[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 40 (Wednesday, March 1, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12912-12915]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-04189]


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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Bureau of Industry and Security


Ilya Balakaev, Sharikopodshipnikovkaya 20-68, Moscow, Russian 
Federation; Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC, 
Sharikopodshipnikovskaya 11, Building 1, Moscow, 115088, Russian 
Federation; and Volgograd Prospect, House 2, Moscow, 109316, Russian 
Federation; Order Temporarily Denying Export Privileges

    Pursuant to section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations 
(the ``Regulations'' or ``EAR''),\1\ the Bureau of Industry and 
Security (``BIS''), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of 
Export Enforcement (``OEE''), has requested the issuance of an Order 
temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges 
under the Regulations of: Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a 
Radiotester LLC. OEE's request and related information indicates that 
these parties are located in the Russian Federation, at the respective 
addresses listed on the caption page of this order and on pages 12-13, 
infra, and that Balakaev, a Russian national, owns or controls 
Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC (referred to collectively as 
``Radiotester'').
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    \1\ The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR parts 730-774 
(2020), originally issued pursuant to the Export Administration Act 
(50 U.S.C. 4601-4623 (Supp. III 2015) (``EAA''), which lapsed on 
August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive Order 13222 of 
August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by 
successive Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in effect 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1701, et seq. (2012)) (``IEEPA''). On August 13, 2018, the President 
signed into law the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which includes the Export Control Reform 
Act of 2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801-4852 (``ECRA''). While section 1766 of 
ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA (except for three sections 
which are inapplicable here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in 
pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other forms 
of administrative action that were made or issued under the EAA, 
including as continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in 
effect as of ECRA's date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall 
continue in effect according to their terms until modified, 
superseded, set aside, or revoked through action undertaken pursuant 
to the authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5) 
of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary denial orders.
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I. Legal Standard

    Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may issue an order temporarily 
denying a respondent's export privileges upon a showing that the order 
is necessary in the public interest to prevent an ``imminent 
violation'' of the Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 766.24(d). ``A 
violation may be `imminent' either in time or degree of likelihood.'' 
15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS may show ``either that a violation is about to 
occur, or that the general circumstances of the matter under 
investigation or case under criminal or administrative charges 
demonstrate a likelihood of future violations.'' Id. As to the 
likelihood of future violations, BIS may show that the violation under 
investigation or charge ``is significant, deliberate, covert and/or 
likely to occur again, rather than technical or negligent[.]'' Id. A 
``[l]ack of information establishing the precise time a violation may 
occur does not preclude a finding that a violation is imminent, so long 
as there is sufficient reason to believe the likelihood of a 
violation.'' Id.
    Pursuant to sections 766.23 and 766.24, a temporary denial order 
(``TDO'') may also be made applicable to other persons if BIS has 
reason to believe that they are related to a respondent and that 
applying the order to them is necessary to prevent its evasion. 15 CFR 
766.23(a)-(b) and 766.24(c). A ``related person'' is a person, either 
at the time of the TDO's issuance or thereafter, who is related to a 
respondent ``by ownership, control, position of responsibility, 
affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business.'' 
15 CFR 766.23(a). Related persons may be added to a TDO on an ex-parte 
basis in accordance with section 766.23(b) of the Regulations. 15 CFR 
766.23(b).

