[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 72 (Friday, April 14, 2023)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 23146-23274]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-05775]



[[Page 23145]]

Vol. 88

Friday,

No. 72

April 14, 2023

Part II





Securities and Exchange Commission





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17 CFR Parts 242 and 249





Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity; Proposed Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 72 / Friday, April 14, 2023 / 
Proposed Rules  

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 242 and 249

[Release No. 34-97143; File No. S7-07-23]
RIN 3235-AN25


Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'' or 
``SEC'') is proposing amendments to Regulation Systems Compliance and 
Integrity (``Regulation SCI'') under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (``Exchange Act''). The proposed amendments would expand the 
definition of ``SCI entity'' to include a broader range of key market 
participants in the U.S. securities market infrastructure, and update 
certain provisions of Regulation SCI to take account of developments in 
the technology landscape of the markets since the adoption of 
Regulation SCI in 2014. The proposed expansion would add the following 
entities to the definition of ``SCI entity'': registered security-based 
swap data repositories (``SBSDRs''); registered broker-dealers 
exceeding an asset or transaction activity threshold; and additional 
clearing agencies exempted from registration. The proposed updates 
would amend provisions of Regulation SCI relating to systems 
classification and lifecycle management; third party/vendor management; 
cybersecurity; the SCI review; the role of current SCI industry 
standards; and recordkeeping and related matters. Further, the 
Commission is requesting comment on whether significant-volume 
alternative trading systems (ATSs) and/or broker-dealers using 
electronic or automated systems for trading of corporate debt 
securities or municipal securities should be subject to Regulation SCI.

DATES: Comments should be received on or before June 13, 2023.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml); or
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number S7-07-23 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments to, Secretary, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number S7-07-23. This file number 
should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help the 
Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please 
use only one method of submission. The Commission will post all 
comments on the Commission's website (https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments are also available for website viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20549 on official business days between the hours of 10 
a.m. and 3 p.m. Operating conditions may limit access to the 
Commission's Public Reference Room. All comments received will be 
posted without change. Persons submitting comments are cautioned that 
we do not redact or edit personal identifying information from comment 
submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make 
available publicly.
    Studies, memoranda, or other substantive items may be added by the 
Commission or staff to the comment file during this rulemaking. A 
notification of the inclusion in the comment file of any materials will 
be made available on our website. To ensure direct electronic receipt 
of such notifications, sign up through the ``Stay Connected'' option at 
www.sec.gov to receive notifications by email.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Heidi Pilpel, Senior Special Counsel; 
David Liu, Special Counsel; Sara Hawkins, Special Counsel; Gita 
Subramaniam, Special Counsel; Josh Nimmo, Special Counsel; An Phan, 
Special Counsel, at (202) 551-5500, Office of Market Supervision, 
Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is proposing amendments to 
the following rules under the Exchange Act and conforming amendments to 
Form SCI.

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           Commission reference                CFR citation (17 CFR)
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Rule 1000................................  Sec.   242.1000
Rule 1001................................  Sec.   242.1001
Rule 1001(a).............................  Sec.   242.1001(a)
Rule 1001(a)(2)..........................  Sec.   242.1001(a)(2)
Rule 1001(a)(2)(v).......................  Sec.   242.1001(a)(2)(v)
Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi)......................  Sec.   242.1001(a)(2)(vi)
Rule 1001(a)(2)(vii).....................  Sec.   242.1001(a)(2)(vii)
Rule 1001(a)(4)..........................  Sec.   242.1001(a)(4)
Rule 1002................................  Sec.   242.1002
Rule 1002(b).............................  Sec.   242.1002(b)
Rule 1002(b)(4)(ii)(B)...................  Sec.   242.1002(b)(4)(ii)(B)
Rule 1002(b)(5)..........................  Sec.   242.1002(b)(5)
Rule 1002(b)(5)(i).......................  Sec.   242.1002(b)(5)(i)
Rule 1002(b)(5)(ii)......................  Sec.   242.1002(b)(5)(ii)
Rule 1002(c).............................  Sec.   242.1002(c)
Rule 1002(c)(3)..........................  Sec.   242.1002(c)(3)
Rule 1002(c)(4)..........................  Sec.   242.1002(c)(4)
Rule 1002(c)(4)(i).......................  Sec.   242.1002(c)(4)(i)
Rule 1002(c)(4)(ii)......................  Sec.   242.1002(c)(4)(ii)
Rule 1003................................  Sec.   242.1003
Rule 1003(b).............................  Sec.   242.1003(b)
Rule 1003(b)(1)..........................  Sec.   242.1003(b)(1)
Rule 1003(b)(2)..........................  Sec.   242.1003(b)(2)
Rule 1003(b)(3)..........................  Sec.   242.1003(b)(3)
Rule 1004................................  Sec.   242.1004
Rule 1004(a).............................  Sec.   242.1004(a)
Rule 1004(b).............................  Sec.   242.1004(b)
Rule 1005................................  Sec.   242.1005
Rule 1005(c).............................  Sec.   242.1005(c)
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I. Introduction
II. Background and Overview
    A. History of Regulation SCI
    B. Current Regulation SCI
    1. SCI Entities and SCI Systems
    2. Reasonably Designed Policies and Procedures
    3. SCI Events
    4. Systems Changes and SCI Review
    5. Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Testing with 
Members/Participants
    6. Recordkeeping and Other Provisions (Rules 1005-1007)
    C. Overview of Proposed Amendments to Regulation SCI
III. Proposed Amendments to Regulation SCI
    A. Definition of SCI Entity
    1. Evolution: Current and Proposed SCI Entities
    2. New Proposed SCI Entities
    3. General Request for Comment on Proposed Expansion of SCI 
Entities
    B. Request for Comment Regarding Significant-Volume Fixed Income 
ATSs and Broker-Dealers Using Electronic or Automated Systems for 
Trading of Corporate Debt Securities or Municipal Securities
    1. Discussion
    2. Request for Comment
    C. Strengthening Obligations of SCI Entities
    1. Systems Classification and Lifecycle Management
    2. Third-Party Provider Management
    3. Security
    4. SCI Review
    5. Current SCI Industry Standards
    6. Other Changes
    D. SCI Entities Subject to the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal and/or Regulation S-P
    1. Discussion
    2. Request for Comment
IV. Paperwork Reduction Act
    A. Summary of Collections of Information
    B. Proposed Use of Information
    1. Rule 1001 of Regulation SCI
    2. Rule 1002 of Regulation SCI
    3. Rule 1003 of Regulation SCI
    4. Rule 1004 of Regulation SCI
    5. Rule 1005 and 1007 of Regulation SCI
    6. Rule 1006 of Regulation SCI

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    C. Respondents
    D. Total Initial and Annual Reporting Burdens
    1. Rule 1001
    2. Rule 1002
    3. Rule 1003
    4. Rule 1004
    5. Rule 1005
    6. Rule 1006
    7. Summary of the Information Collection Burden
    E. Collection of Information Is Mandatory
    F. Confidentiality of Responses to Collection of Information
    G. Request for Comment
V. Economic Analysis
    A. Introduction
    B. Baseline
    1. New SCI Entities
    2. Existing SCI Entities:
    3. Current Market Practice
    4. Other Affected Parties
    C. Analysis of Benefits and Costs of Proposed Amendments
    1. General Benefits and Costs of Proposed Amendments
    2. Expansion to New SCI Entities
    3. Specific Benefits and Costs of Regulation SCI Requirements 
for All SCI Entities
    D. Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation Analysis
    E. Reasonable Alternatives
    1. Limiting the Scope of the Regulation SCI Provisions for New 
SCI Entities
    2. Mandating Compliance with Current SCI Industry Standards
    3. Requiring Diversity of Back-Up Plan Resources
    4. Penetration Testing Frequency
    5. Attestation for Critical SCI System Vendors
    6. Transaction Activity Threshold for SCI Broker-Dealers
    7. Limitation on Definition of ``SCI Systems'' for SCI Broker-
Dealers
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
    A. ``Small Entity'' Definitions
    B. Current SCI Entities
    1. SCI SROs
    2. The MSRB
    3. SCI ATSs
    C. Proposed SCI Entities
    1. SBSDRs
    2. SCI Broker-dealers
    3. Exempt Clearing Agencies
    D. Certification
Statutory Authority

I. Introduction

    The U.S. securities markets are among the largest and most liquid 
in the world, attracting a wide variety of issuers and broad investor 
participation, and are essential for capital formation, job creation, 
and economic growth, both domestically and across the globe. The fair 
and orderly functioning of the U.S. securities markets is critically 
important to the U.S. economy. In 2014, recognizing the decades-long 
transformation of many U.S. securities markets from primarily manual 
markets to those that had become almost entirely electronic and highly 
dependent on sophisticated technology, including complex and 
interconnected trading, clearing, routing, market data, regulatory, 
surveillance and other technological systems, the Commission adopted 17 
CFR 242.1000 through 242.1007 (``Regulation SCI'') to supersede and 
replace the Commission's voluntary Automation Review Policy Program 
(``ARP'') and certain provisions of 17 CFR 242.300 through 242.304 
(``Regulation ATS'').\1\ Regulation SCI, which applies to ``SCI 
entities'' with respect to their ``SCI systems'' and ``indirect SCI 
systems,'' was the Commission's first formal extensive regulatory 
framework for oversight of the core technology of the U.S. securities 
markets.
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    \1\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73639 (Nov. 19, 
2014), 79 FR 72252 (Dec. 5, 2014) (``SCI Adopting Release'').
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    The U.S. securities markets have demonstrated resilience since the 
adoption of Regulation SCI, with some market observers crediting 
Regulation SCI in helping to ensure that markets and market 
participants were prepared for the unprecedented trading volumes and 
volatility experienced in March 2020 at the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic.\2\ The U.S. securities markets continue to experience changes 
and new challenges, however. The growth of electronic trading allows 
ever-increasing volumes of securities transactions in a broader range 
of asset classes to take place at increasing speed by competing trading 
platforms, including those offered by broker-dealers that play multiple 
roles in the markets.\3\ In addition, new types of registered entities 
that are highly dependent on interconnected technology have entered the 
markets.\4\ The prevalence of remote workforces, furthered by the 
COVID-19 pandemic,\5\ and increased outsourcing to third-party 
providers, including cloud service providers, continue to drive the 
markets' and market participants' reliance on new and evolving 
technology.\6\ While these advances demonstrate the dynamic and 
adaptable nature of the U.S. securities markets and market 
participants, the greater dispersal, sophistication, and 
interconnection of the technology underpinning our markets bring 
potential new risks. These risks include not only the heightened risk 
of exposure to cybersecurity events from threat actors intent on doing 
harm, but also operational systems problems that can and do arise 
inadvertently.
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    \2\ See, e.g., Shane Remolina, Is Remote Trading Leading to a 
Paradigm Shift on the Trading Desk?, Traders Magazine (May 20, 
2020), available at www.tradersmagazine.com/departments/buyside/is-remote-trading-leading-to-a-paradigm-shift-on-the-trading-desk 
(observing ``no outages'' at the stock exchanges in Mar. 2020 in 
contrast to ``glitches'' experienced in 2000s); Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, Inc. (``FINRA''), Market Structure & COVID-19: 
Handling Increased Volatility and Volumes (Apr. 28, 2020), available 
at https://www.finra.org/media-center/finra-unscripted/market-structure-covid19-coronavirus (observing that market infrastructure 
and integrity held during the challenges in Mar. 2020, and crediting 
Regulation SCI, among other regulatory protections).
    \3\ See, e.g., Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (``SIFMA''), SIFMA Insights: Electronic Trading Market 
Structure Primer (Oct. 2019), available at https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/SIFMA-Insights-Electronic-Trading-Market-Structure-Primer.pdf (summarizing electronic trading history and 
trends in different markets). See also SEC Staff Report on 
Algorithmic Trading in U.S. Capital Markets at 16-19, 37 (Aug. 5, 
2020), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/marketstructure/research/algo_trading_report_2020.pdf (discussing broker-dealer ATSs 
and internalizers, and other in-house sources of liquidity, such as 
single-dealer platforms (``SDPs''), and central risk books operated 
by broker-dealers) (``Algorithmic Trading Report''). Staff reports, 
Investor Bulletins, and other staff documents (including those cited 
herein) represent the views of Commission staff and are not a rule, 
regulation, or statement of the Commission. The Commission has 
neither approved nor disapproved the content of these staff 
documents and, like all staff statements, they have no legal force 
or effect, do not alter or amend applicable law, and create no new 
or additional obligations for any person.
    \4\ See infra section III.A.2.a (discussing registered SBSDRs).
    \5\ See FS-ISAC, Navigating Cyber 2021 (Apr. 2021), available at 
https://www.fsisac.com/navigatingcyber2021-report. See also Vikki 
Davis, Combating the cybersecurity risks of working home, Cyber 
Magazine (Dec. 2, 2021), available at https://cybermagazine.com/cyber-security/combating-cybersecurity-risks-working-home.
    \6\ See, e.g., Angus Loten, Cloud Demand Drives Data Center 
Market to New Records, Wall St. J. (Feb. 27, 2020); Angus Loten, 
CIOs Accelerate Pre-Pandemic Cloud Push, Wall St. J. (Apr. 26, 
2021).
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    As the Commission has acknowledged, Regulation SCI is not, nor can 
it be, designed to guarantee that SCI entities have flawless 
systems.\7\ Rather, its goals are to strengthen the technology 
infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets and improve its 
resilience when technology falls short.\8\ To help achieve these goals, 
the regulation requires that SCI entities have policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that their systems have levels of 
capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security, adequate 
to maintain their operational capability and promote the maintenance of 
fair and orderly markets, and requires measures that facilitate the 
Commission's oversight of securities market technology 
infrastructure.\9\ Consistent with the goals of addressing 
technological vulnerabilities and improving oversight of the core

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technology of key U.S. securities market entities, the Commission is 
proposing amendments to Regulation SCI that would expand its 
application to additional key market participants and update certain of 
its provisions to take account of the evolution of technology and 
trading since the rule's adoption in 2014. The application of 
Regulation SCI to a broader range of entities together with updates to 
certain provisions--including to account for heightened cybersecurity 
risks, wider use of cloud service providers, and the increasingly 
complex and interconnected nature of SCI entities' systems--should help 
ensure that the technology infrastructure of the U.S. securities 
markets remains robust, resilient, and secure.
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    \7\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72291, 72351.
    \8\ See id. at 72257.
    \9\ See generally SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72299, 
72372, 72402, 72404-05.
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    The Commission has issued other proposals related to cybersecurity 
that would apply to SCI entities as well as other entities under the 
Commission's jurisdiction.\10\ Regulation SCI, currently, and as 
proposed to be amended, however, differs from these proposals in terms 
of its purpose and scope. Regulation SCI applies to entities designated 
as key market participants because they play a significant role in the 
U.S. securities markets and/or have the potential to impact investors, 
the overall market, or the trading of individual securities in the 
event of a systems issue. Regulation SCI requires key market 
participants to (i) have policies and procedures in place to help 
ensure the robustness and resiliency of their market technology 
systems, and (ii) provide certain notices and reports to the 
Commission, and in some cases, market participants, to facilitate 
Commission oversight of securities market infrastructure. While 
Regulation SCI has cybersecurity aspects and certain of the proposed 
amendments to Regulation SCI would update policies and procedures 
requirements designed to keep SCI systems and indirect SCI systems 
secure, the proposed amendments are designed, more broadly, to ensure 
that SCI entities (current and proposed) have systems technology 
adequate to maintain operational capability of the systems on which the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets depend.
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    \10\ These include a proposal to adopt new rules requiring 
broker-dealers, major security-based swap participants, national 
securities exchanges, national securities associations, security-
based swap data repositories, security-based swap dealers, transfer 
agents, and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (``MSRB'') to 
adopt and implement written cybersecurity policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to address cybersecurity risks to their 
``information systems'' and notify the Commission and the public of 
significant cybersecurity incidents affecting their information 
systems. See Securities Exchange Release No. 97142 (Mar. 15, 2023), 
88 FR 20212 (April 5, 2023) (proposing 17 CFR 242.10) (for ease of 
reference, this proposal is referred to as the ``Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal''). See also Securities Exchange Release No. 
97141 (Mar. 15, 2023), 88 FR 20616 (April 6, 2023) (proposing to 
amend 17 CFR part 248, subpart A (``Regulation S-P''), to, among 
other things, require broker-dealers, investment companies, SEC-
registered investment advisers, and transfer agents to adopt 
incident response programs to address unauthorized access to or use 
of customer records and information, including procedures for 
providing timely notification to individuals affected by an 
information security incident designed to help affected individuals 
respond appropriately) (``Regulation S-P 2023 Proposing Release''). 
See infra section III.D (discussing of how SCI entities would be 
affected if the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, Regulation S-P 
2023 Proposing Release, and this proposal are all adopted as 
proposed). In addition, the Commission has pending proposals to 
address cybersecurity risk with respect to investment advisers, 
investment companies, and public companies. See Cybersecurity Risk 
Management for Investment Advisers, Registered Investment Companies, 
and Business Development Companies, Release Nos. 33-11028, 34-94917, 
IA-5956, IC-34497 (Feb. 9, 2022), 87 FR 13524 (Mar. 9, 2022) (``IA/
IC Cybersecurity Proposing Release''); Cybersecurity Risk 
Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, Release 
Nos. 33-11038, 34-94382, IC-34529 (Mar. 9, 2022), 87 FR 16590 (Mar. 
23, 2022). The Commission has reopened the comment period for the 
IA/IC Cybersecurity Proposing Release to allow interested persons 
additional time to analyze the issues and prepare their comments in 
light of other regulatory developments, including the proposed rules 
and amendments regarding this proposal, the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal and the Regulation S-P 2023 Proposing 
Release. The Commission encourages commenters to review those 
proposals to determine whether they might affect their comments on 
this proposing release.
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II. Background and Overview

A. History of Regulation SCI

    The Commission adopted Regulation SCI in 2014 to supersede and 
replace the Commission's legacy voluntary ARP Program as well as 
certain provisions of Regulation ATS.\11\ In doing so, the Commission 
sought to strengthen the technology infrastructure of the U.S. 
securities markets, reduce the occurrence of systems issues in those 
markets, improve their resiliency when technological issues arise, and 
establish an updated and formalized regulatory framework, thereby 
helping to ensure more effective Commission oversight of such 
systems.\12\ Several factors contributed to the Commission's decision 
to adopt this regulation. Recognizing the growing importance of 
technology in the securities markets, the Commission issued the ARP I 
and ARP II Policy Statements in 1989 and 1991, respectively.\13\ In the 
decades that followed, key market participants in the securities 
industry increasingly relied on ever more complex technologies for 
trading and clearance and settlement of securities. The increased 
reliance on technology introduced challenges for the securities 
markets, as evidenced by a variety of market disruptions occurring in a 
relatively short time period.\14\ The Commission convened a roundtable 
entitled ``Technology and Trading: Promoting Stability in Today's 
Markets'' (``Technology Roundtable'') in 2012.\15\ Shortly thereafter, 
following Superstorm Sandy on the U.S. East Coast, the U.S. national 
securities exchanges closed for two business days in light of concerns 
over the physical safety of personnel and the possibility of technical 
issues.\16\ These and other developments in U.S. securities markets led 
the Commission to consider the effectiveness of the 1980s and 90s-era 
ARP Program. The focus of the ARP Program was to ensure that the self-
regulatory organizations (``SROs'') had adequate capacity, security, 
and business continuity plans by, among other things, reporting to the 
Commission staff their planned systems changes 30 days in advance and 
reporting outages in trading and related systems.\17\ While the ARP 
Policy Statements were rooted in Exchange Act

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requirements, as policy statements rather than Commission rules, 
compliance was voluntary and in many instances the SROs did not fully 
disclose problems that occurred. In the SCI Proposing Release, the 
Commission stated that ``the continuing evolution of the securities 
markets to the current state, where they have become almost entirely 
electronic and highly dependent on sophisticated trading and other 
technology (including complex regulatory and surveillance systems, as 
well as systems relating to the provision of market data, intermarket 
routing and connectivity, and a variety of other member and issuer 
services), has posed challenges for the ARP Inspection Program.'' \18\ 
Informed by its review of recent technology problems in the markets, 
the discussions at the Technology Roundtable, and its evaluation of the 
ARP Program,\19\ the Commission proposed Regulation SCI in 2013 to help 
address the technological vulnerabilities, and improve Commission 
oversight, of the core technology of key U.S. securities markets 
entities, including national securities exchanges and associations, 
significant-volume ATSs, clearing agencies, and plan processors.\20\ 
After considering the views of a wide variety of commenters, the 
Commission adopted Regulation SCI in 2014.\21\ In the SCI Adopting 
Release, the Commission stated that it was taking a ``measured 
approach'' and pursuing an ``incremental expansion from the entities 
covered under the ARP Inspection Program'' given the potential costs of 
compliance with Regulation SCI.\22\ It added, however, that this 
approach would allow it ``to monitor and evaluate the implementation of 
Regulation SCI, the risks posed by the systems of other market 
participants, and the continued evolution of the securities markets, 
such that it may consider, in the future, extending the types of 
requirements in Regulation SCI to additional categories of market 
participants, such as non-ATS broker-dealers, security-based swap 
dealers, investment advisers, investment companies, transfer agents, 
and other key market participants.'' \23\ In 2021, the Commission 
amended Regulation SCI to add certain ``competing consolidators'' to 
the definition of SCI entity.\24\ Specifically, a competing 
consolidator that exceeds a five percent consolidated market data gross 
revenue threshold over a specified time period is an SCI competing 
consolidator because it is a significant source of consolidated market 
data for NMS stocks on which market participants rely.\25\
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    \11\ See generally SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1.
    \12\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72252-56 
(discussing the background of Regulation SCI).
    \13\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 27445 (Nov. 16, 
1989), 54 FR 48703 (Nov. 24, 1989), and 29185 (May 9, 1991), 56 FR 
22490 (May 15, 1991).
    \14\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69077 (Mar. 8, 
2013), 78 FR 18083, 18089 (Mar. 25, 2013) (``SCI Proposing 
Release'') (citing, among other things, Findings Regarding the 
Market Events of May 6, 2010, Report of the Staffs of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC'') and SEC to the Joint Advisory 
Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues (Sept. 30, 2010) (``Staff 
Report'') and discussing hackers penetrating certain Nasdaq OMX 
Group, Inc. computer networks in 2011, a ``software bug'' that 
hampered the initial public offerings of BATS Global Markets, Inc. 
in 2012, and issues with Nasdaq's trading systems delaying the start 
of trading in the high-profile initial public offering of Facebook, 
Inc.).
    \15\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67802 (Sept. 7, 
2012), 77 FR 56697 (Sept. 13, 2012) (File No. 4-652); Technology 
Roundtable Transcript, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/otherwebcasts/2012/ttr100212-transcript.pdf. A webcast of the 
Roundtable is available at www.sec.gov/news/otherwebcasts/2012/ttr100212.shtml. The Technology Roundtable examined the relationship 
between the operational stability and integrity of the securities 
market and the ways in which market participants design, implement, 
and manage complex and interconnected trading technologies. The 
Technology Roundtable also highlighted that quality standards, 
testing, and improved response mechanisms were issues ripe for 
consideration. See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18090-91 
(providing for further discussion of the Technology Roundtable).
    \16\ See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18091. See 
also SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72254-72255 (summarizing 
additional disruptions during the period between publication of the 
SCI Proposing and Adopting Releases).
    \17\ See supra note 13.
    \18\ SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18089.
    \19\ See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18085-91 for a 
further discussion of these considerations.
    \20\ As further explained in the SCI Adopting Release, the term 
``plan processor'' means ``any self-regulatory organization or 
securities information processor acting as an exclusive processor in 
connection with the development, implementation and/or operation of 
any facility contemplated by an effective national market system 
plan.'' See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72270 n. 196. 
This term refers to the securities information processors that are 
exclusive processors (and frequently referred to as the ``SIPs'') 
that collect and process (for distribution) quotation data and/or 
transaction reports on behalf of the Consolidated Tape Association 
System (``CTA Plan''), Consolidated Quotation System (``CQS Plan''), 
Joint Self-Regulatory Organization Plan Governing the Collection, 
Consolidation, and Dissemination of Quotation and Transaction 
Information for Nasdaq-Listed Securities Traded on Exchanges on an 
Unlisted Trading Privileges Basis (``Nasdaq UTP Plan''), and Options 
Price Reporting Authority (``OPRA Plan''). The CTA Plan and Nasdaq 
UTP Plan (applicable to national market system (``NMS'') stocks) are 
each a ``transaction reporting plan'' as well as a ``national market 
system plan'' as defined in 17 CFR 242.600 (``Rule 600'' of 
Regulation NMS). The OPRA Plan (applicable to exchange-listed 
options) is a national market system plan. See infra note 212. See 
also text accompanying note 212 (discussing these Plans and how 
transaction reports containing the price and volume associated with 
a transaction involving the purchase or sale of a security are 
currently, and anticipated in the future to be, readily available to 
enable SCI ATSs and SCI broker-dealers to ascertain the total 
average daily dollar volume traded in NMS stock and exchange-listed 
options in a calendar month and self-assess if they exceed the 
proposed transaction activity thresholds discussed below).
    \21\ See generally SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1.
    \22\ Id. at 72259.
    \23\ Id. See also supra note 10 and accompanying text 
(referencing other cybersecurity rules proposed to apply to 
Commission registrants).
    \24\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90610 (Dec. 9, 
2020), 86 FR 18596, 18659-18676 (Apr. 9, 2021) (``Market Data 
Infrastructure Adopting Release'') (adopting rules with respect to 
competing consolidators and defining ``competing consolidator'' to 
mean a securities information processor required to be registered 
pursuant to 17 CFR[thinsp]242.614 (``Rule 614'') or a national 
securities exchange or national securities association that receives 
information with respect to quotations for and transactions in NMS 
stocks and generates a consolidated market data product for 
dissemination to any person).
    \25\ An ``SCI competing consolidator'' is any competing 
consolidator, which during at least four of the preceding six 
calendar months, accounted for five percent or more of consolidated 
market data gross revenue paid to the effective national market 
system plan or plans required under 17 CFR 242.603(b) (``Rule 
603(b)'') for NMS stocks (1) listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
(2) listed on The Nasdaq Stock Market, or (3) listed on national 
securities exchanges other than the New York Stock Exchange or The 
Nasdaq Stock Market, as reported by such plan or plans pursuant to 
the terms thereof. See Rule 1000. An SCI competing consolidator is 
subject to Regulation SCI, and a competing consolidator for which 
Regulation SCI does not apply is subject the systems capability 
requirement in 17 CFR 242.614(d)(9) (``Rule 614(d)(9)'' of 
Regulation NMS). See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
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B. Current Regulation SCI

1. SCI Entities and SCI Systems
    Regulation SCI applies to ``SCI entities.'' \26\ SCI entities are 
those that the Commission has determined are market participants that 
play a significant role in the U.S. securities markets and/or have the 
potential to impact investors, the overall market, or the trading of 
individual securities in the event of certain types of systems 
problems.\27\ Today SCI entities comprise the self-regulatory 
organizations (excluding securities futures exchanges) (``SCI SROs''), 
ATSs meeting certain volume thresholds with respect to NMS stocks and 
non-NMS stocks (``SCI ATSs''), exclusive disseminators of consolidated 
market data (``plan processors''), certain competing disseminators of 
consolidated market (``SCI competing consolidators'' \28\), and certain 
exempt clearing agencies.\29\
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    \26\ See 17 CFR 242.1000 (defining the term ``SCI entity'' and 
terms included therein).
    \27\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72259. Although 
some commenters had urged that Regulation SCI apply to fewer 
entities and only the most systemically important entities, the 
Commission disagreed, stating, ``[L]imiting the applicability of 
Regulation SCI to only the most systemically important entities 
posing the highest risk to the markets is too limited of a category 
of market participants, as it would exclude certain entities that, 
in the Commission's view, have the potential to pose significant 
risks to the securities markets should an SCI event occur.'' Id.
    \28\ See supra notes 24-25 (stating the definitions of competing 
consolidator and SCI competing consolidator). SCI competing 
consolidators are subject to Regulation SCI after a one-year 
transition period. See Market Data Infrastructure Adopting Release, 
supra note 24, at 18604. Competing consolidators in the transition 
period and competing consolidators below the gross revenue threshold 
are subject to a tailored set of operational capability and 
resiliency obligations designed to help ensure that the provision of 
consolidated market data products is prompt, accurate, and reliable. 
See Market Data Infrastructure Adopting Release, supra note 24, at 
18690-97 (providing for a full discussion of systems capability 
requirements for competing consolidators (that are not subject to 
Regulation SCI), but instead subject to Rule 614(d)(9)).
    \29\ See 17 CFR 242.1000 (defining the term SCI entity to mean 
``an SCI self-regulatory organization, SCI alternative trading 
system, plan processor, exempt clearing agency subject to ARP, or 
SCI competing consolidator'' and also separately defining each of 
these terms). See also SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72258-
72 (discussing the rationale for inclusion of SCI SROs, SCI ATSs, 
plan processors, and certain exempt clearing agencies in the 
original adopted definition of SCI entity); infra notes 83-84 and 
accompanying text (citing the releases explaining the expansion the 
definition of SCI entity to include SCI competing consolidators, and 
the recent proposal to further expand the definition of SCI entity 
to include certain ATSs that trade U.S. Treasury Securities or 
Agency Securities exceeding specified volume thresholds 
(``Government Securities ATSs'')).
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    An SCI entity has obligations with respect to its ``SCI systems,'' 
``critical SCI systems,'' and ``indirect SCI

[[Page 23150]]

systems.'' \30\ ``SCI systems'' are, broadly, the technology systems 
of, or operated by or on behalf of, an SCI entity that, with respect to 
securities, directly support at least one of six market functions: (i) 
trading; (ii) clearance and settlement; (iii) order routing; (iv) 
market data; (v) market regulation; or (vi) market surveillance.\31\ In 
addition, Regulation SCI defines ``critical SCI systems,'' which are a 
subset of SCI systems,\32\ and designated as such because they 
represent potential single points of failure in the U.S. securities 
markets.\33\
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    \30\ See 17 CFR 242.1000 (defining the terms ``SCI systems,'' 
``critical SCI systems,'' and ``indirect SCI systems'').
    \31\ Id. (defining SCI systems to mean ``all computer, network, 
electronic, technical, automated, or similar systems of, or operated 
by or on behalf of, an SCI entity that, with respect to securities, 
directly support trading, clearance and settlement, routing, market 
data, market regulation, or market surveillance'').
    \32\ Id. (defining critical SCI systems to mean any SCI systems 
of, or operated by or on behalf of, an SCI entity that: (1) Directly 
support functionality relating to: (i) Clearance and settlement 
systems of clearing agencies; (ii) Openings, reopenings, and 
closings on the primary listing market; (iii) Trading halts; (iv) 
Initial public offerings; (v) The provision of consolidated market 
data; or (vi) Exclusively listed securities; or (2) Provide 
functionality to the securities markets for which the availability 
of alternatives is significantly limited or nonexistent and without 
which there would be a material impact on fair and orderly markets).
    \33\ As discussed in the SCI Adopting Release, ``critical SCI 
systems'' are subject to certain heightened resilience and 
information dissemination provisions of Regulation SCI on the 
rationale that, lacking or having limited substitutes, these systems 
pose the greatest risks to the continuous and orderly function of 
the markets if they malfunction. See SCI Adopting Release, supra 
note 1, at 72277-79 (providing additional discussion of critical SCI 
systems).
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    The term ``indirect SCI systems'' describes systems of, or operated 
by or on behalf of, an SCI entity that, ``if breached, would be 
reasonably likely to pose a security threat to SCI systems.'' \34\ The 
distinction between SCI systems and indirect SCI systems seeks to 
encourage SCI entities physically and/or logically to separate systems 
that perform or directly support securities market functions from those 
that perform other functions (e.g., corporate email; general office 
systems for member regulation and recordkeeping).\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Id. at 72279.
    \35\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72281 (``[I]f an 
SCI entity designs and implements security controls so that none of 
its non-SCI systems would be reasonably likely to pose a security 
threat to SCI systems, then it will have no indirect SCI systems. 
If, however, an SCI entity does have indirect SCI systems, then 
certain provisions of Regulation SCI will apply to those indirect 
SCI systems.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently, the application of Regulation SCI is triggered when an 
entity meets the definition of SCI entity. If an entity meets the 
definition of SCI entity, Regulation SCI applies to its SCI systems and 
indirect SCI systems. The scope of an SCI entity's technology systems 
is determined by whether they are operated ``by or on behalf of'' the 
SCI entity and whether they directly support any of the six market 
functions enumerated in the definition. As a result, the SCI systems 
and indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity are neither limited by the 
type of security nor by the type of business in which an SCI entity 
primarily conducts its securities market activities. Thus, if an SCI 
entity elects to, or obtains the necessary approvals to, engage in 
market functions in multiple types of securities, Regulation SCI's 
obligations apply to the relevant functional systems relating to all 
such securities.\36\ Accordingly, the SCI systems of an SCI entity may 
include systems pertaining to any type of security, whether those 
securities are NMS stocks, over-the-counter (OTC) equity securities, 
listed options, debt securities, security-based swaps (``SBS''), crypto 
asset securities,\37\ or another type of security.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ The current definition of ``SCI systems,'' includes the 
clause, ``with respect to securities,'' without limitation. SCI 
systems ``means all computer, network, electronic, technical, 
automated, or similar systems of, or operated by or on behalf of, an 
SCI entity that, with respect to securities, directly support 
trading, clearance and settlement, order routing, market data, 
market regulation, or market surveillance.'' See 17 CFR 242.1000 
(emphasis added). But see infra section III.A.2.b.iv (discussing the 
proposed limitation to the definition of SCI systems for certain SCI 
broker-dealers).
    \37\ The term ``digital asset'' refers to an asset that is 
issued and/or transferred using distributed ledger or blockchain 
technology (``distributed ledger technology''), including, but not 
limited to, so-called ``virtual currencies,'' ``coins,'' and 
``tokens.'' See Custody of Digital Asset Securities by Special 
Purpose Broker-Dealers, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90788 
(Dec. 23, 2020), 86 FR 11627, 11627 n.1 (Feb. 26, 2021) (``Crypto 
Asset Securities Custody Release''). A digital asset may or may not 
meet the definition of a ``security'' under the Federal securities 
laws. See, e.g., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017) (``DAO 21(a) Report''), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf. See also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). To 
the extent digital assets rely on cryptographic protocols, these 
types of assets also are commonly referred to as ``crypto assets,'' 
and ``digital asset securities'' can be referred to as ``crypto 
asset securities.'' For purposes of this release, the Commission 
does not distinguish between the terms ``digital asset securities'' 
and ``crypto asset securities.''
    \38\ Today, under the current definition of SCI systems, an SCI 
entity (current or future) that engages in market functions for any 
type of securities, including crypto asset securities, is required 
to assess whether the technological systems of, or operated by or on 
its behalf, with respect to securities, directly support at least 
one of six market functions: (i) trading; (ii) clearance and 
settlement; (iii) order routing; (iv) market data; (v) market 
regulation; or (vi) market surveillance. As discussed below, 
however, the Commission is proposing an amendment to the definition 
of SCI systems that would limit its scope solely for certain 
proposed SCI broker-dealers. See infra section III.A.2.b.iv.
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2. Reasonably Designed Policies and Procedures
    The foundational principles of Regulation SCI are set forth in Rule 
1001, which requires each SCI entity to establish, maintain, and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure 
that its SCI systems and, for purposes of security standards, indirect 
SCI systems, have levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, 
availability, and security adequate to maintain their operational 
capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets.\39\ 
Rule 1001(a)(2) of Regulation SCI requires that, at a minimum, such 
policies and procedures include: current and future capacity planning; 
periodic stress testing; systems development and testing methodology; 
reviews and testing to identify vulnerabilities; business continuity 
and disaster recovery planning (inclusive of backup systems that are 
geographically diverse and designed to meet specified recovery time 
objectives); standards for market data collection, processing, and 
dissemination; and monitoring to identify potential systems 
problems.\40\ Under 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(3) (``Rule 1001(a)(3)'' of 
Regulation SCI), SCI entities must periodically review the 
effectiveness of these policies and procedures and take prompt action 
to remedy any deficiencies.\41\ Rule 1001(a)(4) of Regulation SCI 
provides that an SCI entity's policies and procedures will be deemed to 
be reasonably designed if they are consistent with ``current SCI 
industry standards,'' which is defined to be comprised of information 
technology practices that are widely available to information 
technology professionals in the financial sector and issued by an 
authoritative body that is a U.S. governmental entity or agency, 
association of U.S. governmental entities or agencies, or widely 
recognized organization; however, Rule 1001(a)(4) of Regulation SCI 
also makes clear that compliance with such ``current SCI industry 
standards'' is not the exclusive means to comply with these 
requirements.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(1).
    \40\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(2).
    \41\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(3).
    \42\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under 17 CFR 242.1001(b)(1) (``Rule 1001(b)(1)'' of Regulation 
SCI), each SCI entity is required to establish, maintain,

[[Page 23151]]

and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
ensure that its SCI systems operate in a manner that complies with the 
Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder and the entity's 
rules and governing documents, as applicable, and specifies certain 
minimum requirements for such policies and procedures.\43\ In addition, 
17 CFR 242.1001(b)(2) (``Rule 1001(b)(2)'') requires that at a minimum, 
these policies and procedures must include: testing of all SCI systems 
and any changes to SCI systems prior to implementation; a system of 
internal controls over changes to SCI systems; a plan for assessments 
of the functionality of SCI systems designed to detect systems 
compliance issues, including by ``responsible SCI personnel'' (defined 
below) and by personnel familiar with applicable provisions of the 
Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder and the SCI 
entity's rules and governing documents; and a plan of coordination and 
communication between regulatory and other personnel of the SCI entity, 
including by responsible SCI personnel, regarding SCI systems design, 
changes, testing, and controls designed to detect and prevent systems 
compliance issues.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(b)(1).
    \44\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under 17 CFR 242.1001(b)(3) (``Rule 1001(b)(3)'' of Regulation 
SCI), SCI entities must periodically review the effectiveness of these 
policies and procedures and take prompt action to remedy any 
deficiencies.\45\ Under 17 CFR 242.1001(b)(4) (``Rule 1001(b)(4)'' of 
Regulation SCI), individuals are provided with a safe harbor from 
liability under Rule 1001(b) if certain conditions are met.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(b)(3).
    \46\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, 17 CFR 242.1001(c) (``Rule 1001(c)'' of Regulation SCI), 
requires SCI entities to establish, maintain, and enforce reasonably 
designed written policies and procedures that include the criteria for 
identifying responsible SCI personnel, the designation and 
documentation of responsible SCI personnel, and escalation procedures 
to quickly inform responsible SCI personnel of potential SCI 
events.\47\ Rule 1000 of Regulation SCI defines ``responsible SCI 
personnel'' to mean, for a particular SCI system or indirect SCI system 
impacted by an SCI event, such senior manager(s) of the SCI entity 
having responsibility for such system, and their designee(s).\48\ Rule 
1000 also defines ``SCI event'' to mean an event at an SCI entity that 
constitutes a systems disruption, a systems compliance issue, or a 
systems intrusion.\49\ Under 17 CFR 242.1001(c)(2) (``Rule 1001(c)(2)'' 
of Regulation SCI), SCI entities are required periodically to review 
the effectiveness of these policies and procedures and take prompt 
action to remedy any deficiencies.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(c).
    \48\ 17 CFR 242.1000.
    \49\ Id.
    \50\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. SCI Events
    Under Rule 1002 of Regulation SCI, SCI entities have certain 
obligations regarding SCI events. An ``SCI event'' is defined as: (i) a 
``systems disruption,'' which is an event in an SCI entity's SCI 
systems that disrupts, or significantly degrades, the normal operation 
of an SCI system; and/or (ii) a ``systems intrusion,'' which is any 
unauthorized entry into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an 
SCI entity; and/or (iii) a ``systems compliance issue,'' which is an 
event at an SCI entity that has caused any SCI system of such entity to 
operate in a manner that does not comply with the Exchange Act and the 
rules and regulations thereunder or the entity's rules or governing 
documents, as applicable.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See 17 CFR 242.1000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When any responsible SCI personnel has a reasonable basis to 
conclude that an SCI event has occurred, the SCI entity must begin to 
take appropriate corrective action which must include, at a minimum, 
mitigating potential harm to investors and market integrity resulting 
from the SCI event and devoting adequate resources to remedy the SCI 
event as soon as reasonably practicable.\52\ With limited 
exceptions,\53\ Rule 1002(b) provides the framework for notifying the 
Commission of SCI events including, among other things, requirements 
to: notify the Commission of the event immediately; provide a written 
notification on Form SCI within 24 hours that includes a description of 
the SCI event and the system(s) affected, with other information 
required to the extent available at the time; provide regular updates 
regarding the SCI event until the event is resolved; and submit a final 
detailed written report regarding the SCI event.\54\
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    \52\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(a).
    \53\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(b)(5) (relating to the exception for de 
minimis SCI events).
    \54\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 1002(c) of Regulation SCI also requires that SCI entities 
disseminate information to their members or participants regarding SCI 
events.\55\ These information dissemination requirements are scaled 
based on the nature and severity of an event. SCI entities are required 
to disseminate certain information about the event to certain of its 
members or participants (i.e., those that are reasonably estimated to 
have been affected) promptly after any responsible SCI personnel has a 
reasonable basis to conclude that an SCI event has occurred. For 
``major SCI events,'' such dissemination must be made to all of its 
members or participants. In addition, dissemination of information to 
members or participants is permitted to be delayed for systems 
intrusions if such dissemination would likely compromise the security 
of the SCI entity's systems or an investigation of the intrusion.\56\ 
In addition, 17 CFR 242.1002(c)(4) (``Rule 1002(c)(4)'' of Regulation 
SCI) provides exceptions to the dissemination requirements under Rule 
1002(c) of Regulation SCI for SCI events to the extent they relate to 
market regulation or market surveillance systems or SCI events that 
have had, or the SCI entity reasonably estimates would have, either a 
de minimis or no impact on the SCI entity's operations or on market 
participants.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(c).
    \56\ See id. The rule also requires that the SCI entity document 
its reasons for delayed notification. Id.
    \57\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(c)(4).
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4. Systems Changes and SCI Review
    Under 17 CFR 242.1003(a) (``Rule 1003(a)'' of Regulation SCI), SCI 
entities are required to provide reports to the Commission relating to 
system changes, including a report each quarter describing completed, 
ongoing, and planned material changes to their SCI systems and the 
security of indirect SCI systems, during the prior, current, and 
subsequent calendar quarters, including the dates or expected dates of 
commencement and completion.\58\ Rule 1003(b) of Regulation SCI also 
requires that an SCI entity conduct an ``SCI review'' not less than 
once each calendar year.\59\ ``SCI review'' is defined in Rule 1000 of 
Regulation SCI to mean a review, following established procedures and 
standards, that is performed by objective personnel having appropriate 
experience to conduct reviews of SCI systems and indirect SCI systems, 
and which review contains: a risk assessment with respect to such 
systems of an SCI entity; and an assessment of internal control design 
and effectiveness of its SCI systems and indirect SCI systems to 
include logical and physical security controls,

[[Page 23152]]

development processes, and information technology governance, 
consistent with industry standards.\60\ Under Rule 1003(b)(2) and (3), 
SCI entities are also required to submit a report of the SCI review to 
their senior management, and must also submit the report and any 
response by senior management to the report, to their board of 
directors, as well as to the Commission.\61\
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    \58\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(a).
    \59\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b).
    \60\ See 17 CFR 242.1000. Rule 1003(b)(1) of Regulation SCI also 
states that penetration test reviews of an SCI entity's network, 
firewalls, and production systems must be conducted at a frequency 
of not less than once every three years, and assessments of SCI 
systems directly supporting market regulation or market surveillance 
must be conducted at a frequency based upon the risk assessment 
conducted as part of the SCI review, but in no case less than once 
every three years. See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(1)(i) and (ii) (``Rule 
1003(b)(1)(i) and (ii)'').
    \61\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(2) and (3).
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5. Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Testing With Members/
Participants
    Rule 1004 of Regulation SCI sets forth certain requirements for 
testing an SCI entity's business continuity and disaster recovery plans 
with its members or participants. This rule requires that, with respect 
to an SCI entity's business continuity and disaster recovery plan, 
including its backup systems, each SCI entity shall: (a) establish 
standards for the designation of those members or participants that the 
SCI entity reasonably determines are, taken as a whole, the minimum 
necessary for the maintenance of fair and orderly markets in the event 
of the activation of such plans; (b) designate members or participants 
pursuant to the standards established and require participation by such 
designated members or participants in scheduled functional and 
performance testing of the operation of such plans, in the manner and 
frequency specified by the SCI entity, provided that such frequency 
shall not be less than once every 12 months; and (c) coordinate the 
testing of such plans on an industry- or sector-wide basis with other 
SCI entities.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See 17 CFR 242.1004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Recordkeeping and Other Provisions (Rules 1005-1007)
    SCI entities are required by Rule 1005 of Regulation SCI to make, 
keep, and preserve certain records related to their compliance with 
Regulation SCI.\63\ In addition, 17 CFR 242.1006 (``Rule 1006'' of 
Regulation SCI), provides for certain requirements relating to the 
electronic filing, on Form SCI, of any notification, review, 
description, analysis, or report to the Commission required to be 
submitted under Regulation SCI.\64\ Finally, 17 CFR 242.1007 (``Rule 
1007'' of Regulation SCI) requires a written undertaking when records 
required to be filed or kept by an SCI entity under Regulation SCI are 
prepared or maintained by a service bureau or other recordkeeping 
service on behalf of the SCI entity.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ See 17 CFR 242.1005. Unlike 17 CFR 242.1005(a) (``Rule 
1005(a)'') of Regulation SCI, which relates to recordkeeping 
provisions for SCI SROs, 17 CFR 242.1005(b) (``Rule 1005(b)'') 
relates to the recordkeeping provision for SCI entities other than 
SCI SROs.
    \64\ See 17 CFR 242.1006.
    \65\ See 17 CFR 242.1007.
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C. Overview of Proposed Amendments to Regulation SCI

    The Commission is proposing amendments to Regulation SCI that would 
expand the definition of ``SCI entity'' to include a broader range of 
key market participants in the U.S. securities market infrastructure 
and update certain provisions of Regulation SCI to take account of 
developments in the technology landscape of the markets and the 
Commission and its staff's oversight experience since the adoption of 
Regulation SCI in 2014. As discussed in section III.A, the Commission 
is proposing to expand the definition of SCI entity to include 
registered SBSDRs, registered broker-dealers exceeding a size threshold 
(``SCI broker-dealers''), and additional clearing agencies exempt from 
registration.\66\ As discussed in section III.C, the Commission is also 
proposing to update several requirements of Regulation SCI to 
acknowledge certain technology changes in the market, including 
cybersecurity and third-party provider management challenges since the 
adoption of Regulation SCI in 2014, and to account for the experience 
and insights the Commission and its staff have gained with respect to 
technology issues surrounding SCI entities and their systems. These 
include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See infra section III.A.2.a. through c. (providing a 
detailed discussion of each of these categories of entities and 
associated proposed definitions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Amendments to Rule 1001(a) to require that an SCI entity's 
policies and procedures for SCI systems, critical SCI systems, and 
indirect SCI systems, address with specificity:
    [cir] Systems classification and life cycle management; \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See infra section III.C.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [cir] Management of third-party providers, including cloud service 
providers and providers of critical SCI systems; \68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See infra section III.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [cir] Access controls; \69\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ See infra section III.C.3.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [cir] Identification of current SCI industry standards, if any; 
\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See infra section III.C.5.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Expansion of the definition of ``systems intrusion'' in 
Rule 1000 to include a wider range of cybersecurity events; \71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ See infra section III.C.3.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Amendments to Rule 1002 regarding notice of systems 
intrusions to the Commission and affected persons; \72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ See infra section III.C.3.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Amendments to the definition of ``SCI review'' and Rule 
1003(b) to specify in greater detail the contents of the SCI review and 
associated report, and to require annual penetration testing; \73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ See infra sections III.C.3.b and III.C.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Amendments to Rule 1004 to require that SCI entities 
designate key third-party providers for participation in annual 
business continuity/disaster recovery testing; \74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ See infra section III.C.2.d.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Amendments to Rule 1001(a)(4) to address how an SCI entity 
may avail itself of the safe harbor provision; \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ See infra section III.C.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Amendments to Rule 1005 to address the maintenance of 
records by a former SCI entity; and
     Changes to Form SCI consistent with the proposed 
changes.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ See infra section III.C.6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amendments to Regulation SCI are proposed independently of the 
proposals discussed in the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and 
Regulation S-P 2023 Proposing Release. However, the relationship of all 
three proposals, as each may apply to an SCI entity, is discussed in 
section III.D.

III. Proposed Amendments to Regulation SCI

A. Definition of SCI Entity

1. Evolution: Current and Proposed SCI Entities
    Currently, SCI entities are the SCI SROs, SCI ATSs, plan 
processors, certain exempt clearing agencies, and, as of 2020, SCI 
competing consolidators.\77\ In 2013, the Commission proposed to 
include other entities: specifically, ATSs trading corporate debt or 
municipal securities (hereafter, ``Fixed Income ATSs'') exceeding 
specified volume thresholds.\78\ The Commission did not include any 
Fixed Income ATSs as SCI entities at adoption in 2014, however, based 
on consideration of comments regarding the risk profile of Fixed

[[Page 23153]]

Income ATSs at that time.\79\ In 2013, the Commission also solicited 
comment on the inclusion of several other types of entities, including 
SBSDRs and broker-dealers (beyond SCI ATSs).\80\ At adoption in 2014, 
comments regarding these and other entities were summarized, with 
specific proposals deferred for possible future consideration.\81\ In 
sum, the Commission stated in 2014 that it was neither limiting the 
applicability of Regulation SCI to only the most systemically important 
entities as urged by some commenters, nor taking a broad approach at 
the outset, but rather that it was taking a ``measured'' approach in 
establishing the initial scope of SCI entities.\82\ Since the initial 
adoption of Regulation SCI, the Commission has considered expansion of 
the definition of SCI entity several times: first to propose and adopt 
certain competing consolidators as SCI entities,\83\ and more recently 
to propose and repropose adding ATSs that trade U.S. Treasury 
Securities or Agency Securities exceeding specified volume thresholds 
(``Government Securities ATSs'') as SCI entities.\84\
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    \77\ See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text; infra note 83 
and accompanying text.
    \78\ See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18097.
    \79\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72270, 72409 
(discussing determination not to apply Regulation SCI to ATSs 
trading only corporate debt and municipal securities at that time).
    \80\ See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18133-41. The 
Commission also solicited comment on the inclusion of security-based 
swap execution facilities (``SB SEFs''), which entities are now the 
subject of another proposal. See Rules Relating to Security-Based 
Swap Execution and Registration and Regulation of Security-Based 
Swap Execution Facilities, Release No. 94615 (Apr. 6, 2022), 87 FR 
28872 (May 11, 2022) (proposing that SB SEFs be subject to 17 CFR 
242.800 through 242.835 (``Regulation SE'') which includes 
operational capability requirements closely modeled on a detailed 
CFTC rule for SEFs (17 CFR 37.1401)). SB SEFs are not further 
discussed herein.
    \81\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72364-66 
(contemplating possible future proposals).
    \82\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72259 (stating 
that this measured approach would enable the Commission to ``monitor 
and evaluate the implementation of Regulation SCI, the risks posed 
by the systems of other market participants, and the continued 
evolution of the securities markets, such that it may consider, in 
the future, extending the types of requirements in Regulation SCI to 
additional categories of [key] market participants . . . .'').
    \83\ See Market Data Infrastructure Adopting Release, supra note 
24, at 18659-18676.
    \84\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 90019 (Sept. 28, 
2020), 85 FR 87106 (Dec. 31, 2020) (``Government Securities ATS 
Proposing Release''); 94062 (Jan. 26, 2022), 87 FR 15496 (Mar. 18, 
2022) (``Government Securities ATS Reproposal'') (among other 
things, citing operational similarities between Government 
Securities ATSs and NMS stock ATSs). In the Government Securities 
ATS Reproposal, the Commission proposed amendments to 17 CFR 240.3b-
16(a) (``Rule 3b-16(a)'' of the Exchange Act), which defines certain 
terms used in the statutory definition of ``exchange'' under section 
3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act, to include systems that offer the use 
of non-firm trading interest and provide communication protocols to 
bring together buyers and sellers of securities. Trading systems 
that may fall within the criteria of proposed 17 CFR 240.3b-16 
(``Rule 3b-16''), as proposed to be amended, would likely operate as 
ATSs, and possibly SCI ATSs. Because the proposed amendments to Rule 
3b-16(a) could result in a greater number of ATSs, and the 
amendments proposed to expand and update SCI could impact newly 
designated ATSs, commenters are encouraged to review both the 
Government Securities ATS Reproposal and this proposal to determine 
whether it might affect their comments on this proposal, as well as 
their responses to the Commission's request for comment on 
application of Regulation SCI to Fixed Income ATS contained herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission now proposes a further expansion of the definition 
of SCI entity to include SBSDRs, certain registered broker-dealers 
(i.e., SCI broker-dealers), and additional clearing agencies exempted 
from registration. The Commission also solicits comment on whether, in 
light of technological changes in the fixed income markets in recent 
years, Fixed Income ATSs should again be proposed to be subject to 
Regulation SCI, rather than 17 CFR 240.301(b)(6) (``Rule 301(b)(6)'' of 
Regulation ATS), and also whether and how broker-dealers trading 
corporate debt and municipal securities should be considered.\85\
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    \85\ Currently, Rule 301(b)(6) of Regulation ATS applies to 
Fixed Income ATSs exceeding a volume threshold. Under Rule 
301(b)(6), an ATS that trades only municipal securities or corporate 
debt at a threshold of 20% or more of the average daily volume 
traded in the United States, during at least four of the preceding 
six calendar months, is required to comply with capacity, integrity, 
and security requirements with respect to those systems that support 
order entry, order routing, order execution, transaction reporting, 
and trade comparison. See 17 CFR 242.301(b)(6). As discussed further 
below, the amendments proposed in this release do not include 
amendments to modify the numerical volume thresholds or to otherwise 
modify Rule 301(b)(6) of Regulation ATS, or move systems 
requirements for Fixed Income ATSs from Regulation ATS to Regulation 
SCI. The Commission does, however, request comment on the state of 
electronic trading and automation in the corporate debt and 
municipal securities markets, as well as the risks associated with 
entities with significant activity in these markets. See infra 
section III.B.
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2. New Proposed SCI Entities
    When it adopted Regulation SCI, the Commission acknowledged that 
there may be other categories of entities not included in the 
definition of SCI entity that, given their increasing size and 
importance, could pose risks to the market should an SCI event occur, 
but decided to include only certain key market participants at that 
time.\86\ The Commission proposes to expand the definition of SCI 
entity to include SBSDRs, certain types of broker-dealers, and 
additional clearing agencies exempted from registration as additional 
key market participants that would also have to comply with Regulation 
SCI because they play a significant role in the U.S. securities markets 
and/or have the potential to impact investors, the overall market, or 
the trading of individual securities in the event of a systems issue. 
If this amendment is adopted, these new SCI entities would become 
subject to all provisions of Regulation SCI, including the provisions 
proposed to be amended as discussed in section III.C of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72259. See also 
supra note 82 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Registered Security-Based Swap Data Repositories (SBSDRs)
    The Commission proposes to expand the application of Regulation SCI 
to SBSDRs. As registered securities information processors that 
disseminate market data and provide price transparency in the SBS 
market, and centralized trade repositories for SBS data for use by 
regulators, SBSDRs play a key role in the SBS market.\87\
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    \87\ Rule 1000 would define the term registered security-based 
swap data repository to mean ``a security-based swap data 
repository, as defined in 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(75), and that is 
registered with the Commission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 78m(n) and 
Sec.  240.13n-1,'' with a proviso that compliance with Regulation 
SCI would not be required until six months after the entity's 
registration is effective. See proposed Rule 1000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted, the Commission solicited comment on the inclusion of 
SBSDRs as SCI entities when it first proposed Regulation SCI in 
2013.\88\ At that time, the Commission anticipated that SBSDRs would 
``play an important role in limiting systemic risk and promoting the 
stability of the SBS market [and] also would serve as information 
disseminators in a manner similar to plan processors in the equities 
and options markets.'' \89\ But it also acknowledged that there may be 
differences between the equities and options markets and the SBS 
market, ``including differing levels of automation and stages of 
regulatory development.'' \90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ See supra text accompanying note 80.
    \89\ SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18135 (citation 
omitted).
    \90\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Comments received on the inclusion of SBSDRs as SCI entities in the 
SCI Proposing Release were limited. One commenter stated that ``the 
similarities between certain SCI entities and SB SDRs . . . do not 
provide a clear justification for a different set of rules.'' \91\ 
Another commenter stated that SBSDRs should have standards that are 
consistent with, but not identical to, those of SCI entities because 
the

[[Page 23154]]

functions that SBSDRs perform are significantly different from those 
performed by SCI entities.\92\ Other commenters, however, felt the 
practical differences between options and equities and derivatives 
called for some form of harmonization of rules, but not direct 
application of Regulation SCI to these entities.\93\ The Commission 
deferred and stated in the SCI Adopting Release that, ``should [it] 
decide to propose to apply the requirements of Regulation SCI to SB 
SDRs [it] would issue a separate release discussing such a proposal.'' 
\94\ Taking into account the role of SBSDRs in the SBS market, their 
reliance on technology to perform their functions, and the current 
state of regulatory development in the SBS market, the Commission is 
doing so now.
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    \91\ SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72364.
    \92\ See id.
    \93\ See id.
    \94\ SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72364; SCI Proposing 
Release, supra note 14, at 18134.
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i. Role of SBSDRs and Associated Risks
    Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in 2010, provided for a 
comprehensive, new regulatory framework for swaps and security-based 
swaps, including regulatory reporting and public dissemination of 
transactions in security-based swaps.\95\ In 2015, the Commission 
established a regulatory framework for SBSDRs to provide improved 
transparency to regulators and help facilitate price discovery and 
efficiency in the SBS market.\96\ Under this framework, SBSDRs are 
registered securities information processors and disseminators of 
market data in the SBS market,\97\ thereby serving Title VII's goal of 
having public dissemination of price information for all security-based 
swaps, to enhance price discovery for market participants.\98\ Like 
FINRA's Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (``TRACE'') and the 
MSRB's Electronic Municipal Market Access (``EMMA''),\99\ SBSDRs serve 
an important function for market participants because they disseminate 
market data, thereby providing price transparency in the SBS 
market.\100\ Just as TRACE and EMMA provide price transparency to 
market participants and regulatory information to regulators, SBSDRs 
are designed to meet two purposes as mandated by Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act: (1) to provide SBS data and information to regulators to 
surveil the markets and assess for market risks; and (2) to enhance 
price discovery to market participants.\101\ As discussed in detail 
below, given that SBSDRs rely on automated systems and are designed to 
limit systemic risk and promote the stability of the markets they 
serve, the Commission believes that including SBSDRs in the definition 
of SCI entities would better ensure that SBSDR systems are robust, 
resilient, and secure. Additionally, this approach is reasonable and 
consistent as other entities that play a key price transparency role in 
their respective markets, such as plan processors, SCI competing 
consolidators, FINRA and the MSRB, are SCI entities, and their systems 
that directly support market data, among other functions, are currently 
SCI systems.\102\
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    \95\ Public Law 111-203, section 761(a) (adding Exchange Act 
section 3(a)(75) (defining SBSDR)) and section 763(i) (adding 
Exchange Act section 13(n) (establishing a regulatory regime for 
SBSDRs)).
    \96\ See Security-Based Swap Data Repository Registration, 
Duties, and Core Principles, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
74246 (Feb. 11, 2015), 80 FR 14438, 14441 (Mar. 19, 2015) (``SBSDR 
Adopting Release''); Regulation SBSR--Reporting and Dissemination of 
Security-Based Swap Information, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
74244 (Feb. 11, 2015), 80 FR 14563 (Mar. 19, 2015) (``SBSR Adopting 
Release'').
    \97\ See 17 CFR 242.909 (``A registered security-based swap data 
repository shall also register with the Commission as a securities 
information processor on Form SDR.''); see also Form SDR (``With 
respect to an applicant for registration as a security-based swap 
data repository, Form SDR also constitutes an application for 
registration as a securities information processor.'').
    \98\ See, e.g., SBSR Adopting Release, supra note 96, at 14604-
05.
    \99\ FINRA members are subject to transaction reporting 
obligations under FINRA Rule 6730, while municipal securities 
dealers are subject to transaction reporting obligations under MSRB 
Rule G-14. See FINRA Rule 6730(a)(1) (requiring FINRA members to 
report transactions in TRACE-Eligible Securities, which FINRA Rule 
6710 defines to include a range of fixed-income securities). See 
also MRSB Rule G-14 (requiring transaction reporting by municipal 
bond dealers). EMMA, established by the MSRB in 2009, serves as the 
official repository of municipal securities disclosure providing the 
public with free access to relevant municipal securities data, and 
is the central database for information about municipal securities 
offerings, issuers, and obligors. Additionally, the MSRB's Real-Time 
Transaction Reporting System (``RTRS''), with limited exceptions, 
requires municipal bond dealers to submit transaction data to the 
MSRB within 15 minutes of trade execution, and such near real-time 
post-trade transaction data can be accessed through the MSRB's EMMA 
website.
    \100\ See Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and 
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, Principles for financial market infrastructures, at 
1.14, Box 1 (Apr. 16, 2012) (``PFMI''), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101a.pdf (stating that ``[a] TR [trade 
repository] may serve a number of stakeholders that depend on having 
effective access to TR services, both to submit and retrieve data. 
In addition to relevant authorities and the public, other 
stakeholders can include exchanges, electronic trading venues, 
confirmation or matching platforms, and third-party service 
providers that use TR data to offer complementary services.'').
    \101\ See, e.g., SBSR Adopting Release, supra note 96, at 14604-
05.
    \102\ See SBSDR Adopting Release, supra note 96.
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    As centralized repositories for SBS data for use by regulators, 
SBSDRs provide important infrastructure that assists relevant 
authorities in performing their market oversight.\103\ Data maintained 
by SBSDRs may assist regulators in preventing market abuses, performing 
supervision, and resolving issues and positions if an institution 
fails.\104\ SBSDRs are required to collect and maintain accurate SBS 
transaction data so that relevant authorities can access and analyze 
the data from secure, central locations, thereby putting the regulators 
in a better position to monitor for potential market abuse and risks to 
financial stability.\105\ SBSDRs also have the potential to reduce 
operational risk and enhance operational efficiency, such as by 
maintaining transaction records that would help counterparties to 
ensure that their records reconcile on all of the key economic 
details.\106\
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    \103\ See generally PFMI, supra note 100, at 1.14 (stating that 
``[b]y centralising the collection, storage, and dissemination of 
data, a well-designed TR that operates with effective risk controls 
can serve an important role in enhancing the transparency of 
transaction information to relevant authorities and the public, 
promoting financial stability, and supporting the detection and 
prevention of market abuse.'').
    \104\ See Security-Based Swap Data Repository Registration, 
Duties, and Core Principles, Exchange Act Release No. 63347 (Nov. 
19, 2010), 75 FR 77306, 77307 (Dec. 10, 2010), corrected at 75 FR 
79320 (Dec. 20, 2010) and 76 FR 2287 (Jan. 13, 2011) (``SBSDR 
Proposing Release'').
    \105\ See SBSDR Adopting Release, supra note 96, at 14440 
(stating that ``SDRs are required to collect and maintain accurate 
SBS transaction data so that relevant authorities can access and 
analyze the data from secure, central locations, thereby putting 
them in a better position to monitor for potential market abuse and 
risks to financial stability.'').
    \106\ See SBSDR Proposing Release, supra note 104, at 77307 
(stating that ``[t]he enhanced transparency provided by an SDR is 
important to help regulators and others monitor the build-up and 
concentration of risk exposures in the SBS market . . . . In 
addition, SDRs have the potential to reduce operational risk and 
enhance operational efficiency in the SBS market.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, SBSDRs themselves are subject to certain operational 
risks that may impede the ability of SBSDRs to meet the goals set out 
in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Commission's rules.\107\ For 
instance, the links established between an SBSDR and other entities, 
including unaffiliated clearing agencies and other SBSDRs, may expose 
the SBSDR to vulnerabilities outside of its direct control.\108\ 
Without appropriate

[[Page 23155]]

safeguards in place for the systems of SBSDRs, their vulnerabilities 
could lead to significant failures, disruptions, delays, and 
intrusions, which could disrupt price transparency and oversight of the 
SBS market. For instance, an SBSDR processes and disseminates trade 
data using electronic systems, and if these systems fail, public access 
to timely and reliable trade data for the derivatives markets could 
potentially be compromised.\109\ Also, if the data stored at an SBSDR 
is corrupted, the SBSDR would not be able to provide accurate data to 
relevant regulatory authorities, which could hinder the oversight of 
the derivatives markets. Moreover, because SBSDRs receive and maintain 
proprietary and sensitive information (e.g., trading data, non-public 
personal information), it is essential that their systems be capable of 
ensuring the security and integrity of this data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ See SBSDR Adopting Release, supra note 96 at 14450 (``SDRs 
themselves are subject to certain operational risks that may impede 
the ability of SDRs to meet these goals, and the Title VII 
regulatory framework is intended to address these risks.'').
    \108\ See PFMI, supra note 100, at 3.20.20 (stating that ``A TR 
should carefully assess the additional operational risks related to 
its links to ensure the scalability and reliability of IT 
[information technology] and related resources. A TR can establish 
links with another TR or with another type of FMI. Such links may 
expose the linked FMIs to additional risks if not properly designed. 
Besides legal risks, a link to either another TR or to another type 
of FMI may involve the potential spillover of operational risk. The 
mitigation of operational risk is particularly important because the 
information maintained by a TR can support bilateral netting and be 
used to provide services directly to market participants, service 
providers (for example, portfolio compression service providers), 
and other linked FMIs.'').
    \109\ See PFMI, supra note 100, at 1.14, Box 1 (stating that 
``[t]he primary public policy benefits of a TR, which stem from the 
centralisation and quality of the data that a TR maintains, are 
improved market transparency and the provision of this data to 
relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective 
information needs. Timely and reliable access to data stored in a TR 
has the potential to improve significantly the ability of relevant 
authorities and the public to identify and evaluate the potential 
risks posed to the broader financial system.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Along with the reliance of SBSDRs on automated systems to perform 
their functions, regulatory development of the SBS market has proceeded 
significantly since 2015. In particular, security-based swap dealers 
have registered with the Commission,\110\ SBSDRs have registered with 
the Commission,\111\ security-based swap execution facilities 
(``SBSEF'') registration has been proposed,\112\ and straight-through 
processing has increased in the market.\113\ On November 8, 2021, SBS 
data began being reported to SBSDRs, which in turn began disseminating 
such data to the Commission and the public.\114\ In light of the 
important role of SBSDRs in the markets for security-based swaps, their 
level of automation, and the regulatory development of the SBS market 
in recent years, the Commission believes it is timely to propose 
enhanced requirements for registered SBSDRs with respect to their 
technology systems that are central to the performance of their 
regulated activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \110\ See List of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major 
Security-Based Swap Participants, Commission (last updated Jan. 4, 
2023), available at: https://www.sec.gov/files/list_of_sbsds_msbsps_1_4_2023locked_final.xlsx.
    \111\ The Commission approved the registration of two SBSDRs in 
2021. See Security-Based Swap Data Repositories, DTCC Data 
Repository (U.S.), LLC, Order Approving Application for Registration 
as a Security-Based Swap Data Repository, Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 91798 (May 7, 2021), 86 FR 26115 (May 12, 2021); 
Security-Based Swap Data Repositories, ICE Trade Vault, LLC, Order 
Approving Application for Registration as a Security-Based Swap Data 
Repository, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 92189 (Jun. 16, 
2021), 86 FR 32703 (Jun. 22, 2021).
    \112\ See Rules Relating to Security-Based Swap Execution and 
Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap Execution 
Facilities, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94615 (Apr. 6, 
2022), 87 FR 28872 (May 11, 2022).
    \113\ See, e.g., Security-Based Swap Data Repositories, DTCC 
Data Repository (U.S.), LLC, Notice of Filing of Application for 
Registration as a Security-Based Swap Data Repository, Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 91071 (Feb. 5, 2021), 86 FR 8977 (Feb. 10, 
2021) (``[T]he SDR process is an end-to-end straight through 
process; from the receipt of data, processing and maintenance of 
data, and dissemination of data, processes are automated and do not 
require manual intervention.'').
    \114\ See SEC Approves Registration of First Security-Based Swap 
Data Repository; Sets the First Compliance Date for Regulation SBSR, 
Press Release, Commission (May 7, 2021), available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Current Regulation
    The Commission believes the current technology regulation framework 
for SBSDRs should be strengthened. SBSDR technology regulation is 
currently governed by 17 CFR 240.13n-6 (``Rule 13n-6''), a broad, 
principles-based operational risk rule,\115\ which the Commission 
adopted in 2015 when regulatory development of the SBS market was still 
nascent and SBSDRs were not yet registered with the Commission under 17 
CFR 240.13n-1 (``Rule 13n-1'').\116\ Additionally, Rule 13n-6 was 
adopted shortly after the adoption of Regulation SCI, with 
modifications that did not include some of the more detailed proposed 
requirements.\117\ As a result, the two currently-registered SBSDRs 
(which are affiliated with registered clearing agencies that are 
subject to Regulation SCI) \118\ remain subject to the broad 
principles-based rule, Rule 13n-6, which is the only applicable 
operational risk requirement for SBSDRs in the Commission's current 
regulatory framework.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ See 17 CFR 240.13n-6.
    \116\ See SBSDR Adopting Release, supra note 96, at 14499, 14550 
(``[T]he Commission may consider the application of any features of 
Regulation SCI to SDRs in the future.''); SCI Adopting Release, 
supra note 1, at 72364.
    \117\ See SBSDR Adopting Release, supra note 96, at 14499 
(stating that ``[t]he Commission is not adopting Rule 13n-6 as 
proposed because, after proposing Rule 13n-6, the Commission 
considered the need for an updated regulatory framework for certain 
systems of the U.S. securities trading markets and adopted 
Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (`Regulation SCI').''). 
Specifically, the Commission stated that the rule as adopted better 
sets an appropriate core framework for the policies and procedures 
of SBSDRs with respect to automated systems and that the framework 
adopted is ``broadly consistent'' with Regulation SCI. See id. 
Therefore, the Commission declined to adopt more prescriptive 
elements of the rule as proposed, including proposed Rule 13n-6(b), 
which would have required that every security-based swap data 
repository, with respect to those systems that support or are 
integrally related to the performance of its activities: (1) 
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that its systems provide adequate 
levels of capacity, resiliency, and security. These policies and 
procedures shall, at a minimum: (i) establish reasonable current and 
future capacity estimates; (ii) conduct periodic capacity stress 
tests of critical systems to determine such systems' ability to 
process transactions in an accurate, timely, and efficient manner; 
(iii) develop and implement reasonable procedures to review and keep 
current its system development and testing methodology; (iv) review 
the vulnerability of its systems and data center computer operations 
to internal and external threats, physical hazards, and natural 
disasters; and (v) establish adequate contingency and disaster 
recovery plans; (2) on an annual basis, submit an objective review 
to the Commission within thirty calendar days of its completion. 
Where the objective review is performed by an internal department, 
an objective, external firm shall assess the internal department's 
objectivity, competency, and work performance with respect to the 
review performed by the internal department. The external firm must 
issue a report of the objective review, which the security-based 
swap data repository must submit to the Commission on an annual 
basis, within 30 calendar days of completion of the review; (3) 
promptly notify the Commission of material systems outages and any 
remedial measures that have been implemented or are contemplated 
(prompt notification includes the following: (i) immediately notify 
the Commission when a material systems outage is detected; (ii) 
immediately notify the Commission when remedial measures are 
selected to address the material systems outage; (iii) immediately 
notify the Commission when the material systems outage is addressed; 
and (iv) submit to the Commission within five business days of the 
occurrence of the material systems outage a detailed written 
description and analysis of the outage and any remedial measures 
that have been implemented or are contemplated); and (4) notify the 
Commission in writing at least thirty calendar days before 
implementation of any planned material systems changes. See SBSDR 
Proposing Release, supra note 104, at 77370.
    \118\ The two registered SBSDRs, DTCC Data Repository (U.S.), 
LLC and ICE Trade Vault, LLC, are affiliated with the registered 
clearing agencies, Depository Trust Company and ICE Clear Credit 
LCC, respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 13n-6 requires that SBSDRs, with respect to those systems that 
support or are integrally related to the performance of their 
activities, establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to ensure that their systems provide 
adequate levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and

[[Page 23156]]

security.\119\ The operational risk principles underlying Rule 13n-6 
are an essential part of the rules that comprise the core framework for 
SBSDRs that the Commission established in 2015 at the opening of its 
regulatory regime governing SBSDRs. The core framework influences all 
applicable requirements relevant to SBSDRs that follow. The core 
framework not only addresses SBSDR operational risk, but also other 
SBSDR enumerated duties, including registration, market access to 
services and data, governance arrangements, conflicts of interest, data 
collection and maintenance, privacy and disclosure requirements, and 
chief compliance officers,\120\ thereby implementing the provisions of 
Exchange Act section 13(n).\121\ Therefore, the SBSDR core framework, 
which Rule 13n-6 is a part, is different in focus and broader in scope 
than proposed Regulation SCI--as it relates to SBSDRs--which is focused 
on, among things, protecting the security of SBSDR systems. While Rule 
13n-6 may not provide the absolute requirements relating to SBSDR 
operational risk, as the Commission's regulatory regime continues to 
evolve, Rule 13n-6 sets forth an enumerated duty for operational risk 
concerns that registered SBSDRs must address--at the time of 
registration and throughout its registration with the Commission. 
Compliance with the core principles and requirements in the SBSDR 
rules, including Rule 13n-6, is, thus, an important building block for 
better ensuring the integrity of an SBSDR's data quality upon which the 
Commission and the securities markets rely. In this regard, the 
Commission believes that Rule 13n-6 should be preserved, with the 
requirements of this proposal, if adopted, working to complement Rule 
13n-6.\122\ Specifically, the proposed requirements of Regulation SCI 
on SBSDRs would exist and operate in conjunction with Rule 13n-6 and 
would prescribe certain key features and more detailed functional 
requirements to help ensure that SBSDR market systems are robust, 
resilient, and secure.\123\
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    \119\ See 17 CFR 240.13n-6.
    \120\ See 17 CFR 240.13n-1 through 240.13n-12; See SBSDR 
Adopting Release, supra note 96, at 14440-42.
    \121\ 15 U.S.C. 78m(n).
    \122\ When adopting Rule 13n-6, the Commission acknowledged the 
potential application of Regulation SCI provisions to SBSDRs in the 
future. See SBSDR Adopting Release, supra note 96, at 14438, 14499 
(stating that ``[c]onsistent with this approach and in recognition 
of the importance of SDRs as the primary repositories of SBS trade 
information, the Commission may consider the application of any 
features of Regulation SCI to SDRs in the future.''). Additionally, 
as guidance, the Commission stated that, in preparing their policies 
and procedures to comply with Rule 13n-6, SBSDRs may consider 
whether to incorporate aspects of Regulation SCI that may be 
appropriate for their particular implementation of Rule 13n-6. See 
id., at 14499, n.826 (stating that ``[i]n preparing their policies 
and procedures, SDRs may consider whether to incorporate aspects of 
Regulation SCI that may be appropriate for their particular 
implementation of Rule 13n-6, including where an SDR is related by 
virtue of its corporate structure to an entity subject to Regulation 
SCI.'').
    \123\ In 2014, the SEC's SBSDR regulatory framework was subject 
to a Level 2 assessment by the Bank for International Settlements' 
Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (``CPMI'') and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (``IOSCO''), 
which concluded that ``the U.S. jurisdiction has developed rules or 
proposed rules that completely and consistently implement the 
majority of Principles that are applicable to CCPs [central 
counterparties] [but that] [t]he progress of the U.S. jurisdiction 
towards completely and consistently implementing the Principles for 
[trade repositories] has been more limited.'' See CPMI-IOSCO, 
Implementation Monitoring of PFMIs: Level 2 assessment report for 
central counterparties and trade repositories--United States (Feb. 
26, 2015), available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD477.pdf. Additionally, CPMI-IOSCO issued guidance for cyber 
resilience for financial market infrastructures (``FMIs''), 
including trade repositories. See CPMI-IOSCO, Guidance on cyber 
resilience for financial market infrastructures (June 2016), 
available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD535.pdf; see also CPMI-IOSCO, Implementation monitoring of 
the PFMI: Level 3 assessment on Financial Market Infrastructures' 
Cyber Resilience (Nov. 2022), available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD723.pdf (presenting the results of an 
assessment of the state of cyber resilience (as of Feb. 2021) at 37 
FMIs from 29 jurisdictions that participated in this exercise in 
2020 to 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regulation SCI, among other things, defines the scope of systems 
covered, and requires: the establishment, maintenance, and enforcement 
of written policies and procedures to ensure that SCI systems have 
levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security 
adequate to maintain operational capacity and promote the maintenance 
of fair and orderly markets, with minimum elements that include, among 
others, standards designed to facilitate the successful collection, 
processing, and dissemination of market data and robust business 
continuity and disaster recovery plans; policies and procedures 
designed to ensure compliance with the federal securities laws; 
corrective action and reporting and dissemination of SCI events, 
quarterly reporting of material systems changes, and an annual SCI 
review; and participation of key members in SCI entity's business 
continuity and disaster recovery plans.
    The Commission believes that SBSDRs operate with similar complexity 
and in a similar fashion as other registered securities information 
processors that are currently subject to Regulation SCI and that they 
play an important role in the SBS market and face similar technological 
vulnerabilities as existing SCI entities, such as FINRA's TRACE and 
MSRB's EMMA. For example, were an SBSDR to experience a systems issue, 
market participants could be prevented from receiving timely 
information regarding accurate prices for individual SBSs. Given 
SBSDRs' reliance on automated systems and their dual Dodd-Frank 
mandated role of providing price transparency to market participants 
and SBS data to regulators to surveil markets to better ensure that 
systemic risk is limited and market stability is enhanced, the 
Commission believes it appropriate to include SBSDRs into the scope of 
the Regulation SCI proposal.
    Currently, there are two registered SBSDRs that would become 
subject to Regulation SCI should the Regulation SCI amendments be 
adopted.\124\
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    \124\ See supra note 118.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Request for Comment
    1. The Commission requests comment generally on the inclusion of 
SBSDRs as SCI entities. Is their inclusion appropriate? Why or why not? 
Please be specific and provide examples, if possible, to illustrate 
your points.
    2. Should all or some aspects of Regulation SCI apply to SBSDRs? 
Why or why not? If only a portion, please specify which portion(s) and 
explain why. If all, explain why.
    3. Are the definitions of SCI systems and indirect SCI systems 
appropriate for SBSDRs? Why or why not? Are there any systems of SBSDRs 
that should be included but would not be covered by these definitions? 
Please explain. Are there any systems of SBSDRs that should be excluded 
by these definitions? Please explain. Do SBSDRs have any systems that 
would or should be covered by the definition of critical SCI systems? 
Please explain.
    4. Is current Rule 13n-6 sufficient to govern the technology of 
SBSDRs? If not, why not? Would the Regulation SCI proposed 
requirements, together with Rule 13n-6, be sufficient to address 
operational risk concerns posed by SBSDRs? Why or why not? Should Rule 
13n-6 serve as an operational risk requirement for new SBSDR 
registrants during the first year registered with the Commission, with 
Regulation SCI proposed requirements imposed after the first year of 
registration? Why or why not? Please be specific and respond with 
examples, if possible.
    5. Given the current practices of SBSDRs, would the proposed 
Regulation SCI requirements pose unreasonable or unworkable 
difficulties

[[Page 23157]]

for them, technologically, legally, operationally, or procedurally? Why 
or why not? Please be specific and respond with examples, if possible.
    6. Should Regulation SCI distinguish among different types of 
SBSDRs such that some requirements of Regulation SCI might be 
appropriate for some SBSDRs but not others? Why or why not? If so, what 
are those distinctions and what are those requirements? For example, 
should any requirements be based on criteria such as number of 
transactions or notional volume reported to a SBSDR? If so, what would 
be an appropriate threshold for any such criteria, and why? Please be 
specific and provide examples, if possible.
    7. Because proposed Regulation SCI would include SBSDRs as ``SCI 
entities,'' SBSDRs that share systems with affiliated clearing agencies 
could be required to classify those shared systems as SCI systems of 
the SBSDR and indirect SCI systems of the clearing agency, and vice 
versa. Is this outcome appropriate? Why or why not? Please be specific 
and provide examples, if possible.
    8. Is Regulation SCI, including as proposed to be amended, 
comprehensive and robust enough to address SBSDRs that rely on third-
party providers to support core SBSDR operations? Why or why not? 
Please be specific and provide examples, if possible.
b. SCI Broker-Dealers
    The Commission further proposes to expand the application of 
Regulation SCI by including certain broker-dealers--to be referred to 
as ``SCI broker-dealers''--in the definition of SCI entity. An SCI 
broker-dealer would be a broker or dealer registered with the 
Commission pursuant to section 15(b) of the Exchange Act that exceeds 
one or more size thresholds. An SCI broker-dealer would be a broker-
dealer that meets or exceeds: (i) a total assets threshold, or (ii) one 
or more transaction activity thresholds.
    The proposed thresholds are designed to identify the largest U.S. 
broker-dealers by size, as measured in two different ways. The first is 
analysis of broker-dealer size based on total assets reported on Form 
X-17A-5 (Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single (``FOCUS'') 
Report Part II, Item 940),\125\ which reveals the largest firms based 
on their balance sheets at a point in time, and which is a measure used 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (``Federal 
Reserve Board'') to calculate and provide to the public on a quarterly 
basis a measure of total assets of all security broker-dealers.\126\ 
The second is a measure of broker-dealer size using transaction 
activity to identify significant firms active in certain enumerated 
types of securities. As discussed further below, the total assets 
threshold is expressed in terms of the broker-dealer's total assets at 
specified points in time as a percentage of the ``total assets of all 
security broker-dealers'' with ``total assets of all security-broker-
dealers'' being calculated and made publicly available by the Federal 
Reserve Board for the associated preceding calendar quarter, or any 
subsequent provider of such information.\127\ The trading activity 
threshold is expressed in terms of the sum of buy and sell transactions 
that the broker-dealer transacted during a specified time period as a 
percentage of reported total average daily dollar volume in one or more 
enumerated types of securities. The proposed total assets threshold is 
broadly similar to the approach banking regulators use to assess the 
appropriate capital and liquidity requirements for banks.\128\ The 
proposed transaction activity thresholds are similar to, but 
distinguishable from, the market share thresholds for SCI ATSs.\129\ 
The proposed threshold approaches in the proposed definition of SCI 
broker-dealer are designed to identify entities that play key roles in 
the U.S. securities markets due to the magnitude of their activity in 
these markets.\130\
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    \125\ See Form X-17A-5, FOCUS Report, Part II, at 3, available 
at https://www.sec.gov/files/formx-17a-5_2_2.pdf (requiring broker-
dealers to report their total assets in Item 940).
    \126\ See infra note 127.
    \127\ For additional detail on the calculation of total assets 
of all security broker-dealers, see Z.1: Financial Accounts of the 
United States, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/fof/Guide/z1_tables_description.pdf; ((i) stating that the term 
``security broker-dealers'' refers to firms that buy and sell 
securities for a fee, hold an inventory of securities for resale, or 
do both; and firms that make up this sector are those that submit 
information to the Commission on one of two reporting forms, either 
the Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single Report of 
Brokers and Dealers (FOCUS) or the Report on Finances and Operations 
of Government Securities Brokers and Dealers (FOGS); and (ii) 
describing the major assets of the security brokers and dealers 
sector). Currently, this information is readily accessible on the 
Federal Reserve Economic Data (``FRED'') website. See Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Security Brokers and 
Dealers; Total Assets (Balance Sheet), Level [BOGZ1FL664090663Q], 
retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, available 
at: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOGZ1FL664090663Q (making 
publicly available the total assets of all security brokers and 
dealers, as calculated and updated quarterly by the Federal Reserve 
Board).
    \128\ See infra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
    \129\ See infra section III.A.b.iii.
    \130\ See infra text accompanying notes 138-142 (summarizing 
comments on the SCI Proposing Release from commenters urging that 
application of Regulation SCI to broker-dealers should be limited to 
those with substantial transaction volume or having a large 
``footprint'').
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i. Background
    There are approximately 3,500 broker-dealers registered with the 
Commission pursuant to section 15(b) of the Exchange Act, and these 
entities encompass a broad range of sizes, business activities, and 
business models.\131\ In 2013, the Commission proposed to include 
significant volume ATSs in the definition of SCI entity but at that 
time did not propose to include any other aspects of broker-dealer 
operations.\132\ Rather, the Commission solicited comment on whether 
certain classes of broker-dealers should be covered. In particular, the 
Commission sought comment on whether Regulation SCI should apply, for 
example, to OTC market makers \133\ (either all or those

[[Page 23158]]

that execute a significant volume of orders), exchange market makers 
\134\ (either all or those that trade a significant volume on 
exchanges), order-entry firms that handle and route order flow for 
execution (either all or those that handle a significant volume of 
investor orders), clearing broker-dealers (either all or those that 
engage in a significant amount of clearing activities), and/or large 
multi-service broker-dealers that engage in a variety of order 
handling, trading, and clearing activities.\135\ Although OTC market 
makers and clearing broker-dealers were noted specifically as examples 
of categories of broker-dealers that could pose significant risk to the 
market if a large portion of the order flow they handle or process were 
disrupted due to a systems issue, the Commission broadly solicited 
commenters' views on the importance of different categories of broker-
dealers to the stability of overall securities market infrastructure 
and the risks posed by their systems.\136\
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    \131\ This estimate is derived from information on broker-dealer 
FOCUS Report Form X-17A-5 Schedule II filings as of Dec. 31, 2021, 
as well as the third quarter of 2022. See also FINRA, 2022 FINRA 
Industry Snapshot (Mar. 2022), available at https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/2022-industry-snapshot.pdf. Section 
15(b)(8) of the Exchange Act prohibits any broker-dealer from 
effecting transactions in securities unless it is a member of a 
registered national securities association (i.e., FINRA) or effects 
securities transactions solely on a national securities exchange of 
which it is a member. See 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(8); see also 17 CFR 
240.15b9-1 (``Rule 15b9-1'') (exempting proprietarily trading 
dealers from section 15(b)(8)'s national securities association 
membership requirement if they are a member of a national securities 
exchange and meet certain other requirements). But see Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 95388 (July 29, 2022), 87 FR 49930 (Aug. 
12, 2022) (proposing amendments to Exchange Act Rule 15b9-1 that 
would generally require proprietary trading firms that are 
registered broker-dealers to become a registered member of a 
national securities association (i.e., FINRA) if they effect 
securities transactions otherwise than on an exchange of which they 
are a member). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94524 
(Mar. 28, 2022), 87 FR 23054 (Apr. 18, 2022) (``Dealer-Trader 
Release'') (proposing to further define ``dealer'' and ``government 
securities dealer'' to identify certain activities that would 
constitute a ``regular business'' requiring a person engaged in 
those activities to register as a ``dealer'' or a ``government 
securities dealer,'' absent an exception or exemption). Because the 
proposed amendments to further define the definition of dealer could 
result in a greater number of dealers and the amendments proposed to 
expand and update Regulation SCI could impact these newly designated 
dealers, commenters also are encouraged to review the Dealer-Trader 
Release to determine whether it might affect their comments on this 
proposal.
    \132\ See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18138-42.
    \133\ An OTC market maker is a dealer that holds itself out as 
willing to buy and sell NMS stocks on a continuous basis in amounts 
of less than block size otherwise than on an exchange. See 17 CFR 
242.600(b)(64).
    \134\ An exchange market maker is any member of a national 
securities exchange that is registered as a specialist or market 
maker pursuant to the rules of such exchange. See 17 CFR 
242.600(b)(32).
    \135\ See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18139-40.
    \136\ See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18138-40 
(including questions 194-196 soliciting comment on whether and how 
to distinguish between and among categories of broker-dealers, such 
as OTC market makers, order entry firms that handle and route order 
flow for execution, clearing broker-dealers, and large multi-service 
broker-dealers that engage in a variety of order handling, trading, 
and clearing activities).
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    As summarized in the SCI Adopting Release, commenters' views 
varied.\137\ One commenter opined that market makers and brokers or 
dealers that execute orders internally by trading as a principal or 
crossing orders as an agent and handle market share that exceeds that 
of certain SCI ATSs should be subject to Regulation SCI.\138\ Others 
stated that market makers, high frequency trading firms, or any firm 
with market access should be included, arguing that these market 
participants could present systemic risks to the market and had ``a 
significant footprint in the markets.'' \139\ Others stated that 
broker-dealers should be SCI entities because 17 CFR 240.15c3-5 (``Rule 
15c3-5'' or ``Market Access Rule''),\140\ requiring the implementation 
of risk management and supervisory controls to limit risk associated 
with routing orders to exchanges or ATSs, was not sufficient by itself, 
as it does not address the reliability or integrity of the systems that 
implement such controls.\141\ One commenter stated that Regulation SCI 
should be extended to any trading platforms that transact significant 
volume, including systems that are not required to register as an ATS 
because all executions are against the bids and offers of a single 
dealer.\142\ In contrast, other commenters argued that broker-dealers 
should not be subject to Regulation SCI because they must comply with 
other Exchange Act and FINRA rules and the proposed Regulation SCI 
requirements would be ``duplicative and unduly burdensome.'' \143\ At 
adoption, the Commission stated that ``should [it] decide to propose to 
apply the requirements of Regulation SCI to [broker-dealer operations 
other than ATSs, it] would issue a separate release discussing such a 
proposal and would take these comments into account.'' \144\
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    \137\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72365.
    \138\ See id. (citing letter from the New York Stock Exchange, 
Inc. (``NYSE'')).
    \139\ See id. (citing letters from Liquidnet, Inc., David Lauer, 
and R.T. Leuchtkafer).
    \140\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-5.
    \141\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72365 (citing 
letters from David Lauer and the NYSE).
    \142\ See id. (citing letter from BlackRock at 4, in which 
BlackRock stated that trading systems that ``transact significant 
volume'' are ``venues that have a meaningful role and impact on the 
equity market'').
    \143\ See id.
    \144\ SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72366.
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    In considering expansion of Regulation SCI to broker-dealers or 
broker-dealer operations beyond SCI ATSs, the Commission has considered 
the extent to which current Commission and FINRA rules affect how 
broker-dealers design and review their systems for capacity, integrity, 
resiliency, availability, and/or security adequate to maintain 
operational capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly 
markets and compliance with federal securities laws and regulations, 
and whether additional technology oversight is appropriate for certain 
broker-dealers based on the magnitude of their activity in the markets 
today.\145\ The Commission proposes to apply Regulation SCI to a 
limited number of the approximately 3,500 broker-dealers registered 
with the Commission. The proposed thresholds are designed to identify 
firms that, by virtue of their total assets or level of transaction 
activity over a period of time and on a consistent basis, play a 
significant role in the orderly functioning of U.S. securities markets. 
The thresholds are designed to identify firms that, if adversely 
affected by a technology event, could disrupt or impede orderly and 
efficient market operations more broadly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ As noted above, the concurrently issued Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal would establish minimum ``cybersecurity 
rules'' for all broker-dealers. That proposal does not, however, 
independently address weaknesses in broker-dealer operational 
capacity or resiliency not attributable to cybersecurity breaches.
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ii. Current Regulatory Oversight of Broker-Dealer Systems Technology
    There are a number of Commission and FINRA rules that affect how 
broker-dealers design and maintain their technology and promote 
business continuity and regulatory compliance.\146\ Although these 
rules may support the goal of more resilient broker-dealer systems, 
they are not designed to address the same concerns that Regulation SCI 
addresses and are not a substitute for Regulation SCI.\147\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ 17 CFR 240.3a1-1(a)(2) (``Rule 3a1-1(a)(2)''), exempts 
from the Exchange Act section 3(a)(1) definition of ``exchange'' an 
organization, association, or group of persons that complies with 
Regulation ATS. All such exempted ATSs must be a registered broker-
dealer and become a member of an SRO, which typically is FINRA. 
Accordingly, FINRA rules applicable to broker-dealers apply to ATSs. 
A similar discussion of FINRA rules applicable to ATSs appears in 
the SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72263.
    \147\ See infra notes 148-166 and accompanying text. See also 
SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72263 (n. 115 and 
accompanying text), 72365 (discussing comments received).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As some commenters on the SCI Proposing Release stated, the Market 
Access Rule is relevant to certain broker-dealer systems. The Market 
Access Rule requires broker-dealers with market access to implement, on 
a market-wide basis, effective financial and regulatory risk management 
controls and supervisory procedures reasonably designed to limit 
financial exposure and ensure compliance with applicable regulatory 
requirements, and thus seeks to address, among other things, certain 
risks posed to the markets by broker-dealer systems.\148\ Pursuant to 
the Market Access Rule, a broker or dealer with market access, or that 
provides a customer or any other

[[Page 23159]]

person with access to a national securities exchange or ATS through use 
of its market participant identifier or otherwise, must establish, 
document, and maintain a system of risk management controls and 
supervisory procedures reasonably designed to manage the financial, 
regulatory, and other risks of this business activity.\149\ The Market 
Access Rule specifies standards for financial and regulatory risk 
management controls and supervisory procedures.\150\ It requires that 
the financial risk management controls and supervisory procedures must 
be reasonably designed to limit systematically the financial exposure 
of the broker or dealer that could arise from market access.\151\ In 
addition, the Market Access Rule requires that regulatory risk 
management controls and supervisory procedures be reasonably designed 
to ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements.\152\ As such, 
the focus of the Market Access Rule requires controls to prevent 
technology and other errors that can create some of the more 
significant risks to broker-dealers and the markets, namely those that 
arise when a broker-dealer enters orders into a national securities 
exchange or ATS, including when it provides sponsored or direct market 
access to customers or other persons, where the consequences of such an 
error can rapidly magnify and spread throughout the markets. Further, 
the Market Access Rule requires specific controls and procedures around 
a broker-dealer entering orders on a national securities exchange or 
ATS that Regulation SCI does not and would not prescribe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63241 (Nov. 3, 
2010), 75 FR 69792 (Nov. 15, 2010) (``Market Access Release''). 
Under 17 CFR 240.15c3-5(a)(1) (``Rule 15c3-5(a)(1)''), ``market 
access'' is defined to mean: (i) access to trading in securities on 
an exchange or ATS as a result of being a member or subscriber of 
the exchange or ATS, respectively; or (ii) access to trading in 
securities on an ATS provided by a broker-dealer operator of an ATS 
to a non-broker-dealer. See 17 CFR 240.15c3-5(a)(1). In adopting 
Rule 15c3-5(a)(1), the Commission stated that ``the risks associated 
with market access . . . are present whenever a broker-dealer trades 
as a member of an exchange or subscriber to an ATS, whether for its 
own proprietary account or as agent for its customers, including 
traditional agency brokerage and through direct market access or 
sponsored access arrangements.'' See Market Access Release at 69798. 
As such, the Commission stated that ``to effectively address these 
risks, Rule 15c3-5 must apply broadly to all access to trading on an 
Exchange or ATS.'' Id.
    \149\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-5(b).
    \150\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-5(c).
    \151\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-5(c)(1).
    \152\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-5(c)(2). See also 17 CFR 240.15c3-
5(a)(2) (defining ``regulatory requirements'' to mean all Federal 
securities laws, rules and regulations, and rules of self-regulatory 
organizations, that are applicable in connection with market 
access).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In contrast, the policies and procedures required by Regulation SCI 
apply broadly to technology that supports trading, clearance and 
settlement, order routing, market data, market regulation, and market 
surveillance and, among other things, address their overall capacity, 
integrity, resilience, availability, and security independent of market 
access. Whereas the Market Access Rule prescribes specific controls and 
procedures around a broker-dealer entering orders on an exchange or 
ATS, it is not designed to ensure that the key technology pervasive and 
important to the functioning of the U.S. securities markets is robust, 
resilient, and secure.\153\ Among other requirements, the policies and 
procedures requirements of Regulation SCI are designed to help ensure 
that the systems of SCI entities are adequate to maintain operational 
capability independent of any specific SCI event (i.e., a systems issue 
such as a systems disruption, systems intrusion, or systems compliance 
issue). Further, the SCI review requirement obligates an SCI entity to 
assess the risks of its systems and effectiveness of its technology 
controls at least annually, identify weaknesses, and ensure compliance 
with the safeguards of Regulation SCI. The Market Access Rule and 
Regulation SCI, therefore, have different requirements and would 
operate in conjunction with each other to help ensure that SCI broker-
dealer SCI systems, whether used for access to the national securities 
exchanges or ATSs or not, are robust, resilient, and secure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ See also supra note 141 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Broker-dealers are also subject to the Commission's financial 
responsibility rules (17 CFR 240.15c3-1 (``Rule 15c3-1'') and 17 CFR 
240.15c3-3 (``Rule 15c3-3'')) under the Exchange Act. Rule 15c3-1 
requires broker-dealers to maintain minimum amounts of net capital, 
ensuring that the broker-dealer at all times has enough liquid assets 
to promptly satisfy all creditor claims if the broker-dealer were to go 
out of business.\154\ Rule 15c3-3 imposes requirements relating to 
safeguarding customer funds and securities.\155\ These rules provide 
protections for broker-dealer counterparties and customers and can help 
to mitigate the risks to, and impact on, customers and other market 
participants by protecting them from the consequences of financial 
failure that may occur because of a systems issue at a broker-dealer, 
and thus have a different scope and purpose from Regulation SCI.\156\
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    \154\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1.
    \155\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3.
    \156\ Similarly, 17 CFR 248.30 (``Rule 30'' of Regulation S-P), 
which requires registered brokers and dealers to have written 
policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to safeguard 
customer records and information--to insure their security and 
confidentiality, protect against threats or hazards to their 
security and integrity and protect against unauthorized access or 
use that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any 
customer--is not designed to help ensure operational capability of 
market related systems. In addition, 17 CFR 248.201 (``Regulation S-
ID'') requires financial institutions or creditors (defined to 
include registered broker-dealers) that have one or more covered 
accounts, as defined in 17 CFR 248.201(b)(3) (e.g., brokerage 
account), to develop and implement a written identity theft 
prevention program to detect, prevent, and mitigate identity theft 
in connection with covered accounts that includes policies and 
procedures to identify and incorporate red flags into the program, 
detect and respond to red flags, and incorporate periodic updates to 
the program. This rule, however, is also not designed to ensure 
operational capability of market related systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pursuant to 17 CFR 240.17a-3 (``Rule 17a-3'' under the Exchange 
Act) and 17 CFR 240.17a-4 (``Rule 17a-4'' under the Exchange Act), 
broker-dealers are required to make and keep current records detailing, 
among other things, securities transactions, money balances, and 
securities positions.\157\ A systems issue at a broker-dealer would not 
excuse the broker-dealer for noncompliance with these 
requirements.\158\ Further, a broker-dealer that fails to make and keep 
current the records required by Rule 17a-3 must give notice to the 
Commission of this fact on the same day and, thereafter, within 48 
hours transmit a report to the Commission stating what the broker-
dealer has done or is doing to correct the situation.\159\ Regulation 
SCI, however, more directly addresses mitigating the impact of 
technology failures with respect to SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems (which include systems that are not used to make and keep 
current the records required by Rule 17a-3). Specifically, it requires 
notifications to the Commission for a different set of events--systems 
intrusions, systems compliance issues, and systems disruptions--than 
the notification requirements of 17 CFR 240.17a-11 (``Rule 17a-11''), 
and is therefore not duplicative of Rule 17a-11. In addition, it 
requires that, when an SCI event has occurred, an SCI entity must begin 
to take appropriate corrective action which must include, at a minimum, 
mitigating potential harm to investors and market integrity resulting 
from the SCI event and devoting adequate resources to remedy the SCI 
event as soon as reasonably practicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ See 17 CFR 240.17a-3; 17 CFR 240.17a-4.
    \158\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 40162 (July 
2, 1998), 63 FR 37668 (July 13, 1998) (stating that computer systems 
with ``Year 2000 Problems'' may be deemed not to have accurate and 
current records and be in violation of Rule 17a-3).
    \159\ See 17 CFR 240.17a-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA also has several rules that are similar to, but take a 
different approach from, Regulation SCI. For example, FINRA Rule 4370 
requires that each broker-dealer create and maintain a written business 
continuity plan identifying procedures relating to an emergency or 
significant business disruption that are reasonably designed to enable 
them to meet their existing obligations to customers. The procedures 
must also address the broker-dealer's existing relationships

