[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 178 (Thursday, September 15, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 56743-56749]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-20001]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

[Docket No. FAA-2022-0353]


Airworthiness Criteria: Special Class Airworthiness Criteria for 
the MissionGO MGV100 Unmanned Aircraft

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed airworthiness criteria.

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SUMMARY: The FAA announces the availability of and requests comments on 
proposed airworthiness criteria for the MissionGO Model MGV100 unmanned 
aircraft (UA). This document proposes the airworthiness criteria the 
FAA finds to be appropriate and applicable for the UA design.

DATES: Send comments on or before October 17, 2022.

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2022-0353 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room 
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket 
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
    Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without 
change, to https://regulations.gov, including any personal information 
the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket 
website, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments 
received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual 
sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association, 
business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can 
be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 
19477-19478), as well as at https://www.dot.gov/privacy.
    Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at 
https://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions 
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140 
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christopher J. Richards, Emerging 
Aircraft Strategic Policy Section, AIR-618, Strategic Policy Management 
Branch, Policy and Innovation Division, Aircraft Certification Service, 
Federal Aviation Administration, 6020 28th Avenue South, Room 103, 
Minneapolis, MN 55450, telephone (612) 253-4559.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested people to take part in the development 
of these airworthiness criteria by sending written comments, data, or 
views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the 
airworthiness

[[Page 56744]]

criteria, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include 
supporting data. Comments on operational, pilot certification, and 
maintenance requirements would address issues that are beyond the scope 
of this document.
    Except for Confidential Business Information as described in the 
following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 
11.35, the FAA will file in the docket all comments received, as well 
as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA 
personnel concerning these proposed airworthiness criteria. Before 
acting on this proposal, the FAA will consider all comments received on 
or before the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments 
filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring delay. The FAA 
may change these airworthiness criteria based on received comments.

Confidential Business Information

    Confidential Business Information (CBI) is commercial or financial 
information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by 
its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), 
CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to 
these proposed airworthiness criteria contain commercial or financial 
information that is customarily treated as private, that you actually 
treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to these proposed 
airworthiness criteria, it is important that you clearly designate the 
submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission 
containing CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked 
submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed 
in the public docket of these proposed airworthiness criteria. 
Submissions containing CBI should be sent to the individual listed 
under For Further Information Contact. Any commentary that the FAA 
receives which is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in 
the public docket for these proposed airworthiness criteria.

Background

    MissionGO applied to the FAA on November 4, 2020, for a special 
class type certificate under 14 CFR 21.17(b) for the Model MGV100 UA.
    The Model MGV100 consists of a rotorcraft UA and its associated 
elements (AE) including communication links and components that control 
the UA. The Model MGV100 UA has a maximum gross takeoff weight of 54 
pounds. It has a rotor diameter of approximately 76.5 inches. It is 
approximately 66.5 inches in fuselage length and 28.5 inches in height. 
The Model MGV100 UA is battery-powered using electric motors for 
vertical takeoff, landing, and forward flight. The unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS) operations would rely on high levels of automation and 
include a single UA operated by a single pilot. MissionGO anticipates 
operators will use the Model MGV100 for delivering packages. The 
proposed concept of operations for the Model MGV100 identifies a 
maximum operating altitude of 400 feet above ground level, a maximum 
cruise speed of 38 knots, operations beyond visual line of sight of the 
pilot, and operations over human beings. MissionGO has not requested 
type certification for flight into known icing for the Model MGV100.