II. OEE's Request for a Temporary Denial Order

    As further detailed below, OEE's request is based upon facts 
indicating that Balakaev engaged in conduct prohibited by the 
Regulations by unlawfully procuring and exporting from the United 
States electronic devices subject to the EAR to the Federal Security 
Service of the Russian Federation (``FSB''), a BIS-listed entity 
located in the Russian Federation (``Russia''), and to the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (``North Korea'' or ``DPRK'') without the 
required U.S. government authorization. ``Export'' is defined in the 
EAR as an ``actual shipment or transmission out of the United States, 
including the sending or taking of an item out of the United States, in 
any manner.'' 15 CFR 734.13(a)(1).\2\
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    \2\ ``Item'' means ``commodities, software, and technology.'' 15 
CFR 772.1. Further, ``technology'' may be in any tangible or 
intangible form, such as written or oral communications, blueprints, 
drawings, photographs, plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, 
engineering designs and specifications, computer-aided design files, 
manuals or documentation, electronic media or information revealed 
through visual inspection. Id.
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    The FSB is listed on the Commerce Department's Entity List \3\ with 
a policy of denial for all items subject to the EAR with limited 
exceptions for transactions authorized by the Department of the 
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (``OFAC'') pursuant to 
General License No. 1B of March 2, 2021.\4\ As a result of this 
listing, no item subject to the Regulations may be exported, 
reexported, or transferred (in-country) to the FSB without prior 
authorization from BIS, and BIS will review any license applications 
for the FSB pursuant to a policy of denial.\5\ The FSB was originally 
listed on the Entity List on January 4, 2017,\6\ with a license review 
policy of presumption of denial

[[Page 12913]]

for all items subject to the EAR, with some limited exceptions.\7\ As 
such, as of January 4, 2017, a license was required to export, 
reexport, or transfer (in-country) all items subject to the EAR to the 
FSB.\8\
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    \3\ The Entity List (supplement no. 4 to part 744 of the EAR) 
identifies entities for which there is reasonable cause to believe, 
based on specific and articulable facts, that the entities have been 
involved, are involved, or pose a significant risk of being or 
becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or 
foreign policy interests of the United States.
    \4\ See 87 FR 34131 (Jun. 6, 2022). See also sections 734.9(g), 
746.8(a)(3), and 744.21(b) of the EAR.
    \5\ Id.
    \6\ See 82 FR 722 (Jan. 4, 2017). See also 82 FR 18219 (Apr. 18, 
2017), 86 FR 37903 (Jul. 19, 2021), 87 FR 12240 (Mar. 3, 2022), and 
87 FR 34136 (Jun. 6, 2022) for additional listings of FSB-related 
entities on the Entity List.
    \7\ On March 2, 2021, the Department of State designated the FSB 
pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for its contributions to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, exports to the 
FSB were also prohibited under 15 CFR 744.8.
    \8\ As a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, BIS implemented 
a sweeping series of stringent export controls that severely 
restrict Russia's access to technologies and other items that it 
needs to sustain its aggressive military capabilities. As of 
February 24, 2022, any item classified under any Export 
Classification Control Number (``ECCN'') in Categories 3 through 9 
of the Commerce Control List (``CCL'') required a license to be 
exported or reexported to Russia. See 87 FR 12226 (Mar. 3, 2022). As 
of April 8, 2022, the license requirements for Russia were expanded 
to cover all items on the CCL. See 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). 
These rules were codified in title 15 CFR 746.8.
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    As of January 26, 2007, a license is required for the export or 
reexport to North Korea of all items subject to the EAR other than food 
or medicine designated as EAR99.\9\ This rule was codified in title 15 
CFR 746.4, which states ``consistent with United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1718, a license is required to export or reexport 
