[Federal Register Volume 88, Number 5 (Monday, January 9, 2023)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1255-1266]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2023-00254]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY


Implementation of a Parole Process for Nicaraguans

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This notice describes a new effort designed to enhance the 
security of our Southwest Border (SWB) by reducing the number of 
encounters of Nicaraguan nationals crossing the border without 
authorization, as the U.S. Government continues to implement its 
broader, multi-pronged and regional strategy to address the challenges 
posed by a surge in migration. Nicaraguans who do not avail themselves 
of this new process, and instead enter the United States without 
authorization between ports of entry (POEs), generally are subject to 
removal--including to third countries, such as Mexico. As part of this 
effort, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is implementing 
a process--modeled on the successful Uniting for Ukraine (U4U) and 
Process for Venezuelans--for certain Nicaraguan nationals to lawfully 
enter the United States in a safe and orderly manner and be considered 
for a case-by-case determination of parole. To be eligible, individuals 
must have a supporter in the United States who agrees to provide 
financial support for the duration of the beneficiary's parole period, 
pass national security and public safety vetting, and fly at their own 
expense to an interior POE, rather than entering at a land POE. 
Individuals are ineligible for this process if they have been ordered 
removed from the United States within the prior five years; have 
entered unauthorized into the United States between POEs, Mexico, or 
Panama after the date of this notice's publication, with an exception 
for individuals permitted a single instance of voluntary departure or 
withdrawal of their application for admission to still maintain their 
eligibility for this process; or are otherwise deemed not to merit a 
favorable exercise of discretion.

DATES: DHS will begin using the Form I-134A, Online Request to be a 
Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support, for this process on 
January 6, 2023.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Daniel Delgado, Acting Director, 
Border and Immigration Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, 
Department of Homeland Security, 2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE, 
Washington, DC 20528-0445; telephone (202) 447-3459 (not a toll-free 
number).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background--Nicaraguan Parole Process

    This notice describes the implementation of a new parole process 
for certain Nicaraguan nationals, including the eligibility criteria 
and filing process. The parole process is intended to enhance border 
security by reducing the record levels of Nicaraguan nationals entering 
the United States between POEs, while also providing a process for 
certain such nationals to lawfully enter the United States in a safe 
and orderly manner.
    The announcement of this new process followed detailed 
consideration of a wide range of relevant facts and alternatives, as 
reflected in the Secretary's decision memorandum dated December 22, 
2022.\1\ The complete reasons for the Secretary's decision are included 
in that memorandum. This Federal Register notice is intended to provide 
appropriate context and guidance for the public regarding the policy 
and relevant procedures associated with this policy.
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    \1\ See Memorandum for the Secretary from the Under Secretary 
for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection, and Director of U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, Parole Process for Certain Nicaraguan 
Nationals (Dec. 22, 2022).
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A. Overview

    The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-pronged, regional 
strategy to address the challenges posed by irregular migration.\2\ 
This long-term strategy--a shared endeavor with partner nations--
focuses on addressing the root causes of migration, which are currently 
fueling unprecedented levels of irregular migration, and creating safe, 
orderly, and humane processes for migrants seeking protection 
throughout the region. This includes domestic efforts to expand 
immigration processing capacity and multinational collaboration to 
prosecute migrant-smuggling and human-trafficking criminal 
organizations, as well as their facilitators, and money-laundering 
networks. While this strategy shows great promise, it will take time to 
fully implement. In the interim, the U.S. government needs to take 
immediate steps to provide safe, orderly, humane pathways for the large 
numbers of individuals seeking to enter the United States and to 
discourage such individuals from taking the dangerous journey to, and 
arriving without authorization at, the SWB.
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    \2\ In this notice, irregular migration refers to the movement 
of people into another country without authorization.

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[[Page 1256]]

    Building on the success of the successful Uniting for Ukraine (U4U) 
process and the Process for Venezuelans, DHS is implementing a similar 
process to address the increasing number of encounters of Nicaraguan 
nationals at the SWB, which have reached record levels over the past 
six months. Similar to Venezuela, Nicaragua has restricted DHS's 
ability to remove individuals to Nicaragua, which has constrained DHS's 
ability to respond to this surge.
    In October 2022, DHS undertook a new effort to address the high 
number of Venezuelans encountered at the SWB.\3\ Specifically, DHS 
provided a new parole process for Venezuelans who are backed by 
supporters in the United States to come to the United States by flying 
to interior ports of entry--thus obviating the need for them to make 
the dangerous journey to the SWB. Meanwhile, the Government of Mexico 
(GOM) for the first time made an independent decision to accept the 
returns of Venezuelans who crossed the SWB without authorization 
pursuant to the Title 42 public health Order, thus imposing a 
consequence on Venezuelans who sought to come to the SWB rather than 
avail themselves of the newly announced Parole Process. Within a week 
of the October 12, 2022 announcement of that process, the number of 
Venezuelans encountered at the SWB fell from over 1,100 per day to 
under 200 per day, and, as of the week ending December 4, to an average 
of 86 per day.\4\ The new process and accompanying consequence for 
unauthorized entry also led to a precipitous decline in irregular 
migration of Venezuelans throughout the Western Hemisphere. The number 
of Venezuelans attempting to enter Panama through the Dari[eacute]n 
Gap--an inhospitable jungle that spans between Panama and Colombia--was 
down from 40,593 in October 2022 to just 668 in November.\5\
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    \3\ Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans, 87 FR 
63507 (Oct. 19, 2022).
    \4\ DHS Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) analysis of data 
pulled from CBP Unified Immigration Portal (UIP) December 5, 2022. 
Data are limited to USBP encounters to exclude those being paroled 
in through ports of entry.
    \5\ Servicio Nacional de Migraci[oacute]n de Panam[aacute], 
Irregulares en Tr[aacute]nsito Frontera Panam[aacute]-Colombia 2022, 
https://www.migracion.gob.pa/images/img2022/PDF/IRREGULARES_%20POR_%20DARI%C3%89N_NOVIEMBRE_2022.pdf (last viewed 
Dec. 11, 2022).
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    DHS anticipates that implementing a similar process for Nicaraguans 
will reduce the number of Nicaraguans seeking to irregularly enter the 
United States between POEs along the SWB by coupling a meaningful 
incentive to seek a safe, orderly means of traveling to the United 
States with the imposition of consequences for those who seek to enter 
without authorization pursuant to this process. Only those who meet 
specified criteria and pass national security and public safety vetting 
will be eligible for consideration for parole under this process. 
Implementation of the new parole process for Nicaraguans is contingent 
on the GOM accepting the return, departure, or removal to Mexico of 
Nicaraguan nationals seeking to enter the United States without 
authorization between POEs on the SWB.
    As in the process for Venezuelans, a supporter in the United States 
must initiate the process on behalf of a Nicaraguan national (and 
certain non-Nicaraguan nationals who are an immediate family member of 
a primary beneficiary), and commit to providing the beneficiary 
financial support, as needed.
    In addition to the supporter requirement, Nicaraguan nationals and 
their immediate family members must meet several eligibility criteria 
in order to be considered, on a case-by-case basis, for advance travel 
authorization and parole. Only those who meet all specified criteria 
are eligible to receive advance authorization to travel to the United 
States and be considered for a discretionary grant of parole, on a 
case-by-case basis, under this process. Beneficiaries must pass 
national security, public safety, and public health vetting prior to 
receiving a travel authorization, and those who are approved must 
arrange air travel at their own expense to seek entry at an interior 
POE.
    A grant of parole under this process is for a temporary period of 
up to two years. During this two-year period, the United States will 
continue to build on the multi-pronged, long-term strategy with our 
foreign partners throughout the region to support conditions that would 
decrease irregular migration, work to improve refugee processing and 
other immigration pathways in the region, and allow for increased 
removals of Nicaraguans from both the United States and partner nations 
who continue to migrate irregularly but who lack a valid claim of 
asylum or other forms of protection. The two-year period will also 
enable individuals to seek humanitarian relief or other immigration 
benefits for which they may be eligible, and to work and contribute to 
the United States. Those who are not granted asylum or any other 
immigration benefit during this two-year parole period generally will 
need to depart the United States prior to the expiration of their 
authorized parole period or will be placed in removal proceedings after 
the period of parole expires.
    The temporary, case-by-case parole of qualifying Nicaraguan 
nationals pursuant to this process will provide a significant public 
benefit for the United States by reducing unauthorized entries along 
our SWB while also addressing the urgent humanitarian reasons that are 
driving hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans to flee their home 
country, to include widespread and violent repression and human rights 
violations and abuses by the Ortega regime. Most significantly, DHS 
anticipates this process will: (i) enhance the security of the U.S. SWB 
by reducing irregular migration of Nicaraguan nationals, including by 
imposing additional consequences on those who seek to enter between 
POEs; (ii) enhance border security and national security by vetting 
individuals prior to their arrival at a U.S. POE; (iii) reduce the 
strain on DHS personnel and resources; (iv) minimize the domestic 
impact of irregular migration from Nicaragua; (v) disincentivize a 
dangerous irregular journey that puts migrant lives and safety at risk 
and enriches smuggling networks; and (vi) fulfill important foreign 
policy goals to manage migration collaboratively in the hemisphere.
    The Secretary retains the sole discretion to terminate the 
Nicaragua process at any point.