Discussion

    The FAA establishes airworthiness criteria to ensure the safe 
operation of aircraft in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 44701(a) and 44704. 
UA are type certificated by the FAA as special class aircraft for which 
airworthiness standards have not been established by regulation. Under 
the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17(b), the airworthiness standards for 
special class aircraft are those the FAA finds to be appropriate and 
applicable to the specific type design.
    The applicant has proposed a design with constraints upon its 
operations and an unusual design characteristic: the pilot is remotely 
located. The FAA developed existing airworthiness standards to 
establish an appropriate level of safety for each product and its 
intended use. The FAA's existing airworthiness standards did not 
envision aircraft with no pilot in the flight deck and the technologies 
associated with that capability.
    The FAA has reviewed the proposed design and assessed the potential 
risk to the National Airspace System. The FAA considered the size of 
the proposed aircraft, its maximum airspeed and altitude, and 
operational limitations to address the number of unmanned aircraft per 
operator and address operations in which the aircraft would operate 
beyond the visual line of sight of the pilot. These factors allowed the 
FAA to assess the potential risk the aircraft could pose to other 
aircraft and to human beings on the ground. Using these parameters, the 
FAA developed airworthiness criteria to address those potential risks 
to ensure the aircraft remains reliable, controllable, safe, and 
airworthy.
    The proposed criteria focus on mitigating hazards by establishing 
safety outcomes that must be achieved, rather than by establishing 
prescriptive requirements that must be met. This is in contrast to many 
current airworthiness standards, used to certificate traditional 
aircraft systems, which prescribe specific indicators and instruments 
for a pilot in a flight deck that would be inappropriate for UA. The 
FAA finds that the proposed criteria are appropriate and applicable for 
the UA design, based on the intended operational concepts for the UA as 
identified by the applicant.
    The FAA selected the particular airworthiness criteria proposed by 
this notice for the following reasons:
    General: In order to determine appropriate and applicable 
airworthiness standards for UA as a special class of aircraft, the FAA 
determined that the applicant must provide information describing the 
characteristics and capabilities of the UA and how it will be used.
    D&R.001 Concept of Operations: To assist the FAA in identifying and 
analyzing the risks and impacts associated with integrating the 
proposed UA design into the National Airspace System, the applicant 
would be required to submit a Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The 
proposed criteria would require the applicant's CONOPS to identify the 
intended operational concepts for the UA and describe the UAS and its 
operation. The applicant would be required to describe the information 
in the CONOPS in sufficient detail to determine parameters and extent 
of testing, as well as operating limitations that will be placed in the 
UA Flight Manual. If the applicant requests to include collision 
avoidance equipment, the proposed criteria would require the applicant 
to identify such equipment in the CONOPS.
    D&R.005 Definitions: The proposed criteria include a definitions 
section, distinguishing the term ``loss of flight'' from ``loss of 
control.''
    Design and Construction: The FAA selected the design and 
construction criteria in this section to address airworthiness 
requirements where the flight testing demonstration alone may not be 
sufficient to demonstrate an appropriate level of safety.
    D&R.100 UA Signal Monitoring and Transmission: To address the risks 
associated with loss of control of the UA, the applicant would be 
required to design the UA to monitor and transmit to the AE all 
information necessary for continued safe flight and operation. Some of 
the AE are located separately