any item subject to the EAR (see part 734 of the EAR) to the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), except food and medicines 
classified as EAR99 (definitions in part 772 of the EAR).'' \10\
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    \9\ See 52 FR 3722 (Jan. 26, 2007).
    \10\ Additionally, BIS implemented broad based controls for 
items and activities subject to the EAR in support of U.S. national 
security and foreign policy. 50 U.S.C. 481 l(l)-(2). These controls 
included restrictions on exports and reexports to the DPRK for 
United Nations (``UN'') and anti-terrorism reasons. 15 CFR 746.4, 
742.19. Consistent with ECRA and UN Security Council Resolutions, 
with limited exceptions, a license was required to export or 
reexport any item subject to the EAR to North Korea. 15 CFR 746.4. 
The DPRK was also subject to a UN Security Council arms embargo, and 
thus, militarily sensitive items were also restricted. 15 CFR 
746.1(b)(2). Furthermore, the Secretary of State designated the DPRK 
a state sponsor of terrorism and implemented additional restrictions 
on it. 15 CFR 742.19(a)(2)-(3). For example, additional prohibitions 
applied to certain items destined for military, police, intelligence 
or other sensitive end users or if an item would make a significant 
contribution to the military potential of the DPRK. 15 CFR 
742.19(a)(3); Supplement No. 2 to part 742.
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    As referenced in OEE's request, on February 21, 2023, Balakaev was 
indicted on multiple counts in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York. The charges include, but are not limited 
to, conspiring to violate U.S. export control laws in connection with 
the unlicensed export of electronic spectrum analyzers, signal 
generators, and gas detection equipment, among other items, to 
Balakaev's company Radiotester, located in Moscow, Russia, for ultimate 
end use by officials of the FSB and the DPRK. As described in the OEE 
request and related information, Radiotester is owned or controlled by 
Balakaev. The company is described on its website as ``helping to 
quickly resolve issues of supply and repair of foreign-made measuring 
equipment'' and as having ``experience of working with large federal, 
city-forming, manufacturing enterprises''.
    As described in the OEE request and indictment, Balakaev headed an 
illicit procurement network consisting of an individual in the United 
States, referred to herein as ``Individual 3'', who would assist 
Balakaev in purchasing the electronic equipment, as well as two members 
of the FSB in Russia, referred to as FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-
Conspirator 2, who worked in FSB Center 8's Military Unit 43753 and who 
would publish a request for proposal (``RFP'') to repair a device on 
publicly available Russian websites (collectively, the ``Balakaev 
Network''). In particular, Balakaev would purchase the electronic 
devices on the internet or directly through the United States-based 
manufacturers and ship them to Individual 3's home in Richmond, 
Virginia. Then, often traveling through the Eastern District of New 
York, Balakaev flew to the United States to pick up the devices and 
bring them back to Russia or had Individual 3 and others ship the 
electronic devices from the United States to Russia. On occasion, 
Balakaev directed others to travel with the electronic devices from the 
United States to Russia. Balakaev subsequently used parts from the 
electronic devices to repair FSB equipment or provided the equipment 
directly to a DPRK official. The electronic devices Balakaev purchased, 
repaired, and sold to the FSB and DPRK are subject to the EAR and are 
items commonly used as part of sensitive foreign counterintelligence 
and military operations, including the transmission of encrypted 
communications, the ability to scan a room to determine if it was 
bugged, and the detection of hazardous gases.
    In its request, OEE has presented evidence indicating that Balakaev 
and the other above-captioned parties are engaged in unlawfully 
purchasing and shipping dual-use items from U.S. manufacturers to the 
FSB and DPRK. These items included advanced electronics and 
sophisticated testing equipment, some of which can be used in sensitive 
foreign counterintelligence and military operations.