B. Conditions at the Border

1. Impact of Venezuela Process
    This process is modeled on the Venezuela process--as informed by 
the way that similar incentive and disincentive structures successfully 
decreased the number of Venezuelan nationals making the dangerous 
journey to and being encountered along the SWB. The Venezuela process 
demonstrates that combining a clear and meaningful consequence for 
irregular entry along the SWB with a significant incentive for migrants 
to wait where they are and use a safe, orderly process to come to the 
United States can change migratory flows. Prior to the October 12, 2022 
announcement of the Venezuela process, DHS encountered approximately 
1,100 Venezuelan nationals per day between POEs--with peak days 
exceeding 1,500.\6\ Within a week of the announcement, the number of 
Venezuelans encountered at the SWB fell from over 1,100 per day to 
under

[[Page 1257]]

200 per day, and as of the week ending December 4, an average of 86 per 
day.\7\
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    \6\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through 
October 31, 2022.
    \7\ OIS analysis of data pulled from CBP UIP December 5, 2022. 
Data are limited to USBP encounters to exclude those being paroled 
in through ports of entry.
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    Panama's daily encounters of Venezuelans also declined 
significantly over the same time period, falling some 88 percent, from 
4,399 on October 16 to 532 by the end of the month--a decline driven 
entirely by Venezuelan migrants' choosing not to make the dangerous 
journey through the Dari[eacute]n Gap. The number of Venezuelans 
attempting to enter Panama through the Dari[eacute]n Gap continued to 
decline precipitously in November--from 40,593 encounters in October, a 
daily average of 1,309, to just 668 in November, a daily average of 
just 22.\8\
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    \8\ Servicio Nacional de Migraci[oacute]n de Panam[aacute], 
Irregulares en Tr[aacute]nsito Frontera Panam[aacute]-Colombia 2022, 
https://www.migracion.gob.pa/images/img2022/PDF/IRREGULARES_%20POR_%20DARI%C3%89N_NOVIEMBRE_2022.pdf, (last viewed 
Dec. 11, 2022).
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    The Venezuela process fundamentally changed the calculus for 
Venezuelan migrants. Venezuelan migrants who had already crossed the 
Dari[eacute]n Gap returned to Venezuela by the thousands on voluntary 
flights organized by the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, and Panama, 
as well as civil society.\9\ Other migrants who were about to enter the 
Dari[eacute]n Gap turned around and headed back south.\10\ Still others 
who were intending to migrate north are staying where they are to apply 
for this parole process.\11\ Put simply, the Venezuela process 
demonstrates that combining a clear and meaningful consequence for 
irregular entry along the SWB with a significant incentive for migrants 
to wait where they are and use this parole process to come to the 
United States can yield a meaningful change in migratory flows.
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    \9\ La Prensa Latina Media, More than 4,000 migrants voluntarily 
returned to Venezuela from Panama, https://www.laprensalatina.com/more-than-4000-migrants-voluntarily-returned-to-venezuela-from-panama/, Nov. 9 2022 (last viewed Dec. 8, 2022).
    \10\ Voice of America, U.S. Policy Prompts Some Venezuelan 
Migrants to Change Route, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-policy-prompts-some-venezuelan-migrants-to-change-route/6790996.html, Oct. 
14, 2022 (last viewed Dec. 8, 2022).
    \11\ Axios, Biden's new border policy throws Venezuelan migrants 
into limbo, https://www.axios.com/2022/11/07/biden-venezuela-border-policy-darien-gap, Nov. 7, 2022 (last viewed Dec. 8, 2022).
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2. Trends and Flows: Increase of Nicaraguan Nationals Arriving at the 
Southwest Border
    The last decades have yielded a dramatic increase in encounters at 
the SWB and a dramatic shift in the demographics of those encountered. 
Throughout the 1980s and into the first decade of the 2000s, encounters 
along the SWB routinely numbered in the millions per year.\12\ By the 
early 2010s, three decades of investments in border security and 
strategy contributed to reduced border flows, with border encounters 
averaging fewer than 400,000 per year from 2011-2017.\13\ However, 
these gains were subsequently reversed as border encounters more than 
doubled between 2017 and 2019, and--following a steep drop in the first 
months of the COVID-19 pandemic--continued to increase at a similar 
pace in 2021 and 2022.\14\
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    \12\ OIS analysis of historic CBP data.
    \13\ Id.
    \14\ Id.
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    Shifts in demographics have also had a significant effect on 
migration flows. Border encounters in the 1980s and 1990s consisted 
overwhelmingly of single adults from Mexico, most of whom were 
migrating for economic reasons.\15\ Beginning in the 2010s, a growing 
share of migrants have come from Northern Central America \16\ (NCA) 
and, since the late 2010s, from countries throughout the Americas.\17\ 
Migrant populations from these newer source countries have included 
large numbers of families and children, many of whom are traveling to 
escape violence, political oppression, and for other non-economic 
reasons.\18\
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    \15\ According to historic OIS Yearbooks of Immigration 
Statistics, Mexican nationals accounted for 96 to over 99 percent of 
apprehensions of persons entering without inspection between 1980 
and 2000. On Mexican migrants from this era's demographics and 
economic motivations see Jorge Durand, Douglas S. Massey, and Emilio 
A. Parrado, ``The New Era of Mexican Migration to the United 
States,'' The Journal of American History Vol. 86, No. 2 (Sept. 
1999): 518-536.
    \16\ Northern Central America refers to El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras.
    \17\ According to OIS analysis of CBP data, Mexican nationals 
continued to account for 89 percent of total SWB encounters in FY 
2010, with Northern Central Americans accounting for 8 percent and 
all other nationalities for 3 percent. Northern Central Americans' 
share of total encounters increased to 21 percent by FY 2012 and 
averaged 46 percent in FY 2014-FY 2019, the last full year before 
the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. All other countries accounted 
for an average of 5 percent of total SWB encounters in FY 2010-FY 
2013, and for 10 percent of total encounters in FY 2014-FY 2019.
    \18\ Prior to 2013, the overall share of encounters who were 
processed for expedited removal and claimed fear averaged less than 
2 percent annually. Between 2013 and 2018, the share rose from 8 to 
20 percent, before dropping with the surge of family unit encounters 
in 2019 (most of whom were not placed in expedited removal) and the 
onset of T42 expulsions in 2020. At the same time, between 2013 and 
2021, among those placed in expedited removal, the share making fear 
claims increased from 16 to 82 percent. OIS analysis of historic CBP 
and USCIS data and OIS Enforcement Lifecycle through June 30, 2022.
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    Historically, Nicaraguans migrated south to Costa Rica, resulting 
in relatively few Nicaraguan encounters at the SWB. Consistent with 
this trend, the number of Nicaraguans seeking asylum in Costa Rica has 
grown rapidly in recent years, putting immense pressure on the 
country's asylum system, and causing many asylum seekers to wait years 
for an initial interview.\19\ According to United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of February 2022, ``more 
Nicaraguans are currently seeking protection in Costa Rica than all the 
refugees and asylum seekers combined, during Central America's civil 
wars in the 1980s, when Costa Rica was a sanctuary for those fleeing 
violence.'' \20\ The Government of Costa Rica recently announced its 
intention to regularize the status of more than 200,000 Nicaraguan 
migrants and asylum seekers providing them with access to jobs and 
healthcare as part of the process.\21\
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    \19\ AP News, Fleeing Nicaraguans Strain Costa Rica's Asylum 
System (Sept. 2, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/covid-health-elections-presidential-caribbean-52044748d15dbbb6ca706c66cc7459a5.
    \20\ UNHCR, `Sharp rise' in Nicaraguans fleeing to Costa Rica, 
strains asylum system, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114792, 
Mar. 25, 2022 (last viewed Dec. 9, 2022).
    \21\ Reuters, Costa Rica prepares plan to regularize status of 
200,000 mostly Nicaraguan migrants, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/costa-rica-prepares-plan-regularize-status-200000-mostly-nicaraguan-migrants-2022-08-10/, Aug. 10, 2022 (last viewed Dec. 4, 
2022).
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    Despite Costa Rica's efforts, increasing numbers of Nicaraguans are 
traveling north to the SWB due to renewed unrest in Nicaragua and the 
strained asylum system in Costa Rica. As a result, the United States 
and Mexico saw surges in migration from Nicaragua, with Nicaraguans 
claiming asylum in Mexico at three times the rate through October 31 of 
this year than the previous year and with a surge in migration having 
significantly contributed to the rising number of encounters at the 
SWB.\22\ Unique encounters of Nicaraguan nationals increased throughout 
fiscal year (FY) 2021, totaling 47,300,\23\ and increased further--and 
sharply--in FY 2022. DHS encountered an estimated 157,400 unique 
Nicaraguan nationals in FY 2022, which composed nine percent