[[Page 23160]]

with other broker-dealers and counterparties. A broker-dealer is 
required to update its plan in the event of any material change to the 
member's operations, structure, business, or location and must conduct 
an annual review of its business continuity plan to determine whether 
any modifications are necessary in light of changes to the member's 
operations, structure, business, or location. The rule sets forth 
general minimum elements that a broker-dealer's business continuity 
plan must address.\160\
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    \160\ Specifically, FINRA Rule 4370 requires that each plan 
must, at a minimum, address: data back-up and recovery; all mission 
critical systems; financial and operational assessments; alternate 
communications between customers and the member; alternate 
communications between the member and its employees; alternate 
physical location of employees; critical business constituent, bank, 
and counter-party impact; regulatory reporting; communications with 
regulators; and how the member will assure customers' prompt access 
to their funds and securities in the event that the member 
determines that it is unable to continue its business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This rule is akin to Regulation SCI's Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) requiring 
policies and procedures for business continuity and disaster recovery 
plans.\161\ However, unlike Regulation SCI, the FINRA rule does not 
include the requirement that the business continuity and disaster 
recovery plans be reasonably designed to achieve next business day 
resumption of trading and two-hour resumption of critical SCI systems 
following a wide-scale disruption, nor does it require the functional 
and performance testing and coordination of industry or sector-testing 
of such plans, which are instrumental in achieving the goals of 
Regulation SCI with respect to SCI entities.\162\ In addition, FINRA 
Rule 4370 contains certain provisions that Regulation SCI does 
not.\163\ For example, a broker-dealer must disclose to its customers 
through public disclosure statements how its business continuity plan 
addresses the possibility of a future significant business disruption 
and how the member plans to respond to events of varying scope.\164\ 
Accordingly, FINRA Rule 4370 and Regulation SCI would operate in 
conjunction with one another to help ensure that an SCI broker-dealer 
has business continuity and disaster recovery plans to achieve the 
goals of each rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72263-64.
    \162\ Id.
    \163\ See supra note 160.
    \164\ See FINRA Rule 4370(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA Rule 3110(b)(1) requires each broker-dealer to establish, 
maintain, and enforce written procedures to supervise the types of 
business in which it engages and to supervise the activities of 
registered representatives, registered principals, and other associated 
persons that are reasonably designed to achieve compliance with 
applicable securities laws and regulations.
    This supervisory obligation extends to member firms' outsourcing of 
certain ``covered activities''--activities or functions that, if 
performed directly by a member firm, would be required to be the 
subject of a supervisory system and written supervisory procedures 
pursuant to FINRA Rule 3110.\165\ This rule is broadly similar to Rule 
1001(b) of Regulation SCI regarding policies and procedures to ensure 
systems compliance. However, unlike Rule 1001(b), which focuses on 
ensuring that an entity's systems operate in compliance with the 
Exchange Act, the rules and regulations thereunder, and the entity's 
rules and governing documents, this FINRA rule does not specifically 
address compliance of broker-dealers' systems. Further, this provision 
does not cover more broadly policies and procedures akin to those in 
Rule 1001(a) of Regulation SCI regarding ensuring the SCI entity's 
operational capability. FINRA Rule 3110(b)(1) and Regulation SCI would 
operate in conjunction to help ensure that the SCI systems of SCI 
broker-dealers, including those operated by third parties, are robust, 
resilient, and operate as intended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ See FINRA, Regulatory Notice 21-29: Vendor Management and 
Outsourcing (Aug. 13, 2021), available at https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/Regulatory-Notice-21-29.pdf; FINRA, 
Notice to Members 05-48: Outsourcing (July 2005), available at 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p014735.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FINRA Rule 3130 requires a broker-dealer's chief compliance officer 
to certify annually that the member has in place processes to 
establish, maintain, review, test, and modify written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable 
FINRA rules, MSRB rules, and federal securities laws and regulations. 
This rule is similar to Rule 1001(b) of Regulation SCI regarding 
policies and procedures to ensure systems compliance; however, like 
FINRA Rule 3130(b)(1), it does not specifically address compliance of 
broker-dealers' systems, and does not require similar policies and 
procedures to those in Rule 1001(a) of Regulation SCI regarding 
operational capability of SCI entities. Therefore, FINRA Rule 3130 and 
Regulation SCI would operate in conjunction with each other to help 
ensure compliance with applicable law.
    FINRA Rule 4530 imposes a regime for reporting certain events to 
FINRA, including, among other things, compliance issues and other 
events where a broker-dealer has concluded, or should have reasonably 
concluded, that a violation of securities or other enumerated law, 
rule, or regulation of any domestic or foreign regulatory body or SRO 
has occurred. This requirement is similar to Regulation SCI's reporting 
requirements under Rule 1002 with respect to systems compliance issues; 
however, it does not cover reporting of systems disruptions and systems 
intrusions that did not also involve a violation of a securities law, 
rule, or regulation. Further, the FINRA reporting rule differs from the 
Commission notification requirements with respect to the scope, timing, 
content and required recipient of the reports. FINRA Rule 4530 
addressing reporting of certain issues to FINRA is thus not duplicative 
of Regulation SCI, which, among other things, was designed to enhance 
direct Commission oversight of entities designated as key entities 
because they play a significant role in the U.S. securities markets.
    Additionally, while regulations and associated guidance applicable 
to bank holding companies promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board and 
other bank regulators address operational resilience, their direct 
application is to bank holding companies rather than broker-dealers 
registered with the Commission. For example, a 2020 interagency paper 
issued by the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation sets forth 
``sound practices'' for the largest, most complex firms, including U.S. 
bank holding companies, to follow to strengthen their operational 
resilience. While this publication offers key strategies for covered 
entities to follow to remain resilient, many of which are similar to 
what Regulation SCI requires, they are not mandatory for registered 
broker-dealers.\166\ Thus,

[[Page 23161]]

although some Exchange Act and FINRA rules other than Regulation SCI 
support the goal of robust and resilient broker-dealer systems, the 
Commission believes that additional protections, reporting of systems 
problems, and direct Commission oversight of broker-dealer technology 
is appropriate for the largest broker-dealers.
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    \166\ See Federal Reserve Board, SR 20-24: Interagency Paper on 
Sound Practices to Strengthen Operational Resilience (Nov. 2, 2020), 
(``Banking Interagency Paper''), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/SR2024.htm (``To 
help large and complex domestic firms address unforeseen challenges 
to their operational resilience, the sound practices are drawn from 
existing regulations, guidance, and statements as well as common 
industry standards that address operational risk management, 
business continuity management, third-party risk management, 
cybersecurity risk management, and recovery and resolution 
planning.''). The paper applies to national banks, state member 
banks, state nonmember banks, savings associations, U.S. bank 
holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies that have 
average total consolidated assets greater than or equal to (a) $250 
billion or (b) $100 billion and have $75 billion or more in average 
cross-jurisdictional activity, average weighted short-term wholesale 
funding, average nonbank assets, or average off-balance sheet 
exposure. As discussed below, the Commission's proposed approach to 
identifying SCI broker-dealers similarly takes into account the size 
of the firm, as measured by a total assets threshold and/or market 
activity thresholds.
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iii. Proposed Thresholds for an ``SCI Broker-Dealer''
Overview
    As proposed, Regulation SCI would apply to a limited number of 
broker-dealers that satisfy: (i) a total assets threshold, or (ii) one 
or more transaction activity thresholds.
    The Commission preliminarily believes that a broker-dealer that 
meets the proposed thresholds for assets or transaction activity, 
whether operating in multiple markets or predominantly in a single 
market, that becomes unreliable or unavailable due to a systems issue, 
risks disrupting fair and orderly market functioning.
    Current Regulation SCI applies to all national securities exchanges 
and certain significant-volume ATSs, all of which are highly dependent 
on sophisticated automated and interconnected systems. As electronic 
trading has grown, and continues to grow in some asset classes, many 
broker-dealers are similarly dependent on sophisticated and 
interconnected automated systems.\167\ These broker-dealer systems 
contribute to the orderly functioning of U.S. securities markets, 
encompassing, for example, systems for trading and quoting, order 
handling, dissemination and processing of market data, and the process 
of clearance and settlement.
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    \167\ For example, see Algorithmic Trading Report, supra note 3 
(discussing many uses of computer systems in contemporary markets, 
particularly with respect to the trading of equity and debt 
securities).
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    An ``SCI broker-dealer'' would be a broker or dealer registered 
with the Commission pursuant to section 15(b) of the Exchange Act 
which:
     In at least two of the four preceding calendar quarters, 
ending March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31, reported to 
the Commission, on Form X-17A-5 (Sec.  249.617),\168\ total assets in 
an amount that equals five percent (5%) or more of the total assets of 
all security brokers and dealers; or \169\
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    \168\ Broker-dealers that file Form X-17A-5 on a monthly basis 
would use their total assets, as reported on Item 940 of Form X-17A-
5, for the months ending Mar. 31, June 30, Sept. 30, and Dec. 31. 
Broker-dealers that file Form X-17A-5 on a quarterly basis would use 
their total assets, as reported on Item 940 of Form X-17A-5, for the 
quarters ending Mar. 31, June 30, Sept. 30, and Dec. 31.
    \169\ See definition of SCI broker-dealer in proposed amended 
Rule 1000. The term ``total assets of all security brokers and 
dealers'' would, for purposes of this threshold, mean the total 
assets calculated and made publicly available by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve, or any subsequent provider of such 
information, for the associated preceding calendar quarter. Id. See 
supra note 127; infra text accompanying notes 181-185.
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     During at least four of the preceding six calendar months:
    [cir] With respect to transactions in NMS stocks, transacted 
average daily dollar volume in an amount that equals ten percent (10%) 
or more of the average daily dollar volume \170\ reported by or 
pursuant to applicable effective transaction reporting plans, provided, 
however, that for purposes of calculating its activity in transactions 
effected otherwise than on a national securities exchange or on an 
alternative trading system, the broker-dealer shall exclude 
transactions for which it was not the executing party; or
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    \170\ For June 2022, the average daily dollar volume in NMS 
stocks, as reported by applicable effective transaction reporting 
plans, was approximately $560 billion, with 10% of that reflecting 
approximately $56 billion.
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    [cir] With respect to transactions in exchange-listed options 
contracts, transacted average daily dollar volume in an amount that 
equals ten percent (10%) or more of the average daily dollar volume 
\171\ reported by an applicable effective national market system plan; 
or
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    \171\ For June 2022, the average daily dollar volume in 
exchange-listed options contracts, as reported by an applicable 
effective national market system plan, was approximately $23.8 
billion, with 10% of that reflecting approximately $2.4 billion.
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    [cir] With respect to transactions in U.S. Treasury Securities, 
transacted average daily dollar volume in an amount that equals ten 
percent (10%) or more of the total average daily dollar volume \172\ 
made available by the self-regulatory organizations \173\ to which such 
transactions are reported; or
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    \172\ For June 2022, the average daily dollar volume in U.S 
Treasury Securities, according to FINRA TRACE data, was 
approximately $634.1 billion, with 10% of that reflecting 
approximately $63.4 billion.
    \173\ Currently, there is one self-regulatory organization to 
which transactions in U.S Treasury Securities are reported (i.e., 
FINRA).
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    [cir] With respect to transactions in Agency Securities, transacted 
average daily dollar volume in an amount that equals ten percent (10%) 
or more of the total average daily dollar volume \174\ made available 
by the self-regulatory organizations \175\ to which such transactions 
are reported.
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    \174\ For June 2022, the average daily dollar volume in Agency 
Securities, according to FINRA TRACE data was approximately $223 
billion, with 10% of that reflecting approximately $22.3 billion.
    \175\ Currently, there is one self-regulatory organization to 
which transactions in U.S Treasury Securities are reported (i.e., 
FINRA) and one organization to which transactions in Agency 
securities are reported (i.e., FINRA).
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    An SCI broker-dealer would be required to comply with the 
requirements of Regulation SCI six months after the SCI broker-dealer 
satisfied either threshold for the first time.
    The proposed thresholds are designed to identify the largest U.S. 
broker-dealers. To assess which broker-dealers should be subject to 
Regulation SCI,\176\ the Commission has taken into account the size of 
registered broker-dealers based on analyses of: (i) total assets 
reported on Form X-17A-5 (Financial and Operational Combined Uniform 
Single (``FOCUS'') Report Part II, Item 940),\177\ and (ii) transaction 
activity in certain asset classes.
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    \176\ See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
    \177\ See Form X-17A-5, FOCUS Report, Part II, at 3, available 
at https://www.sec.gov/files/formx-17a-5_2_2.pdf (requiring broker-
dealers to report their total assets in Item 940).
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Proposed Total Assets Threshold
    A broker-dealer would be an SCI broker-dealer and included in the 
definition of SCI entity if, in at least two of the four preceding 
calendar quarters ending March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 
31, it reported to the Commission on Form X-17A-5, FOCUS Report Part 
II, Item 940 total assets in an amount that equals five percent or more 
of the total assets of all security brokers and dealers. Congress and 
multiple regulators have used total assets as a factor in assessing 
whether an entity warrants heightened oversight. For example, under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (``FSOC'') 
considers financial assets as one factor to determine whether a U.S. 
non-bank financial services company is supervised by the Federal 
Reserve Board and subject to enhanced prudential standards.\178\ 
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Federal Reserve Board to 
establish enhanced prudential standards for bank holding companies over 
a certain threshold of total assets.\179\ Additionally, the Federal

[[Page 23162]]

Deposit Insurance Corporation (``FDIC'') increases its Deposit 
Insurance Fund assessment for large and highly complex institutions as 
compared to small banks.\180\
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    \178\ See Dodd-Frank Act section 113(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. 
5323(a)(2).
    \179\ See Dodd-Frank Act section 165, 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(1). See 
also Federal Reserve Board, Prudential Standards for Large Bank 
Holding Companies, Savings and Loan Holding Companies, and Foreign 
Banking Organizations, 84 FR 59032 (Nov. 1, 2019), and Federal 
Reserve Board, Changes to Applicability Thresholds for Regulatory 
Capital and Liquidity Requirements, 84 FR 59230 (Nov. 1, 2019). See 
SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72259, and also definition of 
``critical SCI systems'' in 17 CFR 142.1000.
    \180\ See FDIC, Deposit Insurance Fund, Assessment Rates & 
Methodology (last updated July 20, 2021), available at https://www.fdic.gov/resources/deposit-insurance/deposit-insurance-fund/dif-assessments.html.
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    Although a broker-dealer's total assets alone could be used as the 
proposed rule's measure of an entity's size and significance, to ensure 
that a total assets measure reflects significant activity in relative 
terms, the Commission proposes to scale each broker-dealer's total 
assets (the numerator) to a quarterly measure of ``total assets of all 
security brokers and dealers,'' as calculated by the Federal Reserve 
Board (the denominator).\181\ The firm's total assets filed on FOCUS 
reports (of which each firm has current and direct knowledge) would be 
divided by the broader measure of total assets for all securities 
brokers and dealers calculated and made publicly available by the 
Federal Reserve Board, or any subsequent provider of such information, 
for the purpose of comparing the size of a broker-dealer to the group 
of entities tracked by the Federal Reserve Board.\182\ The Commission 
understands that the Federal Reserve Board publishes total assets for 
all security brokers and dealers approximately ten weeks after the end 
of the quarter (e.g., 2022 third quarter results ((for quarter ending 
September 30, 2022)) were published on December 13, 2022). Therefore, 
the information for the preceding quarter should be available prior to 
the date on which the firm's FOCUS report is required to be filed with 
the Commission for the relevant quarter. To enable each firm to 
calculate whether it exceeds the threshold at the time it files its 
FOCUS report (which is due 17 days after the end of the quarter/
month),\183\ broker-dealers would compare their total assets to the 
previous quarter on or before the FOCUS report filing deadline. 
Accordingly, to assess whether it exceeds the threshold for a relevant 
calendar quarter, a broker-dealer would divide its total assets 
reported on Form X-17A-5, FOCUS Report Part II, Item 940 for that 
quarter by the total assets of all security brokers and dealers for the 
preceding quarter, as made available by the Federal Reserve.\184\ 
Although it is possible that the total assets of all security brokers 
and dealers could increase or decrease sharply from one quarter to the 
next, the FRED data shows that this has occurred rarely and that the 
asset totals in the Federal Reserve Board's data generally do not 
change significantly from quarter to quarter.\185\ The Commission 
therefore believes that overall, the data made available by the Federal 
Reserve Board is an appropriate and consistent figure for use as a 
denominator in the proposed threshold.\186\
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    \181\ See supra note 127. This figure has been calculated by the 
Federal Reserve Board and made available on the Federal Reserve 
Economic Data (FRED) website for many years. As stated above, the 
total assets figure calculated by the Federal Reserve Board is based 
on the information reported to the Commission by ``security broker-
dealers'' on either the FOCUS report or the FOGS report. See id.
    \182\ Id.
    \183\ Form X-17A-5 must be filed within 17 business days after 
the end of each calendar quarter, within 17 business days after the 
end of the fiscal year where that date is not the end of a calendar 
quarter, and/or monthly, in accordance with 17 CFR 240.17a-5, 
240.17a-12, or 240.18a-7, as applicable. See Instructions to Form X-
17A-5, FOCUS Report, Part II, at 2, available at https://www.sec.gov/files/formx-17a-5_22.pdf.
    \184\ See supra note 127. For example, to assess whether it 
exceeds the threshold for the calendar quarter ending Dec. 31, a 
broker-dealer would divide its total assets reported Form X-17A-5, 
FOCUS Report Part II, Item 940 for the quarter ending Dec. 31, and 
divide that by the total assets of security brokers and dealers for 
the third quarter (ending Sept. 30) of the same year, as obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Board. If a broker-dealer reported $350 
billion, $385 billion, $359 billion, and $386 billion in total 
assets on its FOCUS reports for Q4 2022, Q3 2022, Q2 2022, and Q1 
2022, respectively, the broker-dealer would divide its total assets 
for each quarter by 5.07 trillion (for Q3 2022), $5.07 trillion (for 
Q2 2022), $5.23 trillion (for Q1 2022), and $4.96 trillion (for Q1 
2021), respectively. See infra note 185. The broker-dealer's total 
assets as a percentage of the total assets of all security broker-
dealers would be 6.9% for Q4 2022, 7.6% for Q3 2022. 6.9% for Q2 
2022, and 7.8% for Q1 2022. In all four quarters, the broker-dealer 
would exceed the 5% threshold and therefore meet the definition of 
SCI broker-dealer.
    \185\ See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), 
Security Brokers and Dealers; Total Assets (Balance Sheet), Level 
[BOGZ1FL664090663Q], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BOGZ1FL664090663Q. The 
total assets data from the Federal Reserve shows a sharp drop at the 
time of the financial crisis, from Q3 2008 to Q4 2008. See id. More 
recent data show total assets for all security-broker dealers for 
purpose of the proposed denominator in recent quarters in trillion 
dollars as follows: Q3 2022: 5.07 trillion; Q2 2022: $5.07 trillion; 
Q1 2022: $5.23 trillion; Q4 2021: $4.96 trillion; Q3 2021: $5.05 
trillion; Q2 2021: $4.94 trillion. See id.
    \186\ The Federal Reserve Board data includes total assets 
reported on both FOCUS and FOGS forms. Its use would result in a 
conservative number of broker-dealers meeting the total assets 
threshold (i.e., because elimination of FOGS data would reduce the 
size of the denominator). The Commission solicits comment below on 
whether another figure would be a more appropriate and useful 
measure for determining if a broker-dealer is in the top 5% of all 
broker-dealers in terms of its total assets, and if a percentage 
threshold is better measure than a dollar measure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If a firm meets or exceeds the threshold in two of the four 
preceding calendar quarters, it would be required to comply with 
Regulation SCI beginning six months after the end of the quarter in 
which the SCI broker-dealer satisfied the proposed asset threshold for 
the first time. Based on data from recent quarters, at the proposed 
threshold, a broker-dealer registered with the Commission pursuant to 
section 15(b) of the Exchange Act and having total assets on its 
balance sheet in excess of approximately $250 billion in two of the 
preceding four calendar quarters would be an SCI broker-dealer for as 
long as it continued to satisfy the threshold.\187\
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    \187\ As a specific example, based on totals retrieved from FRED 
(see supra note 127) a broker-dealer assessing its total assets in 
Dec. 2022 would determine if that level exceeded 5% of total assets 
in two of the preceding four quarters (approximately $253 billion, 
$253 billion, $261 billion, and $248 billion, for Q3 of 2022, Q2 of 
2022, Q1 of 2022, and Q4 of 2021, respectively). See also Banking 
Interagency Paper, supra note 166 (applicable to banking 
institutions having in excess of an average of $250 billion in total 
assets).
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    The Commission believes that the proposed threshold of five percent 
of total assets is a reasonable approach to identifying the largest 
broker-dealers. In addition to its broad consistency with the approach 
taken by banking regulators,\188\ this approach takes into 
consideration the multiple roles that the largest broker-dealers play 
in the U.S. securities markets. Not only do the largest broker-dealers 
generate liquidity in multiple types of securities, but many also 
operate multiple types of trading platforms.\189\ Further, entities 
with assets at this level also take risk that they seek to hedge, in 
some cases using ``central risk books'' for that and other purposes, 
and engage in routing substantial order flow to other trading 
venues.\190\ For these reasons, the

[[Page 23163]]

Commission believes that systems issues at firms having assets at this 
level would have the potential to impact investors, the overall market, 
and the trading of individual securities, and that therefore their 
market technology should be subject to the requirements and safeguards 
of Regulation SCI. The threshold is designed to be appropriately high 
enough to ensure that only the largest broker-dealers are subject to 
the obligations, and associated burdens and costs, of Regulation SCI. 
It is also designed to be a relative measure that does not become 
outdated over time, as the size of the overall market expands or 
contracts.
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    \188\ See, e.g., supra notes 166 and 187 (discussing Banking 
Interagency Paper).
    \189\ For a broad discussion of these roles, see, e.g., 
Rosenblatt Securities, 2022 US Equity Trading Venue Guide (May 24, 
2022) (discussing among other things the features of single-dealer 
platforms for equity securities that are operated by broker-
dealers); Regulation of NMS Stock Alternative Trading Systems, 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 83663 (July 18, 2018), 83 FR 
38768 at 38770-72 (Aug. 7, 2018) (discussing among other things the 
operational complexity of multi-service broker-dealer with 
significant brokerage and dealing activity apart from operation of 
one or more ATSs).
    \190\ See, e.g., Rosenblatt Securities, Central Risk Books: What 
the Buy Side Needs to Know (Oct. 18, 2018) (stating that all of the 
biggest bank-affiliated broker-dealers have some form of central 
risk book and that the ``critical mass of order flow or principal 
activity, spread across asset classes and regions'' may not justify 
the operation of these books for smaller more focused firms). See 
also Algorithmic Trading Report, supra note 3, at 41-42 (describing 
central risk books as an important source of block liquidity). All 
of the firms that satisfy the proposed total assets threshold also 
satisfy at least one of the proposed trading activity thresholds. 
See infra text accompanying note 219.
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    As noted, the proposed total assets threshold for SCI broker-
dealers would include a proposed time period measurement of ``at least 
two of the four preceding calendar quarters.'' Requiring that the 
threshold is met in two out of the four preceding quarters would help 
mitigate the effect of a steep increase/decrease in total assets in any 
individual quarter.
    Further, this measurement is designed to capture only the broker-
dealers that are consistently at or above the proposed five percent 
threshold, and would not include a broker-dealer that may have had an 
anomalous quarterly increase, so that a short-term spike in total 
assets uncharacteristic of the broker-dealer's overall total asset 
history would not cause it to become subject to Regulation SCI. 
Although the Commission is also proposing a time period measurement of 
``at least four of the preceding six calendar months'' for the trading 
activity thresholds discussed below (consistent with the time period 
measurement for SCI ATSs),\191\ using a quarterly measure for the total 
asset threshold is appropriate because FOCUS reports are required at 
least quarterly for all broker-dealers and the proposed scaling measure 
is one that is updated quarterly. Based on its analysis of FOCUS 
reports during the period from Q4 2021 through Q3 2022, the Commission 
estimates that five entities would exceed the proposed threshold (with 
the fifth-ranked firm in each quarter reporting total assets in excess 
of $300 billion, and all firms ranging from approximately seven to 14 
percent of the total assets reported by the Federal Reserve Board for 
the previous quarter), and further anticipates that this threshold 
would result in little, if any, variation in which firms exceed the 
threshold over the course of four calendar quarters.\192\
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    \191\ See Rule 1000 (definition of ``SCI ATS'') (providing a 
time period measurement of ``at least four of the preceding six 
calendar months'').
    \192\ As with other entities that are SCI entities because they 
satisfy a threshold (e.g., SCI ATSs), an SCI broker-dealer would no 
longer be an SCI broker-dealer, and thus no longer be subject to 
Regulation SCI, in the quarter when it no longer satisfies the total 
assets test (i.e., it does not meet the threshold in two of the 
previous four quarters). This assumes the broker-dealer also does 
not meet or no longer satisfies the proposed transaction activity 
threshold.
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Proposed Transaction Activity Threshold
    In the Commission's view, a broker-dealer's transaction activity is 
another reasonable measure for estimating the significance of a broker-
dealer's role in contributing to fair and orderly markets. In several 
asset classes, the transaction activity of each of a relatively small 
number of broker-dealers constitutes a share of trading that could, if 
affected by a systems issue, negatively impact fair and orderly 
markets. For example, in NMS stocks, some broker-dealers constitute 
significant concentrations of on-exchange trading, and some broker-
dealers execute off-exchange transactions at levels that rival or 
exceed the volume of trading on current SCI entities.\193\ For listed 
options, which are required to execute on a national securities 
exchange, a small number of firms participate in a high proportion of 
trades.\194\ Similarly, transaction reporting data for U.S. Treasury 
Securities and Agency Securities reveal that a handful of broker-
dealers each represent a significant percentage of the average weekly 
(for U.S. Treasury Securities) or daily (for Agency Securities) dollar 
volume reported by FINRA (currently the only SRO to which such 
transactions are reported).\195\
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    \193\ For example, in Sept. 2022, one broker-dealer executed a 
greater proportion of shares in NMS stocks than all but two national 
securities exchanges. See, e.g., FINRA, OTC Transparency Data, 
available at https://otctransparency.finra.org/otctransparency; 
CBOE, Historical Market Volume Data, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/equities/market_statistics/historical_market_volume/.
    \194\ As discussed further below in this section, the Commission 
estimates that six firms would satisfy the 10% options transaction 
activity threshold.
    \195\ As discussed further below in this section, the Commission 
estimates that four firms would satisfy the 10% U.S. Treasury 
Security transaction activity threshold, and six firms would satisfy 
the 10% Agency Security transaction activity threshold.
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    Accordingly, the Commission is proposing to include as an SCI 
entity any registered broker-dealer that, irrespective of the size of 
its balance sheet, consistently engages in transaction activity at a 
substantially high level in certain enumerated asset classes, scaled as 
a percentage of total average daily dollar volume over a specified time 
period.\196\ If a significant systems issue at a broker-dealer that 
meets the proposed thresholds were to occur, the concern is that its 
effect would have widespread impact, for example, by impeding the 
ability of other market participants to trade securities in one or more 
of the identified asset classes, interrupting the price discovery 
process, or contributing to capacity issues at other broker-dealers. 
Further, if executions were delayed by a systems disruption in an SCI 
broker-dealer's trading, order routing, clearance and settlement, or 
market data system, due to the magnitude of the proposed covered 
transaction activity in which these firms consistently engage, the 
delay could have cascading effects disruptive to the broader 
market.\197\
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    \196\ As discussed further below, the Commission proposes that 
average daily dollar volume be the denominator used as the scaling 
measure for each relevant asset class. See infra notes 211-217 and 
accompanying text (discussing entities that currently and may in the 
future receive and make available transaction reports, or aggregated 
volume statistics in NMS stocks, exchange-listed options, U.S. 
Treasury Securities, and Agency Securities).
    \197\ For example, capacity constraints, whether due to risk 
management, or operational capability limitations of systems, could 
limit how much one broker-dealer could handle a sudden increase in 
order flow from a large broker-dealer. For context, based on 
analysis of data from the Consolidated Audit Trail, in 2022, two 
large market makers in NMS stocks engaged in over-the counter 
transactions (all purchases and all sales effected otherwise than on 
a national securities exchange or ATS) having a total dollar volume 
of at least $37 billion on most trading days; with at least a 
quarter of trading days in 2022 having total dollar volume of $42.3 
billion or more, and all trading days having an average total dollar 
volume of $37.3 billion. Counting volume across all venues (all 
purchases and all sales effected over-the counter, on a national 
securities exchange, or on ATS), these figures for the same two 
firms, respectively, are: at least $82.2 billion, ($67.6 marked as 
principal/riskless principal) on most trading days; at least $97.1 
billion ($83.7 billion marked as principal/riskless principal) on at 
least a quarter of the trading days; and $83.5 billion ($69.4 
billion marked as principal/riskless principal) as the average for 
all trading days.
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    The proposed transaction thresholds are broadly similar across 
different types of securities. However, because of differences in 
market structure, there are notable differences in the application of 
the thresholds across types of securities.
    Regulation SCI currently applies to, among other entities, national 
securities exchanges for both listed equities and listed options, and 
to ATSs trading significant volume in NMS stocks. A national securities 
exchange and an ATS are a type of ``trading center,'' as that term is 
defined in 17 CFR 242.600 through 242.614 (``Regulation NMS'').\198\ 
For purposes of counting

[[Page 23164]]

transaction activity in NMS stocks, the proposed thresholds are 
anchored to broker-dealer activity conducted on or as a trading center. 
Therefore, the Commission is proposing, with respect to the transaction 
thresholds for NMS stocks, to include broker-dealer activity on 
national securities exchanges and NMS Stock ATSs, as well as broker-
dealer activity as a trading center. Broker-dealer activity ``as a 
trading center'' refers in this context to trading activity in NMS 
stocks not effected on a national securities exchange or on an ATS, but 
by the broker-dealer, where the broker-dealer is the executing party, 
either as principal or as agent.\199\ A similar distinction is not made 
for exchange-listed options contracts because those transactions are 
executed on a national securities exchange.\200\
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    \198\ Rule 600 of Regulation NMS defines the term trading center 
to mean: a national securities exchange or national securities 
association that operates an SRO trading facility, an alternative 
trading system, an exchange market maker, an OTC market maker, or 
any other broker or dealer that executes orders internally by 
trading as principal or crossing orders as agent. 17 CFR 
242.600(b)(95).
    \199\ See 17 CFR 242.600(a)(95), defining ``trading center'' to 
include, among other entities, ``an OTC market maker, or any other 
broker or dealer that executes orders internally by trading as 
principal or crossing orders as agent.''
    \200\ In some cases, matching of orders for exchange-listed 
options occur on an ATS, with matches then routed to one or more 
national securities exchange for execution.
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    The ``trading center'' term in Regulation NMS applies only to NMS 
securities; however, there exist today electronic venues for fixed 
income securities that perform similar functions as trading centers and 
that are equally important to investors to execute trades in fixed 
income securities. Such electronic trading venues, particularly for 
U.S. Treasury Securities and Agency Securities (where electronic 
trading is prevalent \201\), have developed from a market structure in 
which electronic bilateral trading was and continues to be important. 
For this reason, the Commission is proposing to include under the SCI 
broker-dealer threshold all trades for U.S. Treasury Securities and 
Agency Securities in which a broker-dealer may participate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \201\ See Government Securities ATS Reproposal, supra note 84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As proposed, an ``SCI broker-dealer'' would include a broker-dealer 
that, during at least four of the preceding six calendar months: (i) 
with respect to transactions in NMS stocks, transacted average daily 
dollar volume in an amount that equals ten percent (10%) or more of the 
average daily dollar volume reported by or pursuant to applicable 
effective transaction reporting plans, provided, however, that for 
purposes of calculating its activity in transactions effected otherwise 
than on a national securities exchange or on an alternative trading 
system, the broker-dealer shall exclude transactions for which it was 
not the executing party; (ii) with respect to transactions in exchange-
listed options contracts, transacted average daily dollar volume in an 
amount that equals ten percent (10%) or more of the average daily 
dollar volume reported by an applicable effective national market 
system plan; (iii) with respect to transactions in U.S. Treasury 
Securities, transacted average daily dollar volume in an amount that 
equals ten percent (10%) or more of the total average daily dollar 
volume made available by the self-regulatory organizations to which 
such transactions are reported; or (iv) with respect to transactions in 
Agency securities, transacted average daily dollar volume in an amount 
that equals ten percent (10%) or more of the total average daily dollar 
volume made available by the self-regulatory organizations to which 
such transactions are reported.\202\
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    \202\ The proposed definition of SCI broker-dealer does not 
include a transaction activity threshold for equity securities that 
are not NMS stocks and for which transactions are reported to an SRO 
as a category in the proposed transaction activity threshold. The 
size of this market, as currently measured, is substantially smaller 
than the other asset classes enumerated. Based on its analysis of 
data from the Consolidated Audit Trail, between Oct. 2021 and Sept. 
2022, for example, the average daily dollar volume for this market 
segment was approximately $2.6 billion. Nor do the proposed 
amendments to Regulation SCI include Fixed Income ATSs or broker-
dealers that exceed a transaction activity threshold in corporate 
debt or municipal securities. But see infra section III.A.3 
(requesting comment on the matter).
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    The Commission proposes to add a definition of ``U.S. Treasury 
Security'' and ``Agency Security'' to clarify how the transaction 
activity threshold for these asset classes would operate.\203\ A ``U.S. 
Treasury Security'' would mean a security issued by the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury. ``Agency Security'' would mean a debt security issued 
or guaranteed by a U.S. executive agency, as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105, 
or government-sponsored enterprise, as defined in 2 U.S.C. 622(8). 
These definitions are designed to provide the scope of securities an 
SCI broker-dealer must include when assessing whether it has satisfied 
the proposed transaction activity threshold. The proposed definitions 
are similar to and consistent with those in FINRA's rules,\204\ to 
avoid confusion and facilitate the comparison between data used to 
create the numerator and denominator when assessing whether a broker-
dealer surpassed the U.S. Treasury Security or Agency Security 
transaction thresholds.
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    \203\ The Commission believes that the terms NMS stock and 
exchange-listed options are currently well understood. See Rule 600 
of Regulation NMS (defining the terms NMS stock and NMS security and 
distinguishing NMS stocks from listed options on the basis of how 
transaction reports are made available).
    \204\ See FINRA Rules 6710(l) and 6710(p). FINRA Rule 6710 also 
establishes which securities are eligible for transaction reporting 
to the ``Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine'' (TRACE), which is 
the automated system developed by FINRA that, among other things, 
accommodates reporting and dissemination of transaction reports 
where applicable.
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    As is the case currently for the thresholds applicable to SCI 
ATSs,\205\ the proposed thresholds for SCI broker-dealers would include 
a proposed time period measurement of ``at least four of the preceding 
six calendar months.'' Specifically, the proposed time measurement 
period is designed to capture broker-dealers that consistently meet the 
proposed thresholds and not capture broker-dealers with relatively low 
transaction activity that may have had an anomalous increase in trading 
on a given day or few days. In other words, a short-term spike in 
transaction activity uncharacteristic of a broker-dealer's overall 
activity should not cause it to become subject to Regulation SCI; using 
the proposed time period of at least four of the preceding six calendar 
months would help ensure this.
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    \205\ See Rule 1000 (definition of ``SCI ATS'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed thresholds would generally take into account all of a 
broker-dealer's transactions.\206\ The thresholds proposed are designed 
to identify firms whose transaction activity is of such a magnitude 
that a systems issue negatively impacting that activity could 
contribute to a disruption in fair and orderly markets, and for which 
the application of Regulation SCI is therefore appropriate.
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    \206\ As described further above and below, the proposed 
threshold for NMS stocks would operate slightly differently.
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    With respect to NMS stocks, only transactions which the broker-
dealer (i) trades on a national securities exchange or an ATS, or (ii) 
executes off of a national securities exchange or an ATS would be 
counted. When a broker-dealer is the non-executing counterparty to an 
off-exchange, non-ATS transaction that transaction would not be counted 
for that broker-dealer.\207\ The purpose of this approach is to count 
towards the threshold for NMS stocks broker-dealer activity on or as a 
trading center.
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    \207\ The volume for that trade, as reported through an 
effective transaction reporting plan, would still be included in the 
overall calculation of market volume used as the denominator in 
threshold calculations.
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    To assess whether it satisfies the proposed thresholds, a broker-
dealer would need to determine its average daily dollar volume in an 
enumerated asset class each calendar month, and

[[Page 23165]]

divide that figure by the total reported average daily dollar volume 
for that month. More specifically, its numerator would be the average 
daily dollar volume during the calendar month, taking into account all 
relevant purchase and sale transactions \208\ in which the broker-
dealer engaged during that calendar month, as determined by the broker-
dealer from information in its books and records, as required to be 
kept pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 17a-3.\209\ The denominator would be 
the total average daily dollar volume for each calendar month, as that 
total is determined from one or more sources that receive and make 
available transaction reports, or, as the case may be, aggregated price 
and volume statistics.
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    \208\ For NMS stocks, this would exclude those purchases or 
sales off-exchange and not effected through an ATS, in which the 
broker-dealer was not the executing party. As specific examples, 
when broker-dealer A routes a customer order to broker-dealer B for 
routing and execution, and broker-dealer B executes the customer 
order as principal or crosses it against another order it is 
holding, the volume for that order would contribute towards the 
threshold for broker-dealer B but not for broker-dealer A. 
Similarly, if broker-dealer A sends an order to the single-dealer 
platform operated by broker-dealer B, and broker-dealer B executes a 
trade against that order, the volume would contribute towards the 
threshold for broker-dealer B but not for broker-dealer A. For any 
asset class, the proposed definition of SCI broker-dealer would not 
exclude from a broker-dealer operator's transaction tally 
transactions executed on its own ATS. For example, if the broker-
dealer operator trades as a participant on its ATS, or where a 
broker-dealer operator acts as a counterparty to every trade on its 
own ATS, its volume would be counted as trading activity of the 
broker-dealer.
    \209\ See 17 CFR 240.17a-3(a)(6) (requiring a broker-dealer to 
keep a memorandum of each brokerage order given or received for the 
purchase or sale of a security, to include the price at which the 
order executed); 17 CFR 240.17a-3(a)(7) (requiring a memorandum of 
purchases and sales of a security for its own account, to include 
the price).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to NMS stocks, information necessary to calculate the 
denominator currently is available from the plan processors (i.e., the 
SIPs) of the CTA/CQ Plans and Nasdaq UTP Plan. These Plans are 
effective transaction reporting plans, and effective national market 
systems plans.\210\ Following implementation of the Market Data 
Infrastructure rules, the information necessary to calculate the 
denominator would be available from a competing consolidator or may be 
self-determined by a self-aggregator that obtains the information 
pursuant to effective transaction reporting plans, as required by 17 
CFR 242.601 (``Rule 601'' of Regulation NMS) and 17 CFR 242.603(b) 
(``Rule 603(b)'' of Regulation NMS).\211\ For listed options, total 
average daily dollar volume may be determined from consolidated 
information made available by the plan processor of the OPRA Plan.\212\
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    \210\ See supra note 20 and infra note 211. See also infra note 
262 (stating that an ATS that trades NMS stocks is subject to 
Regulation SCI if its trading volume reaches: (i) 5% or more in any 
single NMS stock and 0.25% or more in all NMS stocks of the average 
daily dollar volume reported by applicable transaction reporting 
plans; or (ii) 1% or more in all NMS stocks of the average daily 
dollar volume reported by applicable transaction reporting plans).
    \211\ With respect to NMS stocks, Rule 601 of Regulation NMS (17 
CFR 242.601) requires national securities exchanges and national 
securities associations to report transactions and last sale data 
pursuant to an effective transaction reporting plan filed with the 
Commission in accordance with 17 CFR 242.608 (``Rule 608'' of 
Regulation NMS). See 17 CFR 242.601. The national securities 
exchanges and FINRA comply with Rule 601 by satisfying the 
requirements of Rule 603(b) of Regulation NMS (which requires the 
national securities exchanges and FINRA to act jointly pursuant to 
one or more effective national market system plans, to disseminate 
consolidated information, including transactions, in NMS stocks). 
Currently, transaction information is consolidated by the 
(exclusive) plan processor of each effective national market system 
plan (i.e., the CTA/CQ Plan and Nasdaq UTP Plan for NMS stocks). See 
CTA Plan, available at https://www.ctaplan.com; Nasdaq UTP Plan, 
available at https://www.utpplan.com. After the implementation of 
the Market Data Infrastructure rules (see Market Data Infrastructure 
Adopting Release, supra note24) national securities exchanges and 
FINRA will be required to provide transaction reports to competing 
consolidators and/or self-aggregators pursuant to new effective 
national market system plans that satisfy the requirements of Rule 
603(b). Pursuant to 17 CFR 242.600(a)(14) (Rule 600(a)(14) of 
Regulation NMS) the term ``competing consolidator'' means a 
securities information processor required to be registered pursuant 
to Rule 614 of Regulation NMS or a national securities exchange or 
national securities association that receives information with 
respect to quotations for and transactions in NMS stocks and 
generates a consolidated market data product for dissemination to 
any person. Pursuant to 17 CFR 242.600(a)(83) (Rule 600(a)(83) of 
Regulation NMS) the term ``self-aggregator'' means a broker, dealer, 
national securities exchange, national securities association, or 
investment adviser registered with the Commission that receives 
information with respect to quotations for and transactions in NMS 
stocks, including all data necessary to generate consolidated market 
data, and generates consolidated market data solely for internal use 
(with a proviso that a self-aggregator may make consolidated market 
data available to its affiliates that are registered with the 
Commission for their internal use). See Market Data Infrastructure 
Adopting Release, supra note 24 (providing a full discussion of 
these terms). Following implementation of the Market Data 
Infrastructure rules, a broker-dealer may obtain consolidated 
average daily dollar volume from its chosen competing consolidator, 
or independently calculate that figure itself, as a ``self-
aggregator.''
    \212\ See OPRA Plan, available at https://www.opraplan.com.
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    With respect to U.S. Treasury Securities and Agency Securities, 
total average daily dollar volume may be determined from information 
made available by SROs to which transactions in U.S. Treasury 
Securities and Agency Securities are reported. Currently there is only 
one SRO to which this information is reported: FINRA.\213\ In 
connection with its TRACE system, FINRA is currently the most complete 
source of aggregate volume in U.S. Treasury Securities and Agency 
Securities.\214\ Specifically, FINRA Rule 6750(a) requires FINRA to 
disseminate information on Agency Securities, immediately upon receipt 
of the transaction report.\215\ With respect to U.S. Treasury 
Securities, information in TRACE regarding individual transactions is 
for regulatory purposes only and is not disseminated publicly. However, 
pursuant to FINRA Rule 6750, on March 10, 2020, FINRA began posting on 
its website weekly, aggregate data on the trading volume of U.S. 
Treasury Securities reported to TRACE, and the Commission recently 
approved website posting of aggregate data more frequently (i.e., 
daily).\216\ Notwithstanding the transparency provided by FINRA/TRACE, 
aggregate trading volume in U.S. Treasury and Agency securities does 
not purport to reflect the whole of these markets, as aggregate volume 
statistics are limited to volume reported by TRACE reporters, including 
ATSs, registered-broker dealers that are members of FINRA, and

[[Page 23166]]

depository institutions meeting transaction volume thresholds in U.S. 
Treasury Securities, agency-issued debt and mortgage-backed 
securities.\217\
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    \213\ However, should a national securities exchange (an SRO) 
trade U.S. Treasury or Agency Securities in the future, if 
transaction reports are made available by that SRO, they would be 
relevant to determining consolidated average daily dollar volume.
    \214\ See FINRA, Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), 
available at https://www.finra.org/filing-reporting/trace. FINRA 
Rule 6730(a)(1) requires FINRA members to report transactions in 
TRACE-Eligible Securities, which FINRA Rule 6710 defines to include 
U.S. Treasury Securities and Agency Securities. For each transaction 
in U.S. Treasury Securities and Agency Securities, a FINRA member 
would be required to report the CUSIP number or similar numeric 
identifier or FINRA symbol; size (volume) of the transaction; price 
of the transaction (or elements necessary to calculate price); 
symbol indicating whether transaction is a buy or sell; date of 
trade execution (``as/of'' trades only); contra-party's identifier; 
capacity (principal or agent); time of execution; reporting side 
executing broker as ``give-up'' (if any); contra side introducing 
broker (in case of ``give-up'' trade); the commission (total dollar 
amount), if applicable; date of settlement; if the member is 
reporting a transaction that occurred on an ATS pursuant to FINRA 
Rule 6732, the ATS's separate Market Participant Identifier 
(``MPID''); and trade modifiers as required. For when-issued 
transactions in U.S. Treasury Securities, a FINRA member would be 
required to report the yield in lieu of price. See FINRA Rule 
6730(c).
    \215\ See FINRA Rule 6750(a).
    \216\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 95438 (Aug. 5, 
2022), 87 FR 49626 (Aug. 11, 2022) (Order Approving a Proposed Rule 
Change to Amend FINRA Rule 6750 Regarding the Publication of 
Aggregated Transaction Information on U.S. Treasury Securities). The 
implementation date for these TRACE enhancements for U.S. Treasury 
Securities was Feb. 13, 2023, at which point the weekly data reports 
were replaced with daily and monthly reports. Using daily reports of 
U.S. Treasury Security data, broker-dealers should have the 
information necessary to complete the calculations needed to assess 
if they satisfy the proposed threshold.
    \217\ See Federal Reserve Board, Agency Information Collection 
Activities: Announcement of Board Approval Under Delegated Authority 
and Submission to OMB (Oct. 21, 2021) 86 FR 59716 (Oct. 28, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Counting all relevant purchases and sales from all broker-dealers 
may result in counting a transaction more than once across the market, 
and would sum to total volume across broker-dealers that exceeds what 
is reported pursuant to the relevant plans or SRO. Similarly, summing 
the percentages that result from dividing the total activity of each 
broker-dealer by the total volume reported by the relevant plans or SRO 
would result in a value greater than 100 percent.\218\ Accordingly, the 
proposed ten percent (10%) transaction activity thresholds for 
measuring a broker-dealer's significance in the markets are not market 
share thresholds analogous to the current SCI ATS volume thresholds. 
However, because the types of transactions proposed to be counted are a 
measure of a broker-dealer's size and significance, it is particularly 
useful if that measure continues to reflect significant activity as the 
size of the overall market expands or contracts and remains stable 
relative to a recognizable measure so that it does not become outdated 
over time. Therefore, the Commission proposes as a denominator a 
measure that would scale each broker-dealer's average daily dollar 
transaction volume to consolidated average daily dollar transaction 
volume, the latter being determinable from information reported by, or 
made available by or pursuant to, applicable effective transaction 
reporting or national market system plans or self-regulatory 
organizations, as described above.
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    \218\ Transaction reporting systems generally report volume for 
trades, rather than volume for purchase and sales separately. 
Consequently, adding up the total purchase and sale activity for all 
broker-dealers will not equal the total volume reported through 
these systems. For example, a trade for 100 shares of an NMS stock 
between two broker-dealers on a national securities exchange would 
be reported by the effective transaction reporting plan as 100 
shares, even though one broker-dealer bought 100 shares and another 
sold 100 shares. Similarly, because broker-dealers often trade with 
customers, doubling the transaction volume reported through these 
systems does not provide an accurate measure of total broker-dealer 
purchase and sale activity. After the implementation of the Market 
Data Infrastructure rules (see Market Data Infrastructure Adopting 
Release, supra note 24) national securities exchanges on which NMS 
stocks are traded and FINRA, each of which is required by Rule 601 
of Regulation NMS to file a transaction reporting plan in accordance 
with Rule 608 of Regulation NMS, will be further required, pursuant 
to Rule 603(b) of Regulation NMS, to make available to all competing 
consolidators and self-aggregators its information with respect to 
quotations for and transactions in NMS stocks, including all data 
necessary to generate consolidated market data. Following 
implementation of the Market Data Infrastructure rules, a broker-
dealer may determine average daily dollar volume from information 
provided by its chosen competing consolidator, or independently 
calculate that figure itself, as a ``self-aggregator.''
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    Any broker-dealer that transacts, as proposed, ten percent (10%) or 
more of the average daily dollar volume in an enumerated asset class, 
during at least four of the preceding six calendar months would be an 
SCI broker-dealer. The proposed trading activity thresholds are 
designed to measure the size of a broker-dealer's footprint in the 
market in terms that provide a method for assessing the size of its 
footprint as the market grows (or shrinks). In this way, the proposed 
thresholds identify broker-dealers by their transaction activity as 
compared to a consistent measure of market volume, and give a sense of 
the size and significance of a broker-dealer activity in the markets in 
a manner that should not become outdated over time.
    The Commission also believes that a threshold of ten percent (10%) 
or more in the identified asset classes is appropriately high enough to 
apply Regulation SCI only to the large broker-dealers on which the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets depend. The Commission 
estimates that 17 entities would satisfy one or more of the proposed 
transaction activity thresholds (the same five entities identified by 
the total assets threshold plus 12 additional entities).\219\ In sum, 
the Commission believes that the proposed total assets threshold and 
transaction activity thresholds are appropriate measures for 
identifying broker-dealers that would pose a substantial risk to the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets in the event of a systems 
issue.
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    \219\ See supra text accompanying notes 189-190.
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    SCI broker-dealers would not have to comply with the requirements 
of Regulation SCI until six months after the end of the quarter in 
which the SCI broker-dealer satisfied the proposed asset threshold for 
the first time, or six months after the end of the month in which the 
SCI broker-dealer satisfied one of the proposed activity thresholds for 
the first time. The Commission believes this is an appropriate amount 
of time for firms to come into compliance with Regulation SCI.
iv. Proposed Revision to Definition of ``SCI Systems'' for Certain SCI 
Broker-Dealers; SCI Entities Trading Multiple Asset Classes, Which May 
Include Crypto Asset Securities
    In conjunction with the proposed inclusion of SCI broker-dealers as 
SCI entities, the Commission proposes to limit the definition of ``SCI 
systems'' for an SCI broker-dealer that qualifies as an SCI entity only 
because it satisfies a transaction activity threshold. Specifically, 
the Commission is proposing to revise the definition of ``SCI systems'' 
to add a limitation that states, ``provided, however, that with respect 
to an SCI broker-dealer that satisfies only the requirements of 
paragraph (2) of the definition of `SCI broker-dealer,' such systems 
shall include only those systems with respect to the type of securities 
for which an SCI broker-dealer satisfies the requirements of paragraph 
(2) of the definition.''
    The current definition of ``SCI systems'' does not contain the 
limitation that is proposed for SCI broker-dealers. For example, an SCI 
ATS that exceeds the average daily dollar volume threshold for NMS 
stocks is subject to Regulation SCI requirements for all of its SCI 
systems (i.e., that meet the definition of SCI systems discussed in 
section II.B.1 above) and indirect SCI systems. Thus, to the extent 
that the SCI systems and indirect SCI systems of an SCI ATS (or any 
other SCI entity) relate to equity securities that are non-NMS stocks, 
exchange-listed options, debt securities, security-based swaps, or any 
other securities, including crypto asset securities, such systems are 
subject to the Regulation SCI requirements.\220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ See supra notes 37-38 and 36 and accompanying text 
(discussing the scope of the current definition of ``SCI systems'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As it considers the expansion of Regulation SCI to broker-dealers, 
many of which operate multiple business lines and transact in different 
types of securities, the Commission preliminarily believes that an SCI 
broker-dealer that qualifies as an SCI entity based only on a 
transaction activity threshold for a particular type of security should 
have its obligations limited to systems with respect to that type of 
security. If a broker-dealer meets only the transaction activity 
threshold for NMS stocks, for example, its systems that directly 
support trading, clearance and settlement, order routing, market data, 
market regulation, or market surveillance for NMS stocks are those that 
raise the concerns Regulation SCI is meant to address. If the broker-
dealer's activity with respect to other classes of securities is 
nominal, it is unlikely to pose risk to the maintenance of fair and 
orderly markets if the systems with respect to those types of 
securities were unavailable (assuming the systems for the distinct 
asset class are separate). If a system of the broker-dealer is used for

[[Page 23167]]

more than one type of securities (i.e., an asset class that triggered 
the threshold and an asset class that did not or is not subject to SCI 
thresholds), such system would still meet the definition of ``SCI 
system.'' \221\ Current SCI entities are and will continue to be, and 
proposed SCI entities other than SCI broker-dealers that satisfy a 
transaction activity threshold would be, required to assess whether the 
technology systems of, or operated by or on their behalf, with respect 
to any type of security (including crypto asset securities, discussed 
further below) are SCI systems covered by Regulation SCI because they 
directly support: (i) trading; (ii) clearance and settlement; (iii) 
order routing; (iv) market data; (v) market regulation; or (vi) market 
surveillance.
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    \221\ For example, if a broker-dealer operator of an SCI ATS 
uses an SCI system to trade both a type of security that triggered 
the SCI threshold and a type of security that did not trigger the 
threshold, that system will be an SCI system for both types of 
securities. A broker-dealer operator of such SCI ATS could wish to 
use the SCI system only for trading the type of security that 
triggered the SCI threshold and create a separate system only to 
trade the type of security that did not trigger the SCI threshold.
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v. Crypto Asset Securities
    Public information about the size and characteristics of the crypto 
asset securities market is limited.\222\ However, the Commission, 
currently understands that only a small portion of crypto asset 
security trading activity is occurring within Commission registered 
entities, and particularly, registered broker-dealers. This may be due 
in part to the fact that there are currently no special purpose broker-
dealers authorized to maintain custody of crypto asset securities.\223\ 
Without the ability to custody a customer's crypto-asset securities, a 
broker-dealer is limited in the amount of agency business in crypto-
asset securities that it could do. Similarly, today, only a limited 
amount of crypto asset security volume occurs on ATSs operating 
pursuant to the Regulation ATS exemption.\224\ This may be due in part 
to the significant trading activity in crypto asset securities that may 
be in non-compliance with the federal securities laws.\225\ 
Nonetheless, if an SCI entity (current or proposed) trades crypto asset 
securities, the systems used for trading crypto asset securities may 
currently and in the future be subject to the requirements of 
Regulation SCI.\226\
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    \222\ See, e.g., Fin. Stability Oversight Council, Report on 
Digital Asset Financial Stability Risks and Regulation 119 (2022) 
(``FSOC Report''), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC-Digital-Assets-Report-2022.pdf (``The crypto-asset 
ecosystem is characterized by opacity that creates challenges for 
the assessment of financial stability risks.''); U.S. Dep't of the 
Treasury, Crypto-Assets: Implications for Consumers, Investors, and 
Businesses 12 (Sept. 2022) (``Crypto-Assets Treasury Report''), 
available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/CryptoAsset_EO5.pdf (finding that data pertaining to ``off-chain 
activity'' is limited and subject to voluntary disclosure by trading 
platforms and protocols, with protocols either not complying with or 
not subject to obligations ``to report accurate trade information 
periodically to regulators or to ensure the quality, consistency, 
and reliability of their public trade data''); Fin. Stability Bd., 
Assessment of Risks to Financial Stability from Crypto-assets 18-19 
(Feb. 16, 2022) (``FSB Report''), available at https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P160222.pdf (finding that the difficulty in 
aggregating and analyzing available data in the crypto asset space 
``limits the amount of insight that can be gained with regard to the 
[crypto asset] market structure and functioning,'' including who the 
market participants are and where the market's holdings are 
concentrated, which, among other things, limits regulators' ability 
to inform policy and supervision); Raphael Auer et al., Banking in 
the Shadow of Bitcoin? The Institutional Adoption of 
Cryptocurrencies 4, 9 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 
1013, May 2022), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/work1013.pdf 
(stating that data gaps, which can be caused by limited disclosure 
requirements, risk undermining the ability for holistic oversight 
and regulation of cryptocurrencies); Int'l Monetary Fund, The Crypto 
Ecosystem and Financial Stability Challenges, in Global Financial 
Stability Report 41, 47 (Oct. 2021), available at https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/GFSR/2021/October/English/ch2.ashx (finding that crypto asset service providers provide 
limited, fragmented, and, in some cases, unreliable data, as the 
information is provided voluntarily without standardization and, in 
some cases, with an incentive to manipulate the data provided).
    \223\ For background on Rule 15c3-3 as it relates to digital 
asset securities, see Commission, Joint Staff Statement on Broker-
Dealer Custody of Digital Asset Securities (July 8, 2019), available 
at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/joint-staff-statement-broker-dealer-custody-digital-asset-securities; FINRA, SEC Staff No-
Action Letter, ATS Role in the Settlement of Digital Asset Security 
Trades (Sept. 25, 2020), available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/2020/finra-ats-role-in-settlement-of-digital-asset-security-trades-09252020.pdf. To date, five offerings of 
crypto asset securities have been registered or qualified under the 
Securities Act of 1933, and five classes of crypto asset securities 
have been registered under the Exchange Act. The Commission issued a 
statement describing its position that, for a period of five years, 
special purpose broker-dealers operating under the circumstances set 
forth in the statement will not be subject to a Commission 
enforcement action on the basis that the broker-dealer deems itself 
to have obtained and maintained physical possession or control of 
customer fully paid and excess margin digital asset securities for 
purposes of 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(b)(1) (``Rule 15c3-3(b)(1)'' under the 
Exchange Act). See Crypto Asset Securities Custody Release, supra 
note 37. To date, no such special purpose broker-dealer registration 
applications have been granted by FINRA.
    \224\ ATSs that do not trade NMS stocks file with the Commission 
a Form ATS notice, which the Commission does not approve. Form ATS 
requires, among other things, that ATSs provide information about: 
classes of subscribers and differences in access to the services 
offered by the ATS to different groups or classes of subscribers; 
securities the ATS expects to trade; any entity other than the ATS 
involved in its operations; the manner in which the system operates; 
how subscribers access the trading system; procedures governing 
entry of trading interest and execution; and trade reporting, 
clearance, and settlement of trades on the ATS. In addition, all 
ATSs must file quarterly reports on Form ATS-R with the Commission. 
Form ATS-R requires, among other things, volume information for 
specified categories of securities, a list of all securities traded 
in the ATS during the quarter, and a list of all subscribers that 
were participants. To the extent that an ATS trades crypto asset 
securities, the ATS must disclose information regarding its crypto 
asset securities activities as required by Form ATS and Form ATS-R. 
Form ATS and Form ATS-R are deemed confidential when filed with the 
Commission. Based on information provided on these forms, a limited 
number of ATSs have noticed on Form ATS their intention to trade 
certain crypto asset securities and a subset of those ATSs have 
reported transactions in crypto asset securities on their Form ATS-
R. See also supra note 223, referencing, Commission, Joint Staff 
Statement on Broker-Dealer Custody of Digital Asset Securities (July 
8, 2019), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/joint-staff-statement-broker-dealer-custody-digital-asset-securities; FINRA, SEC Staff No-Action Letter, ATS Role in the 
Settlement of Digital Asset Security Trades (Sept. 25, 2020), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mr-noaction/2020/finra-ats-role-in-settlement-of-digital-asset-security-trades-09252020.pdf.
    \225\ See also FSOC Report, supra note 222, at 5, 87, 94, 97 
(emphasizing the importance of the existing financial regulatory 
structure while stating that certain digital asset platforms may be 
listing securities while not in compliance with exchange, broker-
dealer, or other registration requirements, which may impose 
additional risk on banks and investors and result in ``serious 
consumer and investor protection issues''); Crypto-Assets Treasury 
Report, supra note 222, at 26, 29, 39, 40 (stating that issuers and 
platforms in the digital asset ecosystem may be acting in non-
compliance with statutes and regulations governing traditional 
capital markets, with market participants that actively dispute the 
application of existing laws and regulations, creating risks to 
investors from non-compliance with, in particular, extensive 
disclosure requirements and market conduct standards); FSB Report, 
supra note 222, at 4, 8, 18 (stating that some trading activity in 
crypto assets may be failing to comply with applicable laws and 
regulations, while failing to provide basic investor protections due 
to their operation outside of or in non-compliance with regulatory 
frameworks, thereby failing to provide the ``market integrity, 
investor protection or transparency seen in appropriately regulated 
and supervised financial markets'').
    \226\ But see supra section II.B.1 (discussing how current SCI 
entities that trade crypto asset securities must assess whether 
their systems for trading crypto asset securities are SCI systems). 
As a specific example, if an SCI SRO were to obtain Commission 
approval to add a crypto asset security trading facility, that 
facility would be part of an SCI SRO that is subject to Regulation 
SCI.
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SCI Broker-Dealer Activity in Crypto Asset Securities
    As discussed above, the Commission is proposing to include as SCI 
entities large broker-dealers: those that satisfy a total assets 
threshold or a transaction activity threshold. The total assets 
threshold applies to broker-dealers irrespective of asset classes in 
which they conduct significant transaction activity. In contrast, the 
proposed transaction activity threshold specifies four enumerated asset 
classes: NMS stocks, exchange-listed options, U.S.

[[Page 23168]]

Treasury Securities, and Agency Securities.
    The proposal would affect an SCI broker-dealer that engages in 
crypto asset security activity as follows: for purposes of assessing 
whether it meets a transaction activity threshold, a broker-dealer 
would need to consider if it trades crypto asset securities that are 
NMS stocks, exchange-listed options, U.S. Treasury Securities, or 
Agency securities, and if so, include those transactions in its 
transaction tally of NMS stocks, exchange-listed options, U.S. Treasury 
Securities, or Agency securities, to assess if it satisfies one or more 
of the proposed thresholds. In addition, as proposed, the SCI systems 
and indirect SCI systems pertaining to crypto asset securities that are 
NMS stocks, exchange-listed options, U.S. Treasury Securities, or 
Agency securities would be subject to Regulation SCI, including as it 
is proposed to be amended, as discussed in section III.C, with respect 
to the asset class for which the SCI broker-dealer satisfies the 
transaction activity threshold.
    Furthermore, as proposed, an SCI broker-dealer that meets the 
proposed total assets threshold would need consider its crypto asset 
security activities and assess whether any systems pertaining to crypto 
asset securities meet the current definition of SCI systems or indirect 
SCI systems. Any such systems would be subject to Regulation SCI, 
including as it is proposed to be amended, as discussed in section 
III.C.\227\
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    \227\ Likewise, an ATS currently is an SCI ATS if it satisfies a 
trading volume threshold for NMS stocks or equity securities that 
are not NMS stocks. For purposes of assessing whether it meets an 
SCI ATS trading volume threshold, an ATS needs to consider if it 
trades crypto asset securities that are equity securities; and if it 
does trade such securities, those transactions need to be included 
in its transaction tally as (i) NMS stocks or (ii) equity securities 
that are not NMS stocks, as they case may be, in order to calculate 
the volume threshold. Additionally, the definition of SCI systems 
and indirect SCI systems do not contain an asset class limitation 
with respect to SCI SROs (or any other current SCI entity). See 
supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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vi. Request for Comment
    9. Should Regulation SCI apply to broker-dealers? If not, why not? 
If so, should Regulation SCI apply to all broker-dealers, or just a 
subset? Please explain. At what size or level of a broker-dealer's 
activity would market integrity or the protection of investors be 
affected if the broker-dealer were no longer able to operate due to a 
systems disruption, systems compliance issue, or a systems intrusion? 
Are broker-dealers subject to more market discipline than current SCI 
entities? Please explain. Conversely, does a lack of transparency 
regarding events like SCI events limit this market discipline? Why or 
why not?
    10. Would it be more appropriate to define an SCI broker-dealer 
using an approach that identifies a broker-dealer by category, rather 
than by size? For example, what are commenters' views on the impact to 
overall market integrity or the protection of investors if an OTC 
market maker was no longer able to operate due to a systems disruption, 
systems compliance issue, or a systems intrusion? Or an exchange market 
maker? Or a clearing broker-dealer? What are commenters' views on the 
importance of different categories of broker-dealers to the stability 
of the overall U.S. securities market infrastructure, in the context of 
requiring them to comply with Regulation SCI? What risks do the systems 
of broker-dealers pose to the U.S. securities markets?
    11. If the Commission were to identify an SCI broker-dealer by 
category, rather than by size, which categories should be covered and 
how should they be defined? For example, if commenters believe that 
Regulation SCI should apply to significant ``OTC market makers,'' how 
should they be defined? Is it sufficiently clear which entities are 
``OTC market makers,'' as that term is defined under the Exchange Act? 
If not, why not? If so, should a threshold be used to identify those 
that are the most significant? What should that threshold be and how 
should it be calculated?
    12. Is the current broker-dealer regulatory regime, including the 
Market Access Rule and other Commission and FINRA rules, sufficient to 
reasonably ensure the operational capability of the technological 
systems of the proposed SCI broker-dealers?
    13. As discussed above, an SCI broker-dealer would be a broker-
dealer registered with the Commission pursuant to section 15(b) of the 
Exchange Act, which: (1) in at least two of the four preceding calendar 
quarters, ending March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31, 
reported to the Commission on Form X-17A-5 total assets in an amount 
that equals five percent (5%) or more of the quarterly total assets 
level of all security brokers and dealers; or (2) during at least four 
of the preceding six calendar months: (i) with respect to transactions 
in NMS stocks, transacted average daily dollar volume in an amount that 
equals ten percent (10%) or more of the average daily dollar volume 
reported by or pursuant to applicable effective transaction reporting 
plans, provided, however, that for purposes of calculating its activity 
in transactions effected otherwise than on a national securities 
exchange or on an ATS, the broker-dealer shall exclude transactions for 
which it was not the executing party; (ii) with respect to transactions 
in exchange-listed options contracts, transacted average daily dollar 
volume reported by an applicable effective national market system plan; 
(iii) with respect to transactions in U.S. Treasury Securities, 
transacted average daily dollar volume in an amount that equals ten 
percent (10%) or more of the total average daily dollar volume made 
available by the self-regulatory organization to which such 
transactions are reported; or (iv) with respect to transactions in 
Agency Securities, transacted average daily dollar volume in an amount 
that equals ten percent (10%) or more of the total average daily dollar 
volume made available by the self-regulatory organization to which such 
transactions are reported. The Commission solicits comment with respect 
to all aspects of the proposed definition, including those aspects 
identified in the succeeding questions.
    14. Is the proposed total assets threshold an appropriate way to 
identify broker-dealers that would pose a substantial risk to the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets in the event of a systems 
issue?
    15. Should the proposed total assets threshold be scaled using the 
proposed sources as the denominator? Why or why not? Is use of data 
made available by the Federal Reserve Board appropriate as the 
denominator for the measure of all security broker-dealer total assets? 
If not, what metric, if any, would be appropriate for the Commission to 
use as the denominator? Should the denominator be different in the 
event that such data is no longer made available by the Federal Reserve 
Board? Recognizing that the proposed numeric thresholds ultimately 
represent a matter of judgment by the Commission as it proposes to 
apply Regulation SCI to the largest broker-dealers, the Commission 
solicits comment on the proposed thresholds levels. Is the proposed 
five percent numeric threshold appropriate? Why or why not? Is the 
proposed two of the preceding four quarter methodology, with lookback 
to the previous quarter for the denominator appropriate? Why or why 
not?
    16. Are the proposed transaction activity thresholds an appropriate 
way to identify broker-dealers that would pose a substantial risk to 
the maintenance of fair and orderly markets in the event of a systems 
issue?

[[Page 23169]]

    17. With respect to the proposed transaction activity thresholds, 
are the asset classes identified appropriate? Are there asset classes 
that are included that should be excluded, or asset classes that are 
excluded that should be included? Which ones and why? For example, 
should U.S. Treasury Securities and Agency Securities be included? Why 
or why not? Should OTC equity securities be included? Or security-based 
swaps? Is the size of the market in each asset class relevant? Why or 
why not?
    18. With respect to the proposed transaction activity thresholds, 
recognizing that the proposed numeric thresholds ultimately represent a 
matter of judgment by the Commission as it proposes to apply Regulation 
SCI to the largest broker-dealers, the Commission solicits comment on 
the proposed threshold levels. Are the 10 percent transaction activity 
threshold levels proposed appropriate? Would higher or lower thresholds 
be appropriate? Should thresholds vary based on asset class? Is there a 
different approach that would be more appropriate?
    19. For purposes of the numerator in each transaction activity 
threshold, is use of average daily dollar volume of all purchase and 
sale transactions, as proposed appropriate? If not, why not? Is there 
an alternative measure of market activity that could be consistently 
determined by broker-dealers, as well as the Commission, and that would 
identify large broker-dealer activity that, if disrupted, could disrupt 
market functioning more broadly? Would share volume be more appropriate 
for any of the proposed asset classes?
    20. Is it clear what average daily dollar volume, as made available 
by or pursuant to applicable effective transaction reporting plans, 
would be following implementation of the Market Data Infrastructure 
rules? Why or why not?
    21. Should the transaction activity thresholds denominator have a 
minimum, so that if the market for a particular product shrinks 
significantly, entities that have a significant portion of that small 
market would not be scoped into the test? For example, should an 
options trading activity threshold specify that the threshold is 
exceeded if average daily dollar volume equals the greater of ten 
percent (10%) or more of the average daily dollar volume reported by or 
pursuant to an applicable effective transaction reporting plan, 
applicable national market system plan, applicable SRO, or $x billion? 
Why or why not? What would be an appropriate minimum dollar threshold 
and why? Please be specific.
    22. Is the four out of the preceding six-month measurement period 
an appropriate timeframe for the transaction activity thresholds? Why 
or why not? Is there a different timeframe or approach that would be 
more appropriate? Please explain.
    23. Do commenters believe that six months after the end of the 
quarter in which the broker-dealer satisfies the total assets threshold 
and six months after the end of the month in which the broker-dealer 
satisfies the transaction activity threshold constitute an appropriate 
amount of time to allow them to come into compliance with the 
requirements of Regulation SCI? Why or why not? Is there a different 
time period that would be more appropriate? Please explain.
    24. What are the differences between the current practices of 
broker-dealers and the practices that would be necessary if the 
proposed changes to Regulation SCI are adopted? Please describe and be 
specific.
    25. Should all of the current or newly proposed requirements set 
forth in Regulation SCI apply to SCI broker-dealers? If only a portion, 
please specify which portion(s) and explain why. If all, explain why.
    26. Is it appropriate to limit the application of the definition of 
``SCI systems'' for SCI broker-dealers that meet the definition of an 
SCI broker-dealer only because of a transaction activity threshold only 
to those systems related to the types of securities for which the 
entity has triggered the threshold, as the Commission is proposing? Why 
or why not?
    27. Should the definition of SCI systems as it applies to SCI 
broker-dealers be modified further than as proposed? Is the limitation 
of the definition of SCI systems as proposed to apply to SCI broker-
dealers (and not applicable to broker-dealers that satisfy the total 
assets threshold) appropriate? Should the Commission instead provide a 
unique definition of SCI systems and indirect SCI systems for broker-
dealers? If so, what should it be and why? For example, in the context 
of broker-dealers, would systems that ``directly support trading'' be a 
category of systems that is overbroad, or too narrow? Why or why not? 
Please explain. Are there any types of systems of broker-dealers to 
which Regulation SCI would apply that should not be covered? Which ones 
and why? Are there any types of systems of broker-dealers that would 
not be covered by the definitions of SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems as proposed that should be covered? Which types and why? Please 
be specific.
    28. Is it clear how Regulation SCI would apply to proposed new SCI 
entities that trade crypto asset securities? Why or why not? Please be 
specific.
    29. Are any of the proposed amendments to Regulation SCI (as 
discussed in section III.C below) inappropriate for broker-dealers? If 
so, which ones? As discussed in section III.C.6 below, the Commission 
proposes to add language to Rule 1002(c) of Regulation SCI regarding 
dissemination of information about SCI events by an SCI broker-dealer 
to its ``customers,'' as a broker-dealer does not have ``members and 
participants.'' Should the Commission require an SCI broker-dealer to 
notify its customers of an SCI event in the same manner as other SCI 
entities? Why or why not? Should the term ``customers'' be defined? If 
so, how? Should Rule 1002(c) be specifically tailored to SCI broker-
dealers in a way that differs from the current rule? If so, how? Please 
be specific. Is the proposed requirement that, pursuant to Rule 
1002(b)(4)(ii)(B), notices to the Commission include a copy of the 
information disseminated to customers appropriate? Why or why not?
    30. Do commenters believe that different or unique requirements 
should apply to an SCI broker-dealer or systems of broker-dealers? What 
should they be, and why?
    31. What effect, if any, would there be of having the largest 
broker-dealers subject to Regulation SCI, while others are not? Should 
the Commission include additional broker-dealers as SCI entities, based 
on size or function? Why or why not? For example, should the largest 
carrying broker-dealers, based on a size threshold, be subject to 
Regulation SCI? If so, should the size threshold be based on total 
assets or number of customer accounts, or some other metric? If 
application of all of Regulation SCI is not appropriate for these 
entities, should they be required to adopt and implement reasonably 
designed policies and procedures to address their ability to continue 
to process customer and account transactions in a timely manner during 
reasonably anticipated surges in demand?
    32. Should the proposed thresholds take into account whether a 
broker-dealer is affiliated with another broker-dealer?[thinsp]For 
example, should the Commission aggregate the transaction activity of 
affiliated broker-dealers for purposes of determining whether the 
transaction activity threshold test has been satisfied and, if it has, 
apply Regulation SCI to each broker-dealer?

[[Page 23170]]

Why or why not? Should it aggregate total assets of affiliated broker-
dealers? Why or why not?
    33. Is the proposed six-month period during which a broker-dealer 
that meets the threshold to become an SCI broker-dealer does not have 
to comply with Regulation SCI appropriate? Should the Commission adopt 
a different time period? If so, how long should the period be and why?
    34. Are there characteristics specific to SCI broker-dealers that 
would make applying Regulation SCI, either broadly or by specific 
existing/proposed provision(s), unduly burdensome or inappropriate for 
SCI broker-dealers? How much time would an SCI broker-dealer reasonably 
need to come into compliance with Regulation as proposed?
c. Exempt Clearing Agencies (Deletion of ``Subject to ARP'')
    The Commission proposes to include all ``exempt clearing agencies'' 
as SCI entities. This proposed approach would expand the scope of 
exempt clearing agencies covered by Regulation SCI, which currently 
covers certain exempt clearing agencies--those that are ``subject to 
ARP.'' \228\ The technology systems that underpin operations of both 
registered clearing agencies and exempt clearing agencies are critical 
systems that drive the global financial markets. Further, the 
activities of exempt clearing agencies subject to ARP and those not 
subject to ARP are similar. For example, for covered clearing agencies 
in particular,\229\ such systems include those that set and calculate 
margin obligations and other charges, perform netting and calculate 
payment obligations, facilitate the movement of funds and securities, 
or effectuate end-of-day settlement. Increasingly, the technology 
behind these systems are subject to both rapid innovation and 
interconnectedness.\230\ For the exempt clearing agencies not subject 
to ARP, they also provide CSD functions for transactions in U.S. 
securities between U.S. and non-U.S. persons, using similar 
technologies.\231\ More generally, all exempt clearing agencies offer 
services that centralize a variety of technology functions, increasing 
access to services that help improve the efficiency of the clearance 
and settlement process by, for example, standardizing and automating 
functions necessary to complete clearance and settlement.\232\ Over 
time, the increasing availability of, and access to, such technologies 
has also increased the dependence that market participants have on such 
services, raising the potential that such services could become single 
points of failure for U.S. market participants.\233\ Further, as the 
services that exempt clearing agencies provide have evolved over time, 
they have become increasingly reliant on the provision of new 
technologies to market participants, and so the Commission has 
increasingly focused its oversight of exempt clearing agencies on the 
ways that such services might introduce operational risk to U.S. market 
participants.\234\ Therefore, the Commission proposes to expand the 
scope of SCI entities to cover all exempt clearing agencies. As a 
result, there would no longer be a difference in how exempt clearing 
agencies are addressed by Regulation SCI.
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    \228\ See Rule 1000; SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 
72271 (an ``exempt clearing agency subject to ARP'' is an entity 
that has received from the Commission an exemption from registration 
as a clearing agency under section 17A of the Exchange Act, and 
whose exemption contains conditions that relate to the Commission's 
Automation Review Policies, or any Commission regulation that 
supersedes or replaces such policies (such as Regulation SCI)).
    \229\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22 (``Rule 17Ad-22'' under the Exchange 
Act) provides for two categories of registered clearing agencies and 
contains a set of rules that apply to each category. The first 
category is covered clearing agencies, which are subject to 17 CFR 
240.17Ad-22(e) (Rule 17Ad-22(e)), which includes requirements 
intended to address the activity and risks that their size, 
operation, and importance pose to the U.S. securities markets, the 
risks inherent in the products they clear, and the goals of both the 
Exchange Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. See Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 78961 (Sept. 28, 2016), 81 FR 70786, 70793 (Oct. 13, 
2016) (``CCA Standards Adopting Release''). Covered clearing 
agencies are registered clearing agencies that provide central 
counterparty (``CCP'') or central securities depository (``CSD'') 
services. See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(5). A CCP is a type of 
registered clearing agency that acts as the buyer to every seller 
and the seller to every buyer, providing a trade guaranty with 
respect to transactions submitted for clearing by the CCP's 
participants. See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(2); Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 88616 (Apr. 9, 2020), 85 FR 28853, 28855 (May 14, 2020) 
(``CCA Definition Adopting Release''). A CCP may perform a variety 
of risk management functions to manage the market, credit, and 
liquidity risks associated with transactions submitted for clearing. 
If a CCP is unable to perform its risk management functions 
effectively, however, it can transmit risk throughout the financial 
system. A CSD is a type of registered clearing agency that acts as a 
depository for handling securities, whereby all securities of a 
particular class or series of any issuer deposited within the system 
are treated as fungible. Through use of a CSD, securities may be 
transferred, loaned, or pledged by bookkeeping entry without the 
physical delivery of certificates. A CSD also may permit or 
facilitate the settlement of securities transactions more generally. 
See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(23)(A); 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(a)(3); CCA 
Definition Adopting Release, at 28856. If a CSD is unable to perform 
these functions, market participants may be unable to settle their 
transactions, transmitting risk through the financial system. 
Currently, all clearing agencies registered with the Commission that 
are actively providing clearance and settlement services are covered 
clearing agencies. They are The Depository Trust Company (``DTC''), 
FICC, NSCC, ICE Clear Credit (``ICC''), ICE Clear Europe 
(``ICEEU''), The Options Clearing Corporation (``OCC''), and LCH SA.
    \230\ The second category includes registered clearing agencies 
other than covered clearing agencies; such clearing agencies must 
comply with 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(d) (``Rule 17Ad-22(d)''). See 17 CFR 
240.17Ad-22(d). Rule 17Ad-22(d) establishes a regulatory regime to 
govern registered clearing agencies that do not provide CCP or CSD 
services. See CCA Standards Adopting Release, at 70793. Although 
subject to Rule 17Ad-22(d), the Boston Stock Exchange Clearing 
Corporation (``BSECC'') and Stock Clearing Corporation of 
Philadelphia (``SCCP'') are currently registered with the Commission 
as clearing agencies but conduct no clearance or settlement 
operations. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63629 (Jan. 3, 
2011), 76 FR 1473, 1474 (Jan. 10, 2011) (``BSECC Notice''); 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 63268 (Nov. 8, 2010), 75 FR 
69730, 69731 (Nov. 15, 2010) (``SCCP Notice'').
    \231\ See, e.g., Release No. 79577 (Dec. 16, 2016), 81 FR 93994 
(Dec. 22, 2016) (``Euroclear Exemption''); Release No. 38328 (Feb. 
24, 1997), 62 FR 9225 (Feb. 28, 1997) (``Clearstream Exemption''). 
To manage the potential risks associated with these functions, the 
Commission's exemptions impose volume limits on the amount of 
transactions in U.S. Government securities for which each entity may 
perform clearance and settlement.
    \232\ See, e.g., Euroclear Exemption, supra note 231 (adding 
services for collateral management); Release No. 44188 (Apr. 17, 
2001), 66 FR 20494 (Apr. 23, 2001) (granting an exemption to provide 
a central matching service to Global Joint Venture Matching Services 
US LLC, now known as DTCC ITP Matching US LLC, to facilitate the 
settlement of transactions between broker-dealers and their 
institutional customers) (``ITPM Exemption'').
    \233\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 76514 (Nov. 25, 
2015), 80 FR 75387, 75401 (Dec. 1, 2015) (granting an exemption to 
provide matching services to each of Bloomberg STP LLC and SS&C 
Technologies, Inc. and stating that ``[o]n balance, the Commission 
believes that the redundancy created by more interfaces and linkages 
within the settlement infrastructure increases resiliency''); SEC 
Division of Trading and Markets and Office of Compliance Inspections 
and Examinations, Staff Report on the Regulation of Clearing 
Agencies (Oct. 1, 2020) (``Staff Report on Clearing Agencies''), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/files/regulation-clearing-agencies-100120.pdf (staff stating that ``consolidation among providers of 
clearance and settlement services concentrates clearing activity in 
fewer providers and has increased the potential for providers to 
become single points of failure.'').
    \234\ For example, in 2016 the Commission approved modifications 
to the Euroclear Exemption that included, among other things, a new 
set of conditions for the reporting of service outages. See 
Euroclear Exemption, supra note 231, at 94003 (setting forth eight 
``Operational Risk Conditions Applicable to the Clearing Agency 
Activities'').
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i. Current Regulatory Framework for Exempt Clearing Agencies
    The registration and supervisory framework for clearing agencies 
under the Exchange Act provides the Commission with broad authority to 
provide exemptive relief from certain of the Commission's regulatory 
requirements under the Exchange Act. Specifically, section 17A(b)(1) of 
the Exchange Act provides the Commission with authority to exempt a 
clearing agency or any class of clearing agencies from any provision of 
section 17A or the

[[Page 23171]]

rules or regulations thereunder.\235\ Such an exemption may be effected 
by rule or order, upon the Commission's own motion or upon application, 
either conditionally or unconditionally. The Commission's exercise of 
authority to grant exemptive relief must be consistent with the public 
interest, the protection of investors, and the purposes of section 17A, 
including the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of 
securities transactions and the safeguarding of securities and 
funds.\236\ The Commission has granted exemptions from clearing agency 
registration to three entities that provide matching services. These 
exempt clearing agencies are DTCC ITP Matching US, LCC (successor in 
name to Omgeo and Global Joint Venture Matching Services US, LLC), 
Bloomberg STP LLC (``BSTP''), and SS&C Technologies, Inc. 
(``SS&C'').\237\ In certain instances, non-U.S. clearing agencies also 
have received exemptions from registration as a clearing agency. These 
exempt clearing agencies include Euroclear Bank SA/NV (successor in 
name to Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of NY) \238\ and Clearstream 
Banking, S.A. (successor in name to Cedel Bank, soci[eacute]t[eacute] 
anonyme, Luxembourg).\239\ Each has an exemption to provide clearance 
and settlement for U.S. Government and agency securities for U.S. 
participants, subject to limitations on the volume of transactions set 
forth in their exemptions. The Euroclear Exemption also provides an 
exemption from registration to provide collateral management services 
for transactions in U.S. equity securities between U.S. persons and 
non-U.S. persons.
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    \235\ The Commission has also provided temporary relief from 
registration to certain clearing agencies under section 36 of the 
Exchange Act. On July 1, 2011, the Commission published a 
conditional, temporary exemption from clearing agency registration 
for entities that perform certain post-trade processing services for 
security-based swap transactions. See, e.g., Release No. 64796 (July 
1, 2011), 76 FR 39963 (July 7, 2011) (providing an exemption from 
registration under section 17A(b) of the Exchange Act, and stating 
that ``[t]he Commission is using its authority under section 36 of 
the Exchange Act to provide a conditional temporary exemption [from 
clearing agency registration], until the compliance date for the 
final rules relating to registration of clearing agencies that clear 
security-based swaps pursuant to sections 17A(i) and (j) of the 
Exchange Act, from the registration requirement in section 17A(b)(1) 
of the Exchange Act to any clearing agency that may be required to 
register with the Commission solely as a result of providing 
Collateral Management Services, Trade Matching Services, Tear Up and 
Compression Services, and/or substantially similar services for 
security-based swaps''). The order facilitated the Commission's 
identification of entities that operate in that area and that 
accordingly may fall within the clearing agency definition. 
Recently, the Commission indicated that the 2011 Temporary Exemption 
may no longer be necessary. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
94615 (Apr. 6, 2022), 87 FR 28872, 28934 (May 11, 2022) (stating 
that the ``Commission preliminarily believes that, if it adopts a 
framework for the registration of [security-based swap execution 
facilities (``SBSEFs'')], the 2011 Temporary Exemption would no 
longer be necessary because entities carrying out the functions of 
SBSEFs would be able to register with the Commission as such, 
thereby falling within the exemption from the definition of 
`clearing agency' in existing [17 CFR 240.17Ad-24 (Rule 17Ad-
24)]'').
    \236\ See 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(1).
    \237\ See exemption, supra note 233 (granting an exemption to 
provide matching services to each of BSTP and SS&C).
    \238\ See Euroclear Exemption, supra note 231.
    \239\ See Clearstream Exemption, supra note 231.
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    As previously discussed, each of these exempt clearing agencies 
makes available to market participants an increasingly wide array of 
technology services that help centralize and automate the clearance and 
settlement of securities transactions for market participants. This 
increasing reliance on new technologies has focused the Commission's 
attention on the potential for such services to introduce operational 
risk or introduce single points of failure into the national system for 
clearance and settlement. Given this important role of exempt clearing 
agencies in helping to ensure the functioning, resilience, and 
stability of U.S. securities markets, and their growing technological 
innovations and interconnectedness, the Commission proposes to expand 
the scope of ``SCI entity'' to cover all exempt clearing agencies, 
rather than only those ``subject to ARP'' to help ensure that the risks 
associated with the greater dispersal, sophistication, and 
interconnection of such technologies are appropriately mitigated.\240\ 
In this regard, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the clearing 
agency exemptive orders, the Commission may modify by order the terms, 
scope, or conditions if the Commission determines that such 
modification is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for 
the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the 
purposes of the Exchange Act.\241\
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    \240\ See supra note 228. Pursuant to the Commission's statement 
on CCPs in the European Union (``EU'') authorized under the European 
Markets Infrastructure Regulation (``EMIR''), an EU CCP may request 
an exemption from the Commission where it has determined that the 
application of SEC requirements would impose unnecessary, 
duplicative, or inconsistent requirements in light of EMIR 
requirements to which it is subject. See Statement on Central 
Counterparties Authorized under the European Markets Infrastructure 
Regulation Seeking to Register as a Clearing Agency or to Request 
Exemptions from Certain Requirements Under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 90492 (Nov. 23, 
2020), 85 FR 76635, 76639 (Nov. 30, 2020), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-30/pdf/FR-2020-11-30.pdf 
(stating that in seeking an exemption, an EU CCP could provide ``a 
self-assessment. . . [to] explain how the EU CCP's compliance with 
EMIR corresponds to the requirements in the Exchange Act and 
applicable SEC rules thereunder, such as Rule 17Ad-22 and Regulation 
SCI'').
    \241\ See ITPM Exemption, supra note 231; Euroclear Exemption, 
supra note 231; Clearstream Exemption, supra note 231.
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ii. Request for Comment
    35. Is expanding the scope of ``SCI entity'' to cover all exempt 
clearing agencies, not just those exempt clearing agencies subject to 
ARP, appropriate? Why or why not? Please be specific and provide 
examples, if possible, to illustrate your points.
    36. Should all or some aspects of Regulation SCI apply to all 
exempt clearing agencies? Why or why not? If only a portion, please 
specify which portion(s) and explain why. If all, explain why.
    37. Would the Regulation SCI proposed requirements, together with 
the conditions under which the exempt clearing agency is subject in the 
Commission exemptive order, be sufficient to address operational risk 
concerns posed by exempt clearing agencies? Why or why not? Please be 
specific and respond with examples, if possible.
    38. Given the proposed new requirements of Regulation SCI, should 
exempt clearing agencies be subject to a revised Commission exemptive 
order? Why or why not?
    39. In support of the public interest and the protection of 
investors, the Commission is proposing to amend the clearing agency 
exemptive orders to replace all operational risk conditions with a 
condition that each exempt clearing agency must comply with Regulation 
SCI requirements. Should the ordering language provide that the exempt 
clearing agency must comply with all requirements in Regulation SCI? If 
so, explain why. If not, explain why not.
    40. Should proposed Regulation SCI distinguish among different 
types of exempt clearing agencies such that some requirements of 
Regulation SCI might be appropriate for some exempt clearing agencies, 
but not others? Why or why not? If so, what are those distinctions and 
what are those requirements? Please be specific and provide examples, 
if possible.
    41. To what extent do exempt clearing agencies rely on third-party 
providers to provide systems that support their clearance and 
settlement functions? Do such third-party providers introduce 
operational or other risks that would be subject to the requirements of 
Regulation SCI? Are there any

[[Page 23172]]

circumstances in which the use of a third-party provider would prevent 
compliance with Regulation SCI? Why or why not? Please be specific and 
provide examples, if possible.
    42. For EU CCPs authorized under EMIR, the Commission stated that 
exemptive relief may be considered under section 17A(b)(1) of the 
Exchange Act in scenarios where SEC requirements are unnecessary, 
duplicative, or inconsistent relative to EMIR requirements. The 
Commission recognizes that the EU and other jurisdictions may have 
requirements similar those being proposed in Regulation SCI. Should the 
Commission provide foreign CCPs with exemptive relief from newly 
proposed Regulation SCI? Why or why not? In the context of exemptive 
requests for newly proposed Regulation SCI, what factors should the 
Commission take into account in assessing whether SEC requirements may 
be ``unnecessary, duplicative, or inconsistent'' relative to home 
jurisdiction requirements for foreign CCPs, including EU CCPs 
authorized under EMIR? Please be specific and provide examples, if 
possible.
3. General Request for Comment on Proposed Expansion of SCI Entities
    43. The Commission requests comment generally on the proposed 
expansion of the definition of SCI entity. Are there are other entities 
that should be included as SCI entities? If so, which entities and why? 
Further, are there any entities, which if included as SCI entities, 
would have critical SCI systems? Please explain.

