law enforcement authorities or others.\261\
Delaying health care may negatively affect an individual's health,
including increasing the risk of death. In fact, a recent report from
the Texas Maternal Mortality and Morbidity Review Committee and
Department of State Health Services found that the most common
contributing factors to a woman's pregnancy-related death in Texas were
delay or failure to seek care, lack of knowledge regarding importance
of treatment or follow-up, and lack of access and financial
resources.\262\ Similarly, if such uses and disclosures are permitted,
a health care provider might leave gaps in or include inaccuracies in
the individual's medical records, creating a risk that ongoing or
future health care would be compromised, because they may not trust
that the information would not be obtained by law enforcement
authorities or others.\263\
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\261\ See ``In a doctor's suspicion after a miscarriage, a
glimpse of expanding medical mistrust,'' supra note 13. ``[A health
care provider's] ability to take care of patients relies on trust,
and that will be impossible moving forward [. . .] [abortion
restrictions] are really going to put a damper on people seeking
care, even in very normal, very legal situations.''; See also Lucy
Ogbu-Nwobodo, Ruth S. Shim, Sarah Y. Vinson, et al., ``Mental Health
Implications of Abortion Restrictions for Historically Marginalized
Populations,'' The New England Journal of Medicine (Oct. 27, 2022),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMms2211124 (``With the
elimination of the right to privacy guaranteed by Roe v. Wade and
the criminalization of abortion in many states, the risk of punitive
involvement by the criminal legal system as a consequence of
reproductive decisions, and potentially even in cases of
miscarriage, is likely to be especially high for members of
historically marginalized groups with mental illness--a population
that is already overrepresented in the criminal legal system.'').
\262\ See Texas Maternal Mortality and Morbidity Review
Committee and Department of State Health Services Joint Biennial
Report 2022, supra note 16, p. 41.
\263\ See, e.g., Brief for Zurawski.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Further, even where investigations cannot lawfully result in
proceedings against a person, investigations themselves can reduce the
health information privacy of the individual whose PHI is sought for
the investigation, thereby harming that individual. For example,
permitting a covered entity to disclose a sexual assault survivor's PHI
to law enforcement or others to enable them to investigate that
individual for obtaining lawful reproductive health care as a result of
the assault compounds the harm experienced by the individual by
violating their privacy. Additionally, allowing the disclosure makes
that individual and others in similar circumstances less likely to
obtain lawful reproductive health care if they believe their privacy
will be violated in this manner. Thus, the Department proposes to
prohibit the use or disclosure of PHI where the purpose of the use or
disclosure is for a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation
into or proceeding against any person in connection with seeking,
obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that is
lawful under the circumstances in which it is provided, or identifying
any person for the purpose of initiating such an investigation or
proceeding.
Importantly, and as further discussed below, this proposal is
narrowly tailored to address only uses and disclosures for specified
prohibited purposes. It does not otherwise alter a regulated entity's
responsibility to comply with the conditions imposed on the use or
disclosure of PHI for other criminal, civil, or administrative
investigations or proceedings. For example, the proposed rule would not
broadly preempt state or other laws that would require the disclosure
of information about an individual's reproductive health to support
claims for criminal or civil liability unrelated to the prohibited
purposes, assuming such laws meet the requirements of other provisions
of the Privacy Rule, e.g., the permission to use or disclose PHI where
required by law.\264\
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\264\ 45 CFR 164.512(a).
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Purpose-Based Prohibition
As discussed above and consistent with the general approach and
structure of the Privacy Rule, the proposed prohibition focuses on the
purpose of the use or disclosure, rather than the type of PHI requested
or the type of regulated entity that receives the use or disclosure
request. The Department acknowledges that in most cases, information
about an individual's reproductive health care includes the kind of
highly sensitive information that could chill patients from obtaining
lawful health care if they knew it could be disclosed. However, the
Department is not proposing a rule that would provide a blanket
protection for this category of information. Enforcing such

[[Page 23530]]

a blanket protection would require regulated entities to restrict the
flow of this category of information, possibly disrupting existing
health care delivery models. For example, implementing differing rules
for a newly designated category of PHI would require costly updates to
electronic record systems to allow for segmenting of certain data
elements for extra protection and create barriers for care
coordination. Providing routine treatments for conditions such as
hormonal imbalances, miscarriage, pregnancy complications, or
gynecological emergencies would be problematic for health care
providers attempting to navigate a blanket prohibition against
disclosure of the category of information related to reproductive
health care. Thus, this proposal does not limit the prohibition to the
use or disclosure of certain types of PHI or to PHI that is held or
maintained by certain types of covered health care providers, such as a
gynecologist or endocrinologist.
A purpose-based prohibition as proposed by the Department would
also permit health plans and many other different types of health care
providers to continue to disclose PHI for treatment or payment for
reproductive health care or other health care conditions that are
affected by or affect an individual's reproductive health. For example,
pregnancy can place a significant strain on the heart of an individual
with certain cardiovascular conditions. It is essential that the
individual's cardiologist be informed of and able to monitor the
individual's pregnancy for potential complications without barriers to
access that information. As another example, pregnancy tests are
routinely administered before a surgical procedure to ensure that
surgeons, anesthesiologists, and individuals are aware of a pregnancy
and have the opportunity to discuss the benefits and risks of
proceeding or to identify alternative treatment options.\265\ And an
earlier example related to hormonal imbalances illustrates why
endocrinologists may require access to reproductive health information.
For similar reasons, it is important that a health care provider
maintain complete and accurate patient medical records to ensure
subsequent health care providers are adequately informed in making
diagnoses or recommending courses of treatment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\265\ See Trisha Pasricha, ``Pregnancy tests are routine before
many surgical procedures. But Dobbs has raised the stakes of a
positive result,'' STAT News (Aug. 16, 2022), https://
www.statnews.com/2022/08/16/pregnancy-tests-are-routine-before-many-
surgical-procedures-but-dobbs-has-raised-the-stakes-of-a-positive-
result/
#:~:text=The%20Supreme%20Court's%20h9568%20decision,making%20testing%
20anything%20but%20routine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thus, to avoid the potential for disruption to health care and
ensure the provision of appropriate health care, the Department
proposes to limit the prohibition's application to uses and disclosures
of PHI where the purpose is to use the information against any person
for seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health
care that is lawful under the circumstances in which it is provided, or
to identify any person for doing so. The Department believes the
narrowly crafted prohibition, as proposed, would avoid deterring
individuals from obtaining lawful health care or providing full
information to their health care providers out of fear that highly
sensitive health information could be disclosed in connection with a
criminal, civil, or administrative investigation or proceeding. At the
same time, the proposal would facilitate the ability of health care
providers to navigate the new medical-legal landscape in cooperation
with their patients. The proposed prohibition also would serve as a
disincentive to health care providers considering leaving gaps or
including inaccuracies in medical records or taking other action to
protect individuals or avoid liability under laws prosecuting provision
of reproductive health care. Such disincentives, rooted in the ability
to keep PHI private when sought for certain purposes, are properly
within the Department's authority to regulate under HIPAA.
Preemption of State Laws
The Privacy Rule generally preempts contrary provisions of state
laws.\266\ Thus, if this NPRM were to be finalized, provisions of state
law that are contrary to these proposals would be preempted. The
Department recognizes that the proposal to prohibit uses and
disclosures of PHI for a criminal, civil, or administrative
investigation into or proceeding against any person, or to identify any
person for the purpose of initiating such an investigation or
proceeding, may create a conflict between the Privacy Rule and some
state laws--though we have carefully crafted the proposed prohibition
to apply only in circumstances in which the state lacks any substantial
interest in seeking the disclosure. In such cases, regulated entities
would be required to comply with the Privacy Rule, if modified as
proposed. For example, the Privacy Rule, if modified as proposed, would
prohibit the disclosure of PHI to law enforcement in furtherance of a
law enforcement investigation of an individual for obtaining
reproductive health care that is lawful under the circumstances in
which it is provided. It would also prohibit the disclosure of PHI for
a law enforcement investigation of a health clinic for providing
reproductive health care that is lawful under the circumstances in
which it is provided, even in response to a court order, such as a
search warrant.\267\ Such disclosure, despite the court order, would be
a violation of the Privacy Rule and would subject the regulated entity
to a potential OCR investigation and civil money penalty. Additionally,
if a regulated entity chose to comply with the court order in the
example above, there would be a presumption that a breach of unsecured
PHI had occurred because there was a disclosure of PHI in a manner not
permitted under the Privacy Rule which compromises the privacy of the
PHI. Thus, breach notification would be required unless the entity
could demonstrate that there was a low probability that the PHI had
been compromised.\268\ Where an entity determines that a breach has
occurred, the entity would need to provide notification to the affected
individual(s), the Secretary, and, when applicable, the media.\269\
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\266\ 42 U.S.C. 1320d-7(a)(1) (providing the general rule that,
with limited exceptions, a provision or requirement under HIPAA
supersedes any contrary provision of state law).
\267\ In contrast, the current Privacy Rule would permit such a
disclosure based on a court order requiring the disclosure. See 45
CFR 164.512(a); see also 45 CFR 164.103 (definition of ``Required by
law'').
\268\ 45 CFR 164.402 (definition of ``Breach'').
\269\ See 45 CFR 164.400 through 164.414. The HIPAA Breach
Notification Rule requires covered entities and their business
associates to provide certain notifications following a breach of
unsecured PHI.
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Application of Proposed Prohibition
The Department proposes a Rule of Applicability to apply the
prohibition where the relevant criminal, civil, or administrative
investigation or proceeding is in connection with any person seeking,
obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that:
(1) is provided outside of the state where the investigation or
proceeding is authorized and that is lawful in the state in which such
health care is provided; (2) is protected, required, or authorized by
Federal law, regardless of the state in which such health care is
provided; or (3) is provided in the state in which the investigation or
proceeding is authorized and that is permitted by the law of that
state. This proposed Rule of Applicability would limit the application
of the prohibition to

[[Page 23531]]

circumstances in which the care is lawful under the circumstances in
which such health care is provided.
As described above, all three prongs of the proposed Rule of
Applicability require the reproductive health care at issue to be
provided under circumstances in which the provision of such health care
is lawful. Thus, in order to determine whether the proposed rule would
permit the use or disclosure of PHI, the regulated entity would need to
determine whether the reproductive health care was provided under
circumstances in which it was lawful to do so. Where the regulated
entity determines that the reproductive health care was provided under
circumstances where it was unlawful, the proposed prohibition would not
apply, and the regulated entity would be permitted to use or disclose
the PHI for a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation into or
proceeding against a person in connection with seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care. For example, where
the regulated entity determines that reproductive health care was
provided in a state where it was unlawful to do so and under
circumstances in which Federal law does not protect the provision of
such health care, a regulated entity would be permitted to use or
disclose PHI for a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation
against a health care provider that provided the unlawful reproductive
health care. However, the regulated entity would be prohibited from
disclosing PHI for the same purpose where it determined that the
reproductive health care was provided in a state where it was lawful to
do so, subject to the proposed Rule of Construction, discussed below.
Under the Constitution, an individual cannot be barred from
traveling from one state to another to obtain reproductive health
care.\270\ Accordingly, the Department proposes to prohibit uses and
disclosures of PHI where it is sought for use in an investigation into
or proceeding against a person for seeking, obtaining, providing or
facilitating reproductive health care outside of the state in which
investigation or proceeding is authorized and where such health care is
lawful under the circumstances in which it was provided. The proposal
is not limited to circumstances in which the health care has not yet
been obtained, provided, or facilitated. It also includes situations
where the health care is ongoing or has been completed. For example,
under this proposal, a covered entity that provides lawful reproductive
health care to an out-of-state resident generally would not be
permitted to use or disclose PHI to law enforcement from the
individual's home state for use in an investigation or proceeding in
connection with the individual's receipt of or the covered entity's
provision of that reproductive health care. In addition, a covered
health care provider in the state of the individual's residence that
may receive PHI concerning such reproductive health care provided out
of state (e.g., a hospital in the home state that receives records from
an out-of-state clinic) would be subject to the same restriction. In
these circumstances under the Constitution, administrative, civil, or
criminal liability may not be imposed for the receipt or provision of
the out-of-state care. The Department also notes that generally, states
do not have the ability to permit or limit actors in another state from
engaging in certain activities. For example, states determine the
requirements for licensure of health care providers that furnish health
care within their borders; they do not have the ability to set such
requirements for health care providers that furnish health care
elsewhere. Thus, it would be inconsistent to permit states to impose
liability on health care providers who furnish health care in another
state in accordance with the laws of that state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\270\ Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2309 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(addressing whether a state can ``bar a resident of that State from
traveling to another State to obtain an abortion? [ . . . ] [T]he
answer is not based on the constitutional right to interstate
travel.''); see also ``Application of the Comstock Act to the
Mailing of Prescription Drugs That Can Be Used for Abortions,''
Department of Justice, 46 Op. O.L.C. __, at *19 (Dec. 23, 2022),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1560596/download.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The proposed prohibition would also apply where the use or
disclosure of PHI is sought for use in an investigation into or
proceeding against a person where the reproductive health care is
protected, required, or authorized by Federal law, regardless of the
state in which such care is provided. For example, the proposed
prohibition would prohibit the use or disclosure of PHI for use in an
investigation into or proceeding against a covered entity that provided
reproductive health care in a situation where EMTALA requires offering
such health care. Additionally, the Department's proposal would
prohibit the use or disclosure of PHI for use in an investigation into
or proceeding against employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) who provide or facilitate reproductive health care in a manner
authorized by Federal law, including VA regulations.\271\ And it would
apply where the investigation or proceeding is against any person in
connection with seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating
reproductive health care--such as contraception--that remains protected
by the Constitution after Dobbs.\272\ In these circumstances, Federal
law bars the imposition of administrative, civil, or criminal liability
on such care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\271\ See ``Intergovernmental Immunity for the Department of
Veterans Affairs and Its Employees When Providing Certain Abortion
Services,'' Department of Justice, 46 Op. O.L.C. __ (Sept. 21,
2022), https://www.justice.gov/d9/2022-11/2022-09-21-va_immunity_for_abortion_services.pdf.
\272\ See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2309
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (Dobbs ``does not threaten or cast doubt
on'' the precedents providing constitutional protection for
contraception).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, the prohibition would apply when the relevant criminal,
civil, or administrative investigation or proceeding is in connection
with any person seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating
reproductive health care that is provided in the state in which the
investigation or proceeding is authorized and that is permitted by the
law of that state. Under this proposal, a regulated entity would not be
permitted to use or disclose PHI in response to an investigation or
proceeding occurring in a state where the reproductive health care is
lawful. The proposal would also prohibit the use or disclosure of PHI
where the health care meets the requirements of an exception to a law
limiting the provision of reproductive health care (e.g., for pregnancy
termination when the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest or
because the life of the pregnant individual is endangered). It would
also prohibit the use or disclosure of PHI where the health care
occurred at a point in pregnancy at which such health care is permitted
by state law. If a state has not made the relevant reproductive health
care unlawful, it lacks a legitimate interest in conducting a criminal,
civil, or administrative investigation or proceeding into such health
care where the investigation is centered on the mere fact that
reproductive health care was or is being provided.
Scope of Proposed Prohibition
The proposed prohibition would apply to any request for PHI to
facilitate a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation or
proceeding against any person, or to identify any person in order to
initiate an investigation or proceeding, where the basis for the
investigation, proceeding, or identification is that the person sought,

