[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 49 (Tuesday, March 14, 2023)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 15864-15899]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-03944]
[[Page 15863]]
Vol. 88
Tuesday,
No. 49
March 14, 2023
Part II
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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10 CFR Parts 20, 21, 26, et al.
Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event
Notifications; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 88 , No. 49 / Tuesday, March 14, 2023 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 15864]]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 20, 21, 26, 50, 70, 72, 73, 74, and 76
[NRC-2011-0014; NRC-2011-0015; NRC-2011-0017; NRC-2011-0018]
RIN 3150-AI49
Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event
Notifications
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule and guidance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its
regulations to implement its authority under Section 161A of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended. This final rule applies to several
classes of facilities as well as activities involving the
transportation of radioactive material and other property designated by
the NRC. This final rule also revises the physical security event
notification requirements for different classes of facilities and the
transportation of radioactive material to add consistency and clarity.
Further, the NRC is adding new event notification requirements
associated with the possession of enhanced weapons and imminent or
actual hostile acts, and new reporting requirements for suspicious
activity. The NRC also is issuing a final implementation guidance for
this final rule.
DATES:
Effective date: This final rule is effective April 13, 2023.
Compliance date: Compliance with this final rule is required by
January 8, 2024, for those licensed under parts 50, 52, 60, 63, 70, and
72 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) and subject
to Sec. Sec. 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 73.1215.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket IDs NRC-2011-0014, NRC-2011-0015,
NRC-2011-0017, and NRC-2011-0018 when contacting the NRC about the
availability of information for this action. You may obtain publicly
available information related to this action by any of the following
methods:
Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket IDs NRC-2011-0014, NRC-2011-
0015, NRC-2011-0017, or NRC-2011-0018. Address questions about NRC
dockets to Dawn Forder; telephone: 301-415-3407; email:
[email protected]. For technical questions, contact the individuals
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section. For the convenience of the reader,
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in the document are
also provided in the ``Availability of Documents'' section.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make
an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to
[email protected] or call 1-800-397-4209 or 301-415-4737, between
8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. eastern time, Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stewart Schneider, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, telephone: 301-415-4123; email:
[email protected]; or Philip Brochman, Office of Nuclear
Security and Incident Response, telephone: 301-287-3691; email:
[email protected]. Both are staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Executive Summary
This final rule has three distinct parts. Part 1 implements the
Commission's authority under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended (AEA). Section 161A authorizes the Commission to
designate those classes of licensees permitted to use firearms,
weapons, ammunition, or devices, notwithstanding local, State, and
certain Federal firearms laws and regulations prohibiting such use.
Part 2 revises the requirements for physical security event
notifications and adds two new notification requirements associated
with imminent or actual hostile acts and possession of enhanced
weapons. Additionally, Part 2 simplifies and reorganizes existing
physical security event notification requirements into several
timeliness categories (e.g., 15-minute, 1-hour, 4-hour, and 8-hour
notifications). Part 3 adds requirements for reporting suspicious
activities to law enforcement agencies and the NRC.
A. Need for the Regulatory Action
Part 1 of this final rule amends the NRC's regulations to implement
the Commission's authority under Section 161A of the AEA (Section 161A
authority). Without implementing regulations, the Commission would need
to grant Section 161A authority through confirmatory orders. This
process is unnecessarily inefficient for licensees and the NRC.
Additionally, this process lacks the transparency and regulatory
certainty provided by regulations. These amendments will establish a
clear and consistent regulatory process to enable licensees to apply
for and effectively implement the Commission's Section 161A authority.
Part 2 of this final rule amends the NRC's regulations in 10 CFR
part 73 to modify the physical security event notification
requirements. Currently, all physical security event notifications must
be submitted to the NRC within 1-hour. The revised regulations provide
a graded approach that takes into account the security significance of
the physical security event, which in most cases will provide licensees
greater flexibility. Additionally, this final rule adds new
requirements to notify the NRC following actual or imminent hostile
action as well as lost or stolen enhanced weapons. These new
requirements will ensure licensees provide notification to the NRC of
all appropriate physical security events.
Part 3 of this final rule amends the NRC's regulations in 10 CFR
part 73 to add requirements for licensees to report suspicious
activities. Currently, licensees voluntarily report suspicious
activities. Licensee implementation of voluntary suspicious activity
reporting has been inconsistent in terms of both the types of data
reported and the timeliness of reports. Because licensees' timely and
consistent submission of suspicious activity reports (SARs) to the NRC
and to law enforcement is an important part of the U.S. government's
efforts to disrupt or dissuade malevolent acts against the nation's
critical infrastructure, it is necessary to make suspicious activity
reporting mandatory.
B. Major Provisions
Major provisions of this final rule include:
Implementation of the Commission's Section 161A authority.
[[Page 15865]]
Section 161A authorizes the Commission to designate those classes of
licensees eligible to apply for stand-alone preemption authority or
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority. Stand-
alone preemption authority allows regulated entities to possess and use
weapons that would otherwise be prohibited by State, local, and certain
Federal firearms laws. Combined preemption authority and enhanced
weapons authority allows a regulated entity to possess and use a
certain category of covered weapon called an ``enhanced weapon.''
Enhanced weapons include machine guns, short-barreled shotguns, and
short-barreled rifles.
Modification of the requirements for physical security
event notifications using a graded approach that reflects the security
significance of the event. Additionally, this final rule adds new
notification requirements for imminent or actual hostile actions and
lost or stolen enhanced weapons.
Establishment of new suspicious activity reporting
requirements to clarify and ensure consistency in reporting to law
enforcement agencies and the NRC.
Concurrent with this final rule, the NRC is issuing Regulatory
Guide (RG) 5.86, ``Enhanced Weapons Authority, Preemption Authority,
and Firearms Background Checks''; RG 5.62, Revision 2, ``Physical
Security Event Notifications, Reports and Records''; and RG 5.87,
``Suspicious Activity Reports.''
C. Costs and Benefits
The NRC has prepared a regulatory analysis to determine the
expected quantitative costs and benefits of this final rule, as well as
qualitative factors considered in the NRC's rulemaking decision. The
quantitative analyses evaluate four attributes-industry implementation,
industry operation, NRC implementation, and NRC operation. Qualitative
analyses were prepared because monetizing the full impact of each
attribute is not possible or practical. Monetizing the impact of these
attributes would require estimation of factors such as the frequency of
security-related events and the consequences of such events.
The analysis concluded that this final rule will result in net
quantified costs to the industry and the NRC. The total cost of the
rule reflects, in part, the costs that will be incurred by eight NRC
licensees at seven sites that were granted, by confirmatory order,
stand-alone preemption authority and will need to update their
applicable procedures, instructions, and training to reflect the
requirements in this final rule.
The total cost of the rule also reflects the implementation and
operations costs to comply with the new physical security event
notification and suspicious activity reporting requirements. These
costs apply to the following licensed sites: production or utilization
facilities licensed under Sec. 50.21 or Sec. 50.22 (including both
operating and decommissioning power reactors and non-power reactors);
away-from-reactor independent spent fuel storage installations
(ISFSIs); and facilities that are licensed to possess special nuclear
material (SNM). The costs result from these licensees having to update
their procedures to reflect the new requirements, and estimated costs
associated with providing event notification and suspicious activity
reporting.
NRC costs to implement this final rule include costs associated
with oversight of licensees' transitioning from the confirmatory orders
to the requirements of the final rule. NRC operational costs include
reviewing and receiving both the physical security event notifications
and SARs. The benefits to the NRC are avoided costs associated with not
issuing confirmatory orders to future licensees requesting Section 161A
authority. The regulatory analysis concludes that this final rule
results in an estimated cost of between $2.85 million at a 7-percent
discount rate and $3.07 million at a 3-percent discount rate.
The regulatory analysis also considered the following qualitative
considerations and associated benefits: security-related attributes,
such as the occurrence of a possible attack and the successful
thwarting and mitigation of the attack, flexibility of response to
physical security events, suspicious activity reporting, and
enhancements to regulatory efficiency. Based on the assessment of the
costs and benefits of this final rule, including those benefits which
are unquantified, the NRC has concluded that the final rule provisions
are justified to protect public health and safety and the common
defense and security. For more information, please see the regulatory
analysis (ADAMS Accession No. ML19045A003).
Table of Contents
I. Background
II. Discussion
III. Opportunity for Public Comment
IV. Public Comment Analysis
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
VII. Regulatory Analysis
VIII. Backfitting and Issue Finality
IX. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
X. Plain Writing
XI. Environmental Assessment and Final Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act
XIII. Congressional Review Act
XIV. Criminal Penalties
XV. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
XVI. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XVII. Availability of Guidance
XVIII. Availability of Documents
I. Background
A. Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), as Amended
On August 8, 2005, President George W. Bush signed into law the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), Public Law 109-58, 119 Stat. 594
(2005). Section 653 of the EPAct amended the AEA by adding a new
Section 161A, ``Use of Firearms by Security Personnel'' (42 U.S.C.
2201a). Section 161A of the AEA provides the NRC with authority to
permit a licensee's or certificate holder's security personnel to
transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use weapons,
devices, ammunition, or other firearms, notwithstanding State, local,
and certain Federal firearms laws (and implementing regulations) that
may prohibit or restrict these actions. This could include, if approved
by the NRC, the use of enhanced weapons such as machine guns, short-
barreled shotguns, and short-barreled rifles.
The Commission designates the classes of NRC licensees eligible to
apply for Section 161A authority. Designated licensees may request
permission from the Commission to transfer, receive, possess,
transport, import, and use firearms, ammunition, or devices,
notwithstanding local, State, and certain Federal firearms laws and
regulations prohibiting such possession and use. For the purposes of
this rule, this type of authority is referred to as ``stand-alone
preemption authority.'' Additionally, designated licensees may request
permission to transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use
firearms, ammunition, or devices that require registration under the
National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. Chapter 53). These types of weapons
are typically referred to as ``enhanced weapons'' and for the purposes
of this rule this type of authority is referred to as ``combined
preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority.'' Enhanced weapons
include machine guns, short-barreled shotguns and short-barreled
rifles.
Section 161A.b requires that licensees ensure that their security
personnel that receive, possess, transport, import, or use a weapon,
ammunition, or device otherwise prohibited by State, local, or certain
Federal laws, including
[[Page 15866]]
regulations, shall be subject to a fingerprint-based background check
by the U.S. Attorney General (AG) and a firearms background check
against the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (NICS).
B. The Firearms Guidelines
Section 161A.d of the AEA requires that the Commission, with the
approval of the AG, develop and publish guidelines for the
implementation of the authority granted to the Commission under section
161A. The Firearms Guidelines provide guidance on how the Commission
intends to implement the authority conferred on it by Section 161A of
the AEA. On September 11, 2009, the NRC published the Firearms
Guidelines in the Federal Register (74 FR 46800). Section 161A of the
AEA took effect upon publication of the Firearms Guidelines. The NRC,
with the approval of the AG, revised the Firearms Guidelines (Revision
1) and published them in the Federal Register on June 25, 2014 (79 FR
36100). Subsequently, the NRC, with the approval of the AG, revised the
Firearms Guidelines again (Revision 2) and published them in the
Federal Register on March 8, 2019 (84 FR 8546). The Firearms Guidelines
are available at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2008-
0465.
C. October 2006 Proposed Rule
In 2006, the NRC initiated a rulemaking that would, among other
changes: (1) implement the new authority granted to the Commission in
Section 161A of the AEA and (2) modify existing physical security event
notification requirements. On October 26, 2006, the NRC published a
proposed rule, ``Power Reactor Security Requirements,'' in the Federal
Register (71 FR 62664) to implement the provisions of Section 161A as
one component of a larger proposed amendment to its regulations under
10 CFR parts 50, 72, and 73.
That portion of the proposed rule implementing the authority
granted the Commission under Section 161A of the AEA was consistent
with ongoing discussions between the NRC and the U.S. Department of
Justice on the development of the Firearms Guidelines. In those
discussions, the NRC had proposed that the provisions of Section 161A
of the AEA would apply only to nuclear power reactor facilities,
including both operating and decommissioning nuclear power reactors,
and Category I strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) facilities
(i.e., facilities possessing or using formula quantities or greater of
SSNM). This structure was proposed to permit these two highest-risk
classes of licensed facilities to apply to the NRC for Section 161A
authority. The NRC had also indicated that it would consider making
Section 161A authority available to additional classes of facilities,
radioactive material, or other property (including ISFSIs) in a
separate, future rulemaking.
On March 27, 2009, the NRC published the final rule, ``Power
Reactor Security Requirements'' in the Federal Register (74 FR 13926).
The requirements in the proposed rule to implement the NRC's authority
under Section 161A of the AEA were not included in that final rule
because the Firearms Guidelines had not been published and therefore
the NRC's authority under Section 161A had not yet taken effect.
Consequently, final regulations implementing the Commission's Section
161A authority could not be promulgated at that time. The physical
security event notification regulations were also not included in the
``Power Reactor Security Requirements'' rule because the NRC intended
to add new requirements associated with notifying local law enforcement
of the theft or loss of enhanced weapons.
D. February 2011 Proposed Rule
On February 3, 2011, the NRC published a proposed rule, ``Enhanced
Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event
Notifications,'' in the Federal Register (76 FR 6200). The proposed
enhanced weapons rule was consistent with the approved 2009 Firearms
Guidelines. With the publication of the Firearms Guidelines, Section
161A of the AEA took effect. The 2011 proposed rule included provisions
to implement the Commission's authority under Section 161A of the AEA.
It also made several changes to the physical security event
notification requirements in 10 CFR part 73 to address imminent attacks
or threats against nuclear power reactors, as well as suspicious
activities that could be indicative of potential preoperational
reconnaissance, surveillance, or challenges to security systems by
adversaries (hereinafter referred to as the event notifications part of
the rule, which at that time also included the suspicious activity
reporting part of the rule). The initial public comment period to
review and comment on the 2011 proposed rule and associated guidance
was 90 days. The comment period was extended to 180 days at the request
of stakeholders.
E. Preemption Designation Orders and Confirmatory Orders
Subsequent to the publication of the 2011 proposed rule, the NRC
received requests from ten licensees (located at eight separate sites)
to obtain stand-alone preemption authority. In response to these
requests, the NRC issued designation Order EA-13-092 on June 14, 2013
(78 FR 35984).
Order EA-13-092 designated the ten licensees as an interim class of
licensed facilities eligible to apply for stand-alone preemption
authority under Section 161A of the AEA. Order EA-13-092 also contained
direction related to completing firearms background checks for security
personnel whose official duties require access to covered weapons, and
contained direction for the licensees on submitting applications and
supporting information to obtain stand-alone preemption authority via a
confirmatory order. Subsequent to the NRC's issuance of Order EA-13-
092, two licensees (located at the same site) withdrew their
applications for stand-alone preemption authority.
The NRC approved applications for stand-alone preemption authority
for the eight remaining licensees at seven sites under Order EA-15-006
on September 4, 2015 (80 FR 53588), and under Orders EA-14-134, EA-14-
135, EA-14-136, EA-14-137, EA-14-138, EA-14-139, and EA-14-140 on
January 15, 2016 (81 FR 2247).
F. January 2013 Supplemental Proposed Rule
On January 10, 2013, the NRC published a supplemental proposed
rule, ``Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security
Event Notifications,'' (78 FR 2214) to add at-reactor ISFSIs as a class
of designated facilities eligible to apply for Section 161A authority
under the proposed Sec. 73.18(c) [renumbered Sec. 73.15(c) in this
final rule]. The NRC had concluded that including at-reactor ISFSIs in
the proposed rule would ensure a consistent transition from the
designation order and confirmatory orders to the final implementing
regulations for reactor licensees and any ISFSIs co-located at the
reactor site.
When a reactor facility and an ISFSI share a common security guard
force, as is the case for at-reactor ISFSIs, the NRC staff recognizes
that if the licensee applies for stand-alone preemption authority and
is approved, it may be beneficial for both facilities at the site to
have that authority. In the 2013 supplemental proposed rule, the NRC
indicated that other classes of facilities and activities (e.g., away-
from-reactor
[[Page 15867]]
ISFSIs and transportation of spent nuclear fuel) would be addressed in
a separate, future rulemaking (as originally discussed by the NRC in
the October 2006 proposed rule). The public comment period for the 2013
supplemental proposed rule was 45 days.
G. December 2013 Bifurcation of the Cyber Security Event Notification
Requirements
On December 20, 2013, in COMSECY-13-0031, ``Bifurcation of the
Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event
Notifications Rule'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML13280A366), the NRC staff
requested approval from the Commission to bifurcate the cyber security
event notification (CSEN) requirements from the event notifications
part of the enhanced weapons rule and to address these requirements in
a separate rulemaking. In SRM-COMSECY-13-0031, ``Bifurcation of the
Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event
Notification Rule'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML14023A860), the Commission
approved the NRC staff's plan to bifurcate the CSEN requirements from
the enhanced weapons rule. The NRC received comments on the proposed
CSEN requirements contained in the 2011 proposed enhanced weapons rule.
The NRC's responses to these comments were addressed in the ``Cyber
Security Event Notifications'' final rule published in the Federal
Register on November 2, 2015 (80 FR 67264) and are not addressed in
this rulemaking.
Additionally, draft Regulatory Guide (DG) 5019, Revision 1,
``Reporting and Recording Safeguards Events'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML100830413), was issued for public comment on February 3, 2011 (76 FR
6085). The portions of DG-5019, Revision 1, related to CSEN were also
bifurcated from the original draft guide, and are now included in the
final CSEN guidance in RG 5.83, ``Cyber Security Event Notifications''
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14269A388).
Accordingly, the NRC has removed all CSEN provisions from this
final rule and associated guidance.
H. September 2015 Supplemental Proposed Rule
On September 22, 2015, the NRC published a second supplemental
proposed rule, ``Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and
Security Event Notifications'' (80 FR 57106), to conform Part 1 of the
rule with the 2014 Revision 1 to the Firearms Guidelines. The 2009
Firearms Guidelines provided that the security personnel for all
licensees and certificate holders that fall within the designated
classes of facilities must undergo firearms background checks, whether
or not a particular licensee or certificate holder intends to seek
Section 161A authority. The NRC staff determined that this requirement
placed an unnecessary cost on licensees who had not applied for Section
161A authority without serving any relevant security purpose.
Consequently, under Revision 1 of the 2014 Firearms Guidelines, the
requirement for background checks applies to only those licensees and
certificate holders who apply for Section 161A authority.
In addition to conforming the 2011 proposed rule to Revision 1 of
the 2014 Firearms Guidelines, the 2015 supplemental proposed rule also
made three other changes. First, the 2015 supplemental proposed rule
made several clarifying and corrective changes to the process for
obtaining stand-alone preemption authority and the requirements for
firearms background checks. This was based upon language approved by
the Commission in the designation and confirmatory orders issued by the
NRC, subsequent to the publication of the 2011 proposed rule (i.e.,
Orders EA-13-092, EA-14-134, EA-14-135, EA-14-136, EA-14-137, EA-14-
138, EA-14-139, EA-14-140, and EA-15-006).
Second, the NRC made several additional changes to clarify the
agency's review and acceptance criteria for evaluating applications for
stand-alone preemption authority. These changes were based on lessons
learned by the NRC staff in developing confirmatory orders for those
licensees requesting stand-alone preemption authority, as well as
comments received in response to prior versions of the proposed rule.
Furthermore, to ensure consistency between processes, the NRC planned
to make corresponding changes to the proposed process for obtaining
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority.
Third, the NRC staff implemented Commission direction from SRM-
SECY-12-0125, ``Interim Actions to Execute Commission Preemption
Authority Under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
Amended'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML12326A653). In SRM-SECY-12-0125, the
Commission directed the NRC staff to include a plan ``to sunset
[withdraw] the interim designation order and the confirmatory orders''
in the final rule. Accordingly, the NRC included new language in
Sec. Sec. 73.18(s) and 73.19(r) [renumbered Sec. Sec. 73.15(s) and
73.17(r) in this final rule] of the 2015 supplemental proposed rule to
accomplish the Commission's direction.
Other changes in the 2015 supplemental proposed rule included the
removal of the definition of ``standard weapon'' and the removal of
references to standard weapons in the definitions of ``covered weapon''
and ``enhanced weapon.''
II. Discussion
This final rule reflects the proposed changes from the 2011
proposed rule and the 2013 and 2015 supplemental proposed rules. Part 1
of the rule implements the NRC's authority under Section 161A of the
AEA to permit a licensee security personnel to transfer, receive,
possess, transport, import, and use weapons, devices, ammunition, or
other firearms notwithstanding State, local, and certain Federal
firearms laws (and any implementing regulations) that may prohibit or
restrict these actions. The types of weapons include, for example,
machine guns, semiautomatic assault weapons, and large-capacity
ammunition feeding devices (i.e., magazines). As indicated in the 2011
proposed rule, an NRC licensee may voluntarily apply to the NRC to
obtain Section 161A authority (either stand-alone preemption authority
or combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority). This
part applies to nuclear power reactors, Category I SSNM facilities,
ISFSIs, and the transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF).
Part 2 of this final rule modifies existing physical security event
notifications, written follow-up reports, and recordkeeping
regulations, and adds new requirements for certain facilities or
activities (e.g., transportation). The existing regulations require
that all physical security event notifications be reported in one hour.
This reporting requirement may not reflect the event's actual security
significance. In this final rule, the NRC has applied a graded approach
to these new and revised physical security event notification
requirements that reflects the security significance of the event, the
urgency of the notification, and the underlying security risks to
public health and safety or to the common defense and security that are
posed by the affected facility or material being transported. The final
rule groups physical security events requiring notification into
several timeliness categories, with events having a greater security
significance requiring quicker notifications.
These requirements apply to the following licensees:
[[Page 15868]]
production or utilization facilities licensed under
Sec. Sec. 50.21 or 50.22 (including both operating and decommissioning
power reactors and non-power reactors);
facilities that possess Category I, II, or III quantities
of SSNM;
facilities that possess Category II or III quantities of
SNM;
hot cell facilities subject to 10 CFR 73.50;
ISFSIs;
monitored retrievable storage installations (MRSs); and
geologic repository operations areas (GROAs).
The physical security event notification requirements also apply to
the transportation of Category I, II, or III quantities of SSNM,
Category II or III quantities of SNM, SNF, and high-level radioactive
waste (HLW). This final rule also separates the physical security event
notification requirements, written follow-up reports, and recordable
security events into separate regulations to improve regulatory clarity
and ease of use, and to improve the quality of information provided to
the NRC. The NRC is also incorporating clarifying and editorial changes
to these regulations.
The NRC has also revised existing notification requirements for
licensees transporting Category II quantities of SNM (i.e., SNM
enriched to greater than 10 percent U-235) based upon a higher assessed
security risk from this material.
Additionally, the NRC has exempted most licensees subject to Sec.
73.67 from certain, but not all, of the physical security event
notification requirements in Sec. 73.1200. For example, the actual or
attempted introduction of contraband into a controlled access area has
been excluded given the existing physical security requirements of
Sec. 73.67. These exemptions apply to licensees: (1) possessing
Category III quantities of SSNM (Agreement State and NRC licensees); or
(2) possessing Category II or III quantities of SNM (e.g., non-power
reactors or fuel cycle facilities).
Finally, the NRC has determined that the imposition of certain
recordkeeping requirements in 10 CFR 73.1210(c) and (d) on licensees
subject to Sec. 73.67 that possess or ship Category III quantities of
SSNM (NRC and Agreement State licensees), or Category II or III
quantities of SNM (NRC licensees only) is not warranted, given the low
security risk associated with this material. Therefore, the staff has
revised the draft final rule to exempt these licensees from these
specific recordkeeping requirements. However, licensees subject to
Sec. 73.67 (e.g., non-power reactors) that ship spent nuclear fuel
under Sec. 73.37, ``Requirements for physical protection of irradiated
reactor fuel in transit,'' remain subject to the existing recordkeeping
requirements but only during spent nuclear fuel shipping activities.