A. Misconduct Charged in February 2023 Indictment

    The February 2023 indictment charged Balakaev, owner of 
Radiotester, with conspiring to defraud, conspiring to violate IEEPA, 
conspiring to violate ECRA, and smuggling goods from the United States. 
The violations charged in the indictment cover conduct occurring 
between at least January 2017 through February 2022, and it alleges 
that Balakaev was not only aware of U.S. export control laws but also 
took active steps to evade U.S. export controls by illicitly procuring 
items subject to the EAR without the required BIS export licenses.
i. Unlicensed Exports of U.S.-Origin Electronic Devices to the FSB in 
Russia
    As stated in the indictment, Balakaev and his co-conspirators in 
the Balakaev Network unlawfully sourced, purchased, shipped and 
transported spectrum analyzers and signal generators from vendors and 
manufacturers in the United States for the benefit of the FSB in 
Russia. Spectrum analyzers are generally used to detect the frequency 
of radio signals to identify surveillance devices. The spectrum 
analyzers that were exported by Balakaev are classified under ECCN 
3A992.a and are controlled for Anti-Terrorism (AT) reasons. Signal 
generators are generally used to securely transmit information, often 
as part of counterintelligence or other covert operations. The signal 
generators that were exported by Balakaev are classified under ECCN 
3A992.a and are controlled for Anti-Terrorism (AT) reasons. A license 
was required to export these items to the FSB in Russia.
    As described in the indictment, because many of the spectrum 
analyzers and signal generators used by the FSB were manufactured in 
the United States, it is difficult for the FSB to obtain parts to 
repair these items. Pursuant to the scheme involving the Balakaev 
Network, Balakaev conspired with FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-
Conspirator 2, who worked in FSB Center 8's Military Unit 43753. In 
particular, FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator 2 would publish 
a RFP to repair certain devices on publicly available Russian websites. 
Balakaev, FSB Co-Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator 2 then negotiated 
a contract price to repair the devices before Balakaev submitted a bid 
in response to the RFP. To ensure that Balakaev won the bid, FSB Co-
Conspirator 1 and FSB Co-Conspirator 2 instructed Balakaev to submit 
two higher bids under fictious company

[[Page 12914]]