[[Page 1258]]

of all unique encounters and was the fourth largest origin group.\24\ 
Between FY 2021 and FY 2022, unique encounters of Nicaraguan nationals 
rose 232 percent while unique encounters of all other nationalities 
combined increased just 47 percent.\25\ FY 2022 average unique monthly 
encounters of Nicaraguan nationals at the land border totaled 13,113 as 
opposed to an average monthly rate of 316 encounters in FYs 2014-2019, 
a 41-fold increase.\26\
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    \22\ Boris Cheshirkov, Number of displaced Nicaraguans in Costa 
Rica doubles in less than a year, https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/3/623d894c4/number-displaced-nicaraguans-costa-rica-doubles-year.html, Mar. 25, 2022 (last viewed Dec. 7, 2022).
    \23\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through 
October 31, 2022. Unique encounters include encounters of persons at 
the Southwest Border who were not previously encountered in the 
prior 12 months. Throughout this memo unique encounter data are 
defined to also include OFO parolees and other OFO administrative 
encounters.
    \24\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through 
October 31, 2022.
    \25\ Id.
    \26\ Id.
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    These trends thus far are only accelerating in FY 2023. In October 
and November of 2022, DHS encountered 51,000 Nicaraguan nationals at 
the border--nearly one third of the record total of Nicaraguan 
encounters in FY 2022.\27\
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    \27\ Id.; OIS analysis of UIP CBP data pulled on November 28, 
2022.
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3. Push and Pull Factors
    DHS assesses that the high--and rising--number of Nicaraguan 
nationals encountered at the SWB is driven by two key factors: First, a 
confluence of political, economic, and humanitarian crises in 
Nicaragua--exacerbated by the widespread and violent crackdown on 
democratic freedoms by the Ortega regime and the government's numerous 
human rights violations against its own population--are causing 
thousands to leave the country. This situation is compounded by the 
fact that increasingly sophisticated human smugglers often target 
migrants in such circumstances to offer them a facilitated opportunity 
to travel to the United States--at a cost. Second, the United States 
faces significant limits on the ability to remove Nicaraguan nationals 
who do not establish a legal basis to remain in the United States to 
Nicaragua or elsewhere; absent such an ability, more individuals are 
willing to take a chance that they can come--and stay.
i. Factors Pushing Migration From Nicaragua
    Current political, economic, and humanitarian crises in Nicaragua 
are driving migration of Nicaraguans throughout the hemisphere as well 
as to our border.\28\ As conditions have deteriorated in Nicaragua due 
to this confluence of factors, the Government of Nicaragua has shown 
little tolerance for those who openly criticize their regime and moves 
swiftly to brazenly silence dissent.\29\
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    \28\ Voice of America, With Turmoil at Home, More Nicaraguans 
Flee to the U.S. (July 29, 2021), https://www.voanews.com/a/americas_turmoil-home-more-nicaraguans-flee-us/6208907.html.
    \29\ Los Angeles Times, Sandinistas Complete Their Political 
Domination of Nicaragua Following Local Elections (Nov. 8, 2022), 
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-11-08/sandinistas-complete-political-domination-nicaragua-local-elections.
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    Since 2007, Daniel Ortega and his party, the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN), have gradually consolidated control over the 
country's institutions and society, including by eliminating 
presidential term limits.\30\ Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported in July 
2022 that ``[s]ince taking office in 2007, the Ortega administration 
has dismantled all institutional checks on presidential power, 
including the judiciary.'' \31\ According to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), this consolidation of power in the 
executive ``has facilitated Nicaragua's transformation into a police 
state in which the executive branch has instituted a regime of terror 
and of suppression of all freedoms. . . supported by the other branches 
of government.'' \32\ The IACHR reported in June 2022 that ``the 
state's violent response to the social protests that started on April 
18, 2018, triggered a serious political, social, and human rights 
crisis in Nicaragua,'' \33\ and that as of late September, ``more than 
2,000 organizations of civil society--linked to political parties, 
academic, and religious spaces--have been cancelled'' since April 
2018.\34\ Further, HRW reported that the shutting down of non-
governmental organizations in Nicaragua ``is part of a much broader 
effort to silence civil society groups and independent media through a 
combination of repressive tactics that include abusive legislation, 
intimidation, harassment, arbitrary detention, and prosecution of human 
rights defenders and journalists.'' \35\
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    \30\ Reuters, Ortega's Path to Run for Fourth Straight Re-
election as Nicaraguan President (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ortegas-path-run-fourth-straight-re-election-nicaraguan-president-2021-11-03/.
    \31\ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Situation in Nicaragua 2 (Sept. 2, 
2022), https://reliefweb.int/report/nicaragua/human-rights-situation-nicaragua-report-united-nations-high-commissioner-human-rights-ahrc5142-unofficial-english-translation.
    \32\ Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, Nicaragua: 
Concentration of Power and the Undermining of the Rule of Law, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 288, 65 (Oct. 25, 2021), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/2021_nicaragua-en.pdf.
    \33\ Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, Annual Report 
2021, Chapter IV.B--Nicaragua, 775, (June 2, 2022), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/ia.asp?Year=2021.
    \34\ In light of serious allegations regarding the closure of 
civic spaces in Nicaragua, UN and IACHR Special Rapporteurs urge 
authorities to comply with their international obligations to 
respect and guarantee fundamental freedoms, IACHR, Sept. 28, 2022, 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?lID=1&artID=1257.
    \35\ Nicaragua: Government Dismantles Civil Society, Human 
Rights Watch, July 19, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/19/nicaragua-government-dismantles-civil-society.
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    Since early 2021, the IACHR has observed the escalation of 
repression by the Nicaraguan government, characterized by a series of 
state actions leading to the elimination of the opposition's 
participation in the elections even before they were held.\36\ In 
December 2021, the IACHR expressed its concern ``about the increasing 
number of people who have been forced to flee Nicaragua and to request 
international protection in the context of the ongoing serious human 
rights crisis in the country.'' \37\ In August 2022, Ortega had a 
bishop, five priests, and two seminarians arrested, claiming that the 
bishop ``persisted in destabilizing and provocative activities.'' \38\ 
Prior to the November 2022 municipalities election, the government 
closed 200 nongovernmental groups and over 50 media outlets.\39\
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    \36\ IACHR, Annual Report 2021, Chapter IV.B--Nicaragua, 775 
(June 2, 2022), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/ia.asp?Year=2021.
    \37\ Inter-American Commission On Human Rights, IACHR Calls for 
International Solidarity, Urges States to Protect the People Who 
Have Been Forced to Flee from Nicaragua (Dec. 20, 2021), http://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2021/346.asp.
    \38\ The Washington Post, Nicaragua Detains Catholic Bishop in 
Escalating Crackdown on Dissent (Aug. 19, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/19/nicaragua-bishop-rolando-alvarez-arrest-ortega/.
    \39\ Politico, Sandinistas Complete Their Political Domination 
of Nicaragua (Nov. 8, 2022), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/08/nicaragua-sandinistas-ortega-repression-00065603.
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    Exacerbated by political repression, Nicaragua is one of the 
poorest countries in Latin America. According to the World Bank, 
Nicaragua's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2021 was only 
$2,090.80, the second lowest in the region, above Haiti.\40\ According 
to the World Food Program, almost 30 percent of Nicaraguan families 
live in poverty in the country, ``over 8 percent struggle in extreme 
poverty, surviving on less than $1.25 daily,'' and ``17 percent of 
children aged under five suffer from chronic malnutrition.'' \41\ 
Migrants often seek economic opportunities to be able to support their 
families that remain in Nicaragua. Remittances from the United

[[Page 1259]]

