[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 69 (Tuesday, April 11, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21736-21738]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-07579]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2023-02; Train Makeup and Operational Safety
Concerns
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2023-02 to emphasize
significant concerns related to train makeup and to ensure that all
railroads exercise due diligence and recognize the importance of taking
proactive measures to address potential safety risks related to
operating train builds with varying configurations, load and empty
placement, distributed power arrangements, and other factors. FRA has
noticed a rising trend in recent incidents where train build and makeup
have been identified as a potential cause or contributing factor. In
response, FRA incorporates train simulations into its investigative
process when it is suspected that high in-train forces may have
contributed to train accidents. To address these concerns, FRA is
providing recommendations for freight railroads to improve the safety
of their train build processes and practices.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christian Holt, Staff Director,
Operating Practices Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 366-0978.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Significant Incidents
On March 4, 2023, in Springfield, Ohio, a Norfolk Southern Railway
(NS) 210-car mixed freight train totaling 17,966 trailing tons with
Distributed Power Units (DPU) experienced a derailment involving 28
cars, including 21 empty and 7 loaded cars. The train had 82 cars
equipped with end-of-car cushioning devices, and 18 of those derailed.
The locomotives were arranged in a 3x2x0 configuration,\1\ with
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one headend locomotive offline. The train was traveling on an ascending
0.6% grade with a heavier part on a 0.7% downhill grade. The weight was
mostly concentrated at the head and rear ends of the train. During the
accident, dynamic braking was applied only to the headend locomotive
consist, while the DPUs were idle, making it function like a
conventional train. The derailment happened at the sag between
ascending and descending grades, with short, empty rail cars designed
to ship coiled steel being the first to derail. Buff forces peaked as
the downhill portion of the train ran-in, causing the derailment of
cars 70-72 and the subsequent pile-up. The train was classified as a
Key Train,\2\ with 28 loaded hazardous materials (hazmat) cars
distributed throughout. No hazmat cars derailed.
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\1\ 3x2x0 represents 3 headend locomotives, 2 mid DPU's, 0 rear
DPU's.
\2\ As defined by Association of American Railroads (AAR)
Circular OT-55, available at https://public.railinc.com/sites/default/files/documents/OT-55.pdf, a ``Key Train'' is any train
with: (1) One tank car load of Poison or Toxic Inhalation Hazard1
(PIH or TIH) (Hazard Zone A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia
(UN1005), or ammonia solutions (UN3318); (2) 20 car loads or
intermodal portable tank loads of any combination of hazardous
material; or (3) One or more car loads of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF),
High Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW).
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On September 19, 2022, in Albers, Illinois, a NS train derailment
occurred involving a 131-car mixed freight train (41 empty and 90
loaded) with a DPU and totaling 11,392 trailing tons. The first
derailed car was empty and 27 cars derailed in total. Fifty-six. cars
were equipped with end-of-car cushioning devices. The locomotives were
arranged in a 3x0x2 configuration, and Energy Management System (EMS)
was active during the incident. The derailment occurred as the train
traversed a slight descending grade and a 2-degree curve. Among the
train's cars, 21 were carrying hazmat. Two of these hazmat cars
derailed, and their contents were released. The assigned cause for the
accident was excessive lateral drawbar force on the curve due to the
train's makeup.
On September 5, 2022, in Hampton, Iowa, a Union Pacific Railroad
Company (UP) 165-car mixed freight train (34 empty and 131 loaded) with
a total trailing weight of 18,479 tons experienced a derailment
involving 44 cars. The train had 26 cars equipped with end-of-car
cushioning devices and a 2x0x1 locomotive configuration. The head end
of the train was ascending a 1% grade, while the rear end was
descending a 1% grade during the incident. The derailment took place at
the sag between the ascending and descending grades, with much of the
train's weight concentrated at the head and rear ends. The train was a
Key Train, carrying 26 loaded hazmat cars, of which 14 derailed and 5
released their contents. At the time of the derailment, EMS technology
was operating the train. The assigned cause of the incident was
excessive buffing or slack action due to train makeup.
On May 16, 2022, in Gravette, Arkansas, a Kansas City Southern
Railway DPU train with a total of 125 cars (one empty and 124 loaded)
with a total trailing weight of 17,113 tons experienced a derailment,
which involved one car. The locomotive configuration was 2x0x3. The
incident occurred while the train was moving uphill and negotiating a
curve, resulting in the derailment of the single empty car on the high
side of the curve. The root cause of the derailment was identified as
improper train makeup.