[[Page 23532]]

obtained, provided, or facilitated reproductive health care that is
lawful under the circumstances in which such health care is provided.
As discussed above, the proposal would preempt state or other law
requiring a regulated entity to use or disclose PHI in response to a
court order or other type of legal process for a purpose prohibited by
this proposed rule where the prohibition applies. It would not preempt
laws that require use or disclosure of PHI for other purposes,
including public health purposes.\273\ The proposal also would not
prohibit a regulated entity from disclosing an individual's PHI to law
enforcement where the purpose of the disclosure is to investigate a
sexual assault committed against the individual, provided the
attestation described later in this preamble is obtained, or where such
health care is not lawfully obtained in the state in which it is
provided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\273\ While this proposal does not affect reporting to a public
health authority or other appropriate government authority
authorized by law to receive reports of child abuse or neglect as
permitted under 45 CFR 164.512(b)(1)(ii), the proposed definitions
of ``person'' and ``child abuse'' would make clear that seeking,
obtaining, providing, or facilitating the provision of an abortion,
products related to pregnancy, or fertilized egg or embryo disposal
would not constitute child abuse as addressed therein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department intends ``criminal, civil, or administrative
investigation into or proceeding against'' to encompass any type of
legal or administrative investigation or proceeding. This includes, but
is not limited to, law enforcement investigations, third party
investigations in furtherance of civil proceedings, state licensure
proceedings, criminal prosecutions, and family law proceedings.
Examples of criminal, civil, or administrative investigations or
proceedings for which regulated entities would be prohibited from using
or disclosing PHI would also include a civil suit brought by a person
exercising a private right of action provided for under state law
against an individual or health care provider who obtained, provided,
or facilitated a lawful abortion, or a law enforcement investigation
into a health care provider for lawfully providing or facilitating the
disposal of an embryo at the direction of the individual.
The proposal would prohibit a regulated entity from using or
disclosing PHI for a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation
into or proceeding against ``any person'' in connection with seeking,
obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that is
lawful under the circumstances in which it is provided, or for
identifying ``any person'' for the purpose of initiating such an
investigation or proceeding. ``Against any person'' means, based on the
HIPAA Rules' definition of ``person,'' \274\ that the proposed
prohibition would not be limited to use or disclosure of PHI for use
against the individual; rather, the prohibition would apply to the use
or disclosure of PHI against a regulated entity, or any other person,
including an individual or entity, who may have obtained, provided, or
facilitated lawful reproductive health care.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\274\ 45 CFR 160.103 (definition of ``Person'').
\275\ Note that in section IV.A.1., the Department proposes to
modify the definition of ``person,'' although that proposed
modification would not have an effect here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rule of Construction
The Department does not intend for this proposed prohibition to
prevent a regulated entity from using or disclosing PHI for other
permissible purposes under the Privacy Rule where the request is not
made primarily for the purpose of investigating or imposing liability
on any person for the mere act of seeking, obtaining, providing, or
facilitating reproductive health care that is lawful under the
circumstances in which it is provided, and proposes to clarify that
through a Rule of Construction. In so doing, the Department clarifies
that it does not intend for the prohibition to prevent certain uses or
disclosures of PHI where they are permitted by other provisions of the
Privacy Rule as discussed below.
For example, just as an individual would be able to obtain their
own PHI to initiate a claim against a covered health care provider for
professional misconduct or negligence under the Privacy Rule's right of
access,\276\ the proposed Rule of Construction would make clear that
the proposed prohibition does not inhibit the ability of a covered
health care provider to use or disclose that same PHI to defend
themselves in an investigation or proceeding related to professional
misconduct or negligence where the alleged professional misconduct or
negligence involved reproductive health care. In such instance, there
would be due process concerns that could ultimately prevent the covered
health care provider from being held liable for the professional
misconduct or negligence. Thus, the Department proposes to limit the
Rule of Construction to applying only in circumstances in which the
health care provider would not be using or disclosing such PHI for the
purpose of ``investigating or conducting a legal proceeding against a
person,'' but rather for the purpose of defending itself against such
an investigation or a proceeding. In addition, such an investigation or
proceeding would not be based on the mere act of seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care. Instead, the
investigation or proceeding would be based on allegations of
professional misconduct or negligence in providing reproductive health
care. The use or disclosure of PHI would be permitted under such
circumstances. The Federal government could similarly use PHI (obtained
with an attestation) to defend itself against claims brought by
individuals where professional misconduct based on a health care
provider's failure to meet an applicable standard of care, as described
herein, may not be the primary focus of the claim, but where the
provision of such care is central to the claim.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\276\ 45 CFR 164.524.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed above, under the Rule of Applicability, the proposed
prohibition on the use or disclosure of PHI for the purposes of a
criminal, civil, or administrative investigation or proceeding against
any person in connection with seeking, obtaining, providing, or
facilitating reproductive health care, or the identification of any
person for such investigations or proceedings, would apply only when
such reproductive health care is provided under circumstances in which
it is lawful to do so. When read in isolation, this would seemingly
prevent regulated entities from using or disclosing PHI for the purpose
of defending themselves or others against allegations that they sought,
obtained, provided, or facilitated unlawful care. To address this
potential misreading, the proposed Rule of Construction limits the
proposed prohibition to circumstances in which the PHI is sought for
the purpose of investigating or imposing liability on any person for
the mere act of seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating
reproductive health care. Thus, under the proposal, a regulated entity
could not use or disclose PHI as part of an investigation into any
person for allegedly seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating
reproductive health care; in contrast, the regulated entity could use
or disclose PHI to defend any person in a criminal, civil, or
administrative proceeding where liability could be imposed on that
person for providing such health care.
Additionally, the proposed Rule of Construction would clarify that
the proposed prohibition does not prohibit uses or disclosures to a
health oversight agency for health oversight activities, such as for
the purpose of investigating

[[Page 23533]]

whether reproductive health care was actually provided or appropriately
billed in connection with a claim for such services.\277\ For example,
the proposed Rule of Construction would not prohibit the use or
disclosure of PHI where the PHI is sought to investigate or pursue
proceedings against a person for knowingly submitting a claim for
reproductive health care for payment to the government where the
reproductive health care was not provided or improperly billed. In this
case, the request would not be made primarily for the purpose of
investigating or imposing liability on any person for the mere act of
seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health
care; instead, the request would be primarily for the purpose of
investigating or imposing liability on a person for, in this particular
scenario, an alleged violation of the Federal False Claims Act or a
state equivalent.\278\ As another example, the proposed Rule of
Construction also would not prohibit the use or disclosure of PHI to an
Inspector General where the PHI is sought to conduct an audit aimed at
protecting the integrity of the Medicare or Medicaid program. The
proposed Rule of Construction also would make clear that the proposed
prohibition does not prevent uses or disclosures for the purpose of
investigating alleged violations of Federal nondiscrimination laws or
abusive conduct, such as sexual assault, that occur in connection with
reproductive health care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\277\ See 45 CFR 164.512(d)(1)(i) through (iv) for health
oversight activities for which the Privacy Rule permits uses and
disclosures of PHI. The proposal would permit these uses and
disclosures of PHI to effectuate Federal agencies' health oversight
activities.
\278\ 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The proposed Rule of Construction would also clarify that the
proposed prohibition would not prohibit a regulated entity from
responding to a request for relevant records in a criminal or civil
investigation or proceeding pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 248 regarding freedom
of access to clinic entrances. Investigations under this provision are
conducted for the purpose of determining whether a person physically
obstructed, intimidated, or interfered with persons providing
``reproductive health services,'' \279\ or attempted to do so. They
therefore do not involve investigations or proceedings against a person
in connection with the mere act of ``seeking, obtaining, providing, or
facilitating of reproductive health care'' under circumstances in which
it was lawful to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\279\ 18 U.S.C. 248(e)(5) (definition of ``Reproductive health
services'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Disclosures Required by the Privacy Rule
Regulated entities are expected to continue to comply with and
disclose PHI in response to an individual's request for access to their
own PHI,\280\ or a request from the Secretary to disclose PHI as part
of an investigation into a regulated entity's compliance with the HIPAA
Rules. These requirements to disclose PHI at 45 CFR 164.502(a)(2) and
(4) are unlikely to come into conflict with the proposed prohibition
because neither an individual's request for their own PHI nor a HIPAA
compliance investigation are disclosures sought primarily because a
person sought, obtained, provided, or facilitated reproductive health
care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\280\ Under 45 CFR 164.502(a)(2)(i), covered entities are
primarily responsible for compliance with the Privacy Rule's
individual right of access provisions. The Privacy Rule imposes
narrow direct liability on business associates for compliance with
the individual right of access at 45 CFR 164.502(a)(4)(ii). However,
it is the Department's understanding that many covered entities
engage business associates, such as release-of-information vendors,
to accept and respond to such requests. For additional information
on business associates and their obligations under the HIPAA Rules,
visit https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/business-associates/factsheet/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department also reaffirms that an individual's right of access
to their own PHI cannot be denied based on their intended use of the
PHI.\281\ Thus, an individual would retain their current ability to
obtain a copy of their own PHI in a designated record set from a
covered entity, as well as to direct a covered entity to transmit to
another person (which could be a law enforcement official if the
individual so chooses) an electronic copy of their PHI in an electronic
health record (EHR). The Department is concerned that a law enforcement
official or other person could potentially coerce an individual into
exercising their right of access for the purpose of circumventing the
prohibition. However, the Department also views the right of access as
paramount to an individual's ability to make decisions regarding their
own health care and does not intend to impede an individual's ability
to exercise this right. Therefore, the Department does not propose to
modify the right of access to address this specific concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\281\ As explained in the preamble to the 2000 Privacy Rule,
covered entities may only deny access for the reasons specifically
provided in the rule. 65 FR 82556.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Clarifying Personal Representative Status in the Context of
Reproductive Health Care
Current Provision and Issues To Address
Section 164.502(g) of the Privacy Rule contains the standard for
personal representatives and generally requires a regulated entity to
treat an individual's personal representative as the individual when
consistent with state law.\282\ For example, the Privacy Rule would
treat a legal guardian of an individual who has been declared
incompetent by a court as the personal representative of that
individual, if consistent with applicable law (e.g., state law).\283\
In this and certain other provisions, the Department seeks to maintain
the balance between the interest of a state or others to regulate
health and safety and protect vulnerable individuals \284\ with the
goal of maintaining the privacy protections established in the Privacy
Rule.\285\
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\282\ See 45 CFR 164.502(g)(1).
\283\ See 45 CFR 164.502(g)(3)(i). See also ``Personal
Representatives,'' U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Office for
Civil Rights, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/personal-representatives/index.html.
\284\ See, e.g., 45 CFR 164.510(b)(3) and 164.512(j)(1)(i)(A).
\285\ See 65 FR 82471.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department is concerned that some regulated entities may
interpret the Privacy Rule as providing them with the ability to refuse
to recognize as an individual's personal representative a person who
makes reproductive health care decisions, on behalf of the individual,
with which the regulated entity disagrees. Under these circumstances,
current section 502(g)(5) of the Privacy Rule could be interpreted to
permit a regulated entity to assert that, by virtue of the personal
representative's involvement in the reproductive health care of the
individual, the regulated entity believes that the personal
representative is subjecting the individual to abuse. Further, in the
absence of clarification as proposed in this NPRM, this regulated
entity could exercise professional judgment to decide that it is in the
best interest of the individual not to recognize the personal
representative's authority to make medical decisions for that
individual.
Proposal
To protect the balance of interests struck by the Privacy Rule, the
Department proposes to modify 45 CFR 164.502 by adding a new paragraph
(g)(5)(iii). Proposed 45 CFR 164.502(g)(5)(iii) would ensure that a

[[Page 23534]]

regulated entity could not deny personal representative status to a
person, where such status would otherwise be consistent with state and
other applicable law, primarily because that person facilitates or
facilitated or provided reproductive health care for an individual. The
Department believes this proposal is narrowly tailored and respects the
interests of states and the Department by not unduly interfering with
the ability of states to define the nature of the relationship between
an individual and another person, including between a minor and a
parent, upon whom the state deems it appropriate to bestow personal
representative status. This proposal would, however, maintain the
existing HIPAA standard by ensuring personal representative status,
when otherwise consistent with state law, is not affected by the type
of underlying health care sought.
4. Request for Comment
The Department requests comment on the foregoing proposals,
including any benefits, drawbacks, or unintended consequences. The
Department also requests comment on the following considerations in
particular:
e. Whether the proposed prohibition in section IV.B.2. is
sufficiently narrow so as to limit harmful uses or disclosures (such as
for investigating individuals who have obtained, or health care
providers who have provided, lawful health care primarily because they
obtained or provided the lawful health care) and to permit beneficial
uses or disclosures (such as for conducting investigations into health
care fraud or audits examining general compliance with claims billing
requirements). If not, please explain and provide examples.
f. The effects of individuals' concerns about the potential
disclosure of their PHI to law enforcement or others on their
willingness to confide in their health care providers.
g. The effects of individuals' withholding information about their
health from their health care providers.
h. The effects of health care providers' concerns about potential
criminal, civil, or administrative investigations into or proceedings
against them or their patients in connection with the provision of
lawful reproductive health care on the completeness and accuracy of
medical records and continuity of care.
i. Whether it would be beneficial to further clarify or provide
additional examples of instances in which the use or disclosure of PHI
would be permitted under the proposal, such as examples of type of
investigations or proceedings that are focused on health care fraud and
for which PHI is necessary.
j. Whether the Department should permit the use and disclosure of
an individual's PHI for the purpose described in section IV.B.2. with a
valid authorization from the individual.
i. If so, please provide recommendations for how the Department
could ensure that individuals are adequately protected from coercive
tactics to provide such authorization. For example, should the
Department permit such use or disclosure based on an authorization only
if a regulated entity also obtains some form of attestation or
assurance from the recipient of the PHI?
ii. Whether third parties might circumvent the prohibition by
coercing individuals to exercise their right to direct a covered entity
to transmit to a third party an electronic copy of their PHI in an EHR.
If so, please suggest ways the Department could address this problem
without curtailing an individual's right of access or increasing the
burden on regulated entities.
k. Whether the Department should apply the proposed prohibition
broadly to any health care, rather than limiting it to reproductive
health care. Please explain.
l. Whether the Department should prohibit or limit uses or
disclosures of ``highly sensitive PHI'' for certain purposes. If so:
i. How should the Department define ``highly sensitive PHI''?
Please explain and provide reference materials to support any suggested
definition.
ii. What additional protections should ``highly sensitive PHI'' be
accorded?
iii. Do regulated entities have the technical ability to
differentiate between types of PHI in their electronic record systems
and apply special protections to a new category of ``highly sensitive
PHI''?
iv. What would be the estimated burden on regulated entities of
providing additional protections for ``highly sensitive PHI''?
m. Whether in addition to, or instead of, the proposed prohibition,
the Department should:
i. Require a regulated entity to obtain an individual's
authorization for certain uses and disclosures of PHI that currently
are permitted without an authorization.
ii. Require a regulated entity to obtain an individual's
authorization for any uses and disclosures of a defined category of PHI
(e.g., ``highly sensitive PHI'').
iii. Require a regulated entity to accept and comply with an
individual's request for restrictions of uses and disclosures of
``highly sensitive PHI.''
iv. Eliminate or narrow any existing permissions to use or disclose
``highly sensitive PHI'' (e.g., permissions to report crime on the
premises or report crime in emergencies).
n. What are the practices and procedures that a regulated entity
currently uses to determine what actions they will take when faced with
a conflict of state and Federal laws regarding uses and disclosures of
PHI?
o. Whether the scope of the proposed rule of applicability will be
sufficiently clear to individuals and covered entities, and whether the
provision should be made more specific or otherwise modified to ensure
individuals and covered entities know when disclosures of PHI will be
permitted.
p. Whether the proposed Rule of Construction is sufficient, or
whether the Rule of Construction should be expanded, narrowed, or
otherwise modified. Please explain and provide support for this
response.
q. Whether the proposed clarification to personal representative
status in the context of reproductive health care is sufficient to
clarify that personal representatives who provide or facilitate
reproductive health care have not committed an act of ``child abuse.''
Please explain and provide support for this response.