States to Nicaragua from January-September 2022 have surpassed the 
total remittances sent in all of 2021.\42\
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    \40\ The World Bank, GDP per Capita (Current U.S. $)--Latin 
America & Caribbean, Nicaragua, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ZJ-NI&most_recent_value_desc=false (last visited Dec. 6, 2022).
    \41\ World Food Programme, Nicaragua, https://www.wfp.org/countries/nicaragua (last visited: Sept. 26, 2022).
    \42\ Banco Central De Nicaragua, Remesas Por Pa[iacute]s de 
Origen, https://www.bcn.gob.ni/sites/default/files/estadisticas/siec/datos/remesas_origen.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2022).
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    According to the UNHCR, approximately 200,000 Nicaraguans have 
sought international protection worldwide.\43\ More than 100,000 filed 
asylum applications in 2021; this is a five-fold increase from 
2020.\44\ Daniel Ortega's repressive policies, coupled with widespread 
poverty, have pushed thousands of Nicaraguans to seek humanitarian 
relief in the Western Hemisphere, including increasingly in the United 
States.\45\
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    \43\ UNHCR USA, Displacement in Central America, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/displacement-in-central-america.html.
    \44\ UNHCR, 2021 Global Trends Report, June 16, 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/62a9d1494/global-trends-report-2021.
    \45\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through 
October 31, 2022.
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ii. Return Limitations
    The Government of Nicaragua is not accepting returns or removals of 
their nationals at a volume that allows the United States to 
effectively manage the number of encounters of Nicaraguans by the 
United States. Additionally, the GOM has generally not allowed returns 
of Nicaraguan nationals pursuant to Title 42 authorities, or their 
removal from the United States pursuant to Title 8 authorities.\46\ 
Other countries have similarly refused to accept Title 8 removals of 
Nicaraguan nationals. As a result, DHS was only able to repatriate a 
small number of Nicaraguan nationals to Nicaragua in FY 2022.
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    \46\ There are some limited exceptions to this prohibition, 
including Nicaraguan nationals that have Mexican family members.
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    Moreover, returns alone are not sufficient to reduce and divert 
irregular flows of Nicaraguans. The United States will combine a 
consequence for Nicaraguan nationals who seek to enter the United 
States without authorization at the land border with an incentive to 
use the safe, orderly process to request authorization to travel by air 
to, and seek parole to enter, the United States, without making the 
dangerous journey to the border.
4. Impact on DHS Resources and Operations
    To respond to the increase in encounters along the SWB since FY 
2021--an increase that has accelerated in FY 2022, driven in part by 
the number of Nicaraguan nationals encountered--DHS has taken a series 
of extraordinary steps. Since FY 2021, DHS has built and now operates 
10 soft-sided processing facilities at a cost of $688 million. U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) detailed a combined 3,770 officers and agents to the 
SWB to effectively manage this processing surge. In FY 2022, DHS had to 
utilize its above threshold reprogramming authority to identify 
approximately $281 million from other divisions in the Department to 
address SWB needs, to include facilities, transportation, medical care, 
and personnel costs.
    The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has spent $260 
million in FYs 2021 and 2022 combined on grants to non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) and state and local entities through the Emergency 
Food and Shelter Program--Humanitarian (EFSP-H) to assist with the 
reception and onward travel of irregular migrants arriving at the SWB. 
This spending is in addition to $1.4 billion in additional FY 2022 
appropriations that were designated for SWB enforcement and processing 
capacities.\47\
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    \47\ DHS Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of 
Homeland Security, to Interested Parties, DHS Plan for Southwest 
Border Security and Preparedness (Apr. 26, 2022), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/22_0426_dhs-plan-southwest-border-security-preparedness.pdf.
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    The impact has been particularly acute in certain border sectors. 
The increased flows of Nicaraguan nationals are disproportionately 
occurring within the remote Del Rio and Rio Grande Valley sectors, all 
of which are at risk of operating, or are currently operating, over 
capacity. In FY 2022, 80 percent of unique encounters of Nicaraguan 
nationals occurred in these two sectors.\48\ There have also been a 
growing number of encounters in El Paso sector since September 2022. In 
FY 2023, Del Rio, El Paso, and Rio Grande Valley sectors have accounted 
for 88 percent of encounters of Nicaraguan nationals.\49\ In FY 2022, 
Del Rio sector encountered almost double (85 percent increase) the 
number of migrants as compared to FY 2021. Driven in part by the sharp 
increase in Nicaraguan nationals being encountered in this sector, this 
was an eighteen-fold increase over the average for FY 2014-FY 2019.\50\
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    \48\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through 
October 31, 2022.
    \49\ Id., and CBP UIP data for November 1-27 pulled on November 
28, 2022.
    \50\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through 
October 31, 2022.
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    The focused increase in encounters within those three sectors is 
particularly challenging. Del Rio sector is geographically remote, and 
because--up until the past two years--it has not been a focal point for 
large numbers of individuals entering without authorization, has 
limited infrastructure and personnel in place to safely process the 
elevated encounters that CBP is now seeing there. The Yuma Sector is 
along the Colorado River corridor, which presents additional challenges 
to migrants, such as armed robbery, assault by bandits, and drowning, 
as well as to the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents encountering them. 
El Paso sector has relatively modern infrastructure for processing 
noncitizens encountered at the border but is far away from other CBP 
sectors, which makes it challenging to move individuals for processing 
elsewhere during surges.
    In an effort to decompress sectors that are experiencing surges, 
DHS deploys lateral transportation, using buses and flights to move 
noncitizens to other sectors that have additional capacity to process. 
In November 2022, U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) sectors along the SWB 
operated a combined 602 decompression bus routes to neighboring sectors 
and operated 124 lateral decompression flights, redistributing 
noncitizens to other sectors with additional capacity.\51\
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    \51\ Data from SBCC, as of December 11, 2022.
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    Because DHS assets are finite, using air resources to operate 
lateral flights reduces DHS's ability to operate international 
repatriation flights to receiving countries, leaving noncitizens in 
custody for longer and further taxing DHS resources. Fewer 
international repatriation flights in turn exacerbates DHS's inability 
to return or remove Nicaraguans and other noncitizens in its custody by 
sending the message that there is no consequence for illegal entry. DHS 
assesses that a reduction in the flow of Nicaraguan nationals arriving 
at the SWB would reduce pressure on overstretched resources and enable 
the Department to more quickly process and, as appropriate, return or 
remove those who do not have a lawful basis to stay.

II. DHS Parole Authority

    The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or Act) provides the 
Secretary of Homeland Security with the discretionary authority to 
parole noncitizens ``into the United States temporarily under such 
reasonable conditions as [the Secretary] may prescribe only on a case-
by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or

[[Page 1260]]

significant public benefit.'' \52\ Parole is not an admission of the 
individual to the United States, and a parolee remains an ``applicant 
for admission'' during the period of parole in the United States.\53\ 
DHS may set the duration of the parole based on the purpose for 
granting the parole request and may impose reasonable conditions on 
parole.\54\ Individuals may be granted advance authorization to travel 
to the United States to seek parole.\55\ DHS may terminate parole in 
its discretion at any time.\56\ Individuals who are paroled into the 
United States generally may apply for and be granted employment 
authorization.\57\
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    \52\ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 6 
U.S.C. 202(4) (charging the Secretary with the responsibility for 
``[e]stablishing and administering rules . . . governing . . . 
parole''). Nicaraguans paroled into the United States through this 
process are not being paroled as refugees, and instead will be 
considered for parole on a case-by-case basis for a significant 
public benefit or urgent humanitarian reasons. This parole process 
does not, and is not intended to, replace refugee processing.
    \53\ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
    \54\ Id.
    \55\ See 8 CFR 212.5(f).
    \56\ See 8 CFR 212.5(e).
    \57\ See 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(11).
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    This process will combine a consequence for those who seek to enter 
the United States irregularly between POEs with a significant incentive 
for Nicaraguan nationals to remain where they are and use a lawful 
process to request authorization to travel by air to, and ultimately 
apply for a discretionary grant of parole into, the United States for a 
period of up to two years.

III. Justification for the Process

    As noted above, section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA confers upon the 
Secretary of Homeland Security the discretionary authority to parole 
noncitizens ``into the United States temporarily under such reasonable 
conditions as [the Secretary] may prescribe only on a case-by-case 
basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.'' 
\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
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A. Significant Public Benefit

    The parole of Nicaraguan nationals and their immediate family 
members under this process--which imposes new consequences for 
Nicaraguans who seek to enter the United States without authorization 
between POEs, while providing an alternative opportunity for eligible 
Nicaraguan nationals and their immediate family members to seek advance 
authorization to travel to the United States to seek discretionary 
parole, on a case-by-case basis, in the United States--serves a 
significant public benefit for several, interrelated reasons. 
Specifically, we anticipate that the parole of eligible individuals 
pursuant to this process will: (i) enhance border security through a 
reduction in irregular migration of Nicaraguan nationals, including by 
imposing additional consequences on those who seek to enter between 
POEs; (ii) improve vetting for national security and public safety; 
(iii) reduce strain on DHS personnel and resources; (iv) minimize the 
domestic impact of irregular migration from Nicaragua; (v) provide a 
disincentive to undergo the dangerous journey that puts migrant lives 
and safety at risk and enriches smuggling networks; and (vi) fulfill 
important foreign policy goals to manage migration collaboratively in 
the hemisphere and, as part of those efforts, to establish additional 
processing pathways from within the region to discourage irregular 
migration.
1. Enhanced Border Security by Reducing Irregular Migration of 
Nicaraguan Nationals
    As described above, Nicaraguan nationals make up a significant and 
growing number of those encountered seeking to cross between POEs 
without authorization. Without additional and more immediate 
consequences imposed on those who seek to do so, together with a safe 
and orderly process for Nicaraguans to enter the United States, without 
making the journey to the SWB, the numbers will continue to grow.
    By incentivizing individuals to seek a safe, orderly means of 
traveling to the United States through the creation of an alternative 
pathway to the United States, while imposing additional consequences to 
irregular migration, DHS assesses this process could lead to a 
meaningful drop in encounters of Nicaraguan individuals along the SWB. 
This expectation is informed by the recently implemented process for 
Venezuelans and the significant shifts in migratory patterns that took 
place once the process was initiated. The success to date of the 
Venezuela process provides compelling evidence that coupling effective 
disincentives for irregular entry with incentives for a safe, orderly 
parole process can meaningfully shift migration patterns in the region 
and to the SWB.
    Implementation of this parole process is contingent on the GOM's 
acceptance of Nicaraguan nationals who voluntarily depart the United 
States, those who voluntarily withdraw their application for admission, 
and those subject to expedited removal who cannot be removed to 
Nicaragua or another designated country. The ability to effectuate 
voluntary departures, withdrawals, and removals of Nicaraguan nationals 
to Mexico will impose a consequence on irregular entry that currently 
does not exist.
2. Improve Vetting for National Security and Public Safety
    All noncitizens whom DHS encounters at the border undergo thorough 
vetting against national security and public safety databases during 
their processing. Individuals who are determined to pose a national 
security or public safety threat are detained pending removal. That 
said, there are distinct advantages to being able to vet more 
individuals before they arrive at the border so that we can stop 
individuals who could pose threats to national security or public 
safety even earlier in the process. The Nicaraguan parole process will 
allow DHS to vet potential beneficiaries for national security and 
public safety purposes before they travel to the United States.
    As described below, the vetting will require prospective 
beneficiaries to upload a live photograph via an app. This will enhance 
the scope of the pre-travel vetting--thereby enabling DHS to better 
identify those with criminal records or other disqualifying information 
of concern and deny authorization to travel under this process before 
they arrive at our border, representing an improvement over the status 
quo.
3. Reduce the Burden on DHS Personnel and Resources
    By reducing encounters of Nicaraguan nationals at the SWB, and 
channeling decreased flows of Nicaraguan nationals to interior POEs, we 
anticipate that the process will relieve some of the impact increased 
migratory flows have had on the DHS workforce along the SWB. This 
process is expected to free up resources, including those focused on 
decompression of border sectors, which in turn may enable an increase 
in removal flights--allowing for the removal of more noncitizens with 
final orders of removal faster and reducing the number of days migrants 
are in DHS custody. While the process will also draw on DHS resources 
within U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and CBP to 
process requests for discretionary parole on a case-by-case basis and 
conduct vetting, these requirements involve different parts of DHS and 
require fewer resources as compared to the status quo.
    In addition, permitting Nicaraguans to voluntarily depart or 
withdraw their application for admission one time and still be 
considered for parole through the process also will reduce the burden

