[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 201 (Wednesday, October 19, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63507-63517]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-22739]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY


Implementation of a Parole Process for Venezuelans

AGENCY: Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: This notice describes a new effort designed to immediately 
address the increasing number of encounters of Venezuelan nationals 
along the southwest border (SWB), as the Administration continues to 
implement its broader, multi-pronged and regional strategy to address 
the challenges posed by irregular migration. Venezuelans who do not 
avail themselves of this process, and instead enter the United States 
without authorization between POEs, will be subject to expulsion or 
removal. As part of this effort, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) will implement a process--modeled on the successful Uniting for 
Ukraine (U4U) parole process--for certain Venezuelan nationals to 
lawfully enter the United States in a safe and orderly manner. To be 
eligible, individuals must have a supporter in the United States who 
agrees to provide housing and other supports as needed; must pass 
national security and public safety vetting; and must agree to fly at 
their own expense to an interior U.S. port of entry (POE), rather than 
entering at a land POE. Individuals are ineligible if they have been 
ordered removed from the United States within the prior five years or 
have entered unauthorized into the United States between POEs, Mexico, 
or Panama after the date of this notice's publication.

DATES: DHS will begin accepting online applications for this process on 
October 18, 2022.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ihsan Gunduz, Office of Strategy, 
Policy, and Plans, Department of Homeland Security, 2707 Martin Luther 
King Jr. Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20528-0445, (202) 282-9708.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background--Venezuela Parole Process

    This notice describes the implementation of a new parole process 
for certain Venezuelan nationals announced by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security on October 12, 2022,\1\ including the eligibility criteria and 
filing process. The parole process is intended to enhance border 
security by reducing the record levels of Venezuelan nationals entering 
the United States between POEs, while also providing a process for 
certain such nationals to lawfully enter the United States in a safe 
and orderly manner.
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    \1\ DHS Announces New Migration Enforcement Process for 
Venezuelans, October 12, 2022, available at: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/10/12/dhs-announces-new-migration-enforcement-process-venezuelans.
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    The Secretary's announcement followed detailed consideration of a 
wide range of relevant facts and alternatives, as reflected in the 
Secretary's decision memorandum dated October 12, 2022.\2\ The complete 
reasons for the Secretary's decision are included in that memorandum. 
This Federal Register notice is intended to provide appropriate context 
and guidance for the public regarding the policy and relevant 
procedures associated with this policy.
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    \2\ See Memorandum for the Secretary from U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection Commissioner and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services Director, Parole Process for Certain Venezuelan Nationals 
(Oct. 12, 2022).
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A. Overview

    The U.S. Government is engaged in a multi-pronged, regional 
strategy to address the challenges posed by irregular migration. The 
strategy--a shared endeavor with partner countries--focuses on 
addressing the root causes of migration, which currently are fueling 
unprecedented levels of irregular migration, and creating safe and 
orderly processes for migration throughout the region. This strategy 
will reduce regional irregular migration in the mid- to long-term, but 
we anticipate continued substantial pressures along the southwest 
border over the coming months.
    In light of this reality, DHS is implementing an immediate effort 
to address the increasing number of encounters of Venezuelan nationals 
at the SWB as we continue to implement the broader and long-term 
strategy. We anticipate that this new effort would reduce the record 
levels of Venezuelan nationals seeking to irregularly enter the United 
States between POEs along the SWB, while also providing a process for 
certain such nationals to lawfully enter the United States in a safe 
and orderly manner.
    With the cooperation of the Government of Mexico (GOM), and 
potentially other governments, this effort is intended to serve as a 
deterrent to irregular migration by providing a meaningful alternative 
to irregular migration and by imposing immediate consequences on 
Venezuelan nationals who choose to not avail themselves of the new 
process and instead seek to irregularly enter the United States

[[Page 63508]]

between POEs. It will also provide an incentive for Venezuelans to 
avoid the often dangerous journey to the border altogether, by putting 
in place a safe and orderly process for Venezuelan nationals to travel 
to the United States to seek a discretionary, case-by-case grant of 
parole into the United States, based on significant public benefit and 
urgent humanitarian reasons.\3\ Venezuelan nationals who irregularly 
enter the United States between POEs after October 19, 2022 are subject 
to expulsion or removal from the United States; those who enter 
irregularly into the United States, Mexico, or Panama will also be 
found ineligible for a discretionary grant of parole under this 
process. Only those who meet specified criteria and pass national 
security and public safety vetting would be eligible for consideration 
for parole under this process.
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    \3\ See INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
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    Implementation of the parole process is conditioned on Mexico 
continuing to accept the expulsion or removal of Venezuelan nationals 
seeking to irregularly enter the United States between POEs. As such, 
this new process will couple a meaningful incentive to seek a lawful, 
safe and orderly means of traveling to the United States with the 
imposition of consequences for those who seek to enter irregularly.
    The new policy is modeled on Uniting for Ukraine (U4U), the 
successful parole process that was put in place in the wake of Russia's 
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, when thousands of Ukrainian migrants 
spontaneously arrived at SWB POEs. Once U4U was implemented, such 
spontaneous arrivals fell sharply, and travel shifted to a safe and 
orderly process. This new process is procedurally similar to U4U, in 
which certain Ukrainians with U.S.-based supporters who meet specified 
eligibility criteria have been able to travel to the United States to 
seek a discretionary, case-by-case grant of parole for up to two years. 
As in U4U, applications using this parole process will be initiated by 
a supporter in the United States who would apply on behalf of a 
Venezuelan individual and commit to providing the beneficiary housing 
and other financial support, as needed, for the duration of their 
parole.
    In addition to the supporter requirement, Venezuelan nationals are 
required to meet several eligibility criteria, as outlined in more 
detail later in this notice, to receive advance authorization to travel 
to the United States and be considered for parole, on a case-by-case 
basis. Importantly, individuals are ineligible if they have been 
ordered removed from the United States within the prior five years; 
they are also ineligible if they have crossed into the United States 
between POEs, or entered Mexico or Panama without authorization, after 
October 19, 2022. Only those who pass national security and public 
safety vetting and agree to fly to an interior POE, as opposed to 
entering between POEs, and who meet all specified criteria below will 
be eligible to receive advance authorization to travel to the United 
States and be considered for parole, on a case-by-case basis, under 
this process.
    Any discretionary grants of parole will be for a temporary period 
of up to two years. During this two-year period, the United States will 
continue to build on the multi-pronged and long-term strategy and 
engage with our foreign partners throughout the region. These efforts 
are intended to support conditions that would decrease irregular 
migration, work to improve refugee processing and other lawful 
immigration pathways in the region, and allow for increased removals of 
those who continue to migrate irregularly and lack a valid claim of 
asylum or other lawful basis to remain in the United States. The two-
year period will also enable individuals to seek humanitarian relief or 
other immigration benefits for which they may be eligible, and to work 
and contribute to the U.S. economy as they do so. Those who are not 
granted asylum or other immigration benefits will need to leave the 
United States at the expiration of their authorized period of parole or 
will generally be placed in removal proceedings after the period of 
parole expires.
    The temporary, case-by-case parole of qualifying Venezuelan 
nationals pursuant to this process will provide a significant public 
benefit for the United States, while also addressing the urgent 
humanitarian reasons that Venezuelan nationals are fleeing, to include 
repression and unsafe conditions in their home country. Most 
significantly, we anticipate that parole will: (i) enhance the security 
of our SWB by reducing irregular migration of Venezuelan nationals; 
(ii) enhance border security and national security by vetting 
individuals prior to their arrival at a United States POE; (iii) reduce 
the strain on DHS personnel and resources; (iv) minimize the domestic 
impact of Venezuelan irregular migration; (v) disincentivize a 
dangerous irregular journey that puts migrant lives and safety at risk 
and enriches smuggling networks; and (vi) fulfill important foreign 
policy goals to manage migration collaboratively in the hemisphere. The 
process is capped at 24,000 beneficiaries. After this cap is reached, 
DHS will not approve additional beneficiaries, absent a Secretary-level 
decision, at the Secretary's sole discretion, to continue the process.