names, in addition to the agreed-upon bid through Balakaev's company, 
Radiotester.
    Once the FSB accepted Radiotester's bid and the contract was 
signed, Balakaev traveled to FSB Center 8 in Russia to pick up the 
broken device(s). Either FSB Co-Conspirator 1 or FSB Co-Conspirator 2 
would meet Balakaev outside the secure gate of FSB Center 8 to provide 
Balakaev with the broken device(s).
    As described in OEE's request and the indictment, Balakaev then 
sourced the necessary repair parts from the United States. Balakaev 
either purchased the devices over the internet or directly from the 
U.S. manufacturers, and had the devices shipped to Individual 3's home 
in Richmond, Virginia. Once purchased, Balakaev brought or shipped the 
devices to Russia where he then mined the devices for component parts 
to use to repair the FSB devices. After Balakaev repaired the devices, 
he returned to FSB Center 8, where he met with either FSB Co-
Conspirator 1 or FSB Co-Conspirator 2 outside the FSB Center 8 gate to 
provide the repaired devices. The FSB Military Unit 43753 then wired 
payment to Balakaev's Sberbank account.
    As also referenced in OEE's request and the indictment, in total, 
between approximately 2017 and the present, Balakaev entered into 
approximately ten (10) contracts with FSB Military Unit 43753 to repair 
approximately forty (40) spectrum analyzers and signal generators. In 
furtherance of those contracts, Balakaev purchased approximately forty-
three (43) devices in the United States. Balakaev frequently traveled 
between Russia and the United States during this time to obtain the 
devices, often through John F. Kennedy International Airport (``JFK 
Airport'') in the Eastern District of New York. In furtherance of the 
scheme to unlawfully export controlled items from the United States to 
the FSB, on or about and between February 2017 and March 2021, Balakaev 
traveled from Russia to the United States approximately fourteen (14) 
times, typically staying in the United States anywhere from two (2) to 
fourteen (14) days on each trip. Included below is one example of the 
multiple unlawful exports to the FSB which are described in further 
detail in the indictment.
    By way of example, on or about December 19, 2019, Balakaev, acting 
through Radiotester, entered into a contract with the FSB Military Unit 
43753. As described in the indictment, the contract was to repair an 
Agilent HP 8562EC and two Agilent HP 8560EC spectrum analyzers. 
According to purchase records and shipment notifications, Balakaev 
purchased two Agilent HP 8560E spectrum analyzers that were delivered 
to Individual 3's home in Richmond, Virginia on or about January 14, 
2020 and January 15, 2020. Approximately one month later, on or about 
February 10, 2020, Balakaev flew from Russia to the United States, 
where he stayed for approximately one week, in order to obtain the two 
Agilent HP 8560E spectrum analyzers that he purchased. While in the 
United States, on or about February 17, 2020, Balakaev emailed FSB Co-
Conspirator 1 with the subject of the email ``Repair Contracts 43753'' 
and attached a PDF about spectrum analyzers. The following month, in or 
about March 2020, Balakaev purchased an Agilent HP 8562EC spectrum 
analyzer to fulfill the FSB contract. On or about March 21, 2020, the 
device was delivered to Individual 3's home in Richmond, Virginia.
    In addition to the example described above, between approximately 
April 16, 2020 and March 6, 2021, Balakaev purchased approximately 
thirty (30) additional spectrum analyzers, spectrum analyzer parts, and 
other radio parts which were shipped to Individual 3's home in 
Richmond, Virginia. Balakaev also traveled to the United States twice 
in 2021 to obtain the devices and fulfill his FSB contracts. Further, 
in approximately January 2022, Balakaev, through Radiotester, entered 
into a new contract with FSB Military Unit 43753 to repair six spectrum 
analyzers and signal generators, including the following make and 
models: HP8648D; Agilent HP 8562E; Agilent HP 8562EC; Rohde & Schwarz 
FS300; and Rohde & Schwarz SM300. In approximately February 2022, 
Balakaev picked up the devices from FSB Co-Conspirator 1 at FSB Center 
8 to begin the process of procuring spectrum analyzers for use in 
repairing the devices.
ii. Unlicensed Exports of U.S.-Origin Gas Detection Equipment to the 
DPRK
    Between approximately 2019 and 2020, Balakaev conspired with DPRK 
Government Official 1, the First Secretary of the Embassy of the DPRK 
to the Russian Federation, to provide the DPRK with U.S.-origin 
technology that can detect hazardous gases, in violation of United 
States laws.
    As described in the OEE request and indictment, in approximately 
2019, DPRK Government Official 1 contacted Balakaev to discuss business 
they could engage in together. DPRK Government Official 1 contacted 
Balakaev specifically due to connections that Balakaev had made while 
working at the Russian Ministry of Culture and in his travel to North 
Korea. Balakaev subsequently met DPRK Government Official 1 multiple 
times at the North Korean embassy in Moscow, Russia. On one of those 
occasions, DPRK Government Official 1 asked Balakaev to purchase an 
Altair 4X gas detector for the DPRK. The Altair 4X gas detector is a 
device manufactured by a company in the United States that can be used 
to detect deadly gases such as combustible gases, oxygen-deficient 
atmospheres, and toxic gases. The Altair 4X gas detector is subject to 
the EAR and designated as EAR99.\11\
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    \11\ The Altair 4X gas detector would not fall within the 
exception set forth in Sec.  746.4 as it is not EAR99 food or 
medicine.
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    On approximately December 28, 2019, Balakaev purchased the Altair 
4X gas detector on the internet in the United States and had it shipped 
to Individual 3's home in Richmond, Virginia. On January 2, 2020, the 
shipment arrived at Individual 3's home. Approximately two months 
later, on or about February 9, 2020, DPRK Government Official 1 sent 
Balakaev a photograph of a broken CD labeled ``Altair 4XR Multigas 
Detector.'' Balakaev responded, in sum and substance, that he would 
send a link for the gas detector software. As further described in the 
OEE request and indictment, on or about February 10, 2020, Balakaev 
traveled from Russia to the United States to obtain the gas detector 
that was previously shipped to Individual 3's home. Approximately one 
week later, on or about February 17, 2020, Balakaev returned to Russia 
with the gas detector.
    As the indictment further demonstrates, Balakaev was aware of the 
applicable U.S. export control laws which prohibited him from 
purchasing the electronic devices in the United States for ultimate end 
use by the FSB and DPRK. As described in the indictment, on or about 
November 5, 2019, Individual 3 emailed Balakaev a hyperlink to a BIS 
document titled ``Don't Let This Happen To You!: Actual Investigations 
of Export Control and Antiboycott Violations.'' In the email, 
Individual 3 wrote to Balakaev to ``Take a look just in case.'' The BIS 
document provided ``an introduction to the consequences of violating 
U.S. export control law.'' In addition to explaining U.S. export 
control laws, the document noted specific examples of individuals who 
violated U.S. sanction regulations by exporting items to Russia without 
a BIS license. Balakaev subsequently downloaded the document and saved 
the document to his computer.