[[Page 1261]]

on DHS personnel and resources that would otherwise be required to 
obtain and execute a final order of removal. This includes reducing 
strain on detention and removal flight capacity, officer resources, and 
reducing costs associated with detention and monitoring.
4. Minimize the Domestic Impact
    Though the Venezuelan process has significantly reduced the 
encounters of Venezuelan nationals, other migratory flows continue to 
strain domestic resources, which is felt most acutely by border 
communities. Given the inability to remove, return, or repatriate 
Nicaraguan nationals in substantial numbers, DHS is currently 
conditionally releasing 96 percent of the Nicaraguan nationals it 
encounters at the border, pending their removal proceedings or the 
initiation of such proceedings, and Nicaraguan nationals accounted for 
18 percent of all encounters released at the border in October 
2022.\59\ The increased volume of provisional releases of Nicaraguan 
nationals puts strains on U.S. border communities.
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    \59\ OIS analysis of and CBP subject-level data and OIS Persist 
Dataset based on data through October 31, 2022.
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    Generally, since FY 2019, DHS has worked with Congress to make 
approximately $290 million available through FEMA's EFSP to support 
NGOs and local governments that provide initial reception for migrants 
entering through the SWB. These entities have engaged to provide 
services and assistance to Nicaraguan nationals and other noncitizens 
who have arrived at our border, including by building new 
administrative structures, finding additional housing facilities, and 
constructing tent shelters to address the increased need.\60\ FEMA 
funding has supported building significant NGO capacity along the SWB, 
including a substantial increase in available shelter beds in key 
locations.
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    \60\ CNN, Washington, DC, Approves Creation of New Agency to 
Provide Services for Migrants Arriving From Other States (Sept. 21, 
2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/us/washington-dc-migrant-services-office.
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    Nevertheless, local communities have reported strain on their 
ability to provide needed social services. Local officials and NGOs 
report that the temporary shelters that house migrants are quickly 
reaching capacity due to the high number of arrivals,\61\ and 
stakeholders in the border region have expressed concern that shelters 
will eventually reach full bed space capacity and not be able to host 
any new arrivals.\62\ Since Nicaraguan nationals account for a 
significant percentage of the individuals being conditionally released 
into communities after being processed along the SWB, this parole 
process will address these concerns by diverting flows of Nicaraguan 
nationals into a safe and orderly process in ways that DHS anticipates 
will yield a decrease in the numbers arriving at the SWB.
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    \61\ San Antonio Report, Migrant aid groups stretched thin as 
city officials seek federal help for expected wave (Apr. 27, 2022), 
https://sanantonioreport.org/migrant-aid-groups-stretched-thin-city-officials-seek-federal-help/.
    \62\ KGUN9 Tucson, Local Migrant Shelter Reaching Max Capacity 
as it Receives Hundreds per Day (Sept. 23, 2022), https://www.kgun9.com/news/local-news/local-migrant-shelter-reaching-max-capacity-as-it-receives-hundreds-per-day.
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    DHS anticipates that this process will help minimize the burden on 
communities, state and local governments, and NGOs who support the 
reception and onward travel of arriving migrants at the SWB. 
Beneficiaries are required to fly at their own expense to an interior 
POE, rather than arriving at the SWB. They also are only authorized to 
come to the United States if they have a supporter who has agreed to 
receive them and provide basic needs, including housing support. 
Beneficiaries also are eligible to apply for work authorization, thus 
enabling them to support themselves.
5. Disincentivize a Dangerous Journey That Puts Migrant Lives and 
Safety at Risk and Enriches Smuggling Networks
    The process, which will incentivize intending migrants to use a 
safe, orderly, and lawful means to access the United States via 
commercial air flights, cuts out the smuggling networks. This is 
critical, because transnational criminal organizations--including the 
Mexican drug cartels--are increasingly playing a key role in human 
smuggling, reaping billions of dollars in profit and callously 
endangering migrants' lives along the way.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ CBP, Fact Sheet: Counter Human Smuggler Campaign Updated 
(Oct. 6, 2022), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/10/06/fact-sheet-counter-human-smuggler-campaign-update-dhs-led-effort-makes-5000th.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In FY 2022, more than 750 migrants died attempting to enter the 
United States across the SWB,\64\ an estimated 32 percent increase from 
FY 2021 (568 deaths) and a 195 percent increase from FY 2020 (254 
deaths).\65\ The approximate number of migrants rescued by CBP in FY 
2022 (almost 19,000 rescues) \66\ increased 48 percent from FY 2021 
(12,857 rescues), and 256 percent from FY 2020 (5,336 rescues).\67\ 
Although exact figures are unknown, experts estimate that about 30 
bodies have been taken out of the Rio Grande River each month since 
March 2022.\68\ CBP attributes these rising trends to increasing 
numbers of migrants, as evidenced by increases in overall U.S. Border 
Patrol encounters.\69\ The increased rates of both migrant deaths and 
those needing rescue at the SWB demonstrate the perils in the migrant 
journey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ CNN, First on CNN: A Record Number of Migrants Have Died 
Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Border (Sept. 7, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/index.html.
    \65\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains: Fiscal Year 
2022 Report to Congress.
    \66\ CNN, First on CNN: A Record Number of Migrants Have Died 
Crossing the U.S.-Mexico Border (Sept. 7, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/index.html.
    \67\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains: Fiscal Year 
2022 Report to Congress.
    \68\ The Guardian, Migrants Risk Death Crossing Treacherous Rio 
Grande River for `American Dream' (Sept. 5, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/sep/05/migrants-risk-death-crossing-treacherous-rio-grande-river-for-american-dream.
    \69\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains: Fiscal Year 
2022 Report to Congress.
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    Meanwhile, these numbers do not account for the countless incidents 
of death, illness, and exploitation migrants experience during the 
perilous journey north. These migratory movements are in many cases 
facilitated by numerous human smuggling organizations, for which the 
migrants are pawns; \70\ the organizations exploit migrants for profit, 
often bringing them across inhospitable deserts, rugged mountains, and 
raging rivers, often with small children in tow. Upon reaching the 
border area, noncitizens seeking to cross into the United States 
generally pay transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to coordinate 
and guide them along the final miles of their journey.\71\ Tragically, 
a significant number of individuals perish along the way. The trailer 
truck accident that killed 55 migrants in Chiapas, Mexico, in December 
2021 and the tragic incident in San Antonio, Texas, on June 27, 2022, 
in which 53 migrants died of the heat in appalling conditions, are just 
two examples of many in which TCOs