B. Request for Comment Regarding Significant-Volume Fixed Income ATSs 
and Broker-Dealers Using Electronic or Automated Systems for Trading of 
Corporate Debt Securities or Municipal Securities

1. Discussion
    As stated above, the Commission did not include Fixed Income ATSs 
as SCI entities when it adopted Regulation SCI based on consideration 
of comments regarding the risk profile of these ATSs at that time.\242\ 
In light of the evolution of technology since then, and specifically, 
the technology for trading corporate debt and municipal securities, the 
Commission requests comment on whether significant-volume ATSs and/or 
broker-dealers with significant transaction activity in corporate debt 
or municipal securities should be subject to Regulation SCI.\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \242\ See supra text accompanying note 79.
    \243\ For purposes of this release, the term Fixed Income ATSs 
refers only to ATSs trading corporate debt and municipal securities 
and excludes Government Securities ATSs, which are the subject of a 
separate proposal. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Currently, an ATS is subject to Rule 301(b)(6) of Regulation ATS if 
its trading volume reaches ``20 percent or more of the average daily 
volume traded in the United States'' in either corporate debt or 
municipal securities.\244\ Among other things, Rule 301(b)(6) requires 
such a significant-volume Fixed Income ATS to notify the Commission 
staff of material systems outages and significant systems changes and 
to establish adequate contingency and disaster recovery plans.\245\ The 
requirements of Rule 301(b)(6) applicable to significant-volume Fixed 
Income ATSs, which date to 1998 and have not been updated since that 
time, are less rigorous than the requirements of Regulation SCI.\246\ 
The Commission explained in the SCI Adopting Release that it adopted 
Regulation SCI to expand upon, update, and modernize the requirements 
of Rule 301(b)(6) for those ATSs trading NMS stocks and equity 
securities that are not NMS stocks that it had identified as playing a 
significant role in the U.S. securities markets.\247\ Regulation SCI 
did this by, for example, moving from the Commission's 1980s and 90s-
era technology precepts to a framework that speaks to a broader set of 
systems that are subject to an overarching standard: that they be 
subject to policies and procedures reasonably designed to maintain 
operational capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly 
markets. Regulation SCI also requires tested business continuity and 
disaster recovery plans that include geographic diversity to achieve 
specified recovery time objectives. In addition, Regulation SCI 
requires notice and dissemination of information regarding a wider 
range of systems problems (i.e., SCI events) to the Commission and 
affected market participants, and also requires that corrective action 
be taken with respect to such problems.\248\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \244\ See 17 CFR 242.301(b)(6). Until Regulation SCI was 
adopted, Rule 301(b)(6) applied to an ATS trading NMS stocks, equity 
securities that are not NMS stocks, corporate debt securities, or 
municipal securities exceeding a 20% volume threshold. Since the 
adoption of Regulation SCI, Rule 301(b)(6) has applied only to ATSs 
trading corporate debt securities or municipal securities exceeding 
a 20% volume threshold. Rule 301(b)(6) currently does not specify 
whether the thresholds refer to share, dollar, or transaction 
volume. In the Government Securities ATS Reproposal, the Commission 
has proposed to specify that these thresholds refer to ``average 
daily dollar volume.'' See Government Securities ATS Reproposal, 
supra note 84, at 15572.
    \245\ More specifically, with regard to systems that support 
order entry, order routing, order execution, transaction reporting, 
and trade comparison, Rule 301(b)(6)(ii) of Regulation ATS requires 
significant-volume ATSs to: establish reasonable current and future 
capacity estimates; conduct periodic capacity stress tests of 
critical systems to determine their ability to accurately, timely 
and efficiently process transactions; develop and implement 
reasonable procedures to review and keep current system development 
and testing methodology; review system and data center vulnerability 
to threats; establish adequate contingency and disaster recovery 
plans; perform annual independent reviews of systems to ensure 
compliance with the above listed requirements and perform review by 
senior management of reports containing the recommendations and 
conclusions of the independent review; and promptly notify the 
Commission of material systems outages and significant systems 
changes. See 17 CFR 242.301(b)(6)(ii). As discussed in the SCI 
Adopting Release, the application of Rule 301(b)(6) to Fixed Income 
ATSs is in addition to various Exchange Act and FINRA rules 
applicable to broker-dealers operating ATSs. See SCI Adopting 
Release, supra note 1, at 72263. See also supra notes 146-166 and 
accompanying text (providing an updated discussion of various 
Exchange Act, FINRA, and certain other regulations applicable to 
broker-dealers, including those operating ATSs).
    \246\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 40760 (Dec. 8, 
1998), 63 FR 70844, (Dec. 22, 1998) (``Regulation ATS Adopting 
Release'').
    \247\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72264.
    \248\ As discussed further below, the Commission is now 
proposing updates to Regulation SCI that are designed to take 
account of new and emerging technology challenges. If adopted, these 
changes to Regulation SCI will render Rule 301(b)(6) even more 
outdated by comparison. Below the Commission solicits comment on 
whether, in lieu of applying Regulation SCI to these entities, Rule 
301(b)(6) should be updated instead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When proposing Regulation SCI in 2013, the Commission sought to 
include as SCI entities those ATSs that are reliant on automated 
systems and represent a significant pool of liquidity in certain asset 
classes.\249\ Regarding Fixed Income ATSs, the Commission proposed to 
include those exceeding five percent or more of either average daily 
dollar volume or average daily transaction volume traded in the United 
States, but it did not adopt that proposal.\250\ Instead, for ATSs 
trading corporate debt or municipal securities

[[Page 23173]]

exceeding a 20 percent ``average daily volume'' threshold, it left in 
place the older, more limited technology regulations in Rule 301(b)(6) 
of Regulation ATS.\251\ In support of that determination, the 
Commission distinguished the equity markets from the corporate debt and 
municipal securities markets, stating that the latter markets generally 
relied much less on automation and electronic trading than markets that 
trade NMS stocks or equity securities that are not NMS stocks, and also 
tended to be less liquid than the equity markets, with slower execution 
times and less complex routing strategies.\252\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \249\ See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18094-96.
    \250\ See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at 18093, 18095. 
At adoption, the Commission included only ATSs that trade NMS stocks 
and equity securities that are not NMS stocks exceeding a specified 
volume threshold. Rule 1000 of Regulation SCI defines SCI ATS to 
mean an ATS, which, during at least four of the preceding six 
calendar months, had: (1) With respect to NMS stocks: (i) 5% or more 
in any single NMS stock, and 0.25% or more in all NMS stocks, of the 
average daily dollar volume reported by an effective transaction 
reporting plan, or (ii) 1% or more, in all NMS stocks, of the 
average daily dollar volume reported by an effective transaction 
reporting plan; or (2) with respect to equity securities that are 
not NMS stocks and for which transactions are reported to an SRO, 5% 
or more of the average daily dollar volume as calculated by the SRO 
to which such transactions are reported. See 17 CFR 242.1000. Rule 
1000 also states that an ATS that meets one of these thresholds is 
not required to comply with Regulation SCI until six months after 
satisfying the threshold for the first time. See id.
    \251\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72270.
    \252\ See id. The Commission also acknowledged comments stating 
that lowering the 20% threshold in Rule 301(b)(6) could have the 
unintended effect of discouraging technology evolution in these 
markets. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Due to changes in the market and updates to technology, the 
Commission again requests comment on applying Regulation SCI to 
significant-volume Fixed Income ATSs, and further requests comment 
regarding broker-dealers trading significant volume in corporate debt 
or municipal securities.\253\ In particular, the Commission is 
soliciting comment on whether the distinctions drawn by the Commission 
in its original adoption of Regulation SCI, between equities markets on 
the one hand, and the corporate debt and municipal securities markets 
on the other, based on differences in their reliance on automation and 
electronic trading strategies have diminished such that Fixed Income 
ATSs or broker-dealers with significant activity in corporate debt and 
municipal securities should be subject to increased technology 
oversight pursuant to Regulation SCI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72409 (stating, 
``[A]s the Commission monitors the evolution of automation in this 
market, the Commission may reconsider the benefits and costs of 
extending the requirements of Regulation SCI to fixed-income ATSs in 
the future.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, the Commission proposed and then recently re-
proposed to extend Regulation SCI to ATSs that trade U.S. Treasury 
Securities or Agency Securities (i.e., Government Securities ATSs) 
exceeding a five percent dollar volume threshold in at least four out 
of the preceding six months, citing the increased reliance on 
technology in the government securities markets in recent years and the 
resulting operational similarities and technological vulnerabilities 
and risks of such ATSs to existing SCI entities.\254\ In the Government 
Securities ATS Reproposal, the Commission discussed ways in which the 
government securities markets have become increasingly dependent on 
electronic trading in recent years.\255\ The Commission solicits 
comment on whether trading in corporate debt securities or municipal 
securities by ATSs and/or broker-dealers has evolved similarly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \254\ See Government Securities ATS Proposing Release, supra 
note 84, at 87152-54. See also Government Securities ATS Reproposal, 
supra note 84, at 15527-29. Specifically, in the Government 
Securities ATS Reproposal, the Commission discussed how advances in 
technology have resulted in the increased use of systems that use 
protocols and non-firm trading interest to bring together buyers and 
sellers of securities and how these systems functioned as market 
places similar to market places provided by registered exchanges and 
ATSs. See Government Securities ATS Reproposal, supra note 84, at 
15497-98.
    \255\ See Government Securities ATS Reproposal, supra note 84, 
at 15526.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The growth in electronic trading in the corporate debt and 
municipal securities markets in recent years appears to be 
substantial,\256\ and accelerating.\257\ Although traditional methods 
of bilateral corporate bond trading conducted through either dealer-to-
dealer or dealer-to-customer negotiations (often using telephone calls) 
remain important (with an estimated 71.4 percent of trading in 
corporate bonds facilitated via bilateral voice trading during the 
first half of 2021),\258\ more recent data suggest that dependencies on 
electronic protocols have increased in the last year alone.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \256\ See Government Securities ATS Reproposal, supra note 84, 
at 15528 at n. 389, 15606, and 15609. See also SIFMA Insights: 
Electronic Trading Market Structure Primer, supra note 3 (outlining 
and comparing electronification trends in different markets); SIFMA, 
SIFMA Insights: US Fixed Income Market Structure Primer (July 2018), 
available at https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/SIFMA-Insights-FIMS-Primer_FINAL.pdf (discussing several different types 
of fixed-income markets, noting that the historically quote-driven 
voice broker market structure has moved to accommodate limit order 
book protocols in the intradealer markets and request-for-quote 
(``RFQ'') protocols in the dealer-to-client markets; and assessing 
that ``Current growth [in the dealer-to-client markets] is enabling 
the total growth in overall electronification percentages: UST 70%, 
Agency 50%, Repos 50%, IG Corporates 40% and HY Corporates 25%'').
    \257\ See Annabel Smith, Pandemic sees electronic fixed income 
trading skyrocket in 2021, the Trade (Mar. 3, 2021), available at 
https://www.thetradenews.com/pandemic-sees-electronic-fixed-income-trading-skyrocket-in-2021/; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, 
Characteristics of Municipal Securities Trading on Alternative 
Trading Systems and Broker's Broker Platforms (Aug. 2021), available 
at https://msrb.org/MarketTopics/-/media/27E4F111D18246C6B9DA849082230CD0.ashx (discussing volume on ATSs and 
broker's broker platforms from 2016-2021).
    \258\ See Government Securities ATS Reproposal, supra note 84, 
at 15606-07. Market observers also note increased use of electronic 
trading in the growth of all-to-all trading and portfolio trading. 
See Greenwich Associates, All-to-All Trading Takes Hold in Corporate 
Bonds (Q2 2021), available at https://content.marketaxess.com/sites/
default/files/2021-04/All-to-All-Trading-Takes-Hold-in-Corporate-
Bonds.pdf#:~:text=In%20all-%20to-
all%20markets%2C%20where%20asset%20managers%20provide,of%20the%20corp
orate%20bond%20market%E2%80%99s%20growth%20and%20evolution (stating 
that all-to-all trading, which allows asset managers to provide 
liquidity to dealers and each other and for dealers to trade with 
one another electronically, has increased from 8% of investment 
grade volume in 2019 to 12% of investment grade volume in 2020); see 
also Li Renn Tsai, Understanding Portfolio Trading, Tradeweb (Sept. 
6, 2022), available at https://www.tradeweb.com/newsroom/media-
center/in-the-news/understanding-portfolio-trading/
#:~:text=Portfolio%20Trading%20is%20a%20solution%20that%20gives%20ass
et,savings%2C%20mitigate%20operational%20risk%2C%20and%20reduce%20mar
ket%20slippage (discussing that portfolio trading, a process similar 
to program trading for equities which allows asset managers to buy/
sell a basket of bonds to trade together as a single package, 
increased from 2% of total corporate bond trades in Jan. 2020 to 5% 
in Sept. 2021); Kate Marino, Algorithms have arrived in the bond 
market, Axios (Sept. 3, 2021), available at https://www.axios.com/2021/09/03/bond-market-trading-algorithms (discussing the increase 
in portfolio trading in the bond market).
    \259\ See Jack Pitcher, Record E-Trading Brings More Liquidity 
to Corporate Bond Market, Bloomberg (Oct. 31, 2022), available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-31/electronic-credit-trading-surges-to-record-boosting-liquidity (citing a Sept. 
2022 Coalition Greenwich report stating that ``Investment-grade 
electronic trading accounted for 42% of volume in September, up 9 
percentage points from the same month last year, and high yield was 
34%, up 10 percentage points'' and about one third of trading volume 
on junk bonds was through online trading in Sept. 2022, up from 
about a quarter of trading volume in the same period last year); but 
see Maureen O'Hara and Xing Alex Zhou, The electronic evolution of 
corporate bond dealers, Journal of Financial Economics (Jan. 5, 
2021), available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X21000015 (discussing that any eventual domination of 
electronic bond trading may ultimately be limited because of the 
particular nature of bond trading, which includes bond illiquidity, 
the inability for larger trades to be broken into smaller trade 
sizes that can trade electronically, dealer unwillingness to trade 
more information-sensitive high-yield bonds electronically, and the 
lack of new dealers in bond market structure).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the municipal securities markets, a majority (56.4%) of all 
inter-dealer trades and 26% of inter-dealer par value traded were 
executed on ATSs during the period from August 2016 through April 
2021.'' \260\ Moreover, as recently reported by the MSRB, the number of 
transactions with a dealer on an ATS

[[Page 23174]]

more than tripled from 2015 to 2021; the average daily number of 
municipal securities trades increased more than 550% from 2015 to 2022 
and also increased more than 75% in 2022; and the average daily par 
amount traded increased more than 400% since 2015 and more than doubled 
in 2022 compared to 2021.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \260\ See Simon Z. Wu, Characteristics of Municipal Securities 
Trading on Alternative Trading Systems and Broker's Broker 
Platforms, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (Aug. 2021), 
available at https://www.msrb.org/sites/default/files/MSRB-Trading-on-Alternative-Trading-Systems.pdf. See also Government Securities 
ATS Reproposal, supra note 84, at 15609 (discussing use of 
electronic trading protocols in the municipal securities markets, 
and noting that ``one MSRB report found that technological 
advancements in this market and the movement away from voice trading 
and towards electronic trading have helped reduce transaction costs 
for dealer-customer trades by 51 percent between 2005 and 2018'').
    \261\ See John Bagley and Marcelo Vieira, Customer Trading with 
Alternative Trading Systems, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 
(Aug. 2022), available at https://www.msrb.org/sites/default/files/2022-08/MSRB-Customer-Trading-with-Alternative-Trading-Systems.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While technological developments provide many benefits to the U.S. 
securities markets and investors, they also increase the risk of 
operational problems that have the potential to cause a widespread 
impact on the securities markets and market participants. The trend in 
electronic trading in these markets and recent data on the volume of 
Fixed Income ATSs suggest that there is likely to be one or more Fixed 
Income ATSs (or broker-dealers) that both rely on electronic trading 
technology and represent or generate significant sources of liquidity 
in these asset classes. In light of these developments, the Commission 
believes that it is appropriate to request comment on whether ATSs and 
broker-dealers that trade significant volume in corporate debt 
securities or municipal securities should also be subject to some or 
all of the requirements of Regulation SCI, and if so, what an 
appropriate threshold would be.\262\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ An ATS that trades NMS stocks is subject to Regulation SCI 
if its trading volume reaches: (i) 5% or more in any single NMS 
stock and 0.25% or more in all NMS stocks of the average daily 
dollar volume reported by applicable transaction reporting plans; or 
(ii) 1% or more in all NMS stocks of the average daily dollar volume 
reported by applicable transaction reporting plans. An ATS that 
trades equity securities that are not NMS stocks is subject to 
Regulation SCI if its trading volume is 5% or more of the average 
daily dollar volume (across all equity securities that are not NMS 
stocks) as calculated by the SRO to which such transactions are 
reported. As stated in the SCI Adopting Release, the higher 
threshold for equity securities that are not NMS stocks versus NMS 
stocks was selected taking into account the lower degree of 
automation, electronic trading, and interconnectedness in the market 
for equity securities that are not NMS stocks and assessment that 
those ATSs would present lower risk to the market in the event of a 
systems issue, but not necessarily no risk. See SCI Adopting 
Release, supra note 1, at 72269. As stated above, a 5% average daily 
dollar volume threshold is proposed for Government Securities ATSs 
(i.e., ATSs that that trade Agency Securities and/or U.S. Treasury 
Securities), where electronic trading is prevalent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Request for Comment
    The Commission is requesting comment on whether to apply Regulation 
SCI to Fixed Income ATSs on the basis of volume, or to broker-dealers 
that trade corporate debt or municipal securities on or above a trading 
activity threshold. Specifically:
    44. Should significant volume ATSs and/or broker-dealers with 
significant transaction activity in corporate debt or municipal 
securities be subject, in whole or in part, to Regulation SCI? \263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \263\ The Commission notes that ATSs may also trade crypto asset 
securities. See section II.A.3.b.v. (discussing obligations of ATSs 
trading crypto asset securities).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    45. Do commenters agree that the corporate debt and municipal 
securities markets have become increasingly electronic in recent years? 
Why or why not? Please provide data to support your views. If 
electronic trading in the corporate debt and municipal securities 
markets has increased, are these markets sufficiently different or 
unique to warrant an approach to technology oversight that differs from 
the approach taken in Regulation SCI? Why or why not?
    46. What are the risks associated with systems issues at Fixed 
Income ATSs or broker-dealers that trade corporate debt or municipal 
securities today? What impact would a systems issue at a Fixed Income 
ATS or such broker-dealer have on the trading of corporate debt or 
municipal securities and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets?
    47. Do electronic systems used to trade corporate debt or municipal 
securities markets today have linkages to any trading venues, including 
to U.S. Treasury markets? Are these linkages developing or likely to 
develop? If not, are there interconnections with third-party or other 
types of systems? How do any interconnections impact the risk of an SCI 
event at a Fixed Income ATS or broker-dealer that trades corporate debt 
or municipal securities on the market and/or market participants?
    48. If commenters believe that Regulation SCI should apply, in 
whole or in part, to Fixed Income ATSs or broker-dealers that trade 
corporate debt or municipal securities, should there be a volume 
threshold? For example, should the definition of SCI ATS include those 
ATSs which, during at least four of the preceding six calendar months 
had: (1) with respect to municipal securities, five percent or more of 
the average daily dollar volume traded in the United States, as 
provided by the self-regulatory organization to which such transactions 
are reported; or (2) with respect to corporate debt securities, five 
percent or more of the average daily dollar volume traded in the United 
States as provided by the self-regulatory organization to which such 
transactions are reported? Similarly, should the definition of SCI-
broker-dealer include a similar threshold to that proposed for 
registered broker-dealers trading Treasury or Agency securities (during 
at least four of the preceding six calendar months reported to the 
self-regulatory organization(s) to which such transactions are 
reported, average daily dollar volume in an amount that equals ten 
percent (10%) or more of the total average daily dollar volume as made 
available by the self-regulatory organization to which such 
transactions are reported)?
    49. Is basing a threshold on a percentage of average daily dollar 
volume appropriate? Should there be an alternative threshold based on 
average daily share volume? Or par value? Or transaction volume?
    50. Would commenters have a different view on what an appropriate 
threshold would be for Fixed Income ATSs if additional entities become 
Fixed Income ATSs as a result of adoption of the amendments to Rule 3b-
16(a) that the Commission has proposed in the Government Securities ATS 
Reproposal?
    51. If the Commission proposes to apply Regulation SCI to Fixed 
Income ATSs, should it propose a similar approach for broker-dealers 
that trade corporate debt or municipal securities? Why or why not?
    52. Would four out of the preceding six months be an appropriate 
period to measure the volume thresholds for corporate debt and 
municipal securities for purposes of Regulation SCI? Why or why not? 
Would Fixed Income ATSs or broker-dealers that trade corporate debt or 
municipal securities have available appropriate data with which to 
determine whether a proposed threshold has been met? If not, what data 
or information is missing? Does the answer depend on whether the 
Government Securities ATS Reproposal (proposing to expand the 
definition of exchange in Rule 3b-16(a)) is adopted as proposed?
    53. Should any or all Fixed Income ATSs that meet a volume 
threshold be subject to Rule 301(b)(6) of Regulation ATS instead of 
Regulation SCI (i.e., should Rule 301(b)(6) be retained)? Why or why 
not? Alternatively, should any or all Fixed Income ATSs or broker-
dealers that trade corporate debt or municipal securities be subject to 
only certain provisions of Regulation SCI? Which ones and why? Please 
explain. Alternatively, should Rule 301(b)(6) of Regulation ATS be 
updated to be more similar to Regulation SCI in certain respects? If 
so, how?

[[Page 23175]]

    54. If commenters believe Rule 301(b)(6) should continue to apply 
to Fixed Income ATSs, is the 20 percent average daily volume threshold 
an appropriate threshold? Should it be amended to specify what the 20 
percent average daily volume refers to (e.g., share? dollar? par? 
transaction?)? Should the Commission amend Rule 301(b)(6) to subject 
all Fixed Income ATSs, or certain Fixed Income ATSs, to the 
requirements of the rule if the Fixed Income ATS reaches a 5 percent, 
10 percent, 15 percent or another volume threshold? If so, please 
explain why such a threshold would be appropriate. Alternatively, 
should Rule 301(b)(6) be superseded and replaced by Regulation SCI?
    55. Are there characteristics specific to the corporate debt and 
municipal securities markets that would make applying Regulation SCI 
broadly or any specific provision of Regulation SCI to Fixed Income 
ATSs or broker-dealers that trade corporate debt or municipal 
securities unduly burdensome or inappropriate? Please explain. For 
example, if an ATS that fits the description of a Communication 
Protocol System (as described in the Government Securities ATS 
Proposal) were to be become an SCI ATS, would there be certain features 
or functions of that system that would not meet the definition of SCI 
systems, but that should be subject to Regulation SCI as SCI systems? 
Would there be any features or functions of that system that would meet 
the definition of SCI systems, but that should not be subject to 
Regulation SCI? Commenters that recommend that the Commission propose 
that ATSs and/or broker-dealers with significant transaction activity 
in corporate debt or municipal securities be subject to Regulation SCI 
are requested to specifically address the expected benefits and costs 
of their recommendations, above the current baseline of Rule 301(b)(6) 
of Regulation ATS, and the expected effects of their recommendations on 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

C. Strengthening Obligations of SCI Entities

    In adopting Regulation SCI, the Commission recognized that 
technology, standards, and threats would continue to evolve and that 
the regulation would need to be flexible so as to develop alongside 
such changes. Thus, 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(1) (``Rule 1001(a)(1)'' of 
Regulation SCI) requires that each SCI entity have ``written policies 
and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that its SCI systems and, 
for purposes of security standards, indirect SCI systems, have levels 
of capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security, 
adequate to maintain the SCI entity's operational capability and 
promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets.'' \264\ While Rule 
1001(a)(2) itemizes certain minimum requirements such policies and 
procedures must include, they are generally broad areas that must be 
covered (e.g., requiring capacity planning estimates, stress tests, 
systems development and testing programs, reviews and testing for 
threats, business continuity and disaster recovery plans, standards 
with respect to market data, and monitoring for potential SCI events), 
Rule 1001(a) does not prescribe in detail how they should be 
addressed.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \264\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(1).
    \265\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since the adoption and implementation of Regulation SCI, technology 
and the ways SCI entities employ such technology have continued to 
evolve, as have the potential vulnerabilities of, and threats posed to, 
SCI entities. In addition, the Commission and its staff have gained 
valuable experience and insights with respect to technology issues 
surrounding SCI entities and their systems. Given the important role 
SCI entities play in our markets, it is appropriate to strengthen the 
requirements Regulation SCI imposes on SCI entities to help ensure that 
their SCI systems and indirect SCI systems continue to remain robust, 
resilient, and secure.
1. Systems Classification and Lifecycle Management
a. Discussion
    The terms ``SCI systems,'' ``indirect SCI systems,'' and ``critical 
SCI systems'' are foundational definitions within Regulation SCI. These 
terms map out the scope of Regulation SCI's applicability to an SCI 
entity. If an SCI entity does not classify its systems pursuant to 
these defined terms, it cannot fully understand how it should apply 
Regulation SCI's requirements and where its obligations under the 
regulation start and end. Specifically, ``SCI systems'' is defined to 
mean ``all computer, network, electronic, technical, automated, or 
similar systems of, or operated by or on behalf of, an SCI entity that, 
with respect to securities, directly support trading, clearance and 
settlement, order routing, market data, market regulation, or market 
surveillance.'' The definition of ``SCI systems'' does not scope in 
every system of an SCI entity; rather, it is limited to those functions 
the Commission believed were of particular significance for the 
purposes of Regulation SCI, namely systems that, with respect to 
securities, directly support trading, clearance and settlement, order 
routing, market data, market regulation, or market surveillance. 
``Indirect SCI systems'' come into play with respect to security 
standards and systems intrusions and include ``any systems of, or 
operated by or on behalf of, an SCI entity that, if breached, would be 
reasonably likely to pose a security threat to SCI systems.'' 
Importantly, both definitions include systems operated by an SCI entity 
as well as systems operated by third parties on behalf of a given SCI 
entity.
    Except as discussed above,\266\ the proposed rule amendments would 
not change the definition of SCI systems, indirect SCI systems, or 
critical SCI systems. However, the Commission is proposing to modify 
certain existing, and add a number of additional, requirements to the 
policies and procedures required of SCI entities with respect to their 
SCI systems (and indirect SCI systems or critical SCI systems, as the 
case may be), under Rule 1001(a), as discussed in further detail below.
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    \266\ See supra section III.A.2.b.iv (discussing the proposed 
limitation to the definition of SCI systems for certain SCI broker-
dealers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One of the first steps many SCI entities take to comply with 
Regulation SCI is developing a classification of their systems in 
accordance with these definitions; i.e., a documented inventory of the 
specific systems of the SCI entity that fall within each type of 
systems (i.e., SCI system, indirect SCI system, and critical SCI 
system). However, not all SCI entities maintain such a list. A 
foundational and essential step for an SCI entity to be able to meet 
its obligations under Regulation SCI is to be able to identify clearly 
the systems that are subject to obligations under Regulation SCI. 
Therefore, the Commission is proposing a new provision to ensure that 
SCI entities develop and maintain a written inventory of their systems 
and classification. Specifically, new paragraph (a)(2)(viii) in Rule 
1001 would require each SCI entity to include in their policies and 
procedures the maintenance of a written inventory and classification of 
all of its SCI systems, critical SCI systems, and indirect SCI systems.
    In addition, 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(2)(viii) (``proposed Rule 
1001(a)(2)(viii)'') would require that the

[[Page 23176]]

SCI entity's policies and procedures include a program with respect to 
the lifecycle management of such systems, including the acquisition, 
integration, support, refresh, and disposal of such systems, as 
applicable. This provision would require SCI entities to consider how a 
system subject to Regulation SCI moves through its lifecycle, from 
initial acquisition to eventual disposal. The purpose of this provision 
is to help ensure that an SCI entity is able to identify risks an SCI 
system may face during its various lifecycle phases. Importantly, SCI 
entities would need to address the refresh of such systems in their 
lifecycle management program. Generally, systems that are properly 
refreshed and updated include up-to-date software and security patches. 
In addition, the lifecycle management program required in their 
policies and procedures must address disposal of such systems. Disposal 
generally should include sanitization of end-of-life systems to help 
ensure that systems that are no longer intended as SCI systems or 
indirect SCI systems do not contain sensitive information (e.g., 
relating to the operations or security of the SCI entity or its systems 
architecture) that might be unintentionally revealed if such end-of-
life systems fall into the wrong hands.\267\ Thus, this generally would 
require SCI entities to pinpoint precisely when a given system 
``becomes'' an SCI system (or an indirect SCI system), as well as the 
point at which it is officially ``no longer'' an SCI system (or an 
indirect SCI system).
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    \267\ For example, such policies generally should not simply 
require mere disposal of end-of-life SCI systems but should ensure 
their effective disposal such that sensitive information (including 
software, configuration info, middleware, etc.) that could 
compromise the security of an SCI entity's data and network is not 
inadvertently revealed.
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b. Request for Comment
    56. Do commenters agree with the proposed requirement in proposed 
Rule 1001(a)(2)(viii) to require SCI entities to include in their 
policies and procedures the maintenance of a written inventory and 
classification of all of its SCI systems, critical SCI systems, and 
indirect SCI systems? Why or why not?
    57. Do commenters believe that Regulation SCI should require that 
SCI entities have a program with respect to the lifecycle management of 
such systems, including the acquisition, integration, support, refresh, 
and disposal of such systems, as applicable? Why or why not? Do SCI 
entities currently maintain such lifecycle management programs? Are 
there other aspects of lifecycle management that commenters believe 
should be included in the proposed requirement? If so, please describe.
2. Third-Party Provider Management
a. Third-Party Provider Management Issues
    When it adopted Regulation SCI, the Commission recognized that an 
SCI entity may choose to use third parties to assist it in running its 
SCI systems and indirect SCI systems. The Commission took into account 
such scenarios by including the phrase ``or operated by or on behalf of 
'' \268\ in key definitions such as ``SCI systems,'' ``critical SCI 
systems,'' and ``indirect SCI systems.'' The inclusion of the phrase 
``or on behalf of'' was intended to make clear that outsourced systems 
are not excluded and that any such systems were within the scope of 
Regulation SCI, even when operated not by the SCI entity itself but 
rather by a third party. In the SCI Adopting Release, the Commission 
made clear that it was the responsibility of the SCI entity to manage 
its relationships with such third parties through due diligence, 
contract terms, and monitoring of third-party performance.\269\ In 
addition, as the Commission stated when adopting Regulation SCI, ``[i]f 
an SCI entity is uncertain of its ability to manage a third-party 
relationship . . . to satisfy the requirements of Regulation SCI, then 
it would need to reassess its decision to outsource the applicable 
system to such third party. (footnotes omitted)'' \270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \268\ Emphasis added.
    \269\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72276.
    \270\ Id.
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    An SCI entity may decide to outsource certain functionality to, or 
utilize the support or services of, a third-party provider (which would 
include both affiliated providers as well as vendors unaffiliated with 
the SCI entity) for a variety of reasons. In selecting a third-party 
provider to operate an SCI system on its behalf, an SCI entity may be 
attracted to the potential benefits that it may believe the third-party 
provider would bring, which could range from cost efficiencies and 
increased automation to particular expertise the vendor may provide in 
areas such as security and data latency. Third-party providers may also 
provide services that an SCI entity may not currently have in-house, 
such as a particular type of software required to run or monitor a 
given SCI system, or a data or pricing feed.
    The Commission believes that the use of third-party providers by 
SCI entities can be appropriate and even advantageous and preferable in 
certain instances, given the benefits they may provide when employed 
appropriately. However, as the Commission discussed in the SCI Adopting 
Release, when utilizing a third-party provider, an SCI entity is 
``responsible for having in place processes and requirements to ensure 
that it is able to satisfy the requirements of Regulation SCI for 
systems operated on behalf the SCI entity by a third party.'' \271\ 
Thus, an SCI entity generally should be aware of the potential costs 
and risks posed by this choice including, for example: cybersecurity 
risks (e.g., a compromise in a third-party provider's systems impacting 
the systems of the SCI entity); operational risks (e.g., a disruption 
or shutdown of a third-party provider's service, or a bankruptcy or 
cessation of operation of a third-party provider, negatively impacting 
or disrupting the operation of an SCI system); reputational risks 
(e.g., a faulty or incorrect input from a third-party provider causing 
an SCI entity's output to be incorrect); and legal and regulatory risks 
(e.g., a third-party provider's lack of responsiveness or unwillingness 
to provide the SCI entity necessary information or detail results in an 
SCI entity missing a reporting or compliance deadline, such as a 
deadline for reporting an SCI event or taking corrective action on an 
SCI event). With the continued and increasing use of third-party 
providers by SCI entities and, in some cases, with third-party 
providers playing increasingly important and even critical roles in 
ensuring the reliable, resilient, and secure operation of SCI systems 
and indirect SCI systems, the Commission believes that it is 
appropriate to strengthen Regulation SCI's requirements with respect to 
SCI entities' use of third-party providers and the management of such 
relationships, as described in detail below.\272\
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    \271\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72276.
    \272\ See infra sections III.C.2.b. through d (discussing the 
proposed rule changes with respect to third-party management 
programs, third-party providers for critical SCI systems, and third-
party provider participation in BC/DR testing).
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    In recent years, many types of businesses have turned to cloud 
service providers (``CSPs'') to take advantage of their services.\273\ 
Today, CSPs can provide a range of support to a wide variety of 
businesses, with deployment models ranging from public cloud, private 
cloud, hybrid cloud, and multi-cloud, and service models including 
Infrastructure as a Service (``IaaS''), Platform as a Service 
(``PaaS''), and

[[Page 23177]]

Software as a Service (``SaaS'').\274\ SCI entities are also engaging 
with CSPs to assist in operating their SCI systems and some utilize, or 
have announced their intention to utilize, CSPs for all or nearly all 
of their applicable systems,\275\ others have begun moving towards 
employing CSPs at a more deliberate pace,\276\ and others continue to 
explore and consider whether or not to use such services. A decision to 
move their systems from an ``on-premises,'' \277\ internally run data 
center to ``the cloud'' is a significant one, often with potential 
benefits that may include cost efficiencies, automation, increased 
security, and resiliency, and entities may also take advantage of such 
an opportunity to reengineer or otherwise update their systems and 
applications to run even more efficiently than before.
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    \273\ See, e.g., Angus Loten, CIOs Accelerate Pre-Pandemic Cloud 
Push Wall St. J. (Apr. 26, 2021).
    \274\ Additional information relating to the services provided 
by CSPs is widely available online from CSPs as well as firms that 
provide consulting services for potential clients of CSPs. FINRA, 
Cloud Computing in the Securities Industry 3-4 (Aug. 2021), 
available at https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/2021-cloud-computing-in-the-securities-industry.pdf (providing a summary 
description of these services). For a discussion of considerations 
and risks relevant to the use of cloud service providers by entities 
in the financial services sector, see the Financial Services 
Sector's Adoption of Cloud Services, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury 
(issued February 8, 2023), available at: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-Cloud-Report.pdf.
    \275\ See, e.g., FINRA, Podcast: How the Cloud has 
Revolutionized FINRA Technology (July 30, 2018), available at 
www.finra.org/media-center/finra-unscripted/how-cloud-has-revolutionized-finra-technology; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
93433 (Oct. 27, 2021), 86 FR 60503 (Nov. 2, 2021) (SR-OCC-2021-802) 
(Notice of Filing and Extension of Review Period of Advance Notice 
Relating to OCC's Adoption of Cloud Infrastructure for New Clearing, 
Risk Management, and Data Management Applications). See also, Huw 
Jones, Microsoft invests $2 billion in London Stock Exchange, 
Reuters (Dec. 12, 2022).
    \276\ See, e.g., Nasdaq, Press Release: Nasdaq and AWS Partner 
to Transform Capital Markets (Nov. 30, 2021), available at 
www.nasdaq.com/press-release/nasdaq-and-aws-partner-to-transform-capital-markets-2021-12-01; Nasdaq, Press Release: Nasdaq Completes 
Migration of the First U.S. Options Market to AWS (Dec. 5, 2022), 
available at https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/nasdaq-completes-migration-of-the-first-u.s.-options-market-to-aws-2022-12-05.
    \277\ In using the term ``on-premises,'' the Commission means 
that the data center's hardware (e.g., the servers, switches, and 
other physical machines) is generally under the control of and 
operated by the SCI entity, even if the data center is physically 
located in a facility operated by a third party and for which such 
third party provides or arranges for certain services including, but 
not limited to, power, water, and physical security.
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    In deciding whether to utilize a CSP, an SCI entity generally 
should take into account the various factors it would as with any other 
third-party providers.\278\ However, given the degree to which CSP 
services may be integral to the operation of SCI systems, SCI entities 
generally should examine closely any potential relationship and 
utilization of CSP services. Importantly, regardless of the CSP and 
service model an SCI entity may be considering, it is the SCI entity's 
responsibility to ensure that it can and does comply with Regulation 
SCI. For example, in describing the services they provide, CSP 
marketing materials typically describe their service models as ``shared 
responsibilities'' between the CSP and client. With respect to an SCI 
entity's obligations under Regulation SCI, however, the SCI entity 
bears responsibility for compliance with the requirements of Regulation 
SCI, including for SCI systems operated on its behalf by third-party 
providers. As with other third-party providers that operate SCI systems 
on behalf of an SCI entity, if an SCI entity is uncertain of its 
ability to manage a CSP relationship (whether through appropriate due 
diligence, contract terms, monitoring, or other methods) to satisfy the 
requirements of Regulation SCI, the SCI entity would need to reassess 
its decision to outsource the applicable system to such CSP. As with 
any third-party provider, the SCI entity generally should not rely 
solely on the reputation of or attestations from a given CSP. In 
addition, an SCI entity that utilizes a CSP should not view the usage 
of a CSP from the perspective of being able to turn over its Regulation 
SCI-related responsibilities to the CSP; instead, an SCI entity 
generally should ensure that its own personnel have the requisite 
skills to properly manage and oversee such a relationship, and 
understand the issues--including technical ones--that may arise from 
the utilization of a CSP and are relevant to ensure its compliance with 
Regulation SCI.\279\
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    \278\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72275-76. In 
this section, the Commission discusses many issues that may be 
relevant for SCI entities to consider in relation to their use of 
third-party vendors generally, and with respect to cloud service 
providers specifically. These issues include those that the 
Commission and its staff have encountered with respect to SCI 
entities since the adoption and implementation of Regulation SCI; 
however, this is not meant to be a comprehensive list of all 
potential issues and considerations, and the Commission welcomes 
comment on other applicable issues and considerations that 
commenters believe are relevant for SCI entities with respect to 
third-party providers.
    \279\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72276.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) of Regulation SCI requires that an SCI entity's 
policies and procedures include business continuity and disaster 
recovery plans that include maintaining backup and recovery 
capabilities sufficiently resilient and geographically diverse and that 
are reasonably designed to achieve next business day resumption of 
trading and two-hour resumption of critical SCI systems following a 
wide-scale disruption.\280\ When the Commission adopted this provision 
it did not specifically discuss its application to CSPs. Whereas ``on-
premises'' systems are installed and run at a site under the control of 
an SCI entity, the systems of an SCI entity that reside ``in the public 
cloud'' may not be tied to any specific geographic location. However, 
SCI entities must ensure that their SCI systems, whether ``on-
premises'' or ``in the public cloud,'' comply with the requirement in 
Regulation SCI to have backup and recovery capabilities sufficiently 
resilient and geographically diverse and that are reasonably designed 
to achieve next business day resumption of trading and two-hour 
resumption of critical SCI systems following a wide-scale disruption. 
These provisions of Regulation SCI exist to help limit the downtime 
caused by wide-scale disruptions. Thus, for example, in determining 
whether any SCI-related systems ``in the public cloud'' can meet this 
requirement, SCI entities generally should understand where its systems 
will reside (i.e., the locations of the CSP data center site(s) that 
may be used), and should consider whether those sites provide 
sufficient geographical diversity and operational resiliency to achieve 
the resumption requirements of Rule 1001(a)(2)(v).\281\
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    \280\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72295. See also 
infra section III.C.2.c, including notes 292-294 and accompanying 
text (discussing the proposed modifications to Rule 1001(a)(2)(v)).
    \281\ While CSPs may use slightly different nomenclature, 
typically, a CSP's region contains multiple availability zones, and 
an availability zone contains multiple data centers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in section III.C.2.b.2 below, the Commission's 
proposal includes a requirement that every SCI entity undertake a risk-
based assessment of the criticality of each of its third-party 
providers, including analyses of third-party provider concentration, of 
key dependencies if the third-party provider's functionality, support, 
or service were to become unavailable or materially impaired, and of 
any potential security, including cybersecurity, risks posed. This 
third-party provider assessment may be particularly relevant with 
respect to CSPs utilized by SCI entities, and an SCI entity may want to 
take into consideration the degree to which it may be ``locked-in'' to 
any given CSP it is considering engaging. As with any third-party 
provider, it could consider its exit strategies with respect to any 
potential CSP it might choose and may consider architectural decisions 
that would enable a quick re-deployment to another CSP if needed. Even 
when tools,

[[Page 23178]]

such as containerization,\282\ exist that are designed to automate and 
simplify the deployment of systems to CSPs, and which appear at first 
glance to allow for greater portability among CSPs, SCI entities may 
want to consider any lock-in effects that utilizing CSP-specific tools 
might have. In addition, it may be useful for SCI entities to consider 
the relative benefits and costs of potential alternatives that could 
reduce dependence on any single CSP. In cases where the use of CSPs is 
being considered for both primary and backup systems, an SCI entity, 
taking into account the nature of its systems, may want to consider 
whether it is appropriate to utilize different CSPs, for such systems, 
as well as whether an ``on-premises'' backup may be appropriate. 
Similarly, SCI entities should generally engage their CSPs to ensure 
that they can meet the business continuity and disaster recovery 
requirements of Regulation SCI, which may not apply to the vast 
majority of a CSP's other clients.
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    \282\ Containerization allows developers to deploy applications 
more quickly by bundling an application with its required 
frameworks, configuration files, and libraries such that it may be 
run in different computing environments. Container orchestrators 
allow for automated deployment of identical applications across 
different environments, and simplify the process for management, 
scaling, and networking of containers.
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    More broadly, an SCI entity should ensure that it is able to meet 
its regulatory obligations under Regulation SCI, including the notice 
and dissemination requirements of Rule 1002. When there is a systems 
issue (including, for example, an outage or a cybersecurity event) at a 
CSP, a wide swath of CSP clients may be affected. SCI entities have 
regulatory requirements under Regulation SCI that other CSP clients may 
not have, and an SCI entity must have information regarding such issues 
within the time requirements of Regulation SCI to comply with its 
notice and dissemination requirements.\283\
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    \283\ See, e.g., Rule 1002 (relating to an SCI entity's 
obligations with respect to SCI events). See also Rule 1001(c) 
(which include requirements that an SCI entity's policies and 
procedures include escalation procedures to quickly inform 
responsible SCI personnel of potential SCI events).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An SCI entity should also be cognizant of its data security and 
recordkeeping obligations under Regulation SCI,\284\ and generally 
should consider how the CSP and its employees or contractors would 
secure confidential information, how and where it would retain 
information (including all records required to be kept under Regulation 
SCI), how the information would be accessed by the personnel of the SCI 
entity, or others, such as those conducting SCI reviews and Commission 
staff, as well as ensure that such information access will be provided 
in a manner that provides for its compliance with the requirements of 
Regulation SCI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \284\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(2)(iv) (``Rule 1001(a)(2)(iv)'') 
(relating to, among other things, vulnerabilities pertaining to 
internal threats) and Rule 1005 (relating to recordkeeping 
requirements related to compliance with Regulation SCI). See also 
infra section III.C.3.a (discussing newly proposed 17 CFR 
242.1001(a)(2)(x) (``proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(x)''), relating to 
unauthorized access to systems and information).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the discussion above is focused on CSPs, they are only one of 
many types of third-party providers an SCI entity may utilize. The 
discussion above is not an exhaustive list of issues SCI entities 
generally should consider with respect to utilizing CSPs; in addition, 
while the discussion provides some illustrative examples of areas of 
potential concern in an SCI entity's relationship with a CSP, similar 
issues may be applicable to the relationships between SCI entities and 
other types of third parties. In addition, some third-party providers 
may provide key functionality that may not have been widely utilized by 
SCI entities when Regulation SCI was adopted,\285\ and the Commission 
anticipates that third-party providers will likely arise to provide 
other types of functionality, service, or support to SCI entities that 
are not contemplated yet today. All the same, the Commission believes 
that any third-party provider that an SCI entity uses with respect to 
its SCI systems and indirect SCI systems should be managed 
appropriately by the SCI entity to help ensure that such utilization of 
the third-party provider is consistent with the SCI entity's 
obligations under Regulation SCI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \285\ One example of this are the services of shadow 
infrastructure providers, such as edge cloud computing, content 
delivery networks, and DNS providers.
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    As discussed above, when the Commission adopted Regulation SCI in 
2014, it had accounted for the possibility that an SCI entity might 
utilize third-party providers to operate its SCI systems or indirect 
SCI systems by incorporating the phrase ``on behalf of'' in certain key 
definitions of Regulation SCI.\286\ In addition, ``outsourcing'' is one 
of the ``domains'' identified by the Commission and its staff.\287\ 
Based on the experience of Commission staff, all SCI entities that 
utilize third-party providers have some level of third-party provider 
oversight in place. However, given the growing role they are playing 
with respect to SCI systems and indirect SCI systems, and because the 
myriad of issues that may arise with respect to third-party providers 
(including, but not limited to oversight, access, speed of information 
flow, security and unauthorized access, loss of expertise internally, 
and lock-in) may become even more amplified when taking into account 
the regulatory obligations of SCI entities, the Commission believes 
that it is appropriate to delineate more clearly requirements with 
respect to the oversight and management of third-party providers, and 
thus is proposing to revise Regulation SCI to include additional 
requirements relating to third-party providers.\288\
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    \286\ See supra notes 268-270 and accompanying text (discussing 
``on behalf of'').
    \287\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72302. See also 
Staff Guidance on Current SCI Industry Standards 5, 8 (Nov. 19, 
2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/staff-guidance-current-sci-industry-standards.pdf.
    \288\ The Commission proposed the Clearing Agency Governance 
rules in Aug. 2022, which contains, among other proposed 
requirements, proposed new 17 CFR 240.17Ad-25(i) (``Rule 17Ad-
25(i)''). See Clearing Agency Governance and Conflicts of Interest, 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 95431 (Aug. 8, 2022), 87 FR 
51812 (Aug. 23, 2022) (proposing policy and procedure requirements 
for clearing agency board of directors to oversee relationships with 
service providers for critical services to, among other things, 
confirm and document that risks related to relationships with 
service providers for critical services are managed in a manner 
consistent with its risk management framework, and review senior 
management's monitoring of relationships with service providers for 
critical services, and to review and approve plans for entering into 
third-party relationships where the engagement entails being a 
service provider for critical services to the registered clearing 
agency). Registered clearing agencies that would be subject to 
proposed Rule 17Ad-25(i), if adopted, would also be subject to 
Regulation SCI, as proposed to be amended. However, the scope of 
proposed Rule 17Ad-25(i) is meant to address not only service 
providers providing technology or systems-based services, but also 
service providers that would include the clearing agency's parent 
company under contract to staff the registered clearing agency, as 
well as service providers that are investment advisers under 
contract to help facilitate the closing out of a defaulting 
participant's portfolio. See id. at 51836. Commenters are encouraged 
to review the Clearing Agency Governance proposed rules to determine 
whether they might affect their comments on this proposal.
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b. Third-Party Provider Management Program
    The Commission is proposing new 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(2)(ix) 
(``proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix)'') regarding third-party provider 
management. While some SCI entities may already have a formal vendor 
management program, the Commission is proposing to require that SCI 
entities have a third-party provider management program that includes 
certain elements. Specifically, proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) would 
require each SCI entity to include in its policies and procedures 
required under Rule 1001(a)(1) a program to manage and

[[Page 23179]]

oversee third-party providers that provide functionality, support or 
service, directly or indirectly, for its SCI systems and, for purposes 
of security standards, indirect SCI systems. The Commission is 
proposing this new provision to help ensure that an SCI entity that 
elects to utilize a third-party provider will be able to meet its 
obligations under Regulation SCI.
i. Third-Party Provider Contract Review
    First, the program would be required to include initial and 
periodic review of contracts with such third-party providers for 
consistency with the SCI entity's obligations under Regulation SCI. The 
Commission believes that it is critical that each SCI entity carefully 
analyze and understand the impact any third-party providers it chooses 
to utilize may have on its ability to satisfy its obligations under 
Regulation SCI. As discussed above,\289\ the Commission recognizes that 
many SCI entities may seek to and, in practice, do outsource certain of 
its SCI-related functionality, support, or service to third parties. As 
key entities in our securities markets, SCI entities have regulatory 
obligations that are not placed upon non-SCI entities, and third-party 
providers SCI entities may utilize may not be familiar with the 
requirements of Regulation SCI. As the Commission stated in adopting 
Regulation SCI, if an SCI entity determines to utilize a third party 
for an applicable system, ``it is responsible for having in place 
processes and requirements to ensure that it is able to satisfy the 
applicable requirements of Regulation SCI for such system.'' \290\ And, 
if an SCI entity is uncertain of its ability to manage a third-party 
relationship (including through contract terms, among other methods) to 
satisfy the requirements of Regulation SCI, ``then it would need to 
reassess its decision to outsource the applicable system to such third 
party.'' \291\ Thus, it is incumbent on SCI entities to review their 
relationships with such third-party providers to ensure that the SCI 
entities are able to satisfy their obligations under Regulation SCI. In 
addition, consistent with the current requirement that an SCI entity 
periodically review the effectiveness of its policies and procedures, 
this provision would require an SCI entity to review contracts with 
such third-party providers periodically for consistency with the SCI 
entity's obligations under Regulation SCI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \289\ See supra section III.C.2.a.
    \290\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72276.
    \291\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A foundational part of this review is to ensure that any contracts 
that the SCI entity has with such third-party providers are consistent 
with the requirements of Regulation SCI. These documents govern the 
obligations and expectations as between an SCI entity and a third-party 
provider it utilizes, and the SCI entity is responsible for assessing 
if these agreements allow it to comply with the requirements of 
Regulation SCI. For example, an SCI entity generally should consider 
whether or not it is appropriate to rely on a third-party provider's 
standard contract or standard service level agreement (``SLA''), 
particularly if such contract or SLA has not been drafted with 
Regulation SCI's requirements in mind. For example, regardless of 
whether an SCI entity is negotiating with the dominant provider in the 
field, has made its best efforts in negotiating contract or SLA terms, 
or has extracted what it believes to be ``the best terms'' it (or any 
client of the third party) could get, if the SCI entity determines that 
any term in such agreements are inconsistent with such SCI entity's 
obligations under Regulation SCI, the SCI entity should reassess 
whether such outsourcing arrangement is appropriate and will allow it 
to meet its obligations under Regulation SCI. In addition, in some 
cases, particularly where the third-party provider would play a 
significant role in the operation of an SCI entity's SCI systems or 
indirect SCI systems, or provide functionality, support, or service to 
such systems without which there would be a meaningful impact, an SCI 
entity and its third-party provider may find it useful to negotiate an 
addendum to any standard contract to separate and highlight the 
contractual understanding of the parties with respect to SCI-related 
obligations.
    While each contract's specific terms and circumstances will likely 
differ, there are several considerations that SCI entities generally 
should take into consideration when entering into such a contract. For 
example, SCI entities generally should consider whether a contract 
raises doubt on its consistency with the SCI entity's obligations under 
Regulation SCI (e.g., the contract terms are vague regarding the third-
party provider's obligations to the SCI entity to enable the SCI entity 
to meets its SCI obligations). Generally, contractual terms should not 
be silent or lack substance on key aspects of Regulation SCI that would 
need the third-party provider's cooperation (e.g., SCI event 
notifications and information dissemination, and business continuity 
and disaster recovery for an SCI entity seeking to move its SCI systems 
to a cloud service provider). Nor should they undermine the ability of 
the SCI entity to oversee and manage the third party (e.g., by limiting 
the SCI entity's personnel ability to assess whether systems operated 
by a third-party provider on behalf of the SCI entity satisfy the 
requirements of Regulation SCI). The SCI entity may want to consider 
and, if appropriate, negotiate provisions that provide priority to the 
SCI entity's systems, such as for failover and/or business continuity 
and disaster recovery (``BC/DR'') scenarios, if needed to meet the SCI 
entity's obligations under Regulation SCI. In addition, an SCI entity 
generally should review the contract for provisions that, by their 
terms, are inconsistent with Regulation SCI or would otherwise fail to 
satisfy the requirements of Regulation SCI (e.g., restricting 
information flow to the SCI entity and/or Commission and its staff 
pursuant to a non-disclosure agreement in a manner inconsistent with 
the requirements of Regulation SCI; specifying response times that are 
inconsistent with (i.e., slower than) those required by Regulation SCI 
with respect to notifications regarding SCI events under Rule 1002). 
The Commission also believes that, to the extent possible, SCI entities 
may want to avoid defining terms in a contract with a third-party 
provider differently from how they are used in Regulation SCI, as this 
may introduce confusion as to the scope and applicability of Regulation 
SCI. In addition, although it is a term that may be common in many 
commercial contracts, provisions that provide the third-party provider 
with the contractual right to be able to make decisions that would 
negatively impact an SCI entity's obligations in its ``commercially 
reasonable discretion'' should be carefully considered, as what may be 
considered ``commercially reasonable'' for many entities that are not 
subject to Regulation SCI may not be appropriate for an SCI entity and 
its SCI systems and indirect SCI systems when taking into consideration 
the regulatory obligations of Regulation SCI.
ii. Risk-Based Assessment of Third-Party Providers
    The Commission is also proposing in proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) to 
require each SCI entity to undertake a risk-based assessment of each 
third-party provider's criticality to the SCI entity, including 
analyses of third-party provider concentration, of key dependencies if 
the third-party provider's functionality, support, or

[[Page 23180]]

service were to become unavailable or materially impaired, and of any 
potential security, including cybersecurity, risks posed. The 
Commission believes that specifically requiring each SCI entity to 
undertake a risk-based assessment of each of its third-party providers' 
criticality to the SCI entity will help them more fully understand the 
risks and vulnerabilities of utilizing each third-party provider, and 
provide the opportunity for the SCI entity to better prepare in advance 
for contingencies should the provider's functionality, support, or 
service become unavailable or materially impaired. In performing this 
risk-based assessment, SCI entities would be required to consider 
third-party provider concentration, which would help ensure that they 
properly account and prepare contingencies or alternatives for an 
overreliance on a given third-party provider by the SCI entity or by 
its industry. In addition, each SCI entity would be required to assess 
any potential security, including cybersecurity, risks posed by its 
third-party provider, to help ensure that the SCI entity does not only 
take into consideration the benefits it believes a third-party provider 
can provide it, but the security risks involved in utilizing a given 
provider as well.
c. Third-Party Providers for Critical SCI Systems
    The newly proposed provisions of proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) 
discussed above would apply to all SCI entities for all of their SCI 
systems. However, given the essential nature of critical SCI 
systems,\292\ the Commission believes that it is appropriate to require 
SCI entities to have even more robust policies and procedures with 
respect to any third-party provider that supports such systems. In 
adopting Regulation SCI, the Commission stated that critical SCI 
systems are those SCI systems ``whose functions are critical to the 
operation of the markets, including those systems that represent 
potential single points of failure in the securities markets [and] . . 
. are those that, if they were to experience systems issues, the 
Commission believes would be most likely to have a widespread and 
significant impact on the securities market.'' \293\ Therefore, the 
Commission is proposing to revise Rule 1001(a)(2)(v), which relates to 
the business continuity and disaster recovery plans of SCI entities. 
Currently, Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) requires their policies and procedures to 
include business continuity and disaster recovery plans that include 
maintaining backup and recovery capabilities sufficiently resilient and 
geographically diverse and that are reasonably designed to achieve next 
business day resumption of trading and two-hour resumption of critical 
SCI systems following a wide-scale disruption. To help ensure that SCI 
entities are appropriately prepared for any contingency relating to a 
third-party provider with respect to critical SCI systems, the 
Commission is proposing to revise Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) to also require 
the BC/DR plans of SCI entities to be reasonably designed to address 
the unavailability of any third-party provider that provides 
functionality, support, or service to the SCI entity without which 
there would be a material impact on any of its critical SCI systems.
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    \292\ Critical SCI systems include systems that directly support 
functionality relating to: (i) clearance and settlement systems of 
clearing agencies; (ii) openings, reopenings, and closings on the 
primary listing market; (iii) trading halts; (iv) initial public 
offerings; (v) the provision of market data by a plan processor; or 
(vi) exclusively listed securities. In addition, the definition of 
critical SCI systems includes a catchall provision for systems that 
provide functionality to the securities markets for which the 
availability of alternatives is significantly limited or nonexistent 
and without which there would be a material impact on fair and 
orderly markets.
    \293\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72277.
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    As discussed above, the Commission is proposing under proposed Rule 
1001(a)(2)(ix) to require each SCI entity to conduct a risk-based 
assessment of the criticality of each of its third-party providers to 
the SCI entity. With respect to an SCI entity's critical SCI systems, 
the Commission believes the revised provisions of Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) 
are appropriate to ensure that an SCI entity has considered and 
addressed in its BC/DR plans how it would deal with a situation in 
which a third-party provider that provides any functionality, support, 
or service for any of its critical SCI systems has an issue that would 
materially impact any such system. For example, such BC/DR plans 
generally should not only take into account and address temporary 
losses of functionality, support, or service--such as a momentary 
outage that causes a feed to be interrupted or extended cybersecurity 
event on the third-party provider--but also consider more extended 
outage scenarios, including if the third-party provider goes into 
bankruptcy or dissolves, or if it breaches its contract and decides to 
suddenly, unilaterally, and/or permanently cease to provide the SCI 
entity's critical SCI systems with functionality, support, or 
service.\294\ In determining how to satisfy the requirement that 
policies and procedures be reasonably designed to address the 
unavailability of any third-party provider that provides functionality, 
support, or service to the SCI entity without which there would be a 
material impact on any of its critical SCI systems, an SCI entity could 
consider if use of a CSP for its critical SCI systems also warrants 
maintaining an ``on-premises'' backup data center or other contingency 
plan which could be employed in the event of the scenarios noted above.
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    \294\ While such scenarios may appear to be improbable, given 
the criticality of the critical SCI systems to the SCI entity and 
U.S. securities markets, SCI entities should have plans in place to 
account for such scenarios, however remote.
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d. Third-Party Provider Participation in BC/DR Testing
    With respect to an SCI entity's business continuity and disaster 
recovery plans, including its backup systems, Rule 1004 of Regulation 
SCI requires SCI entities to: (a) establish standards for the 
designation of those members or participants that the SCI entity 
reasonably determines are, taken as a whole, the minimum necessary for 
the maintenance of fair and orderly markets in the event of the 
activation of such plans; (b) designate members or participants 
pursuant to such standards and require participation by such designated 
members or participants in scheduled functional and performance testing 
of the operation of such plans, in the manner and frequency specified 
by the SCI entity, provided that such frequency shall not be less than 
once every 12 months; and (c) coordinate the testing of such plans on 
an industry- or sector-wide basis with other SCI entities.\295\
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    \295\ See 17 CFR 242.1004. See also SCI Adopting Release, supra 
note 1, at 72347-55 (providing a more detailed discussion of the BC/
DR testing requirements under Rule 1004).
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    Because the Commission believes that some third-party providers may 
be of such importance to the operations of an SCI entity, the 
Commission is proposing to include certain third-party providers in the 
BC/DR testing requirements of Rule 1004. In the same way SCI entities 
currently are required to establish standards for and require 
participation by their members or participants in the annual industry-
wide testing required of all SCI entities, the Commission is adding 
third-party providers as another category of entities. Thus, pursuant 
to revised paragraph (a) of Rule 1004, an SCI entity would be required 
also to establish standards for the designation of third-party 
providers (in addition to members or participants) that it determines 
are, taken as a whole, the minimum necessary for the

[[Page 23181]]

maintenance of fair and orderly markets in the event of the activation 
of the SCI entity's BC/DR plans. In addition, paragraph (b) of Rule 
1004 would require each SCI entity to designate such third-party 
providers (in addition to members or participants) pursuant to such 
standards and require their participation in the scheduled functional 
and performance testing of the operation of such BC/DR plans, which 
would occur not less than once every 12 months and which would be 
coordinated with other SCI entities on an industry- or sector-wide 
basis.
    As discussed above, SCI entities often employ a wide array of 
third-party providers which perform a multitude of different functions, 
support, or services for them. While many of these third-party 
providers may provide relatively minor functions, support, or services 
for an SCI entity, there may be one or more third-party providers of 
such significance to the operations of an SCI entity that, without the 
functions, support, or services of such provider(s), the maintenance of 
fair and orderly markets in the event of the activation of the SCI 
entity's BC/DR plans would not be possible. For example, the Commission 
believes it likely that, for an SCI entity that utilizes a cloud 
service provider for all, or nearly all, of its operations, such CSP 
would be of such importance to the operations of the SCI entity and the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets in the event of the activation 
of the SCI entity's BC/DR plans that it would be required to 
participate in the BC/DR testing required by Rule 1004.\296\
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    \296\ Contractual arrangements with applicable third-party 
providers that require such providers to engage in BC/DR testing 
could help ensure implementation of this requirement. See also SCI 
Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72350 (discussing how contractual 
arrangements by SCI entities that are not SROs would enable such SCI 
entities to implement the BC/DR testing requirement for their 
members or participants).
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e. Third-Party Providers of Certain Registered Clearing Agencies
    The Commission may examine the provision of services by third-party 
providers of certain registered clearing agencies. The Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (``FSOC'') has designated certain financial 
market utilities (``FMUs'') \297\ as systemically important or likely 
to become systemically important financial market utilities 
(``SIFMUs'').\298\ The Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision 
Act of 2010 (``Clearing Supervision Act''), enacted in Title VIII of 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(``Dodd-Frank Act''), provides for the enhanced regulation of certain 
FMUs.\299\ FMUs include clearing agencies that manage or operate a 
multilateral system for the purpose of transferring, clearing, or 
settling payments, securities, or other financial transactions among 
financial institutions or between financial institutions and the 
FMU.\300\ For SIFMUs, the Clearing Supervision Act provides for 
enhanced coordination between the Commission and Federal Reserve Board 
by allowing for regular on-site examinations and information 
sharing,\301\ and further provides that the Commission and CFTC shall 
coordinate with the Federal Reserve Board to develop risk management 
supervision programs for SIFMUs jointly.\302\ In addition, section 807 
of the Clearing Supervision Act provides that ``[w]henever a service 
integral to the operation of a designated financial market utility is 
performed for the designated financial market utility by another 
entity, whether an affiliate or non-affiliate and whether on or off the 
premises of the designated financial market utility, the Supervisory 
Agency may examine whether the provision of that service is in 
compliance with applicable law, rules, orders, and standards to the 
same extent as if the designated financial market utility were 
performing the service on its own premises.'' \303\ Given the 
importance of the provision of services by SIFMUs to the U.S. financial 
system and global financial stability, SIFMU third-party providers may 
be integral to the operation of the SIFMU and thus be examined by the 
Commission.
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    \297\ See 12 U.S.C. 5462(6). The definition of ``financial 
market utility'' in section 803(6) of the Clearing Supervision Act 
contains a number of exclusions that include, but are not limited 
to, certain designated contract markets, registered futures 
associations, swap data repositories, swap execution facilities, 
national securities exchanges, national securities associations, 
alternative trading systems, security-based swap data repositories, 
security-based swap execution facilities, brokers, dealers, transfer 
agents, investment companies, and futures commission merchants. See 
12 U.S.C. 5462(6)(B).
    \298\ See 12 U.S.C. 5463. An FMU is systemically important if 
the failure of or a disruption to the functioning of such FMU could 
create or increase the risk of significant liquidity or credit 
problems spreading among financial institutions or markets and 
thereby threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system. See 12 
U.S.C. 5462(9). On July 18, 2012, the FSOC designated as 
systemically important the following then-registered clearing 
agencies: CME Group (``CME''), DTC, FICC, ICC, NSCC, and OCC. The 
Commission is the supervisory agency for DTC, FICC, NSCC, and OCC, 
and the CFTC is the supervisory agency for CME and ICE. The 
Commission jointly regulates ICC and OCC with the CFTC. The 
Commission also jointly regulates ICE Clear Europe (``ICEEU''), 
which has not been designated as systemically important by FSOC, 
with the CFTC and Bank of England. The Commission also jointly 
regulated CME with the CFTC until 2015, when the Commission 
published an order approving CME's request to withdraw from 
registration as a clearing agency. See Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 76678 (Dec. 17, 2015), 80 FR 79983 (Dec. 23, 2015).
    \299\ The objectives and principles for the risk management 
standards prescribed under the Clearing Supervision Act shall be to 
(i) promote robust risk management; (ii) promote safety and 
soundness; (iii) reduce systemic risks; and (iv) support the 
stability of the broader financial system. Further, the Clearing 
Supervision Act states that the standards may address areas such as 
risk management policies and procedures; margin and collateral 
requirements; participant or counterparty default policies and 
procedures; the ability to complete timely clearing and settlement 
of financial transactions; capital and financial resources 
requirements for designated FMUs; and other areas that are necessary 
to achieve the objectives and principles described above. See 12 
U.S.C. 5464(b), (c).
    \300\ See 12 U.S.C. 5462(6).
    \301\ See 12 U.S.C. 5466.
    \302\ See 12 U.S.C. 5472; see also Federal Reserve Board, et 
al., Risk Management Supervision of Designated Clearing Entities 
(July 2011), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/risk-management-supervision-report-201107.pdf (describing the joint supervisory framework of the 
Commission, CFTC, and Federal Reserve Board).
    \303\ 12 U.S.C. 5466.
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f. Request for Comment
    58. Do SCI entities employ third-party providers to operate SCI 
systems or indirect SCI systems on their behalf? If so, what types of 
systems are most frequently operated by third parties?
    59. Please describe SCI entities' use of third-party providers 
generally, even if they do not operate SCI systems or indirect SCI 
systems on behalf of an SCI entity. What types of functionality, 
support, or service do such entities provide to SCI entities? Please 
describe.
    60. The Commission requests commenters' views on significant issues 
that they believe SCI entities should take into account with respect to 
their use of third-party providers and the requirements of Regulation 
SCI. Are there common or important issues that commenters believe the 
Commission should focus on in addition to those discussed above? If so, 
please describe.
    61. Do commenters believe it is appropriate to require, as in 
proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix), that each SCI entity have a program to 
manage and oversee third-party providers that provide functionality, 
support or service, directly or indirectly, for its SCI systems and, 
for purposes of security standards, indirect SCI systems? Do commenters 
believe that such a program should require an initial and periodic 
review of contracts with such providers for consistency with the SCI 
entity's obligations under Regulation SCI? Why or why not?
    62. Do commenters believe that it is appropriate to require each 
SCI entity to

[[Page 23182]]

include a risk-based assessment of each third-party provider's 
criticality to the SCI entity, including analyses of third-party 
provider concentration, of key dependencies if the third-party 
provider's functionality, support, or service were to become 
unavailable or materially impaired, and of any potential security, 
including cybersecurity, risks posed? Why or why not?
    63. Are there any third-party providers, or types of third-party 
providers, that commenters believe an SCI entity or SCI entities rely 
on in a manner that creates, from the commenters' point of view, undue 
concentration risk? If so, please describe.
    64. Are there other aspects of third-party provider management that 
commenters believe should be included in the proposed rule provision? 
If so, please describe.
    65. Do commenters agree with the proposed revisions to Rule 
1001(a)(2)(v) to require the BC/DR plans of SCI entities to be 
reasonably designed to address the unavailability of any third-party 
provider that provides functionality, support, or service to the SCI 
entity without which there would be a material impact on any of its 
critical SCI systems? Why or why not? Do commenters believe that any 
such providers exist today for the critical SCI systems of SCI 
entities? If so, please describe. Should the Commission require third-
party provider diversity for critical systems of an SCI entity, for 
example, requiring an SCI entity that utilizes a third-party provider 
for its critical SCI systems to use a different party (i.e., another 
third-party provider or operate the critical SCI system itself) for its 
backup for such systems? Why or why not?
    66. Do commenters agree with the proposed revisions to Rule 1004 to 
require that SCI entities establish standards and designate third-party 
providers that must participate in BC/DR testing in the annual 
industry-wide BC/DR testing required by Rule 1004? Why or why not?
3. Security
    The Commission recognized the importance of security for the 
technology systems of SCI entities and included various requirements 
and provisions in Regulation SCI relating to the security of an SCI 
entity's SCI systems. For example, the rules provide that minimum 
policies and procedures must provide for, among other things, regular 
reviews and testing of systems, including backup systems, to identify 
vulnerabilities from internal and external threats.\304\ In addition, 
penetration testing is required as part of the SCI review.\305\ 
Recognizing that SCI systems may be vulnerable if other types of 
systems are not physically or logically separated (or ``walled off''), 
Regulation SCI also specifies that ``indirect systems''--defined as 
systems that if breached, are reasonably likely to pose a security 
threat to SCI systems--are also subject to the provisions of Regulation 
SCI relating to security standards and systems intrusions.\306\ Thus, 
the application of Regulation SCI to indirect SCI systems could 
encourage SCI entities to establish effective controls that result in 
the core SCI systems being logically or physically separated from other 
systems that could provide vulnerable entry points into SCI systems, 
thereby removing these non-SCI systems from the scope of indirect SCI 
systems.\307\
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    \304\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(2)(iv).
    \305\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(1)(i).
    \306\ See 17 CFR 242.1000.
    \307\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72287-89 
(discussing systems intrusions).
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    Regulation SCI also includes ``systems intrusions'' \308\ as one of 
three types of SCI events for which SCI entities are required to take 
corrective action, provide notification to the Commission, and 
disseminate information to their members and participants.\309\ Since 
the adoption of Regulation SCI in 2014, cybersecurity has continued to 
be a significant concern for SCI entities and non-SCI entities alike. 
Various studies and surveys have noted significant increases in 
cybersecurity events \310\ across all types of companies in recent 
years.\311\ Among these are targeted ransomware attacks that lock 
access to a victim's data unless a ransom is paid, and have included 
certain high-profile incidents involving the local government of a 
major U.S. city \312\ as well as one of the largest oil pipelines in 
the United States.\313\ Cybersecurity events have also included hacks 
that have had widespread impacts across many industries and types of 
entities.\314\ Financial sector entities have been vulnerable to 
cybersecurity events as well, including the Society for Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (``SWIFT''), an international 
cooperative of financial institutions that provides safe and secure 
financial transactions for its members, which was the target of a 
series of cybersecurity events in 2015 and 2016, including one incident 
in which $81 million was stolen.\315\
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    \308\ A ``systems intrusion'' is defined as ``any unauthorized 
entry into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an SCI 
entity.'' See 17 CFR 242.1000.
    \309\ See 17 CFR 242.1002.
    \310\ Cybersecurity events can span a wide variety of types of 
threats. For example, FINRA summarized common cybersecurity threats 
faced by broker-dealers to include phishing, imposter websites, 
malware, ransomware, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and 
vendor breaches, among others. See FINRA, Common Cybersecurity 
Threats, available at www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/common-cybersecurity-threats.
    \311\ See, e.g., Financial Services Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center, Navigating Cyber 2022 (Mar. 2022), available at 
www.fsisac.com/navigatingcyber2022-report (detailing cyber threats 
that emerged in 2021 and predictions for 2022); Bree Fowler, Number 
and cost of cyberattacks continue to grow, new survey says, CNET 
(Jan. 21, 2022), available at https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/cyberattacks-continue-to-increase-new-survey-says (citing, among 
other things, Anomali's poll of cybersecurity decision makers that 
87% of their companies had experienced a cyberattack in the past 
three years that resulted in damage, disruption, or data breach); 
Accenture, Triple digit increase in cyberattacks: What next? (Aug. 
4, 2021), available at www.accenture.com/us-en/blogs/security/triple-digit-increase-cyberattacks; Chris Morris, Cyberattacks and 
ransomware hit a new record in 2021, says report, Fast Company (Jan. 
25, 2022), available at https://www.fastcompany.com/90715622/cyberattacks-ransomware-data-breach-new-record-2021 (citing report 
by Identity Theft Resource Center stating that the number of 
security compromises was up more than 68% in 2021).
    \312\ See, e.g., Stephen Deere, Cost of City of Atlanta's cyber 
attack: $2.7 million--and rising, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
(Apr. 12, 2018), available at https://www.ajc.com/news/cost-city-atlanta-cyber-attack-million-and-rising/nABZ3K1AXQYvY0vxqfO1FI/ 
(describing the costs relating to a five-day ransomware attack on 
the City of Atlanta in Mar. 2018).
    \313\ See, e.g., Clare Duffy, Colonial Pipeline attack: A `wake 
up call' about the threat of ransomware, CNN Business (May 16, 
2021), available at https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/16/tech/colonial-ransomware-darkside-what-to-know/index.html (describing the 
ransomware attack on a pipeline and concerns regarding the potential 
for similar attacks on critical US infrastructure).
    \314\ See, e.g., David Uberti, et al., The Log4j Vulnerability: 
Millions of Attempts Made Per Hour to Exploit Software Flaw, Wall 
Street Journal (Dec. 21, 2021), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-is-the-log4j-vulnerability-11639446180 (discussing the 
Log4j hack).
    \315\ See, e.g., Kim Zetter, That Insane, $81M Bangladesh Bank 
Heist? Here's What We Know, WIRED (May 17, 2016), available at 
https://www.wired.com/2016/05/insane-81m-bangladesh-bank-heist-heres-know/.
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    Given the continued and increasing risks associated with 
cybersecurity for SCI entities, the Commission believes it is 
appropriate to enhance the cybersecurity provisions of Regulation SCI 
to help ensure that SCI systems and indirect SCI systems of the most 
important entities in our securities markets remain secure.
a. Unauthorized Access to Systems and Information
    While Rule 1001(a)(1) already requires an SCI entity to have 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that its SCI 
systems and indirect SCI systems have levels of security adequate to 
maintain operational capabilities and promote the

[[Page 23183]]

maintenance of fair and orderly markets, and Rule 1001(a)(4) specifies 
that policies and procedures will be deemed reasonable if consistent 
with current SCI industry standards, Rule 1001(a)(2) is not specific in 
terms of the need for an SCI entity to have access controls designed to 
protect both the security of the systems and the information residing 
therein. Limiting access to SCI systems and indirect SCI systems and 
the information residing therein to authorized purposes and users is 
particularly important given that these systems include the core 
technology of key U.S. securities markets entities, and would help 
ensure that such systems and information remain safeguarded and 
protected from unauthorized uses. Proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(x) would 
specify that the Rule 1001(a)(1) policies and procedures of SCI 
entities include a program to prevent the unauthorized access to such 
systems and information residing therein. An SCI entity's policies and 
procedures generally should specify appropriate access controls to 
ensure that its applicable systems and information is protected. Such 
policies and controls generally should be designed to prevent both 
unauthorized external intruders as well as unauthorized internal 
personnel from access to these systems and information. For example, 
this would also include personnel that may be inappropriately accessing 
certain systems and/or information residing on such systems, though 
they may have authorized access to other systems, portions of systems, 
or certain information residing in such systems at the SCI entity. 
Thus, for example, the procedures and access controls at the SCI entity 
generally should provide for an appropriate patch management cycle for 
systems software, to ensure that known software vulnerabilities are 
identified and patches are deployed and validated in a timely manner. 
The procedures and access controls generally should also be calibrated 
sufficiently to account for such different levels of access for each 
person granted access to any part of the SCI entity's systems or 
information. In addition, this requirement would make clear that an SCI 
entity's policies and procedures are required to address not only 
protection of its technology systems, but also of the information 
residing on such systems.
    In developing and implementing such policies and procedures, SCI 
entities generally should develop a clear understanding of the need for 
access to systems and data, including identifying which users should 
have access to sensitive systems or data. In general, such policies and 
procedures should include: requiring standards of behavior for 
individuals authorized to access SCI systems and indirect SCI systems 
and information residing therein, such as an acceptable use policy; 
identifying and authenticating individual users; establishing 
procedures for timing distribution, replacement, and revocation of 
passwords or methods of authentication; restricting access to specific 
SCI systems or components thereof or information residing therein only 
to individuals requiring access to such systems or information as is 
necessary for them to perform their responsibilities or functions for 
the SCI entity; and securing remote access technologies used to 
interface with SCI systems.\316\ Access to systems and data can be 
controlled through a variety of means, including but not limited to the 
issuance of user credentials, digital rights management with respect to 
proprietary hardware and copyrighted software, authentication methods 
including multifactor authentication as appropriate, tiered access to 
sensitive information and network resources, and security and access 
measures that are regularly monitored not only to provide access to 
authorized users, but also to remove access for users that are no 
longer authorized (e.g., due to termination of employment).\317\ As 
with other policies and procedures required under Rule 1001, SCI 
entities may, if they choose, look to SCI industry standards in 
developing their policies and procedures to prevent unauthorized access 
to information and systems.\318\
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    \316\ See Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 10.
    \317\ See Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 10 
(similarly discussing examples of access controls).
    \318\ See Rule 1001(a)(4) of Regulation SCI (defining current 
SCI industry standards), which is discussed further in infra section 
III.C.5.
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b. Penetration Testing
    Penetration tests can help entities understand how effective their 
security policies and controls are in the face of attempted and 
successful systems intrusions, and assist in revealing the potential 
threats and vulnerabilities to the entity's network and controls that 
might be exploited by malicious attackers to disrupt the operation of 
their systems, result in stolen confidential information, and damage 
their reputations. When the Commission adopted Regulation SCI in 2014, 
it required that SCI entities conduct penetration testing as part of 
its SCI review \319\ but, because of the costs associated with 
penetration testing at the time, only required that such tests be 
conducted once every three years.\320\ In the time since the adoption 
of Regulation SCI, cybersecurity has become an even greater and more 
pervasive concern for all types of businesses, including SCI entities. 
At the same time, best practices of businesses with respect to 
penetration testing have evolved such that such tests occur on a much 
more frequent basis, as businesses confront the threat of cybersecurity 
events on a wider scale.\321\
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    \319\ Specifically, paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 1003 currently 
requires that ``[p]enetration test reviews of the network, 
firewalls, and production systems shall be conducted at a frequency 
of not less than once every three years . . .''. Rule 1003(b)(1).
    \320\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72344.
    \321\ See, e.g., Fortra, 2022 Penetration Testing Report 14 
(July 7, 2022), available at https://static.fortra.com/core-security/pdfs/guides/cs-2022-pen-testing-report.pdf (stating that 
42% of respondents conducted penetration testing one or two times a 
year, and 45% of respondents conducted penetration testing at a more 
frequent pace); PCI Security Standards Council, Information 
Supplement: Penetration Testing Guidance 6 (Sept. 2017), available 
at https://listings.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Penetration-Testing-Guidance-v1_1.pdf (``at least annually and upon significant 
changes'').
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    Given this, the Commission is proposing to increase the frequency 
of penetration testing by SCI entities such that they are conducted at 
least annually, rather than once every three years. The Commission 
believes that such tests are a critical component of ensuring the 
cybersecurity health of an SCI entity's technology systems and that 
such a frequency would help to ensure that robust measures are in place 
to protect an SCI entity's systems from cybersecurity events. In 
addition, the proposed annual frequency would only be a minimum 
frequency and SCI entities may choose to adopt even more frequent 
penetration tests if they feel it appropriate to do so.\322\
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    \322\ As discussed further below, as part of the proposed 
revisions to the SCI review requirement, the Commission is also 
moving rule provisions relating to the substantive requirements of 
the SCI review to Rule 1000 under the definition of ``SCI review,'' 
while timing requirements relating to the SCI review and the report 
of the SCI review would be contained in Rule 1003(b). Thus, although 
currently the requirement relating to penetration test reviews is in 
Rule 1003, it is now proposed to be in Rule 1000.
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    In addition, the Commission is proposing to require that the 
conduct of such penetration testing include testing by the SCI entity 
of any vulnerabilities of its SCI entity's SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems identified pursuant to Sec.  242.1001(a)(2)(iv). Currently, the 
requirement in Rule 1003 with respect to penetration testing does not 
include this phrase. However, Rule 1001(a)(2)(iv) requires an SCI 
entity's policies and procedures to include,

[[Page 23184]]

among other things, ``regular reviews and testing . . . to identify 
vulnerabilities pertaining to internal and external threats . . .'' The 
new language with respect to penetration testing (which is proposed to 
be located in the definition of SCI review in Rule 1000) would require 
SCI entities to include testing of the vulnerabilities identified 
pursuant to its regular review and testing requirement in designing its 
penetration testing. Thus, rather than, for example, running a static 
annual test against a portion of its SCI systems, this proposed 
language would require an SCI entity's penetration testing program to 
include any identified relevant threats and then conduct penetration 
testing accordingly, which should help ensure the security and 
resiliency of SCI systems.
c. Systems Intrusions
    Rule 1000 of Regulation SCI defines a ``systems intrusion'' as any 
unauthorized entry into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an 
SCI entity. Systems intrusions are one of three types of SCI events 
that each SCI entity must monitor for and, when they occur, subject to 
certain exceptions, an SCI entity must: take corrective action; \323\ 
immediately notify the Commission and maintain certain records with 
respect to the event; \324\ and promptly disseminate information about 
the event to applicable members and participants of each SCI 
entity.\325\ As discussed in the SCI Adopting Release,\326\ the 
definition of systems intrusion has several important characteristics 
to it, two of which are relevant to the changes proposed. First, 
because the term ``entry'' is used in the current definition, the term 
systems intrusions only applies to ``successful'' intrusions, thus 
excluding attempted (i.e., unsuccessful) intrusions. In addition, the 
term ``entry into'' implies that the intrusion is limited to events 
that result in an intruder entering into the SCI entity's SCI systems 
or indirect SCI systems, and thus does not include any types of attacks 
on systems outside of the SCI entity's SCI systems or indirect SCI 
systems that nonetheless impacts such systems.
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    \323\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(a).
    \324\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(b) (setting forth the notification and 
follow-up reporting that is required for a systems intrusion that is 
not de minimis).
    \325\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(c).
    \326\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72288.
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    As discussed above, cybersecurity has become ever more increasingly 
important for all types of entities, and the same is true for SCI 
entities. The Commission believes that it is appropriate to expand the 
definition of systems intrusion to include two additional types of 
cybersecurity events. The first additional type of systems intrusion 
would include certain types of incidents that are currently considered 
to be cybersecurity events that are not included in the current 
definition, as discussed below. In addition, the revised definition 
would ensure that the Commission and its staff are made aware when an 
SCI entity is the subject of a significant cybersecurity threat, 
including those that may be ultimately unsuccessful, which would 
provide important information regarding threats that may be posed to 
other entities in the securities markets, including other SCI entities. 
By requiring SCI entities to submit SCI filings for these new types of 
systems intrusions, the Commission believes that the revised definition 
of systems intrusion would provide the Commission and its staff more 
complete information to assess the security status of the SCI entity, 
and also assess the impact or potential impact that unauthorized 
activity could have on the security of the SCI entity's affected 
systems as well on other SCI entities and market participants.
    The proposed definition would have three prongs, the first of which 
would contain the current requirement that defines any ``unauthorized 
entry into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity'' 
as a systems intrusion, and would continue to include a wide range of 
cybersecurity events. As stated in the SCI Adopting Release, the 
current definition describes ``any unauthorized'' entry or ``breach'' 
into SCI systems or indirect SCI systems, and includes unauthorized 
access, whether intentional or inadvertent, by employees or agents of 
the SCI entity that resulted from weaknesses in the SCI entity's access 
controls and/or procedures.\327\ For example, data breaches are 
included under the first prong, as are instances in which an employee 
of an SCI entity accessed an SCI system without proper authorization. 
It also includes instances in which an employee, such as a systems 
administrator, was authorized to access a system, but where the 
employee improperly accessed confidential information within such 
system. Similarly, an instance in which members of an SCI entity were 
properly accessing a system but were inadvertently exposed to the 
confidential information of other members would also likewise fall 
within this prong.\328\
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    \327\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72887-89 
(providing a more detailed discussion of the current definition of 
systems intrusions).
    \328\ See id. (providing a more detailed discussion of the 
current definition of systems intrusions).
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    The new second prong would expand the definition of systems 
intrusion to include any cybersecurity event that disrupts, or 
significantly degrades, the normal operation of an SCI system. This 
prong is intended to include cybersecurity events on the SCI entity's 
SCI systems or indirect SCI systems that cause disruption to such 
systems, regardless of whether the event resulted in an entry into or 
access to them. For example, in distributed denial-of-service attacks, 
the attacker, often using malware-infected machines, typically seeks to 
overwhelm or drain the resources of the target with illegitimate 
requests to prevent the target's systems from providing services to 
those seeking to access or use them. Unlike cybersecurity events that 
would qualify under the current definition of systems intrusions (i.e., 
the first prong of the proposed definition), the objective of these 
attacks is often simply to disrupt or disable the target's operations, 
rendering them unable to run efficiently, or run at all. For example, 
given the essential role hypervisors play in supporting cloud 
computing, an attack on a CSP's hypervisor, which enables the sharing 
of physical compute and memory resources across multiple virtual 
machines, could also significantly disrupt or even disable, albeit 
indirectly, the SCI systems of an SCI entity that is utilizing such 
CSP, and thus constitute a systems intrusion under the proposed second 
prong. Likewise, these systems intrusions could include certain command 
and control attacks where a malicious actor is able to infiltrate a 
system to install malware to enable it to send commands to infected 
devices remotely. Similarly, supply chain attacks that enter a SCI 
entity's systems through an apparently authorized means, such as 
through regular maintenance software updates that--unbeknownst to the 
software provider and the recipient--contain malicious code and could 
also be systems intrusions under this proposal.\329\ Because such 
cybersecurity events can cause serious harm and disruption to an SCI 
entity's operations, the Commission believes that the definition of 
systems intrusion should be broadened to include cybersecurity events 
that may not entail actually entering or accessing the SCI entity's SCI 
systems or indirect SCI systems, but still cause disruption or 
significant

[[Page 23185]]

degradation. For this second prong, the Commission believes it is 
appropriate to utilize language similar to that used in the definition 
of systems disruption (i.e., ``disrupts, or significantly degrades, the 
normal operation of an SCI system'').\330\ Similar to a systems 
disruption that occurs within the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems, 
if a cybersecurity event disrupts, or significantly degrades, an SCI 
entity's normal operations,\331\ it would constitute a systems 
intrusion under the proposed revised definition, and the obligations 
and reporting requirements of Rule 1002 would apply.\332\
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    \329\ See supra note 314 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Log4j hack).
    \330\ The Commission believes that the term ``cybersecurity 
event,'' as used here, would generally be understood to mean ``an 
unauthorized activity that disrupts or significantly degrades the 
normal operation of an SCI system.''
    \331\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72284 (``SCI 
entities would likely find it helpful to establish parameters that 
can aid them and their staff in determining what constitutes the 
`normal operation' of each of its SCI systems and when such `normal 
operation' has been disrupted or significantly degraded because 
those parameters have been exceeded.'' (footnotes omitted)).
    \332\ Such events may, in some cases, first appear to an SCI 
entity to be a ``systems disruption'' but, upon further 
investigation and understanding of the true cause of the SCI event, 
may turn out to be both a ``systems intrusion'' as well as a 
``systems disruption.'' In such cases, the applicable SCI entity 
should mark the SCI event as both types on its submissions to the 
Commission on Form SCI.
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    The third prong would include any significant attempted 
unauthorized entry into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an 
SCI entity, as determined by the SCI entity pursuant to established 
reasonable written criteria. In contrast to the types of systems 
intrusions that are part of the first prong of the proposed definition, 
the third prong is intended to capture unsuccessful, but significant, 
attempts to enter an SCI entity's SCI systems or indirect SCI systems. 
The Commission recognizes that it would be inefficient, inappropriate, 
and undesirable (for both SCI entities as well as the Commission and 
its staff) to require that all attempted entries be considered systems 
intrusions. Rather, the Commission is seeking to include only attempts 
that an SCI entity believes to be significant attempts to its systems, 
even if successfully prevented.
    The term ``significant attempted unauthorized entry'' would not be 
defined in the rule. Rather, the proposed rule would require each SCI 
entity to establish reasonable written criteria for it to use to 
determine whether a significant attempted unauthorized entry has 
occurred, because the Commission believes that each SCI entity should 
be granted some degree of discretion and flexibility in determining 
what constitutes a significant attempted unauthorized entry for its 
purposes, given that SCI entities differ in nature, size, technology, 
business model, and other aspects of their businesses.\333\ However, 
the Commission believes that certain characteristics of attempted 
unauthorized entries would generally weigh in favor of such attempted 
unauthorized entries being considered significant and constituting 
systems intrusions that should be considered SCI events subject to the 
requirements of Regulation SCI, including: when an SCI entity becomes 
aware of reconnaissance that may be leveraged by a threat actor; a 
targeted campaign that is customized to the SCI entity's system; \334\ 
an attempted cybersecurity event that required the SCI entity's 
personnel to triage, even if it was ultimately determined to have no 
impact; an attempted attack from a known sophisticated advanced threat 
actor; the depth of the breach in terms of proximity to SCI systems and 
critical SCI systems; and a cybersecurity event that, if successful, 
had meaningful potential to result in widespread damage and/or loss of 
confidential data or information.
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    \333\ Under 17 CFR 242.1003(a)(1) (``Rule 1003(a)(1)''), each 
SCI entity is similarly required to establish reasonable written 
criteria for identifying a material change to its SCI systems for 
quarterly reporting to the Commission. See also SCI Adopting 
Release, supra note 1, at 72341-42 (discussing the definition of 
material systems change).
    \334\ A wide variety of entities engage in web scanning, which 
may be in a targeted manner (e.g., looking at certain IP address 
ranges) or broadly across the internet. Often, such scanning may be 
for non-malicious purposes such as, for example, indexing website 
content (for search engines) or mapping networks. Others may engage 
in such scanning to identify vulnerable systems or websites, which 
could be to inform vulnerability management identification and 
remediation efforts or identify opportunities for exploitation. 
Because of the wide range of possible uses of scanning and the 
nature of scanning tools' interactions with systems, such scanning 
activity alone is not necessarily indicative of malicious intent or 
even a vulnerable system capable of being exploited. However, 
evidence of further, follow-on activity indicative of a precursor to 
unauthorized entry may be a factor that an SCI entity should 
consider in weighing whether a significant attempted unauthorized 
entry has occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with all SCI events, SCI entities would be required under 17 CFR 
242.1002(a) (``Rule 1002(a)'') to take corrective action with respect 
to any events that were determined to be systems intrusions under the 
proposed revised definition. In addition, the Commission is proposing 
to make a revision to the Commission reporting requirements relating to 
systems intrusions under Rule 1002(b) such that all systems intrusions 
would be required to be immediately reported to the Commission pursuant 
to the requirements of Rule 1002(b). Currently, paragraph (b)(5) of 
Rule 1002 states that the Commission notification requirements under 
paragraphs (b)(1) through (4) do not apply to any SCI event that has 
had, or the SCI entity reasonably estimates would have, no or a de 
minimis impact on the SCI entity's operations or on market participants 
(``de minimis SCI events'').\335\ Instead, SCI entities are currently 
required to make, keep and preserve records relating to all such SCI 
events, and provide a quarterly report of de minimis systems intrusions 
and systems disruptions pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(5).\336\ The 
Commission is proposing to eliminate the de minimis exception's 
applicability to systems intrusions, thus requiring all systems 
intrusions, whether de minimis or non-de minimis, to be reported 
pursuant to the requirements of 17 CFR 242.1002(b)(1) through (4) 
(``Rule 1002(b)(1) through (4)'').\337\ By their very nature, systems 
intrusions may be difficult to identify, and assessing the impact of 
any systems intrusion is often complex and could potentially require a 
lengthy investigation before any conclusions may be reached with any 
degree of certainty. Because of this, the Commission recognizes that it 
may be difficult for SCI entities to make a clear determination in a 
timely manner of whether a systems intrusion is de minimis. At the same 
time, the Commission believes that it is important for the Commission 
and its staff to receive notification of systems intrusions to be aware 
of potential and actual security threats to individual SCI entities, 
particularly given that such threats may extend to other market 
participants in the securities markets, including other SCI entities. 
Thus, the Commission believes it is appropriate to eliminate systems 
intrusions from the types of SCI events that may make use of the 
exception for de minimis SCI events and be quarterly reported, and 
instead require that each systems intrusion be reported under the

[[Page 23186]]

framework in Rule 1002(b)(1) through (4).\338\
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    \335\ Rule 1002(b)(5).
    \336\ Id.
    \337\ To conform to the proposed elimination of de minimis 
systems intrusions from the quarterly report, Rule 1002(b)(5)(i) 
would be amended by replacing the phrase ``all such SCI events'' 
with the phrase ``all such systems disruptions or systems compliance 
issues,'' and Rule 1002(b)(5)(ii) would be amended to no longer 
include references to systems intrusions and instead read: ``Submit 
to the Commission a report, within 30 calendar days after the end of 
each calendar quarter, containing a summary description of such 
systems disruptions, including the SCI systems affected by such 
systems disruptions during the applicable calendar quarter.''
    \338\ The Commission notes that systems intrusions, as currently 
defined in Rule 1000 of Regulation SCI, have been relatively 
infrequent as compared to other types of SCI events, and thus the 
burden of this proposed change in reporting for systems intrusions 
under the current definition (which is the first prong of the 
proposed revised definition of systems intrusions) should be 
relatively low for SCI entities. For example, in the three-year 
period from 2019 to 2021, systems intrusions only accounted for 27 
of the 10,501 SCI events in total (including both de minimis and 
non-de minimis SCI events). The Commission requests comment below 
regarding the frequency of systems intrusions as defined by the 
second and third prongs of the proposed revised definition of 
systems intrusion.
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    Rule 1002(c) sets forth the requirements with respect to 
disseminating information regarding SCI events to applicable members or 
participants of SCI entities, and the Commission believes that it would 
be appropriate that information about systems intrusions under the 
proposed second prong of the systems intrusion definition (a 
``cybersecurity event that disrupts, or significantly degrades, the 
normal operation of an SCI system'') be disseminated pursuant to Rule 
1002(c)'s requirements. However, importantly, in contrast to the more 
detailed information dissemination requirements for SCI entities in 
paragraph (c)(1) of Rule 1002 for systems disruptions and systems 
compliance issues, in recognition of the more sensitive nature of 
systems intrusions (disclosure of which may alert threat actors of an 
existing or potential weakness in an SCI entity's systems, or alert 
them of an ongoing investigation of a systems intrusion), the 
Commission's information dissemination requirements for systems 
intrusions contained in paragraph (c)(2) of Rule 1002 only requires SCI 
entities to provide a ``summary description'' for such events.\339\ In 
addition, paragraph (c)(2) also permits an SCI entity to delay 
disclosure of a systems intrusion in cases where the SCI entity 
``determines that dissemination of such information would likely 
compromise the security of the SCI entity's SCI systems or indirect SCI 
systems, or an investigation of the systems intrusion, and documents 
the reasons for such determination.'' \340\
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    \339\ The information dissemination requirements described here 
for systems intrusions differ from the analogous requirements for 
the other two types of SCI events (systems disruptions and systems 
compliance issues), which require SCI entities to also, among other 
things, further provide a more detailed description of such SCI 
events when known. See 17 CFR 242.1002(c)(1).
    \340\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(c)(2) (``Rule 1002(c)(2)'').
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    With respect to information dissemination to an SCI entity's 
members or participants, however, the Commission believes that 
information regarding significant attempted unauthorized entries should 
not be required to be disseminated to an SCI entity's members or 
participants, as any benefits associated with disseminating information 
about unsuccessful attempted unauthorized entries to members or 
participants of an SCI entity would likely not be justified due to 
distractions that such information would bring, particularly since the 
SCI entity's security controls were able, in fact, to repel the 
cybersecurity event. In addition, disseminating information regarding 
unsuccessful intrusions could result in the threat actors being 
unnecessarily alerted that they have been detected, which could make it 
more difficult to identify the attackers and halt their efforts on an 
ongoing, more permanent basis. Thus, the Commission is proposing to new 
17 CFR 242.1002(c)(4)(iii) (``proposed Rule 1002(c)(4)(iii)'') which 
would exclude systems intrusions that are significant attempted 
unauthorized entries into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an 
SCI entity from the information dissemination requirements of 17 CFR 
242.1002(c)(1) through (3) (``Rule 1002(c)(1) through (3)'').
d. Request for Comment
    67. Do commenters agree that cybersecurity is an area that the 
Commission should enhance as part of Regulation SCI? Is it necessary to 
help ensure that SCI entities maintain a robust technology 
infrastructure for the SCI systems and indirect SCI systems? Why or why 
not?
    68. Do commenters agree with the proposed addition of Rule 
1001(a)(2)(x), to enumerate that the policies and procedures of SCI 
entities shall include a program to prevent the unauthorized access to 
SCI systems and, for purposes of security standards, indirect SCI 
systems, and information residing therein? Why or why not?
    69. Do commenters agree that SCI entities should be required to 
have an increased frequency of penetration test reviews? Why or why 
not? Do commenters feel that the requirement to have such tests at 
least annually is appropriate? How frequently do SCI entities conduct 
penetration testing today? Do commenters agree with the proposed 
requirement that the penetration testing include testing of any 
identified vulnerabilities? Why or why not?
    70. Do commenters believe that it is appropriate to modify the 
definition of systems intrusion as proposed in Rule 1000? Do commenters 
believe that it would be useful (for example, for SCI entities and the 
Commission and its staff) to include other types of scenarios in the 
definition of systems intrusion? If so, which scenarios should be 
included and why? If not, why not?
    71. Do commenters agree with the proposed revisions to the 
definition of systems intrusions to include the second prong, (i.e., 
for any cybersecurity event that disrupts, or significantly degrades, 
the normal operation of an SCI system)? Why or why not? Could such 
events put the security or operational capability of an SCI system at 
risk? How frequently do commenters believe systems intrusions, as 
defined by the proposed second prong, occur at SCI entities? The 
Commission does not define the term ``cybersecurity event'' in the 
proposed rule text but, as noted, believes it would generally be 
understood to mean ``an unauthorized activity that disrupts or 
significantly degrades the normal operation of an SCI system.'' Do 
commenters agree? Do commenters believe it is necessary to provide a 
definition of the term ``cybersecurity event'' in the proposed rule 
text? If so, do commenters agree with the meaning above? If not, how 
should it be defined? Please be specific.
    72. Do commenters believe that significant attempted unauthorized 
entries into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity 
should be included in the definition of systems intrusions, as under 
the proposed third prong? Why or why not? Do commenters believe that 
the Commission should define the term ``significant attempted 
unauthorized entry,'' or do commenters believe it is appropriate to 
require an SCI entity to establish reasonable written criteria to make 
such determinations to provide SCI entities some degree of discretion 
and flexibility in determining what constitutes a significant attempted 
unauthorized entry for its purposes, given differences as between SCI? 
What types of criteria or scenarios do commenters believe should 
constitute a significant attempted unauthorized entry? Please describe 
and be specific. How frequently do commenters believe systems 
intrusions, as defined by the proposed third prong, occur at SCI 
entities?
    73. Do commenters agree with the proposed removal of systems 
intrusions from the types of de minimis SCI events permitted to be 
reported quarterly under Rule 1002(b)(5)? Why or why not? Should there 
be a requirement that SCI events that are systems intrusions, as 
proposed to be defined, be reported to senior management of an SCI 
entity? Why or why not?
    74. Do commenters agree with proposed addition of Rule

[[Page 23187]]