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from the UA, and therefore are a unique feature to UAS. As a result, no 
regulatory airworthiness standards exist that directly apply to this 
part of the system. The FAA based some of the proposed criteria on 
existing regulations that address the information that must be provided 
to a pilot in the flight deck of a manned aircraft, and modified them 
as appropriate to the UAS. These proposed criteria list the specific 
minimum types of information the FAA finds are necessary for the UA to 
transmit for continued safe flight and operation; however, the 
applicant must determine whether additional parameters are necessary.
    D&R.105 UAS AE Required for Safe UA Operations: Because safe UAS 
operations depend and rely on both the UA and the AE, the FAA considers 
the AE in assessing whether the UA meets the criteria that comprise the 
certification basis. While the AE items themselves will be outside the 
scope of the UA type design, the applicant must provide sufficient 
specifications for any aspect of the AE, including the control station, 
which could affect airworthiness. The proposed criteria would require a 
complete and unambiguous identification of the AE and their interface 
with the UA, so that their availability or use is readily apparent.
    As explained in FAA Policy Memorandum AIR600-21-AIR-600-PM01, dated 
July 13, 2021, the FAA will approve either the specific AE or minimum 
specifications for the AE, as identified by the applicant, as part of 
the type certificate by including them as an operating limitation in 
the type certificate data sheet and flight manual. The FAA may impose 
additional operating limitations specific to the AE through conditions 
and limitations for inclusion in the operational approval (i.e., 
waivers, exemptions, operating certificates, or a combination of 
these). In this way, the FAA will consider the entirety of the UAS for 
operational approval and oversight.
    D&R.110 Software: Software for manned aircraft is certified under 
the regulations applicable to systems, equipment, and installations 
(e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.2510, 25.1309, 27.1309, or 29.1309). There are two 
regulations that specifically prescribe airworthiness standards for 
software: Engine airworthiness standards (Sec.  33.28) and propeller 
airworthiness standards (Sec.  35.23). The proposed UA software 
criteria are based on these regulations and tailored for the risks 
posed by UA software.
    D&R.115 Cyber Security: The location of the pilot separate from the 
UA requires a continuous wireless connection (command and control link) 
with the UA for the pilot to monitor and control it. Because the 
purpose of this link is to control the aircraft, this makes the UA 
susceptible to cyber security threats in a unique way.
    The current regulations for the certification of systems, 
equipment, and installations (e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.2510, 25.1309, 
27.1309, and 29.1309) do not adequately address potential security 
vulnerabilities exploited by unauthorized access to aircraft systems, 
data buses, and services. For manned aircraft, the FAA therefore issues 
special conditions for particular designs with network security 
vulnerabilities.
    To address the risks to the UA associated with intentional 
unauthorized electronic interactions, the applicant would be required 
to design the UAS's systems and networks to protect against intentional 
unauthorized electronic interactions and mitigate potential adverse 
effects. The FAA based the language for the proposed criteria on 
recommendations in the final report dated August 22, 2016, from the 
Aircraft System Information Security/Protection (ASISP) working group 
under the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. Although the 
recommendations pertained to manned aircraft, the FAA has reviewed the 
report and determined the recommendations are also appropriate for UA. 
The wireless connections used by UA make these aircraft susceptible to 
the same cyber security risks, and therefore require similar criteria 
as manned aircraft.
    D&R.120 Contingency Planning: The location of the pilot and the 
controls for the UAS, separate from the UA, is a unique feature to UAS. 
As a result, no regulatory airworthiness standards exist that directly 
apply to this feature of the system.
    To address the risks associated with loss of communication between 
the pilot and the UA, and thus the pilot's inability to control the UA, 
the proposed criteria would require that the UA be designed to 
automatically execute a predetermined action. Because the pilot needs 
to be aware of the particular predetermined action the UA will take 
when there is a loss of communication between the pilot and the UA, the 
proposed criteria would require that the applicant identify the 
predetermined action in the UA Flight Manual. The proposed criteria 
would also include requirements for preventing takeoff when quality of 
service is inadequate.
    D&R.125 Lightning: Because of the size and physical limitations of 
this UA, it would be unlikely that this UA would incorporate 
traditional lightning protection features. To address the risks that 
would result from a lightning strike, the proposed criteria would 
require an operating limitation in the UA Flight Manual that prohibits 
flight into weather conditions conducive to lightning. The proposed 
criteria would also allow design characteristics to protect the UA from 
lightning as an alternative to the prohibition.
    D&R.130 Adverse Weather Conditions: Because of the size and 
physical limitations of this UA, adverse weather such as rain, snow, 
and icing pose a greater hazard to the UA than to manned aircraft. For 
the same reason, it would be unlikely that this UA would incorporate 
traditional protection features from icing. The FAA based the proposed 
criteria on the icing requirements in 14 CFR 23.2165(b) and (c) and 
applied them to all of these adverse weather conditions. The proposed 
criteria would allow design characteristics to protect the UA from 
adverse weather conditions. As an alternative, the proposed criteria 
would require an operating limitation in the UA Flight Manual that 
prohibits flight into known adverse weather conditions, and either also 
prevent inadvertent flight into adverse weather or provide a means to 
detect and to avoid or exit adverse weather conditions.
    D&R.135 Flight Essential Parts: The proposed criteria for flight 
essential parts are substantively the standards for normal category 
rotorcraft critical parts in Sec.  27.602, with changes to reflect UA 
terminology and failure conditions. Because part criticality is 
dependent on safety risk to those on board the aircraft, the term 
``flight essential'' is used for those components of an unmanned 
aircraft whose failure may result in loss of flight or unrecoverable 
loss of UA control.
    Operating Limitations and Information: Similar to manned aircraft, 
the FAA determined that the UA applicant must provide airworthiness 
instructions, operating limitations, and flight and performance 
information necessary for the safe operation and continued operational 
safety of the UA.
    D&R.200 Flight Manual: The proposed criteria for the UA Flight 
Manual are substantively the same as those in Sec.  23.2620, with minor 
changes to reflect UA terminology.
    D&R.205 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: The proposed 
criteria for the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) are 
substantively the same as that in Sec.  23.1529, with