[[Page 12915]]

B. Ongoing Procurement Attempts

    As evidenced by the multiple transactions involving Balakaev and 
the Balakaev Network dating back to 2017 described in the OEE request 
and indictment, Balakaev has demonstrated a pattern of conduct 
involving the illicit procurement and unauthorized exports of EAR 
controlled items for end use by the FSB and DPRK. Further, as detailed 
in OEE's request and related information, Balakaev made statements to 
law enforcement that he intended to continue to procure EAR controlled 
items through other means and is still obtaining contracts through the 
FSB.

III. Findings

    As described above, I find that the evidence presented by BIS 
demonstrates that a violation of the Regulations by the above-captioned 
parties is imminent in both time and degree of likelihood. As such, a 
TDO is needed to give notice to persons and companies in the United 
States and abroad that they should cease dealing with Ilya Balakaev and 
Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC in export or reexport 
transactions involving items subject to the EAR. Such a TDO is 
consistent with the public interest to preclude future violations of 
the Regulations given the deliberate, covert, and determined nature of 
the misconduct and clear disregard for complying with U.S. export 
control laws.
    This Order is being issued on an ex parte basis without a hearing 
based upon BIS's showing of an imminent violation in accordance with 
section 766.24 of the Regulations.
    It is therefore ordered:
    First, that ILYA BALAKAEV, with an address at 
Sharikopodshipnikovkaya 20-68 Moscow, Russian Federation; RADIOTESTER 
OOO A/K/A RADIOTESTER LLC, with an address at Sharikopodshipnikovskaya 
11, Building 1, Moscow, 115088, Russian Federation, and Volgograd 
Prospect, House 2, Moscow, 109316, Russian Federation; and when acting 
for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees 
(each a ``Denied Person'' and collectively the ``Denied Persons'') may 
not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction 
involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as ``item'') exported or to be exported from 
the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity 
subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
    A. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, License 
Exception, or export control document;
    B. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, 
receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, 
forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, 
any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the 
United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity 
subject to the EAR; or
    C. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item 
exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to 
the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR.
    Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the 
following:
    A. Export or reexport to or on behalf of a Denied Person any item 
subject to the EAR;
    B. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted 
acquisition by a Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control 
of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from 
the United States, including financing or other support activities 
related to a transaction whereby a Denied Person acquires or attempts 
to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
    C. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition 
or attempted acquisition from a Denied Person of any item subject to 
the EAR that has been exported from the United States;
    D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the United States any item 
subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will 
be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
    E. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is 
owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied Person, or service any item, 
of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by a Denied 
Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR 
that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes 
of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, 
modification or testing.
    Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided 
in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or 
business organization related to Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/
a Radiotester LLC by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of 
responsibility in the conduct of trade or related services may also be 
made subject to the provisions of this Order.
    In accordance with the provisions of section 766.24(e) of the EAR, 
Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC may, at any 
time, appeal this Order by filing a full written statement in support 
of the appeal with the Office of the Administrative Law Judge, U.S. 
Coast Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, 
Maryland 21202-4022.
    In accordance with the provisions of Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, 
BIS may seek renewal of this Order by filing a written request not 
later than 20 days before the expiration date. Respondents Ilya 
Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC may oppose a request 
to renew this Order by filing a written submission with the Assistant 
Secretary for Export Enforcement, which must be received not later than 
seven days before the expiration date of the Order.
    A copy of this Order shall be served on each denied person and 
shall be published in the Federal Register.
    This Order is effective immediately and shall remain in effect for 
180 days.

Matthew S. Axelrod,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2023-04189 Filed 2-28-23; 8:45 am]
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