1002(c)(4)(iii), which would exclude systems intrusions that are 
significant attempted unauthorized entries from the information 
dissemination requirements of Rule 1002(c)(1) through (3)? Why or why 
not?
4. SCI Review
a. Discussion
    Rule 1000 currently defines the SCI review to be a review, 
following established procedures and standards, that is performed by 
objective personnel having appropriate experience to conduct reviews of 
SCI systems and indirect SCI systems, and which review contains: (a) a 
risk assessment with respect to such systems of an SCI entity; and (b) 
an assessment of internal control design and effectiveness of its SCI 
systems and indirect SCI systems to include logical and physical 
security controls, development processes, and information technology 
governance, consistent with industry standards. Paragraph (b)(1) of 
Rule 1003 requires each SCI entity to conduct an SCI review of the SCI 
entity's compliance with Regulation SCI not less than once each 
calendar year; however, penetration test reviews of the network, 
firewalls, and production systems may be conducted at a frequency of 
not less than once every three years, and assessments of SCI systems 
directly supporting market regulation or market surveillance may be 
conducted at a frequency based upon the risk assessment conducted as 
part of the SCI review, but in no case less than once every three 
years. Paragraph (b)(2) of Rule 1003 requires SCI entities to submit a 
report of the SCI review to senior management of the SCI entity for 
review no more than 30 calendar days after completion of such SCI 
review, and paragraph (b)(3) requires SCI entities to submit to the 
Commission, and to the board of directors of the SCI entity or the 
equivalent of such board, a report of the SCI review, together with any 
response by senior management, within 60 calendar days after its 
submission to senior management of the SCI entity.
    The SCI review is an important part of Regulation SCI because it is 
a periodic evaluation by objective personnel of an SCI entity's 
compliance with SCI and helps the SCI entity to identify weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities in its systems and controls. In addition, because of 
Rule 1003(b)'s reporting requirements, the SCI review and the report of 
the SCI review helps to ensure that the senior management and board of 
the SCI entity are involved in and aware of the SCI entity's compliance 
with the regulation. Finally, the report provides the Commission and 
its staff insight into the SCI entity's compliance with Regulation SCI 
as well and assists the staff in determining how to follow up with the 
SCI entity in reviewing and addressing any identified weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities.
    The SCI review is currently required to be conducted by ``objective 
personnel,'' and the Commission believes that this requirement 
continues to be appropriate. Thus, as the Commission discussed in the 
SCI Adopting Release, SCI reviews may be performed by personnel of the 
SCI entity (such as internal audit function) or an external firm, 
provided that such personnel are, in fact, objective and, as required 
by rule, have the appropriate experience to conduct reviews of SCI 
systems and indirect SCI systems.\341\
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    \341\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72343. The 
Commission continues to believe that persons who were not involved 
in the process for development, testing, and implementation of the 
systems being reviewed would generally be in a better position to 
identify weaknesses and deficiencies that were not identified in the 
development, testing, and implementation stages. Thus, any personnel 
with conflicts of interest that have not been adequately mitigated 
to allow for objectivity should be excluded from serving in this 
role, and a person or persons conducting an SCI review should not 
have a conflict of interest that interferes with their ability to 
exercise judgment, express opinions, and present recommendations 
with impartiality. See id.
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    As described below, the Commission is proposing a number of 
revisions to the requirements relating to SCI reviews and for the 
reports SCI entities submit (both to their board of directors as well 
as to the Commission).\342\ The definition of SCI review in Rule 1000 
is proposed to be amended to contain the substantive requirements for 
an SCI review, which would be required to be ``a review, following 
established and documented procedures and standards, that is performed 
by objective personnel having appropriate experience to conduct reviews 
of SCI systems and indirect SCI systems . . .'' The revised definition 
of SCI review in Rule 1000 would go on to detail what an SCI review 
would be required to include and would require the use of appropriate 
risk management methodology. Specifically, paragraph (1) of the 
definition would require, with respect to each SCI system and indirect 
SCI system of the SCI entity, three assessments to be performed by 
objective personnel conducting the SCI review. The first required 
assessment would be of the risks related to the capacity, integrity, 
resiliency, availability, and security. The second assessment would be 
of internal control design and operating effectiveness to include 
logical and physical security controls, development processes, systems 
capacity and availability, information technology service continuity, 
and information technology governance, consistent with industry 
standards. The third assessment would be of third-party provider 
management risks and controls. As discussed above, the Commission is 
also proposing to update the requirement for penetration testing, from 
the current requirement of at least once every three years to at least 
annually.\343\ Finally, the definition of SCI review in Rule 1000 would 
provide that assessments of SCI systems directly supporting market 
regulation or market surveillance would be required to be conducted at 
a frequency based upon the risk assessment conducted as part of the SCI 
review, but in no case less than once every three years.
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    \342\ Rule 1000 (definition of SCI review) and Rule 1003(b) both 
currently contain requirements relating to SCI reviews. As described 
in this section, the Commission is proposing to focus the definition 
of SCI review in Rule 1000 on requirements relating to the SCI 
review itself, whereas Rule 1003(b)'s proposed language would be 
focused on the required contents of the report of the SCI review, as 
well as the timelines for when the SCI review is required to be 
conducted and when the report of the SCI review is required to be 
provided to senior management and the Commission.
    \343\ See supra section III.C.3.b (discussing the frequency of 
required penetration test reviews).
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    It has been the experience of the Commission and its staff that the 
SCI reviews and their reports of such SCI reviews vary among SCI 
entities in content and detail. To help ensure that every SCI review 
and report of such reviews contain the assessments and related 
information the Commission and its staff believes is necessary for an 
SCI entity to be able to assess its compliance with Regulation SCI, the 
Commission proposes adding certain additional requirements and details 
with respect to each SCI review and the report of the SCI review that 
are submitted to the SCI entity's board and to the Commission. In the 
lead-in provision for the definition, the words ``and documented'' are 
proposed to be added to ensure that SCI entities and the objective 
personnel conducting SCI reviews document the work that is done during 
the SCI review. Documentation is necessary as evidence that the 
requirements relating to the SCI review are being complied with, and 
would help ensure that policies and procedures are followed. 
Documentation is also critical to any follow-on reviews of the work 
that may be required, such as follow-up on the work of the SCI review 
by SCI entity personnel (including by its senior management or board of 
directors) or by the Commission or its staff. In addition,

[[Page 23188]]

such documentation would facilitate follow-up required to address 
deficiencies and weaknesses that may be identified during the SCI 
review, such as through mitigation and remediation plans.
    The proposed definition of SCI review would also require that the 
SCI review use ``appropriate risk management methodology.'' The 
objective personnel conducting the SCI review would be required to 
establish, document, and utilize a given risk methodology in conducting 
the SCI review that is appropriate for the SCI entity being reviewed. 
The Commission is not specifying a particular methodology that a given 
SCI entity and its objective personnel must use, but rather is 
providing the flexibility to such objective personnel to determine the 
risk management methodology that should be utilized, so long as it is 
appropriate given the SCI entity's characteristics and risks.
    The requirements of the SCI review would apply to each individual 
SCI system and indirect SCI system, and would require that the SCI 
review include three specific assessments to be performed by objective 
personnel. This language is intended to require that each of these 
assessments be performed by objective personnel--either by those 
conducting the SCI review or others that those conducting the SCI 
review engage for such purposes--rather than utilizing, for example, 
enterprise or IT risk assessments as the basis for the SCI review after 
deeming them ``reasonable.'' The proposed requirement would not specify 
a particular control framework to be applied for such assessments, but 
rather would provide flexibility to those conducting the SCI review to 
choose the methodology they believe to be most appropriate given the 
particular characteristics and risks of the SCI entity's systems being 
assessed, and undertake the assessments themselves, or oversee and 
direct other objective personnel on how the assessments should be 
performed. The Commission considers the SCI reviews to be an important 
window into the strength of the technological infrastructure of SCI 
entities, and whether the controls implemented by the SCI entity are 
appropriate and employed properly. In addition, the Commission requires 
that objective personnel be used to help ensure the impartiality of the 
review and that the reviewers examine what they believe to be most 
appropriate for such a review.\344\ The Commission believes that, by 
requiring that these assessments be performed by objective personnel, 
these assessments and tests will be able to provide the SCI entity, its 
senior management, its board of directors, and the Commission, an 
appropriately impartial and accurate assessment of the risks associated 
with the SCI entity's SCI systems and indirect SCI systems.
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    \344\ See supra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing 
``objective personnel'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the definition of SCI review in Rule 1000, the phrase ``a risk 
assessment with respect to such systems of an SCI entity'' would be 
replaced with an assessment of ``the risks related to the capacity, 
integrity, resiliency, availability, and security'' of each such 
system. The Commission believes that the additional detail in the 
proposed language would tie the required risk assessment more closely 
with the key principles of Regulation SCI (found in Rule 1001(a)(1)) 
relating to the ``capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability and 
security'' of each SCI entity's systems, while maintaining the focus of 
the assessment on the overall risks associated with such systems.
    Further, in the definition of SCI review he phrase ``internal 
control design and effectiveness'' would be revised to read ``internal 
control design and operating effectiveness'' to clarify that the 
associated assessment must examine how well the internal controls 
performed in actual operations, i.e., in practice. Thus, this 
assessment would look not only at how the controls worked in theory 
(i.e., as designed), but also in practice (i.e., in operations).\345\ 
In addition, the definition of SCI review in Rule 1000 would expand on 
the list of controls to be assessed, adding ``systems capacity and 
availability'' and ``information technology service continuity'' to the 
current list of ``logical and physical security controls, development 
processes, and information technology governance.'' The Commission 
believes that systems capacity and availability and information 
technology service continuity are important areas for SCI entities to 
consider when conducting their SCI reviews, and is proposing to include 
them on the list of controls reviewed by objective personnel performing 
the SCI reviews to ensure that these additional areas of controls are 
assessed during each SCI review. As stated above, the foundational 
principles of Regulation SCI are set forth in Rule 1001 and require in 
part that each SCI entity establish, maintain, and enforce written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that their SCI 
systems and, for purposes of security standards, indirect SCI systems, 
have levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and 
security adequate to maintain their operational capability and promote 
the maintenance of fair and orderly markets.\346\ The proposed addition 
of ``systems capacity and availability'' relates to this requirement 
with respect to ``capacity'' and ``availability,'' and ``information 
technology service continuity'' relates to this requirement with 
respect to ``resiliency'' and ``availability,'' and would require that 
objective personnel consider whether an SCI entity's internal controls 
have been designed and implemented in a manner to achieve these 
objectives of Regulation SCI, rather than only those currently 
enumerated regarding security, development processes, and governance.
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    \345\ See, e.g., Sunil Bakshi, Tips for Effective Control 
Design, ISACA (Feb. 9, 2022), available at https://www.isaca.org/resources/news-and-trends/newsletters/atisaca/2022/volume-6/tips-for-effective-control-design; PCAOB, AS2201: An Audit of Internal 
Controls Over Financial Reporting That is Integrated with An Audit 
of Financial Statements, available at https://pcaobus.org/oversight/standards/auditing-standards/details/AS2201; and AICPA, AU-C Section 
94), An Audit of Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting That is 
Integrated With an Audit of Financial Statements, available at 
https://us.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/research/standards/auditattest/downloadabledocuments/au-c-00940.pdf.
    \346\ See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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    New paragraph (1)(C) of the definition of SCI review in Rule 1000 
would require an assessment of third-party provider management risks 
and controls with respect to each of its SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems. As discussed in detail above,\347\ third-party provider 
management is an important part of managing the risks posed when an SCI 
entity uses a third-party for functionality, support, or services.
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    \347\ See supra section III.C.2.
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    Importantly, the proposed amended definition of SCI review under 
Rule 1000 uses the phrase ``with respect to each'' when referencing SCI 
systems and indirect SCI systems. This wording clarifies that the 
associated assessments are required to be made for each applicable 
system for each SCI review (i.e., every year). Thus, the Commission 
believes it to be appropriate to conduct these assessments for each and 
every SCI system or, as applicable, indirect SCI system annually, 
rather than, for example, rotating control testing across several years 
such that not all systems and/or relevant controls are tested each 
year. However, in adopting Regulation SCI, the Commission determined to 
allow assessments of SCI systems directly supporting market regulation 
or market surveillance to be conducted, based upon a risk-assessment, 
at least

[[Page 23189]]

once every three years, rather than annually, and the Commission is not 
amending this provision.\348\
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    \348\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(1)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed paragraph (2) would contain the requirement that 
penetration test reviews be performed by objective personnel, conducted 
at least once each year. As discussed above, the revised requirements 
relating to SCI reviews would change the frequency of required 
penetration testing provision (currently located in Rule 1003(b)(1) but 
proposed to be relocated to the definition of ``SCI review'' in Rule 
1000) from ``not less than once every three years'' to at least 
annually with each SCI review, and require that they include testing of 
any identified vulnerabilities of its SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems.\349\ In addition, the language relating to the frequency of 
assessments of SCI systems directly supporting market regulation or 
market surveillance, proposed to be in paragraph (3), would remain 
unchanged.\350\
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    \349\ See supra section III.C.3.b. and proposed paragraph (2) of 
the definition of SCI review in Rule 1000, (relating to 
cybersecurity revisions, including penetration testing). Of course, 
while SCI entities would be required to conduct penetration test 
reviews at least annually as part of the SCI review, nothing in the 
proposed rule would prevent them from conducting penetration testing 
more frequently if warranted.
    \350\ As noted above, while the substance of the provision 
relating to the frequency of assessments of SCI systems directly 
supporting market regulation or market surveillance would remain 
unchanged, the provision would be moved from current Rule 
1003(b)(1)(ii) to proposed paragraph (3) of the definition of SCI 
review in Rule 1000.
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    Proposed Rule 1003(b) would continue to include requirements 
relating to the timeframes for conducting the SCI review (unchanged at 
``not less than once each calendar year'') \351\ and submitting reports 
of the SCI review to senior management (unchanged at ``no more than 30 
calendar days after completion of such SCI review'') \352\ and the 
Commission (unchanged at ``within 60 calendar days after its submission 
to senior management'').\353\ However, proposed Rule 1003(b)(1) would 
add the phrase ``for each calendar year during which it was an SCI 
entity for any part of such calendar year'' to clarify that, if an SCI 
entity is an SCI entity for any part of the calendar year, it must 
conduct the SCI review and submit the associated report of the SCI 
review to the SCI entity's senior management and board, as well as to 
the Commission. Thus, an SCI review would be required for a new SCI 
entity, even in its first year as an SCI entity and even if its 
starting date as an SCI entity were not until late in the year. 
Similarly, if an SCI entity ceased to be an SCI entity during the 
middle of a calendar year (e.g., an SCI ATS that falls out of the SCI 
ATS thresholds in July of a given year), it would still be required to 
submit an SCI review for that portion of the calendar year during which 
it was an SCI entity. The Commission believes this is appropriate, as 
the SCI review and the report of the SCI review contain, among other 
things, assessments of the SCI entity's compliance with the 
requirements of Regulation SCI which help to confirm, through objective 
personnel, that the capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability and 
security requirements of Regulation SCI have been met by the entity for 
the period during which it was an SCI entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \351\ See proposed Rule 1003(b)(1).
    \352\ See proposed Rule 1003(b)(2).
    \353\ See proposed Rule 1003(b)(3).
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    Rule 1003(b) would also add additional detail on what the report of 
the SCI review is required to contain. Currently, the rule does not 
provide any specific requirements with respect to the contents of the 
report of the SCI review. In the experience of Commission staff, this 
has resulted in a wide range in the types and quality of SCI reports 
the Commission receives from SCI entities. In reviewing the reports, 
the Commission staff has found certain information particularly 
important in assessing the SCI review, and as a result the Commission 
is now revising the rule to require this information to be included in 
all reports on SCI reviews. Rule 1003(b)(2) would be revised to require 
the report of the SCI review to include: (i) the dates the SCI review 
was conducted and the date of completion; (ii) the entity or business 
unit of the SCI entity performing the review; (iii) a list of the 
controls reviewed and a description of each such control; (iv) the 
findings of the SCI review with respect to each SCI system and indirect 
SCI system, which must include, at a minimum, assessments of: the risks 
related to the capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and 
security; internal control design and operating effectiveness; and 
vendor management risks and controls; (v) a summary, including the 
scope of testing and resulting action plan, of each penetration test 
review conducted as part of the SCI review; and (vi) a description of 
each deficiency and weakness identified by the SCI review.
    Items (i) and (ii) contain basic administrative information 
(relating to dates and the entity/unit conducting the SCI review) about 
the SCI review to identify the period over which the SCI review was 
conducted and the entity/unit responsible for such review that 
Commission staff may contact for any questions regarding the SCI review 
or the report of the SCI review. Item (iii), relating to controls 
reviewed as part of the SCI review, would assist Commission staff in 
understanding the scope of the review and, if applicable, also allow 
staff to identify and request additional information regarding any of 
the controls listed or any controls it believed to be missing. Item 
(iv) would contain the substantive findings of the SCI review and 
relate to the three assessments that are required to be part of the SCI 
review under paragraph (1) of the definition of SCI review in Rule 
1000. Similarly, item (v) relates to paragraph (2) of the definition of 
SCI review relating to penetration test reviews and would require an 
SCI entity to provide a summary of each penetration test review 
conducted as part of the SCI review.\354\ Item (v) also would require 
that the summary include the scope of testing and the resulting action 
plan. Item (vi) would require a description of each deficiency and 
weakness identified during the SCI review, including through the 
assessments and any testing conducted as part of the SCI review. This 
information is proposed to be included in the report of the SCI review 
to provide the senior management and board of the SCI entity, as well 
as the Commission and its staff, with information on the SCI review, 
including any deficiencies and weaknesses identified by the objective 
personnel that conducted the SCI review.
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    \354\ The Commission notes that the proposed requirement under 
item (vi) would specify that a summary of each penetration test 
review be included but does not call for the penetration test review 
itself be included. The Commission believes that a summary that 
includes the scope of testing and action plan of the penetration 
test would provide Commission staff with sufficient initial 
information to obtain a broad understanding of what was tested and 
any vulnerabilities it identified and that Commission staff could, 
in any case, if it believed it appropriate, request that the SCI 
entity provide it with a copy of the penetration test review.
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    The Commission believes that requiring this minimum set of 
requirements for the report of the SCI review, as described above, 
would help ensure that SCI entities and the objective personnel that 
conduct the SCI review include in the report of the SCI review the key 
pieces of information relating to the SCI review (i.e., information 
relating to the controls reviewed; substantive findings from the 
assessments conducted as part of the SCI review; summaries of 
penetration test reviews; and descriptions of each deficiency and 
weakness identified) that go towards ensuring that the SCI

[[Page 23190]]

systems of SCI entities remain robust with respect to their capacity, 
integrity, resiliency, availability, and security, and are in 
compliance with the requirements of Regulation SCI.
    Finally, the Commission is proposing several revisions to paragraph 
(b)(3) of Rule 1003, which relates to submission of the report of the 
SCI review to the Commission and to the board of directors (or its 
equivalent) of the SCI entity. First, because Rule 1003(b)(2) now 
contains details relating to the required contents of the report of the 
SCI review, the Commission is proposing to update the internal cross-
reference in paragraph (b)(3) from ``paragraph (b)(1)'' to ``paragraph 
(b)(2).'' The proposed revisions would also require that, when the 
report is submitted to the board of directors of the SCI entity and the 
Commission, it must also include the date the report was submitted to 
senior management. In addition, the revisions would make mandatory that 
a response from senior management to the report is included when it is 
submitted to the Commission and board, whereas previously the language 
appeared permissive. The Commission believes that mandating a response 
from senior management will help ensure that both the SCI entity's 
senior management and board are informed of the findings in the report 
of the SCI review and that the SCI entity's policies and procedures are 
reasonably designed, as required by the rule, and as informed by the 
issues identified in the report.
b. Request for Comment
    75. Do commenters agree with the proposed revisions to the 
definition of ``SCI review'' in Rule 1000? Why or why not? Do 
commenters agree with the proposed addition of ``and documented'' to 
require that the work relating to the SCI review be documented? Why or 
why not? Do commenters agree with the proposed addition that the 
objective personnel conducting the SCI review use ``appropriate risk 
management methodology?'' Why or why not? What risk management 
methodologies do commenters believe would be appropriate for use by SCI 
entities? Please describe. Does the requirement that SCI reviews be 
performed by ``objective personnel'' remain appropriate? For example, 
should the term ``objective personnel'' be defined? Why or why not? 
Should there be a requirement that the SCI review be performed by an 
independent third party? Why or why not? Should there be a requirement 
that senior management certify that the SCI review was performed by 
objective personnel? Why or why not?
    76. What are commenters' views on not specifying a particular 
control framework to be applied for the internal control assessments? 
What are the costs and benefits to SCI entities if the Commission 
required the application of, for example, a suitable, recognized 
control framework that is established by a body or group that has 
followed due-process procedures, including the broad distribution of 
the framework for public comment?
    77. With respect to the three assessments proposed to be required 
by paragraph (1) of the definition of SCI review, do commenters agree 
that these assessments should be overseen by the objective personnel 
responsible for the SCI review, rather than utilizing, for example, 
enterprise or IT risk assessments as the basis for the SCI review after 
deeming them ``reasonable''? Why or why not? What is the current 
practice among objective personnel conducting assessments for SCI 
reviews? Please describe. What do commenters believe would be the 
advantages and disadvantages for this proposed requirement?
    78. Do commenters believe that it is appropriate that the SCI 
review include an assessment of ``the risks related to the capacity, 
integrity, resiliency, availability, and security,'' as proposed to be 
required in paragraph (1)(A) of the definition of SCI review under Rule 
1000? Why or why not?
    79. Do commenters believe that the revisions to the second 
assessment proposed to be required in paragraph (1)(A) of the 
definition of SCI review in Rule 1000 (replacing the phrase ``internal 
control design and effectiveness'' with ``internal control design and 
operating effectiveness,'' and adding ``systems capacity and 
availability'' and ``information technology service continuity'' to the 
current list of controls to be assessed) are appropriate as part of the 
SCI review?'' Why or why not?
    80. Do commenters agree that the third assessment proposed to be 
required as part of the SCI review, relating to third-party provider 
management risks and controls, is appropriate? Why or why not?
    81. Do commenters agree with the revision that the three 
assessments in paragraph (1) of the definition of SCI review be made 
``with respect to each'' SCI system and indirect SCI system, thereby 
requiring that these assessments be made for each applicable system for 
each SCI review every year? Why or why not?
    82. Do commenters agree that the SCI review and report of the SCI 
review should be conducted by an SCI entity ``for each calendar year 
during which it was an SCI entity for any part of such calendar year,'' 
as proposed to be added to Rule 1003(b)(1)? Why or why not?
    83. Do commenters believe that the requirements in proposed Rule 
1003(b)(2) are appropriate for the report of the SCI review? Why or why 
not? Do commenters believe additional requirements should be added or 
that any proposed requirements should be modified or not included? Why 
or why not? Please describe.
5. Current SCI Industry Standards
a. Overview of Current Rule 1001(a)(4)
    Rule 1001(a)(4) of Regulation SCI states that, for purposes of 
paragraph (a) of Rule 1001, an SCI entity's policies and procedures 
will be deemed to be reasonably designed if they are consistent with 
``current SCI industry standards.'' The provision defines ``current SCI 
industry standards'' to be ``comprised of information technology 
practices that are widely available to information technology 
professionals in the financial sector and issued by an authoritative 
body that is a U.S. governmental entity or agency, association of U.S. 
governmental entities or agencies, or widely recognized organization.'' 
In addition, Rule 1001(a)(4) also states that compliance with such 
current SCI industry standards shall not be the exclusive means to 
comply with the requirements of paragraph (a). Thus, Rule 1001(a)(4) 
provides a safe harbor for SCI entities to comply with Rule 1001(a) 
(i.e., they will be deemed to comply if they have policies and 
procedures that are consistent with current SCI industry standards), 
while at the same time stating that following such current SCI industry 
standards is not the sole means of achieving compliance with the rule.
b. Rule 1001(a)(4) Safe Harbor
    The Commission believes that utilizing current SCI industry 
standards is an appropriate way for SCI entities to develop their Rule 
1001(a) policies and procedures. It has been the experience of the 
Commission and its staff that some SCI entities look to publications 
issued by the federal government's National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (``NIST'') Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity (``NIST Framework''),\355\ or frameworks issued by non-

[[Page 23191]]

governmental bodies such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (``ISO'') \356\ or the Control Objectives for 
Information and Related Technologies (``COBIT''),\357\ and some SCI 
entities may not point to any specific industry standards at all. In 
addition, among those SCI entities that utilize industry standards, 
some may look to a single industry standard for most or all of their 
policies and procedures, while others may ``mix and match'' standards 
for different policies and procedures. And, in some cases, an SCI 
entity may utilize multiple industry standards for a single set of 
their policies and procedures.
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    \355\ The NIST Framework is available at https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/framework.
    \356\ ISO is an independent, non-governmental international 
organization whose members include national standards bodies that 
develops and publishes international standards. See International 
Organization for Standardization, available at https://www.iso.org.
    \357\ COBIT is a leading framework for the enterprise governance 
of information and technology and is issued by ISACA, an 
international professional associated focused on information 
technology governance. See ISACA, available at https://www.isaca.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that use of industry standards continues to 
be an appropriate framework for SCI entities to model their policies 
and procedures.\358\ To make clear that Rule 1001(a)(4)'s reference to 
and definition of ``current SCI industry standards'' provides a safe 
harbor for SCI entities with respect to their Rule 1001(a) policies and 
procedures, the Commission proposes to add the words ``safe harbor'' in 
Rule 1001(a)(4).\359\
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    \358\ We note that concurrent with the Commission's adoption of 
Regulation SCI in 2014, Commission staff stated its views regarding 
``current SCI industry standards,'' including a listing of examples 
of publications describing processes, guidelines, frameworks, or 
standards for each inspection area, or domain, an SCI entity could 
look to in developing its reasonably designed policies and 
procedures. See Commission, Staff Guidance on Current SCI Industry 
Standards (Nov. 19, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2014/staff-guidance-current-sci-industry-standards.pdf. 
Commission staff is reviewing staff statements with respect to 
Regulation SCI to determine whether any such statements, or portion 
thereof, should be revised or withdrawn in connection with any 
adoption of this proposal. These statements include the Staff 
Guidance on Current SCI Industry Standards, as well as the Responses 
to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Regulation SCI, Sept. 2, 
2015 (Updated Aug. 21, 2019), available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/regulation-sci-faq.shtml.
    \359\ Specifically, the second sentence of Rule 1001(a)(4) would 
be revised to read: ``Compliance with such current SCI industry 
standards as a safe harbor, however, shall not be the exclusive 
means to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a) of this 
section.''
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c. Identification of Current SCI Industry Standards Used
    In the experience of Commission staff, many SCI entities align 
their Rule 1001(a) policies and procedures, in part or whole, with 
current SCI industry standards, often referencing such standards in 
communications with Commission staff during inspections or 
examinations. However, some SCI entities do not reference any industry 
standard(s) for their Rule 1001(a) policies and procedures.
    In conjunction with the proposed revision to Rule 1001(a)(4), the 
Commission is proposing to add a new requirement in Rule 1001(a)(2), 
which lays out certain minimum requirements for an SCI entity's Rule 
1001(a) policies and procedures. Specifically, proposed new 17 CFR 
242.1001(a)(2)(xi) (``proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(xi)'') would require 
that an SCI entity's policies and procedures include ``[a]n 
identification of the current SCI industry standard(s) with which each 
such policy and procedure is consistent, if any.'' SCI entities are not 
required to avail themselves of the safe harbor of Rule 1001(a)(4) by 
aligning their policies and procedures required by Rule 1001(a) with 
current SCI industry standards,\360\ but for SCI entities that choose 
to do so, this proposed provision would require SCI entities to provide 
a list of the specific current SCI industry standard(s) with which each 
of its policies and procedures is consistent. Thus, for example, such 
SCI entities would be required to identify the standard(s) used for 
their business continuity and disaster recovery policies and 
procedures, and separately identify the standard(s) used for its vendor 
management policies and procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \360\ For SCI entities that do not seek to avail themselves of 
the safe harbor of Rule 1001(a)(4), the requirements of proposed 
Rule 1001(a)(2)(xi) would not apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Commission recognizes that there may be cases in 
which an SCI entity may draw from multiple current SCI industry 
standards in developing a given policy and procedure, and proposed Rule 
1001(a)(2)(xi) recognizes this may be the case (``. . . the current SCI 
industry standard (s). . .''). In such cases, an SCI entity may simply 
list multiple standards with which the given policy and procedure is 
consistent.
d. Request for Comment
    84. Do commenters agree with the proposed revisions to Rule 
1001(a)(4) relating to current SCI industry standards? Why or why not?
    85. Do SCI entities seek to make use of the safe harbor contained 
in Rule 1001(a)(4) for compliance with Rule 1001(a) of Regulation SCI? 
Why or why not? With what current SCI industry standard(s) do SCI 
entities seek to make their policies and procedures consistent?
    86. For an SCI entity that seeks to avail itself of the safe 
harbor, do commenters agree that an SCI entity should identify the 
current SCI industry standard(s) with which each of its policies and 
procedures is consistent? Why or why not?
6. Other Changes
    Rule 1002(c) of Regulation SCI requires that SCI entities 
disseminate information to their members or participants regarding SCI 
events.\361\ These information dissemination requirements are scaled 
based on the nature and severity of an event, with SCI entities 
required to disseminate certain information about the event to members 
or participants that the SCI entity reasonably estimated to have been 
affected by the SCI event, and, in the case of a major SCI event, to 
all members or participants.\362\ In connection with the proposal to 
include SCI broker-dealers as SCI entities, the Commission proposes 
that an SCI broker-dealer be required to disseminate information about 
an SCI event it is experiencing, in accordance with the requirements of 
Rule 1002(c), to its ``customers.'' As discussed above, the Commission 
proposes to include SCI broker-dealers as SCI entities because it 
believes that a systems issue at an SCI broker-dealer could, for 
example, impede the ability of other market participants to trade 
securities in a fair and orderly manner. As explained in the SCI 
Adopting Release, information about an SCI event is likely to be of 
greatest value to those market participants affected by it, who can use 
such information to evaluate the event's impact on their trading and 
other activities and develop an appropriate response.\363\ To the 
extent that an SCI event at a broker-dealer affects its customers 
(i.e., those with whom it trades or for whom it facilitates trades as 
an agent), the Commission believes that the SCI broker-dealer should 
inform them, and do so in the same manner and as required for other SCI 
entities, pursuant to Rule 1002(c). Similarly, and consistent with the 
current requirement of Rule 1002(b)(4)(ii)(B), an SCI broker-dealer 
would be required to include in its notices to the Commission a copy of 
any information it disseminated to its

[[Page 23192]]

customers.\364\ The Commission requests comment on the proposed 
amendments to Rule 1002(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Rule 1002(c) in section 
III.A.2.b above, which discusses the proposed definition of an SCI 
broker-dealer.\365\
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    \361\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(c).
    \362\ Id. See also supra section II.B.3 (discussing current Rule 
1002(c)).
    \363\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1 at 72334.
    \364\ Id. See also supra section II.B.3 (discussing current Rule 
1002(b)(4).
    \365\ See supra section III.A.2.b.
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    Rule 1005 of Regulation SCI requires SCI entities to make, keep, 
and preserve certain records related to their compliance with 
Regulation SCI.\366\ Rule 1005(c) specifies that the recordkeeping 
period survives even if an SCI entity ceases to do business or ceases 
to be registered under the Exchange Act. The Commission proposes to add 
that this survival provision applies to an SCI entity ``otherwise 
ceasing to be an SCI entity.'' This addition accounts for circumstances 
not expressly covered; specifically, those in which an SCI entity 
continues to do business or remains a registered entity, but may cease 
to qualify as an SCI entity, such as an SCI ATS that no longer 
satisfies a volume threshold. Such entities would not be excepted from 
complying with the recordkeeping provisions of Rule 1005 and would be 
required to make, keep, and preserve their records related to their 
compliance with Regulation SCI related to the period during which they 
were an SCI entity.
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    \366\ See 17 CFR 242.1005. Rule 1005(a) of Regulation SCI 
relates to recordkeeping provisions for SCI SROs, whereas Rule 
1005(b) relates to the recordkeeping provision for SCI entities 
other than SCI SROs.
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    In addition, Form SCI is proposed to be modified to conform the 
text of the General Instructions and description of the attached 
Exhibits to the other changes proposed herein. Specifically, the 
operational aspects of Form SCI filing are unchanged, except to reflect 
that quarterly reports of SCI events with no or a de minimis impact 
would pertain only to systems disruptions, and not to systems 
intrusions.\367\ Furthermore, the instructions to Exhibit 5 of Form SCI 
is proposed to be modified to reflect the requirement that an SCI 
entity's senior management respond to the report of the SCI 
review.\368\ In addition, the Commission proposes to update section I 
of the General Instructions for Form SCI: Explanation of Terms to 
reflect the proposed changes in the definitions in Rule 1000, by 
revising the definitions of SCI entity, SCI review, SCI systems, and 
Systems Intrusion.
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    \367\ See supra section III.C.3.c (discussing proposed changes 
to Rule 1002(b)(5)(ii)).
    \368\ See supra section III.C.4 (discussing proposed changes to 
Rule 1003(b)(3)).
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D. SCI Entities Subject to the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and/
or Regulation S-P

1. Discussion
a. Introduction
    The Commission separately is proposing the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal,\369\ and separately is also proposing to amend 
Regulation S-P.\370\ As discussed in more detail below, certain types 
of SCI entities also are or would be subject to the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal and/or Regulation S-P (currently and as it would 
be amended).\371\ The Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and 
Regulation S-P (currently and as it would be amended) have or would 
have provisions requiring policies and procedures that address certain 
types of cybersecurity risks.\372\ The Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal also requires certain reporting to the Commission on Form SCIR 
of certain types of cybersecurity incidents.\373\ These notification 
and subsequent reporting requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal are triggered by a ``significant cybersecurity incident,'' 
\374\ which could also be an SCI event such as a ``systems intrusion'' 
as that term would be defined in current and proposed Rule 1000 of 
Regulation SCI.\375\ Finally, the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal 
and Regulation S-P (currently and as it would be amended) have or would 
have provisions requiring disclosures of certain cybersecurity 
incidents.\376\ Consequently, if the proposed amendments to Regulation 
SCI and the other proposals are all adopted as proposed, SCI entities 
could be subject to requirements of that rule that relate to certain 
proposed requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and 
certain existing and proposed requirements of Regulation S-P. In the 
Commission's view, this would be appropriate because, while the current 
and proposed cybersecurity requirements of Regulation SCI may impose 
some broadly similar obligations, it has a different scope and purpose 
than the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and Regulation S-P. 
Moreover, in many instances, compliance with the current and proposed 
cybersecurity requirements of Regulation SCI that relate to the 
proposed requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and 
the existing or proposed requirements Regulation S-P can be 
accomplished through similar efforts.
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    \369\ See Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, supra note 10.
    \370\ See Regulation S-P 2023 Proposing Release supra note 10.
    \371\ See proposed 17 CFR 242.10 of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal Rule (``Rule 10''); 17 CFR 248.1 through 
248.30 (Regulation S-P). See also section III.D.1.b. of this release 
(discussing the types of SCI Entities that are or would be subject 
to the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and/or Regulation S-P).
    \372\ See infra section III.D.1.c (discussing the proposed 
requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and the 
existing and proposed requirements of Regulation S-P to have 
policies and procedures that address certain cybersecurity risks).
    \373\ See infra section III.D.1.d (discussing the proposed 
Commission notification requirements of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal).
    \374\ The Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal defines a 
``significant cybersecurity incident'' to be a cybersecurity 
incident, or a group of related cybersecurity incidents, that: (i) 
Significantly disrupts or degrades the ability of the market entity 
to maintain critical operations; or (ii) Leads to the unauthorized 
access or use of the information or information systems of the 
market entity, where the unauthorized access or use of such 
information or information systems results in or is reasonably 
likely to result in: (A) Substantial harm to the market entity; or 
(B) Substantial harm to a customer, counterparty, member, 
registrant, or user of the market entity, or to any other market 
participant that interacts with the market entity. See proposed 
Sec.  242.10(a) of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal.
    \375\ See current and proposed Rule 1000 of Regulation SCI 
(defining the term ``systems intrusion'').
    \376\ See infra section III.D.1.e (discussing the proposed 
disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal 
and the existing and proposed disclosure requirements of Regulation 
S-P).
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    The specific instances in which the cybersecurity requirements of 
current and proposed Regulation SCI would relate to the proposed 
requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and the 
existing or proposed requirements of Regulation S-P are discussed 
briefly below. The Commission encourages interested persons to provide 
comments on the discussion below, as well as on the potential 
application of Regulation SCI, the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, 
and Regulation S-P. More specifically, the Commission encourages 
commenters: (1) to identify any areas where they believe the relation 
between requirements of the existing or proposed requirements of 
Regulation SCI and the proposed requirements of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal and the existing or proposed requirements of 
Regulation S-P would be particularly costly or create practical 
implementation difficulties; (2) to provide details on why these 
instances would be particularly costly or create practical 
implementation difficulties; and (3) to make recommendations on

[[Page 23193]]

how to minimize these potential impacts, while also achieving the goal 
of this proposal to address, among other things, the cybersecurity 
risks faced by SCI entities. To assist this effort, the Commission is 
seeking specific comment below on these topics.\377\
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    \377\ See infra section III.D.2.
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b. SCI Entities That Are or Would Be Subject to the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal and/or Regulation S-P
    Various SCI entities under this proposal are or would be subject to 
the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and/or Regulation S-P 
(currently and as it would be amended). In particular, most SCI 
entities under Regulation SCI (currently and as it would be amended) 
would be subject to the requirements of Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal. Specifically, all SCI entities other than plan processors and 
SCI competing consolidators that are or would be subject to Regulation 
SCI also would be subject to the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal as 
``covered entities'' \378\ of that proposal. Therefore, if the proposed 
amendments to Regulation SCI and the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal are all adopted as proposed, these SCI entities would be 
subject to the requirements of Regulation SCI in addition to the 
requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal.
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    \378\ The requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal would apply to broker-dealers, clearing agencies, major 
security-based swap participants, the MSRB, national securities 
associations, national securities exchanges, security-based swap 
data repositories, security-based swap dealers, and transfer agents. 
See proposed 17 CFR 240.10(a). The Commission believes that a 
broker-dealer that exceeds one or more of the transaction activity 
thresholds under the proposed amendments to Regulation SCI (i.e., an 
SCI broker-dealer) likely would meet one of the broker-dealer 
definitions of ``covered entity'' in proposed Rule 10 of the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal given their size and activities. 
For example, it would either be a carrying broker-dealer, have 
regulatory capital equal to or exceeding $50 million, have total 
assets equal to or exceeding $1 billion, or operate as a market 
maker. See paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(A), (C), (D), and (E) of proposed 
Rule 10. The Commission is seeking comment in the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal as to whether a broker-dealer that is an SCI 
entity should be defined specifically as a ``covered entity'' under 
proposed Rule 10. See section II.A.10 of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal. In addition, the Commission requests comment 
in the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal as to whether plan 
processors and SCI competing consolidators should be subject to its 
requirements. See id. The discussion in this section III.D focuses 
on the requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal only 
as they would apply to current and proposed SCI entities.
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    In addition, broker-dealers that would be subject to Regulation SCI 
and those that operate certain ATSs currently subject to Regulation ATS 
(i.e., as SCI ATSs or SCI broker-dealers) also are or would be subject 
to Regulation S-P (currently and as it would be amended).\379\ 
Therefore, if the proposed amendments to Regulation SCI and Regulation 
S-P are all adopted as proposed, broker-dealers could be subject to 
Regulation SCI in addition to the requirements of Regulation S-P 
(currently and as it would be amended).
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    \379\ Regulation S-P applies to additional types of market 
participants that are not or would not be subject to Regulation SCI. 
See 17 CFR 248.3. For example, with regard to the proposed inclusion 
of broker-dealers, Regulation SCI would only be applicable to an 
estimated 17 broker-dealers under the proposed definition of SCI 
broker-dealer. The discussion in this section III.D focuses on the 
current and proposed requirements of Regulation S-P only as they 
would apply to current and proposed SCI entities.
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c. Policies and Procedures To Address Cybersecurity Risks
    As discussed below, Regulation S-P currently has certain 
cybersecurity-related provisions. The Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal and the proposed amendments to Regulation S-P would add to 
these requirements. These existing and proposed requirements would 
relate to certain of the requirements of Regulation SCI (currently and 
as it would be amended). The Commission believes this result would be 
appropriate because the policies and procedures requirements of 
Regulation SCI (currently and as it would be amended) differ in scope 
and purpose from those of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and 
Regulation S-P, and because the policies and procedures required under 
Regulation SCI that relate to cybersecurity (currently and as it would 
be amended) are generally consistent with the proposed requirements of 
the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and the existing and proposed 
requirements of Regulation S-P that pertain to cybersecurity.
i. Different Scope of the Policies and Procedures Requirements
    As discussed above in sections II.B and III.C, Regulation SCI 
(currently and as it would be amended) limits its requirements to SCI 
systems, which are certain systems of the SCI entity that support 
specified securities market related functions,\380\ and indirect SCI 
systems.\381\ Therefore, the policies and procedures requirements of 
Regulation SCI (currently and as it would be amended) that pertain to 
cybersecurity apply to SCI systems and indirect SCI systems. They do 
not and would not apply to other systems maintained by an SCI entity.
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    \380\ See 17 CFR 242.1000 (defining ``SCI systems''). See also 
supra section II.B.1.
    \381\ See 17 CFR 242.1000 (defining ``indirect SCI systems''). 
See also supra section II.B.1.
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    Regulation S-P's safeguards provisions currently apply to customer 
records and information.\382\ Regulation S-P defines ``customer'' to 
mean a consumer who has a customer relationship with the broker-
dealer.\383\ Regulation S-P further defines the term ``consumer'' to 
mean an individual who obtains or has obtained a financial product or 
service from the broker-dealer that is to be used primarily for 
personal, family, or household purposes, or that individual's legal 
representative.\384\ Regulation S-P's disposal provisions apply to 
consumer report information maintained for a business purpose.\385\ 
Regulation S-P currently defines ``consumer report information'' to 
mean any record about an individual, whether in paper, electronic or 
other form, that is a consumer report or is derived from a consumer 
report and also a compilation of such records.\386\ The Commission is 
separately proposing to amend the scope of information covered under 
both the Regulation S-P safeguards provisions and the Regulation S-P 
disposal provisions.\387\ The amendments, however, would not 
fundamentally broaden the scope of these provisions. Therefore, the 
existing and proposed policies and procedures requirements of the 
Regulation S-P safeguards and disposal provisions that pertain to 
cybersecurity would apply to customer and consumer-related information. 
They do not and would not apply to other types of information stored on 
the information systems of the broker-dealer.\388\
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    \382\ See 17 CFR 248.30(a).
    \383\ See 17 CFR 248.3(j).
    \384\ See 17 CFR 248.3(g)(1).
    \385\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(2).
    \386\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(1)(ii).
    \387\ See Regulation S-P 2023 Proposing Release.
    \388\ Additionally, Regulation S-P (currently and as it would be 
amended) implicates cybersecurity to the extent that customer 
records or information or consumer report information is stored on 
an information system (e.g., on a computer). If this information is 
stored in paper form (e.g., in a file cabinet), the requirements of 
Regulation S-P apply but the policies and procedures required under 
the rule would need to address risks that are different than 
cybersecurity risks--for example, the physical security risk that 
individuals could gain unauthorized access to the room or file 
cabinet where the paper records are stored as compared to the 
cybersecurity risk that individuals could gain unauthorized access 
to the information system on which the records are stored 
electronically.
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    Regulation SCI (currently and as it would be amended), the Exchange 
Act Cybersecurity Proposal, and Regulation S-P (currently and as it 
would be amended) would, therefore, differ in scope. The Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity

[[Page 23194]]

Proposal would require covered entities to establish, maintain, and 
enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to 
address their cybersecurity risks.\389\ Therefore, the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal does not limit its application to certain 
systems or information residing on those systems based on the functions 
and operations performed by the covered entity through the system or 
the use of the information residing on the system unlike Regulation SCI 
(currently and as it would be amended). In addition, the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal does not limit its application to a specific 
type of information residing on an information system unlike Regulation 
S-P (currently and as it would be amended).
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    \389\ See paragraphs (b) and (e) of proposed Rule 10 (setting 
forth the requirements of covered entities, among others, to have 
policies and procedures to address their cybersecurity risks).
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ii. Consistency of the Policies and Procedures Requirements
    The Commission also believes that it would be appropriate to apply 
Regulation SCI to SCI entities even if they also are subject to the 
requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and/or 
Regulation S-P (currently and as it would be amended) because an SCI 
entity could use one comprehensive set of policies and procedures to 
satisfy the requirements of the current and proposed cybersecurity-
related policies and procedures requirements of Regulation SCI, the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, and Regulation S-P. As explained 
below, the more focused current and proposed policies and procedures 
requirements of Regulation SCI and Regulation S-P addressing certain 
cybersecurity risks would logically fit within and be consistent with 
the broader policies and procedures required under the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal to address all cybersecurity risks (including 
those outside of SCI systems and indirect SCI systems).
    SCI entities that would be covered entities under the proposed 
requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would be 
subject the proposed policies and procedures requirements of the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal. In addition, broker-dealers that 
would be subject to Regulation SCI and those that operate certain ATSs 
currently subject to Regulation ATS (i.e., as SCI ATSs or SCI broker-
dealers) are subject to the requirements of Regulation S-P (currently 
and as it would be amended).
    General Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures Requirements. 
Regulation SCI, Regulation S-P, and the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal all include requirements that address certain cybersecurity-
related risks. Regulation SCI requires an SCI entity to have reasonably 
designed policies and procedures to ensure that its SCI systems and, 
for purposes of security standards, indirect SCI systems, have levels 
of capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security, 
adequate to maintain the SCI entity's operational capability and 
promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets.\390\
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    \390\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(1).
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    Regulation S-P's safeguards provisions require broker-dealers to 
adopt written policies and procedures that address administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards for the protection of customer 
records and information.\391\ Additionally, Regulation S-P's disposal 
provisions require broker-dealers that maintain or otherwise possess 
consumer report information for a business purpose to properly dispose 
of the information by taking reasonable measures to protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of the information in connection with its 
disposal.\392\
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    \391\ See 17 CFR 248.30(a).
    \392\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(2). Regulation S-P currently defines 
the term ``disposal'' to mean: (1) the discarding or abandonment of 
consumer report information; or (2) the sale, donation, or transfer 
of any medium, including computer equipment, on which consumer 
report information is stored. See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(1)(iii).
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    Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would require a 
covered entity to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and 
procedures that are reasonably designed to address the covered entity's 
cybersecurity risks. These requirements are designed to position 
covered entities to be better prepared to protect themselves against 
cybersecurity risks, to mitigate cybersecurity threats and 
vulnerabilities, and to recover from cybersecurity incidents. They are 
also designed to help ensure that covered entities focus their efforts 
and resources on the cybersecurity risks associated with their 
operations and business practices.
    A covered entity that implements reasonably designed policies and 
procedures in compliance with the requirements of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal that cover its SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems should generally satisfy the current and proposed general 
policies and procedures requirements of Regulation SCI that pertain to 
cybersecurity.\393\ Similarly, policies and procedures implemented by a 
broker-dealer that is an SCI entity that are reasonably designed in 
compliance with the current and proposed cybersecurity requirements of 
Regulation SCI should generally satisfy the existing general policies 
and procedures requirements of Regulation S-P safeguards and disposal 
provisions discussed above that pertain to cybersecurity.
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    \393\ The CAT System is a facility of each of the Participants 
and an SCI system. See also Joint Industry Plan; Order Approving the 
National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail, 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 79318 (Nov. 15, 2016), 81 FR 
84696, 84758 (Nov. 23, 2016) (``CAT NMS Plan Approval Order''). It 
would also qualify as an ``information system'' of each national 
securities exchange and each national securities association under 
the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal. The CAT NMS Plan requires 
the CAT's Plan Processor to follow certain security protocols and 
industry standards, including the NIST Cyber Security Framework, 
subject to Participant oversight. See, e.g., CAT NMS Plan at 
Appendix D, Section 4.2. For the reasons discussed above and below 
with respect to SCI systems, the policies and procedures 
requirements of Regulation SCI are not intended to be inconsistent 
with the security protocols set forth in the CAT NMS Plan. Moreover, 
to the extent the CAT NMS Plan requires security protocols beyond 
those that would be required under Regulation SCI, those additional 
security protocols should generally fit within and be consistent 
with the policies and procedures required under the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal to address all cybersecurity risks.
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    Requirements to Oversee Service Providers. Under the amendments to 
Regulation SCI, the policies and procedures required of SCI entities 
would need to include a program to manage and oversee third-party 
providers that provide functionality, support or service, directly or 
indirectly, for SCI systems and indirect SCI systems, and are discussed 
above in more detail in section III.C.2. In addition, proposed 
amendments to Regulation S-P's safeguards provisions would require 
broker-dealers to include written policies and procedures within their 
response programs that require their service providers, pursuant to a 
written contract, to take appropriate measures that are designed to 
protect against unauthorized access to or use of customer information, 
including notification to the broker-dealer in the event of any breach 
in security resulting in unauthorized access to a customer information 
maintained by the service provider to enable the broker-dealer to 
implement its response program.\394\
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    \394\ See Regulation S-P 2023 Proposing Release.
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    Proposed Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would 
have several policies and procedures requirements that are designed to 
address similar cybersecurity-related

[[Page 23195]]

risks to these proposed amendments to Regulation SCI and Regulation S-
P. First, a covered entity's policies and procedures under proposed 
Rule 10 would need to require periodic assessments of cybersecurity 
risks associated with the covered entity's information systems and 
information residing on those systems.\395\ This element of the 
policies and procedures would need to include requirements that the 
covered entity identify its service providers that receive, maintain, 
or process information, or are otherwise permitted to access its 
information systems and any of its information residing on those 
systems, and assess the cybersecurity risks associated with its use of 
these service providers.\396\ Second, under proposed Rule 10, a covered 
entity's policies and procedures would need to require oversight of 
service providers that receive, maintain, or process its information, 
or are otherwise permitted to access its information systems and the 
information residing on those systems, pursuant to a written contract 
between the covered entity and the service provider, and through that 
written contract the service providers would need to be required to 
implement and maintain appropriate measures that are designed to 
protect the covered entity's information systems and information 
residing on those systems.\397\
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    \395\ See paragraph (b)(1)(i)(A) of proposed Rule 10; see also 
section II.B.1.a of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal 
(discussing this requirement in more detail).
    \396\ See paragraph (b)(1)(i)(A)(2) of proposed Rule 10.
    \397\ See paragraphs (b)(1)(iii)(B) of proposed Rule 10; see 
also section II.B.1.c. of this release (discussing this requirement 
in more detail).
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    A covered entity that implements these requirements of proposed 
Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal with respect to its 
SCI systems and indirect SCI systems should generally satisfy the 
proposed requirements of Regulation SCI that the SCI entity's policies 
and procedures include a program to manage and oversee third-party 
providers that provide functionality, support or service, directly or 
indirectly, for SCI systems and indirect SCI systems. Similarly, a 
broker-dealer that is an SCI entity that implements these requirements 
of Regulation SCI should generally comply with the proposed 
requirements of Regulation S-P's safeguards provisions relating to the 
oversight of service providers.
    Unauthorized Access Requirements. Under the proposed amendments to 
Regulation SCI, SCI entities would be required to have a program to 
prevent the unauthorized access to their SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems, and information residing therein, and are discussed above in 
more detail in section III.C.3.a. The proposed amendments to Regulation 
S-P's disposal provisions would require broker-dealers that maintain or 
otherwise possess consumer information or customer information for a 
business purpose to properly dispose of this information by taking 
reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access to or use of 
the information in connection with its disposal.\398\ The broker-dealer 
would be required to adopt and implement written policies and 
procedures that address the proper disposal of consumer information and 
customer information in accordance with this standard.\399\
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    \398\ See Regulation S-P 2023 Proposing Release. As discussed 
above, the general policies and procedures requirements of 
Regulation S-P's safeguards provisions require the policies and 
procedures--among other things--to protect against unauthorized 
access to or use of customer records or information that could 
result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer. See 17 
CFR 248.30(a)(3).
    \399\ See Regulation S-P 2023 Proposing Release.
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    Proposed Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would 
have several policies and procedures requirements that are designed to 
address similar cybersecurity-related risks to these proposed 
requirements of Regulation SCI and the proposed disposal provisions of 
Regulation S-P. First, a covered entity's policies and procedures under 
proposed Rule 10 would need controls: (1) requiring standards of 
behavior for individuals authorized to access the covered entity's 
information systems and the information residing on those systems, such 
as an acceptable use policy; (2) identifying and authenticating 
individual users, including but not limited to implementing 
authentication measures that require users to present a combination of 
two or more credentials for access verification; (3) establishing 
procedures for the timely distribution, replacement, and revocation of 
passwords or methods of authentication; (4) restricting access to 
specific information systems of the covered entity or components 
thereof and the information residing on those systems solely to 
individuals requiring access to the systems and information as is 
necessary for them to perform their responsibilities and functions on 
behalf of the covered entity; and (5) securing remote access 
technologies.\400\
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    \400\ See paragraphs (b)(1)(ii)(A) through (E) of proposed Rule 
10; see also section II.B.1.b of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal (discussing these requirements in more detail).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, under proposed Rule 10, a covered entity's policies and 
procedures would need to include measures designed to protect the 
covered entity's information systems and protect the information 
residing on those systems from unauthorized access or use, based on a 
periodic assessment of the covered entity's information systems and the 
information that resides on the systems.\401\ The periodic assessment 
would need to take into account: (1) the sensitivity level and 
importance of the information to the covered entity's business 
operations; (2) whether any of the information is personal information; 
(3) where and how the information is accessed, stored and transmitted, 
including the monitoring of information in transmission; (4) the 
information systems' access controls and malware protection; and (5) 
the potential effect a cybersecurity incident involving the information 
could have on the covered entity and its customers, counterparties, 
members, registrants, or users, including the potential to cause a 
significant cybersecurity incident.\402\
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    \401\ See paragraph (b)(1)(iii)(A) of proposed Rule 10; see also 
section II.B.1.c. of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal 
(discussing these requirements in more detail).
    \402\ See paragraphs (b)(1)(iii)(A)(1) through (5) of proposed 
Rule 10.
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    A covered entity that implements these requirements of proposed 
Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal with respect to its 
SCI systems and indirect SCI systems should generally satisfy the 
proposed requirements of Regulation SCI that the SCI entity's policies 
and procedures include a program to prevent the unauthorized access to 
their SCI systems and indirect SCI systems, and information residing 
therein. Similarly, a broker-dealer that is an SCI entity that 
implements these proposed requirements of Regulation SCI should 
generally satisfy the proposed requirements of Regulation S-P's 
disposal provisions to adopt and implement written policies and 
procedures that address the proper disposal of consumer information and 
customer information.
    Review Requirements. The current and proposed provisions of 
Regulation SCI prescribe certain elements that must be included in each 
SCI entity's policies and procedures relating to regular reviews and 
testing, penetration testing, and the SCI review, and are discussed 
above in more detail in sections II.B.2, II.B.4, III.C.3.b, and 
III.C.4.
    Proposed Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would 
have several policies and procedures requirements that are designed to

[[Page 23196]]

address similar cybersecurity-related risks to these existing and 
proposed requirements of Regulation SCI. First, a covered entity's 
policies and procedures under proposed Rule 10 would need to require 
periodic assessments of cybersecurity risks associated with the covered 
entity's information systems and information residing on those 
systems.\403\ Moreover, this element of the policies and procedures 
would need to include requirements that the covered entity categorize 
and prioritize cybersecurity risks based on an inventory of the 
components of the covered entity's information systems and information 
residing on those systems and the potential effect of a cybersecurity 
incident on the covered entity.\404\ Second, under proposed Rule 10, a 
covered entity's policies and procedures would need to require measures 
designed to detect, mitigate, and remediate any cybersecurity threats 
and vulnerabilities with respect to the covered entity's information 
systems and the information residing on those systems.\405\
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    \403\ See paragraph (b)(1)(i)(A) of proposed Rule 10; see also 
section II.B.1.a of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal 
(discussing this requirement in more detail).
    \404\ See paragraph (b)(1)(i)(A)(1) of proposed Rule 10.
    \405\ See paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of proposed Rule 10; see also 
section II.B.1.d of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal 
(discussing this requirement in more detail).
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    A covered entity that implements these requirements of proposed 
Rule 10 with respect to its SCI systems and indirect SCI systems should 
generally satisfy the current requirements of Regulation SCI that the 
SCI entity's policies and procedures require regular reviews and 
testing of SCI systems and indirect SCI systems, including backup 
systems, to identify vulnerabilities from internal and external 
threats. Further, while proposed Rule 10 does not require penetration 
testing, the proposed rule requires measures designed to protect the 
covered entity's information systems and protect the information 
residing on those systems from unauthorized access or use, based on a 
periodic assessment of the covered entity's information systems and the 
information that resides on the systems \406\ and penetration testing 
could be part of these measures.\407\ Therefore, the existing and 
proposed requirements of Regulation SCI requiring penetration testing 
could be incorporated into and should logically fit within a covered 
entity's policies and procedures to address cybersecurity risks under 
proposed Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal.
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    \406\ See paragraph (b)(1)(iii)(A) of proposed Rule 10.
    \407\ See also section II.B.1.c of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal.
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    Response Program. Regulation SCI requires SCI entities to have 
policies and procedures to monitor its SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems for SCI events, which include systems intrusions for 
unauthorized access, and also requires them to have policies and 
procedures that include escalation procedures to quickly inform 
responsible SCI personnel of potential SCI events, which are discussed 
above in more detail in section II.B.2.\408\ The amendments to 
Regulation S-P's safeguards provisions would require the policies and 
procedures to include a response program for unauthorized access to or 
use of customer information. Further, the response program would need 
to be reasonably designed to detect, respond to, and recover from 
unauthorized access to or use of customer information, including 
procedures, among others: (1) to assess the nature and scope of any 
incident involving unauthorized access to or use of customer 
information and identify the customer information systems and types of 
customer information that may have been accessed or used without 
authorization; and (2) to take appropriate steps to contain and control 
the incident to prevent further unauthorized access to or use of 
customer information.\409\
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    \408\ See paragraphs (a)(2)(vii) and (c)(1) of Rule 1001 of 
Regulation SCI, respectively. See also Rule 1002(a) of Regulation 
SCI and supra sections II.B.3 and III.C.3.c (discussing Regulation 
SCI's current and proposed requirements with respect to taking 
corrective action for SCI events, including systems intrusions).
    \409\ See Regulation S-P 2023 Proposing Release. The response 
program also would need to have procedures to notify each affected 
individual whose sensitive customer information was, or is 
reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without 
authorization unless the covered institution determines, after a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and circumstances of the 
incident of unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer 
information, the sensitive customer information has not been, and is 
not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result in 
substantial harm or inconvenience. See id.
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    Proposed Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would 
have several policies and procedures requirements that are designed to 
address similar cybersecurity-related risks to these proposed 
requirements of Regulation SCI and the proposed requirements of the 
safeguards provisions of Regulation S-P. First, under proposed Rule 10, 
a covered entity's policies and procedures would need to have measures 
designed to detect, mitigate, and remediate any cybersecurity threats 
and vulnerabilities with respect to the covered entity's information 
systems and the information residing on those systems.\410\ Second, 
under proposed Rule 10, a covered entity's policies and procedures 
would need to have measures designed to detect, respond to, and recover 
from a cybersecurity incident, including policies and procedures that 
are reasonably designed to ensure (among other things): (1) the 
continued operations of the covered entity; (2) the protection of the 
covered entity's information systems and the information residing on 
those systems; and (3) external and internal cybersecurity incident 
information sharing and communications.\411\
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    \410\ See paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of proposed Rule 10; see also 
section II.B.1.d of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal 
(discussing this requirement in more detail).
    \411\ See paragraph (b)(1)(v) of proposed Rule 10; see also 
section II.B.1.e of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal 
(discussing this requirement in more detail).
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    A covered entity that implements reasonably designed policies and 
procedures in compliance with these requirements of proposed Rule 10 of 
the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal should generally satisfy the 
current and proposed requirements of Regulation SCI and Regulation S-
P's safeguards provisions relating to response programs for 
unauthorized access.
d. Commission Notification
    As discussed above in sections II.B.3 and III.C.3.c, Regulation SCI 
(currently and as it would be amended) provides the framework for 
notifying the Commission of SCI events including, among other things, 
requirements to: notify the Commission of the event immediately; 
provide a written notification on Form SCI within 24 hours that 
includes a description of the SCI event and the system(s) affected, 
with other information required to the extent available at the time; 
provide regular updates regarding the SCI event until the event is 
resolved; and submit a final detailed written report regarding the SCI 
event.\412\ If proposed Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal is adopted as proposed, it would establish a framework for 
covered entities to provide the Commission (and other regulators, if 
applicable) with immediate written electronic notice of a significant 
cybersecurity incident affecting the covered entity and, thereafter, 
report and update information about the

[[Page 23197]]

significant cybersecurity incident by filing Part I of proposed Form 
SCIR with the Commission (and other regulators, if applicable).\413\ 
Part I of proposed of Form SCIR would elicit information about the 
significant cybersecurity incident and the covered entity's efforts to 
respond to, and recover from, the incident.
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    \412\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(b); supra sections II.B.2 and 
III.C.3.c (discussing Regulation SCI's current and proposed 
requirements relating to SCI events, which include systems 
intrusions, and Commission notification for SCI events).
    \413\ See paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of proposed Rule 10 
(requiring covered entities to provide immediate written notice and 
subsequent reporting on Part I of proposed Form SCIR of significant 
cybersecurity incidents); and sections II.B.2. and II.B.4. of the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal (discussing the requirements of 
paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of proposed Rule 10 and Part I of Form 
SCIR in more detail).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consequently, an SCI entity that is also a covered entity under the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal that experiences a systems 
intrusion under Regulation SCI that also is a significant cybersecurity 
incident under proposed Rule 10 would be required to make two filings 
for the single incident: one on Form SCI and the other on Part I of 
proposed Form SCIR. The SCI entity also would be required to make 
additional filings on Forms SCI and SCIR pertaining to the systems 
intrusion (i.e., to provide updates and final reports). The Commission 
believes the approach of having two separate notification and reporting 
programs--one under Regulation SCI and the other under proposed Rule 10 
of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal--would be appropriate for 
the following reasons.
    As discussed earlier, most broker-dealers would not be SCI entities 
under the current and proposed requirements of Regulation SCI.\414\ 
Certain of the broker-dealers that are not SCI entities (currently and 
as it would be amended) would be covered entities under the Exchange 
Act Cybersecurity Proposal, as would other types of entities.\415\ In 
addition, the current and proposed reporting requirements of Regulation 
SCI are or would be triggered by events impacting SCI systems and 
indirect SCI systems. In addition to SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems, covered entities that are or would be SCI entities use and 
rely on information systems that are not SCI systems or indirect SCI 
systems under the current and proposed amendments to Regulation SCI. 
For these reasons, covered entities under the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal could be impacted by significant cybersecurity 
incidents that do not trigger the current and proposed notification 
requirements of Regulation SCI either because they do not meet the 
current or proposed definitions of ``SCI entity'' or because the 
significant cybersecurity incident does not meet the current or 
proposed definitions of ``SCI event.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \414\ See section II.F.1.b of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal.
    \415\ See paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(A) and (F) of proposed Rule 10 
(defining the categories of broker-dealers that would be covered 
entities); see also supra note 378.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The objective of notification and reporting requirements of 
proposed Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal is to 
improve the Commission's ability to monitor and respond to significant 
cybersecurity incidents and use the information reported about them to 
better understand how they can be avoided or mitigated.\416\ For this 
reason, Part I of proposed Form SCIR is tailored to elicit information 
relating specifically to cybersecurity, such as information relating to 
the threat actor, and the impact of the incident on any data or 
personal information that may have been accessed.\417\ The Commission 
and its staff could use the information reported on Part I of Form SCIR 
to monitor the U.S. securities markets and the covered entities that 
support those markets broadly from a cybersecurity perspective, 
including identifying cybersecurity threats and trends from a market-
wide view. By requiring all covered entities to report information 
about a significant cybersecurity incident on a common form, the 
information obtained from these filings over time would create a 
comprehensive set of data of all significant cybersecurity incidents 
impacting covered entities that is based on these entities responding 
to the same check boxes and questions on the form. This would 
facilitate analysis of the data, including analysis across different 
covered entities and significant cybersecurity incidents. Eventually, 
this set of data and the ability to analyze it by searching and sorting 
how different covered entities responded to the same questions on the 
form could be used to spot common trending risks and vulnerabilities as 
well as best practices employed by covered entities to respond to and 
recover from significant cybersecurity incidents.\418\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \416\ See section II.B.2.a of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal.
    \417\ See section II.B.2.b of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal.
    \418\ FSOC has found that ``[s]haring timely and actionable 
cybersecurity information can reduce the risk that cybersecurity 
incidents occur and can mitigate the impacts of those that do 
occur.'' FSOC, Annual Report (2021), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2021AnnualReport.pdf (``FSOC 
2021 Annual Report'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The current and proposed definitions of ``SCI event'' include not 
only cybersecurity events, but also events that are not related to 
significant cybersecurity incidents under the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal.\419\ For example, under the current and 
proposed requirements of Regulation SCI, the definition of ``SCI 
event'' includes ``systems disruptions,'' which are events in an SCI 
entity's SCI systems that disrupts, or significantly degrades, the 
normal operation of an SCI system.\420\ Therefore, the definitions are 
not limited to events in an SCI entity's SCI systems that disrupt, or 
significantly degrade, the normal operation of an SCI system caused by 
a significant cybersecurity incident. The information elicited in Form 
SCI reflects the broader scope of the reporting requirements of 
Regulation SCI (as compared to the narrower focus of proposed Rule 10 
on reporting about significant cybersecurity incidents). For example, 
Form SCI requires the SCI entity to identify the type of SCI event: 
systems compliance issue, systems disruption, and/or systems intrusion. 
In addition, Form SCI is tailored to elicit information specifically 
about SCI systems. For example, the form requires the SCI entity to 
indicate whether the type of SCI system impacted by the SCI event 
directly supports: (1) trading; (2) clearance and settlement; (3) order 
routing; (4) market data; (5) market regulation; and/or (6) market 
surveillance. If the impacted system is a critical SCI system, the SCI 
entity must indicate whether it directly supports functionality 
relating to: (1) clearance and settlement systems of clearing agencies; 
(2) openings, reopenings, and closings on the primary listing market; 
(3) trading halts; (4) initial public offerings; (5) the provision of 
consolidated market data; and/or (6) exclusively listed securities. The 
form also requires the SCI entity to indicate if the systems that 
provide functionality to the securities markets for which the 
availability of alternatives is significantly limited or nonexistent 
and without which there would be a material impact on fair and orderly 
markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \419\ See 17 CFR 242.1000 (defining the term ``SCI event''); see 
also supra sections II.B.3 and III.C.3.c (discussion the current and 
proposed requirements relating to SCI events, including systems 
intrusions).
    \420\ See 17 CFR 242.1000 (defining the term ``system 
disruption'' and including that term in the definition of ``SCI 
event'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. Information Dissemination and Disclosure
    As discussed above in sections II.B.3 and III.C.3.c, Regulation SCI 
(currently and as it would be amended) would require that SCI entities 
disseminate information to their members,

[[Page 23198]]

participants, or customers (as applicable) regarding SCI events, 
including systems intrusions.\421\ The proposed amendments to 
Regulation S-P would require broker-dealers to notify affected 
individuals whose sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably 
likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization.\422\ 
Proposed Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal would 
require a covered entity to make two types of public disclosures 
relating to cybersecurity on Part II of proposed Form SCIR.\423\ 
Covered entities would be required to make the disclosures by filing 
Part II of proposed Form SCIR on the Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system and posting a copy of the filing 
on their business websites.\424\ In addition, a covered entity that is 
either a carrying or introducing broker-dealer would be required to 
provide a copy of the most recently filed Part II of Form SCIR to a 
customer as part of the account opening process. Thereafter, the 
carrying or introducing broker-dealer would need to provide the 
customer with the most recently filed form annually. The copies of the 
form would need to be provided to the customer using the same means 
that the customer elects to receive account statements (e.g., by email 
or through the postal service). Finally, a covered entity would be 
required to make updated disclosures promptly through each of the 
methods described above (as applicable) if the information required to 
be disclosed about cybersecurity risk or significant cybersecurity 
incidents materially changes, including, in the case of the disclosure 
about significant cybersecurity incidents, after the occurrence of a 
new significant cybersecurity incident or when information about a 
previously disclosed significant cybersecurity incident materially 
changes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \421\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(c).
    \422\ However, disclosure under proposed Regulation S-P would 
not be required if ``a covered institution has determined, after a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and circumstances of the 
incident of unauthorized access to or use of sensitive customer 
information, that sensitive customer information has not been, and 
is not reasonably likely to be, used in a manner that would result 
in substantial harm or inconvenience.'' See Regulation S-P 2023 
Proposing Release. The proposed amendments to Regulation S-P would 
define ``sensitive customer information'' to mean any component of 
customer information alone or in conjunction with any other 
information, the compromise of which could create a reasonably 
likely risk of substantial harm or inconvenience to an individual 
identified with the information. Id. The proposed amendments would 
provide example of sensitive customer information. Id.
    \423\ See paragraph (d)(1) of proposed Rule 10.
    \424\ See section II.B.3.b (discussing these proposed 
requirements in more detail).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consequently, a covered entity would, if it experiences a 
``significant cybersecurity incident,'' be required to make updated 
disclosures under proposed Rule 10 by filing Part II of proposed Form 
SCIR on EDGAR, posting a copy of the form on its business website, and, 
in the case of a carrying or introducing broker-dealer, by sending the 
disclosure to its customers using the same means that the customer 
elects to receive account statements. Thus, if an SCI entity is a 
covered entity under the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and if the 
SCI event would be a significant cybersecurity incident under the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal, the SCI entity also could be 
required to disseminate certain information about the SCI event to 
certain of its members, participants, or customers (as applicable). 
Further, if the SCI entity is a broker-dealer and, therefore, subject 
to Regulation S-P (as it is proposed to be amended), the broker-dealer 
also could be required to notify individuals whose sensitive customer 
information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used 
without authorization.
    However, the Commission believes that this result would be 
appropriate. First, as discussed above, Regulation SCI (currently and 
as it would be amended), proposed Rule 10, and Regulation S-P (as 
proposed to be amended) require different types of information to be 
disclosed. Second, as discussed above, the disclosures, for the most 
part, would be made to different persons: (1) affected members,\425\ 
participants, or customers (as applicable) of the SCI entity in the 
case of Regulation SCI; (2) the public at large in the case of proposed 
Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal; \426\ and (3) 
affected individuals whose sensitive customer information was, or is 
reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization 
or, in some cases, all individuals whose information resides in the 
customer information system that was accessed or used without 
authorization in the case of Regulation S-P (as proposed to be 
amended).\427\ For these reasons, the Commission believes it would be 
appropriate to apply these current and proposed requirements of 
Regulation SCI to SCI entities even if they would be subject to the 
disclosure requirements of proposed Rule 10 of the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal and/or Regulation S-P (as proposed to be 
amended).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \425\ Information regarding major SCI events would be required 
to be disseminated by an SCI entity to all of its members, 
participants, or customers (as applicable). See current and proposed 
Rule 1002(c)(3) of Regulation SCI.
    \426\ A carrying broker-dealer would be required to make the 
disclosures to its customers as well through the means by which they 
receive account statements.
    \427\ Under the Regulation SCI and Regulation S-P proposals, 
there could be circumstances in which a compromise involving 
sensitive customer information at a broker-dealer that is an SCI 
entity could result in two forms of notification being provided to 
customers for the same incident. In addition, under the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal, the broker-dealer also may need to publicly 
disclose a summary description of the incident via EDGAR and the 
entity's business internet website, and, in the case of an 
introducing or carrying broker-dealer, send a copy of the disclosure 
to its customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Request for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on the relation between the 
requirements of Regulation SCI (as it currently exists and as it is 
proposed to be amended), proposed Rule 10, and Regulation S-P (as it 
currently exists and as it is proposed to be amended). In addition, the 
Commission is requesting comment on the following matters:
    87. Should the policies and procedures requirements of current and 
proposed Regulation SCI regarding cybersecurity be modified to address 
SCI entities that also would be subject to proposed Rule 10 of the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and/or the existing and proposed 
requirements of Regulation S-P? For example, would it be particularly 
costly or create practical implementation difficulties to apply the 
requirements of current and proposed Regulation SCI to have policies 
and procedures to address cybersecurity risks to SCI entities even if 
they also would be subject to requirements to have policies and 
procedures under proposed Rule 10 (if it is adopted) and/or Regulation 
S-P that address certain cybersecurity risks (currently and it they 
would be amended)? If so, explain why. If not, explain why not. Are 
there ways the policies and procedures requirements of current or 
proposed Regulation SCI regarding could be modified to minimize these 
potential impacts while achieving the separate goals of this proposal? 
If so, explain how and suggest specific modifications.
    88. Should the Commission notification and reporting requirements 
of current and proposed Regulation SCI be modified to address SCI 
entities that also would be subject to the proposed requirements of 
Rule 10 of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal? For example, would 
it be particularly costly or create practical implementation 
difficulties to apply the Commission notification and reporting 
requirements

[[Page 23199]]

of current and proposed Regulation SCI and Form SCI to SCI entities 
even if they also would be subject to immediate notification and 
subsequent reporting requirements under proposed Rule 10 of the 
Exchange Act Cybersecurity Proposal and Part I of proposed Form SCIR 
(if they are adopted)? If so, explain why. If not, explain why not. Are 
there ways the Commission notification and reporting requirements of 
current or proposed Regulation SCI and Form SCI could be modified to 
minimize these potential impacts while achieving the separate goals of 
this proposal? If so, explain how and suggest specific modifications. 
For example, should Form SCI be modified to include a section that 
incorporates the check boxes and questions of Part I of Form SCIR so 
that a single form could be filed to meet the reporting requirements of 
Regulation SCI and proposed Rule 10? If so, explain why. If not, 
explain why not. Should the Commission modify the proposed Commission 
notification framework for systems intrusions that are also significant 
cybersecurity incidents under Rule 10? For example, should such systems 
intrusions be initially reported (i.e., immediately and for the 24-hour 
notification) on Form SCI, with subsequent reports exempted from Rule 
1002(b)'s requirements if they are reported to the Commission on Form 
SCIR pursuant to the proposed requirements of Rule 10? Why or why not? 
Are there other ways Form SCI could be modified to combine the elements 
of Part I of Form SCIR? If so, explain how.
    89. Should the disclosure requirements of proposed and current 
Regulation SCI be modified to address SCI entities that also would be 
subject to the proposed requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal and the existing and proposed requirements of Regulation S-P? 
For example, would it be particularly costly or create practical 
implementation difficulties to apply the disclosure requirements of 
current and proposed Regulation SCI to SCI entities even if they also 
would be subject to the proposed Rule 10 and Part II of proposed form 
SCIR (if they are adopted) the current and proposed requirements of 
Regulation S-P? If so, explain why. If not, explain why not. Are there 
ways the disclosure requirements of Regulation SCI could be modified to 
minimize these potential impacts while achieving the separate goals of 
this proposal? If so, explain how and suggest specific modifications.
    90. Would the addition of the requirements in the Exchange Act 
Cybersecurity Proposal--together with the current broker-dealer 
regulatory regime, including the Market Access Rule and other 
Commission and FINRA rules--be sufficient to reasonably ensure the 
operational capability of the technological systems of the proposed SCI 
broker-dealers? Why or why not? For example, are there any provisions 
of Regulation SCI that, if added to the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal as it applies to broker-dealers, would help ensure the 
operational capability of the technological systems of the proposed SCI 
broker-dealers? Which provisions?

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Certain provisions of the proposal would contain a new ``collection 
of information'' within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995 (``PRA'').\428\ The Commission is submitting the proposed rule 
amendments to the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') for review 
and approval in accordance with the PRA and its implementing 
regulations.\429\ An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is 
not required to respond to a collection of information unless it 
displays a currently valid OMB control number.\430\ The Commission is 
proposing to alter the 31 existing collections of information and apply 
such collections of information to new categories of respondents. The 
title for the collections of information is: Regulation Systems 
Compliance and Integrity (OMB control number 3235-0703). The burden 
estimates contained in this section do not include any other possible 
costs or economic effects beyond the burdens required to be calculated 
for PRA purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \428\ See 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
    \429\ See 44 U.S.C. 3507; 5 CFR 1320.11.
    \430\ See 5 CFR 1320.11(l).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Summary of Collections of Information

    The proposed amendments to Regulation SCI create paperwork burdens 
under the PRA by (1) adding new categories of respondents to the 31 
existing collections of information (across 7 rules) noted above and 
(2) modifying the requirements of 16 of those collections, as noted 
below. For entities that are already required to comply with Regulation 
SCI (``Current SCI Entities''), the proposed amendments would result in 
the modification of certain collections of information. Entities that 
would become subject to Regulation SCI as a result of the proposed 
amendments (``New SCI Entities'') would be newly subject to the 31 
existing collections of information, including the modifications.\431\ 
The collections of information and applicable categories of new 
respondents are summarized (by rule) in the following table.\432\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \431\ See infra section IV.C (Respondents) for more information 
on Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities.
    \432\ Unless otherwise described, none of the existing 
information collections are being revised with new requirements.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Collection of information                Rule                Burden description       Respondent categories
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 1001 of Regulation SCI........  Rule 1001(a)..........  Rule Description:            Current SCI Entities
                                                              Requirement to establish,    and New SCI Entities.
                                                              maintain, and enforce
                                                              written policies and
                                                              procedures related to
                                                              capacity, integrity,
                                                              resiliency, availability,
                                                              and security.
                                                             Revised burden: ensure
                                                              policies and procedures
                                                              include a program to
                                                              manage and oversee third-
                                                              party providers that
                                                              provide functionality,
                                                              support or service for the
                                                              SCI entity's SCI systems;
                                                              inventory all SCI systems,
                                                              include a program to
                                                              prevent unauthorized
                                                              access to SCI system
                                                              access and the information
                                                              residing therein, identify
                                                              the SCI industry standard
                                                              with which such policy and
                                                              procedure is consistent,
                                                              if any.

[[Page 23200]]

 
                                     Rule 1001(b)..........  Rule Description:            New SCI Entities.
                                                              Requirement to establish,
                                                              maintain, and enforce
                                                              policies and procedures
                                                              reasonably designed to
                                                              ensure that its SCI
                                                              systems operate in a
                                                              manner that complies with
                                                              the Exchange Act, rules
                                                              and regulations
                                                              thereunder, and the
                                                              entity's rules and
                                                              governing documents.
                                     Rule 1001(c)..........  Rule Description:            New SCI Entities.
                                                              Establish, maintain, and
                                                              enforce reasonably
                                                              designed written policies
                                                              and procedures that
                                                              include the criteria for
                                                              identifying responsible
                                                              SCI personnel, the
                                                              designation and
                                                              documentation of
                                                              responsible SCI personnel,
                                                              and escalation procedures
                                                              to inform responsible SCI
                                                              personnel of potential SCI
                                                              events.
Rule 1002 of Regulation SCI........  Rule 1002(a)..........  Rule Description: Each SCI   New SCI Entities.
                                                              entity is required to take
                                                              appropriate corrective
                                                              action upon any
                                                              responsible SCI personnel
                                                              having a reasonable basis
                                                              to conclude that an SCI
                                                              event has occurred.
                                     Rule 1002(b)..........  Rule Description: Rules      Current SCI Entities
                                                              1002(b)(1) through (4):      and New SCI Entities.
                                                              Requirement that each SCI
                                                              entity, upon any
                                                              responsible SCI personnel
                                                              having a reasonable basis
                                                              to conclude that an SCI
                                                              event has occurred, notify
                                                              the Commission immediately
                                                              of such SCI event and
                                                              submit a written
                                                              notification within 24
                                                              hours of responsible SCI
                                                              personnel having a
                                                              reasonable basis to
                                                              conclude there was an SCI
                                                              event. Periodic updates
                                                              are required pertaining to
                                                              the SCI event on either a
                                                              regular basis or at such
                                                              frequency requested by
                                                              representatives of the
                                                              Commission. An interim
                                                              written notification is
                                                              required if the SCI event
                                                              is not closed within 30
                                                              days of its occurrence. A
                                                              final notification is
                                                              required to be submitted
                                                              within five days of the
                                                              resolution and closure of
                                                              the SCI event.
                                                             Rule 1002(b)(5): For events
                                                              that the SCI entity
                                                              reasonably estimates would
                                                              have no, or a de minimis
                                                              impact on the SCI entity's
                                                              operations or on market
                                                              participants, submit a
                                                              report within 30 days
                                                              after the end of each
                                                              calendar quarter
                                                              containing a summary
                                                              description of such
                                                              systems disruptions and
                                                              systems intrusions.
                                                             Revised burden: add (1)
                                                              cybersecurity events that
                                                              disrupt, or significantly
                                                              degrade the normal
                                                              operation of an SCI
                                                              system, and (2)
                                                              significant attempted
                                                              unauthorized entries into
                                                              SCI systems or indirect
                                                              SCI systems, as determined
                                                              by the SCI entity pursuant
                                                              to established reasonable
                                                              written criteria, to the
                                                              definition of systems
                                                              intrusions in Rule 1000,
                                                              thus requiring that SCI
                                                              entities provide
                                                              notifications under Rule
                                                              1002(b)(1) through (4);
                                                              eliminate the de minimis
                                                              exception's applicability
                                                              to systems intrusions,
                                                              thus requiring all systems
                                                              intrusions to be reported
                                                              pursuant to Rule
                                                              1002(b)(1) through (4);
                                                              require interim written
                                                              notification to the
                                                              Commission to include a
                                                              copy of any information
                                                              disseminated pursuant to
                                                              Rule 1002(c) regarding the
                                                              SCI event by SCI broker-
                                                              dealers to their customers.
                                     Rule 1002(c)..........  Rule Description:            Current SCI Entities
                                                              Requirements to              and New SCI Entities.
                                                              disseminate certain
                                                              information to members and
                                                              participants concerning
                                                              SCI events promptly after
                                                              any responsible SCI
                                                              personnel has a reasonable
                                                              basis to conclude that an
                                                              SCI event has occurred.
                                                              For major SCI events,
                                                              information must be
                                                              disseminated to all
                                                              members and participants,
                                                              and for SCI events that
                                                              are not major, the
                                                              information must be
                                                              disseminated to members or
                                                              participants that any
                                                              responsible SCI personnel
                                                              has reasonably estimated
                                                              may have been affected by
                                                              the SCI event.

[[Page 23201]]

 
                                                             Revised burden: add
                                                              cybersecurity events to
                                                              the definition of systems
                                                              intrusions in Rule 1000,
                                                              thus making them SCI
                                                              events and requiring that
                                                              SCI entities provide
                                                              notifications under Rule
                                                              1002(c)(2) for those
                                                              additional SCI events;
                                                              exclude systems intrusions
                                                              that are significant
                                                              attempted unauthorized
                                                              entries into the SCI
                                                              systems or indirect SCI
                                                              systems of an SCI entity
                                                              from information
                                                              dissemination
                                                              requirements; add that SCI
                                                              broker-dealers would
                                                              notify their customers
                                                              (rather than members or
                                                              participants).
Rule 1003 of Regulation SCI........  Rule 1003(a)..........  Rule Description: Submit     New SCI Entities.
                                                              quarterly report
                                                              describing completed,
                                                              ongoing, and planned
                                                              material changes to SCI
                                                              systems and the security
                                                              of indirect SCI systems;
                                                              establish reasonable
                                                              written criteria to
                                                              identify changes to SCI
                                                              systems and the security
                                                              of indirect SCI systems as
                                                              material and report such
                                                              changes in accordance with
                                                              such criteria. Promptly
                                                              submit a supplemental
                                                              report notifying the
                                                              Commission of a material
                                                              error in or material
                                                              omission from a previously
                                                              submitted report.
                                     Rule 1003(b)..........  Rule Description:            Current SCI Entities
                                                              Requirement to conduct an    and New SCI Entities.
                                                              SCI review of the SCI
                                                              entity's compliance with
                                                              Regulation SCI not less
                                                              than once each calendar
                                                              year; conduct penetration
                                                              test reviews not less than
                                                              once every three years.
                                                             Revised burden: include
                                                              certain additional
                                                              requirements and
                                                              information in SCI
                                                              reviews, require the SCI
                                                              review to be performed
                                                              annually, and require a
                                                              response by senior
                                                              management be reported to
                                                              the Commission.
Rule 1004 of Regulation SCI........  Rule 1004.............  Rule Description: Establish  Current SCI Entities
                                                              standards to designate       and New SCI Entities.
                                                              members and participants
                                                              that are the minimum
                                                              necessary for the
                                                              maintenance of fair and
                                                              orderly markets, designate
                                                              members or participants
                                                              and require their
                                                              participation in testing
                                                              of the BC/DR plans
                                                              pursuant to such
                                                              standards, and coordinate
                                                              testing on an industry or
                                                              sector-wide basis with
                                                              other SCI entities.
                                                             Revised burden: require SCI
                                                              entities to establish
                                                              standards for designating
                                                              certain third-party
                                                              providers that are the
                                                              minimum necessary for the
                                                              maintenance of fair and
                                                              orderly markets, and
                                                              designate third-party
                                                              providers for BC/DR
                                                              testing pursuant to those
                                                              standards.
Rule 1005 of Regulation SCI........  Rule 1005.............  Rule Description:            Current SCI Entities
                                                              Requirement to make, keep,   and New SCI Entities.
                                                              and preserve all documents
                                                              relating to compliance
                                                              with Regulation SCI.
                                                             Revised burden: Entities
                                                              that ``otherwise [cease]
                                                              to be an SCI entity'' are
                                                              required to comply with
                                                              the recordkeeping
                                                              requirements in this
                                                              section.
Rule 1006..........................  Rule 1006.............  Rule Description: Require    New SCI Entities.
                                                              submissions to the
                                                              Commission pursuant to
                                                              Regulation SCI to be made
                                                              electronically on Form SCI.
Rule 1007..........................  Rule 1007.............  Rule Description:            New SCI Entities.
                                                              Requirement that SCI
                                                              entities make available
                                                              records required to be
                                                              filed or kept under
                                                              Regulation SCI that are
                                                              prepared or maintained by
                                                              a service bureau or other
                                                              recordkeeping service on
                                                              behalf of the SCI entity.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Proposed Use of Information

    The existing information collections and the proposed amendments 
are used as described below:
1. Rule 1001 of Regulation SCI
    Rule 1001(a)(1) of Regulation SCI requires each SCI entity to 
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that their SCI systems and, for purposes 
of security standards, indirect SCI systems, have levels of capacity, 
integrity, resiliency, availability, and security adequate to maintain 
their operational capability and promote the maintenance of fair and 
orderly markets.\433\ Rule 1001(a)(2) of Regulation SCI requires that, 
at a minimum, such policies and procedures include: current and future 
capacity planning; periodic stress testing; systems development and 
testing methodology; reviews and testing to identify vulnerabilities; 
business continuity and disaster recovery planning (inclusive of backup 
systems that are geographically diverse and designed to meet specified 
recovery

[[Page 23202]]

time objectives); standards for market data collection, processing, and 
dissemination; and monitoring to identify potential SCI events.\434\ 
Rule 1001(a)(3) of Regulation SCI requires that SCI entities 
periodically review the effectiveness of these policies and procedures 
and take prompt action to remedy any deficiencies.\435\ Rule 1001(a)(4) 
of Regulation SCI provides that an SCI entity's policies and procedures 
will be deemed to be reasonably designed if they are consistent with 
current SCI industry standards, which is defined to be comprised of 
information technology practices that are widely available to 
information technology professionals in the financial sector and issued 
by an authoritative body that is a U.S. governmental entity or agency, 
association of U.S. governmental entities or agencies, or widely 
recognized organization; \436\ however, Rule 1001(a)(4) of Regulation 
SCI also makes clear that compliance with such ``current SCI industry 
standards'' is not the exclusive means to comply with these 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \433\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(1).
    \434\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(2).
    \435\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(3).
    \436\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(a)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 1001(b) of Regulation SCI requires each SCI entity to 
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to ensure that its SCI systems operate in a manner 
that complies with the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations 
thereunder and the entity's rules and governing documents, as 
applicable, and specifies certain minimum requirements for such 
policies and procedures.\437\ Rule 1001(c) of Regulation SCI requires 
SCI entities to establish, maintain, and enforce reasonably designed 
written policies and procedures that include the criteria for 
identifying responsible SCI personnel, the designation and 
documentation of responsible SCI personnel, and escalation procedures 
to quickly inform responsible SCI personnel of potential SCI 
events.\438\
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    \437\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(b).
    \438\ See 17 CFR 242.1001(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is proposing revisions to Rule 1001(a)(2) and (4) of 
Regulation SCI to include four additional elements in the policies and 
procedures: (1) the maintenance of a written inventory of all SCI 
systems, critical SCI systems, and indirect SCI systems, including a 
lifecycle management program with respect to such systems; (2) a 
program to manage and oversee third-party providers that includes an 
initial and periodic review of contracts with third-party providers and 
a risk-based assessment of each third-party provider's criticality to 
the SCI entity; (3) a program to prevent unauthorized SCI system 
access; and (4) identification of the SCI industry standard with which 
such policies and procedures are consistent, if any. The Commission 
also proposes to amend the existing requirements in Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) 
for the BC/DR plan to include the requirement to maintain backup and 
recovery capabilities that are reasonably designed to address the 
unavailability of any third-party provider without which there would be 
a material impact on any of its critical SCI systems.
    The requirement to have a third-party provider management program 
would help ensure that any third-party provider an SCI entity selects 
is able to support the SCI entity's compliance with Regulation SCI's 
requirements.
    Additionally, the proposed revisions would ensure SCI entities are 
creating an inventory of their SCI systems, critical SCI systems, and 
indirect SCI systems and have a lifecycle management program for such 
systems, which would ensure that SCI entities are able to identify when 
a system becomes an SCI system or indirect SCI system and when it 
ceases to be one. Next, the revisions would require SCI entities to 
have in place a program to prevent unauthorized SCI system access. The 
existing collections of information, which would be extended to new SCI 
entities would advance the goals of promoting the maintenance of fair 
an orderly markets and improving Commission review and oversight of 
U.S. securities market infrastructure. The proposed additional 
collections of information would advance these same goals.
2. Rule 1002 of Regulation SCI
    Under Rule 1002 of Regulation SCI, SCI entities have certain 
obligations regarding SCI events. Rule 1002(a) requires an SCI entity 
to begin to take appropriate corrective action when any responsible SCI 
personnel has a reasonable basis to conclude that an SCI event has 
occurred. The corrective action must include, at a minimum, mitigating 
potential harm to investors and market integrity resulting from the SCI 
event and devoting adequate resources to remedy the SCI event as soon 
as reasonably practicable.\439\ Rule 1002(b)(1) requires each SCI 
entity to immediately notify the Commission of an SCI event.\440\ Under 
17 CFR 242.1002(b)(2) (``Rule 1002(b)(2)''), each SCI entity is 
required, within 24 hours of any responsible SCI personnel having a 
reasonable basis to conclude that the SCI event has occurred, to submit 
a written notification to the Commission pertaining to the SCI event 
that includes a description of the SCI event and the system(s) 
affected, with other information required to the extent available at 
the time.\441\ Under 17 CFR 242.1002(b)(3) (``Rule 1002(b)(3)''), each 
SCI entity is required to provide regular updates regarding the SCI 
event until the event is resolved.\442\ Under 17 CFR 242.1002(b)(4)(i) 
(``Rule 1002(b)(4)(i)''), each SCI entity is required to submit written 
interim reports, as necessary, and a written final report regarding an 
SCI event to the Commission.\443\ Under 17 CFR 242.1002(b)(4)(ii) 
(``Rule 1002(b)(4)(ii)''), the information that is required to be 
included in the interim and final written reports is set forth, 
including the SCI entity's assessment of the types and number of market 
participants affected by the SCI event and the impact of the SCI event 
on the market, and a copy of any information disseminated pursuant to 
Rule 1002(c) regarding the SCI event to the SCI entity's members or 
participants. For any SCI event that ``has had, or the SCI entity 
reasonably estimates would have, no or a de minimis impact on the SCI 
entity's operations or on market participants,'' Rule 1002(b)(5) 
provides an exception to the general Commission notification 
requirements under Rule 1002(b) Instead, an SCI entity must make, keep, 
and preserve records relating to all such SCI events, and submit a 
quarterly report to the Commission regarding any such events that are 
systems disruptions or systems intrusions. SCI events that are reported 
immediately and later determined to have a de minimis impact may be 
reclassified as de minimis.\444\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \439\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(a).
    \440\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(b)(1).
    \441\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(b)(2).
    \442\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(b)(3).
    \443\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(b)(4).
    \444\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 1002(c) of Regulation SCI requires that SCI entities 
disseminate information to their members or participants regarding SCI 
events.\445\ Under 17 CFR 242.1002(c)(1)(i) (``Rule 1002(c)(1)(i)''), 
each SCI entity is required, promptly after any responsible SCI 
personnel has a reasonable basis to conclude that an SCI event (other 
than a systems intrusion) has occurred, to disseminate certain 
information to its members or participants. Under 17 CFR 
242.1002(c)(1)(ii) (``Rule 1002(c)(1)(ii)''), each SCI entity is 
required, when

[[Page 23203]]

known, to disseminate additional information about an SCI event (other 
than a systems intrusion) to its members or participants promptly. 
Under 17 CFR 242.1002(c)(1)(iii) (``Rule 1002(c)(1)(iii)''), each SCI 
entity is required to provide to its members or participants regular 
updates of any information required to be disseminated under Rule 
1002(c)(1)(i) and (ii) until the SCI event is resolved. Rule 1002(c)(2) 
requires each SCI entity to disseminate certain information regarding a 
systems intrusion to its members or participants. For ``major SCI 
events,'' these disseminations must be made to all of its members or 
participants. For SCI events that are not ``major SCI events,'' SCI 
entities must disseminate such information to those SCI entity members 
and participants reasonably estimated to have been affected by the 
event.\446\ In addition, dissemination of information to members or 
participants is permitted to be delayed for systems intrusions if such 
dissemination would likely compromise the security of the SCI entity's 
systems or an investigation of the intrusion and documents the reasons 
for such determination.\447\ Rule 1002(c)(4) of Regulation SCI provides 
exceptions to the dissemination requirements under Rule 1002(c) of 
Regulation SCI for SCI events to the extent they relate to market 
regulation or market surveillance systems and SCI events that have had, 
or the SCI entity reasonably estimates would have, no or a de minimis 
impact on the SCI entity's operations or on market participants.\448\ 
Rule 1000 sets out the definition of systems intrusion, which means any 
unauthorized entry into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an 
SCI entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \445\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(c).
    \446\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(c)(3).
    \447\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(c)(2).
    \448\ See 17 CFR 242.1002(c)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposes to amend the definition of systems 
intrusion in Rule 1000 to include cybersecurity events that disrupt, or 
significantly degrade, the normal operation of an SCI system and 
significant attempted unauthorized entries into the SCI systems or 
indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity, as determined by the SCI entity 
pursuant to established reasonable written criteria. SCI entities would 
be required to report information concerning these systems intrusions 
pursuant to Rule 1002(b). The Commission believes that it is 
appropriate to expand the definition of systems intrusion to include 
two additional types of cybersecurity events that are currently not 
part of the current definition as described above. The additional 
notifications that would result from the proposed revised definition of 
systems intrusion would provide the Commission and its staff more 
complete information to assess the security status of the SCI entity, 
and also assess the impact or potential impact that unauthorized 
activity could have on the security of the SCI entity's affected 
systems as well on other SCI entities and market participants.
    The proposed revisions to Rule 1002(b) would eliminate the de 
minimis exception's applicability to systems intrusions, thus requiring 
all systems intrusions, whether de minimis or non-de minimis, to be 
reported pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(1) through (4). The Commission would 
also amend the information required under Rule 1002(b)(4)(ii) to be 
included in the interim and final written notifications to include a 
copy of any information disseminated pursuant to Rule 1002(c) by an SCI 
broker-dealer to its customers. The Commission would use this 
information to be aware of potential and actual security threats to SCI 
entities, including threats that may extend to other market 
participants in the securities markets, including other SCI entities.
    As a result of the amendment to the definition of systems 
intrusions, SCI entities would be required to disseminate information 
to members and participants pursuant to Rule 1002(c)(2) concerning 
cybersecurity events not currently covered by the rule. This would have 
the effect of increasing the number of SCI events that would be 
required to be disseminated. Further, in connection with expansion of 
Regulation SCI to SCI broker-dealers, amended Rule 1002(c)(3) would 
require that SCI broker-dealers promptly disseminate information about 
major SCI events to all of its customers and, for SCI events that are 
not major SCI events, to customers that any responsible SCI personnel 
subsequently reasonably estimates may have been affected by the SCI 
event. Such information would be used by the SCI entity's members and 
participants, and in the case of an SCI broker-dealer, its customers, 
to understand better the threats faced by the SCI entity, evaluate the 
event's impact on their trading or other business with the SCI entity 
and formulate a response, thereby advance the Commission's goal of 
promoting fair and orderly markets and investor protection. The 
proposed revisions to Rule 1002(c), however, would exclude systems 
intrusions that are significant attempted unauthorized entries into the 
SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity from the 
information dissemination requirements of Rule 1002(c)(1) through 
(3).\449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \449\ See proposed amended Rule 1002(c)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Rule 1003 of Regulation SCI
    Rule 1003(a) establishes reporting burdens for all SCI entities. 
Rule 1003(a)(1) requires each SCI entity to submit to the Commission 
quarterly reports describing completed, ongoing, and planned material 
changes to its SCI systems and security of indirect SCI systems during 
the prior, current, and subsequent calendar quarters, including the 
dates or expected dates of commencement and completion.\450\ Under 17 
CFR 242.1003(a)(2) (``Rule 1003(a)(2)''), each SCI entity is required 
to promptly submit a supplemental report notifying the Commission of a 
material error in or material omission from a report previously 
submitted under Rule 1003(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \450\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 1003(b) of Regulation SCI also requires that an SCI entity 
conduct an ``SCI review'' not less than once each calendar year.\451\ 
``SCI review'' is defined in Rule 1000 of Regulation SCI to mean a 
review, following established procedures and standards, that is 
performed by objective personnel having appropriate experience to 
conduct reviews of SCI systems and indirect SCI systems, and which 
review contains: (1) a risk assessment with respect to such systems of 
an SCI entity; and (2) an assessment of internal control design and 
effectiveness of its SCI systems and indirect SCI systems to include 
logical and physical security controls, development processes, and 
information technology governance, consistent with industry standards 
Rule 1003(b)(2) requires each SCI entity to submit a report of the SCI 
review to senior management no more than 30 calendar days after 
completion of the review.\452\ Rule 1003(b) requires that penetration 
test reviews of the network, firewalls, and production systems shall be 
conducted at a frequency of not less than once every three years and 
that assessments of SCI systems directly supporting market regulation 
or market surveillance shall be conducted at a frequency based upon the 
risk assessment conducted as part of the SCI review, but in no case 
less than once every three years.\453\ Rule 1003(b)(2) requires that 
the submission of a report of the SCI review to senior management of 
the SCI entity for review no more than 30 calendar days after 
completion

[[Page 23204]]

of such SCI review.\454\ Rule 1003(b)(3) requires each SCI entity to 
submit the report of the SCI review to the Commission and to its board 
of directors or the equivalent of such board, together with any 
response by senior management, within 60 calendar days after its 
submission to senior management.\455\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \451\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b).
    \452\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(2).
    \453\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(1)(i) and (ii).
    \454\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(2).
    \455\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is proposing revisions to Rule 1003(b) and the 
definition of SCI review. The Commission is proposing to increase the 
frequency of penetration testing by SCI entities such that they are 
conducted at least annually, rather than once every three years, and 
that the penetration tests include any of the vulnerabilities of its 
SCI systems and indirect SCI systems identified pursuant to Rule 
1001(a)(2)(iv).\456\ The Commission would use this more frequent 
information to have more up-to-date information regarding an SCI 
entity's systems vulnerabilities and help the Commission with its 
oversight of U.S. securities market technology infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \456\ See 17 CFR 242.1000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the Commission is proposing a number of revisions to 
the requirements relating to SCI reviews and for the reports SCI 
entities submit (both to their board of directors as well as to the 
Commission). The definition of SCI review in Rule 1000 is proposed to 
contain the substantive requirements for an SCI review, which would be 
required to be ``a review, following established and documented 
procedures and standards, that is performed by objective personnel 
having appropriate experience to conduct reviews of SCI systems and 
indirect SCI systems . . .'' \457\ The Commission proposes to amend the 
definition of SCI review in Rule 1000 to require that the SCI review: 
(1) use appropriate risk management methodology, (2) include third-
party provider management risks and controls, (3) include the risks 
related to the capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and 
security, and (4) include systems capacity and availability and 
information technology service continuity within the review of internal 
control design and operating effectiveness.\458\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \457\ See id.
    \458\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also proposes to amend Rule 1003(b)(2) to require 
that the SCI review be conducted in each calendar year during which the 
entity was an SCI entity for any part of that calendar year and that 
the SCI entity submit the associated report of the SCI review to the 
SCI entity's senior management and board, as well as to the 
Commission.\459\ The Commission proposes amend Rule 1003(b)(2) to 
specify that certain elements be included in the report of the SCI 
review, namely: (1) the dates the SCI review was conducted and the date 
of completion; (2) the entity or business unit of the SCI entity 
performing the review; (3) a list of the controls reviewed and a 
description of each such control; (4) the findings of the SCI review 
with respect to each SCI system and indirect SCI system, which shall 
include, at a minimum, assessments of: the risks related to the 
capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security; internal 
control design and operating effectiveness; and an assessment of third-
party provider management risks and controls; (5) a summary, including 
the scope of testing and resulting action plan, of each penetration 
test review conducted as part of the SCI review; and (6) a description 
of each deficiency and weakness identified by the SCI review.\460\ The 
Commission also proposes to amend Rule 1003(b)(3) to require a response 
to the report of the SCI review from senior management and to require 
that the date the report was submitted to senior management be 
submitted to the Commission and the board of directors, and that the 
response from senior management include a response for each deficiency 
and weakness identified by the SCI review, and the associated 
mitigation and remediation plan and associated dates for each.\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \459\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(2) and (3).
    \460\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(2).
    \461\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The additional requirements and details are designed to ensure SCI 
reviews contain certain baseline information and are based on the 
appropriate risk management methodology. The enhanced SCI review and 
corresponding report would provide the Commission and its staff greater 
insight into the SCI entity's compliance with Regulation SCI and would 
more thoroughly assist the staff in determining how to follow up with 
the SCI entity in reviewing and addressing any identified weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities. The Commission would use this additional reporting 
and information to improve the Commission's oversight of the technology 
infrastructure of SCI entities further.
4. Rule 1004 of Regulation SCI
    Rule 1004 of Regulation SCI requires SCI entities to, with respect 
to an SCI entity's business continuity and disaster recovery plans, 
including its backup systems: (a) establish standards for the 
designation of those members or participants that the SCI entity 
reasonably determines are, taken as a whole, the minimum necessary for 
the maintenance of fair and orderly markets in the event of the 
activation of such plans; (b) designate members or participants 
pursuant to such standards and require participation by such designated 
members or participants in scheduled functional and performance testing 
of the operation of such plans, in the manner and frequency specified 
by the SCI entity, provided that such frequency shall not be less than 
once every 12 months; and (c) coordinate the testing of such plans on 
an industry- or sector-wide basis with other SCI entities.\462\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \462\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is proposing to include certain third-party 
providers in the BC/DR testing requirements of Rule 1004. Specifically, 
an SCI entity would be required to establish standards for the 
designation of third-party providers (in addition to members or 
participants) that it determines are, taken as a whole, the minimum 
necessary for the maintenance of fair and orderly markets in the event 
of the activation of the SCI entity's BC/DR plans. In addition, Rule 
1004 would require each SCI entity to designate such third-party 
providers (in addition to members or participants) pursuant to such 
standards and require their participation in the scheduled functional 
and performance testing of the operation of such BC/DR plans.\463\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \463\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that the requirement that SCI entities 
establish standards that require designated third-party providers to 
participate in the testing of their business continuity and disaster 
recovery plans will help reduce the risks associated with an SCI 
entity's decision to activate its BC/DR plans and help to ensure that 
such plans operate as intended, if activated. The testing participation 
requirement should help an SCI entity to ensure that its efforts to 
develop effective BC/DR plans are not undermined by a lack of 
participation by third-party providers that the SCI entity believes are 
necessary to the successful activation of such plans. This requirement 
should also assist the Commission in maintaining fair and orderly 
markets in a BC/DR scenario following a wide-scale disruption.