[[Page 56746]]

minor changes to reflect UA terminology.
    Testing: Traditional certification methodologies for manned 
aircraft are based on design requirements verified at the component 
level by inspection, analysis, demonstration, or test. Due to the 
difference in size and complexity, the FAA determined testing 
methodologies that demonstrate reliability at the aircraft (UA) level, 
in addition to the design and construction criteria identified in this 
proposal, will achieve the same safety objective. The proposed testing 
criteria in sections D&R.300 through D&R.320 utilize these 
methodologies.
    D&R.300 Durability and Reliability: The FAA intends the proposed 
testing criteria in this section to cover key design aspects and 
prevent unsafe features at an appropriate level tailored for this UA. 
The proposed durability and reliability testing would require the 
applicant to demonstrate safe flight of the UA across the entire 
operational envelope and up to all operational limitations, for all 
phases of flight and all aircraft configurations. The UA would only be 
certificated for operations within the limitations prescribed for its 
operating environment, as defined in the applicant's proposed CONOPS 
and demonstrated by test. The FAA intends for this process to be 
similar to the process for establishing limitations prescribed for 
special purpose operations for restricted category aircraft. The 
proposed criteria would require that all flights during the testing be 
completed with no failures that result in a loss of flight, loss of 
control, loss of containment, or emergency landing outside of the 
operator's recovery zone.
    For some aircraft design requirements imposed by existing 
airworthiness standards (e.g., Sec. Sec.  23.2135, 23.2600, 25.105, 
25.125, 27.141, 27.173, 29.51, 29.177), the aircraft must not require 
exceptional piloting skill or alertness. These rules recognize that 
pilots have varying levels of ability and attention. In a similar 
manner, the proposed criteria would require that the durability and 
reliability flight testing be performed by a pilot with average skill 
and alertness.
    Flight testing will be used to determine the aircraft's ability to 
withstand flight loads across the range of operating limits and the 
flight envelope. Because small UA may be subjected to significant 
ground loads when handled, lifted, carried, loaded, maintained, and 
transported physically by hand, the proposed criteria would require 
that the aircraft used for testing endure the same worst-case ground 
loads as those the UA will experience in operation after type 
certification.
    D&R.305 Probable Failures: The FAA intends the proposed testing 
criteria to evaluate how the UA functions after failures that are 
probable to occur. The applicant will test the UA by inducing certain 
failures and demonstrating that the failure will not result in a loss 
of containment or control of the UA. The proposed criteria contain the 
minimum types of failures the FAA finds are probable; however, the 
applicant must determine the probable failures related to any other 
equipment that will be addressed for this requirement.
    D&R.310 Capabilities and Functions: The proposed criteria for this 
section address the minimum capabilities and functions the FAA finds 
are necessary for the design of the UA and would require the applicant 
to demonstrate these capabilities and functions by test. Due to the 
location of the pilot and the controls for UAS, separate from the UA, 
communication between the pilot and the UA is significant to the 
design. Thus, the proposed criteria would require the applicant to 
demonstrate the capability of the UAS to regain command and control 
after a loss. As with manned aircraft, the electrical system of the UA 
must have a capacity sufficient for all anticipated loads; the proposed 
criteria would require the applicant to demonstrate this by test.
    The proposed criteria contain functions that would allow the pilot 
to command the UA to deviate from its flight plan or from its pre-
programmed flight path. For example, in the event the pilot needs to 
deconflict the airspace, the UA must respond to pilot inputs that 
override any pre-programming.
    In the event an applicant requests approval for certain features, 
such as geo-fencing or external cargo, the proposed criteria contain 
requirements to address the associated risks. The proposed criteria in 
this section would also require the design of the UA to safeguard 
against unintended discontinuation of flight or release of cargo, 
whether by human action or malfunction.
    D&R.315 Fatigue: The FAA intends the proposed criteria in this 
section to address the risks from reduced structural integrity and 
structural failure due to fatigue. The proposed criteria would require 
the applicant to establish an airframe life limit and demonstrate that 
loss of flight or loss of control due to structural failure will be 
avoided throughout the operational life of the UA. These proposed 
criteria would require the applicant to demonstrate this by test, while 
maintaining the UA in accordance with the ICA.
    D&R.320 Verification of Limits: This section would evaluate 
structural safety and address the risks associated with inadequate 
structural design. While the proposed criteria in D&R.300 address 
testing to demonstrate that the UA structure adequately supports 
expected loads throughout the flight and operational envelopes, the 
proposed criteria in this section would require an evaluation of the 
performance, maneuverability, stability, and control of the UA with a 
factor of safety.