[[Page 1262]]

engaged in human smuggling prioritize profit over safety.\72\
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    \70\ DHS Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of 
Homeland Security, to Interested Parties, DHS Plan for Southwest 
Border Security and Preparedness (Apr. 26, 2022), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/22_0426_dhs-plan-southwest-border-security-preparedness.pdf.
    \71\ New York Times, Smuggling Migrants at the Border Now a 
Billion-Dollar Business, (July 25, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/25/us/migrant-smuggling-evolution.html.
    \72\ Reuters, Migrant Truck Crashes in Mexico Killing 54 (Dec. 
9, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-immigration-mexico-accident-idUKKBN2IP01R; Reuters, The Border's Toll: Migrants 
Increasingly Die Crossing into U.S. from Mexico (July 25, 2022), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-immigration-border-deaths/the-borders-toll-migrants-increasingly-die-crossing-into-u-s-from-mexico-idUSL4N2Z247X.
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    DHS anticipates this process will save lives and undermine the 
profits and operations of the dangerous TCOs that put migrants' lives 
at risk for profit because it incentivizes intending migrants to use a 
safe and orderly means to access the United States via commercial air 
flights, thus ultimately reducing the demand for smuggling networks to 
facilitate the dangerous journey to the SWB. By reducing the demand for 
these services, DHS is effectively targeting the resources of TCOs and 
human smuggling networks that so often facilitate these unprecedented 
movements with utter disregard for the health and safety of migrants. 
DHS and federal partners have taken extraordinary measures--including 
the largest-ever surge of resources against human smuggling networks--
to combat and disrupt the TCOs and smugglers and will continue to do 
so.\73\
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    \73\ See DHS Update on Southwest Border Security and 
Preparedness Ahead of Court-Ordered Lifting of Title 42 (Dec. 13, 
2022), https://www.dhs.gov/publication/update-southwest-border-security-and-preparedness-ahead-court-ordered-lifting-title-42.
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6. Fulfill Important Foreign Policy Goals To Manage Migration 
Collaboratively in the Hemisphere
    Promoting a safe, orderly, legal, and humane migration strategy 
throughout the Western Hemisphere has been a top foreign policy 
priority for the Administration. This is reflected in three policy-
setting documents: the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of 
Migration in Central America (Root Causes Strategy); \74\ the 
Collaborative Migration Management Strategy (CMMS); \75\ and the Los 
Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection (L.A. Declaration), 
which was endorsed in June 2022 by 21 countries.\76\ The CMMS and the 
L.A. Declaration call for a collaborative and regional approach to 
migration, wherein countries in the hemisphere commit to implementing 
programs and processes to stabilize communities hosting migrants or 
those of high outward-migration; humanely enforce existing laws 
regarding movements across international boundaries, especially when 
minors are involved; take actions to stop migrant smuggling by 
targeting the criminals involved in these activities; and provide 
increased regular pathways and protections for migrants residing in or 
transiting through the 21 countries.\77\ The L.A. Declaration 
specifically lays out the goal of collectively ``expand[ing] access to 
regular pathways for migrants and refugees.'' \78\
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    \74\ National Security Council, Root Causes of Migration in 
Central America (July 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf.
    \75\ National Security Council, Collaborative Migration 
Management Strategy (July 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery.
    \76\ Id.; The White House, Los Angeles Declaration on Migration 
and Protection (LA Declaration) (June 10, 2022) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/10/los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-and-protection/.
    \77\ Id.
    \78\ Id.
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    This new process helps achieve these goals by providing an 
immediate and temporary orderly process for Nicaraguan nationals to 
lawfully enter the United States while we work to improve conditions in 
sending countries and expand more permanent lawful immigration pathways 
in the region, including refugee processing and other lawful pathways 
into the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries. It thus 
provides the United States another avenue to lead by example.
    The process also responds to an acute foreign policy need. Key 
allies in the region--including specifically the Governments of Mexico 
and Costa Rica--are affected by the increased movement of Nicaraguan 
nationals and have been seeking greater U.S. action to address these 
challenging flows for some time. These Nicaraguan flows contribute to 
strain on governmental and civil society resources in Mexican border 
communities in both the south and the north--something that key foreign 
government partners have been urging the United States to address.
    Along with the Venezuelan process, this new process adds to these 
efforts and enables the United States to lead by example. Such 
processes are a key mechanism to advance the larger domestic and 
foreign policy goals of the U.S. Government to promote a safe, orderly, 
legal, and humane migration strategy throughout our hemisphere. The new 
process also strengthens the foundation for the United States to press 
regional partners--many of which are already taking important steps--to 
undertake additional actions with regard to this population, as part of 
a regional response. Any effort to meaningfully address the crisis in 
Nicaragua will require continued efforts by these and other regional 
partners.
    Importantly, the United States will only implement the new parole 
process while able to remove or return to Mexico Nicaraguan nationals 
who enter the United States without authorization across the SWB. The 
United States' ability to execute this process thus is contingent on 
the GOM making an independent decision to accept the return or removal 
of Nicaraguan nationals who bypass this new process and enter the 
United States without authorization.
    For its part, the GOM has made clear its position that, in order to 
effectively manage the migratory flows that are impacting both 
countries, the United States needs to provide additional safe, orderly, 
and lawful processes for migrants who seek to enter the United States. 
The GOM, as it makes its independent decisions as to its ability to 
accept returns of third country nationals at the border and its efforts 
to manage migration within Mexico, is thus closely watching the United 
States' approach to migration management and whether it is delivering 
on its plans in this space. Initiating and managing this process--which 
is dependent on GOM's actions--will require careful, deliberate, and 
regular assessment of GOM's responses to independent U.S. actions and 
ongoing, sensitive diplomatic engagements.
    As noted above, this process is responsive to the GOM's request 
that the United States increase lawful pathways for migrants and is 
also aligned with broader Administration domestic and foreign policy 
priorities in the region. The process couples a meaningful incentive to 
seek a lawful, orderly means of traveling to the United States with the 
imposition of consequences for those who seek to enter without 
authorization along the SWB. The goal of this process is to reduce the 
irregular migration of Nicaraguan nationals while the United States, 
together with partners in the region, works to improve conditions in 
sending countries and create more lawful immigration and refugee 
pathways in the region, including to the United States.

B. Urgent Humanitarian Reasons

    The case-by-case temporary parole of individuals pursuant to this 
process will address the urgent humanitarian needs of Nicaraguan 
nationals who have fled the Ortega regime and Nicaragua. The Government 
of Nicaragua continues to repress and punish all forms of dissent and 
public criticism of the regime and has continued to take actions 
against

[[Page 1263]]

those who oppose its positions.\79\ This process provides a safe 
mechanism for Nicaraguan nationals who seek to leave their home country 
to enter the United States without having to make the dangerous journey 
to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ OHCHR, Presentation of Report on the Human Rights Situation 
in Nicaragua, Human Rights Council Resolution 49/3 (Sept. 13, 2022), 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/speeches/2022/09/presentation-report-human-rights-situation-nicaragua.
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IV. Eligibility To Participate in the Process and Processing Steps

A. Supporters

    U.S.-based supporters must initiate the process by filing Form I-
134A on behalf of a Nicaraguan national and, if applicable, the 
national's immediate family members.\80\ Supporters may be individuals 
filing on their own, with other individuals, or on behalf of non-
governmental entities or community-based organizations. Supporters are 
required to provide evidence of income and assets and declare their 
willingness to provide financial support to the named beneficiary for 
the length of parole. Supporters are required to undergo vetting to 
identify potential human trafficking or other concerns. To serve as a 
supporter under the process, an individual must:
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    \80\ Certain non-Nicaraguans may use this process if they are an 
immediate family member of a Nicaraguan beneficiary and traveling 
with that Nicaraguan beneficiary. For purposes of this process, 
immediate family members are limited to a spouse, common-law 
partner, and/or unmarried child(ren) under the age of 21.
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     be a U.S. citizen, national, or lawful permanent resident; 
hold a lawful status in the United States; or be a parolee or recipient 
of deferred action or Deferred Enforced Departure;
     pass security and background vetting, including for public 
safety, national security, human trafficking, and exploitation 
concerns; and
     demonstrate sufficient financial resources to receive, 
maintain, and support the intended beneficiary whom they commit to 
support for the duration of their parole period.