C. Section 164.509--Uses and Disclosures for Which an Attestation Is
Required (Proposed Heading)

1. Current Provision and Issues To Address
The Privacy Rule currently separates uses and disclosures into
three categories: required, permitted, and prohibited. Permitted uses
and disclosures are further subdivided into those to carry out
treatment, payment, or health care operations; \286\ those for which an
individual's authorization is required; \287\ those requiring an
opportunity for the individual to agree or object; \288\ and those for
which an authorization or opportunity to agree or object is not
required.\289\ For an individual's authorization to be valid, the
Privacy Rule requires that it contain certain specific information to
ensure that an individual authorizing a regulated entity to use or
disclose their PHI to another person knows and

[[Page 23535]]

understands to what it is they are agreeing.\290\
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\286\ 45 CFR 164.506.
\287\ 45 CFR 164.508.
\288\ 45 CFR 164.510.
\289\ 45 CFR 164.512.
\290\ 45 CFR 164.508(b).
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Pursuant to proposals in this NPRM, a regulated entity presented
with a request for PHI that is potentially related to reproductive
health care would need to discern whether using or disclosing PHI in
response to the request would be prohibited by the proposed 45 CFR
164.502(a)(5)(iii). Without a mechanism for assisting regulated
entities in determining the purpose of a use or disclosure request from
certain persons, the Department believes it would be difficult for
regulated entities to distinguish between use and disclosure requests
for permitted and prohibited purposes, potentially leading regulated
entities to deny use or disclosure requests for permitted purposes.
Additionally, absent an enforcement mechanism, the Department believes
requesters of PHI could seek to use existing Privacy Rule permissions
for purposes that would be prohibited under 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii).
2. Proposal
To facilitate compliance with the proposed prohibition while also
providing a pathway to disclose PHI for permitted purposes for which
authorization is not required and an opportunity to agree or object is
not required, the Department proposes to add a requirement to obtain an
attestation from the person requesting the use and disclosure as a
condition for certain permitted uses and disclosures.
Specifically, the Department proposes to add a new section 45 CFR
164.509: ``Uses and disclosures for which an attestation is required.''
This proposed condition would require a regulated entity to obtain
assurances from the person requesting the PHI, in the form of a signed
and dated written statement attesting that the use or disclosure would
not be for a purpose prohibited under 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii), where
the person is making the request under the Privacy Rule permissions at
45 CFR 164.512(d) (disclosures for health oversight activities), (e)
(disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings), (f)
(disclosures for law enforcement purposes), or (g)(1) (disclosures
about decedents to coroners and medical examiners). This proposed
condition would apply when the request is for PHI that is potentially
related to reproductive health care, as defined in proposed 45 CFR
160.103. Thus, an attestation would not be required when the person
making the request does not seek PHI potentially related to
reproductive health care. If, however, the request would require a
regulated entity to disclose PHI potentially related to reproductive
health care, a regulated entity would have to first obtain an
attestation from the person making the request to ensure that the PHI
would not be used or disclosed for a prohibited purpose.
Additionally, where one of these permissions applies, the
attestation must include a statement that the use or disclosure is not
prohibited as described at 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii). Thus, the
Department proposes to limit the attestation requirement to the Privacy
Rule provisions that have the greatest potential to result in use or
disclosure of an individual's PHI for a criminal, civil, or
administrative investigation into or proceeding against, any person for
seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care
or to identify any person for the purpose of initiating such an
investigation or proceeding.
The attestation proposal is intended both to ensure that the
existing Privacy Rule permissions could not be used to circumvent the
new proposed prohibition at 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii) and to continue
permitting essential disclosures. The proposed attestation requirement
also would limit the additional burden on the regulated entity
receiving requests for such uses and disclosures by providing a
standard mechanism by which the regulated entity would ascertain
whether a requested use or disclosure would be prohibited under the
proposal.
The Department's attestation proposal is modeled after the
authorization requirement at 45 CFR 164.508.\291\ Modeling the proposed
attestation provision after the authorization provision would ensure
that a person requesting the PHI provides a regulated entity with the
information needed to ascertain whether the request is for a prohibited
purpose because the proposed attestation requirement would require the
person requesting the disclosure to confirm the types of PHI that they
are requesting; to clearly identify the name of the individual whose
PHI is being requested, if practicable, or if not practicable, the
class of individuals whose PHI is being requested, and to confirm, in
writing, that the use or disclosure is not for a purpose prohibited
under 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii). For purposes of the ``class of
individuals'' described in 45 CFR 164.509(c)(1)(i)(B), the requesting
entity may describe such a class in general terms--for example, as all
individuals who were treated by a certain health care provider or for
whom a certain health care provider submitted claims, all individuals
who received a certain procedure, or all individuals with given health
insurance coverage. Similar to the authorization provision, the
proposed attestation provision would also include the general
requirements for a valid attestation, and defects of an invalid
attestation. The provision would also include the attestation's content
requirements and would apply to both uses and disclosures for the
specified purposes.\292\ In addition, the attestation must be written
in plain language.\293\
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\291\ Section 164.508 of title 45 CFR details the general rules
for authorizations, such as the rules specific to types of PHI or
purposes for disclosure, compound authorizations, the elements
required for a valid authorization, and how authorizations may be
revoked.
\292\ Pursuant to 45 CFR 164.530(j), regulated entities would be
required to maintain a written or electronic copy of the
attestation.
\293\ The Federal plain language guidelines under the Plain
Writing Act of 2010 only applies to Federal agencies, but it serves
as a helpful resource. See .
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The proposed attestation provision would also include a prohibition
on compound attestations. Specifically, the proposal would prohibit the
attestation from being ``combined with'' any other document. The
Department intends this prohibition to mean that an attestation must be
clearly labeled and distinct from any surrounding text. For example, an
attestation would not be impermissibly ``combined with'' a subpoena if
it is attached to it, provided that the attestation is clearly labeled
as such. As another example, an electronic attestation would not to be
impermissibly ``combined with'' another document where the attestation
is on the same screen as the other document, provided that the
attestation is clearly and distinctly labeled as such.
Further, the attestation proposal would explicitly permit the
attestation document to be in electronic format, as well as
electronically signed by the person requesting the disclosure.\294\ At
this time, the Department declines to propose mandating a specific
electronic format for the attestation. The attestation would be
facially valid when the document meets the required elements of the
attestation proposal and includes an electronic signature that is valid
under applicable Federal and state law.\295\
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\294\ Proposed 45 CFR 164.509(b)(1)(iv) and (c)(1)(v).
\295\ While not explicitly stated in the Privacy Rule, the
Department previously issued guidance clarifying that authorizations
are permitted to be submitted and signed electronically. See HIPAA
FAQ #475, and HIPAA FAQ #554, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/554/how-do-hipaa-authorizations-apply-to-electronic-health-information/index.html.

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[[Page 23536]]

Unlike the authorization provision, the proposed attestation would
be limited to the specific use or disclosure. Generally, when a
regulated entity receives a valid authorization, they may continue to
use or disclose PHI to such requestor pursuant to that authorization
after the initial disclosure, provided that such subsequent uses and
disclosures are valid and related to that authorization. Under the
proposal, the Department anticipates that each use or disclosure
request would require a new attestation.
The Department is explicitly declining to propose a new exception
to the minimum necessary standard for uses and disclosures made
pursuant to an attestation under 45 CFR 164.509.\296\ Thus, a regulated
entity would have to limit a use or disclosure to the minimum necessary
when provided in response to a request that would be subject to the
proposed attestation requirement. Where the person requesting the PHI
is also a regulated entity, that person would also need to make
reasonable efforts to limit their request to the minimum necessary to
accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or
request.\297\
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\296\ See 45 CFR 164.502(b). The minimum necessary standard of
the Privacy Rule applies to all uses and disclosures where a request
does not meet one of the specified exceptions in paragraph (b)(2).
\297\ 45 CFR 164.502(b)(1).
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The Department does not propose to require a regulated entity to
investigate the validity of an attestation provided by a person
requesting a use or disclosure of PHI; rather, a regulated entity would
be able to rely on the attestation provided that it is objectively
reasonable under the circumstances for the regulated entity to believe
the statement required by 45 CFR 164.509(c)(1)(iv) that the requested
disclosure of PHI is not for a purpose prohibited by 45 CFR
164.502(a)(5)(iii).\298\ If such reliance is not objectively
reasonable, then the regulated entity may not rely on the attestation.
Under the proposal, it would not be objectively reasonable for a
regulated entity to rely on a requester's representation as to whether
the reproductive health care was provided under circumstances in which
it was lawful to provide such care. This is because the regulated
entity, and not the requester, has the information about the provision
of such care that is necessary to make this determination. Therefore,
this determination would need to be made by the regulated entity prior
to using or disclosing PHI in response to a request for a use or
disclosure of PHI that would require an attestation under the proposal.
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\298\ This approach is consistent with 45 CFR
164.514(h)(2)(iii), which permits a covered entity to rely on
certain statements or requests to meet the requirement to verify the
legal authority of a public official or a person acting on behalf of
the public official if such reliance is reasonable under the
circumstances.
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The proposed attestation also would require a regulated entity to
cease use or disclosure of PHI if the regulated entity developed reason
to believe, during the course of the use or disclosure, that the
representations contained within the attestation were materially false,
leading to uses or disclosures for a prohibited purpose.\299\ The
Department notes that pursuant to HIPAA, a person who knowingly and in
violation of the Administrative Simplification provisions obtains or
discloses IIHI relating to another individual or discloses IIHI to
another person would be subject to criminal liability.\300\ Thus, a
requester who knowingly falsifies an attestation (e.g., makes material
misrepresentations as to the intended uses of the PHI requested) to
obtain (or cause to be disclosed) an individual's IIHI would be in
violation of HIPAA and could be subject to criminal penalties as
outlined in the statute.\301\ Additionally, the Department notes that a
disclosure made based on an attestation that contains material
misrepresentations after the regulated entity becomes aware of such
misrepresentations would constitute an impermissible disclosure, which
may require notifications of a breach to the individual, the Secretary,
and in some cases, the media.\302\
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\299\ Proposed 45 CFR 164.509(d).
\300\ See 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6(a).
\301\ See 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6(b).
\302\ 45 CFR 164.400 et seq. The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule,
45 CFR 164.400-414, requires HIPAA covered entities and their
business associates to provide notification following a breach of
unsecured PHI.
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The proposed attestation does not replace the requirements of the
Privacy Rule's permissions for a regulated entity to disclose PHI in
response to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process
\303\ or administrative request; \304\ instead, it is designed to work
with these permissions and their requirements. Under this proposal, for
PHI to be disclosed pursuant to 45 CFR 164.512(e)(1)(ii) and
(f)(1)(ii)(C), a regulated entity would need to verify that the
requirements of each provision are met and also satisfy the
requirements of the new attestation provision under the proposed 45 CFR
164.509. In addition, the requirements of 45 CFR 164.528, the right to
an accounting of disclosures of PHI made by a covered entity, would not
be affected by the proposed attestation. Therefore, disclosures made
pursuant to a permission under 45 CFR 164.512(d), (e), (f), or (g) must
be included in the accounting, including when they are made pursuant to
an attestation.\305\
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\303\ 45 CFR 165.512(e)(1)(ii).
\304\ 45 CFR 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C).
\305\ See also 45 CFR 164.528(a)(2) regarding when the covered
entity must temporarily suspend an individual's right to receive an
accounting of disclosures to a health oversight agency or law
enforcement official.
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To reduce the burden on regulated entities implementing this
proposed attestation, the Department is considering developing a model
attestation that a regulated entity may use when developing its own
attestation templates. The Department does not anticipate requiring
regulated entities to use the model attestation at this time, thereby
leaving a regulated entity free to draft an attestation that meets the
specific needs of their organization. However, we do note that under
the proposal, an attestation would be defective if it contained
anything beyond the elements and statements required by paragraphs
(c)(1) of Sec. 164.509.
3. Request for Comment
The Department requests comment on the foregoing proposals,
including any benefits, drawbacks, or unintended consequences. The
Department also requests comment on the following considerations in
particular:
r. Whether the proposed attestation requirement in section IV.C.
would address all relevant types of permitted uses and disclosures
under the Privacy Rule. That is, should the proposed requirement apply
as a condition of any additional permitted uses and disclosures that
could be used to request uses and disclosures of PHI for a prohibited
purpose?
i. Conversely, would the proposed requirement be overinclusive,
placing unreasonable barriers to disclosures for beneficial purposes
such that the Department should narrow the scope of the proposed
requirement?
ii. The Department requests comment on specific examples of
unreasonable barriers and recommended alternatives.
s. Whether requesters of PHI should be required to name the
individuals whose PHI they are requesting, or if describing a class of
individuals whose PHI is requested is sufficient. Please explain how
the Department can further protect the privacy of individuals from
requests for large amounts of PHI ostensibly sought for a non-
prohibited

[[Page 23537]]

purpose if requesters of PHI are permitted to describe a class of
individuals whose PHI is requested.
t. How the Department should interpret the terms ``practicable''
and ``class of individuals.''
u. Whether a model attestation would be useful for regulated
entities.
i. If so, what other information should be included within such
model attestation to improve regulated entities' understanding of the
proposed attestation requirements, if adopted?
ii. What should be the format of a model attestation?
v. Whether the Department should require a particular attestation
format, rather than providing a model attestation.
w. How the Department should interpret ``combined with'' at
proposed 45 CFR 164.509(b)(3) with respect to both paper and electronic
attestations to minimize the burden on regulated entities of
understanding and responding to requests that require an attestation.
x. Whether the Department should consider permitting the
attestation to be combined with other types of documents.
i. If so, which types of documents should regulated entities be
permitted to combine with the attestation?
ii. What potential negative impacts could this have on the clarity
of the attestation?
y. Whether the Department should require the attestation to include
a signed declaration made under penalty of perjury that the requester
is not making the request for a purpose prohibited by this proposal and
any ramifications, positive or negative, of such a requirement.
z. Whether there are any other elements that should be included
within the proposed attestation that are not currently listed.
aa. Whether the Department should consider it a material
misrepresentation if a person who signs an attestation does not have an
objectively reasonable basis to suspect that the reproductive health
care was provided under circumstances in which it was unlawful. If so,
what should the Department consider a reasonable basis for suspicion?
bb. How the proposed attestation requirement would affect a
regulated entity's process for responding to regular or routine
requests from certain requestors, such as government agencies that
request PHI for purposes of health oversight activities. For such
requests, what information should such requestors provide to reduce
regulated entities' compliance burden associated with the proposed
attestation requirements?
cc. Whether there is alternative documentation that a requestor
could provide, instead of an attestation, to assist a regulated entity
in complying with 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii). For example, would a
notice from a health oversight agency that identifies the objective of
an audit, information sought, and the requesting agency provide
sufficient information to assure the regulated entity that the audit is
not subject to the prohibition at proposed 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii)?
Please provide examples of documentation that may be helpful.

D. Section 164.512--Uses and Disclosures for Which an Authorization or
Opportunity To Agree or Object Is Not Required

1. Applying the Proposed Prohibition and Attestation Requirement to
Certain Permitted Uses and Disclosures
Current Provision and Issues To Address
Section 164.512 of the Privacy Rule contains the standards for uses
and disclosures for which an authorization or opportunity to agree or
object is not required. Many of the uses and disclosures addressed by
45 CFR 164.512 relate to government or administrative functions,\306\
or as described in the 2000 Privacy Rule preamble, ``national priority
purposes.'' \307\ These permissions for uses and disclosures were not
required by HIPAA but instead represented the Secretary's previous
balancing of the privacy interests and expectations of individuals and
the interests of communities in making certain information available
for community purposes, such as for certain public health, health care
oversight, and research purposes.\308\ As discussed previously, the
regulations implementing HIPAA have sought to ensure that individuals
do not forgo health care when needed--or withhold important information
from their health care providers that may affect the quality of health
care they receive--out of a fear that their sensitive information would
be revealed outside of their relationships with their health care
providers.
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\306\ See, e.g., 45 CFR 164.512(a), Uses and disclosures
required by law; 45 CFR 164.512(b), Uses and disclosures for public
health activities; 45 CFR 164.512(c), Disclosures about victims of
abuse, neglect or domestic violence; 45 CFR 164.512(d) Uses and
disclosures for health oversight activities; 45 CFR 164.512(e),
Disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings; 45 CFR
164.512(f), Disclosures for law enforcement purposes; 45 CFR
164.512(g) Uses and disclosures about decedents; 45 CFR 164.512(h),
Uses and disclosures for cadaveric organ, eye or tissue donation
purposes; 45 CFR 164.512(i), Uses and disclosures for research
purposes; 45 CFR 164.512(j), Uses and disclosures to avert a serious
threat to health or safety; 45 CFR 164.512(k), Uses and disclosures
for specialized government functions; and 45 CFR 164.512(l),
Disclosures for workers' compensation.
\307\ 65 FR 82524.
\308\ See 65 FR 82471.
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The changes proposed in this NPRM attempt to address the need to
ensure that PHI continues to be used and disclosed only in a manner
consistent with the standard established in the Privacy Rule, given
recent developments in Federal and state law that may undermine the
privacy protections for PHI.
As discussed above, the proposed 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii) may
prohibit uses and disclosures of PHI in some circumstances that are
currently permitted. To clarify that this proposal is inclusive of
purposes currently permitted under 45 CFR 164.512, the Department
believes it is necessary to modify the general rule for such permitted
uses and disclosures. In addition, the Department believes it is
necessary to modify the general rule to reflect the new condition that
would be imposed upon certain uses and disclosures permitted under 45
CFR 164.512 through the proposed attestation requirement at 45 CFR
164.509.
Proposal
The Department proposes to modify the introductory text of 45 CFR
164.512 by citing the proposed prohibition at the beginning of the
first sentence and conditioning certain disclosures on the receipt of
the attestation proposed at 45 CFR 164.509. The proposed modification
would add the clause ``Except as provided by 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii),
[ . . . ]'' and ``and 45 CFR 164.509'' to ``subject to the applicable
requirements of this section.''
As discussed above, the proposed change would create a new
requirement to obtain an attestation from the person requesting the use
and disclosure of PHI potentially related to reproductive health care
as a condition for certain types of permitted uses and disclosures of
PHI. For example, the Privacy Rule currently permits uses and
disclosures for health care oversight,\309\ judicial and administrative
proceedings,\310\ law enforcement purposes,\311\ and coroners and
medical examiners,\312\ provided specified conditions are met. If
paragraph (a)(5)(iii) of 45 CFR 164.502