Applicability

    These airworthiness criteria, established under the provisions of 
Sec.  21.17(b), are applicable to the Model MGV100 UA. Should MissionGO 
apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include 
another model, these airworthiness criteria would apply to that model 
as well, provided the FAA finds them appropriate in accordance with the 
requirements of subpart D to part 21.

Conclusion

    This action affects only the airworthiness criteria for the one 
model UA. It is not a standard of general applicability.

Authority Citation

    The authority citation for these airworthiness criteria is as 
follows:
    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

Proposed Airworthiness Criteria

    The FAA proposes to establish the following airworthiness criteria 
for type certification of the MissionGO Model MGV100 UA. The FAA 
proposes that compliance with the following would mitigate the risks 
associated with the proposed design and Concept of Operations 
appropriately and would provide an equivalent level of safety to 
existing rules:

General

D&R.001 Concept of Operations

    The applicant must define and submit to the FAA a concept of 
operations (CONOPS) proposal describing the unmanned aircraft system 
(UAS) operation in the national airspace system for which unmanned 
aircraft (UA) type certification is requested. The CONOPS proposal must 
include, at a minimum, a description of the following information in 
sufficient detail to determine the parameters and extent of testing and 
operating limitations:
    (a) The intended type of operations;

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    (b) UA specifications;
    (c) Meteorological conditions;
    (d) Operators, pilots, and personnel responsibilities;
    (e) Control station, support equipment, and other associated 
elements (AE) necessary to meet the airworthiness criteria;
    (f) Command, control, and communication functions;
    (g) Operational parameters (such as population density, geographic 
operating boundaries, airspace classes, launch and recovery area, 
congestion of proposed operating area, communications with air traffic 
control, line of sight, and aircraft separation); and
    (h) Collision avoidance equipment, whether onboard the UA or part 
of the AE, if requested.