B. Conditions at the Border

1. Trends and Flows: Increase of Venezuelan Nationals Arriving at the 
Southwest Border
    The last decades have yielded a dramatic increase in encounters at 
the SWB and a dramatic shift in the demographics of those encountered. 
Throughout the 1980s and into the first decade of the 2000s, encounters 
along the SWB routinely numbered in the millions per year. By the early 
2010s, three decades of investments in border security and strategy 
contributed to reduced border flows, with border encounters averaging 
fewer than 400,000 per year from 2011-2017.\4\ These gains were 
subsequently reversed, however, as border encounters more than doubled 
between 2017 and 2019, and--following a steep drop in the first months 
of the COVID-19 pandemic--continued to increase at a similar pace in 
2021 and 2022.
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    \4\ Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) analysis of historic 
CBP data.
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    Shifts in demographics have also had a significant effect on 
irregular migration. Border encounters in the 1980s and 1990s consisted 
overwhelmingly of single adults from Mexico, most of whom were 
migrating for economic reasons. Beginning in the 2010s, a growing share 
of migrants have been from Northern Central America \5\ (NCA) and, 
since the late 2010s, from countries throughout the Americas. Migrant 
populations from these newer source countries have included large 
numbers of families and children, many of whom are traveling to escape 
violence and political oppression and for other non-economic 
reasons.\6\
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    \5\ Northern Central America refers to El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras.
    \6\ Prior to 2013, the overall share of encounters who were 
processed for expedited removal and claimed fear averaged less than 
2 percent annually. Between 2013 and 2018, the share rose from 8 to 
20 percent, before dropping with the surge of family unit encounters 
in 2019 (most of whom were not placed in expedited removal) and the 
onset of Title 42 expulsions in 2020. As the same time, between 2013 
and 2021, among those placed in expedited removal, the share making 
fear claims increased from 16 to 82 percent. OIS analysis of 
historic CBP and USCIS data and OIS Enforcement Lifecycle through 
June 30, 2022.
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    The most recent rise in the numbers of encounters at the border has 
been driven in significant part by a surge in

[[Page 63509]]

migration of Venezuelan nationals. Unique encounters of Venezuelan 
nationals increased throughout fiscal year (FY) 2021, totaling 47,328. 
More than 25% of Venezuela's population has left the country. The 
United States is seeing a rising rate of Venezuelans encountered at our 
border over the past two years, which has surged in the last few 
months. Average monthly unique encounters of Venezuelan nationals at 
the land border totaled 15,494 in FY 2022,\7\ rising further to over 
25,000 in August and 33,000 in September, compared to a monthly average 
of 127 unique encounters from FY 2014-2019.\8\ Of note, unique 
encounters of Venezuelan nationals rose 293 percent between FY 2021 and 
FY 2022, while unique encounters of all other nationalities combined 
increased by 45 percent. Panama is currently seeing more than 3,000 
people, mostly Venezuelan nationals, crossing into its territory from 
Colombia via the Dari[eacute]n jungle each day.
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    \7\ FY 2022 CBP data cited in this notice is based on internal 
reporting to date. CBP releases official data in regular intervals; 
final FY 2022 figures may differ to some degree from the figures 
cited here.
    \8\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through 
August 31, 2022 and OIS analysis of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) data from Unified Immigration Portal (UIP) as of 
October 6, 2022. Unique encounters include encounters of persons at 
the Southwest Border who were not previously encountered in the 
prior 12 months. Throughout this notice unique encounter data are 
defined to also include OFO parolees and other OFO administrative 
encounters.
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    In recent months, this surge in irregular migration of Venezuelan 
nationals has been accelerating. Nationals from Venezuela accounted for 
25,130 unique encounters in August 2022, and the Office of Immigration 
Statistics (OIS) estimates that there were 33,500 unique encounters in 
September, more than Mexico and more than all three NCA countries 
combined.\9\
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    \9\ OIS Persist Dataset based on data through August 31, 2022 
and OIS analysis of CBP UIP data as of October 6, 2022.
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2. Push and Pull Factors
    DHS assesses that the high--and rising--number of Venezuelan 
encounters has three key causes: First, the deteriorating conditions in 
Venezuela, including repression, instability, and violence, are pushing 
large numbers to leave their home country. Second, the lack of safe and 
orderly migration alternatives throughout the entire region, including 
to the United States, means that those seeking refuge outside of 
Venezuela have few lawful options. Third, the United States faces 
significant limits on the ability to return Venezuelan nationals to 
Venezuela or elsewhere, as described below; absent such a return 
ability, more individuals are willing to take a chance that they can 
come--and stay.
a. Factors Pushing Migration From Venezuela
    A complex political, humanitarian, and economic crisis; the 
widespread presence of non-state armed groups; crumbling 
infrastructure; and the repressive tactics of Nicol[aacute]s Maduro 
have caused nearly 7 million Venezuelans to flee their country.\10\ 
Maduro has arbitrarily banned key opposition figures from participating 
in the political process, detained hundreds of political prisoners, 
employed judicial processes to circumscribe political parties, and 
denied opposition political representatives equal access to media 
coverage and freedom of movement in the country.\11\ In a February 2022 
report, Amnesty International reported that ``[c]rimes under 
international law and human rights violations, including politically 
motivated arbitrary detentions, torture, extrajudicial executions and 
excessive use of force have been systematic and widespread, and could 
constitute crimes against humanity.'' \12\ Amnesty International 
further reported that ``trends of repression in Venezuela have been 
directed against a specific group of people: those perceived as 
dissidents or opponents'' of Nicol[aacute]s Maduro.\13\
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    \10\ UNHCR, Venezuela Situation, available at: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html (last visited Sept. 24, 
2022).
    \11\ 2021 Country Reports of Human Rights Practices: Venezuela, 
U.S. Department of State, Apr. 12, 2022, available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/venezuela/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2022).
    \12\ Venezuela: Calculated repression: Correlation between 
stigmatization and politically motivated arbitrary detentions, 
Amnesty International, p. 11, Feb. 10, 2022, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/5133/2022/en/ (last visited Sept. 
25, 2022).
    \13\ Venezuela: Calculated repression: Correlation between 
stigmatization and politically motivated arbitrary detentions, 
Amnesty International, p.52, Feb. 10, 2022, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/5133/2022/en/ (last visited Sept. 
25, 2022).
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    According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
Venezuela has become the second-largest external displacement crisis in 
the world, following Syria.\14\ At least in the short term, the crisis 
is expected to continue, thus continuing to push Venezuelans to seek 
alternatives elsewhere. As described above, Panama is currently seeing 
more than 3,000 people, mostly Venezuelan nationals, crossing into its 
territory from Colombia via the Dari[eacute]n jungle each day.
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    \14\ UNHCR, Venezuela Situation, available at: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html (last visited Sept. 24, 
2022).
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b. Return Limitations
    At this time, there are significant limits in DHS's ability to 
expel or return Venezuelans who enter the United States without 
authorization in between POEs. DHS is currently under a court-ordered 
obligation to implement the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention's (CDC) Title 42 public health Order, under which covered 
noncitizens may be prevented entry or expelled to prevent the spread of 
communicable disease.\15\ But Venezuela does not presently allow 
repatriations via charter flights, which significantly limits DHS's 
ability to return those subject to the Title 42 Order or who are 
ordered removed. To date, other countries, including Mexico, have 
generally been reluctant to accept Venezuelans as well. As a result, 
DHS was only able to repatriate a small number of Venezuelan nationals 
to Venezuela in FY 2022.
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    \15\ Louisiana v. CDC,--F. Supp. 3d--, 2022 WL 1604901 (W.D. La. 
May 20, 2022).
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c. Overall Effect
    DHS assesses that the combination of the country conditions in 
Venezuela, the lack of safe and orderly lawful pathways, and the 
present inability to expel or remove Venezuelan nationals engaged in 
irregular migration, has significantly led to the significant increase 
in irregular migration among Venezuelan nationals. Conversely, DHS 
assesses that the return of a significant portion of Venezuelans who 
enter irregularly at the border, coupled with an alternative process 
pursuant to which Venezuelans could enter the United States lawfully, 
would meaningfully change the incentives for those intending to 
migrate--leading to a decline in the numbers of Venezuelans seeking to 
irregularly cross the SWB.
    This prediction is based on prior experience: CBP saw rapidly 
increasing numbers of encounters of Guatemalan and Honduran nationals 
from January 2021 until August 2021, when these countries began 
accepting the direct return of their nationals. In January 2021, CBP 
encountered an average of 424 Guatemalan nationals and 362 Honduran 
nationals a day. By August 4, 2021, the 30-day average daily encounter 
rates had climbed to 1,249 Guatemalan nationals and 1,502 Honduran 
nationals--an increase of 195 percent and 315 percent, respectively. In 
the 60 days immediately following the resumption of routine flights, 
average daily encounters fell by 37