[[Page 23538]]

is finalized, uses and disclosures of PHI for these purposes would be
subject to an additional condition; that is, such uses and disclosures
would be prohibited unless a regulated entity first obtained an
attestation from the person requesting the use and disclosure under
proposed 45 CFR 164.509.
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\309\ 45 CFR 164.512(d).
\310\ 45 CFR 164.512(e).
\311\ 45 CFR 164.512(f).
\312\ 45 CFR 164.512(g)(1).
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The Department assumes that there would be instances in which a
state or other law requires a regulated entity to use or disclose PHI
for health care oversight, judicial and administrative proceedings, law
enforcement purposes, or coroners and medical examiners for a purpose
not related to one of the prohibited purposes in proposed 45 CFR
164.502(a)(5)(iii). The Department believes that a regulated entity
would be able to comply with such laws, as well as the proposed
attestation requirement if the PHI is potentially related to
reproductive health care. For example, a regulated entity may continue
to disclose PHI without an authorization to a state medical board, a
prosecutor, or a coroner, in accordance with the Privacy Rule, when the
request is for PHI that is not potentially related to reproductive
health care or accompanied by the required attestation. As a result, a
regulated entity may continue to assist the state in carrying out its
health care oversight, judicial and administrative functions, law
enforcement, and coroner duties with the use or disclosure of PHI that
is potentially related to reproductive health care once a facially
valid attestation has been provided to the regulated entity from whom
PHI is sought, except in matters involving restrictions on seeking,
obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care. In such
cases, the state would need to obtain information about an individual's
reproductive health or reproductive health care received by the
individual from an entity not regulated under the Privacy Rule. As a
reminder, the Privacy Rule only applies to PHI, which is IIHI that is
maintained or transmitted by, for, or on behalf of a covered entity.
Thus, it does not apply to individuals' health information when it is
in the possession of a person that is not a covered entity or business
associate, such as a friend, family member, or is stored on a personal
cellular telephone or tablet.\313\
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\313\ See Guidance on ``Protecting the Privacy and Security of
Your Health Information When Using Your Personal Cell Phone or
Tablet,'' U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs. (June 29, 2022),
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/cell-phone-hipaa/index.html.
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Additionally, for clarity, the Department proposes to change the
word ``orally'' at the end of the introductory paragraph to
``verbally.'' No substantive change is intended.
2. Making a Technical Correction to the Heading of 45 CFR 164.512(c)
and Clarifying That Providing or Facilitating Reproductive Health Care
Is Not Abuse, Neglect, or Domestic Violence
Current Provisions and Issues to Address
Paragraph (c) of 45 CFR 164.512 permits disclosures of PHI about
victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence under specified
conditions. While the regulatory text includes the serial comma,
clearly indicating that the provision addresses victims of three
different types of crimes, the standard heading is less clear.
This section permits a regulated entity to disclose an individual's
PHI under certain conditions to an authorized government agency where
the regulated entity reasonably believes the individual to be a victim
of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence. The Department is concerned
that recent state actions may lead regulated entities to think that
they are permitted to make such disclosures of PHI when they believe
that persons who provide or facilitate access to reproductive health
care are perpetrators of such crimes. Thus, the Department believes it
is necessary to clarify that providing or facilitating access to
appropriate reproductive health care is not abuse, neglect, or domestic
violence.
Proposals
For grammatical clarity, the Department proposes to add the serial
comma after the word ``neglect'' in the heading of the standard
contained at 45 CFR 164.512(c), so it would read ``Standard:
Disclosures about victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence.''
The Department also proposes to add a new paragraph (c)(3) to 45
CFR 164.512(c), with the heading ``Rules of construction,'' that would
read, ``Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit uses or
disclosures prohibited by Sec. 164.502(a)(5)(iii).'' This new
paragraph would clarify that the permission to use or disclose PHI in
reports of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence does not permit uses or
disclosures based primarily on the provision or facilitation of
reproductive health care to the individual. The proposed provision is
intended to safeguard the privacy of individuals' PHI against claims
that uses and disclosures of that PHI are warranted because the
provision or facilitation of reproductive health care, in and of
itself, may constitute abuse, neglect, or domestic violence. Similar to
the discussion above in section IV.D.1, the Department also does not
intend for this proposal to obstruct oversight related to professional
conduct or similar legal proceedings for which PHI related to
reproductive health care is needed.
3. Clarifying the Permission for Disclosures Based on Administrative
Processes
Current Provision and Issues To Address
Under 45 CFR 164.512(f)(1), a regulated entity may disclose PHI
pursuant to an administrative request, provided that: (1) the
information sought is relevant and material to a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry; (2) the request is specific and limited in scope
to the extent reasonably practicable in light of the purpose for which
the information is sought; and (3) de-identified information could not
reasonably be used.\314\ Examples of administrative requests include
administrative subpoena or summons, a civil or an authorized
investigative demand, or similar process authorized under law.\315\ The
examples of administrative requests provided in the existing regulatory
text include only those requests that are enforceable in a court of
law, and the catchall ``or similar process authorized by law''
similarly is intended to include only requests that, by law, require a
response. This interpretation is consistent with the Privacy Rule's
definition of ``required by law,'' which enumerates these and other
examples of administrative requests that constitute ``a mandate
contained in law that compels an entity to make a use or disclosure of
protected health information and that is enforceable in a court of
law.'' \316\ However, the Department has become aware that some
regulated entities may be interpreting this provision in a manner that
is inconsistent with the Department's intent. Therefore, the Department
is taking this opportunity to clarify the types of administrative
processes that this provision was intended to address.
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\314\ 45 CFR 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C).
\315\ Id.
\316\ See 45 CFR 164.103. The Privacy Rule's definition of
``Required by law'' includes administrative requests and lists the
examples of processes that are enumerated under 45 CFR
164.512(f)(1)(ii)(C).
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Proposal
Specifically, the Department proposes to insert language to clarify
that the administrative processes that give rise to a permitted
disclosure include only those that, by law, require a regulated

[[Page 23539]]

entity to respond. Accordingly, the proposal would specify that PHI may
be disclosed pursuant to an administrative request ``for which a
response is required by law.'' This is not intended to be a substantive
change, as the proposal is consistent with preamble discussion on this
topic in the 2000 Privacy Rule.\317\
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\317\ See 65 FR 82531.
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4. Request for Comment
The Department requests comment on the forgoing proposals,
including any benefits, drawbacks, or unintended consequences. The
Department also requests comment on the following considerations in
particular:
dd. The way in which regulated entities currently receive and
address requests for PHI when requested pursuant to the Privacy Rule
permissions at 45 CFR 164.512(d) (uses and disclosures for health
oversight activities), (e) (disclosures for judicial and administrative
proceedings), (f) (disclosures for law enforcement purposes), or (g)(1)
(uses and disclosures about decedents to coroners and medical
examiners). Specifically:
i. How are such requests currently submitted (e.g., hard copy
letter, electronically via email, an online form)?
ii. For requests under 45 CFR 164.512(e)(1)(ii) and (f)(1)(ii)(C):
i. When using or disclosing information after receiving the
required assurances,\318\ does the entity choose to obtain assurances
for every subsequent related request, or does the entity continue to
disclose PHI to such entity after receiving the initial assurance,
provided that subsequent requests are related to the initial request in
which the initial assurance was received?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\318\ See 45 CFR 164.512(e)(1)(iii) and (f)(1)(ii)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. How do regulated entities accept assurances (e.g., hard copy
letter, electronically via email, uploading to an online portal)?
ee. Examples, if any, of uses or disclosures of PHI that are
required by law and are not for prohibited purposes but may no longer
be permitted under this proposal.
ff. The effect expanding the scope of the proposed prohibition to
include any health care would have on the proposed attestation
requirement and the ability of regulated entities to implement it.
gg. Whether the phrase ``based primarily'' is sufficient to clarify
that the proposed rule of construction is only intended to address
situations where the purpose is to investigate or impose liability
because reproductive health care was provided, rather than, for
example, the quality of the health care provided or whether claims
submitted for that health care were appropriate.
hh. Whether there are disclosures currently made under Federal
agencies' interpretations of the Privacy Act that would not be
permitted under the proposal. If so, what would they be, and should the
Department permit them?

E. Section 164.520--Notice of Privacy Practices for Protected Health
Information

1. Current Provision and Issues To Address
The Privacy Rule generally requires that a covered entity provide
individuals with an NPP to ensure that they understand how a covered
entity may use and disclose their PHI, as well as their rights and the
covered entity's legal duties with respect to PHI.\319\ Section
164.520(b)(1)(ii) of the Privacy Rule describes the required contents
of the NPP, including descriptions of the types of permitted uses and
disclosures of their PHI. It does not, however, currently require a
covered entity to provide information about prohibited uses and
disclosures of PHI. The Department is concerned that the current NPP
requirements might not provide individuals with adequate assurances
that a revised Privacy Rule would prohibit the use or disclosure of
their PHI in certain circumstances. Without such assurances, the
Department is concerned that individuals may avoid accessing crucial
health care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\319\ 45 CFR 164.520. Unlike many provisions of the Privacy
Rule, 45 CFR 164.520 applies only to covered entities, as opposed to
both covered entities and their business associates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Proposal
The Department proposes to modify 45 CFR 164.520(b)(1)(ii) to
require that a covered entity add two types of uses and disclosures to
those already described in the NPP, putting individuals on notice about
how their PHI may or may not be used. Specifically, the Department
proposes at 45 CFR 164.520(b)(1)(ii)(F) to add to the NPP's list of
required elements two that address the proposed use and disclosure
prohibition at 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii). Under this proposal, a
covered entity must separately describe each type of use or disclosure
prohibited by 45 CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii) and must do so in sufficient
detail for an individual to understand this prohibition and the
proposed attestation requirement.
By modifying the NPP, a covered entity would continue to provide an
individual with information the individual needs to make decisions
about their health care, as well as information about how the covered
entity will treat PHI the individual chooses to disclose to the covered
entity, and about how to exercise their rights of access \320\ and to
request restrictions.\321\ The modification would also enable the
covered entity to provide the individual with reassurance about their
privacy rights and their ability to discuss their reproductive health
and related care with any health care provider without fear of harm
because it would inform an individual that their PHI may not be used or
disclosed for the purposes the Department proposes to prohibit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\320\ With certain exceptions, an individual has a right of
access to inspect and obtain a copy of PHI about the individual in a
designated record set for as long as the PHI is maintained in the
designated record set. See 45 CFR 164.524.
\321\ A covered entity must permit an individual to request that
the covered entity restrict uses or disclosures of PHI for certain
purposes. While the covered entity is not required to agree to the
restriction, they may not use or disclose PHI if they agree to do
so, except in limited circumstances. Additionally, a covered health
care provider must permit an individual to request and must
accommodate a reasonable request by an individual to receive
communications of PHI from the covered entity by alternative means
or at alternative locations. A health plan must do the same in
certain circumstances. See 45 CFR 164.522.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Request for Comment
The Department requests comment on the foregoing proposals,
including any benefits, drawbacks, or unintended consequences. The
Department also requests comment on the following considerations in
particular:
ii. Whether it would benefit individuals for the Department to
require that covered entities include a statement in the NPP explaining
that when PHI is disclosed for a permitted purpose to an entity other
than a covered entity (e.g., disclosed to a non-covered health care
provider for treatment purposes), the recipient of the PHI would not be
bound by the proposed prohibition because the Privacy Rule would no
longer apply.

V. Executive Order 12866 and Related Executive Orders on Regulatory
Review

A. Regulatory Impact Analysis

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS or Department) has
examined the effects of the proposed rule under Executive Order (E.O.)
12866, Regulatory Planning and Review,\322\ E.O. 13563, Improving
Regulation and Regulatory Review,\323\

[[Page 23540]]

the Regulatory Flexibility Act \324\ (RFA), and the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 \325\ (UMRA). E.O.s 12866 and 13563 direct the
Department to assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory
alternatives and, when regulation is necessary, to select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages;
distributive effects; and equity). This proposed rule is significant
under section 3(f)(1) of E.O. 12866.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\322\ 58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
\323\ 76 FR 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
\324\ Public Law 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
601-612).
\325\ Pubic Law 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified at 2 U.S.C. 1501).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The RFA requires us to analyze regulatory options that would
minimize any significant effect of a rule on small entities. As
discussed in greater detail below, this analysis concludes, and the
Secretary proposes to certify, that the proposed rule, if finalized,
would not result in a significant economic effect on a substantial
number of small entities.
The UMRA (section 202(a)) generally requires us to prepare a
written statement, which includes an assessment of anticipated costs
and benefits, before proposing ``any rule that includes any Federal
mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one
year.'' The current threshold after adjustment for inflation is $165
million, using the most current (2021) Implicit Price Deflator for the
Gross Domestic Product. UMRA does not address the total cost of a rule.
Rather, it focuses on certain categories of cost, mainly Federal
mandate costs resulting from imposing enforceable duties on state,
local, or Tribal governments, or on the private sector; or increasing
the stringency of conditions in, or decreasing the funding of, state,
local, or Tribal governments under entitlement programs. This proposed
rule would impose mandates that would result in the expenditure by
state, local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of more than $165 million in any one year. The impact
analysis in this proposed rule addresses those impacts both
qualitatively and quantitatively. In general, each regulated entity,
including government entities such as state Medicaid agencies that meet
the definition of covered entity, would be required to ensure it adopts
new policies and procedures for handling requests for PHI for which an
attestation is required and train its workforce members on the new
requirements. Additionally, although the Department has not quantified
the costs, state, local, and Tribal investigative agencies would need
to analyze requests that they initiate for PHI and provide regulated
entities with an attestation that the request is not for a prohibited
purpose where the request is for PHI that is potentially related to
reproductive health care. One-time costs for all regulated entities to
make these policy changes would result in costs over the UMRA threshold
in one year. The Department has initially estimated that ongoing
expenses for the new attestation requirement would not rise
significantly; however, it seeks additional data to inform its
estimates. Although Medicaid has funds available for states for certain
administrative costs, these are limited to costs specific to operating
the Medicaid program. There are no Federal funds directed at HIPAA
compliance activities.
The Summary of Major Proposals and Need for Rulemaking sections at
the beginning of this preamble contain a summary of this proposed rule
and describe the reasons it is needed. The Department presents a
detailed analysis below.
1. Summary of Costs and Benefits
The Department has identified six general categories of
quantifiable costs arising from these proposals: (1) creating an
attestation form and handling requests for disclosures for which an
attestation is required; (2) revising business associate agreements;
(3) updating the Notice of Privacy Practices (NPP) and posting it
online; (4) developing new or modified policies and procedures; (5)
revising training programs for workforce members; and (6) requesting an
exception from preemption of state law. The first five categories apply
primarily to covered entities such as health care providers and health
plans, while the sixth category applies to states and other interested
persons.
The Department estimates that the first-year costs attributable to
the proposed rule would total approximately $612 million. These costs
are associated with covered entities creating an attestation form and
responding to requests for protected health information (PHI) that may
require an attestation; revising business associate agreements;
revising policies and procedures; updating, posting, and mailing the
NPP; and revising training programs for workforce members, and with
states or other persons requesting exceptions from preemption. These
costs also include increased estimates for wages, postage, and the
number of NPPs distributed by health plans. For years two through five,
estimated annual costs of approximately $68 million are attributable to
ongoing costs related to the proposed attestation requirement. Table 1
reports the present value and annualized estimates of the costs of the
proposed rule covering a 5-year time horizon. Using a 7% discount rate,
the Department estimates the proposed rule would result in annualized
costs of $192 million; and using a 3% discount rate, these annualized
costs are $183 million.

Table 1--Accounting Table, Costs of the Proposed Rule, $ Millions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary Period
Costs estimate Year dollars Discount rate covered
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present Value......................... $883.4 2021 Undiscounted............ 2023-2027
Present Value......................... 786.8 2021 7%...................... 2023-2027
Present Value......................... 839.1 2021 3%...................... 2023-2027
Annualized............................ 191.9 2021 7%...................... 2023-2027
Annualized............................ 183.2 2021 3%...................... 2023-2027
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The proposed changes to the Privacy Rule would likely result in
important benefits that the Department is unable to fully quantify at
this time. As explained further below, unquantified benefits include
improved trust between individuals and health care providers; enhanced
privacy and improved access to reproductive health care and
information, which may prevent increases in maternal mortality and
morbidity; increased accuracy and

[[Page 23541]]

completeness in patient medical records, which may prevent poor health
outcomes; enhanced support for victims of rape, incest, and sex
trafficking; and maintenance of family economic stability.
Additionally, the Department believes that allowing regulated entities
to accept an attestation from a requester of PHI that is potentially
related to reproductive health care will reduce potential liability for
regulated entities by providing some assurance that the requested
disclosure is not prohibited.