D&R.005 Definitions

    For purposes of these airworthiness criteria, the following 
definitions apply.
    (a) Loss of Control: Loss of control means an unintended departure 
of an aircraft from controlled flight. It includes control reversal or 
an undue loss of longitudinal, lateral, and directional stability and 
control. It also includes an upset or entry into an unscheduled or 
uncommanded attitude with high potential for uncontrolled impact with 
terrain. A loss of control means a spin, loss of control authority, 
loss of aerodynamic stability, divergent flight characteristics, or 
similar occurrence, which could generally lead to crash.
    (b) Loss of Flight: Loss of flight means a UA's inability to 
complete its flight as planned, up to and through its originally 
planned landing. It includes scenarios where the UA experiences 
controlled flight into terrain, obstacles, or any other collision, or a 
loss of altitude that is severe or non-reversible. Loss of flight also 
includes deploying a parachute or ballistic recovery system that leads 
to an unplanned landing outside the operator's designated recovery 
zone.

Design and Construction

D&R.100 UA Signal Monitoring and Transmission

    The UA must be designed to monitor and transmit to the AE all 
information required for continued safe flight and operation. This 
information includes, at a minimum, the following:
    (a) Status of all critical parameters for all energy storage 
systems;
    (b) Status of all critical parameters for all propulsion systems;
    (c) Flight and navigation information as appropriate, such as 
airspeed, heading, altitude, and location; and
    (d) Communication and navigation signal strength and quality, 
including contingency information or status.

D&R.105 UAS AE Required for Safe UA Operations

    (a) The applicant must identify and submit to the FAA all AE and 
interface conditions of the UAS that affect the airworthiness of the UA 
or are otherwise necessary for the UA to meet these airworthiness 
criteria. As part of this requirement--
    (1) The applicant may identify either specific AE or minimum 
specifications for the AE.
    (i) If minimum specifications are identified, they must include the 
critical requirements of the AE, including performance, compatibility, 
function, reliability, interface, operator alerting, and environmental 
requirements.
    (ii) Critical requirements are those that if not met would impact 
the ability to operate the UA safely and efficiently.
    (2) The applicant may use an interface control drawing, a 
requirements document, or other reference, titled so that it is clearly 
designated as AE interfaces to the UA.
    (b) The applicant must show the FAA the AE or minimum 
specifications identified in paragraph (a) of this section meet the 
following:
    (1) The AE provide the functionality, performance, reliability, and 
information to assure UA airworthiness in conjunction with the rest of 
the design;
    (2) The AE are compatible with the UA capabilities and interfaces;
    (3) The AE must monitor and transmit to the operator all 
information required for safe flight and operation, including but not 
limited to those identified in D&R.100 and
    (4) The minimum specifications, if identified, are correct, 
complete, consistent, and verifiable to assure UA airworthiness.
    (c) The FAA will establish the approved AE or minimum 
specifications as operating limitations and include them in the UA type 
certificate data sheet and Flight Manual.
    (d) The applicant must develop any maintenance instructions 
necessary to address implications from the AE on the airworthiness of 
the UA. Those instructions will be included in the instructions for 
continued airworthiness (ICA) required by D&R.205.

D&R.110 Software

    To minimize the existence of software errors, the applicant must:
    (a) Verify by test all software that may impact the safe operation 
of the UA;
    (b) Utilize a configuration management system that tracks, 
controls, and preserves changes made to software throughout the entire 
life cycle; and
    (c) Implement a problem reporting system that captures and records 
defects and modifications to the software.

D&R.115 Cybersecurity

    (a) UA equipment, systems, and networks, addressed separately and 
in relation to other systems, must be protected from intentional 
unauthorized electronic interactions that may result in an adverse 
effect on the security or airworthiness of the UA. Protection must be 
ensured by showing that the security risks have been identified, 
assessed, and mitigated as necessary.
    (b) When required by paragraph (a) of this section, procedures and 
instructions to ensure security protections are maintained must be 
included in the ICA.