[[Page 63510]]

percent for Guatemala and 42 percent for Honduras, as shown in Figure 1 
below.\16\
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    \16\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through 
August 31, 2022.

Figure 1: Daily Encounters of Guatemalan and Honduran Nationals, May 1-
November 1, 2021.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN19OC22.007

    Note: Figure depicts 30-day average of daily encounters.
    Source: OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset.

    Returns alone, however, are not sufficient. While the numbers of 
encounters of Guatemalan and Honduran nationals have fallen, CBP is 
currently encountering a total of around 1,000 nationals from these two 
countries each day. The process thus seeks to combine a consequence for 
Venezuelan nationals who seek to enter the United States irregularly at 
the land border with an incentive to use the lawful process to request 
authorization to travel by air to and enter the United States, without 
making the dangerous journey to the border.
    This effort is informed by the way that similar incentives and 
disincentives worked in the U4U process. In the two weeks prior to 
U4U's implementation, DHS encountered a daily average of 940 nationals 
of Ukraine at the U.S.-Mexico land border seeking to enter the United 
States. After the new parole process launched and approved Ukrainians 
could fly directly into the United States--whereas those who sought to 
enter irregularly were subject to expulsion pursuant to the Title 42 
public health Order--daily encounters dropped to fewer than twelve per 
day.\17\ Mexican officials also reported seeing a similar decline in 
the number of inbound Ukrainian air passengers.
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    \17\ OIS Persist Dataset based on data through August 31, 2022.
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3. Impact on DHS Resources and Operations
    To respond to the increase in encounters along the SWB since FY 
2021--an increase that has accelerated in FY 2022, driven in 
significant part by the number of Venezuelan nationals encountered--DHS 
has taken a series of extraordinary steps. Largely since FY 2021, DHS 
has built and now operates 10 soft-sided processing facilities, which 
cost $688 million in FY 2022. It has detailed 3,770 officers and agents 
from CBP and ICE to the SWB. In FY 2022, DHS had to utilize its above 
threshold reprogramming authority to identify approximately $281 
million from elsewhere in the Department to address SWB needs, to 
include facilities, transportation, medical care, and personnel costs.
    The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has spent $260 
million in FYs 2021 and 2022 on grants to non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) and state and local entities through the Emergency 
Food and Shelter Program--Humanitarian (EFSP--H) to assist with the 
reception and onward travel of irregular migrants arriving at the SWB. 
This spending is in addition to $1.4 billion in FY 2022 one-year surge 
funding for SWB enforcement and processing capacities.\18\
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    \18\ DHS Plan for Southwest Border Security and Preparedness, 
DHS Memorandum for Interested Parties, Alejandro N. Mayorkas, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Apr. 26, 2022.
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    The impact has been particularly acute in certain border sectors. 
The increased flows of Venezuelan nationals are disproportionately 
occurring within the remote Del Rio, El Paso, and Yuma sectors, all of 
which are at risk of operating, or are currently operating, over 
capacity. In FY 2022, 93 percent of unique encounters of Venezuelan 
nationals occurred in these three sectors, with the trend rising to 98 
percent in September 2022.\19\ In FY 2022, the Del Rio, El Paso, and 
Yuma sectors encountered almost double the number of migrants as 
compared to FY 2021 (an 87 percent increase), and a ten-fold increase 
over the average for FY 2014-FY 2019, primarily as a result of 
increases in Venezuelans and other non-traditional sending 
countries.\20\
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    \19\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset through August 31, 2022 
and CBP UIP data for September 1-30, 2022.
    \20\ OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset through August 31, 
2022.
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    The focused increase in encounters in those three sectors is 
particularly challenging. Yuma and Del Rio sectors are geographically 
remote, and because--until the past two years--they have never been a 
focal point for large numbers of individuals entering irregularly, they 
have limited infrastructure and personnel in place to safely process 
the elevated encounters

[[Page 63511]]

that they are seeing. El Paso sector has relatively modern 
infrastructure for processing noncitizens encountered at the border, 
but is far away from other CBP sectors, which makes it challenging to 
move individuals elsewhere for processing during surges.
    In an effort to decompress sectors that are experiencing surges, 
DHS deploys lateral transportation, using buses and flights to move 
noncitizens to other sectors with capacity to process. In just one week 
(between September 22-September 28), El Paso and Yuma sectors operated 
a combined 79 decompression buses staffed by Border Patrol agents to 
neighboring sectors.\21\ In that same week, El Paso and Yuma sectors 
also operated 29 combined lateral decompression flights, redistributing 
noncitizens to other sectors with additional capacity.\22\
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    \21\ Data from SBCC, as of September 29, 2022.
    \22\ Data from SBCC, as of September 29, 2022.
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    Because these assets are finite, using DHS air resources to operate 
lateral flights impacts DHS's ability to operate international 
repatriation flights to receiving countries, leaving noncitizens in 
custody for longer and further taxing DHS resources. This is concerning 
given the correlation between DHS's ability to operate return flights 
to non-contiguous home countries and encounters at the border, as 
described above. DHS assesses that a reduction in the flow of 
Venezuelans arriving at the SWB would reduce pressure on overstretched 
resources and enable the Department to more quickly process and, as 
appropriate, return or remove those who do not have a lawful basis to 
stay.