Table 2--Potential Non-Quantified Benefits for Covered Entities and
Individuals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Improve access to complete information about lawful reproductive health
care options for individuals who are pregnant or considering a
pregnancy (i.e., health literacy).
Maintain or reduce levels of maternal mortality and morbidity by
ensuring that individuals and their clinicians can freely communicate
and have access to complete information needed for quality health care,
including coordination of care.
Decrease barriers to accessing prenatal health care by maintaining
privacy for individuals who seek a complete range of reproductive
health care options.
Enhance mental health and emotional well-being of pregnant individuals
by reducing fear of prosecution based on potential disclosures of their
PHI.
Improve or maintain trust between individuals and health care providers
by reducing the potential for health care providers reporting PHI in a
manner that could harm the individuals' interests.
Prevent or reduce re-victimization of pregnant individuals who have
survived rape or incest by protecting their PHI from undue scrutiny.
Improve or maintain families' economic well-being by not exposing
individuals to costly criminal, civil, or administrative investigations
or proceedings for engaging in lawful activities if their PHI or a
family member's PHI is disclosed.
Maintain the economic well-being of regulated entities by not exposing
regulated entities or workforce members to costly civil litigation,
investigation, or prosecution for engaging in lawful activities.
Ensure individuals' ability to obtain full and complete information and
make lawful decisions concerning fertility- or infertility-related
health care that may include selection or disposal of embryos without
risk of criminal, civil, or administrative investigation or proceedings
based on the disclosure of their PHI.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Baseline Conditions
The Privacy Rule, in conjunction with the Security and Breach
Notification Rules, protects the privacy and security of individuals'
PHI, that is, individually identifiable health information (IIHI)
transmitted by or maintained in electronic media or any other form or
medium, with certain exceptions. It limits the circumstances under
which regulated entities are permitted or required to use or disclose
PHI and requires covered entities to have safeguards in place to
protect the privacy of PHI. The Privacy Rule also establishes certain
rights for individuals with respect to their PHI. The Rule requires
appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of PHI and sets limits
and conditions on the uses and disclosures that may be made of such
information without an individual's authorization.
As explained in the preamble, the Department has the authority
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) to modify the Privacy Rule to prohibit the use or disclosure of
PHI for a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation into or
proceeding against any person in connection with obtaining, providing,
or facilitating reproductive health care, as well as to identify any
person for the purpose of initiating such an investigation or
proceeding. The Privacy Rule has been modified several times since it
was first issued in 2000 to address statutory requirements, changed
circumstances, and concerns and issues raised by stakeholders regarding
the effects of the Privacy Rule on regulated entities, individuals, and
others. Recently, as the preamble discusses, changed circumstances
resulting from new inconsistencies in the regulation of reproductive
health care nationwide and the negative effects on individuals'
expectations for privacy and their relationships with their health care
providers, as well as the additional burdens imposed on regulated
entities, necessitate consideration of additional modifications.
For purposes of this Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), the proposed
rule adopts the list of covered entities and cost assumptions
identified in the Department's 2019 Information Collection Request
(ICR).\326\ The Department also relies on certain estimates and
assumptions from the 1999 Privacy Rule NPRM \327\ that remain relevant,
and the 2013 Omnibus Rule,\328\ as referenced in the analysis that
follows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\326\ 84 FR 34905 (July 19, 2019).
\327\ 64 FR 59918 (Nov. 3, 1999).
\328\ 78 FR 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department quantitatively analyzes and monetizes the effect
that this proposed rule may have on regulated entities' actions to:
revise business associate agreements between covered entities and their
business associates, including release-of-information contractors;
create new forms; respond to certain types of requests for PHI that is
potentially related to reproductive health care; update their NPP;
adopt policies and procedures to implement the legal requirements of
this proposed rule, and train their employees on the updated policies
and procedures. The Department analyzes the remaining benefits and
burdens qualitatively because of the uncertainty inherent in predicting
other concrete actions that such a diverse scope of regulated entities
might take in response to this proposed rule.
Analytic Assumptions
The Department bases its assumptions for calculating estimated
costs and benefits on a number of publicly available datasets,
including data from the U.S. Census, the U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
Implementing the proposed regulatory changes likely would require
covered entities to engage workforce members or consultants for certain
activities. The Department assumes that an attorney would draft or
review the new attestation form, revisions to business associate
agreements, revisions to the NPP, and required changes to HIPAA
policies and procedures. The Department expects that a training
specialist would revise the necessary HIPAA training and a web designer
would post the updated NPP. The Department further anticipates that a
workforce member at the pay level of general health care practitioner
would

[[Page 23542]]

confirm receipt of required attestations. To the extent that these
assumptions would affect the Department's estimate of costs, the
Department welcomes comment on its assumptions, particularly those in
which the Department identifies the level of workforce member (i.e.,
clerical staff, professional) that would be engaged in activities, and
the amount of time that particular types of workforce members spend
conducting activities related to this NPRM as further described below.
Table 3 also lists pay rates for occupations referenced in the
explanation of estimated information collection burdens in section F of
this RIA and related tables.
For changes in time use for on-the-job activities considered in
this analysis, the Department adopts an hourly value of time based on
the cost of labor, including wages and benefits, and also indirect
costs, which ``reflect resources necessary for the administrative
oversight of employees and generally include time spent on
administrative personnel issues (e.g., human resources activities such
as hiring, performance reviews, personnel transfers, affirmative action
programs), writing administrative guidance documents, office expenses
(e.g., space rental, utilities, equipment costs), and outreach and
general training (e.g., employee development).'' \329\ For each
occupation performing activities as a result of the proposed rule, the
Department identifies a pre-tax hourly wage using a database maintained
by the BLS.\330\ For the purposes of this analysis, the Department
assumes that benefits plus indirect costs equal approximately 100
percent of pre-tax wages, and adjusts the hourly wage rates by
multiplying by two, for a fully loaded hourly wage rate. The Department
adopts this as the estimate of the hourly value of time for changes in
time use for on-the-job activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\329\ See ``Valuing Time in U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services Regulatory Impact Analyses: Conceptual Framework and Best
Practices,'' U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (2017), p. v,
https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/valuing-time-us-department-health-human-services-regulatory-impact-analyses-conceptual-framework.
\330\ See ``Occupational Employment and Wages,'' Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor (May 2021), https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_nat.htm.

Table 3--Occupational Pay Rates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mean hourly Fully loaded
Occupation code and title wage hourly wage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
00-0000 All Occupations................. $28.01 $56.02
43-3021 Billing and Posting Clerks...... 20.55 41.10
29-0000 Healthcare Practitioners and 43.80 87.60
Technical Occupations..................
29-9021 Health Information Technologists 29.53 59.06
and Medical Registrars.................
29-9099 Healthcare Practitioners and 31.19 62.38
Technical Workers, All Other...........
15-1212 Information Security Analysts... 54.46 108.92
23-1011 Lawyers......................... 71.17 142.34
13-1111 Management Analysts............. 48.33 96.66
11-9111 Medical and Health Services 57.61 115.22
Manager................................
29-2072 Medical Records Specialist...... 23.23 46.46
43-0000 Office and Administrative 20.88 41.76
Support Occupations....................
11-2030 Public Relations and Fundraising 63.85 127.70
Managers...............................
13-1151 Training and Development 32.51 65.02
Specialist.............................
43-4171 Receptionists and Information 15.82 31.64
Clerks.................................
15-1255 Web and Digital Interface 45.90 91.80
Designers..............................
Composite Wage for Breach Notice........ 38.33 76.66
------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department assumes that the vast majority of covered entities
would be able to incorporate changes to their workforce training into
existing HIPAA training programs because the total time frame for
compliance from date of finalization would be 240 days.\331\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\331\ This includes 60 days from publication of a final rule to
the effective date and an additional 180 days until the compliance
date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Covered Entities Affected
This proposed rule would apply to HIPAA covered entities, including
health care providers \332\ that conduct covered electronic
transactions, health plans, and in certain circumstances, health care
clearinghouses.\333\ The Department estimates that there are 774,331
business establishments that meet the definition of a covered entity
(see Table 4). By calculating costs for establishments, rather than
firms (which may be an umbrella organization over multiple
establishments), there is a tendency toward overestimating some
burdens, because certain costs would be borne by a parent organization
rather than each separate facility. However, the level of an
organization that is financially responsible for covering costs to
implement Privacy Rule requirements may vary across the health care
industry. The Department requests data on the extent to which certain
burdens of the proposed rule would be borne by each facility versus an
umbrella organization. Unless otherwise indicated, the Department
relies on data about the number of firms and establishments from the
U.S. Census.\334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\332\ The Department notes that pharmacies, discussed later in
the preamble, are a type of health care provider under HIPAA. HIPAA
defines the term health care provider for the purposes of the
Administrative Simplification provisions at section 262: ``The term
`health care provider' includes a provider of services (as defined
in section 1861(u)), a provider of medical or other health services
(as defined in section 1861(s)), and any other person furnishing
health care services or supplies.''
\333\ Only certain provisions of the Privacy Rule apply to
clearinghouses as covered entities. In addition, certain provisions
apply to clearinghouses in their role as business associates of
other covered entities. See 45 CFR 164.500(b) and (c). Because the
provisions addressed in this proposed rule generally do not apply
directly to clearinghouses, the Department does not anticipate that
these entities would experience costs associated with this proposed
rule.
\334\ See ``2015 Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) Annual
Data Tables by Establishment Industry'' (Jan. 2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/econ/susb/2015-susb-annual.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department expects that the proposed rule will have varying
effects on different covered entities and would have the most direct
effect on covered health care providers and health plans. However, all
affected covered entities would at least need to adopt or change some
policies and procedures and re-train some employees. Affected covered
entities would include many Federal, state, local, Tribal, and private
sector health care providers.

[[Page 23543]]

Census data for businesses in the category of Third Party
Administration of Insurance and Pension Funds does not separately
enumerate those that service health and medical insurance. However, the
Department is able to extrapolate from data about insurance carriers
the percentage of businesses that service health and medical insurance.
According to Census data, there are 880 Direct Health and Medical
Insurance Carrier firms compared to 5,350 Insurance Carrier firms, such
that health and medical insurance firms make up 16.4% of insurance
firms. Thus, the Department assumes for purposes of this analysis that
16.4% of Third Party Administration of Insurance and Pension Funds
firms and establishments service health and medical insurance. Applying
this percentage to the 2,773 firms and 4,772 establishments in the
category Third Party Administration of Insurance and Pension Funds, the
Department estimates that 455 of these firms and 783 establishments are
affected by this proposed rule.\335\ See Table 4 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\335\ [2,773 x .164 = 454.7; 4,772 x .164 = 782.6].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Covered pharmacies would also be affected by the proposed rule.
There were 67,753 community pharmacies (including 19,500 pharmacy and
drug store firms and 44,130 establishments identified in U.S. Census
data) operating in the U.S. in 2015.\336\ Small pharmacies largely use
pharmacy services administration organizations (PSAOs) to provide
administrative services, such as negotiations, on their behalf.\337\ A
2013 study identified 22 PSAOs and notes there may be more in
operation.\338\ Based on information received from industry, the
Department adjusts this number upward and estimates that the proposed
rule would affect 40 PSAOs. The Department assumes that costs affecting
pharmacies are incurred at each pharmacy and drug store establishment
and each PSAO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\336\ See Dima Mazen Qato, Shannon Zenk, Jocelyn Wilder, et al.,
``The availability of pharmacies in the United States: 2007-2015,''
PLOS ONE (Aug. 2017), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0183172.
\337\ Discussing generally that small and independent pharmacies
often lack internal resources to support these services. See
``Prescription Drugs: The Number, Role, and Ownership of Pharmacy
Services Administrative Organizations,'' U.S. Government
Accountability Office, GAO-13-176 (Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-176.
\338\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department has not separately calculated the effect of the
proposed rule on business associates because the primary effect is on
the covered entities for which they provide services. To the extent
that covered entities engage business associates to perform activities
under the proposed rule, the Department assumes that any additional
costs will be borne by the covered entities through their contractual
agreements with business associates. The Department's estimate that
each revised business associate agreement would require no more than 1
hour of a lawyer's labor assumes that the hourly burden could be split
between the covered entity and the business associate. Thus, the
Department has calculated estimated costs based on the potential number
of business associate agreements that are revised rather than the
number of covered entities or business associates with revised
agreements. The Department requests data on the number of business
associates (which may include health care clearinghouses acting in
their role as business associates of other covered entities) that would
be affected by the proposed rule and the extent to which they may
experience costs or other burdens not already accounted for in the
estimates of burdens for revising business associate agreements. The
Department also requests comment on the number of business associate
agreements that would need to be revised, if any.
The Department requests public comment on these estimates,
including those for third party administrators and pharmacies where the
Department has provided additional explanation. The Department
additionally requests detailed comment on any situations in which
covered entities other than those identified here would be affected by
this rulemaking.

Table 4--Estimated Number and Type of Covered Entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Covered Entities
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS code Type of entity Firms Establishments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
524114...................................... Health and Medical Insurance 880 5,379
Carriers.
524292...................................... Third Party Administrators..... 456 783
622......................................... Hospitals...................... 3,293 7,012
44611....................................... Pharmacies..................... 19,540 \a\ 67,753
6211-6213................................... Office of Drs. & Other 433,267 505,863
Professionals.
6215........................................ Medical Diagnostic & Imaging... 7,863 17,265
6214........................................ Outpatient Care................ 16,896 39,387
6219........................................ Other Ambulatory Care.......... 6,623 10,059
623......................................... Skilled Nursing & Residential 38,455 86,653
Facilities.
6216........................................ Home Health Agencies........... 21,829 30,980
532291...................................... Home Health Equipment Rental... 611 3,197
----------------------------------
Total................................... ............................... 549,713 774,331
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Number of pharmacy establishments is taken from industry statistics.

Individuals Affected
The Department believes that the population of individuals
potentially affected by the proposed rule is approximately 74 million
overall,\339\ representing nearly one-fourth of the U.S. population,
including approximately 6 million pregnant women and girls annually and
an unknown number of individuals facing a potential pregnancy or
pregnancy risk due to sexual activity, contraceptive avoidance or
failure, rape (including statutory rape), and incest. According to
Federal data, 78 percent of sexually active females received
reproductive health care in 2015-2017.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\339\ See females aged 10-44, American Community Survey S0101
AGE AND SEX 2020: ACS 5-Year Estimates Subject Tables, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=United%20States%20females&t=Populations%20and%20People&g=0100000US&tid=ACSST5Y2020.S0101.
\340\ See Sexually active females who received reproductive
health services (FP-7.1), Healthypeople.gov, https://wayback.archive-it.org/5774/20220415172039/https:/www.healthypeople.gov/2020/leading-health-indicators/2020-lhi-topics/Reproductive-and-Sexual-Health/data.