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued guidance
requesting licensees to voluntarily notify the NRC of actual or
imminent hostile acts. This final rule makes these voluntary
notification requirements mandatory and adds new reporting requirements
for those licensees possessing enhanced weapons. Licensees that obtain
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority are
required to notify the NRC when the licensee makes a separate
notification to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) and the applicable local law enforcement agency (LLEA)
regarding a stolen or lost enhanced weapon. These requirements apply to
nuclear power reactors, ISFSIs, Category I SSNM facilities, or those
licensees engaged in the transportation of Category I SSNM or SNF.
Part 3 of this final rule establishes new requirements for
licensees to report suspicious activities to the LLEA, the FBI, the
NRC, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) if the suspicious
activity involves an aircraft. Following the events of September 11,
2001, the NRC issued security advisories and other guidance on
suspicious activities and requested that such activity be voluntarily
reported to the NRC. The new requirements make the reporting of
suspicious activities to these various agencies mandatory for certain
licensees.
Licensees' timely submission of SARs to the NRC and to law
enforcement is an important part of the U.S. government's efforts to
disrupt or dissuade malevolent acts against the nation's critical
infrastructure. Attack planning and preparation generally proceed
through several predictable stages, including intelligence gathering
and pre-attack surveillance. Reporting suspicious activities that could
be indicative of preoperational surveillance or reconnaissance efforts,
challenges to security systems and protocols, or elicitation of non-
public information related to security or emergency response programs,
offer law enforcement and security personnel the greatest opportunity
to disrupt or dissuade acts of terrorism before they occur.
Additionally, licensees' timely submission of SARs to the NRC supports
one of the agency's primary mission essential functions of threat
assessment for licensed facilities, materials, and shipping activities.
In this new regulation, the NRC is seeking to balance agency and
national objectives of reporting suspicious activities, while not
imposing unnecessary or undue costs on licensees. In this regard, it is
not the NRC's intent to dispute a licensee's conclusions about whether
an event is considered to be suspicious. Accordingly, the NRC intends
to focus any inspection and enforcement efforts regarding this new
regulation on programmatic aspects (e.g., adherence to established
procedures, training, points of contact, and the reporting process).
The NRC objective is to increase the flow of information to the law
enforcement and intelligence communities and thus, potentially disrupt
or dissuade potential terrorist attacks. These new suspicious activity
reporting requirements apply to:
production or utilization facilities licensed under Sec.
50.21 or Sec. 50.22 (including both operating and decommissioning
power reactors and non-power reactors);
fuel cycle facilities that possess a Category I quantity
of SSNM;
enrichment facilities that possess Category II or III
quantities of SNM and use Restricted Data (RD) materials, technology,
and information in the enrichment process;
hot cell facilities subject to 10 CFR 73.50;
ISFSIs;
MRSs; and
GROAs.
These new suspicious activity reporting requirements also apply to
licensees shipping SNF and Category I quantities of SSNM. This final
rule does not apply these reporting requirements to licensees engaged
in the fabrication of new fuel assemblies containing Category II or III
quantities of SNM; NRC and Agreement State licensees possessing
Category III quantities of SSNM; licensees possessing SSNM or SNM in a
form that has been encapsulated into sealed sources that are used for
research, development, and testing purposes; and licensees engaging in
the transportation of Category II and III quantities of SSNM or SNM.
The NRC has taken this approach because of the decreased security risk
given the lower enrichment level, lower quantity possessed, or physical
form of these materials. However, the NRC has applied these suspicious
activity reporting requirements to Category II and III SNM enrichment
facilities given the national security non-proliferation concerns
associated with RD materials, technology, and information.
The proposed rule contained the term ``certificate holder.'' As
used in the
[[Page 15869]]
proposed rule, the term referred only to entities holding a 10 CFR part
76 certificate of compliance (CoC), not to entities holding a 10 CFR
part 72 CoC. Entities possessing a part 72 CoC are not authorized to
possess radioactive material. Consequently, these entities have no need
for Section 161A authority. Subsequent to the publication of the 2015
supplemental proposed rule, the NRC terminated the remaining CoC for
gaseous diffusion facilities certified to enrich SNM under 10 CFR part
76. The NRC does not expect to issue any new CoCs under 10 CFR part 76.
Therefore, consistent with plain language objectives and increased
regulatory clarity, this final rule eliminates the terms ``certificate
holder'' and ``certificate of compliance'' from the final rule text.
The proposed rule also contained physical security event
notification and recordkeeping requirements regarding the loss or theft
of Safeguards Information. The NRC has reevaluated the need to address
the loss or theft of Safeguards Information in the final rule. Based on
this reevaluation, these provisions have been removed as the NRC has
determined that it is preferable to retain the existing notification
procedures in licensee security plans.
Withdrawal of Orders
On June 14, 2013, the Commission issued Order EA-13-092, ``Order
Designating an Interim Class of NRC-Licensed Facilities that are
Eligible to Apply to the Commission for Authorization to Use the
Authority Granted Under the Provisions of Section 161a of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as Amended.'' Between September 2015 and January
2016 the Commission issued seven confirmatory orders to eight licensees
authorizing them to use stand-alone preemption authority at seven
sites.
In SRM-SECY-12-0125, the Commission directed the NRC staff to
include in the final rule a plan ``to sunset [withdraw] the interim
designation order and the confirmatory orders'' that would later be
issued by the Commission. This final rule designates the classes of
facilities eligible to apply to use the Commission's Section 161A
authority. Additionally, this final rule specifies that those licensees
subject to confirmatory orders granting them stand-alone preemption
authority must update their applicable procedures, instructions, and
training, and come into compliance with the requirements of the rule as
of the compliance date specified in the final rule. In accordance with
the Commission's direction in SRM-SECY-12-0125, this final rule
includes language in 10 CFR 73.15, ``Authorization for use of enhanced
weapons and preemption of firearms laws,'' and 10 CFR 73.17, ``Firearms
background checks for armed security personnel,'' to withdraw the
designation order and confirmatory orders 300 days from the date of
publication of the final rule.
III. Opportunity for Public Comment
As stated in the background section, the NRC published the proposed
rule and the two supplemental proposed rules for public comment in the
Federal Register. Additionally, the NRC staff hosted three public
meetings to discuss issues associated with the proposed rule,
supplemental proposed rules, and the final rule. A public meeting was
held at NRC Headquarters on June 1, 2011, to discuss the proposed
implementation plan for the 2011 proposed rule published on February 3,
2011 (76 FR 6200). A summary of the June 2011 public meeting is
available in ADAMS under Package Accession No. ML111720007. The NRC did
not hold a public meeting to discuss the 2013 supplemental proposed
rule because of the limited scope of the proposed change. Another
public meeting was held at NRC Headquarters on November 19, 2015, to
discuss the 2015 supplemental proposed rule that was published for
public comment on September 22, 2015 (80 FR 57106), and to discuss the
implementation period for the final rule. A summary of the November
2015 public meeting is available in ADAMS under Accession No.
ML15348A082. The feedback from the two public meetings informed the NRC
staff's recommended schedule for both the implementation of the
background check requirements and for the implementation of the
physical security event notification and suspicious activity reporting
requirements.
A third public meeting was held at NRC Headquarters on May 30,
2019, to inform stakeholders of the final changes the staff was
planning to make in this final rule. The NRC did not accept public
comments at this meeting. A summary of the May 2019 public meeting is
available in ADAMS under Accession No. ML19176A143.
IV. Public Comment Analysis
The NRC received a total of 18 comment submissions on this
rulemaking effort. Private citizens provided 8 comment submissions, 5
licensees provided comment submissions, 1 Federal agency provided a
comment submission, 2 nuclear industry organizations provided 3 comment
submissions, and 1 U.S. Congressman provided a comment submission. Most
comment submissions were generally supportive of the regulatory action.
The public comment submittals are available on the Federal e-Rulemaking
website at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID Nos. NRC-2011-
0014, NRC-2011-0015, NRC-2011-0017, and NRC-2011-0018.
The NRC staff prepared a summary and analysis of public comments
received on the 2011 proposed rule and the 2013 and 2015 supplemental
proposed rules, respectively. This summary and analysis is available in
ADAMS under Accession No. ML16264A004. Of the 18 comment submissions
received, 6 included comments on the associated draft regulatory guides
and draft weapons safety assessment document. The NRC prepared a
separate summary and analysis of the public comments received on these
guides and document, which is available in ADAMS under Accession No.
ML17123A319.
Responses to the public comments, including a description of how
the final rule text or guidance changed as a result of the public
comments, can be found in the two public comment analysis documents
identified above. For more information about the associated supporting
and guidance documents see the ``Availability of Guidance'' section of
this final rule.
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
The following paragraphs describe the specific changes that are
reflected in this final rule.
Sec. 20.2201 Reports of Theft or Loss of Licensed Material
Paragraph 20.2201(c) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71. The
relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec. 73.1205.
This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 21.2 Scope
Paragraph 21.2(c) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71. The
relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec. Sec.
73.1200 and 73.1205. This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 26.417 Recordkeeping and Reporting
Paragraph (b)(1) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71. The
relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec. 73.1200.
This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 26.719 Reporting Requirements
Paragraph (a) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71. The
relevant
[[Page 15870]]
regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec. 73.1200. This final
rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 50.55 Conditions of Construction Permits, Early Site Permits,
Combined Licenses, and Manufacturing Licenses
Paragraph 50.55(e)(8) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71.
The relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec.
73.1205. This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 50.72 Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear
Power Reactors
Paragraph 50.72(a), footnote 1, contains a cross reference to Sec.
73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec.
73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 70.20a General License To Possess Special Nuclear Material for
Transport
Paragraph 70.20a(e)(2) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71.
The relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec.
73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 70.20b General License for Carriers of Transient Shipments of
Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material, Special
Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic Significance, Special Nuclear
Material of Low Strategic Significance, and Irradiated Reactor Fuel
Paragraphs 70.20b(c), (d), and (e) contain a cross reference to
Sec. 73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in
Sec. 73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 72.74 Reports of Accidental Criticality or Loss of Special
Nuclear Material
Paragraph (c) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71. The
relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec. 73.1200.
This final rule updates the cross reference.
Part 73--Physical Protection of Plants and Materials
This final rule restructures 10 CFR part 73 to add Subparts A
through T. The new structure uses subparts to provide a logical
structure and increase clarity for part 73. These new subparts
incorporate existing regulations, add new regulations, and provide for
future regulations, within this logical structure. Subparts J through S
are reserved for future rulemakings. The subpart structure is as
follows:
Subpart A--General Provisions: contains existing
Sec. Sec. 73.1 through 73.8. Detailed descriptions of the revisions to
Sec. Sec. 73.2 and 73.8 are provided later in this section. No
amendments are made to the requirements for the remaining sections.
Subpart B--Enhanced Weapons, Preemption, and Firearms
Background Checks: contains new sections Sec. Sec. 73.15 and 73.17.
These sections contain the requirements associated with implementation
of stand-alone preemption authority, combined preemption authority and
enhanced weapons authority, and firearms background checks pursuant to
Section 161A of the AEA. Detailed descriptions of those sections are
provided later in this section.
Subpart C--General Performance Objective of Strategic
Special Nuclear Material: contains the existing Sec. 73.20. No
amendments are made to this section.
Subpart D--Protection of Safeguards Information: contains
the existing Sec. Sec. 73.21 through 73.23. Detailed descriptions of
the revisions to Sec. Sec. 73.22 and 73.23 are provided later in this
section. No amendments are made to the requirements for the remaining
sections.
Subpart E--Physical Protection Requirements of Special
Nuclear Material and Spent Nuclear Fuel in Transit: contains the
existing Sec. Sec. 73.24 through 73.38. Detailed descriptions of the
revisions to Sec. Sec. 73.27 and 73.37 are provided later in this
section. No amendments are made to the requirements for the remaining
sections.
Subpart F--Physical Protection Requirements at Fixed
Sites: contains the existing Sec. Sec. 73.40 through 73.55. Detailed
descriptions of the revisions to Sec. Sec. 73.46, 73.51, and 73.55 are
provided later in this section. No amendments are made to the
requirements for the remaining sections.
Subpart G--Background Check and Access Authorization
Requirements: contains the existing Sec. Sec. 73.56 through 73.67.
Detailed descriptions of revisions to Sec. 73.67 are provided later in
this section. No amendments are made to the requirements for the
remaining sections.
Subpart H--Records and Postings: contains the existing
Sec. Sec. 73.70 through 73.75. Section 73.71 has been removed and
reserved. No amendments are made to the requirements for the remaining
sections.
Subpart I--Enforcement: contains the existing Sec. Sec.
73.76 through 73.81 with no amendments to the requirements in those
sections.
Subparts J through S--Reserved
Subpart T--Security Notifications, Reports, and
Recordkeeping: contains new Sec. Sec. 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and
73.1215. These requirements were previously located in Sec. 73.71 and
appendix G to 10 CFR part 73. This final rule also removes and reserves
both Sec. 73.71 and appendix G to 10 CFR part 73. Detailed
descriptions of those sections are provided later in this section.
Sec. 73.2 Definitions
This final rule adds new terms to the list of defined terms in
Sec. 73.2 and revises one existing term. Added terms include new
definitions of Adverse firearms background check, Combined preemption
authority and enhanced weapons authority, Covered weapon, Enhanced
weapon, Firearms background check, NICS, NICS response, NICS
transaction number, Satisfactory firearms background check, and Stand-
alone preemption authority. These terms are used in the Firearms
Guidelines and in the new enhanced weapons regulations to describe the
types of weapons, background check characteristics, and authority
relevant to Section 161A of the AEA.
Other new terms being added to clarify the physical event
notification requirements, include: Contraband, Greater than class C
waste, High-level radioactive waste, Independent spent fuel storage
installation, Restricted Data, Special nuclear material, Spent nuclear
fuel or spent fuel, and Time of discovery. This final rule also revises
the existing term Movement control center.
Additionally, this final rule adds new paragraphs (b) and (c) to
Sec. 73.2, which provide cross references to appropriate ATF and FBI
regulations for terms that are relevant to Section 161A activities
(e.g., Handgun, Machine gun, or Short-barreled shotgun), which fall
under the original purview of these agencies.
Sec. 73.8 Information Collection Requirements: OMB Approval
This final rule revises paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 73.8 to
update the list of paragraphs in 10 CFR part 73 that contain
information collection requirements. Paragraph (b) removes Sec. 73.71
and appendix G (which are removed from 10 CFR part 73) and adds new
Sec. Sec. 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 73.1215 (which contain
notification, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements in 10 CFR part
73).
Paragraph (c) references three forms and their associated OMB
control numbers. These control numbers are separate from the control
number associated with 10 CFR part 73 itself. Two existing forms (NRC
Form 366 and FBI Form FD-258) are used by NRC licensees and are added
to this paragraph as a corrective change under
[[Page 15871]]
OMB control numbers 3150-0104 (NRC) and 1110-0046 (FBI), respectively.
New NRC Form 754 is added to this paragraph under OMB control number
3150-0204. The NRC Form 754 is used by licensees to submit security
personnel for a firearms background check under the provisions of Sec.
73.17. The NRC has also made conforming changes to NRC Form 366 to
reflect the submission of written follow-up security event reports
(under Sec. 73.1205) following notifications made by licensees,
pursuant to Sec. 73.1200. Conforming changes to NRC Form 366 were
necessary to reflect the restructuring of the physical security event
notifications requirements in 10 CFR part 73.
Sec. 73.15 Authorization for Use of Enhanced Weapons and Preemption of
Firearms Laws
New Sec. 73.15 contains requirements for a licensee to apply for:
(1) stand-alone preemption authority or (2) combined preemption
authority and enhanced weapons authority, under Section 161A of the
AEA.
Paragraph (a) describes the purpose of the section and paragraph
(b) contains general requirements applicable to both types of
authority.
Paragraph (c) lists the designated classes for either stand-alone
preemption authority or combined preemption authority and enhanced
weapons authority.
Paragraph (d) sets forth the requirements and process for licensees
who are included within the designated classes of facilities,
radioactive material, and other property specified in Sec. 73.15(c)(1)
and desire to voluntarily apply for stand-alone preemption authority
under Section 161A of the AEA.
Paragraph (e) sets forth the requirements and process for eligible
licensees (as specified in Sec. 73.15(c)(2)) who choose to voluntarily
apply for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority
under Section 161A of the AEA. Paragraph (e) requires that the licensee
in its application provide sufficient information to justify its
request for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority and how that authority will be implemented. Applicants for
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority that
already have stand-alone preemption authority under Sec. 73.15(d) are
not required to reapply for stand-alone preemption authority in their
Sec. 73.15(e) application.
Paragraph (f) requires the licensee to submit additional
information to the NRC in support of a request for combined preemption
authority and enhanced weapons authority addressing the specific
enhanced weapons that the licensee requests permission to use and the
required training for security personnel whose official duties require
access to the enhanced weapons.
Paragraph (g) requires licensees to provide a copy of the NRC's
letter approving the licensee's request for combined preemption
authority and enhanced weapons authority to the entity that will be
transferring the enhanced weapons to the licensee. The ATF must
approve, in advance, all transfers of enhanced weapons to an NRC
licensee. This final rule revises Sec. 73.15(g)(1) and adds new
subparagraphs (g)(2) and (g)(3) to cross-reference NRC-licensee
responsibilities to comply with relevant ATF regulations in 27 CFR part
479.
Paragraph (h) requires licensees to ensure that security personnel
complete training and qualification on any enhanced weapons prior to
their use. Recurring training and requalification on any enhanced
weapons are also required in accordance with the licensee's approved
training and qualification plan.
Paragraph (i) is reserved.
Paragraph (j) lists those sections of part 73 that contain
requirements applicable to the use of enhanced weapons by licensee
security personnel.
Paragraph (k) requires NRC licensees to notify the NRC of any
adverse ATF inspection or enforcement findings received by the licensee
regarding the receipt, possession, or transfer of enhanced weapons.
Paragraph (l) is reserved.
Paragraph (m) defines what constitutes a transfer of enhanced
weapons. The paragraph describes requirements for the transfer of
enhanced weapons including, but not limited to, prior approval from the
ATF as well as records and reporting requirements. The issuance of an
enhanced weapon by a licensee to a security individual with the
subsequent return of the weapon to the licensee upon the individual's
completion of official duties would not constitute a transfer under
ATF's regulations.
Paragraph (n) describes requirements to transport enhanced weapons
for activities that are not considered a transfer of the enhanced
weapons. Additionally, this final rule adds new subparagraph (6) to
Sec. 73.15(n) to clarify that NRC licensees planning interstate
transport of enhanced weapons must obtain prior ATF approval, as
required by 27 CFR 478.28.
Paragraph (o) describes requirements for conducting periodic
inventories of enhanced weapons to verify that these weapons are not
stolen or lost. These inventories include a monthly inventory that
involves counting the number of enhanced weapons that are present at
the licensee's facility and an annual inventory that verifies the
serial number of each weapon that is present at the licensee's
facility. The paragraph requires that records be maintained on
inventory results. The paragraph also provides minimum requirements for
tamper-indicating devices used for securing enhanced weapons. Finally,
the paragraph requires that inventory discrepancies be resolved within
24 hours of identification. Otherwise, the discrepancy should be
treated as if an enhanced weapon had been stolen or lost.
This final rule adds new subparagraph (8) to Sec. 73.15(o) to
clarify that NRC licensees conducting periodic inventories while
enhanced weapons are offsite for an authorized purpose must document
the absence of such weapons in the periodic inventory.
Paragraph (p) describes requirements for notification of the NRC
and local law enforcement officials of lost or stolen enhanced weapons.
Paragraph (q) describes the records requirements for licensees
relating to the receipt, transfer, and transportation of enhanced
weapons. Licensees are permitted to integrate any records required
under this paragraph with records required by ATF relating to the
possession of enhanced weapons. This final rule also includes
conforming changes to Sec. 73.15(q)(1) to clarify the records
requirements for the inventories in paragraph (o).
Paragraph (r) describes requirements regarding the termination,
modification, suspension, and revocation of a licensee's Section 161A
authority. Licensees seeking termination or modification of their
authority to possess enhanced weapons, or different types, calibers,
gauges, or quantities of enhanced weapons, are required to apply to the
NRC in accordance with Sec. 73.4 and the license amendment provisions
of Sec. Sec. 50.90, 70.34, or 72.56 of this chapter. Licensees are
required to transfer any enhanced weapons that they will no longer be
authorized to possess to an appropriate party in accordance with ATF's
requirements. Alternatively, the weapons can be surrendered to the ATF
for destruction.
This final rule revises paragraphs (r)(1) and (2) to include a
cross reference to the license amendment application regulations in
Sec. 72.56. This conforming change is made as a result of including
[[Page 15872]]
all ISFSIs within the scope of the rule. Additionally, consistent with
the global removal of the term ``certificate holders'' from the final
rule text, this final rule also removes the cross reference to Sec.
76.45 (for amendments to a 10 CFR part 76 CoC) from paragraphs (r)(1)
and (r)(2).
Paragraph (s) adds provisions to provide for licensees' transitions
from stand-alone preemption authority or combined preemption authority
and enhanced weapons authority previously approved by the NRC via
orders to the requirements of this final rule. The NRC expects that a
licensee would complete its transition to the requirements of this
final rule without the need for any additional applications or
notifications to the NRC. Paragraph (s)(4) of Sec. 73.15 provides that
as of January 8, 2024, any orders implementing the Commission's Section
161A authority are withdrawn.
Sec. 73.17 Firearms Background Checks for Armed Security Personnel
New Sec. 73.17 contains requirements for a licensee to conduct
firearms background checks mandated under Section 161A of the AEA. Only
licensees that voluntarily apply for Section 161A authority under Sec.
73.15 are required to conduct firearms background checks under Sec.
73.17.
Paragraph (a) states that the firearms background checks are
intended to verify that the licensee's armed security personnel are not
prohibited from receiving, possessing, transporting, importing, or
using covered weapons under Federal, State, or local law or
regulations.
Paragraph (b) provides general requirements regarding the
completion of firearm background checks, including the establishment
and implementation of a Firearms Background Check Plan. The Firearms
Background Check Plan is a component of the licensee's 10 CFR part 73,
appendix B, required Training and Qualification plan for security
personnel whose official duties require access to covered weapons.
Paragraph (b)(2) describes the groups of individuals included
within the phrase security personnel whose official duties require
access to covered weapons.
Paragraph (b)(3) specifies the elements of the Firearms Background
Check Plan.
Paragraphs (b)(4) through (b)(8) address the requirements for
conducting firearms background checks and specify, among other things,
that the licensee can only assign security personnel who have completed
a satisfactory firearms background check to duties requiring access to
covered weapons. This section also includes a requirement to remove
individuals from duties requiring access to covered weapons, without
delay, if they receive a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response.
Paragraph (b)(9) requires licensees to complete a new satisfactory
firearms background check for security personnel who experience a
break-in-service.
Paragraph (b)(10) specifies that changes in license ownership or
changes in the licensee's security guard contractor do not constitute a
break-in-service that would require a new firearms background check.
Paragraph (b)(11) prohibits licensees from using a satisfactory
firearms background check in lieu of completing other required criminal
history records checks or background investigations specified in the
NRC's access authorization or personnel security clearance programs
under other provisions of 10 CFR chapter I.
Paragraph (b)(12) specifies that a new firearms background check is
not required for security personnel who have completed a satisfactory
firearms background check, pursuant to a Commission designation order
issued before the effective date of this final rule. However, these
security personnel remain subject to the periodic firearms background
checks and the break-in-service firearms background check requirements
of Sec. 73.17.
Paragraph (b)(13) requires a licensee to stop conducting firearms
background checks if it withdraws its application for Section 161A
authority.