[[Page 23205]]

5. Rule 1005 and 1007 of Regulation SCI
    Rule 1005 of Regulation SCI requires SCI entities to make, keep, 
and preserve certain records related to their compliance with 
Regulation SCI.\464\ Rule 1007 sets forth requirements for a SCI entity 
whose Regulation SCI records are prepared or maintained by a service 
bureau or other recordkeeping service on behalf of the SCI entity.\465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \464\ See 17 CFR 242.1005. Rule 1005(a) of Regulation SCI 
relates to recordkeeping provisions for SCI SROs, whereas Rule 
1005(b) relates to the recordkeeping provision for SCI entities 
other than SCI SROs.
    \465\ See 17 CFR 242.1007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule 1005(c) specifies that the requirement that records required 
to be made, kept, and preserved by Rule 1005 be accessible to the 
Commission and its representatives for the period required by Rule 
1005, in cases where an SCI entity ceases to do business or ceases to 
be registered under the Exchange Act.\466\ The Commission proposes to 
add that this survival provision similarly applies to an SCI entity 
that ``otherwise [ceases] to be an SCI entity.'' \467\ This addition 
accounts for circumstances not expressly covered; specifically, the 
circumstance in which an SCI entity continues to do business or remains 
a registered entity, but may cease to qualify as an SCI entity (e.g., 
an SCI ATS that no longer satisfies a volume threshold). Such entities 
would not be excepted from complying with the recordkeeping provisions 
of Rule 1005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \466\ See 17 CFR 242.1005(c).
    \467\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes the records of entities that ceased being 
SCI entities are important for assisting the Commission and its staff 
in understanding whether such an SCI entity met its obligations under 
Regulation SCI, assessing whether such an SCI entity had appropriate 
policies and procedures with respect to its technology systems, helping 
to identify the causes and consequences of an SCI event, and 
understanding the types of material systems changes that occurred at 
such an SCI entity. The Commission expects this revision to facilitate 
the Commission's inspections and examinations of SCI entities that have 
ceased to be SCI entities and assist it in evaluating such SCI entity's 
previous compliance with Regulation SCI. Furthermore, having an SCI 
entity's records available even after it has ceased to be an SCI entity 
should provide an additional tool to help the Commission to reconstruct 
important market events and better understand the impact of such 
events. There are no amendments to Rule 1007, which sets forth 
requirements for a SCI entity whose Regulation SCI records are prepared 
or maintained by a service bureau or other recordkeeping service on 
behalf of the SCI entity.
6. Rule 1006 of Regulation SCI
    Rule 1006 requires each SCI entity, with a few exceptions, to file 
any notification, review, description, analysis, or report to the 
Commission required under Regulation SCI electronically on Form 
SCI.\468\ There are no amendments to this section. The Commission staff 
would use the collection of information in its examination and 
oversight program in identifying patterns and trends across 
registrants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \468\ See 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Respondents

    The collection of information requirements contained in Regulation 
SCI apply to SCI entities. As of 2021, there were an estimated 47 
Current SCI Entities (i.e., entities that met the definition of SCI 
entity) \469\ that were subject to the requirements of Regulation 
SCI.\470\ The Commission preliminarily estimates that as a result of 
the proposed amendments to Rule 1000, there would be a total of 23 New 
SCI Entities (i.e., meet the amended definition of SCI entity) that 
would become subject to the requirements of Regulation SCI. Thus, the 
Commission preliminarily estimates that a total of 70 entities would be 
subject to the requirements of Regulation SCI. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that the remaining amendments would not add any 
additional respondents but would result in additional reporting 
burdens, which are discussed in section IV.D (Total Initial and Annual 
Reporting Burdens).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \469\ In 2020, the Commission amended Regulation SCI to add as 
SCI entities SCI competing consolidators, defined as competing 
consolidators that exceed a five percent consolidated market data 
gross revenue threshold over a specified time period. See Market 
Data Infrastructure Adopting Release, supra note 24. The Commission 
estimated that seven persons would meet the definition of SCI 
competing consolidator and be subject to Regulation SCI, two of 
which would be Current SCI Entities (as plan processors) and five of 
which would be new SCI competing consolidators, if they registered 
as competing consolidators and exceeded the threshold. See Extension 
Without Change of a Currently Approved Collection: Regulation SCI 
and Form SCI; ICR Reference No. 202111-3235-005; OMB Control No. 
3235-0703 (Mar. 3, 2022), available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewDocument?ref_nbr=202111-3235-005 (``2022 PRA 
Supporting Statement''). Currently, no competing consolidators have 
registered with the Commission. As a result, no competing 
consolidators (in addition to the two current plan processors that 
are Current SCI Entities) are included as Current SCI Entities. To 
the extent that a competing consolidator registers with the 
Commission and qualifies as an SCI competing consolidator it would 
be subject to the same additional burdens as Current SCI Entities as 
a result of the proposed amendments to Regulation SCI. The 
additional burdens for Current SCI Entities are set forth in section 
IV.D.
    \470\ Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Extension: 
Regulation SCI, Form SCI; SEC File No. 270-653, OMB Control No. 
3235-0703, 87 FR 3132.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following table summarizes the estimated number of Current SCI 
Entities and New SCI Entities:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Type of SCI entity                         Number
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities....................................              47
New SCI Entities:
    SBSDR \1\...........................................               3
    SCI broker-dealers \2\..............................              17
    Exempt Clearing Agencies \3\........................               3
                                                         ---------------
        Total New SCI Entities..........................              23
                                                         ---------------
        Total SCI Entities..............................              70
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See supra notes 118, 124 and accompanying text. As noted earlier,
  two SBSDRs are currently registered with the Commission. The
  Commission estimates for purposes of the PRA that one additional
  entity may seek to register as an SBSDR in the next three years, and
  so for purposes of this proposal the Commission has assumed three
  SBSDR respondents.
\2\ See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
\3\ See supra notes 240 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, the
  Commission proposes to expand the scope of ``SCI entity'' to cover two
  additional exempt clearing agencies that are not subject to ARP, which
  are Euroclear Bank SA/NV and Clearstream Banking, S.A. The Commission
  estimates for purposes of the PRA that one additional entity may
  receive an exemption from registration as a clearing agency in the
  next three years, and so for purposes of this proposal the Commission
  has assumed three exempt clearing agency respondents.


[[Page 23206]]

D. Total Initial and Annual Reporting Burdens

    As stated above, each requirement to disclose information, offer to 
provide information, or adopt policies and procedures constitutes a 
collection of information requirement under the PRA. We discuss below 
the collection of information burdens associated with the proposed 
rules and rule amendments.
1. Rule 1001
    The rules under Regulation SCI that would require an SCI entity to 
establish policies and procedures are discussed more fully in sections 
II.B, and the proposed amendments are discussed more fully in sections 
III.A and III.C above.
a. Rule 1001(a)
    Current SCI Entities are already required to establish, maintain, 
and enforce policies and procedures pursuant to Rule 1001(a) and 
therefore already incur baseline initial \471\ and ongoing burden \472\ 
for complying with Rule 1001(a), so the amendments should only impose a 
burden required to comply with the additional requirements.\473\ 
Presently, none of the New SCI Entities are required to comply with the 
policies and procedures requirement of Rule 1001(a), but the proposed 
amendments will newly impose the baseline burden to develop and draft 
written policies and procedures and review and update annually such 
policies and procedures, as well as the additional burden to include 
the proposed requirements in the policies and procedures. The 
Commission estimates an initial compliance burden of 386 additional 
hours \474\ for Current SCI Entities and 890 hours \475\ for New SCI 
Entities. The Commission estimates an annual compliance burden of 58 
hours \476\ for Current SCI Entities and 145 hours \477\ for New SCI 
Entities.\478\ The table below summarizes the initial and ongoing 
annual burden estimates for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:
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    \471\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for average 
compliance burden per SCI entity to develop and draft the policies 
and procedures required by Rule 1001(a) (except for 17 CFR 
242.1001(a)(2)(vi) (``Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi)'')) is 534 hours. See 
Extension Without Change of a Currently Approved Collection: 
Regulation SCI and Form SCI; ICR Reference No. 202111-3235-005; OMB 
Control No. 3235-0703 (Mar. 3, 2022), available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewDocument?ref_nbr=202111-3235-005 
(``2022 PRA Supporting Statement''). Rule 1001(a)(2) currently 
requires six elements (excluding Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi)) to be included 
in the policies and procedures required by Rule 1001(a)(1). The 
burden hours for each element would be 89 hours per policy element 
(534 hours/6 policy elements).
    \472\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for average 
compliance burden per SCI entity to review and update the policies 
and procedures required by Rule 1001(a) (except for Rule 
1001(a)(2)(vi)) is 87 hours. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, 
supra note 471. The burden hours for each element would be 14.5 
hours per policy element (87 hours/6 policy elements).
    \473\ The Commission estimates that at the additional burden 
would be the result of the additions to Rule 1001(a)(2), 
specifically the proposed requirement in the BC/DR plan and the four 
proposed additional policy elements. The Commission does not 
anticipate that Current SCI Entities or New SCI Entities would incur 
any additional burden from the amendment to Rule 1001(a)(4) above 
and beyond the burden hours estimated for the policies and 
procedures in this release.
    \474\ 89 hours x 4 additional policy elements = 356 hours. The 
Commission estimates a one-time burden of 30 hours (one-third of 89 
hours per policy element) for SCI entities to address the 
unavailability of third-party providers in their BC/DR plans. 356 
hours + 30 hours = 386 hours. The burden hours include 139 
Compliance Manager hours, 139 Attorney hours, 43 Senior System 
Analyst hours, 43 Operations Specialist hours, 15 Chief Compliance 
Officer hours, and 7 Director of Compliance hours.
    \475\ 534 baseline burden hours + 356 additional burden hours = 
890 hours. The burden hours include 320 Compliance Manager hours, 
320 Attorney hours, 100 Senior System Analyst hours, 100 Operations 
Specialist hours, 33 Chief Compliance Officer hours, and 17 Director 
of Compliance hours.
    \476\ 14.5 hours x 4 additional policy elements = 58 hours. The 
burden hours include 19 Compliance Manager hours, 19 Attorney hours, 
5 Senior System Analyst hours, 5 Operations Specialist hours, 7 
Chief Compliance Officer hours, and 3 Director of Compliance hours.
    \477\ 87 baseline burden hours + 58 additional burden hours = 
145 hours. The burden hours include 47 Compliance Manager hours, 47 
Attorney hours, 13 Senior System Analyst hours, 13 Operations 
Specialist hours, 17 Chief Compliance Officer hours, and 8 Director 
of Compliance hours.
    \478\ The Commission recognizes that the some of the Regulation 
SCI requirements and certain proposed requirements in the Exchange 
Act Cybersecurity Proposal rule may appear duplicative. The 
Commission believes that although the requirements are related, they 
are ultimately separate obligations. Thus, the Commission has not 
considered the requirements of the Exchange Act Cybersecurity 
Proposal rule in formulating its estimates.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Estimated burden
                                                                                                hours for all
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours   entities  (estimated
          Respondent type                 Burden type         respondents     per entity        respondents x
                                                              (entities)        (hours)       burden hours per
                                                                                                   entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities...............  Initial..............              47             386                18,142
                                     Annual...............              47              58                 2,726
New SCI Entities...................  Initial..............              23             890                20,470
                                     Annual...............              23             145                 3,335
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance for Current SCI Entities and New 
SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                        Estimated       Average internal         (estimated
        Respondent type             Burden type        respondents     cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                       (entities)          per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities...........  Initial..........                47          \1\ $144,787            $6,804,989
                                 Annual...........                47            \2\ 23,403             1,099,941
New SCI Entities...............  Initial..........                23           \3\ 333,371             7,667,533

[[Page 23207]]

 
                                 Annual...........                23            \4\ 58,315             1,341,245
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (139 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (139 Attorney hours x $462) + (43 Senior Systems Analyst hours x
  $316) + (43 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (15 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (7 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $144,787. The Commission derived this estimate based on per hour figures from
  SIFMA's Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2013, modified by Commission staff to
  account for an 1,800-hour work-year and inflation, and multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size,
  employee benefits, and overhead.
\2\ (19 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (19 Attorney hours x $462) + (5 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316)
  + (5 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (7 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (3 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $23,403.
\3\ (320 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (320 Attorney hours x $462) + (100 Senior Systems Analyst hours x
  $316) + (100 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (33 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (17 Director
  of Compliance hours x $542) = $333,371.
\4\ (47 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (47 Attorney hours x $462) + (13 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316)
  + (13 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (17 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (8 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $58,315.

    The proposed amendments would newly impose a burden on New SCI 
Entities to comply with Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi), which requires the 
policies and procedures required by Rule 1001(a) to include standards 
that result in systems being designed, developed, tested, maintained, 
operated, and surveilled in a manner that facilitates the successful 
collection, processing, and dissemination of market data.\479\ The 
Commission estimates that New SCI Entities would incur an initial 
burden of 160 hours and an ongoing burden of 145 hours to annually 
review and update the policies and procedures.\480\ The table below 
summarizes the initial and ongoing annual burden estimates for New SCI 
Entities to comply with Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \479\ Current SCI Entities would incur no additional burden as 
they are already required to include the required standards in their 
policies and procedures.
    \480\ These estimates are consistent with the Commission-
approved baseline initial and ongoing average compliance burdens per 
SCI entity. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471. The 
160 hour initial burden includes 100 Compliance Manager hours, 20 
Chief Compliance Officer hours, 10 Director of Compliance hours, and 
30 Compliance Attorney hours. The 145 annual burden hours includes 
100 Compliance Manager hours, 10 Chief Compliance Officer hours, 5 
Director of Compliance hours, and 30 Compliance Attorney hours.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Estimated burden
                                                                                                hours for all
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours    entities (estimated
          Respondent type                 Burden type         respondents     per entity        respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                   entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities...................  Initial..............              23             160                 3,680
                                     Annual...............              23             145                 3,335
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance for New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                             Total internal cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
         Respondent type              Burden type       respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities................  Initial...........              23           \1\ $60,980            $1,402,540
                                  Annual............              23            \2\ 52,380             1,204,740
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (100 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) + (20 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (10 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) + (30 Compliance Attorney hours x $406) = $60,980.
\2\ (100 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) + (10 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (5 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) + (30 Compliance Attorney hours x $406) = $52,380.


[[Page 23208]]

    The Commission estimates that on average, Current SCI Entities 
would seek outside legal and/or consulting services to initially update 
their policies and procedures for the proposed additional requirements 
at a cost of $29,050 per SCI entity,\481\ while New SCI Entities would 
seek such services in the initial preparation of the policies and 
procedures (including the proposed requirements) at a cost of $73,800 
per SCI entity.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \481\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for 
annualized recordkeeping cost per SCI entity to consult outside 
legal and/or consulting services in the initial preparation policies 
and procedures required by Rule 1001(a) is $47,000. See 2022 PRA 
Supporting Statement, supra note 471. Rule 1001(a)(2) currently 
requires seven elements (including Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi)) to be 
included in the policies and procedures required by Rule 1001(a)(1). 
The cost per element would be approximately $6,700 per policy 
element ($47,000 hours/7 policy elements = $6,714). As noted 
earlier, the Commission proposes to add four additional elements to 
the policies and procedures. $6,700 per policy element x 4 
additional policy elements = $26,800. The Commission also estimates 
a one-time burden of approximately $2,250 per SCI entity (one-third 
of $6,700 per policy element) to address the unavailability of 
third-party providers in their BC/DR plans. $26,800 + $2,250 = 
$29,050.
    \482\ $47,000 + $26,800 = $73,800.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                             Total internal cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average external         (estimated
                   Respondent type                      respondents      cost per entity        respondents x
                                                        (entities)                            average external
                                                                                              cost per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities................................              47               $29,050            $1,365,350
New SCI Entities....................................              23                73,800             1,697,400
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Rule 1001(b)
    New SCI Entities would be required to meet the requirements of Rule 
1001(b), which requires each SCI entity to establish, maintain, and 
enforce systems compliance policies. The Commission estimates a 
compliance burden of 270 hours initially to design the systems 
compliance policies and procedures and 95 hours annually to review and 
update such policies and procedures.\483\ The table below summarizes 
the initial and ongoing annual burden estimates for New SCI Entities to 
comply with Rule 1001(b):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \483\ The Commission estimates that the burden for New SCI 
Entities is consistent with the Commission's current approved 
baselines for the initial and ongoing burdens. For the initial 
recordkeeping burden, this baseline is 270 hours (40 Compliance 
Attorney hours + 200 Senior System Analyst hours + 20 Chief 
Compliance Officer hours + 10 Director of Compliance hours). The 
Commission estimated separate baselines for the ongoing 
recordkeeping burden for SCI SROs and entities that were not SROs. 
Since none of the entities that would potentially be subject to 
Regulation SCI as a result of the proposed amendments are SROs, the 
Commission is basing its estimates on the baseline for non-SROs. The 
Commission's current approved baseline for the ongoing recordkeeping 
burden for entities that are not SROs is 95 hours (14 Compliance 
Attorney hours + 66 Senior System Analyst hours + 10 Chief 
Compliance Officer hours + 5 Director of Compliance hours). See 2022 
PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Estimated burden
                                                                                                hours for all
         Respondent type              Burden type        Estimated      Burden hours per     entities (estimated
                                                        respondents          entity         respondents x burden
                                                                                              hours per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities................  Initial...........              23                   270                 6,210
                                  Annual............              23                    95                 2,185
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance for New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                             Total internal cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
         Respondent type              Burden type       respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities................  Initial...........              23           \1\ $96,640            $2,222,720
                                  Annual............              23            \2\ 35,140               808,220
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (200 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) + (20 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (10 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) + (40 Compliance Attorney hours x $406) = $96,640.
\2\ (66 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) + (10 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (5 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) + (14 Compliance Attorney hours x $406) = $35,140.

    In establishing, maintaining, and enforcing the policies and 
procedures required by Rule 1001(b), the Commission believes that each 
new SCI entity will seek outside legal and/or consulting services in 
the initial preparation of such policies and procedures. The total 
annualized cost of seeking outside legal and/or consulting services 
will be $621,000.\484\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \484\ The Commission estimates that the cost for outside legal 
and/or consulting services for New SCI Entities is consistent with 
the Commission's current approved baselines, which is $27,000 per 
new SCI entity. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471. 
$27,000 for the first year x 23 New SCI Entities = 621,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Rule 1001(c)
    The proposed amendments would newly impose a burden on New SCI 
Entities to develop and maintain policies with Rule 1001(c), relating 
to

[[Page 23209]]

the policies for designation of responsible SCI personnel. The 
Commission estimates a compliance burden of 114 hours initially to 
design the systems compliance policies and procedures and 39 hours 
annually to review and update such policies and procedures.\485\ The 
table below summarizes the initial and ongoing annual burden estimates 
for New SCI Entities to comply with Rule 1001(b):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \485\ The Commission's current approved baseline 114 hours for 
the initial burden to establish the criteria for identifying 
responsible SCI personnel and the escalation procedures (32 
Compliance Manager hours + 32 Attorney hours x $412 + 10 Senior 
Systems Analyst hours x $282 + 10 Operations Specialist hours x $135 
+ 20 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $526 + 10 Director of 
Compliance). The Commission's approved baseline is 39 hours for the 
ongoing burden to annually review and update the criteria and the 
escalation procedures (9.5 Compliance Manager hours + 9.5 Attorney 
hours + 2.5 Senior Systems Analyst hours + 2.5 Operations Specialist 
hours + 10 Chief Compliance Officer hours + 5 Director of Compliance 
hours). See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Estimated burden
                                                                                                hours for all
          Respondent type                 Burden type          Estimated     Burden hours    entities (estimated
                                                              respondents     per entity    respondents x burden
                                                                                              hours per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities...................  Initial..............              23             114                 2,622
                                     Annual...............              23              39                   897
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance for New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                             Total internal cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
         Respondent type              Burden type       respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities................  Initial...........              23           \1\ $47,672            $1,096,456
                                  Annual............              23            \2\ 17,427               400,821
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (32 Compliance Manager hours x 344) + (32 Attorney hours x $462) + (10 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316)
  + (10 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (20 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (10 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $47,672.
\2\ (9.5 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (9.5 Attorney hours x $462) + (2.5 Senior Systems Analyst hours x
  $316) + (2.5 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (10 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (5 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $17,427.

    The Commission does not expect SCI entities to incur any external 
PRA costs in connection with the policies and procedures required under 
Rule 1001(c).
2. Rule 1002
    The rules under Regulation SCI that would require an SCI entity to 
take corrective action, provide certain notifications and reports, and 
disseminate certain information regarding SCI events are discussed more 
fully in sections II.B, and the proposed amendments are discussed more 
fully in sections III.A and III.C above.
a. Rule 1002(a)
    As noted above, Rule 1002(a) requires each SCI entity, upon any 
responsible SCI personnel having a reasonable basis to conclude that an 
SCI event has occurred, to begin to take appropriate corrective action. 
The Commission has previously expressed the view that Rule 1002(a) 
would likely result in SCI entities developing and revising their 
processes for corrective action.\486\ The Commission believes that the 
requirement to take corrective action for these additional systems 
intrusions would likely result in SCI entities updating their processes 
for corrective action.\487\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \486\ See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
    \487\ The Commission's estimate includes the amendments to the 
definition of systems intrusions adding (1) cybersecurity events 
that disrupt, or significantly degrade, the normal operation of an 
SCI system and (2) significant attempted unauthorized entries into 
the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity. It does 
not include the systems intrusions that would previously have been 
classified as de minimis events because Current SCI Entities are 
already required to take corrective action to resolve such SCI 
events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission continues to believe that Rule 1002(a) will likely 
result in SCI entities developing and revising their processes for 
corrective action as well as review them annually.\488\ Current SCI 
Entities are already required to take corrective action pursuant to 
Rule 1002(a) and therefore already incur the initial \489\ and ongoing 
\490\ baseline burdens for developing and revising their corrective 
action process, so the amendments should only impose a one-time burden 
required to update the procedures to account for the additional types 
of systems intrusions.\491\ The Commission estimates that the one-time 
burden for each SCI entity to include in its corrective action process 
the proposed systems intrusions would be 20% of the 114 hours baseline

[[Page 23210]]

burden.\492\ Presently, the New SCI Entities are not required to comply 
with requirement in Rule 1002(a) to take corrective action, but the 
proposed amendments will newly impose these burdens, including the 
burden for incorporating the additional systems intrusions into the 
corrective action process. For Current SCI Entities, the Commission 
estimates a one-time compliance burden of 23 hours. For New SCI 
Entities, the Commission estimates an initial burden of 137 hours \493\ 
and an annual compliance burden of 39 hours \494\ for New SCI Entities. 
The table below summarizes the initial and ongoing annual burden 
estimates for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \488\ See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
    \489\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for average 
compliance burden per respondent to develop a process for corrective 
action is 114 hours (32 Compliance Manager hours + 32 Attorney hours 
+ 10 Senior Systems Analyst hours + 10 Operations Specialist hours + 
20 Chief Compliance Officer hours + 10 Director of Compliance 
hours). See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
    \490\ The average compliance burden for each SCI entity to 
review their process is 39 hours (9 Compliance Manager hours + 9 
Attorney hours + 3 Senior Systems Analyst hours + 3 Operations 
Specialist hours + 10 Chief Compliance Officer hours + 5 Director of 
Compliance hours. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
    \491\ The Commission also proposes to remove the option for SCI 
entities to classify systems intrusions as de minimis and 
potentially report them pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(5) on the quarterly 
SCI reports as de minimis events. SCI entities would instead report 
these systems intrusions pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(1) through (4). 
The Commission believes that the burden for developing a corrective 
action plan for these systems intrusions is already incorporated in 
the baseline burden estimates. See supra notes 489-490.
    \492\ 114 hours x 0.20 = 23 hours. The burden hours include 7 
Compliance Manager hours, 6 Attorney hours, 2 Senior Systems Analyst 
hours, 2 Operations Specialist hours, 4 Chief Compliance Officer 
hours, and 2 Director of Compliance hours.
    \493\ 114 baseline burden hours + 23 burden hours for additional 
systems intrusions = 137 hours. The burden hours include 39 
Compliance Manager hours, 38 Attorney hours, 12 Senior Systems 
Analyst hours, 12 Operations Specialist hours, 24 Chief Compliance 
Officer hours, and 12 Director of Compliance hours.
    \494\ The Commission estimates that the ongoing recordkeeping 
burden for each New SCI Entity to review its corrective action 
process would be the same as the baseline ongoing recordkeeping 
burden of 39 hours. See supra note 490.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Burden hours for all
                                                                                                 respondents
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours        (estimated
          Respondent type                 Burden type         respondents   per SCI entity  respondents x burden
                                                                                                hours per SCI
                                                                                                   entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities...............  One-time Burden......              47              23                 1,081
New SCI Entities...................  Initial..............              23             137                 3,151
                                     Ongoing..............                              39                   897
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the cost 
of compliance for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                             Total internal cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                                        Average internal         (estimated
         Respondent type              Burden type        Estimated     cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        respondents        per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities............  One-time Burden...              47            \1\ $9,556              $449,132
New SCI Entities................  Initial...........              23            \2\ 57,228             1,316,244
                                  Ongoing...........                            \3\ 17,258               396,934
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (7 Compliance Manager hours x 344) + (6 Attorney hours x $462) + (2 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) +
  (2 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (4 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (2 Director of Compliance
  hours x $542) = $9,556.
\2\ (39 Compliance Manager hours x 344) + (38 Attorney hours x $462) + (12 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316)
  + (12 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (24 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (12 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $57,228.
\3\ (9 Compliance Manager hours x 344) + (9 Attorney hours x $462) + (3 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) +
  (3 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (10 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (5 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $17,258.

    The Commission does not expect SCI entities to incur any external 
PRA costs in connection with the requirement to take corrective actions 
under Rule 1002(a).
b. Rule 1002(b)(1) Through (4)
    As noted earlier, SCI entities have certain reporting obligations 
regarding SCI events. Current SCI Entities are already required to 
submit the notifications, updates, and reports required by Rule 
1002(b)(1) through (4) and therefore already incur a baseline burden. 
As a result of the additional systems intrusions, including the 
amendments to the definition of systems intrusions and the exclusion of 
systems intrusions from de minimis SCI events required to be reported 
to the Commission, Current SCI Entities could potentially incur new 
burdens pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(1) through (4) reporting additional 
SCI events for which they currently either do not report or which they 
currently report quarterly as de minimis. As proposed, New SCI Entities 
would for the first time be required to provide the submissions 
required by Rule 1002(b)(1) through (4) and would bear the existing 
burden for compliance with Rule 1002(b)(1) through (4) and the 
additional burden to report the proposed systems intrusions.
    The Commission estimates that on average each Current SCI Entity 
will experience an additional three SCI events each year that are not 
de minimis SCI events \495\ and New SCI Entities will experience an 
average of eight SCI events each year that are not de minimis SCI 
events.\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \495\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for the 
number of SCI events is five events per year that are not de 
minimis. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471. The 
Commission estimates that as a result of the additional systems 
intrusions that SCI entities would be required to report, the number 
of SCI events would increase by three events per year that are not 
de minimis.
    \496\ The Commission estimates that each New SCI Entity would 
experience the baseline burden of five SCI events and three 
additional SCI events, for a total of eight SCI events that are not 
de minimis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result, pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(1), which requires immediate 
notification of SCI events, the Commission estimates that each Current 
SCI Entity will submit, on average, an additional three notifications 
per year beyond the current baseline,\497\ and each New SCI Entity will 
submit eight

[[Page 23211]]

notifications per year.\498\ These notifications can be made orally or 
in writing, and the Commission estimates that approximately one-fourth 
of these notifications will be submitted in writing (i.e., 
approximately one event per year for each Current SCI Entity and two 
events per year for each New SCI Entity \499\), and approximately 
three-fourths will be provided orally (i.e., approximately two events 
per year for each Current SCI Entity \500\ and six events per year for 
each New SCI Entity \501\). The Commission estimates that each written 
notification will require two hours and each oral notification will 
require 1.5 hours.\502\ The Commission estimates a burden of 5 hours 
\503\ for each Current SCI Entities and 13 hours \504\ for New SCI 
Entities. The table below summarizes the initial and ongoing annual 
burden estimates for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \497\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for the 
number of notifications submitted by an SCI entity pursuant to Rule 
1002(b)(1) is five notifications per year, with one-fourth of the 
five notifications submitted in writing (i.e., approximately one 
event per year for each SCI entity), and approximately three-fourths 
provided orally (i.e., approximately four events per year for each 
SCI entity). See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471. The 
Commission estimates that the proposed systems intrusions will 
result in each SCI entity submitting three additional notifications, 
one for each of the three estimated additional SCI events.
    \498\ The Commission estimates that each New SCI Entity will 
submit both the current baseline of five notifications and the 
additional three notifications, for a total of eight notifications. 
See supra note 497 (discussing the 3 additional notifications).
    \499\ 8 SCI events / 4 = 2 SCI events reported in writing. The 
Commission estimates that each Current SCI Entities already reports 
one SCI event per year in writing. See 2022 PRA Supporting 
Statement, supra note 471. The Commission therefore estimates that 
they would report one additional SCI event in writing. New SCI 
Entities would report two SCI events in writing.
    \500\ 3 SCI events-1 SCI event reported in writing = 2 SCI 
events reported orally.
    \501\ 8 SCI events-2 SCI events reported in writing = 6 SCI 
events reported orally.
    \502\ The Commission-approved baseline for the burden hours for 
each notification are 2 hours for written communications (0.5 
Compliance Manager hours + 0.5 Attorney hours + 0.5 Senior Systems 
Analyst hours + 0.5 Senior Business Analyst hours) and 1.5 hours for 
oral communications (0.25 Compliance Manager hours + 0.25 Attorney 
hours + 0.5 Senior Systems Analyst hours + (0.5 Senior Business 
Analyst hours). See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471. 
The Commission does not believe that reporting the proposed systems 
intrusions would change the estimated burden hours.
    \503\ 1 written notification each year * 2 hours per 
notification + 2 oral notifications each year * 1.5 hours per 
notification = 5 hours.
    \504\ 2 written notification each year * 2 hours per 
notification + 6 oral notifications each year * 1.5 hours per 
notification = 13 hours.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Burden hours for
                                                                                               all respondents
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours        (estimated
                      Respondent type                         respondents   per SCI entity      respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                 SCI entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities......................................              47               5                   235
New SCI Entities..........................................              23              13                   299
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance associated with the ongoing 
reporting burden for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
                   Respondent type                      respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)       per SCI entity       average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities................................              47         \1\ $1,737.50               $81,663
New SCI Entities....................................              23             \2\ 4,499               103,477
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The average internal cost of compliance for each Current SCI entity to submit an additional written
  notification per year is $713.50 (0.5 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (0.5 Attorney hours x $462) + (0.5
  Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) + (0.5 Senior Business Analyst hours x $305) = $713.50 per written
  notification. $713.50 x 1 written notification each year = $713.50.
(0.25 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (0.25 Attorney hours x $462) + (0.5 Senior Systems Analyst hours x
  $316) + (0.5 Senior Business Analyst hours x $305) = $512 per oral notification. $512 x 2 = $1,024.
$713.50 + $1,024 = $1,737.50.
\2\ $713.50 per written notification x 2 written notifications + $512 per written notification x 6 oral
  notifications = $4,499.

    The Commission estimates that each notification submitted pursuant 
to Rule 1002(b)(2) will require 24 hours per SCI entity.\505\ The 
Commission estimates an average of 72 hours \506\ for each Current SCI 
Entity and 192 hours \507\ for each New SCI Entity to submit the 24 
hour written notifications required by Rule 1002(b)(2). The table below 
summarizes the initial and ongoing annual burden estimates for Current 
SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \505\ The Commission-approved baseline for the burden hours for 
each written notification is 24 hours (5 Compliance Manager hours + 
5 Attorney hours + 6 Senior Systems Analyst hours + 1 Assistant 
General Counsel hour + 1 Chief Compliance Officer hour + 6 Senior 
Business Analyst hours) for each SCI entity. See 2022 PRA Supporting 
Statement, supra note 471.
    \506\ 3 additional notifications x 24 hours per notification = 
72 hours. See supra note 497 (discussing the three additional 
notifications for each Current SCI Entity).
    \507\ 8 notifications x 24 hours per notification = 192 hours. 
See supra note 498 (discussing the eight notifications for each New 
SCI Entity).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Burden hours for
                                                                                               all respondents
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours        (estimated
                      Respondent type                         respondents   per SCI entity      respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                 SCI entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities......................................              47              72                 3,384
New SCI Entities..........................................              23             192                 4,416
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 23212]]

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the cost 
of compliance associated with the ongoing reporting burden for Current 
SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
                   Respondent type                      respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)       per SCI entity       average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities................................              47           \1\ $26,589            $1,249,683
New SCI Entities....................................              23            \2\ 70,904             1,630,792
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The average internal cost of compliance for each Current SCI entity to submit an additional written
  notification per year is $8,863 per notification ((5 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (5 Attorney hours x
  $462) + (6 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) + (1 Assistant General Counsel x $518) + (6 Senior Business
  Analyst hours x $305) + (1 Chief Compliance Officer hour x $589)). $8,863 per notification x 3 notifications
  each year = $26,589.
\2\ $8,863 per notification x 8 notifications each year = $70,904.

    As for Rule 1002(b)(3), the Commission estimates that, based on 
past experience, each Current SCI entity will submit 1 additional 
written update and 1 additional oral update each year and each New SCI 
Entity will submit 2 written updates (on Form SCI) and 2 oral 
updates.\508\ The Commission estimates that each written update will 
require 6 hours and each oral update will require 4.5 hours.\509\ The 
Commission estimates a total burden of 10.5 hours \510\ for Current SCI 
Entities and 21 hours \511\ for New SCI Entities. The table below 
summarizes the initial and ongoing annual burden estimates for Current 
SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \508\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for the 
number of updates submitted by an SCI entity pursuant to Rule 
1002(b)(3) is one written update and one oral update each year, for 
a total of two updates per a year. See 2022 PRA Supporting 
Statement, supra note 471. The Commission estimates that as a result 
of the three additional SCI events resulting from the additional 
systems intrusions each SCI entity is potentially required to be 
report, the total number of updates would increase to two written 
updates and two oral updates each year, for a total of four updates 
per a year.
    \509\ The Commission-approved baseline for the burden hours for 
each update are 6 hours for the written update (1.5 Compliance 
Manager hours + 1.5 Attorney hours + 1.5 Senior Systems Analyst 
hours + 1.5 Senior Business Analyst hours) and 4.5 hours for the 
oral update (0.75 Compliance Manager hours + 0.75 Attorney hours + 
1.5 Senior Systems Analyst hours + 1.5 Senior Business Analyst 
hours). See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471. The 
Commission does not propose to change the estimated burden hours at 
this time and notes that the estimated hours for the Senior Systems 
Analyst and Senior Business Analyst regarding the oral update 
reflect a correction to a typographical error in the 2022 PRA 
Supporting Statement.
    \510\ 1 written notification x 6 hours per written notification 
+ 1 oral notification x 4.5 hours per oral notification = 10.5 
hours.
    \511\ 2 written notifications x 6 hours per written notification 
+ 2 oral notifications x 4.5 hours per oral notification = 21 hours.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Burden hours for
                                                                                               all respondents
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours        (estimated
                      Respondent type                         respondents   per SCI entity      respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                 SCI entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities......................................              47            10.5                 493.5
New SCI Entities..........................................              23              21                   483
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the cost 
of compliance associated with the ongoing reporting burden for Current 
SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
                   Respondent type                      respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)       per SCI entity       average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI entities................................              47            \1\ $3,677              $172,819
New SCI Entities....................................              23             \2\ 7,354               169,142
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The average internal cost of compliance for each SCI entity to submit an additional written update is $2,141
  per notification ((1.5 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (1.5 Attorney hours x $462) + (1.5 Senior Systems
  Analyst hours x $316) + (1.5 Senior Business Analyst hours x $305)).
The average internal cost of compliance for each SCI entity to submit an additional oral update is $1,536 ((0.75
  Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (0.75 Attorney hours x $462) + (1.5 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) +
  (1.5 Senior Business Analyst hours x $305)).
$2,141 + $1,536 = $3,677 for each Current SCI Entity to submit two additional updates (one written update and
  one oral update).
\2\ $2,141 per written update x 2 written updates per year + $1,536 per oral update x 2 oral updates per year =
  $7,354 for each New SCI Entity to submit updates in compliance with Rule 1002(b)(3).


[[Page 23213]]

    As for Rule 1002(b)(4), the Commission estimates that Current SCI 
Entities will submit an additional 3 reports per year above and beyond 
the current baseline \512\ and New SCI Entities will submit 8 reports 
per year.\513\ The Commission estimates that compliance with Rule 
1002(b)(4) for a particular SCI event will require 35 hours.\514\ The 
Commission estimates that each Current SCI Entity will incur 105 hours 
\515\ and each New SCI Entity will incur 280 hours \516\ to meet the 
requirements of Rule 1002(b)(4). The table below summarizes the initial 
and ongoing annual burden estimates for Current SCI Entities and New 
SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \512\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for the 
number of reports submitted by an SCI entity pursuant to Rule 
1002(b)(4) is five reports per year. See 2022 PRA Supporting 
Statement, supra note 471. The Commission estimates that as a result 
of the increase in the estimated number of SCI events from five 
events to eight events, SCI entities would potentially be required 
to submit an additional three reports per year.
    \513\ As noted earlier, the Commission estimates that New SCI 
Entities would submit both the baseline estimate of five reports and 
the additional three reports, for a total of eight reports.
    \514\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for burden 
hours each SCI entity would incur to comply with Rule 1002(b)(4) for 
each SCI event would be 35 hours (8 Compliance Manager hours + 8 
Attorney hours + 7 Senior Systems Analyst hours + 2 Assistant 
General Counsel hours + 1 General Counsel hour + 2 Chief Compliance 
Officer hours + 7 Senior Business Analyst hours). See 2022 PRA 
Supporting Statement, supra note 471. The Commission does not 
propose to change the estimated burden hours at this time.
    \515\ 3 notifications each year x 35 hours per notification = 
105 hours.
    \516\ 8 notifications each year x 35 hours per notification = 
280 hours.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Burden hours for
                                                                                               all respondents
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours        (estimated
                      Respondent type                         respondents   per SCI entity      respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                 SCI entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities......................................              47             105                 4,935
New SCI Entities..........................................              23             280                 6,440
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission estimates that the average internal cost of 
compliance per notification is $13,672.\517\ The table below summarizes 
the Commission's estimates for the cost of compliance associated with 
the ongoing reporting burden for Current SCI Entities and New SCI 
Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \517\ (8 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (8 Attorney hours x 
$462) + (7 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) + (2 Assistant 
General Counsel hours x $518) + (1 General Counsel hour x $663) + (2 
Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (7 Senior Business Analyst 
hours x $305) = $13,672.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
                   Respondent type                      respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)       per SCI entity       average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities................................              47           \1\ $41,016            $1,927,752
New SCI Entities....................................              23           \2\ 109,376             2,515,648
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ $13,672 per notification x 3 notifications each year = $41,016.
\2\ $13,672 per notification x 8 notifications per year = $109,376 average internal cost of compliance for each
  New SCI Entity.

c. Rule 1002(b)(5)
    The Commission estimates that eliminating systems intrusions from 
the SCI events reported as de minimis events \518\ on the quarterly 
reports reduces the burden for each SCI entity to submit the quarterly 
report by 10% less compared to the current baseline, or 36 hours.\519\ 
Each Current SCI Entity would experience a decrease in its reporting 
burden of 4 hours per quarterly report,\520\ for a total decrease of 16 
hours per SCI entity.\521\ As New SCI Entities are not currently 
required to meet this burden, they would newly incur a burden of 36 
hours per report, for a total burden per SCI entity of 144 hours.\522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \518\ Systems intrusions, whether de minimis or non-de minimis, 
would be reported pursuant to Rules 1002(b)(1) through (4), as 
discussed earlier. See section III.C.3. The burdens for reporting 
all systems intrusions as non-de minimis events is discussed above. 
See supra notes 495-517 and accompanying text.
    \519\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for the 
initial and ongoing reporting burden to comply with the quarterly 
report requirement is 40 hours. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, 
supra note 471. 40 hours x 10% = 36 hours. This estimate includes 7 
hours for a Compliance Manager, 7 hours for an Attorney, 9 hours for 
a Senior Systems Analyst, 1 hours for an Assistant General Counsel, 
9 hours for a Senior Business Analyst, 1 hours for a General 
Counsel, and 2 hours for a Chief Compliance Officer.
    \520\ 40 hours (baseline estimate)-36 hours (revised estimate) = 
4 hours per quarterly report. This estimate includes 0.75 hours for 
a Compliance Manager, 0.75 hours for an Attorney, 1 hour for a 
Senior Systems Analyst, 0.2 hours for an Assistant General Counsel, 
1 hours for a Senior Business Analyst, 0.1 hours for a General 
Counsel, and 0.2 hours for a Chief Compliance Officer.
    \521\ 4 quarterly submissions per year x 4 hours per submission 
= 16 hours decrease per SCI entity.
    \522\ 4 quarterly submissions per year x 36 hours per submission 
= 144 hours per SCI entity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the initial and ongoing annual burden 
estimates for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                    Burden hours for all
                                                                                                              Burden hours per SCI       respondents
                                                                 Estimated       Number of       Hours per      entity (number of        (estimated
                       Respondent type                          respondents       reports         report       reports x hours per      respondents x
                                                                (entities)                                           report)          burden hours  per
                                                                                                                                         SCI entity)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities........................................              47               4             (4)                  (16)                 (752)

[[Page 23214]]

 
New SCI Entities............................................              23               4              36                   144                 3,312
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance associated with the ongoing 
reporting burden for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                Average internal    Total internal  cost
                                                                                                               cost of compliance       of compliance
                                                               Estimated                    Internal cost of     per SCI entity          (estimated
                      Respondent type                         respondents      Number of     compliance per   (number of reports x      respondents x
                                                              (entities)        reports          report         internal cost of      average internal
                                                                                                                 compliance per      cost of compliance
                                                                                                                     report)             per entity
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI entities......................................              47               4      \1\ $(1,513)          \2\ $(6,052)            $(284,444)
New SCI entities..........................................              23               4        \3\ 13,619            \4\ 54,476             1,252,948
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (0.75 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (0.75 Attorney hours x $462) + (1 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) + (0.2 Assistant General Counsel
  hours x $518) + (0.1 General Counsel hour x $663) + (0.2 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (1 Senior Business Analyst hours x $305) = $1,513.
\2\ $1,513 per notification x 4 notifications each year = $6,052 per Current SCI Entity.
\3\ (6.75 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (6.75 Attorney hours x $462) + (9 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) + (1.8 Assistant General Counsel
  hours x $518) + (0.9 General Counsel hour x $663) + (1.8 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (9 Senior Business Analyst hours x $305) = $13,619.
\4\ $13,619 per notification x 4 notifications each year = $54,476 per New SCI Entity.

    The Commission estimates that while SCI entities will handle 
internally most of the work associated with Rule 1002(b), SCI entities 
will seek outside legal advice in the preparation of certain Commission 
notifications. The Commission estimates that the total annual reporting 
cost of seeing outside legal advice is $5,800 per SCI entity.\523\ 
Because Rule 1002(b) will impose approximately 32 reporting 
requirements \524\ per SCI entity per year and each required 
notification will be require an average of $181.25.\525\ The total 
annual reporting costs for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities is 
summarized below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \523\ The Commission-approved baseline for the annual reporting 
cost of seeking outside legal advice is $5,800 per SCI entity. See 
2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
    \524\ The Commission-approved baseline for the number of 
reporting requirements required by Rule 1002(b) is 21 requirements 
for each SCI entity. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 
471. The proposed amendments add an additional 11 reporting 
requirements (3 immediate notifications + 3 24-hour notifications + 
2 updates pertaining to an SCI event + 3 interim/final 
notifications). 21 + 11 = 32 reporting requirements.
    \525\ $5,800 per SCI entity/32 reporting requirements = $181.25 
per reporting requirement.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                           Cost per  SCI
                                                                                                                              entity        Total cost
                                                                                                                            (number of     burdens (cost
                                                                              Number of      Number of       Cost per        reporting        per SCI
                    Rule                           Type of respondent        respondents     reporting       reporting    requirements x     entity x
                                                                                           requirements     requirement      cost per        number of
                                                                                                                             reporting     respondents)
                                                                                                                           requirement)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 1002(b)(1)............................  Current SCI Entities..........           47               3         $181.25            $544         $25,556
                                             New SCI Entities..............           23               8          181.25           1,450          33,350
Rule 1002(b)(2)............................  Current SCI Entities..........           47               3          181.25             544          25,556
                                             New SCI Entities..............           23               8          181.25           1,450          33,350
Rule 1002(b)(3)............................  Current SCI Entities..........           47               2          181.25             363          17,038
                                             New SCI Entities..............           23               4          181.25             725          16,675
Rule 1002(b)(4)............................  Current SCI Entities..........           47               3          181.25             544          25,556
                                             New SCI Entities..............           23               8          181.25           1,450          33,350
Rule 1002(b)(5)............................  Current SCI Entities..........           47               0          181.25               0               0
                                             New SCI Entities..............           23               4          181.25             725          16,675
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Rule 1002(c)
    The Commission anticipates that the proposed amendment will newly 
impose the information dissemination requirements of Rule 1002(c)(1) on 
New SCI Entities, and New SCI Entities will incur the same burdens that 
Current SCI Entities already incur to comply with these 
requirements.\526\ The table below summarizes the burden that would be 
newly imposed on New SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \526\ Current SCI Entities are already required to comply with 
Rule 1002(c)(1). The burdens for compliance are summarized in the 
most recent PRA Supporting Statement. See 2022 PRA Supporting 
Statement, supra note 471. The proposed amendments impose no 
additional burden related to this section. The Commission does not 
anticipate that New SCI Entities would incur burdens beyond what is 
estimated in the 2022 PRA Supporting Statement.

[[Page 23215]]



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                    Burden hours for all
                                                                                                                  Burden hours per       respondents
                                                              Estimated          Number of           Hours per       SCI Entity          (estimated
               Rule                    Respondent type       respondents       dissemination       dissemination     (number of         respondents x
                                                                                                                   reports x hours    burden hours  per
                                                                                                                     per report)         SCI entity)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 1002(c)(1)(i)................  New SCI Entities.....              23  3 information                   \2\ 7                21                   483
                                                                            disseminations \1\.
Rule 1002(c)(1)(ii) and (iii).....                                         9 updates \3\........          \4\ 13               117                 2,691
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for the number of each SCI entity's information disseminations per year under Rule 1002(c)(1)(i) is
  three information disseminations. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
\2\ The Commission's currently approved baseline is that each information dissemination under Rule 1002(c)(1)(i) would require 7 hours. This includes 1
  Compliance Manager hour, 2.67 Attorney hours, 1 Senior System Analyst hour, 0.5 General Counsel hours, 0.5 Director of Compliance hours, 0.5 Chief
  Compliance Officer hours, 0.5 Corporate Communications Manager hours, and 0.33 Webmasters hours. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
\3\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for Rule 1002(c)(1)(ii) and (iii) is that each SCI entity will disseminate three updates for each SCI
  event. 3 updates per SCI Event x 3 SCI events = 9 updates each year.
\4\ The Commission's currently approved baseline is that each information dissemination under Rule 1002(c)(1)(ii) and (iii) would require 13 hours. This
  includes 2 Compliance Manager hours, 4.67 Attorney hours, 2 Senior System Analyst hour, 1 General Counsel hours, 1 Director of Compliance hours, 1
  Chief Compliance Officer hours, 1 Corporate Communications Manager hours, and 0.33 Webmasters hours. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note
  471, at 25-26.

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance associated with the ongoing 
reporting burden for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
              Rule                  Respondent type     respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)       per SCI entity       average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 1002(c)(1)(i)..............  New SCI Entities..              23            \1\ $9,212              $211,876
Rule 1002(c)(1)(ii) and (iii)...                                                \2\ 51,666             1,188,318
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (1 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (2.67 Attorney hours x $462) + (1 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316)
  + (0.5 General Counsel hour x $663) + (0.5 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (0.5 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) + (0.5 Corporate Communications Manager hours x $378) + (0.33 Webmaster hours x $276)
  = $3,071. $3,071 per notification x 3 notifications each year = $9,212.
\2\ (2 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (4.67 Attorney hours x $462) + (2 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316)
  + (1 General Counsel hour x $663) + (1 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (1 Director of Compliance
  hours x $542) + (1 Corporate Communications Manager hours x $378) + (0.33 Webmaster hours x $276) = $5,741.
  $5,741 per notification x 9 notifications each year = $51,666.

    With respect to the Rule 1002(c)(2) requirement to disseminate 
information regarding systems intrusions, the Commission estimates that 
each Current SCI Entity will disseminate information regarding 3 
systems intrusions each year and each New SCI Entity will disseminate 
information regarding 4 systems intrusions each year.\527\ The 
Commission estimates that each dissemination under Rule 1002(c)(2) will 
require 10 hours.\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \527\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for the 
number of each SCI entity's information disseminations per year 
under Rule 1002(c)(2) is that each SCI entity will disseminate 
information about one systems intrusion each year. See 2022 PRA 
Supporting Statement, supra note 471. As discussed above, the 
Commission estimates an additional three SCI events (i.e., three 
additional systems intrusions) as a result of the additional types 
of systems intrusions added to the definition systems intrusions in 
Rule 1000 and the elimination of systems intrusions from the de 
minimis SCI events reported quarterly in Rule 1002(b)(5). The 
Commission estimates that each SCI entity would disseminate 
information related to four systems intrusions each year. Each 
Current SCI Entity would disseminate information for three systems 
intrusions beyond the baseline estimate of one systems intrusion. As 
New SCI Entities will newly incur this burden, and as a result will 
report four systems intrusions.
    \528\ The Commission's currently approved baseline is that each 
dissemination under Rule 1002(c)(2) will require 10 hours. See 2022 
PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the initial and ongoing annual burden 
estimates for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Burden hours for all
                                                                                                 respondents
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours        (estimated
                      Respondent type                         respondents   per SCI entity      respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                 SCI entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities......................................              47          \1\ 30                 1,410
New SCI Entities..........................................              23          \2\ 40                   920
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 3 information disseminations x 10 hours per dissemination = 30 hours.
\2\ 4 information disseminations x 10 hours per dissemination = 40 hours.

    The Commission estimates that the average internal cost of 
compliance per notification is $4,406.\529\ The table below summarizes 
the Commission's estimates for the cost of compliance associated with 
the ongoing reporting burden for Current SCI Entities and New SCI 
Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \529\ (1.5 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (3.67 Attorney 
hours x $462) + (1.5 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) + (0.75 
General Counsel hour x $633) + (0.75 Director of Compliance hours x 
$542) + (0.75 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (0.75 
Corporate Communications Manager hours x $378) + (0.33 Webmasters 
hours x $276) = $4,406 per notification.

[[Page 23216]]



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                             Total internal cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
                   Respondent type                      respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)       per SCI entity       average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities................................              47           \1\ $13,218              $621,246
New SCI Entities....................................              23            \2\ 17,624               405,352
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ $4,406 per notification x 3 information disseminations each year = $13,218.
\2\ $4,406 per notification x 4 information disseminations per year = $17,624.

    The Commission believes SCI entities will seek outside legal advice 
in the preparation of the information dissemination under Rule 1002(c). 
The Commission estimates that the total annual reporting cost of seeing 
outside legal advice is $3,320 per SCI entity.\530\ Because Rule 
1002(c) will impose approximately 16 third-party disclosure 
requirements \531\ per SCI entity per year and each required disclosure 
will be require an average of $207.50.\532\ The total annual reporting 
costs for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities are summarized 
below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \530\ The Commission-approved baseline for the annual reporting 
cost of seeking outside legal advice is $3,320 per SCI entity. See 
2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
    \531\ The Commission-approved baseline for the number of 
disclosure requirements required by Rule 1002(c) is 13 requirements 
for each SCI entity. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 
471. The proposed amendments add an additional 3 reporting 
requirements (3 additional information disseminations related to 3 
additional systems intrusions). 13 + 3 = 16 disclosure requirements.
    \532\ $3,320 per SCI entity/16 reporting requirements = $207.50 
per reporting requirement.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                           Cost per SCI     Total cost
                                                                                                                          entity (number   burdens (cost
                     Rule                                Respondent type            Number of    Number of     Cost per   of disclosures  per SCI entity
                                                                                   respondents  disclosures   disclosure    x cost per      x number of
                                                                                                                            disclosure)    respondents)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 1002(c)(1)(i)............................  New SCI Entities.................           23            3      $207.50         $622.50      $14,317.50
Rule 1002(c)(1)(ii) and (iii).................  New SCI Entities.................           23            9       207.50        1,867.50       42,952.50
Rule 1002(c)(2)...............................  Current SCI Entities.............           47            3       207.50          622.50       29,257.50
                                                New SCI Entities.................           23            4       207.50             830          19,090
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted above, Regulation SCI requires SCI entities to identify 
certain types of events and systems. The Commission believes that the 
identification of critical SCI systems, major SCI events, and de 
minimis SCI events will impose an initial one-time implementation 
burden on new SCI entities in developing processes to quickly and 
correctly identify the nature of a system or event. The identification 
of these systems and events may also impose periodic burdens on SCI 
entities in reviewing and updating the processes. The Commission 
anticipates that the because the proposed amendment will newly impose 
the requirements of Rule 1002(b) on New SCI Entities, New SCI Entities 
will incur the burden to develop processes to comply with these 
requirements.\533\ The Commission estimates that each New SCI entity 
will initially require 198 hours to establish criteria for identifying 
material systems changes and 39 hours to annually to review and update 
the criteria.\534\ The table below summarizes the burden that would be 
newly imposed on New SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \533\ Current SCI Entities are already required to comply with 
Rule 1003(a). The burdens for compliance are summarized in the most 
recent PRA Supporting Statement. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, 
supra note 471. The proposed amendments impose no additional burden 
related to this section.
    \534\ These estimates reflect the Commission-approved baseline. 
See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471. The Commission 
does not anticipate that New SCI Entities would incur burdens beyond 
what is estimated in the 2022 PRA Supporting Statement.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Estimated burden
                                                               Estimated                        hours for all
          Respondent type                 Burden type         respondents    Burden hours    entities (estimated
                                                              (entities)      per entity    respondents x burden
                                                                                              hours per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities...................  Initial..............              23             198                 4,554
                                     Annual...............              23              39                   897
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance for New SCI Entities:

[[Page 23217]]



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
         Respondent type              Burden type       respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities................  Initial...........              23           \1\ $78,144            $1,797,312
                                  Annual............              23            \2\ 17,258               396,934
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (64 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (64 Attorney hours x $462) + (20 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316)
  + (20 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (20 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (10 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $78,144.
\2\ (9 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (9 Attorney hours x $462) + (3 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) +
  (3 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (10 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (5 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $17,258.

    As discussed above in section III.C.3.c, the proposed amendments to 
the definition of systems intrusion would require SCI entities to 
establish reasonable written criteria to identify significant attempted 
unauthorized entries into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an 
SCI entity. As this is a new burden for both Current SCI Entities and 
New SCI Entities, the Commission estimates an average burden across all 
SCI entities of 89 hours \535\ initially to establish the criteria for 
identifying material systems changes and 14.5 hours \536\ annually to 
review and update the criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \535\ This estimate is based on the Commission's burden estimate 
for Rule 1001(a), because Rule 1001(a) requires policies and 
procedures. See supra notes 474-475 and accompanying text. Rule 
1001(a) (excluding Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi)) requires a total of ten 
policy elements at a minimum, consisting of six currently required 
policy elements and four proposed policy elements. See supra notes 
471 and 474. Because the proposed amendment to the definition of 
systems intrusion in Rule 1000 requires only one set of written 
criteria, the Commission estimates that the initial staff burden to 
draft the criteria required to identify significant attempted 
unauthorized systems intrusions is one-tenth of the initial staff 
burden to draft the policies and procedures required by Rule 1001(a) 
(excluding Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi)). 890 hours/10 policy elements = 89 
burden hours per policy element. The 89 burden hours includes 25 
hours for a Compliance Manager, 25 hours for an Attorney, 8 hours 
for a Senior Systems Analyst, and 8 hours for an Operations 
Specialist. The Commission also estimates that a Chief Compliance 
Officer will spend 15 hours and a Director of Compliance and a 
Director of Compliance will spend 8 hours reviewing the policies and 
procedures.
    \536\ This estimate is based on the Commission's burden estimate 
for Rule 1001(a), because Rule 1001(a) requires policies and 
procedures. See supra notes 475-476 and accompanying text. Rule 
1001(a) (excluding Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi)) requires a total of ten 
policy elements at a minimum, consisting of six currently required 
policy elements and four proposed policy elements. See supra notes 
472 and 475. Because the proposed amendment to the definition of 
systems intrusion in Rule 1000 requires only one set of written 
criteria, the Commission estimates that the ongoing staff burden to 
review and update the criteria required to identify significant 
attempted unauthorized systems intrusions is one-tenth of the 
ongoing staff burden to review and update the policies and 
procedures required by Rule 1001(a) (excluding Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi)). 
145 hours/10 policy elements = 14.5 burden hours per policy element. 
The 14.5 burden hours includes 2 hours for a Compliance Manager, 2 
hours for an Attorney, 1 hours for a Senior Systems Analyst, and 1 
hours for an Operations Specialist. The Commission also estimates 
that a Chief Compliance Officer will spend 5.5 hours and a Director 
of Compliance and a Director of Compliance will spend 3 hours 
reviewing the policies and procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the initial and ongoing annual burden 
estimates for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Estimated burden
                                                                                                hours for all
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours    entities (estimated
          Respondent type                 Burden type         respondents     per entity        respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                   entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities...............  Initial..............              47              89                 4,183
                                     Annual...............              47            14.5                 681.5
New SCI Entities...................  Initial..............              23              89                 2,047
                                     Annual...............              23            14.5                 333.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance for New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
         Respondent type              Burden type       respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities............  Initial...........              47           \1\ $37,065            $1,742,055
                                  Annual............              47             \2\ 6,946               326,462
New SCI Entities................  Initial...........              23            \3\ 37,065               852,495
                                  Annual............              23             \4\ 6,946               159,758
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (25 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (25 Attorney hours x $462) + (8 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316)
  + (8 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (15 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (8 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $37,065.
\2\ (2 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (2 Attorney hours x $462) + (1 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) +
  (1 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (5.5 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (3 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $6,946.
\3\ See supra note 1 of this table.
\4\ See supra note 2 of this table.


[[Page 23218]]

3. Rule 1003
    The Commission anticipates that the proposed amendment will newly 
impose the Rule 1003(a) requirements to report material system changes 
on New SCI Entities, and New SCI Entities will incur the same burdens 
that Current SCI Entities already incur to comply with these 
requirements.\537\ The table below summarizes the burden that would be 
newly imposed on New SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \537\ Current SCI Entities are already required to comply with 
Rule 1003(a). The burdens for compliance are summarized in the most 
recent PRA Supporting Statement. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, 
supra note 471. The proposed amendments impose no additional burden 
related to this section. The Commission does not anticipate that New 
SCI Entities would incur burdens beyond what is estimated in the 
2022 PRA Supporting Statement.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                    Burden hours for all
                                                                                                                  Burden hours per       respondents
                                                              Estimated                              Hours per        SCI entity         (estimated
               Rule                    Respondent type       respondents     Number of reports        report         (number of         respondents x
                                                             (entities)                                            reports x hours    burden hours  per
                                                                                                                     per report)         SCI entity)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 1003(a)(1)...................  New SCI Entities.....              23  4 reports (1 per              \1\ 125               500                11,500
                                                                            quarter).
Rule 1003(a)(2)...................                                         \2\ 1 supplemental             \3\ 15                15                  345
                                                                            report.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Commission's currently approved baseline is that each quarterly report under Rule 1003(a)(1) would require 125 hours. This includes 7.5
  Compliance Manager hours, 7.5 Attorney hours, 5 Chief Compliance Officer hours, 75 Senior System Analyst hours, and 30 Senior Business Analyst hours.
  See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
\2\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for Rules 1002(c)(1)(ii) and (iii) is that each SCI entity will submit one supplemental report each
  year. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
\3\ The Commission's currently approved baseline is that the supplemental report under Rule 1003(a)(1) would require 15 hours. This includes 2
  Compliance Manager hours, 2 Attorney hours, 1 Chief Compliance Officer hours, 7 Senior System Analyst hours, and 3 Senior Business Analyst hours. See
  2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.

    The table below summarizes the average internal cost of compliance 
that would be newly imposed on New SCI Entities:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                    Total internal  cost
                                                                                                                                        of compliance
                                                            Estimated                             Cost of       Average internal         (estimated
               Rule                   Respondent type      respondents    Number of reports     compliance     cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                           (entities)                           per report         per entity         average internal
                                                                                                                                     cost of compliance
                                                                                                                                         per entity)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 1003(a)(1)..................  New SCI Entities....              23  4 reports (1 per        \1\ $41,480          \2\ $167,360            $3,849,280
                                                                          quarter).
Rule 1003(a)(2)..................                                        1 supplemental            \3\ 5,328                 5,328               122,544
                                                                          report.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (7.5 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (7.5 Attorney hours x $462) + (5 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (75 Senior Systems Analyst hours x
  $316) + (30 Senior Business Analyst hours x $305) = $41,840.
\2\ $41,480 per report x 4 reports each year = $167,360.
\3\ (2 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (2 Attorney hours x $462) + (1 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (7 Senior Systems Analyst hours x
  $316) + (3 Senior Business Analyst hours x $305) = $5,328.

    Rule 1003(a)(1) requires each SCI entity to establish reasonable 
written criteria for identifying a change to its SCI systems and the 
security of indirect SCI systems as material. The Commission 
anticipates that the proposed amendment will newly impose these 
requirements on New SCI Entities, and New SCI Entities will incur the 
same burdens that Current SCI Entities already incur to comply with 
these requirements.\538\ The Commission estimates that each New SCI 
entity will initially require 114 hours to establish criteria for 
identifying material systems changes and 27 hours to annually to review 
and update the criteria.\539\ The table below summarizes the burden 
that would be newly imposed on New SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \538\ Current SCI Entities are already required to comply with 
Rule 1003(a). The burdens for compliance are summarized in the most 
recent PRA Supporting Statement. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, 
supra note 471. The proposed amendments impose no additional burden 
related to this section.
    \539\ These estimates reflect the Commission-approved baseline. 
See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471. The Commission 
does not anticipate that New SCI Entities would incur burdens beyond 
what is estimated in the 2022 PRA Supporting Statement.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Estimated burden
                                                                                                hours for all
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours    entities (estimated
          Respondent type                 Burden type         respondents     per entity        respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                   entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities...................  Initial..............              23             114                 2,622
                                     Annual...............              23              27                   621
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the cost 
of compliance for New SCI Entities:

[[Page 23219]]



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
                   Respondent type                      respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities....................................              23           \1\ $47,672            $1,096,456
                                                                                \2\ 12,929               297,367
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (32 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (32 Attorney hours x $462) + (10 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316)
  + (10 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (20 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (10 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $47,672.
\2\ (4.5 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (4.5 Attorney hours x $462) + (1.5 Senior Systems Analyst hours x
  $316) + (1.5 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (10 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (5 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) = $12,929.

    The Commission does not expect SCI entities to incur any external 
PRA costs in connection with the reports required under Rule 1003(a).
    As for Rule 1003(b), each Current SCI Entity is already required to 
perform an SCI review and therefore already incurs a baseline burden 
\540\ for compliance, so the amendments should only impose a burden 
required to comply with the additional requirements. Presently, none of 
the New SCI Entities are required to comply with the requirements of 
Rule 1003(b), but the proposed amendments will newly impose both the 
baseline burden to conduct the SCI review and the additional burden to 
meet the proposed requirements for the SCI review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \540\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for the 
annual recordkeeping burden of conducting an SCI review and 
submitting the SCI review to senior management of the SCI entity for 
review is 690 hours (35 Compliance Manager hours + 80 Attorney hours 
+ 375 Senior Systems Analyst hours + 5 General Counsel hours + 5 
Director of Compliance hours + 20 Chief Compliance Officer hours 
+170 Internal Audit Manager hours). See 2022 PRA Supporting 
Statement, supra note 471.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission estimates that the proposed additional requirements 
for conducting the SCI review will increase the burden of conducting 
the SCI review and submitting the report by 50%. With respect to Rule 
1003(b)(1) and (2), the Commission estimates an additional burden for 
Current SCI Entities of 345 hours \541\ and 1,035 hours \542\ for New 
SCI Entities. The table below summarizes the initial and ongoing annual 
burden estimates for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \541\ 690 hours (baseline burden) x 0.5 = 345 hours. This 
estimate includes 17.5 hours for a Compliance Manager, 40 hours for 
an Attorney, 187.5 hours for a Senior Systems Analyst, 2.5 hours for 
General Counsel, 10 hours for a Chief Compliance Officer, 2.5 hours 
for a Director of Compliance, and 85 hours for an Internal Audit 
Manager.
    \542\ 690 baseline burden hours + 345 additional burden hours = 
1,035 hours. This estimate includes 52.5 hours for a Compliance 
Manager, 120 hours for an Attorney, 562.5 hours for a Senior Systems 
Analyst, 7.5 hours for General Counsel, 30 hours for a Chief 
Compliance Officer, 7.5 hours for a Director of Compliance, and 255 
hours for an Internal Audit Manager.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Estimated burden
                                                                                                hours for all
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours   entities  (estimated
                      Respondent type                         respondents     per entity        respondents x
                                                                                              burden hours  per
                                                                                                   entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities......................................              47             345                16,215
New SCI Entities..........................................              23           1,035                23,805
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance for Current SCI Entities and New 
SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                                        Average internal         (estimated
                   Respondent type                       Estimated     cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        respondents        per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities................................              47          \1\ $123,848            $5,820,856
New SCI Entities....................................              23           \2\ 371,543            $8,545,489
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (17.5 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (40 Attorney hours x $462) + (187.5 Senior Systems Analyst hours x
  $316) + (2.5 General Counsel hours x $663) + (2.5 Director of Compliance hours x $542) + (10 Chief Compliance
  Officer hours x $589) + (85 Internal Audit Manager hours x $367) = $123,848.
\2\ (52.5 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (120 Attorney hours x $462) + (562.5 Senior Systems Analyst hours x
  $316) + (7.5 General Counsel hours x $663) + (7.5 Director of Compliance hours x $542) + (30 Chief Compliance
  Officer hours x $589) + (255 Internal Audit Manager hours x $367) = $371,543.

    With respect to Rule 1003(b)(3), the Commission estimates that the 
burden for SCI entities would increase to 25 hours from the current 
baseline estimate.\543\ Thus, the Commission estimates an additional 
burden for

[[Page 23220]]

Current SCI Entities of 24 hours \544\ and a new burden of 25 hours 
\545\ for New SCI Entities. The table below summarizes the initial and 
ongoing annual burden estimates for Current SCI Entities and New SCI 
Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \543\ The Commission's currently approved baseline to submit the 
report for the SCI review to the board of directors is 1 hour (1 
Attorney hour). See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471. 
The Commission estimates an increase to 25 hours as a result of the 
proposed requirement that senior management provide a response to 
the SCI review.
    \544\ 25 hours (revised estimate) - 1 hour (baseline estimate) = 
24 hours. This estimate includes 1 hours for a Compliance Manager, 3 
hours for an Attorney, 13 hours for a Senior Systems Analyst, 1 
hours for a Chief Compliance Officer, and 6 hours for an Internal 
Audit Manager.
    \545\ This estimate includes 1 hours for a Compliance Manager, 3 
hours for an Attorney, 14 hours for a Senior Systems Analyst, 1 
hours for a Chief Compliance Officer, and 6 hours for an Internal 
Audit Manager.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Estimated burden
                                                                                                hours for all
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours    entities (estimated
                      Respondent type                         respondents     per entity        respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                   entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities......................................              47              24                 1,128
New SCI Entities..........................................              23              25                   575
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the 
average internal cost of compliance for Current SCI Entities and New 
SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
                   Respondent type                      respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities................................              47            \1\ $8,629              $405,563
New SCI Entities....................................              23             \2\ 8,945               205,735
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (1 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (3 Attorney hours x $462) + (13 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) +
  (1 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (6 Internal Audit Manager hours x $367) = $8,629.
\2\ (1 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (3 Attorney hours x $462) + (14 Senior Systems Analyst hours x $316) +
  (1 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (6 Internal Audit Manager hours x $367) = $8,945.

    Rule 1003(b) imposes recordkeeping costs for SCI entities. The 
Commission estimates that while SCI entities will handle internally 
some or most of the work associated with compliance with Rule 1003(b), 
SCI entities will outsource some of the work associated with an SCI 
review. The Commission estimates that the proposed amendments to the 
SCI review would increase the annual recordkeeping cost by 50% beyond 
the current baseline.\546\ The table below summarizes the Commission's 
estimates for the cost of outsourcing for Current SCI Entities and New 
SCI Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \546\ The Commission-approved baseline for the annual 
recordkeeping cost per SCI entity of outsourcing is $50,000. See 
2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
                   Respondent type                      respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities................................              47           \1\ $25,000            $1,175,000
New SCI Entities....................................              23            \2\ 75,000             1,725,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 50,000 (baseline estimate) x 0.5 = $25,000.
\2\ 50,000 (baseline estimate) x 1.5 = $75,000.

4. Rule 1004
    The rules under Regulation SCI that would require an SCI entity to 
mandate member or participant participation in business continuity and 
disaster recovery plan testing are discussed more fully in sections 
II.B, and the proposed amendments including third-party providers in 
the requirement are discussed more fully in III.C.2 above.
    Current SCI Entities are already required to establish standards 
and designate members or participants for testing pursuant to Rule 1004 
and therefore already incur baseline initial \547\ and ongoing burdens 
\548\ for complying with Rule 1004, so the amendments should only 
impose a burden required to comply with the additional requirements. 
Presently, none of the New SCI Entities are required to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 1004, but the proposed amendments will newly

[[Page 23221]]

impose both the baseline burden to establish standards for the 
designation of members and participants for BC/DR testing and 
coordinate industry or sector-wide basis testing and additional burden 
to establish standards for the designation of third-party providers for 
BC/DR testing and coordinate industry or sector-wide basis testing for 
third-party providers. The Commission estimates an initial compliance 
burden of 90 hours \549\ for Current SCI Entities and 450 hours \550\ 
for New SCI Entities. The Commission estimates an annual compliance 
burden of 34 hours \551\ for Current SCI Entities and 169 hours \552\ 
for New SCI Entities. The table below summarizes the initial and 
ongoing annual burden estimates for Current SCI Entities and New SCI 
Entities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \547\ The Commission's currently approved baseline for average 
initial compliance burden per respondent with 17 CFR 242.1004(a) 
(``Rule 1004(a)'') (i.e., establishment of standards for the 
designation of members and participants) and (c) (i.e., the 
coordination of testing on an industry- or sector-wide basis) is 360 
hours (40 Compliance Manager hours + 60 Attorney hours + 20 
Assistant General Counsel hours + 60 Senior Operations Manager hours 
+ 140 Operations Specialist hours + 26 Chief Compliance Officer 
hours + 14 Director of Compliance hours). See 2022 PRA Supporting 
Statement, supra note 471. The estimate of 360 hours includes the 
burden for designating members or participants for testing, as 
required by 17 CFR 242.1004(b) (``Rule 1004(b)''). Id. at 18 n.50.
    \548\ The average annual compliance burden for each SCI entity 
to review and update the policies and procedures is 135 hours for 
each entity that is not a plan processor. See 2022 PRA Supporting 
Statement, supra note 471. None of the New SCI Entities are plan 
processors, so the Commission is applying the 135 hour estimate to 
the New SCI Entities.
    \549\ The Commission estimates that the additional burden to 
establish standards for the designation of third-party providers for 
BC/DR testing and coordinate testing would be 25% of the 360 hour 
baseline burden hours. 360 hours x 0.25 = 90 hours. The burden hours 
include 10 Compliance Manager hours, 15 Attorney hours, 5 Assistant 
General Counsel hours, 35 Operations Specialist hours, 6 Chief 
Compliance Officer hours, 4 Director of Compliance hours, and 15 
Senior Operations Manager hours.
    \550\ 360 baseline burden hours + 90 additional burden hours = 
450 hours.
    \551\ The Commission estimates that the additional annual burden 
would be 25% of the 135 hour baseline burden hours, or 34 hours (135 
hours x 0.25). The burden hours include 3 Compliance Manager hours, 
3 Attorney hours, 1 Assistant General Counsel hours, 18 Operations 
Specialist hours, 3 Chief Compliance Officer hours, 1 Director of 
Compliance hours, and 5 Senior Operations Manager hours.
    \552\ 135 baseline burden hours + 34 additional burden hours = 
169 hours.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Estimated burden
                                                                                                hours for all
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours   entities  (estimated
          Respondent type                 Burden type         respondents     per entity        respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                   entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities...............  Initial..............              47              90                 4,230
                                     Annual...............              47              34                 1,598
New SCI Entities...................  Initial..............              23             450                10,350
                                     Annual...............              23             169                 3,887
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimates for the cost 
of compliance for Current SCI Entities and New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
         Respondent type              Burden type       respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current SCI Entities............  Initial...........              47           \1\ $30,072            $1,413,384
                                  Annual............              47            \2\ 10,011               470,517
New SCI Entities................  Initial...........              23           \3\ 150,478             3,460,994
                                  Annual............              23            \4\ 50,331             1,157,613
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ (10 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (15 Attorney hours x $462) + (5 Assistant General Counsel hours x
  $518) + (35 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (6 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (4 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) + (15 Senior Operations Manager hours x $406) = $30,072.
\2\ (3 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (3 Attorney hours x $462) + (1 Assistant General Counsel hours x $518)
  + (18 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (3 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (1 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) + (5 Senior Operations Manager hours x $406) = $10,011.
\3\ (50 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (75 Attorney hours x $462) + (25 Assistant General Counsel hours x
  $518) + (175 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (32.5 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (17.5
  Director of Compliance hours x $542) + (75 Senior Operations Manager hours x $406) = $150,478.
\4\ (13 Compliance Manager hours x $344) + (18 Attorney hours x $462) + (6 Assistant General Counsel hours x
  $518) + (88 Operations Specialist hours x $152) + (13 Chief Compliance Officer hours x $589) + (6 Director of
  Compliance hours x $542) + (25 Senior Operations Manager hours x $406) = $50,331.

    The Commission continues to believe that SCI entities (other than 
plan processors) would handle internally the work associated with the 
requirements of Rule 1004.
5. Rule 1005
    Rules 1005 and 1007 impose on SCI entities recordkeeping 
requirements related to their compliance with Regulation SCI. These 
requirements would be newly imposed on New SCI Entities as a result of 
the proposed amendment. The table below summarizes the Commission's 
estimates as to the burden that each New SCI Entity would incur to meet 
the requirements of Rules 1005 and 1007: \553\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \553\ Current SCI Entities are already required to comply with 
Rules 1005 and 1007. The burdens for compliance are summarized in 
the most recent PRA Supporting Statement. See 2022 PRA Supporting 
Statement, supra note 471. The proposed amendments impose no 
additional burden related to this section. The Commission does not 
anticipate that New SCI Entities would incur burdens beyond what is 
estimated in the 2022 PRA Supporting Statement.

[[Page 23222]]



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Burden hours for all
                                                                                                 respondents
                                                               Estimated     Burden hours        (estimated
          Respondent type                 Burden type         respondents   per SCI entity      respondents x
                                                              (entities)                      burden hours  per
                                                                                                 SCI entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities...................  Initial..............              23         \1\ 170                 3,910
                                     Annual...............                          \2\ 25                   575
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Commission approved baseline estimate for each new non-SRO SCI entity to set up or modify a
  recordkeeping system is 170 hours. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
\2\ The Commission approved baseline estimate for each new non-SRO SCI entity to make, keep, and preserve
  records relating to compliance with Regulation SCI, as required by Rule 1005(b), is 25 hours. See 2022 PRA
  Supporting Statement, supra note 471.

    The table below summarizes the average internal cost of compliance 
that would be newly imposed on New SCI Entities:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
         Respondent type              Burden type       respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities................  Initial...........              23           \1\ $13,260              $304,980
                                  Annual............                             \2\ 1,950                44,850
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 170 Compliance Clerk hours x $78 per hour = $13,260.
\2\ 25 Compliance Clerk hours x $78 per hour = $1,950.

    The recordkeeping requirements impose recordkeeping costs for SCI 
entities other than SCI SROs. The Commission estimates that a New SCI 
Entity other than an SCI SRO will incur a one-time cost of $900 for 
information technology costs for purchasing recordkeeping software, for 
a total of $20,700.\554\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \554\ $900 per SCI entity x 21 SCI entities = $18,900.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Rule 1006
    SCI entities submit Form SCI through the Electronic Form Filing 
System (``EFFS''), which is also used by SCI SROs to file Form 19b-4 
filings. Access to EFFS establishes reporting burdens for all SCI 
entities. An SCI entity will submit to the Commission an External 
Application User Authentication Form (``EAUF'') to register each 
individual at the SCI entity who will access the EFFS system on behalf 
of the SCI entity. The Commission is including in its burden estimates 
the reporting burden for completing the EAUF for each individual at a 
New SCI Entity that will request access to EFFS.\555\ The table below 
summarizes the initial and ongoing burdens that would be New SCI 
Entities would incur to establish access to EFFS:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \555\ Current SCI Entities would already have incurred these 
burdens, which are summarized in the most recent PRA Supporting 
Statement. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471. The 
proposed amendments impose no additional burden related to this 
section. The Commission does not anticipate that New SCI Entities 
would incur burdens beyond what is estimated in the 2022 PRA 
Supporting Statement.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                Burden hours  per   Burden hours for all
                                                                                 Number of                     SCI entity  (number       respondents
                                                                 Estimated      individuals       Time to        of  individuals         (estimated
           Respondent type                Type of  burden       respondents     requesting     complete EAUF  requesting  access x      respondents x
                                                                (entities)        access                        time to  complete     burden hours  per
                                                                                                                      EAUF)              SCI entity)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities....................  Initial...............              23           \1\ 2        \2\ 0.15                   0.3                   6.9
                                      Annual................                           \3\ 1                                  0.15                   3.5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Commission approved baseline estimate for the number of individuals per SCI entity who will request access to EFFS initially through the EAUF is
  two individuals. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
\2\ The Commission approved baseline estimate to complete the EAUF is 0.15 hours. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
\3\ The Commission approved baseline estimate for the number of individuals per SCI entity who will request access to EFFS annually through the EAUF is
  one individual. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.

    The table below summarizes the average internal cost of compliance 
that would be newly imposed on New SCI Entities:

[[Page 23223]]



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Total internal  cost
                                                                                                of compliance
                                                         Estimated      Average internal         (estimated
         Respondent type              Burden type       respondents    cost of compliance       respondents x
                                                        (entities)         per entity         average internal
                                                                                             cost of compliance
                                                                                                 per entity)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities................  Initial...........              23              \1\ $139                $3,197
                                  Annual............                                \2\ 69                 1,587
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 0.3 Attorney hours x $462 = $139.
\2\ 0.15 Attorney hours x $462 = $69.

    Obtaining the ability for an individual to electronically sign a 
Form SCI imposes reporting costs for SCI entities. The table below 
summarizes the cost for individuals at each New SCI Entity to obtain 
digital IDs to sign Form SCI:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                             Cost per SCI entity
                                                                                                                  (number of            Cost for all
                                                            Estimated        Number of      Cost to obtain       individuals            respondents
                    Respondent type                        respondents     individuals to     digital ID     requesting  access x        (estimated
                                                            (entities)     sign form SCI                      time to  complete     respondents x burden
                                                                                                                    EAUF)          hours per SCI entity)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
New SCI Entities.......................................              23            \1\ 2          \2\ $25                    $50                 $1,150
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Commission approved baseline estimate for the number of individuals per SCI entity who will sign Form SCI each year is two individuals. See 2022
  PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.
\2\ The Commission approved baseline estimate to obtain a digital ID is $50. See 2022 PRA Supporting Statement, supra note 471.

7. Summary of the Information Collection Burden
    The table below summarizes the Commission's estimate of the total 
hourly burden, total internal costs of compliance, and external cost 
estimates for SCI entities under Regulation SCI.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Burden hours                 Costs of compliance
             Rule                Respondent type ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Initial         Annual          Initial         Annual
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Policies and procedures         Current SCI               18,142           2,726      $6,804,989      $1,099,941
 required by Rule 1001(a)        Entities.                20,470           3,335       7,667,533       1,341,245
 (except Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi))   New SCI Entities
 (Recordkeeping).
Policies and procedures         New SCI Entities           3,680           3,335       1,402,540       1,204,740
 required by Rule
 1001(a)(2)(vi)
 (Recordkeeping).
Costs for outside legal/        Current SCI                  N/A             N/A       1,365,350             N/A
 consulting services in          Entities.                   N/A             N/A       1,697,400             N/A
 initial preparation of         New SCI Entities
 policies and procedures
 required by Rule 1001(a)
 (Recordkeeping).
Policies and procedures         Current SCI               18,142           2,726       8,170,339       1,099,941
 required by Rule 1001(a)        Entities.                24,150           6,670      10,767,473       2,545,985
 Total.                         New SCI Entities
Policies and procedures         New SCI Entities           6,210           2,185       2,222,720         808,220
 required by Rule 1001(b)
 (Recordkeeping).
Costs for outside legal/        New SCI Entities             N/A             N/A         621,000               0
 consulting services in
 initial preparation of
 policies and procedures
 required by Rule 1001(b)
 (recordkeeping).
Policies and procedures         New SCI Entities           6,210           2,185       2,843,720         808,220
 required by Rule 1001(b)
 Total.
Policies and procedures         New SCI Entities           2,622             897       1,096,456         400,821
 required by Rule 1001(c)
 (Recordkeeping).
Mandate participation in        Current SCI                4,230           1,598       1,413,384         470,517
 certain testing required by     Entities.                10,350           3,887       3,460,994       1,157,613
 Rule 1004 (Recordkeeping).     New SCI Entities
SCI Event Notice Required By    Current SCI                  235             235          81,663          81,663
 Rule 1002(b)(1) (Reporting).    Entities.                   299             299         103,477         103,477
                                New SCI Entities
External Legal Costs for Rule   Current SCI                  N/A             N/A          25,556          25,556
 1001(b)(1) (Reporting).         Entities.                   N/A             N/A          33,350          33,350
                                New SCI Entities
SCI Event Notice Required By    Current SCI                  235             235         107,219         107,219
 Rule 1002(b)(1) Total.          Entities.                   299             299         136,827         136,827
                                New SCI Entities
SCI Event Notice Required By    Current SCI                3,384           3,384       1,249,683       1,249,683
 Rule 1002(b)(2) (Reporting).    Entities.                 4,416           4,416       1,630,792       1,630,792
                                New SCI Entities
External Legal Costs for Rule   Current SCI                  N/A             N/A          25,556          25,556
 1001(b)(2) (Reporting).         Entities.                   N/A             N/A          33,350          33,350
                                New SCI Entities
SCI Event Notice Required By    Current SCI                3,384           3,384       1,275,239       1,275,239
 Rule 1002(b)(2) Total.          Entities.                 4,416           4,416       1,664,142       1,664,142
                                New SCI Entities
SCI Event Notice Required By    Current SCI                493.5           493.5         172,819         172,819
 Rule 1002(b)(3) (Reporting).    Entities.                   483             483         169,142         169,142
                                New SCI Entities
External Legal Costs for Rule   Current SCI                  N/A             N/A          17,038          17,038
 1002(b)(3) (Reporting).         Entities.                   N/A             N/A          16,675          16,675
                                New SCI Entities

[[Page 23224]]

 
SCI Event Notice Required By    Current SCI                493.5           493.5         189,857         189,857
 Rule 1002(b)(3) Total.          Entities.                   483             483         185,817         185,817
                                New SCI Entities
SCI Event Notice Required By    Current SCI                4,935           4,935       1,927,752       1,927,752
 Rule 1002(b)(4) (Reporting).    Entities.                 6,440           6,440       2,515,648       2,515,648
                                New SCI Entities
External Legal Costs for        Current SCI                  N/A             N/A          25,556          25,556
 1001(b)(4) (Reporting).         Entities.                   N/A             N/A          33,350          33,350
                                New SCI Entities
SCI Event Notice Required By    Current SCI                4,935           4,935       1,953,308       1,953,308
 Rule 1002(b)(4) Total.          Entities.                 6,440           6,440       2,548,998       2,548,998
                                New SCI Entities
SCI Event Notice Required By    Current SCI                (752)           (752)       (284,444)       (284,444)
 Rule 1002(b)(5) (Reporting).    Entities.                 3,312           3,312       1,252,948       1,252,948
                                New SCI Entities
External Legal Costs for Rule   Current SCI                  N/A             N/A               0               0
 1002(b)(5) (Reporting).         Entities.                   N/A             N/A          16,675          16,675
                                New SCI Entities
SCI Event Notice Required By    Current SCI                (752)           (752)       (284,444)       (284,444)
 Rule 1002(b)(5) Total.          Entities.                 3,312           3,312       1,269,623       1,269,623
                                New SCI Entities
Dissemination of information    New SCI Entities           3,174           3,174       1,400,194       1,400,194
 required by Rule 1002(c)(1)
 (Third-Party Disclosure).
External Legal Costs for Rule   New SCI Entities             N/A             N/A          57,270          57,270
 1002(c)(1) (Third-Party
 Disclosure).
Dissemination of information    New SCI Entities           3,174           3,174       1,457,464       1,457,464
 required by Rule 1002(c)(1)
 Total.
Dissemination of information    Current SCI                1,410           1,410         621,246         621,246
 required by Rule 1002(c)(2)     Entities.                   920             920         405,352         405,352
 (Third-Party Disclosure).      New SCI Entities
External Legal Costs for Rule   Current SCI                  N/A             N/A       29,257.50       29,257.50
 1002(c)(2) (Third-Party         Entities.                   N/A             N/A          19,090          19,090
 Disclosure).                   New SCI Entities
Dissemination of information    Current SCI                1,410           1,410       650,503.5       650,503.5
 required by Rule 1002(c)(2)     Entities.                   920             920         424,442         424,442
 Total.                         New SCI Entities
Burden to develop processes to  New SCI Entities           4,554             897       1,797,312         396,934
 identify the nature of a
 system or event.
Establish reasonable written    Current SCI                4,183           681.5       1,742,055         326,462
 criteria for identifying a      Entities.                 2,047           333.5         852,495         159,758
 significant attempted          New SCI Entities
 unauthorized systems
 intrusion.
Material systems change notice  New SCI Entities          11,845          11,845       3,971,824       3,971,824
 required by Rule 1003(a)(1)
 and (2) (Reporting).
Establish reasonable written    New SCI Entities           2,622             621       1,096,456         297,367
 criteria for identifying a
 material change to its SCI
 systems and the security of
 indirect SCI systems.
SCI review required by Rule     Current SCI               16,215          16,215       5,820,856       5,820,856
 1003(b)(1) and (2)              Entities.                23,805          23,805       8,545,489       8,545,489
 (Recordkeeping).               New SCI Entities
SCI review required by Rule     Current SCI                1,128           1,128         405,563         405,563
 1003(b)(3) (Reporting).         Entities.                   575             575         205,735         205,735
                                New SCI Entities
External Legal Costs for Rule   Current SCI                  N/A             N/A       1,175,000       1,175,000
 1003(b) (Recordkeeping).        Entities.                   N/A             N/A       1,725,000       1,725,000
                                New SCI Entities
SCI Review Costs (Rule          Current SCI               17,343          17,343       7,401,419       7,401,419
 1003(b)) Total.                 Entities.                24,380          24,380      10,476,224      10,476,224
                                New SCI Entities
Corrective action required by   Current SCI                1,081             N/A         449,132             N/A
 Rule 1002(a) (Recordkeeping).   Entities.                 3,151             897       1,316,244         396,934
                                New SCI Entities
Recordkeeping required by       New SCI Entities           3,910             575         304,980          44,850
 Rules 1005/1007
 (Recordkeeping).
One-time cost to purchase       New SCI Entities             N/A             N/A          20,700             N/A
 recordkeeping software Rules
 1005/1007 (Recordkeeping).
Total recordkeeping costs       New SCI Entities           3,910             575         325,680          44,850
 required by Rules 1005/1007.
Request access to EFFS (Rule    New SCI Entities             6.9             3.5           3,197           1,587
 1006) (Reporting).
Rule 1006--obtain digital IDs   New SCI Entities             N/A             N/A           1,150           1,150
 (Reporting).
Total Costs to comply with      New SCI Entities             6.9             3.5           4,347           2,737
 Rule 1006.
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
Total.........................  Overall Total...         169,576         104,289      68,764,549      41,536,601
                                Current SCI               54,685          32,054      23,068,011      13,190,021
                                 Entities.               112,845          72,235      45,696,538      28,346,580
                                New SCI Entities
Per Entity Hourly Burden/Cost.  Current SCI                1,163             682      490,808.75      280,639.75
                                 Entities \1\.             4,995           3,141       1,986,806       1,232,460
                                New SCI Entities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As noted earlier, currently no SCI competing consolidators have registered with the Commission. See supra
  note 469. To the extent that a competing consolidator registers with the Commission, its initial and ongoing
  burdens as a result of the proposed amendments would be the same as the initial and ongoing burden per entity
  calculated for Current SCI Entities.


[[Page 23225]]

    In summary, the estimated paperwork related compliance burdens for 
SCI entities as a result of the amendments are approximately 170,000 
hours and $69 million initially and approximately 104,000 hours and $41 
million annually.

E. Collection of Information Is Mandatory

    The collections of information pursuant to Regulation SCI is 
mandatory as to all entities subject to the rule.

F. Confidentiality of Responses to Collection of Information

    The Commission expects that the written policies and procedures, 
processes, criteria, standards, or other written documents developed or 
revised by SCI entities pursuant to Regulation SCI will be retained by 
SCI entities in accordance with, and for the periods specified in 17 
CFR 240.17a-1 (``Rule 17a-1'' of the Exchange Act) and Rule 1005, as 
applicable. Should such documents be made available for examination or 
inspection by the Commission and its representatives, they would be 
kept confidential subject to the provisions of applicable law.\556\ In 
addition, the information submitted to the Commission pursuant to 
Regulation SCI that is filed on Form SCI, as required by Rule 1006, 
will be treated as confidential, subject to applicable law, including 
amended 17 CFR 240.24b-2 (``Rule 24b-2'').\557\ The information 
disseminated by SCI entities pursuant to Rule 1002(c) under Regulation 
SCI to their members or participants will not be confidential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \556\ See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78x (governing the public 
availability of information obtained by the Commission); 5 U.S.C. 
552 et seq.
    \557\ See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78x (governing the public 
availability of information obtained by the Commission); 5 U.S.C. 
552 et seq. See also Form SCI section IV (including a provision 
stating ``Confidential treatment is requested pursuant to 17 CFR 
240.24b-2(g) (``Rule 24b-(g)'')).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Request for Comment

    Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), the Commission solicits 
comment on the proposed collections of information in order to:
    91. Evaluate whether the proposed collections of information are 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the 
Commission, including whether the information would have practical 
utility;
    92. Evaluate the accuracy of the Commission's estimates of the 
burden of the proposed collections of information;
    93. Determine whether there are ways to enhance the quality, 
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and
    94. Evaluate whether there are ways to minimize the burden of the 
collection of information on those who respond, including through the 
use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information 
technology.
    Persons submitting comments on the collection of information 
requirements should direct them to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Attention: Desk Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, and 
should also send a copy of their comments to Vanessa A. Countryman, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20549-1090, with reference to File Number S7-07-23. 
Requests for materials submitted to OMB by the Commission with regard 
to this collection of information should be in writing, with reference 
to File Number S7-07-23 and be submitted to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Office of FOIA/PA Services, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549-2736. As OMB is required to make a decision concerning the 
collections of information between 30 and 60 days after publication, a 
comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect if OMB 
receives it within 30 days of publication.