[[Page 23544]]

Table 5--Estimated Number of Individuals Affected
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Females of potentially childbearing Population Number of 2017
age estimate Pregnancies \341\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Females Aged 10--14 \342\............ 10,310,162 4,460
Females 15--44 \343\................. 64,130,037 5,575,150
----------------------------------
Total............................ 74,440,199 5,579,610
------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Costs of the Proposed Rule
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\341\ See Isaac Maddow[hyphen]Zimet and Kathryn Kost,
``Pregnancies, Births and Abortions in the United States, 1973-2017:
National and State Trends by Age Appendix Tables,'' Guttmacher
Institute, https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_downloads/pregnancies-births-abortions-us-1973-2017-appendix-tables.pdf.
\342\ See American Community Survey S0101 AGE AND SEX 2020: ACS
5-Year Estimates Subject Tables, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=United%20States%20females&t=Populations%20and%20People&g=0100000US&tid=ACSST5Y2020.S0101.
\343\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Below, the Department provides the basis for its estimated
quantifiable costs resulting from the proposed changes to specific
provisions of the Privacy Rule and invites comments on the Department's
assumptions, data, and calculations, as well as any additional
considerations that the Department has not identified here. Many of the
estimates are based on assumptions formed through the Office for Civil
Rights' (OCR's) experience in its compliance and enforcement program
and accounts from stakeholders received at outreach events. The
Department has not quantified recurring burdens for the proposed rule
beyond that of obtaining a required attestation from the requester for
health oversight, legal proceedings, law enforcement, and coroners or
medical examiners.
The Department welcomes information or data points from commenters
to further refine its estimates and assumptions.
a. Costs Associated With Requests for Exception From Preemption
The Department anticipates that states that restrict access to
reproductive health care are likely to seek an exception to the
proposed requirements of this rule that would preempt state law. Given
the fast-developing status of state laws governing access to
reproductive health care, the Department estimates a potential increase
of 26 states \344\ incurring costs to develop an exception request to
submit to the Secretary. Based on existing burden estimates for this
activity,\345\ the Department estimates that each exception request
would require approximately 16 hours of labor at the rate of a general
health care practitioner and that approximately 26 states would make
such requests. Thus, the Department estimates that states will spend a
total of 416 hours requesting exception from preemption and monetize
this as a one-time cost of $36,442 [= 16 x 26 x $87.60].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\344\ See Elizabeth Nash, Lauren Cross, ``26 States Are Certain
or Likely to Ban Abortion Without Roe: Here's Which Ones and Why,''
Guttmacher Institute (published Oct. 28, 2021; updated Apr. 19,
2022; an updated analysis was published on Jan. 10, 2023), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2021/10/26-states-are-certain-or-likely-ban-abortion-without-roe-heres-which-ones-and-why. The number of
states identified dropped to 24 in 2023; however, due to the pace of
change in this area the Department relies on the higher number as a
basis for its cost estimates.
\345\ Information Collection, Process for Requesting Exception
Determinations (states or persons), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewIC?ref_nbr=201909-0945-001&icID=10428.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Estimated Costs From Adding a Requirement for an Attestation for
Disclosures for Certain Purposes
The Department analyzed the costs of the proposed attestation
requirement in comparison to the estimated costs of complying with the
existing authorization requirement because both activities involve
reviewing requests for disclosures and required documentation. The
Department estimates that the annual costs of implementing a
requirement to obtain an attestation that certain types of requests for
PHI that is potentially related to reproductive health care are not for
a prohibited purpose would be similar to the costs associated with uses
and disclosures for which an authorization is required because the
number of attestation-based requests likely would be lower even if the
handling of such requests were more burdensome. For purposes of this
analysis, the Department adopts the cost estimates already approved for
documenting disclosures based on an authorization because those
estimates provide an established baseline. The Department draws this
estimate from its approved ICR for 45 CFR 164.508, which allows for one
burden hour per covered entity based on the hourly wage of a general
health care practitioner.\346\ For 774,331 covered entities, this would
amount to a total annual cost of $67,831,396 [= 774,331 x 1 x $87.60].
The quantified burden is associated with the requirement to keep
records of attestations received. The Department anticipates an
increase in time needed by regulated entities to process each request
for PHI under 45 CFR 164.512(d), (e), (f), or (g)(1) that is not
accompanied by an attestation. The Department believes that the
regulated entity would likely need to determine whether the requested
PHI includes PHI potentially related to reproductive health care.
However, the Department lacks sufficient information to estimate the
amount such a burden would vary from the burden of processing requests
for PHI with an authorization. Additionally, the Department believes
that regulated entities may need to evaluate whether the reproductive
health care encompassed within the scope of a request under 45 CFR
164.512(d) through (f) and (g)(1) was lawful under the circumstances in
which it was provided, and solicits comments on data about the
associated costs of such reviews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\346\ See Section F. of this RIA, Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to the recurring costs of responding to requests for
PHI under the proposed revisions, the Department estimates that covered
entities would incur a one-time cost for creating a new attestation
form for a total of $55,109,137 [= 774,331 x (30/60) x $142.34]. This
would be based on 30 minutes of labor by a lawyer using the
Department's sample form.
c. Costs Arising From Revised Business Associate Agreements
The Department anticipates that a certain percentage of business
associate agreements would likely need to be updated to reflect a
determination made by covered entities and business associates that,
where the business associate receives requests for disclosures of PHI
under proposed 45 CFR 164.512(d), (e), (f), or (g)(1), the covered
entity will bear the burden of determining whether a requested
disclosure would include PHI that is potentially related to
reproductive health care. Based on estimates in previous HIPAA
rulemaking, the

[[Page 23545]]

Department estimates that each new or significantly modified contract
between a business associate and its subcontractors would require, at
most, one hour of labor by a lawyer at the wage reported in Table 3. We
believe that approximately 35 percent of 1 million business associates,
or 350,000 entities, would decide to create or significantly modify
subcontracts, resulting in total costs of $49,819,000 [= 350,000 x
$142.34]. The Department invites comments on these assumptions and the
number of business associate agreements likely to be revised due to the
proposed regulatory changes.
d. Costs Arising From Changes to the Notice of Privacy Practices
The Department proposes to modify the NPP to notify individuals
that covered entities cannot use or disclose PHI for certain purposes
and that in certain circumstances, covered entities must obtain an
attestation from the person requesting the use or disclosure affirming
that the request is not for a prohibited purpose, and where applicable,
that the use or disclosure is primarily for a purpose described at 45
CFR 164.502(a)(5)(iii)(C).
The Department believes the burden associated with revising the NPP
consists of costs related to developing and drafting the revised NPP
for covered entities. The Department estimates that the proposal to
update and revise the language in the NPP would require 30 minutes of
professional legal services at the wage reported in Table 3. Across all
covered entities, the Department estimates a cost of $55,109,137 [=
774,331 x (30/60) x $142.34]. The Department does not anticipate any
new costs for health care providers associated with distribution of the
revised notice other than posting it on the entity's website (if it has
one) because health care providers have an ongoing obligation to
provide the notice to first-time patients that is already accounted for
in cost estimates for the HIPAA Rules. Health plans that post their NPP
online would incur minimal costs by posting the updated notice, and
then, including the updated NPP in the next annual mailing to
subscribers.\347\ Health plans that do not provide an annual mailing
would potentially incur an additional $12,743,700 in capital expenses
for mailing the revised NPP to an estimated 10 percent of the
150,000,000 health plan subscribers who receive a mailed, paper copy of
the notice, as well as the labor expense for an administrative support
staff member at the rate shown in Table 3 to complete the mailing, for
approximately $2,610,000 [= 62,500 hours x $41.76]. The Department
further estimates the cost of posting the revised NPP on the covered
entity's website would be 15 minutes of a web designer's time at the
wage reported in Table 3. Across all covered entities, the Department
estimates a cost of online posting as $17,770,896 [= 774,331 x (15/60)
x $91.80].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\347\ 45 CFR 164.520(c)(1)(v)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. Estimated Costs for Developing New or Modified Policies and
Procedures
The Department anticipates that covered entities would need to
develop new or modified policies and procedures related to new
requirements for attestations, prohibited uses and disclosures, certain
uses and disclosures permitted under 45 CFR 164.512, and clarification
of personal representative qualifications. The Department estimates
that the costs associated with developing policies and procedures would
be the labor of a lawyer for 2.5 hours and that this expense would
represent the largest area of cost for compliance with the rule once
finalized, for a total of $275,545,686 [= 774,331 x 2.5 x $142.34].
f. Costs Associated With Training Workforce Members
The Department anticipates that covered entities would be able to
incorporate new content into existing HIPAA training requirements and
that the costs associated with doing so would be attributed to the
labor of a training specialist for an estimated 90 minutes for a total
of $75,543,732 [= 774,331 x (90/60) x $65.04].
The Department invites comments on all aspects of its estimates and
assumptions, including the time spent on the identified activities and
the occupations or professions of persons designated to perform those
tasks.
g. Total Quantifiable Costs
The Department summarizes in Table 6 the estimated nonrecurring
costs that covered entities and states would experience in the first
year of implementing the proposed regulatory changes. The Department
anticipates that these costs would be for requesting exceptions from
preemption of state law, implementing the attestation requirement,
revising business associate agreements, revising the NPP, mailing it,
and posting it online, revising policies and procedures, and updating
HIPAA training programs.

Table 6--New Nonrecurring Costs of Compliance With the Proposed Rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Burden hours/action x Total costs
Nonrecurring costs hourly wage Respondents (millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exception Requests...................... 16 x $87.60............... 26 States................. $0.04
Attestations, New Form.................. 30/60 x $142.34........... 774,331 Covered entities.. 55
BAAs, Revising.......................... 1 x $142.34............... 350,000 BAAs.............. 50
NPP, Updating........................... 30/60 x $142.34........... 774,331 Covered entities.. 55
NPP, Mailing............................ 0.25/60 x $41.76.......... 15,000,000 Subscribers.... 3
NPP, Posting Online..................... 15/60 x $91.80............ 774,331 Covered entities.. 18
Policies & Procedures................... 150/60 x $142.34.......... 774,331 Covered entities.. 276
Training................................ 90/60 x $65.04............ 774,331 Covered entities.. 76
Capital Expenses, Mailing NPPs--Health $.85/NPP.................. 15,000,000 Subscribers.... 13
Plans.
---------------
Total Nonrecurring Burden........... .......................... .......................... \a\ 544
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Totals may not add up due to rounding.

Table 7 summarizes the recurring costs that the Department
anticipates covered entities would incur annually as a result of the
proposed regulatory changes. These new costs would be based on
responding to requests for disclosures for which an attestation is
required.

[[Page 23546]]

Table 7--Recurring Annual Costs of Compliance With the Proposed Rule \a\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total annual
Recurring costs Burden hours/CE x wage Respondents cost
(millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclosures for which an attestation is 1 x $87.60................ 774,331 Covered entities.. $67,831,396
required.
---------------
Total Recurring Annual Burden....... .......................... .......................... 67,831,396
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Totals may not add up due to rounding.

Costs Borne by the Department
The covered entities that are operated by the Department would be
affected by the proposed changes in a similar manner to other covered
entities, and those costs have been factored into the estimates above.
The Department expects that it would incur costs related to
drafting and disseminating information about the proposed regulatory
changes to covered entities, including health care providers and health
plans. In addition, the Department anticipates that it may incur a 26-
fold increase in the number of requests for exceptions from state law
preemption in the first year after a final rule becomes effective, at
an estimated total cost of approximately $146,319 to analyze and
develop responses for an average cost of $7,410 per request. This
increase is based on the number of states that have or are likely to
pass more restrictive abortion laws \348\ and may seek to use or
disclose individuals' PHI to enforce those laws. This estimate assumes
that the Department receives and reviews exception requests from each
of those 26 states, that half of those require a more complex analysis,
and that all requests result in a written response within one year of
the final rule's publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\348\ See Elizabeth Nash, Lauren Cross, ``26 States Are Certain
or Likely to Ban Abortion Without Roe: Here's Which Ones and Why,''
Guttmacher Institute (published Oct. 28, 2021; updated Apr. 19, 2022
and Jan. 10, 2023), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2021/10/26-states-are-certain-or-likely-ban-abortion-without-roe-heres-which-ones-and-why. In January 2023, the number of projected states
dropped to 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Benefits of the Proposed Rule
The benefits of the proposed rule to individuals and families are
likely substantial, and yet are not fully quantifiable because the area
of health care the proposed rule addresses is among the most sensitive
and life-altering if privacy is violated. Additionally, the value of
privacy, which cannot be recovered once lost, and trust that privacy
will be protected by others, is difficult to quantify fully. Notably,
matters of reproductive health may include circumstances resulting in a
pregnancy, considerations concerning maternal and fetal health, family
genetic conditions, information concerning sexually transmitted
infections, and the relationship between prospective parents (including
victimization due to rape, incest, or sex trafficking). Involuntary or
poorly-timed disclosures can irreparably harm relationships and
reputations, and even result in job loss or other negative consequences
in the workplace,\349\ as well as investigation, civil litigation or
proceedings, and prosecution for lawful activities.\350\Additionally,
fear of potential penalties or liability that may result from
disclosing information to a health care provider related to accessing
abortion or other reproductive health care may cast a long shadow,
decreasing trust between individuals and health care providers,
discouraging and deterring access to other valuable and necessary
health care, or compromising ongoing or subsequent care if patient
medical records are not accurate or complete.\351\ The proposed rule
would prevent or reduce the harms discussed here, resulting in non-
quantifiable benefits to individuals and their families, friends, and
health care providers. In particular, the role of trust in the health
care system and its importance to the provision of high-quality health
care is discussed extensively in section III of this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\349\ See Danielle Keats Citron and Daniel J. Solove, ``Privacy
Harms,'' GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2021-11, GWU Law
School Public Law Research Paper No. 2021-11, 102 Boston University
Law Review 793, 830--861 (Feb. 9, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3782222.
\350\ See ``Lawyers preparing for abortion prosecutions warn
about health care, data privacy,'' supra note 166.
\351\ See ``Women with chronic conditions struggle to find
medications after abortion laws limit access,'' Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Division of Reproductive Health, National
Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (Jan. 4,
2023), https://www.cdc.gov/teenpregnancy/health-care-providers/index.htm; and ``Abortion Bans May Limit Essential Medications for
Women with Chronic Conditions,'' supra note 176.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department believes the proposed rule would increase health
literacy by improving access to complete information about health care
options for individuals.\352\ For example, the proposal to prohibit use
and disclosure of PHI for purposes of prosecuting an individual, a
person assisting them, or their health care provider would enable
health care providers to obtain and provide complete and accurate
medical information about reproductive health care without undue fear
of serious and costly repercussions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\352\ See Lynn M. Yee, Robert Silver, David M. Haas, et al.,
``Association of Health Literacy Among Nulliparous Individuals and
Maternal and Neonatal Outcomes,'' JAMA Network Open (Sept. 1, 2021),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2783674.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department believes that the proposed rule would also
contribute to increased access to prenatal health care at the critical
early stages of pregnancy by affording individuals the assurance that
they may obtain reproductive health care without fearing that records
related to that care would be subject to disclosure. For example, if a
sexually active individual fears they or their health care providers
could be subject to prosecution as a result of disclosure of their PHI,
the individual may avoid informing health care providers about symptoms
or asking questions of medical experts and may consequently fail to
receive the support and health care they need to obtain a pregnancy
diagnosis and receive appropriate, lawful health care.\353\ Similarly,
the proposed rule would likely contribute to decreasing the rate of
maternal mortality and morbidity by improving access to information
about health services.\354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\353\ See Texas Maternal Mortality and Morbidity Review
Committee and Department of State Health Services Joint Biennial
Report 2022, supra note 16.
\354\ See Helen Levy, Alex Janke, ``Health Literacy and Access
to Care,'' Journal of Health Communication (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4924568/; see also Brief for
Zurawski.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department believes that the proposed rule would contribute to
enhancing the mental health and emotional well-being of individuals
seeking or obtaining reproductive health care by reducing fear that
their PHI would be disclosed for an investigation

[[Page 23547]]

of or proceeding against, or prosecution of the individual, their
health care provider, or any persons facilitating the individual's
access to reproductive health care. This is especially important for
individuals who need access to reproductive health care because they
are survivors of rape, incest, or sex trafficking. For at least some
such individuals, certain types of reproductive health care, including
abortion, generally remain legal even if the option to terminate a
pregnancy is no longer available to the broader population under state
laws. The proposed rule is projected to prevent or reduce re-
victimization of pregnant individuals who have been subject to rape,
incest, or sex trafficking by protecting their PHI from disclosure.
Investigations and prosecutions that rely on that information may
be costly to defend against and thus financially draining for the
target of the investigation or prosecution and for persons who are not
the target of the investigation or prosecution but whose information
may be used as evidence against others. Witnesses or targets of an
investigation or prosecution may lose time from work and incur steep
legal bills that create unmanageable debt or otherwise harm the
economic stability of the individual, their family, and their health
care provider. In the absence of the proposal, much of those costs may
be for defending against the disclosure or use of PHI. Thus, the
Department expects that the proposed rule would contribute to families'
economic well-being by reducing the risk of exposure to costly
investigation or prosecution for lawful activities as a result of
disclosures of PHI.
The Department believes that the proposed rule would also
contribute to improved continuity of care and ongoing and subsequent
health care for individuals, thereby improving health outcomes. If a
health care provider believes that the patient's PHI is likely to be
disclosed without the patient's or the health care provider's knowledge
or consent, possibly to initiate or be used in criminal or civil
proceedings against the patient, their health care provider, or others,
the health care provider is more likely to omit information about a
patient's medical history or condition, or leave gaps or include
inaccuracies, when preparing patient medical records. And if an
individual's medical records lack complete information about the
individual's health history, a subsequent health care provider may not
be able to conduct an appropriate health assessment to reach a sound
diagnosis and recommend the best course of action for the individual.
Alternatively, health care providers may withhold from the individual
full and complete information about their treatment options because of
liability concerns stemming from fears about the privacy of an
individual's PHI.\355\ Heightened confidentiality and privacy
protections enable a health care provider to feel confident maintaining
full and complete patient records. Without complete patient records, an
individual is less likely to receive appropriate ongoing or future
health care, including correct diagnoses, and will be impeded in making
informed treatment decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\355\ See Brief for Zurawski at p. 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Comparison of Benefits and Costs
The Department expects the totality of the benefits of the proposed
rule to outweigh the costs because the rule would create a net benefit
to society, particularly for the significant number of individuals who
could become pregnant (nearly one-fourth of the population of the U.S.)
and who need access to lawful health care without the risk of their PHI
being used or disclosed in furtherance of criminal, civil, or
administrative investigations or proceedings. The Department expects
covered entities and individuals to benefit from covered entities'
increased flexibility and confidence to be able to provide health care
according to professional standards.
The Department's benefit-cost analysis asserts that the proposed
regulatory changes would help support individuals' right to access
health care and information about their health care options free of
government intrusion, enhance the relationship between health care
professionals and individuals, strengthen maternal well-being and
family stability, and support victims of rape, incest, and sex
trafficking. The regulatory proposals would also aid health care
providers in developing and maintaining a high level of trust between
health care professionals and individuals and maintaining complete and
accurate patient medical records to aid ongoing and subsequent health
care. Greater levels of trust would further enable individuals to
develop and maintain relationships with health care professionals,
which would enhance continuity of health care for all individuals
receiving care from the health care provider, not only those in need of
reproductive health care.
The financial costs of the proposed rule would accrue primarily to
covered entities, particularly health care providers and health plans
in the first year after implementation of a final rule, with recurring
costs accruing annually at a lower rate.
4. Request for Comment
jj. The Department requests comment on all the estimates,
assumptions, and analyses within the cost-benefits analysis, including
the costs to regulated entities and individuals.
kk. The Department also requests comments on any relevant
information or data that would inform a quantitative analysis of
proposed reforms that the Department qualitatively addresses in this
RIA. Specifically, the Department requests comment on the following:
i. Whether this proposed rule would affect other activities of
regulated entities, including their ability to comply with other laws,
and, if so, how.
ii. Whether the proposed prohibition on the use or disclosure of
PHI for a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation or
proceeding against any person in connection with seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that is lawful
under the circumstances in which it is provided would affect the
disclosure of PHI between health care providers or between health care
providers and health plans for treatment purposes.
iii. Whether the proposed prohibition on the use or disclosure of
PHI for a criminal, civil, or administrative investigation or
proceeding against any person in connection with seeking obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that is lawful
under the circumstances in which it is provided would affect the
provision of access to individuals who request copies of their own PHI.
iv. Data about the costs to regulated entities of determining
whether reproductive health care revealed in PHI that is the subject of
a request under 45 CFR 164.512(d) through (f) and (g)(1) was lawful
under the circumstances in which it was provided.
v. Data about the costs to regulated entities of determining
whether a request for the use or disclosure of PHI is for a prohibited
purpose where an attestation is not provided.
vi. Whether the ongoing cost associated with the burden of
responding to requests for PHI with an authorization is an appropriate
comparator for the ongoing cost associated with the burden of
responding to requests for PHI that may require an attestation.
vii. The number of requests regulated entities receive annually for
uses and disclosures under 45 CFR 164.512(d) through (f) and (g)(1),
and the number of individuals' records encompassed by those requests.