Paragraph (b)(14) requires a licensee to discontinue conducting
firearms background checks if the NRC rescinds or revokes the
licensee's Section 161A authority, in accordance with Sec. 73.15.
Paragraph (c) is reserved.
Paragraph (d) describes the components of a firearms background
check. A firearms background check consists of two parts: (1) a check
of an individual's fingerprints against the FBI's fingerprint system,
and (2) a check of the individual's identity against the FBI's NICS
databases.
Paragraph (e) describes the information that a licensee must submit
to the NRC for each individual subject to a firearms background check.
This paragraph also specifies how long the licensee must retain this
information as a record.
Paragraph (f) describes the requirements for periodic firearms
background checks, which are to be completed at least once every 5
calendar years. The paragraph also specifies an allowance period for
completion of a satisfactory periodic firearms background check of
midnight of the end of the month that is 5 years from the date of the
most recent firearms background check. Security personnel may remain
assigned to duties requiring access to covered weapons, while pending
completion of a periodic firearms background check (started before the
end of the allowance period). However, if a satisfactory firearms
background check is not completed by the end of the allowance period,
then the security personnel must be removed from duties requiring
access to covered weapons. Paragraph (f) also specifies that an
individual who receives a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response
during a periodic firearms background check must be removed, without
delay, from duties requiring access to covered weapons.
Paragraph (g) requires affected licensees to notify the NRC that an
individual with access to covered weapons has been removed from all
duties requiring such access because of the discovery of a
disqualifying status condition or disqualifying event under applicable
Federal, State, or local law. The licensee is required to maintain
records of such removals under the Firearms Background Check Plan, as
required under revised paragraph (b)(3)(vi).
Paragraph (h) requires affected security personnel to make timely
disclosure within 72 hours of the occurrence of a disqualifying event
or status condition specified in 27 CFR 478.32 that would prevent them
from receiving or possessing firearms.
Paragraph (i) is reserved.
Paragraph (j) requires training for security personnel who are
subject to firearms background checks under the licensee's Firearms
Background Check Plan on the following: (1) Federal and State
disqualifying status conditions or disqualifying events specified in 27
CFR 478.32, (2) ATF's implementing regulations defining such status
conditions or disqualifying events, (3) the ongoing obligation of
security personnel who are subject to a firearms background check to
notify their licensee's security management of the occurrence of such a
disqualifying status condition or disqualifying event, and (4) the
process for appealing adverse firearms background check results.
Finally, periodic refresher training on these modules is required
annually.
Paragraph (k) describes the requirements for processing fingerprint
checks as part of the firearms background checks. This includes the
submission of fingerprint cards or electronic fingerprint records to
the NRC.
[[Page 15873]]
Paragraph (l) is reserved.
Paragraph (m) describes the requirements for fees associated with
processing firearms background checks. The amount of the fee will be
specified on the NRC's public website.
Paragraph (n) describes NRC responsibilities regarding the
processing of firearms background checks.
Paragraph (o) is reserved.
Paragraph (p) states that licensees may not assign security
personnel who have received a ``denied'' or a ``delayed'' NICS response
to any official duties requiring access to covered weapons during the
pendency of an appeal of the firearms background check.
Paragraph (q) requires licensees to establish and maintain a system
of files and procedures to protect the firearms background check, NRC
Form 754 records, and personal information from unauthorized
disclosure.
Paragraph (r) provides a cross reference to Sec. 73.15(s) for the
withdrawal of the orders issued under Section 161A of the AEA.
Sec. 73.22 Protection of Safeguards Information: Specific Requirements
Paragraph (f)(3) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71. The
relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec. 73.1200.
This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 73.23 Protection of Safeguards Information-Modified Handling:
Specific Requirements
Paragraph (f)(3) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71. The
relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec. 73.1200.
This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 73.27 Notification Requirements
Paragraph (c) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71. The
relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec. Sec.
73.1200 and 73.1205. This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 73.37 Requirements for Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor
Fuel in Transit
Paragraphs (b)(3)(iii) and (b)(3)(v)(C) contain a cross reference
to Sec. 73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found
in Sec. 73.1200. This final rule updates the cross references.
New paragraph (b)(3)(viii) requires a licensee to ensure that the
firearms background check requirements of Sec. 73.17 are met for all
armed escorts whose official duties require access to covered weapons
or who inventory enhanced weapons.
Sec. 73.46 Fixed Site Physical Protection Systems, Subsystems,
Components, and Procedures
This final rule updates paragraph (b) to cross reference to the
firearms background check requirements of Sec. 73.17 and requires that
security personnel subject to Sec. 73.46 and who are using covered
weapons are also subject to the firearms background check requirements
in Sec. 73.17.
Sec. 73.51 Requirements for the Physical Protection of Stored Spent
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste
New paragraph (b)(4)(i) is added to Sec. 73.51 to cross reference
to the firearms background check requirements of Sec. 73.17.
Paragraph (d)(13) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71. The
relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec. 73.1210.
This final rule updates the cross reference.
Paragraph (e) is amended to add a paragraph heading.
Paragraph (f) is added as a conforming change to Sec. 73.15(j) to
reflect the potential for a specific license ISFSI to possess covered
weapons. This modified provision follows from the change described in
Sec. 73.15(c) in which all ISFSI licensees are included in the scope
of this final rule, meaning all ISFSI licensees are eligible to apply
for Section 161A authority. Paragraph (f) also requires ISFSI licensees
employing covered weapons to train their security personnel on the use
of sufficient force, including deadly force.
Sec. 73.55 Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities
in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage
This final rule updates Sec. 73.55(b)(12) to cross reference to
the firearms background check requirements of Sec. 73.17.
Additionally, Sec. 73.55(p)(3) is updated to reflect the reporting
requirements for suspension of security measures in accordance with
Sec. Sec. 73.1200 and 73.1205 instead of Sec. 73.71.
Sec. 73.67 Licensee Fixed Site and In-Transit Requirements for the
Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate and Low
Strategic Significance
This final rule updates Sec. 73.67(e)(3)(vii) and (g)(3)(iii) to
update the cross reference to the new Sec. Sec. 73.1200 and 73.1205.
Sec. 73.71 Reporting of Safeguard Events
This final rule removes and reserves Sec. 73.71. The regulations
on physical security event notifications, written follow-up reports,
and lesser-significance recordable physical security events that were
previously located in Sec. 73.71 and appendix G to 10 CFR part 73 are
relocated to new Sec. Sec. 73.1200, 73.1205, and 73.1210,
respectively.
Sec. 73.1200 Notification of Physical Security Events
This final rule adds new Sec. 73.1200 on physical security event
notifications. This section describes categories of physical security
events and the timeframes by which the licensee must notify the NRC of
these events.
Paragraph (a) adds a 15-minute notification requirement for a
licensee's initiation of a security response based on an imminent or
actual hostile action against its facility or for a licensee being
notified by LLEA or government officials of potential hostile action or
sabotage anticipated within the next 12 hours. These notification
requirements apply only to nuclear power reactors, fuel cycle
facilities authorized to possess and use Category I quantities of SSNM,
and ISFSIs. In addition, these requirements will apply to future
licensees such as MRSs, GROAs, and production facilities.
Paragraph (b) adds a 15-minute notification requirement for a
licensee's initiation of a security response based on an imminent or
actual hostile actions against shipments or for a licensee being
notified by LLEA or government officials of potential sabotage
anticipated within the next 12 hours. These notification requirements
apply only to shipments of Category I SSNM, SNF, and HLW.
Paragraph (c) clarifies the 1-hour notifications for significant
security events against facilities. These notifications apply to:
production or utilization facilities licensed under Sec.
50.21 or Sec. 50.22 (including both operating and decommissioning
power reactors and non-power reactors);
facilities that possess Category I, II, or III quantities
of SSNM;
facilities that possess Category II or III quantities of
SNM;
hot cell facilities subject to 10 CFR 73.50;
ISFSIs;
MRSs; and
GROAs.
Significant security events requiring notification include actual,
attempted, or a threat to cause: theft or diversion of Category I, II,
or III quantities of SSNM or Category II or III quantities of SNM;
significant physical damage to a facility; unauthorized operation,
manipulation, or tampering that results in interruption of normal
operation of a
[[Page 15874]]
reactor or an accidental criticality at a Category I SSNM facility; for
facilities with a vehicle barrier, introduction of a quantity of
explosives that exceeds the facility's adversary characteristics beyond
a protected area's vehicle barrier system; and notification from LLEA
or other government agency of potential hostile action or sabotage
against a nuclear power reactor, SNF storage or disposal facility, or a
Category I SSNM facility that is anticipated to occur in more than 12
hours.
Paragraph (d) adds 1-hour notifications for significant security
events against shipments. These notifications apply to shipments of
Category I, II, or III quantities of SSNM; SNF; HLW; and Category II or
III quantities of SNM. The types of significant security events
requiring notification include actual, attempted, or threat to cause:
theft or diversion of a shipment; significant physical damage to a
conveyance (vehicle) transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM,
Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW, or to the material itself;
discovery of the loss of, and recovery or accounting for, a lost
shipment of Category I SSNM; and notification from LLEA or other
government agency of potential hostile action or sabotage against a
shipment of Category I SSNM, SNF, or HLW that is anticipated within
greater than the next 12 hours.
Paragraph (e) adds 4-hour notifications for security events against
facilities. These notifications apply to the same classes of facilities
as specified under paragraph (c). Examples of events that require
notification include but are not limited to: actual or attempted entry
of an unauthorized individual into a protected area (PA), vital area
(VA), material access area (MAA), or controlled access area (CAA);
actual or attempted introduction of contraband into a PA, VA, or MAA;
and an authorized weapon is lost or uncontrolled inside a PA, VA, or
MAA.
Paragraph (f) adds 4-hour notifications for security events against
shipments. These notifications apply to many of the classes of
shipments specified under paragraph (d). Examples of events that
require notification include but are not limited to: actual or
attempted entry of unauthorized persons into a transport vehicle or the
material being transported, which involves shipment of a Category I or
II quantity of SSNM, a Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW; and
actual or attempted introduction of contraband into a transport vehicle
or the material being transported, which involves shipment of a
Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II quantity of SNM, SNF,
or HLW.
Paragraph (g) adds 8-hour notifications for security program
failure events at facilities. These notifications apply to the same
classes of facilities as specified under paragraph (c). A security
program failure is a programmatic failure of a security system,
process, or procedure. Examples of security program failures include
but are not limited to: the failure, degradation, or vulnerability of a
security system, process, or procedure (for which compensatory measures
have not been implemented) that could have allowed an unauthorized
individual into a PA, VA, MAA, or CAA, or could have allowed contraband
into a PA, VA, or MAA or that could have allowed a quantity of
explosives exceeding the facility's adversary characteristics beyond a
vehicle barrier; and the unauthorized operation, manipulation, or
tampering with a nuclear reactor's controls or structures, systems, or
components (SSCs) that does not interrupt the normal operation of a
reactor.
Paragraph (h) adds 8-hour notifications for security program
failure events for those classes of shipments as specified under
paragraph (d). Examples of security program failures include but are
not limited to: failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability (for
which compensatory measures have not been implemented) that could have
allowed an unauthorized individual or contraband into a transport
vehicle or the material being transported.
Paragraphs (i), (j), (k), and (l) are reserved.
Paragraph (m) adds a requirement for licensees to notify the ATF
immediately upon the discovery of any stolen or lost enhanced weapons.
After which, licensees must notify the NRC as soon as possible, but not
later than 1 hour.
Paragraph (n) adds a requirement for a 24-hour notification to the
NRC when a licensee receives an adverse inspection finding, enforcement
finding, or other adverse notice from the ATF regarding any ATF-issued
federal firearms license or the licensee's possession, receipt,
transfer, transportation, or storage of enhanced weapons.
Paragraph (o) adds requirements for making telephonic notifications
to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center (i.e., the notification
process) under Sec. 73.1200. Provisions address the communication of
security events where the information contains safeguards or classified
information.
Paragraph (p) adds requirements for licensees providing significant
supplementary information to a previously submitted notification to the
NRC in compliance with paragraph (o).
Paragraph (q) adds provisions regarding retraction of previous
security event reports. Based upon the NRC's response to public
comments, the retraction provisions have been expanded from only
``invalid'' security events to also include ``not reportable'' security
events.
Paragraphs (r) and (s) add provisions clarifying the importance of
emergency notifications and eliminating unnecessary duplication.
Paragraph (t) adds provisions regarding the deliberate disclosure,
theft, loss, compromise, or possible compromise of classified
documents, information, or material. For such events, the licensee's
notification should be made in accordance with the requirements of
Sec. 95.57.
Sec. 73.1205 Written Follow-Up Reports of Physical Security Events
This final rule adds new Sec. 73.1205 addressing the submission of
written follow-up reports following a licensee's telephonic
notification of a physical security event under Sec. 73.1200. This
section is applicable to licensees who are also subject to the various
provisions of Sec. 73.1200.
Paragraph (a) adds the general requirement to submit written
follow-up reports to the NRC within 60 days of the licensee's
notification made under Sec. 73.1200. Paragraph (a) also adds several
exemptions to the requirement to submit written follow-up reports for
certain security events.
Paragraph (b) adds criteria for written follow-up report
development and submission, including the development of significant
supplemental information.
Paragraph (c) adds requirements on the contents of a written
follow-up report.
Paragraph (d) adds requirements regarding the transmission of a
written follow-up report to the NRC.
Paragraph (e) adds requirements for licensees to retain records of
written follow-up reports submitted to the NRC for 3 years from the
date of the report.
Sec. 73.1210 Recordkeeping of Physical Security Events
This final rule adds new Sec. 73.1210 addressing the recordkeeping
of less significant physical security events and conditions adverse to
security. It consolidates and clarifies the safeguards event log
requirements into this new section. This section is applicable to
licensees who are also subject to the various provisions of Sec.
73.1200.
[[Page 15875]]
Paragraph (a) specifies the categories of events and conditions
that must be recorded and adds the objective and purpose for recording
such events. The recording of appropriate events is intended to
facilitate the licensee's monitoring of the effectiveness of its
physical security program as part of the licensee's overall quality
assurance program.
Paragraph (b) adds the general requirement to record the events or
conditions specified in Sec. 73.1210(c) through (f) within 24 hours of
the time of discovery. Paragraph (b)(2) provides record retention
requirements. Paragraph (b)(3) adds flexibility by allowing licensees
to record these events or conditions in either a standalone safeguards
event log or in the licensee's corrective action program. Licensees
must implement information security requirements of 10 CFR parts 73 or
95, as applicable, on the protection of this information. Paragraph
(b)(4) describes the content of the information in these records.
Paragraph (b)(5) specifies that an event or condition, for which a
notification was made under Sec. 73.1200, is not also required to be
recorded under Sec. 73.1210. Paragraph (b)(6) specifies that an event
or condition, for which a SAR was made under Sec. 73.1215, is not also
required to be recorded under Sec. 73.1210.
Paragraph (c) specifies compensated events which must be recorded
pursuant to paragraph (b)(1). Compensated events include any failure,
degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a security or safeguards
system for which compensatory measures were established within the
required timeframe and that could have resulted in a security event
(e.g., entry of unauthorized personnel into a PA, VA, MAA, CAA,
transport vehicle, or transported material; entry of contraband into a
PA, VA, or MAA).
Paragraph (d) specifies ammunition events which must be recorded
pursuant to paragraph (b)(1). Ammunition events involve lost or
uncontrolled small quantities of ammunition.
Paragraph (e) is reserved.
Paragraph (f) requires that events or conditions involving other
decreases in the effectiveness of the physical security program be
recorded in accordance with paragraph (b)(1).
Paragraph (g) requires that events or conditions involving
infractions, losses, compromises, or possible compromise of classified
information or classified documents be recorded under the requirements
found in Sec. 95.57.
Paragraph (h) adds exemptions to the recording of physical security
events for licensees who are subject to Sec. 73.67 and who possess or
transport a Category III quantity of SSNM or a Category II or III
quantity of SNM.
Sec. 73.1215 Suspicious Activity Reports
This final rule adds a new Sec. 73.1215, which requires that
licensees report suspicious activities to their LLEA, their FBI local
field office, the NRC, and the local FAA control tower (for suspicious
activities involving aircraft), as soon as possible, but within 4 hours
of the time of discovery. The NRC's objective is to encourage licensees
to use their best judgement to promptly assess whether an activity is
suspicious and must be reported. As part of this assessment, licensees
may discuss the activity with local authorities or review electronic
information, such as surveillance video, before concluding that the
activity is suspicious. The new suspicious activity reporting
requirements are applicable to all licensees subject to the provisions
of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.45, Sec. 73.46, Sec. 73.50, Sec. 73.51,
Sec. 73.55, Sec. 73.60, or Sec. 73.67 with the exceptions noted in
paragraphs (d) and (g).
Paragraphs (a) and (b) add the NRC's purpose and objective of this
new requirement.
Paragraph (c) adds general requirements for the reporting of
suspicious activities, the establishment of points of contact with the
licensee's LLEA, local FBI field office, and local FAA control tower
(for suspicious activities involving aircraft) and the inclusion of
this information in security communication procedures.
Paragraph (d) adds reporting of suspicious activities for
facilities and material involving: challenges to the licensee's
security systems and procedures; elicitation of non-public information
from knowledgeable personnel relating to security or emergency response
programs; or observed preoperational surveillance or reconnaissance
activities. Paragraphs (d)(1) through (3) also specify which licensees
are subject to suspicious activity reporting.
Paragraph (e) adds reporting of suspicious activities for shipments
involving: challenges to transportation communication systems or
security systems; interference with in-progress shipments; elicitation
of non-public information from knowledgeable personnel relating to
security or emergency response programs; or observed preoperational
surveillance or reconnaissance activities.
Paragraph (f) adds reporting of suspicious activities for
facilities engaged in the enrichment of SNM using RD technology. Such
suspicious activities include, but are not limited to: aggressive
noncompliance by visitors involving willful departure from tour groups
or unauthorized entry into restricted areas; unauthorized recording or
imaging of RD information, technology, or materials; or elicitation of
non-public information from knowledgeable individuals regarding
physical and information systems for protecting RD information,
technology, or materials.
Paragraph (f)(2) adds an exemption for the reporting of a
licensee's identification of alleged or suspected activities involving
actual, attempted, or conspiracies to obtain RD, communicate RD, remove
RD, or disclose RD in violation of Sections 224, 225, 226, and 227 of
the AEA under Sec. 95.57 instead of Sec. 73.1215.
Paragraph (g) adds exemptions to the reporting of suspicious
activities for (1) NRC and Agreement State licensees who are subject to
Sec. 73.67 and who possess SSNM in quantities greater than 15 grams
but less than the quantity necessary to form a critical mass per Sec.
150.11(a); and (2) a particular NRC licensee who is authorized for
possession of SSNM or SNM in the form of sealed sources that are used
for research, development, and testing purposes.
Appendix A to Part 73--U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Offices and
Classified Mailing Addresses
This final rule updates appendix A to 10 CFR part 73 to add a
secure email address for licensees authorized to transmit classified
information to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center. Paragraphs III
and IV are also added to appendix A to require the use of classified
telephone numbers, secure telephones, and secure email when licensees
are communicating classified information to the NRC Headquarters
Operations Center unless directed otherwise by the NRC.
Appendix B to Part 73--General Criteria for Security Personnel
This final rule updates appendix B to 10 CFR part 73, section VI,
paragraph B.1(a)(4), which contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.19.
The relevant regulations from proposed Sec. 73.19 are now found in
Sec. 73.17. This final rule corrects this cross reference. Appendix B
is also revised to clarify employment suitability for armed security
personnel.
Appendix G to Part 73--Reportable Safeguards Events
This final rule removes and reserves appendix G to 10 CFR part 73.
The regulations on physical security event
[[Page 15876]]
notifications, written follow-up reports, and lesser-significance
recordable physical security events and conditions adverse to security,
which were previously located in Sec. 73.71 and appendix G to 10 CFR
part 73, are relocated to new Sec. Sec. 73.1200, 73.1205, and 73.1210,
respectively.
Sec. 74.11 Reports of Loss or Theft or Attempted Theft or Unauthorized
Production of Special Nuclear Material
Paragraph 74.11(c) contains a cross reference to Sec. 73.71. The
relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec. 73.1200.
This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 76.113 Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material--
Category I
Paragraph (b) to Sec. 76.113 contains a cross reference to Sec.
73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec.
73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 76.115 Special Nuclear Material of Moderate Strategic
Significance--Category II
Paragraph (b) to Sec. 76.115 contains a cross reference to Sec.
73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec.
73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.
Sec. 76.117 Special Nuclear Material of Low Strategic Significance--
Category III
Paragraph (b) to Sec. 76.117 contains a cross reference to Sec.
73.71. The relevant regulations from Sec. 73.71 are now found in Sec.
73.1200. This final rule updates the cross reference.
VI. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule does not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
This final rule affects only the licensing, operation of, and
transportation by:
production or utilization facilities licensed under Sec.
50.21or Sec. 50.22 (including both operating and decommissioning power
reactors and non-power reactors);
facilities that possess Category I, II, or III quantities
of SSNM;
facilities that possess Category II or III quantities of
SNM;
hot cell facilities subject to 10 CFR 73.50;
ISFSIs;
MRSs; and
GROAs.
The companies, universities, and government agencies that own and
operate these facilities do not fall within the scope of the definition
of ``small entities'' set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or
the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810).
VII. Regulatory Analysis
The NRC has prepared a regulatory analysis for this final rule. The
analysis examines the costs and benefits of the alternatives considered
by the NRC. The final regulatory analysis can be found under ADAMS
Accession No. ML19045A003. The NRC requested comment on the draft
regulatory analyses prepared for the 2011 proposed rule and the 2015
supplemental proposed rule. No public comments were received.
VIII. Backfitting and Issue Finality
The provisions of this final rule implementing the statutory
authority of Section 161A of the AEA are voluntary in nature. These
amendments do not impose modifications or additions to existing
licensee SSCs, designs, procedures, or organizations required to
operate an NRC-licensed facility. Accordingly, the provisions of this
final rule do not constitute backfitting, as defined in Sec. Sec.
50.109, 70.76, and 72.62, and are not otherwise inconsistent with any
issue finality provision in 10 CFR part 52.
This final rule contains three requirements that were not imposed
by order on the eight licensees with stand-alone preemption authority:
notification of disqualifying events or conditions (Sec. 73.17(g)),
training supporting notification of disqualifying events or conditions
and information for appealing an adverse firearms background check to
the FBI (Sec. 73.17(j)), and protection of information from
unauthorized disclosure (Sec. 73.17(q)). Although these amendments
represent new requirements, they involve recordkeeping, reporting
requirements or an appeals process, which do not constitute backfitting
as defined in 10 CFR Chapter I or a violation of issue finality in 10
CFR part 52.
This final rule also imposes new physical security event
notification and suspicious activity reporting requirements. These
amendments involve information collection and reporting activities,
which are outside the purview of the backfitting and issue finality
provisions. Therefore, a backfit analysis is not required and has not
been prepared for this final rule.
IX. Cumulative Effects of Regulation
Cumulative Effects of Regulation (CER) consists of the challenges
licensees may face in addressing the implementation of new regulatory
positions, programs, and requirements (e.g., rulemaking, guidance,
generic letters, backfits, inspections). The CER may manifest in
several ways, including the total impact on licensees from simultaneous
or consecutive regulatory actions that can adversely affect the
licensee's capability to implement those requirements, while continuing
to operate or construct its facility in a safe and secure manner.
The goals of the NRC's CER effort were met throughout the
development of this final rule. The NRC staff has engaged external
stakeholders at public meetings and by soliciting public comments on
the proposed rules and associated draft guidance documents. The
proposed rule (76 FR 6199) was issued on February 3, 2011, for public
comment. The staff also issued the draft guidance for public comment at
the same time as the February 2011 proposed rule (February 3, 2011; 76
FR 6085). A public meeting was held at NRC Headquarters on June 1, 2011
(ADAMS Package Accession No. ML111720007), to discuss the proposed
implementation plan for the February 2011 proposed rule (76 FR 6199).