II. DHS Parole Authority

    The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA or Act) provides the 
Secretary of Homeland Security with discretionary authority to parole 
noncitizens into the United States temporarily, under such reasonable 
conditions that the Secretary may prescribe, on a case-by-case basis 
for ``urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.'' \23\ 
Parole is not an admission of the individual to the United States, and 
a parolee remains an ``applicant for admission'' during the period of 
parole in the United States.\24\ DHS may set the duration of the parole 
based on the purpose for granting the parole request and may impose 
reasonable conditions on parole.\25\ Individuals may be granted advance 
authorization to travel to the United States to seek parole.\26\ DHS 
may terminate parole in its discretion at any time.\27\ Individuals who 
are paroled into the United States generally may apply for employment 
authorization.\28\
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    \23\ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 6 
U.S.C. 202(4) (charging the Secretary with the responsibility for 
``[e]stablishing and administering rules . . . governing . . . 
parole'').
    \24\ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
    \25\ INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
    \26\ See 8 CFR 212.5(f).
    \27\ See 8 CFR 212.5(e).
    \28\ See 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(11).
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    This effort will combine a consequence for those who seek to enter 
the United States irregularly between POEs with a significant incentive 
for Venezuelan nationals to remain where they are and use a lawful 
process to request authorization to travel by air to and ultimately 
enter the United States for the purpose of seeking a discretionary 
grant of parole for up to two years.

III. Justification for the Process

A. Significant Public Benefit

    The case-by-case parole of Venezuelan nationals pursuant to this 
process--which combines consequences for those who seek to enter the 
United States irregularly between POEs with an opportunity for eligible 
Venezuelan nationals to seek advance authorization to travel to the 
United States to seek discretionary parole, on a case-by-case basis, in 
the United States--will serve a significant public benefit for 
multiple, intersecting reasons. Specifically, as noted above, we assess 
that the parole of eligible individuals pursuant to this process will 
result in the following: (i) enhancing the security of our border by 
reducing irregular migration of Venezuelan nationals; (ii) enhancing 
border security and national security by vetting individuals before 
they arrive at our border; (iii) reducing the strain on DHS personnel 
and resources; (iv) minimizing the domestic impact of Venezuelan 
irregular migration; (v) disincentivizing a dangerous irregular journey 
that puts migrant lives and safety at risk and enriches smuggling 
networks; and (vi) fulfilling important foreign policy goals to manage 
migration collaboratively in the hemisphere and, as part of those 
efforts, to establish additional processing pathways from within the 
region to discourage irregular migration.
1. Enhancing the Security of Our Border by Reducing Irregular Migration 
of Venezuelan Nationals
    Implementation of the parole process is contingent on the GOM 
agreeing to accept the return of Venezuelan nationals encountered 
irregularly entering the United States without authorization between 
POEs. While DHS remains under the court order to implement the CDC's 
Title 42 public health Order, these returns will take the form of 
expulsions. Once Title 42 is no longer in place, DHS will engage the 
GOM to effectuate Title 8 removals of individuals subject to expedited 
removal who cannot be returned to Venezuela or elsewhere. The ability 
to effectuate returns to Mexico will impose a consequence on irregular 
entry that currently does not exist.
    As described above, Venezuelan nationals make up a significant and 
growing number of those encountered seeking to cross between POEs 
irregularly. We assess that without additional and more immediate 
consequences imposed on those who seek to do so, together with a safe 
and orderly parole process, the numbers will continue to grow. By 
pairing a consequence on those seeking to irregularly cross between the 
POEs with the incentive provided by the opportunity to apply for 
advance authorization to travel to the United States to seek a 
discretionary grant of parole, this process will create a combination 
of incentives and disincentives that will lead to a substantial decline 
in irregular migration by Venezuelans to the SWB.
    As also described above, this expectation is informed, in part, by 
past experience with respect to the ways that flows of irregular 
migration decreased from NCA countries once nationals from those 
countries were returned to their home countries and shifts that took 
place once the U4U process was initiated. These experiences provide 
compelling evidence of the importance of coupling effective 
disincentives for irregular entry with incentives for lawful entry as a 
way of addressing migratory surges.
2. Enhance Border Security and National Security by Vetting Individuals 
Before They Arrive at Our Border
    The Venezuelan parole process described above will allow DHS to vet 
potential beneficiaries for national security and public safety 
purposes before they travel to the United States. It is important to 
note that all noncitizens DHS encounters at the border undergo thorough 
vetting against national security and public safety databases during 
their processing, and that individuals who are determined to pose a 
national security or public safety threat are detained pending removal. 
Venezuelan nationals seeking parole via this process will still be 
subject to this vetting upon their arrival at the POE. That said, there 
are distinct advantages to being able to conduct some vetting actions 
before an individual arrives at the border to prevent individuals who

[[Page 63512]]