[[Page 23548]]

viii. Data about the costs and any other burdens for regulated
entities associated with determining that a request is for PHI that is
potentially related to reproductive health care.
ix. Whether the lack of an attestation for some requests received
under 45 CFR 164.512(d) through (f) and (g)(1) would increase the time
needed to process each request.
ll. The Department also requests comments on whether there may be
other indirect costs and benefits resulting from the changes in the
proposed rule and welcomes additional information that may help
quantify those costs and benefits.

B. Regulatory Alternatives to the Proposed Rule

The Department welcomes public comment on any benefits or drawbacks
of the following alternatives it considered, but did not propose, while
developing this proposed rule. The Department also requests comment on
whether the Department should reconsider any of the alternatives
considered, and if so, why.
No Regulatory Changes
The Department carefully considered several alternatives to issuing
this NPRM, including the option of not pursuing any regulatory changes,
but rejected that approach for several reasons. Recent developments in
state law that impose greater restrictions on access to reproductive
health care are generating significant confusion for individuals,
health care providers, and family, friends, and caregivers regarding
their ability to privately seek, obtain, provide, or facilitate lawful
reproductive health care. In light of these developments, there is
significant confusion about the extent to which reproductive health
care information is protected by the Privacy Rule. Perhaps most
importantly, the current regulatory environment is diminishing the
ability of individuals to receive medically appropriate health care
that remains legal under the circumstances in which it is provided--
including in a wide range of contexts beyond reproductive care--thus
putting their health at increased risk.\356\ The Department believes
that the Privacy Rule should be modified to protect the privacy of PHI
to better support the provision of appropriate, timely, and lawful
reproductive health care and other health care for pregnant individuals
in the current environment. The proposed regulatory changes would
further Congressional intent to protect the privacy of IIHI and bolster
patient-provider confidentiality. Revising the Privacy Rule would
clarify covered entities' obligations and flexibilities, protect the
privacy of individuals' PHI, and improve the quality of individuals'
health care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\356\ See ``Methotrexate access becomes challenging for some
patients following Supreme Court decision on abortion,'' ``Abortion
restrictions may be making it harder for patients to get a cancer
and arthritis drug,'' ``Abortion bans complicate access to drugs for
cancer, arthritis, even ulcers,'' supra note 175. See also, e.g.,
``Women with chronic conditions struggle to find medications after
abortion laws limit access,'' ``Abortion Bans May Limit Essential
Medications for Women with Chronic Conditions,'' supra note 176.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Modify Privacy Rule Without Preempting State Law
The Department also considered whether to remove the Privacy Rule
permissions for a covered entity to comply with certain other legal
requirements to use or disclose PHI, such as the terms of a court order
or other judicial or administrative process without preempting statutes
or regulations that specifically require regulated entities to make
uses and disclosures of PHI about an individual's reproductive health.
The Department believes that this approach would not protect an
individual from having their PHI disclosed and used against them when
another law requires the disclosure. As discussed in the preamble, the
Department believes that this result would undermine trust in the
health care system and thereby decrease access to quality health care,
as well as interfere with continuity of care by compromising the
accuracy and completeness of patient medical records, contrary to
Congress' intent in enacting HIPAA. The Department believes that these
harms outweigh the states' interests in this context. The Department
therefore proposes to preempt state law that would require use or
disclosure of PHI about an individual's reproductive health for
prohibited purposes, as discussed herein.
Modify the Privacy Rule To Align With 42 CFR Part 2 for Uses and
Disclosures of PHI for Certain Criminal and Noncriminal Proceedings
Against an Individual
The Department also considered proposing to apply requirements
equivalent to 42 CFR part 2 (referred to as ``part 2'') for uses and
disclosures of PHI for certain criminal and noncriminal proceedings
against an individual based on their alleged decision to obtain, or
attempt to obtain, reproductive health care. However, the Department
believes this approach also would not protect an individual from having
their PHI disclosed and potentially used against them pursuant to a
court order, and thus it also would not prevent regulated entities from
disclosing an individual's PHI for purposes of imposing criminal or
civil liability on an individual, health care provider, or other
person, for obtaining, providing, or facilitating lawful reproductive
health care. Part 2 affords some discretion to courts to order
disclosures of part 2 records in certain circumstances; however, part 2
also expressly prohibits further use or disclosure of those records by
any recipient for a proceeding against a patient. The Privacy Rule only
regulates uses and disclosures by regulated entities; the Privacy Rule
cannot limit further uses or disclosures by other persons who receive
an individual's health information from a regulated entity. Therefore,
an approach similar to part 2 would not sufficiently strengthen privacy
protections with respect to the purposes for which this proposal would
prohibit the use or disclosure of PHI.
Require a Valid Authorization Before Using or Disclosing PHI for
Certain Purposes
As an alternative to prohibiting certain uses and disclosures as
proposed in this NPRM, the Department considered proposing to permit
regulated entities to make such uses or disclosures of PHI only after
obtaining a valid authorization. However, the Department has concerns
regarding the potential for coercion or harassment of individuals to
pressure them into providing authorization for access to their PHI by
persons requesting the disclosure, such as law enforcement. In such a
scenario, covered entities would be forced to choose between their
obligations under state law and their Privacy Rule compliance
responsibilities in the event that an individual declined to provide an
authorization, undermining health information privacy protections for
individuals. As a result, the Department's current view is that an
authorization approach would not adequately ensure trust in the
relationship between health care professionals and individuals.
Require Covered Entities To Agree to Requests for Restrictions on
Disclosures of PHI for Treatment, Payment, and Health Care Operations
Concerns have arisen that some states may attempt to criminalize or
otherwise penalize individuals for traveling out of state to obtain
reproductive health care, or other persons for assisting individuals
who do, notwithstanding

[[Page 23549]]

relevant constitutional protections. The Department thus considered
including a proposal that would have required regulated entities to
agree to requests from individuals to restrict disclosures of PHI
related to reproductive health care for treatment, payment, or health
care operations. This may lower the risk of PHI being disclosed to
covered entities in states that may seek to obtain it pursuant to a
criminal, civil, or administrative investigation or proceeding related
to the receipt or facilitation of reproductive health care. However,
the Department has concerns about the ability of regulated entities to
operationalize such a requirement. Further, the requirement would
likely be overly restrictive for regulated entities and may not improve
the quality of health care. Additionally, this approach would be
dependent on individuals' awareness of their right to make a request
for restrictions and confidence that such requests would be granted.
The Privacy Rule permits regulated entities to accept requests for
restrictions from individuals, although they are only mandated to
accept such requests to prevent disclosures to an individual's health
plan for health care that has been paid in full by the individual.
Prohibit Uses and Disclosures of PHI Related to Reproductive Health
Care
The Department considered limiting the prohibition to uses and
disclosures of PHI related to reproductive health care for certain
purposes. However, as discussed in the preamble, this would have
required the Department to define what constitutes ``related to''
reproductive health care. Given the connection between reproductive
health care and other types of health care, the Department believes
that it would not be possible to create such a definition at this time
without being both under- and over-inclusive. The difficulty of
defining this category could make it impossible for electronic health
records to reliably segregate the information.
In addition, requiring regulated entities to take actions that
necessitate treating one category of PHI differently than other PHI
(e.g., imposing conditions on uses and disclosures that would require
such entities to label or segment certain PHI within medical records)
would hinder coordinated care and potentially result in negative health
outcomes if treating clinicians are unaware of an individual's complete
medical history. As a result, the Department believes that this
approach would not enhance access to quality health care.
Under the current proposal, regulated entities would be required to
obtain an attestation from persons requesting PHI that is ``potentially
related to reproductive health care'' when the request is made pursuant
to the use and disclosure permissions at 45 CFR 164.512(d) through (f)
or (g)(1). While the language itself is similar, the Department
believes using it in this instance would not create the same
operational challenges described above. For example, because the
proposed attestation requirement would apply only to certain
permissions that are not used by covered health care providers to
disclose PHI to other health care providers for treatment purposes,
care coordination would not be hindered. Additionally, we do not
believe that this approach would implicate the segmentation concerns
described above because ``potentially related to reproductive health
care'' is broader than ``related to reproductive health care.'' This
would require regulated entities to consider the full scope and context
of the PHI requested to determine whether it could reveal information
about the individual's reproductive health.
Prohibit the Uses and Disclosures of PHI Proposed in This Rule Without
the Rule of Applicability
The Department considered prohibiting the use or disclosure of PHI
for the purpose of investigating or conducting a proceeding against any
person for seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive
care, regardless of whether the care was lawful under state or Federal
law. However, the Department is concerned that this uniform approach
would have placed significant burdens on states' abilities to enforce
their laws. The Department has therefore proposed the more tailored
approach in this proposed rule.
Require Attestations for Requests for Any PHI Under 45 CFR 164.512(d)
Through (f) and (g)(1)
The Department considered requiring that regulated entities obtain
an attestation before using or disclosing any PHI under 45 CFR
164.512(d) through (f) and (g)(1). However, this could have placed an
unnecessary burden on regulated entities and persons requesting PHI by
requiring attestations even under circumstances in which the requested
disclosure would be unlikely to implicate the prohibition. Thus, the
Department has taken a narrower approach to the proposed attestation
requirement.
Require Attestations To Include Names of Individuals Whose PHI Is Being
Sought for All Requests
The Department considered requiring that an attestation include the
name of any individual whose PHI is being requested, without providing
an option for the requestor to identify a class of individuals if it is
not practicable to provide the individuals' names. However, this could
have impeded investigations of health care fraud, for example, where
health oversight agencies and law enforcement authorities know the name
of a suspected health care provider, but may not know the names of
individuals before the request is made. Therefore, where providing the
names of individuals is not practicable, the Department has proposed an
option for identifying a class of individuals.

C. Regulatory Flexibility Act--Small Entity Analysis

The Department has examined the economic implications of this
proposed rule as required by the RFA. This analysis, as well as other
sections in this RIA, serves as the Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis, as required under the RFA.
For purposes of the RFA, small entities include small businesses,
nonprofit organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions. The Act
defines ``small entities'' as (1) a proprietary firm meeting the size
standards of the Small Business Administration (SBA), (2) a nonprofit
organization that is not dominant in its field, and (3) a small
government jurisdiction of less than 50,000 population. Because 90
percent or more of all health care providers meet the SBA size standard
for a small business or are a nonprofit organization, the Department
generally treats all health care providers as small entities for
purposes of performing a regulatory flexibility analysis. The SBA size
standard for health care providers ranges between a maximum of $8
million and $41.5 million in annual receipts, depending upon the type
of entity.\357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\357\ See ``Table of Small Business Size Standards,'' U.S. Small
Business Administration (July 14, 2022), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2022-07/Table%20of%20Size%20Standards_Effective%20July%2014%202022_Final-508.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With respect to health insurers, the SBA size standard is a maximum
of $41.5 million in annual receipts, and for third party administrators
it is $40 million.\358\ While some insurers are classified as
nonprofit, it is possible

[[Page 23550]]

they are dominant in their market. For example, a number of Blue Cross/
Blue Shield insurers are organized as nonprofit entities; yet they
dominate the health insurance market in the states where they are
licensed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\358\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

For the reasons stated below, it is not expected that the cost of
compliance would be significant for small entities. Nor is it expected
that the cost of compliance would fall disproportionately on small
entities. Although many of the covered entities affected by the
proposed rule are small entities, they would not bear a
disproportionate cost burden compared to the other entities subject to
the proposed rule.
The projected total costs are discussed in detail in the RIA. The
Department does not view this as a burden because the result of the
changes would be annualized costs per covered entity of approximately
$236 [= $183 million \359\/774,331 covered entities]. Thus, this
analysis concludes, and the Secretary proposes to certify, that the
proposed rule, if finalized, would not result in a significant economic
effect on a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\359\ This figure represents annualized costs discounted at a 3%
rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Executive Order 13132--Federalism

As required by E.O. 13132 on Federalism, the Department has
examined the effects of provisions in the proposed regulation on the
relationship between the Federal Government and the states. In the
Department's view, this proposed regulation would have federalism
implications because it would have direct effects on the states, the
relationship between the National Government and states, and on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among various levels of
government relating to the disclosure of PHI.
Any federalism implications of the rule, however, flow from and are
consistent with the underlying statute--and the proposed Rule of
Applicability would limit the proposed regulation to those
circumstances in which the state lacks any substantial interest in
seeking the disclosure. The statute allows the Department to preempt
state or local rules that provide less stringent privacy protection
requirements than Federal law.\360\ Section 3(b) of E.O. 13132
recognizes that national action limiting the policymaking discretion of
states will be imposed only where there is constitutional and statutory
authority for the action and the national activity is appropriate in
light of the presence of a problem of national significance. The
privacy of PHI is of national concern by virtue of the scope of
interstate health commerce. As described in the preamble, recent state
actions on reproductive health care have undermined the longstanding
expectation among individuals in all states that their highly sensitive
reproductive health information will remain private. These state
actions thus directly threaten the trust that is essential to ensuring
access to, and quality of, lawful health care. HIPAA's provisions
reflect this position by authorizing the Secretary to promulgate
regulations to implement the Privacy Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\360\ 42 U.S.C. 1320d-7(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 4(a) of E.O. 13132 expressly contemplates preemption when
there is a conflict between exercising state and Federal authority
under a Federal statute. Section 4(b) of the E.O. authorizes preemption
of state law in the Federal rulemaking context when ``the exercise of
State authority directly conflicts with the exercise of Federal
authority under the Federal statute.'' The approach in this regulation
is consistent with these standards in the Executive order in
superseding state authority only when such authority is inconsistent
with standards established pursuant to the grant of Federal authority
under the statute. State and local laws that impose less stringent
requirements for the protection of reproductive health information
undermine Congress' intent to ensure that all individuals who receive
health care are assured a minimum level of privacy for their PHI. Both
the personal and public interest is served by protecting PHI so as not
to undermine an individual's access to and quality of health care
services and their trust in the health care system.
Section 6(b) of E.O. 13132 includes some qualitative discussion of
substantial direct compliance costs that state and local governments
would incur as a result of a proposed regulation. The Department
anticipates that the most significant direct costs on state and local
governments would be the cost for state and local government-operated
covered entities to revise business associate agreements, revise
policies and procedures, create a new form for attestations, update the
NPP, update training programs, and process requests for disclosures for
which an attestation is required. In addition, the Department
anticipates that approximately half of the states may choose to file a
request for an exception to preemption. The longstanding regulatory
provisions that govern preemption exception requests under the HIPAA
Rules would remain undisturbed by this proposed rule.\361\ However,
based on the legal developments in some states that are described
elsewhere in this preamble, the Department believes it is likely that,
in the first year of implementation of a final rule, more states will
submit requests for exceptions from preemption than have done so in the
past. The RIA above addresses these costs in detail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\361\ 45 CFR 160.201 through 160.205.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Department requests comment from local and state governments on
provisions in the proposed rule that would preempt state and local laws
and on whether state and local governments are likely to incur
additional costs, such as those associated with the effects of the
prohibited disclosures on law enforcement's access to information.