D&R.120 Contingency Planning

    (a) The UA must be designed so that, in the event of a loss of the 
command and control (C2) link, the UA will automatically and 
immediately execute a safe predetermined flight, loiter, landing, or 
termination.
    (b) The applicant must establish the predetermined action in the 
event of a loss of the C2 link and include it in the UA Flight Manual.
    (c) The UA Flight Manual must include the minimum performance 
requirements for the C2 data link defining when the C2 link is degraded 
to a level where remote active control of the UA is no longer ensured. 
Takeoff when the C2 link is degraded below the minimum link performance 
requirements must be prevented by design or prohibited by an operating 
limitation in the UA Flight Manual.

D&R.125 Lightning

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, the UA 
must have design characteristics that will protect the UA from loss of 
flight or loss of control due to lightning.
    (b) If the UA has not been shown to protect against lightning, the 
UA Flight Manual must include an operating limitation to prohibit 
flight into weather conditions conducive to lightning activity.

D&R.130 Adverse Weather Conditions

    (a) For purposes of this section, ``adverse weather conditions'' 
means rain, snow, and icing.
    (b) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, the UA 
must have design characteristics that will allow the UA to operate 
within the adverse weather conditions specified in the

[[Page 56748]]

CONOPS without loss of flight or loss of control.
    (c) For adverse weather conditions for which the UA is not approved 
to operate, the applicant must develop operating limitations to 
prohibit flight into known adverse weather conditions and either:
    (1) Develop operating limitations to prevent inadvertent flight 
into adverse weather conditions; or
    (2) Provide a means to detect any adverse weather conditions for 
which the UA is not certificated to operate and show the UA's ability 
to avoid or exit those conditions.

D&R.135 Flight Essential Parts

    (a) A flight essential part is a part, the failure of which could 
result in a loss of flight or unrecoverable loss of UA control.
    (b) If the type design includes flight essential parts, the 
applicant must establish a flight essential parts list. The applicant 
must develop and define mandatory maintenance instructions or life 
limits, or a combination of both, to prevent failures of flight 
essential parts. Each of these mandatory actions must be included in 
the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the ICA.

Operating Limitations and Information

D&R.200 Flight Manual

    The applicant must provide a Flight Manual with each UA.
    (a) The UA Flight Manual must contain the following information:
    (1) UA operating limitations;
    (2) UA operating procedures;
    (3) Performance information;
    (4) Loading information; and
    (5) Other information that is necessary for safe operation because 
of design, operating, or handling characteristics.
    (b) Those portions of the UA Flight Manual containing the 
information specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section must be 
approved by the FAA.

D&R.205 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness

    The applicant must prepare ICA for the UA in accordance with 
Appendix A to part 23, as appropriate, that are acceptable to the FAA. 
The ICA may be incomplete at type certification if a program exists to 
ensure their completion prior to delivery of the first UA or issuance 
of a standard airworthiness certificate, whichever occurs later.