could pose threats to national security or public safety from even 
traveling to the United States.
    As described above, the vetting will require prospective 
beneficiaries to upload a live photograph via a mobile application. 
This will substantially enhance the scope of the pre-travel vetting--
thereby enabling DHS to better identify those with criminal records or 
other disqualifying information of concern and deny them an advance 
authorization to travel before they arrive at our border.
3. Reduce the Burden on DHS Personnel and Resources
    As discussed above, the impact of the increased migratory flows has 
strained the DHS workforce in ways that have been particularly 
concentrated in certain sectors along the SWB. By reducing encounters 
of Venezuelan nationals at the SWB, and channeling decreased flows of 
Venezuelan nationals to interior POEs through this streamlined process, 
we anticipate the process will relieve some of this burden. This will 
free up resources, including those focused on decompression of border 
sectors, which in turn could enable an increase in removal flights--
enabling the removal of more noncitizens with final orders of removal 
faster and reducing the number of days in DHS custody. While the 
process will also draw on DHS resources within USCIS and CBP to process 
requests for discretionary parole on a case-by-case basis and conduct 
vetting, these requirements involve different parts of DHS and require 
minimal resources as compared to the status quo.
4. Minimize the Domestic Impact
    The increase in irregular migration, including the change in 
demographics, has put a strain on domestic resources, which is felt 
most acutely by border communities. As the number of arrivals 
increases, thus necessitating more conditional releases, the strains 
are shared by others as well. Given the current inability to return or 
repatriate Venezuelans in substantial numbers, Venezuelan nationals 
account for a significant percentage of the individuals being 
conditionally released pending their removal proceedings or the 
initiation of such proceedings after being encountered and processed 
along the SWB.
    State and local governments, along with NGOs, are providing 
services and assistance to the Venezuelans and other noncitizens who 
have arrived at our border, including by building new administrative 
structures, finding additional housing facilities, and constructing 
tent shelters to address the increased need.\29\ DHS also has worked 
with Congress to make approximately $290 million available since FY 
2019 through FEMA's EFSP to support NGOs and local governments that 
provide initial reception for migrants entering through the SWB. This 
funding has allowed DHS to support building significant NGO capacity 
along the SWB, including a substantial increase in available shelter 
beds in key locations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Aya Elamroussi and Adrienne Winston, Washington, DC, 
approves creation of new agency to provide services for migrants 
arriving from other states, CNN, Sept. 21, 2022, available at: 
https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/us/washington-dc-migrant-services-office (last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
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    Despite these efforts, local communities have reported strain on 
their ability to provide needed social services.\30\ Local officials 
and NGOs report that the temporary shelters that house migrants are 
quickly reaching capacity due to the high number of arrivals,\31\ and 
stakeholders in the border region have expressed concern that shelters 
will eventually reach full bed space capacity and not be able to host 
any new arrivals.\32\ The parole process will address these concerns by 
diverting flows of Venezuelan nationals to interior POEs through a safe 
and orderly process and ensuring that those who do arrive in the United 
States have support during their period of parole. The effort is 
intended to yield a decrease in the numbers arriving at the SWB.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Lauren Villagran. El Paso struggles to keep up with 
Venezuelan migrants: 5 key things to know. Sep. 14, 2022, available 
at: https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/2022/09/14/venezuelan-migrants-el-paso-what-to-know-about-their-arrival/69493289007/ (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2022); Uriel J. Garcia. El Paso scrambles to move 
migrants off the streets and gives them free bus rides as shelters 
reach capacity. Sept. 20, 2022, available at: https://www.texastribune.org/2022/09/20/migrants-el-paso-texas-shelter/ 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
    \31\ Email from City of San Diego Office of Immigration Affairs 
to DHS, Sept. 23, 2022.
    \32\ Denelle Confair, Local migrant shelter reaching max 
capacity as it receives hundreds per day, KGUN9 Tucson, Sept. 23, 
2022, available at: https://www.kgun9.com/news/local-news/local-migrant-shelter-reaching-max-capacity-as-it-receives-hundreds-per-day (last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
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    Moreover, and critically, beneficiaries will be required to fly to 
the interior, rather than arriving at the SWB, absent extraordinary 
circumstances. They will only be authorized to come to the United 
States if they have a supporter who has agreed to receive them and 
provide basic needs, including housing support. Beneficiaries also will 
be eligible to apply for work authorization, thus enabling them to 
support themselves. We anticipate that this process will help reduce 
the burden on communities, state and local governments, and NGOs that 
currently support the reception and onward travel of migrants arriving 
at the SWB.
5. Disincentivize a Dangerous Journey That Puts Migrant Lives and 
Safety at Risk and Enriches Smuggling Networks
    In FY 2022, more than 750 migrants died attempting to enter the 
United States across the SWB,\33\ an estimated 32 percent increase from 
FY 2021 (568 deaths) and a 195 percent increase from FY 2020 (254 
deaths).\34\ The approximate number of migrants rescued by CBP in FY 
2022 (almost 19,000 rescues) \35\ increased 48 percent from FY 2021 
(12,857 rescues), and 256 percent from FY 2020 (5,336 rescues).\36\ 
Although exact figures are unknown, experts estimate that about 30 
bodies have been taken out of the Rio Grande River each month since 
March 2022.\37\ CBP attributes these rising trends to increasing 
numbers of migrants, as evidenced by increases in overall U.S. Border 
Patrol encounters.\38\ The increased rates of both migrant deaths and 
those needing rescue at the SWB demonstrate the perils of the journey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ Priscilla Alvarez, First on CNN: A record number of 
migrants have died crossing the US-Mexico border, Sept. 7, 2022, 
available at: https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2022).
    \34\ Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains, Fiscal Year 2022 
Report to Congress, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
    \35\ Priscilla Alvarez, First on CNN: A record number of 
migrants have died crossing the US-Mexico border, Sept. 7, 2022, 
available at: https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2022).
    \36\ Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains, Fiscal Year 2022 
Report to Congress, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
    \37\ Valerie Gonzalez, The Guardian, Migrants risk death 
crossing treacherous Rio Grande river for `American dream,' Sept. 5, 
2022, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/sep/05/migrants-risk-death-crossing-treacherous-rio-grande-river-for-american-dream (last visited Oct. 11, 2022).
    \38\ Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains, Fiscal Year 2022 
Report to Congress, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
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    Meanwhile, these numbers do not account for the countless incidents 
of death, illness, and exploitation migrants experience during the 
perilous journey north. Migrants are increasingly traveling to the SWB 
from South America through the Dari[eacute]n Gap, an incredibly 
dangerous and grueling 100-kilometer stretch of dense jungle between 
Colombia and Panama. Women and children are particularly vulnerable. 
Children are particularly at risk for diarrhea, respiratory diseases, 
dehydration, and other ailments that

[[Page 63513]]