V. Economic Analysis

A. Introduction

    The Commission is sensitive to the economic effects, including the 
costs and benefits, of its rules. When engaging in rulemaking pursuant 
to the Exchange Act that requires the Commission to consider or 
determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest, section 3(f) of the Exchange Act requires the Commission to 
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the 
action would promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. In 
addition, section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act requires the Commission 
in making rules pursuant to the Exchange Act to consider the impact any 
such rule would have on competition. The Exchange Act prohibits the 
Commission from adopting any rule that would impose a burden on 
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes 
of the Exchange Act.
    As explained above, the Commission believes that developments in 
the U.S. securities markets since the adoption of Regulation SCI in 
2014 warrant expanding the scope of Regulation SCI as well as 
strengthening the obligations of SCI entities. These developments 
include the growth of electronic trading, which allows greater volumes 
of securities transactions to take place across a multitude of trading 
systems in our markets. In addition, large institutional and other 
professional market participants today employ sophisticated methods to 
trade electronically on multiple venues simultaneously in ever-
increasing volumes with increasing speed. In recent years, financial 
institutions have increasingly used and relied on third parties that 
provide information and communications technology systems.\558\ 
Together, these developments have resulted in greater dispersal, 
sophistication, and interconnection of the systems underpinning our 
U.S. securities markets, thereby bringing potential new risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \558\ See, e.g., FINRA, Cloud Computing in the Securities 
Industry (Aug. 16, 2021), available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/key-topics/fintech/report/cloud-computing; see also 
Franklin Allen et al., A Survey of Fintech Research and Policy 
Discussion, 1 Rev. Corp. Fin. 259, 259 (2021) (``Cloud storage and 
cloud computing have also played increasing roles in payment 
systems, financial services, and the financial system overall''). 
See also Financial Stability Board, Regulatory and Supervisory 
Issues Relating to Outsourcing and Third-Party Relationships, 
(discussion paper Nov. 9, 2020), available at https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P091120.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments to Regulation SCI would expand the 
definition of ``SCI entity'' to include a broader range of entities 
that perform key functions in U.S. securities market infrastructure, 
and update certain other definitions and provisions to take account of 
technological market developments, including cybersecurity and vendor 
management, since the adoption of Regulation SCI in 2014. The proposed 
expansion would add to the definition of ``SCI entity'' registered 
security-based swap data repositories, and registered broker-dealers 
exceeding certain asset and transaction activity thresholds, and the 
proposal would expand the category of exempt clearing agencies subject 
to Regulation SCI to include all clearing agencies exempted from 
registration. Additional proposed amendments to Regulation SCI are 
designed to update the requirements of Regulation SCI relating to: (i) 
systems classification and lifecycle management; (ii) vendor 
management; (iii) cybersecurity; (iv) SCI review; (v) current SCI 
industry standards; and (vi) other matters.
    The Commission is sensitive to the economic effects of the proposed 
expansion and strengthening of Regulation SCI, including its costs and 
benefits. As discussed further below, the Commission requests comment 
on all

[[Page 23226]]

aspects of the costs and benefits of the proposal, including any 
effects the proposed rules may have on efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.

B. Baseline

    The Commission proposes to expand the scope of Regulation SCI to 
include new entities as well as strengthen the obligations of SCI 
entities. In order to assess the benefits and costs that can properly 
be attributed to the proposed rules, the Commission begins by 
considering the relevant baselines--the current market practices as 
well as applicable regulations in the absence of these proposed rules.
1. New SCI Entities
    The proposed rules will affect new SCI entities, specifically 
SBSDRs, certain broker-dealers, and certain exempt clearing agencies, 
in addition to existing SCI entities. The baseline for each category of 
entities is discussed in turn, including applicable regulatory 
baselines and relevant market descriptions.
a. Registered Security-Based Swap Data Repositories
i. Affected Parties
    The Commission proposes to include SBSDRs as SCI entities. SBSDRs 
are required for the dissemination of SBS market data to provide price 
transparency, limit risk posed to the maintenance of fair and orderly 
markets, promote the market stability, prevent market abuses, and 
reduce operational risk. They play an important role in transparency in 
the market for SBSs and make available to the Commission SBS data that 
will provide a broad view of this market and help monitor for pockets 
of risk and potential market abuses that might not otherwise be 
observed by the Commission and other relevant authorities.
    Security-based swaps entail the transfer of financial obligations 
between two parties with sometimes a long time horizon. Counterparties 
to a security-based swap rely on each other's creditworthiness and bear 
this credit risk and market risk until the security-based swap 
terminates or expires.\559\ The information provided by SBSDRs, such as 
individual counterparty trade and position data, helps the Commission 
gain a better understanding of the actual and potential market 
risks.\560\ This information also helps the Commission and other 
relevant authorities investigate market manipulation, fraud, and other 
market abuses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \559\ For cleared trades, the clearing agencies generally step 
in the place of the original counterparties and effectively assume 
the risk should there be a default.
    \560\ See SBSR Adopting Release, supra note 96 (for information 
required to be reported by SBSDRs to the Commission).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As of February 2023, two data repositories for security-based swap 
markets are registered with the Commission. The registered SBSDRs are 
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation Data Repository (``DDR'') and 
the ICE Trade Vault (``ITV''). DDR operates as a registered SBSDR for 
security-based swap transactions in the credit, equity, and interest 
rate derivatives asset classes. ITV operates as a registered SBSDR for 
security-based swap transactions in the credit derivatives asset 
class.\561\ As of March 2022, 47 entities had registered with the 
Commission as security-based swap dealers and pursuant to Regulation 
SBSR, they are required to report the trade activities to the 
SBSDRs.\562\ In total, these two SBSDRs received approximately 542.6 
million reports \563\ between November 2021 and September 2022, from 
contracts of 15,593 distinct counterparties.\564\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \561\ See DTCC Data Repository (U.S.) LLC; Order Approving 
Application, supra note 111; ICE Trade Vault, LLC; Order Approving 
Application, supra note 111. Note that additional entities may 
register as SBSDRs in the future.
    \562\ See List of Registered Security-Based Swap Dealers and 
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, supra note 110 (providing 
the list of registered security-based swap dealers and major SBS 
participants that was updated as of Mar. 28, 2022).
    \563\ The transaction reports include not only the initial 
trade, but also life-cycle events.
    \564\ Number of reports and number of counterparties are 
calculated from trade activities data of the DDR and ITV reports. 
Number of counterparties is calculated as the number of unique 
counterparties' IDs. Due to data limitation, we only included 
reports occurred on or after Nov. 8, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Regulatory Baseline
    As discussed above in section III.A.2, SBSDRs are subject to Rule 
13n-6, which requires that ``every security-based swap data repository, 
with respect to those systems that support or are integrally related to 
the performance of its activities, shall establish, maintain, and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure 
that its systems provide adequate levels of capacity, integrity, 
resiliency, availability, and security.'' \565\ The SBSDRs registered 
with the Commission are also registered with the CFTC as swap data 
repositories and accordingly are also subject to CFTC rules and 
regulations related to swap data repositories, including the ``SDR 
System Safeguards'' rule.\566\ That rule requires swap data 
repositories to establish and maintain emergency procedures, 
geographically diverse backup facilities and staff, and a business 
continuity and disaster recovery plan that should enable next day 
resumption of the swap data repository's operations following the 
disruption.\567\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \565\ See 17 CFR 240.13n-6.
    \566\ See 17 CFR 49.24.
    \567\ See 17 CFR 49.24(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the rule requires programs of risk analysis and 
oversight with respect to its operations and automated systems to 
address each of the following categories of risk analysis and 
oversight: (1) information security; (2) business continuity and 
disaster recovery planning and resources; (3) capacity and performance 
planning; (4) systems operations; (5) systems development and quality 
assurance; (6) physical security and environmental controls; and (7) 
enterprise risk management.\568\ This rule also requires systems 
monitoring to identify potential systems disruptions and cybersecurity 
attacks via provisions relating to capacity and performance planning, 
information security, and physical security and environmental controls. 
It also requires swap data repositories to maintain a security incident 
response plan that must include, among other items, policies and 
procedures for reporting security incidents and for internal and 
external communication and information sharing regarding security 
incidents, the hand-off and escalation points in its security incident 
response process, and the roles and responsibilities of its management, 
staff and independent contractors in responding to security 
incidents.\569\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \568\ See 17 CFR 49.24(b).
    \569\ See 17 CFR 49.24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, the rule requires regular, periodic testing and review 
of business continuity and disaster recovery capabilities.\570\ Under 
the rule, both the senior management and the board of directors of a 
swap data repository receive and review reports setting forth the 
results of the specified testing and assessment. A swap data repository 
is required to establish and follow appropriate procedures for the 
remediation of issues identified through the review, and for evaluation 
of the effectiveness of testing and assessment protocols.\571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \570\ Id.
    \571\ 17 CFR 49.24(m) (Internal reporting and review).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The System Safeguards rule requires SDRs to conduct testing and 
review sufficiency to ensure that their

[[Page 23227]]

automated systems are reliable, secure, and have adequate scalable 
capacity.\572\ The System Safeguards rule requires SDRs to conduct 
external and internal penetration testing at a frequency determined by 
an appropriate risk analysis, but no less frequently than 
annually.\573\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \572\ See 17 CFR 49.24(j).
    \573\ See 17 CFR 49.24(j)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The System Safeguards rule also specifies and defines five types of 
system safeguards testing that a SDR necessarily must perform to 
fulfill the testing requirement: vulnerability testing; penetration 
testing; controls testing; security incident response plan testing; and 
enterprise technology risk assessment.\574\ SDRs are required to notify 
CFTC staff of any system malfunctions, cyber security incidents, or 
activation of the business continuity and disaster recovery plan.\575\ 
A swap data repository must also give CFTC staff advance notice of 
planned changes to automated systems that may affect the reliability, 
security, or adequate scalable capacity of such systems.\576\ Finally, 
the CFTC's System Safeguards rule requires an SDR to follow generally 
accepted standards and best practices with respect to the development, 
operation, reliability, security, and capacity of automated systems 
related to SDR data.\577\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \574\ Id.
    \575\ See 17 CFR 49.24(g).
    \576\ See 17 CFR 49.24(h).
    \577\ See 17 CFR 49.24(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Broker-Dealers
i. Affected Parties
    The Commission is proposing to expand the application of Regulation 
SCI to include certain broker-dealers in the definition of SCI entity. 
There are approximately 3,500 broker-dealers registered with the 
Commission pursuant to section 15(b) of the Exchange Act as of Q3 
2022.\578\ Figure 1 represents the distribution of all registered 
broker-dealer firms between Q4 2021 and Q3 2022 by level of total 
assets \579\ (Panel A) and by percentage of aggregate total assets 
\580\ (Panel B) with firm size (Panel A) and percentage of aggregate 
total assets (Panel B) increasing along the x-axis from left to right. 
These entities encompass a broad range of sizes, business activities, 
and business models.\581\ The distribution of firms \582\ by level of 
total assets (Panel A) shows that the vast majority of firms \583\ fall 
somewhere within the $30,000 to $450,000,000 dollar range, with a small 
minority of firms showing up as a descending long right tail. The 
distribution of broker-dealers \584\ by percentage of aggregate total 
assets (Panel B) shows that a small number of firms individually had 
percentages of aggregate total assets in the high single digits to low 
double digits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \578\ See supra note 131.
    \579\ The level of total assets is measured by the average 
quarterly total assets for each broker-dealer between Q4 2021 and Q3 
2022.
    \580\ The percentage of aggregate total assets is estimated by 
the average quarterly percentage of aggregate total assets for each 
broker-dealer between Q4 2021 and Q3 2022.
    \581\ See 2022 FINRA Industry Snapshot, supra note 131.
    \582\ Panel A of Figures 1 through 5 is represented on a 
logarithmic scale for ease of viewing when the distribution is far 
less evenly distributed if displayed using a standard x-axis.
    \583\ This represents the range of the average quarterly total 
assets for firms that fall between the 5th and 95th percentile.
    \584\ The number of individual firms in Panel B of Figures 1 
through 5 is more visible here due to use of a standard x-axis even 
though the y-axis is represented logarithmically. The use of a 
logarithmic y-axis does however flatten the overall distribution 
with a disproportionate effect on the firms with percentage of 
aggregate average daily dollar volume between 0% and 2.5% making it 
slightly less obvious upon first glance that the vast majority of 
firms actually fall between 0% and 2.5%.
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BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14AP23.000

    Figures 2 through 5 represent the distribution of firms by level of 
transaction activity \585\ as measured by average daily dollar volume 
\586\ (Panel A) and the distribution of firms by percentage of 
transaction activity \587\ (Panel B) for each of four asset classes 
including NMS stocks, exchange-listed options, U.S. Treasury 
Securities, and Agency Securities respectively. The distributions of 
firms \588\ by level of transaction activity (Panel A) show that the 
vast majority of firms \589\ fall somewhere within the $30,000 to $14.4 
billion dollar range, $500,000 to $3.1 billion dollar range, $2,000 to 
$4.0 billion dollar range, and $500 to $1.2 billion dollar range for 
the NMS, stock

[[Page 23228]]

exchange-listed options, U.S. Treasury Securities, and Agency 
Securities markets, respectively.
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    \585\ The level of transaction activity in Panel A of Figures 2 
through 5 is measured by the average of monthly average daily dollar 
volume for each broker-dealer from Jan. 2022 to June 2022.
    \586\ These measures are described in more detail in section 
III.A.2.b.iii.
    \587\ Id.
    \588\ See supra note 582.
    \589\ This represents the range of the average of monthly 
average daily dollar volume for firms that fall between the 5th and 
95th percentile.
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    Figures 2 through 5 (Panel B), showing the distribution of broker-
dealers by percentage of aggregate average daily dollar volume,\590\ 
indicate that a very small number of firms \591\ individually had 
percentages of aggregate average daily dollar volume in the high single 
digits to low double digits.
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    \590\ The percentage of aggregate average daily dollar volume in 
Panel B of figures 2 through 5 is estimated by the average of 
monthly percentage for each broker-dealer of aggregate average daily 
dollar volume reported to the plan processors (SIPs) of the CTA/CQ 
Plans and Nasdaq UTP Plan, OPRA Plan, or FINRA TRACE in each 
respective asset class from Jan. 2022 to June 2022.
    \591\ See supra note 584.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14AP23.001
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14AP23.002
    

[[Page 23229]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14AP23.003

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP14AP23.004

BILLING CODE 8011-01-C
    A substantial number of firms had transaction activity \592\ across 
these four markets: 336 had transaction activity in NMS equities,\593\ 
105 had options transaction activity,\594\ 703 had transaction activity 
in U.S. Treasury Securities,\595\ and 461 had transaction activity in 
Agency Securities.\596\
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    \592\ The number of firms that had transaction activity here may 
be different than the number of firms that reported business lines 
on Form BD at least in part due to differences in how business 
activities are categorized on Form BD, and also because firms are 
able to indicate lines of business based on expected business rather 
than current business. With respect to categorical differences, Form 
BD does not allow firms to distinguish between NMS and OTC equity 
business as both types of stocks can be traded over the counter. 
Additionally, Form BD does not distinguish between lines of business 
for exchange-traded or OTC options. Finally, Form BD allows firms to 
indicate government securities broker or dealer lines of business 
but does not allow firms to specify more granularly treasury or 
agency securities businesses.
    \593\ Estimate is based on Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) data 
from Jan. 2022 to June 2022.
    \594\ Id.
    \595\ Estimate is based on TRACE for Treasury Securities data 
from Jan. 2022 to June 2022 and firm names as of Feb. 1, 2023.
    \596\ Estimate is based on regulatory TRACE data from Jan. 2022 
to June 2022.
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ii. Regulatory Baseline
    As discussed above in section III.A.2.b.ii, there are already a 
number of Exchange Act and FINRA rules that affect how broker-dealers 
design and maintain their technology and promote business continuity 
and regulatory compliance. These include: Commission broker-dealer 
rules; \597\ FINRA supervision rules \598\ (discussed at length in 
section III.A.2.b); and FINRA's business continuity and reporting rules 
(Rule 4370 and 4530, respectively) discussed previously in section 
III.A2.b and further in this section. Furthermore, the Commission's 
cybersecurity-related regulations (Regulation S-P and 17 CFR part 248, 
subpart C (Regulation S-ID)) are discussed further below.\599\
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    \597\ See supra section III.A.2.b (discussing Rules 17a-3, 17a-
4, 17a-11, 15c3-1, 15c3-3, and 15c3-5 (the Market Access Rule)).
    \598\ FINRA rule 3110 and 3130.
    \599\ See supra note 156.
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    FINRA Rule 4370 primarily requires that each broker-dealer create 
and maintain a written business continuity plan \600\ identifying 
procedures relating

[[Page 23230]]

to an emergency or significant business disruption that are reasonably 
designed to enable them to meet their existing obligations to customers 
with explicit requirements for data back-up and recovery with respect 
to mission critical systems as well as an alternate physical location 
of employees.\601\ Each broker-dealer must update its plan in the event 
of any material change to the member's operations, structure, business 
or location. Each member must also conduct an annual review of its 
business continuity plan to determine whether any modifications are 
necessary in light of changes to the member's operations, structure, 
business, or location. FINRA identified that firms \602\ frequently 
tested their BC/DRs plans as part of their annual review and also 
included key vendors in those tests.\603\ Furthermore, a broker-dealer 
must disclose to its customers through public disclosure statements how 
its business continuity plan addresses the possibility of a future 
significant business disruption and how the member plans to respond to 
events of varying scope. Such required business continuity public 
disclosure statements \604\ offer some summary information on broker-
dealer actual practices that relate to FINRA Rule 4370. Recent FINRA 
exam findings reports \605\ in relation to FINRA Rule 4370 suggest 
increasing attention by broker-dealers to operational resiliency issues 
and the value of capacity planning, stress testing, and the review of 
testing and development methodology.
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    \600\ See FINRA, 2019 Report on Examination Findings and 
Observations: Business Continuity Plans (BCPs) (Oct. 16, 2019), 
available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/reports/2019-report-exam-findings-and-observations. Broker-dealers are 
required to conduct an annual review of their business continuity 
plans along with recommended testing and evaluation of its 
effectiveness with vendor participation.
    \601\ FINRA Rules 4370, 3110 (Supervision), and 4511 (General 
Requirements), as well as Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act) Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4.
    \602\ FINRA did not disclose the number or identity of these 
firms.
    \603\ See FINRA, 2019 Report on Examination Findings and 
Observations: Business Continuity Plans (BCPs), supra note 600.
    \604\ While broker-dealers are required to provide a brief 
summary disclosure statement regarding their BCPs to customers, they 
do not disclose the actual BCP. Based on a review of 2021 and 2022 
BCP disclosure statements, firms often did not provide any detail on 
operational capacity to meet demand surges or any specific 
timeframes for resumption of service. They sometimes mention the use 
of redundant service centers, data centers, systems, and staff 
across geographically diverse locations in case primary centers and 
systems go offline; immediate failover to backup systems and plans 
to restore services quickly in the event of a technology disruption; 
and review of third parties' business contingency plans.
    \605\ See FINRA, 2022 Report on FINRA's Examination and Risk 
Monitoring Program (Feb. 9, 2022), available at https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/2022-report-finras-examination-risk-monitoring-program.pdf. See also FINRA, 2020 Risk 
Monitoring and Examination Priorities Letter (Jan. 9, 2020), 
available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/communications-firms/2020-risk-monitoring-and-examination-priorities-letter; FINRA, 
Equity Trading Initiatives: Supervision and Control Practices for 
Algorithmic Trading Strategies (Mar. 2015), available at https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Notice_Regulatory_15-09.pdf.
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    FINRA rules relating to supervision \606\ require each member to 
establish, maintain, and enforce written procedures to supervise the 
types of business in which it engages and the activities of its 
associated persons that are reasonably designed to achieve compliance 
with applicable securities laws and regulations including Federal 
cybersecurity laws and regulations applicable to broker-dealers such as 
Regulation S-P \607\ and Regulation S-ID.\608\ As discussed in section 
III.D.1.c.i, Regulation S-P's safeguards provisions require broker-
dealers to adopt written policies and procedures that address 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards for the protection 
of customer records and information.\609\ The Regulation S-P Safeguards 
Rule further provides that these policies and procedures must: (1) 
insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and 
information; (2) protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to 
the security or integrity of customer records and information; and (3) 
protect against unauthorized access to or use of customer records or 
information that could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to 
any customer.\610\ Additionally, the Regulation S-P Disposal Rule 
requires broker-dealers that maintain or otherwise possess consumer 
report information for a business purpose to properly dispose of the 
information by taking reasonable measures to protect against 
unauthorized access to or use of the information in connection with its 
disposal.\611\ In contrast, Regulation S-ID is more narrowly concerned 
with identity theft. Broker-dealers subject to Regulation S-ID must 
develop and implement a written identity theft program that includes 
policies and procedures to identify and detect relevant red flags.\612\
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    \606\ FINRA Rules 3110 (Supervision) and 3120 (Supervisory 
Control Systems).
    \607\ See 17 CFR 248.1 through 248.30.
    \608\ See 17 CFR 248.201 and 248.202.
    \609\ See 17 CFR 248.30(a).
    \610\ See 17 CFR 248.30(a)(1) through (3).
    \611\ See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(2). Regulation S-P currently defines 
the term ``disposal'' to mean: (1) the discarding or abandonment of 
consumer report information; or (2) the sale, donation, or transfer 
of any medium, including computer equipment, on which consumer 
report information is stored. See 17 CFR 248.30(b)(1)(iii).
    \612\ See 17 CFR 248.201.
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    Past Commission staff statements \613\ and FINRA guidance \614\ 
with respect to these rules identify common elements of reasonably 
designed cybersecurity policies and procedures including risk 
assessment, user security and access,

[[Page 23231]]

information protection, incident response,\615\ and training.\616\
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    \613\ See OCIE, SEC, Cybersecurity: Safeguarding Client Accounts 
against Credential Compromise (Sep. 15, 2020), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/Risk%20Alert%20-%20Credential%20Compromise.pdf; 
OCIE, SEC, Select COVID-19 Compliance Risks and Considerations for 
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers (Aug. 12, 2020), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/files/Risk%20Alert%20-%20COVID-19%20Compliance.pdf; OCIE, SEC, Cybersecurity: Ransomware Alert 
(July 10, 2020), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/Risk%20Alert%20-%20Ransomware.pdf; OCIE, SEC, Report on OCIE 
Cybersecurity and Resiliency Observations (Jan. 27, 2020), available 
at https://www.sec.gov/files/OCIE%20Cybersecurity%20and%20Resiliency%20Observations.pdf; OCIE, 
SEC, OCIE Safeguarding Customer Records and Information in Network 
Storage--Use of Third Party Security Features (May 23, 2019), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/files/OCIE%20Risk%20Alert%20-%20Network%20Storage.pdf; OCIE, SEC, Investment Adviser and Broker-
Dealer Compliance Issues Related to Regulation S-P--Privacy Notices 
and Safeguard Policies (Apr. 16, 2019), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/OCIE%20Risk%20Alert%20-%20Regulation%20S-P.pdf; 
OCIE, SEC, Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations (Aug. 7, 
2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/observations-from-cybersecurity-examinations.pdf; OCIE, SEC, Cybersecurity: Ransomware 
Alert (May 17, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/risk-alert-cybersecurity-ransomware-alert.pdf; OCIE, SEC, OCIE's 2015 
Cybersecurity Examination Initiative (Sep. 15, 2015), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/files/ocie-2015-cybersecurity-examination-initiative.pdf; OCIE, SEC, Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary 
(Feb. 3, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/cybersecurity-examination-sweep-summary.pdf; OCIE, SEC, OCIE's 2014 
Cybersecurity Initiative (Apr. 15, 2014), available at https://
www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/Cybersecurity-Risk-Alert_Appendix_-
4.15.14.pdf.
    \614\ See FINRA, Core Cybersecurity Threats and Effective 
Controls for Small Firms (May 2022), available at https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/Core_Cybersecurity_Threats_and_Effective_Controls-Small_Firms.pdf; 
FINRA, Cloud Computing in the Securities Industry (Aug. 16, 2021), 
available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/key-topics/fintech/report/cloud-computing; FINRA, Common Cybersecurity Threats 
(July 9, 2019), available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/common-cybersecurity-threats; FINRA, Report on Selected 
Cybersecurity Practices (Dec. 1, 2018), available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/common-cybersecurity-threats; 
FINRA, Report on FINRA Examination Findings (Dec. 6, 2017), 
available at https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2017-Report-FINRA-Examination-Findings.pdf; FINRA, Small Firm Cybersecurity 
Checklist (May 23, 2016), available at https://www.finra.org/compliance-tools/small-firm-cybersecurity-checklist. Cybersecurity 
has also been a regular theme of FINRA's Regulatory and Examination 
Priorities Letter since 2008 often with reference to Regulation S-P. 
Similarly the SEC sponsored a Cybersecurity Roundtable and the 
Division of Examination conducted cybersecurity initiative I and II 
to assess industry practices and legal and compliance issues 
associated with broker-dealer and investment adviser cybersecurity 
preparedness.
    \615\ See FINRA, 2021 Report on FINRA's Examination and Risk 
Monitoring Program (Feb. 01, 2021), available at https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/reports/2021-finras-examination-and-risk-monitoring-program/cybersecurity (FINRA 
recommended among effective practices with respect to incident 
response: Establishing and regularly testing (often using tabletop 
exercises) a written formal incident response plan that outlines 
procedures for responding to cybersecurity and information security 
incidents; and developing frameworks to identify, classify, 
prioritize, track and close cybersecurity-related incidents.).
    \616\ These categories vary somewhat in terms of nomenclature 
and the specific categories themselves across different Commission 
and FINRA publications.
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    Consistent with these rules, nearly all broker-dealers that 
participated in two Commission exam sweeps in 2015 and 2017 reported 
\617\ maintaining some cybersecurity policies and procedures; 
conducting some periodic risk assessments to identify threats and 
vulnerabilities,\618\ conducting firm-wide systems inventorying or 
cataloguing, ensuring regular system maintenance including the 
installation of software patches to address security vulnerabilities, 
performing some penetration testing,\619\ although both sweeps also 
discussed various flaws in compliance. A separate staff statement, 
based on observed industry practices, noted that at least some firms 
implemented capabilities that are able to control, monitor, and inspect 
all incoming and outgoing network traffic to prevent unauthorized or 
harmful traffic and implemented capabilities that are able to detect 
threats on endpoints.\620\ In the two Commission exam sweeps, many 
firms indicated that policies and procedures were vetted and approved 
by senior management and that firms provided annual cybersecurity 
reports to the board while some also provided ad hoc reports in the 
event of major cybersecurity events.\621\ Broadly, many broker-dealers 
reported relying on industry standards with respect to cybersecurity 
\622\ typically by adhering to a specific industry standard or 
combination of industry standards or by using industry standards as 
guidance in designing policies and procedures. In the Commission's 2017 
sweep, however, weaknesses in policies and procedures and failure to 
implement policies and procedures were observed at a majority of the 
participating firms.\623\
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    \617\ See Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary, supra note 
613 (Of 57 examined broker-dealers, the vast majority adopted 
written information security policies, conducted periodic audits to 
determine compliance with these information security policies and 
procedures, conducted risk assessments and reported considering such 
risk assessments in establishing their cybersecurity policies and 
procedures. With respect to vendors, the majority of the broker-
dealers required cybersecurity risk assessments of vendors with 
access to their firms' networks and had at least some specific 
policies and procedures relating to vendors.). See also Observations 
from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 613 (This largely 
aligned with the prior 2015 Exam Sweep but is based on additional 
data from a mixed group of 75 broker-dealers and investment 
advisers. For example, nearly all firms had incident response plans. 
Still, it appeared that a number of firms did not appear to fully 
remediate some of the high risk observations that they discovered 
from these tests and vulnerability scans in a timely manner or 
failed to conduct penetration testing regularly).
    \618\ See Report on Selected Cybersecurity Practices, supra note 
614. According to FINRA's 2018 RCA, 94% of higher revenue firms and 
70% of mid-level revenue firms use a risk assessment as part of 
their cybersecurity program. The Risk Control Assessment (RCA) 
Survey is a voluntary survey conducted by FINRA on an annual basis 
with all active member firms.
    \619\ Id. According to FINRA's 2018 RCA, 100% of higher revenue 
firms include penetration testing as a component in their overall 
cybersecurity program.
    \620\ See Cybersecurity and Resiliency Observations, supra note 
614.
    \621\ See Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary, supra note 
613, and Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 
613.
    \622\ Id. Among the firms that were part of the sweep, nearly 
90% used one or more of the NIST, ISO or ISACA frameworks or 
standards. More specifically, 65% of the respondents reported that 
they use the ISO 27001/27002 standard while 25% use COBIT. Some 
firms use combinations of these standards for various parts of their 
cybersecurity programs. While the report focused on firm utilization 
of cybersecurity frameworks specifically, in many cases, the 
referenced frameworks were broader IT frameworks.
    \623\ See OCIE, SEC, Observations from Cybersecurity 
Examinations (Aug. 7, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/observations-from-cybersecurity-examinations.pdf.
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    FINRA Rule 3110's supervisory obligation also extends to member 
firms' outsourcing of certain ``covered activities''--activities or 
functions that, if performed directly by a member firm, would be 
required to be the subject of a supervisory system and written 
supervisory procedures pursuant to FINRA Rule 3110. These vendor 
management obligations are discussed in further guidance.\624\ As 
discussed in section III.A.2.b of this release, FINRA Rule 4530 
requires broker-dealer reporting of certain events to FINRA, including, 
among other things, compliance issues and other events \625\ where a 
broker-dealer has concluded or should have reasonably concluded that a 
violation of securities or other enumerated law, rule, or regulation of 
any domestic or foreign regulatory body or SRO has occurred. Broker-
dealers affiliated with a banking organization \626\ may also be 
affected by a cybersecurity notification requirement. For example, if a 
broker-dealer is a subsidiary of a bank holding company, an incident at 
the broker-dealer would likely be reported by the bank holding company 
to its respective banking regulator.
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    \624\ See Regulatory Notice 21-29: Vendor Management and 
Outsourcing, supra note 165; Notice to Members 05-48: Outsourcing, 
supra note 165. FINRA found that most firms had adequate privacy and 
security language in contracts where customer or firm confidential 
data or high-risk systems were at risk. Standard contract language 
topics that firms included were: non-disclosure agreements/
confidentiality agreements, data storage, retention, and delivery; 
breach notification responsibilities; right-to-audit clauses; vendor 
employee access limitations; use of subcontractors; and vendor 
obligations upon contract termination. Id.
    \625\ While FINRA has urged firms to report material cyber 
incidents that do not trigger a reporting obligation to their 
regulatory coordinator, current practices are unclear.
    \626\ In the simplification of the Volcker Rule, effective Jan. 
21, 2020, Commission staff estimated that there were 202 broker-
dealers that were affiliated with banking organizations.
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    Aside from specific dissemination obligations under Regulation SCI 
for a limited number of broker-dealers with respect to their related 
SCI ATSs, there are no Commission or FINRA requirements for broker-
dealers to disseminate notifications of breaches to members or clients 
although many firms do so \627\ pursuant to various state data breach 
laws.\628\ Broker-dealers are subject to state laws known as ``Blue Sky 
Laws,'' which generally are regulations established as safeguards for 
investors against securities fraud.\629\ All 50 states have enacted 
laws in recent years requiring firms to notify individuals of data 
breaches, standards differ by state, with some states imposing 
heightened notification requirements relative to other states.\630\
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    \627\ See Cybersecurity Examination Sweep Summary, supra note 
613 (Based on a small sample of firms, the vast majority of broker-
dealers maintained plans for data breach incidents and most had 
plans for notifying customers of material events.)
    \628\ See Digital Guardian, The Definitive Guide to U.S. State 
Data Breach Laws, digitalguardian.com, available at https://info.digitalguardian.com/rs/768-OQW-145/images/the-definitive-guide-to-us-state-data-breach-laws.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2022).
    \629\ See, e.g., Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, 
Commission, Blue Sky Laws, available at https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/blue-sky-laws.
    \630\ For example, some states may require a firm to notify 
individuals when a data breach includes biometric information, while 
others do not. Compare Cal. Civil Code sec. 1798.29 (notice to 
California residents of a data breach generally required when a 
resident's personal information was or is reasonably believed to 
have been acquired by an unauthorized person; ``personal 
information'' is defined to mean an individual's first or last name 
in combination with one of a list of specified elements, which 
includes certain unique biometric data), with Ala. Stat. secs. 8-38-
2, 8-38-4, 8-38-5 (notice of a data breach to Alabama residents is 
generally required when sensitive personally identifying information 
has been acquired by an unauthorized person and is reasonably likely 
to cause substantial harm to the resident to whom the information 
relates; ``sensitive personally identifying information'' is defined 
as the resident's first or last name in combination with one of a 
list of specified elements, which does not include biometric 
information).

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[[Page 23232]]

    Additionally, market data, including bids, offers, quotation sizes, 
among other types of data, are currently collected from broker-dealers 
and consolidated and distributed pursuant to a variety of Exchange Act 
rules and joint industry plans.\631\
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    \631\ See, e.g., Rules 601 through 17 CFR 242.604 (``Rule 604'') 
of Regulation NMS and 17 CFR 242.301(b)(3) (``Rule 301(b)(3)'') of 
Regulation ATS.
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c. Exempt Clearing Agencies
i. Affected Parties
    Certain SCI entities are in the market for clearance and settlement 
services. Registered clearing agencies and certain exempt clearing 
agencies are already SCI entities. The Commission proposes to extend 
Regulation SCI to include all other exempt clearing agencies. The 
proposed amendment would have the immediate effect of introducing two 
exempt clearing agencies into the scope of Regulation SCI.
    There are broadly two types of clearing agencies: registered 
clearing agencies and exempt clearing agencies. There are seven 
registered and active clearing agencies: DTC, FICC, NSCC, ICC, ICEEU, 
the Options Clearing Corp., and LCH SA. There are two other clearing 
agencies that are no longer active but both maintain registration with 
the Commission.\632\ In addition to these registered clearing agencies, 
there are clearing agencies that have received from the Commission an 
exemption from registration as a clearing agency under section 17A of 
the Exchange Act. There are five exempt clearing agencies: Bloomberg 
STP (inactive), ITPMATCH (DTCC), SSCNET (SS&C Technologies), Euroclear 
Bank SA/NV, and Clearstream Banking, S.A. Of these exempt clearing 
agencies, Bloomberg STP, ITPMATCH (DTCC), and SSCNET (SS&C 
Technologies) are subject to Regulation SCI as ``exempt clearing 
agencies subject to ARP,'' together with registered clearing agencies.
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    \632\ See BSECC Notice and SCCP Notice, supra note 230.
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    The other two, Euroclear Bank SA/NV, and Clearstream Banking, S.A, 
both exempt clearing agencies,\633\ have not been required to comply 
with Regulation SCI. Each performs CSD functions and provides clearance 
and settlement for U.S. Treasury transactions, subject to volume limits 
set forth in their exemptions. Euroclear Bank also provides collateral 
management services for U.S. equity transactions involving a U.S. 
person and a non-U.S. person.
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    \633\ See Euroclear Exemption, supra note 231 (providing an 
exemption to Euroclear Bank SA/NV (successor in name to Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company of NY)); Clearstream Exemption, supra note 
231 (providing an exemption to Clearstream Banking, S.A. (successor 
in name to Cedel Bank, soci[eacute]t[eacute] anonyme, Luxembourg)). 
Furthermore, pursuant to the Commission's statement on CCPs in the 
European Union (``EU'') authorized under the European Markets 
Infrastructure Regulation (``EMIR''), an EU CCP may request an 
exemption from the Commission where it has determined that the 
application of SEC requirements would impose unnecessary, 
duplicative, or inconsistent requirements in light of EMIR 
requirements to which it is subject. See Statement on Central 
Counterparties Authorized under the European Markets Infrastructure 
Regulation Seeking to Register as a Clearing Agency or to Request 
Exemptions from Certain Requirements Under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 supra note 240 (stating that in seeking an exemption, an 
EU CCP could provide ``a self-assessment . . . [to] explain how the 
EU CCP's compliance with EMIR corresponds to the requirements in the 
Exchange Act and applicable SEC rules thereunder, such as Rule 17Ad-
22 and Regulation SCI.'').
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ii. Regulatory Baseline
    The two exempt clearing agencies not subject to ARP are required 
per Commission exemptive orders to submit to the Commission a number of 
items including transaction volume data,\634\ notification regarding 
material adverse changes in any account maintained for customers,\635\ 
one or more disclosure documents, amendments to its application for 
exemption on Form CA-1,\636\ responses to a Commission request for 
information,\637\ etc. In the case of one exempt clearing agency, its 
exemptive order also requires submission of additional items related to 
its systems including quarterly reports describing completed, ongoing, 
and planned material system changes,\638\ notification \639\ regarding 
systems events; \640\ as well as a requirement to take appropriate 
corrective action regarding such systems events. This exempt clearing 
agency is also required to maintain policies and procedures that are 
reasonably designed to identify, manage, and monitor systems 
operational risk; clearly define the roles and responsibilities of 
personnel for addressing operational risk; review such policies and 
procedures; conduct systems audits and system tests periodically and at 
implementation of significant changes; clearly define operational 
reliability objectives for the systems; ensure that the systems have 
scalable capacity adequate to handle increasing stress volumes and 
achieve the systems service-level objectives; establish comprehensive 
physical and information security policies that address all potential 
vulnerabilities and threats to the systems; and establish a business 
continuity plan \641\ for the systems that addresses events posing a 
significant risk of disrupting the systems' operations, including 
events that could cause a wide-scale or major disruption in the 
provision of the clearing agency activities. Such policies and 
procedures should be consistent with current information technology 
industry standards \642\ and be reasonably designed to ensure that the 
systems operate on an ongoing basis in a manner that complies with the 
conditions applicable to the systems and with the exempt clearing 
agency's rules and governing documents applicable to the clearing 
agency activities. This exempt clearing agency must also provide the

[[Page 23233]]

Commission with an annual update regarding policies and procedures.
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    \634\ Id. This is provided in the form of quarterly reports, 
calculated on a twelve-month rolling basis, of volume statistics 
related to government securities. One exempt clearing agency also 
reports volume statistics related to equities.
    \635\ Id. This is for customers that are members or affiliates 
of members of a U.S. registered clearing agency in the case of one 
exempt clearing or US participants in the case of the other.
    \636\ Id. This must be filed prior to the implementation of any 
change in stated policies, practices, or procedures that makes the 
information contained in the original Form CA-1 incomplete or 
inaccurate in any material respect.
    \637\ Id. This would typically concern a U.S. customer or its 
affiliate about whom the Commission has financial solvency concerns.
    \638\ This must be filed within 30 calendar days after the end 
of each quarter. These reported information represents changes 
related to the Clearing Agency Activities during the prior, current, 
and subsequent calendar quarters, including the dates or expected 
dates of commencement and completion.
    \639\ This requires notification of such systems event within 24 
hours after occurrence; regular updates until such time as a systems 
event is resolved and investigation of the systems event is closed; 
interim written notification within 48 hours after the occurrence of 
a systems event or promptly thereafter if such a deadline cannot be 
met; a written final report within ten business days after the 
occurrence of a systems event or promptly thereafter if such a 
deadline cannot be met. For systems events characterized as ``bronze 
level'' events (i.e., a Systems Event in which the incident is 
clearly understood, almost immediately under control, involves only 
one business unit and/or entity, and is resolved within a few 
hours), the clearing agency is instead required to provide on a 
quarterly basis an aggregated list of bronze level events.
    \640\ This includes disruptions, compliance issues, or 
intrusions of the systems that impact, or is reasonably likely to 
impact clearing agency activities.
    \641\ The business continuity plan would require the use of a 
secondary site designed to ensure two-hour resumption of operation 
following disruptive events; regular testing of business continuity 
plans; identification, monitoring, and management of the risks that 
key participants, other financial market infrastructures, and 
service and utility providers might pose to the systems' operations 
in relation to the clearing agency activities.
    \642\ The exempt clearing agency is required to provide annual 
notice to the Commission regarding the industry standards utilized. 
These standards consist of information technology practices that are 
widely available to information technology professionals in the 
financial sector and issued by a widely recognized organization.
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    Additionally, the two exempt clearing agencies not subject to ARP 
are subject to Europe's Central Securities Depositories Regulation 
(CSDR) which provides a set of common requirements for CSDs operating 
securities settlement systems across the EU.\643\ CSDR provides, among 
other things, Operational Risk rules (Article 45).\644\ There are more 
specific requirements in the CSDR's Regulatory Technical Standards 
\645\ including identifying operational risks; \646\ methods to test, 
address and minimize operational risks; \647\ IT systems; \648\ and 
business continuity.\649\
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    \643\ The two exempt clearing agencies may also be subject to 
the EU Regulation, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), 
which went into effect in 2015: See Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Digital Operational 
Resilience for the Financial Sector and Amending Regulations (EC) No 
1060/2009, (EU) No 648/2012, (EU) No 600/2014 and (EU) No 909/2014 
available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020PC0595.
    \644\ See Commission Regulation No. 909/2014 of July 23, 2014, 
on improving securities settlement in the European Union and on 
central securities depositories and amending Directives 98/26/EC and 
2014/65/EU and Regulation (EU) No 236/2012, art. 45, 2014 O.J. (L 
257) 47, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0909.
    \645\ See Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/392, 
Supplementing Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council with Regard to Regulatory Technical Standards on 
Authorization, Supervisory and Operational Requirements for Central 
Securities Depositories. 65 Off. J. Eur. Union 48 (2017) available 
at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0392&from=EN.
    \646\ Id. art. 45:1.
    \647\ Id. art. 45:2.
    \648\ Id. art. 45:3.
    \649\ Id. art. 45:4.
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    Furthermore, each of these two exempt clearing agencies publish 
disclosure framework reports \650\ that purport to describe the 
policies and procedures \651\ with respect to the operational risk 
framework of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) 
published by CPSS and IOSCO.\652\
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    \650\ See infra notes 683-684.
    \651\ The respective disclosure documents have not been reviewed 
by the Commission and its staff for accuracy and may or may not 
demonstrate implementation/compliance with international standards.
    \652\ Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Principles for 
Financial Market Infrastructures: Disclosure Framework and 
Assessment Methodology (Dec. 2012), available at https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d106.pdf.
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2. Existing SCI Entities
a. Affected Parties
    In addition to these proposed new SCI entities, Regulation SCI has 
applied to entities that facilitate several different markets, 
including the market for trading services, the market for listing 
services, the market for regulation and surveillance services, the 
market for clearance and settlement services, and the market for market 
data.\653\ As of this writing, there are 47 SCI entities. These include 
35 SCI SROs (including 24 exchanges, 9 registered clearing agencies, 
FINRA, and the MSRB), 7 SCI ATSs (including 5 NMS stock ATSs and 2 non-
NMS stock ATSs), 2 plan processors, and 3 exempt clearing agencies 
subject to ARP.\654\ All of them are already required to comply with 
Regulation SCI, and, as discussed in section V.B.2.b, subsets of these 
entities also have other specific rules that apply to them.
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    \653\ 17 CFR 242.1000 (definitions of ``SCI systems'' and 
``critical SCI systems'').
    \654\ In 2021, the Commission amended Regulation SCI to add 
competing consolidators that exceed a 5% consolidated market data 
gross revenue threshold over a specified time period as SCI 
entities. Currently, no competing consolidators have registered with 
the Commission. See Market Data Infrastructure Adopting Release, 
supra note 24.
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    The general characteristics of the markets in which the existing 
SCI entities operate are described in the SCI Proposing Release \655\ 
and SCI Adopting Release.\656\ There are, however, broad changes to 
these markets--as they pertain to Regulation SCI--that should be noted. 
The markets have changed in at least four important ways. First, the 
total trading volumes have increased across all types of 
securities.\657\ Second, there is an increased reliance on technology 
and automation among financial institutions, a trend which accelerated 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic.\658\ Third, and relatedly, financial 
institutions have become increasingly dependent on third parties--
including cloud service providers--to operate their businesses and 
provide their services.\659\ This is, in fact, a general trend among 
all global companies, and this trend, too, has been driven in part by 
the COVID-19 pandemic.\660\ Fourth, cybersecurity events have grown in 
both number and sophistication.\661\ These developments in the market 
have significantly increased the negative externalities that may flow 
from systems failures.
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    \655\ See SCI Proposing Release, supra note 14, at section V. 
See also Market Data Infrastructure Adopting Release, supra note 24, 
for a description of competing consolidator market characteristics.
    \656\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at section VI.
    \657\ See, e.g., SIFMA Insights: Electronic Trading Market 
Structure Primer, supra note 3 (summarizing electronic trading 
history and trends in different markets); SEC, Staff Report on 
Equity and Options Market Structure Conditions in Early 2021 (Oct. 
14, 2021), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/staff-report-equity-options-market-struction-conditions-early-2021.pdf; see also 
U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Game Stopped: How the 
Meme Stock Market Event Exposed Troubling Business Practices, 
Inadequate Risk Practices, and the Need for Legislative and 
Regulatory Reform (June 2022), available at: https://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/6.22_hfsc_gs.report_hmsmeetbp.irm.nlrf.pdf.
    \658\ See, e.g., Henning Soller, et al., Innovative Technologies 
in Financial Institutions: Risk as a Strategic Issue, McKinsey 
Digital (Sep. 25, 2020), available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/tech-forward/innovative-technologies-in-financial-institutions-risk-as-a-strategic-issue (``The current COVID-19 crisis has significantly 
accelerated the need for financial institutions to adopt innovative 
technologies.'').
    \659\ See, e.g., Noah Kessler, Cloud Is on the Rise in Financial 
Services and Regulators Are Taking Note, ABA Risk and Compliance 
(Sept. 29, 2021), available at https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2021/09/cloud-is-on-the-rise-in-financial-services-and-regulators-are-taking-note/.
    \660\ See, e.g., Deloitte, 2021 Global Shared Services and 
Outsourcing Survey Report 3, available at https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Process-and-Operations/gx-2021-global-shared-services-report.pdf (``[T]here's an increasing 
shift to leverage global, multifunctional, and virtual or remote 
models, especially driven by learnings from COVID-19'').
    \661\ See, e.g., Chuck Brooks, Alarming Cyber Statistics For 
Mid-Year 2022 That You Need To Know, Forbes.com (June 3, 2022), 
available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckbrooks/2022/06/03/alarming-cyber-statistics-for-mid-year-2022-that-you-need-to-know/?sh=2429c57e7864.
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    Current SCI entities are required to report systems intrusions, 
either immediately or on a quarterly basis, rather than immediately if 
de miminis in impact. However, current SCI entities have not been 
reporting attempted intrusions, as they were not required to do so.
b. Regulatory Baseline
    The common regulatory baseline for current SCI entities is 
Regulation SCI which was adopted in 2014. Regulation SCI requires, 
among other things, that these entities establish, maintain, and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure 
that their SCI systems have levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, 
availability, and security adequate to maintain their operational 
capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets and 
operate in a manner that complies with the Exchange Act and the rules 
and regulations thereunder and the entity's rules and governing 
documents, as applicable, and specifies certain minimum requirements 
for such policies and procedures. As a policies and procedures based 
rule, and one that employs a risk-based approach, Regulation SCI 
provides flexibility to allow each SCI entity to determine how

[[Page 23234]]

to best meet the requirements in Rule 1001(a).
    In addition, 17 CFR 242.613 (``Rule 613'') of Regulation NMS 
requires national securities exchanges and national securities 
associations (FINRA) to jointly develop and submit to the Commission a 
Consolidated Audit Trail National Market System (CAT NMS) Plan.\662\
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    \662\ 17 CFR 242.613.
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    Under the Commission-approved CAT NMS Plan, the national securities 
exchanges and FINRA (the Participants) conduct the activities related 
to the CAT through a jointly owned limited liability company, 
Consolidated Audit Trail, LLC (``Company'').\663\ FINRA CAT, LLC--a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of FINRA--has entered into an agreement with 
the Company to act as the plan processor for the CAT. However, the 
Participants remain ultimately responsible for the performance of the 
CAT and its compliance with any statutes, rules, and regulations.\664\ 
The Plan Processor must develop three sets of policies and procedures: 
(1) the CAT information security program and related data security 
policies and procedures; (2) user security and access policies and 
procedures; and (3) breach management policies and procedures.\665\
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    \663\ Consolidated Audit Trail, LLC, CAT NMS Plan, secs. 1.1, 
3.1, 4.1 (July 2020), available at https://catnmsplan.com/sites/default/files/2020-07/LLC-Agreement-of-Consolidated-Audit-Trail-LLC-as-of-7.24.20.pdf; see also CAT NMS Plan Approval Order, supra note 
393; Joint Industry Plan; Order Approving Amendment to the National 
Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail, 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 89397 (July 24, 2020), 85 FR 
45941 (July 30, 2020).
    \664\ CAT NMS Plan, secs. 4.3, 5.1, 6.1. The Participants 
jointly own on an equal basis the Company. As such, the CAT's 
Central Repository is a facility of each of the Participants, and 
also an SCI system of each of the Participants. See SCI Adopting 
Release, supra note 1, at 72275 at n. 246; CAT NMS Plan Approval 
Order, supra note 393, at 84758.
    \665\ CAT NMS Plan, secs. 6.12 and app. D. secs. 4.1 to 4.1.5. 
The Plan Processor is subject to certain industry standards with 
respect to its information security program, including, among 
others, NIST-800-23 (Guidelines to Federal Organizations on Security 
Assurance and Acquisition/Use of Test/Evaluated Products), NIST 800-
53 (Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems 
and Organizations), and NIST 800-115 (Technical Guide to Information 
Security Testing and Assessment). CAT NMS Plan, app D sec 4.2.
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    First, the Plan Processor must develop and maintain a comprehensive 
information security program, to be approved and reviewed at least 
annually by an operating committee, which contains certain specific 
requirements for the Company related to data security.\666\ As part of 
this requirement, the Plan Processor is required to create and enforce 
policies, procedures, and control structures to monitor and address CAT 
data security, including reviews of industry standards and periodic 
penetration testing.\667\ Second, both the Participants and the Plan 
Processor must implement user security and access policies and 
procedures that include safeguards to secure access and use of the 
CAT.\668\ The Plan Processor must also review Participant information 
security policies and procedures related to the Company to ensure that 
such policies and procedures are comparable to those of the CAT 
system.\669\ Finally, the Plan Processor must develop a cyber-incident 
response plan and document all information relevant to breaches.\670\ 
In addition to these policies and procedures requirements, the CAT NMS 
Plan requires several forms of periodic review of CAT, including an 
annual written assessment,\671\ regular reports,\672\ and an annual 
audit.\673\ The Commission has proposed amendments to the CAT NMS Plan 
that are designed to enhance the security of the CAT through increased 
security requirements as well as limiting the scope of sensitive 
information required to be collected by the CAT.\674\
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    \666\ CAT NMS Plan, app. D sec. 4.1.
    \667\ Id. sec. 6.2(b)(v) and app. D secs. 4.1 to 4.2.
    \668\ Specifically, these safeguards must include: (1) 
restrictions on the acceptable uses of CAT Data; (2) role-based 
access controls; (3) authentication of individual users; (4) 
multifactor authentication and password controls; (5) implementation 
of information barriers to prevent unauthorized staff from accessing 
CAT Data; (6) separate storage of sensitive personal information and 
controls on transmission of data; (7) security-driven monitoring and 
logging; (8) escalation of non-compliance or security events; and 
(9) remote access controls. Id. at secs. 6.2(b)(v), 6.5(c)(i), 
6.5(c)(iii) and (iv) and app. D secs. 4.1 to 4.1.4, 4.1.6, 8.1, 
8.1.1, 8.1.3, 8.2, 8.2.2.
    \669\ Id. sec. 6.2(b)(vii).
    \670\ Id. app. D sec. 4.1.5.
    \671\ The Participants are required to provide the Commission 
with an annual written assessment of the Plan Processor's 
performance, which must include, among other things, an evaluation 
of potential technology upgrades and an evaluation of the CAT 
information security program. Id. secs. 6.2(a)(v)(G), 6.6(b).
    \672\ The Plan Processor is required to provide the operating 
committee with regular reports on various topics, including data 
security issues and the Plan Processor. Id. secs. 6.1(o), 
6.2(b)(vi), 6.2(a)(v)(E), 6.2(b)(vi).
    \673\ The Plan Processor is required to create and implement an 
annual audit plan that includes a review of all Plan Processor 
policies, procedures, control structures, and tools that monitor and 
address data security. Id. secs. 6.2(a)(v)(B) and (C), app. D secs. 
4.1.3, 5.3.
    \674\ Proposed Amendments to the National Market System Plan 
Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail to Enhance Data Security, 
Release No. 89632 (Aug. 21, 2020), 85 FR 65990 (Oct. 16, 2020).
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3. Current Market Practice
    This section describes current and new SCI entities' market 
practices, as relevant to certain of the proposed and existing 
provisions. These market practices include entities' compliance efforts 
that exceed current regulatory baseline requirements, entities' 
adherence to voluntary standards and best practices, and business 
practices not directly related to compliance with a regulatory 
obligation that nevertheless overlap with the substantive or procedural 
requirements of the proposed rule. To the extent the entities' existing 
practices already comply with the requirements or proposed requirements 
of Regulation SCI, or to the extent those practices might facilitate 
such compliance, the benefits and costs of the proposal could be 
mitigated. The Commission requests comment on how the new and existing 
SCI entities' current market practices affect the baseline against 
which the economic effects are measured.
a. Systems Classification and Lifecycle Management
    Based on the experience of Commission most current SCI entities 
undertake some form of lifecycle management program that includes 
acquisition, integration, support, refresh and disposal of covered 
systems, as applicable, and the sanitization of end-of-life systems.
b. Third-Party Vendor Management and Oversight
    Globally the end-user spending on public cloud services is 
estimated to grow 20.4% in 2022 to a total of $494.7 billion, up from 
$410.9 billion in 2021.\675\ In terms of market concentration, as of Q1 
2022, the three largest CSPs collectively have the market share of 65 
percent global spending on cloud computing \676\ and the eight largest 
CSPs have roughly 80 percent of the market.\677\ SCI entities employ 
cloud service providers. Some of the largest cloud service providers 
appear to be familiar with the Regulation SCI requirements with which 
SCI entities are obliged to comply.\678\
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    \675\ See Press Release, Gartner.com (Apr. 19, 2020), available 
at https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2022-04-19-gartner-forecasts-worldwide-public-cloud-end-user-spending-to-reach-nearly-500-billion-in-2022.
    \676\ See Synergy Research Group, Huge Cloud Market Still 
Growing at 34% Per Year; Amazon, Microsoft & Google Now Account for 
65% of the Total, PR Newswire (Apr. 28, 2022), available at https://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/huge-cloud-market-still-growing-at-
34-per-year-amazon-microsoft_google-now-account-for-65-of-the-
total-301535935.html (estimating as of Q1 2022 that the breakdown 
is: Amazon Web Services (AWS): 33%; Microsoft Azure: 22%; Google 
Cloud: 10%).
    \677\ Id.
    \678\ For example, see Microsoft Azure, Regulation Systems 
Compliance and Integrity (SCI) Cloud Implementation Guide (2019), 
available at https://azure.microsoft.com/mediahandler/files/resourcefiles/microsoft-azure-regulation-systems-compliance-and-integrity-sci-cloud-implementation-guide/AzureRegSCIGuidance.pdf; or 
Google Cloud, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission Regulation 
Systems Compliance & Integrity (Regulation SCI) (Dec. 2021), 
available at https://services.google.com/fh/files/misc/sec_regulation_sci_gcp_whitepaper.pdf.

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[[Page 23235]]

    Both new and existing SCI entities may have existing agreements 
with third-party providers that govern the obligations and expectations 
as between an SCI entity and a third-party provider it utilizes. These 
documents may not currently be consistent with the SCI entity's 
requirements under the proposed amendments Regulation SCI. Some SCI 
entities may currently rely on a third-party provider's standard 
contract or SLA, which may not been drafted with Regulation SCI's 
requirements in mind. Similarly, some existing agreements between the 
SCI entity and a third-party provider may provide the third-party 
provider with the contractual right to be able to make decisions that 
would negatively impact an SCI entity's obligations in the third-party 
provider's ``commercially reasonable discretion.'' Likewise, existing 
agreements may include defined terms that differ from those under the 
proposed amendments.
    Regardless of their size, SCI entities typically enter into 
contracts with third-party providers to perform a specific function for 
a given time frame at a set price. At the conclusion of a contract, it 
may be renewed if both parties are satisfied. Because prices typically 
increase over time, there may be some need to negotiate a new fee for 
continued service. Negotiations also occur if additional services are 
requested from a given third-party provider. In the instance where 
additional services are required mid-contract, for example, due to 
increased regulatory requirements, the third-party provider may be able 
to separately bill for the extra work that it must incur to provide the 
additional service, particularly if that party is in a highly 
concentrated market for that service and can wield market power. 
Alternatively, the service provider may be forced to absorb the 
additional cost until the contract can be renegotiated. This may be the 
case because that condition is specified in the contract with the SCI 
entity.
Request for Comment
    95. The Commission requests that commenters provide relevant data 
on the number of third-party providers available to SCI entities by 
their types of services they offer or by the types of systems, such as 
critical SCI systems, SCI systems, and indirect SCI systems.
    96. To what extent do third-party providers compete with each other 
for SCI entities?
c. SCI Review
    With respect to business continuity and disaster recovery plan 
reviews, FINRA Rule 4370 requires a broker-dealer to conduct an annual 
review of its business continuity plan. FINRA has observed that some 
broker-dealers \679\ engaged in annual testing to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their business continuity plans.\680\ With respect to 
broker-dealer reporting to their boards regarding cybersecurity 
policies and procedures and cybersecurity incidents, the board 
reporting frequency ranged from quarterly to ad-hoc among the firms 
FINRA reviewed.\681\ Approximately two-thirds of the broker-dealers 
(68%) examined in a 2015 survey had an individual explicitly assigned 
as the firm's CISO which might suggest extensive executive leadership 
engagement.
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    \679\ FINRA did not disclose the number or identity of the firms 
but it is likely that larger firms have more robust systems and 
practices given their greater resources.
    \680\ See FINRA, 2019 Report on Examination Findings and 
Observations: Business Continuity Plans (BCPs), supra note 600.
    \681\ See Report on Cybersecurity Practices, supra note 621. At 
a number of firms, the board received annual cybersecurity-related 
reporting while other firms report on a quarterly basis. A number of 
firms also provide ad hoc reporting to the board in the event of 
major cybersecurity events.
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d. Current SCI Industry Standards
    As of 2015, the majority of broker-dealers reported utilizing one 
or more frameworks with respect to cybersecurity \682\ either mapping 
directly to the standard or using it as reference point. Some of the 
standards such as COBIT may have broad application to various areas of 
IT but it is unclear to what extent broker-dealers utilize such 
standards beyond cybersecurity.
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    \682\ See supra note 622. Among the firms that were part of the 
FINRA sweep, nearly 90% used one or more of the NIST, ISO or ISACA 
frameworks or standards. More specifically, 65% of the respondents 
reported that they use the ISO 27001/27002 standard while 25% use 
COBIT. Some firms use combinations of these standards for various 
parts of their cybersecurity programs. The COBIT standard, for 
example, is focused more on information technology governance than 
cybersecurity per se. In addition, several firms underscored the 
utility of the PCI Standard as well as the SANS Top 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Also, each of the two exempt clearing agencies (Euroclear Bank SA/
NV, and Clearstream Banking, S.A.) publish disclosure framework 
reports,\683\ that purport to describe the policies and procedures 
relating to the 24 principles and five responsibilities set forth in 
the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) published by 
CPSS and IOSCO.\684\ The PFMI establishes new international standards 
for financial market infrastructures (FMIs) including payment systems 
that are systemically important, central securities depositories, 
securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade 
repositories and prescribes the form and content of the disclosures 
expected of financial market infrastructures. Most relevant, principle 
17 on operational risk offers guidelines on policies and procedures to 
identify, monitor, and manage operational risks, vulnerabilities, and 
threats; capacity planning; stress testing; systems development and 
testing methodology; business continuity and disaster recovery planning 
and testing; vendor risk management; and board supervision of risk 
management, etc.
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    \683\ Clearstream, Principles for financial market 
infrastructures: Disclosure Framework (Dec. 23, 2020), available at 
https://www.clearstream.com/resource/blob/1386778/3458c1c468e5f40ddf5dc970e8da4af2/cpmi-iosco-data.pdf; Euroclear 
Bank, Disclosure Framework CPMI IOSCO 2020 (June 2020), available at 
https://www.euroclear.com/content/dam/euroclear/About/business/PA005-Euroclear-Bank-Disclosure-Framework-Report.pdf.
    \684\ Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Principles for 
Financial Market Infrastructures: Disclosure Framework and 
Assessment Methodology (Dec. 2012), available at https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d106.pdf.
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e. Penetration Testing
    Current SCI entities are required to conduct penetration testing as 
part of its SCI review \685\ once every three years.\686\ Among the new 
SCI entities, two SBSDRs that are currently registered as SDRs are 
subject to CFTC's rules, which require conducting penetration testing 
of the systems with the scope of those rules at least once every year.
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    \685\ Specifically, paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 1003 currently 
requires that ``[p]enetration test reviews of the network, 
firewalls, and production systems shall be conducted at a frequency 
of not less than once every three years. . .''. Rule 1003(b)(1).
    \686\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72344.
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4. Other Affected Parties
    In addition to new and existing SCI entities, the proposed 
amendments may indirectly affect other parties, namely third-party 
service providers to which SCI systems functionality is outsourced. As 
discussed in depth above, an SCI entity may decide to outsource certain 
functionality to, or utilize the support or services of, a third-party 
provider (which would include both affiliated providers as well as 
vendors unaffiliated with the SCI entity) for a variety of reasons, 
including cost efficiencies,

[[Page 23236]]

increased automation, particular expertise, or functionality that the 
SCI entity does not have in-house. Based on Commission staff 
experience, the Commission believes that these third-party providers, 
play a growing role with respect to SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems, and the Commission anticipates that third-party providers will 
likely arise to provide other types of functionality, service, or 
support to SCI entities that are not contemplated yet today.\687\
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    \687\ It has long been recognized that the financial services 
industry is increasingly relying on service providers through 
various forms of outsourcing. See, e.g., Bank for International 
Settlements, Outsourcing in Financial Services (Feb. 15, 2005), 
available at https://www.bis.org/publ/joint12.htm. Recent estimates 
suggest that the aggregate contract value of outsourcing in the 
financial services industry is on the order of $10 to $20 billion. 
See, e.g., Business Wire, Insights on the Finance and Accounting 
Outsourcing Global Market to 2026 (Jan. 14, 2022), available at 
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20220114005440/en/Insights-
on-the-Finance-and-Accounting-Outsourcing-Global-Market-to-2026_-
Featuring-Accenture-Capgemini-and-Genpact-Among-Others_-
ResearchAndMarkets.com.
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    Due to data limitations, we are unable to quantify or characterize 
in much detail the structure of these various service provider 
markets.\688\ The Commission lacks specific information on the exact 
extent to which third-party service providers are retained, the 
specific services they provide, and the costs for those services beyond 
the estimates discussed above for cloud service providers. We also do 
not have information about the market for these services, including the 
competitiveness of such markets. We request information from commenters 
on the services related to SCI systems and indirect systems provided by 
third parties to new and existing SCI entities, the costs for those 
services, and the nature of the market for these services.
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    \688\ Although certain regulatory filings may shed a limited 
light on the use of third-party service providers, we are unaware of 
any data sources that provide detail on the overall picture for each 
of the new and existing SCI entities.
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C. Analysis of Benefits and Costs of Proposed Amendments

    The proposed amendments both expand the scope of Regulation SCI to 
reach new entities and also strengthen existing requirements in 
Regulation SCI that would apply to both old and new entities. This 
section explores the benefits and costs of these changes. First, we 
discuss the general benefits and costs of the proposed amendments to 
Regulation SCI. Next, we discuss the expansion of Regulation SCI to 
certain new SCI entities and the rationale for it. Finally, we analyze 
the specific benefits and costs of applying each provision of amended 
Regulation SCI to each of the proposed new SCI entities and current SCI 
entities.\689\ The Commission encourages commenters to identify, 
discuss, analyze, and supply relevant data, information, or statistics 
regarding the benefits and costs.
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    \689\ For purposes of measuring the benefits and costs of the 
proposed rule on both existing and new SCI entities, this analysis 
assumes that market participants are compliant with existing 
applicable Commission, FINRA, CFTC, and other applicable rules, 
including those requiring registration and the rules and regulations 
applicable to such registered entities. To the extent that some 
entities engaged in activities including crypto asset securities are 
not, but should be, FINRA or Commission registered entities, they 
may incur additional costs to comply with existing registration 
obligations that are distinct from the costs associated with the 
proposed rule amendments and are not discussed in this analysis. 
Similarly, any benefits from coming into compliance with existing 
registration obligations are also not discussed in this analysis. 
For such entities, we expect the benefits and costs specifically 
associated with the proposed rule amendments to be same as those 
described below for existing and new SCI entities that are currently 
registered.
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    The Commission is providing both a qualitative assessment and 
quantified estimates, including ranges, of the potential economic 
effects of the proposal where feasible. The overall magnitude of the 
economic effects will depend, in part, on the extent to which the new 
and current SCI entities already have in place practices that are 
aligned with the requirements of Regulation SCI, including the proposed 
amendments. New SCI entities' costs of implementing Regulation SCI 
could also differ with the number and size of their systems affected.
    In many cases it is difficult to quantify the economic effects, 
particularly those beyond the costs estimated in the Paperwork 
Reduction Act analysis. As explained in more detail below, the 
Commission in certain cases does not have, and does not believe it can 
reasonably obtain, data or information necessary to quantify certain 
effects. For instance, the Commission finds it impracticable to 
quantify many of the benefits associated with amended Regulation SCI. 
Indeed, we lack information that would allow us to predict the 
reduction in frequency and severity of SCI events or the specific cost 
savings that might arise from avoiding the harm Regulation SCI is 
designed to prevent. Further, even in cases where the Commission has 
some data, quantification is not practicable due to the number and type 
of assumptions necessary to quantify certain economic effects, which 
render any such quantification unreliable. The Commission requests that 
commenters provide relevant data and information to assist the 
Commission in quantifying the economic consequences of proposed 
amendments to Regulation SCI.
1. General Benefits and Costs of Proposed Amendments
    Regulation SCI promotes the capacity, integrity, resiliency, 
availability, and security of SCI systems, as well as transparency 
about systems problems when they do occur, and thereby promote 
investors' confidence in market transactions. SCI events can today have 
broad impacts because of the growth of electronic trading, which allows 
increased volumes of securities transactions in a broader range of 
asset classes, at increasing speed, by a variety of trading platforms; 
\690\ changes in the way SCI entities employ technology, including the 
increasing importance of third-party service providers to ensure 
reliable, resilient, and secure systems; \691\ a significant increase 
in cybersecurity events across all types of companies, including SCI 
entities; \692\ and an evolution of the threat environment.\693\ A 
joint report from the World Economic Form and Deloitte states that 
``new interconnections and collective dependencies on certain critical 
providers significantly contribute to the number of vulnerable nodes 
that could threaten and exploit the financial system's essential 
functions.'' \694\
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    \690\ See section I and supra note 3.
    \691\ See sections III.B, III.B.2.a.
    \692\ See section III.B.3.
    \693\ See id.
    \694\ See World Economic Forum, Beneath the Surface: Technology-
Driven Systemic Risks and the Continued Need for Innovation (Oct. 
28, 2021) at 14, available at https://www.weforum.org/reports/beneath-the-surface-technology-driven-systemic-risks-and-the-continued-need-for-innovation/; see also Henning Soller, et al., 
Innovative Technologies in Financial Institutions: Risk as a 
Strategic Issue, McKinsey Digital (Sep. 25, 2020), available at: 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/tech-forward/innovative-technologies-in-financial-institutions-risk-as-a-strategic-issue.
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    Expanding Regulation SCI to new SCI entities will help to ensure 
that the core technology systems of these newly designated SCI entities 
are robust, resilient, and secure--especially for those entities that 
have not already adopted comparable measures on their own--and would 
also help to improve Commission oversight of the core technology of key 
entities in the U.S. securities markets.\695\
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    \695\ For example, some expert views suggest that current SCI 
entities' compliance with Regulation SCI likely prepared those 
entities to be more resilient and more prepared to face times of 
increased volatility--beyond what their prudent business practices 
may have allowed. For example, one industry publication notes that 
even as financial firms ``updated their [business continuity 
planning] after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and superstorm 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012, when these events exposed cracks in Wall 
Street's contingency plans,'' they were still ``more prepared during 
COVID-19 thanks to Regulation SCI for Systems, Compliance and 
Integrity.'' See, e.g., Is Remote Trading Leading to a Paradigm 
Shift on the Trading Desk?, supra note 2. Similarly, a senior 
executive at FINRA stated in an interview that he found most 
surprising the resiliency of the market during COVID-19 and said ``a 
lot of credit goes to the SEC for [the market's resiliency] with 
respect to adopting [Regulation SCI].'' FINRA, Podcast: Market 
Structure & COVID-19: Handling Increased Volatility and Volumes, at 
24:38-25:08 (Apr. 28, 2020), available at https://www.finra.org/media-center/finra-unscripted/market-structure-covid19-coronavirus 
(featuring an interview with FINRA's then-Executive VP of Market 
Regulation and Transparency Services, Tom Gira).

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[[Page 23237]]

    The Commission is also proposing amendments to update Regulation 
SCI in order to strengthen its requirements. These amendments would 
benefit markets and market participants by reducing the likelihood, 
severity, and duration of market disruptions arising from systems 
issues, among both current and new SCI entities, whether such events 
may originate from natural disasters, third-party provider service 
outages, cybersecurity events, hardware or software malfunctions, or 
any other sources.\696\ Decreasing the number of trading interruptions 
can improve price discovery and liquidity because such interruptions 
interfere with the process through which relevant information gets 
incorporated into security prices and, may thereby, temporarily disrupt 
liquidity flows.\697\ Trading interruptions in one security can also 
affect securities trading in other markets. For example, an 
interruption in the market for index options and other securities that 
underlie derivatives securities could harm the price discovery process 
for derivatives securities, and liquidity flows between the stock 
market and derivatives markets could be restricted. For this reason, 
market-based incentives alone are unlikely to result in optimal 
provision of SCI-related services. In this context, having plans and 
procedures in place to prepare for and respond to system issues is 
beneficial,\698\ and the proposed amendments to Regulation SCI would 
help ensure that the infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets 
remains robust, resilient, and secure. A well-functioning financial 
system is a public good.
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    \696\ For example, the Ponemon Institute's 2016 Cost of Data 
Center Outages report estimates the average cost per minute of an 
unplanned outage was $8,851 for the average data center the 
Institute surveyed in 2016. See Ponemon Institute, 2016 Cost of Data 
Center Outages 14 (Jan. 19, 2016) available at https://www.vertiv.com/globalassets/documents/reports/2016-cost-of-data-center-outages-11-11_51190_1.pdf. Also, although it is difficult to 
estimate the total cost of a cyberattack at an SCI entity, a 
potential effect of a cyberattack involving an SCI entity is a data 
breach. According to the IBM's 2022 Cost of a Data Breach report, 
the average cost of a data breach in the United States is $9.44 
million, and the report added that ``[f]or 83% of companies, it's 
not if a data breach will happen, but when. Usually more than 
once.'' See IBM, 2022 Cost of a Data Breach, available at https://
www.ibm.com/reports/data-
breach#:~:text=Average%20cost%20of%20a%20data,million%20in%20the%2020
20%20report. Relatedly, another study reports that in 2020 the 
average loss in the financial services industry was $18.3 million 
per company per incident. The average cost of a financial services 
data breach was $5.85 million. See Jennifer Rose Hale, The Soaring 
Risks of Financial Services Cybercrime: By the Numbers, Diligent 
(Apr. 9, 2021), available at https://www.diligent.com/insights/financial-services/cybersecurity/#.
    \697\ See Osipovich, Alexander, NYSE Glitch Causes Erroneous 
Prices in Hundreds of Stocks, Wall St. J. (online edition) (Jan. 24, 
2023), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/dozens-of-nyse-stocks-halted-in-opening-minutes-after-wild-price-swings-11674585962 
(retrieved from Factiva database).
    \698\ For example, according to the IBM Report, in the context 
of system issues arising from cybersecurity events, having an 
incident response plan and ``testing that plan regularly can help 
[each firm] proactively identify weaknesses in [its] cybersecurity 
and shore up [its] defenses'' and ``save millions in data breach 
costs.'' See 2022 Cost of a Data Breach, supra note 696. See also 
Alex Asen et al., Are You Spending Enough on Cybersecurity (Feb. 19, 
2020), available at https://www.bcg.com/publications/2019/are-you-spending-enough-cybersecurity (noting ``[a]s the world becomes ever 
more reliant on technology, and as cybercriminals refine and 
intensify their attacks, organizations will need to spend more on 
cybersecurity'').
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    The Commission recognizes that the proposed amendments to 
Regulation SCI would impose costs on SCI entities, as well as costs on 
certain members, participants, customers (in the case of SCI broker-
dealers), or third-party providers of SCI entities. The majority of 
these costs would be direct compliance costs, which are discussed in 
detail below for each requirement of proposed Regulation SCI. For 
current SCI entities, these costs would relate to the areas of 
Regulation SCI that are being amended. For new SCI entities, the costs 
would relate to complying with the entirety of Regulation SCI, 
including the proposed amendments. For current SCI entities, these 
costs may be mitigated to the extent the SCI entity's current business 
practices are already consistent with the proposed requirements, and 
if, as a result of compliance, the SCI entity avoids the costs 
associated with a systems failure or breach. Likewise, for new SCI 
entities, these costs may be mitigated to the extent the SCI entity's 
current business practices are already consistent with the requirements 
of Regulation SCI, including the proposed amendments, and if, as a 
result of compliance, the SCI entity avoids the costs associated with a 
systems failure or breach.
    Some portion of compliance costs could be economic transfers. This 
may be the case if compliance with a particular provision entails 
making use of certain third-party providers, and the market for third-
party provider services is not itself competitive.\699\ In such a case, 
third-party providers would make economic profits from the services 
they offer and the fees they charge, and some of the services fees 
charged would be economic transfers from SCI entities to third-party 
providers.
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    \699\ See, e.g., Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, SEC Rules, Stakeholder 
Interests, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 10 Mkts L.J. 311 (2015), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2541805 (retrieved from SSRN Elsevier 
database; Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion of Securities 
Regulation: Investor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 85 
(2015), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2406032 (retrieved from SSRN Elsevier 
database.
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    The proposed amendments could have other potential costs. For 
example, entities covered by the proposed rule frequently would need to 
make systems changes to comply with new and amended rules and 
regulations under Federal securities laws and SRO rules. For entities 
that meet the definition of SCI entity, because they would need to 
comply with the proposed amendments when they make systems changes, the 
proposed amendments could increase the costs and time needed to make 
systems changes to comply with new and amended rules and regulations. 
The Commission requests comment on the nature of such additional costs 
and time.
Request for Comment
    The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the Overall 
Benefits and Costs of Proposed Amendments discussion. In addition, the 
Commission is requesting comment on the following specific aspects of 
the discussion:
    97. For new SCI entities, what activities do you currently perform 
(either because you are required to or you have chosen to voluntarily) 
that are already consistent with the requirements of Regulation SCI?
    98. For new SCI entities and current SCI entities, can compliance 
with Regulation SCI result in the benefits the Commission describes in 
the analysis?
    99. Are commenters aware of any data that can be used to quantify 
any aspects of benefits?
    100. The Commission seeks commenters' views regarding the 
prospective costs, as well as the potential benefits, of applying 
Regulation SCI to SBSDRs. Are there characteristics specific to SBSDRS 
or the SBS market that would make applying Regulation SCI broadly or 
any specific provision or proposed new provision Regulation SCI 
challenging for

[[Page 23238]]

SBSDRs? How much time would an SBSDR reasonably need to come into 
compliance with Regulation as proposed? Commenters should quantify the 
costs of applying Regulation SCI to SBSDRs, to the extent possible. 
Commenters are urged to address specifically each requirement of 
Regulation SCI and note whether it would be reasonable to apply each 
such requirement to SBSDRs and what the benefits and costs of such 
application would be.
    101. For current SCI entities, what activities do you currently 
perform that are already consistent with the proposed amendments that 
seek to strengthen the obligations of SCI entities?
    102. Are the Commission's estimates of incremental compliance costs 
owing to these proposed reasonable? Please note that the Commission 
does not purport to estimate the total costs of all activities SCI 
entities will perform in promoting the capacity, integrity, resiliency, 
availability, and security of their automated systems. The Commission's 
estimates pertain only to the increase in costs that will arise 
directly as a result of having to comply with the specific provisions 
of the proposed rules to the extent the covered entity has not already 
been performing such activities on its own or pursuant to other 
relevant rules or regulations.
    103. What activities do you currently perform that go beyond the 
proposed amendments to Regulation SCI?
    104. For current SCI entities, will compliance with the proposed 
amendments to Regulation SCI result in performing activities that go 
significantly above and beyond their current approach to promoting the 
capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security of their 
automated systems? In other words, will these new rules require a 
significant rearranging of their resources beyond what they are already 
complying with voluntarily?
    105. What are the costs of Regulation SCI? Are commenters aware of 
any data that can be used to quantify any aspects of costs?
2. Expansion to New SCI Entities
    The Commission proposes to expand the definition of SCI entity to 
encompass SBSDRs, certain broker-dealers, and additional clearing 
agencies exempted from registration. These entities are key market 
participants that play a significant role in the U.S. securities 
markets and, in the event of a systems issues, they have the potential 
to impact investors, the overall market, or the trading of individual 
securities. Under the proposed amendments, the new SCI entities would 
become subject to all provisions of Regulation SCI, including the 
provisions that the Commission proposes to amend for SCI entities, as 
discussed in section III.C of this release. We discuss in this section 
the entities to which Regulation SCI would be extended, including the 
rationale for doing so. The benefits and costs associated with applying 
each of the Regulation SCI requirements to these entities are 
subsequently discussed in section V.D.3.
    The Commission preliminarily estimates that as a result of the 
proposed amendments to the definition of ``SCI entity'' in Rule 1000, 
there would be a total of 21 new SCI entities that would become subject 
to the requirements of Regulation SCI. These include 2 SBSDRs, 17 SCI 
broker-dealers, and 2 exempt clearing agencies.\700\ Generally, 
inclusion of these new SCI entities in the amended definition is 
expected to help ensure systems resiliency at such entities and reduce 
the potential for incidents at these entities to have broad, disruptive 
effects across the securities markets and for investors. Furthermore, 
applying Regulation SCI to these entities increases market protections 
by establishing these obligations under the Exchange Act so that the 
Commission may enforce them directly and examine for compliance and 
provides a uniform requirement for all SCI entities.
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    \700\ The Commission is estimating 23 new SCI entities in the 
PRA section based on the PRA's forward-looking requirement to 
account for persons to whom a collection of information is addressed 
by the agency within any 12-month period. But for purposes of the 
Economic Analysis, this section analyzes the baseline of existing 
entities that will be new SCI entities and then predicts the cost to 
those entities if the rule were to be adopted. Accordingly the 
Economic Analysis assumes 21, rather than 23, new SCI entities.
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a. SBSDRs
    Currently, two SBSDRs are registered with the Commission and are 
subject to Rule 13n-6. The SBSDRs registered with the Commission are 
also registered with the CFTC as swap data repositories (SDRs) and 
accordingly, with respect to systems of concern to the CFTC, are 
subject to CFTC rules and regulations related to swap data 
repositories, including the CFTC's System Safeguards rule.
    Systems failures at SBSDRs can limit access to data, call into 
question the integrity of data, and prevent market participants from 
being able to report transaction data, and receive transaction data, 
and thereby have a large impact on market confidence, risk exposure, 
and market efficiency. For example, were an SBSDR to experience a 
systems issue, market participants could be prevented from receiving 
timely information regarding accurate prices for individual SBSs--such 
as aggregate market exposures to referenced entities (instruments), 
positions taken by individual entities or groups, and data elements 
necessary for a person to determine the market value of the 
transaction.\701\ This could contribute to market instability.
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    \701\ See Access to Data Obtained by Security-Based Swap Data 
Repositories, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 78716 (Aug. 29, 
2016), 81 FR 60585, 60594, 60605-6 (Sep. 2, 2016). In that release, 
the Commission estimates that approximately 300 relevant authorities 
may make requests for data from security-based swap data 
repositories.
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    Having SBSDRs comply with Regulation SCI would reduce the risk of 
system issues at SBSDRs and allow continued transparency and access to 
data. As noted above in the baseline, SBSDRs are currently subject to 
Rule 13n-6, which requires an SBSDR to ``establish, maintain, and 
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure 
that its systems provide adequate levels of capacity, integrity, 
resiliency, availability, and security.'' However, as described in 
detail below, the requirements of Regulation SCI that go beyond those 
required in Rule 13n-6--such as policies and procedures that include 
specific elements for infrastructure planning, up-to-date system 
development and testing methodology, regular systems reviews and 
testing, BC/DR planning, monitoring for SCI events, and standards to 
facilitate successful collection, processing, and dissemination of 
market data--should deliver benefits beyond those currently achieved 
through Rule 13n-6.
    The coverage of SBSDRs under the proposed amendments to Regulation 
SCI would augment the current principles-based requirements for 
policies and procedures on operational risk with detailed, more 
specific requirements to help ensure that SBSDR market systems are 
robust, resilient, and secure and that policies and procedures in place 
at SBSDRs meet requirements necessary to maintain the robustness of 
critical systems.
b. SCI Broker-Dealers
    The Commission proposes to include certain broker-dealers--to be 
referred to as ``SCI broker-dealers''--in the definition of SCI entity. 
This expansion would be limited to broker-dealers that exceed one or 
more size thresholds. The first proposed threshold is a total assets 
test. This test scopes within Regulation SCI any broker-dealers with 
five percent

[[Page 23239]]

(5%) or more of the total assets \702\ of all security brokers and 
dealers during at least two of the four preceding calendar quarters 
ending March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31. The second 
proposed threshold is a transaction activity test. This test scopes 
within Regulation SCI any broker-dealer that transacted ten percent 
(10%) or more of the total average daily dollar volume by applicable 
reporting entities during at least four of the preceding six calendar 
months in any of the following asset classes: NMS stocks, exchange-
listed options contracts, Agency Securities, or U.S. Treasury 
Securities.
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    \702\ See supra note 169.
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    The Commission proposes to limit the definition of ``SCI systems'' 
for an SCI broker-dealer that qualifies as an SCI entity that satisfies 
only one or more transaction activity thresholds.\703\ Specifically, 
only those systems that relate to the asset class for which the trading 
activity threshold is met (i.e., NMS stocks, exchange-listed options 
contracts, Treasury Securities, or Agency Securities) would be ``SCI 
systems'' or ``indirect SCI systems.'' \704\ Broker-dealers may have 
multiple business lines and transact in different types of securities, 
and the proposal reflects the Commission's preliminary conclusion that 
systems related to asset classes that do not meet the rule's 
transaction activity threshold are unlikely to pose risk to the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets if the systems with respect to 
that type of security were unavailable (assuming the systems for the 
distinct asset class are separate) relative to the burden of complying 
with the regulation's more stringent requirements.
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    \703\ See section III.A.2.b(iv).
    \704\ See section III.A.2.b(iv). As explained above in section 
III.A.2.b.v, although crypto asset securities are not a separately 
enumerated asset class for the volume threshold, the SCI systems and 
indirect SCI systems pertaining to crypto asset securities that are 
NMS stocks, exchange-listed options, U.S. Treasury Securities, or 
Agency securities would be subject to Regulation SCI, including as 
it is proposed to be amended, as discussed in section III. C, with 
respect to the asset class for which the SCI broker-dealer satisfies 
the threshold.
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    In contrast, no such limitation applies to an SCI broker-dealer 
that qualifies as an SCI entity because it satisfies the total assets 
threshold. In this case, broker-dealers that qualify as SCI entities 
due to the total assets threshold are subject to Regulation SCI 
requirements for all of its applicable systems, regardless of the asset 
classes such systems relate to.\705\ As discussed in section 
III.A.2.b.iii, this approach with respect to the total assets threshold 
takes into consideration the multiple roles that the largest broker-
dealers play in the U.S. securities markets. Not only do some of the 
largest broker-dealers generate liquidity in multiple types of 
securities, but many also operate multiple types of trading platforms. 
Entities with assets at this level also take risks that they may seek 
to hedge across asset classes, in some cases using ``central risk 
books'' for that and other purposes, and engage in routing substantial 
order flow to other trading venues. For these reasons, the Commission 
believes that systems issues at firms having assets at this level could 
have the potential to impact investors, the overall market, and the 
trading of individual securities, following a systems failure in any 
market in which they operate.
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    \705\ As explained above, any system of an SCI broker-dealer 
meeting the total asset threshold that pertains to any type of 
security, including crypto asset securities, that meets the 
definition of SCI systems or indirect SCI systems would be covered 
by Regulation SCI.
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    The Commission estimates that there would be 17 SCI broker-dealers, 
five of which would satisfy both the total assets threshold and at 
least one of the transaction activity thresholds, and twelve others of 
which would satisfy at least one of the transaction activity 
thresholds.\706\ As discussed in section V.B.1.b.i, figure 6 (Panel A) 
shows the distribution of all registered broker-dealer firms between Q4 
2021 and Q3 2022 by level of total assets. Figure 6 (Panel B) 
represents the distribution of all registered broker-dealer firms by 
percentage of aggregate total assets.\707\ It shows that five firms 
accounted for roughly half of broker-dealer aggregate total assets and 
thus each could pose a substantial risk to the maintenance of fair and 
orderly markets in the event of a systems issue. During all four 
quarters from Q4 2021 to Q3 2022, all five firms reported to the 
Commission, on Form X-17A-5 (Sec.  249.617), total assets in an amount 
that equals five percent (5%) or more of the total assets of all 
security brokers and dealers.\708\ Figures 7 through 10 represent the 
distribution by level of transaction activity as measured by average 
daily dollar volume \709\ (Panel A) and the distribution of firms by 
percentage of transaction activity \710\ (Panel B) for each of four 
asset classes including NMS stocks, exchange-listed options, U.S. 
Treasury Securities, and Agency Securities respectively.\711\ These 
figures clearly show that a few firms consistently accounted for a 
significant percentage of transaction activity over the six month 
period and thus each could pose a substantial risk to the maintenance 
of fair and orderly markets in the event of a systems issue. During at 
least four months of the six month period, six NMS stocks trading 
firms, six exchange-listed options contracts trading firms, four U.S. 
Treasury Securities trading firms, and six Agency Securities trading 
firms transacted average daily dollar volume in an amount that equals 
ten percent (10%) or more of the total average daily dollar of the 
corresponding markets. Most of these firms transacted more than ten 
percent (10%) during all six months.\712\
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    \706\ See section III.A.2.b(iv).
    \707\ Panel A and Panel B in figure 6 show the same information 
as in figure 1 in section V.B.1.b.i., but with 5% threshold lines 
added. The threshold line in Panel A shows the average of 5% of 
aggregate total assets in each quarter from Q4 2021 to Q3 2022.
    \708\ Each of these firms would satisfy the proposed total 
assets thresholds for an ``SCI broker-dealer''. See section 
III.A.2.b.iii (discussing proposed thresholds for an ``SCI broker-
dealer'').
    \709\ These measures are described in more detail in section 
III.A.2.b.iii.
    \710\ Id.
    \711\ Panel A and Panel B in figures 7 through 10 show the same 
information as in figures 2 through 5 in section V.B.1.b.i., but 
with 10% threshold lines added. The threshold line in each Panel A 
shows the average of 10% of aggregate average daily dollar volume 
reported to the plan processors (SIPs) of the CTA/CQ Plans and 
Nasdaq UTP Plan, OPRA Plan, or FINRA TRACE in each respective asset 
class from Jan. 2022 to June 2022. The threshold line in each Panel 
B equals 10%.
    \712\ Each of these firms would satisfy the proposed transaction 
activity thresholds for an ``SCI broker-dealer''. See section 
III.A.2.b.iii (discussing proposed thresholds for an ``SCI broker-
dealer'').
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    These large broker-dealers, by virtue of the total assets or 
transaction activity each represents over a period of time, play a 
significant role in the orderly functioning of U.S. securities markets. 
If such a broker-dealer was adversely affected by a system issue, then 
the impact could not only affect the broker-dealer's own customers, but 
also disrupt the overall market, by compromising or removing 
significant liquidity from the market, interrupting the price discovery 
process, or indirectly contributing to capacity issues at other broker-
dealers.\713\
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    \713\ See section III.A.2.b(iv).
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    Application of Regulation SCI is expected to reduce the likelihood 
of system issues at these largest broker-dealers as well as mitigate 
the effects of any such event. While it is possible that these broker-
dealers may have systems in place due to market-based incentives, there 
are reasons to believe that these incentives may be insufficient. 
First, as mentioned in section V.C.1, a well-functioning financial 
system is a public good.\714\ Second, investment in SCI

[[Page 23240]]

systems takes the form of a hidden-action problem. As such, due to 
principal-agent conflict, it may not be possible for customers or 
counterparties to observe the degree of investment in SCI systems and 
thus to provide market-based discipline from underinvestment. In this 
case, a broker-dealer's investment in SCI systems would offer benefits 
to customers and counterparties who might incur switching costs to find 
a different broker if a substantial systems issue occurred. These 
benefits are likely to be especially high for market participants who 
rely on a single counterparty (such as is sometimes the case in 
Treasury securities and prime brokerage relationships), and for retail 
investors who have invested in the relationship with a single retail 
broker.
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    \714\ Since broker-dealers are not compensated for the positive 
impact that their systems investments have on other entities, they 
lack sufficient incentives to invest on others' behalf. See, for 
instance, Mazaher Kianpour et al., Advancing the concept of 
cybersecurity as a public good, 116 Simulation Modeling Practice and 
Theory 102493 (2022).
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BILLING CODE 8011-01-C
c. Additional Exempt Clearing Agencies
    The proposed amendments would expand the scope of exempt clearing 
agencies covered by Regulation SCI to include two new exempt clearing 
agencies: Euroclear Bank SA/NV and Clearstream Banking, S.A. These 
exempt clearing agencies are not currently subject to Regulation SCI 
because Regulation SCI was initially limited to those exempt clearing 
agencies that were ``subject to ARP'' and these exempt clearing 
agencies are not subject to ARP. At the time it adopted Regulation SCI, 
the Commission stated it was taking a measured approach in applying 
requirements primarily to entities already covered under the ARP 
Inspection Program.\715\
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    \715\ SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72259.
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    The exempt clearing agencies not subject to ARP that the Commission 
proposes to scope into Regulation SCI provide CSD functions for 
transactions in U.S. securities between U.S. and non-U.S. persons using 
similar technologies as registered clearing agencies that are subject 
to Regulation SCI.\716\ The technology systems that underpin operations 
of these exempt clearing agencies are critical systems that centralize 
and automate clearance and settlement functions for the global 
financial markets.\717\ Such systems concentrate risk in the clearing 
agency.\718\ A disruption to a clearing agency's operations, or failure 
on the part of a clearing agency to meet its obligations, could 
therefore serve as a source of contagion, resulting in significant 
costs not only to the clearing agency itself and its participants but 
also to other market participants across the U.S. financial 
system.\719\ For example, an SCI event could cause a delay or 
disruption in the settlement process with respect to certain 
securities, leading to a decrease in liquidity. Trading firms could be 
unwilling or unable to enter into new positions should prior trades 
suffer settlement timing delays requiring posting of additional margin 
at clearing agencies and the assumption of additional risk by trading 
firms.
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    \716\ See section III.A.2.c.
    \717\ See section III.A.2.c.
    \718\ See generally Albert J. Menkveld & Guillaume Vuillemey, 
The Economics of Central Clearing, 13 Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 153 
(2021), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3957021 (retrieved from SSRN Elsevier 
database). See also Paolo Saguato, Financial Regulation, Corporate 
Governance, and the Hidden Costs of Clearinghouses, 82 Ohio St. L.J. 
1071, 1074-75 (2022), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3269060 (retrieved from SSRN Elsevier 
database) (``[T]he decision to centralize risk in clearinghouses 
made them critical for the stability of the financial system, to the 
point that they are considered not only too-big-to-fail, but also 
too-important-to-fail institutions.'').
    \719\ See generally Dietrich Domanski, et al., Central Clearing: 
Trends and Current Issues, BIS Q. Rev. (Dec. 2015), available at 
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1512g.pdf (describing links 
between CCP financial risk management and systemic risk); Darrell 
Duffie, et al., Policy Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market 
Infrastructure, Fed. Res. Bank N.Y. Staff Rep. No. 424, at 9 (Mar. 
2010), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1534729 (retrieved 
from SSRN Elsevier database) (``If a CCP is successful in clearing a 
large quantity of derivatives trades, the CCP is itself a 
systemically important financial institution. The failure of a CCP 
could suddenly expose many major market participants to losses. Any 
such failure, moreover, is likely to have been triggered by the 
failure of one or more large clearing agency participants, and 
therefore to occur during a period of extreme market fragility.''); 
Craig Pirrong, The Inefficiency of Clearing Mandates, Policy 
Analysis No. 655, at 11-14, 16-17, 24-26 (July 2010), available at 
https://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA665.pdf (stating, among other 
things, that ``CCPs are concentrated points of potential failure 
that can create their own systemic risks,'' that ``[a]t most, 
creation of CCPs changes the topology of the network of connections 
among firms, but it does not eliminate these connections,'' that 
clearing may lead speculators and hedgers to take larger positions, 
that a CCP's failure to effectively price counterparty risks may 
lead to moral hazard and adverse selection problems, that the main 
effect of clearing would be to ``redistribute losses consequent to a 
bankruptcy or run,'' and that clearing entities have failed or come 
under stress in the past, including in connection with the 1987 
market break); Glenn Hubbard et al., Report of the Task Force on 
Financial Stability 96, Brookings Inst.(June 2021), available at 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/financial-stability_report.pdf (``In short, the systemic consequences from a 
failure of a major CCP, or worse, multiple CCPs, would be severe. 
Pervasive reforms of derivatives markets following 2008 are, in 
effect, unfinished business; the systemic risk of CCPs has been 
exacerbated and left unaddressed.''); Froukelien Wendt, Central 
Counterparties: Addressing their Too Important to Fail Nature (IMF 
Working Paper No. 15/21, Jan. 2015), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1521.pdf (assessing the 
potential channels for contagion arising from CCP 
interconnectedness); Manmohan Singh, Making OTC Derivatives Safe--A 
Fresh Look (IMF Working Paper No. 11/66, Mar. 2011), at 5-11, 
available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1166.pdf 
(retrieved from SSRN Elsevier database) (addressing factors that 
could lead central counterparties to be ``risk nodes'' that may 
threaten systemic disruption).
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    Notably, Euroclear Bank SA/NV and Clearstream Banking, S.A. are 
already subject to Europe's CSDR, which has Operational Risk rules 
(Article 45) that includes many requirements that may align with those 
in Regulation SCI.\720\ Additionally, the Commission exemptive order 
for one of the exempt clearing agencies requires certain provisions 
that are consistent with those in Regulation SCI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \720\ The two exempt clearing agencies may also be subject to 
the EU Regulation, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), 
which went into effect in 2015: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020PC0595.
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3. Specific Benefits and Costs of Regulation SCI Requirements for All 
SCI Entities
a. Rule 1001--Policies and Procedures
    Rule 1001(a) through (c) sets forth requirements relating to the 
written policies and procedures that SCI entities are required to 
establish, maintain, and enforce. New SCI entities will need to comply 
with these requirements for the first time. In addition, the Commission 
is proposing to amend portions of Rule 1001(a), which will affect 
existing SCI entities as well. We discuss the benefits and costs of 
applying existing provisions to new SCI entities, as well as the 
benefits and costs of the amendments for both new and existing 
entities, below. We also discuss below the economic effects of these 
changes specific to the new SCI entities.
i. Benefits
(1) Provisions Applicable Only to New SCI Entities
    Rule 1001 requires certain policies and procedures for SCI 
entities. We consider here the provisions under Rule 1001 that we are 
not amending and therefore will only have an impact on SCI entities, 
relative to the baseline. We separately consider the provisions that we 
propose to amend in the following section, for both new and existing 
SCI entities.
(i) Capacity, Integrity, Resiliency, Availability, and Security (Rule 
1001(a)(1), (a)(2)(i) Through (iv), (vi), and (vii))
    Rule 1001(a)(1) requires that each SCI entity establish, maintain, 
and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
ensure that its SCI systems and, for purposes of security standards, 
indirect SCI systems, have levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, 
availability, and security, adequate to maintain the SCI entity's 
operational capability and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly 
markets. Rule 1001(a)(2)(i) through (iv), (vi), and (vii) prescribe 
certain minimum requirements for an SCI entity's policies and 
procedures. The Commission is not amending paragraphs (a)(1) and 
(a)(2)(i) through (iv), (vi), or (vii), and therefore current SCI 
entities will not be affected whereas new SCI entities will become 
subject to these provisions for the first time.
    Generally, the requirements to establish policies and procedures in 
Rule 1001(a)(1) should help ensure more robust systems that help reduce 
the risk and incidence of systems issues affecting the markets by 
imposing requirements on new entities that are