B. Beneficiaries

    In order to be eligible to request and ultimately be considered for 
a discretionary issuance of advance authorization to travel to the 
United States to seek a discretionary grant of parole at the POE, such 
individuals must:
     be outside the United States;
     be a national of Nicaragua or be a non-Nicaraguan 
immediate family member \81\ and traveling with a Nicaraguan principal 
beneficiary;
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    \81\ See preceding footnote.
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     have a U.S.-based supporter who filed a Form I-134A on 
their behalf that USCIS has vetted and confirmed;
     possess an unexpired passport valid for international 
travel;
     provide for their own commercial travel to an air U.S. POE 
and final U.S. destination;
     undergo and pass required national security and public 
safety vetting;
     comply with all additional requirements, including 
vaccination requirements and other public health guidelines; and
     demonstrate that a grant of parole is warranted based on 
significant public benefit or urgent humanitarian reasons, as described 
above, and that a favorable exercise of discretion is otherwise 
merited.
    A Nicaraguan national is ineligible to be considered for advance 
authorization to travel to the United States as well as parole under 
this process if that person is a permanent resident or dual national of 
any country other than Nicaragua, or currently holds refugee status in 
any country, unless DHS operates a similar parole process for the 
country's nationals.\82\
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    \82\ This limitation does not apply to immediate family members 
traveling with a Nicaraguan national.
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    In addition, a potential beneficiary is ineligible for advance 
authorization to travel to the United States as well as parole under 
this process if that person:
     fails to pass national security and public safety vetting 
or is otherwise deemed not to merit a favorable exercise of discretion;
     has been ordered removed from the United States within the 
prior five years or is subject to a bar to admissibility based on a 
prior removal order; \83\
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    \83\ See, e.g., INA sec. 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A).
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     has crossed irregularly into the United States, between 
the POEs, after January 9, 2023 except individuals permitted a single 
instance of voluntary departure pursuant to INA section 240B, 8 U.S.C. 
1229c or withdrawal of their application for admission pursuant to INA 
section 235(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1225(a)(4) will remain eligible;
     has irregularly crossed the Mexican or Panamanian border 
after January 9, 2023; or
     is under 18 and not traveling through this process 
accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, and as such is a child whom 
the inspecting officer would determine to be an unaccompanied 
child.\84\
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    \84\ As defined in 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2). Children under the age of 
18 must be traveling to the United States in the care and custody of 
their parent or legal guardian to be considered for parole at the 
POE under the process.
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    Travel Requirements: Beneficiaries who receive advance 
authorization to travel to the United States to seek parole into the 
United States will be responsible for arranging and funding their own 
commercial air travel to an interior POE of the United States.
    Health Requirements: Beneficiaries must follow all applicable 
requirements, as determined by DHS's Chief Medical Officer, in 
consultation with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, with 
respect to health and travel, including vaccination and/or testing 
requirements for diseases including COVID-19, polio, and measles. The 
most up-to-date public health requirements applicable to this process 
will be available at www.uscis.gov/CHNV.

C. Processing Steps

Step 1: Declaration of Financial Support
    A U.S.-based supporter will submit a Form I-134A, Online Request to 
be a Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support, with USCIS through 
the online myUSCIS web portal to initiate the process. The Form I-134A 
identifies and collects information on both the supporter and the 
beneficiary. The supporter must submit a separate Form I-134A for each 
beneficiary they are seeking to support, including Nicaraguans' 
immediate family members and minor children. The supporter will then be 
vetted by USCIS to protect against exploitation and abuse, and to 
ensure that the supporter is able to financially support the 
beneficiary whom they agree to support. Supporters must be vetted and 
confirmed by USCIS, at USCIS' discretion, before moving forward in the 
process.
Step 2: Submit Biographic Information
    If a supporter is confirmed by USCIS, the listed beneficiary will 
receive an email from USCIS with instructions to create an online 
account with myUSCIS and next steps for completing the application. The 
beneficiary will be required to confirm their biographic information in 
their online account and attest to meeting the eligibility 
requirements.
    As part of confirming eligibility in their myUSCIS account, 
individuals who seek authorization to travel to the United States will 
need to confirm that they meet public health requirements, including 
certain vaccination requirements.
Step 3: Submit Request in CBP One Mobile Application
    After confirming biographic information in myUSCIS and

[[Page 1264]]

completing required eligibility attestations, the beneficiary will 
receive instructions through myUSCIS for accessing the CBP One mobile 
application. The beneficiary must then enter limited biographic 
information into CBP One and submit a live photo.
Step 4: Approval to Travel to the United States
    After completing Step 3, the beneficiary will receive a notice in 
their myUSCIS account confirming whether CBP has, in CBP's discretion, 
provided the beneficiary with advance authorization to travel to the 
United States to seek a discretionary grant of parole on a case-by-case 
basis. If approved, this authorization is generally valid for 90 days, 
and beneficiaries are responsible for securing their own travel via 
commercial air to the United States.\85\ Approval of advance 
authorization to travel does not guarantee parole into the United 
States. Whether to parole the individual is a discretionary 
determination made by CBP at the POE at the time the individual arrives 
at the interior POE.
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    \85\ Air carriers can validate an approved and valid travel 
authorization submission using the same mechanisms that are 
currently in place to validate that a traveler has a valid visa or 
other documentation to facilitate issuance of a boarding pass for 
air travel.
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    All of the steps in this process, including the decision to grant 
or deny advance travel authorization and the parole decision at the 
interior POE, are entirely discretionary and not subject to appeal on 
any grounds.
Step 5: Seeking Parole at the POE
    Each individual arriving at a POE under this process will be 
inspected by CBP and considered for a grant of discretionary parole for 
a period of up to two years on a case-by-case basis.
    As part of the inspection, beneficiaries will undergo additional 
screening and vetting, to include additional fingerprint biometric 
vetting consistent with CBP inspection processes. Individuals who are 
determined to pose a national security or public safety threat or 
otherwise do not warrant parole pursuant to section 212(d)(5)(A) of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A), and as a matter of discretion upon 
inspection, will be processed under an appropriate processing pathway 
and may be referred to ICE for detention.
Step 6: Parole
    If granted parole pursuant to this process, each individual 
generally will be paroled into the United States for a period of up to 
two years, subject to applicable health and vetting requirements, and 
will be eligible to apply for employment authorization from USCIS under 
existing regulations. USCIS is leveraging technological and process 
efficiencies to minimize processing times for requests for employment 
authorization. All individuals two years of age or older will be 
required to complete a medical screening for tuberculosis, including an 
IGRA test, within 90 days of arrival to the United States.

D. Scope, Termination, and No Private Rights

    The Secretary retains the sole discretion to terminate the process 
at any point.The number of travel authorizations granted under the 
Parole Process for Nicaraguans shall be spread across this process and 
the separate and independent Parole Process for Cubans, the Parole 
Process for Haitians, and Parole Process for Venezuelans (as described 
in separate notices published concurrently in today's edition of the 
Federal Register) and shall not exceed 30,000 each month in the 
aggregate. Each of these processes operates independently, and any 
action to terminate or modify any of the other processes will have no 
bearing on the criteria for or independent decisions with respect to 
this process.
    This process is being implemented as a matter of the Secretary's 
discretion. It is not intended to and does not create any rights, 
substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party in any matter, 
civil or criminal.

V. Regulatory Requirements

A. Administrative Procedure Act

    This process is exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking and 
delayed effective date requirements on multiple grounds, and is 
therefore amenable to immediate issuance and implementation.
    First, the Department is merely adopting a general statement of 
policy,\86\ i.e., a ``statement[ ] issued by an agency to advise the 
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to 
exercise a discretionary power.'' \87\ As section 212(d)(5)(A) of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A), provides, parole decisions are made by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security ``in his discretion.''
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    \86\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A); id. 553(d)(2).
    \87\ See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (quoting 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979)).
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    Second, even if this process were considered to be a legislative 
rule that would normally be subject to requirements for notice-and-
comment rulemaking and a delayed effective date, the process would be 
exempt from such requirements because it involves a foreign affairs 
function of the United States.\88\ Courts have held that this exemption 
applies when the rule in question ``is clearly and directly involved in 
a foreign affairs function.'' \89\ In addition, although the text of 
the Administrative Procedure Act does not expressly require an agency 
invoking this exemption to show that such procedures may result in 
``definitely undesirable international consequences,'' some courts have 
required such a showing.\90\ This process satisfies both standards.
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    \88\ 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1).
    \89\ Mast Indus. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567, 1582 (C.I.T. 1984) 
(cleaned up).
    \90\ See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 437 (2d Cir. 
2008).
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    As described above, this process is directly responsive to requests 
from key foreign partners--including the GOM--to provide a lawful 
process for Nicaraguan nationals to enter the United States. The United 
States will only implement the new parole process while able to return 
or remove to Mexico Nicaraguan nationals who enter without 
authorization across the SWB. The United States' ability to execute 
this process is contingent on the GOM making an independent decision to 
accept the return or removal of Nicaraguan nationals who bypass this 
new process and enter the United States without authorization. Thus, 
initiating and managing this process will require careful, deliberate, 
and regular assessment of the GOM's responses to U.S. action in this 
regard, and ongoing, sensitive diplomatic engagements.
    Delaying issuance and implementation of this process to undertake 
rulemaking would undermine the foreign policy imperative to act now. It 
also would complicate broader discussions and negotiations about 
migration management. For now, the GOM has indicated it is prepared to 
make an independent decision to accept the return or removal of 
Nicaraguan nationals. The GOM's willingness to accept the returns or 
removals could be impacted by the delay associated with a public 
rulemaking process involving advance notice and comment and a delayed 
effective date. Additionally, making it publicly known that we plan to 
return or remove nationals of Nicaragua to Mexico at a future date 
would likely result in an even greater surge in migration, as migrants 
rush to the border to enter before the process begins--which would 
adversely impact each country's border security and