The staff also issued two supplemental proposed rules that: (1)
expanded the scope of the rulemaking to include at-reactor ISFSIs
(January 10, 2013; 78 FR 2214) and (2) revised the firearms background
check requirements to align with the updated Firearms Guidelines from
2014 (September 22, 2015; 80 FR 57106). A second public meeting was
held at NRC Headquarters on November 19, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15348A082), to discuss the supplemental proposed rule that was
published on September 22, 2015 (80 FR 57106) and to discuss the
implementation period for the final rule. The feedback from these two
public meetings informed the staff's implementation schedule for both
the background check requirements and the physical security event
notifications requirements. The staff held a third public meeting at
NRC Headquarters on May 30, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19176A143), to
inform stakeholders of the final changes the staff was planning to make
in this final rule. NRC did not accept public comments at this meeting.
Based upon input from the public and affected licensees, and in
consideration of the need to promulgate the regulations on Section 161A
authority and to update the regulations on physical security event
notifications, the NRC has specified that this final rule will take
effect 30 days from the date of publication of this notice. The NRC is
[[Page 15877]]
not providing licensees a compliance period to apply for Section 161A
authority because such application is voluntary. However, in Sec. Sec.
73.15 and 73.17, the NRC is specifying a compliance period of 300 days
from the date of publication of this final rule for licensees who have
applied for and received stand-alone preemption authority via
confirmatory orders to transition to the requirements of this final
rule. Finally, the NRC is also specifying a compliance period of 300
days from the date of publication of this final rule for licensees to
implement and train key personnel on the revised physical security
event notification and suspicious activity reporting requirements.
Information on the effective and compliance dates for the various
provisions of this final rule are found in the DATES section of this
notice.
X. Plain Writing
The Plain Writing Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111-274) requires Federal
agencies to write documents in a clear, concise, and well-organized
manner. The NRC has written this document to be consistent with the
Plain Writing Act as well as the Presidential Memorandum, ``Plain
Language in Government Writing,'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR
31885).
XI. Environmental Assessment and Final Finding of No Significant
Environmental Impact
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10
CFR part 51 subpart A that this final rule will not have a significant
effect on the quality of the human environment and, therefore, an
environmental impact statement is not required. The principal effect of
this action is to revise the security regulations to implement Section
161A of the AEA, to clarify existing requirements for notification of
physical security events, and to add several new requirements for
physical security event notification and suspicious activity reporting.
Many of the changes in this final rule fall under a categorical
exclusion for which the Commission has previously determined that such
actions, neither individually nor cumulatively, will have significant
impacts on the human environment. The NRC has determined that Parts 2
and 3 of this final rule regarding physical security event
notifications and the suspicious activity reporting requirements are
subject to the exemptions in Sec. Sec. 51.22(c)(3)(ii),
51.22(c)(3)(iii), and 51.22(c)(3)(iv). The NRC has also determined that
the cross-reference changes are subject to the exemption in Sec.
51.22(c)(2).
The remaining changes in this final rule not qualifying for a
categorical exclusion were evaluated for their environmental impacts
and the effects of these changes are addressed in the Environmental
Assessment. The determination of this Environmental Assessment is that
there will be no significant radiological or non-radiological
environmental impacts associated with this rule. The environmental
assessment is available as indicated under the ``Availability of
Documents'' section.
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act
This final rule contains new or amended collections of information
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et.
seq). The collections of information were approved by the Office of
Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0253, 3150-0104, and 3150-
0204.
The burden to the public for the information collections is
estimated to average 2.4 hours per response for information collection
requirements contained in part 73 and 2.2 hours per response for NRC
Form 754, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching
existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and
completing and reviewing the information collection. There is no
additional burden for NRC Form 366.
The information collection contained in part 73 is being conducted
to implement Section 161A of the AEA and to add several new
requirements to event notification requirements that resulted from
insights from implementation of the security orders, review of site
security plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection
program and force-on-force exercises. Responses to this collection of
information are voluntary in the case of Section 161A authority. This
information will be used by the NRC to review and approve applications
for Section 161A authority. In the case of the physical security event
notifications, responses to this collection of information are required
under the new Sec. 73.1200. In the case of the written follow-up
reports associated with the physical security event notifications,
responses to this collection of information are required under the new
Sec. 73.1205. The information will be used by the NRC to provide
oversight of security events at licensed facilities. Information
submitted on NRC Form 754 is being collected to fulfill requirements
for the firearms background checks from Section 161A of the AEA. Use of
NRC Form 754 is voluntary under Section 161A of the AEA and only those
licensees that apply for Section 161A authority will be required to use
the form to submit security personnel for firearms background checks
against the FBI's NICS system. Confidential and proprietary information
submitted to the NRC is protected in accordance with NRC regulations at
Sec. Sec. 9.17(a), 9.301(a), and 2.390(b) of chapter I.
You may submit comments on any aspect of the information
collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden, by the
following methods:
Federal Rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2011-0018.
Mail comments to: FOIA, Library, and Information
Collections Branch, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Mail Stop:
T6-A10M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001
or to the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (3150-0253, 3150-0104, and 3150-0204), Attn: Desk Officer for
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC
20503; email: [email protected].
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting
or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB control
number.
XIII. Congressional Review Act
This final rule is a rule as defined in the Congressional Review
Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808). However, the Office of Management and Budget
has not found it to be a major rule as defined in the Congressional
Review Act.
XIV. Criminal Penalties
For the purposes of Section 223 of the AEA, the NRC is issuing this
final rule that amends 10 CFR part 73 under one or more of Sections
161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA. Willful violations of the rule are
subject to criminal enforcement. Criminal penalties as they apply to
regulations in 10 CFR part 73 are already discussed in Sec. 73.81.
Accordingly, Sec. Sec. 73.15, 73.17, 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and
73.1215 will not be included in Sec. 73.81(b).
XV. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
Under the ``Agreement State Program Policy Statement'' approved by
the Commission on October 2, 2017, and published in the Federal
Register (82
[[Page 15878]]
FR 48535; October 18, 2017), this rule is classified as compatibility
``NRC.'' Compatibility is not required for Category ``NRC''
regulations. The NRC program elements in this category are those that
relate directly to areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the AEA
or the provisions of 10 CFR, and although an Agreement State may not
adopt program elements reserved to the NRC, it may wish to inform its
licensees of certain requirements via a mechanism that is consistent
with the particular State's administrative procedure laws but does not
confer regulatory authority on the State.
XVI. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub.
L. 104-113) requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies,
unless using such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or is
otherwise impractical. In this final rule, the NRC is using standards
from applicable firearms standards developed by nationally recognized
firearms organizations or standard setting bodies or from standards
developed by: (1) Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the U.S.
Department of Energy's National Training Center, and the U.S.
Department of Defense; (2) State law-enforcement training centers; or
(3) State Division (or Department) of Criminal Justice Services
Training Academies.
XVII. Availability of Guidance
The NRC is issuing the following new or revised guidance documents
in support of the implementation of the requirements set forth in this
final rule:
RG 5.62, Revision 2, ``Physical Security Event
Notifications, Reports, and Records'';
RG 5.86, ``Enhanced Weapons Authority, Preemption
Authority, and Firearms Background Checks'';
RG 5.87, ``Suspicious Activity Reports'';
``Weapons Safety Assessment,'' Volumes 1-4; and
``WSA Reference Information.''
Revision 2 to RG 5.62, new RG 5.86, and new RG 5.87 are publicly
available and may be found in ADAMS under Accession Nos. ML17131A285,
ML17131A296, and ML17138A384, respectively. Volumes 1-4 of the Weapons
Safety Assessment may be found in ADAMS under Package Accession No.
ML18108A014. The WSA Reference Information volume may be found in ADAMS
under Accession No. ML18115A418 but is not publicly available.
Information and comment submissions related to the guidance can be
accessed by searching on https://www.regulations.gov under Docket IDs
NRC-2011-0014, NRC-2011-0015, and NRC-2011-0017. Analysis of public
comments received on these guidance documents are discussed in Section
IV, ``Public Comment Analysis.''
The NRC is issuing RG 5.86 that contains detailed guidance on the
implementation of the proposed requirements on applying for combined
preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority, stand-alone
preemption authority, and conducting firearms background checks. The
associated draft regulatory guide (DG-5020) and Revision 1 to DG-5020
were published for public comment in conjunction with the 2011 proposed
rule and the 2015 supplemental proposed rule, respectively. These draft
regulatory guides and public comments can be found under docket ID NRC-
2011-0015. The final guidance reflects public comments received on both
draft regulatory guides.
The NRC has published a four volume ``Weapons Safety Assessment''
document as an acceptable method to assist licensees in completing the
weapons safety assessment required under Sec. 73.15(e) as part of an
application for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority. Volumes 1 and 3 contain introductory and explanatory
material. Volume 2 contains a weapons safety assessment template that
licensees may complete and submit with their applications under Sec.
73.15. Licensees are not required to use the Volume 2 template in their
application but may use their own methodology to evaluate the onsite
and offsite risks associated with the deployment and potential use of a
specific enhanced weapon and the need to implement preventive or
mitigative measures to address those risks. Volume 4 contains a
completed sample template for a hypothetical power reactor facility.
The WSA Reference Information volume contains information on weapons
capabilities and characteristics and is not publicly available for
security reasons. Licensees that are considering applying for combined
preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority may request the WSA
Reference Information volume through their NRC licensing project
manager. The NRC considered public comments in developing the final
weapons safety assessment. Additional information can be found under
docket ID NRC-2011-0017.
The NRC is also issuing a revision to RG 5.62. Revision 2 to RG
5.62 provides guidance on the implementation of physical security event
notification requirements, as modified by this final rule. The NRC
published DG-5019, Revision 1, on February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6085) for
public comment after the publication of the 2011 proposed rule. The
final guidance reflects public comments received on the draft
regulatory guide.
The NRC has bifurcated the guidance in DG-5019, Revision 1,
regarding suspicious activity reporting into a separate new RG 5.87.
The final guidance reflects public comments received on the draft
regulatory guide.
The NRC is temporarily withdrawing NUREG-1304, ``Reporting of
Safeguards Events,'' dated February 1988, (ADAMS Accession No.
ML16012A188). NUREG-1304 contains a set of questions and answers on
physical security event notifications and reports. Since the new and
old physical security event notification regulations differ, the NRC
will temporarily withdraw this NUREG to prevent confusion. The NRC will
conduct a workshop after licensees have implemented the revised
physical security event notification, written follow-up report, and
recordkeeping requirements. The NRC will publish the results of the
workshop as NUREG-1304, Revision 1. The NRC will also conduct a
separate workshop after licensees have implemented the suspicious
activity reporting requirements and publish those results as a separate
NUREG.
The NRC is withdrawing Generic Letter (GL) 91-03, ``Reporting of
Safeguards Events'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML031140131). This GL is no
longer consistent with the revised physical security event notification
regulations in Sec. Sec. 73.1200 and 73.1205 and will be withdrawn to
prevent confusion. The staff has incorporated relevant topics from GL
91-03 into the new revision of RG 5.62.
XVIII. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as
indicated.
[[Page 15879]]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document ADAMS Accession No./ Federal Register citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Firearms Guidelines (September 11, 2009)........ 74 FR 46800.
Firearms Guidelines, Revision 1 (June 25, 2014). 79 FR 36100.
Firearms Guidelines, Revision 2 (March 8, 2019). 84 FR 8546.
Environmental Assessment (July 2006 proposed ML061920093.
rule).
Environmental Assessment for Final Rule......... ML16270A086.
Regulatory Analysis Regulatory Analysis- ML061380803.
appendices (May 2006 proposed rule). ML061380796.
ML061440013.
Regulatory Analysis for Final Rule.............. ML19045A003.
Information Collection Analysis................. ML092640277.
NRC Form 754, ``Armed Security Personnel ML11321A240.
Firearms Background Check''.
Commission: SECY-08-0050, ``Firearms Guidelines ADAMS Package--ML072920478.\1\
Implementing Section 161A of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Issues''
(April 17, 2008).
Commission: SECY-08-0050A, ``Firearms Guidelines ML081910207.
Implementing Section 161A of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 and Associated Policy Issues--
Supplemental Information'' (July 8, 2008).
Commission: SRM-SECY-08-0050/0050A, ``Firearms ML082280364.
Guidelines Implementing Section 161A of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and Associated Policy
Issues'' (August 15, 2008).
Letter Opinion from Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, ML090080191.
Firearms and Explosives' Office of Enforcement
on the Transfer of Enhanced Weapons (January 5,
2009).
Commission: SECY-10-0085, ``Proposed Rule: ML101110121.
Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks
and Security Event Notifications (RIN: 3150-
AI49)'' (June 27, 2010).
Commission: SRM-SECY-10-0085, ``Proposed Rule: ML102920342.
Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks
and Security Event Notifications (RIN: 3150-
AI49)'' (October 19, 2010).
Proposed Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background 76 FR 6199.
Checks, and Security Event Notifications Rule
(February 3, 2011).
Supplemental Proposed Enhanced Weapons Firearms 78 FR 2214.
Background Checks and Security Event
Notifications Rule (January 10, 2013).
Supplemental Proposed Enhanced Weapons Firearms 80 FR 57106.
Background Checks and Security Event
Notifications Rule (September 22, 2015).
Annotated Public Comments on: Enhanced Weapons, ML22287A158.
Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event
Notifications Rule and Supporting Regulatory
Guidance Documents.
Public Comment Analysis for the Final Rule...... ML16264A004.
Public Comment Analysis for the Final Rule ML17123A319.
Supporting Regulatory Guides and Weapons Safety
Assessment.
DG-5019, Revision 0, ``Reporting and Recording ML071710233.
Safeguards Events'' (June 2007).
DG-5019, Revision 1, ``Reporting and Recording ML100830413.
Safeguards Events'' (January 2011).
DG-5020, Revision 0, ``Applying................. ML100321956.
for Enhanced Weapons Authority, Applying for
Preemption Authority, and Accomplishing
Firearms Background Checks under 10 CFR Part
73'' (January 2011).
DG-5020, Revision 1, ``Applying for Enhanced ML14322A847.
Weapons Authority, Applying for Preemption
Authority, and Accomplishing Firearms
Background Checks under 10 CFR Part 73''
(September 2015).
Regulatory Guide 5.62, Revision 2, ``Physical ML17131A285.
Security Event Notifications, Reports, and
Records''.
Regulatory Guide 5.86, ``Enhanced Weapons ML17131A296.
Authority, Preemption Authority, and Firearms
Background Checks''.
Regulatory Guide 5.87, ``Suspicious Activity ML17138A384.
Reports''.
Commission: SECY-12-0027, ``Preemption Authority ML113130015.
Pursuant to Section 161A, `Use of Firearms by
Security Personnel,' of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as Amended'' (February 17, 2012).
Commission: SRM-SECY-12-0027, ``Preemption ML12124A377.
Authority Pursuant to Section 161A, `Use of
Firearms by Security Personnel,' of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as Amended'' (May 3, 2012).
Commission: SECY-12-0125, ``Interim Actions to ADAMS Package--ML12164A839.
Execute Commission Preemption Authority Under
Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as Amended'' (September 20, 2012).
Commission: SRM-SECY-12-0125, ``Interim Actions ML12326A653.
to Execute Commission Preemption Authority
Under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as Amended'' (November 21, 2012).
NUREG/BR-0058, ``Regulatory Analysis Guidelines ML042820192.
of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,''
Revision 4 (September 30, 2004).
Order EA-13-092, ``Order Designating an Interim 78 FR 35984.
Class of NRC-Licensed Facilities That are
Eligible to Apply to the Commission for
Authorization to Use the Authority Granted
Under the Provisions of Section 161a of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended'' (June
14, 2013).
Order EA-15-004, ``BWXT Preemption Order'' 80 FR 53588.
(September 4, 2015).
Orders EA-14-134, EA-14-135, EA-14-136, EA-14- 81 FR 2247.
137, EA-14-138, EA-14-139, and EA-14-140,
``Reactor Preemption Orders'' (January 15,
2016).
Draft OMB Supporting Statement for the second ML15035A633.
supplemental proposed rule.
OMB Supporting Statements for the Final Rule and ADAMS Package--ML17067A164.
Associated Forms.
``Weapons Safety Assessment'', Volumes 1-4...... ADAMS Package--ML18108A014.
``WSA Reference Information (non-publicly ML18115A418.
available).
Generic Letter 1991-003, ``Reporting of ML031140131.
Safeguards Events'' (March 6, 1991).
Commission: SECY-18-0058, ``Draft Final Rule-- ADAMS Package--ML16264A000.
Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks,
and Security Event Notifications'' (May 22,
2018).
Commission: ``Supplement to SECY-18-0058: Draft ML19017A025.
Final Rule--Enhanced Weapons, Firearms
Background Checks, And Security Event
Notifications'' (February 4, 2020).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Enclosure 1 to SECY-08-0050 is not publicly available.
[[Page 15880]]
Throughout the development of this rule, the NRC has posted
documents related to this rule, including public comments, on the
Federal Rulemaking website at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket
IDs NRC-2011-0014, NRC-2011-0015, NRC-2011-0017, and NRC-2011-0018.
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 20
Byproduct material, Criminal penalties, Hazardous waste, Licensed
material, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Occupational safety and health, Packaging and containers,
Penalties, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Source material, Special nuclear material, Waste
treatment and disposal.
10 CFR Part 21
Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalties, Radiation protection,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
10 CFR Part 26
Administrative practice and procedure, Alcohol abuse, Alcohol
testing, Appeals, Chemical testing, Drug abuse, Drug testing, Employee
assistance programs, Fitness for duty, Management actions, Nuclear
power plants and reactors, Privacy, Protection of information,
Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
10 CFR Part 50
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Classified
information, Criminal penalties, Education, Fire prevention, Fire
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Penalties, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria,
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Whistleblowing.
10 CFR Part 70
Classified information, Criminal penalties, Emergency medical
services, Hazardous materials transportation, Material control and
accounting, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, Packaging and
containers, Penalties, Radiation protection, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Security measures,
Special nuclear material, Whistleblowing.
10 CFR Part 72
Administrative practice and procedure, Hazardous waste, Indians,
Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear energy, Penalties, Radiation
protection, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security
measures, Spent fuel, Whistleblowing.
10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Exports, Hazardous materials transportation,
Imports, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security
measures.
10 CFR Part 74
Accounting, Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation,
Material control and accounting, Nuclear energy, Nuclear materials,
Packaging and containers, Penalties, Radiation protection, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Scientific equipment, Special nuclear
material.
10 CFR Part 76
Certification, Criminal penalties, Nuclear energy, Penalties,
Radiation protection, Reporting and record keeping requirements,
Security measures, Special nuclear material, Uranium, Uranium
enrichment by gaseous diffusion.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting
the following amendments to 10 CFR parts 20, 21, 26, 50, 70, 72, 73,
74, and 76:
PART 20--STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST RADIATION
0
1. The authority citation for part 20 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 11, 53, 63, 65, 81,
103, 104, 161, 170H, 182, 186, 223, 234, 274, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2014,
2073, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2133, 2134, 2201, 2210h, 2232, 2236, 2273,
2282, 2021, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201,
202 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842); Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, sec. 2 (42 U.S.C. 2021b); 44 U.S.C. 3504
note.
Sec. 20.2201 [Amended]
0
2. In Sec. 20.2201(c), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1205''.
PART 21--REPORTING OF DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
0
3. The authority citation for part 21 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 63, 81,103,
104, 161, 223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2093, 2111, 2133, 2134,
2201, 2273, 2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs.
201, 206 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5846); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,
secs. 135, 141 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
Sec. 21.2 [Amended]
0
4. In Sec. 21.2(c), remove the reference ``Sec. 73.71'' and add in
its place the reference ``Sec. Sec. 73.1200 and 73.1205''.
PART 26--FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS
0
5. The authority citation for part 26 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 103, 104, 107,
161, 223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2133, 2134, 2137, 2201, 2273,
2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42
U.S.C. 5841, 5842); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
Sec. 26.417 [Amended]
0
6. In Sec. 26.417(b)(1), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1200''.
Sec. 26.719 [Amended]
0
7. In Sec. 26.719(a), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1200''.
PART 50--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION
FACILITIES
0
8. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 11, 101, 102, 103,
104, 105, 108, 122, 147, 149, 161, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186,
187, 189, 223, 234 (42 U.S.C. 2014, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135,
2138, 2152, 2167, 2169, 2201, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236,
2237, 2239, 2273, 2282); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs.
201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, sec. 306 (42 U.S.C. 10226); National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332); 44 U.S.C. 3504
note; Sec. 109, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 783.
Sec. 50.55 [Amended]
0
9. In Sec. 50.55(e)(8), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1205''.
Sec. 50.72 [Amended]
0
10. In Sec. 50.72(a), footnote 1, remove the reference ``73.71'' and
add in its place the reference ``73.1200''.
PART 70--DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
0
11. The authority citation for part 70 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 51, 53, 57(d), 108,
122, 161, 182, 183,
[[Page 15881]]
184, 186, 187, 193, 223, 234, 274, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2071, 2073,
2077(d), 2138, 2152, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2243, 2273,
2282, 2021, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201,
202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, secs. 135, 141 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161); 44
U.S.C. 3504 note.
Sec. 70.20a [Amended]
0
12. In Sec. 70.20a(e)(2), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in
its place the reference ``73.1200''.
Sec. 70.20b [Amended]
0
13. In Sec. 70.20b:
0
a. In paragraph (c), remove the reference ``73.71(b)'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1200'';
0
b. In paragraph (d), remove the reference ``73.71(b)'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1200''; and
0
c. In paragraph (e), remove the reference ``73.71(b)'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1200''.
PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AND REACTOR-
RELATED GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE
0
14. The authority citation for part 72 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63,
65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 223, 234, 274 (42
U.S.C. 2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2210e,
2232, 2233, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2273, 2282, 2021); Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C.
5841, 5842, 5846, 5851); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(42 U.S.C. 4332); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, secs. 117(a),
132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 141, 145(g), 148, 218(a) (42 U.S.C.
10137(a), 10152, 10153, 10154, 10155, 10157, 10161, 10165(g), 10168,
10198(a)); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
Sec. 72.74 [Amended]
0
15. In Sec. 72.74(c), remove the reference ``Sec. 73.71'' and add in
its place the reference ``Sec. 73.1200''.
PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
0
16. The authority citation for part 73 is revised to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 147, 149, 161,
161A, 170D, 170E, 170H, 170I, 223, 229, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073,
2167, 2169, 2201, 2201a, 2210d, 2210e, 2210h, 2210i, 2273, 2278a,
2282, 2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42
U.S.C. 5841, 5842); Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, secs. 135, 141
(42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
Section 73.37(b)(2) also issued under Sec. 301, Public Law 96-
295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).
0
17. Remove undesignated center headings ``General Provisions,''
``Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material in Transit,''
``Physical Protection Requirements at Fixed Sites,'' ``Physical
Protection of Special Nuclear Material or Moderate and Low Strategic
Significance,'' ``Records and Reports,'' and ``Enforcement.''
Sec. Sec. 73.1 through 73.8 [Designated as Subpart A]
0
18. Designate Sec. Sec. 73.1 through 73.8 as subpart A and add a
heading for newly designated subpart A to read as follows:
Subpart A--General Provisions
0
19. In Sec. 73.2:
0
a. In paragraph (a) remove the phrase ``and 70'' and add in its place
the phrase ``70, and 95'';
0
b. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions for ``Adverse firearms
background check'', ``Combined preemption authority and enhanced
weapons authority'', ``Contraband'', ``Covered weapon'', ``Enhanced
weapon'', ``Firearms background check'', ``Greater than class C
waste'', ``High-level radioactive waste'', and ``Independent spent fuel
storage installation'';
0
c. Revise the definition for Movement control center;
0
d. Add, in alphabetical order, the definitions for ``NICS'', ``NICS
response'', ``NICS transaction number'', ``Restricted Data'',
``Satisfactory firearms background check'', ``Special nuclear material
(SNM)'', ``Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or spent fuel'', ``Stand-alone
preemption authority'', and ``Time of discovery''; and
0
e. Add paragraphs (b) and (c).