require immediate medical attention.\39\ According to Panama migration 
authorities, of the over 31,000 migrants passing through the 
Dari[eacute]n Gap in August 2022, 23,600 were Venezuelan.\40\
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    \39\ UNICEF, 2021 Records Highest Ever Number of Migrant 
Children Crossing the Darien Towards the U.S., Oct. 11, 2021, 
available at: https://www.unicef.org/lac/en/press-releases/2021-records-highest-ever-number-migrant-children-crossing-darien-towards-us (last visited Sept. 29, 2022).
    \40\ Panam[aacute] Migraci[oacute]n, Irregulares en 
Tr[aacute]nsito Frontera Panam[aacute]--Colombia 2022, available at: 
https://www.migracion.gob.pa/inicio/estadisticas
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    These migration movements are in many cases facilitated by numerous 
human smuggling organizations that treat the migrants as pawns.\41\ 
These organizations exploit migrants for profit, often bringing them 
through across inhospitable jungles, rugged mountains, and raging 
rivers, often with small children in tow. Upon reaching the border 
area, noncitizens seeking to cross the United States generally pay 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) to coordinate and guide 
them along the final miles of their journey. Tragically, a significant 
number of individuals perish along the way. The trailer truck accident 
that killed 55 migrants in Chiapas, Mexico last December, and the 
tragic incident in San Antonio, Texas on June 27, 2022, in which 53 
migrants died of the heat in appalling conditions, are just two 
examples of many in which TCOs engaged in human smuggling prioritize 
profit over safety.\42\
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    \41\ DHS Plan for Southwest Border Security and Preparedness, 
DHS Memorandum for Interested Parties, Alejandro N. Mayorkas, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Apr. 26, 2022.
    \42\ Jacob Garcia, Reuters, Migrant truck crashes in Mexico 
killing 54, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-immigration-mexico-accident-idUKKBN2IP01R (last visited Sept. 29, 
2022); Mica Rosenberg, Kristina Cooke, Daniel Trotta, The border's 
toll: Migrants increasingly die crossing into U.S. from Mexico, July 
25, 2022, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-immigration-border-deaths/the-borders-toll-migrants-increasingly-die-crossing-into-u-s-from-mexico-idUSL4N2Z247X (last visited Oct. 
2, 2022).
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    This new process, which will incentivize intending migrants to use 
a safe and orderly means to access the United States via commercial air 
flights, cuts out the smuggling networks. DHS anticipates it will save 
lives and undermine the profits and operations of the dangerous TCOs 
that put migrants' lives at risk for profit.
6. Fulfill Important Foreign Policy Goals To Manage Migration 
Collaboratively in the Hemisphere
    Promoting a safe, orderly, legal, and humane migration strategy 
throughout the Western Hemisphere has been a top foreign policy 
priority for the Administration. This is reflected in three policy-
setting documents: the U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of 
Migration in Central America (Root Causes Strategy); the Collaborative 
Migration Management Strategy (CMMS); and the Los Angeles Declaration 
on Migration and Protection (L.A. Declaration), which was endorsed in 
June 2022 by 21 countries. The CMMS and the L.A. Declaration call for a 
collaborative and regional approach to migration. Countries that have 
endorsed the L.A. Declaration are committed to implementing programs 
and processes to stabilize communities that host migrants, or that have 
high outward migration. They commit to humanely enforcing existing laws 
regarding movements across international boundaries, especially when 
minors are involved, taking actions to stop migrant smuggling by 
targeting the criminals involved in these activities, and providing 
increased regular pathways and protections for migrants residing in or 
transiting through the 21 countries. The L.A. Declaration specifically 
lays out the goal of collectively ``expand[ing] access to regular 
pathways for migrants and refugees.'' \43\
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    \43\ L.A. Declaration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This new process helps achieve these goals by providing an 
immediate and temporary safe and orderly process for Venezuelan 
nationals to lawfully enter the United States while we work to improve 
conditions in sending countries and expand more permanent lawful 
immigration pathways in the region, including refugee processing, and 
other lawful pathways into the United States and other Western 
Hemisphere countries. It thus enables the United States to lead by 
example.
    The process also responds to an acute foreign policy need. The 
current surge of Venezuelan nationals transiting the Dari[eacute]n Gap 
is impacting every country between Colombia and the SWB. Colombia, 
Peru, and Ecuador are now hosting almost 4 million displaced 
Venezuelans among them. The Government of Panama has repeatedly 
signaled that it is overwhelmed with the number of migrants, a 
significant portion of whom are Venezuelan, emerging from harrowing 
journeys through the Dari[eacute]n Gap.
    Reporting indicates that in the first six months of 2022, 85 
percent more migrants, primarily Venezuelans, crossed from Colombia 
into Panama through the Dari[eacute]n Gap than during the same period 
in 2021--including approximately 40,000 Venezuelans in September 
alone.\44\ Again, Dari[eacute]n Gap migrant encounters now average more 
than 3,000 each day, predominantly comprised of Venezuelan nationals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ The Department of State Cable, 22 Panama 624.
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    Figure 2 shows that the number of Venezuelan nationals processed by 
Panama after entering irregularly from Colombia increased by almost 30-
fold from the week of April 1, 2022 to the week of October 1, 2022.

Figure 2: Panamanian Encounters of Venezuelan Nationals in the 
Dari[eacute]n Gap, February-September 2022

[[Page 63514]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN19OC22.008

    Note: September figure is a preliminary estimate.
    Source: Panama Migration Report, September 24, 2022.

    Key allies throughout the region--including the Governments of 
Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama, all of which are also affected by the 
increased movement of Venezuelan nationals--have been seeking greater 
action to address these challenging flows for some time. Meanwhile, the 
GOM has consistently expressed concerns with policies, programs, and 
trends that contribute to large populations of migrants, many of whom 
are Venezuelan, entering Mexico. These entries strain local 
governmental and civil society resources in Mexican border communities 
in both the south and north, and have at times led to violence, crime, 
and unsafe and unhealthy encampments.
    The United States is already taking key steps to address some of 
these concerns. On June 10, 2022, the Department of State's Bureau of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) announced $314 million in new funding 
for humanitarian and development assistance for refugees and vulnerable 
migrants across the hemisphere, including support for socio-economic 
integration and humanitarian aid for Venezuelans in 17 countries of the 
region.\45\ And on September 22, 2022, PRM and USAID announced nearly 
$376 million in additional humanitarian assistance, which will provide 
essential support for vulnerable Venezuelans inside Venezuela, as well 
as urgently needed assistance for migrants, refugees, and host 
communities across the region. This funding will further address 
humanitarian needs in the region.\46\
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    \45\ The United States Announces More Than $314 Million in New 
Stabilization Efforts and Humanitarian Assistance for Venezuelans 
and Other Migrants at the Summit of the Americas, June 10, 2022, 
available at: https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jun-10-2022-united-states-announces-more-314-million-new-stabilization-efforts-venezuela (last visited Oct. 11, 2022).
    \46\ The United States Announces Nearly $376 Million in 
Additional Humanitarian Assistance for People Affected by the 
Ongoing Crisis in Venezuela and the Region, Sept. 22, 2022, 
available at: https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/sep-22-2022-the-us-announces-nearly-376-million-additional-humanitarian-assistance-for-people-affected-by-ongoing-crisis-in-venezuela (last visited Sept. 30, 2022).
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    This new process adds to these efforts and enables the United 
States to lead by example. It is a key mechanism to advance the larger 
domestic and foreign policy goals of this Administration to promote a 
safe, orderly, legal, and humane migration strategy throughout our 
hemisphere. It also lays the foundation for the United States to press 
regional partners to undertake additional actions with regards to these 
populations, many of which are already taking important steps. 
Colombia, for example, is hosting more than 2.4 million displaced 
Venezuelans and has provided temporary protected status for more than 
1.5 million of them. Costa Rica is developing plans to renew temporary 
protection for Venezuelans. And on June 1, 2022, the Government of 
Ecuador--which is hosting more than 500,000 Venezuelans--authorized a 
second regularization process that would provide certain Venezuelans a 
two-year temporary residency visa.\47\ Any effort to meaningfully 
address the crisis in Venezuela will require continued efforts by these 
and other regional partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ Venezuela Regional Crisis--Complex Emergency, June 14, 
2022, available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-06-14_USG_Venezuela_Regional_Crisis_Response_Fact_Sheet_3.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Importantly, the United States will not implement the new parole 
process without the ability to return Venezuelan nationals to Mexico 
who enter irregularly. The United States' ability to execute this 
process thus requires the GOM to accept the return of Venezuelan 
nationals who bypass this new process and enter the United States 
irregularly between POEs.
    For its part, the GOM has made clear that in order to effectively 
manage the migratory flows that are impacting both countries, the 
United States needs to provide additional safe and orderly processes 
for migrants who seek to enter the United States. As the GOM makes a 
unilateral decision whether to accept returns of third country 
nationals at the border and how best to manage migration within Mexico, 
it is closely watching the United States' approach to migration 
management and whether the United States is delivering on its plans in 
this space. Initiating and managing this process--which is dependent on 
the GOM's actions--will require careful, deliberate, and regular 
assessment of the GOM's responses to unilateral U.S. actions and 
ongoing, sensitive diplomatic engagements.
    This process is responsive to the GOM's desire to see more lawful 
pathways to the United States and is aligned with broader 
Administration

[[Page 63515]]

domestic and foreign policy priorities in the region. It will couple a 
meaningful incentive to seek a lawful, orderly means of traveling to 
the United States with the imposition of consequences for those who 
seek to enter irregularly. The goal of this process is to reduce the 
irregular migration of Venezuelan nationals throughout the hemisphere 
while we, together with partners in the region, work to improve 
conditions in sending countries and create more lawful immigration and 
refugee pathways in the region, including to the United States.