Testing

D&R.300 Durability and Reliability

    The UA must be designed to be durable and reliable when operated 
under the limitations prescribed for its operating environment, as 
documented in its CONOPS and included as operating limitations on the 
type certificate data sheet and in the UA Flight Manual. The durability 
and reliability must be demonstrated by flight test in accordance with 
the requirements of this section and completed with no failures that 
result in a loss of flight, loss of control, loss of containment, or 
emergency landing outside the operator's recovery area.
    (a) Once a UA has begun testing to show compliance with this 
section, all flights for that UA must be included in the flight test 
report.
    (b) Tests must include an evaluation of the entire flight envelope 
across all phases of operation and must address, at a minimum, the 
following:
    (1) Flight distances;
    (2) Flight durations;
    (3) Route complexity;
    (4) Weight;
    (5) Center of gravity;
    (6) Density altitude;
    (7) Outside air temperature;
    (8) Airspeed;
    (9) Wind;
    (10) Weather;
    (11) Operation at night, if requested;
    (12) Energy storage system capacity; and
    (13) Aircraft to pilot ratio.
    (c) Tests must include the most adverse combinations of the 
conditions and configurations in paragraph (b) of this section.
    (d) Tests must show a distribution of the different flight profiles 
and routes representative of the type of operations identified in the 
CONOPS.
    (e) Tests must be conducted in conditions consistent with the 
expected environmental conditions identified in the CONOPS, including 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) and high intensity radiated fields 
(HIRF).
    (f) Tests must not require exceptional piloting skill or alertness.
    (g) Any UAS used for testing must be subject to the same worst-case 
ground handling, shipping, and transportation loads as those allowed in 
service.
    (h) Any UA used for testing must use AE that meet, but do not 
exceed, the minimum specifications identified under D&R.105. If 
multiple AE are identified, the applicant must demonstrate each 
configuration.
    (i) Any UAS used for testing must be maintained and operated in 
accordance with the ICA and UA Flight Manual. No maintenance beyond the 
intervals established in the ICA will be allowed to show compliance 
with this section.
    (j) If cargo operations or external-load operations are requested, 
tests must show, throughout the flight envelope and with the cargo or 
external-load at the most critical combinations of weight and center of 
gravity, that--
    (1) The UA is safely controllable and maneuverable; and
    (2) The cargo or external-load is retainable and transportable.

D&R.305 Probable Failures

    The UA must be designed such that a probable failure will not 
result in a loss of containment or control of the UA. This must be 
demonstrated by test.
    (a) Probable failures related to the following equipment, at a 
minimum, must be addressed:
    (1) Propulsion systems;
    (2) C2 link;
    (3) Global Positioning System (GPS);
    (4) Flight control components with a single point of failure;
    (5) Control station; and
    (6) Any other AE identified by the applicant.
    (b) Any UA used for testing must be operated in accordance with the 
UA Flight Manual.
    (c) Each test must occur at the critical phase and mode of flight, 
and at the highest aircraft-to-pilot ratio.

D&R.310 Capabilities and Functions

    (a) All of the following required UAS capabilities and functions 
must be demonstrated by test:
    (1) Capability to regain command and control of the UA after the C2 
link has been lost.
    (2) Capability of the electrical system to power all UA systems and 
payloads.
    (3) Ability for the pilot to safely discontinue the flight.
    (4) Ability for the pilot to dynamically re-route the UA.
    (5) Ability to safely abort a takeoff.
    (6) Ability to safely abort a landing and initiate a go-around.
    (b) The following UAS capabilities and functions, if requested for 
approval, must be demonstrated by test:
    (1) Continued flight after degradation of the propulsion system.
    (2) Geo-fencing that contains the UA within a designated area, in 
all operating conditions.
    (3) Positive transfer of the UA between control stations that 
ensures only one control station can control the UA at a time.
    (4) Capability to release an external cargo load to prevent loss of 
control of the UA.
    (5) Capability to detect and avoid other aircraft and obstacles.
    (c) The UA must be designed to safeguard against inadvertent 
discontinuation of the flight and inadvertent release of cargo or 
external load.

[[Page 56749]]

D&R.315 Fatigue

    The structure of the UA must be shown to withstand the repeated 
loads expected during its service life without failure. A life limit 
for the airframe must be established, demonstrated by test, and 
included in the ICA.

D&R.320 Verification of Limits

    The performance, maneuverability, stability, and control of the UA 
within the flight envelope described in the UA Flight Manual must be 
demonstrated at a minimum of 5% over maximum gross weight with no loss 
of control or loss of flight.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 9, 2022.
Ian Lucas,
Manager, Policy Implementation Section, Policy and Innovation Division, 
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2022-20001 Filed 9-14-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P