[[Page 1265]]

further strain their personnel and resources deployed to the border.
    Moreover, this process is not only responsive to the interests of 
key foreign partners--and necessary for addressing migration issues 
requiring coordination between two or more governments--it is also 
fully aligned with larger and important foreign policy objectives of 
this Administration and fits within a web of carefully negotiated 
actions by multiple governments (for instance in the L.A. Declaration). 
It is the view of the United States that the implementation of this 
process will advance the Administration's foreign policy goals by 
demonstrating U.S. partnership and U.S. commitment to the shared goals 
of addressing migration through the hemisphere, both of which are 
essential to maintaining strong bilateral relationships.
    The invocation of the foreign affairs exemption here is also 
consistent with Department precedent. For example, DHS published a 
notice eliminating an exception to expedited removal for certain Cuban 
nationals, which explained that the change in policy was consistent 
with the foreign affairs exemption because the change was central to 
ongoing negotiations between the two countries.\91\ DHS similarly 
invoked the foreign affairs exemption more recently, in connection with 
the Venezuela parole process.\92\
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    \91\ See 82 FR 4902 (Jan. 17, 2017).
    \92\ See 87 FR 63507 (Oct. 19, 2022).
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    Third, DHS assesses that there is good cause to find that the delay 
associated with implementing this process through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking and with a delayed effective date would be contrary to the 
public interest and impracticable.\93\ The numbers of Nicaraguans 
encountered at the SWB are already high, and a delay would greatly 
exacerbate an urgent border and national security challenge and would 
miss a critical opportunity to reduce and divert the flow of irregular 
migration.\94\
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    \93\ See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B); id. 553(d)(3).
    \94\ See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (``The [``good cause''] exception excuses notice 
and comment in emergency situations, where delay could result in 
serious harm, or when the very announcement of a proposed rule 
itself could be expected to precipitate activity by affected parties 
that would harm the public welfare.'' (citations omitted)).
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    Undertaking notice-and-comment rule making procedures would be 
contrary to the public interest because an advance announcement of the 
process would seriously undermine a key goal of the policy: it would 
incentivize even more irregular migration of Nicaraguan nationals 
seeking to enter the United States before the process would take 
effect. There are urgent border and national security and humanitarian 
interests in reducing and diverting the flow of irregular 
migration.\95\ It has long been recognized that agencies may use the 
good cause exception, and need not take public comment in advance, 
where significant public harm would result from the notice-and-comment 
process.\96\ If, for example, advance notice of a coming price increase 
would immediately produce market dislocations and lead to serious 
shortages, advance notice need not be given.\97\ A number of cases 
follow this logic in the context of economic regulation.\98\
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    \95\ See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).
    \96\ See, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 94-95 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that the ``good cause'' exception ``is 
appropriately invoked when the timing and disclosure requirements of 
the usual procedures would defeat the purpose of the proposal--if, 
for example, announcement of a proposed rule would enable the sort 
of financial manipulation the rule sought to prevent [or] in order 
to prevent the amended rule from being evaded'' (cleaned up)); 
DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1332 (Temp. Emer. Ct. 
App. 1975) (``[W]e are satisfied that there was in fact `good cause' 
to find that advance notice of the freeze was `impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest' within the meaning 
of section 553(b)(B). . . . Had advance notice issued, it is 
apparent that there would have ensued a massive rush to raise prices 
and conduct `actual transactions'--or avoid them--before the freeze 
deadline.'' (cleaned up)).
    \97\ See, e.g., Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064, 1068 (Temp. 
Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (``[W]e think good cause was present in this 
case based upon [the agency's] concern that the announcement of a 
price increase at a future date could have resulted in producers 
withholding crude oil from the market until such time as they could 
take advantage of the price increase.'').
    \98\ See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC., 443 F.3d 
890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (``The [``good cause''] exception excuses 
notice and comment in emergency situations, where delay could result 
in serious harm, or when the very announcement of a proposed rule 
itself could be expected to precipitate activity by affected parties 
that would harm the public welfare.'' (citations omitted)); Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 728 F.2d 1477, 1492 (Temp. Emer. Ct. 
App. 1983) (``On a number of occasions . . . this court has held 
that, in special circumstances, good cause can exist when the very 
announcement of a proposed rule itself can be expected to 
precipitate activity by affected parties that would harm the public 
welfare.'').
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    The same logic applies here, where the Department is responding to 
exceedingly serious challenges at the border, and advance announcement 
of that response would significantly increase the incentive, on the 
part of migrants and others (such as smugglers), to engage in actions 
that would compound those very challenges. It is well established that 
migrants may change their behavior in response to perceived imminent 
changes in U.S. immigration policy.\99\ For example, as detailed above, 
implementation of the parole process for Venezuelans was associated 
with a drastic reduction in irregular migration by Venezuelans. Had the 
parole process been announced prior to a notice-and-comment period, it 
likely would have had the opposite effect, resulting in many hundreds 
of thousands of Venezuelan nationals attempting to cross the border 
before the program went into effect. Overall, the Department's 
experience has been that in some circumstances when public 
announcements have been made regarding changes in our immigration laws 
and procedures that would restrict access to immigration benefits to 
those attempting to enter the United States along the U.S.-Mexico land 
border, there have been dramatic increases in the numbers of 
noncitizens who enter or attempt to enter the United States. Smugglers 
routinely prey on migrants in response to changes in domestic 
immigration law.
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    \99\ See, e.g., Tech Transparency Project, Inside the World of 
Misinformation Targeting Migrants on Social Media, https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/inside-world-misinformation-targeting-migrants-social-media, July 26, 2022 (last 
viewed Dec. 6, 2022).
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    In addition, it would be impracticable to delay issuance of this 
process in order to undertake such procedures because--as noted above--
maintaining the status quo, which involves record numbers of Nicaraguan 
nationals currently being encountered attempting to enter without 
authorization at the SWB, coupled with DHS's extremely limited options 
for processing, detaining, or quickly removing such migrants, would 
unduly impede DHS's ability to fulfill its critical and varied 
missions. At current rates, a delay of just a few months to conduct 
notice-and-comment rulemaking would effectively forfeit an opportunity 
to reduce and divert migrant flows in the near term, harm border 
security, and potentially result in scores of additional migrant 
deaths.
    The Department's determination here is consistent with past 
practice in this area. For example, in addition to the Venezuelan 
process described above, DHS concluded in January 2017 that it was 
imperative to give immediate effect to a rule designating Cuban 
nationals arriving by air as eligible for expedited removal because 
``pre-promulgation notice and comment would . . . endanger[ ] human 
life and hav[e] a potential destabilizing effect in the region.'' \100\ 
DHS cited the prospect that ``publication of the rule as a proposed 
rule, which would signal a significant change in policy while 
permitting

[[Page 1266]]

continuation of the exception for Cuban nationals, could lead to a 
surge in migration of Cuban nationals seeking to travel to and enter 
the United States during the period between the publication of a 
proposed and a final rule.'' \101\ DHS found that ``[s]uch a surge 
would threaten national security and public safety by diverting 
valuable Government resources from counterterrorism and homeland 
security responsibilities. A surge could also have a destabilizing 
effect on the region, thus weakening the security of the United States 
and threatening its international relations.'' \102\ DHS concluded that 
``a surge could result in significant loss of human life.'' \103\
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    \100\ Eliminating Exception to Expedited Removal Authority for 
Cuban Nationals Arriving by Air, 82 FR 4769, 4770 (Jan. 17, 2017).
    \101\ Id.
    \102\ Id.
    \103\ Id.; accord, e.g., Visas: Documentation of Nonimmigrants 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, as Amended, 81 FR 5906, 
5907 (Feb. 4, 2016) (finding the good cause exception applicable 
because of similar short-run incentive concerns).
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B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. chapter 35, all 
Departments are required to submit to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), for review and approval, any new reporting requirements 
they impose. The process announced by this notice requires changes to 
two collections of information, as follows.
    OMB has recently approved a new collection, Form I-134A, Online 
Request to be a Supporter and Declaration of Financial Support (OMB 
control number 1615-NEW). This new collection will be used for the 
Nicaragua parole process, and is being revised in connection with this 
notice, including by increasing the burden estimate. To support the 
efforts described above, DHS has created a new information collection 
that will be the first step in these parole processes and will not use 
the paper USCIS Form I-134 for this purpose. U.S.-based supporters will 
submit USCIS Form I-134A online on behalf of a beneficiary to 
demonstrate that they can support the beneficiary for the duration of 
their temporary stay in the United States. USCIS has submitted and OMB 
has approved a request for emergency authorization of the required 
changes (under 5 CFR 1320.13) for a period of 6 months. Within the next 
90 days, USCIS will immediately begin normal clearance procedures under 
the PRA.
    OMB has previously approved an emergency request under 5 CFR 
1320.13 for a revision to an information collection from CBP entitled 
Advance Travel Authorization (OMB control number 1651-0143). In 
connection with the implementation of the process described above, CBP 
is making multiple changes under the PRA's emergency processing 
procedures at 5 CFR 1320.13, including increasing the burden estimate 
and adding Nicaraguan nationals as eligible for a DHS established 
process that necessitates collection of a facial photograph in CBP 
OneTM. OMB has approved the emergency request for a period 
of 6 months. Within the next 90 days, CBP will immediately begin normal 
clearance procedures under the PRA.
    More information about both collections can be viewed at 
www.reginfo.gov.

Alejandro N. Mayorkas,
Secretary of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2023-00254 Filed 1-5-23; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 9110-9M-P