B. Urgent Humanitarian Reasons

    The case-by-case temporary parole of individuals pursuant to this 
process will address the urgent humanitarian reasons faced by so many 
Venezuelans subject to the repressive regime of Nicol[aacute]s Maduro. 
This process provides a safe and orderly mechanism for Venezuelan 
nationals who seek to leave their home country to enter the United 
States without having to make the dangerous journey to the United 
States.

IV. Eligibility To Participate in the Process and Processing Steps

A. Supporters

    U.S.-based supporters will initiate an application on behalf of a 
Venezuelan national \48\ by submitting a Form I-134, Declaration of 
Financial Support, to USCIS for each beneficiary. Supporters can be 
sole individuals, individuals filing on behalf of a group, or 
individuals representing an entity. To serve as a supporter under the 
process, an individual must:
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    \48\ Certain non-Venezuelans may use this process if they are an 
immediate family member of a Venezuelan beneficiary and traveling 
with that Venezuelan beneficiary. For purposes of this process, 
immediate family members are limited to a spouse, common-law 
partner, and/or unmarried child(ren) under the age of 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     be a U.S. citizen, national, or lawful permanent resident; 
hold a lawful status in the United States; or be a parolee or recipient 
of deferred action or Deferred Enforced Departure;
     pass security and background vetting, including for public 
safety, national security, human trafficking, and exploitation 
concerns; and
     demonstrate sufficient financial resources to receive, 
maintain, and support the intended beneficiary whom they commit to 
support for the duration of their parole period.

B. Beneficiaries

    In order to be eligible to request and ultimately be considered for 
a discretionary issuance of advance authorization to travel to the 
United States to seek a discretionary grant of parole at the POE, such 
individuals must:
     be outside the United States;
     be a national of Venezuela or be a non-Venezuelan 
immediate family member \49\ of and traveling with a Venezuelan 
principal beneficiary;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See the preceding footnote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     have a U.S.-based supporter who filed a Form I-134 on 
their behalf that USCIS has vetted and confirmed;
     possess a passport valid for international travel;
     provide for their own commercial travel to an air POE and 
final U.S. destination;
     undergo and pass required national security and public 
safety vetting;
     comply with all additional requirements, including 
vaccination requirements and other public health guidelines; and
     demonstrate that a grant of parole is warranted based on 
significant public benefit or urgent humanitarian reasons, as described 
above, and that a favorable exercise of discretion is otherwise 
merited.
    A Venezuelan national is ineligible to be considered for parole 
under this process if that person is a permanent resident or dual 
national of any country other than Venezuela, or currently holds 
refugee status in any country.\50\
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    \50\ This limitation does not apply to immediate family members 
traveling with a Venezuelan national.
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    In addition, a potential beneficiary is ineligible for advance 
authorization to travel to the United States as well as parole under 
this process if that person:
     failed to pass national security and public safety vetting 
or is otherwise deemed not to merit a favorable exercise of discretion;
     has been ordered removed from the United States within the 
prior five years or is subject to a bar based on a prior removal order; 
\51\
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    \51\ See, e.g., INA sec. 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     has crossed irregularly into the United States, between 
the POEs, after October 19, 2022;
     has irregularly crossed the Mexican or Panamanian borders 
after October 19, 2022; or
     is under 18 and not traveling through this process 
accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, and as such is a child whom 
the inspecting officer would determine to be an unaccompanied 
child.\52\
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    \52\ As defined in 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2). Children under the age of 
18 must be traveling to the United States in the care and custody of 
their parent or legal guardian to be considered for parole at the 
POE under the process.
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    Travel requirements: Beneficiaries who receive advance 
authorization to travel to the United States to seek parole into the 
United States will be responsible for arranging and funding their own 
commercial air travel to the United States.
    Health Requirements: Beneficiaries must follow all applicable 
requirements, as determined by DHS's Chief Medical Officer, in 
consultation with CDC, with respect to health and travel, including 
vaccination and/or testing requirements for diseases including COVID-
19, polio, and measles. The most up-to-date public health requirements 
applicable to this process will be available at https://www.uscis.gov/venezuela.

C. Processing Steps

Step 1: Financial Support
    A U.S.-based supporter will submit a Form I-134, Declaration of 
Financial Support with USCIS through the online myUSCIS web portal to 
initiate the process. The Form I-134 identifies and collects 
information on both the supporter and the beneficiary. The supporter 
must submit a separate Form I-134 for each beneficiary they are seeking 
to support, including Venezuelans' immediate family members and minor 
children. The supporter will then be vetted by USCIS to protect against 
exploitation and abuse, and to ensure that the supporter is able to 
financially support the individual and any immediate family members 
whom they agree to support. Supporters must be vetted and confirmed by 
USCIS, at USCIS' discretion, before moving forward in the process.
Step 2: Submit Biographic Information
    If a supporter is confirmed by USCIS, the listed beneficiary will 
receive an email from USCIS on how to create an account with myUSCIS 
and instructions on next steps for completing the application. The 
beneficiary will be required to confirm their biographic information in 
myUSCIS and attest to meeting the eligibility requirements.
    As part of confirming eligibility in their myUSCIS account, 
individuals who seek authorization to travel to the United States will 
need to confirm that they meet public health requirements, including 
certain vaccination requirements.
Step 3: Submit Request in CBP One Mobile Application
    After confirming biographic information in myUSCIS and completing 
required eligibility attestations, the beneficiary will receive

[[Page 63516]]

instructions through myUSCIS on how to access the CBP One mobile 
application. The beneficiary must then enter limited biographic 
information into CBP One and submit a live photo.
Step 4: Approval To Travel to the United States
    After completing Step 3, the beneficiary will receive a notice to 
their myUSCIS account confirming whether CBP has, in CBP's discretion, 
provided the beneficiary advance authorization to travel to the United 
States to seek a discretionary grant of parole on a case-by-case basis. 
If approved, this authorization is generally valid for 90 days, and 
beneficiaries are responsible for securing their own travel via 
commercial air to the United States.\53\ Approval of advance 
authorization to travel does not guarantee parole into the United 
States at a U.S. POE. That parole is a discretionary determination made 
by CBP at the POE.
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    \53\ Air carriers can validate an approved and valid travel 
authorization submission using the same mechanisms that are 
currently in place to validate that a traveler has a valid visa or 
other documentation to facilitate issuance of a boarding pass for 
air travel.
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    All of the steps in this process, including the decision to grant 
or deny advance travel authorization and the parole decision at the 
POE, are entirely discretionary and not subject to appeal on any 
grounds.
Step 5: Seeking Parole at the POE
    Upon their arrival at a POE, each individual arriving under this 
process will be inspected by CBP and considered for a grant of 
discretionary parole for a period of up to two years on a case-by-case 
basis.
    As part of the inspection, beneficiaries will undergo additional 
screening and vetting, to include additional fingerprint biometric 
vetting consistent with the CBP inspectional process. Individuals who 
are determined to pose a national security or public safety threat or 
otherwise do not warrant parole pursuant to section 212(d)(5)(A) of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A), and as a matter of discretion upon 
inspection, will be processed under an appropriate processing pathway 
and may be referred to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
for detention.
Step 6: Parole
    If granted parole pursuant to this process, each individual 
generally will be paroled into the United States for a period of up to 
two years, subject to applicable health and vetting requirements, and 
will be eligible to apply for employment authorization under existing 
regulations. Individuals may request authorization to work from USCIS. 
USCIS is leveraging technological and process efficiencies to minimize 
processing times for requests for work authorization. All individuals 
two years of age or older will be required to complete a medical 
screening for tuberculosis, including an IGRA test, within 90 days of 
arrival to the United States.