The additions and revision read as follows:
Sec. 73.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
Adverse firearms background check means a firearms background check
that has resulted in a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
* * * * *
Combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority means
the authority granted to the Commission, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2201a,
to authorize licensees or the designated security personnel of a
licensee to transfer, receive, possess, transport, import, and use one
or more categories of enhanced weapons, notwithstanding any State,
local, or certain Federal firearms laws, including regulations, that
prohibit or restrict such conduct.
* * * * *
Contraband means unauthorized firearms, explosives, incendiaries,
or other dangerous materials (e.g., disease causing agents), which are
capable of causing acts of sabotage against a licensed facility or
licensed radioactive material, as specified under 42 U.S.C. 2284. For
licensees that possess or conduct activities involving classified
national security information or classified Restricted Data (RD) as
defined in Sec. 95.5 of this chapter, contraband also means
unauthorized electronic devices or unauthorized electronic media that
are capable of facilitating acts of espionage; unauthorized
communication, transmission, disclosure, or receipt of RD; or tampering
with RD, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 793 or 42 U.S.C. 2274-2276,
respectively. Contraband items are banned from a licensee's protected
area, vital area, materials access area, or controlled access area.
* * * * *
Covered weapon means any handgun, rifle, shotgun, short-barreled
shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semiautomatic assault weapon, machine
gun, ammunition for any such weapons, or large capacity ammunition
feeding device otherwise prohibited by State, local, or certain Federal
firearms laws, including regulations, as specified under 42 U.S.C.
2201a(b).
* * * * *
Enhanced weapon means any short-barreled shotgun, short-barreled
rifle, or machine gun. Enhanced weapons do not include destructive
devices as defined in 18 U.S.C. 921(a).
* * * * *
Firearms background check means a background check by the U.S.
Attorney General pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2201a that includes a check
against the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) fingerprint
system and the National Instant Criminal Background Check System.
* * * * *
Greater than Class C waste or GTCC waste has the same meaning as
defined in Sec. 72.3 of this chapter.
* * * * *
High-level radioactive waste or HLW has the same meaning as defined
in Sec. 72.3 of this chapter.
* * * * *
Independent spent fuel storage installation or ISFSI has the same
[[Page 15882]]
meaning as defined in Sec. 72.3 of this chapter.
* * * * *
Movement control center means an operations center which is remote
from the transport activity and which maintains position information on
the movement of special nuclear material or radioactive material;
receives reports of actual or attempted attacks, thefts, or sabotage;
provides a means for notifying these and other problems to the NRC and
appropriate agencies; and can request and coordinate appropriate aid.
* * * * *
NICS means the National Instant Criminal Background Check System
established by Section 103(b) of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, Public Law 103-159 (107 Stat. 1536), that is operated by the FBI's
Criminal Justice Information Services Division.
NICS response means a response provided by the FBI, as the result
of a firearms background check against the NICS. A NICS response
provided by the FBI may be ``proceed,'' ``delayed,'' or ``denied.''
NICS transaction number or NTN means the identification number
created by the FBI to track firearms background checks upon entry of
the information into the FBI's system. The NICS response and the NTN
are the information returned by the FBI, following a firearms
background check.
* * * * *
Restricted Data or RD has the same meaning as defined in Sec. 95.5
of this chapter.
* * * * *
Satisfactory firearms background check means a firearms background
check that has resulted in a ``proceed'' NICS response.
* * * * *
Special nuclear material (SNM) has the same meaning as defined in
Sec. 70.4 of this chapter.
* * * * *
Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or spent fuel means the fuel that has been
withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation and has not been
chemically separated into its constituent elements by reprocessing.
Spent nuclear fuel includes the special nuclear material, byproduct
material, source material, and other radioactive materials associated
with a fuel assembly.
* * * * *
Stand-alone preemption authority means the authority granted to the
Commission, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2201a, to authorize licensees or the
designated security personnel of a licensee to transfer, receive,
possess, transport, import, and use one or more categories of covered
weapons, notwithstanding any State, local, or certain Federal firearms
laws, including regulations, that prohibit or restrict such conduct.
Such covered weapons do not include enhanced weapons as defined in this
part.
* * * * *
Time of discovery means the time at which a cognizant individual
observes, identifies, or is notified of a security-significant event or
condition. A cognizant individual is considered anyone who, by
position, experience, and/or training, is expected to understand that a
particular condition or event adversely impacts security.
* * * * *
(b) The terms ``ammunition,'' ``handgun,'' ``rifle,'' ``machine
gun,'' ``large capacity ammunition feeding device,'' ``semiautomatic
assault weapon,'' ``short-barreled shotgun,'' ``short-barreled rifle,''
and ``shotgun'' specified in Sec. Sec. 73.15 and 73.17 have the same
meaning as provided for these terms in the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' regulations at 27 CFR 478.11.
(c) The terms ``delayed,'' ``denied,'' and ``proceed'' that are
used in NICS responses specified in this section have the same meaning
provided these terms in the FBI's regulations at 28 CFR 25.2.
0
20. In Sec. 73.8, paragraphs (b) and (c) are revised to read as
follows:
Sec. 73.8 Information collection requirements: OMB approval.
* * * * *
(b) The approved information collection requirements contained in
this part appear in Sec. Sec. 73.5, 73.15, 73.17, 73.20, 73.21, 73.24,
73.25, 73.26, 73.27, 73.37, 73.40, 73.45, 73.46, 73.50, 73.54, 73.55,
73.56, 73.57, 73.58, 73.60, 73.67, 73.70, 73.72, 73.73, 73.74, 73.1200,
73.1205, 73.1210, 73.1215, and appendices B and C to this part.
(c) This part contains information collection requirements in
addition to those approved under the control number specified in
paragraph (a) of this section. These information collection
requirements and control numbers under which they are approved are as
follows:
(1) In Sec. 73.17, NRC Form 754 is approved under control number
3150-0204;
(2) In Sec. Sec. 73.17 and 73.57, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Form FD-258 is approved under control number 1110-0046; and
(3) In Sec. 73.1205, NRC Form 366 is approved under control number
3150-0104.
0
21. Add subpart B to read as follows:
Subpart B--Enhanced Weapons, Preemption, and Firearms Background
Checks
Sec.
73.15 Authorization for use of enhanced weapons and preemption of
firearms laws.
73.17 Firearms background checks for armed security personnel.
Sec. 73.15 Authorization for use of enhanced weapons and preemption
of firearms laws.
(a) Purpose. This section presents the requirements for licensees
to obtain approval to use the authority provided to the Commission
under Section 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA),
in protecting Commission-designated classes of facilities, radioactive
material, or other property. This authority includes ``stand-alone
preemption authority'' and ``combined preemption authority and enhanced
weapons authority.''
(b) General Requirements. (1) Licensees of facilities, activities,
and other property listed in paragraph (c) of this section may apply to
the NRC, in accordance with the provisions of this section, to receive
stand-alone preemption authority or combined preemption authority and
enhanced weapons authority.
(2) With respect to the possession and use of firearms by all other
NRC licensees, the Commission's requirements in effect before April 13,
2023 remain applicable, except to the extent that those requirements
are modified by an NRC order or regulations applicable to these
licensees.
(c) Applicability. (1) Stand-alone preemption authority. The
license holders for the following classes of facilities, radioactive
material, or other property are designated by the Commission as
eligible to apply for stand-alone preemption authority pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 2201a--
(i) Nuclear power reactor facilities;
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess or use a formula quantity or
greater of strategic special nuclear material, where the material has a
radiation level less than or equal to 1 Gray (Gy) (100 Rad) per hour at
a distance of 1 meter (m) (3.3 feet (ft)), without regard to any
intervening shielding;
(iii) Independent spent fuel storage installations; and
(iv) Spent nuclear fuel transportation.
(2) Combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority.
The license holders for the following classes of facilities,
radioactive material, or other property are designated by the
Commission as eligible to apply for
[[Page 15883]]
combined enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. 2201a--
(i) Nuclear power reactor facilities;
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess or use a formula quantity or
greater of strategic special nuclear material, where the material has a
radiation level less than or equal to 1 Gy (100 Rad) per hour at a
distance of 1 m (3.3 ft), without regard to any intervening shielding;
(iii) Independent spent fuel storage installations; and
(iv) Spent nuclear fuel transportation.
(d) Application process for stand-alone preemption authority. (1)
Only licensees included within the classes of facilities, radioactive
material, and other property listed in paragraph (c)(1) of this section
may apply to the NRC for stand-alone preemption authority.
(2) Licensees applying for stand-alone preemption authority must
submit an application to the NRC using the procedures specified in this
section.
(3) The contents of the application must include the following
information:
(i) A statement indicating that the licensee is applying for stand-
alone preemption authority;
(ii) The Commission-designated facility, radioactive material, or
other property to be protected by the licensee's security personnel
using the covered weapons;
(iii) A description of the licensee's purposes and objectives in
requesting stand-alone preemption authority. This description must
include whether these covered weapons are currently employed as part of
the licensee's existing protective strategy or whether these covered
weapons will be used in a revised protective strategy; and
(iv) A description of the licensee's Firearms Background Check
Plan, as required by Sec. 73.17 of this part.
(4) Once a licensee has been notified that its application for
stand-alone preemption authority has been accepted for review by the
NRC, the licensee must provide the following supplemental information
once it becomes available:
(i) A confirmation that a sufficient number of security personnel
have completed a satisfactory firearms background check to meet the
licensee's security personnel minimum staffing requirements, as
specified in its physical security plan and any applicable fatigue
requirements under part 26 of this chapter;
(ii) A confirmation that the necessary training modules and
notification procedures have been developed under its Firearms
Background Check Plan; and
(iii) A confirmation that all security personnel whose official
duties require access to covered weapons have been trained on these
modules and notification procedures.
(5) The licensee must submit both the application and the
supplementary information to the NRC in writing, under oath or
affirmation, and in accordance with Sec. 73.4 of this part.
(6) Upon the effective date of the NRC's approval of its
application for stand-alone preemption authority, the licensee must
only assign security personnel who have completed a satisfactory
firearms background check to duties requiring access to any covered
weapons.
(e) Application process for combined preemption authority and
enhanced weapons authority.
(1) Only licensees included within the classes of facilities,
radioactive material, and other property listed in paragraph (c)(2) of
this section may apply to the NRC for combined preemption authority and
enhanced weapons authority.
(2) Licensees applying for combined preemption authority and
enhanced weapons authority must submit an application to the NRC using
the procedures specified in this section.
(3) The contents of the application must include the following
information:
(i) A statement indicating that the licensee is applying for
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority;
(ii) The Commission-designated facility, radioactive material, or
other property to be protected by the licensee's security personnel
using the covered weapons, including enhanced weapons;
(iii) A description of the licensee's purposes and objectives in
requesting combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority. This must include whether these enhanced weapons are
currently employed as part of the licensee's existing protective
strategy or whether these enhanced weapons will be used in a revised
protective strategy;
(iv) The total quantities of enhanced weapons, including the types
and calibers or gauges, requested; and
(v) A description of the licensee's Firearms Background Check Plan,
required by Sec. 73.17 of this part.
(vi) If the NRC has previously approved the licensee's application
for stand-alone preemption authority under either paragraph (d) of this
section or under an NRC Order issued before April 13, 2023, then the
licensee must include the effective date of the NRC's approval for
stand-alone preemption authority in its application for combined
preemption authority and enhanced weapons.
(4) The licensee must include with its application the additional
technical information required by paragraph (f) of this section.
(5) Once a licensee has been notified that its application for
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority has been
accepted for review by the NRC, the licensee must provide the following
supplemental information once it becomes available:
(i) A confirmation that a sufficient number of security personnel
have completed a satisfactory firearms background check to meet the
licensee's security personnel minimum staffing requirements, as
specified in its physical security plan, and any applicable fatigue
requirements under part 26 of this chapter;
(ii) A confirmation that the necessary training modules and
notification procedures have been developed under its Firearms
Background Check Plan; and
(iii) A confirmation that security personnel, whose official duties
require access to enhanced weapons, have been trained on these modules
and notification procedures.
(iv) Exceptions: Licensees that were previously approved by the NRC
for stand-alone preemption authority do not have to submit the
supplemental information required by paragraph (e)(5) since it has been
previously submitted under paragraph (d)(4) of this section or in
response to an NRC Order.
(6) The licensee must submit its application in accordance with the
applicable license amendment provisions specified in Sec. 50.90, Sec.
70.34, or Sec. 72.56 of this chapter. The licensee must submit both
the application and the supplementary information to the NRC in
writing, under oath or affirmation, and in accordance with Sec. 73.4
of this part.
(7) If a licensee wishes to use a different type or caliber or
gauge of an enhanced weapon or obtain a different quantity of enhanced
weapons from that previously approved by the Commission under this
section, then the licensee must submit a new application to the NRC in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this section (to address these
different weapons or different quantities of weapons).
(8) Upon the effective date of the NRC's approval of its
application for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority, the licensee must only assign security personnel who have
completed a satisfactory firearms background check
[[Page 15884]]
to duties requiring access to any covered weapons.
(f) Application for combined preemption authority and enhanced
weapons authority additional technical information. (1) A licensee must
also submit to the NRC for prior review and approval the following
plans and assessments. These plans and assessments must be specific to
the facility, radioactive material, or other property being protected.
(i) A new or revised physical security plan, security personnel
training and qualification plan, and safeguards contingency plan; and
(ii) A new weapons safety assessment.
(2) In addition to other requirements presented in this part, these
plans and assessments must--
(i) For the physical security plan, identify the quantities, types,
and calibers or gauges of enhanced weapons that will be deployed;
(ii) For the training and qualification plan, address the training
and qualification requirements to use these specific enhanced weapons;
(iii) For the safeguards contingency plan--
(A) The licensee must address how these enhanced weapons will be
employed by the security personnel in implementing the protective
strategy, including tactical approaches and maneuvers;
(B) In such instances where the addition of the enhanced weapons
would not affect the content of the safeguards contingency plan, the
required information on how the weapons will be employed may instead be
incorporated into the licensee's physical security plan or an addendum
thereto;
(C) Furthermore, in such instances, the licensee's application
shall indicate that the proposed enhanced weapons do not affect the
content of the NRC-approved safeguards contingency plan and it remains
unchanged; and
(iv) For the weapons safety assessment, assess any potential safety
impact by the use of enhanced weapons--
(A) At the facility, radioactive material, or other property being
protected;
(B) On public or private facilities, public or private property, or
on members of the public in areas outside of the site boundary; and
(C) On public or private facilities, public or private property, or
on members of the public from the use of these enhanced weapons at
training facilities; and
(D) Such assessments must consider both accidental and deliberate
discharge of the enhanced weapons. However, licensees are not required
to assess malevolent discharges of these enhanced weapons by trained
and qualified security personnel, who have been screened and evaluated
by the licensee's insider mitigation or human reliability programs.
(3) The licensee's training and qualification plan for enhanced
weapons must be based upon applicable firearms standards developed by
nationally-recognized firearms organizations or standard setting bodies
or from standards developed by--
(i) Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security's Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the U.S. Department
of Energy's National Training Center, and the U.S. Department of
Defense;
(ii) State law-enforcement training centers; or
(iii) State Division (or Department) of Criminal Justice Services
Training Academies.
(g) Conditions of approval. (1) Licensees that have been approved
by the NRC for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority must provide a copy of the NRC's authorization to the U.S.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) Federal
firearms license (FFL) holder (i.e., the transferor) for inclusion with
the application to request ATF's pre-approval of the transfer and
registration of the enhanced weapons to the NRC licensee (i.e., the
transferee).
(2) Licensees receiving enhanced weapons must comply with
applicable ATF regulations in 27 CFR part 479.
(3) All enhanced weapons possessed by the licensee must be
registered under the name of the licensee. Enhanced weapons may not be
registered under the name of a licensee's security contractor.
(4) Licensees obtaining enhanced weapons may, at their discretion,
also apply to ATF to obtain an FFL or a special occupational tax stamp,
in conjunction with obtaining these enhanced weapons.
(h) Completion of training and qualification before deployment of
enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees that have received combined preemption
authority and enhanced weapons authority must ensure that their
security personnel with access to enhanced weapons have completed the
required firearms training and qualification, in accordance with the
licensee's training and qualification plan.
(2) Initial training and qualification on enhanced weapons must be
completed before the security personnel's deployment of enhanced
weapons to implement the licensee's protective strategy.
(3) Recurring training and qualification on enhanced weapons by
security personnel must be completed in accordance with the licensee's
training and qualification plan.
(4) All training must be documented in accordance with the
requirements of the licensee's training and qualification plan.
(i) [Reserved]
(j) Use of enhanced weapons. The requirements regarding the use of
force by the licensee's security personnel, in the performance of their
official duties, are contained in Sec. Sec. 73.46, 73.51, and 73.55
and in appendices B, C, and H of this part, as applicable.
(k) Notification of adverse ATF findings. Requirements on
notification of adverse ATF inspection or enforcement findings can be
found under Sec. 73.1200 of this part.
(l) [Reserved]
(m) Transfer of enhanced weapons. (1)(i) A licensee's issuance of
enhanced weapons to its security personnel is not considered a transfer
of those weapons as specified under ATF's regulations in 27 CFR part
479, provided the enhanced weapons remain within the site of a
facility.
(ii) Remaining within the site of a facility means within the site
boundary, as defined by the licensee's safety analysis report submitted
to the NRC.
(2) A licensee's issuance of enhanced weapons to its security
personnel for the permissible reasons specified in paragraph (m)(3) of
this section, for activities that are outside of the facility's site
boundary, are not considered a transfer under the provisions of 26
U.S.C. chapter 53, as specified under ATF's regulations in 27 CFR part
479, provided--
(i) The security personnel possessing the enhanced weapons are
employees of the licensee; or
(ii) The security personnel possessing the enhanced weapons are
employees of a contractor providing security services to the licensee
and these contractor security personnel are under the direction of, and
accompanied by, an authorized licensee employee.
(3) Permissible reasons for removal of enhanced weapons from the
licensee's facility include--
(i) Removal of enhanced weapons for use at a firing range or
training facility that is used by the licensee in accordance with its
NRC-approved training and qualification plan for enhanced weapons;
(ii) Removal of enhanced weapons for use in escorting shipments of
[[Page 15885]]
radioactive material or other property designated under paragraph (c)
of this section that are being transported to or from the licensee's
facility; or
(iii) Removal of an enhanced weapon from a licensee's facility to a
gunsmith for the purposes of repair or maintenance and the subsequent
return of the enhanced weapon to the licensee's facility.
(4) A licensee that has authorized the removal of enhanced weapons
from its facility for any of the permissible reasons listed under
paragraph (m)(3) of this section must verify that these weapons are
returned to the facility upon the completion of the authorized
activity.
(5) Removal of enhanced weapons from and/or return of these weapons
to the licensee's facility must be documented in accordance with the
records requirements of paragraph (q) of this section.
(6) Removal of enhanced weapons from a licensee's facility for
reasons other than those set forth in paragraph (m)(3) of this section
are considered a transfer as specified under ATF's regulations in 27
CFR part 479.
(7) The licensee may only transfer enhanced weapons pursuant to an
ATF application to transfer and register the weapons that is approved
by ATF in advance of the transfer, as required by ATF's regulations
under 27 CFR part 479. Examples of transfers include, but are not
limited to:
(i) Sale or disposal of an enhanced weapon to another authorized
NRC licensee;
(ii) Sale or disposal of an enhanced weapon to an authorized
Federal firearms license holder, government agency, or official police
organization; or
(iii) Abandonment of an enhanced weapon to ATF.
(8) Following the completion of their official duties, security
personnel must either--
(i) Return issued enhanced weapons to a licensee's authorized
enhanced weapons storage location, as specified in the licensee's
physical security plan, or
(ii) Turn over responsibility for the issued enhanced weapon to
another on-shift security personnel authorized to use enhanced weapons
as part of their official duties.
(9) Enhanced weapons that are not returned to the licensee's
facility, following permissible removal, must be considered a transfer
of a weapon under this paragraph, or a stolen or lost weapon under
paragraph (p) of this section, as applicable. Information on the
transfer, theft, or loss of an enhanced weapon must be documented, as
required under paragraph (q) of this section.
(n) Transport of weapons. (1) Security personnel transporting
enhanced weapons to or from a firing range or training facility used by
the licensee must ensure that these weapons are unloaded and locked in
a secure container during transport. Unloaded weapons and ammunition
may be transported in the same locked secure container.
(2) Security personnel transporting enhanced weapons to or from a
licensee's facility following the completion of, or in preparation for,
escorting shipments of radioactive material or other property must
ensure that these weapons are unloaded and locked in a secure container
during transport. Security personnel may transport unloaded weapons and
ammunition in the same locked secure container.
(3) Security personnel using enhanced weapons to protect shipments
of radioactive material or other property that are being transported to
or from the licensee's facility must ensure that these weapons are
maintained in a state of loaded readiness and available for immediate
use, except when otherwise prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 922(q).
(4) Security personnel transporting enhanced weapons to or from the
licensee's facility must also comply with the requirements of Sec.
73.17 of this part.
(5) Situations where security personnel transport enhanced weapons
to or from the licensee's facility are not considered transfers of
these weapons under ATF's regulations in 27 CFR part 479, provided--
(i) The security personnel transporting the enhanced weapons are
employees of the licensee; or
(ii) The security personnel transporting the enhanced weapons are
employees of a contractor providing security services to the licensee;
and these contractor security personnel are under the direction of, and
accompanied by, an authorized licensee employee.
(6) For the interstate transportation of enhanced weapons, pursuant
to this section, the licensee must obtain prior written approval from
ATF, as required by 27 CFR part 478.
(o) Periodic inventories of enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees
possessing enhanced weapons under this section must conduct the
following periodic accountability inventories of the enhanced weapons
in their possession to verify the continued presence of each enhanced
weapon that the licensee is authorized to possess.
(2)(i) Licensees must conduct a monthly inventory to verify that
the authorized quantity of enhanced weapons are present at the
licensee's facility.
(ii) Licensees must verify the presence of each individual enhanced
weapon.
(iii) Licensees that store enhanced weapons in a locked secure
weapons container (e.g., a ready-service arms locker) located within a
protected area, vital area, or material access area may verify the
presence of an intact tamper-indicating device (TID) on the locked
secure weapons container, instead of verifying the presence of each
individual weapon.
(iv) Verification of the presence of enhanced weapons via the
presence of an intact TID must be documented in the inventory records
and include the serial number of the TID.
(v) Licensees may use electronic technology (e.g., bar-codes on the
weapons) in conducting such inventories.
(vi) The time interval from the previous monthly inventory must not
exceed 30 + 7 days.
(3)(i) Licensees must conduct an annual inventory to verify that
each authorized enhanced weapon is present at the licensee's facility
through the verification of the serial number of each enhanced weapon.
(ii) Licensees must verify the presence of each enhanced weapon
located in a locked secure weapons container (e.g., a ready-service
arms locker) through the verification of the serial number of each
enhanced weapon located within the container.
(iii) The time interval from the previous annual inventory must not
exceed 365 + 7 days.
(iv) Licensees conducting an annual inventory may substitute this
annual inventory in lieu of conducting the normal monthly inventory for
that particular month, as required under paragraph (o) of this section.
(4) Licensees must conduct periodic inventories of enhanced weapons
using either a two-person team or a single individual, provided the
individual is subject to the licensee's behavioral observation or human
reliability programs.