On February 17, 2022, in Rupert, Idaho, a UP 195-car mixed freight,
DPU train derailed 4 cars that consisted of 106 empty and 89 loaded
cars with 14,017 trailing tons. The first car to derail was empty. The
locomotives were configured as 3x1x1. The train was in the process of
stopping due to a hot box detector warning. It was using dynamic
braking on the head and mid locomotive consists while idling down on
the rear consist as it traveled down a descending grade. The train
contained five HazMat cars, but none of them derailed. Nearby residents
were evacuated as a precautionary measure. The incident was attributed
to improper train make-up.
On May 16, 2021, in Sibley, Iowa, a UP 159-car mixed freight train
(43 empty and 116 loaded), weighing a total of 16,545 tons, with a
2x1x0 DPU configuration experienced a derailment, resulting in 47
derailed cars. The first car to derail was empty and equipped with an
end-of-car cushioning device, as were 12 other derailed cars. At the
time of the incident, the train navigated a grade, with the front
section ascending and the rear section descending a grade steeper than
1%. Dynamic braking was used before the derailment but was switched to
idle shortly before the accident. The derailment took place in a curve
located in a sag between the ascending and descending grades. This Key
Train contained 26 loaded hazmat cars, of which 14 derailed and 5
released their contents. As a result, the nearby town was evacuated for
three days. The cause of the derailment was determined to be excessive
buffing or slack action due to the train's makeup.
The analysis of the recent train accidents reveals several common
characteristics and patterns:
1. Train Length: Each of the accident trains had 125 or more cars.
2. Distributed Power Units (DPUs): The fact that all accident
trains featured DPUs underscores the importance of correctly utilizing
and managing DPUs to enhance train handling and minimize the likelihood
of accidents. While DPUs can contribute to improved train control, they
should not be considered a replacement for proper train car placement
and makeup.
3. Trailing Tons: All accident trains far exceeded 4,000 trailing
tons, which is the maximum weight threshold established by the AAR's
1992 Train Make-up Manual, for considering train makeup for mixed
merchandise trains with a grade less than 2.0% and maximum track
curvature less than 8 degrees.
4. First Car Derailed: In each accident, the first car to derail
was an empty car.
5. Train Type: Five out of the six accidents involved mixed freight
trains, which typically require more complex train makeup
considerations.
6. Hazmat Cars: Five out of the six accident trains contained
hazmat cars, highlighting the potential risks associated with
transporting hazardous materials in long, complex consists.
7. Derailed Hazmat Cars: In three of the accidents, hazmat cars
were derailed, increasing the risk of hazardous material release and
environmental damage.
8. Hazmat Release: Three of the accidents resulted in the release
of hazardous materials, posing a threat to public safety and the
environment.
9. Evacuations: Two of the accidents led to the evacuation of local
populations due to the release of hazardous materials.
10. Key Trains: Three of the six accident trains were classified as
Key Trains, which are trains with a higher level of potential risk due
to the nature of the cargo they carry or their operational
characteristics.
Technologies such as DPUs, energy management systems, and dynamic
braking can be used in conjunction with proper train car placement and
makeup. While these technologies can improve train handling and fuel
efficiency, they cannot replace the need for correct car placement and
assembly. Railroads must prioritize proper train makeup to maintain
safety, prevent accidents, and optimize train performance. Further, all
operating employees must be properly trained in these technologies and
the handling of complex trains to ensure safe operation and minimize
human error.
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Recommended Actions
To improve train safety and reduce the risk of accidents, FRA
recommends the following best practices:
1. Review and update train makeup policies, procedures, and
guidelines to ensure they are comprehensive, effective, and current.
2. Ensure that all personnel involved in train makeup decisions and
operations receive appropriate training, guidance, and supervision to
effectively execute train makeup policies, procedures, and guidelines
to ensure safe operations.
3. Establish a system to regularly monitor and assess train makeup
practices, with a focus on identifying and addressing potential safety
risks.
4. Encourage open communication and collaboration among all
stakeholders, including train crews, dispatchers, yardmasters, and
maintenance personnel, to ensure a comprehensive understanding of train
makeup factors and their potential impact on safety. Personnel should
be encouraged and empowered to adhere to train makeup policies,
procedures, and guidelines, even if it delays a train.
5. Develop and implement strategies to mitigate the risks
associated with train build factors, such as the proper use of
distributed power, train length limitations, and other operational
train handling practices.
6. Enhance incident investigation procedures to specifically
address train makeup factors and their potential contribution to the
cause of the incident.
FRA encourages freight railroads to take actions consistent with
the preceding recommendations. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory
2023-02, issue additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate
action necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's
railroads, including pursing other corrective measures under its rail
safety authority.
Issued in Washington, DC.
John Karl Alexy,
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2023-07579 Filed 4-10-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P