D. Sunset, Renewal, and Termination

    The process is capped at 24,000 beneficiaries. After this cap is 
reached, the program will sunset absent a decision by the Secretary to 
continue the process, based on the Secretary's sole discretion. The 
Secretary also retains the sole, unreviewable discretion to terminate 
the process at any point.

E. Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

    This process is exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking 
requirements on multiple grounds, and is therefore amenable to 
immediate issuance and implementation.
    First, the Department is merely adopting a general statement of 
policy,\54\ i.e., a ``statement[ ] issued by an agency to advise the 
public prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to 
exercise a discretionary power.'' \55\ As section 212(d)(5)(A) of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A), provides, parole decisions are made by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security ``in his discretion.''
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    \54\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).
    \55\ Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (quoting 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979)).
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    Second, even if this process were considered to be a legislative 
rule that would normally be subject to requirements for notice-and-
comment rulemaking and a delayed effective date, the process is exempt 
from such requirements because it involves a foreign affairs function 
of the United States.\56\ In addition, although under the APA, 
invocation of this exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking does 
not require the agency to show that such procedures may result in 
``definitely undesirable international consequences,'' some courts have 
required such a showing,\57\ and DHS can make one here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1).
    \57\ See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 437 (2d Cir. 
2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As described above, this process is directly responsive to requests 
from key foreign partners--including the GOM--to provide a lawful 
process for Venezuelan nationals to enter the United States. The United 
States will not implement the new parole process without the ability to 
return Venezuelan nationals who enter irregularly to Mexico, and the 
United States' ability to execute this process thus requires the GOM's 
willingness to accept into Mexico those who bypass this new process and 
enter the United States irregularly between POEs. Thus, initiating and 
managing this process will require careful, deliberate, and regular 
assessment of the GOM's responses to this unilateral U.S. action and 
ongoing, sensitive diplomatic engagements.
    Delaying issuance and implementation of this process to undertake 
rulemaking would undermine the foreign policy imperative to act now and 
result in definitely undesirable international consequences. It also 
would complicate broader discussions and negotiations about migration 
management. For now, Mexico has indicated it is prepared to make a 
unilateral decision to accept a substantial number of Venezuela 
returns. That willingness to accept the returns could be impacted by 
the delay associated with a public rulemaking process involving advance 
notice and comment and a delayed effective date. Additionally, making 
it publicly known that we plan to return nationals of Venezuela to 
Mexico at a future date would likely result in a surge in migration, as 
migrants rush to the border to enter before the rule becomes final--
which would adversely impact each country's border security and further 
strain their personnel and resources deployed to the border.
    Moreover, this process is not only responsive to the request of 
Mexico and key foreign partners--and necessary for addressing migration 
issues requiring coordination between two or more governments--it is 
also fully aligned with larger and important foreign policy objectives 
of this Administration and fits within a web of carefully negotiated 
actions by multiple governments (for instance in the L.A. Declaration). 
It is the view of the United States that the implementation of this 
process will advance the Administration's foreign policy goals by 
demonstrating U.S. partnership and U.S. commitment to the shared goals 
of addressing migration through the hemisphere, both of which are 
essential to maintaining a strong bilateral relationship.
    The invocation of the foreign affairs exemption here is also 
consistent with Department precedent. For example, in 2017 DHS 
published a notice eliminating an exception to expedited removal for 
certain Cuban nationals, which explained that the change in

[[Page 63517]]

policy was consistent with the foreign affairs exemption because the 
change was central to ongoing negotiations between the two 
countries.\58\
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    \58\ See 82 FR 4902 (Jan. 17, 2017).
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    Third, DHS assesses that there is good cause to find that the delay 
associated with implementing this process through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest 
because of the need for coordination with the GOM described above, and 
the urgent border and national security and humanitarian interests in 
reducing and diverting the flow of irregular migration.\59\ It would be 
impracticable to delay issuance in order to undertake such procedures 
because--as noted above--maintaining the status quo, which involves 
record numbers of Venezuelan nationals currently being encountered 
attempting to enter irregularly at the SWB, coupled with DHS's 
extremely limited options for processing, detaining, or quickly 
removing such migrants, unduly impedes DHS's ability to fulfill its 
critical and varied missions. At current rates, a delay of just a few 
months to conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking would effectively 
forfeit an opportunity to reduce and divert migrant flows in the near 
term, harm border security, and potentially result in scores of 
additional migrant deaths. Undertaking such procedures would also be 
contrary to the public interest because an advance announcement of this 
process would seriously undermine a key goal of the policy by 
incentivizing even more irregular migration of Venezuelan nationals 
seeking to enter the United States before the process would take 
effect.
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    \59\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).
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F. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. chapter 35, all 
Departments are required to submit to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), for review and approval, any new reporting requirements 
they impose. The process announced by this notice requires changes to 
two collections of information, as follows.
    First, OMB has approved a revision to USCIS Form I-134, Declaration 
of Financial Support (OMB control number 1615-0014) under the PRA's 
emergency processing procedures at 5 CFR 1320.13. USCIS is making some 
changes to the online form in connection with the implementation of the 
process described above. These changes include: requiring two new data 
elements for U.S.-based supporters (``Sex'' and ``Social Security 
Number''); adding a third marker (``X'') in addition to ``M'' and ``F'' 
in accordance with this Administration's stated gender equity goals; 
and adding Venezuela as an acceptable option for the beneficiary's 
country of origin. USCIS has submitted and OMB has approved a request 
for emergency authorization of the required changes (under 5 CFR 
1320.13) for a period of 6 months. Within the next 90 days, USCIS will 
immediately begin normal clearance procedures under the PRA.
    Second, OMB has approved an emergency request under 5 CFR 1320.13 
for a new information collection from CBP entitled Advance Travel 
Authorization. OMB has approved the emergency request for a period of 6 
months and will assign a control number to the collection. This new 
information collection will allow certain noncitizens from Venezuela, 
and their qualifying immediate family members, who lack United States 
entry documents to submit information through the newly developed CBP 
ATA capability within the CBP OneTM application as part of 
the process to request an advance authorization to travel to the United 
States to seek parole. Within the next 90 days, CBP will immediately 
begin normal clearance procedures under the PRA. More information about 
both collections can be viewed at www.reginfo.gov.

Alejandro N. Mayorkas,
Secretary of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2022-22739 Filed 10-18-22; 8:45 am]
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