(5) The results of any periodic inventories of enhanced weapons
must be retained in accordance with the records requirements of
paragraph (q) of this section.
(6) Licensees must inventory any locked secure weapons container
that was sealed with a TID and has subsequently been opened and must
[[Page 15886]]
verify the serial number for each of the enhanced weapons stored in the
weapons container. The inventoried weapons container must be relocked
and resealed with a new TID and the new TID's serial number must be
recorded in the periodic inventory records. The inventory must be
conducted in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (o)(4) of
this section.
(i) Licensees must use TIDs with unique serial numbers on locked
secure weapons containers containing enhanced weapons.
(ii) Licensees must store unused TIDs in a manner similar to other
security access control devices (e.g., keys, lock cores, etc.) and must
maintain a log of issued TID serial numbers.
(7) Licensees must resolve any discrepancies identified during
periodic inventories within 24 hours of their identification;
otherwise, the discrepancy must be treated as a stolen or lost enhanced
weapon and notifications must be made in accordance with paragraph (p)
of this section.
(8) As an exception, enhanced weapons that are offsite for
authorized purposes, in accordance with paragraphs (m) and (n) of this
section, are required to be included in a periodic inventory but are
not considered lost or stolen solely because they are offsite. The
licensee must document the absence of these weapon(s) from the
licensee's facility in the report of the results of a completed
periodic enhanced weapons inventory, as required under paragraph (q) of
this section.
(p) Stolen or lost enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees that discover
that any enhanced weapons they are authorized to possess under this
section are stolen or lost, must notify the NRC and local law
enforcement officials in accordance with Sec. 73.1200 of this part.
(2) Licensees that discover that any enhanced weapons they are
authorized to possess under this section are stolen or lost are also
required to notify ATF in accordance with ATF's regulations in 27 CFR
part 479.
(q) Records requirements. (1) Licensees possessing enhanced weapons
under this section must maintain records relating to the receipt,
transfer, transportation, and inventory of such enhanced weapons.
(2) Licensees must maintain the following minimum records regarding
the receipt of each enhanced weapon, including--
(i) Date of receipt of the weapon;
(ii) Name and address of the transferor who transferred the weapon
to the licensee;
(iii) Name of the manufacturer of the weapon, or the name of the
importer (for weapons manufactured outside the U.S.); and
(iv) Serial number, type, and caliber or gauge of the weapon.
(3) Licensees must maintain the following minimum records regarding
the transfer of each enhanced weapon--
(i) Date of shipment of the weapon;
(ii) Name and address of the transferee who received the weapon;
and
(iii) Serial number, type, and caliber or gauge of the weapon.
(4) Licensees must maintain the following minimum records regarding
the transportation of each enhanced weapon away from the licensee's
facility--
(i) Date of departure of the weapon;
(ii) Date of return of the weapon;
(iii) Purpose of the weapon's removal from the facility;
(iv) Name(s) of the security personnel transporting the weapon;
(v) Name(s) of the licensee employee accompanying and directing the
transportation, where the security personnel transporting the weapons
are employees of a security contractor providing security services to
the licensee;
(vi) Name of the person/facility to whom the weapon is being
transported; and
(vii) Serial number, type, and caliber or gauge of the weapon.
(5) Licensees possessing enhanced weapons pursuant to this section
must document in these records the discovery that any of these enhanced
weapons are stolen or lost.
(6) Licensees possessing enhanced weapons pursuant to this section
must maintain records relating to the inventories of enhanced weapons
for a period of up to one year after the licensee's authority to
possess enhanced weapons is terminated, suspended, or revoked under
paragraph (r) of this section and all enhanced weapons have been
transferred from the licensee's facility.
(7) Licensees may integrate any records required by this section
with records maintained by the licensee pursuant to ATF's regulations.
(8) Licensees must make any records required by this section
available to NRC staff and ATF staff upon request.
(r) Termination, modification, suspension, or revocation of Section
161A authority.
(1)(i) Licensees seeking to terminate their stand-alone preemption
authority must apply to the NRC in writing, under oath or affirmation,
and in accordance with Sec. 73.4.
(ii) Licensees seeking to terminate their combined enhanced weapons
authority and preemption authority must apply to the NRC in writing,
under oath or affirmation, and in accordance with Sec. 73.4, and the
license amendment provisions of Sec. 50.90, Sec. 70.34, or Sec.
72.56 of this chapter, as applicable. These licensees must have
transferred or disposed of any enhanced weapons, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (m) of this section, prior to the NRC approval
of a request for termination of their authority.
(2) Licensees seeking to modify their combined preemption authority
and enhanced weapons authority, issued under this section, must apply
to the NRC in writing, under oath or affirmation, and in accordance
with Sec. 73.4, and the license amendment provisions of Sec. 50.90,
Sec. 70.34, or Sec. 72.56 of this chapter, as applicable. Licensees'
applications to modify their enhanced weapons authority must provide
the information required under paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section.
(i) Licensees seeking to replace their enhanced weapons with
different types of enhanced weapons must amend their original
application to include the different quantities, types, and calibers or
gauges of the new enhanced weapons. This amended application must
include a plan to transfer or dispose of their existing enhanced
weapons once the new weapons are deployed.
(ii) Licensees adding additional quantities or types of enhanced
weapons do not require a transfer or disposal plan.
(3) The Commission may revoke, suspend, or modify, in whole or in
part, any approval issued under this section for any material false
statement in the application or other statement of fact required of the
licensee; or because of conditions revealed by the application or
statement of fact or any report, record, inspection, or other means
that would warrant the Commission refusing to grant approval of an
original application; or for violation of, or for failure to observe,
any of the terms and provisions of the act, regulations, license,
permit, approval, or order of the Commission, or for any other reason
that the Commission determines is appropriate.
(4) Licensees that have their stand-alone preemption authority or
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority
terminated, suspended, or revoked may reapply for such authority by
filing a new
[[Page 15887]]
application under the provisions of this section.
(5) The NRC will notify ATF within 3 business days after taking
action to terminate, modify, suspend, or revoke a licensee's stand-
alone preemption authority or combined preemption authority and
enhanced weapons authority issued under this section.
(s) Withdrawal of orders. For licensees that received an order
issued under Section 161A (42 U.S.C. 2201a) prior to April 13, 2023,
the following provisions apply.
(1) Licensees are not required to reapply for this authority.
(2) The requirements of such orders are superseded in their
entirety by the requirements of this section and Sec. 73.17 of this
part.
(3) Licensees must complete their transition from the confirmatory
orders to the requirements of this rule by January 8, 2024.
(4) On January 8, 2024 the following orders are withdrawn:
(i) Order EA-13-092, ``Order Designating an Interim Class of NRC-
Licensed Facilities that are Eligible to Apply to the Commission for
Authorization to Use the Authority Granted Under the Provisions of
Section 161a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended'' (78 FR
35984; June 14, 2013);
(ii) Confirmatory Order EA-15-006, ``In the Matter of BWXT Nuclear
Operations Group, Inc.'' (80 FR 53588; September 4, 2015);
(iii) Confirmatory Orders EA-14-135 and EA-14-136, ``In the Matter
of Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc.; Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2,
LLC; and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC (Indian Point Nuclear
Generating Unit (Nos. 1, 2, and 3)'' (81 FR 2247; January 15, 2016);
(iv) Confirmatory Order EA-14-137, ``In the Matter of Entergy
Nuclear Fitzpatrick, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. (James A.
Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant)'' (81 FR 2247; January 15, 2016);
(v) Confirmatory Order EA-14-138, ``In the Matter of Exelon
Generation Company, LLC (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Units 1 and
2)'' (81 FR 2247; January 15, 2016);
(vi) Confirmatory Order EA-14-139, ``In the Matter of Exelon
Generation Company, LLC (R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant)'' (81 FR 2247;
January 15, 2016);
(vii) Confirmatory Order EA-14-134, ``In the Matter of Pacific Gas
and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2,
and DCPP Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation)'' (81 FR 2247;
January 15, 2016); and
(viii) Confirmatory Order EA-14-140, ``In the Mater of Southern
California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units
2 and 3, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation)'' (81 FR
2247; January 15, 2016).
Sec. 73.17 Firearms background checks for armed security personnel.
(a) Purpose. This section presents the requirements for completion
of firearms background checks pursuant to Section 161A of the Atomic
Energy Act, as amended (AEA) (42 U.S.C. 2201a), for security personnel
whose official duties require access to covered weapons at Commission-
designated classes of facilities, radioactive material, or other
property specified in Sec. 73.15(c). Firearms background checks are
intended to verify that such armed security personnel are not
prohibited from receiving, possessing, transporting, importing, or
using covered weapons under applicable Federal, State, or local law.
(b) General Requirements. (1) Licensees that have applied to the
NRC under Sec. 73.15 of this part for stand-alone preemption authority
or for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority
must comply with the provisions of this section. Such licensees must
establish a Firearms Background Check Plan. Licensees must establish
this plan as part of their overall NRC-approved Training and
Qualification plan for security personnel whose official duties require
access to covered weapons.
(2) For the purposes of Sec. 73.15 and this section only, the term
security personnel whose official duties require access to covered
weapons includes, but is not limited to, the following groups of
individuals:
(i) Security officers using covered weapons to protect a
Commission-designated facility, radioactive material, or other
property;
(ii) Security officers undergoing firearms training on covered
weapons;
(iii) Firearms-training instructors conducting training on covered
weapons;
(iv) Armorers conducting maintenance, repair, and testing of
covered weapons;
(v) Individuals with access to armories and weapons storage lockers
containing covered weapons;
(vi) Individuals conducting inventories of enhanced weapons;
(vii) Individuals removing enhanced weapons from the site for
repair, training, and escort-duty purposes; and
(viii) Individuals whose duties require access to covered weapons,
whether the individuals are employed directly by the licensee or
employed by a security contractor who provides security services to the
licensee.
(3) The Firearms Background Check Plan must describe how the
licensee will accomplish the following objectives:
(i) Completing firearms background checks for all security
personnel whose duties require, or will require, access to covered
weapons;
(ii) Establishing a process for completing initial, periodic, and
break-in-service firearms background checks;
(iii) Defining the training objectives and modules for security
personnel who are subject to firearms background checks;
(iv) Completing the initial and periodic training for security
personnel whose official duties require access to covered weapons;
(v) Maintaining records of completed firearms background checks,
required training, and any supporting documents;
(vi) Maintaining records of a decision to remove security personnel
from duties requiring access to covered weapons, due to the
identification or occurrence of any Federal or State disqualifying
status condition or disqualifying event; and
(vii) Developing and implementing procedures for notifying the NRC
of the removal of security personnel from access to covered weapons,
due to the identification or occurrence of any Federal or State
disqualifying status condition or disqualifying event.
(4)(i) Licensees that have applied to the NRC for stand-alone
preemption authority or for combined preemption authority and enhanced
weapons authority under Sec. 73.15 must ensure that a satisfactory
firearms background check has been completed for all security personnel
whose official duties require access to covered weapons.
(ii) Security personal may continue to have access to covered
weapons pending the results of the initial firearms background check.
(5) Only licensees that have applied for Section 161A authority
under Sec. 73.15 may conduct the firearms background checks required
by this section.
(6) The licensee must commence firearms background checks only
after receiving notification from the NRC that the agency has accepted
for review its application for stand-alone preemption authority or for
combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons authority.
[[Page 15888]]
(7)(i) Applicants for a license who have also submitted an
application for Section 161A authority must only commence firearms
background checks after:
(A) The NRC has issued its license; and
(B) The NRC has accepted its application for stand-alone preemption
authority or for combined preemption authority and enhanced weapons
authority for review.
(ii) Subsequent to April 13, 2023, applicants for a license who
have also applied for Section 161A authority and been issued their
license must ensure that a satisfactory firearms background check (as
defined in Sec. 73.2) has been completed for all security personnel
who require access to covered weapons, before the licensee's initial
receipt of any source material, special nuclear material, or
radioactive material specified under the license.
(8) In response to an adverse firearms background check (as defined
in Sec. 73.2),
(i) The licensee must remove, without delay, from duties requiring
access to covered weapons, any security personnel who receive a
``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response.
(ii) If the security personnel to be removed is on duty at the time
of removal, then the licensee must fill the vacated position within the
timeframe specified in its physical security plan.
(9)(i) The licensee must complete a new satisfactory firearms
background check for any of its security personnel that has had a
break-in-service greater than 1 week.
(ii) The licensee must complete a new satisfactory firearms
background check if the security personnel has transferred from a
different licensee.
(iii) A break-in-service means the security personnel's cessation
of employment with the licensee or its security contractor,
notwithstanding that the previous licensee completed a satisfactory
firearms background check on the individual within the last 5 years.
(iv) Exceptions: (A) For the purposes of this section, a break-in-
service does not include a security personnel's temporary active duty
with the U.S. military reserves or National Guard.
(B) The licensee, in lieu of completing a new satisfactory firearms
background check, may instead verify, via an industry-wide information-
sharing database, that the security personnel has completed a
satisfactory firearms background check within the previous 12 months,
provided that this previous firearms background check included a duty
station location in the State or Territory where the licensee (who
would otherwise be accomplishing the firearms background check) is
located or the activity is solely occurring.
(10) Changes in the licensee's ownership or its security contractor
services are not considered a break-in-service for current security
personnel whose duties require access to covered weapons. Licensees are
not required to conduct a new firearms background check for these
security personnel.
(11) With regard to accomplishing the requirements for other
background (e.g., criminal history records) checks or personnel
security investigations under the NRC's access authorization or
personal security clearance program requirements of this chapter, the
licensee may not substitute a satisfactory firearms background check in
lieu of completing these other required background checks or security
investigations.
(12) If a licensee has completed initial satisfactory firearms
background checks pursuant to an NRC order issued before April 13,
2023, then the licensee is not required to conduct a new initial
firearms background check for its current security personnel. However,
the licensee must conduct initial firearms background checks on new
security personnel and periodic and break-in-service firearms
background checks on current security personnel in accordance with the
provisions of this section.
(13) A licensee who withdraws its application for Section 161A
authority or who has its application disapproved by the NRC, must
discontinue conducting firearms background checks.
(14) A licensee whose authority under Section 161A has been
rescinded or whose authority has been revoked by the NRC must
discontinue conducting firearms background checks.
(c) [Reserved]
(d) Firearms background check requirements. A firearms background
check for security personnel must include--
(1) A check of the individual's fingerprints against the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) fingerprint system; and
(2) A check of the individual's identifying information against the
FBI's National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).
(e) Firearms background check submittals. (1) Licensees must submit
to the NRC, in accordance with Sec. 73.4, for all security personnel
requiring a firearms background check under this section--
(i) A set of fingerprint impressions, in accordance with paragraph
(k) of this section; and
(ii) A completed NRC Form 754.
(2) In lieu of submitting a copy of each individual completed NRC
Form 754 to the NRC, licensees may submit a single document
consolidating the NRC Forms 754 data for multiple security personnel.
(3) Licensees submitting to the NRC via an electronic method an
individual NRC Form 754 or consolidated data from multiple NRC Forms
754 must ensure that any personally identifiable information contained
within these documents is protected in accordance with Sec. 2.390 of
this chapter.
(4) Licensees must retain a copy of all NRC Forms 754 submitted to
the NRC for one year subsequent to the termination or denial of an
individual's access to covered weapons.
(5) Licensees that are Federal agencies with authority to submit
fingerprints directly to the FBI may do so provided that they also
include the requested information from NRC Form 754. However, such
licensees are still required to comply with the other provisions of
this section.
(f) Periodic firearms background checks. (1) Licensees must
complete a satisfactory periodic firearms background check at least
once every 5 calendar years for security personnel whose continuing
duties require access to covered weapons.
(2) Licensees must complete a periodic firearms background check
within the same calendar month as the initial, or most recent, firearms
background check with an allowance period to midnight (local time) of
the last day of the calendar month of expiration.
(3) The licensee may conduct periodic firearms background checks at
an interval of less than once every 5 calendar years, at its
discretion.
(4)(i) Licensees may assign security personnel to duties requiring
access to covered weapons while the results of the periodic firearms
background check are pending.
(ii) Licensees must remove security personnel from duties requiring
access to covered weapons if the satisfactory completion of a periodic
firearms background check does not occur before the expiration of the
allowance period.
(5) Licensees must remove, without delay, from duties requiring
access to covered weapons, any security personnel who receive either a
``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response during a periodic firearms
background check.
(g) Notification of removal. (1) Licensees must notify the NRC
Headquarters Operations Center by telephone within 72 hours after
removing security personnel from duties
[[Page 15889]]
requiring access to covered weapons due to the identification or
occurrence of any Federal or State disqualifying status condition or
disqualifying event that would prohibit them from possessing,
receiving, or using firearms or ammunition. Licensees must contact the
NRC Headquarters Operations Center at the phone numbers specified in
Table 1 of appendix A of this part.
(2) The NRC will subsequently inform the FBI of any notifications
received under this paragraph.
(h) Security personnel responsibilities. Security personnel
assigned to duties requiring access to covered weapons must notify the
licensee's security management within 72 hours of the identification or
occurrence of any Federal or State disqualifying status condition or
disqualifying event that would prohibit the individual from possessing,
receiving, or using firearms or ammunition. This requirement is
applicable to security personnel directly employed by the licensee or
employed by a contractor providing security services to the licensee.
(i) [Reserved]
(j) Training for security personnel subject to firearms background
checks on disqualifying status conditions and disqualifying events. (1)
Licensees must include, within their Firearms Background Check Plan,
training modules for security personnel assigned to official duties
requiring access to covered weapons that provide training on the
following topics:
(i) Federal disqualifying status conditions or disqualifying events
specified in 27 CFR 478.32;
(ii) Applicable State disqualifying status conditions or
disqualifying events;
(iii) The responsibility of security personnel subject to a
firearms background check and assigned to official duties that require
access to covered weapons to promptly notify their employing licensee
of the occurrence of any disqualifying status condition or
disqualifying event; and
(iv) Information for appealing an adverse firearms background check
(i.e., a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response) to the FBI.
(2) Licensees must conduct periodic refresher training on these
modules at an annual frequency for security personnel assigned official
duties requiring access to covered weapons.
(k) Procedures for processing fingerprint checks. (1) Licensees,
using an appropriate method listed in Sec. 73.4, must manually or
electronically submit to the NRC one completed, legible standard
fingerprint card (FBI Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where practicable,
other electronic fingerprint records for each individual requiring a
firearms background check. Information on how to obtain FBI Form FD-258
and the process for manual or electronic submission of fingerprint
records to the NRC is on the NRC's public website at: https://www.nrc.gov/security/chp.html.
(2) Licensees must indicate on the fingerprint card (or other
electronic fingerprint records) that the submittal is part of a
firearms background check for personnel whose duties require, or will
require, access to covered weapons. Licensees must add the following
information to the FBI Form FD-258 fingerprint card or the electronic
fingerprint records submitted to the NRC:
(i) For fingerprints submitted to the NRC for the completion of a
firearms background check only, the licensee must enter the terms
``MDNRCNICZ'' in the ``ORI'' field and ``Firearms'' in the ``Reasons
Fingerprinted'' field of the FBI Form FD-258 or the electronic
fingerprint records submitted to the NRC.
(ii) For fingerprints submitted to the NRC for the completion of
both an access authorization check or personnel security clearance
check and a firearms background check, the licensee must enter the
terms ``MDNRC000Z'' in the ``ORI'' field and ``Employment and
Firearms'' in the ``Reasons Fingerprinted'' field of the FBI Form FD-
258 or the electronic fingerprint records submitted to the NRC.
(3) Licensees must establish procedures that produce high-quality
fingerprint images, cards, and records with a minimal rejection rate.
(4) The NRC will review fingerprints for firearms background checks
for completeness. Any FBI Form FD-258 or other electronic fingerprint
records containing omissions or evident errors will be returned to the
licensee for correction. The fee for processing fingerprint checks
includes one free resubmission if the initial submission is returned by
the FBI because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified. The
one free resubmission must have the FBI Transaction Control Number
reflected on the resubmission. If additional submissions are necessary,
they will be treated as an initial submittal and require a second
payment of the processing fee. The payment of a new processing fee
entitles the submitter to an additional free resubmittal, if necessary.
Previously rejected submissions may not be included with the third
submission because the submittal will be rejected automatically.
(5) The NRC will forward to the submitting licensee all data
received from the FBI as a result of the licensee's application(s) for
a firearms background check. This will include the FBI's ``proceed,''
``delayed,'' or ``denied'' NICS response and the NICS transaction
number.
(l) [Reserved]
(m) Fees. (1) Fees for the processing of firearms background checks
are due upon application. The fee for the processing of a firearms
background check consists of a fingerprint fee and a NICS check fee.
Licensees must submit payment with the application for the processing
of fingerprints, and payment must be made by corporate check, certified
check, cashier's check, money order, or electronic payment, made
payable to ``U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.'' Combined payment for
multiple applications is acceptable. Licensees can find fee information
for firearms background checks on the NRC's public website at: https://www.nrc.gov/security/chp.html.
(2) The application fee for the processing of fingerprint checks is
the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each fingerprint card or
other fingerprint records submitted by the NRC on behalf of a licensee,
and an administrative processing fee assessed by the NRC. The NRC
processing fee covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling
of licensee fingerprint submissions.
(3) The application fee for the processing of NICS checks is an
administrative processing fee assessed by the NRC.
(4) Licensees that are also Federal agencies and submit
fingerprints and information contained in the NRC Form 754 directly to
the FBI are not assessed an application fee by the NRC.
(n) Processing of the NICS portion of a firearms background check.
(1) The NRC will forward the information contained in the submitted NRC
Form 754 to the FBI for evaluation against the NICS databases. Upon
completion of the NICS portion of the firearms background check, the
FBI will inform the NRC of the results with one of three responses
under 28 CFR part 25; ``proceed,'' ``delayed,'' or ``denied,'' and the
associated NICS transaction number (NTN). The NRC will forward these
results and the associated NTN to the submitting licensee.
(2) Licensees that are Federal agencies and submit fingerprints and
information contained in the NRC Form 754 directly to the FBI for
evaluation against the NICS databases will receive one of three
responses under 28 CFR part 25;
[[Page 15890]]
``proceed,'' ``delayed,'' or ``denied,'' and the associated NTN.
(3) The submitting licensee must provide these results to the
individual who completed the NRC Form 754.
(o) [Reserved]
(p) Appeals and resolution of adverse firearms background checks.
(1) Licensees may not assign security personnel who have received a
``denied'' or a ``delayed'' NICS response to any official duties
requiring access to covered weapons--
(i) During the pendency of an appeal to the FBI of a ``denied''
NICS response; or
(ii) During the pendency of providing to the FBI any necessary
additional information to resolve a ``delayed'' NICS response.
(2) Licensees must provide the NICS Transaction Number (NTN) or
NTNs associated with the adverse firearms background check to the
affected individual. It is the affected individual's responsibility to
initiate an appeal or resolution of a ``delayed'' or ``denied'' NICS
response.
(3) Licensees may assign security personnel to official duties
requiring access to covered weapons subsequent to the individual's
satisfactorily resolving a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response.
(q) Protection of information. (1) Each licensee that obtains a
firearms background check and NRC Form 754 information on individuals
under this section shall establish and maintain a system of files and
procedures to protect these records and any enclosed personally
identifiable information (PII) from unauthorized disclosure.
(2) The licensee may not disclose these records or PII to persons
other than the subject individual, his/her representative, or to those
with a need to have access to the information in performing assigned
duties in the process of granting access to covered weapons. No
individual authorized to have access to this information may
disseminate the information to any other individual who does not have a
need to know.
(3) The record or PII may be disclosed to an appropriate Federal or
State agency in the performance of its official duties, in the course
of an administrative or judicial proceeding, or in response to a
Congressional inquiry.
(4) The licensee must make firearms background check records and
NRC Forms 754 obtained under this section available for examination by
an authorized representative of the NRC to determine compliance with
applicable regulations and laws.