[[Page 23243]]

not currently subject to Regulation SCI and by covering systems and 
events that are not currently within the scope of existing regulations 
and current practices.\721\ In addition, the required policies and 
procedures may help new SCI entities recover more quickly from SCI 
events that do occur.
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    \721\ The potential adverse effects of systems failures are 
described in section V.C.2. for each type of new SCI entity. 
Benefits to new SCI entities from a reduction in the risk and 
incidents of systems issues would arise from a reduction in these 
adverse effects.
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    Application of Rule 1001(a)(2)(i) through (iv), (vi), and (vii) to 
the new SCI entities is expected to benefit securities markets and 
market participants by leading to the establishment, maintenance, and 
enforcement of policies and procedures for these entities related to 
current and future capacity planning; periodic stress testing; systems 
development and testing methodology; and reviews and testing to 
identify vulnerabilities; standards for market data collection, 
processing, and dissemination; and monitoring to identify potential 
systems problems. These requirements should reduce the risk and 
incidence of systems issues, such as systems disruptions and systems 
intrusions. This, in turn, could reduce interruptions in the price 
discovery process and liquidity flows. Systems issues that directly 
inhibit execution facilities, order matching, and dissemination of 
market data could cause slow executions or delayed orders, or cause 
inoperability of an SCI entity for a period of time. If executions were 
delayed by a systems disruption in an SCI system related to a trading, 
order routing, clearance and settlement, or market data system, given 
the magnitude of the transaction activity in which SCI entities 
consistently engage, the delay could have cascading effects disruptive 
to the broader market.\722\
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    \722\ See supra note 197.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi) provides that an SCI entity's 
policies and procedures must include standards that result in systems 
being designed, developed, tested, maintained, operated, and surveilled 
in a manner that facilitates the successful collection, processing, and 
dissemination of market data. Rule 1001(a)(2)(vi) is expected to help 
ensure that timely and accurate market data are made available by new 
SCI entities. Market participants rely on market data in a variety of 
ways, including for making markets, formulating trading algorithms, and 
placing orders, among others. Although new SCI entities currently 
facilitate the successful collection, processing, and dissemination of 
market data, improvements in timeliness and accuracy of the generation 
of market data inputs would help further ensure pricing efficiencies 
and uninterrupted liquidity flows in markets.
    Similarly, by requiring policies and procedures for monitoring 
systems to identify potential SCI events, Rule 1001(a)(2)(vii) may help 
ensure that new SCI entities identify potential SCI events, which could 
allow them to prevent some SCI events from occurring or to take timely 
appropriate corrective action after the occurrence of SCI events. As 
discussed above, reducing the frequency and duration of SCI events or 
reducing the duration of SCI events that disrupt markets would reduce 
pricing inefficiencies and promote price discovery and liquidity.
    In general, setting forth policies and procedures with regard to 
capacity planning, stress testing, systems development and testing 
methodology, and reviews and testing to identify vulnerabilities could 
yield benefits to market participants and new SCI entities, including a 
potential reduction in the likelihood, duration, or severity of SCI 
events, thus helping to contain losses from these events, as described 
above.\723\ Capacity planning and stress testing are necessary to help 
an SCI entity determine its systems' ability to process transactions in 
an accurate, timely, and efficient manner, and thereby help ensure 
market integrity. Development and testing systems are important in 
ensuring the reliability and resiliency of SCI systems. The potential 
adverse effects of systems failures are described in section V.C.2. for 
each type of new SCI entity. More reliable and resilient systems should 
help reduce the occurrence of SCI events and improve systems uptime for 
the new SCI entities, and thus possibly result in a reduction in losses 
due to SCI events and a reduction in these adverse effects. 
Furthermore, the use of inadequately tested software in production 
could result in substantial losses to market participants if it does 
not function as intended. For instance, if software malfunctions, it 
might not execute or route orders as intended and also could have 
unintended effects on quoted prices and the actual prices at which 
orders execute. Additionally, if a system's capacity thresholds are 
improperly estimated, it may become congested, resulting in higher 
indirect transaction costs due to lower execution quality (e.g., 
decrease in order fill rates).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \723\ See section V.D.1.
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    The Commission recognizes that the new SCI entities are subject to 
existing policies and procedures obligations as discussed in the 
baseline. Pursuant to those obligations, the new SCI entities may 
already engage in practices that are similar to certain requirements 
under Regulation SCI. To the extent that the existing policies and 
procedures are similar to those reflected in Regulation SCI, the 
magnitude of the costs and benefits discussed above that stem from the 
application of those policies and procedures will be correspondingly 
reduced. However, costs and benefits that arise from obligations under 
Regulation SCI that differ from those existing obligations, such as 
reporting to the Commission will be maintained.
    While some of the existing regulations that apply to the proposed 
new SCI entities may be consistent with or similar to the policy and 
procedure requirements of Regulation SCI discussed in this section, the 
Commission believes it is nevertheless appropriate to apply these 
policy and procedure requirements to the new SCI entities and doing so 
would benefit participants in the securities markets in which these 
entities operate. Applying Regulation SCI to these entities increases 
market protections by establishing these obligations under the Exchange 
Act so that the Commission may enforce them directly and examine for 
compliance and provides a uniform mandatory requirement that will 
ensure their continued application.
    In addition, some new SCI entities may already be voluntarily 
implementing policies and procedures consistent with the requirements 
of Regulation SCI. The magnitude of the benefits (and associated costs, 
as discussed below) from the policy and procedure requirements in Rule 
1001(a)(1) and (a)(2)(i) through (iv), (vi), and (vii) for the new SCI 
entities (and the costs, as discussed below), will therefore depend on 
the extent to which their current operations already align with the 
rule's requirements, given both existing regulation and current 
practice. However, the Commission believes the application of 
Regulation SCI is still necessary. For example, while SBSDRs that also 
function as SDRs in the swap markets, may currently apply the CFTC 
rules to their securities-based swap markets as well as their swaps 
markets, the CFTC rules only apply to their swap market SDR systems. 
Therefore, applying Regulation SCI to SBSDRs would help to ensure that 
the systems relevant to the securities markets are subject to a 
requirement to have levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, 
availability, and security adequate to maintain their operational 
capability and promote the maintenance of fair

[[Page 23244]]

and orderly markets and are subject to enhanced Commission oversight.
    Additionally, with respect to SBSDRs, the requirements of 
Regulation SCI are more specific and comprehensive than the principles-
based requirements of Rule 13n-6. The requirements of Regulation SCI 
would thus exist and operate in conjunction with Rule 13n-6, helping 
ensure that SBSDR market systems are robust, resilient, and secure and 
enhancing Commission oversight of the these systems.
    Similarly, application of Regulation SCI to broker-dealers would 
complement existing requirements and enhance the policies and 
procedures already in place for these entities. For example, the Market 
Access Rule prescribes specific controls and procedures around a 
broker-dealer entering orders on an exchange or ATS, but the policy and 
procedure requirements of Regulation SCI are broader in scope and are 
designed to ensure that the key technology pervasive and important to 
the functioning of the U.S. securities markets is robust, resilient, 
and secure. Further, the SCI review requirement obligates an SCI entity 
to assess the risks of its systems and effectiveness of its technology 
controls at least annually, identify weaknesses, and ensure compliance 
with the safeguards of Regulation SCI. In addition, with respect to the 
requirements concerning the collection, processing, and dissemination 
of market data, Regulation SCI extends beyond existing requirements to 
include SCI systems directly supporting proprietary market data, which 
will provide additional benefits to market participants. Further while 
Rule 17a-3 has a notification requirement when a broker-dealer fails to 
make and keep current the records required by that Rule, Regulation SCI 
more directly addresses mitigating the impact of technology failures 
with respect to SCI systems and indirect SCI systems (which include 
systems that are not used to make and keep current the records required 
by Rule 17a-3) and requires notifications to the Commission for a 
different set of events--systems intrusions, systems compliance issues, 
and systems disruptions--than the notification requirements of 17 CFR 
240.17a-11 (``Rule 17a-11'').
    Likewise, while FINRA Rule 4370 requires broker-dealers to maintain 
business contingency and disaster recovery plans, it does not include 
the requirement that the business continuity and disaster recovery 
plans be reasonably designed to achieve next business day resumption of 
trading and two-hour resumption of critical SCI systems following a 
wide-scale disruption, nor does it require the functional and 
performance testing and coordination of industry or sector-testing of 
such plans, which are instrumental in achieving the goals of Regulation 
SCI with respect to SCI entities.
    Finally, with respect to the exempt clearing agencies not subject 
to ARP, subjecting these entities to the policy and procedure 
requirements of Regulation SCI will ensure that uniform, minimum 
requirements regarding capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, 
and security applies to all exempt clearing agencies. Although some of 
the conditions underlying the exemptive orders for the two exempt 
clearing agencies that would be subject to Regulation SCI under the 
proposed amendments may be consistent with Regulation SCI's policy and 
procedure requirements, the conditions vary across the agencies and in 
their similarity to the Regulation SCI requirements. As these exempt 
clearly agencies and other entities that they interact with become more 
technologically innovative and interconnected, applying a uniform, 
minimum set of requirements will improve the Commission's oversight and 
better ensure the resiliency of the markets in which they operate.
    Overall, applying the specific and comprehensive requirements set 
forth in Rule (a)(2)(i) through (iv), (vi), and (vii) of Regulation SCI 
to the new SCI entities would create a uniform, mandatory framework 
under the Commission's oversight thereby furthering the goals of 
Regulation SCI to strengthen the technology infrastructure of the U.S. 
securities markets and improve its resilience.
(ii) Systems Compliance (Rule 1001(b))
    Rule 1001(b)(1) requires each SCI entity to establish, maintain, 
and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to 
ensure that its SCI systems operate in a manner that complies with the 
Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder, and the entity's 
rules and governing documents, as applicable. Rule 1001(b)(2)(i) 
through (iv) provides that an SCI entity's policies and procedures 
under Rule 1001(b)(1) must include, at a minimum: (i) testing of all 
SCI systems and any changes to SCI systems prior to implementation; 
(ii) a system of internal controls over changes to SCI systems; (iii) a 
plan for assessments of the functionality of SCI systems designed to 
detect systems compliance issues, including by responsible SCI 
personnel and by personnel familiar with applicable provisions of the 
Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder and the SCI 
entity's rules and governing documents; and (iv) a plan of coordination 
and communication between regulatory and other personnel of the SCI 
entity, including by responsible SCI personnel, regarding SCI systems 
design, changes, testing, and controls designed to detect and prevent 
systems compliance issues.
    These provisions remain unchanged and do not create any new 
requirement for current SCI entities. New SCI entities, however, would 
become subject to these provisions for the first time. The Commission 
recognizes that new SCI entities currently take various measures to 
ensure that their systems operate in a manner that complies with 
relevant laws and rules. The specific requirements of Rule 1001(b) will 
further ensure that new SCI entities operate their SCI systems in 
compliance with the Exchange Act and relevant rules. For example, the 
tests under Rule 1001(b)(2)(i) should help new SCI entities to identify 
potential compliance issues before new systems or systems changes are 
implemented; the internal controls under 17 CFR 242.1001(b)(2)(ii) 
(``Rule 1001(b)(2)(ii)'') should help to ensure that new SCI entities 
remain vigilant against compliance challenges when changing their 
systems and resolve potential noncompliance before the changes are 
implemented; and the systems assessment plans under 17 CFR 
242.1001(b)(2)(iii) (``Rule 1001(b)(2)(iii)'') and the coordination and 
communication plans under Rule 1001(b)(2)(iv) should help technology, 
regulatory, and other relevant personnel of new SCI entities to work 
together to prevent compliance issues, and to promptly identify and 
address compliance issues if they occur.\724\ To the extent that new 
SCI entities operate market regulation and market surveillance systems, 
and to the extent that compliance with Rule 1001(b) reduces the 
occurrence of systems compliance issues, Rule 1001(b) should advance 
investor protection.\725\
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    \724\ See SCI Adopting Release, at 72422.
    \725\ See id. at 72410 and 72422; see also section III.A.2.b.ii 
(policies and procedures, including those for system compliance, are 
expected to strengthen broker-dealers' operational capabilities 
independent of any specific SCI event affecting their technology 
supporting trading, clearance and settlement, order routing, market 
data, market regulation, and market surveillance).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iii) Responsible SCI Personnel (17 CFR 242.1001(c)(1) (``Rule 
1001(c)(1)''))
    Rule 1001(c)(1) requires an SCI entity to establish, maintain, and 
enforce reasonably designed written policies and procedures that 
include the criteria

[[Page 23245]]

for identifying responsible SCI personnel, the designation and 
documentation of responsible SCI personnel, and escalation procedures 
to quickly inform responsible SCI personnel of potential SCI events. 
This provision remains unchanged and does not create any new 
requirement for current SCI entities. New SCI entities, however, will 
become subject to this provision for the first time.
    Requiring policies and procedures to identify and designate 
responsible SCI personnel and to establish escalation procedures to 
quickly inform such personnel of potential SCI events should help to 
effectively determine whether an SCI event occurred and what 
appropriate actions should be taken without unnecessary delay. As such, 
Rule 1001(c)(1) is expected to reduce the duration of SCI events as new 
SCI entities become aware of them and take appropriate corrective 
actions more quickly. The reduction in the duration of SCI events would 
benefit markets and their participants as it would promote pricing 
efficiency and price discovery.
    The Commission recognizes that the new SCI entities currently have 
certain regulatory obligations that may align with certain requirements 
of Rule 1001(c)(1), as described in the baseline, and in addition the 
new SCI entities may already be voluntarily implementing policies and 
procedures that may align with certain requirements of Rule 1001(c)(1). 
For example, SBSDRs and exempt clearing agencies may have policies and 
procedures that identify roles and responsibilities for key personnel 
as well as appropriate escalation procedures including designation and 
documentation of responsible personnel as noted above.\726\ Likewise, 
as discussed above,\727\ broker-dealers may have policies and 
procedures for designating employees with specific roles and 
responsibilities and escalation procedures documented in their incident 
response plans. As discussed above, the extent of these benefits (and 
related costs, as discussed below) would depend in part on how closely 
the existing policies and procedures of the new SCI entities align with 
the specific requirements of Rule 1000(c)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \726\ See sec. V.B.1.a.ii and V.B.1.c.ii.
    \727\ See section V.B.1.b.ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(iv) Periodic Reviews of Policies and Procedures and Prompt Remedial 
Actions (Rule 1001(a)(3), (b)(3), (c)(2))
    Rule 1001(a)(3), (b)(3), and (c)(2) require each SCI entity to 
periodically review the effectiveness of the policies and procedures 
required under Rule 1001(a) through (c) related to capacity, integrity, 
resiliency, availability, and security; systems compliance; and 
responsible SCI personnel, respectively, and to take prompt action to 
remedy deficiencies in such policies and procedures. These provisions 
remain unchanged since the adoption of Regulation SCI in 2014, but new 
SCI entities will become subject to them for the first time.
    Requiring periodic review of the policies and procedures and 
remedial actions to address any deficiencies in the policies and 
procedures would help to ensure that new SCI entities maintain robust 
policies and procedures and update them when necessary so that the 
benefits of Rule 1001(a) through (c) as discussed in section V.C.1 
should continue to be realized. For example, Rule 1001(a)(3), (b)(3), 
and (c)(2) should help to decrease the number of trading interruptions 
due to system issues in new SCI entities. It should lead to fewer 
interruptions in the price discovery process \728\ and liquidity flows, 
thus, may result in fewer periods with pricing inefficiencies. Further, 
because interruptions in liquidity flows and the price discovery 
process in one security can affect securities trading in other markets, 
reducing trading interruptions could have broad effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \728\ The price discovery process involves trading--buyers and 
sellers arriving at a transaction price for a specific asset at a 
given time. Thus, generally, any trading interruptions would 
interfere with the price discovery process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with the other requirements of Regulation SCI previously 
discussed, the Commission acknowledges that the new SCI entities are 
subject to existing regulations, and the extent of the benefits (and 
costs, as discussed below) will depend on how closely their current 
policies and procedures align with the requirements for review and 
remedial action under Rule 1001(a)(3), (b)(3), and (c)(2). The SBSDRs 
registered with the Commission are registered with the CFTC as swap 
data repositories (SDRs) and, with respect to systems of concern to the 
CFTC, are subject to CFTC's rules that require these entities to 
conduct periodic reviews of automated systems and business continuity-
disaster recovery capabilities.\729\ While such entities may apply the 
CFTC rules to the entirety of their repositories, the CFTC rules do not 
apply to the SBSDR and its security-based swap related systems. 
Therefore, applying Rule 1001(a)(3), (b)(3), and (c)(2) to SBSDRs would 
ensure periodic reviews of the effectiveness of policies and procedures 
specifically related to SCI systems and create a uniform, mandatory 
framework under the Commission's oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \729\ See 17 CFR 49.24(j); 17 CFR 49.24(m); 17 CFR 49.24(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, SCI broker-dealers also are required under FINRA Rule 
4370 to conduct an annual review of the business continuity and 
disaster recovery plans.\730\ Further, as noted above, the two exempt 
clearing agencies are required to report at least on an annual basis to 
the competent authority regarding their compliance with CSDR, including 
on their operational risk management framework and systems and their 
information security framework.\731\ The exempt clearing agencies must 
also periodically test and review the operational arrangements and 
policies and procedures with users. Additionally, the exemptive order 
for one of the exempted clearing agencies requires a review of policies 
and procedures and reporting on the status of policies and procedures 
to the Commission. To the extent that that the broker-dealers and the 
exempt clearing agencies increase the scope of the review of their 
policies and procedures related to capacity, integrity, resiliency, 
availability, and security; systems compliance; and responsible SCI 
personnel, and take prompt action to remedy deficiencies, the exempt 
clearing agencies, broker-dealers and their customers will benefit from 
application of Rule 1001(a)(3), (b)(3), and (c)(2) and create a 
uniform, mandatory framework under the Commission's oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \730\ See sec. V.B.1.b.ii.
    \731\ See sec. V.B.1.c.ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Amended Provisions Applicable to Current and New SCI Entities
    The Commission is proposing to amend Rule 1001(a)(2)(v)--to add to 
that provision a requirement that business continuity and disaster 
recovery plans be reasonably designed to address the unavailability of 
any third-party provider that provides functionality, support, or 
service to the SCI entity without which there would be a material 
impact on any of its critical SCI systems--and add several new 
provisions in Rule 1001(a)(2), including proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(viii) 
(systems classifications and lifecycle management programs); proposed 
Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) (third-party provider management program); proposed 
Rule 1001(a)(2)(x) (a program to prevent the unauthorized access to 
such systems and information residing therein); and proposed Rule 
1001(a)(2)(xi) (identification of the relevant current industry 
standard claimed as a safe harbor, if any). In addition, we are

[[Page 23246]]

proposing to amend Rule 1001(a)(4) to clarify that policies and 
procedures that are consistent with current SCI industry standards 
provide a safe harbor with respect to the requirement that such 
policies and procedures be reasonably designed. These amendments would 
impact both new and existing SCI entities.
(i) Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plans (Rule 
1001(a)(2)(v))
    Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) currently requires SCI entities' policies and 
procedures to set forth business continuity and disaster recovery plans 
that include maintaining backup and recovery capabilities sufficiently 
resilient and geographically diverse and that are reasonably designed 
to achieve next business day resumption of trading and two-hour 
resumption of critical SCI systems following a wide-scale disruption. 
The Commission is proposing to also require that such plans are 
reasonably designed to address the unavailability of any third-party 
provider that provides functionality, support, or service to the SCI 
entity, without which there would be a material impact on any of its 
critical SCI systems.
    With respect to the existing requirements that will remain 
unchanged, these would only affect new SCI entities and not create any 
new requirement for current SCI entities. Requiring business continuity 
and disaster recovery plans increases the likelihood that the markets 
in which they participate will continue to function, and SCI systems 
can resume operation in a timely manner, even when there are 
significant outages to SCI systems. Rule 1001(a)(2)(v), among other 
things, is expected to help ensure prompt resumption of all critical 
SCI systems, which in turn is expected to help minimize interruptions 
in trading and clearance and settlement after a wide-scale disruption. 
Notably, in the case of a wide-scale disruption, multiple SCI entities 
may be affected by the same incident at the same time. Given that U.S. 
securities market infrastructure is concentrated in relatively few 
areas, such as New York City, New Jersey, and Chicago, maintaining 
backup and recovery capabilities that are geographically diverse could 
facilitate resumption in trading and critical SCI systems following 
wide-scale market disruptions.\732\ Reducing the frequency and duration 
of trading interruptions would promote pricing efficiency, price 
discovery, and liquidity flows in markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \732\ As discussed in section III.C.2, the geographic diversity 
of data center sites is an important consideration even where an SCI 
entity uses CSPs as its business continuity and disaster recovery 
service providers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the new requirement on the unavailability of third-
party providers, both new and current SCI entities will be affected. 
Financial institutions, including SCI entities, have become 
increasingly dependent on third parties--such as cloud service 
providers--to operate their businesses and provide their services.\733\ 
The proposed requirement for business continuity and disaster recovery 
plans to address the unavailability of any third-party provider would 
help ensure that SCI entities are appropriately prepared for 
contingencies relating to a third-party provider with respect to 
critical SCI systems., including the potential for an extended outage, 
if, for example the third-party provider goes into bankruptcy or 
dissolves, or if it breaches its contract and decides to suddenly, 
unilaterally, and/or permanently cease to provide the SCI entity's 
critical SCI systems with functionality, support, or service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \733\ See supra sec. V.B.4. and note 687.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission understands that some new SCI entities are already 
subject to similar requirements and may already have policies and 
procedures that may align with Rule 1001(a)(2)(v),\734\ while others 
may need to make more significant changes to their current policies, 
procedures and practices. As discussed above, the extent of the 
benefits (and costs, as discussed below) will depend on how closely the 
new SCI entities' current policies and procedures align with the 
requirements of 1001(a)(2)(v), including the proposed amendment. With 
respect to SBSDRs, which are also registered as SDRs with the CFTC, the 
CFTC's System Safeguard rule sets forth requirements for swap data 
repositories to establish and maintain emergency procedures, 
geographically diverse \735\ backup facilities, and a business 
continuity-disaster recovery plan that allows for the timely recovery 
and resumption of next day operations following the disruption. While 
such entities may apply the CFTC rules to the entirety of their 
repositories, the CFTC rules do not apply to the SBSDR and its 
security-based swap related systems. Therefore, Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) 
would help ensure SBSDR's have in place for their SCI systems business 
continuity and disaster recovery plans that meet the minimum 
requirements set forth in the rule and create a uniform, mandatory 
framework under the Commission's oversight. The proposed amendment 
would ensure that these plans specifically address the unavailability 
of any third-party provider that provides functionality, support, or 
service to the SBSDR's SCI systems, without which there would be a 
material impact on any of its critical SCI systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \734\ See sections III.A.2.a.ii, III.A.2.b.ii, III.A.2.c.i., 
V.B.1.a.ii, V.B.1.b.ii, and V.B.1.c.ii.
    \735\ SDRs deemed critical by the CFTC require geographically 
diverse backup facilities and staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SCI broker-dealers are likewise required to create and maintain a 
written business continuity plan under FINRA Rule 4370.\736\ Currently 
required business continuity public disclosure statements \737\ 
generally indicate that some backup systems are geographically diverse, 
but limited information is disclosed with respect to a specific 
timeline for resumption of service in the event of a disruption. 
Similarly, these required business continuity public disclosure 
statements generally do not provide information on specific BC/DR plans 
to address the unavailability of any third-party provider, as would be 
required under the proposed amendment. Applying the requirements of 
Rule 100(a)(2)(v) to broker-dealers may reduce the frequency and 
duration of trading interruptions, which would promote pricing 
efficiency, price discovery, and liquidity flows in markets. Further, 
the proposed amendment to Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) would help ensure broker-
dealers have business continuity and disaster recovery plans in place 
to address the unavailability of any third-party provider that provides 
functionality, support, or service to the SCI systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \736\ See section V.B.1.b.ii.
    \737\ While broker-dealers are required to provide a brief 
summary disclosure statement regarding their BCPs to customers, they 
do not disclose the actual BCP. Based on a review of 2021 and 2022 
BCP disclosure statements, firms often do not provide any detail on 
operational capacity to meet demand surges or any specific 
timeframes for resumption of service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, as discussed above, the exempt clearing agencies are 
currently required to maintain a business continuity policy and 
disaster recovery plan that ensures two hour resumption of critical 
operations and geographically diverse backup systems and monitor and 
test it at least annually.\738\ The exempt clearing agencies are also 
required to address the unavailability of any critical third-party 
provider.\739\ Application of Rule 1000(a)(2)(v), including the 
proposed amendment, would help ensure exempt clearing agencies have 
business continuity and disaster recovery plans in place to address the 
unavailability of any third-

[[Page 23247]]

party provider that provides functionality, support, or service to the 
SCI systems and thus would likely incrementally reduce the frequency 
and duration of trading interruptions and promote pricing efficiency, 
price discovery, and liquidity flows in markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \738\ See sec. V.b.1.e.ii.
    \739\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(ii) Systems Classification and Lifecycle Management (Proposed Rule 
1001(a)(2)(viii))
    Proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(viii) provides that an SCI entity's 
policies and procedures must provide for the maintenance of a written 
inventory and classification of all SCI systems, critical SCI systems, 
and indirect SCI systems as such, and a program with respect to the 
lifecycle management of such systems, including the acquisition, 
integration, support, refresh, and disposal of such systems, as 
applicable. This is a new provision and applies to both current SCI 
entities and new SCI entities.
    A foundational and essential step for an SCI entity to be able to 
meet its obligations under Regulation SCI is to be able to clearly 
identify the different types of its systems that are subject to 
differing obligations under Regulation SCI. Reasonably designed systems 
classification and lifecycle management policies and procedures, which 
include vulnerability and patch management, reduce the risk of SCI 
system defects and operational issues. The systems classification 
requirement would promote more efficient and timely compliance with the 
remaining provisions of Regulation SCI. The lifecycle management 
requirement would also ensure that sensitive information (including 
software configuration info, middleware, etc.) is not inadvertently 
revealed, potentially compromising the security of an SCI entity's data 
and network--and would further enhance the systems' integrity, 
resiliency, and security. The Commission understands that one of the 
first steps many current SCI entities would take to comply with 
Regulation SCI is to develop a classification of their systems in 
accordance with the definitions of each type of system in SCI, but not 
all SCI entities maintain such a list. Accordingly, the extent of the 
benefits described above will depend on whether existing entities have 
taken such steps and how closely they align with the proposed 
requirements.
    With respect to new SCI entities, broker-dealers are required to 
maintain policies and procedures per Regulation S-P and S-ID, as 
discussed above.\740\ In two Commission exam sweeps, the Commission 
staff observed that most broker-dealers already inventory, catalog, and 
classify the risks of their systems and had a process in place for 
ensuring regular system maintenance, including the installation of 
software patches to address security vulnerabilities.\741\ Furthermore, 
identification of mission critical systems is required by FINRA rule 
4370. Accordingly, there would be an incremental benefit (and cost) 
from applying this particular provision of Regulation SCI to the 
broker-dealers. Additionally, the practice of inventorying and 
classifying systems might also encourage the firm to invest in 
supplemental security measures to reduce the number of indirect SCI 
systems, which would result in an incremental and upfront or short-term 
cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \740\ See sec. V.B.1.b.ii.
    \741\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in section V.B.1.c.ii, exempt clearing agencies are 
required by CSDR to prepare a list with all the processes and 
activities that contribute to the delivery of the services they 
provide; and identify and create an inventory of all the components of 
their IT systems that support the processes and activities. This likely 
would represent an incremental benefit (and cost). Additionally, the 
practice of inventorying and classifying systems might also encourage 
the firm to invest in supplemental security measures to reduce the 
number of indirect SCI systems to reduce the long-time compliance 
burden which would result in an incremental and upfront or short-term 
cost.
(iii) Third-Party Provider Management (Proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix))
    Proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) concerns policies and procedures for 
effective third-party provider management and would newly apply to both 
existing and new SCI entities. As discussed above, financial 
institutions have been increasingly outsourcing parts of their 
services.\742\ When a market participant chooses to outsource a 
particular component of its operation to a third-party vendor, the 
vendor may offer components of services (of certain quality) at a 
cheaper rate than the market participant can supply on its own or where 
the market participant may lack the expertise or ability to provide 
them. If this is done properly and with full information, it can result 
in an efficient outcome without compromising the service quality below 
what is required under Regulation SCI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \742\ See supra sec. V.B.4. and note 687.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    But in some cases, if there is information asymmetry--especially 
with respect to service quality--market dynamics among SCI entities 
result on the provision of sub-optimal services. This may be the case 
for a number of reasons, including imperfect communication between the 
SCI entity and its third-party provider. First, a third-party provider 
providing its service to an SCI entity may lack the knowledge of the 
level of resiliency and capacity the SCI entity must maintain. Second, 
an SCI entity may lack the knowledge of the robustness of the third-
party provider's operation. Third, the market for these services may 
not be competitive, and an SCI entity looking to outsource these 
services may not have other comparable choices. Failure to ensure that 
policies and procedures are adequate to reduce these risks may result 
in unidentified security weaknesses, the inability to analyze potential 
security events, and delayed business continuity and disaster recovery.
    Proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) would require each SCI entity to have 
a program to manage and oversee third-party providers that provide 
functionality, support or service, directly or indirectly, for its SCI 
systems and, for purposes of security standards, its indirect SCI 
systems. Each SCI entity would be required to undertake a risk-based 
assessment of each third-party provider's criticality to the SCI 
entity, including analyses of third-party provider concentration, of 
key dependencies if the third-party provider's functionality, support, 
or service were to become unavailable or materially impaired, and of 
any potential security, including cybersecurity, risks posed. The 
Commission believes that specifically requiring each SCI entity to 
undertake a risk-based assessment of each of its third-party providers' 
criticality to the SCI entity will help it more fully understand the 
risks and vulnerabilities of utilizing each third-party provider, and 
provide the opportunity for the SCI entity to better prepare in advance 
for contingencies should the provider's functionality, support, or 
service become unavailable or materially impaired.
    Again, the extent of these benefits may depend on whether an SCI 
entities' existing practices, and applicable regulations, are 
consistent with the requirements of proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix). As 
noted above, SBSDRS that are dually registered as SDRs with the CFTC 
are also subject to the CFTC

[[Page 23248]]

System Safeguards rule, which requires a SDR to undertake program of 
risk analysis and oversight of outsourcing and vendor management 
affecting its operations and automated systems.\743\ A dual-registered 
entity's outsourced systems for processing SDR data might also be SCI 
systems if such systems also process SBSDR data. Accordingly, an SDR's 
adherence to the System Safeguard Rule's provision for vendor 
management and outsourcing is reasonably likely to reduce the benefit 
(and the cost, as discussed below) of complying with proposed Rule 
1001(a)(2)(ix).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \743\ 17 CFR 49.24(b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, as discussed above, broker-dealers are already subject 
to general vendor management obligations in accordance with FINRA Rule 
3110 and obligations under Regulation S-P \744\ and thus some of their 
current practices may be consistent with some of the requirements of 
Rule 1001(a)(ix). However, those rules are different in scope and 
purpose than the proposed amendment to Regulation SCI.\745\ For 
example, while FINRA rules already require initial and ongoing due 
diligence, third-party provider contract review and ongoing third-party 
risk assessment, proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) also requires an 
additional risk-based assessment of each third-party provider's 
criticality to the SCI entity. Accordingly, proposed Rule 
1001(a)(2)(ix) may restrict usage of particular third-party providers, 
if and when they are unwilling or unable to comply with Regulation 
SCI's third-party provider requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \744\ See supra sec. V.B.1.b.ii.
    \745\ See sec. III.A.2.b.ii. and III.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, as discussed in V.B.1.c.ii, the two exempt clearing 
agencies are required by CSDR to have arrangements for the selection 
and substitution of IT third-party service providers and proper 
controls and monitoring tools which seems within the scope of proposed 
Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) initial and ongoing due diligence provisions. The 
exempt clearing agencies are also required to identify critical 
utilities providers and critical service providers that may pose risks 
to tier operations due to dependency on them which seems within the 
scope of ongoing third-party risk assessment. In light of the existing 
requirements for exempt clearing agencies discussed in the baseline, 
any benefits (and associated costs, as discussed below) from the 
proposed amendment are likely to be relatively small with respect to 
critical service providers. However, the benefit would likely be larger 
with respect to non-critical service providers where the requirements 
are less specific.
(iv) Security (Proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(x))
    Since the adoption of Regulation SCI in 2014, the financial system 
has become more digitized and consequently cybersecurity has become a 
significant concern for financial firms, investors, and regulatory 
authorities.\746\ In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic and accelerated 
move to working from home increased the demand for digital services and 
reliance of SCI entities on third-party providers including CSPs. 
Moving the majority of activities to the online or digitized 
environment has increased the risk of cybersecurity events.\747\ 
According to the Bank for International Settlements, the financial 
sector had the second-largest share of COVID-19-related cybersecurity 
events between March and June 2020.\748\ The Commission is proposing a 
new paragraph (a)(2)(x) of Rule 1001 that would require policies and 
procedures of SCI entities include a program to prevent the 
unauthorized access to SCI systems and, for purposes of security 
standards, indirect SCI systems and information residing therein. This 
would be a new provision and would apply to both current SCI entities 
and new SCI entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \746\ See supra sec. III.C.3.
    \747\ I[ntilde]aki Aldasoro et al., COVID-19 and Cyber Risk in 
the Financial Sector, BIS Bull. No. 37 (Jan. 14, 2021), available at 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull37.pdf.
    \748\ Id. The health sector is ranked first in term of the 
cyberattacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission anticipates that the primary benefit of the proposed 
rule would be to ensure that all SCI entities, including the new SCI 
entities, have policies and procedures to enhance their preparedness 
against cybersecurity threats. The proposed requirements to develop 
policies and procedures that are specifically designed to prevent the 
unauthorized access to SCI systems and information residing therein, 
would better protect SCI entities against cybersecurity threats. Such 
policies and procedures can strengthen the security surrounding their 
information systems and the data contained within, aiding in the 
prevention of unauthorized access; minimizing the damage from 
cybersecurity events; and improving incident recovery time.
    Another significant benefit is that any such unauthorized access 
should be reported to the Commission. Thus, this rule, together with 
the Commission notification requirement in Rule 1002(b), as amended, 
will help the Commission better understand which entities are most 
affected by cybersecurity events, what the current trends may be, and 
provide the Commission with information that may aid in subsequent 
guidance or rulemaking to further strengthen the affected entities from 
future cybersecurity events and disruptions to their business 
operations. Indeed, as we stated in section B.2.a, it is the 
Commission's understanding that current SCI entities have been 
reporting de minimis system intrusions on a quarterly basis, rather 
than immediately, as permitted under the current requirements of 
Regulation SCI. Current SCI entities are not required to report 
attempted intrusions.
    The extent of these benefits will depend on how consistent the 
existing policies and procedures of both current and new SCI entities 
are with the requirements of proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(x). The 
Commission believes that many existing SCI entities already have most 
or all of such policies and procedures in place as part of their 
security protocols; thus the benefits (and the associated costs) of 
applying the proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(x) may be reduced.
    Among new SCI entities, both registered SBSDRs have stated they 
have policies and procedures addressing access management.\749\ To the 
extent that SBSDRs already have access management policies and 
procedures that are aligned with the requirements of proposed Rule 
1001(a)(2)(x), the proposed rule would offer limited benefits. Further, 
as discussed in section V.B.1.b.ii, broker-dealers are required to 
maintain policies and procedures addressing security issues per 
Regulation S-P and S-ID, although those regulations and the required 
policies and procedures are different in scope and purpose. The extent 
of the benefits of proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(x) would thus depend on how 
consistent the broker-dealer's current policies and procedures are with 
the requirements of the proposed Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \749\ 17 CFR 49.24(b)(2). See Security-Based Swap Data 
Repositories; ICE Trade Vault, LLC; Notice of Filing of Application 
for Registration as a Security-Based Swap Data Repository, available 
at https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2021/34-91331.pdf; Security-Based 
Swap Data Repositories; DTCC Data Repository (U.S.), LLC; Notice of 
Filing of Application for Registration as a Security-Based Swap Data 
Repository, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2021/34-91071.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in section V.B.1.c.ii, the two exempt clearing 
agencies are required to maintain information security frameworks 
describing mechanisms to detect and prevent cyber-attacks and a plan in 
response to cyber-attacks. The information security

[[Page 23249]]

framework includes among other requirements access controls to the 
system and adequate safeguards against intrusions and data misuse. 
Therefore, proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(x) may offer only limited 
incremental benefits.\750\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \750\ See section V.B.1.c.ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(v) Current SCI Industry Standards (Proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(xi)) and 
Safe Harbor for Policies and Procedures Consistent With SCI Industry 
Standards (Rule 1001(a)(4))
    Proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(xi) would provide that an SCI entity's 
policies and procedures must include an identification of the current 
SCI industry standard(s) with which each such policy and procedure is 
consistent, if any. This requirement would be applicable if the SCI 
entity is taking advantage of the safe harbor provision, Rule 
1001(a)(4). We are also proposing to amend the text of Rule 1001(a)(4), 
which deems an SCI entity's policies and procedures under Rule 1001(a) 
to be reasonably designed if they are consistent with current SCI 
industry standards, to make clear that its reference to and definition 
of ``current SCI industry standards'' provides a safe harbor for SCI 
entities with respect to their Rule 1001(a) policies and procedures. 
Proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(xi) and the amendment to Rule 1001(a)(4) would 
apply to both current SCI entities and new SCI entities.
    Rule 1001(a)(4) specifically states that compliance with current 
SCI industry standards is not the exclusive means to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 1001(a). Therefore, Rule 1001(a)(4) provides 
flexibility to allow each SCI entity to determine how to best meet the 
requirements in Rule 1001(a), taking into account, for example, its 
nature, size, technology, business model, and other aspects of its 
business. SCI entities can choose the technology standards that best 
fit with their business, promoting efficiency. The ability of SCI 
entities to rely on widely recognized technology standards, if they 
choose to do so, will provide guidance to SCI entities on policies and 
procedures that would meet the articulated standard of being 
``reasonably designed to ensure that their systems have levels of 
capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security, adequate 
to maintain their operational capability and promote the maintenance of 
fair and orderly markets.''
    In addition, the flexibility of this requirement leaves room for 
industry-wide innovation, while encouraging each SCI entity to conform 
to an industry standard that is most appropriate for itself given the 
entity's scope of operation and particular characteristics. These 
standards currently in place may require protocols that go beyond the 
level that would have been chosen by an entity that is driven by 
profit-maximizing or cost-saving motives. Furthermore, as industry 
standards continue to evolve, Regulation SCI helps to ensure that SCI 
entities are motivated to adhere to the changing standards that reflect 
the changes in market conditions and technology. The Commission 
understands that many existing SCI entities rely on industry standards, 
typically by adhering to a specific industry standard or combination of 
industry standards for a particular technology area or by using 
industry standards as guidance in designing policies and procedures. 
Thus, overall benefits and costs to existing SCI entities will be 
incremental, and the benefits and costs are likely to be greater for 
entities that do not already rely on industry standards and lesser for 
entities that already adhere closely to industry standards.
    Among new entities, both SBSDR entities are also registered with 
the CFTC as SDRs, and as such are subject to the CFTC's System 
Safeguard rule in their capacity as SDRs. The System Safeguard rule 
requires SDRs to follow generally accepted standards and best practices 
with respect to the development, operation, reliability, security, and 
capacity of automated systems.\751\ While not required, it is likely 
that dual-registered SDRs/SBSDRs are following these requirements for 
SBSDRs given the CFTC requirements for SDRs. Therefore, it is likely 
that SBSDRs already have policies and procedures consistent with 
existing industry standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \751\ See 17 CFR 49.24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, broker-dealers are required to have certain 
policies and procedures pursuant to Regulation S-P and S-ID.\752\ The 
2015 FINRA report on cybersecurity practices observed that broker-
dealers reported relying on industry standards with respect to 
cybersecurity requirements, typically by adhering to a specific 
industry standard or combination of industry standards or by using 
industry standards as a reference point for designing policies and 
procedures.\753\ To the extent that any broker-dealers do not rely on 
industry standards or only selectively, applying Rule 1001(a)(4) and 
proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(xi) will likely increase broker-dealer 
adherence to industry standards and improve overall compliance with 
Rule 1001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \752\ See sec. V.B.1.b.ii.
    \753\ See section V.B.1.b.ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in section V.B.1.c.ii, the two exempt clearing 
agencies are required by CSDR to rely on internationally recognized 
technical standards and industry best practices with respect to its IT 
systems. As such, it is likely that they already have policies and 
procedures that are consistent with one or more industry standards. The 
proposed amendment may have some incremental benefit and improve 
overall compliance with Rule 1001.
ii. Costs
    The policies and procedures requirements of Regulation SCI would 
impose certain compliance costs on new SCI entities, which are expected 
to change at least some of their current practices to comply. In 
addition, the proposed amendments to certain provisions in Rule 1001 
would impose additional costs on new and existing SCI entities. We 
discuss these costs below.
(1) Compliance Costs for New SCI Entities
    Some of the new SCI entities are already subject to existing 
regulatory requirements that are similar to the requirements in Rule 
1001, including the proposed amendments. To the extent these entities 
already have policies and procedures that are consistent with the Rule 
1001 requirements, they could incur lower costs to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 1001 than entities without such existing policies 
and procedures. Similarly, the compliance costs associated with Rule 
1001 may vary across SCI entities depending on the degree to which 
their current voluntary practices are already consistent with the 
requirements of Rule 1001.The compliance costs of Rule 1001 may further 
depend on the complexity of SCI entities' systems (e.g., the compliance 
costs will be higher for SCI entities with more complex systems). They 
may also depend, to a large extent, on the scale as well as the 
relative criticality of a given SCI entity's systems. We discuss below 
the costs for new SCI entities to comply with Rule 1001, including the 
proposed amendments; this includes PRA costs as well as additional 
compliance costs.
    First, with respect to PRA costs, the Commission estimates total 
initial costs of approximately $13.4 million and annual costs of 
approximately $3.5

[[Page 23250]]

million for all new SCI entities.\754\ In addition to the compliance 
costs estimated as part of the PRA analysis, the Commission 
acknowledges there may, in some cases, be other compliance costs. In 
the SCI Adopting Release, the Commission formed estimates of non-PRA 
compliance costs for complying with Rule 1001(a) and (b),\755\ which 
are instructive for determining such costs now for the new SCI 
entities. The Commission believed then, and continues to do so now, 
that the costs of complying with Rule 1001(c) are fully captured in the 
PRA cost estimates. The Commission's estimates then were based on 
extensive discussions with industry participants as well as information 
contained in the comment letters submitted during the rulemaking 
process. After carefully considering all comments, the Commission 
concluded that to comply with all requirements underlying the policies 
and procedures required by Rule 1001(a) and (b), other than paperwork 
burdens, on average, each SCI entity will incur an initial cost of 
between approximately $320,000 and $2.4 million and an ongoing annual 
cost of between approximately $213,600 and $1.6 million.\756\ Adjusted 
for inflation since 2014, the initial cost would be between 
approximately $407,000 and $3.1 million, and the ongoing annual cost 
would be between approximately $272,000 and $2.0 million.\757\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \754\ See section IV.D.7. These are the estimated costs to 
comply with Rule 1001(a) through (c). For purposes of this Economic 
Analysis, there are two fewer entities than under the PRA analysis, 
lowering these estimated costs. See supra note 700.
    \755\ According to the 2014 adopting release, these non-PRA 
compliance costs include, for example, establishing current and 
future capacity planning estimates, capacity stress testing, 
reviewing and keeping current systems development and testing 
methodology, regular reviews and testing to detect vulnerabilities, 
testing of all SCI systems and changes to SCI systems prior to 
implementation, implementing a system of internal controls, 
implementing a plan for assessments of the functionality of SCI 
systems, implementing a plan of coordination and communication 
between regulatory and other personnel of the SCI entity, including 
by responsible SCI personnel, designed to detect and prevent systems 
compliance issues, and hiring additional staff. See SCI Adopting 
Release, supra note 1, at 72416 n. 1939.
    \756\ Id.
    \757\ SEC inflation calculations are based on annual GDP price 
index data from Table 1.1.4. in the National Income and Product 
Accounts from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and on inflation 
projections from The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2023 to 2033, 
published by the Congressional Budget Office in February 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the 2014 adopting release, the Commission acknowledged that its 
cost estimates reflect a high degree of uncertainty because the 
compliance costs may depend on the complexity of SCI entities' systems 
(e.g., the compliance costs will be higher for SCI entities with more 
complex systems). The initial compliance costs associated with Rule 
1001 could also vary across SCI entities depending on the degree of 
that their current practices are already consistent with the 
requirements of Rule 1001.\758\ The Commission explained the difficulty 
of gauging the degree to which an SCI entity was already taking 
measures consistent with Regulation SCI, which would affect the 
compliance costs with respect to Rule 1001. These considerations 
continue to apply to the Commission's estimate of any non-PRA costs for 
new SCI entities, which span multiple markets and vary a great deal in 
terms of the services they provide and the operations they perform. 
These new SCI entities face different baselines depending on the 
applicable regulatory requirements that they are subject to and the 
market practices each SCI entity has been following.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \758\ These estimates in the SCI Adopting Release were in turn 
based on the preliminary estimates included in the SCI Proposing 
Release, supra note 14, at 18171. However, one important assumption 
the SCI Proposing Release made was to assume that certain SCI 
entities ``already [had or had] begun implementation of business 
continuity and disaster recovery plans that include maintaining 
backup and recovery capabilities sufficiently resilient and 
geographically diverse to ensure next business day resumption of 
trading and two-hour resumption of clearance and settlement services 
following a wide-scale disruption.'' Id. at note 633. In the SCI 
Adopting Release, however, in order to accommodate the cost 
considerations of those SCI entities that did not already have 
geographically diverse backup facilities, the Commission estimated 
the average cost to be approximately $1.5 million annually for such 
SCI entities. See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72420. In 
the section discussing Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) below, the Commission 
estimates the comparable estimate to be between $1.5 million and 
$1.8 million. This additional estimate range only applies to SCI 
entities that do not already have geographically diverse backup 
facilities and would be in addition to the non-paperwork burden 
estimates discussed in the current section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given these considerations, the Commission believes that the 
estimates from 2014 are still appropriate estimates for the non-PRA 
costs associated with Rule 1001(a) and (b) of Regulation SCI without 
the proposed amendments for the new SCI entities. There are reasons to 
believe that these ranges should be increased for inflation \759\ and 
technological changes since 2014, such as greater interconnectivity, 
that have expanded the scope for testing, leading to greater costs. 
However, there are also reasons to believe that as of 2023 these ranges 
may have come down.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \759\ For example, GDP Price Index data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) and projections from the Congressional 
Budget Office show that, economy-wide, prices increased by about 27% 
from 2014 to 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, some components of costs may be lower in 2023 because of 
technological improvements since 2014.\760\ Second, the experience of 
the current 47 SCI entities complying with Regulation SCI since 2014 
has likely generated a useful industry knowledge base for new SCI 
entities, including common practices, industry standards, and cost-
saving measures. From this perspective, the cost of learning would be 
lower, including the start-up cost. Third, the Commission understands 
that many financial institutions that are not subject to Regulation SCI 
have voluntarily begun to conform to one or more industry standards and 
adopted written policies and procedures related to ensuring capacity, 
integrity, resiliency, availability, and security of their systems. 
Indeed, the Commission understands--based on the Commission's 
discussions with industry participants--that the changes in the 
market--including greater automation and interconnectivity and an 
overall need to expand the scope of testing--have already incentivized 
many SCI entities to improve their internal protocols and to increase 
their technology expenditures. For example, the growing risk of 
cybersecurity events has already led many corporate executives to 
significantly increase their cybersecurity budgets.\761\ From this 
perspective, although the overall security and IT spending may have 
increased manifold for SCI entities over the years, the Commission 
estimates that the magnitude of compliance costs owing to the adoption 
of Regulation SCI

[[Page 23251]]

for new SCI entities, over and above their current expenses, may not 
necessarily have increased significantly as a result since 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \760\ See Matt Rosoff, Why is Tech Getting Cheaper?, weforum.org 
(Oct. 16, 2015), available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/10/why-is-tech-getting-cheaper/. For example, price has been 
dropping for cloud computing services over the last years. See Jean 
Atelsek, et al., Major Cloud Providers and Customers Face Cost and 
Pricing Headwinds, spglobal.com (May 10, 2022), available at https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/research/major-cloud-providers-and-customers-face-cost-and-pricing-headwinds; 
see also David Friend, The Coming Era of Simple, Fast, Incredibly 
Cheap Cloud Storage, Cloudtweaks.com (Nov. 15, 2022, 9:12 a.m.), 
available at https://cloudtweaks.com/2018/02/fast-incredibly-cheap-cloud-storage/ (describing the significant price drop for cloud 
storage as of 2018, and explaining that ``the prices for cloud 
storage are heading in the same direction.''). These trends may be 
reversing. See Jean Atelsek, et al., (``Rising energy costs and 
supply chain woes threaten to push up costs for the cloud 
hyperscalers in building and operating their data centers; 
therefore, cloud infrastructure prices are poised to increase.''); 
Frederic Lardinois, Google Cloud Gets More Expensive, TechCrunch+ 
(Mar. 14, 2022, 11:54 p.m.), available at https://techcrunch.com/2022/03/14/inflation-is-real-google-cloud-raises-its-storage-prices/
.
    \761\ For example, according to one source, as of 2020, ``55% of 
enterprise executives [were planning] to increase their 
cybersecurity budgets in 2021 and 51% are adding full-time cyber 
staff in 2021.'' Louis Columbus, The Best Cybersecurity Predictions 
for 2021 Roundup, Forbes.com (Dec. 15, 2020), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2020/12/15/the-best-cybersecurity-predictions-for-2021-roundup/?sh=6d6db8b65e8c.
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    Taking these varied considerations into account, the Commission 
estimates that, adjusted for inflation since 2014, the 2014 figures 
remain reasonable ranges for non-PRA costs associated with Rule 1001(a) 
and (b) in 2023, without accounting for the proposed amendments in Rule 
1001(a). In other words, the Commission estimates that a new SCI entity 
in 2023 will incur an initial non-PRA cost of between approximately 
$407,000 and $3.1 million and an ongoing annual non-PRA cost of between 
approximately $272,000 and $2.0 million to comply with the original 
provisions of Regulation SCI from 2014.
    To account for the proposed amendments, the Commission 
preliminarily estimates that, based on staff experience with current 
SCI entities' compliance practices, the non-PRA cost of complying with 
the amended provisions could be up to approximately 20% of the 
estimated non-PRA cost for complying with the original (i.e., 
unamended) Rule 1001(a). Accordingly, the Commission estimates that a 
new SCI entity would incur an additional initial cost of between 
approximately $81,000 and $611,000 and an additional ongoing annual 
cost of between approximately $54,000 and $407,000 to comply with the 
amended provisions of Rule 1001(a).\762\ Combined with the non-PRA 
costs estimates above for complying with the rest of Rule 1001(a) and 
(b), a new SCI entity will incur an additional initial non-PRA cost of 
between approximately $489,000 and $3.7 million \763\ and an additional 
ongoing annual non-PRA cost of between approximately $326,000 and $2.4 
million, plus the PRA costs estimated above.\764\ The Commission 
estimates that, in the aggregate, all new SCI entities will incur a 
total initial non-PRA cost of between approximately $10.3 million and 
$77.0 million to comply with the policies and procedures required by 
Rule 1001(a) and (b).\765\ In addition, the Commission estimates that, 
in the aggregate, new SCI entities will incur total annual ongoing non-
PRA cost of between approximately $6.9 million and $51.3 million.\766\ 
Depending on the price-sensitivity of their customers and the 
availability of alternative providers, new SCI entities may pass on 
some of these costs to their customers.\767\
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    \762\ These figures are 20% of the range from the Regulation SCI 
Adopting Release, adjusted for inflation from 2014 to 2023.
    \763\ These figures are 120% of the range from the Adopting 
Release of Regulation SCI, adjusted for inflation since 2014.
    \764\ These figures are approximately 120% of the range from the 
Adopting Release of Regulation SCI, adjusted for inflation since 
2014.
    \765\ The Commission currently estimates there are 23 new SCI 
entities, two of which are excluded from the economic analysis as 
explained above. The range of $10.3 million and $77.0 million 
represents 21 times the per-entity initial cost range from the 
Regulation SCI Adopting Release, adjusted for inflation since 2014.
    \766\ The range of $6.9 million and $51.3 million represents 21 
times the per-entity ongoing annual cost range from the Regulation 
SCI Adopting Release, adjusted for inflation since 2014.
    \767\ See, e.g., Jonathan Baker, Orley Ashenfelter, David 
Ashmore & Signe-Mary McKernan, Identifying the Firm-Specific Cost 
Pass-Through Rate, Federal Trade Commission. Bureau of Economics 1 
(1998), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/identifying-firm-specific-cost-pass-through-rate/wp217.pdf.
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    In addition, with respect to the periodic reviews required by Rule 
1001(a)(3), (b)(3), and (c)(2), there may be additional indirect costs 
if an SCI entity takes prompt or unplanned remedial action following 
the discovery of deficiencies in its policies and procedures. 
Specifically, the new SCI entities may need to delay or shift their 
resources away from profitable projects and reallocate their resources 
towards taking prompt or unplanned remedial actions required by the 
rules. It is nevertheless difficult to assess such indirect costs 
imposed on SCI entities because the Commission lacks information 
necessary to provide a reasonable estimate and such indirect costs will 
be circumstance-specific.
(2) Compliance Costs for Existing SCI Entities
    Existing SCI entities should incur new costs only to comply with 
the proposed amendments to Rule 1001(a). With respect to PRA costs, the 
Commission estimates total initial costs of approximately $8.2 million 
and annual costs of approximately $1.1 million for all current SCI 
entities.\768\ For non-PRA costs associated with these amendments, the 
Commission estimates that the non-PRA cost of complying with the 
amended provisions could be up to approximately 20% of the estimated 
non-PRA cost for complying with the original (i.e., unamended) Rule 
1001(a), as explained above. Accordingly, the Commission estimates that 
an existing SCI entity would incur an additional initial non-PRA cost 
of between approximately $81,000 and $611,000 and an additional ongoing 
annual non-PRA cost of between approximately $54,000 and $407,000 to 
comply with the amended provisions of Rule 1001(a).\769\ The Commission 
in turn estimates that, in the aggregate, current SCI entities will 
incur a total initial non-PRA cost of between approximately $3.8 
million and $28.7 million to comply with the policies and procedures 
required by Rule 1001(a) and (b).\770\ In addition, the Commission 
estimates that, in the aggregate, current SCI entities will incur total 
annual ongoing non-PRA cost of between approximately $2.6 million and 
$19.1 million.\771\
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    \768\ See section IV.D.7. These include costs for existing 
entities to comply only with Rule 1001(a), and for new entities to 
comply with Rule 1001(a) through (c).
    \769\ These figures are 20% of the range from the Regulation SCI 
Adopting Release, adjusted for inflation since 2014.
    \770\ The Commission currently estimates there are 47 current 
SCI entities. The range of $3.8 million and $28.7 million represents 
47 times the per-entity cost range from the SCI Adopting Release, 
adjusted for inflation since 2014.
    \771\ The range of $2.6 million and $19.1 million represents 47 
times the per-entity cost range from the SCI Adopting Release, 
adjusted for inflation since 2014.
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(3) Other Costs for All SCI Entities and Other Affected Parties
    Proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) could raise costs of third-party 
service providers insofar as they may have to renegotiate contracts and 
change the terms of their services to accommodate the requirements of 
SCI entities. SCI entities could also incur costs in enforcing their 
third-party provider management program. In particular, to the extent 
that accommodating the terms and conditions that would be demanded by 
SCI entities under proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) would be costly to 
third-party service providers, SCI entities could face higher prices 
from third-party providers, though any change in prices would also 
depend upon market conditions (such as the level of competition amongst 
third-party service providers for the type of services sought after by 
the SCI entity, the relative bargaining power of the SCI entity in 
negotiations with third-party service providers, new entry into the 
market for third-party services, and willingness of service providers 
to absorb costs or pass costs to other customers).
Request for Comment
    106. For current SCI entities, do you agree that the Commission's 
specified ranges reasonably capture the non-paperwork burden costs 
owing to Rule 1001(a) and (b) that you have incurred above and beyond 
amounts you were already spending to ensure your SCI systems' capacity, 
integrity, resiliency, availability, and security under the existing 
requirements of Regulation SCI?

[[Page 23252]]

    107. For new SCI entities, do you agree that the Commission's 
specified ranges reasonably capture the non-paperwork burden costs 
owing to Rule 1001(a) and (b) that you expect to incur above and beyond 
the amounts you were already spending to ensure your SCI systems' 
capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security under the 
existing requirements of Regulation SCI?
    108. For current and new SCI entities, do you agree that the 
Commission's specified ranges for the non-paperwork cost of complying 
with the proposed amendments to Rule 1001(a) and (b), at 20 percent of 
the specified ranges for Rule 1001(a) and (b), reasonably capture such 
costs that you expect to incur, above and beyond amounts you are 
already spending to ensure your SCI systems' capacity, integrity, 
resiliency, availability, and security owing to the proposed 
amendments?
    109. If you are a current SCI entity and currently inventory and 
classification of all SCI systems, critical SCI systems, and indirect 
SCI systems, how does your activity differ from the requirements of the 
rule proposal? What have been the benefits and costs of this activity?
    110. If you are a current SCI entity and have a program with 
respect to the lifecycle management of SCI systems, does it address the 
acquisition, integration, support, refresh, and disposal of such 
systems, as applicable? How does your activity differ from the 
requirements of the rule proposal? What have been the benefits and 
costs of this activity?
    111. If you are a current SCI entity and you currently have a 
third-party provider management program to ensure that your SCI systems 
contractors perform their work in accordance with the requirements of 
Regulation SCI, how does your activity differ from the requirements of 
the rule proposal? What have been the benefits and costs of this 
activity?
    112. If you are a current SCI entity and you currently require an 
initial and periodic review of contracts with service providers for 
consistency with your obligations under Regulation SCI, how does your 
activity differ from the requirements of the rule proposal? What have 
been the benefits and costs of this activity?
    113. If you are a current or proposed SCI entity and you currently 
conduct a risk-based assessment of each third-party provider's 
criticality, to your operations, how does your activity differ from the 
requirements of the rule proposal? What have been the benefits and 
costs of this activity?
    114. If you are a current SCI entity and your policies and 
procedures include a program to prevent the unauthorized access to SCI 
systems and information residing therein, how does your activity differ 
from the requirements of the rule proposal? What have been the benefits 
and costs of this activity?
    115. The Commission requests that commenters provide relevant data 
and analysis to assist us in determining the economic consequences of 
the proposed amendments related to third-party providers' management. 
In particular, the Commission requests data and analysis regarding the 
costs SCI entities and third-party providers may incur, and benefits 
they may receive, from the proposed amendments.
    116. Do you agree with the Commission's analysis of the benefits of 
the proposed amendments related to third-party providers' management? 
Why or why not? Please explain in detail.
    117. Do you agree with the Commission's analysis of the costs of 
the proposed amendments related to third-party providers' management? 
Why or why not? Please explain in detail.
b. Rule 1002--Corrective Action, Commission Notification, and 
Information Dissemination
    Regulation SCI requires SCI entities to take appropriate corrective 
actions in response to SCI events (Rule 1002(a)), notify the Commission 
of SCI events (Rule 1002(b)), and disseminate information regarding 
certain major SCI events to all members or participants of an SCI 
entity and certain other SCI events to affected members or participants 
(Rule 1002(c)). Rule 1000, in turn, defines SCI events to include 
systems disruptions, systems compliance issues, and systems intrusions. 
The Commission is proposing two amendments that affect these 
provisions. First, it is proposing to expand the definition of systems 
intrusion in Rule 1000. Second, it is proposing to amend Rule 
1002(b)(5) to eliminate the exception to the reporting requirement for 
de minimis systems intrusions and instead require the reporting of all 
systems intrusions, whether de minimis or not, within the time frames 
specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (4).
    New SCI entities will need to comply with these requirements of 
Rules 1000 and 1002, and their proposed amendments, for the first time. 
Existing SCI entities will need to apply the new definition of systems 
intrusion in Rule 1000 to the requirements of Rule 1002, including the 
amendments to Rule 1002(c). We discuss below the benefits and costs of 
these provisions and amendments for new and existing SCI entities.
i. Benefits
(1) Rule 1000--Definition of SCI Events
    In general, the definition of SCI event (and its component parts) 
in Rule 1000 circumscribe the scope of the substantive requirements in 
Rule 1002. Therefore, many of the costs and benefits associated with 
the definitions are incorporated in the discussion of the substantive 
requirements. The benefits associated with scoping the substantive 
requirements for Rule 1002 through the specific definitions of systems 
disruption, systems compliance issue, and systems intrusion are 
discussed at length in the 2014 SCI Adopting Release \772\ and would 
apply to the new SCI entities. We summarize those benefits here and 
discuss the benefits for both new and current SCI entities resulting 
from expanding the definition of systems intrusion.
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    \772\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72423-27.
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    Systems Disruption. Rule 1000 of Regulation SCI currently defines a 
``systems disruption'' as an event in an SCI entity's SCI systems that 
disrupts, or significantly degrades, the normal operation of an SCI 
system. This definition would remain unchanged. As the Commission noted 
in 2014, the definition sets forth a standard that SCI entities can 
apply in a wide variety of circumstances to determine in their 
discretion whether a systems issue should be appropriately categorized 
as a systems disruption. The inclusion of systems disruptions in the 
definition of SCI event, along with the requirements Rule 1002 should 
help effectively reduce the severity and duration of events for new SCI 
entities that harm pricing efficiency, price discovery, and liquidity 
and help Commission oversight of the securities markets.
    Systems Compliance Issues. Under Rule 1000, a systems compliance 
issue is an event at an SCI entity that has caused any SCI system of 
such entity to operate in a manner that does not comply with the Act 
and the rules and regulations thereunder or the entity's rules or 
governing documents, as applicable. The Commission stated in 2014 that 
inclusion of systems compliance issues in the definition of SCI event 
and the resulting applicability of the Commission reporting, 
information dissemination, and recordkeeping requirements are important 
to help ensure that SCI

[[Page 23253]]

systems are operated by SCI entities in compliance with the Exchange 
Act, rules thereunder, and their own rules and governing documents.
    System Intrusion. Rule 1000 of Regulation SCI currently defines a 
``systems intrusion'' as any unauthorized entry into the SCI systems or 
indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity. The Commission is proposing to 
expand the definition of systems intrusions to include any 
cybersecurity attack that disrupts, or significantly degrades, the 
normal operation of an SCI system. This revision includes cybersecurity 
events that cause disruption on an SCI entity's SCI systems or indirect 
SCI systems, whether or not the event resulted in an entry into or 
access to such systems. In addition, the proposed revised definition 
would include any significant attempted unauthorized entry into the SCI 
systems or indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity, as determined by the 
SCI entity pursuant to established reasonable written criteria. This 
revision is intended to capture unsuccessful, but significant, attempts 
to enter an SCI entity's SCI systems or indirect SCI systems. The 
definition, including the proposed amendments, will apply to new SCI 
entities for the first time while the proposed amendments will apply to 
existing SCI entities.
    In the SCI Adopting Release, the Commission discussed the benefits 
of including a system intrusion in the definition of an SCI event for 
which the requirements of Rule 1002 apply. These same benefits extend 
to the new SCI entities. Specifically, the Commission stated that 
unauthorized access, destruction, and manipulation of SCI systems and 
indirect SCI systems could adversely affect the markets and market 
participants because intruders could force systems to operate in 
unintended ways that could create significant disruptions in securities 
markets. Therefore, the inclusion of systems intrusions in the 
definition of SCI events can help reduce the risk of such adverse 
effects for new SCI entities.
    The proposed changes, which would apply to new and current SCI 
entities, would update the definition to include additional types of 
incidents that are currently considered to be cybersecurity events that 
are not included in the current definition. If an incident meets the 
definition, it must then comply with the requirements for corrective 
action, Commission notice, and information dissemination in Rule 1002. 
The proposed changes to the definition would thus ensure that the 
Commission and its staff are made aware when an SCI entity is the 
subject of a significant cybersecurity threat, including those that may 
be ultimately unsuccessful, which would provide important information 
regarding threats that may be posed to other entities in the securities 
markets, including other SCI entities. Because such cybersecurity 
events can cause serious harm and disruption to an SCI entity's 
operations, the Commission believes that the definition of systems 
intrusion should be broadened to include cybersecurity events that may 
not entail actually entering or accessing the SCI entity's SCI systems 
or indirect SCI systems, but still cause disruption or significant 
degradation, as well as significant attempted unauthorized entries. By 
requiring SCI entities to submit SCI filings for these new types of 
systems intrusions, the Commission believes that the revised definition 
of systems intrusion would also provide the Commission and its staff 
more complete information to assess the security status of the SCI 
entity, and also assess the impact or potential impact that 
unauthorized activity could have on the security of the SCI entity's 
affected systems as well on other SCI entities and market participants.
(2) Rule 1002--Corrective Action, Commission Notice, Information 
Dissemination
    As noted, Rule 1002 prescribes certain required actions for SCI 
entities upon any responsible SCI personnel having a reasonable basis 
to conclude that an SCI event has occurred. The requirements of Rule 
1002(a) and (c) remain substantively unchanged from current Regulation 
SCI except additional events are scoped into the Rules for existing SCI 
entities through the proposed expanded definition of systems intrusion. 
These provisions will therefore primarily affect new SCI entities. We 
discuss generally the benefits of the expanded definition above and do 
not repeat those here.\773\
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    \773\ The SCI Adopting Release considered the benefits and costs 
of the specific definitions for each type of SCI event. See SCI 
Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72404-08. Those costs and 
benefits remain the same for new SCI entities to which these 
definitions would apply and are not repeated here, except with 
respect to the definition of systems intrusions, which the 
Commission proposes to amend. To the extent that the primary effect 
of these definitions is realized through the requirements in Rule 
1002 to take corrective action, notify the Commission, and 
disseminate information, we discuss the effects of applying those 
requirements on new SCI entities below.
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    Corrective Action (Rule 1002(a)). Rule 1002(a) requires an SCI 
entity to begin to take appropriate corrective action upon any 
responsible SCI personnel having a reasonable basis to conclude that an 
SCI event has occurred. Rule 1002(a) also requires corrective action to 
include, at a minimum, mitigating potential harm to investors and 
market integrity resulting from the SCI event, and devoting adequate 
resources to remedy the SCI event as soon as reasonably practicable. 
Thus, it would not be appropriate for an SCI entity to delay the start 
of corrective action once its responsible SCI personnel have a 
reasonable basis to conclude that an SCI event has occurred, and the 
SCI entity would be required to focus on mitigating potential harm to 
investors and market integrity resulting from the SCI event and 
devoting adequate resources to remedy the SCI event as soon as 
reasonably practicable. This provision remains unchanged for existing 
SCI entities, except to the extent they must comply with the 
requirements for additional events scoped in under the expanded 
definition of systems intrusion, as noted above. For both current and 
new SCI entities, the benefits of expanding the definition to include 
certain types of systems intrusions that are not covered by Regulation 
SCI would include a potential reduction in the length or severity of 
systems disruptions caused by these types of intrusions and would thus 
reduce the negative effects of those interruptions on the SCI entity 
and on market participants.
    The corrective action requirement of Regulation SCI will likely 
reduce the length of systems disruptions, systems compliance issues, 
and systems intrusions, and thus reduce the negative effects of those 
interruptions on the SCI entity and market participants. Additionally, 
to the extent that corrective action could involve wide-scale systems 
upgrades, some SCI entities may potentially seek to accelerate capital 
expenditures, for example, by updating their systems with newer 
technology earlier than they might have otherwise to comply with 
Regulation SCI. As such, Rule 1002(a) could further help ensure that 
SCI entities invest sufficient resources as soon as reasonably 
practicable to address systems issues.
    New SCI entities will become subject to Rule 1002(a) for the first 
time. The Commission believes that new SCI entities already have a 
variety of procedures in place to take corrective actions when system 
issues occur. However, Rule 1002(a) may require modifications to those 
existing practices in part because the rule specifies the

[[Page 23254]]

timing and enumerates certain goals for corrective action.\774\
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    \774\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72423.
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    Commission Notification (Rule 1002(b)). Rule 1002(b) requires an 
SCI entity to notify the Commission of the SCI event immediately upon 
any responsible SCI personnel having a reasonable basis to conclude 
that an SCI event has occurred. Within 24 hours of any responsible SCI 
personnel having a reasonable basis to conclude that an SCI event has 
occurred, an SCI entity is required to submit to the Commission a more 
detailed written notification, on a good faith, best efforts basis, 
pertaining to the SCI event. Until such time as the SCI event is 
resolved and the SCI entity's investigation of the SCI event is closed, 
the SCI entity is required to provide updates regularly, or at such 
frequency as requested by a representative of the Commission. The SCI 
entity is also required to submit a detailed final written notification 
after the SCI event is resolved and the SCI entity's investigation of 
the event is closed (and an additional interim written notification, if 
the SCI event is not resolved or the investigation is not closed within 
a specified period of time). Finally, paragraph (b)(5) currently 
provides an exception to the reporting requirements of paragraphs 
(b)(1) through (4) for de minimis SCI events, and SCI entities are 
currently required to submit a summary to the Commission with respect 
to systems disruptions and systems intrusions only on a quarterly 
basis. The Commission is proposing to amend this provision to require 
SCI entities to exclude systems intrusions from this exception so that 
SCI entities will need to report systems intrusions, whether de minimis 
or not, within the time frames specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through 
(4). This would eliminate quarterly reporting for de minimis systems 
intrusions. Thus, for current SCI entities, the difference concerns the 
time frame for, and manner of, reporting de minimis systems intrusions 
while new SCI entities will be subject to the entire Commission 
notification regime for the first time.
    For the new SCI entities, Rule 1002(b) as a whole would enhance the 
effectiveness of Commission oversight of the operation of these 
entities. For example, SCI events notification results in greater 
transparency for the Commission, including ensuring that the Commission 
has a view into problems at particular SCI entities for regulatory 
purposes as well as perspective on the effect of a single problem to 
the market at-large.\775\ Further, the requirements of submitting 
notifications pertaining to the SCI events to the Commission, set forth 
by Rule 1002(b), could help prevent systems failures from being 
dismissed as momentary issues, because notification would help focus 
the SCI entity's attention on the issue and encourage allocation of SCI 
entity resources to resolve the issue as soon as reasonably 
practicable.
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    \775\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72424 (citing 
letter by David Lauer).
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    Both new and current SCI entities would be subject to the new 
reporting requirements under the proposed revisions to Rule 1001(b)(5). 
These revisions eliminate the need for entities to determine if an 
intrusion (which should be rare and also may be difficult to assess) 
meets the de minimis threshold before it notifies the Commission, and 
instead would require reporting to the Commission for all systems 
intrusions at the time of the event, which will provide more timely 
information to the Commission. This may result in more frequent 
reporting for systems intrusions while also eliminating quarterly 
reporting of systems intrusions, as compared to the baseline.
    Information Dissemination (Rule 1002(c)). Rule 1002(c) currently 
requires an SCI entity to disseminate information regarding certain 
major SCI events to all of its members or participants and certain 
other SCI events to affected members or participants. Specifically, 
promptly after any responsible SCI personnel having a reasonable basis 
to conclude that an SCI event has occurred, an SCI entity is required 
to disseminate certain information regarding the SCI event. When 
certain additional information becomes known, the SCI entity is 
required to promptly disseminate such information to those members or 
participants (or, as proposed, in the case of an SCI broker-dealer, 
customers) of the SCI entity that any responsible SCI personnel has 
reasonably estimated may have been affected by the SCI event. Until the 
SCI event is resolved, the SCI entity is required to provide regular 
updates on the required information. In the case of a major SCI event, 
where the impact is most likely to be felt by many market participants, 
dissemination of information to all members, participants, or 
customers, as applicable, of the SCI entity is required. A major SCI 
event is defined to mean an SCI event that has any impact on a critical 
SCI system or a significant impact on the SCI entity's operations or on 
market participants.
    The information dissemination requirement currently does not apply 
to SCI events to the extent that they relate to market regulation or 
market surveillance systems and de minimis SCI events. The Commission 
is proposing to add to these exceptions for the information 
dissemination requirement, a systems intrusion that is a significant 
attempted unauthorized entry into the SCI systems or indirect SCI 
systems. Accordingly, Rule 1002(c) remains mostly unchanged for 
existing SCI entities, except to the extent they must comply with the 
requirements for additional events scoped in under the expanded 
definition of systems intrusion (the benefits of which are discussed 
above) and except for systems intrusions that are significant attempted 
unauthorized entries, which are exempted from the information 
dissemination requirements. New SCI entities, however, will become 
subject to the information dissemination requirements for the first 
time.
    Rule 1002(c) is expected to help market participants--specifically 
the members, participants, or customers, as applicable of new SCI 
entities estimated to be affected by an SCI event and, in the case of 
major SCI events, all members, participants, or customers of a new SCI 
entity--to better evaluate the operations of SCI entities by requiring 
certain information about the SCI event to be disclosed. Furthermore, 
increased awareness of SCI events through information disseminated to 
members, participants, or customers, as applicable, should provide new 
SCI entities additional incentives to maintain robust systems and 
minimize the occurrence of SCI events. More robust SCI systems and the 
reduction in the occurrence of SCI events at new SCI entities could 
reduce interruptions in price discovery processes and liquidity flows. 
For example, in 2014, a commenter stated that sharing information about 
hardware failures, systems intrusions, and software glitches will alert 
others in the industry about such problems and help reduce system-wide 
costs of diagnosing problems, as well as result in improved responses 
to technology problems.\776\
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    \776\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72426 n. 931 
(citing letter from James Angel).
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    With respect to the new exception for significant attempted 
unauthorized entries, which impacts new and existing SCI entities, the 
Commission is concerned that disseminating information about 
unsuccessful attempted entries to members or

[[Page 23255]]

participants of an SCI entity would create unnecessary distractions, 
particularly since the SCI entity's security controls were able, in 
fact, to repel the cybersecurity event. In addition, disseminating 
information regarding unsuccessful intrusions could result in the 
threat actors being unnecessarily alerted that they have been detected, 
which could make it more difficult to identify the attackers and halt 
their efforts on an ongoing, more permanent basis.
    The Commission recognizes that many of the new SCI entities are 
currently subject to other regulatory requirements to maintain policies 
and procedures that address the provisions required by these rules, as 
discussed in detail above.\777\ Similarly, some existing SCI entities 
engage in current market practices consistent with the expanded 
definition of systems intrusion.
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    \777\ See sections III.A.2.a.ii, III.A.2.b.ii, III.A.2.c.i., 
V.B.1.a.ii, V.B.1.b.ii, and V.B.1.c.ii.
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    The benefits from the policy and procedure requirements in Rule 
1002(a) through (c) for the new SCI entities (and the costs, as 
discussed below), will therefore depend on the extent to which their 
current operations already align with the rule's requirements, given 
both existing regulation and current practice.
    While some of the existing regulations that apply to the proposed 
new SCI entities may be consistent with or similar to the policy and 
procedure requirements of Regulation SCI discussed in this section, the 
Commission believes it is nevertheless appropriate to apply these 
policy and procedure requirements to the new SCI entities and that 
doing so would benefit participants in the securities markets in which 
these entities operate.
    Overall, applying the specific and comprehensive requirements set 
forth in Rule 1002(a) through (c) of Regulation SCI to the new SCI 
entities would enhance and build on any existing policies and 
procedures, thereby furthering the goals of Regulation SCI to 
strengthen the technology infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets 
and improve its resilience.
ii. Costs
    We discuss below the costs of complying with the requirements of 
Rule 1002, applying the definitions in Rule 1000, including the amended 
definition of systems intrusion. Because the definitions themselves 
have no associated costs, all of the costs associated with the amended 
definition flow through the substantive requirements. New SCI entities 
will need to comply with these requirements for the first time whereas 
costs for the existing SCI entities are attributed to the expanded 
definition of systems intrusion and the amendment to Rule 1002(b)(5). 
Relative to the current practice and baseline, the proposed rule 
expansion of the definition of the intrusion would likely result in 
more frequent reporting by the SCI entities to the Commission, which is 
reflected in the costs estimates below.
    Corrective Action (Rule 1002(a)). Rule 1002(a) could impose 
modestly higher costs for new SCI entities in responding to SCI events 
relative to their current practice. In the PRA analysis, the Commission 
estimates those costs as approximately $1.2 million in initial and $0.4 
million in annual costs.\778\ Furthermore, if Regulation SCI reduces 
the frequency and severity of SCI events in the future, the cost of 
corrective action could similarly decline over time. Nevertheless, the 
Commission lacks data regarding the degree to which Regulation SCI will 
reduce the frequency and severity of SCI events at new SCI entities.
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    \778\ See section IV.D.7. For purposes of this Economic 
Analysis, there are two fewer entities than under the PRA analysis, 
lowering these estimated costs. See supra note 700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, if a new SCI entity is required to take corrective 
action sooner than it might have without the requirements of Regulation 
SCI, this may impose indirect costs (i.e., opportunity costs) to such 
SCI entities because they may have to delay or reallocate their 
resources away from profitable projects and direct their resources 
toward taking corrective action required by the rule. It is difficult 
to assess indirect costs imposed on new SCI entities without having 
comprehensive and detailed information on the value of the potential 
foregone projects of those SCI entities. The facts and circumstances of 
each specific SCI event will be different.
    Existing SCI entities may incur new costs associated with 
corrective action for additional systems intrusions scoped in under the 
expanded definition. The Commission estimates a one-time total cost of 
approximately $0.5 million for all existing SCI entities to update 
their procedures to account for additional types of systems 
intrusions.\779\
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    \779\ See section IV.D.2.b, IV.D.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent new SCI entities currently undertake correction 
action consistent with the Rule 1002(a) requirements, they could incur 
lower PRA costs to comply with the requirements of Rule 1002(a) than 
entities without such existing requirements. Similarly, to the extent 
many existing SCI entities currently undertake corrective action 
consistent with the expanded definition of systems intrusion, they 
could incur lower PRA costs to comply with the amended requirements of 
Rule 1002(a) than entities without such existing requirements.
    Notification of SCI Events (Rule 1002(b)). The compliance costs 
associated with Rule 1002(b) are attributed to the paperwork burden of 
Commission notifications of SCI events, including recordkeeping and 
submission of quarterly reports with respect to de minimis SCI events, 
as applicable. For new SCI entities, these costs include costs to 
comply with the notification requirements, as amended, for the first 
time. Existing SCI entities would incur costs complying with the 
amendment to Rule 1002(b)(5) as well as the costs associated with 
notification for new events scoped in under the expanded definition of 
systems intrusions. These are discussed in detail in section IV.
    For Rule 1002(b)(1), the Commission estimates approximately $0.1 
million in initial and annual costs for existing and new SCI entities 
alike.\780\ For Rule 1002(b)(2), the Commission estimates approximately 
$1.3 million in initial and annual costs for existing SCI entities and 
$1.5 million in initial and annual costs for new SCI entities.\781\ For 
Rule 1002(b)(3), the Commission estimates approximately $0.2 million in 
initial and annual costs for existing SCI entities and $0.2 million in 
initial and annual costs for new SCI entities.\782\ For Rule 
1002(b)(4), the Commission estimates approximately $2.0 million in 
initial and annual costs for existing SCI entities and $2.3 million in 
initial and annual costs for new SCI entities.\783\ Finally, for Rule 
1002(b)(5), the Commission estimates a savings for existing SCI 
entities, as noted above, and approximately $1.2 million in initial and 
annual costs for new SCI entities.\784\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \780\ See section IV.D.7; see also supra note 700.
    \781\ See id.
    \782\ Id.
    \783\ Id.
    \784\ Id.
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    To the extent new SCI entities currently provide notification 
consistent with the Rule 1002(b) requirements, they could incur lower 
PRA costs to comply with the requirements of Rule 1002(b) than entities 
without such existing practices.
    Information Dissemination (Rule 1002(c)). While some new SCI 
entities currently provide their members or participants and, in some 
cases, market

[[Page 23256]]

participants or the public more generally, with notices of certain 
systems issues (e.g., system outages), Rule 1002(c) may impose new 
requirements that they have not currently implemented. As such, the 
requirements of Rule 1002(c) will impose costs--which are attributed to 
paperwork burdens--on new SCI entities with respect to preparing, 
drafting, reviewing, and making the information available to members or 
participants, or, in the case of an SCI broker-dealer, customers. For 
new SCI entities the Commission estimates approximately $1.3 million in 
costs, initially and annually, for disseminating information about SCI 
events and systems affected, as required by Rule 1002(c)(1).\785\ For 
new entities, the Commission also estimates approximately $1.6 million 
in initial costs and $0.4 million in annual costs to develop processes 
to identify the nature of a critical system, major SCI event, or a de 
minimis SCI event for purposes of disseminating this information.\786\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \785\ See section IV.D.7. For purposes of this Economic 
Analysis, there are two fewer entities than under the PRA analysis, 
lowering these estimated costs. See supra note 700.
    \786\ See section IV.D.2.d, IV.D.7; see also supra note 700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Existing SCI entities may incur new costs associated with 
information dissemination for additional systems intrusions scoped in 
under the expanded definition. The Commission estimates approximately 
$0.7 million in initial and annual PRA costs for existing SCI entities, 
and $0.4 million in initial and annual costs for new SCI entities, for 
disseminating information about system intrusions as required by the 
proposed revisions to Rule 1002(c)(2).\787\ These costs are discussed 
in more detail in section IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \787\ See section IV.D.7; supra note 700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent new SCI entities currently disseminate information 
consistent with the Rule 1002(c) requirements, they could incur lower 
PRA costs to comply with the requirements of Rule 1002(c) than entities 
without such existing requirements. Similarly, to the extent many 
existing SCI entities currently disseminate information consistent with 
the expanded definition of systems intrusion, they could incur lower 
PRA costs to comply with the amended requirements of Rule 1002(c) than 
entities without such existing practices.
    Identification of Nature of System or Event. To comply with the 
requirements of Rule 1002, SCI entities need to identify certain types 
of events and systems issues, including whether the event is de 
minimis. Current SCI entities would already have such processes in 
place to comply with the existing requirements of Regulation SCI. The 
Commission understands that many new SCI entities likely already have 
some internal procedures for determining the severity of a systems 
issue.
    As a new SCI entity must determine whether an SCI event has 
occurred and whether it is a de minimis SCI event, Rule 1002 may impose 
one-time implementation costs on new SCI entities associated with 
developing a process or modifying its existing process to ensure that 
they are able to quickly and correctly make such determinations, as 
well as ongoing costs in reviewing the adopted process. As explained in 
detail in section IV, we estimate new SCI entities would incur an 
initial PRA cost of $1,641,024 and an ongoing annual PRA cost of 
$362,418 to develop these processes.
    To the extent new SCI entities currently have a process in place 
for identifying certain types of events and system issues consistent 
with the relevant Rule 1002 requirements, they could incur lower PRA 
costs to comply with the relevant requirements of Rule 1002 than 
entities without such existing requirements.
c. Rule 1003--Material Systems Changes and SCI Review
i. Reports to the Commission (Rule 1003(a))
    Rule 1003(a)(1) requires an SCI entity to provide quarterly reports 
to the Commission describing completed, ongoing, and planned material 
systems changes to its SCI systems and the security of indirect SCI 
systems, during the prior, current, and subsequent calendar quarters. 
Rule 1003(a)(1) also requires an SCI entity to establish reasonable 
written criteria for identifying a change to its SCI systems and the 
security of its indirect SCI systems as material. Rule 1003(a)(2) 
requires an SCI entity to promptly submit a supplemental report to 
notify the Commission of a material error in or material omission from 
a previously submitted report. These requirements remain unchanged. New 
SCI entities, however, will become subject to them for the first time. 
We discuss the benefits and costs of applying these provisions to new 
SCI entities below.
(1) Benefits
    The notification requirement would be beneficial because it permits 
the Commission and its staff to have up-to-date information regarding 
an SCI entity's systems development progress and plans, to aid in 
understanding the operations and functionality of the systems, and any 
material changes thereto, without requiring SCI entities to submit a 
notification to the Commission for each material systems change.\788\
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    \788\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72337-38.
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    The Commission recognizes that some of the new SCI entities are 
currently subject to other material systems change notification 
requirements and that most, if not all, new SCI entities have some 
internal processes for documenting systems changes as discussed in 
detail above.\789\ Accordingly, the Commission notification 
requirements in Rule 1003(a) would be new for most but not all of the 
new SCI entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \789\ See sections III.A.2.a.ii, III.A.2.b.ii, III.A.2.c.i., 
V.B.1.a.ii, V.B.1.b.ii, and V.B.1.c.ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The benefits from the policy and procedure requirements in Rule 
1003(a) for the new SCI entities (and the costs, as discussed below), 
will therefore depend on the extent to which their current operations 
already align with the rule's requirements, given both existing 
regulation and current practice.
    While some of the existing regulations that apply to the proposed 
new SCI entities may be consistent with or similar to the policy and 
procedure requirements of Regulation SCI discussed in this section, the 
Commission believes it is nevertheless appropriate to apply these 
policy and procedure requirements to the new SCI entities and doing so 
would benefit participants in the securities markets in which these 
entities operate. Overall, applying the specific and comprehensive 
requirements set forth in Rule 1003(a) of Regulation SCI to the new SCI 
entities would complement any existing requirements and enhance any 
reporting of material systems changes already in place for these 
entities.
Costs
    The compliance costs of Rule 1003(a) primarily entail costs 
associated with preparing and submitting Form SCI in accordance with 
the instructions thereto. The initial and ongoing PRA cost estimates 
associated with preparing and submitting Form SCI with regard to 
material systems changes under Rule 1003(a)(1) and (2) are discussed in 
detail in section V. The Commission does not expect Rule 1003(a) would 
impose significant costs on SCI entities other than those discussed in 
section IV. For new SCI entities, the Commission estimates 
approximately $1.0 million in initial PRA costs and $0.3 million in 
annual PRA costs to establish

[[Page 23257]]

reasonable written criteria for identifying material changes to SCI 
systems and to the security of indirect SCI systems.\790\ For new SCI 
entities, the Commission also estimates approximately $3.6 million 
initially and annually in PRA costs associated with material system 
change notices.\791\ The Commission acknowledges that the actual cost 
for each new entity may differ depending on their existing processes 
for documenting system changes and whether the necessary information is 
readily available. The Commission does not expect Rule 1003(a) to 
impose significant costs on new SCI entities besides the costs 
discussed here. To the extent new SCI entities are currently subject to 
other material systems change notification regulatory requirements and 
have existing processes for documenting systems changes that align with 
the Rule 1003(a) requirements, they could incur lower costs to comply 
with the requirements of Rule 1003(a) than entities without such 
existing requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \790\ See section IV.D.7. For purposes of this Economic 
Analysis, there are two fewer entities than under the PRA analysis, 
lowering these estimated costs. See supra note 700.
    \791\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Annual SCI Review (Rules 1000 and 1003(b))
    Rule 1003(b) requires SCI entities to conduct an annual SCI review 
and works in conjunction with the definition of ``SCI review'' from 
Rule 1000. Under the current definition, SCI review includes ``(1) A 
risk assessment with respect to such systems of an SCI entity; and (2) 
An assessment of internal control design and effectiveness of its SCI 
systems and indirect SCI systems to include logical and physical 
security controls, development processes, and information technology 
governance, consistent with industry standards.'' \792\ Rule 1003(b)(1) 
then requires an annual SCI review, ``provided, however, that (i) 
Penetration test reviews . . . shall be conducted at a frequency of not 
less than once every three years; and (ii) Assessment of SCI systems 
directly supporting market regulation or market surveillance shall be 
conducted at a frequency based upon the risk assessment conducted as 
part of the SCI review, but in no case less than once every three 
years.'' \793\ Rule 1003(b)(2) and (3) require each SCI entity to 
submit its annual SCI review report to, respectively, ``senior 
management of the SCI entity for review'' and ``to the Commission and 
to the board of director of the SCI entity, or the equivalent of such 
board'' within specified time frames.\794\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \792\ 17 CFR 242.1000.
    \793\ 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(1).
    \794\ 17 CFR 242.1003(b)(2) and (3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission proposes to make changes to the definition of ``SCI 
review.'' Specifically, under the proposed amendment, ``SCI review'' 
would include, for both SCI systems and indirect SCI systems, an annual 
assessment, using appropriate risk management methodology, of risks 
related to capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security, 
and internal control design and operating effectiveness, and annual 
penetration test reviews (increased from at least one review every 
three years), and a review of third-party provider management risks and 
controls. Rule 1003(b) would also be amended to require more specific 
information to be included in the SCI review report, including a list 
of the controls reviewed and a description of each such control; the 
findings of the SCI review, including, at a minimum, assessments of the 
risks described above; a summary, including the scope of testing and 
resulting action plan, of each penetration test review; and a 
description of each deficiency and weakness identified by the SCI 
review. In addition, the revisions would make mandatory that a response 
from senior management to the report is included when it is submitted 
to the Commission and board, whereas previously the language appeared 
permissive.
(1) Benefits
    The SCI review requirement would have SCI entities assess the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of their systems which may help, in 
turn, improve systems and reduce the number of SCI events. The 
reduction in occurrence of SCI events could reduce interruptions in the 
price discovery process and liquidity flows, as discussed above. In 
addition, the efficiency of the Commission's oversight (e.g., 
inspection) of SCI entities' systems would be enhanced.
    The proposed increase in the frequency of penetration testing 
reviews, which applies to both new and existing SCI entities, should 
better prepare SCI entities against cyber threats, which are increasing 
in numbers and becoming more sophisticated. For this reason, the 
proposed amendment is expected to further strengthen the security, 
integrity, and resilience of all SCI entities. Having an annual 
penetration testing requirement can help SCI entities reduce the 
likelihood of costly data breaches.\795\ For instance, according to one 
industry source, RSI Security, a penetration test ``can measure [the 
entity's] system's strengths and weaknesses in a controlled environment 
before [the entity has] to pay the cost of an extremely damaging data 
breach.'' \796\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \795\ See, e.g., Mirza Asrar Baig, How Often Should You 
Pentest?, Forbes.com (Jan. 22, 2021), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/01/22/how-often-should-you-pentest/?sh=b667999573c6.
    \796\ RSI Security, What is the Average Cost of Penetration 
Testing?, RSI Security Blog (Mar. 5, 2020), available at https://
blog.rsisecurity.com/what-is-the-average-cost-of-penetration-
testing/#:~:text=Penetration%20testing%20can%20cost%20anywhere,that%2
0of%20a%20large%20company.
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    The requirement to review third-party provider management risks and 
controls will work in conjunction with the proposed amendment to Rule 
1001(a)(2) requiring inclusion of a third-party provider management. 
The additional benefit of requiring an annual review of third-party 
provider management risks and controls is to ensure the benefits 
provided by the amendment to Rule 1001(a)(2) are properly realized and 
further increasing the likelihood that third-party providers provide 
functionality, support or services that are consistent with the 
requirements of Regulation SCI.
    The Commission understands that many existing SCI entities have 
already adopted practices that may align with some of the provisions of 
the proposed amendment to Rule 1003(b).
    The Commission also understands that many new SCI entities 
currently undertake annual systems reviews and that senior management 
and/or the board of directors or a committee thereof reviews reports of 
such reviews as discussed in detail above.\797\ However, the scope of 
the systems reviews, and the level of senior management and/or board 
involvement in such reviews, can vary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \797\ See sections III.A.2.a.ii, III.A.2.b.ii, III.A.2.c.i., 
V.B.1.a.ii, V.B.1.b.ii, and V.B.1.c.ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The benefits from the policy and procedure requirements in Rule 
1003(b) for the new SCI entities (and the costs, as discussed below) 
and the benefits from the amended policy and procedure requirements in 
Rule 1003(b) for the existing SCI entities, will therefore depend on 
the extent to which their current operations already align with the 
rule's requirements, given both existing regulation and current 
practice.
    For example, with respect to broker-dealers, prior Commission and 
FINRA exam results indicate that many if not most large broker-dealers 
conduct risk assessments of internal control design and effectiveness. 
Additionally, some

[[Page 23258]]

broker-dealers provide annual cybersecurity reports to the board. The 
Commission understands that nearly all large broker-dealers conduct 
penetration testing \798\ of systems considered critical although not 
all firms conduct such testing annually. Many of these current market 
practices align with the policy and procedure requirements of 
Regulation SCI discussed in this section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \798\ Supra note 619. According to FINRA's 2018 RCA, 100% of 
higher revenue firms include penetration testing as a component in 
their overall cybersecurity program. Other factors these firms 
consider in evaluating the relevance of penetration testing include 
the degree to which they manage or store confidential or critical 
data such as trading strategies, customer PII, information about 
mergers and acquisitions or confidential information from other 
entities (for example, in the case of clearing firms).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While some of the existing regulations that apply to the proposed 
new SCI entities or current market practices may be consistent with or 
similar to some of the policy and procedure requirements of Regulation 
SCI discussed in this section, the Commission believes it is 
nevertheless appropriate to apply these policy and procedure 
requirements to the new SCI entities and that doing so would benefit 
participants in the securities markets in which these entities operate.
    Overall, applying the specific and comprehensive requirements set 
forth in Rule 1003(b) of Regulation SCI to the new SCI entities would 
enhance and build on any existing policies and procedures, thereby 
furthering the goals of Regulation SCI to strengthen the technology 
infrastructure of the U.S. securities markets and improve its 
resilience.
(2) Costs
    New SCI entities will incur costs to comply with the review 
requirements for the first time, and existing SCI entities will incur 
costs to comply with the amended provisions. The initial and ongoing 
paperwork burden associated with conducting an SCI review, submitting a 
report of the SCI review to senior management of the SCI entity for 
review, and submitting a report of the SCI review and the response by 
senior management to the Commission and to the board of directors of 
the SCI entity or the equivalent of such board is discussed in detail 
in section IV. For existing SCI entities, the Commission estimates 
approximately $7.4 million in initial and annual costs, while for new 
SCI entities the Commission estimates approximately $9.6 million in 
initial and annual costs.\799\ The paperwork burden estimates provided 
here for new SCI entities include the costs of complying with the 
proposed amended versions of the Rule, namely the proposed additional 
requirements for conducting the SCI review, the requirement that SCI 
entities include more specific information in their SCI review reports, 
and related recordkeeping.\800\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \799\ See section IV.D.7. For purposes of this Economic 
Analysis, there are two fewer entities than under the PRA analysis, 
lowering these estimated costs. See supra note 700.
    \800\ See section IV.D.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent new SCI entities currently undertake annual systems 
reviews and that senior management and/or the board of directors or a 
committee thereof reviews reports of such reviews consistent with the 
Rule 1003(a) requirements, they could incur lower PRA costs to comply 
with the requirements of Rule 1003(a) than entities without such 
existing practices. Similarly, to the extent many existing SCI entities 
have already adopted practices that are consistent with some of the 
provisions of the proposed amendment to Rule 1003(b), they could incur 
lower PRA costs to comply with the requirements of Rule 1003(a) than 
entities without such existing practices.
    With respect to the increased frequency for the penetration test 
review, this requirement will impose non-paperwork compliance costs in 
addition to those captured by the PRA estimates for both new and 
existing SCI entities. For example, RSI Security explains that 
penetration testing ``can cost anywhere from $4,000-$100,000,'' and 
``[o]n average, a high quality, professional [penetration testing] can 
cost from $10,000-$30,000.'' \801\ RSI Security, however, was clear 
that the magnitudes of these costs can vary with size, complexity, 
scope, methodology, types, experience, and remediation measures.\802\ 
Another source estimates a ``high-quality, professional [penetration 
testing to cost] between $15,000-$30,000,'' while emphasizing that 
``cost varies quite a bit based on a set of variables.'' \803\ This is 
in line with a third source, which states that ``[a] true penetration 
test will likely cost a minimum of $25,000.'' \804\ The Commission 
preliminarily believes that the cost of penetration testing will range 
between $25,000 and $100,000 for new and existing SCI entities, in 
light of the complexity and scope required, although the costs may be 
somewhat lower depending on the frequency with which such testing and 
review are currently conducted by new and existing SCI entities. The 
Commission acknowledges the non-paperwork costs of the proposed 
increase in the frequency of a penetration test review, and seeks 
feedback on these costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \801\ See RSI Security, supra note 796.
    \802\ See id.
    \803\ Gary Glover, How Much Does a Pentest Cost?, 
Securitymetrics Blog (Nov. 15, 2022, 8:36 a.m.), available at 
https://www.securitymetrics.com/blog/how-much-does-pentest-cost.
    \804\ Mitnick Security, What Should You Budget for a Penetration 
Test? The True Cost, Mitnick Security Blog, (Jan. 29, 2021, 5:13 
a.m.), available at https://www.mitnicksecurity.com/blog/what-should-you-budget-for-a-penetration-test-the-true-cost.
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Request for Comment
    118. For current and proposed SCI entities, how often do you 
(already) perform penetration testing and how much does it cost?
d. Rule 1004--Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan Testing
    Rule 1004(b) requires the testing of an SCI entity's business 
continuity and disaster recovery plans at least once every 12 months. 
Rule 1004(a) and (b) require participation in such testing by those 
members or participants that an SCI entity reasonably determines are, 
taken as a whole, the minimum number necessary for the maintenance of 
fair and orderly markets in the event of the activation of its BC/DR 
plans. Rule 1004(c) requires an SCI entity to coordinate such testing 
on an industry- or sector-wide basis with other SCI entities.\805\ The 
Commission is proposing to amend Rule 1004 to require that third-party 
providers also participate in such testing. Therefore, for current SCI 
entities, the difference is to include third-party providers in its 
testing. For new SCI entities, the entire provision is a new 
obligation. We discuss below the benefits and costs of applying this 
provision, including the proposed amendments, to new and existing SCI 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \805\ One avenue for coordinating such testing is through 
SIFMA's voluntary Industry-Wide Business Continuity Test. See SIFMA, 
Industry-Wide Business Continuity Test (Oct. 15, 2022), available at 
https://www.sifma.org/resources/general/industry-wide-business-continuity-test/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Benefits
    As discussed above, requiring the new SCI entities to test their 
BC/DR plans would likely improve backup infrastructure and lead to 
fewer market-wide shutdowns, which should help facilitate continuous 
liquidity flows in markets, reduce pricing errors, and thus improve the 
quality of the price discovery process.\806\ Moreover, Rule 1004 would 
help ensure fair and orderly markets in the event of the activation of 
BC/DR plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \806\ See sec. V.C.1.; see also SCI Adopting Release, supra note 
1, at 72429.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, for both new and existing SCI entities, the proposed 
requirement to establish standards for the