E. Assessment of Federal Regulation and Policies on Families

Section 654 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations
Act of 1999 \362\ requires Federal departments and agencies to
determine whether a proposed policy or regulation could affect family
well-being. If the determination is affirmative, then the Department or
agency must prepare an impact assessment to address criteria specified
in the law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\362\ Public Law 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (Oct. 21, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The proposed rule would strengthen the stability of the family and
marital commitment because it enables individuals and families to have
access to the full range of reproductive health care information and
access to options for consideration when making sensitive decisions
about family planning. The proposed rule may be carried out only by the
Federal Government because it would modify Federal health privacy law,
ensuring that American families have access to reproductive health care
information and can freely discuss their reproductive health,
regardless of the state where they are located when health care is
accessed. Access to reproductive health care and information about the
full range of reproductive health care is vital for individuals who may
become pregnant or who are capable of becoming pregnant.

F. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 \363\ (PRA), agencies are
required to submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
review and approval any reporting or record-keeping requirements
inherent in a

[[Page 23551]]

proposed or final rule, and are required to publish such proposed
requirements for public comment. The PRA requires agencies to provide a
60-day notice in the Federal Register and solicit public comment on a
proposed collection of information before it is submitted to OMB for
review and approval. To fairly evaluate whether an information
collection should be approved by the OMB, section 3506(c)(2)(A) of the
PRA requires that the Department solicit comment on the following
issues:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\363\ Public Law 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (May 22, 1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Whether the information collection is necessary and useful to
carry out the proper functions of the agency;
2. The accuracy of the agency's estimate of the information
collection burden;
3. The quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be
collected; and
4. Recommendations to minimize the information collection burden on
the affected public, including automated collection techniques.
The PRA requires consideration of the time, effort, and financial
resources necessary to meet the information collection requirements
referenced in this section. The Department explicitly seeks, and will
consider, public comment on its assumptions as they relate to the PRA
requirements summarized in this section. To comment on the collection
of information or to obtain copies of the supporting statements and any
related forms for the proposed paperwork collections referenced in this
section, email your comment or request, including your address and
phone number to [email protected], or call the Reports Clearance
Office at (202) 690-6162. Written comments and recommendations for the
proposed information collections must be directed to the OS Paperwork
Clearance Officer at the above email address within 60 days.
In this NPRM, the Department is revising certain information
collection requirements and, as such, is revising the information
collection last prepared in 2019 and previously approved under OMB
control # 0945-0003. The revised information collection describes all
new and adjusted information collection requirements for covered
entities pursuant to the implementing regulation for HIPAA at 45 CFR
parts 160 and 164, the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Breach Notification,
and Enforcement Rules.
The estimated annual labor burden presented by the proposed
regulatory modifications in the first year of implementation, including
nonrecurring and recurring burdens, is 5,189,569 burden hours at a cost
of $596,728,985 \364\ and $67,831,396 of estimated annual labor costs
in years two through five. The overall total burden for respondents to
comply with the information collection requirements of all of the HIPAA
Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Rules, including
nonrecurring and recurring burdens presented by proposed program
changes, is 955,098,062 burden hours at a cost of $101,685,085,101,
plus $188,873,438 in capital costs for a total estimated annual burden
of $101,873,958,539 in the first year following the effective date of
the final rule, assuming all changes are adopted as proposed. Details
describing the burden analysis for the proposals associated with this
NPRM are presented below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\364\ This includes an increase of 416 burden hours and $36,442
in costs added to the existing information collection for requesting
exemption determinations under 45 CFR 160.204.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Explanation of Estimated Annualized Burden Hours
Below is a summary of the significant program changes and
adjustments made since the 2019 information collection. These program
changes and adjustments form the bases for the burden estimates
presented in information collection request associated with this NPRM.
Adjusted Estimated Annual Burdens of Compliance
(1) Increasing the number of covered entities from 700,000 to
774,331 based on program change;
(2) Increasing the number of respondents requesting exceptions to
state law preemption from 1 to 27 based on an expected reaction by
states that have enacted restrictions on reproductive health care
access;
(3) Increasing the burden hours by a factor of two for responding
to individuals' requests for restrictions on disclosures of their PHI
under 45 CFR 164.522 to represent a doubling of the expected requests;
and
(4) Increasing the total number of NPPs distributed by health plans
by 50% to total 300,000,000 due to the increase in number of Americans
with health coverage.
New Burdens Resulting From Program Changes
In addition to these changes, the Department added new annual
burdens as a result of program changes:
(1) A nonrecurring burden of 30 minutes per covered entity to
create a new attestation form using the sample provided by the
Department;
(2) A recurring burden of 1 hour per covered entity for uses and
disclosures for which an attestation must be obtained from the person
requesting the use and disclosure;
(3) A nonrecurring burden of 1 hour per business associate
agreement that is revised as a result of the proposed changes to
handling requests under 45 CFR 164.512(d), (e), (f), and (g)(1), to
allocate responsibilities between covered entities and their release-
of-information contractors;
(4) A nonrecurring burden of 30 minutes per covered entity to
update the required content of its NPP;
(5) A nonrecurring burden of 15 minutes per covered entity for
posting an updated NPP online;
(6) A nonrecurring burden of 2.5 hours for each covered entity to
update its policies and procedures; and
(7) A nonrecurring burden of 90 minutes for each covered entity to
update the content of its HIPAA training program.

VI. Request for Comment

In addition to the questions posed above, the Department also seeks
comment on the following questions:
mm. Whether individuals who are members of historically underserved
and minority communities are more likely to be subjects of
investigations into or proceedings against persons in connection with
obtaining, providing, or facilitating lawful reproductive health care.
If so, please explain the relationship to and effects on the health
information privacy of community members, including data and citations
to relevant literature.
nn. Whether individuals who are members of historically underserved
and minority communities are less likely to have access to legal
counsel when facing investigations into or proceedings against persons
in connection with obtaining, providing, or facilitating lawful
reproductive health care. If so, please explain the relationship to and
effects on the health information privacy of community members,
including data and citations to relevant literature.
oo. With respect to an individual's right to restrict uses and
disclosures of their PHI under 45 CFR 164.522(a)(1):
i. Whether individuals are generally aware of this right.
ii. Whether covered entities have experienced an increase in
requests from individuals to exercise this right.
iii. Whether regulated entities have been or are more likely to
grant individuals such requests considering the recent developments in
the legal environment.

[[Page 23552]]

VII. Public Participation

The Department seeks comment on all issues raised by the proposed
regulation, including any unintended adverse consequences. Because of
the large number of public comments normally received on Federal
Register documents, the Department is not able to acknowledge or
respond to them individually. In developing the final rule, the
Department will consider the public comments that are received by the
date and time specified in the DATES section of the Preamble, in
accordance with the agency practices described in the section labeled
ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects

45 CFR Part 160

Administrative practice and procedure, Computer technology,
Electronic information system, Electronic transactions, Employer
benefit plan, Health, Health care, Health facilities, Health insurance,
Health professions, Health records, Hospitals, Investigations,
Medicaid, Medical research, Medicare, Penalties, Preemption, Privacy,
Public health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Reproductive
health care, Security.

45 CFR Part 164

Administrative practice and procedure, Computer technology, Drug
abuse, Electronic information system, Electronic transactions, Employer
benefit plan, Health, Health care, Health facilities, Health insurance,
Health professions, Health records, Hospitals, Medicaid, Medical
research, Privacy, Public health, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Reproductive health care, Security.

Proposed Rule

For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Department of Health
and Human Services proposes to amend 45 CFR subtitle A, subchapter C,
parts 160 and 164 as set forth below:

PART 160--GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS

0
1. The authority citation for part 160 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 1302(a); 42 U.S.C. 1320d-1320d-9; sec.
264, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2033-2034 (42 U.S.C. 1320d-2
(note)); 5 U.S.C. 552; secs. 13400-13424, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat.
258-279; and sec. 1104 of Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 146-154.

0
2. Amend Sec. 160.103 by:
0
a. Revising the definition of ``Person''; and
0
b. Adding in alphabetical order the definitions of ``Public health''
and ``Reproductive health care''.
The revision and additions read as follows:

Sec. 160.103 Definitions.

* * * * *
Person means a natural person (meaning a human being who is born
alive), trust or estate, partnership, corporation, professional
association or corporation, or other entity, public or private.
* * * * *
Public health, as used in the terms ``public health surveillance,''
``public health investigation,'' and ``public health intervention,''
means population-level activities to prevent disease and promote health
of populations. Such activities do not include uses and disclosures for
the criminal, civil, or administrative investigation into or proceeding
against a person in connection with obtaining, providing, or
facilitating reproductive health care, or for the identification of any
person in connection with a criminal, civil, or administrative
investigation into or proceeding against a person in connection with
obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care.
Reproductive health care means care, services, or supplies related
to the reproductive health of the individual.
* * * * *

PART 164--SECURITY AND PRIVACY

0
3. The authority citation for part 164 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 1302(a); 42 U.S.C. 1320d-1320d-9; sec.
264, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2033-2034 (42 U.S.C. 1320d-2(note));
and secs. 13400-13424, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 258-279.

0
4. Amend Sec. 164.502 by revising paragraphs (a)(1)(iv) and (vi) and
adding paragraphs (a)(5)(iii) and (g)(5)(iii) to read as follows:

Sec. 164.502 Uses and disclosures of protected health information:
General rules.

(a) * * *
(1) * * *
(iv) Except for uses and disclosures prohibited under paragraph
(a)(5)(i) or (iii) of this section, pursuant to and in compliance with
a valid authorization under Sec. 164.508;
* * * * *
(vi) As permitted by and in compliance with any of the following:
(A) This section.
(B) Section 164.512 and, where applicable, Sec. 164.509.
(C) Section 164.514(e).
(D) Section 164.514(f).
(E) Section 164.514(g).
* * * * *
(5) * * *
(iii) Reproductive health care--(A) Prohibition. Subject to
paragraphs (a)(5)(iii)(C) and (D) of this section, a covered entity or
business associate may not use or disclose protected health information
for either of the following purposes.
(1) Where the use or disclosure is for a criminal, civil, or
administrative investigation into or proceeding against any person in
connection with seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating
reproductive health care.
(2) To identify any person for the purpose of initiating an
activity described at paragraph (a)(5)(iii)(A)(1) of this section.
(B) Scope of prohibition. For the purposes of this subpart,
seeking, obtaining, providing, or facilitating reproductive health care
includes, but is not limited to, any of the following: expressing
interest in, inducing, using, performing, furnishing, paying for,
disseminating information about, arranging, insuring, assisting, or
otherwise taking action to engage in reproductive health care; or
attempting any of the same.
(C) Rule of applicability. The prohibition at paragraph (a)(5)(iii)
of this section applies where one or more of the following conditions
exists.
(1) The relevant criminal, civil, or administrative investigation
or proceeding is in connection with any person seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care outside of the
state where the investigation or proceeding is authorized and where
such health care is lawful in the state in which it is provided.
(2) The relevant criminal, civil, or administrative investigation
or proceeding is in connection with any person seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that is protected,
required, or authorized by Federal law, regardless of the state in
which such health care is provided.
(3) The relevant criminal, civil, or administrative investigation
or proceeding is in connection with any person seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care that is provided in
the state in which the investigation or proceeding is authorized and
that is permitted by the law of that state.
(D) Rule of construction. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prohibit a use or disclosure of protected health
information otherwise permitted by this subpart unless such use or

[[Page 23553]]

disclosure is primarily for the purpose of investigating or imposing
liability on any person for the mere act of seeking, obtaining,
providing, or facilitating reproductive health care.
* * * * *
(g) * * *
(5) * * *
(iii) Paragraph (g)(5) of this section does not apply where the
primary basis for the covered entity's belief is the facilitation or
provision of reproductive health care by such person for and at the
request of the individual.
* * * * *
0
5. Add Sec. 164.509 to read as follows:

Sec. 164.509 Uses and disclosures for which an attestation is
required.

(a) Standard: Attestations for certain uses and disclosures of
protected health information to persons other than covered entities. A
covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information
potentially related to reproductive health care for purposes specified
in Sec. 164.512(d), (e), (f), or (g)(1), without obtaining an
attestation that is valid under this section from the person requesting
the use or disclosure.
(b) Implementation specifications: General requirements--(1) Valid
attestations. (i) A valid attestation is a document that meets the
requirements of paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
(ii) A valid attestation verifies that the use or disclosure is not
otherwise prohibited by Sec. 164.502(a)(5)(iii).
(iii) A valid attestation may be electronic, provided that it meets
the requirements in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, as applicable.
(2) Defective attestations. An attestation is not valid if the
document submitted has any of the following defects:
(i) The attestation lacks an element or statement required by
paragraph (c) of this section.
(ii) The attestation contains an element or statement not required
by paragraph (c) of this section.
(iii) The attestation violates paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(iv) The covered entity has actual knowledge that material
information in the attestation is false.
(v) It is objectively unreasonable for the covered entity to
believe that the attestation is true with respect to the requirement at
paragraph (c)(1)(iv) of this section.
(3) Compound attestation. An attestation may not be combined with
any other document.
(c) Implementation specifications: Content requirements and other
obligations--(1) Required elements. A valid attestation under this
section must contain the following elements:
(i) A description of the information requested that identifies the
information in a specific fashion, including one of the following:
(A) The name of any individual(s) whose protected health
information is sought, if practicable.
(B) If including the name(s) of any individual(s) whose protected
health information is sought is not practicable, a description of the
class of individuals whose protected health information is sought.
(ii) The name or other specific identification of the person(s), or
class of persons, who are requested to make the use or disclosure.
(iii) The name or other specific identification of the person(s),
or class of persons, to whom the covered entity is to make the
requested use or disclosure.
(iv) A clear statement that the use or disclosure is not for a
purpose prohibited under Sec. 164.502(a)(5)(iii).
(v) Signature of the person requesting the protected health
information, which may be an electronic signature, and date. If the
attestation is signed by a representative of the person requesting the
information, a description of such representative's authority to act
for the person must also be provided.
(2) Plain language requirement. The attestation must be written in
plain language.
(d) Material misrepresentations. If, during the course of using or
disclosing protected health information in reasonable reliance on a
facially valid attestation, a covered entity discovers information
reasonably showing that the representations in the attestation were
materially false, leading to uses or disclosures for a prohibited
purpose, the covered entity must cease such use or disclosure.
0
6. Amend Sec. 164.512 by:
0
a. Revising the introductory text and the heading of paragraph (c);
0
b. Adding paragraph (c)(3); and
0
c. Revising paragraph (f)(1)(ii)(C) introductory text.
The revisions and addition read as follows:

Sec. 164.512 Uses and disclosures for which an authorization or
opportunity to agree or object is not required.

Except as provided by Sec. 164.502(a)(5)(iii), a covered entity
may use or disclose protected health information without the written
authorization of the individual, as described in Sec. 164.508, or the
opportunity for the individual to agree or object as described in Sec.
164.510, in the situations covered by this section, subject to the
applicable requirements of this section and Sec. 164.509. When the
covered entity is required by this section to inform the individual of,
or when the individual may agree to, a use or disclosure permitted by
this section, the covered entity's information and the individual's
agreement may be given verbally.
* * * * *
(c) Standard: Disclosures about victims of abuse, neglect, or
domestic violence. * * *
(3) Rule of construction. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to permit disclosures prohibited by Sec. 164.502(a)(5)(iii)
when the report of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence is based
primarily on the provision of reproductive health care.
* * * * *
(f) * * *
(1) * * *
(ii) * * *
(C) An administrative request for which response is required by
law, including an administrative subpoena or summons, a civil or an
authorized investigative demand, or similar process authorized under
law, provided that:
* * * * *
0
7. Amend Sec. 164.520 by adding paragraphs (b)(1)(ii)(F) and (G) to
read as follows:

Sec. 164.520 Notice of privacy practices for protected health
information.

* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) * * *
(ii) * * *
(F) A description, including at least one example, of the types of
uses and disclosures prohibited under Sec. 164.502(a)(5)(iii) in
sufficient detail for an individual to understand the prohibition.
(G) A description, including at least one example, of the types of
uses and disclosures for which an attestation is required under Sec.
164.509.
* * * * *

Dated: April 5, 2023.
Xavier Becerra,
Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services.
[FR Doc. 2023-07517 Filed 4-12-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4153-01-P