(5) The record obtained on an individual from a firearms background
check may be transferred to another licensee--
(i) Upon an individual's written request to transfer the
individual's record to the licensee identified in the written request;
and
(ii) Upon verification from the gaining licensee of the
individual's name, date of birth, social security number, and sex.
(r) Withdrawal of orders. In accordance with the provisions of
Sec. 73.15(s), orders issued under Section 161A (42 U.S.C. 2201a)
prior to April 13, 2023 are withdrawn. Accordingly, the requirements of
those orders are superseded in their entirety by the requirements of
Sec. Sec. 73.15 and 73.17.
Sec. 73.20 [Designated as Subpart C]
0
22. Designate Sec. 73.20 as subpart C and add a heading for the newly
created subpart C to read as follows:
Subpart C--General Performance Objective for Protection of
Strategic Special Nuclear Material
Sec. Sec. 73.21 through 73.23 [Designated as Subpart D]
0
23. Designate Sec. Sec. 73.21 through 73.23 as subpart D and add a
heading for the newly created subpart D to read as follows:
Subpart D--Protection of Safeguards Information
Sec. 73.22 [Amended]
0
24. In Sec. 73.22(f)(3), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1200''.
Sec. 73.23 [Amended]
0
25. In Sec. 73.23(f)(3), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1200''.
Sec. Sec. 73.24 through 73.38 [Designated as Subpart E]
0
26. Designate Sec. Sec. 73.24 through 73.38 as subpart E and add a
heading for the newly created subpart E to read as follows:
Subpart E--Physical Protection Requirements of Special Nuclear
Material and Spent Nuclear Fuel in Transit
Sec. 73.27 [Amended]
0
27. In Sec. 73.27 (c), remove the reference ``Sec. 73.71'' and add in
its place the reference ``Sec. Sec. 73.1200 and 73.1205''.
0
28. In Sec. 73.37:
0
a. In paragraphs (b)(3)(iii) and (b)(3)(v)(C), remove the reference
``73.71'' and add in its place the reference ``73.1200''; and
0
b. Add paragraph (b)(3)(viii).
The additions and revision read as follows:
Sec. 73.37 Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor
fuel in transit.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(viii)(A) The licensee must ensure that the firearms background
check requirements of Sec. 73.17 are met for all armed escorts whose
official duties require access to covered weapons or who inventory
enhanced weapons.
(B) The provisions of this paragraph are only applicable to
licensees subject to this section who are also subject to the firearms
background check provisions of Sec. 73.17.
(C) The provisions of this paragraph are not applicable to members
of local law enforcement agencies serving as armed escorts or ship's
officers serving as unarmed escorts.
* * * * *
Sec. Sec. 73.40 through 73.55 [Designated as Subpart F]
0
29. Designate Sec. Sec. 73.40 through 73.55 as subpart F and add a
heading for newly created subpart F to read as follows:.
Subpart F--Physical Protection Requirements at Fixed Sites
0
30. In Sec. 73.46, add paragraph (b)(13) to read as follows:
Sec. 73.46 Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems,
components, and procedures.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(13)(i) The licensee must ensure that the firearms background check
requirements of Sec. 73.17 are met for all members of the security
organization whose official duties require access to covered weapons or
who inventory enhanced weapons.
(ii) The provisions of this paragraph are only applicable to
licensees subject to this section who are also subject to the firearms
background check provisions of Sec. 73.17 of this part.
* * * * *
0
31. In Sec. 73.51:
0
a. In paragraph (d)(13), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1210''.
0
b. Add paragraph (b)(4), a heading to paragraph (e), and paragraph (f)
to read as follows:
The additions and revision read as follows:
[[Page 15891]]
Sec. 73.51 Requirements for the physical protection of stored spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(4)(i) The licensee must ensure that the firearms background check
requirements of Sec. 73.17 of this part are met for all members of the
security organization whose official duties require access to covered
weapons or who inventory enhanced weapons.
(ii) The provisions of this paragraph are only applicable to
licensees subject to this section who are also subject to the firearms
background check provisions of Sec. 73.17 of this part.
* * * * *
(e) GROA exemption. * * *
(f) Response requirements. Licensees must train each armed member
of the security organization with access to enhanced weapons on the use
of deadly force when the armed member of the security organization has
a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force is necessary in self-
defense or in the defense of others, or any other circumstances as
authorized by applicable State or Federal law.
0
32. In Sec. 73.55, add paragraph (b)(12) and revise paragraph (p)(3)
to read as follows:
Sec. 73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(12)(i) The licensee must ensure that the firearms background check
requirements of Sec. 73.17 of this part are met for all members of the
security organization whose official duties require access to covered
weapons or who inventory enhanced weapons.
(ii) The provisions of this paragraph are only applicable to
licensees subject to this section that are also subject to the firearms
background check provisions of Sec. 73.17 of this part.
* * * * *
(p) * * *
(3) The suspension of security measures must be reported and
documented in accordance with the provisions of Sec. Sec. 73.1200 and
73.1205 of this part.
* * * * *
Sec. Sec. 73.56 through 73.67 [Designated as Subpart G]
0
33. Designate Sec. Sec. 73.56 through 73.67 as subpart G and add a
heading to the newly created subpart G to read as follows:
Subpart G--Access Authorization and Access Control Requirements for
the Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material
0
34. In Sec. 73.67, revise paragraphs (e)(3)(vii) and (g)(3)(iii) to
read as follows:
Sec. 73.67 Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the
physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low
strategic significance.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(3) * * *
(vii) Notify the NRC Operations Center after the discovery of the
loss of the shipment and after recovery of or accounting for such lost
shipment, in accordance with the provisions of Sec. Sec. 73.1200 and
73.1205 of this part.
* * * * *
(g) * * *
(3) * * *
(iii)(A) Immediately conduct a trace investigation of any shipment
that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time; and
(B) Notify the NRC Operations Center after the discovery of the
loss of the shipment and after recovery of or accounting for such lost
shipment, in accordance with the provisions of Sec. Sec. 73.1200 and
73.1205 of this part.
* * * * *
Sec. Sec. 73.70 through 73.75 [Designated as Subpart H]
0
35. Designate Sec. Sec. 73.70 through 73.75 as subpart H and add a
heading to newly created subpart H to read as follows:
Subpart H--Records and Postings
Sec. 73.71 [Reserved]
0
36. Remove and reserve Sec. 73.71.
Sec. Sec. 73.77 through 73.81 [Designated as Subpart I]
0
37. Designate Sec. Sec. 73.77 through 73.81 as subpart I and add a
heading to newly created subpart I to read as follows:
Subpart I--Enforcement
Subparts J through S [Reserved]
0
38. Add and reserve subparts J through S.
0
39. Add subpart T to read as follows:
Subpart T--Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping
Sec.
73.1200 Notification of physical security events.
73.1205 Written follow-up reports of physical security events.
73.1210 Recordkeeping of physical security events.
73.1215 Suspicious activity reports.
Sec. 73.1200 Notification of physical security events.
(a) 15-minute notifications--facilities. Each licensee subject to
the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.45, Sec. 73.46, Sec. 73.51,
or Sec. 73.55 of this part must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations
Center, as soon as possible but within 15 minutes after--
(1) The licensee's initiation of a security response in accordance
with its safeguards contingency plan or protective strategy, based on
an imminent or actual hostile action against a licensee's facility; or
(2) The licensee's notification by law enforcement or government
officials of a potential hostile action or act of sabotage anticipated
within the next 12 hours against a licensee's facility.
(3) Licensee notifications to the NRC must:
(i) Identify the facility's name; and
(ii) Briefly describe the nature of the hostile action or event,
including:
(A) The type of hostile action or event (e.g., armed assault,
vehicle bomb, bomb threat, sabotage, etc.); and
(B) The current status (i.e., imminent, in progress, or
neutralized).
(4) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this
section, as applicable.
(5) The licensee is not required to notify the NRC of security
responses initiated as a result of threat or warning information
communicated to the licensee from the NRC.
(6) The licensee's request for immediate local law enforcement
agency (LLEA) assistance or initiation of a contingency response may
take precedence over the notification to the NRC. However, in such
instances, the licensee must notify the NRC as soon as possible
thereafter.
(b) 15-minute notifications--shipments. Each licensee subject to
the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.25, Sec. 73.26, or Sec. 73.37
or its designated movement control center must notify the NRC
Headquarters Operations Center, as soon as possible but within 15
minutes after--
(1) The licensee's initiation of a security response in accordance
with its safeguards contingency plan or protective strategy, based on
an imminent or actual hostile action against a shipment of Category I
SSNM, spent nuclear fuel (SNF), or high-level radioactive waste (HLW);
or
(2) The licensee's notification by law enforcement or government
officials of a potential hostile action or attempted act
[[Page 15892]]
of sabotage anticipated within less than the next 12 hours against a
shipment of Category I SSNM, SNF, or HLW.
(3) Licensee notifications to the NRC must:
(i) Identify the name of the facility making the shipment, the
material being shipped, and the last known location of the shipment;
and
(ii) Briefly describe the nature of the threat or event, including:
(A) Type of hostile threat or event (e.g., armed assault, vehicle
bomb, theft of shipment, sabotage, etc.); and
(B) Threat or event status (i.e., imminent, in progress, or
neutralized).
(4) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this
section, as applicable.
(5) The licensee is not required to notify the NRC of security
responses initiated as a result of threat or warning information
communicated to the licensee from the NRC.
(6) The licensee's request for immediate LLEA assistance may take
precedence over the notification to the NRC. However, in such
instances, the licensee must notify the NRC as soon as possible
thereafter.
(c) One-hour notifications--facilities. (1) Each licensee subject
to the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.45, Sec. 73.46, Sec.
73.50, Sec. 73.51, Sec. 73.55, Sec. 73.60, or Sec. 73.67 must
notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as possible but
no later than 1 hour after the time of discovery of the following
significant facility security events involving--
(i) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has
committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a
threat to commit or cause:
(A) The theft or diversion of a Category I, II, or III quantity of
SSNM or a Category II or III quantity of special nuclear material
(SNM);
(B) Significant physical damage to any nuclear power reactor, to a
facility possessing a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, or to a
facility storing or disposing of SNF and/or HLW;
(C) The unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering with any
nuclear power reactor's controls or with structures, systems, and
components (SSCs) that results in the interruption of normal operation
of the reactor; or
(D) The unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering with any
Category I SSNM facility's SSCs that results in an accidental
criticality.
(ii)(A) For licensees required to have a vehicle barrier system
protecting their facility, the introduction beyond the vehicle barrier
of a quantity of unauthorized explosives that meets or exceeds the
relevant facility's adversary characteristics.
(B) This provision is applicable to facilities where the vehicle
barrier system protecting the facility is located at the Protected Area
boundary.
(iii) The licensee's notification by law enforcement or government
officials of a potential hostile action or act of sabotage anticipated
within greater than 12 hours against a licensee's facility.
(2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this
section, as applicable.
(3) Notifications made under paragraph (a) of this section are not
required to be repeated under this paragraph.
(4) As an exemption, licensees subject to Sec. 73.50, Sec. 73.60,
or Sec. 73.67 are not required to make notifications for events listed
under paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of this section.
(d) One-hour notifications--shipments. (1) Each licensee subject to
the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.25, Sec. 73.26, Sec. 73.27,
Sec. 73.37, or Sec. 73.67 or its designated movement control center
must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as possible
but no later than 1 hour after the time of discovery of the following
significant transportation security events involving--
(i) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person has
committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has made a
threat to commit or cause:
(A) The theft or diversion of the Category I, II, or III quantity
of SSNM; a Category II or III quantity of SNM; SNF; or HLW being
transported;
(B) Significant physical damage to any vehicle transporting a
Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II quantity of SNM, SNF,
or HLW; or
(C) Significant physical damage to the Category I or II quantity of
SSNM, a Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW being transported.
(ii) The discovery of the loss of a shipment of Category I SSNM.
(iii) The recovery of, or accounting for, a lost shipment of
Category I SSNM.
(iv) The licensee's notification by law enforcement or government
officials of a potential hostile action or attempted act of sabotage
anticipated within greater than the next 12 hours against a shipment of
Category I quantities of SSNM, SNF, or HLW.
(2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this
section, as applicable.
(3) Notifications made under paragraph (b) of this section are not
required to be repeated under this paragraph.
(e) Four-hour notifications--facilities. (1) Each licensee subject
to the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.45, Sec. 73.46, Sec.
73.50, Sec. 73.51, Sec. 73.55, Sec. 73.60, or Sec. 73.67 of this
part must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center within 4 hours
after time of discovery of the following facility security events
involving--
(i) The actual access of an unauthorized person into a facility's
protected area (PA), vital area (VA), material access area (MAA), or
controlled access area (CAA);
(ii) The attempted access of an unauthorized person into a PA, VA,
MAA, or CAA;
(iii) The actual introduction of contraband into a PA, VA, or MAA;
(iv) The attempted introduction of contraband into a PA, VA, or
MAA.
(v)(A) The discovery that a weapon that is authorized by the
licensee's security plan is lost or uncontrolled within a PA, VA, or
MAA;
(B) Uncontrolled authorized weapons are defined as weapons that are
authorized by the licensee's security plan and are not in the
possession of authorized personnel or are not in an authorized weapons
storage location;
(vi) The unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering with
any nuclear reactor or Category I SSNM facility's controls or SSCs that
could prevent the implementation of the licensee's protective strategy
for protecting any target set;
(vii) The identification or discovery of a previously unrecognized
or unidentified vulnerability that could prevent the implementation of
the licensee's protective strategy for protecting any target set; or
(viii)(A) For licensees required to have a vehicle barrier system
protecting their facility, the identification or discovery at or beyond
the vehicle barrier of unauthorized explosives.
(B) This provision is applicable to facilities where the vehicle
barrier system protecting the facility is located at a distance from
the Protected Area boundary greater than that assumed in the facility's
blast analysis.
(2) An event related to the licensee's implementation of their
security program for which a notification was made to local, State, or
Federal law enforcement officials provided that the event does not
otherwise require a notification under paragraphs (a) through (h) of
this section.
(3)(i) An event involving a law enforcement response to the
facility that could reasonably be expected to result in public or media
inquiries and that does not otherwise require a notification under
paragraphs (a) through (h) of this
[[Page 15893]]
section, or in other NRC regulations such as Sec. 50.72(b)(2)(xi) of
this chapter.
(ii) As an exemption, licensees need not report law enforcement
responses to minor incidents, such as traffic accidents.
(4) For licensees subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.55 of this
part, an event involving the licensee's suspension of security
measures.
(5) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this
section, as applicable.
(6) Notifications made under paragraphs (a) and (c) of this section
are not required to be repeated under this paragraph.
(f) Four-hour notifications--shipments. (1) Each licensee subject
to the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.25, Sec. 73.26, Sec.
73.27, Sec. 73.37, or Sec. 73.67 or its designated movement control
center must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center within 4
hours after time of discovery of the following transportation security
events involving--
(i) The actual access of an unauthorized person into a transport
vehicle transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II
quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW;
(ii) The attempted access of an unauthorized person into a
transport vehicle transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a
Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW;
(iii) The actual access of an unauthorized person into the Category
I or II quantity of SSNM, Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW
being transported;
(iv) The attempted access of an unauthorized person into the
Category I or II quantity of SSNM, Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or
HLW being transported;
(v) The actual introduction of contraband into a transport vehicle
transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II
quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW;
(vi) The attempted introduction of contraband into a transport
vehicle transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II
quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW;
(vii) The actual introduction of contraband into the Category I or
II quantity of SSNM, Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW being
transported;
(viii) The attempted introduction of contraband into the Category I
or II quantity of SSNM, Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW being
transported;
(ix) The discovery of the loss of a shipment of Category II or III
quantities of SSNM, Category II or III quantities of SNM, SNF, or HLW;
or
(x) The recovery of or accounting for a lost shipment of Category
II or III quantities of SSNM, Category II or III quantities of SNM,
SNF, or HLW.
(2) An event related to the licensee's implementation of their
security program for which a notification was made to local, State, or
Federal law enforcement officials, provided that the event does not
otherwise require a notification under paragraphs (a) through (h) of
this section.
(3) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this
section, as applicable.
(4) Notifications made under paragraphs (b) and (d) of this section
are not required to be repeated under this paragraph.
(g) Eight-hour notifications--facilities. (1) Each licensee subject
to the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.45, Sec. 73.46, Sec.
73.50, Sec. 73.51, Sec. 73.55, Sec. 73.60, or Sec. 73.67 must
notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center within 8 hours after time
of discovery of the following facility security program failures
involving--
(i) Any failure, degradation, or vulnerability in a security or
safeguards system, for which compensatory measures have not been
employed within the required timeframe, that could allow unauthorized
or undetected access of--
(A) Unauthorized personnel into a PA, VA, MAA, or CAA; or
(B) Contraband into a PA, VA, or MAA;
(ii) The unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering with
any nuclear power reactor's controls or with SSCs that does not result
in the interruption of normal operation of the reactor; or
(iii) The unauthorized operation, manipulation, or tampering with
any Category I SSNM facility's SSCs that does not result in the
interruption of normal operation of the facility or an accidental
criticality.
(2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this
section, as applicable.
(3) Notifications made under paragraphs (a), (c), and (e) of this
section are not required to be repeated under this paragraph.
(h) Eight-hour notifications--shipments. (1) Each licensee subject
to the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.25, Sec. 73.26, Sec.
73.27, Sec. 73.37, or Sec. 73.67 or its designated movement control
center must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center within 8
hours after time of discovery of the following transportation security
program failures involving any failure, degradation, or vulnerability
in a security or safeguards system, for which compensatory measures
have not been employed within the required timeframe, that could allow
unauthorized or undetected access of--
(i) Personnel or contraband into a transport vehicle transporting a
Category I or II quantity of SSNM, a Category II quantity of SNM, SNF,
or HLW; or
(ii) Personnel or contraband into the Category I or II quantity of
SSNM, Category II quantity of SNM, SNF, or HLW being transported;
(2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this
section, as applicable.
(3) Notifications made under paragraphs (b), (d), and (f) of this
section are not required to be repeated under this paragraph.
(i) through (l) [Reserved]
(m) Enhanced weapons notifications--stolen or lost. (1) Each
licensee possessing enhanced weapons in accordance with Sec. 73.15
must--
(i) Immediately notify the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) upon discovery of any stolen or lost
enhanced weapons (see 27 CFR 479.141).
(ii) Notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as
possible, but not later than 1 hour, after notification to the ATF of
the discovery of any stolen or lost enhanced weapons possessed by the
licensee.
(iii) Notify the appropriate local law enforcement agency (LLEA)
officials as soon as possible, but not later than 48 hours, after the
discovery of stolen or lost enhanced weapons. This notification must be
made by telephone or in person to the appropriate LLEA officials.
Licensees must include appropriate point of contact information in
their security event notification procedures.
(2) Notifications to the NRC must be made according to paragraph
(o) of this section, as applicable.
(n) Enhanced weapons--adverse ATF findings. (1) Each licensee
possessing enhanced weapons in accordance with Sec. 73.15 must--
(i) Notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as
possible, but not later than 24 hours, after receipt of an adverse
inspection finding, enforcement finding, or other adverse notice from
the ATF regarding the licensee's possession, receipt, transfer,
transportation, or storage of enhanced weapons; and
(ii) Notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as
possible, but not later than 24 hours after receipt
[[Page 15894]]
of an adverse inspection finding, enforcement finding or other adverse
notice from the ATF regarding any ATF issued Federal firearms license
to the NRC licensee.
(2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (o) of this
section, as applicable.
(o) Notification process. (1) Each licensee must make the
telephonic notifications to the NRC required by paragraphs (a) through
(n) of this section to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center via any
available telephone system. Commercial telephone numbers for the NRC
Headquarters Operations Center are specified in Table 1 of appendix A
of this part.
(2) Licensees must make required telephonic notifications via any
method that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC
Headquarters Operations Center or other specified government officials
within the timeliness requirements of paragraphs (a) through (n) of
this section, as applicable.
(3) Notifications required by this section that contain Safeguards
Information may be made to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center
without using secure communications systems under the exception of
Sec. 73.22(f)(3) for the communication of emergency or extraordinary
conditions.
(4)(i) Notifications required by this section that contain
classified national security information and/or classified restricted
data must be made to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center using
secure communications systems appropriate to the classification level
of the message. Licensees making classified telephonic notifications
must contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Center at the commercial
numbers specified in Table 1 of appendix A to this part and request a
transfer to a secure telephone, as specified in paragraph III of
appendix A to this part.
(ii) If the licensee's secure communications capability is
unavailable (e.g., due to the nature of the security event), the
licensee must provide to the NRC the information required by this
section, without revealing or discussing any classified information, in
order to meet the timeliness requirements of this section. The licensee
must also indicate to the NRC that its secure communications capability
is unavailable.
(iii) Licensees using a non-secure communications capability may be
directed by the NRC emergency response management, in accordance with
32 CFR 2001.52(a), to provide classified national security information
to the NRC over the non-secure system, due to the significance of the
ongoing security event. In such circumstances, the licensee must
document this direction and any information provided to the NRC over a
non-secure communications capability in the follow-up written report
required in accordance with Sec. 73.1205.
(5) For events reported under paragraph (a) of this section, the
NRC may request that the licensee establish and maintain an open and
continuous communications channel with the NRC Headquarters Operations
Center as soon as possible.
(i) Licensees must establish the requested continuous
communications channel once the licensee has completed other required
notifications under this section, Sec. 50.72 of this chapter, appendix
E to part 50 of this chapter, Sec. 70.50 of this chapter; or Sec.
72.75 of this chapter; as appropriate.
(ii) Licensees must complete any immediate actions required to
stabilize the plant, to place the plant in a safe condition, to
implement defensive measures, or to request assistance from the LLEA.
(iii) When established, the continuous communications channel must
be staffed by a knowledgeable individual in the licensee's security,
operations, or emergency response organizations from a location deemed
appropriate by the licensee.
(iv) The continuous communications channel may be established via
any available telephone system.
(6) For events reported under paragraph (b) of this section, the
NRC may request that the licensee or its movement control center
establish and maintain an open and continuous communications channel
with the NRC Headquarters Operations Center as soon as possible.
(i) Licensees must establish the requested continuous
communications channel once the licensee or the movement control center
has completed other required notifications under this section, Sec.
50.72 of this chapter, appendix E to part 50 of this chapter, or Sec.
70.50 of this chapter; Sec. 72.75 of this chapter; or requested
assistance from the LLEA, as appropriate.
(ii) When established, the continuous communications channel must
be staffed by a knowledgeable individual in the licensee's security,
operations, or emergency response organizations or the movement control
center monitoring the shipment.
(iii) The continuous communications channel may be established via
any available telephone system.
(7)(i) For events reported under paragraphs (c), (e), (g), and (m)
of this section, the NRC may request that the licensee establish and
maintain an open and continuous communications channel with the NRC
Headquarters Operations Center.
(ii) When established, the continuous communications channel must
be staffed by a knowledgeable individual in the licensee's security,
operations, or emergency response organizations from a location deemed
appropriate by the licensee.
(iii) The continuous communications channel may be established via
any available telephone system.
(8)(i) For events reported under paragraphs (d), (f), and (h) of
this section, the NRC may request that the licensee or the movement
control center establish and maintain an open and continuous
communications channel with the NRC Headquarters Operations Center.
(ii) When established, the continuous communications channel must
be staffed by a knowledgeable individual in the movement control center
monitoring the shipment.
(iii) The continuous communications channel may be established via
any available telephone system.
(p) Significant supplemental information. Licensees identifying
significant supplemental information for events reported under
paragraphs (a) through (h), (m), and (n) of this section, subsequent to
the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Headquarters Operations
Center, must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center of such
supplemental information under paragraph (o) of this section.