[[Page 23259]]

designation of third-party providers and their participation in the 
currently scheduled functional and performance testing of the operation 
of BC/DR plans will help those SCI entities ensure that their efforts 
to develop effective BC/DR plans are not undermined by a lack of 
participation by third-party providers that the SCI entity believes are 
necessary to the successful activation of such plans.
    Although the Commission finds it impracticable to quantify these 
benefits in dollar terms,\807\ the Commission believes it would be 
helpful to consider the cost of an unplanned outage. For example, the 
Commission considers a reduced occurrence of a potential outage as a 
benefit of complying with Regulation SCI. As discussed above, one 
source of cost estimates for an unplanned outage is the Ponemon 
Institute's 2016 Cost of Data Center Outages report.\808\ According to 
the report, the total cost per minute of an unplanned outage was $8,851 
for the average data center the Institute surveyed in 2016.\809\ This 
implies a cost of $531,060 per hour of an unplanned outage at the 
time.\810\ Moreover, outages themselves can also last far longer than 
one hour. For example, natural disasters, such as hurricanes, can often 
lead to lengthy outages lasting 200 to 400 hours.\811\ Taken together, 
this data suggests potentially significant benefits to having an 
adequate policy and procedure in place to ensure business continuity 
and disaster relief plans for SCI entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \807\ As discussed in section V.D.1. multiple factors would 
affect the harm to the overall economy from an unplanned outage at 
an SCI entity.
    \808\ See supra note 696.
    \809\ Id. at 14.
    \810\ The report also showed that this figure was increasing 
over time. The same figure was $5,617/min in 2010 and $7,908/min in 
2013. See id.
    \811\ See Data Foundry, How Much Should You Spend On Business 
Continuity and Disaster Recovery (Dec. 12, 2019), available at 
https://www.datafoundry.com/blog/much-spend-business-continuity-disaster-recovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The benefits from the BC/DR requirements in Rule 1004 for the 
current and new SCI entities (and the costs, as discussed below) will 
depend on the extent to which their current operations already align 
with the rule's requirements, given both existing regulation and 
current practice. Based on discussion with industry participants, the 
Commission understands that some existing SCI entities already require 
third-party service provider participation in testing despite not being 
required to do so currently under Regulation SCI. For these SCI 
entities, there may be incremental benefits from making the third-party 
service provider participation a requirement under the Regulation and 
ensuring that they continue to include these parties in such testing 
going forward.
    Some new SCI entities, either due to existing regulatory 
requirements or on their own volition, also already require some of 
their members or participants, as well as third-party providers, to 
participate in performance testing of BC/DR plans or offer the 
opportunity to do so on a voluntary basis, although such participation 
may be limited in nature (e.g., testing for connectivity to backup 
systems). However, existing requirements for the new SCI entities may 
differ from the requirements of Rule 1004. For example, FINRA Rule 4370 
does not require the functional and performance testing and 
coordination of industry or sector-testing of such plans.
    With respect to SBSDRs, the requirements of Regulation SCI are more 
specific and comprehensive in terms of testing business continuity and 
disaster recovery plans than the principles-based requirements of Rule 
13n-6. The requirements of Regulation SCI would thus exist and operate 
in conjunction with Rule 13n-6 and help ensure that SBSDR market 
systems are robust, resilient, and secure and enhance Commission 
oversight of these systems. Moreover, to the extent the systems of 
SBSDRs that relate to the securities-based swap markets function 
separately (or could function separately in the future) from the 
systems of SDRs that relate to the swaps markets, applying Rule 1004 to 
these entities would help to ensure effective testing of BC/DR plans 
for the specific systems relevant to the securities markets and would 
subject these systems to enhanced Commission oversight.
    Similarly, the Commission recognizes that exempt clearing agencies 
that this rule proposal would newly scope into Regulation SCI are 
currently required to have BC/DR plans and test them at least annually 
with the participation of customers, critical utilities, critical 
service providers, other clearing agencies, other market 
infrastructures, and any other institution with which interdependencies 
have been identified in the business continuity policy. Overall, 
applying the specific and comprehensive requirements set forth in Rule 
1004 would complement existing requirements and enhance the BC/DR plans 
tests already in place for these entities.
ii. Costs
    The mandatory testing of SCI entity BC/DR plans, including backup 
systems, as required under amended Rule 1004, will result in costs to 
SCI entities. For current SCI entities, the increase in the cost would 
come from the requirement to include designated third-party providers 
in when testing their BC/DR plans--to the extent they have not been 
doing so. In addition, because the proposed requirements of Rule 1004 
would require participation by various other parties, including 
designated members, participants, and other third parties, these 
parties may also bear costs of Rule 1004. We discuss these various 
costs below.
    Costs to New and Existing SCI Entities. It is the Commission's 
understanding that some new SCI entities already engage with their 
members, participants or customers, as applicable, or third-party 
providers when testing BC/DR plans. Furthermore, as mentioned above, 
market participants, including new SCI entities, already coordinate 
certain BC/DR plans testing to an extent. However, Rule 1004 mandates 
participation in testing for new SCI entities that do not currently 
participate, requires coordination when testing BC/DR plans, and 
requires their members, market participants, or their third-party 
providers participate.
    In particular, Rule 1004 requires SCI entities to designate their 
members, participants, or third-party providers to participate in BC/DR 
plans testing and to coordinate such testing with other SCI entities on 
an industry- or sector-wide basis. The requirement of member, 
participant, or third-party provider designation in BC/DR plans testing 
under Rule 1004 may impose new costs even for those that currently have 
BC/DR plan testing, as an SCI would have to allocate resources towards 
initially establishing and later updating standards for the designation 
of its members and participants and third-party providers for testing. 
For example, systems reconfiguration for functional and performance 
testing and establishing an effective coordinated test script could be 
a complex process and result in additional costs, but it is an 
important first step in establishing robust and effective BC/DR plans 
testing. Furthermore, the requirement to coordinate industry- or 
sector-wide testing would impose additional administrative costs 
because an SCI entity would be required to notify its members, 
participants, or third-party providers and also organize, schedule, and 
manage the coordinated testing.
    Many of the costs associated with Rule 1004 are costs estimated in 
the PRA in section IV. For existing SCI entities the Commission 
estimates approximately $1.4 million in initial costs and $0.5 million 
in annual costs,

[[Page 23260]]

while for new SCI entities the Commission estimates approximately $3.2 
million in initial costs and $1.1 million in annual costs.\812\ In 
addition to the PRA costs, the Commission believes that new SCI 
entity's may incur non-paperwork costs associated with the mandatory 
testing of BC/DR plans, including backup systems; however, the 
Commission finds it impracticable to provide a quantified estimate of 
these specific non-paperwork costs for new SCI entities because the 
Commission does not have detailed information regarding the current 
level of engagement by members or participants in BC/DR testing and the 
associated costs, or the details of the BC/DR testing that new SCI 
entities would implement pursuant to Rule 1004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \812\ See section IV.D.4. For purposes of this Economic 
Analysis, there are two fewer entities than under the PRA analysis, 
lowering these estimated costs. See supra note 700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, both new and existing SCI entities may incur costs 
beyond the PRA costs to comply with the requirement that third-party 
providers be included in the testing requirement. The Commission 
acknowledges that there will be significant variations in incremental 
cost for new and existing SCI entities beyond the costs of complying 
with the rest of the testing requirements, depending on the 
relationship of each SCI entity with the third-party provider and the 
need to revise any contractual agreement between them. But in any 
situation where a third-party provider is already required to provide a 
continuous service plan (such as 24/7 connectivity), the incremental 
cost of having the third-party provider participate in the BC/DR 
testing should be modest. To the extent existing and new SCI entities 
already have BC/DR plan testing that align with the Rule 1004 
requirements, they could incur lower costs to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 1004 than entities without such existing BC/DR 
plan testing.
    Costs to SCI Entity Members, Participants, and Third-Party 
Providers. Rule 1004 will also impose costs on SCI entity designated 
members, participants and third-party providers. Although members, 
participants, and third-party providers will incur costs as a result of 
Rule 1004, those that are likely to be designated to participate in 
business continuity and disaster recovery plans testing are those that 
conduct a high level of activity with the SCI entity or those that play 
an important role for the SCI entity and who are more likely to have 
already established connections to the SCI entity's backup site. It is 
the Commission's understanding that most of the larger members, 
participants, and third-party providers already have established 
connectivity with the SCI entity's backup site and already monitor and 
maintain such connectivity, and thus the additional connectivity costs 
imposed by Rule 1004 would be modest to these members or 
participants.\813\ The Commission, however, finds it impracticable to 
provide a quantified estimate of the specific costs for SCI entity 
members, participants or third-party providers associated with the 
mandatory testing required by Rule 1004 as such data or information is 
not required to be provided by SCI entities to the Commission under 
Regulation SCI. Nevertheless, the Commission preliminarily believes, 
for similar reasons as provided in the section discussing non-paperwork 
burden estimates for Rule 1001(a) and (b), that the figures from 2014 
remain reasonable approximations for new SCI entities in 2023, after 
adjusting for inflation since 2014.\814\
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    \813\ See SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72430.
    \814\ After adjusting for inflation since 2014, the cost of BD/
DR plan testing ranges from approximately $31,000 to $76,000 per 
year, per member or participant. The aggregate annual cost for 
designated members and participants to participate in BC/DR testing 
is approximately $84.0 million after adjusting for inflation since 
2014.
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    Because SCI entities have an incentive to limit the imposition of 
the cost and burden associated with testing to the minimum necessary to 
comply with the rule, given the option, most SCI entities would likely, 
in the exercise of reasonable discretion, prefer to designate the 
fewest number of members, participants, or third-party providers to 
participate in testing and meet the requirements of the rule, than to 
designate more.
    The Commission believes that the cost associated with Rule 1004 is 
unlikely to induce the designated members or participants to reduce the 
number of SCI entities through which they trade and adversely affect 
price competitiveness in markets. As noted above, the Commission also 
recognizes that costs to some SCI entity members, participants, or 
third-party providers associated with Rule 1004 could vary depending on 
the BC/DR plans being tested, and to the extent they participate. Based 
on industry sources, the Commission understands that most of the larger 
members or participants of SCI entities already maintain connectivity 
with the backup systems of SCI entities.\815\ However, the Commission 
understands that there is a lower incidence of smaller members or 
participants maintaining connectivity with the backup sites of SCI 
entities. As such, the Commission believes that the compliance costs 
associated with Rule 1004 would be higher for those members, 
participants, or third-party providers that are designated for testing 
by SCI entities who would need to invest in additional infrastructure 
to participate in such testing.\816\
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    \815\ SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72430.
    \816\ Id.
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    As discussed above, Rule 1001(a) does not require backup facilities 
of SCI entities fully duplicate the features of primary 
facilities.\817\ Further as discussed in section IV.B.6, SCI entity 
members, participants, or third-party providers are not required by 
Regulation SCI to maintain the same level of connectivity with the 
backup sites of an SCI entity as they do with the primary sites. In the 
event of a wide-scale disruption in the securities markets, the 
Commission acknowledges that SCI entities and their members, 
participants, or third-party providers may not be able to provide the 
same level of service as on a normal trading day. However, when BC/DR 
plans are in effect due to a wide-scale disruption in the securities 
markets, the requirements of Rule 1004 should help ensure adequate 
levels of service and pricing efficiency, to facilitate trading and 
maintain fair and orderly markets without imposing excessive costs on 
SCI entities and market participants by requiring them to maintain the 
same connectivity with the backup systems as with the primary 
sites.\818\
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    \817\ SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72353.
    \818\ See id.
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Request for Comment
    119. If you are a current or proposed SCI entity and you currently 
require any of your service providers to participate in your scheduled 
business continuity or disaster recovery testing, how does your 
activity differ from the requirements of the rule proposal? What have 
been the benefits and costs of this activity?
    120. If you are a current or proposed SCI entity and your business 
continuity or disaster recovery plans address the unavailability of 
your third-party providers, how does your activity differ from the 
requirements of the rule proposal? What have been the benefits and 
costs of this activity?
e. Rules 1005 Through 1007--Recordkeeping and Electronic Filing
    Rules 1005 through 1007 relate to recordkeeping requirements, 
filing and submission requirements, and

[[Page 23261]]

requirements for service bureaus. SCI entities are required by Rule 
1005 of Regulation SCI to make, keep, and preserve certain records 
related to their compliance with Regulation SCI.\819\ Rule 1006 of 
Regulation SCI provides for certain requirements relating to the 
electronic filing on Form SCI, of any notification, review, 
description, analysis, or report to the Commission required to be 
submitted under Regulation SCI.\820\ Rule 1007 of Regulation SCI 
requires a written undertaking when records are required to be filed or 
kept by an SCI entity under Regulation SCI, or are prepared or 
maintained by a service bureau or other recordkeeping service on behalf 
of the SCI entity.\821\
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    \819\ See 17 CFR 242.1005. Rule 1005(a) of Regulation SCI 
relates to recordkeeping provisions for SCI SROs, whereas Rule 
1005(b) relates to the recordkeeping provision for SCI entities 
other than SCI SROs.
    \820\ See 17 CFR 242.1006.
    \821\ See 17 CFR 242.1007.
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    Rule 1005(c) currently requires that the recordkeeping period 
survives even if an SCI entity ceases to do business or ceases to be 
registered under the Exchange Act. The Commission proposes to amend 
Rule 1005(c) so that this record retention provision also applies to an 
SCI entity that remains in business as a registered entity but 
``otherwise [ceases] to be an SCI entity.'' Therefore, for existing SCI 
entities, this is the only difference from the current recordkeeping 
requirement in Rule 1005(c). For new SCI entities, all of the 
requirements in Rules 1005 through 1007 are new obligations. We discuss 
below the benefits and costs of applying these provisions to new and 
existing SCI entities.
i. Benefits
    The Commission believes that Rules 1005 and 1007 would allow 
Commission staff to inspect and examine the new SCI entities for their 
compliance with Regulation SCI, and would increase the likelihood that 
Commission staff can identify conduct inconsistent with Regulation SCI. 
Preserved information should provide the Commission with an additional 
source to help determine the causes and consequences of one or more SCI 
events and better understand how such events may have impacted trade 
execution, price discovery, liquidity, and investor participation. 
Consequently, the Commission believes that the requirements of Rules 
1005 and 1007 would help ensure compliance of the new SCI entities with 
Regulation SCI and help realize the potential benefits (e.g., better 
pricing efficiency, price discovery, and liquidity flows) of the 
regulation.
    Rule 1006 requires SCI entities to electronically file all written 
information to the Commission on Form SCI.\822\ Rule 1006 would provide 
a uniform manner in which the Commission receives--and SCI entities 
provide--written notifications, reviews, descriptions, analyses, or 
reports required by Regulation SCI. Rule 1006 should add efficiency for 
the new SCI entities in drafting and submitting the required reports, 
and for the Commission in reviewing, analyzing, and responding to the 
information provided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \822\ Except for notifications submitted pursuant to Rule 
1002(b)(1) and (3).
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    The Commission recognizes that all of the new SCI entities are 
currently subject to the Commission and other regulatory recordkeeping 
requirements.\823\ However, records relating to Regulation SCI may not 
be specifically addressed in the recordkeeping requirements of certain 
rules. The benefits from the recordkeeping requirements in Rules 1005 
and 1007 for the new SCI entities (and the costs, as discussed below), 
will therefore depend on the extent to which their current operations 
already align with the rule's requirements, given both existing 
regulation and current practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \823\ See, e.g., 17 CFR 240.17a-3 and 240.17a-4, applicable to 
broker-dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendment to Rule 1005(c) will apply to new and 
existing SCI entities. Although many SCI events may be resolved in a 
short time frame, there may be other SCI events that may not be 
discovered for an extended period of time after their occurrences, or 
may take significant periods of time to fully resolve. In such cases, 
having an SCI entity's records available after it has ceased to be an 
SCI entity or be registered under the Exchange Act would add to the 
scope of historical records available for review in the event of an SCI 
event. This is a particular issue for entities whose coverage under the 
rule might vary over time, depending on when the entities--or their 
systems--meet the rule's coverage thresholds. For these entities, 
uniform record retention periods will also facilitate comparative 
review of risk and compliance trends. These benefits will be limited if 
entities and systems of entities tend to continue meeting coverage 
requirements over time, without a break in coverage.
ii. Costs
    The recordkeeping requirements of Rules 1005 and 1007 will impose 
additional costs, including a one-time cost to set up or modify an 
existing recordkeeping system to comply with Rules 1005 and 1007. The 
initial and ongoing compliance costs associated with the recordkeeping 
requirements are attributed to paperwork burdens, which are discussed 
in section IV above.\824\
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    \824\ When monetized, the paperwork burden associated with all 
recordkeeping requirements would result in approximately $278,460 
initially and $40,950 annually for all new SCI entities in the 
aggregate. The Commission estimates that a New SCI Entity other than 
an SCI SRO will incur a one-time cost of $900 for information 
technology costs for purchasing recordkeeping software, for a total 
of $18,900. See section IV.D.7. For purposes of this Economic 
Analysis, there is two fewer entities than under the PRA analysis, 
lowering these estimated costs. See supra note 700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to Rule 1006, all costs associated with Form SCI are 
attributed to the paperwork burdens discussed in section IV. For 
existing SCI entities the Commission estimates approximately $21.0 
million in initial costs and $12.0 million in annual costs, while for 
new SCI entities the Commission estimates approximately $41.7 million 
in initial costs and $25.8 million in annual costs.\825\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \825\ See section IV.D.7; supra note 700.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Every new SCI entity will be required to have the ability to 
electronically submit Form SCI through the EFFS system, and every 
person designated to sign Form SCI will be required to have an 
electronic signature and a digital ID. The Commission believes that 
this requirement will not impose an additional burden on new SCI 
entities, as these entities likely already prepare documents in an 
electronic format that is text searchable or can readily be converted 
into a format that is text searchable.
    The Commission also believes that many new SCI entities currently 
have the ability to access the EFFS system and electronically submit 
Form SCI, such that the requirement to submit Form SCI electronically 
will not impose significant new implementation or ongoing costs.\826\ 
The Commission also believes that some of the persons who will be 
designated to sign Form SCI already have digital IDs and the ability to 
provide an electronic signature. To the extent that some persons do not 
have digital IDs, the additional cost to obtain and maintain digital 
IDs is accounted for in the paperwork burden, discussed in section IV 
above.\827\
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    \826\ The initial and ongoing costs associated with various 
electronic submissions of Form SCI for the new SCI entities are 
discussed in the Paperwork Reduction Act section above. See supra 
section IV.D.6.
    \827\ See id.

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[[Page 23262]]

D. Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation Analysis

    As previously discussed in section C, the proposed amendments to 
Regulation SCI would reduce the impact of market disruptions arising as 
a result of natural disasters, third-party provider service outages, 
cybersecurity events, hardware or software malfunctions. We expect that 
the proposed amendments will reduce the frequency, severity, and 
duration of systems issues that occur in the context of these events, 
and will thus decrease the number of trading interruptions. The 
proposed amendments will thus improve market efficiency, price 
discovery, and liquidity, because trading interruptions interfere with 
the process through which information gets incorporated into security 
prices. In addition, by reducing trading interruptions, the proposed 
amendments will have beneficial effects across markets, because of the 
interconnectedness of securities markets. For example, an interruption 
in the market for equity securities could harm the price discovery 
process in the options markets, reducing the flow of liquidity across 
markets. As a result, we expect the proposed amendments, if adopted, 
would improve price efficiency in securities markets.\828\
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    \828\ See sections V.D.1 and V.D.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prices that accurately convey information about fundamental value 
improve the efficiency with which capital is allocated across projects 
and firms, thus promoting capital formation. In addition, we expect the 
proposed amendments to encourage capital formation by reinforcing 
investors' confidence in market transactions.
    The proposed amendments to Regulation SCI could affect competition 
among SCI entities because the compliance costs could differ among SCI 
entities. For example, current SCI entities are expected to face 
smaller incremental compliance costs than new SCI entities. New SCI 
entities that have been subject to similar regulations could also face 
smaller incremental compliance costs than those who have not. Even 
among new SCI entities, certain provisions can be more costly for some 
than others. For example, the initial compliance costs of the systems 
resumption requirements could differ among new SCI entities. 
Specifically, as mentioned above, Rule 1004's BC/DR testing 
requirements may require greater incremental costs for smaller SCI 
entities that have not already been engaged in BC/DR testing. Lastly, 
some of the new SCI entities may already have practices that are 
aligned with at least some of the requirements under amended Regulation 
SCI compared to the baseline, reducing their incremental compliance 
costs.
    In addition to competition among SCI entities, the compliance costs 
imposed by the proposed amendments to Regulation SCI could have an 
effect on competition where SCI entities and non-SCI entities compete, 
such as in the markets for trading services (e.g., broker-dealers). 
Specifically, since non-SCI entities do not have to incur the 
compliance costs associated with Regulation SCI, SCI entities could 
find it difficult to pass on their own compliance costs to investors or 
customers without losing investors or customers to non-SCI entities. 
This would adversely affect the profits of SCI entities. That said, by 
expanding the set of SCI entities, the proposed amendments would ensure 
that, where there is currently competition between existing SCI 
entities and the new entities under this proposed rule then these 
competing entities are subject to similar SCI compliance requirements.
    The proposed threshold-based tests for scoping a broker-dealer into 
Regulation SCI could bring about a potential unintended effect of 
deterring growth among broker-dealers and discouraging potential 
benefits of scale economies. For example, to the extent a certain 
broker-dealer may take otherwise-unwanted steps to keep its trading 
volumes or asset level low, or spin off entities and not realize scale 
economies, all for the purpose of avoiding being subject to regulation, 
this can be inefficient for the economy. Likewise, the proposal to 
apply regulation SCI to all exempt clearing agencies would mean that 
any entity that seeks to become a clearing agency will automatically be 
subject to Regulation SCI and will thus bear the associated compliance 
cost.
    The compliance costs associated with Rule 1004 could raise barriers 
to entry and affect competition among members or participants of SCI 
entities. Specifically, to the extent that members or participants 
could be subject to designation in BC/DR plan testing and could incur 
additional compliance costs, the member or participant designation 
requirement of Rule 1004 could raise barriers to entry. In addition, as 
discussed above, the compliance costs of the rule will likely be higher 
for smaller members or participants of SCI entities compared to larger 
members or participants of SCI entities. The adverse effect on 
competition may be mitigated to some extent, as the most likely members 
or participants to be designated for testing are larger members or 
participants who already maintain connectivity with an SCI entity's 
backup systems. Further, the adverse effect on competition for smaller 
members or participants could be partially mitigated to the extent that 
larger firms, which are members of multiple SCI entities, could incur 
additional compliance costs as these larger member firms could be 
subject to multiple designations for business continuity and disaster 
recovery plan testing.\829\
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    \829\ Id. at 72433.
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E. Reasonable Alternatives

    In formulating our proposal, we have considered various 
alternatives. Those alternatives are discussed below and we have also 
requested comments on certain of these alternatives.
1. Limiting the Scope of the Regulation SCI Provisions for New SCI 
Entities
    The Commission has considered whether all of the obligations set 
forth in Regulation SCI should apply to the new SCI entities or whether 
only certain requirements should be imposed, such as those requiring 
written policies and procedures, notification of systems problems, 
business continuity and disaster recovery testing, and penetration 
testing.\830\ For example, the Commission has considered if SBSDRs 
should be subject to full Regulation SCI requirements, similar to SCI 
plan processors, or should be subject to only some of the Regulation 
SCI requirements, given differing levels of automation and stages of 
regulatory development of the SBS market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \830\ Such an approach is similar to that taken regarding the 
competing consolidators in Market Data Consolidator rule. The Market 
Data Consolidator rule subjects competing consolidators that do not 
meet the earning thresholds to some, but not all, obligations that 
apply to competing consolidators. 17 CFR 242.614.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission believes that these alternatives would reduce some 
of the benefits as well as some of the costs compared to the proposed 
rules. The lower costs from limiting the Regulation SCI requirements, 
such as periodic reviews of policies and procedures or Commission 
notification, for some new entities could result in lower barriers to 
entry and could increase competition in the relevant markets compared 
to the proposed rules. However, taking into consideration the large 
size of the new SCI entities and, therefore, their externalities on 
some other SCI entities in case of system failure, the Commission 
believes these effects on the competition may not be significant enough 
to warrant forgoing benefits

[[Page 23263]]

(such as timely notifications to the Commission) in addition to the 
reduced effectiveness of the regulation. Moreover, not requiring 
specific SCI requirements for certain new SCI entities would likely 
result in less uniform treatment across current and new SCI entities 
performing similar functions.\831\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \831\ See supra section III.A.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Mandating Compliance With Current SCI Industry Standards
    The Commission has considered the alternative of mandating 
compliance with current SCI industry standards. This alternative would 
require that the policies and procedures of SCI entities required under 
Rule 1001(a) comply with ``current SCI industry standards'' rather than 
simply making such compliance a safe harbor under Rule 1001(a)(4).\832\ 
This alternative would ensure that an SCI entity have policies and 
procedures consistent with current SCI industry standards. These 
standards likely have the advantage of economy of scale as several 
entities in that industry adopted the standards and thus the standards 
benefit from more innovative efficiencies than in-house standards. 
Moreover, mapping policies and procedures to the industry standard 
would help facilitate the Commission's inspection and enforcement 
capabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \832\ Proposed Rule 1000(a)(4) defines ``current SCI industry 
standards'' as ``information technology practices that are widely 
available to information technology professionals in the financial 
sector and issued by an authoritative body that is a U.S. 
governmental entity or agency, association of U.S. governmental 
entities or agencies, or widely recognized organization.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on Commission staff experience, however, this alternative 
would not be an appropriate solution for all SCI entities. One reason 
is that given the differences exhibited by various SCI entities and the 
complexity of each SCI entity's operations, it may not be suitable for 
each one to find a current SCI industry standard that suits its needs 
without substantial modification and customization. To this extent, the 
Commission sees a great value in allowing each SCI entity to customize 
its policies and procedures to address the specific operational risks 
it faces. It is the Commission's understanding that a number of current 
SCI entities have developed and implemented policies and procedures 
largely based on industry standards, but they have also customized them 
based on the size, risks, and unique characteristics of SCI entities. 
For this reason, mandating compliance with a current SCI industry 
standard may be an inefficient approach. For the larger and more 
complex-structured SCI entities, losing flexibility to design systems 
or develop policies and procedures by mandating the industry standards 
could also result in less effective policies and procedures or 
adversely affect integrity, resiliency, availability, or security of 
SCI systems.
3. Requiring Diversity of Back-Up Plan Resources
    With respect to critical SCI systems, the Commission has considered 
mandating multi-vendor backups. This alternative would require that SCI 
entities that utilize third-party providers to operate critical SCI 
systems have geographically diverse backup systems that are operated by 
a different third-party provider (e.g., multi-cloud). As previously 
discussed, there can be significant advantages for an entity moving its 
systems from an on-premises, internally run data center to cloud 
service providers (CSPs), which may include cost efficiencies, 
automation, increased security, and resiliency, and the ability to 
leverage the opportunity to reengineer or otherwise update their 
systems and applications to run more efficiently.\833\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \833\ See section III.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, each SCI entity is obligated to satisfy the requirements 
of Regulation SCI for systems operated on behalf the SCI entity by a 
third party. This necessarily requires an individualized assessment of 
the costs and risks associated with managing the CSP relationship, and 
determining that the CSPs' backup and recovery capabilities are 
sufficiently resilient, geographically diverse, and reasonably designed 
to achieve timely recovery following a wide-scale disruption.\834\ 
Further, while reducing the risk of over-reliance on a single vendor 
and the chance of system failures-for example, due to the same 
vulnerabilities within a vendor--a multi-cloud strategy would add 
additional costs including negotiation, contract, deployment, and 
management costs; and it is the Commission's understanding that multi-
cloud architecture could introduce more complexity and, accordingly, 
operational and cybersecurity risks into the SCI back-up systems.\835\ 
In place of a prescriptive alternative of mandating multi-vendor 
backups, the Commission is proposing, in Rule 1001(a)(2)(v) and (ix), a 
more flexible approach under which each SCI entity must consider CSPs 
and other third-party providers as part of a risk-based assessment of 
the providers' criticality and their role in the entity's business 
continuity and disaster recovery planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \834\ See id.
    \835\ For example, security breach possibilities could increase 
because of the interconnection of SCI systems between multi cloud 
providers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Penetration Testing Frequency
    With respect to the penetration testing frequency, the Commission 
has considered requiring longer (e.g., every 2 years) or shorter 
(quarterly, every 6 months) frequencies for penetration testing, rather 
than the currently proposed annual (a reduction from the current rule 
of every three years). When the Commission adopted Regulation SCI in 
2014, the Commission decided to require penetration test reviews ``not 
less than once every three years in recognition of the potentially 
significant costs that may be associated with the performance of such 
tests.'' \836\ Nevertheless, as mentioned above, markets have changed 
since the adoption of Regulation SCI. In particular, cybersecurity has 
become a more pervasive concern for all types of businesses, including 
SCI entities. In addition, the Commission understands that industry 
practices with respect to penetration testing has evolved such that 
tests occur on a much more frequent basis, as businesses confront the 
threat of cybersecurity events on a wider scale. To this extent, the 
Commission has considered whether penetration testing should be 
conducted at least once quarterly, every 6 months, or every 2 years.
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    \836\ SCI Adopting Release, supra note 1, at 72344.
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    The Commission understands industry practices generally tend to 
recommend at least one penetration test review a year. Requiring 
penetration test reviews more frequently could further strengthen 
security and reduce cybersecurity events at SCI entities. Nevertheless, 
the Commission believes that requiring all SCI entities to conduct such 
reviews more than once every year may be too much of a drain on the 
institution's resources, due to the estimated cost of $10,000 to 
$30,000 per test,\837\ and given the wide scope of annual testing to be 
conducted as part of an annual review under proposed Rule 1003(b).\838\ 
Moreover, while some entities may need to perform multiple tests each 
year on different components of their environment, for other entities a 
requirement for multiple tests may be counterproductive, if the testing 
cycle

[[Page 23264]]

does not provide time to implement security investments.
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    \837\ See section V.D.3.c.
    \838\ See proposed Rules 1000, 1001(a)(2)(iv) (penetration 
testing as part of an annual review under Rule 1003(b) must include 
testing of ``network, firewalls, and production systems, including 
of any vulnerabilities of . . . SCI systems and indirect SCI 
systems,'' including vulnerabilities ``pertaining to internal and 
external threats, physical hazards, and natural or manmade 
disasters'').
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5. Attestation for Critical SCI System Vendors
    Given the importance of critical SCI systems and SCI entities' 
increasing reliance on third-party providers, the Commission has 
considered requiring attestation (such as by an SCI entity's chief 
executive officer or general counsel) that contracts with third-party 
providers for critical SCI systems comply with the SCI entity's 
obligations under Regulation SCI. Such an attestation requirement would 
further ensure that SCI entities are negotiating contract terms with 
third-party providers for critical SCI systems in a manner that is 
consistent with Regulation SCI's requirements. However, an attestation 
requirement for each such contract may have limited value, and may be 
overly time-consuming and resource-intensive, relative to the value of 
the attestation requirement.
    The value of an attestation requirement will be limited, given that 
proposed Rule 1001(a)(2)(ix) would require each SCI entity to have a 
program to manage and oversee third-party providers, or to the extent 
that they already provide attestations to their customers (which, in 
turn, may vary to the degree that they are in competition with like 
entities). At the same time, an attestation requirement may have 
significant costs.
    For SCI entities these costs may include the direct costs of 
updating their oversight processes in order to ensure that their 
attestations are accurate and in compliance; training their in-house 
personnel on the third-party service provider's methods for operating 
critical IT systems; and conducting oversight of the service provider's 
subcontractors as well as oversight of the service provider itself. SCI 
entities may also incur costs if they move critical system functions 
in-house or consolidate vendors to reduce the risk or burden of the 
attestation requirement, which could result in lower-quality or less 
efficient services. Furthermore, requiring the attestation by SCI 
entity's senior officers could increase the due diligence cost of the 
attestation requirement. Senior officers making attestations may 
require additional liability insurance, higher compensation or lower 
incentive pay as a share of overall compensation. Finally, the service 
providers themselves may face increased costs as part of their efforts 
to help the SCI entity make the relevant attestation, including 
contract renegotiation costs, upgrading operations, and responding to 
information requests from the SCI entity. These costs, in turn, might 
be passed to the SCI entity and ultimately to its participants, 
members, or customers.
    The Commission believes the additional costs could be 
disproportionate to the benefits of an attestation requirement. For 
these reasons, the Commission has decided against including an 
attestation requirement.
6. Transaction Activity Threshold for SCI Broker-Dealers
    With respect to the transaction activity threshold used to scope 
broker-dealers within Regulation SCI as discussed in section III.A.2.b, 
the Commission has considered as an alternative whether to set a higher 
(more limited) or lower (more expansive) threshold than the proposed 
10% threshold. For example, the Commission has considered if only 
broker-dealers with transaction activity thresholds above 15% should be 
included as SCI broker-dealers \839\ but determined that this would 
fail to scope within Regulation SCI some of the largest and most 
significant broker-dealers that pose technological vulnerabilities and 
risks to the maintenance of fair and orderly markets. This would have 
the effect of decreasing costs moderately for broker-dealers no longer 
within the scope of Regulation SCI at the expense of a significant 
decrease in benefits otherwise associated with the improvements to fair 
and orderly markets, as described above.
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    \839\ The Commission believes that the proposed threshold of 5% 
of total assets is a reasonable approach to identifying the largest 
broker-dealers. See section III.A.2.b.iii (discussing proposed 
thresholds for an ``SCI broker-dealer''). The Commission has 
considered as an alternative to further scope in the broker-dealers 
with transaction activity thresholds above 15%. Regulation SCI would 
only be applicable to an estimated ten broker-dealers based on the 
analysis of data which include broker-dealer FOCUS Report Form X-
17A-5 Schedule II filings from Q4 2021 to Q3 2022. Also for 
additional detail on the calculation of total assets of all security 
broker-dealers, see supra note 127. Data also include Consolidated 
Audit Trail (CAT) data from Jan. 2022 to June 2022, the plan 
processors (SIPs) of the CTA/CQ Plans and Nasdaq UTP Plan. CTA Plan, 
available at https://www.ctaplan.com; Nasdaq UTP Plan, available at 
https://www.utpplan.com, Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) 
data, TRACE for Treasury Securities data from Jan. 2022 to June 
2022, regulatory TRACE data from Jan. 2022 to June 2022, and FINRA 
TRACE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, the Commission has also considered whether all broker-
dealers with transaction activity thresholds above 5% should be 
included as SCI broker-dealers,\840\ but determined that this would 
scope within Regulation SCI several broker-dealers that are not among 
the most significant broker-dealers that pose technological 
vulnerabilities and risks to the maintenance of fair and orderly 
markets. This would have the effect of increasing costs for marginal 
firms without a comparable increase in benefits associated with an 
improvement of fair and orderly markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \840\ The Commission believes that the proposed threshold of 5% 
of total assets is a reasonable approach to identifying the largest 
broker-dealers. See section III.A.2.b.iii (discussing proposed 
thresholds for an ``SCI broker-dealer''). The Commission has 
considered as an alternative to further scope in the broker-dealers 
with transaction activity thresholds above 5%. Regulation SCI would 
only be applicable to an estimated 29 broker-dealers based on the 
analysis of data which include broker-dealer FOCUS Report Form X-
17A-5 Schedule II filings from Q4 2021 to Q3 2022. Also for 
additional detail on the calculation of total assets of all security 
broker-dealers, see supra note 127. Data also include Consolidated 
Audit Trail (CAT) data from Jan. 2022 to June 2022, the plan 
processors (SIPs) of the CTA/CQ Plans and Nasdaq UTP Plan. CTA Plan, 
available at https://www.ctaplan.com; Nasdaq UTP Plan, available at 
https://www.utpplan.com, Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) 
data, TRACE for Treasury Securities data from Jan. 2022 to June 
2022, regulatory TRACE data from Jan. 2022 to June 2022, and FINRA 
TRACE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, with respect to the transaction activity threshold 
used to scope broker-dealers within Regulation SCI as discussed in 
section III.A.2.b, the Commission has also considered as an alternative 
whether to apply the proposed 10% threshold to principal trades only, 
rather than all transactions. Accordingly, the Commission considered 
whether to include as an SCI entity any registered broker-dealer that, 
irrespective of the size of its balance sheet, consistently trades for 
its own account at a substantially high level in certain enumerated 
asset classes, scaled as a percentage of total average daily dollar 
volume, as reported by applicable reporting organizations. Under the 
alternative, ten broker-dealer firms \841\ would have been scoped in as 
``SCI broker-dealers,'' which are among the 17 ``SCI broker-dealers'' 
subject to the proposed Regulation SCI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \841\ The estimated ten broker-dealer firms are based on the 
analysis of data which include broker-dealer FOCUS Report Form X-
17A-5 Schedule II filings from Q4 2021 to Q3 2022. Also for 
additional detail on the calculation of total assets of all security 
broker-dealers, see supra note 127. Data also include Consolidated 
Audit Trail (CAT) data from Apr. 2022 to Sept. 2022, the plan 
processors (SIPs) of the CTA/CQ Plans and Nasdaq UTP Plan. CTA Plan, 
available at https://www.ctaplan.com; Nasdaq UTP Plan, available at 
https://www.utpplan.com, Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA) 
data, TRACE for Treasury Securities data from Apr. 2022 to Sept. 
2022, regulatory TRACE data from Apr. 2022 to Sept. 2022, and FINRA 
TRACE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This alternative approach to the transaction activity threshold 
would identify those broker-dealers that

[[Page 23265]]

generate significant liquidity in specified types of securities markets 
and could also be considered a proxy for those that also engage in 
substantial agency trading and other business. Because the alternative 
would also scope in fewer broker-dealers as SCI entities, this 
alternative would also impose fewer total costs compared to the 
proposed approach.
    However, the Commission preliminarily believes that limiting the 
extension of Regulation SCI to broker-dealers that engage in 
significant trading activity for their own account in one or more of 
the enumerated asset classes and generate significant liquidity on 
which fair and orderly markets rely would fail to acknowledge the 
substantial role that executing brokers acting as agents also play in 
the markets. Accordingly, the alternative approach would fail to scope 
within Regulation SCI some of the largest and most significant broker-
dealers that pose technological vulnerabilities and risks to the 
maintenance of fair and orderly markets. In the Commission's view, 
using all transaction activity rather than limiting the analysis to 
principal trades is a more appropriate measure for estimating the 
significance of a broker-dealer's footprint in the markets and the 
effect that its sudden unavailability could have on the fair and 
orderly market functioning.
    Thus, while the alternative would likely scope in fewer broker-
dealers as SCI entities, and thus reduce the aggregate costs of 
extending Regulation SCI, compared to the proposal, it would also limit 
the extensive benefits, discussed above, associated with applying 
Regulation SCI to additional broker-dealers that play a critical role 
in the market.
7. Limitation on Definition of ``SCI Systems'' for SCI Broker-Dealers
    Additionally, the Commission considered leaving the original 
definition of ``SCI systems'' unrevised such that any broker-dealer 
that were to only meet or exceed the trading activity threshold of 10% 
for any asset class would have been subject to Regulation SCI 
requirements for all of its systems, not only those systems with 
respect to the type of securities for which an SCI broker-dealer 
satisfies the trading activity threshold. Leaving the definition 
unrevised would scope in SCI broker-dealer systems with respect to 
classes of securities with a lower volume of trading, for which system 
unavailability is less likely to pose a risk to the maintenance of fair 
and orderly markets. This would have the effect of increasing costs for 
SCI broker-dealers with limited trading activity in one or more other 
cases of securities, while yielding a potential benefit in terms of 
risk reduction with respect to the maintenance of fair and orderly 
markets.

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \842\ requires Federal 
agencies, in promulgating rules, to consider the impact of those rules 
on small entities. Section 603(a) \843\ of the Administrative 
Procedures Act,\844\ as amended by the RFA, generally requires the 
Commission to undertake a regulatory flexibility analysis of all 
proposed rules, or proposed rule amendments, to determine the impact of 
such rulemaking on ``small entities.'' \845\ Section 605(b) of the RFA 
states that this requirement shall not apply to any proposed rule or 
proposed rule amendment which, if adopted, would not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.\846\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \842\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \843\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
    \844\ 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.
    \845\ Although section 601(b) of the RFA defines the term 
``small entity,'' the statute permits agencies to formulate their 
own definitions. The Commission has adopted definitions for the term 
``small entity'' for purposes of Commission rulemaking in accordance 
with the RFA. Those definitions, as relevant to this proposed 
rulemaking, are set forth in 17 CFR 240.0-10 (``Rule 0-10'').
    \846\ See 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. ``Small Entity'' Definitions

    For purposes of Commission rulemaking in connection with the RFA, a 
small entity includes an exchange that has been exempt from the 
reporting requirements of Rule 601 under Regulation NMS, and is not 
affiliated with any person (other than a natural person) that is not a 
small business or small organization. A small entity also includes a 
broker-dealer with total capital (net worth plus subordinated 
liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the date in the prior fiscal year 
as of which its audited financial statements were prepared pursuant to 
17 CFR 240.17a-5(d) (``Rule 17a-5(d)'' under the Exchange Act),\847\ 
or, if not required to file such statements, a broker-dealer with total 
capital (net worth plus subordinated liabilities) of less than $500,000 
on the last business day of the preceding fiscal year (or in the time 
that it has been in business, if shorter); and is not affiliated with 
any person (other than a natural person) that is not a small business 
or small organization. Furthermore, a small entity includes a 
securities information processor that: (1) had gross revenues of less 
than $10 million during the preceding fiscal year (or in the time it 
has been in business, if shorter); (2) provided service to fewer than 
100 interrogation devices or moving tickers at all times during the 
preceding fiscal year (or in the time that it has been in business, if 
shorter); and (3) is not affiliated with any person (other than a 
natural person) that is not a small business or small organization 
under 17 CFR 240.0-10.\848\ A small entity additionally includes a 
clearing agency that (1) Compared, cleared and settled less than $500 
million in securities transactions during the preceding fiscal year (or 
in the time that it has been in business, if shorter); (2) had less 
than $200 million of funds and securities in its custody or control at 
all times during the preceding fiscal year (or in the time that it has 
been in business, if shorter); and (3) is not affiliated with any 
person (other than a natural person) that is not a small business or 
small organization as defined in 17 CFR 240.0-10.\849\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \847\ 17 CFR 240.17a-5(d).
    \848\ 17 CFR 240.0-10(g).
    \849\ 17 CFR 240.0-10(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Current SCI Entities

    Currently, SCI entities comprise SCI SROs, SCI ATSs, plan 
processors, SCI competing consolidators, and certain exempt clearing 
agencies. The Commission believes that none of these entities would be 
considered small entities for purposes of the RFA.
1. SCI SROs
    As discussed in section II.B.1 above, Regulation SCI currently 
applies to SCI SROs, which is defined as any national securities 
exchange, registered securities association, or registered clearing 
agency, or the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; provided however, 
that for purposes of 17 CFR 242.1000, the term SCI self-regulatory 
organization shall not include an exchange that is notice registered 
with the Commission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 78f(g) or a limited purpose 
national securities association registered with the Commission pursuant 
to 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(k).\850\ Currently, there are 35 SCI SROs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \850\ See 17 CFR 242.1000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the Commission's existing information about the entities 
that are subject to proposed Regulation SCI, the Commission believes 
that SCI SROs would not fall within the definition of ``small entity'' 
as described above.
    As stated, the Commission has defined a ``small entity'' as an 
exchange that has been exempt from the reporting requirements of Rule 
601 of Regulation NMS and is not affiliated with any

[[Page 23266]]

person (other than a natural person) that is not a small business or 
small organization.\851\ None of the national securities exchanges 
registered under section 6 of the Exchange Act that would be subject to 
the proposed rule and form is a ``small entity'' for purposes of the 
RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \851\ See paragraph (e) of Rule 0-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There is only one national securities association (FINRA), and the 
Commission has previously stated that it is not a small entity as 
defined by 13 CFR 121.201.\852\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \852\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62174 (May 
26, 2010), 75 FR 32556, 32605 n.416 (June 8, 2010) (``FINRA is not a 
small entity as defined by 13 CFR 121.201.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As stated, a small entity includes, when used with reference to a 
clearing agency, a clearing agency that: (1) compared, cleared, and 
settled less than $500 million in securities transactions during the 
preceding fiscal year; (2) had less than $200 million of funds and 
securities in its custody or control at all times during the preceding 
fiscal year (or at any time that it has been in business, if shorter); 
and (3) is not affiliated with any person (other than a natural person) 
that is not a small business or small organization.\853\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \853\ See paragraph (d) of Rule 0-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the Commission's existing information about the clearing 
agencies currently registered with the Commission, the Commission 
preliminarily believes that such entities exceed the thresholds 
defining ``small entities'' set out above. While other clearing 
agencies may emerge and seek to register as clearing agencies, the 
Commission preliminarily does not believe that any such entities would 
be ``small entities'' as defined in Exchange Act Rule 0-10.
2. The MSRB
    The Commission's rules do not define ``small business'' or ``small 
organization'' for purposes of entities like the MSRB. The MSRB does 
not fit into one of the categories listed under the Commission rule 
that provides guidelines for a defined group of entities to qualify as 
a small entity for purposes of Commission rulemaking under the 
RFA.\854\ The RFA in turn, refers to the Small Business Administration 
(``SBA'') in providing that the term ``small business'' is defined as 
having the same meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under 
section 3 of the Small Business Act.\855\ The SBA provides a 
comprehensive list of categories with accompanying size standards that 
outline how large a business concern can be and still qualify as a 
small business.\856\ The industry categorization that appears to best 
fit the MSRB under the SBA table is Professional Organization. The SBA 
defines a Professional Organization as an entity having average annual 
receipts of less than $15 million. Within the MSRB's 2021 Annual Report 
the organization reported total revenue exceeding $35 million for 
fiscal year 2021.\857\ The Report also stated that the organization's 
total revenue for fiscal year 2020 exceeded $47 million.\858\ The 
Commission is using the SBA's definition of small business to define 
the MSRB for purposes of the RFA and has concluded that the MSRB is not 
a ``small entity.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \854\ See Rule 0-10.
    \855\ See 5 U.S.C. 601(3).
    \856\ See 13 CFR 121.201. See also SBA, Table of Small Business 
Size Standards Marched to North American Industry Classification 
System Codes, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf (outlining the list of small business 
size standards within 13 CFR 121.201).
    \857\ See MSRB, 2021 Annual Report, 16, available at https://msrb.org/-/media/Files/Resources/MSRB-2021-Annual-Report.ashx.
    \858\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. SCI ATSs
    As discussed in section II.B.1 above, Regulation SCI currently 
applies to SCI ATSs (which are required to be registered as broker-
dealers) that during at least four of the preceding six calendar 
months: (1) Had with respect to NMS stocks: (i) Five percent (5%) or 
more in any single NMS stock, and one-quarter percent (0.25%) or more 
in all NMS stocks, of the average daily dollar volume reported by 
applicable transaction reporting plans, which represents the sum of all 
reported bought and all reported sold dollar volumes; or (ii) One 
percent (1%) or more in all NMS stocks of the average daily dollar 
volume reported by applicable transaction reporting plans, which 
represents the sum of all reported bought and all reported sold dollar 
volumes; or (2) Had with respect to equity securities that are not NMS 
stocks and for which transactions are reported to a self-regulatory 
organization, five percent (5%) or more of the average daily dollar 
volume as calculated by the self-regulatory organization to which such 
transactions are reported. All NMS stock and non-NMS stock ATSs are 
required to register as broker-dealers.
    There are seven SCI ATS currently. As stated, a small entity also 
includes a broker-dealer with total capital (net worth plus 
subordinated liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the date in the 
prior fiscal year as of which its audited financial statements were 
prepared pursuant to Rule 17a-5(d) under the Exchange Act,\859\ or, if 
not required to file such statements, a broker-dealer with total 
capital (net worth plus subordinated liabilities) of less than $500,000 
on the last business day of the preceding fiscal year (or in the time 
that it has been in business, if shorter); and is not affiliated with 
any person (other than a natural person) that is not a small business 
or small organization. Applying this test for broker-dealers, the 
Commission believes that none of the SCI ATSs currently trading were 
operated by a broker-dealer that is a ``small entity.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \859\ 17 CFR 240.17a-5(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Plan Processors
    As discussed in section II.B.1 above, Regulation SCI currently 
applies to plan processors, which are ``any self-regulatory 
organization or securities information processor acting as an exclusive 
processor in connection with the development, implementation and/or 
operation of any facility contemplated by an effective national market 
system plan.'' \860\ Currently, there are two plan processors subject 
to Regulation SCI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \860\ See 17 CFR 242.1000; 17 CFR 242.600(b)(67).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The current plan processors are SIAC a subsidiary of NYSE Group, 
Inc., and Nasdaq Stock Market LLC, a subsidiary of Nasdaq, Inc. In 
addition, even if other entities do become plan processors, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that most, if not all, plan 
processors would be large business entities or subsidiaries of large 
business entities, and that every plan processor (or its parent entity) 
would have gross revenues in excess of $10 million and provide service 
to 100 or more interrogation devices or moving tickers. Therefore, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that none of the current plan 
processors or potential plan processors would be considered small 
entities.
SCI Competing Consolidators
    As discussed in section II.B.1 above, Regulation SCI currently 
applies to SCI competing consolidators. While no SCI competing 
consolidators have yet to register, as discussed in the adopting 
release for the Market Data Infrastructure rule, the Commission 
estimates, and continues to estimate, that up to 10 entities will 
register as competing consolidators.\861\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \861\ See Market Data Infrastructure Adopting Release, supra 
note 24, at 18808.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed in the Market Data Infrastructure final rule, ``based 
on the Commission's information about the 10 potential entities the 
Commission

[[Page 23267]]

estimates may become competing consolidators, the Commission believes 
that all such entities will exceed the thresholds defining `small 
entities' set out above.'' \862\ The Commission continues to believe 
this analysis is accurate, and that ``[c]ompeting consolidators will be 
participating in a sophisticated business that requires significant 
resources to compete effectively.'' \863\ Accordingly, the Commission 
believes that any such registered competing consolidators will exceed 
the thresholds for ``small entities'' set forth in 17 CFR 240.0-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \862\ Id.
    \863\ Id. at 18808-09.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Exempt Clearing Agencies
    As discussed in section II.B.1 above, Regulation SCI currently 
applies to certain clearing agencies, specifically, exempt clearing 
agencies subject to ARP. There are currently 3 exempt clearing agencies 
subject to Regulation SCI, and the Commission estimates that Regulation 
SCI will apply to two more if the proposed rules are finalized. The 
Commission believes that all the clearing agencies, both those to which 
Regulation SCI currently applies and those to which it will, exceed the 
thresholds defining `small entities' set out above.

C. Proposed SCI Entities

    The proposed expansion of the definition of the term ``SCI entity'' 
would include SBSDRs and SCI broker-dealers, as well as additional 
clearing agencies exempted from registration. The Commission 
preliminarily believes that none of these would be considered small 
entities for purposes of the RFA.
1. SBSDRs
    As discussed in section III.A.2.a above, in 2015, the Commission 
established a regulatory framework for SBSDRs, under which SBSDRs are 
registered securities information processors and disseminators of 
market data in the SBS market. There are currently two registered 
SBSDRs that would be subject to Regulation SCI.
    The two currently registered SBSDRs are subsidiaries of large 
business entities.\864\ In addition, even if other entities do register 
as SBSDRs, for purposes of Commission rulemaking, the Commission 
believes that none of the SBSDRs will be considered small 
entities.\865\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \864\ See supra note 111.
    \865\ See SBSDR Adopting Release, supra note 96, 80 FR 14548-49 
(providing that in the Proposing Release, the Commission stated that 
it did not believe that any persons that would register as SBSDRs 
would be considered small entities. The Commission stated that it 
believed that most, if not all, SBSDRs would be part of large 
business entities with assets in excess of $5 million and total 
capital in excess of $500,000. As a result, the Commission certified 
that the proposed rules would not have a significant impact on a 
substantial number of small entities and requested comments on this 
certification. The Commission did not receive any comments that 
specifically addressed whether 17 CFR 240.13n-1 through 240.13n-12 
(``Rules 13n-1 through 13n-12'') and Form SBSDR would have a 
significant economic impact on small entities. Therefore, the 
Commission continues to believe that Rules 13n-1 through 13n-12 and 
Form SBSDR will not have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, the Commission 
hereby certifies that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), Rules 13n-1 
through 13n-12, Form SBSDR will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. SCI Broker-dealers
    As discussed in section III.A.2.b above, the proposed definition of 
an SCI broker-dealer would be a broker or dealer registered with the 
Commission pursuant to section 15(b) of the Exchange Act which: (1) in 
at least two of the four preceding calendar quarters, ending March 31, 
June 30, September 30, and December 31, reported to the Commission, on 
Form X-17A-5 (Sec.  249.617), total assets in an amount that equals 
five percent (5%) or more of the total assets of all security brokers 
and dealers; or (2) during at least four of the preceding six calendar 
months: (i) with respect to transactions in NMS stocks, transacted 
average daily dollar volume in an amount that equals ten percent (10%) 
or more of the average daily dollar volume reported by or pursuant to 
applicable effective transaction reporting plans, provided, however, 
that for purposes of calculating its activity in transactions effected 
otherwise than on a national securities exchange or on an alternative 
trading system, the broker-dealer shall exclude transactions for which 
it was not the executing party; or (ii) with respect to transactions in 
exchange-listed options contracts, transacted average daily dollar 
volume in an amount that equals ten percent (10%) or more of the 
average daily dollar volume reported by an applicable effective 
national market system plan; or (iii) with respect to transactions in 
U.S. Treasury Securities, transacted average daily dollar volume in an 
amount that equals ten percent (10%) or more of the total average daily 
dollar volume made available by the self-regulatory organizations to 
which such transactions are reported; or (iv) with respect to 
transactions in Agency securities, transacted average daily dollar 
volume in an amount that equals ten percent (10%) or more of the total 
average daily dollar volume made available by the self-regulatory 
organizations to which such transactions are reported.\866\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \866\ Such broker-dealer would not be required to comply with 
the requirements of Regulation SCI until six months after the SCI 
broker-dealer satisfied either threshold for the first time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission preliminarily estimates that 17 entities would 
satisfy one or more of these thresholds. Applying the test for broker-
dealers stated above, the Commission believes that none of the 
potential SCI broker-dealers would be considered small entities.
3. Exempt Clearing Agencies
    For the purposes of Commission rulemaking, a small entity includes, 
when used with reference to a clearing agency, a clearing agency that: 
(1) compared, cleared, and settled less than $500 million in securities 
transactions during the preceding fiscal year; (2) had less than $200 
million of funds and securities in its custody or control at all times 
during the preceding fiscal year (or at any time that it has been in 
business, if shorter); and (3) is not affiliated with any person (other 
than a natural person) that is not a small business or small 
organization.\867\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \867\ See paragraph (d) of Rule 0-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the Commission's existing information about the clearing 
agencies currently exempted from registration with the Commission, the 
Commission preliminarily believes that such entities exceed the 
thresholds defining ``small entities'' set out above. While other 
clearing agencies may emerge and seek to register as clearing agencies, 
the Commission preliminarily does not believe that any such entities 
would be ``small entities'' as defined in Exchange Act Rule 0-10.

D. Certification

    For the foregoing reasons, the Commission certifies that the 
proposed amendments to Rules 1000, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, and 1005, 
and Form SCI if adopted, would not have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities for purposes of the RFA.
    The Commission invites commenters to address whether the proposed 
rules would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities, and, if so, what would be the nature of any impact 
on small entities. The Commission requests that commenters provide 
empirical data to support the extent of such impact.
Statutory Authority
    Pursuant to the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., and 
particularly, sections 2, 3, 5, 6, 11A, 13, 15, 15A, 17,

[[Page 23268]]

17A, and 23(a) thereof (15 U.S.C. 78b, 78c, 78e, 78f, 78k-1, 78m, 78o, 
78o-3, 78q, 78q-1, and 78w(a)), the Commission proposes amendments to 
Regulation SCI under the Exchange Act and Form SCI under the Exchange 
Act, and to amend Regulation ATS under the Exchange Act, and 17 CFR 
parts 242 and 249.

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Parts 242 and 249

    Brokers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.
    For the reasons stated in the preamble, title 17, chapter II of the 
Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended as follows:

PART 242--REGULATIONS M, SHO, ATS, AC, NMS, AND SBSR AND CUSTOMER 
MARGIN REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY FUTURES

0
1. The authority citation for part 242 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77g, 77q(a), 77s(a), 78b, 78c, 78g(c)(2), 
78i(a), 78j, 78k-1(c), 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(b), 78o(c), 78o(g), 
78q(a), 78q(b), 78q(h), 78w(a), 78dd-1, 78mm, 80a-23, 80a-29, and 
80a-37.
0
2. Amend Sec.  242.1000 by:
0
a. Adding in alphabetical order the definitions of ``Agency Security'' 
and ``Exempt clearing agency'';
0
b. Removing the definition of ``Exempt clearing agency subject to 
ARP'';
0
c. Adding in alphabetical order the definitions of ``Registered 
security-based swap data repository'' and ``SCI broker-dealer'';
0
d. Revising the definitions of ``SCI entity'', ``SCI review'', ``SCI 
systems'', and ``Systems intrusion''; and
0
e. Adding in alphabetical order the definition of ``U.S. Treasury 
Security''.
    The additions and revisions read as follows:


Sec.  242.1000  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Agency Security means a debt security issued or guaranteed by a 
U.S. executive agency, as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105, or government-
sponsored enterprise, as defined in 2 U.S.C. 622(8).
* * * * *
    Exempt clearing agency means an entity that has received from the 
Commission an exemption from registration as a clearing agency under 
section 17A of the Exchange Act.
* * * * *
    Registered security-based swap data repository means any security-
based swap data repository, as defined in 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(75), that is 
registered with the Commission pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 78m(n) and Sec.  
240.13n-1 of this chapter.
* * * * *
    SCI broker-dealer means a broker or dealer registered with the 
Commission pursuant to section 15(b) of the Exchange Act, which:
    (1) In at least two of the four preceding calendar quarters, ending 
March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31, reported to the 
Commission, on Form X-17A-5 (Sec.  249.617 of this chapter), total 
assets in an amount that equals five percent (5%) or more of the total 
assets of all security brokers and dealers. For purposes of this 
paragraph (1), total assets of all security brokers and dealers shall 
mean the total assets, as calculated and made publicly available by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, or any subsequent provider 
of such information, for the associated preceding calendar quarter; or
    (2) During at least four of the preceding six calendar months:
    (i) With respect to transactions in NMS stocks, transacted average 
daily dollar volume in an amount that equals ten percent (10%) or more 
of the average daily dollar volume reported by or pursuant to 
applicable effective transaction reporting plans, provided, however, 
that for purposes of calculating its activity in transactions effected 
otherwise than on a national securities exchange or on an alternative 
trading system, the broker-dealer shall exclude transactions for which 
it was not the executing party;
    (ii) With respect to transactions in exchange-listed options 
contracts, transacted average daily dollar volume in an amount that 
equals ten percent (10%) or more of the average daily dollar volume 
reported by an applicable effective national market system plan;
    (iii) With respect to transactions in U.S. Treasury Securities, 
transacted average daily dollar volume in an amount that equals ten 
percent (10%) or more of the total average daily dollar volume made 
available by the self-regulatory organizations to which such 
transactions are reported; or
    (iv) With respect to transactions in Agency Securities, transacted 
average daily dollar volume in an amount that equals ten percent (10%) 
or more of the total average daily dollar volume made available by the 
self-regulatory organizations to which such transactions are reported.
    (3) Provided, however, that such SCI broker-dealer shall not be 
required to comply with the requirements of Regulation SCI until six 
months after the end of the quarter in which the SCI broker-dealer 
satisfied paragraph (1) of this definition for the first time or six 
months after the end of the month in which the SCI broker-dealer 
satisfied paragraph (2) of this definition for the first time.
* * * * *
    SCI entity means an SCI self-regulatory organization, SCI 
alternative trading system, plan processor, exempt clearing agency, SCI 
competing consolidator, SCI broker-dealer, or registered security-based 
swap data repository.
* * * * *
    SCI review means a review, following established and documented 
procedures and standards, that is performed by objective personnel 
having appropriate experience to conduct reviews of SCI systems and 
indirect SCI systems, and which review, using appropriate risk 
management methodology, contains:
    (1) With respect to each SCI system and indirect SCI system of the 
SCI entity, assessments performed by objective personnel of:
    (i) The risks related to the capacity, integrity, resiliency, 
availability, and security;
    (ii) Internal control design and operating effectiveness, to 
include logical and physical security controls, development processes, 
systems capacity and availability, information technology service 
continuity, and information technology governance, consistent with 
industry standards; and
    (iii) Third-party provider management risks and controls; and
    (2) Penetration test reviews performed by objective personnel of 
the network, firewalls, and production systems, including of any 
vulnerabilities of its SCI systems and indirect SCI systems identified 
pursuant to Sec.  242.1001(a)(2)(iv);
    (3) Provided, however, that assessments of SCI systems directly 
supporting market regulation or market surveillance shall be conducted 
at a frequency based upon the risk assessment conducted as part of the 
SCI review, but in no case less than once every three years.
* * * * *
    SCI systems means all computer, network, electronic, technical, 
automated, or similar systems of, or operated by or on behalf of, an 
SCI entity that, with respect to securities, directly support trading, 
clearance and settlement, order routing, market data, market 
regulation, or market surveillance; provided, however, that with 
respect to an SCI broker-dealer that satisfies only the requirements of 
paragraph (2) of the definition of ``SCI

[[Page 23269]]

broker-dealer,'' such systems shall include only those systems with 
respect to the type of securities for which an SCI broker-dealer 
satisfies the requirements of paragraph (2) of the definition.
* * * * *
    Systems intrusion means any:
    (1) Unauthorized entry into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems 
of an SCI entity;
    (2) Cybersecurity event that disrupts, or significantly degrades, 
the normal operation of an SCI system; or
    (3) Significant attempted unauthorized entry into the SCI systems 
or indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity, as determined by the SCI 
entity pursuant to established reasonable written criteria.
    U.S. Treasury Security means a security issued by the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury.
0
3. Amend Sec.  242.1001 by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:


Sec.  242.1001  Obligations related to policies and procedures of SCI 
entities.

    (a) Capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security. 
(1) Each SCI entity shall establish, maintain, and enforce written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that its SCI 
systems and, for purposes of security standards, indirect SCI systems, 
have levels of capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and 
security, adequate to maintain the SCI entity's operational capability 
and promote the maintenance of fair and orderly markets.
    (2) Policies and procedures required by paragraph (a)(1) of this 
section shall include, at a minimum:
    (i) The establishment of reasonable current and future 
technological infrastructure capacity planning estimates;
    (ii) Periodic capacity stress tests of such systems to determine 
their ability to process transactions in an accurate, timely, and 
efficient manner;
    (iii) A program to review and keep current systems development and 
testing methodology for such systems;
    (iv) Regular reviews and testing, as applicable, of such systems, 
including backup systems, to identify vulnerabilities pertaining to 
internal and external threats, physical hazards, and natural or manmade 
disasters;
    (v) Business continuity and disaster recovery plans that include 
maintaining backup and recovery capabilities sufficiently resilient and 
geographically diverse and that are reasonably designed to achieve next 
business day resumption of trading and two-hour resumption of critical 
SCI systems following a wide-scale disruption; and that are reasonably 
designed to address the unavailability of any third-party provider that 
provides functionality, support, or service to the SCI entity without 
which there would be a material impact on any of its critical SCI 
systems;
    (vi) Standards that result in such systems being designed, 
developed, tested, maintained, operated, and surveilled in a manner 
that facilitates the successful collection, processing, and 
dissemination of market data;
    (vii) Monitoring of such systems to identify potential SCI events;
    (viii) The maintenance of a written inventory and classification of 
all SCI systems, critical SCI systems, and indirect SCI systems as 
such, and a program with respect to the lifecycle management of such 
systems, including the acquisition, integration, support, refresh, and 
disposal of such systems, as applicable;
    (ix) A program to manage and oversee third-party providers that 
provide functionality, support or service, directly or indirectly, for 
any such systems, including: initial and periodic review of contracts 
with such third-party providers for consistency with the SCI entity's 
obligations under Regulation SCI; and a risk-based assessment of each 
third-party provider's criticality to the SCI entity, including 
analyses of third-party provider concentration, of key dependencies if 
the third-party provider's functionality, support, or service were to 
become unavailable or materially impaired, and of any potential 
security, including cybersecurity, risks posed;
    (x) A program to prevent the unauthorized access to such systems 
and information residing therein; and
    (xi) An identification of the current SCI industry standard(s) with 
which each such policy and procedure is consistent, if any.
    (3) Each SCI entity shall periodically review the effectiveness of 
the policies and procedures required by this paragraph (a), and take 
prompt action to remedy deficiencies in such policies and procedures.
    (4) For purposes of this paragraph (a), such policies and 
procedures shall be deemed to be reasonably designed if they are 
consistent with current SCI industry standards, which shall be composed 
of information technology practices that are widely available to 
information technology professionals in the financial sector and issued 
by an authoritative body that is a U.S. governmental entity or agency, 
association of U.S. governmental entities or agencies, or widely 
recognized organization. Compliance with such current SCI industry 
standards as a safe harbor, however, shall not be the exclusive means 
to comply with the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section.
* * * * *
0
4. Amend Sec.  242.1002 by:
0
a. In paragraph (b)(4)(ii)(B), removing the words ``or participants'' 
and adding in their place ``participants, or, in the case of an SCI 
broker-dealer, customers'';
0
b. Revising paragraph (b)(5) and (c)(3);
0
c. In paragraph (c)(4)(i), removing the ``or'' after the semicolon;
0
d. In paragraph (c)(4)(ii), removing the period and adding in its place 
``; or''; and
0
e. Adding paragraph (c)(4)(iii).
    The revision and additions read as follows:


Sec.  242.1002  Obligations related to SCI events.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (5) The requirements of paragraphs (b)(1) through (4) of this 
section shall not apply to any systems disruption or systems compliance 
issue that has had, or the SCI entity reasonably estimates would have, 
no or a de minimis impact on the SCI entity's operations or on market 
participants. For such events, each SCI entity shall:
    (i) Make, keep, and preserve records relating to all such systems 
disruptions or systems compliance issues; and
    (ii) Submit to the Commission a report, within 30 calendar days 
after the end of each calendar quarter, containing a summary 
description of such systems disruptions, including the SCI systems 
affected by such systems disruptions during the applicable calendar 
quarter.
    (c) * * *
    (3) The information required to be disseminated under paragraphs 
(c)(1) and (2) of this section promptly after any responsible SCI 
personnel has a reasonable basis to conclude that an SCI event has 
occurred, shall be promptly disseminated by the SCI entity to those 
members, participants, or, in the case of an SCI broker-dealer, 
customers of the SCI entity that any responsible SCI personnel has 
reasonably estimated may have been affected by the SCI event, and 
promptly disseminated to any additional members, participants, or, in 
the case of an SCI broker-dealer, customers that any responsible SCI 
personnel subsequently reasonably estimates may have been affected by 
the SCI event; provided, however, that for major SCI events, the 
information required to be disseminated under paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) 
of this section shall be promptly disseminated by the

[[Page 23270]]

SCI entity to all of its members, participants, or, in the case of an 
SCI broker-dealer, customers.
    (4) * * *
    (iii) A systems intrusion that is a significant attempted 
unauthorized entry into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an 
SCI entity.
0
5. Amend Sec.  242.1003 by revising paragraph (b) to read as follows:


Sec.  242.1003  Obligations related to systems changes; SCI review.

* * * * *
    (b) SCI review. Each SCI entity shall:
    (1) Conduct an SCI review of the SCI entity's compliance with 
Regulation SCI not less than once each calendar year for each calendar 
year during which it was an SCI entity for any part of such calendar 
year;
    (2) Submit a report of the SCI review required by paragraph (b)(1) 
of this section to senior management of the SCI entity for review no 
more than 30 calendar days after completion of such SCI review. Such 
report of the SCI review shall include:
    (i) The dates the SCI review was conducted and the date of 
completion;
    (ii) The entity or business unit of the SCI entity performing the 
review;
    (iii) A list of the controls reviewed and a description of each 
such control;
    (iv) The findings of the SCI review with respect to each SCI system 
and indirect SCI system, which shall include assessments of: the risks 
related to the capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and 
security; internal control design and operating effectiveness; and an 
assessment of third-party provider management risks and controls;
    (v) A summary, including the scope of testing and resulting action 
plan, of each penetration test review conducted as part of the SCI 
review; and
    (vi) A description of each deficiency and weakness identified by 
the SCI review; and
    (3) Submit to the Commission, and to the board of directors of the 
SCI entity or the equivalent of such board, the report of the SCI 
review required by paragraph (b)(2) of this section, together with the 
date the report was submitted to senior management and the response of 
senior management to such report, within 60 calendar days after its 
submission to senior management of the SCI entity.


Sec.  242.1004  [Amended]

0
6. Amend Sec.  242.1004 by:
0
a. In the section heading, adding ``, and third-party providers'' to 
the end of the heading;
0
b. In paragraph (a), after the word ``participants'', adding ``, and 
third-party providers''; and
0
c. In paragraph (b), after both instances of the word ``participants'' 
adding ``, and third-party providers''.


Sec.  242.1005  [Amended]

0
7. Amend Sec.  242.1005 in paragraph (c) by:
0
a. Between ``business'' and ``ceasing,'' removing the ``or'' and adding 
a comma in its place; and
0
b. Immediately before ``an SCI entity'' adding ``or otherwise ceasing 
to be an SCI entity,''.

PART 249--FORMS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

0
8. The general authority citation for part 249 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. and 7201 et seq.; 12 U.S.C. 
5461 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1350; Sec. 953(b) Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1904; Sec. 102(a)(3) Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 309 (2012), Sec. 107 
Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 313 (2012), Sec. 72001 Pub. L. 114-94, 
129 Stat. 1312 (2015), and secs. 2 and 3 Pub. L. 116-222, 134 Stat. 
1063 (2020), unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
0
9. Revise Form SCI (referenced in Sec.  249.1900).

    Note: Form SCI is attached as Appendix A to this document. Form 
SCI will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.


    By the Commission.

    Dated: March 15, 2023.
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Deputy Secretary.

Appendix A--Form SCI

Securities and Exchange Commission

Washington, DC 20549

Form SCI

Page 1 of ___
File No. SCI-{name{time} -
YYYY-###
SCI Notification and Reporting by: {SCI entity name{time} 
Pursuant to Rules 1002 and 1003 of Regulation SCI under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
[ballot] Initial
[ballot] Withdrawal

Section I: Rule 1002--Commission Notification of SCI Event

A. Submission Type (select one only)
[ballot] Rule 1002(b)(1) Initial Notification of SCI event
[ballot] Rule 1002(b)(2) Notification of SCI event
[ballot] Rule 1002(b)(3) Update of SCI event: ####
[ballot] Rule 1002(b)(4) Final Report of SCI event
[ballot] Rule 1002(b)(4) Interim Status Report of SCI event

    If filing a Rule 1002(b)(1) or Rule 1002(b)(3) submission, 
please provide a brief description:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

B. SCI Event Type(s) (select all that apply)
[ballot] Systems compliance issue;
[ballot] Systems disruption
[ballot] Systems intrusion

C. General Information Required for (b)(2) filings.
(1) Has the Commission previously been notified of the SCI event 
pursuant to 1002(b)(1)? yes/no
(2) Date/time SCI event occurred: mm/dd/yyyy hh:mm am/pm
(3) Duration of SCI event: hh:mm, or days
(4) Please provide the date and time when a responsible SCI 
personnel had reasonable basis to conclude the SCI event occurred: 
mm/dd/yyyy hh:mm am/pm
(5) Has the SCI event been resolved? yes/no
(a) If yes, provide date and time of resolution: mm/dd/yyyy hh:mm 
am/pm
(6) Is the investigation of the SCI event closed? yes/no
(a) If yes, provide date of closure: mm/dd/yyyy
(7) Estimated number of market participants potentially affected by 
the SCI event: ####
(8) Is the SCI event a major SCI event (as defined in Rule 1000)? 
yes/no

D. Information about impacted systems:
Name(s) of system(s):
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Type(s) of system(s) impacted by the SCI event (check all that 
apply):
[ballot] Trading
[ballot] Clearance and settlement
[ballot] Order routing
[ballot] Market data
[ballot] Market regulation
[ballot] Market surveillance
[ballot] Indirect SCI systems (please describe):
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Are any critical SCI systems impacted by the SCI event (check all 
that apply)? Yes/No
(1) Systems that directly support functionality relating to:
[ballot] Clearance and settlement systems of clearing agencies
[ballot] Openings, reopenings, and closings on the primary listing 
market
[ballot] Trading halts
[ballot] Initial public offerings
[ballot] The provision of consolidated market data
[ballot] Exclusively-listed securities
(2) [ballot] Systems that provide functionality to the securities 
markets for which the availability of alternatives is significantly 
limited or nonexistent and without which there would be a material 
impact on fair and orderly markets (please describe):
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Section II: Periodic Reporting (select one only)

A. Quarterly Reports: For the quarter ended: mm/dd/yyyy
[ballot] Rule 1002(b)(5)(ii): Quarterly report of systems 
disruptions with no or a de minimis impact.

[[Page 23271]]

[ballot] Rule 1003(a)(1): Quarterly report of material systems 
changes
[ballot] Rule 1003(a)(2): Supplemental report of material systems 
changes

B. SCI Review Reports
[ballot] Rule 1003(b)(3): Report of SCI review, together with the 
response of senior management
Date of completion of SCI review: mm/dd/yyyy
Date of submission of SCI review to senior management: mm/dd/yyyy

Section III: Contact Information

    Provide the following information of the person at the {SCI 
entity name{time}  prepared to respond to questions for this 
submission:

First Name:
Last Name:
Title:
E-Mail:
Telephone:
Fax:

Additional Contacts (Optional)
First Name:
Last Name:
Title:
E-Mail:
Telephone:
Fax:
First Name:
Last Name:
Title:
E-Mail:
Telephone:
Fax:

Section IV: Signature

    Confidential treatment is requested pursuant to Rule 24b-2(g). 
Additionally, pursuant to the requirements of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, {SCI Entity name{time}  has duly caused this 
{notification{time}  {report{time}  to be signed on its behalf by 
the undersigned duly authorized officer:

Date:
By (Name)
Title (______)
``Digitally Sign and Lock Form''

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exhibit 1: Rule 1002(b)(2)          Within 24 hours of any responsible
 Notification of SCI Event. Add/     SCI personnel having a reasonable
 Remove/View.                        basis to conclude that the SCI
                                     event has occurred, the SCI entity
                                     shall submit a written notification
                                     pertaining to such SCI event to the
                                     Commission, which shall be made on
                                     a good faith, best efforts basis
                                     and include:
                                    (a) a description of the SCI event,
                                     including the system(s) affected;
                                     and
                                       (b) to the extent available as of
                                        the time of the notification:
                                        the SCI entity's current
                                        assessment of the types and
                                        number of market participants
                                        potentially affected by the SCI
                                        event; the potential impact of
                                        the SCI event on the market; a
                                        description of the steps the SCI
                                        entity has taken, is taking, or
                                        plans to take, with respect to
                                        the SCI event; the time the SCI
                                        event was resolved or timeframe
                                        within which the SCI event is
                                        expected to be resolved; and any
                                        other pertinent information
                                        known by the SCI entity about
                                        the SCI event.
Exhibit 2: Rule 1002(b)(4) Final    When submitting a final report
 or Interim Report of SCI Event.     pursuant to either Rule
 Add/Remove/View.                    1002(b)(4)(i)(A) or Rule
                                     1002(b)(4)(i)(B)(2), the SCI entity
                                     shall include:
                                       (a) a detailed description of:
                                        the SCI entity's assessment of
                                        the types and number of market
                                        participants affected by the SCI
                                        event; the SCI entity's
                                        assessment of the impact of the
                                        SCI event on the market; the
                                        steps the SCI entity has taken,
                                        is taking, or plans to take,
                                        with respect to the SCI event;
                                        the time the SCI event was
                                        resolved; the SCI entity's
                                        rule(s) and/or governing
                                        document(s), as applicable, that
                                        relate to the SCI event; and any
                                        other pertinent information
                                        known by the SCI entity about
                                        the SCI event;
                                       (b) a copy of any information
                                        disseminated pursuant to Rule
                                        1002(c) by the SCI entity to
                                        date regarding the SCI event to
                                        any of its members,
                                        participants, or, in the case of
                                        an SCI broker-dealer, customers;
                                        and
                                       (c) an analysis of parties that
                                        may have experienced a loss,
                                        whether monetary or otherwise,
                                        due to the SCI event, the number
                                        of such parties, and an estimate
                                        of the aggregate amount of such
                                        loss.
                                    When submitting an interim report
                                     pursuant to Rule
                                     1002(b)(4)(i)(B)(1), the SCI entity
                                     shall include such information to
                                     the extent known at the time.
Exhibit 3: Rule 1002(b)(5)(ii)      The SCI entity shall submit a
 Quarterly Report of DeMinimis SCI   report, within 30 calendar days
 Events. Add/Remove/View.            after the end of each calendar
                                     quarter, containing a summary
                                     description of systems disruptions
                                     that have had, or the SCI entity
                                     reasonably estimates would have, no
                                     or a de minimis impact on the SCI
                                     entity's operations or on market
                                     participants, including the SCI
                                     systems affected by such systems
                                     disruptions during the applicable
                                     calendar quarter.
Exhibit 4: Rule 1003 (a) Quarterly  When submitting a report pursuant to
 Report of Systems Changes. Add/     Rule 1003(a)(1), the SCI entity
 Remove/View.                        shall provide a report, within 30
                                     calendar days after the end of each
                                     calendar quarter, describing
                                     completed, ongoing, and planned
                                     material changes to its SCI systems
                                     and the security of indirect SCI
                                     systems, during the prior, current,
                                     and subsequent calendar quarters,
                                     including the dates or expected
                                     dates of commencement and
                                     completion. An SCI entity shall
                                     establish reasonable written
                                     criteria for identifying a change
                                     to its SCI systems and the security
                                     of indirect SCI systems as material
                                     and report such changes in
                                     accordance with such criteria.
                                    When submitting a report pursuant to
                                     Rule 1003(a)(2), the SCI entity
                                     shall provide a supplemental report
                                     of a material error in or material
                                     omission from a report previously
                                     submitted under Rule 1003(a)(1).
Exhibit 5: Rule 1003(b)(3) Report   The SCI entity shall provide the
 of SCI review. Add/Remove/View.     report of the SCI review, together
                                     with the date the report was
                                     submitted to senior management and
                                     the response of senior management
                                     to such report, within 60 calendar
                                     days after its submission to senior
                                     management of the SCI entity.
Exhibit 6: Optional Attachments.    This exhibit may be used in order to
 Add/Remove/View.                    attach other documents that the SCI
                                     entity may wish to submit as part
                                     of a Rule 1002(b)(1) initial
                                     notification submission or Rule
                                     1002(b)(3) update submission.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

General Instructions for Form SCI

A. Use of the Form

    Except with respect to notifications to the Commission made 
pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(1) or updates to the Commission made 
pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(3), any notification, review, description, 
analysis, or report required to be submitted pursuant to Regulation 
SCI under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'') shall be 
filed in an electronic format through an electronic form filing 
system (``EFFS''), a secure website operated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (``Commission''). Documents attached as exhibits 
filed through the EFFS system must be in a text-searchable format 
without the use of optical character recognition. If, however, a 
portion of a Form SCI submission (e.g., an image or diagram) cannot 
be made available in a text-searchable format, such portion may be 
submitted in a non-text searchable format.

B. Need for Careful Preparation of the Completed Form, Including 
Exhibits

    This form, including the exhibits, is intended to elicit 
information necessary for Commission staff to work with SCI entities 
to ensure the capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, 
security, and compliance of their automated systems. An SCI entity 
must provide all the information required by the form, including the 
exhibits, and must present the information in a clear and 
comprehensible manner. A filing that is incomplete or similarly 
deficient may be returned to the SCI entity. Any filing so returned 
shall for all purposes be deemed not to have been filed with the 
Commission. See also Rule 0-3 under the Act (17 CFR 240.0-3).

C. When To Use the Form

    Form SCI is comprised of six types of required submissions to 
the Commission pursuant to Rules 1002 and 1003. In addition, Form 
SCI permits SCI entities to submit to the Commission two additional 
types of submissions pursuant to Rules 1002(b)(1) and 1002(b)(3); 
however, SCI entities are not required to use Form SCI for these two 
types of submissions to the Commission. In filling out Form SCI, an 
SCI

[[Page 23272]]

entity shall select the type of filing and provide all information 
required by Regulation SCI specific to that type of filing.
    The first two types of required submissions relate to Commission 
notification of certain SCI events:
    (1) ``Rule 1002(b)(2) Notification of SCI Event'' submissions 
for notifications regarding systems disruptions, systems compliance 
issues, or systems intrusions (collectively, ``SCI events''), other 
than any systems disruption or systems compliance issue that has 
had, or the SCI entity reasonably estimates would have, no or a de 
minimis impact on the SCI entity's operations or on market 
participants; and
    (2) ``Rule 1002(b)(4) Final or Interim Report of SCI Event'' 
submissions, of which there are two kinds (a final report under Rule 
1002(b)(4)(i)(A) or Rule 1002(b)(4)(i)(B)(2); or an interim status 
report under Rule 1002(b)(4)(i)(B)(1)).
    The other four types of required submissions are periodic 
reports, and include:
    (1) ``Rule 1002(b)(5)(ii)'' submissions for quarterly reports of 
systems disruptions which have had, or the SCI entity reasonably 
estimates would have, no or a de minimis impact on the SCI entity's 
operations or on market participants;
    (2) ``Rule 1003(a)(1)'' submissions for quarterly reports of 
material systems changes;
    (3) ``Rule 1003(a)(2)'' submissions for supplemental reports of 
material systems changes; and
    (4) ``Rule 1003(b)(3)'' submissions for reports of SCI reviews.

Required Submissions for SCI Events

    For 1002(b)(2) submissions, an SCI entity must notify the 
Commission using Form SCI by selecting the appropriate box in 
Section I and filling out all information required by the form, 
including Exhibit 1. 1002(b)(2) submissions must be submitted within 
24 hours of any responsible SCI personnel having a reasonable basis 
to conclude that an SCI event has occurred.
    For 1002(b)(4) submissions, if an SCI event is resolved and the 
SCI entity's investigation of the SCI event is closed within 30 
calendar days of the occurrence of the SCI event, an SCI entity must 
file a final report under Rule 1002(b)(4)(i)(A) within five business 
days after the resolution of the SCI event and closure of the 
investigation regarding the SCI event. However, if an SCI event is 
not resolved or the SCI entity's investigation of the SCI event is 
not closed within 30 calendar days of the occurrence of the SCI 
event, an SCI entity must file an interim status report under Rule 
1002(b)(4)(i)(B)(1) within 30 calendar days after the occurrence of 
the SCI event. For SCI events in which an interim status report is 
required to be filed, an SCI entity must file a final report under 
Rule 1002(b)(4)(i)(B)(2) within five business days after the 
resolution of the SCI event and closure of the investigation 
regarding the SCI event. For 1002(b)(4) submissions, an SCI entity 
must notify the Commission using Form SCI by selecting the 
appropriate box in Section I and filling out all information 
required by the form, including Exhibit 2.

Required Submissions for Periodic Reporting

    For 1002(b)(5)(ii) submissions, an SCI entity must submit 
quarterly reports of systems disruptions which have had, or the SCI 
entity reasonably estimates would have, no or a de minimis impact on 
the SCI entity's operations or on market participants. The SCI 
entity must select the appropriate box in Section II and fill out 
all information required by the form, including Exhibit 3.
    For 1003(a)(1) submissions, an SCI entity must submit its 
quarterly report of material systems changes to the Commission using 
Form SCI. The SCI entity must select the appropriate box in Section 
II and fill out all information required by the form, including 
Exhibit 4.
    Filings made pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(5)(ii) and Rule 1003(a)(1) 
must be submitted to the Commission within 30 calendar days after 
the end of each calendar quarter (i.e., March 31st, June 30th, 
September 30th and December 31st) of each year.
    For 1003(a)(2) submissions, an SCI entity must submit a 
supplemental report notifying the Commission of a material error in 
or material omission from a report previously submitted under Rule 
1003(a). The SCI entity must select the appropriate box in Section 
II and fill out all information required by the form, including 
Exhibit 4.
    For 1003(b)(3) submissions, an SCI entity must submit its report 
of its SCI review, together with the date the report was submitted 
to senior management and the response of senior management to such 
report, to the Commission using Form SCI. A 1003(b)(3) submission is 
required within 60 calendar days after the report of the SCI review 
has been submitted to senior management of the SCI entity. The SCI 
entity must select the appropriate box in Section II and fill out 
all information required by the form, including Exhibit 5.

Optional Submissions

    An SCI entity may, but is not required to, use Form SCI to 
submit a notification pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(1). If the SCI entity 
uses Form SCI to submit a notification pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(1), 
it must select the appropriate box in Section I and provide a short 
description of the SCI event. Documents may also be attached as 
Exhibit 6 if the SCI entity chooses to do so. An SCI entity may, but 
is not required to, use Form SCI to submit an update pursuant to 
Rule 1002(b)(3). Rule 1002(b)(3) requires an SCI entity to, until 
such time as the SCI event is resolved and the SCI entity's 
investigation of the SCI event is closed, provide updates pertaining 
to such SCI event to the Commission on a regular basis, or at such 
frequency as reasonably requested by a representative of the 
Commission, to correct any materially incorrect information 
previously provided, or when new material information is discovered, 
including but not limited to, any of the information listed in Rule 
1002(b)(2)(ii). If the SCI entity uses Form SCI to submit an update 
pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(3), it must select the appropriate box in 
Section I and provide a short description of the SCI event. 
Documents may also be attached as Exhibit 6 if the SCI entity 
chooses to do so.

D. Documents Comprising the Completed Form

    The completed form filed with the Commission shall consist of 
Form SCI, responses to all applicable items, and any exhibits 
required in connection with the filing. Each filing shall be marked 
on Form SCI with the initials of the SCI entity, the four-digit 
year, and the number of the filing for the year (e.g., SCI Name-
YYYY-XXX).

E. Contact Information; Signature; and Filing of the Completed Form

    Each time an SCI entity submits a filing to the Commission on 
Form SCI, the SCI entity must provide the contact information 
required by Section III of Form SCI. Space for additional contact 
information, if appropriate, is also provided.
    All notifications and reports required to be submitted through 
Form SCI shall be filed through the EFFS. In order to file Form SCI 
through the EFFS, SCI entities must request access to the 
Commission's External Application Server by completing a request for 
an external account user ID and password. Initial requests will be 
received by contacting (202) 551-5777. An email will be sent to the 
requestor that will provide a link to a secure website where basic 
profile information will be requested. A duly authorized individual 
of the SCI entity shall electronically sign the completed Form SCI 
as indicated in Section IV of the form. In addition, a duly 
authorized individual of the SCI entity shall manually sign one copy 
of the completed Form SCI, and the manually signed signature page 
shall be preserved pursuant to the requirements of Rule 1005.

F. Withdrawals of Commission Notifications and Periodic Reports

    If an SCI entity determines to withdraw a Form SCI, it must 
complete Page 1 of the Form SCI and indicate by selecting the 
appropriate check box to withdraw the submission.

G. Paperwork Reduction Act Disclosure

    This collection of information will be reviewed by the Office of 
Management and Budget in accordance with the clearance requirements 
of 44 U.S.C. 3507. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a 
person is not required to respond to, a collection of information 
unless it displays a currently valid control number. The Commission 
estimates that the average burden to respond to Form SCI will be 
between one and 125 hours, depending upon the purpose for which the 
form is being filed. Any member of the public may direct to the 
Commission any comments concerning the accuracy of this burden 
estimate and any suggestions for reducing this burden.
    Except with respect to notifications to the Commission made 
pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(1) or updates to the Commission made 
pursuant to Rule 1002(b)(3), it is mandatory that an SCI entity file 
all notifications, reviews, descriptions, analyses, and reports 
required by Regulation SCI using Form SCI. The Commission will keep 
the information collected pursuant to Form SCI confidential to the 
extent permitted by law. Subject to the provisions of the Freedom of

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Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 522 (``FOIA''), and the Commission's rules 
thereunder (17 CFR 200.80(b)(4)(iii)), the Commission does not 
generally publish or make available information contained in any 
reports, summaries, analyses, letters, or memoranda arising out of, 
in anticipation of, or in connection with an examination or 
inspection of the books and records of any person or any other 
investigation.

H. Exhibits

    List of exhibits to be filed, as applicable:
    Exhibit 1: Rule 1002(b)(2)--Notification of SCI Event. Within 24 
hours of any responsible SCI personnel having a reasonable basis to 
conclude that the SCI event has occurred, the SCI entity shall 
submit a written notification pertaining to such SCI event to the 
Commission, which shall be made on a good faith, best efforts basis 
and include: (a) a description of the SCI event, including the 
system(s) affected; and (b) to the extent available as of the time 
of the notification: the SCI entity's current assessment of the 
types and number of market participants potentially affected by the 
SCI event; the potential impact of the SCI event on the market; a 
description of the steps the SCI entity has taken, is taking, or 
plans to take, with respect to the SCI event; the time the SCI event 
was resolved or timeframe within which the SCI event is expected to 
be resolved; and any other pertinent information known by the SCI 
entity about the SCI event.
    Exhibit 2: Rule 1002(b)(4)--Final or Interim Report of SCI 
Event. When submitting a final report pursuant to either Rule 
1002(b)(4)(i)(A) or Rule 1002(b)(4)(i)(B)(2), the SCI entity shall 
include: (a) a detailed description of: the SCI entity's assessment 
of the types and number of market participants affected by the SCI 
event; the SCI entity's assessment of the impact of the SCI event on 
the market; the steps the SCI entity has taken, is taking, or plans 
to take, with respect to the SCI event; the time the SCI event was 
resolved; the SCI entity's rule(s) and/or governing document(s), as 
applicable, that relate to the SCI event; and any other pertinent 
information known by the SCI entity about the SCI event; (b) a copy 
of any information disseminated pursuant to Rule 1002(c) by the SCI 
entity to date regarding the SCI event to any of its members, 
participants, or, in the case of an SCI broker-dealer, customers; 
and (c) an analysis of parties that may have experienced a loss, 
whether monetary or otherwise, due to the SCI event, the number of 
such parties, and an estimate of the aggregate amount of such loss. 
When submitting an interim report pursuant to Rule 
1002(b)(4)(i)(B)(1), the SCI entity shall include such information 
to the extent known at the time.
    Exhibit 3: Rule 1002(b)(5)(ii)--Quarterly Report of De Minimis 
SCI Events. The SCI entity shall submit a report, within 30 calendar 
days after the end of each calendar quarter, containing a summary 
description of systems disruptions that have had, or the SCI entity 
reasonably estimates would have, no or a de minimis impact on the 
SCI entity's operations or on market participants, including the SCI 
systems affected by such SCI events during the applicable calendar 
quarter.
    Exhibit 4: Rule 1003(a)--Quarterly Report of Systems Changes. 
When submitting a report pursuant to Rule 1003(a)(1), the SCI entity 
shall provide a report, within 30 calendar days after the end of 
each calendar quarter, describing completed, ongoing, and planned 
material changes to its SCI systems and the security of indirect SCI 
systems, during the prior, current, and subsequent calendar 
quarters, including the dates or expected dates of commencement and 
completion. An SCI entity shall establish reasonable written 
criteria for identifying a change to its SCI systems and the 
security of indirect SCI systems as material and report such changes 
in accordance with such criteria. When submitting a report pursuant 
to Rule 1003(a)(2), the SCI entity shall provide a supplemental 
report of a material error in or material omission from a report 
previously submitted under Rule 1003(a); provided, however, that a 
supplemental report is not required if information regarding a 
material systems change is or will be provided as part of a 
notification made pursuant to Rule 1002(b).
    Exhibit 5: Rule 1003(b)(3)--Report of SCI Review. The SCI entity 
shall provide the report of the SCI review, together with the date 
the report was submitted to senior management and the response of 
senior management to such report, within 60 calendar days after its 
submission to senior management of the SCI entity.
    Exhibit 6: Optional Attachments. This exhibit may be used in 
order to attach other documents that the SCI entity may wish to 
submit as part of a Rule 1002(b)(1) initial notification submission 
or Rule 1002(b)(3) update submission.

I. Explanation of Terms

    Critical SCI systems means any SCI systems of, or operated by or 
on behalf of, an SCI entity that: (1) directly support functionality 
relating to: (i) clearance and settlement systems of clearing 
agencies; (ii) openings, reopenings, and closings on the primary 
listing market; (iii) trading halts; (iv) initial public offerings; 
(v) the provision of market data by a plan processor; or (vi) 
exclusively-listed securities; or (2) provide functionality to the 
securities markets for which the availability of alternatives is 
significantly limited or nonexistent and without which there would 
be a material impact on fair and orderly markets.
    Indirect SCI systems means any systems of, or operated by or on 
behalf of, an SCI entity that, if breached, would be reasonably 
likely to pose a security threat to SCI systems.
    Major SCI event means an SCI event that has had, or the SCI 
entity reasonably estimates would have: (1) any impact on a critical 
SCI system; or (2) a significant impact on the SCI entity's 
operations or on market participants.
    Responsible SCI personnel means, for a particular SCI system or 
indirect SCI system impacted by an SCI event, such senior manager(s) 
of the SCI entity having responsibility for such system, and their 
designee(s).
    SCI entity means an SCI self-regulatory organization, SCI 
alternative trading system, plan processor, exempt clearing agency, 
SCI competing consolidator, SCI broker-dealer, or registered 
security-based swap data repository.
    SCI event means an event at an SCI entity that constitutes: (1) 
a systems disruption; (2) a systems compliance issue; or (3) a 
systems intrusion.
    SCI review means a review, following established and documented 
procedures and standards, that is performed by objective personnel 
having appropriate experience to conduct reviews of SCI systems and 
indirect SCI systems, and which review, using appropriate risk 
management methodology, contains: (1) with respect to each SCI 
system and indirect SCI system of the SCI entity, assessments 
performed by objective personnel of: (A) the risks related to 
capacity, integrity, resiliency, availability, and security; (B) 
internal control design and operating effectiveness, to include 
logical and physical security controls, development processes, 
systems capacity and availability, information technology service 
continuity, and information technology governance, consistent with 
industry standards; and (C) third party provider management risks 
and controls; and (2) penetration test reviews performed by 
objective personnel of the network, firewalls, and production 
systems, including of any vulnerabilities of its SCI systems and 
indirect SCI systems identified pursuant to paragraph Sec.  
242.1001(a)(2)(iv); (3) provided, however, that assessments of SCI 
systems directly supporting market regulation or market surveillance 
shall be conducted at a frequency based upon the risk assessment 
conducted as part of the SCI review, but in no case less than once 
every three years.
    SCI systems means all computer, network, electronic, technical, 
automated, or similar systems of, or operated by or on behalf of, an 
SCI entity that, with respect to securities, directly support 
trading, clearance and settlement, order routing, market data, 
market regulation, or market surveillance; provided, however, that 
with respect to an SCI broker-dealer that satisfies only the 
requirements of paragraph (2) of the definition of ``SCI broker-
dealer,'' such systems shall include only those systems with respect 
to the type of securities for which an SCI broker-dealer satisfies 
the requirements of paragraph (2) of the definition.
    Systems Compliance Issue means an event at an SCI entity that 
has caused any SCI system of such entity to operate in a manner that 
does not comply with the Act and the rules and regulations 
thereunder or the entity's rules or governing documents, as 
applicable.
    Systems Disruption means an event in an SCI entity's SCI systems 
that disrupts, or significantly degrades, the normal operation of an 
SCI system.

[[Page 23274]]

    Systems Intrusion means any: (1) unauthorized entry into the SCI 
systems or indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity; (2) cybersecurity 
event that disrupts, or significantly degrades, the normal operation 
of an SCI system; or (3) significant attempted unauthorized entry 
into the SCI systems or indirect SCI systems of an SCI entity, as 
determined by the SCI entity pursuant to established reasonable 
written criteria.
[FR Doc. 2023-05775 Filed 4-13-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P