(q) Retraction of previous security event reports. (1) Licensees
desiring to retract a previous physical security event notification
made under paragraphs (a) through (h), (m), and (n) of this section,
which have been determined to be invalid, not reportable in accordance
with the requirements of paragraphs (a) through (h), (m), and (n) of
this section, or recharacterized as recordable under Sec. 73.1210 of
this part (instead of reportable under Sec. 73.1200), must
telephonically notify the NRC Headquarters Operations Center in
accordance with paragraph (o) of this section and indicate the report
that is being retracted and the basis for the retraction.
(2) Invalid, not reportable, or recharacterized events include, but
are not limited to, events for which the licensee subsequently receives
new information regarding the event or relevant information from an
external entity (e.g., the initial information on a reportable event is
subsequently determined to be incorrect or a law
[[Page 15895]]
enforcement determination is made on the absence of a malevolent
intent).
(r) Declaration of emergencies. Licensees notifying the NRC of the
declaration of an emergency class must do so in accordance with
Sec. Sec. 50.72, 63.73, 70.50, and 72.75 of this chapter, as
applicable.
(s) Elimination of duplication. Licensees with notification
obligations under paragraphs (a) through (h), (m), and (n) of this
section and Sec. Sec. 50.72, 63.73, 70.50, and 72.75 of this chapter
may notify the NRC of events in a single communication. This
communication must identify each regulation under which the licensee is
reporting.
(t) Classified information. Licensee notifications regarding
security events associated with the deliberate disclosure, theft, loss,
compromise, or possible compromise of classified documents,
information, or material must comply with the requirements found in
Sec. 95.57 of this chapter.
Sec. 73.1205 Written follow-up reports of physical security events.
(a) General requirements. (1) Licensees making a telephonic
notification under Sec. 73.1200 of this part must also submit a
written follow-up report to the NRC within 60 days of such
notifications, in accordance with Sec. 73.4.
(2) As an exemption, licensees are not required to submit a written
follow-up report subsequent to a telephonic notification made--
(i) Under the provisions of Sec. 73.1200(e) and (f) regarding
interactions with a Federal, State, or local law-enforcement agency;
(ii) Under the provisions of Sec. 73.1200(m) regarding lost or
stolen enhanced weapons; or
(iii) Under the provisions of Sec. 73.1200(n) regarding adverse
findings from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) for enhanced weapons possessed by the licensee.
(3)(i) Licensees are not required to submit a written follow-up
report if the licensee subsequently retracts a telephonic notification
made under Sec. 73.1200 as invalid, not reportable under Sec.
73.1200, or recharacterized as recordable under Sec. 73.1210 (instead
of reportable under Sec. 73.1200), and has not yet submitted a written
follow-up report under this section.
(ii) If the licensee subsequently retracts a telephonic
notification made under Sec. 73.1200 after it has submitted a written
follow-up report under this section, then the licensee must submit a
revised written follow-up report documenting the retraction.
(b) Submission criteria. (1) Each licensee must submit to the NRC
written follow-up reports that contain sufficient information for NRC
analysis and evaluation and are of a quality that will permit legible
reproduction and processing.
(2)(i) Licensees subject to Sec. 50.73 of this chapter must
prepare the written follow-up report on NRC Form 366.
(ii) Licensees not subject to Sec. 50.73 of this chapter must
prepare the written follow-up report in a letter format.
(3)(i) If significant supplemental information becomes available
after the submission of the initial written follow-up report, then the
licensee must submit a revised report with the revisions indicated.
(ii) The revised written follow-up report must replace the previous
written report in its entirety. The update must be complete and not be
limited to only supplementary or revised information.
(iii) Errors discovered in a written follow-up report must be
corrected in a revised report with the revisions indicated.
(c) Contents. A written follow-up report must contain:
(1) A brief abstract describing the major occurrences during the
event or condition, including all component or system failures that
contributed to the event or condition, and significant corrective
actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence.
(2) A clear, specific, narrative description of what occurred so
that a knowledgeable reader conversant with general security program
requirements, but not familiar with the security requirements for the
specific facility or activity, can understand the complete event.
(3) The narrative description must include, as a minimum, the
following information, as applicable--
(i) The date and time the event or condition was discovered;
(ii) The date and time the event or condition occurred;
(iii) The affected structures, systems, components, equipment, or
procedures;
(iv) The environmental conditions at the time of the event or
occurrence, if relevant;
(v) The root cause of the event or condition;
(vi) Whether any human performance errors were the cause or were a
contributing factor to the event or condition, including: personnel
errors, inadequate procedures, or inadequate training;
(vii) Whether previous events or conditions are relevant to the
current event or condition and whether corrective actions to prevent
recurrence were ineffective or insufficient;
(viii) Whether this event or condition is a recurring failure of a
structure, system, component, or procedure important to security;
(ix) What compensatory measures, if any, were implemented in
response to the event or condition;
(x) What corrective actions, if any, were taken in response to the
event or condition; and
(xi) When corrective actions, if any, were taken or will be
completed.
(d) Transmission criteria. (1) In addition to the addressees
specified in Sec. 73.4, the licensee must also provide one copy of the
written follow-up report addressed to the Director, Office of Nuclear
Security and Incident Response (NSIR).
(2) For copies of a classified written follow-up report, the
licensee must transmit them to the NRC via either the NRC Headquarters
classified mailing address specified in Table 2 of appendix A to this
part or via the NRC's secure email address specified in Table 1 of
appendix A to this part.
(3) Each written follow-up report containing classified information
must be created, stored, marked, labeled, handled, transmitted to the
NRC, and destroyed in accordance with the requirements of part 95 of
this chapter.
(4) Each written follow-up report containing Safeguards Information
must be created, stored, marked, labeled, handled, transmitted to the
NRC, and destroyed in accordance with the requirements of Sec. Sec.
73.21 and 73.22.
(e) Records retention. Licensees must maintain a copy of a written
follow-up report as a record for a period of 3 years from the date of
the report or until termination of the license, whichever is later.
Sec. 73.1210 Recordkeeping of physical security events.
(a) Objective and purpose. (1) Licensees with facilities or
shipment activities subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec.
73.25, Sec. 73.26, Sec. 73.27, Sec. 73.37, Sec. 73.45, Sec. 73.46,
Sec. 73.50, Sec. 73.51, Sec. 73.55, Sec. 73.60, or Sec. 73.67,
must record the physical security events and conditions adverse to
security that are specified in paragraphs (c) through (f) of this
section.
(2) These records facilitate the licensee's monitoring of the
effectiveness of its physical security program. These records also
facilitate the licensee's effective tracking, trending, and performance
monitoring of these security events and conditions adverse to security;
and the subsequent identification and implementation of corrective
actions to prevent recurrence.
(3) These physical security events and conditions adverse to
security include,
[[Page 15896]]
but are not limited to, human performance security errors; failure to
comply with security procedures; insufficient or inadequate security
procedures; security equipment failures and malfunctions; security
structures, systems, and components design deficiencies; and inadequate
or insufficient security structures, systems, and components. This
includes events or conditions where the licensee has implemented
compensatory measures within the required timeframe specified in its
physical security plan.
(b) General requirements. (1) Licensees must record within 24 hours
of the time of discovery the physical security events and conditions
adverse to security specified in paragraphs (c) through (f) of this
section.
(2) Licensees must retain these records for a period up to 3 years
after the last entry is recorded, or until their license is terminated,
whichever is later.
(3)(i) Licensees must record these physical security events and
conditions adverse to security in either a stand-alone safeguards event
log or as part of the licensee's corrective action program, as
specified under the applicable quality assurance program provisions of
parts 50, 52, 60, 63, 70, and 72 of this chapter, or both.
(ii) Licensees choosing to use their corrective action program to
record these physical security events and conditions adverse to
security must ensure that the records contain sufficient information to
permit the effective tracking, trending, and performance monitoring of
these events and conditions and the implementation of corrective
actions.
(iii) Licensees must ensure that Safeguards Information or
classified security information associated with these records is
created, stored, and handled in accordance with the provisions of Sec.
73.21, or of part 95 of this chapter, as applicable.
(iv) Licensees choosing to use their corrective action program for
these records may also choose to bifurcate the information in such
records systems so as to maximize the use and advantages of their
corrective action programs' tracking, trending, and performance
monitoring capabilities while simultaneously compartmenting sensitive
security information and security vulnerabilities (i.e., by controlling
access and limiting need to know to necessary personnel), in order to
ensure information protection requirements are effectively implemented.
(4) These records must include, but are not limited to, information
on the following data elements, as applicable--
(i) The date and time the event or condition was discovered;
(ii) The date and time the event or condition occurred;
(iii) The affected structures, systems, components, equipment, or
procedures;
(iv) A description of the event or condition;
(v) The environmental conditions at the time of the event or
occurrence, if relevant;
(vi) The root cause of the event or condition;
(vii) Whether any human performance errors were the cause or were a
contributing factor of the event or condition, including: personnel
errors, inadequate procedures, or inadequate training;
(viii) Whether previous events or conditions are relevant to the
current event or condition and whether corrective actions were
ineffective or insufficient;
(ix) Whether this event or condition is a recurring failure of a
structure, system, component, or procedure;
(x) What compensatory measures, if any, were implemented in
response to the event or condition;
(xi) What corrective actions, if any, were taken in response to the
event or condition; and
(xii) When corrective actions, if any, were taken or will be
completed.
(5) Physical security events and conditions adverse to security for
which notifications were made to the NRC under Sec. 73.1200 are not
required to be recorded under this section.
(6) Suspicious activities that are reported under Sec. 73.1215 are
not required to be recorded under this section.
(7) Enhanced weapons events that are reported under Sec. 73.1200
are not required to be recorded under this section.
(c) Compensated security events. The requirements of this section
apply to any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a
security or safeguards system for which compensatory measures were
established within the required timeframe and for which the following
could have resulted in--
(1) Undetected access of unauthorized explosives beyond a required
vehicle barrier;
(2) Unauthorized personnel gaining access into a protected area
(PA), vital area (VA), material access area (MAA), or controlled access
area (CAA);
(3) Undetected access of contraband into a PA, VA, or MAA;
(4) Unauthorized personnel accessing a vehicle transporting a
Category I or II quantity of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM),
spent nuclear fuel (SNF), or high-level radioactive waste (HLW);
(5) Unauthorized personnel accessing a Category I or II quantity of
SSNM, SNF, or HLW being transported;
(6) Undetected introduction of contraband into a vehicle
transporting a Category I or II quantity of SSNM, SNF, or HLW; or
(7) Undetected introduction of contraband into the Category I or II
quantity of SSNM, SNF, or HLW being transported.
(d) Ammunition events. (1) For licensees with armed security
personnel, the discovery that greater than a small quantity of live
ammunition authorized by the licensee's security plan:
(i) Has been lost inside a PA, VA, or MAA; or
(ii) Has been found uncontrolled inside a PA, VA, or MAA.
(2)(i) The discovery that greater than a small quantity of
unauthorized live ammunition is inside a PA, VA, or MAA.
(ii) A small quantity of live ammunition means five rounds or fewer
of ammunition.
(iii) Uncontrolled authorized ammunition means ammunition
authorized by the licensee's security plans that is not in the
possession of authorized personnel or is not in an authorized
ammunition storage location.
(iv) Unauthorized ammunition means ammunition that is not
authorized by the licensee's security plans.
(3) As exemptions, licensees are not required to record:
(i) Ammunition that is in the possession of Federal, State, or
local law-enforcement personnel performing official duties inside a PA,
VA, or MAA is considered controlled and authorized; or
(ii) Blank ammunition used for training purposes by the licensee.
(e) [Reserved]
(f) Decreases in the effectiveness of the physical security
program. The requirements of this section apply to any other
threatened, attempted, or committed act not previously defined in this
section that has resulted in or has the potential for decreasing the
effectiveness of the licensee's physical security program below that
committed to in a licensee's NRC-approved physical security plan.
(g) Classified Information. Licensee recordkeeping requirements
regarding any security events or conditions adverse to security
involving any infractions, losses, compromises, or possible compromise
of classified information or classified documents are found in Sec.
95.57 of this chapter.
[[Page 15897]]
(h) Recordkeeping--exemptions. Licensees subject to Sec. 73.67 who
possess or transport SSNM or special nuclear material (SNM) in the
following categories are exempt from the provisions of this section:
(1) Category III quantity of SSNM;
(2) Category II quantity of SNM; or
(3) Category III quantity of SNM.
Sec. 73.1215 Suspicious activity reports.
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth the reporting criteria and
process for licensees to use in reporting suspicious activities.
Licensees are required to report suspicious activities to the local law
enforcement agency (LLEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
local field office, the NRC, and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) local control tower if aircraft are a part of the suspicious
activity.
(b) Objective. (1) A licensee's timely submission of suspicious
activity reports (SARs) to Federal and local law enforcement agencies
is an important part of the U.S. government's efforts to disrupt or
dissuade malevolent acts against the nation's critical infrastructure.
Despite the increasingly fluid and unpredictable nature of the threat
environment, some elements of terrorist tactics, techniques, and
procedures remain constant. For example, attack planning and
preparation generally proceed through several predictable stages,
including intelligence gathering and preattack surveillance or
reconnaissance. These preattack stages, in particular, offer law
enforcement and security personnel a significant opportunity to
identify and disrupt or dissuade acts of terrorism before they occur.
However, to use this information most effectively, timely reporting of
suspicious activities by licensees to both Federal and local law
enforcement is of vital importance.
(2) Licensee's timely submission of SARs to the NRC supports one of
the agency's primary mission essential functions of threat assessment
for licensed facilities, materials, and shipping activities.
(c) General requirements. (1)(i) Licensees subject to paragraphs
(d), (e), and (f) of this section must report suspicious activities
that are applicable to their facility, material, or shipping activity.
(ii) If a suspicious activity requires a physical security event
notification pursuant to Sec. 73.1200, then the licensee is not
required to also report the occurrence as a suspicious activity
pursuant to this section.
(iii) If a suspicious activity report results in a LLEA response
the licensee must notify the NRC in accordance with the requirements of
Sec. 73.1200.
(2)(i) Licensees must promptly assess whether an activity is
suspicious. Licensees may review additional information as part of an
assessment process, including interactions with their LLEA. However,
such assessments and any subsequent reporting must be completed as soon
as possible, but within 4 hours of the time of discovery. The licensee
must base its assessment upon its best available information on the
activity, which may include its knowledge of its locale and the local
population.
(ii) The licensee's assessment of a potential suspicious activity,
and any discussion of this activity with its LLEA, does not constitute
a conclusion, in and of itself, that the activity is suspicious.
(iii) Licensees are not required to report activities that, based
on their assessment, appear to be innocent or innocuous.
(3) For a suspicious activity specified under paragraph (d) of this
section, the licensee must make the following reports:
(i) First, to their LLEA;
(ii) Second, to their applicable FBI local field office;
(iii) Third, to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center; and
(iv) Lastly, to the local FAA control tower if the suspicious
activity involves aircraft overflights in proximity to the licensee's
facility.
(4) For a suspicious activity specified under paragraphs (e) and
(f) of this section, the licensee or its designated movement control
center must make the following reports, in the order indicated:
(i) First, to the applicable LLEA;
(ii) Second, to the applicable FBI local field office; and
(iii) Lastly, to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center.
(iv) For licensees making such reports related to shipping
activities, the licensee responsible for the security of the shipment
must contact the applicable FBI local field office.
(v) For a movement control center making such reports related to
shipping activities, the applicable FBI local field office is as
requested by the FBI. As such, the FBI may direct the use of the FBI
local field office applicable to the movement control center itself or
to the FBI local field office applicable to the licensee responsible
for the security of the shipment.
(5)(i) Licensees subject to paragraphs (d) and (f) of this section
must establish a point of contact with their local FBI field office.
(ii) Licensees subject to paragraph (d) of this section must
establish a point of contact with their local FAA control tower.
(6)(i) For licensees subject to paragraph (e) of this section who
are responsible for the security of the shipment(s), the licensee must
establish a point of contact with their local FBI field office.
(ii) For licensees subject to paragraph (e) of this section who are
employing the services of a movement control center, the movement
control center must establish a point of contact with its local FBI
field office.
(7) Licensees and movement control centers reporting suspicious
activities to the NRC must notify the NRC Headquarters Operations
Center via the telephone number specified in Table 1 of appendix A of
this part.
(8)(i) Licensees and movement control centers reporting suspicious
activities must document the LLEA and FBI points of contact in written
security communication procedures or route approvals, as applicable.
(ii) Licensees reporting suspicious aircraft overflight activities
must document the FAA point of contact in written communication
procedures.
(d) Suspicious activities--facilities and materials. (1) For
licensees subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.45, Sec.
73.46, Sec. 73.50, Sec. 73.51, Sec. 73.55, Sec. 73.60, or Sec.
73.67, the licensees must report activities they assess are suspicious.
Examples include, but are not limited to, the following:
(i) Challenges to the licensee's security systems and procedures;
(ii) Elicitation of non-public information from knowledgeable
licensee or contractor personnel regarding the licensee's security or
emergency response programs;
(iii) Observed surveillance or reconnaissance activity from within
posted or restricted areas (i.e., non-public areas), including surface
activity, underwater activity, manned aerial activity, and unmanned
aerial activity;
(iv) Observed surveillance activity from public spaces outside of
the licensee's control; or
(v) Unauthorized aircraft activities in close proximity to the
facility (i.e., above or near), involving either manned or unmanned
aircraft, operating in a manner potentially indicative of surveillance
or reconnaissance activity.
(2) As an exemption, this paragraph does not apply to:
(i) Licensees who are subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.67, and
who are also engaged in the enrichment of special nuclear material
using Restricted Data
[[Page 15898]]
(RD) information, technology, or materials.
(ii) Licensees who are subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.67 of
this part, and who are also engaged in the fabrication of new fuel
assemblies.
(3) Licensees are not required to report commercial or military
aircraft activity that is assessed as routine or non-threatening.
(e) Suspicious activity--shipping activities. (1) For licensees
subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.20, Sec. 73.25, Sec. 73.26,
Sec. 73.27, or Sec. 73.37, the licensee must report activities they
assess are suspicious. Examples include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(i) Challenges to the licensee's or its transportation contractor's
communications subsystems regarding the transport system;
(ii) Challenges to the licensee's or its transportation
contractor's security subsystems for the transport system;
(iii) Interference with or harassment of in-progress shipments;
(iv) Elicitation of non-public information from knowledgeable
licensee personnel or the licensee's transportation contractor
personnel regarding transportation program elements, including:
security programs, operations programs, communication protocols,
shipment routes, safe haven locations, and emergency response programs;
or
(v) Observed surveillance or reconnaissance activity of ongoing
shipments.
(2) For licensees using a movement control center for shipments of
radioactive material or special nuclear material (SNM), the movement
control center may report suspicious activities to LLEA, the FBI, and
the NRC, in lieu of the licensee making such reports.
(f) Suspicious activities--enrichment facilities. (1) For licensees
subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.67, who are also engaged in the
enrichment of SNM using RD information, technology, or materials; the
licensee must report activities they assess are suspicious. Examples
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(i) Aggressive noncompliance by visitors to the licensee's facility
involving willful unauthorized departure from a tour group or willful
unauthorized entry into restricted areas;
(ii) Unauthorized recording or imaging of sensitive technology,
equipment, or materials; or
(iii) Elicitation of non-public information from knowledgeable
licensee or contractor personnel regarding physical or information
security programs intended to protect RD information, technology, or
materials.
(2)(i) Licensees must report, in accordance with Sec. 95.57 of
this chapter, alleged or suspected activities involving actual,
attempted, or conspiracies to obtain RD, communicate RD, remove RD, or
disclose RD in potential violation of Sections 224, 225, 226, and 227
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2274, 2275,
2276, and 2277).
(ii) As an exemption, the licensee is not required to also report
such actual, attempted, or conspiracies to obtain RD, communicate RD,
remove RD, or disclose RD as suspicious activities pursuant to this
section.
(g) Suspicious activities--exemptions. (1) Licensees subject to
Sec. 73.67 who possess strategic special nuclear material in
quantities greater than 15 grams but less than the quantity necessary
to form a critical mass, as specified in Sec. 150.11(a) of this
chapter, are exempt from the provisions of this section.
(2) The following licensees are exempt from the provisions of this
section:
(i) Docket number 70-7020; and
(ii) Docket number 70-7028.
0
40. In appendix A to part 73, designate the first table as Table 1 and
add a heading to and revise the first row in newly designated table 1,
designate the second table as Table 2 and add a heading to newly
designated table 2, and add paragraphs III and IV to read as follows:
Appendix A to Part 73--U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Offices and
Classified Mailing Addresses
Table 1--Mailing Addresses, Telephone Numbers, and Email Addresses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Address Telephone (24-hour) Email
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NRC Headquarters Operations USNRC, Division of (301) 816-5100; [email protected]; [email protected]
Center. Preparedness and (301) 816-5151 (secure).
Response, (fax).
Washington, DC
20555-0001.
* * * * * * *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2--Classified Mailing Addresses
III. Classified telephone calls must be made to the telephone
numbers for the NRC Headquarters Operations Center in Table 1 of
this appendix and the caller must request transfer to a secure
telephone to communicate the classified information.
IV. Classified emails must be sent to the secure email address
specified in Table 1 of this appendix.
0
41. In appendix B to part 73:
0
a. Revise section I.A;
0
b. In section VI, paragraph B.1(a)(4), remove the reference ``10 CFR
73.19'' and add in its place the reference ``Sec. 73.17''.
The revision reads as follows:
Appendix B to Part 73--General Criteria for Security Personnel
* * * * *
I. * * *
A. Employment Suitability and Qualification.
1. Suitability.
(a) Before employment, or assignment to the security
organization, an individual shall:
(1) Possess a high school diploma or pass an equivalent
performance examination designed to measure basic mathematical,
language, and reasoning skills, abilities, and knowledge required to
perform security duties and responsibilities;
(2) Have attained the age of 21 for an armed capacity or the age
of 18 for an unarmed capacity;
(3) Not have any felony convictions that reflect on the
individual's reliability; and
(4) Not be disqualified, in accordance with applicable state or
Federal law from possessing or using firearms or ammunition.
(i) Licensees may use the information that has been obtained
during the completion of the individual's background investigation
for unescorted access to determine suitability; or
(ii) Licensees may use the satisfactory completion of a firearms
background check for the individual under Sec. 73.17 of this part
to also fulfill this requirement.
(b) The qualification of each individual to perform assigned
duties and responsibilities must be documented by a qualified
training instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.
* * * * *
Appendix G to Part 73 [Reserved]
0
42. Remove and reserve appendix G to part 73.
[[Page 15899]]
PART 74--MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIAL
0
44. The authority citation for part 74 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 53, 57, 161, 182,
223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2201, 2232, 2273, 2282,
2297f); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 202 (42 U.S.C.
5841, 5842); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
0
45. In Sec. 74.11, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 74.11 Reports of loss or theft or attempted theft or
unauthorized production of special nuclear material.
* * * * *
(c) Notifications required under Sec. 73.1200 of this chapter need
not be duplicated under the requirements of this section.
PART 76--CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS
0
46. The authority citation for part 76 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Atomic Energy Act of 1954, secs. 122, 161, 193(f),
223, 234, 1701 (42 U.S.C. 2152, 2201, 2243(f), 2273, 2282, 2297f);
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, secs. 201, 206, 211 (42 U.S.C.
5841, 5846, 5851); 44 U.S.C. 3504 note.
Sec. 76.113 [Amended]
0
47. In Sec. 76.113(b), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1200''.
Sec. 76.115 [Amended]
0
48. In Sec. 76.115(b), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1200''.
Sec. 76.117 [Amended]
0
49. In Sec. 76.117(b), remove the reference ``73.71'' and add in its
place the reference ``73.1200''.
Dated: February 22, 2023.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brooke P. Clark,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2023-03944 Filed 3-13-23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P